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Two Afghan Soldiers Kill 12 Colleagues at Post Outside Kunduz

Source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-afghan-soldiers-kill-12-colleagues-at-post-outside-kunduz-1474995982>

Sep 27 – **Two Afghan soldiers shot and killed 12 colleagues at a post outside of Kunduz before defecting to the Taliban, the Defense Ministry said, in one of the country's deadliest insider attacks this year.**

Both men fled the scene to join the insurgency, according to a provincial police commander. The militant group, which has been fighting to unseat the Afghan government since being ousted from power about



15 years ago, took responsibility for the attack. The ministry said the attack was under investigation.

The northern city last year fell briefly to the Taliban, being the first to come under militant control since 2001.

U.S. and Afghan special forces drove the insurgents from the city within days, but Afghan and foreign officials in the country are increasingly concerned it could be overrun again, as the militants control the city's outskirts and most of Kunduz province.

Security has deteriorated across Afghanistan since most foreign troops pulled out in 2014. Army and police casualties are at a record high in 2016, despite increased U.S. military efforts this year—including airstrikes—to support local forces on the ground.

Still, insider attacks happen sporadically in Afghanistan. In January, a policeman in the country's second-largest city, Kandahar, killed 10 colleagues before joining the Taliban. Two Romanian soldiers were killed by Afghan troops in May.

Such attacks peaked in 2012, when rogue Afghan soldiers killed dozens of coalition troops, severely eroding the trust between them. The incidents prompted Afghan and U.S. military leaders to introduce measures limiting their soldiers' interaction and requiring coalition forces to be armed at all times while on base.

Tuesday's attack came as elite Afghan special operations units arrived in southern Uruzgan province to reinforce beleaguered troops who have for weeks struggled to prevent its capital, Tarin Kot, from falling to the Taliban.

"Heavy fighting is ongoing right now in Tarin Kot," provincial council chief Abdul Karim Khadimzai said. "The Taliban haven't been pushed back, and the city is still under attack." The Taliban had called in backup fighters from neighboring province, he added.

The Defense Ministry said the arrival of senior military officials in the province would keep the city from falling to the militants. "Our forces are pushing the Taliban out of the city," ministry spokesman, General Dawlat Waziri, said.

The U.S. military has in recent weeks stepped up its support of Afghan forces in Uruzgan with airstrikes. An errant strike, however, killed eight Afghan policemen at a checkpoint last week. The interior ministry said it was investigating the incident.



Militants Dressed as Doctors Attack a Kandahar Hospital

Source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/militants-dressed-as-doctors-attack-a-kandahar-hospital-1473699923>

Sep 12 – Two militants dressed as doctors raided a hospital in Kandahar supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross on Monday, killing at least one emergency room patient in an hourlong fire fight, Afghans officials said.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Just a reminder that this approach can be implemented in a Western hospital as well – especially when the term security has only to do with where to park legally inside the hospital and time to leave visiting patients.





Is Terrorism Effective? It doesn't usually achieve its objectives—and the perpetrators know it.

By Philip Giraldi

Source: <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/is-terrorism-effective/>

Sep 21 – There might well be thousands of books on terrorism, which means that it is extremely difficult to imagine something new. But Richard English's [Does Terrorism Work? A History](#), due to be released next month, **differs**



from most discussions of the terror phenomenon.

English is not a former intelligence officer or national-security official, nor a self-styled foreign-policy expert. **He is instead a distinguished historian, born in Northern Ireland and currently a professor at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.** He has written four books on the Irish Republican Army and is very knowledgeable of the history and development of terrorist groups, primarily European ones. He is prone not only to ask questions, but also to try to answer them, having written in 2009 [Terrorism: How to Respond](#).


I found *Does Terrorism Work?* particularly interesting, as my own career as a

counterterrorism officer began in the mid-1970s, when terrorism was still pretty much Western European. I know quite a bit about the groups that English discusses, and I am also intimately familiar with the countermeasures that were employed to combat and eventually defeat them.

English basically accepts the United Nations language on what constitutes terrorism, which is: an action "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act." He observes that the threat of terror is greatly exaggerated for political reasons, and he notes that efforts to confront it through a global crusade like the U.S.-led War on Terror do little other than create more terrorists. He counsels a restrained response.

In coming to those conclusions he is far from alone. But English also shares his historian's insights into how groups develop and are motivated, in part to help readers understand how public policy might respond to the actual threat that these groups constitute. As his title indicates, one of the central questions relating to terrorism—and one that oddly has received little attention—is whether it's effective in achieving what terrorists seek to achieve.

English grades terrorist groups based on whether they achieved their objectives—a



process that Thomas Nagel, [writing in the London Review of Books](#), describes as a "report card." Along the way he makes some assumptions. For example, he posits that terrorist leaders are not as a rule crazy. They are rational players in that they have well-defined political objectives that they seek to attain and that they explicitly lay out in their manifestos. Terror is consequently best seen as a tool in a political process.

English focuses on four terrorist entities—the Irish Republican



Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Akatasuna (ETA), Hamas, and al-Qaeda—though he discusses a number of other groups in passing. Three of his four groups have clearly demonstrated nationalist aspirations; they seek the union of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland (IRA), Basque independence from Spain (ETA), and restoration of Arab-Muslim hegemony in Palestine (Hamas). Al-Qaeda is defined by English as a “religio-political” movement that is transnational, but it too embraces territorial objectives, including removing the United States from the Middle East and overthrowing and replacing most of the “corrupt” Muslim regimes that are universally in power both in the region as well as in the remainder of the Islamic *Ummah*.

The book examines in considerable detail the histories of these groups. It notes that an overwhelming percentage of Irishmen and Basques do not and never have embraced the violent agenda promoted by the IRA and ETA, meaning that any kind of terrorist political ascendancy would never have popular support. And the groups have understood from the get-go that they would never defeat, say, the British Army or the Guardia Civil.

English also observes that the existence of terrorist groups actually hampered the moves toward greater regional autonomy, as terrorism hardened existing government positions and tended to undermine the efforts being made by more moderate reformers. In other words, Basque and Northern Irish autonomy would have come sooner without the distraction provided by the IRA and ETA—and change, when it did come, came in spite of the presence of these hostile armed groups, not because of it.

Al-Qaeda likewise is not particularly popular in the Muslim world and has accomplished little more than empowering the existing Islamic governments to get even tougher with dissidents. Its “victories,” as at 9/11, have been merely tactical and have led to the virtual destruction of the group. Hamas falls into the same trap with its continued support of violence against Israel, actually empowering leaders like Benjamin Netanyahu (who are skillful at using the “threat” to justify increasingly hardline responses) while frustrating any attempts by moderates to establish a viable *modus vivendi* between Jews

and Arabs. Netanyahu might not even exist without Hamas.

One might also mention Hezbollah. The group scored a major tactical success when it blew up the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, but the bombings did not translate into any larger political role until the group became more conventional.

Indeed, the book describes in detail only two terrorist movements that plausibly were driving forces in bringing about real political change.

The first was 1945-47 Palestine, where Jewish terrorists (primarily associated with the Stern Gang, Irgun, and Haganah) eventually compelled the British to hand over the problem to the United Nations, resulting in the creation of the state of Israel. **The second** was the campaign by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) to drive the French out of Algeria from 1954 until 1962. But even in those cases, English plausibly makes the case that the British or French could easily have crushed the terrorists, but were not motivated to make the effort, because both countries were retrenching militarily and politically post-World War II. There was also very little popular support back at home for either war, which means that while terror may have accelerated the timetable for withdrawal, it was not a major factor in bringing it about.

All of which leads English to conclude that terrorism has never “worked”—that it has failed to succeed in achieving its principal objectives in strategic terms—a judgment that I would share based on my own experience. And that point is where the book really becomes interesting, as English goes on to argue that terror is unsuccessful not because it employs violence, but rather because its goals are generally unachievable by any means. Given the dismal record of failure by terrorists, English concludes that terrorists cannot win and must even know that they can never win.

And winning is important. One only has to note how ISIS was flooded with volunteers when it was seen as successful, a process that has been reversed now that it is in decline. The persistent failure of terror actually challenges English’s assumption that its leaders are truly rational players, and it also demands some exploration of what motivates the rank-and-file, as it is hardly logical to pursue a policy that you know will not



succeed and that will eventually lead to your death. Nagel describes terrorist activity as “delusional.” This failure to connect with reality also potentially upends the perception, which I have shared, that all terrorism is at heart political.

English's meticulous examination of documents and personal testimony from various groups reveals that both leaders and followers who are prepared to kill large numbers of innocent civilians do not necessarily expect to be rewarded with victory over government forces or benefit personally from political transformation.

English concludes instead that they are frequently driven by hatred and the desire to get revenge for the suffering and humiliation inflicted on them by what they regard as an illegitimate government, or by foreigners or foreign governments. He cites, among other evidence, a quotation by Osama bin Laden: “Every Muslim, from the moment they realize the distinction in their hearts, hates Americans, hates Jews and hates Christians.”

So is it possible that George W. Bush was right when he said “they hate us for our freedom”?

Well, not exactly, though they certainly do hate us. To be accurate, a lot of the hatred from Islamic terrorist groups is blowback for what we Americans have been doing to Muslims in a tangible and very visible way. If I were a Muslim living in the Middle East or South Asia, it would be very difficult for me to concur with any mainstream-media depiction of the United States as some kind of benevolent hegemon.

English perhaps underappreciates how the brutality and unpredictability of terrorist attacks serve as force multipliers, providing “little victories” and often compelling governments to act contrary to their true interests, even if the eventual result is something less than regime change. And it is certainly possible to disagree with him over the rationality of terrorist leaders in light of his own conclusions. But his observation that terrorism always fails certainly gives one pause in attempts to explain the appeal of quasi-political violent movements that are by nature suicidal. **Perhaps attributing it to hatred and revenge taken together, rather than to any rational process seeking to bring about real change, is as close as we can come to understanding it.**

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.

AQAP Newspaper Says NYC Bomber Rahami Influenced By 'Inspire'

By Anthony Kimery (Editor-in-Chief)

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/aqap-newspaper-says-nyc-bomber-rahami-influenced-by-inspire/0791f25e7955d5f9d4afd8a6d468ee31.html>

Sep 29 – The 24th issue of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) weekly *Al Masra* newspaper featured a report about Ahmad Rahami, who was arrested on suspicion of planting bombs in New York

and New Jersey, stating he was influenced by Al Qaeda, according to the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), which monitors jihadi social media.

Al Masra quoted “news reports,” “sources” and “observers” from US media which “claimed Rahami was inspired by A Qaeda's leaders and the group's anti-US rhetoric,



and that he received operational guidance from AQAP's English-language magazine

Inspire,” MEMRI said. “The report constitutes AQAP’s attempt to take some credit for Rahami’s actions without claiming responsibility for them, as Rahami was not directly affiliated with the group.”

MEMRI also pointed out that, “It should be noted that AQAP ignored Rahami’s mention of recently-killed senior ISIS leader Abu Muhammad Al Adnani.”

“News reports concerning the perpetrator of last week’s Manhattan operation are coming one after the other. Sources are saying Ahamd Khan Rahami was influenced by Sheikh Anwar Al Awlaki, that he praised sheikh Osama bin Laden and that he threatened America because it is killing Muslims in Afghanistan,” AQAP’s *Al Masra* reported, adding, “The media mentioned that the notes written by the young man in his private journal clarified much of the mystery surrounding his tendencies and loyalties.”

“[The journal] displayed notes praising Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and other leaders from the organization such as Al Qaeda cleric Anwar Al Awlaki and Nidal Hasan, the perpetrator of the 2009 Fort Hood operation that killed f 13.

Al Alwaki directly corresponded with Hasan and other since arrested or killed jihadists in the US who’d largely been ignored by Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

Rahami’s “journal also contained attacks on the U.S. ...Observers pointed out that the way the explosion was caused and the manufacturing of the pressure cooker bombs [indicate] it is likely the perpetrator of the attack benefited from [guides] in *Inspire* magazine, which is published by AQAP’s Al Malahim Foundation [the group’s media company] ...,” MEMRI said.

[Homeland Security Today](#) recently reported that in the wake of the bombings in New York and New



Jersey, the pro-Islamic State (ISIS) hacking entity Cyber Kahilafah posted new and potentially more deadly tutorials on building pressure cooker bombs using modified cell phones and Bluetooth devices to detonate the bombs remotely, according to MEMRI.”

US counterterrorism officials told *Homeland Security Today* on background that

they’re taking this potential new threat “very seriously,” as one said. “This shows the growing sophistication of jihadi groups to develop new methods of creating new attack capabilities.”

The officials acknowledged that this represents a “serious new threat.”

Since that report, US and Western counterterrorism officials have told *Homeland Security* “more and more” intelligence “chatter” and jihadi social media websites – including Dark Web sites for jihadi communication – have indicated exploitation of Rahami’s jihad and exhortation of jihadists everywhere to become involved by using the newest pressure bomb techniques.

Indeed. MEMRI reported that, “On September 25, the Al Battar Media Foundation, which is associated with ISIS, published a post by Abu Al Muntasir Al Maghribi, *While Sisters Fight the Jihad War*, which criticized male ISIS supporters who do not take up arms and join the jihad themselves.”

MEMRI said, “The author argues that if the three women who carried out the recent attack on a police station in Mombasa, Kenya rose up and acted despite the fact that the duty of jihad does not apply to them, then men are doubly obligated to do so as well. He called on supporters to follow in the footsteps of the Mombasa women and of the perpetrators of the attacks in Paris, Brussels, Orlando, Nice, Germany and elsewhere.”

“It should be mentioned,” MEMRI stated, “that the Mombasa attack sparked a debate among ISIS supporters and opponents regarding the permissibility of women participating in jihad. ISIS supporters also recently addressed this issue, arguing that women should leave the jihad fighting to men, but that in special cases, such as the Mombasa attack, women can actively participate in the jihad war.”

American woman have been caught in recent years actively supporting jihadists abroad as well as on US soil.





Homegrown terrorists to target **concerts, sporting events**, Homeland Security warns

Source: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/27/homegrown-terrorists-target-concerts-sporting-even/>

Sep 27 – The nation's top counterterrorism official testified Tuesday that the world's army of terrorists is "broader, wider and deeper than any point since 9/11," the day al Qaeda attacked America.

Nicholas Rasmussen, who directs the National Counterterrorism Center, said the Islamic State may be losing ground in Iraq and Syria but its ability to strike abroad, including in the U.S., "has not thus far been significantly diminished."

The nation is facing a phase in which people quickly radicalize and launch simple but deadly attacks before authorities have time to detect them, he said.

His testimony to the Senate Homeland Security Committee conflicts with upbeat reports from the White House, which has focused on territorial losses in Syria and Iraq as signs that the Islamic State is being defeated.

"Even ISIL's leaders know they're going to keep losing," President Obama said in August. "In their message to followers, they're increasingly acknowledging that they may lose Mosul and Raqqa, and ISIL is right ... they will lose them. And we'll keep hitting them and pushing them back and driving them out until they do."

Swiss Vote to Give Their Government More Spying Powers

Source: <http://news.softpedia.com/news/swiss-vote-to-give-their-government-more-spying-powers-508638.shtml>

Yesterday, September 25, Swiss voters decided with a 66.5 percent majority to give their own government more spying powers over their daily lives.

Last year, the country's parliament passed a law that allowed its secret service, FIS (Federal Intelligence Service), more powers to snoop on emails, tap phones, or use hidden cameras and microphones.

Such technologies and investigative procedures are common practice in other countries, but they have been outlawed by the strict Swiss government.

New surveillance law passed in 2015, implementation delayed

The law, which the government argued it was necessary after the devastating Paris ISIS attacks, was contested by privacy groups and the Swiss leftist political parties, which delayed its implementation and forced it into a country-wide referendum that took place this Sunday.

The Swiss population made their voice heard over the weekend and, due to concerns over the ever-increasing threat from terrorist groups, have voted to sacrifice some of their privacy for the sake of security.

Switzerland, next to Germany and the northern Scandinavian countries, has some of the strictest privacy laws in Europe. So much so that it took Google years to get permission to map out the country via its Street View service.

Swiss secret service will need special authorization on a per-case basis

FIS, who handles both internal and external cyber-espionage operations, will need special authorization from a court, the defense ministry, and the cabinet if they are to launch internal surveillance operations.

According to SwissInfo, opponents of this law struggled with winning the older generation on their side, who mostly voted in favor of the new surveillance laws.

The publication also noted the little attention the campaign got in the media, with most of the attention focusing on another topic included in the three-vote referendum, related to a 10 percent boost to the country's old age pension fund.

The population voted against an increase of the pension fund just because it would add an extra strain on the state's budget. The third issue was related to



Switzerland increasing its green economy, which citizens also voted down.

How the Media Covered for Orlando Terrorist Omar Mateen

By Raheem Kassam

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6303/media-covered-for-omar-mateen>

Sep 26 – Seventeen pages of transcripts between the Orlando police and Omar Mateen – the dead Islamic terrorist who killed 49 people at the Pulse nightclub in Florida in June – have now been released.



Despite the drastic attempts by the establishment media to portray Mr. Mateen as a scorned, mentally ill, repressed homosexual, the documents reveal one crucial point: Omar Mateen ranted at the police about America's fight against the Islamic State, mentioning the war and air strikes at least 20 times in total.

There had previously only been summaries of the 17 pages released by the FBI,

which gave media outlets the wiggle room to try and portray Mr. Mateen as something other than an Islamic fundamentalist. He is [specific](#) throughout the conversations, telling police his motive was the death of Abu Wahib, and Islamic State commander killed by U.S. backed forces in May.

But the establishment media went to significant lengths to cover for Mr. Mateen and his motives:

1. [Washington Post](#): 'He was not a stable person': Orlando shooter showed signs of emotional trouble (June 12)

The *Washington Post*, increasingly recognised for its spin rather than news coverage, reported that "Mateen claimed allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi... no evidence had emerged by late Sunday pointing to actual ties to terrorist groups or a significant association with jihadist causes." They describe Mateen as having a "blemish free record" and underscored their point with a quote from U.S. President Barack Obama who said: "We have reached no definitive conclusions."

2. [Associated Press](#): Orlando Shooter's Imam Blames Mental Illness: 'This Has Nothing to Do with ISIS'

It's not terrible that wire agencies like AP report the words of Mateen's imam. But let's have some context maybe. Is it likely the imam was going to blame radical Islam? Is he a credible or reliable source? The answer of course is no, but AP doesn't provide any context such as a similar denial by the Tablighi Jamaat mosque representatives during the San Bernardino shooting. The American public deserves to know these religious leaders' first job is to protect Islam, not be reliable news sources.

3. [BBC](#) (and the rest): Seddique Mateen said his son became "very angry" after seeing two men kissing

While evidently an attack on an LGBT nightclub, Mateen doesn't mention his target once in his very frank exchange with the police in the transcript. If the two men kissing in downtown Miami was really his motive, why did he rant about Syria and Abu Wahib?

His ex-wife said he had strong views on homosexuality, which may have been true and may have served as a rationale for him picking the Pulse nightclub to target. But what is deeply obvious from this transcript is that he was a man hell bent on revenge – deranged by it, even – for the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq against Islamic State targets.



4. POLITICO: It was gay revenge, not terrorism

Politico so badly wanted this to be a "revenge" attack on a lover, rather than Islamic terrorism, they relied on a dubious Univision [interview](#) with a man named "Miguel" who claimed to be Mateen's lover. But this was even after the FBI already [declared](#) none of its investigations had found any evidence of a secret, gay, double life from Mateen. Instead, as one gay dating website spokesman put it, it looks to have been a "hoax" – and one that the media went for, hook, line, and sinker. Why? Because "Islamic terrorism" was a conclusion they never wanted to have to reach.

5. Guardian: CIA has not found any link between Orlando killer and Isis, says agency chief

Except that's not really what CIA director John Brennan said. What he was talking about was a "direct" (that's the quote) link between Mateen and ISIS operatives. Which is to say he was not communicating with someone in Syria who was directing him. But who thought he was? Maybe the Guardian did, but as we know a lot of these ISIS operatives and cells are "inspired" rather than instructed. Instead, their instructions emanate from magazines, videos, and social media. But this headline was clearly too good to pass up for the *Guardian*.

Like U.S. President Obama, the media was unwilling to follow the obvious links, and ones that are now so glaringly obvious given the transcript details. No doubt many of these outlets will now fall back on his claim that Mateen was simply using ISIS as a cover-up for his repressed homosexuality. Demonising gay people is easier than attributing blame to Muslim terrorists.

Raheem Kassam is a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum and editor-in-chief of Breitbart London.

Obama: Why I won't say 'Islamic terrorism'

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/28/politics/obama-radical-islamic-terrorism-cnn-town-hall/index.html>

Sep 29 – President Barack Obama has taken a lot of criticism from political opponents over his rhetoric when it comes to terrorism. But on Wednesday at a CNN presidential town hall, he was asked to defend why he refuses to say "Islamic" terrorism to a Gold Star mother.

"My son gave his life for acts of terrorism," audience member Tina Houchins told Obama at the town hall moderated by CNN's Jake Tapper. "Do you still believe that the acts of terrorism are done for the self-proclaimed Islamic religious motive? And if you do, why do you still refuse to use the term ... Islamic terrorist?"

Obama called it a "sort of manufactured" issue.

"There is no doubt, and I've said repeatedly, where we like al Qaeda or ISIL -- They have perverted and the mantle of Islam for an excuse for basically said.


"These are people who've killed children, killed there's no religious rationale that would justify in that they do," he said. "But what I have when I describe these issues is to make not lump these murderers into the billion exist around the world, including in this are peaceful, who are responsible, who, are fellow troops and police officers and and teachers and neighbors and friends."

The President compared using the term to if a Christian were a murderer but claiming their religion in their actions.

"If you had an organization that was going around killing and blowing people up and said, 'We're on the

see terrorist organizations distorted and tried to claim barbarism and death," he

Muslims, take sex slaves, any way any of the things been careful about sure that we do Muslims that country, who in this country, fire fighters



vanguard of Christianity.' As a Christian, I'm not going to let them claim my religion and say, 'you're killing for Christ.' I would say, that's ridiculous," Obama said.

"That's not what my religion stands for. Call these folks what they are, which is killers and terrorists," he added.

At one point, Obama said that the danger of using the term is when "a president or people aspiring to become president get loose with this language."

Tapper interjected: "You were clearly talking about the Republican nominee Donald Trump just then --"

"No, I wasn't," Obama said. "It's not unique to the Republican nominee. Look, I'm trying to be careful, we're on a military base, I don't insert partisan politics into this. I think that there have been a number of public figures where you start hearing commentary that is dangerous. Because what it starts doing is it starts dividing us up as Americans."

After the Orlando shootings in June, Trump used the term "radical Islamic terrorism" to describe the motives. It became a topic of the election after he publicly criticized Obama and Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton for not using the term.

From the Taliban Frying Pan to the Islamic State Fire

Source: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/28/taliban-frying-pan-islamic-state-fire>

Sep 29 – Gales of laughter greeted my question: "So, which is worse, ISIS or the Taliban?"

I was speaking to a room full of women who had recently fled areas in Afghanistan's eastern Nangarhar province controlled by groups claiming allegiance to the Islamic State. But they didn't laugh for long. "ISIS is worse," one said. "They kill boys, girls, women, men — everyone."

The life these women described in Islamic State-controlled areas of Nangarhar was so



bad they sounded almost nostalgic for those earlier years spent under the Taliban's thumb. While the Taliban's abuses were extreme — and deeply resented — the Islamic State has brought a whole new level of suffering to villagers already expert at ranking hurt during Afghanistan's 38 years of conflict. Rumors of the Islamic State's presence in Afghanistan first began to surface in 2014, and initially appeared exaggerated. In early 2015, however, the Islamic State announced plans to expand into what it calls "Khorasan," an area


that includes regions of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As of mid-2016, the Islamic State's efforts to establish itself in other parts of Afghanistan have in large part failed, but the group now controls significant portions of four districts of Nangarhar province, which borders Pakistan.

When the Islamic State first popped up in Afghanistan, its fighters formed an uneasy alliance with the Taliban, based on a shared opposition to the U.S.-backed government of President Ashraf Ghani. Some Islamic State recruits were defectors from the Taliban, still bound by the complex webs of kinship and rivalry that see some Afghan families with one foot in the government and one in the insurgency. The relationship quickly soured, however; the Taliban came to see the Islamic State as a threat, and increasingly

violent clashes erupted between the two groups.

The Taliban and Islamic State have fundamentally different objectives. The Taliban consistently articulates goals that solely pertain to its quest to regain control of Afghanistan. As the group's leader wrote on Sept. 9, 2016:

"[O]ur country has been invaded and an anti-Islamic, subservient and surrogate regime has been imposed on us by dent [sic] of tanks, artilleries and bomber aircrafts against the wishes of our religion and independence-loving and



independent thought-loving people. An Islamic system and independence of our country is our human and religious right.”

This is in sharp contrast to the global ambitions of the Islamic State, which announced the establishment of its own, global caliphate and called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to its leader. As Borhan Osman, an Afghan analyst, observed, the Taliban has welcomed foreign militants on the condition that they obey the Taliban on Afghan soil, but Islamic State “is an organisation claiming jihadist supremacy over all militant groups in the world, and would be very unlikely to listen to the Taliban.”

It is somewhat unclear how Nangarhar fits into the Islamic State’s goals of global domination. In interviews, villagers who have encountered Islamic State fighters said that they described a plan to overthrow Afghanistan’s government and rename the country Khorasan. Others suggested that the Islamic State sees Afghanistan as a platform for launching operations in Central Asia, and pointed to the presence of fighters from Central Asia among the group’s ranks in Nangarhar.

Women from the Islamic State-controlled areas of the province said their families had refused to budge from their villages through years of intermittent fighting between the Taliban and the government, and had clung on despite Taliban threats and abuses, only to be dislodged by the Islamic State. “We came to Jalalabad two months ago,” said Mariam, a 45-year-old mother of 10 whose name has been changed to protect her safety, referring to the provincial capital. “My children are students but [the Islamic State doesn’t] let them go to school. The school closed three months ago. They left letters threatening the school and also bombs.” Mariam said that the Islamic State left night letters telling parents not to send any children to school and ordering villagers to stop going to the mosque to pray. “Then they put a bomb and blasted it [near the school early one morning],” she said. “The people of the village found the bomb and called the police.” Before the police arrived, however, the bomb exploded, she said, fortunately without injuries.

Afghans who have lived under the Islamic State described frequent violence: shootings, beheadings, and bombings. The group has sometimes targeted people associated with the

government; other violence is seemingly random. “My sister’s 18-year-old son was beheaded,” an elderly man told me. “People said he was a spy. He was just a farmer.”

“They killed one or two people daily in our village,” one woman said. “Mostly people working for the government.” There were reports of men, women, and children being abducted. A few were ransomed; most were never heard from again.

Daily life all but stopped. “ISIS made women sit in the home,” one woman said. “If you go out they will kidnap you. No one could go out, not even to the nearest shop.” Another said that in her village the mullah even stopped leading prayers at the mosque out of fear.

The Islamic State forces villagers to work for them. “We cooked for ISIS, we were forced to — then they wouldn’t harm us,” one woman said. They described schools sitting empty. Teachers were threatened into staying home, or faced with demands they “donate” their salaries to the Islamic State. At first some parents still sent their children to class, but the situation worsened until there was effectively no school to attend.

Before the Islamic State, schools faced different threats. “The Taliban only had problems with girls,” one woman said. “Girls’ schools were open, but only up to eighth grade.” The Taliban had emerged in her village five or six years earlier and tried to close all girls’ schools, but the community managed to resist and keep some open, she said. A woman from another village described an acid attack by the Taliban there that injured seven or eight girls as they walked to school, prompting many girls — including her daughter — to drop out.

In Jalalabad, which remains under the control of the Afghan government, in spite of worsening security the women are able to educate their children. The government’s department of education has been flexible about allowing parents to register their children in a new school even if they lack the official transfer letter normally required. “They know the situation,” one mother said. “The school was closed but we had the principal or teacher sign a paper. They just wrote on simple paper, and the department of education accepted it.”

Access to education is one bright spot in their otherwise miserable ordeal for people torn away from



their homes, jobs, and land they struggle to survive in an expensive city. “We are happy our daughters go to school here,” one mother said. “I want my daughter to graduate from university and become a doctor.”

Their future is uncertain. When we spoke at the end of July, the Afghan and U.S. militaries were fighting to try to clear the Islamic State from parts of Nangarhar. The United States said it killed up to 300 Islamic State fighters in the operation. Media reports from

late September, however, suggested that Islamic State fighters were retaking territory.


For displaced parents, being able to educate their children may be a strong push not to go home. “If the situation remains bad in our village, we will not leave Jalalabad,” one woman said. “We like it here because our girls can continue school easily. We are trying to find a job here. We will continue their school. We will never stop. We want our children to get more education.”

French schoolboy faces terrorism charges as concern grows youths are being targeted via encrypted messaging

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/01/french-schoolboy-faces-terrorism-charges-as-concern-grows-youths/>

Oct 01 – **A 15-year-old schoolboy** is the latest French teenager to face terrorism charges amid mounting fears that jihadists are systematically targeting minors through encrypted online messaging services.

The boy was arrested at his family home in the Paris suburb of Domont after investigators found encrypted messages he exchanged with Rachid Kassim, a notorious French recruiter for the Islamic State group, via the Telegram service.



Telegram is a [smartphone app favoured by extremists](#) because of its impenetrable encryption. The French intelligence chief, Patrick Calvar, has described it as “the main network used by terrorists”.

France and Germany want the EU to force messaging services such as Telegram and WhatsApp to provide unencrypted records for national security services.

However, the Russian internet guru, Pavel Durov, who founded Telegram with his brother Nikolai, has insisted that not even he has the power to intercept users’ private chats.

After the massacre of 130 people in Paris last

November, Telegram blocked dozens of its public ‘channels’, or message groups, because they were being used to spread jihadist propaganda.

However, to gain access to private messages, intelligence agents have to go through the time-consuming process of posing as extremists.

The charging of the 15-year-old is likely to intensify pressure for stricter regulation of messaging services after a string of atrocities carried out by attackers believed to have been recruited online.

“There was a suspicion that the schoolboy was about to attempt an attack,” a source close to the investigation said. “Under questioning, he claimed to have abandoned his plan.”

Nevertheless, he was placed under formal investigation — a stage in the French legal process equivalent to being charged — on Friday night, two days after being taken into custody.

More than 10 teenagers have been detained in the past few weeks after falling under the online influence of Kassim, 29, a former child carer believed to be in Syria.

He allegedly used Telegram and similar services to mastermind the murder of a Normandy priest whose throat was slit by a 19-year-old in July, and the killing of a policeman and his partner at their home in a Paris suburb in June.

According to a legal source, the 15-year-old was “highly present on Telegram and ran two channels on the service putting out jihadist propaganda”.



A 29-year-old Frenchman convicted of using Telegram to try to incite a psychologically-disturbed youth to carry out an attack was given a two-year prison term on Friday, with a further two years suspended. The court rejected his claim that he was “joking”.

The Islamic State group has often claimed atrocities on Telegram, including those in Paris and Nice, where 86 people were killed in a lorry attack in July.

Congress overrides Obama's veto of law allowing 9/11 families to sue Saudi Arabia

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160929-congress-overrides-obamas-veto-of-law-allowing-9-11-families-to-sue-saudi-arabia>

Sep 29 – The Congress on Wednesday voted overwhelmingly to override President Barack Obama's veto of a bill which would allow families of 9/11 to sue Saudi Arabia, seeking damages for the 9/11 attacks. The Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the president's veto, and **the House voted 348 to 77** to do so. This is the first time Congress has successfully overruled a veto during Obama's tenure.

ISIS's imminent defeat will create “terrorist diaspora sometime in the next **two to five** years”: Comey

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160929-isis-imminent-defeat-will-create-terrorist-diaspora-sometime-in-the-next-two-to-five-years-comey>

Sep 29 – FBI director James Comey on Tuesday warned that the increasing success of the military campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq carries an ominous downside: a wave of terrorist fighters who will spread across the globe as the group loses control of its territory on the ground. “They will not all die on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. There will be a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next two to five years like we've never seen before.”

Europe facing “generation-long struggle” with returning battle-hardened jihadists

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160930-europe-facing-generationlong-struggle-with-returning-battlehardened-jihadists>

Sep 30 – Rob Wainwright, director of the European Union's police agency Europol, told the *Wall Street Journal* that Europe faces a generation-long struggle to deal with thousands of battle-hardened Islamic jihadists returning as the ISIS caliphate starts to collapse.

Military experts say that the cumulative effects of the relentless military campaign by the U.S.-led coalition would finish off the so-called caliphate by the end of 2017 at the latest, if not sooner.

The coalition's military campaign has so far killed between 45,000 and 50,000 ISIS fighters, many of them foreigners, but an estimated 3,000 European fighters are still fighting in ISIS ranks. European security officials believe that the imminent fall of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, would signal the

beginning of the end of the caliphate, resulting in many of the European ISIS fighters returning to their home countries.

The Telegraph reports that around 850 Britons are thought to have gone to fight in Syria or Iraq. Many of them have been killed, but about 400 are still in the Middle East.

“I think it will be a generation-long struggle that we face to absorb the return of thousands of foreign fighters, particularly to Western Europe,” Wainwright said.

He said their exposure to extreme violence “on top of their radicalized state makes them highly dangerous individuals.”

ISIS has lost more than half of its territory in Iraq, and about a quarter of its territory in Syria.



and Iraqi and Kurdish forces are closing in on Mosul and Raqqa, respectively.

The Telegraph says that the British government is in talks with its allies over how to bring to justice British fighters expected to be captured during fighting in the coming months.

Michael Fallon, the U.K. defense secretary, said last week: "Partners in the coalition are very clear that their nationals who have gone out to fight and been involved in the most barbaric of crimes should not be allowed to slip through the net without facing justice. We will be reviewing how we each attempt to prosecute our own fighters."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: (Written so many times): If you know the numbers, you know the persons; if you now the persons you know their IDs; if you know their IDs lock them outside the country. If you do not know the numbers but make estimates then there is something fishy in the story and what is hidden behind.

Addressing Radical Ideologies and Violent Extremism: The Role of Research

By Prof Gilles Kepel and Prof Bernard Rougier

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2016/addressing_extremism/index.cfm

Sep 26 – To mark the completion of a policy review on "Addressing Terrorism: European Research in social sciences and the humanities in support to policies for inclusion and security" and in the context of recent ideology-based movements in Europe, The European Commission organised a conference on



"Addressing Radical Ideologies and Violent Extremism: The Role of Research" on 26 September 2016 in Brussels.

The Policy Review takes stock of the available scientific knowledge, including from ten EU funded projects, on the new emerging forms of violent radicalisation and terrorism. It also proposes concrete areas of research needed to further increase this knowledge.

✱ [Read the Policy Review](#)

The policy review was presented and discussed at the conference. Past and current research stemming from EU funded projects - including on identities, personal belonging, youth, cities, and ideologies that erode social cohesion – was debated from a policy perspective. Special emphasis was given to identifying knowledge gaps and research needs in these areas at European level.

A Conference Report summarising the discussions and conclusions will be published soon.

Gilles Kepel is Professor at Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (Ecole Normale Supérieure) and Sciences Po

Bernard Rougier is Professor of Arab and Oriental Studies at Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris

PST: Every fifth extremist in Norway is a Muslim convert

Source: <https://www.thelocal.no/20160915/every-fifth-extremist-in-norway-is-a-muslim-convert-pst>

Sep 15 – A new report from the Norwegian Police Security Service (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste - PST) has found that **nearly every fifth radicalized Muslim is a convert to the religion.**

The PST study attempted to investigate the backgrounds of people in extreme Islamist groups. Everyone in the representative sample study by



the security service had been radicalized in Norway and all were under the age of 40.

A full 88 percent of the radicalized individuals have an ethnic background other than Norwegian and over 30 different nationalities are represented amongst the radicalized individuals. Some 76 percent of the extremists have Norwegian citizenship.

The vast majority, 88 percent, are men and 68 percent of those men have been either suspected, charged or convicted of a crime before they became radicalized.

"This is rather unique and something that only a security service with have full access could have made such an in-depth study," PST chief Benedicte Bjørnland told TV2.

Converts over-represented

"The study confirms the pre-existing understanding of extreme Islamism in Norway as a multiethnic phenomenon, characterized by young men with low education, high crime rates and a loose attachment to the labour market," PST wrote in the introduction to the report.

Converts to Islam represent 18 percent of the overall sample of extremists.

"We can see that ethnic Norwegian converts are over-represented and when we look at the profile of these people, we see the same

vulnerability factors. Poor labor market attachment, poor school achievement and a low rate of high school completion, substance abuse and criminality have obviously made these people vulnerable to radicalization," Bjørnland said.

The war in Syria

The PST study revealed that 73 percent of those included in the survey were radicalized after the conflict in Syria broke out. A full 61 percent immigrated to Norway when they were children or young teens and 17.5 percent have lost one or both of their parents before coming of age.

The survey also shows that Pakistanis and Somalis are underrepresented amongst extremists in relation to how many people with those nationalities are living in Norway.

According to PST, the investigation into the background of radical Islamists has revealed clear factors that can be monitored to head off possible threats.

"This will likely contribute to making it easier for us as a security service to keep track of potential individual threats, primarily individuals with criminal records, school dropouts and people with substance abuse issues and only sporadic participation in the labour market," PST wrote.

Norway files terror recruitment charges for first time

Source: <https://www.thelocal.no/20160920/norway-files-terror-recruitment-charges-for-first-time>

Sep 20 – **Ubaydullah Hussain, an Islamist who has had numerous run-ins with the law, on Monday became the first person in Norway to be officially charged with recruiting terrorists.**

The 31-year-old is believed to have helped advise would-be terrorists, purchase equipment on their behalf and distribute contact information for members of the Islamic State.

"He denies his guilt," Hussain's lawyer, John Christian Elden, said.

According to the indictment in his case, Hussain helped five specific individuals make connections to terrorists and recruited at least two converts to the Islamists' cause.

Hussain is also charged with making travel arrangements for people who either successfully joined or attempted to join Isis in Syria.



Counselling

Hussain's role allegedly entailed advice on the itinerary, the procurement of proper equipment and the full or partial purchase of travel tickets, as well as the passing on of contact information for Isis-associated individuals.



Hussain is accused of having communicated with Isis personnel to ensure that the travellers were picked up and transported across the border from Turkey to Isis-controlled areas in Syria.

One of the converts allegedly assisted by Hussain was a 19-year-old who was arrested in Sweden last year. The other, a 24 year old from Halden, was killed in the Syrian border town of Kobani in 2015. Both the recruitment and support of Norwegian Isis fighters is punishable under section 147d of Norway's penal code.

Hussain has been detained since December 10th of last year and his trial is scheduled to officially get underway in Oslo District Court on November 3rd. The court has set aside six weeks for the case.

In February 2014, Hussain was sentenced to 120 days in jail for making threats. He was charged with inciting terrorism and praising acts of terrorism for posting a photo of convicted terrorists on his Facebook page in 2013, but was acquitted by the Oslo District Court.

When the Court of Appeal dealt with the appeal in early summer last year, he was again acquitted of inciting terrorism, but the threat verdict was upheld.

ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is seriously ill after assassin POISONS his food

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3819325/ISIS-leader-seriously-ill-assassin-POISONS-food.html>

Oct 03 – ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is reportedly seriously ill after having his food poisoned by an assassin.

Meals prepared for the ISIS leader and three other commanders of the terrorist organisation were allegedly poisoned in the Be'aaj district, southwest of Nineveh.

A source told Iraqi news agency WAA the four are suffering from 'severe poisoning' and 'have been transferred to an unknown location under strict measures.'

The terror group have reportedly launched a campaign of arrests to track down those responsible.



Baghdadi is credited with transforming the breakaway al-Qaeda group turning it into the independent ISIS group that is arguably the most powerful and wealthiest jihadist organisation in the world.

Under his leadership, the group spearheaded a militant offensive that expanded into Syria in 2013 and which later overran much of Iraq's Sunni Arab heartland.

Baghdadi has reportedly been wounded multiple times.

Earlier this year there were reports he had been killed by

US-led coalition air strikes, but they turned out to be inaccurate.

Baghdadi - whose real name is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim - is thought to have been born in Samarra, north of Baghdad, in 1971.

Reports suggest he was a cleric in a mosque in the city around the time of the US-led invasion in 2003.

Some believe he was already a militant jihadist during the rule of Saddam Hussein.

Others believe he was radicalised during the four years he was held at Camp Bucca, a US facility in southern Iraq where many al-Qaeda commanders were detained.

In October 2011, the US officially designated Baghdadi as 'terrorist' and offered a \$10million reward for information leading to his capture or death.

Under Baghdadi's leadership ISIS thugs have shocked the world with their sadistic and savage murder of thousands of people in the Middle East and Europe.

He prefers to shun the spotlight for an aura of mystery that adds to his appeal, in direct contrast to the likes of Osama bin Laden, who regularly appeared in videos sprouting hate messages and was internationally known long before 9/11.

As well as the uncertainty surrounding his true identity, his whereabouts are also unclear.

Although there were reports he was in Raqqa in Syria - the ISIS stronghold - those reports are unconfirmed.



News of his poisoning comes as Iraqi media claimed 16 jihadis - including senior ISIS leaders - were killed when a malfunction caused an explosive belt to explode.

It detonated during a high-level meeting in Hawija, between Mosul and Baghdad, it was reported.

Al-Sumaria Iraqi media outlet reported: 'A number of the ISIS members were wearing explosive belts during the meeting, and the explosion took place due to a defect in one of them.'

'The meeting was held to prepare for an attack on the positions of the security forces in Hamrin Mountains, al-Zawiya area and Ajil area in Salahuddin Province.'

The Islamic State's prolific 'martyrdom' machine

By Thomas Joscelyn

Source: <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/the-islamic-states-prolific-martyrdom-machine.php>

June 08 – The Islamic State claims to have executed 489 “martyrdom operations” in Iraq, Syria and Libya during the first five months of 2016. The figure comes from monthly data published by Amaq News Agency, a propaganda arm of the so-called caliphate that releases infographics summarizing the group's suicide attacks.



Amaq's most recent infographic (seen on the right) indicates that the jihadists executed 119 “martyrdom operations” in the month of May alone. If Amaq's figures are accurate, then the Islamic State is launching suicide attacks at a historically high rate.

Earlier this month, for example, the State Department [reported](#) that there were 726 “suicide attacks” executed by all perpetrators around the globe in 2015. Therefore, all terrorist groups, including the Islamic State, carried out an average of 61 suicide bombings per month in 2015. The Islamic State nearly doubled that rate in May and has exceeded it by more than 20 attacks each month this year, according to Amaq's infographics.

The data referenced by Foggy Bottom are compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), which maintains an “unclassified event database compiled from information in open-source reports of terrorist attacks.”

According to START's data, 2015 witnessed a record number of suicide bombings. But 2016 is currently on pace to eclipse that high-water mark.

While Amaq's claims are difficult to independently verify, the statistics are reasonable given the scale of the Islamic State's fighting. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's men routinely [claim credit](#) for simultaneous suicide bombings. The organization is taking on multiple adversaries in every country where it operates, making the use of suicide bombings (one of the jihadists' most effective tactics) an especially important tool. For instance, the State Department [noted](#) that “[o]n average, suicide attacks in 2015 were 4.6 times as lethal as non-suicide attacks.”

A recent video from Al Hayat, another one of the Islamic State's mouthpieces, trumpeted this “caliphate vs. the world” mentality. In “The Religion of Kufr Is One,” Al Hayat made it clear that Baghdadi's enterprise is at war with virtually everyone else. The subtitle of the video, “The Islamic State and its methodology dealing with all apostate parties and nations of disbelief,” underscored the degree to which this is the group's deliberate strategy.

The Islamic State's prolific use of “martyrs” probably highlights both its strength and weakness. On the one hand, there are likely more people, predominately young men, willing to die for the jihadists' cause today than ever. (It should also be noted that adolescents and even children have been used in suicide attacks.) On the other hand, most of the organization's suicide attackers are being dispatched in areas where the “caliphate” is being challenged, including locations that were once under its control.



The Long War Journal assesses that Islamic State is being forced to deploy many of its “martyrs” because its territorial claims are being rolled back in Iraq, Syria and even Libya.

The Long War Journal has tallied the figures provided on Amaq’s infographics from January through May of 2016. The English-language versions of these infographics can be seen below.

The following observations have been culled from Amaq’s statistics.

Most of the Islamic State’s “martyrdom operations,” 303 of the 489 claimed (62 percent), have been carried out inside Iraq. Approximately half of these (152 of 303) have been launched in Anbar province, where the jihadists are engaged in fierce battles with Iraqi government forces and Iranian-backed Shiite militias for months. Salahuddin (52 suicide attacks), Nineveh (40), Baghdad (32), and Kirkuk (17) are the next most frequently targeted areas.

The Islamic State launched 175 suicide attacks in Syria (36 percent of the total) during the first five months of the year. Aleppo province (59) was hit most frequently, followed by Hasakah (33), Deir Ezzor (25), Homs (20) and Raqqa (14) provinces. Raqqa is, of course, the *de facto* capital of the Islamic State. Amaq’s data indicate that 12 of the 14 suicide attacks there this year were carried out in February.

The remaining 11 “martyrdom operations” took place in Libya. Interestingly, Amaq claimed only one suicide attack in Libya from January through April. But the infographic for May shows 10 such bombings. Nine of the 10 have been executed in and

around Sirte, the group’s central base of operations in Libya. The Islamic State’s presence in Sirte has been under assault from multiple directions for weeks, with the jihadists losing their grip on some of the neighboring towns and key facilities. Thus, the group is likely attempting to stymie its rivals’ advances with the deployment of its suicide bombers.

Iraqi forces are the most frequent target of the Islamic State’s “martyrdom operations,” as they were hit 279 times from January through May. Bashar al Assad’s regime is the second most frequent target, with the Islamic State’s suicide bombers striking the Syrian government’s forces on 89 occasions. The remaining bombings struck “Kurdish units” (54), the “Syrian opposition” (31 times), the Peshmerga (25), Fajr Libya (10) and General Khalifa Haftar’s fighters in Libya (1).

Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) are used more often than individual bombers strapped with explosives, according to Amaq. The infographics count 301

Martyrdom Operations in Iraq, Syria, and Libya


February 2016



Martyrdom Operations

90

Carried out by Fighters of
the Islamic State



VBIEDs used in suicide attacks (62 percent of the total) as compared to 184 bombings using explosive belts, jackets and vests. The remaining four are listed as “dual operations.” Assuming Amaq’s data are accurate, then the Islamic State’s “martyrdom” machine is setting a record pace for suicide operations.



► Study the infographics at source’s URL.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

ISIS regards battle for Dabiq as an apocalyptic showdown of Muslim and Christian armies

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161003-isis-regards-battle-for-dabiq-as-an-apocalyptic-showdown-of-muslim-and-christian-armies>

Oct 03 – **This may not be the end of the ISIS caliphate – which military experts say will occur sometime during the second half of 2017 – but the Islamist organization views the coming battle for the town of Dabiq in apocalyptic terms nonetheless.**



U.S.-backed Syrian opposition forces and Turkish military units are within forty-eight hours of reaching the ISIS-controlled Dabiq, which jihadists regard as the preordained site of the final apocalyptic battle between Muslims and Christians.

Business Insider notes that Prophet Muhammad foretold 1,400 years ago “the last hour will not come” until an Islamic army defeated “the Romans” there. ISIS view the Americans and their regional supporters as the Romans.

Dabiq, located northeast of Aleppo near the Turkish border, has no strategic value, but the Islamists are likely to defend it as long as they can because of its theological value. In the past few weeks the organization has sent several hundred of its most experienced fighters to defend the town, which came under its control in 2014.

Some 300 U.S. Special Forces are providing support to Free Syrian Army fighters, who have been steadily pushing south to remove ISIS fighters from areas along the Turkish border.

Brett McGurk, Washington’s special envoy for the U.S.-led coalition, Tweeted on Monday that “The coalition actively supporting the rebels as they advance to within a few kilometers of (its) weakening stronghold” of Dabiq.

U.S. commanders say that taking Dabiq would be a blow to ISIS morale, especially as the groups will soon lose Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria – the two largest cities held by the Islamists.

ISIS emphasized the theological significance of Dabiq, even naming one of its two main English-language propaganda magazines after the town.



“The spark has been lit in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify — by Allah’s permission — until it burns the Crusader armies in Dabiq,” Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of Isis’s founders, said in a 2015 issue of the magazine.

Military analysts say, however, that the coming loss in Dabiq is not likely to dent the group’s resolve.

“If they lose the battle, I’m sure they’ll fold it into their narrative of ‘in God’s good time’, said Kyle Orton of the Henry Jackson Society think-tank. “The idea is that there is much suffering and many setbacks needed before the promised land.”

Women’s emergence as terrorists in France points to shift in ISIS gender roles

Source: <http://www.todayonline.com/world/europe/womens-emergence-terrorists-france-points-shift-isis-gender-roles>

Oct 04 – There was the parked car stuffed with gas canisters near the Notre Dame Cathedral, a possible effort to set off an explosion in the heart of Paris. There was the suspected plot to attack a train station in the Paris area. There was the effort by one of the Islamic State’s most prominent propagandists to recruit two young people in Nice, where an attacker had killed 86 people in July by running them down in a truck.

In France, where terrorist threats have become distressingly commonplace, these three episodes, all in the last month, stood out for one reason in particular: Radicalised women were at the heart of each.

It is not clear whether the phenomenon is a blip or the beginning of a trend in which women play a more active role in plotting and carrying out attacks on the West.

Security officials say they are concerned, and they are seeking to understand whether women are beginning to step up because so many men are under surveillance or in detention, or whether recruiters from terror groups are urging women on, in part, as a way to shame more men into taking action. They also wonder if it is part of a strategy to make Europeans feel that they should fear men and women alike.

Whatever the reasons, authorities take it as a given that women are now part of the Islamic State’s European strategy, said Mr Francois Molins, the Paris prosecutor who is in charge of terrorism investigations nationwide.

“The terrorist organisation not only uses men but also women, young women, who meet and develop their projects virtually,” he said.

Interviews with sociologists, lawyers, a Muslim chaplain and security experts suggest that the

female extremists now drawing the attention of French law enforcement are different in several respects from earlier generations of women who joined or were attracted to Islamist groups. Those being apprehended now are often younger and blur traditional gender roles between male and female Islamic extremists. They are more willing to take action themselves rather than to remain behind the scenes, in contrast to the women who have been leaving Western Europe for Syria to become wives of Islamic State fighters and bear their children.

Today’s female, European jihadis are also far from the Muslim extremist women from Chechnya and Iraq who became suicide bombers, almost always under the instruction and careful monitoring of male extremists. They are also far from earlier generations of non-Muslim radical women, such as those in the Red Brigades who embraced violence but often also had feminist ideals.

Professor Farhad Khosrokhavar, a sociologist at the cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, said adolescent and post-adolescent boys and girls were increasingly involved in jihad in Europe. “And then we have a second category, which is women,” he said.

While the extremist women operating today in France typically proclaim loyalty to the Islamic State and have been in touch with people affiliated with the group, they appear to be acting with guidance and encouragement only from afar, from men either in Syria or in Europe.

Yet there are also continuing signs of the ways in which the male-dominated nature of Islamic



jihadi culture defines the relationships between male and female extremists. Recruiters encourage online betrothals, and one of the women who were recently detained in the case of the train station attack had been engaged online to two different extremists, each of whom was killed in carrying out gruesome attacks in France, Mr Molins said.

These somewhat contradictory elements suggest that the threat is coming from a more independent, feminist type of jihadi, who sees herself as acting similarly to a man, but at the same time, some in this category of women also appear to be acting on instructions from male counterparts in the Islamic State. In both cases, there is the possibility, experts say, that the Islamic State and other groups are using women to goad men into staging attacks.

Recent comments made by Rachid Kassim, a Frenchman who joined the Islamic State and is now suspected of being one of its leading propagandists, suggest this kind of strategy might be at play.

"Women, sisters are going on the attack," he wrote on the Telegram messaging application last month, after the gas canister plot was thwarted, according to the newspaper Le Monde. "Where are the brothers?" he added. Kassim is suspected of encouraging the women in that plot.

The recent plots in France led by women show both determination and the limits of their efforts. They also highlight what these women have in common: Some are converts, and some have tried to go to Syria but have been turned back. And the younger ones, especially, seem emotionally troubled, said Ms Wafa Messaoud, a Muslim chaplain, who works with Muslim women in French prisons.

Among those in prison for extremist activities, "there are many converts," Ms Messaoud said. She added that the Islamic State seemed to be playing on the insecurities of the very young women being recruited and their desire to belong.

"They are young, in the middle of adolescence, and they have this psychological vulnerability," she said.

In the recent episode in Paris, at least two women, Ins Madani, 19, and Ornella Gilligmann, 29, are suspected of placing full gas canisters in a car in early September,

trying to light them and then leaving the car parked overnight near Notre Dame.

Gilligmann, who is a convert to Islam, told investigators that she had bought the gas canisters, according to French news reports. She was interested in going to Syria, said Mr Molins, the Paris prosecutor.

Madani supplied the car — it was her father's, the Paris prosecutor said. She appears to have had connections to jihadi circles in Belgium, and investigators there wanted to question her about a network of extremists in Charleroi.

A few days after the car was found, police used phone taps and analysis of phone data to trace Madani and two other women to Boussy-Saint-Antoine, about 32km south of Paris. The three women are believed to have been planning an attack on a train station, French police said. As they emerged from the house where they were hiding, one of the women, Sarah Hervouet, 23, stabbed a police officer in one of his shoulders as he sat in his police car, according to Mr Molins. Madani also tried to stab a police officer during her arrest, Mr Molins said. A third woman, Amal Sakaou, 39, did not try to attack the police, and almost nothing is known about her.

Hervouet is a convert to Islam, and she, too, wanted to go to Syria, Mr Molins said. She left for Syria in March last year, but never got there because Turkish authorities turned her back. Mr Molins said that she had been betrothed first to the man who killed a police captain and his companion in June in Magnanville near Paris and then to Adel Kermiche, who went on to kill an 85-year-old priest in St-Etienne-du-Rouvray in July. There was no indication that she had ever met either of them face to face — both men were killed by police after their attacks — suggesting she had only interacted with them online. She subsequently appeared to be entering another online relationship, this time with another man who was arrested in connection with the Magnanville killing. In the case in Nice, a 17-year-old and a 19-year-old were arrested on suspicion of having been in touch with Kassim, the Islamic State propagandist, on his encrypted Telegram channel and of having discussed a possible attack. But it appears that they changed their minds after the July 14 attack in Nice by a driver who was loyal to the Islamic State.



Certainly Frenchwomen have been fertile ground for Islamic State recruitment. Proportionately, more Frenchwomen than women from any other European country have gone to Syria and Iraq. And 40 per cent of the young people who have left France and are now in Syria are women, according to the French Interior Ministry.

While Mr Molins depicts the women as bound up with the Islamic State and directed by its male leadership, Prof Khosrokhavar said that in interviewing women who had gone to Syria or tried to get there, he had found evidence that the female recruits in this newest group were more independent than their predecessors.

These are young women who have grown up in Europe, where it is taken for granted that women can control much about their

lives. The result is that their language is that of European feminists and yet, confusingly, was in the service of an ideology quite contrary to that, Prof Khosrokhavar said.

The women spoke of being stopped from achieving their goal of going to Syria as “an insult to their dignity and an insult to their autonomy,” he said.

The Muslim chaplain, Ms Messaoud, described the same trend as Mr Molins and Prof Khosrokhavar. Two years ago when she first started working in the prisons, she saw relatively few women who had embraced extremist views.

Today there are “more and more” who have been detained for a connection to extremist activities or individuals, she said.

Why Colombia voted “no” to peace with FARC

By Jonathan Newman

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161004-why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc>

Oct 04 – **It seemed like a done deal.** After sixty years of fighting, three years of detailed negotiations, and a [peace agreement](#) signed in front of the head of the United Nations, the horrific conflict between the Colombian state and the Marxist Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC) finally seemed to be over.

The peace process looked set to be a model for future negotiations around the world; **all it needed was public approval.** And then, in the referendum that was meant to finish the job, **50.24 percent of voters rejected the agreement – with fewer than 40 percent even showing up.**

This wasn't supposed to happen – but looked at in a different way, it's far from a surprise.

The negotiations were all but designed to be disconnected from voters, and might as well have taken place on another planet. Sequestered behind closed doors in Cuba, the negotiators represented only the Colombian state and FARC; both sides dealt with the human consequences of their violence by flying in representatives of victims' groups, and then flying them home again.

As far as securing a deal goes, the design worked. Untroubled by the day-to-day vacillations of popular opinion and safely isolated from the [violence](#) between the two

sides, negotiators reached a well thought out settlement to stop the conflict for good – a remarkable achievement after one of the modern world's longest-running wars.

On paper, it was a remarkable achievement. But on the ground, it was also clear that most Colombians had no interest in what was happening.

There were attempts to engage them: touring meetings and talks where people would be spoken to and have their opinions listened to, adverts and documentaries in which former enemies publicly reconciled, a [website](#) on which people could post their opinions. Nevertheless, the lack of interest was palpable – and for some reason, it apparently didn't strike the negotiators as a significant problem.

All the expertise and effort was at the negotiating table. If these two sides could resolve the intractable conflict everyone would be relieved, regardless of the deal's content. There was no need for a Plan B: after all, who would vote against peace? No one would read the thing anyway, and they would vote with their instincts.

But instincts change over the course of sixty years of war, especially a war in which guerrillas fight the state military



and police, who themselves collude with or fight paramilitaries, who in turn fight the guerrillas – all of them killing thousands of civilians and displacing millions more. In a climate like this, the norms of justice shift; impunity rules, violence escalates, illegal and legal economies alike are infused with violence. Distrust thrives.

Personality contest

In the end, the Yes-No campaign revolved around two men: the dealmaking current president, Santos, and his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe, who [campaigned for a No vote](#). Santos is more unpopular than ever; like many leaders from elite backgrounds, he comes off as uninterested in ordinary people. Uribe's stock, evidently, is much higher.

At first, Uribe totally opposed any negotiations with FARC; then, once the negotiations were clearly working, he moved on to opposing any deal under which FARC members would avoid proper judicial sentences or be allowed to enter political office. His objections were always unlikely to be met, but he'd hit a nerve: for



many Colombians, the social and personal injustices of negotiating an end to war were just too painful to accept.

Uribe also stood to lose out personally from the deal. The central pillar of his legacy was the military campaign that weakened FARC to the point that they would negotiate. Yet, his well-reported connections to paramilitaries who killed thousands of civilians while fighting FARC indicate a dirtier side to this war. Many of his political allies – including his [head of intelligence](#), his [brother](#), and his [cousin](#) (who was his campaign manager) – are now behind bars for colluding with paramilitaries to advance their political and business ambitions.

By offering reduced sentences to those who confessed their crimes on all sides, the deal could have opened up the Uribe era to unprecedented scrutiny. The media even [speculated](#) that Uribe himself could face criminal convictions for crimes against humanity.

And yet, Uribe remains surprisingly popular. He was able to mobilize his supporters against the peace process; without his efforts, there might have been a different result.

In the name of the people

Many people who voted No are angry. Like Uribe, they view the conflict with absolute certainty: destroy, by any means necessary, or be destroyed. To them, FARC must be contained either through annihilation or incarceration; there is no alternative. Those that voted Yes don't necessarily support either the deal or Santos, but they saw no option but to accept what was offered. They were prepared to put aside revenge and retribution so that future generations could live without fear.

[A Nobel Prize for Peace not completed...](#)

The high proportion of non-voters, meanwhile, reflects not just popular alienation from the peace process, but also a much longer history of political distrust. Most voters have seen this all before: a deal is done behind closed doors and, outside of election

campaigns, leaders take little or no interest in their people's needs.

Ironically, that's what started the war, and what perpetuated it. Belligerents on all sides claimed to be fighting for "the people". But most Colombians recognized that some or all of them ended up fighting for their own interests. For some, continued conflict feels safer than peace by compromise, while others will feel that Colombia has thrown away a chance to offer its next generation a peaceful life. Still others will see this as nothing more than business as usual: a never-



ending story of self-interest, lies, corruption, impunity, and violence.

It's hard to know what happens next: more negotiations, another offer, reinvigorated conflict. The already weakened FARC might yet fragment, making another deal less robust; the government might shift back to the right,

possibly heralding a return to a war fought through paramilitary proxies.

Whatever happens, Colombia needs to find a way for all its people to discuss their own war – and their own peace – in a way that validates their experiences and does not escalate the violence further.

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The 52-year war in Colombia: The numbers

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161004-the-52year-war-in-colombia-the-numbers>

Oct 04 – The toll of the 52-year war in Colombia: 267,000 killed; 6.7 million people forcibly displaced; 46,386 victims of forced disappearance; 29,622 kidnapped; 8,022 children soldiers used both by FARC and right-wing paramilitary groups; 4,392 victims of extrajudicial execution by the government security forces

The rejection of the peace agreement in Sunday's plebiscite in Colombia is a missed opportunity for the country to finally move away from its tragic 50-year-long war, said Amnesty International.



"Today will go down in history as the day Colombia turned its back to what could have been an end to a 50-year long conflict that devastated millions of lives," said Erika Guevara-Rosas, Americas Director at Amnesty International.

"Although imperfect, the agreement represented a concrete way forward for peace and justice. The uncertainty this vote brings could place millions of Colombians, particularly those from vulnerable groups such as Indigenous, Afro-descendant and peasant farmer communities at greater risk

of suffering human rights violations."

"It's imperative that Colombia does not walk away from this project and that the country continues to move towards the long awaited peace millions are longing for."


Human rights in Colombia in ten numbers

- 7.9 million – victims of the armed conflict, almost half of them are women. ([Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas](#) (UARIV), September 2016)
- 6.9 million – victims of forced displacement. (UARIV)
- 267,000 – conflict-related killings, mostly of civilians. (UARIV)
- 4,392 – victims of possible extrajudicial executions recorded by the Office of the Attorney General (Office in Colombia of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 2016).
- 46,386 - victims of enforced disappearance (UARIV).
- 29,622 - kidnappings (UARIV).
- 11,062 - victims of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance (UARIV)
- 8,022 – child soldiers used by paramilitaries and guerrilla groups. (UARIV)
- 63 - human rights defenders, including Indigenous, Afro-descendant and peasant farmer leaders, killed in 2015. Fifty-two in the first nine months of 2016. (We Are Defenders Program).
- 20 – trade union members killed in 2015 (The National Trade Union School (Escuela Nacional Sindical))



Greece – Muslim Brotherhood of Crete (?)

Source: <https://www.e-mesara.gr>



Leaflets thrown in the streets of Messara village in the Island of Crete.



In yellow box:

Allah dictates that the entire planet must be conquered and believers must have all the grounds and cultivated fields!

Infidels cannot possess land and cultures because they belong only to believers.

Infidels should only get charity from us as Quran rules!



Can Western Muslims Be De-radicalized?

By Uriya Shavit and Sören Andresen

Middle East Quarterly – Fall 2016

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6272/can-western-muslims-be-de-radicalized>

Stopping the radicalization of young Muslims has become a focal point of political and academic discussion in the West as thousands of Western Muslims have traveled to jihadist training camps in Syria and Iraq. The attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels and Nice in 2016 have also heightened fears of terrorism in the West perpetrated by returning jihadists. Along with an intensification of intelligence and surveillance operations, three main courses of action have been deliberated and partially implemented by Western governments: banning or limiting the freedom of preachers who, while not endorsing violence, openly oppose liberal values and envision an Islamic future for the West; setting up domestic programs to prevent or reverse radicalization by enhancing integration of Muslim communities and persuading citizens who have joined jihadist groups to return home; and fighting the Islamic State (or ISIS) on its home turf with the aim of destroying it.

There are positive aspects to each of these courses of action, but do they significantly decrease the current threat of Islamic terror in Western countries? Is it possible that they may even contribute to increasing the very threat they aim to counter? An examination of current programs can reveal which components are useful and which are not. Such an assessment along with other ideas based, in part, on



interviews with European security officials and leading radical imams in Europe offer useful policy recommendations.

1. Closing Down "Grey Zones"

A primary thesis in political and academic counterterrorism discourse is that in some, though not all, cases, gradual, nonviolent radicalization precedes and anticipates violent actions. To combat this, some in the West have concluded that "grey zones," places where Islamist, Salafi, and other radical ideologies are endorsed and promoted, must be closed down. While not sanctioning violence, some mosques and schools cultivate among young devotees a triumphal, supremacist, Islamic mindset, which can eventually lead to violent action. Then British prime minister David Cameron articulated this view in October 2015 when he spoke about the existence of radical breeding grounds for terror and vowed there would be "no more passive tolerance [to radicalism] in Britain."^[1]

Banning the proliferation of hateful and supremacist rhetoric limits freedom of speech, but, as implied by Cameron and others, can be justified with caution. Liberal democracies have an obligation to protect their citizens and defend their very existence against those who openly use the freedoms of those democracies to extinguish those freedoms for others. However, a closer look at some of the assumptions underlying this argument should give pause.

Much attention, for example, has been devoted by authorities to the dangers of Salafi proselytizing. An influential study published in 2007 by the New York police department analyzed the backgrounds of terrorists involved in ten terror attacks in North America, Europe, and Australia, and demonstrated that individuals attending Salafi mosques (i.e., mosques that are radical yet preach against violence) are considerably more likely to become jihadist-Salafi and active in terrorism than individuals attending other mosques.^[2] According to another study, out of some 2,600 mosques in Germany, almost 37 percent of the 110 German Muslim jihadists whose biographies were studied and whose attendance at a specific mosque could be verified, had been attendees of just six specific Salafi mosques in the country.^[3]

Their hostility to liberal values and intolerance of other religions notwithstanding, there are

reasons to think that closing down Salafi mosques may also negatively impact the fight against terror, especially in the short term. To begin with, some Salafi mosque leaders are adamant and passionate propagators of an anti-jihadist agenda, in line with the anti-jihadist campaigns of the Saudi religious establishment.^[4] These imams argue that by residing in the West and being given citizenship or a visa, Muslims are party to a contract, and true Muslims never breach a contract,^[5] or that attacking civilians and committing atrocities breach Islamic norms.^[6] Salafi imams in England^[7] and in Germany^[8] have stated in interviews with the authors that their preaching is a great asset to prevention efforts because of their ability to ground opposition to jihad in persuasive religious terms. And while these claims may well be self-serving, Salafi mosques do contain more anti-ISIS and anti al-Qaeda literature than other places of worship due to the burning hatred between Wahhabis and jihadist-Salafis.

The revised British "Prevent Strategy," the country's main anti-radicalization program, stated unequivocally that cooperation with radical preachers is out of the question,^[9] and German security officials take a similar stand.^[10] But some challenge the wisdom of this view, noting that police cooperation with radical communities has proven effective.^[11]

The complicated reality is that neither side of the debate is wrong as exposure to radical ideas has varying effects on different individuals. On the one hand, there is evidence that some of those who attend radical mosques turn to jihadism. On the other, it is safe to conclude that the vast majority of Western Muslims who embrace and even articulate radical rhetoric have not turned to actual, violent jihadism. For them, provocative rhetoric appears to satisfy a need to profess anger or disrespect toward their host for whatever reason. This form of passive radicalism is still problematic, but, in terms of terror prevention efforts, it is fanciful to think that adherents of radical ideologies will choose mainstream ideologies if their radical bases are closed down; they may become angrier and go underground.



Finally, the needs of the intelligence community should be considered. As long as the "breeding grounds" of which Cameron spoke exist, security agencies have, at the very least, settings upon which to focus some of their work. When radical individuals center in one location, intelligence is more effective and easier to gather than when they disperse.

2. Radicalization Prevention Programs

Over the past decade, Western governments have established multi-layered prevention programs to de-radicalize jihadists as well as those Muslims who may be on the verge of



becoming violent. Stopping young Muslims from turning to terror or encouraging them to leave terror organizations has become a huge, publicly-funded industry, parallel in scope to other prevention campaigns such as the war on drugs, smoking, alcohol abuse, etc.

Silvio K, a convert to Islam, is a German jihadist who has threatened to bomb a U.S. nuclear weapons storage facility located in Germany

One example is the Berlin-based, federally-sponsored Hayat (Turkish and Arabic for "life"), established in 2011 by Exit-Germany, an organization that originally specialized in encouraging individuals to leave neo-Nazi groups. Hayat's guiding principal is that family members are the most effective influence on radicalized individuals. It counsels families on appropriate, non-confrontational approaches to de-radicalize potential jihadists or, in extreme cases, bring loved ones home who have gone off to wage jihad.^[12]

The federal program Demokratie leben (Live Democracy) supports dozens of anti-radicalization initiatives, including seminars held at youth centers in which radicalized young Germans learn to embrace a pluralistic view of Islam taught by state-hired educators,

including Muslims.^[13] One criticism against the program is that, by using the term Islamism, it risks contributing to the confusion of Islamist ideology as representing Islam.^[14] The Wegweiser program, developed by the Interior Ministry and the Verfassungsschutz in the German state of Nord Rhine-Westphalia, approaches young, at-risk people based on information provided by concerned parents, friends, and teachers. Its premise is that improving the social situation of young people who are being radicalized is crucial to the prevention of radicalization. Thus, it seeks to help at-risk youths find jobs and to educate them about the dangers of Salafi teachings and the manipulative techniques Salafi preachers employ.^[15]

Since 2007, the British government's efforts to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism have centered on the Prevent program, part of the broader, national anti-terrorism program CONTEST, reformed by the Conservative government in 2011.^[16] Among its activities is the funding of local theater productions that raise the issue of extremism.^[17]

A flagship program of Prevent is the Channel de-radicalization project, an initiative that identifies at-risk individuals, assesses the threat they pose, and offers them support. Since 2007, Channel has intervened in the lives of hundreds of such Muslim youths, including those who planned to travel to Syria and join the Islamic State.^[18] Channel encourages parents, friends, community leaders, public servants, and teachers to report possible terrorists (for the latter two groups, reporting is mandatory). Between June and August 2015, 798 individuals were reported to the program, 312 of whom were under eighteen years of age. The number of referrals found to have been justified has not been made public.^[19] Similar programs have been employed in other Western countries, including the United States,^[20] Denmark,^[21] and Australia.^[22] These pro-grams aim at redirecting youths from the path of radicalization through educational initiatives and the interventions of trusted facilitators.

Several positive aspects of Western prevention programs are beyond dispute. Cases of de-radicalized individuals suggest



that there are programs that have had an impact on some Muslims.^[23] These programs have also informed parents, educators, and local religious leaders that fighting radicalization is a responsibility they share. These initiatives have also facilitated the funding of cultural and social programs for Western Muslim populations at large that may have otherwise not been funded, including Internet forums, theater productions, "safe spaces" for discussions of grievances, and matching youth at risk with role models.

There are, however, limits to the ability of prevention programs to significantly contain the threat of terrorism. To begin with, the idea that a sense of disaffection and marginalization is the key factor underlying violent radicalization, which guides most prevention programs, is hardly borne out by reality. Many, if not most, young people lose their jobs or face the agonies of unrequited love at one point or another, but only a small percentage become terrorists. In fact, quantitative studies suggest that poor prospects for employment or economic marginalization are not predictive of potential or active jihadist affiliations. For example, the above noted biographical survey of 110 Germans involved in jihadist activities since 2001 identified a wide range of economic, educational, ethnic, religious, and migratory backgrounds.^[24] Likewise, a study of English Muslims aged 18-45 of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent in East London and Bradford found that university students who were U.K.-born, were in good health, and whose prospects in life were relatively promising were more likely to sympathize with terrorist causes than poor, unhealthy individuals who were not enrolled at a university.^[25] Other than being young and male, there is evidently no standard type of Western Muslim who acts on the belief that the West should be violently attacked from within. It is unlikely that any of the prevention programs currently implemented in the West can affect the majority of those already dedicated to jihad. As interventions rely on cooperation from family, friends, or relatives (who serve as informants as well as contact-persons to the suspects) and also from the actual suspected individuals, those strongly committed to jihad are less likely to be affected by any form of intercession. Hundreds of Western recruits who have joined ISIS have

remained loyal to its cause and have lost touch with their families, and are, therefore, beyond the reach of such prevention programs.

Broadly speaking, state-funded initiatives that educate young people to distinguish between "true" Islam and "misguided" Islam have two significant pitfalls. First, massive campaigns against radical Islamic ideologies elevate the status of these ideologies, in essence putting them on an equal footing with more moderate beliefs and practices. In Germany, for example, Salafis constitute less than 1 percent of the total Muslim population,^[26] but the volume of public-funded literature against their ideology creates, ironically, the impression that Salafiya is a dominant affiliation.

The association of anti-jihadist preaching with the state or with more moderate Islamic organizations supported by the state presents another dilemma. Just as a school nurse, who represents the establishment while speaking out against smoking risks, may actually tempt rebellious teenagers to experiment with cigarettes, so government-associated imams or teachers who preach against radicalization may make such affiliations more attractive.

Finally, the continuum between becoming a more devout Muslim and radicalization is neither clearly defined nor understood by Western authorities. Given the high level of anxiety in Western societies at the moment and the general ignorance about Islam, mistaken accusations of radicalization are almost inevitable. Such accusations, in turn, can push some Muslims toward violence.

3. Defeating the Islamic State

In his October 2015 speech, Cameron also stated that Britain would not be safe until the Islamic State is defeated.^[27] There are, indeed, good arguments why ISIS's destruction would significantly decrease the threat of Islamic terrorism in Europe over the long term. The Islamic State's strongholds in the Middle East provide radical Muslims with training, funding, and, most importantly, inspiration. Its major recruiting appeal has been its overwhelming success—unmatched in the annals of modern Arab jihadist groups—in establishing Muslim rule over a vast territory. While other radical groups have had similar visions of grandeur, ISIS actualized them through its conquests. Tarnishing



its triumphal image could lessen its appeal for some.

In the short term, however, the complete destruction of the Islamic State may actually exacerbate the threat. By all estimates, thousands of European Muslims have been trained in ISIS camps and are part of its fighting forces. In 2015, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King's College London estimated that 4,000 Western Europeans have joined either the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra in Iraq and Syria. One third have either died or left the conflict zone. These include some 1,200 fighters from France and some 1,200 from Germany and England.^[28] If the Islamic State is destroyed, at least some of its fighters will find their way back to their homelands, armed with field experience, motivated by the same convictions that sent them to ISIS, and out for revenge. It is also possible that Libya and other countries where ISIS has established strongholds will transform into new grounds for massive recruitment of Europeans.

Even if the last European recruits to the Islamic State were somehow to be eradicated or contained, the threat of terror in the West is unlikely to disappear altogether. In ideological and operational terms, the attacks on Western soil by affiliates of the Islamic State do not constitute a novelty. They did not start with ISIS and are unlikely to die with it. For almost two decades now, well before ISIS came into existence, hundreds of young Western Muslims have considered it their duty as Muslims to violently attack the West from within. The cornerstone of this concept was encapsulated in Osama bin Laden's declaration on the establishment of The World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders back in February 1998, which ended with a religious edict calling upon all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies, servicemen and civilians alike, wherever and whenever possible.^[29]

It is clear that this religious edict has been largely rejected. Nevertheless, it has appealed to those who, since 2001, have conspired to attack Western targets. To plan religiously-motivated terror attacks, they did not need to meet with bin Laden personally nor be financed or trained by his henchmen. It sufficed that they were impressed with the premise that the West was at war with Islam, and the only way to

effectively defend Muslims was to transfer that battle to Western soil.

Policy Recommendations

A troubling reality emerges from this analysis. None of the projects discussed have the potential to reduce significantly the threat of terror, and some aspects of these policies may prove counterproductive.

More efforts should be exerted in learning why thousands of young Western Muslims are violently radicalized and in evaluating the efficacy of existing programs. But it is unlikely that additional studies will provide any single instantaneous remedy. And as seen in Paris, San Bernardino, and most recently Brussels, Orlando, Nice, and Berlin, the West cannot afford to wait.

In the short term, Western governments must slash opportunities by focusing on intelligence and security measures. Security operations in Western Europe have tended to oscillate between extreme reactions such as closing down entire cities in the aftermath of attacks to periods of complacent negligence. Instead, the middle-ground of a steady and calm state of alert and action should be established. This middle-ground should include, most importantly, tightening controls in public areas. The death toll and emotional effects caused by the takeover of a train, a subway, a ferry, a museum, or a theater by an ISIS cell are no different from those caused by the commandeering of a commercial airplane, but all these venues are extremely vulnerable and penetrable as are other forms of mass transportation.

Soft targets of this kind must be secured by well-trained, armed guards, equipped with metal detectors and authorized to inspect personal belongings. Landmarks of great symbolic importance that attract mass crowds—for example, the Eiffel Tower, or the Chiesa di Santa Maria delle Grazie in Milan—must be protected by two tiers of security to minimize the risk of an effective attack (the latter, appallingly, is currently not secured at all). The Israeli experience since the 1990s has demonstrated that, while costly, such measures are economically feasible, meagerly injure privacy, and have a positive psychological effect on the public's sense of



security. Besides, the cost of a crisis involving hundreds of victims will be far higher.

Over the long term, more consideration and focus should be dedicated to the deep-rooted origins of the jihadist phenomenon in the West, and new, more audacious approaches to countering it should be formulated and applied. On the political and diplomatic fronts, Western governments should turn their attention from the consumers of radical ideologies to the providers.

The Saudi religious and political establishment plays an ambivalent role vis-à-vis violent radicalization. On the one hand, it leads and inspires theologically-grounded campaigns against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other jihadist groups. On the other, it has served as the main financier and propagator of the notions that non-Muslims are inferior to Muslims; that Muslims are bound to segregate culturally from non-Muslims and Islamize the West; and that the liberal West is a corrupt, helpless civilization on the verge of collapse.

In strategic terms, it is astonishing that a militarily weak kingdom, whose existence hinges in substantial ways on the continued support of the United States, should serve as the main sponsor of radicalization that destabilizes Western societies. U.S. and European Union policies should, therefore, be confidently informed by a simple truth: The West can survive without a Saudi alliance, but the kingdom will not last a year without U.S. military support. The kingdom's responsibility for breeding radicalism in the West should be underscored publicly and regularly, and the House of Saud should be pressured to reform its ways by all means possible. It must substitute its ambivalent policies for either unequivocal support for integration-minded agendas, or better still, a complete retreat from its campaign to influence the minds of Muslims in the West.

Other allies of the United States that directly and indirectly support radical affiliations in the West, including Qatar, should be treated similarly. Countries that serve as transits for terrorists must be warned that their negligence could bear harsh diplomatic consequences.

There is an equal need for clearer guidelines and for actions to match rhetoric in the West. Western governments without exception have never fully clarified what specific radical notions they deem beyond the pale of legitimacy.

Authorities need to be provided with the flexibility to address nuanced situations, but once limits on inflammatory rhetoric and teaching are decided upon and made public, they should be strictly observed and applied. David Cameron's strong rhetoric, for example, has not been matched by action. British legislators have never explicitly stipulated, for example, whether disavowing non-Muslims or teaching that they should be hated based exclusively on their religious beliefs is acceptable in the eyes of the law.

Lastly, in the ongoing battle for hearts and minds, some thought needs to be given to the implication of home-grown Islamic terrorists becoming the focus of the public discourse on Islam in the West.

Islam is most often discussed in the media in the context of terror. So much is said about ISIS, and rightly so; yet so little is said about Indonesia's democratic transformation, for example, which is as important. Young people search for role models to look up to and imitate. Heroes help build their characters and motivate them for a life of positive contributions. But other than professional athletes, notably soccer players, few Western Muslims have been portrayed in the Western media as heroes and not all young people are attracted to sporting culture.

This in turn means that the violent heroes' culture cultivated by ISIS, with its promise of meaning and glory in this life and eternal paradise in the afterlife, has faced meager competition in the West. In December 2015, a Muslim, American-Turkish scientist, Aziz Sancar, won the Nobel Prize in chemistry. Sancar's story could serve as an inspiration for millions of young Muslims across Europe and the United States for what they can achieve in liberal, pluralistic societies while maintaining their faith. Sadly, he has not gained a fraction of the attention that British-born Jihadi John (Muhammad Emwazi) received before being killed in a drone attack.

To explore and trumpet the success stories of Muslim minorities in the West is not an act of political correctness. It is a reflection of a diverse reality that deserves more attention from Western politicians, journalists, and academics. In the on-going fight against jihadi-Salafi terrorism, the worst may yet be to come. It is clear that some of the



main policies of Western governments are not only of limited efficacy but also, possibly, counter-productive. New long- and short-term

policies should be introduced to avert catastrophe.

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Couter terrorism-Surgical strikes: Bodies taken away on trucks, loud explosions, eyewitnesses give graphic details

Source: <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-border-terror-camps-surgical-strikes-kashmir-loc-indian-army-jihadist-3065975/>

Oct 05 – Eyewitnesses living across the Line of Control (LoC) have provided The Indian Express with graphic accounts of last week's

staging posts, describing how bodies of those killed in clashes before dawn on September 29 were loaded onto trucks for secret burials. The eyewitnesses also described brief but intense fire engagements that destroyed makeshift buildings that housed jihadists before they left for the last stage of their journeys across the LoC.

Their accounts corroborate India's claims that it carried out strikes against terror launch pads — a claim Pakistan has denied, saying, instead, that its military's forward positions were targeted with small-arms and mortar fire.

They also provide, for the first time, details on some of the locations targeted in the operation, information which the governments of India and Pakistan have not made public.

However, eyewitness accounts, as well as intelligence records obtained by The Indian Express, suggest that fatalities in the raids may have been lower than the 38-50 killed attributed to Indian officials in reports, including in this newspaper, and have caused little damage to jihadist logistics and infrastructure.

Lethal strike

Five eyewitnesses were contacted by The Indian Express through their kin living on the Indian side of the LoC and questions were sent to them using a commercially available encrypted chat system. The eyewitnesses'

identities are being withheld for

Indian Army Special Forces strikes on jihadists'

SURGICAL STRIKES, THEATRE OF OPERATIONS



DUDHNIAL: Most detailed account of the fighting from two witnesses who visited this hamlet, some 4 km across the LoC.

AL-HAAWI BRIDGE: Gutted building across the bridge from the hamlet's main bazaar near military outpost and Lashkar compound. Loud explosions heard from across the bridge.

CHALHANA: Five, perhaps six, bodies loaded on to a truck early next morning and possibly transported to nearest major Lashkar camp at Chalhana, across the Neelum river.

■ At Friday prayers at a Lashkar-affiliated mosque, a cleric vowed to avenge the deaths of men killed the previous day.



LEEPA: Complex of 25 hamlets located at the bottom of Qazi Nag stream among launch pads targeted in cross-LoC raids.

KHAIRATI BAGH: Villagers saw a Lashkar-occupied building destroyed.

ATHMUQAM: Firing and explosions heard from the east bank of the Neelum river.

their safety at the request of their families.

Indian journalists have no access to the Pakistani side of the LoC and the only Pakistan media reporting from these regions has been after a team of journalists were taken to some areas by the military there.

The most detailed account of the fighting came from two eyewitnesses who visited Dudhnial, a small hamlet some 4 km across the LoC from India's nearest forward post, Gulab, ahead of the town of Kupwara. The eyewitness reported seeing a gutted building across the Al-Haawi bridge from the hamlet's main bazaar, where a military outpost and a compound used by the Lashkar are both sited.

Al-Haawi bridge is the last point where infiltrating groups are loaded with supplies before beginning their climb up to the LoC towards Kupwara, both eyewitnesses said.

Local residents told one of the eyewitnesses that loud explosions — possibly rounds fired from 84-mm Carl Gustav rifles — were heard from across the Al-Haawi bridge late in the night, along with intense small-arms fire. "People did not come out to see what was going on," the eyewitness reported, "so did not see Indian soldiers but they gathered from the Lashkar people the next day that they had been attacked."

Five, perhaps six, bodies were loaded on to a truck early next morning, and possibly transported to the nearest major Lashkar camp at Chalhana, across the Neelum river from Teetwal, on the Indian side of the LoC, the eyewitness said he was told by local residents.

The Indian Army has made no official claim on casualties, but Director General of Military Operations Lieutenant General Ranbir Singh said the strikes caused "significant casualties" to "terrorists and those providing support to them."

Friday prayers at a Lashkar-affiliated mosque in Chalhana, another eyewitness said, ended with a cleric vowing to avenge the deaths of the men killed the previous day. "The Lashkar men gathered there were blaming the Pak Army for failing to defend the border", he said in one message, "and saying they would soon give India an answer it would never forget".

From classified intelligence documents accessed by The Indian Express, it appears the assault caught the Lashkar and other jihadist groups by surprise. Intelligence Bureau records, one released on September 30 for a

scheduled inter-agency meeting in New Delhi, spoke only of one major build-up, saying up to 40 jihadists had massed in Kél, facing India's Machil sector. This unusual number was interpreted to be a preparation for a last-ditch infiltration push before the passes closed in early winter.

Terrorists unprepared

Elsewhere, though, nine intelligence alerts seen by The Indian Express, and issued in the week prior to the strike, flagged only small groups of five to 10 infiltrators biding their time at so-called "launch-pads", essentially rural homes located close to military facilities, from where jihadists are guided towards India's LoC defences.

"They were basically sitting around thinking it was business as usual", an official familiar with the intelligence said. "Many of them would have died crossing the LoC anyway, when they hit our defences but this (the strikes) has made them feel unsafe one step back in their journeys".

Leepa, a complex of some 25 hamlets located at the bottom of the Qazi Nag stream flowing down from the mountains above Naugam, on the Indian side of the LoC, was among the "launch-pads" targeted in the cross-LoC raids, one eyewitness said. Though the eyewitness was unable to visit the area, he said he spoken to villagers who had seen a Lashkar-occupied three-storied wooden building destroyed by Indian troops near the hamlet of Khairati Bagh. Khairati Bagh was, until 2003, a major Lashkar base, which was slowly scaled down once the LoC ceasefire went into place and the terrorist group's cross-LoC operations slowly declined. It remains, though, of key importance to the group, offering multiple lines of access into northern [Kashmir](#) through Chowkibal and the Bangas bowl.

The eyewitness said local residents said "three or four" Lashkar personnel were thought to have been killed in the raid, while others fled into the adjoining forests after the firing began. Interestingly, the eyewitness said the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's charitable wing, the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation, had held a major eye-surgery camp in Khairati Bagh in August, using the opportunity to deliver speeches on alleged atrocities by Indian soldiers in Kashmir. Fire and explosions



were also heard, an eyewitness said, from the east bank of the Neelum river in Athmuqam, the district headquarters of the region.

Next to Pak Army

The fighting, the eyewitness said, appeared to have taken place near military camps along the Katha Nar stream that empties into the Neelum river just north of the town. A bustling town that serves as a hub for tourism and commerce, Athmuqam is also a major military hub, with several army facilities on the ridges the east bank of the river, sheltered from artillery bombardment.

The ghost villages of Bicchwal and Bugna, almost entirely abandoned by their residents who fled when the long jihad in Kashmir began in 1990, are barely 2 km from Salkhanna, the first village on the Pakistani side of the LoC, and the last loading point for jihadist infiltrators. An eyewitness who visited the Neelum District Hospital in Athmuqam said he heard several

Lashkar personnel had been killed and injured in the clash last Thursday but said no bodies had been buried locally.

Neelum valley residents, tied by kinship to mountain peoples on the other side of the LoC, have had a fraught relationship with jihadists operating in the area, fearing the collapse of the India-Pakistan ceasefire could lead to the return of the artillery exchanges which claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians before 2003.

In 2011, India-Pakistan military clashes led scores of Athmuqam women and children to march to the local army unit, demanding that it stop cross-border movement by jihadists.

The Pakistan Army responded by locating jihadist launch-pads alongside its camps, thus minimising contact between local residents and groups like the Lashkar. However, the massive street violence in Kashmir has led to a surge in the visibility of jihadists across the Neelum valley.

CIA routinely reviews Hollywood scripts

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IwLTleEugQo>

Pentagon Spends \$500 Million on Fake Al-Qaeda Videos

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/news/pentagon-spends-500-million-fake-al-qaeda-videos>

Oct 05 – The Pentagon spent over \$500 million on hiring a public relations firm to create anti-extremist and fake extremist propaganda during the American military's campaign in Iraq, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism as reported by The Daily Beast.

British firm Bell Pottinger created their materials at the U.S. military base of Camp Victory. At one point, they were employing some 300 British and Iraqi staff at the cost of over \$100 million per year.



Bell Pottinger was hired in 2004 to produce material for the "promotion of democratic elections" in Iraq. These materials aimed to convince the Iraqi population of the benefits of democracy and inform them about the new legal structures in place following regime change.

The use of Pentagon funds to promote local media outlets and get across the U.S. government's strategic message to populations in Iraq and

Afghanistan has been extensively chronicled elsewhere. Bell Pottinger's work in Iraq was different.

The firm was also contracted to create news-style broadcasts in Arabic covering Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks and other events, which would then get placed with Arabic media outlets without saying who made the clips.

Other firms such as the Lincoln Group created articles that were inserted into Arabic media outlets, sometimes represented as unbiased news.



But the most clandestine of Bell Pottinger's operations was the creation of fake Al-Qaeda propaganda videos. These were produced in the exact style, length and format as genuine Al-Qaeda videos. They were loaded onto CDs that were dropped off by U.S. soldiers while carrying out raids against Al-Qaeda targets.

"If they're raiding a house and they're going to make a mess of it looking for stuff anyway, they'd just drop an odd CD there," former video editor for Bell Pottinger Martin Wells told the Bureau.

The team added a code which enabled them to track the CDs and monitor the IP addresses of where it was played. Some of the CDs ended up in Iran or even in America.

From 2007 to 2011 the Pentagon spent at least \$540 million paying Bell Pottinger for "information operations" and "psychological operations," according to the Bureau.

The Pentagon confirmed that Bell Pottinger had been hired to carry out work under the Information Operations Task Force and would only say that the information was "truthful."

"We do not discuss intelligence gathering methods for operations past and present," a U.S. military official said concerning Bell Pottinger's work as part of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force.

"We did a lot to help resolve the situation," Lord Tim Bell, the former chairman of Bell Pottinger told The Sunday Times. "Not enough. We did not stop the mess which emerged, but it was part of the American propaganda machinery."

The U.S. Department of Defense spent \$159.1 million in 2016 on its "Information Operations" budget, down from \$580 million in 2009, according to the Global Investigative Journalism Network.

'Terror attack' in Brussels as two cops are stabbed and train station and prosecutor's office evacuated over bomb scare

Source: <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1916705/brussels-train-station-evacuated-over-bomb-scare/>

Oct 05 – **A train station in Brussels and the public prosecutor's office have been evacuated following a bomb scare – while elsewhere in the city two cops were stabbed and another wounded in a suspected terror attack.**

Bruxelles Nord station and the prosecutor's office were emptied after police received a call warning of a bomb threat.



It comes after two officers were stabbed at a checkpoint close to the station in the city's Schaerbeek neighbourhood, HLN reports, during an identity check.

The assailant was wounded after a policeman – whose nose was broken during a struggle – shot him in the leg as he tried to flee the scene.

The train station and prosecutor's office bomb threats are being treated as two separate incidents.

The policemen suffered injuries to the neck and stomach after being attacked by a man armed with a Swiss army knife.

Their condition is not thought to be life-threatening.

A station spokesman said: "A message of an alleged bomb threat was sent to the police, all the people were evacuated from the station, the trains have stopped."

"This will continue until security services inspect the station, minimum an hour."

Meanwhile, Eric Van Der Sypt, a spokesman for the Belgian federal prosecutor's office, told AFP: "We have elements to believe that the incident was a terrorist attack."

It is allegedly the second time the station has been emptied this week over a suspected bomb alert.





A knife is pictured on the scene where three policemen were stabbed

Brussels remains on high alert following terror attacks across the country in March, which killed 32 people.

One local caught up in the scare wrote on Twitter: "Second time this week Brussels north station is evacuated for bomb alert."

What Follows the Defeat of ISIS in Mosul?

By Jonathan Spyer

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6306/beyond-mosul>

Sep 27 – Black smoke was rising from the Qayara oilfields as the refugees huddled in the shade. They had arrived that morning from ISIS controlled territory a little further west.

These refugees had come from Jahala village. They were Sunni Arabs. They had elected earlier that day to risk an escape from Islamic State (IS, ISIS) territory across the desert – a route ending in certain death if caught by the jihadis. "ISIS have set fire to the oil fields," one of them told us. "The smoke makes it impossible to breathe. 12 or so people every day need the hospital. It's impossible to stay."

So they had set out in the early dawn, just after first light. A convoy of men, women and children. "The best time is before the sun rises, when ISIS are sleeping. We used that time to come over."

Now they were exhausted, grimy, but safe. The Peshmerga fighters of General Mala Mahdi were quizzing the men, looking for any indications that they might be IS members sent to infiltrate the lines. It appeared that all was well, however. After a while trucks arrived and the families began to load their belongings. Their destination was one of the large refugee camps established by the government of Iraq. There would be little by way of comfort there. But there would be shelter, food, water – and a chance to breathe air not polluted by the black smoke of burning oil.

The act of firing the Qayara oilfields in an area under their own control exemplified the florid insanity with which the name of Islamic State is associated. It provided no substantive benefit to the jihadis themselves, and with a stroke rendered the lives of the civilians in the area unlivable. The result was that Sunni Arabs, like the refugees from Jahala, were forced to seek sanctuary with the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Sunni Arabs, of course, are the very people in whose name IS wages its jihad. 80 miles south of the city of Mosul, witnessing scenes like this, the issues




surrounding the current war between the Islamic State and its enemies can seem fairly stark and simple. But the seeming simplicity is deceptive.

The insanity of Islamic State, and the imperative that it be destroyed, are indeed fairly unambiguous matters. The reduction of the area of IS control, meanwhile, is already an advanced process. The jihadis have lost 50% of their holdings in Iraq, and around 25% in Syria. The city of Mosul is the next, looming target for the enemies of IS. It promises to be a fiercely contested fight. The result, eventually, inevitably, must surely be the defeat of the jihadis. After which, perhaps, the air around Jahala will clear

and its unfortunate residents may return home.

Unambiguity, however, ends when one comes to consider the state of affairs among the various forces seeking to carry out the task of defeating IS. Here, one finds clashing agendas, different and rival traditions, and the almost certain prospect that the defeat of IS will ultimately constitute only an episode in the wider story of conflict in Iraq.



Iraqi Security Forces

"I don't believe in Shia and Sunna, Kurd and Turkmen. We are all citizens," said Major General Najim Abed al-Jubouri, as we sat in his office at an army base south of Mosul. Jubouri is the commander of Nineveh operations for the Iraqi Army and the officer commanding the Mosul operation for the army.

Jubouri, slow of speech and with the measured and cool delivery of an experienced commander, has an interesting and varied past. Graduating the officer's school of the old Iraqi army in 1979, he was a brigadier general in Saddam's air

defense units in the war of 2003. Later, he began to work with the Americans, serving as mayor of Tel Afar west of Mosul in the period 2005-8. Then he made his new home in America.

Now he is back, commanding the army in Mosul, and still declaring his loyalty to the idea of a united Iraq. "Politicians use sectarianism to keep their positions. I don't believe in it," he told me. "If we stay locked to the past, we'll go to hell. If we forget what happened, we'll have a chance for the future."

The army, Jubouri asserted, has moved on since the disastrous performance of the summer of 2014, when IS took Mosul and was stopped at the gates of Baghdad and Erbil. Better training, better weapons, increased motivation will produce different results.

Perhaps. But it has been a long and slow slog to Qayyara airfield, the hub of the Iraqi army's operations south of Mosul.

Jubouri, when he is not commanding troops for the Mosul offensive, is a research fellow at the Near East and South Asia department of the National Defense University in Washington DC. He has come a long way from Saddam Hussein's anti-aircraft units. His paeans to forgetting the past, embracing shared citizenship and rejecting sectarianism are certainly of the stuff that his DC employers would be happy to hear.

They do not, however, reflect the sentiments of other, no less important players in the area of the Mosul battlefield. They also do not resemble the frankly sectarian nature of the Shia



dominated government in which he serves, which relies, in good part, on the efforts of Shia Islamist militias supported by Iran. Jubouri will be returning to his home in the US when the Mosul operation is completed.

The anti-IS forces arranged around Ninevah province, of which Mosul is the capital, meanwhile, are a deeply varied gathering. And the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) of Major-General Jubouri are not the strongest or most consequential of them. In addition to the ISF, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Shia militias of the PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces or Hashd al-Sha'abi), the Sunni militiamen of the Hashd al-Watani (National Mobilization) and even the Kurdish PKK, as well as US-led coalition air power and advisers are all set to play an active role in the battle.

The Kurds

The powerful Kurdish Peshmerga, controlling the entrances to Mosul from the north, east and west, have a starkly different view to the representatives of the Baghdad government of the nature and meaning of the battle in which they are engaged. For them, the sweet words of Major-General Jubouri about shared citizenship conceal a bitter history, and a state structure in which they have no desire to remain. Though they are at pains to point out that many refugees from IS controlled areas, in particular from minority communities, appear to prefer Kurdish controlled northern Iraq to the areas controlled by the Iraqi Army.

Senior Peshmerga commander General Bahram Yassin, speaking at his HQ in Bashiqa overlooking Mosul city, told me that "The process of capturing Mosul will be a stage in the achievement of Kurdish independence. President Barzani has already started the process by announcing a referendum. Our main goal is getting to independence."

I reminded the commander of a recent statement by Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi urging the Kurds to move no further towards Mosul on their own. Abadi had warned of the possibility of resistance to the Peshmerga from the Sunni Arab inhabitants of the city.

"The Peshmerga have been responsible for security around Mosul since 2003," Bahram Yassin responded, "And regardless of what Abadi says, we are going to move forward...And we will have clear conditions for taking part in the Mosul operation. There is a need for clarity on who will control the city after the operation is concluded, including taking into account the interests of minority communities. We will not take part in a process where we lose many men, and are then asked to leave the areas we conquer."

In the course of a week in northern Iraq, I interviewed a number of Peshmerga commanders and leading officials of the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party. Not all of them expressed themselves in such blunt terms as this senior field officer. But all, without exception, spoke of an imminent independence referendum and the inevitability of a Kurdish state.

Yassin was concerned not only about IS, but also about the presence of the Iran-supported Iraqi Shia militias in the Mosul area, and of their agenda. "The Hashd al-Sha'abi (Shia militias) are a big challenge to the future both of Kurdistan and of Iraq. Many of them are trained by the Iranians. They receive support from the government. They are seeking to secure an area in the west of Mosul. Which will be a channel to Sinjar, and from there to Syria. They want to complete the 'Shia circle' from Iraq, to Syria, and to Lebanon."

According to a rumor commonly heard in Erbil, Shia militiamen are to be found among the Iraqi army forces, wearing the uniforms of Iraqi troops. That is, of the troops of Major-General Jubouri, who dislikes sectarianism and wants to forget the past.

As if things were not complicated enough, Yassin and other Peshmerga officers accuse the rival Kurdish PKK of collaboration with the Iran-aligned Shia militias in this task. They are deeply suspicious of the presence of a few hundred PKK fighters in the Sinjar area, to Mosul's west. Sources close to the PKK, meanwhile, dismiss these charges and issue a counter accusation regarding the KRG's closeness to Turkey at a time when it is repressing its Kurdish population. They note the vital role played by the PKK in the defense of this area against IS in 2014.

Kurdish internal rivalries, in short, are also part of the picture around Mosul.

The KRG has recovered much of its composure since the summer of 2014. At that time, in a series of events which have yet to be adequately explained, the Peshmerga failed to adequately defend their borders against the jihadis. The result was that IS reached the



outskirts of the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil, and launched an attempt at genocide against the Yezidis, a non-Muslim Kurdish speaking minority resident in areas close to the border.

The Peshmerga have now re-conquered all territory lost in 2014. In recent weeks they have pushed IS from a series of strategic entry points into Mosul city, and taken a number of villages across the Khazer river, to Mosul's east.

Nor do they appear to have any intention of ceding any ground taken. As General Mahdi in the Makhmur area put it, "We clean the area, we make the border, we opened the way. Where we gave our blood, only with blood will we leave."

It is worth noting that for the Kurdish Regional Government, the Mosul campaign and the chance for military glory comes at a time of considerable domestic discontent. Low oil prices are wreaking havoc on an economy geared strongly toward energy exports. There is widespread unemployment. Salaries of officials have been cut, in some cases by as much as 75%.

In this climate, rivals of the ruling KDP accuse it of seeking to use the military campaign against IS, and the subsequent talk of independence referenda and independence as distractions from more immediate needs. Whatever the value of such statements, they reflect the extent to which the KRG has moved beyond a sense of danger to its existence, to the extent that the war against IS has become something of an internal political matter rather than an issue of common survival.

Sunni Arabs

Under the protection of the Kurdish Peshmerga, but separate from it, the Sunni Arab Hashd al-Watani (National Mobilization) force has also emerged, but little noticed by the outside world.

A trip to their training base in the Bashiqa area is an entry into a world generally held to have vanished. The officers of the Hashd al Watani are all veteran commanders of Saddam's army. There, on the plains of Ninevah province, in miniature, they have created a version of the military culture they know. To enter their base is to encounter in all its faded glory the once menacing military style of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. This comes complete with the suspicion and paranoia toward outsiders, the faint but clearly apparent desire to convey menace and intimidate, and the ability to step effortlessly into the language of ringing propaganda.

All rather offset, or rather transferred to a slightly surreal plane, by the fact that these former overlords of Iraq are today able to assemble their little force of 2-3000 men only with the permission and under the tutelage of the Kurdish Peshmerga. That is to say, they are now under the protection of the very men who as young officers they chased and harried and hunted through the mountains of northern Iraq, when they were the representatives of a mighty and brutal regime, and the Peshmerga only a ragged guerrilla force. But if the Hashd al Watani officers were affected by the irony of all of this, they weren't showing it.

The Hashd al Watani was established in cooperation with Barzani's Kurdish government. But its training is being provided by none other than the Turkish Army. Welcome to the changed Middle East. On the Nineveh plains, a small Sunni Arab militia is being trained by the Turks, officered by former members of Saddam's army, under the tutelage of a Kurdish government open in its desire for statehood and independence.

And who is this strange arrangement being mobilized against? Islamic State, of course. But then everyone is against the Islamic State. Their victims are the bloody shirt that every party in Iraq and Syria waves to establish their own righteousness. More meaningfully, the enemy of the Hashd al Watani, once again, is the Shia dominated, increasingly Iran-aligned government in Baghdad.

Indeed, the best way to understand this strange but significant initiative is that it represents a notable if tentative entry by Turkey into the arena that Iran has largely made its own in Iraq – namely, the sponsoring of sectarian political/military organizations in neighboring countries intended to advance the cause of the sponsoring state.

Turkish infantry officers, a lot younger and fitter looking than the superannuated Saddam-era veterans, are overseeing the training of the Hashd al Watani volunteers at the base at Bashiqa.

The Hashd al Watani is the brainchild of Atheel Nujaifi, former governor of Ninevah Province, who is strongly linked to Turkey.

Nujaifi, who I interviewed in Erbil, sees his force as an element in the construction of a federalized, decentralized northern Iraq, divided into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish areas. There



will be "greater Turkish involvement," he predicted, if no solution is found to the needs of Iraq's Sunnis. Nujaifi has been criticized in the past for statements apparently taking a lenient view of the nature of IS rule in Mosul. He dismissed these criticisms, but it is clear that his main focus is what he sees as the intention of the government in Baghdad to create a sectarian Shia government, and what this would mean for the country's Sunni Arab minority.

Like Bahram Yassin, Nujaifi sees the future of Mosul as part of a larger struggle to resist Iranian encroachment in the region. The Iranians, according to Nujaifi, wish to make use of Iraq's Shia militias to achieve this goal. "Iran wants to use Mosul to build a corridor to Syria," he told me, "and to dominate the region." The Iranian intention, he suggested, is to "build a revolutionary army" through the Shia militias. (an identical point was made to me a year ago in Baghdad by an officer of the Badr Organization, one of the main Iran-supported militias in Iraq.)

As for Iraq's future, if the attempts at federalism fail, and "if the Kurds split and become independent, then Iraq itself will split. The Sunnis cannot go back to the situation before 2014. But we hope this can be avoided."

So both the commanders of the Peshmerga, and their junior partners in Hashd al Watani, see the Iraqi government and in particular the Shia militias aligned with it as no less a danger to their respective community's aspirations as are the now retreating Sunni jihadis of the Islamic State.

Mosul and Beyond

Where is all this heading? The offensive appears to be approaching. There are reports of heavy military traffic on the Erbil-Mosul road. Leaflets have been dropped by coalition aircraft over the city, informing its inhabitants that the liberation of the city is imminent and urging them to leave so as not to be used by IS as human shields during the battle. The refugees are continuing to stream in from the IS controlled areas.

From the frontline positions of General Bahram Yassin's Peshmerga in Bashiqa, the city of Mosul can be clearly seen. About 12 kilometers only separate the Kurdish forces from Mosul city center, their final objective in any assault. On most days now, the frontlines are quiet, just the occasional mortar fire or the crump of heavier ordnance from further off. The fighters spend their days cleaning their weapons, keeping fit, and waiting for the order to move forward.

Much fighting and dying remains to be done in and around Mosul city before Islamic State is finally destroyed. The gravity and urgency of this task should not in any way be underestimated. The refugees from Jahala are of the same flesh and blood as all of us, and this is salient.

But the eventual defeat of the Islamic State is looking increasingly inevitable. And even now, before the victory, the various forces in the "coalition" assembled to destroy IS are already looking beyond the city, toward the political, and perhaps also the military struggles which will follow its conquest. The Kurdish Peshmerga on the ridges above the city are thinking about independence, the Sunni militiamen under their tutelage also see little future for themselves in a united Iraq, the Shia militiamen are serving the cause of the larger, Iran-led regional alliance of which they are a part. The PKK are seeking to advance their own, rival Kurdish nationalist project. The road beyond Mosul promises to be a treacherous, complicated path, strewn with landmines.

Jonathan Spyer is director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Active Shooter School Preparedness: An Update

By Kay C. Goss

Source: <https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/active-shooter-school-preparedness-an-update/>

Oct 05 – Schools, colleges, and universities are diverse communities that present especially challenging situations. Safety officials know that they have to be extremely well prepared for a vast array of potentially difficult situations that can spiral. Fortunately, many resources exist to help communities prepare for such dangerous scenarios.



Since the mass killings at Columbine High School (Colorado) in 1999 and at Virginia Tech in 2007, federal, state, tribal, and local officials from around the country have made significant efforts on planning, training, and exercises, as well as technologies and standards, to strengthen preparedness for these devastating attacks. Federal agencies, along with campus safety leaders, state, tribal, and local officials have focused significant time in preparing for this special potential crisis.

Active Shooter Online Training



The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has a one-hour online course ([IS-907 Active Shooter: What You Can Do](#)) that provides an introductory lesson on the actions that may be taken when confronted by an active shooter, as well as indicators of workplace violence and how to manage the consequences of an incident. This course describes actions to take to prevent and prepare for potential active shooter incidents, ways to recognize potential workplace violence indicators, actions to take when confronted with an active shooter and responding law enforcement officials, and ways to manage the consequences of an active shooter incident.

FEMA – in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Counter Terrorism Center, and other partners – conducts active shooter and mass casualty event training through FEMA's Joint Counter-Terrorism Awareness Workshop Series. FEMA's whole of community emphasis has been deployed in this scenario as in other disasters with the following stakeholders: individuals, families, and households; the private and nonprofit sectors; faith-based organizations; and local, schools, colleges, universities, state, tribal, territorial, and federal governments.

Strategic & Tactical Training

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center ([FLETC](#)) held a national summit, in a number of locations, over the last three years, on preventing multiple casualty violence, focusing on strategic approaches to information sharing. This summit brought together stakeholders from fields such as emergency management, fire service, law enforcement, healthcare, law, social sciences, education, and academia to discuss how to improve the nation's ability to prevent future mass casualty attacks.

In response to the 2012 Newtown (Connecticut) shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, the FBI sought ways to better protect the lives of responding officers and the innocent people victimized by an active shooter. The FBI partnered with Texas State University (TSU) to update Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance funded tactical training for frontline patrol officers who respond alone, or with one or two others, to an active shooter situation. The FBI then sent 100 of its trainers to TSU train-the-trainer programs, so these agents and their TSU counterparts expanded training on active shooter response tactics nationwide. These instructors provide free and vital training to state and local law enforcement officers, and an additional \$1.1 million in funding provided by the FBI and DOJ significantly increased the number of trained officers.


A couple of years ago, the FBI's 56 field offices hosted newly developed two-day workshops on active shooter situations, which brought together sheriffs, chiefs, and other senior command staff from more than 1,850 state, local, tribal, and campus police agencies. FBI experts and attendees shared lessons learned and best practices, and they discussed available resources when faced with responding to and recovering from active



shooter and mass casualty incidents. All 56 FBI field offices nationwide hosted active shooter tabletop exercises to focus on how to respond to and recover from a mass killing incident at an elementary school. More than 2,000 representatives from more than 1,000 agencies participated, including: representatives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement, fire services, and emergency medical services, as well as federal prosecutors and district, county, and state attorneys. FBI offices continue to host these no-cost trainings and table-top exercises.

Critical Incident Resources

The FBI has developed and distributed throughout the year 25,000 copies of a comprehensive critical incident handbook specifically designed for state, local, campus, and tribal law enforcement. The handbook, and an accompanying on-scene commander pocket guide, provides essential checklists, resources, and guidance for on-scene commanders responding to events including active shooter and mass casualty incidents.



Effectively working with the media is a critical part of emergency management. The FBI developed and distributed 25,000 new crisis communications quick reference guides. These pocket guides, which are being distributed to state, local, campus, and tribal law enforcement, provide easy-to-follow guidance on how to prepare to handle a national media event, a checklist to follow, and guidance on how to coordinate with unified command, manage press conferences, and deal with social media.

The FBI has an [active shooter web page](#), housing information on best practices, lessons learned, and resources on active shooter situations. The FBI has an active shooter location on “Law Enforcement Online,” a secured site that allows law enforcement agencies to share resources and speak to each other during ongoing events and investigations via a virtual command center.

Expanded Outreach & Preparedness Tools

Since Newtown, the FBI – in partnership with FEMA, state, local, tribal, and campus law enforcement agencies – has hosted hundreds of meetings, exercises, and presentations with citizen groups, private industry, and educational groups. These events have focused on best practices and lessons learned from the 2013 response to the Boston Marathon bombing as well as the following 2012 active shooter incidents: school shooting in Newtown; theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado; and Sikh Temple shooting in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.

In addition, the FBI maintains a database of all active shooter scenarios since 2000, now containing 27 pages of descriptions of more than 200 such incidents. The FBI’s Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal deals with working on preparedness for such events, with working groups addressing the agency’s emergency response and domestic preparedness.

The National Association of School Principals is significantly engaged in awareness and preparedness activities as well. Many private companies offer preparedness training, using these active shooter scenarios for their format.

The newest nonprofit addition to these preparedness tools, the Points of Light Foundation, founded by former President George H. W. Bush, offering an opportunity for nonprofit, community, and faith-based organizations to participate in an internet-based exercise entitled “[Workplace Down – An Active Shooter Exercise](#).” This free tabletop exercise was held on Thursday, 29 September 2016, and provided an opportunity to work through scenario information and injects dealing with an active shooter within the office (see Table 1).



Table 1. Resource links for "Workplace Down – An Active Shooter Exercise."

University	Active Shooter Response Exercise
	Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise
Hospital	Active Shooter Response Exercise
	Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise
School (K-12)	Active Shooter Response Exercise
	Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise
Workplace	Active Shooter Response Exercise
	Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise

Finally, FEMA has a new [instructive piece](#) available online for steps to take: (a) before an active shooter incident to prepare; (b) during such an event to stay safe; and (c) after such an event to recover. In summary, progress has been made, but no one is completely satisfied with the current status of active shooter preparedness. Improvements are being made every day as hard work continues to focus on safety of children, students, faculty, and administrators at schools, colleges, and universities, as well as all governmental jurisdictions and many private and nonprofit sector leaders.

Note: *This is a subject of personal as well as professional concern. The author's grandson found himself and his academic advisor in the midst of strategizing in an attempt to keep their classroom safe during the Virginia Tech shooting incident in 2007, while the attacker was able to shoot his way into the classroom, slaying several students and his professor.*

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S&T selects RAND Corp. to operate new DHS research center

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161005-s-t-selects-rand-corp-to-operate-new-dhs-research-center>

Oct 05 – DHS has selected the Homeland Security Operational conduct technical and operational department. The new center is a development center, and is worth as much as \$494.7 million.



RAND Corporation to operate the Analysis Center (HSOAC), which will research and analysis to aid the federally funded research and funded under a five-year contract



Morocco votes after five years under Islamists

Source: <http://saudigazette.com.sa/world/mena/morocco-votes-five-years-islamists/>

Oct 07 – Morocco will elect a parliament on Friday for the first time since an Islamist-led government took office following Arab Spring uprisings that toppled leaders across the region.



The Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) came to power in 2011 after swelling protests prompted concessions from King Mohammed VI, the scion of a monarchy that has ruled the North African country for 350 years.

A new constitution reduced some, though not all, of the king's near-absolute powers as autocratic regimes fell in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane's PJD says a second term would allow it to continue its limited economic and social reforms.

Heading a coalition that includes communists, liberals and conservatives, it retains considerable support among the urban middle classes that have largely abandoned the left in favor of Islamist parties.

But it has been weakened by rising unemployment and what critics say is a failure to deal with corruption.

The party has faced a string of scandals within its ranks including a major drugs bust, a dodgy land-grab deal and the suspension of two vice presidents found in a "sexual position" on a beach. It also faces a resurgent liberal opposition Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), formed in 2008 by a close adviser to the king.

The PAM has poured enormous resources into a campaign criticizing the government's record as "catastrophic" and pledging to roll back the "Islamization" of society. It pitches itself as the defender of women's rights and liberal social mores, and aims to bring more women into parliament, where they hold just 67 out of 395 seats.

The PJD accuses its rival of being the party of the palace, part of a shadowy "parallel state" controlling political life.

If it holds on to power, the PJD will remain an essential part of Moroccan politics, "despite the feelings it rouses at the palace and among the globalized bourgeoisie," said Pierre Vermeren, a historian of the Maghreb region.

A victorious PJD would try to take the opportunity to gain more space from the monarchy for joint decision-making, he said.

But the decisive clout in Morocco remains in the hands of King Mohammed VI — regardless of who is in government.

"The king is de facto the exclusive decision maker on a series of long-term and strategic matters," including foreign policy and big infrastructure projects, according to an analysis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank.

Friday's poll also marks the return of Salafists, followers of an ultra-conservative brand of religion, to the political arena.

There are only a few dozen Salafists among the 7,000 candidates in Friday's poll, but their re-emergence is a notable shift in a country where they were once pariahs. They include Abdelwahab Rafiki, also known as Abou Hafs, a former preacher who was sentenced to 30 years in prison after militant attacks in Casablanca in 2003 that left 45 people dead.

He was pardoned in 2012 and is running for Istiqlal, a nationalist party.

Rafiki is not alone. The Casablanca bombings prompted authorities to arrest some 8,000 people, many of them Salafists. But like him, many were pardoned following the 2011 turmoil, and have since gained a foothold in Moroccan politics.



“Alive & kicking” Al-Qaeda poses ‘very direct threat’ to UK – Defense secretary

Source: <https://www.rt.com/uk/361783-isis-alqaeda-terror-europe/>

Oct 07 – A resurgent Al-Qaeda poses a growing threat to the West as Islamic State is driven out of its strongholds, British Secretary of Defense Michael Fallon and security experts told media. They warn its branch in Syria, Al-Nusra Front, may be planning attacks.

“Al-Qaeda is still alive and kicking in Afghanistan, in Syria, in Yemen and elsewhere,” Fallon said, as reported by the Times newspaper.

“It has not been finally defeated and we are very conscious of that [...] It is a very direct threat to the UK. Not just the [defense] ministry, but the security agencies are very much aware of that,” he added. He claimed that is one of the reasons the UK is keeping troops in Afghanistan, as Al-Qaeda has been setting up camps in the south of the country, where British forces were based.

Al-Qaeda is a militant Sunni Islamist multinational organization founded back in 1988 by Osama Bin Laden, the man behind the 9/11 terror attacks in the US. It spawned an offshoot terror organization in war-torn Syria, Al-Nusra Front, which has recently been renamed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.

Considered one of the strongest jihadist groups in the region, it is currently battling President Bashar Assad's army in Syria. One of the group's leaders, Abu Mohammad Julani, was named a “*specially designated global terrorist*” by the US State Department in 2013.

Another leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, recently called on Islamists to stage more attacks in the United States, addressing the world in a video statement on the 15th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 tragedy.

“The events of 9/11 were a direct result of your crimes against us, your crimes in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, Somalia, Yemen, Islamic Maghreb, and Egypt [and] the result of your occupation of Muslim lands, theft of their resources, and support for the murderous corrupt criminals, who rule over them [...] As long as your crimes continue, the events of 9/11 will be repeated thousands of times, by the will of Allah. And we will follow you — if you don't cease your aggression [against us] — until the Day of Judgment,” al-Zawahiri said,

according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).

Although in July this year Jabhat Fateh al-Sham said it was cutting ties from Al-Qaeda, the Pentagon recently alleged the two groups are still connected.

Citing sources in the defense sphere, the Times reported that the leadership of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham is working on plans to attack the United Kingdom and other targets across Europe after Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL), the other major terror group operating in the Middle East, is pushed back from the territories it occupied in Syria and Iraq. *“Al-Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding itself,”* a government source told the news outlet. *“They watched [IS] become the big kid on the block. Al-Qaeda is biding its time. It will still be there when [IS] is done.”*

The source's words were echoed by Nigel Inkster, an ex-chief of operations at MI6 working for London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank.

“Al-Qaeda have been rebuilding quietly and waiting out Islamic State, waiting to see Islamic State come under the pressure it has come under,” Inkster was cited as saying.

Russia and the US-led coalition have been separately fighting IS in Syria. Russia has also been conducting airstrikes against Jabhat Fateh al-Sham positions, while repeatedly accusing Washington of sparing the militant group and failing to separate it from more moderate rebels fighting against Assad's governance.

FBI Director James Comey recently predicted that the international coalition would eventually succeed in defeating IS in Syria and Iraq, but warned that this will bring about another terror-linked problem, as *“not all of the Islamic State killers are going to die on the battlefield”* and *“there will be a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next two to five years like we have never seen before.”*

Apart from Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Bin Laden's organization's branch based in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), also poses a threat as it has been



successfully regrouping and gaining ground using the conflict between Yemen's government and the rebel Houthis.

Moreover, sources say that some of Al-Qaeda's core members have been returning to southern Afghanistan 15 years after they were forced to leave by the US-led invasion.

Finally, Osama Bin Laden's son, Hamza bin Laden, recently came center-stage with a

series of audio recordings released by the Al-Qaeda-linked As-Sahab media outlet, aimed at asserting his influence over the global terrorist network. Believed to be 25 years old now and living in Pakistan, he also released a video in July vowing revenge against the United States at home and abroad in response to Washington's policies in Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia.

How Sweden became an exporter of jihad ?!

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37578919>

Oct 08 – Sweden is a peaceful democratic state that has long been a safe haven for those fleeing conflict. Yet many young people whose families took refuge there are now turning their back on the country. More than 300 people have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq, making Sweden per capita one of the biggest exporters

lashed and executed; the constant bombardment and airstrikes - all part of the daily life of a jihadi bride.

To begin with, it had seemed more appealing - she had been glad to be there. But after her husband died she began to notice things that were alien to the religion she had been brought up in.

"When they burned the Jordanian pilot I asked them why they burn up a human being. Is that right in Islam? What I know is that you are not allowed to burn anyone."

With the help of another IS fighter, she managed to get smuggled out of Syria, across the border to Turkey before flying back to Sweden. She shows me pictures of her Kalashnikov and her injured daughter, her face covered with shrapnel wounds.

Why did she decide to join IS, I ask?

"When you go this way you don't think about the worldly life. Like I can have a good bed. You don't care about these things. You just think about the fastest way I can die and go to heaven."

After the interview I drop her off on the outskirts of the city. Driving away, I notice her playing with a stray cat - looking just like any other shy young girl.

Gothenburg is where much of the recruitment for jihad is taking place.

With a population of just over half a million, this port city and former industrial powerhouse has seen at least 100 men and women leave to join militants fighting for the proclaimed caliphate.

It's one of Sweden's most diverse cities. A third of the population are from immigrant backgrounds, many of them Muslim, and in the north-eastern suburb of Angered, the proportion rises to more than 70%.



of jihadists in Europe.

I meet 23-year-old Sara in the basement of a building in Gothenburg, Sweden's second city. She seems like any other young Western woman, wearing tight clothing and make-up and displaying a number of tattoos on her arms and neck. But she has recently returned from Raqqa in Syria, where her husband died fighting for the so-called Islamic State (IS).

She recalls some of the horrors she had witnessed. The sound of Yazidi women being raped in the room next to hers; offenders being



Sweden's massive housing shortage and long waits for rent controlled apartments in the centre of town mean that many new arrivals end up here, and stay here. This includes some of the 160,000 people who received asylum in Sweden last year.

Suburbs like Angered have become pressure cookers of discontent

Angered has become a tough area to police.



Parts of it are classified as "vulnerable", which in Swedish police terminology indicates a breakdown of law and order, among other things, and the emergence of a parallel society.

I am told that religious enforcers attempt to control the community to ensure Sharia law is adhered to.

They allegedly harass and intimidate people - mainly women - for the way they dress and for attending parties where there is music and dancing, which they consider *haram*.

Meanwhile, two-thirds of children have dropped out of school by the time they are 15, and unemployment is 11% - high by Swedish standards. It's these vulnerable young people that the extremists target.

One softly spoken young man - who I will call Imran - told me hardline recruiters were manipulating young people who had lost their way, and encouraging them to join IS. "Like a big brother will say to you, like a father will say to you, 'Stop doing drugs, stop hitting people. Come with us instead. Fight for God. Fight for Allah. Fight for your freedom of the Muslims. The Muslim people are being killed and raped. You are wasting your life. You don't get nothing from the Swedish people.' "This guy has been a criminal just like me and done a lot of bad stuff. And now he is coming to me and telling me, 'You have to change.'"

Imran was initially eager to travel to the Middle East and join IS. But after seeing videos and photographs of their brutality he says he is now afraid, and wants to build a life for himself in Sweden instead.

Suburbs like Angered have become pressure cookers of discontent.

You see this built-up resentment mainly with the second-generation "non-ethnic Swedes", as they're known here.

Many of their parents fled war-torn countries in search of safety and found it in Sweden. They appear grateful for what the country has offered them. Their children, however, often feel they've been discriminated against and left out of the system. Many young people I spoke to said they felt disconnected from the country where their parents came from - but didn't feel they were Swedish either.

The issues here have been further compounded by the sudden influx of refugees fleeing wars in Syria and Iraq. Accepting refugees is part of what it means to be Swedish. Last year alone, Sweden accepted more refugees per capita than any other European country.

Ulf Bostrom, a veteran Gothenburg policeman who has become Sweden's only "integration officer", puts part of the blame for the problems the city now faces on police cutbacks.

"We have lost more than 50% of the policemen working in uniform in the different areas - 50%," he says. "You can see for yourself. How many policemen have you seen during your time here in the areas you have been to? Have you seen any?" No, I reply.

Bostrom himself, however, is a well-known figure in Gothenburg's suburbs and spends most of his time building trust and engaging with the migrant community and different faith groups.

He took me to the Bellevue mosque on the outskirts of Gothenburg, which is reported to have ties to various Islamist and terrorist-designated organisations. Many of the people who have gone to Syria and Iraq have had connections here, and spiritual leader of al-Shabaab, Hassan Hussein, visited in 2009.

Later I attended Friday prayer at Angered's largest mosque where about 500 worshippers had gathered. The imam, who came to Sweden from Syria three years ago, urged them to respect Swedish laws and customs and to assimilate as much as they could into mainstream society. But I was told that on one occasion two men stood up and verbally attacked him for condemning extremism, before they were escorted out. Just another indication of how divided and polarised these communities are.

What has happened to Swedes who have travelled to Iraq and Syria, I ask Bostrom.



"Well there is a number of 311 or so but none who have come back have been arrested. I think our terrorism law is not functioning well enough," he says.

Only in April was the law changed to make it illegal to travel abroad with the intention to commit acts of terrorism.

Klas Friberg, the regional police chief and Ulf Bostrom's boss, says the authorities are aware of the problems they face, and know that security needs to be improved in areas where parallel societies have taken shape.

But the reality is that right now young people from immigrant backgrounds are being radicalised.

Why would someone raised in Gothenburg want to leave one of the most peaceful and progressive countries in the developed world to join a violent extremist group in the Middle East?

With so many of them saying they don't feel Swedish, perhaps the bigger question is: has integration and Sweden's experiment with multiculturalism failed?

Ex-undercover MI5 agent reveals how he foiled terror plot to kill thousands in Easter weekend shopping centre massacre

Source: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ex-undercover-mi5-agent-reveals-8992995>

Oct 06 – **A former MI5 agent has revealed how he helped foil a terror plot to blow up a bustling shopping centre that would have killed thousands of innocent people on Easter weekend.**

Tom Marcus was part of a crack team that brought down an Al Qaeda terror cell that was planning 'spectacular' attacks in New York and Manchester.



As part of their incredible operation they foiled a plot to kill and maim thousands in a terrifying attack on Manchester's Arndale Centre.

Terrorists had planned to detonate a huge car bomb outside the Arndale Centre over the busy Easter weekend of April, 2009, while suicide bombers were waiting to blow themselves up, along with any evacuees in St Ann's Square.

But government spying station GCHQ intercepted a coded email sent from an internet cafe in Cheetham Hill which indicated the 'wedding' was imminent and the security services swooped, arresting a dozen suspects

just two days before the strike was due to take place.

Abid Naseer, 29, who had sent the 'wedding' email, was jailed for 40 years in 2015 for plotting to attack the Arndale and a New York subway.

In his memoir *Soldier Spy*, former MI5 agent Marcus described his part in the huge surveillance operation in the weeks and

months before the attack was foiled, reports the Manchester Evening News.

"This operation had been going on for months, and, while nearly all our operations have an international element to them, this wasn't just your run-of-the-mill tourist-spot attack. This was the biggest operation I've ever been involved in.

"A highly planned attack that aimed to kill tens of thousands of people, both here in the UK and in New York City," wrote Marcus.

He details a plot to carry out another attack on New York and adds: "The second part of their plan, while they also discussed bringing down a transatlantic passenger plane, was to blow up a shopping centre in Manchester during Easter weekend.

"We estimated the casualty numbers could top 20,000 dead and triple that in injuries. These two attacks, though months apart, would have been catastrophic."

He describes tailing 'one of seven major players in the cell' down the M1 to Heathrow Airport where the




target got a flight to New York and was picked up by US intelligence.

New York jailed student Naseer, 29, was jailed for plotting to attack the Arndale and a New York subway.

He planned to blow himself up with a huge car bomb he would park outside Next on Corporation Street, just 100 metres from the spot where the IRA detonated a bomb in 1996.

Apart from causing widespread casualties in Exchange Square, the plan was also to murder those fleeing the blast with a squad of suicide bombers waiting to detonate devices in Market Street and St Ann's Square.



He had sent them the 'wedding' email from a internet cafe near his home in Cheetham Hill.

Naseer was convicted nearly six years after he was first arrested in a British anti-terrorism operation.

British authorities never charged Naseer, but he was later indicted in the United States and extradited in 2013.

A team of around 300 counter terrorism officers had already been investigating Naseer but the 'game changing' wedding email prompted an urgent re-think.

Naseer, who was raised in Peshawar, Pakistan and said he was a semi-professional cricket player, led an al Qaeda cell that plotted to bomb a shopping center in Manchester in April 2009, prosecutors said.

The proposed bombing in Britain was part of an overall plot involving Naseer and al Qaeda cells that included attacks against the New

York City subway system and a Copenhagen newspaper, prosecutors said.

Based on the Islamic calendar, investigators believed this email was referring to a planned attack during the Easter weekend in 2009.

Detective Chief Superintendent Tony Mole, of Greater Manchester Police, said at the time: "Abid Naseer has finally seen justice for the terrorist atrocities he planned to orchestrate against the people of Greater Manchester.

"In 2009, the North West Counter Terrorism Unit received credible intelligence that Naseer and others were just days away from carrying out a plot which would have resulted in a massive explosive device being detonated outside the Arndale Centre.

"A sentence of 40 years, we believe, is a fitting punishment for a man who came so close to carrying out what would have been one of the horrific terrorist acts seen in the UK since the 7/7 bombings.

"They planned to strike on Easter Weekend, the second busiest shopping day of the year, when between 40,000 and 90,000 people would have been in the targeted areas throughout the weekend.

"The actions of the NWCTU and our partners in the security service potentially saved the lives of hundreds of people that day, and struck a hammer blow to the heart of Al Qaeda's plans in the UK."

"I know you're not what I'd say for any lack of a better word a 'typical' criminal. Not in any sense of the word," US District Judge Raymond Dearie in Brooklyn told Naseer.

"You're a terrorist."

Two men, Najibullah Zazi and Zarein Ahmedzay, also pleaded guilty to charges stemming from the New York subway plot.

A third, Adis Medunjanin, was sentenced in 2012 to life in prison.

Zazi testified at Naseer's trial, providing testimony that supported prosecutors' claims that both men coordinated their plans through coded emails with an al Qaeda operative in Pakistan.

At trial, prosecutors used never-before publicised documents seized from the 2011 raid in Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden as part of their case against Naseer and testimony from British MI5 officers who conducted surveillance on him.



MI5 officers testified anonymously, wearing wigs and makeup to protect their identities. Naseer denied any affiliation with al Qaeda or any plot, telling jurors that "terrorism is not compatible with Islam."

Prosecutors had sought a prison term of 30 years to life for Naseer, saying he remained committed to al Qaeda's cause and posed an extreme danger.

Operation Tinombala: Indonesia's New Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Analysis

By Jasmininder Singh

Source: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/08102016-operation-tinombala-indonesias-new-counter-terrorism-strategy-analysis/>

Oct 08 – The serious threat posed by the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has led to an expansion of the Indonesian military's role in counter-terrorism. This was demonstrated in Operation Tinombala that disabled the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and its leaders.



The success of the combined Indonesian military and police operation against the home-grown militants network in Eastern Indonesia, named Operation Tinombala, highlights the new phase of the republic's counter terrorism strategy. This phase was brought about by the rise of the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as IS, whose members and supporters possessed well-trained combat skills and pursue a more symmetrical capability against the security forces.

The Indonesian political leadership in the beginning of 2015 tasked the military (TNI) with the responsibility of terminating the

threat posed by the MIT, led by the elusive Santoso. In June 2015 the military's Joint Special Operations Command was launched. The military undertook Operation Tinombala and worked in concert with the police to terminate the group's top leaders. For all intents and purposes the group has been largely neutralised.

Background to TNI's Counter-terrorism Role

Southeast Asia's largest component of ISIS is from Indonesia. ISIS' Southeast Asian militant arm, known as Katibah Nusantara, is led and manned mainly by Indonesians. Also, the police had not been able to neutralise the militant threat posed by Santoso and the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in the jungles of Central Sulawesi, which had seen the unprecedented participation of foreign Uighur fighters.

With the establishment of Wilayah Philippines by the Islamic State in South Philippines, again, Indonesia's police-led counter terrorism units have not been very successful in stopping the migration of Indonesian fighters to South Philippines under a new group called the Katibah Al Muhajir. Indeed, the threat has grown to the extent that it is beyond the capability of the police to deal with it alone.

While the police and especially Detachment 88 (Densus 88) performed well to contain the terrorist menace, mostly from the Al-Qaeda

linked Jemaah Islamiyah, it is now confronted with serious challenges in facing today's terrorism threat, which has become more symmetrical in nature – increasingly taking on conventional warfare tactics as it grows in resources. The police also faced public criticism whenever mistakes in field operations came to light.

Sceptics have played up the perceived failure of the police to detect the return of several terrorists, including Dulmatin and Abu Dujana from abroad, and even attributed this to the success of the jihadists in revenge killings of more than 40 police officers.

It is against this backdrop that the Indonesian military, especially the army, started playing a bigger counter-terrorism role, in collaboration with the police, to protect the country.

Military's Expanded Role

A breakthrough in the military's expanded role came with the placement of a senior military



officer in the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in January 2011 which had, until then, been led by a police officer. Major General Agus Surya Bakti served as the deputy in-charge of deradicalisation from January 2011 to October 2015. Since then, there has been a gradual increase in the military's role in counter-terrorism operations in Indonesia.

In September 2013, the army was allowed to assist the police by collecting information on terrorist activities domestically. In March 2015, military personnel began counter-terrorism training with the police, followed by the launching in June 2015 of the military's Joint Special Operations Command. That ended the police monopoly in counter-terrorism that has been in place since 2002.

A key factor leading to rising joint army-police counter-terrorism operations in Indonesia is the manifold capabilities of the army that were built over the years. The growth of home-grown terrorists targeting Indonesians has propelled the military to the forefront of counter-terrorism. The military's territorial structure, right down to the remotest village, accords it a unique resource. The military's all-round strength in counter-terrorism in the past and its possession of well-trained combat units, supported by good intelligence, are strong factors putting it in good

stead for deployment in counter-terrorism duties.

The military's experience in counter-terrorism, its proven assets in training, experience and intelligence in counter-terrorism, its legal mandate to participate in counter-terrorism operations and the rising new terrorist threat to national security, are the key factors that have led to the military's increasing role in counter-terrorism compared to the past.

Trailblazing Army-Police Cooperation

The success of Operation Tinombala, significant for trailblazing a major joint army-police counter-terrorism operations – the first since 1998 – showed how joint army-police operations can effectively deal with the threat posed by the quick-morphing threat of terrorism in the country.

The past reservations about the expanded role of the Indonesian military and uncertainties over what role it should play in the present security climate have been largely dissipated by Operation Tinombala's success. It is also due to the realisation that terrorism is posing an existential threat to the state and society. Through a whole-of-government approach, especially army-police collaboration in counter-terrorism, Indonesia's security can be assured, especially in neutralising ISIS.

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Pet cats banned in ISIS-held Mosul, jihadists search homes - report

Source: <https://www.rt.com/viral/361719-isis-ban-cats-mosul/>

Oct 06 – **Islamists in Iraq's city of Mosul have issued a fatwa banning the city's residents from keeping the felines at home claiming the new law supports jihadists' "vision, ideology and beliefs".**



Keeping cats at home is no longer allowed for Mosul residents, the terrorist group Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) said in the new decree. "Islamic State's Central Fatwa Committee issued a fatwa against the breeding of cats inside houses in Mosul," Iraqi's Al Sumaria reported on Tuesday.

Support Cats Opposition Army to fight IS back!

The outlet did not provide a clear explanation as to why IS had issued a



ban on cat breeding only saying that the decree, along with other fatwas, “matches” jihadist “vision, ideology and beliefs”. Warning the city’s residents not to violate the new law, ISIS fighters began searching their houses for felines.

IS was not so averse to cats before, at least on the outside. Its propaganda accounts on social media have previously posted numerous pictures of kittens to lure in young recruits. In the photos, the cats were surrounded by guns and grenades or cuddled by IS fighters.

Without specifying whether it was because of the kittens, a 2014 UN report stated that as many as 15,000 fighters from abroad had joined IS ranks, arriving via 80 countries. The terror group is fully aware of the “the terror and recruitment value of multi-channel, multi-language social and other media messaging,” the report said.

A similar fatwa banning the breeding of pigeons was reportedly issued by IS in June. The group at the time claimed that “the sight of the birds’ genitals as they fly overhead is offensive to Islam,” The Daily Mail reported.

A fatwa is an Islamic legal degree. In legitimate countries that adhere to Islamic law, like Saudi Arabia, it is issued by the respective country’s top mufti. IS has a Central Fatwa Committee, comprised of senior clerics and figures from the terrorist group.

Man armed with **AXE** and **CHAINSAW** kills woman shopper and wounds several others in terrifying mall attack

Source: <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1937696/man-armed-with-axe-and-chainsaw-kills-woman-shopper-and-wounds-several-others-in-terrifying-mall-attack/>

Oct 08 – A rampaging man armed with an **AXE** and **CHAINSAW** killed one woman and wounded several others in a Belarus shopping centre.

One suspect has been arrested after the horror attack in Minsk earlier this afternoon.

Alexander Lastovsky, a spokesman for Minsk Police, said the motives for the crime are not known at this stage.

A spokesman from the Investigative Committee of Belarus said that reports of ‘two attackers’ were not correct.

He told Russian website Onliner: “A man brought a chainsaw and an axe in the boot of a guitar.

“He inflicted bodily injuries to chainsaw girl, she died on the spot.

“He suffered another girl.

“Suspect arrested, a man of Slavic appearance born in 1998, Belarusian nationality.

“Investigative Committee (have) opened a criminal case.”

The attackers targeted a woman, believed to be around 30-year-old, who died from her injuries.

The area to the mall was cordoned by police and paramedics.

Hundreds of shoppers were reportedly in the mall when the terrifying attack began.

It has been reported that the suspect wore a mask.



the attacker went into the centre – Europa – through a side entrance, wounding one man in the arm initially.

News.tut reports that



Two Israelis dead after drive-by shooting at Jerusalem tram stop

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/09/drive-by-shooting-at-jerusalem-tram-stop>



Oct 09 – Two people have been reported dead and six injured in a drive-by shooting at a Jerusalem tram stop near the Israeli police headquarters. The gunman was killed by police after a brief car chase. The attack happened on Sunday at the Ammunition Hill light rail stop, an area that has been the site of a number of attacks over the last two years. It is close to the line dividing mainly Palestinian east Jerusalem from the mostly Jewish western side of the city.

The attacker was provisionally identified by Israeli police as a 39-year-old resident of Silwan, a Palestinian neighbourhood of east Jerusalem.

The victims were named as Levana Malihi, 60, a grandmother and police sergeant Yosef Kirma, 29.

The incident began when a gunman in a car opened fire on the tram stop where one woman was shot. According to police, the gunman then continued into a Palestinian neighbourhood of east Jerusalem where he fired on pursuing police before being shot himself.

“When the terrorist spotted the police he fired at them, and they managed to shoot and kill him,” a police spokeswoman said. One of the police officers was shot by the gunman during the exchange and died. Images from the scene showed a bus stop damaged by gunfire and a grey car stopped in the middle of the road with the driver’s side window shattered.

The gunman was later identified as Misbah Abu Sbeih who had been due to start a four month prison sentence for assaulting an Israeli police officer in 2013.

He had previously spent a year in prison after being convicted of social media posts encouraging violence against Israelis and had, on Saturday, complained to a Palestinian news site of recent run-ins with Israeli police.

Palestinians, many acting alone and with rudimentary weapons, have killed at least 33 Israelis and two visiting Americans in attacks. There had been a drop-off in incidents, but recent weeks have seen renewed escalation.

About 218 Palestinians have been killed during that period. Israel says the vast majority of them were attackers.

Israel says anti-Israeli incitement by Palestinian officials and on social media networks is stoking attacks.

Palestinian leaders say assailants are acting out of desperation over the collapse in 2014 of peace talks and the expansion of Israeli settlements on occupied land that Palestinians seek for an independent state.



The last attack in Jerusalem was on 19 September, amid a spate of incidents, when two police officers were wounded, one seriously, in a stabbing close to the Old City.

New release of The Islamic State's magazine: "Rome #2"

Posted on October 4, 2016 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Source: <http://jihadology.net/2016/10/04/new-release-of-the-islamic-states-magazine-rome-2/>



► Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: [Rome Magazine #2](#)



Clown threats may be unnerving, but they are not terrorism

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161007-clown-threats-may-be-unnerving-but-they-are-not-terrorism>

Oct 07 – **The fear of clowns has been around for decades, perpetuated by Stephen King's 1986 novel "It" as well as dozens of TV shows and movies. But what previously was an underlying nervousness recently has mushroomed into a more immediate threat.**

On 29 August, residents at a South Carolina apartment complex reported a person in a clown costume trying to lure children into the woods. The same situation was reported 4 September in North Carolina. Ten days later, two boys in Georgia reported being chased by men dressed as clowns.

Since then, the fear has grown as people across the country continue to report being chased by or simply spotting people dressed as clowns. It has caused school lockdowns, more than a dozen arrests, and false reports generally considered to be hoaxes. Social media has responded with entire accounts dedicated to creepy clowns.

TTU says that a Texas Tech University terrorism expert says, however, that despite the growing sense of fear, it is important to avoid calling the threats and attacks acts of terrorism.

Retired U.S. Air Force [Col. Dave Lewis](#) is the director of the [Strategic Studies](#) graduate program at Texas Tech. He teaches courses in strategy, intelligence, terrorism, counterinsurgency, national security, public sector strategy, and Homeland Security. He was a career military officer with extensive operational and staff experience, and he served as a professor of strategy at the United States Naval War College after earning his master's degree with distinction in national security and strategic studies there.

Lewis stresses the following points:

- "The goal with this clown stuff seems to be either just to gain notoriety or to create turmoil or anarchy, and even if they're trying to do it for economic benefits or personal gain, it doesn't really fit our terrorism definition. Think about drug cartels. Do they use terror? Absolutely. Are they trying to change a political system? No, they're trying to make money."
- "Who do we classify as terrorists? Usually we talk about non-state or sub-state actors: somebody that is not a country and doing something that is not what we'd consider the



legitimate use of violence, like fighting wars. It's somebody who is using violence to achieve political goals that they don't have a process to achieve."

- "When people start talking about terrorism, I apply that four-way test to make sure we're on the same level of definition because it's such an emotionally charged word. We have to really adhere to a strict definition of what we believe terrorism is. It doesn't mean people aren't afraid or that they're not being terrorized, but we want to look at that political goal."
- "Sometimes in this day and age of social media, people just pick up on things and run with it. We could start to create an element of panic, and that's where it becomes dangerous."
- "Even though we're taking a strict definition of terrorism, that doesn't mean it's not dangerous or that it can't create challenges. A terroristic threat is different than what we consider terrorism. If somebody were to do something to try to make you fearful or cause harm to you, I believe that would be a terroristic threat versus what we would traditionally call terrorism."
- "From an anarchy perspective, the implications are that we're occupying our law enforcement and creating havoc with our universities, our residents, our dorms. You have to take this seriously, but there's an opportunity cost to that. When somebody's doing something like that, what aren't the police forces able to do? If we actually have a serious crime going on and our law enforcement is responding to something that's frivolous, then we've really created a problem in our community."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: I do not agree with the overall concept posed above. When people will be desensitized to clowns and feel "comfortable" with them, then it is a good time clowns to turn to terrorists. Besides what is really the difference between "terror" and "fear" – practically nothing! Perhaps this is a good base to try to define terrorism without all the other parameters usually accompanying terrorism definitions. Terror can be private, collective, local, national, international, global. Next time you suffer a clown attack FIGHT BACK! There are so many ways to have fun and this is not one of them!

U.S.: UN should investigate war crimes committed by Russia, Syria in Aleppo

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161007-u-s-un-should-investigate-war-crimes-committed-by-russia-syria-in-aleppo>

Oct 07 – **U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that the military campaign by Russia and Syria against civilians in Aleppo amounts to a war crime, and that the UN must launch a war crime investigation into the two countries' actions.**

Military analysts noted that the Russian and Syrian campaign aims not only to kill civilians directly by dropping barrel bombs on Sunni neighborhood: Assad and his Russian allies deliberately increase the death toll by using bunker-busting munitions systematically to destroy the city's civilian infrastructure — hospitals, clinics, water treatment facilities, and power stations.

The analysts say that Assad's ultimate goal is to make life in the city impossible, thus forcing hundreds of thousands of Sunnis to flee, making it easier for his Alawite and Shi'a forces to control the city once they recapture it from the rebels.

DW [reports](#) that Kerry's remarks come after a series of hospital bombings in the war-torn country.

"Russia and the regime owe the world more than an explanation about why they keep hitting hospitals, and medical facilities, and women and children," Kerry said, speaking alongside French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault in Washington.

He added that the actions "beg for an appropriate investigation of war crimes."

"They are beyond the accidental now, way beyond, years beyond" Kerry said, saying: "This is a targeted strategy to terrorize civilians and to kill anybody and everybody who is in the way of their military objectives."

Kerry's comments came ahead of a weekend emergency United Nations Security Council vote on imposing a draft resolution submitted by France on a ceasefire in Syria.



"Tomorrow will be a moment of truth, a moment of truth for all the members of the Security Council," Ayrault said on Friday alongside Kerry. "Do you want a ceasefire in Aleppo, yes or no? And the question is in particular for our Russian partner."

Earlier this week, the State Department announced that the United States would suspend contacts with Russia after Syria and Russia broke the 9 September ceasefire agreement, which Kerry and Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov had reached a few days earlier.

"This is not a decision that was taken lightly," State Department spokesman John Kirby said. "Unfortunately, Russia failed to live up to its own commitments ... and was also either unwilling or unable to ensure Syrian regime adherence to the arrangements to which Moscow agreed."

"Russia and the Syrian regime have chosen to pursue a military course, inconsistent with the Cessation of Hostilities," he said, "as demonstrated by their intensified attacks against civilian areas, targeting of critical infrastructure such as hospitals, and preventing humanitarian aid from reaching civilians in need, including through the September 19 attack on a humanitarian aid convoy."

On Friday, Russia's lower house of parliament unanimously approved a treaty with Syria which would allow Russian troops to remain in the country indefinitely.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Why only Russia and Syria and not ALL those that contributed in numerous ways resulting in today's chaos and bloodshed? Unless they feel completely innocent. Are they?

Pillars of Turkey's Islamization: Schools, Mosques, and Prisons

By Burak Bekdil

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6315/pillars-of-islamization-in-turkey>

Sep 27 – One way the rise of Islamist authoritarianism in a country can be seen is by the rise in the number of mosques, religious schools and prisons -- coupled with a sharp decline in the quality of education. Turkey is no exception.

Most recently, the Turkish government said that it would [build 174 new prisons](#), increasing capacity by 100,000 convicts. This is Turkey's reply to complaints that six convicts must share a cell built for three. Convicts say they must sleep in turns in their bunk beds.

Before that, Turkey's government [released nearly 40,000 convicted criminals](#), in order to make space for tens of thousands of suspects, including journalists, businessmen and academics, detained after the failed coup of July 15.

The other type of trendy building in Turkey is the mosque. Turkey's state-funded Directorate for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) has proudly [announced](#) that nearly 9,000 new mosques were built across the country between 2005 and 2015.

The number of mosques in Turkey is estimated at around 90,000, or one mosque per 866 people. Iran, with a similar population to Turkey's [nearly 78 million] boasts just 48,000 mosques. In other words, Turkey has twice as many mosques as the

Islamic Republic of Iran, for roughly the same population. Egypt, which has a population -- nearly 90 million -- bigger than Turkey's, has 67,000 mosques.

Turkey's president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has not only been building mosques and prisons to further Islamize the country. He has also passionately been building religious schools [from which he once graduated]. He boasts that during his term as prime minister and president (since November 2002), the number of students enrolled at religious schools, officially called "imam schools," has [risen](#) from 60,000 to more than 1.2 million -- a 20-fold increase. In his study, "[The Islamization of Turkey: Erdogan's Education Reforms](#)," Svante E. Cornell wrote that:

The growing efforts at Islamization of Turkish society have largely gone unnoticed. For many years, Islamization was the dog that did not bark: in spite of dire predictions by secularists, the [ruling] AKP did not introduce conspicuous efforts to Islamize Turkey. But since 2011, this has changed. The main exhibit is the education sector, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has remodeled to instill considerably more Islamic content, in line with his stated purpose to raise "pious generations". Ultimately, the



Islamic overhaul of the education system is bound to have implications for Turkey's civilizational identity, and on the choices it will make on where it belongs politically.

In 2012, Erdogan's government introduced a contentious 12-year compulsory education system, paving the way for religious middle schools. In 2014, it introduced a scheme which forcibly enrolled about 40,000 students at imam schools. In some districts, imam schools were suddenly the [only option for parents](#) who could not afford private schooling. Also in 2014, the government granted permission for girls as young as 10 to wear Islamic headscarves in class.

So, where does Turkey's increasingly Islamist education stand after all those efforts? [According to a report](#) released this month by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Turkey is one of the countries with the lowest spending per student. Turkey's public spending for primary and secondary school education, and its spending

per university student, were all below the OECD average. The OECD study also found that 43% of Turkish women aged between 15 and 29 were neither working nor receiving education. The OECD average for that group is 17%.

But it is not just about the quantitative findings; qualitative findings also point to an alarming education deficit in Turkey. In 2016, more than two million Turkish high school graduates took the annual national test to enroll at a post-secondary institution. According to the nationwide test results, the students scored an average 4.6 out of 40 questions in mathematics; 7.8 in science and 10.7 in humanities. Ironically, the [test results show](#) that the Turkish students do not even have adequate skills in their own language. The average score in Turkish was 19.1 out of 40.

This is the inevitable outcome of systematic Islamization of society in general, and of education in particular, over the past 14 years. The next 14 years will doubtless be far bleaker.

Burak Bekdil is an Ankara-based columnist for the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet Daily News and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Comparing U.S. deaths from terrorism *vs.* gun violence

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161005-comparing-u-s-deaths-from-terrorism-vs-gun-violence>

Oct 05 – On twenty-five occasions during his nearly eight years in office, President Barack Obama has formally talked to the American people on the subject of gun violence. This is one formal address on the subject every 112 days.

Fox43 reports that that in the last year alone, he has formally addressed the nation on the subject of gun violence every thirty-six days.

After a gunman opened fire at Umpqua Community College in Oregon in October 2015, killing nine people and injuring seven, Obama said the shootings, unfortunately, were becoming routine. In his address after the shooting, he [urged](#) American news organizations to tally two sets of figures, and compare them to each other: the number of Americans killed in terrorist attacks in the last decade, and the number of Americans who have died in gun violence.

"We spend over 1 trillion dollars and pass countless laws and devote entire agencies to preventing terrorist attacks on our soil, and rightfully so," Obama said. "And yet we have a Congress that explicitly blocks us from collecting data on how we could potentially reduce gun deaths. How can that be?"

"I would ask news organizations — because I won't put these facts forward — have news organizations tally up the number of Americans who have been killed in terrorist attacks in last decade and the number of Americans who've been killed by gun violence. And post those side by side on your news reports. This won't be information coming from me. It will be coming from you."

"When Americans are killed in mine disasters, we work to make mines safer," the president noted.

"When Americans are killed in floods and hurricanes, we make communities safer. When roads are unsafe, we fix them, to reduce auto fatalities. We have seat-belt laws because we know it saves lives.



“The notion that gun violence is somehow different — that our freedom and our Constitution prohibits any modest regulation of how we use a deadly weapon when there are law-abiding gun owners all across the country who could hunt and do everything they do under such regulations — it doesn’t make sense.”

Last year CNN [tallied](#) these numbers – and has updated the numbers with another year of data now available.

CNN found that for every one American killed by an act of terror in the United States or abroad in 2014, more than 1,049 American died or were killed because of guns.

CNN says that it used numbers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and found that from 2001 to 2014, 440,095 people died by firearms on U.S. soil (the most recent data on death by firearms which CDC has are for 2014). The “death by firearms” data cover homicides, accidents, and suicides.

The U.S. State Department numbers show that 369 U.S. citizens were killed overseas as a result of incidents of terrorism from 2001 to 2014.

CNN has also compiled all terrorism incidents inside the United States and found that between 2001 and 2014, 3,043 people killed in domestic acts of terrorism – including the 9/11 attacks (see below the list of terrorist acts on U.S. soil).

This brings the total of U.S. citizens killed in acts of terrorism inside the United States and abroad from 2001 to 2014 to 3,412.

CNN has compiled this list of domestic terrorism incidents on U.S. soil:

[September 11 attacks](#) (NY, DC, PA) 9/11/01
[2001 Anthrax attacks](#) (DC, NY, CT, FL) Oct., Nov. 2001
[El Al counter shooting](#) (California) 7/4/02
[Beltway sniper attacks](#) (DC, Mid-Atlantic) Oct. 2002
[Knoxville church shooting](#) (Tennessee) 7/27/08
[Pittsburgh police officers killed](#) (Pennsylvania) 4/4/09
[Tiller abortion clinic](#) (Kansas) 5/31/09
[Holocaust Museum shooting](#) (DC) 6/10/09
[Fort Hood shooting](#) (Texas) 11/5/09
[Plane crash into Austin IRS building](#) (Texas) 2/18/10
[Fort Stewart Army base killing](#) (Georgia) 12/10/11
[Sikh Temple Shooting](#) (Wisconsin) 8/7/12

[St. John's Parish police ambush](#) (Louisiana) 8/16/12
[Boston Marathon Bombing](#) (Massachusetts) 4/15/13
[LAX Shooting](#) (California) 11/05/13

2014 additions:

[Overland Park Jewish community center](#) (Kansas) 4/13/14
[Isla Vista shooting](#) (California) 5/23/14
[Las Vegas shooting](#) (Nevada) 6/8/14
[Killing of state trooper in Blooming Grove](#) (Pennsylvania) 9/12/14

A dangerous liaison: terrorists and organized crime in South America

By Alejandro Ramos

Source: <http://origin-nyl.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/299884-a-dangerous-liaison-terrorists-and-organized-crime-in>

Oct 09 – About 100 South Americans have fought alongside the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and returned home. What's to stop them from sneaking into the United States? In the U.S., the FBI monitors suspected terrorists. But are they effectively tracked in Choco forest in Colombia or business fronts in Bolivia?

Terrorist groups are closer to us than you might think. The most prominent and well-known in South America is Hezbollah. It works with drug cartels and local terrorists such as the FARC in Colombia. Now that Colombian citizens

rejected a peace deal between the FARC and their government, there is a fear drug-trafficking will continue and connections with Hezbollah will remain. The U.S. needs to provide its regional allies with financial assistance, limited military aid, and intelligence to help disrupt these sorts of relationships before there's another attack on U.S. soil.

We need a robust counter-terrorism strategy that includes counter-narcotics and anti-money-laundering assistance from the U.S. to our southern neighbors.



Additionally, the U.S. should provide limited amounts of military surveillance equipment and firearms to countries such as Peru and Paraguay. And to keep databases updated, the U.S. and its allies need to share pertinent intelligence, making sure all potential terrorists are monitored within their borders.

Member States of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) need U.S. assistance. CICTE is under-funded. Currently, its programs cannot help train countries to locate and dismantle terror and organized crime cells. With appropriate funding, the organization can provide countries with the necessary training and equipment.

This plan will deter terrorists against forming new partnerships with cartels. For instance, **Hezbollah has been smuggling drugs and counterfeit products throughout South America since the 1980s.** If left unchecked, it will continue funding ongoing terror operations in the Middle East, with the potential of harming Americans.

Hezbollah and organized crime networks have different ideologies, but they share a similar desire: profit. If there is a cash incentive, what's to stop cartels from sneaking an extremist into the U.S.?

The U.S. and its allies cannot afford to tackle terrorism and drug-trafficking as two separate issues. The data shows the issues are inextricably tied. If intelligence is shared among the U.S. and its allies, with priorities outlined for each country, it will provide the right kind of

guidance to tackle collaborations between terrorists and illicit crime networks.

Is the plan expensive to the U.S.? No. Just \$5 million re-allocated from the proposed \$49.7 million to the Organization of American States budget, matched by allies, would be sufficient. With adequate funding, the U.S. and its allies can investigate, monitor, and ultimately apprehend suspects.

Is there a risk of misuse of funds? No, not if the U.S. and current-CICTE chair, Paraguay, create an accountability board that ensures funding is spent responsibly and, most importantly, produces favorable results.

Why focus on terrorism in South America if major terror groups are based in the Middle East? Because it only takes one motivated extremist in South America to sneak into the U.S. with weapons. With modest funding and willing allies, we can prevent that tragedy from happening.

The U.S. and its allies must place more attention on disrupting cooperation between cartels and terrorists. It is quite simple: dismantle terror connections, defend the hemisphere. A renewed strategy countering terror will benefit all. The U.S. will secure its interests and protect its citizens. South American countries will dismantle cooperation between cartels and terrorists, decrease drug-trafficking, and diminish illicit activities. We and our allies, working together, will build a stronger and safer Western Hemisphere.

Alejandro Ramos is a Master's candidate at the George Washington University, studying Security Policy Studies and concentrating on Transnational Security Issues.

European jihadists and the new crime-terror nexus

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161013-european-jihadists-and-the-new-crimeterror-nexus>

Oct 13 – The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) has released its [new study](#) on European jihadists and the increasing convergence between criminal and jihadist milieus. The study challenges long-held assumptions about radicalization, recruitment, and how to counter terrorism.

ICSR says that the presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with ISIS and the

ongoing mobilization of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. **In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals.**

The purpose of this new report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR



researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts.

What the researchers have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organizations, but of their social networks, environments, or *milieus*. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalize and operate. This is what the researchers call the *new crime-terror nexus*.

Radicalization and recruitment

The profiles and pathways in the ICSR database suggest that the jihadist narrative — as articulated by the Islamic State — is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to condone as well as curtail the continued involvement in crime.

For up to ten of the individuals in the ICSR database, the researchers found evidence for what they termed the “redemption narrative”: jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the “jump” from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived.

Prisons

Fifty-seven percent of the individuals in the ICSR database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalization, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offenses from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 percent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalized there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release.

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Recommendations

- **Re-thinking radicalization:** The emergence of the new crime-terror nexus and its associated dynamics should compel researchers, analysts, and policymakers to re-think long-held ideas about how terror, crime, and radicalization have to be understood. Being pious is no guarantee that criminal behavior has stopped, while acting like a “gangster” does not preclude involvement in terrorism.
- **Targeting ALL streams of financing:** Countering terrorist finance needs to be broadened beyond the banking system to counter all sources of funding, including small-scale and petty crime, such as drug dealing, theft, robberies, and the trade in counterfeit goods. Not only will doing so help to counter terrorist funding, but also

The ICSR database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of “angry young men” who are “ripe” for radicalization; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and “skills transfers”; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society.

“Skills transfers”

There are many “skills” that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. In particular: (1) individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) they are adept at staying “under the radar” and planning discreet logistics; and (3) their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts.

Financing

Jihadists not only condone the use of “ordinary” criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging “jihad” in the “lands of war.” Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice.

Already, up to 40 percent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through petty crime, especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on the ICSR database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing.



reduce 'ordinary' crimes and enable law enforcement agencies to operate a so-called "Al Capone approach."

- **Data sharing:** Just like the lines between crime and terrorism have become blurred, relevant agencies need to break down institutional silos and become more effective at sharing relevant information across departments and "disciplines." Counter-terrorism, customs, intelligence services, criminal police, and even outside actors need to share information, conduct joint training, and participate in early warning systems.
- **New partnerships:** More important than before are relationships with civil society and local authorities who know more about communities, local dynamics and relationships, than law enforcement and the intelligence agencies. Another potentially valuable tool are public-private partnerships, because businesses are affected by many of the crimes described in this report, and — in addition to wanting to be seen as good "citizens" — they typically have a commercial interest in countering smuggling, fraud, or the trade in counterfeit goods.


— Read more in Rajan Basra et al., *Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus* (ICSR, October 2016).

US Navy ship targeted in failed missile attack from Yemen

Source: <http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/09/us-navy-ship-uss-mason-targeted-in-failed-missile-attack-from-yemen.html>

Oct 10 – A U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer was targeted on Sunday in a failed missile attack from territory in Yemen controlled by Iran-aligned Houthi rebels, a U.S. military spokesman told Reuters, saying neither of the two missiles hit the ship.

The attempted strike on the USS Mason (DDG-87; Arleigh Burke class), which was first reported by



Reuters, came just a week after a United Arab Emirates vessel came under attack from Houthis and suggests growing risks to the U.S. military from Yemen's conflict.

The U.S. government, which has become increasingly vocal about civilian casualties in the war, this weekend announced a review of its support to a Saudi Arabia-led coalition battling the Houthis after a strike on mourners in the capital Sanaa that killed up to 140 people.

The failed missile attack on the



USS Mason began around 7 p.m. local time, when the ship detected two inbound missiles over a 60-minute period in the Red Sea off Yemen's coast, the U.S. military said.

"Both missiles impacted the water before reaching the ship," Pentagon spokesman Captain Jeff Davis said. "There were no injuries to our sailors and no damage to the ship."

Saudi Arabia and the United States blame Shi'ite Iran for supplying weapons to the Houthis. Tehran views the Houthis, who are from a Shi'ite sect, as the legitimate authority in Yemen but denies it supplies them with weapons.

A U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the first missile triggered counter-measures from the USS Mason. It was not immediately clear whether those defenses may have helped prevent a direct hit on the ship.

The USS Mason did not return fire, the official said, adding that the incident took place just north of the Bab al-Mandab strait off Yemen's southern coast.



Last week's attack on the UAE vessel also took place around the Bab al-Mandab strait, in what the UAE branded an "act of terrorism."

C-801 anti-ship missiles



In 2013, more than 3.4 million barrels of oil passed through the 20 km (12 mile)-wide Bab al-Mandab each day, the U.S. Energy Information Administration says.

It was unclear what actions the U.S. military might take, but Davis stressed a commitment to defend freedom of navigation and protect U.S. forces.

"We will continue to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of our ships and our service members," he said.


Phalanx CIWS

The attack also came the same day that Yemen's powerful former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, a key Houthi ally, called for an escalation of attacks against Saudi Arabia, demanding "battle readiness at the fronts on the (Saudi) border".

An estimated 10,000 people have been killed in Yemen's war. The [United Nations](#) blames Saudi-led coalition strikes for 60 percent of some 3,800 civilian deaths since they began in March 2015.

Second Missile Attack on USS Mason Near Yemen

Source: <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dod-second-missile-attack-uss-mason-near-yemen-n665286>



Oct 13 - For the second time this week the USS Mason was targeted by at least one incoming missile fired from a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen. The missiles did not impact the ship and no one was hurt.

A U.S. military official said a coastal defense cruise missile was fired from a Houthi-controlled area south of Al Hudaydah around 6 p.m. local time. The



ship used countermeasures, but the officials are not yet certain whether the measures stopped the missile or if it fizzled.

The USS San Antonio and the USS Ponce was operating in the area with the Mason at the time.

In search of the triggers to Muslim radicalization

By Mrs. Sheema Khan

Source: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/in-search-of-the-triggers-to-muslim-radicalization/article32278938/>

Oct 07 – **Is there any way to pinpoint which factors lead to radicalization of Muslims, or to predict which countries will produce foreign fighters joining groups such as the Islamic State?**

These are the types of questions researchers such as Chris Meserole and Will McCants of the Brookings Institution have been studying. The two, who first discussed their research in a [Foreign Affairs](#) essay last March, have used powerful computational methods to pinpoint factors that strongly correlate with the radicalization of Muslims. They sifted through large amounts of data related to foreign fighters in Syria and socioeconomic parameters, and found that four of the five countries that have the highest foreign-fighter index score – Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Belgium and France – are francophone (i.e., they have, or have had, French as a national language).

The researchers also found that the *lingua franca* is the biggest factor that correlates with radicalization – almost twice as much as youth unemployment and urbanization.

At first glance, it seems absurd that French is tied to extremism. However, they postulated that the French language is a proxy for French political culture, commonly known as *laïcité*, which imposes strict limits on the public expressions of faith.

[A follow-up study](#) by the two researchers probed deeper into *laïcité*, and found that the banning of the hijab/niqab, and the divisive public debate surrounding such edicts, seemed to trigger a jump in the number of Muslims leaving to fight in Syria. In 2010, not long before the start of the Syrian civil war, both France and Belgium passed laws banning the face veil. France had also banned the hijab in public schools in 2004, putting basic religious freedom into question, according to research by [Melanie Adrian](#), a Carleton University professor. Tunisia began strict enforcement of a law banning hijabs in 2006, which remained in place until 2011.

In all three countries, public debates framed the issue as one of incompatibility between *laïcité* and Muslim expression of faith. This was the exact message that Islamic State propagates: One cannot be Muslim and live in the West. The Islamic State strategy is to eliminate the so-called [grey zone](#), a space for meaningful co-existence between Muslims and non-Muslims, and a melding of values and ideas for the enrichment of society.

The idea that toxic rhetoric surrounding Muslim identity can serve as a trigger toward radicalization was given credence by the debate about the Quebec Charter of Values, introduced in the fall of 2013. The bill would have placed restrictions on the hijab and niqab in public spaces. The public debate at times descended into xenophobia about Muslims, and whether they belonged in Quebec. Amarnath Amarasingam, who researches extremism at the University of Waterloo and George Washington University, unearthed compelling information: Before September, 2013, only two Quebec Muslims had left to fight in Syria, whereas 14 left soon after the bill was introduced. Mr. Amarasingam, cited in the Brookings follow-up study, said that interviews with families and friends of the fighters confirmed that those who left “had experienced a general sense of discrimination and racism in the Quebec context, but the Charter was kind of the straw that broke the camel’s back.”

Last month, the Montreal-based Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence issued a [report](#) suggesting that a number of factors affect vulnerable Quebec youth in the radicalization process, such as social identity, psychology, family dynamics and external factors. The latter seems to confirm the findings of the Brookings researchers, namely that polarizing government stances, toxic debates and extremist propaganda that feeds into alienation combine to trigger certain individuals.



The timing of toxic rhetoric is predictable: Elections now bring forth politicians who seek office by preying on the fears of voters. They calculate that alienation of Muslim communities is worth the votes gained elsewhere. They also know that this feeds into the Islamic State narrative, and vow to get tough on terrorism. Such a political strategy contributes to the pool

of disaffected youth who struggle with questions of identity and belonging. This damages social cohesion, and is highly dangerous. Citizens should demand better from the political class, and work themselves to strengthen the common ties of humanity that bind us.

ISIS foreign recruits **better educated** than their average countryman: Report

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161010-isis-foreign-recruits-better-educated-than-their-average-countryman-report>

Oct 10 – A new World Bank study found that contrary to popular notions, recruits to ISIS are better educated than their average countryman.

Moreover, those offering to become suicide bombers ranked on average in the more educated group, said the new study, titled [Economic and Social Inclusion to Prevent Violent Extremism](#).

The *Daily Mail* reports that the study aimed to identify socioeconomic conditions and traits which might explain why some individuals are drawn to ISIS. The authors of the study stressed that poverty and deprivation were not at the main reason for supporting for the group. Nearly in all cases, individuals joining ISIS ranks in Syria and Iraq had spent more years in school in their home countries — in Europe, Africa, or the Middle East — than the average citizen in those countries.

The report says that the data clearly show that “poverty is not a driver of radicalization into violent extremism.”

The World Bank researchers analyzed leaked data from disenfranchised former ISIS members, obtained by German intelligence. The 22,000 leaked documents include questionnaires of each would-be recruit. The questionnaires contain basic information — such as their name, level of education, and place of birth — on 3,803 foreign recruits who joined the terrorist group between 2013 and 2014.

Out of the nearly 4,000 recruits described in a leaked ISIS database, only 17 percent did not finish high school, with a quarter having university-level education.

Only ISIS recruits from Eastern Europe had levels of education below the average in their

home countries — and even then, only marginally so, according to the study.

“Foreign recruits from the Middle East, North Africa, and South and East Asia are significantly more educated than what is typical in their region,” the World Bank report says.

About 30 percent of the recruits told ISIS commanders specifically what positions they wanted in the organization, and one in nine of those volunteered for suicide operations. The educational levels of those who volunteered for suicide missions were equal to those who sought administrative or support positions, such as medics or communicators.

“The proportions of administrators but also of suicide fighters increase with education,” the report said.

Most of the 3,803 recruits also held jobs in their home countries before traveling to the Middle East to join ISIS.

The report notes, though, that a significant number of those volunteering for suicide missions said they had not been employed in their home countries, or that they had served in their countries’ military before joining the group. “An important finding is that these individuals are far from being uneducated or illiterate. Most claim to have attended secondary school and a large fraction have gone on to study at university,” the World Bank report said.

“We find that Daesh [ISIS] did not recruit its foreign workforce among the poor and less educated, but rather the opposite. Instead, the lack of economic inclusion seems to explain the extent of radicalization into violent extremism.”




The World Bank's report highlights:

- The research shows that Daesh [ISIS] did not recruit its foreign workforce among the poor and less educated, but rather the opposite. Instead, the lack of economic inclusion seems to explain the extent of radicalization into violent extremism.
- 69% of recruits report at least a secondary education. Only 15% left school before high school and less than 2% are illiterate.
- Foreign recruits from the Middle East, North Africa, and South and East Asia are significantly more educated than what is typical in their region
- Self-assessed religious knowledge: 53% report a "Basic" level, 20% an "Intermediate" level, and 4% an "Advanced" level
- An important finding is that these individuals are far from being uneducated or illiterate. Most claim to have attended secondary school and a large fraction have gone on to study at university.
- Notably, Daesh [ISIS] recruits from Africa, South and East Asia, and the Middle East are significantly more educated than individuals from their cohort in their region of origin. The vast majority of them declared having an occupation before joining the organization.
- This result is consistent with a number of other studies that come to a similar conclusion: poverty is *not* a driver of radicalization into violent extremism.
- Looking at measures of economic inclusion shows a strong association between a country's male unemployment rate and the propensity of that country to supply Daesh [ISIS] foreign recruits.
- Unemployment among the educated leads to a greater probability to hold radical ideas.
- Large Muslim-population countries that exhibit higher levels of religiosity are *less* likely to be the origin of Daesh [ISIS] recruits.

ISIS caliphate continues to shrink, flow of foreign fighters drying up

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161010-isis-caliphate-continues-to-shrink-flow-of-foreign-fighters-drying-up>

Oct 10 – **Territory controlled by the Islamic State shrunk by 16 percent in the first nine months of 2016**, according to new analysis released today by IHS Markit.



In 2015, the Islamic State's caliphate shrunk from 90,800 km² to 78,000 km², a net loss of 14 percent. In the first nine months of 2016, that territory shrunk again by a further 16 percent. As of 3 October 2016, the Islamic State controls roughly 65,500 km² in Iraq and Syria, which is roughly the size of Sri Lanka.

[IHS Conflict Monitor](#) released its last territory report in July 2016. As of 4 July 2016, the Islamic State controlled roughly 68,300 km² in Iraq and Syria, about the size of Ireland.

"The Islamic State's territorial losses since July are relatively modest in scale, but unprecedented in their strategic significance", said Columb Strack, senior analyst and head of the IHS Conflict Monitor. "The loss of direct road access to cross-border smuggling routes into Turkey severely restricts the group's ability to recruit new fighters from abroad, while the Iraqi government is poised to launch its offensive on Mosul."

IHS Markit notes that the Islamic State's losses in Syria over the last three months have been concentrated in northern Aleppo province, where Turkish proxy groups have pushed the jihadists back to around ten km from the border with Turkey. In Iraq, government forces have secured Qayyarah Airbase in Iraq's Nineveh province, a critical staging area for the anticipated offensive to liberate Mosul.

Obstacles to Mosul's long-term stabilization

Turkey's President Erdogan has stated that the operation to retake Mosul will begin on 19 October, and this week the Turkish parliament extended its deployment of troops in both Syria and Iraq. Erdogan was reported to have stated that post-liberation, Mosul was a city only for Sunnis.

Strong opposition to plans proposed by the Kurdish Region (KRG) president, Masoud Barzani, and former Mosul governor Atheel Nujaifi, seen as being backed by Turkey, to divide Nineveh province risks undermining co-operation between the respective military forces of the KRG and Baghdad in securing Nineveh province in the longer term.

"Should Prime Minister Abadi not be seen as going far enough in pressuring Turkey to withdraw its forces from northern Iraq, there is a greater risk of the Shia Hashd al-Shaabi taking matters into their own hands, particularly post-liberation," said Zaineb al-Assam, principal Iraq analyst at IHS Country Risk.

Drop in fighting between Syrian Democratic Forces and Islamic State

IHS notes that Turkey's intervention in northern Syria has stalled the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations against the Islamic State, which led to the liberation of Manbij in August. IHS Conflict Monitor recorded an 87 percent drop in the volume of fighting between the SDF and the Islamic State from August to September.

"There is deep underlying competition between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkey's Sunni proxies over their conflicting ambitions

for Syria's future," Strack said. "For the time being, the US is cooperating with both, but once the Islamic State has been defeated as a conventional force, Washington will have to pick a side."

Given Turkey's vehement stance against Syria's Kurds, U.S. support for them is more likely to be sacrificed the report said. "The Kurds know that support from the U.S. may dry up," Strack said. "They will be looking for assurances from the US on their plans for federal governance as a precondition for their involvement in any offensive on Raqqa."

Russia seeking to undermine support for Syrian opposition

Meanwhile, the share of Russian airstrikes targeting the Islamic State in Syria, as recorded by IHS Conflict Monitor, has reduced since the start of the year. In Q1 2016, 26 percent of recorded Russian airstrikes targeted the Islamic State. That reduced to 22 percent in Q2 2016, and 17 percent in Q3 2016.

"Last September, President Putin said it was Russia's mission to fight international terrorism and specifically the Islamic State," said Alex Kokcharov, principal Russia analyst at IHS Country Risk. "Our data suggests that is not the case. Russia's priority is to provide military support to the Assad government and, most likely, transform the Syrian civil war from a multi-party conflict into a binary one between the Syrian government and jihadist groups like the Islamic State; thereby undermining the case for providing international support to the opposition."



Al-shabaab and carry: Muslim extremist jailed for raising £3,000 for ISIS-linked terror group now works as Sainsbury's delivery driver

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3829882/Al-shabaab-carry-Muslim-extremist-jailed-raising-3-000-ISIS-linked-terror-group-works-Sainsbury-s-delivery-driver.html#ixzz4MenpPKco>

Oct 10 – An extremist jailed for raising thousands of pounds to help an ISIS-linked terror group train jihadis with AK-47s now works as a Sainsbury's delivery driver.

Father-of-three Mohammed Shabir Ali, 29, of Tower Hamlets, east London, was jailed for three years in 2012 after raising £3,000 for al-Shabaab training camps in Somalia.

He, along with his identical twin brother Shafiq Ali, posed as charity collectors to raise the money which they funnelled back to the al-Qaeda-affiliated group.

As a result of their crimes, Shabir was placed on a terror watchlist for 10 years and sent to Belmarsh prison.

However, **since being freed from jail**, he appears to have landed himself a job working as a home delivery driver for Sainsbury's – dropping off online food orders to customers' homes while unsupervised.



The move has outraged MPs and shoppers, who claim it is 'scandalous' he is working in a one-to-one customer role, which sees him take groceries inside homes.

One Sainsbury's customer told The Sun: 'He's a convicted terrorist. How can Sainsbury's let him do this?'

'He is entering people's homes, sometimes vulnerable people of different faiths.'



Tory MP Andrew Rosindell added: 'If someone has been convicted for funding terrorism the employer and more importantly the customers should be made aware.'

Shabir's trial in August 2012 heard how he and his brother imitated legitimate fundraisers on street stalls collecting money for Palestinians and the world's poor.

But instead of giving the cash to good causes, they wired it to their elder brother Shamim, then aged 29, after he travelled to Somalia to join the Islamic insurgency.

Shamim had flown to Somalia via Nairobi and Dubai in August 2008 to train alongside other jihadists in weapons, combat and survival.

Several weeks later he boasted in a telephone call about how he was prepared to die.

The brothers kept the phone conversation as a final memento of their elder sibling but it led to their arrest after counter terrorism police raided their home and discovered the digital recording.

Officers also uncovered extremist literature at the property, including a pamphlet by Anwar Al-Awlaki, entitled '44 Ways To Support Jihad.'

Sentencing them at the Old Bailey to three years in prison, Mr Justice Fulford said the men sent at least £3,000 to the Horn of Africa.

He said their brother was determined to sacrifice his life alongside others fighting to create an 'Islamic Emirate of Somalia'.

The brothers had been inspired by Al-Qaeda hate preacher Al-Awlaki, the mastermind behind a series of bombings before he was killed in a drone strike.

The judge added: 'Both defendants worked to help somebody who was contributing to terrorist activities in a war-torn country in Africa.'

'The court must reflect the seriousness of offences of this kind in sentences given that they were intended to support terrorism.'



Shamim, who left Britain with two other men, has not been heard from since and the return parts of the trio's air tickets have never been used.

Shabir's wife said Sainsbury's was well aware of her husband's past, claiming 'they know all about what happened'.

But it is understood the supermarket chain may have launched an internal investigation.

When contacted by the Daily Mail last night, a Sainsbury's spokesman refused to confirm whether Shabir was still employed by the company, adding: 'We don't comment on employees' contracts.'

Syrian Arrested After German Manhunt Plotted Berlin Airport Attack, Officials Say

Source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-police-arrest-suspect-in-alleged-terror-bomb-plot-1476077420>

Oct 10 – Authorities said a 22-year-old Syrian refugee arrested after a two-day manhunt had been plotting to attack airports in Berlin and was captured only after fellow Syrians tied him up and turned him in.

The man—who had received asylum in Germany last year and sparked the international search after [eluding police](#) on Saturday—is suspected of planning a suicide bombing, officials say.

German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, said that the preparations for the bombing appeared similar to those in the attacks in Paris and Brussels. About 3 pounds of an “extremely dangerous explosive,” along with materials for making a suicide vest, had been found in the man's apartment, Germany's prosecutor-general said.

Authorities say the suspect, Jaber Albakr, slipped away Saturday as police were staking out the apartment where he had been staying in the eastern city of Chemnitz. “I'm happy that the fugitive terror suspect was able to be captured and that the security agencies—at least according to what is currently known—prevented an attack,” Mr. de Maizière said Monday.

Another security official said that while the explosive—believed to be the substance TATP—was similar to that used in the Paris and Brussels terror strikes, there were no immediate signs that Mr. Albakr had been planning an attack on the scale of those incidents, which involved multiple targets and assailants. Mr. Albakr was believed to have been planning to target airports in Berlin, according to Hans-Georg Maassen, chief of Germany's domestic intelligence agency, speaking to ARD public television.

Investigators continued to work Monday to determine whether Mr. Albakr was part of a broader network and whether he was radicalized before or after he arrived in Germany in February 2015.

Authorities said Mr. Albakr was granted asylum in Germany that July. While the suspect arrived before last year's influx of migrants in the summer and fall, the alleged terror plot has shined the spotlight on the security implications of large-scale migration and led some politicians to call for more intensive screening of new arrivals.

Mr. Albakr appeared on the authorities' radar last month after the domestic intelligence agency received a tip. The ensuing investigation pointed to Islamic State ties and that the man was planning a suicide bombing, officials said. Last Friday, intelligence agents determined he had visited a store to buy hot glue—possibly the last ingredient needed to build a bomb, according to Mr. Maassen.

“The behavior of the suspect currently suggests an IS context,” Jörg Michaelis, the head of the criminal investigations bureau in the state of Saxony, said at a news conference on Monday.

Alerted by the intelligence agency, state police deployed Friday evening to a building where Mr. Albakr was believed to be staying, but had to use caution because they didn't know which apartment the man was staying in. Saturday morning, officers chased one man leaving the apartment who appeared to be the suspect but couldn't catch up with him, in part because their tactical gear weighed some 80 pounds, Mr. Michaelis said.

The manhunt, which spread beyond Germany's borders, ended early Monday morning after another Syrian walked into a police station in the city of Leipzig, about 50 miles away from Chemnitz. The tipster said he and two friends had subdued the suspect, and police officers found Mr. Albakr tied up in a Leipzig apartment.

The suspect had met two of the Syrians in the Leipzig train station on Saturday, Germany's Bild newspaper reported, after he had posted on an online refugee network



that he needed a place to stay. The men then brought him to a friend's apartment and only realized the next day—after he had asked for a haircut—that he was being sought by the police. The police couldn't be reached for comment on the report.

Syrians in Germany had been sharing information about the wanted suspect over the weekend over various [Facebook](#) groups for refugees.

"We the Syrians here are, of course, against the dumb generalization about us being terrorists," said a post in German and Arabic in one popular such group, German LifeStyle, which included photos of the suspect and a police phone number. "But, we as Syrians here must fight against those among us who want to do something bad to the people here who support us and all those who live here."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel thanked authorities for their work, her spokeswoman said Monday. She added: "Our thanks and recognition also go to the man from Syria who informed police about the whereabouts of suspect and made a decisive contribution to arresting him."

Syrian Accused of Bomb Plot in Germany Committed Suicide

Source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-refugee-suspected-of-plotting-attack-in-germany-committed-suicide-lawyer-says-1476306793>

Oct 12 – A Syrian refugee arrested this week for plotting a terror attack in Germany was found dead in prison late Wednesday in the latest setback for a security operation marred by police mishaps since it began at the weekend.

The justice ministry in the Eastern German state of Saxony said in a statement that Jaber Albakr, 22, had committed suicide. Mr. Albakr was in detention pending terror charges after a large quantity of explosives were found in a flat he shared with another refugee in the German city of Chemnitz on Saturday.

"I know there was a suicide risk and I was told earlier today that he had been under permanent surveillance," Alexander Hübner, the lawyer representing Mr. Albakr said. Mr. Hübner said he was outraged that a terror suspect who had been on a hunger strike since Monday could manage to kill himself.

Terrorism and Civil Aviation Security

October 2016


Source: <http://www.hozint.com/2016/10/terrorism-and-civil-aviation-security/>

Over the past year civil aviation has suffered major terrorist attacks that have caused both economic and psychological impact on the sector and civil society. Recent threats against airports and civil aviation companies highlight how terrorists see in the transport industry a favoured target to instil fear



and deep disruption. There is very little room for novelties in the type, scale and means through which the industry can be targeted as the list appears to be exhaustive. However, airports across the world differ in a large extent in the measures put in place to mitigate all of the potential assaults at the same time. The extent to which place depends largely

countries have comprehensive security measures in place depends largely on their affluence and past record of attacks, and as a result there are serious security discrepancies between countries and between regional and main airports within the same state. Once terrorists have gained access to the resources they require to launch a strike against a soft-target, no security measure can guarantee the mitigation of all loss of life. Efforts should take places as part of a broad and wholesale security revamp of all modes of transport rather than limited actions that will just sway terrorist threats to other less guarded targets. The security of the civil aviation industry can be boosted via



increasing intelligence on specific threats as well as improving the overall crisis management cycle with regard to mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response and recover.

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Recent attacks

- On October 31st, 2015, Russian Metrojet / Kogalymavia flight 9268 on its way from Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg crashed in North Sinai region in Egypt killing 224 people.^[iii] The Islamic State-affiliated “Sinai Province” terrorist group (formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis) claimed responsibility.
- On February 2nd, 2016, Daallo Flight 159 made an emergency landing at Mogadishu airport after a bomb exploded on board creating a one-meter hole on the side of the fuselage.^[iii]
- On March 22nd, 2016, three coordinated suicide vest attacks targeted Brussels’ Airport in Zaventem and Maalbeek metro station leaving 35 dead and about 340 injured.^[iv]
- On June 28th, 2016, three IS-affiliated terrorists attacked Atatürk Airport in Istanbul leaving 48 dead and more than 200 injured.^[v]

Recent threats

- Germany: On October 10, German police arrested a Syrian man, Jaber Albakr, in Leipzig. He was plotting a terrorist attack against an airport in Berlin and train stations.^[vi]
- Thailand: On October 10, police units in Bangkok’s suburb of Samut Prakan have been alerted for possible car bomb attacks between 20 – 25 October. According to a leaked police memo, the targets of the attacks could be Suvarnabhumi Airport, Bhumibol Bridge and Ancient Siam open-air museum.^[vii] On October 11, Police released the photos of two models of cars that might be used by a group of terrorists to carry out the attacks: a Honda Accord and a Mitsubishi Triton.^[viii]
- India: On October 9, police carried out an extensive search operation in the villages at the periphery of Sri Guru Ramdas International Airport in Amritsar, Punjab. The operation was triggered by intelligence input of threat to airports in north India.^[ix]

Analysis

1. The analysis of attacks

On March the 22nd 2016, three coordinated attacks were carried out in Brussels. Two of the three assailants detonated Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive Devices (SVIED) in the departure hall of Zaventem Brussels Airport, with the third attacker failing to detonate his vest, having been blown away by the previous blast. During the Atatürk Airport incident on June the 28th 2016, the three assailants launched their attack with rifles and then detonated their vests at the departure, arrival and outside parking areas.

As a result of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent terrorist attempts, airport security dramatically increased in the vast majority of international airports. However, these changes were mostly geared to prevent armed assailants from boarding planes and hijacking them, leaving areas that lie before the security checks prone to assaults.

Security threats to civil aviation can be summarized as follows:

- A direct raid on the airport by a group of assailants equipped with firearms and/or SVIEDs.^{[x] [xi]}
- Smuggling an explosive device inside the airport or inside a plane, either with a carrier-passenger, or smuggled by airport personnel that has clearance. (shoe bomb^[xii], underwear bomb^[xiii], liquid bombs^[xiv], jet fuel tanks^[xv], laptop bomb^[xvi], ink-cartridge bomb^[xvii])
- An attack by mortar or a short range shoulder fired anti-tank missile, beyond the perimeter of the airport’s security or fence.^{[xviii] [xix] [xx]}
- An VBIED attack whereby a vehicle laden with explosives or inflammables attempts to ram its way through the security of an area or past a fence.^{[xxi] [xxii]}
- The hijacking of an aircraft with the aim of using it as a missile (9/11) or as leverage for political demands.^[xxiii]



- Using a drone to carry IEDs inside an airport area, or to ram it against an incoming or departing airplane mid-air. [\[xxiv\]](#)
- Using an anti-aircraft missile (shoulder-fired or other), incoming or departing airplanes can be shot-down outside the perimeter of the airport, where MANPADS or other batteries may target planes within their operational altitude. [\[xxv\]](#) [\[xxvi\]](#)

Generally, security measures in airports have been reactive to attempts rather than proactive. Richard Reid attempted to board American Airlines Flight 63 with a shoe bomb in 2001; currently, shoes with pronounced hardened heels, now need to be removed while going through security. In the aftermath of the 2006-foiled Al-Qaeda plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard, restrictions were introduced with regards to liquids onboard: 100ml per container and a limit of a 1L plastic re-sealable bag to include all containers.

Gaining control of a large aircraft filled with passengers and kerosene allows the perpetrators to exponentially increase casualties as well as the psychological damage of an attack by effectively turning the plane into a missile. While we have not seen a scenario similar to 9/11's magnitude, successful inflight attacks have occurred as airport security measures and checks vary across countries.

An explosive device brought Metrojet Flight 9268 down (31/10/2015) along with 224 passengers in the Sinai while a suicide attack onboard the Somali-operated Daallo Flight 159 created a one-meter hole on the side of the fuselage (2/2/2016), failing however to bring down the plane. The attacks were carried out by Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (IS' Sinai branch) and Al-Shabaab (Somalia) respectively.

There are very few novelties about the way in which the recent attacks in Brussels and Ankara were conducted, or how these attacks are linked to non-state or state actors. The attacks against Zaventem or Atatürk Airport have great similarities with the attacks against Domodedovo airport in Moscow in 2011 or the 2014 attack against Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. Analysts and policymakers have access to vast amounts of data with regards to the ways in which the aviation industry and its infrastructure can be attacked that none of the recent attempts can be characterized as constituting a 'new' type of threat.

The psychological and economic effect of attacks against airport and the aviation industry are great, given that they tend to paralyze or disrupt all modes of transportation in the targeted state with disruptions occurring in neighboring states as well. With developed economies heavily reliant on fast and undisrupted air travel, such attacks have a detrimental economic impact.

Measures to improve security in operations linked to the Aviation industry and its infrastructure

Counter-terrorist security planning in the context of preventing attacks against soft-targets comes under two categories. First, measures taken to prevent the recruitment of terrorists and the extent to which these individuals may access weaponry, depend on medium to long-term planning that cannot be enforced overnight. There are however measures to manage threats once individuals are armed and determined to attack which can theoretically occur overnight but whose effectiveness depends on their application across the board of potential targets and the extent to which these are permanent.

1. Screening

More than 70 employees of Orly and Charles de Gaulle airports had their restricted access clearance cancelled after the attacks in Paris in November 2015. [\[xxvii\]](#) The vast majority of airport personnel is engaged in low-skilled and relatively low-paid jobs; positions that are likely to employ the sort of disgruntled and disillusioned individuals that make-up the preferred pool of candidates for IS' intricate online radicalization and recruitment efforts. The importance of a comprehensive security screening of all employees that have access to potential targeted infrastructure cannot be underestimated. Whether recruited online, willing to act due to psychological reasons or even trained returnees from warzones, potential assailants' behavior is very likely to be peculiar and distinct if an attack is imminent.

In the US, only Miami and Orlando airports require of their employees to undergo a security screening prior to entering the airport's post-security-check areas. [\[xxviii\]](#) A TSA report concluded that beyond a physical screening of the employees there should also be measures of social media monitoring. [\[xxix\]](#) The same report concluded that employee physical screenings are never performed with the same standards as for passengers, nor do 100% employee-screening measures guarantee security. Only random and unpredictable security measures that are difficult to be by-passed and anticipated "provide a higher degree of risk mitigation".



Familiarity between employees and predictable checks, increase the risk of security measures being bypassed.

There is fine line between the comprehensive screening of employees (or passengers) and racial profiling. The importance of having personnel, which is adequately trained in profiling techniques, is key, as the blowback from racial incidents will backfire on efforts to prevent the radicalization of individuals belonging to a religious or ethnic minority. Moreover, the roster of security agents needs to be as inclusive as possible to reflect the intricate ethnic mosaic that makes-up the vast majority of Western European nations, and lessen perceptions that increased measures target specifically given ethnic groups.

2. Standoff Zones

Since the March attacks against Zaventem Airport, Belgium has put in place additional security measures whereby vehicles may be stopped after the exit from the motorway, departing passengers pass through a security pre-check prior to entering the departure hall, while visitors in the arrival hall are now also subject to a security check.[\[xxx\]](#)

There is a need for security checks and screenings to be organized in concentric circles. Where physically and logistically possible, visual checks and vehicle screenings need to take place before the arrival at the terminals. Passing through several checks before reaching the desired target will increase the likelihood of attackers being intercepted or that they will launch their assault prematurely. Preventing all loss of life is extremely challenging but an attack where passengers are inside their vehicles will result in fewer casualties than if they are gathered as a crowd.

The logistics of this feat are challenging given that the vast majority of airports were built during times where the security environment and the type of threats differed. Their design allows little room for radical changes, which would not involve huge costs and medium to long-term works that would surely cause disruption.

In countries that have experienced attacks in the past or that have incorporated security 'lessons learned' from previous cases, stand-off zones are common in new airports. Queen Alia Airport in Amman, Jordan, inaugurated in 2013, has a military checkpoint whereby vehicles and passengers are checked and screened 300m from the departure hall. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has suffered several car bomb attacks as a result of the spill-over from neighboring Iraq, with the explosion against its embassy in Baghdad being the most prominent.[\[xxxi\]](#)

3. Assigning clear operational roles

The Belgian army has taken on the role of patrolling the country's airports and guarding government and key civilian buildings. It is very clear that using the country's Armed Forces as domestic security guards can be but a temporary measure. Either the police or a specialized security company ought to take over such roles and use personnel that is specialized in screening, controlling and fulfilling effective sentry duties. For an army with a relatively small size, a domestic deployment is beginning to affect its ability to effectively and efficiently deliver its missions abroad.[\[xxxii\]](#)

Deploying elements of the armed forces in domestic security tasks is a quick way for governments to show that they are doing their utmost to prevent further attacks from materializing. In Belgium, the presence of well-armed and equipped soldiers may have a very clear positive and reassuring psychological impact on civilian passers-by, but their training is not geared to sentry duties in crowded civilian spaces, nor are they trained in operational co-existence with private security employees or law-enforcement personnel. Bringing additional actors into an already congested law enforcement scene has ramifications in the medium to long-term. The overlap of several agencies with poorly integrated counter-terrorist strategies whose dogma, operational protocol and training greatly differs, complicates security enforcement.

4. Situational Crisis Training

It is necessary for employees in all government buildings or citizens in all other potential soft targets, to be familiar with evacuation procedures. If civilians are trained in procedures during attacks or crises, it will minimize the extent to which chaos during actual incidents



increases the number of victims and the time required for law enforcement agencies to intervene. Naturally, staging evacuation drills at airports that will include passengers is impossible, as it will disrupt operations and flights. The airport's personnel however need to be fully capable of responding to crises by knowing the evacuation procedures on a number of scenarios. Broader government policy ought to standardize evacuation and crisis training for citizens by practicing on a regular basis such drills in schools, companies and public buildings. Citizens ought to be familiar with being active participants in security incidents and not purely victims; maximizing the chance that they will respond in a way that will keep them alive.

- Understanding the limitations of 'immediately enforceable' security measures

1. National and International consistency

The extent to which there is a standardization of security procedures and equipment across airports to prevent all the types of attacks that have occurred in the past, is a key issue in the effectiveness of measures. Recently the EU Commission proposed that airport security equipment certified in one EU member be automatically certified across the Union.^[xxxiii] This will allow for companies to compete and raise the quality of their products without countries obstructing such competition through protectionist policies via certification permits. Ultimately, airports will be able to acquire the most competitive and effective products.

On the 22nd of September, 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2309^[xxxiv], which calls for 'Closer Collaboration to Ensure the Safety of Global Air Services,(and) Prevent Terrorist Attacks.' The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was placed at the center of responsibility for developing international security standards and ensure that these are implemented. While the resolution is a step in the right direction, it is unlikely that the discrepancies in security measures between states, (or even between airports inside the same country) will be effectively addressed. The main reason behind discrepancies has to do with a country's affluence and the extent to which it has suffered terrorist attacks in the past, as governments tend to be overwhelmingly reactive as opposed to proactive.

It is in the interest of individuals states themselves to push for similar measures in the destinations where their citizens travel. Lessons from Israel's counter-insurgency history are indicative of this. Due to the stringent security measures that are in place at Ben Gurion airport in Tel-Aviv, in the past, attacks against El-Al with the aim of killing Israeli citizens where launched at, or began from, airports abroad.

2. Terrorist adaptability and innovation

Increased security checks prior to boarding have generally prevented hijacks as complex and coordinated as the ones that took place on 9/11. The attack against the Russian airliner that crashed in the Sinai indicates that terrorists do not need to put an operative onboard to bring down a plane; all they need is to smuggle onboard an IED. The attacks in the departure, arrival or other areas of airports of key targets, indicates that assailants understand the importance of picking manageable targets in light of increased measures elsewhere. The two deadliest terrorist attacks in Europe since the Madrid train bombings in 2004 were the November 2015 Paris attacks and the ramming in Nice in July 2016. None of these attacks occurred against targets whose security could have been impermeably guaranteed permanently, unless tipped-off by relevant intelligence.

Moreover, tightening security selectively on the infrastructure and operations of one mode of transport will have little or no impact on overall safety unless it is part of a wholesale security revamp. If measures do not affect all means of transportation and the security protocol of key soft-targets such as malls or other government buildings, then potential attackers will choose easier targets. Underestimating the extent to which terrorists are highly adaptable and innovative despite limited resources, will only result in expenses minimizing the security weaknesses of one mode of transport while terrorists' focus switches to other more logistically manageable targets. Security reforms ought to occur across the board of what intelligence agencies and previous incidents suggest as potential targets. To some extent this is well understood and it is reflected in the measures that France took in the aftermath of the Brussels attacks, to deploy security personnel across the country's transportation system.^[xxxv]

3. Assailant capabilities and training vary

Once individuals are determined to commit suicide attacks and they have managed to acquire the resources they need to carry out a raid on a soft-target, it becomes extremely hard to prevent all loss of life. Having the initiative of movement on their side, the amount



of damage and casualties of an attack will depend on the cool-headedness, training and composure of the assailants.

There is a pronounced difference between the military quality and operational capability of battle-hardened fighters and the ephemeral recruits that IS fields to conduct its suicide missions in Europe. So far IS has refrained from using its most capable assets to conduct suicide missions. It has instead used individuals whose competencies do not mandate significant 'human capital investment' (e.g. Salah Abdelsalam) while it kept precious and competent assets (e.g. Abdelhamid Abaaoud) in organizational roles relatively distanced from the 'front-line'.

While lacking the initiative of action in any upcoming incident, security and law-enforcement personnel has the advantage of dealing with assailants who do not constitute the best and brightest of their cells or organisations. In the case of highly decentralized attacks such as those carried by lone wolves, training may however vary significantly and security personnel could find itself outmatched (e.g. Anders Breivik).

4. Resources are finite

Terrorists rely on unorthodox methods of warfare that target civilians, which renders all the measures in place permeable. Public opinion expectations about the effectiveness of new measures, should be moderated to account for the impossibility of preventing all loss of life. Not all the areas of an airport, all restaurants, malls, train-coaches, or mid-sized lorries during large pedestrianized events, can be monitored or guarded at all times. Law enforcement manpower and resources are finite, the number of potential targets huge and the ways in which an attack can be executed endless.

Ultimately, the consistency and permanency of security measures in place at civil aviation targets and the speed with which operations revert to normal if an attack is successful, will determine the attractiveness of the industry and its infrastructure for potential attackers. Minimizing the potential disruption will decrease the economic and psychological impact of an attack and thus the incentive of attackers to choose such targets.

How abandoned luggage causes havoc at Paris airports

Source: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20161005/how-abandoned-luggage-causes-havoc-at-paris-airports>

Oct 05 – Passengers deliberately abandoning luggage at the two airports in Paris are forcing authorities – already on high alert – to bring in the bomb squad several times a day.

Anyone who regularly passes through one of Paris's two main airports will likely have seen an area cordoned off by soldiers or border police due to a suspicious or unattended luggage.

New figures released this week laid bare the extent of the problem.

Last year specialist bomb squad teams were called out 2,200 times at Charles de Gaulle and Orly airports – that equates to around six times a day, according to figures obtained by LCI media.

The figure of 2,200 is up 37.5 percent on the 1,600 interventions by the bomb squad in 2014. And airport officials say the number of interventions will increase even further in 2016 given the rate is on the up.

Charles de Gaulle airport was worst hit last year with some 1,850 interventions by the bomb squad, whereas Orly saw 348 checks.

Each time an unattended bag is spotted it takes almost an hour before the all clear is given.

The time taken to set up a perimeter and for the bomb squad to arrive and carry out the necessary checks often causes delays and disruption to passengers, as well as raising their fears at a time of heightened terror alert.

Once a bag is identified the process would normally see it x-rayed to find out if it contains anything suspicious. If the contents cannot be verified it will be destroyed in a controlled explosion, although this has only happened 15 times last year. No bag was found to contain any explosives.

So who is to blame for all this disruption?

Well mainly the passengers.



For a start members of the public are being far more vigilant, given the heightened terror threat and are far more likely to alert airport staff to abandoned baggage than before.

This is a habit that is applauded by police.

"The public need to continue to alert us. But at the same time we need make them more aware to avoid them forgetting their suitcases," a police source told LCI.

But police have also pointed out that passengers are deliberately abandoning their luggage, in most cases because they don't want to pay the extra costs charged by airlines of checking in it.

It seems they would rather leave their belongings behind than pay an extra fee.

Many of these bags are abandoned near the check-in desks, explaining why most bomb squad interventions happen before passengers have passed through security.

Police union official Jean-Yann William, who works at Charles-de Gaulle airport said: "These interventions could be easily avoided if airlines were more vigilant."

He would also like to see authorities impose fines on passengers who deliberately leave their luggage behind. A dissuasive move that has recently been brought in by French rail operators SNCF, which also has to deal with scores of alerts over suspicious and unattended bags at rail stations.

Aéroports de Paris, which runs Charles de Gaulle and Orly airports, recently **demand**ed that French border police try to cut the time it takes the bomb squad to intervene and give the all clear.

They also asked the border police to try to improve the time it takes for passengers to get through passport control, which if anyone has been through Charles de Gaulle in recent months knows can be lengthy wait.

But in the meantime the public have a role to play.

Don't leave your bag unattended, make sure you know exactly how much you can take on board before travelling to avoid the temptation to dump a bag at the airport and continue to alert authorities of any suspicious bags.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: "...passengers are deliberately abandoning their luggage, in most cases because they don't want to pay the extra costs charged by airlines of checking in it." Is that logic? Everybody knows that either one luggage is included in the price or you have to pay for an extra piece. So why bring the luggage to the airport? In case of overweight you can always remove some pieces to go down to permitted (usually) 23 kg – so why abandon the whole luggage? It would be interesting to read what the content of these abandoned pieces is. Perhaps other conclusions could be drawn – i.e. measuring the EOD response time etc. Also there are always tens of people from airlines and other airport services around the check-in area – do they see anything or just be decorative? And when an abandoned piece is identified: do they evacuate the area first and call EODs or call EODs first and let them decide if to evacuate or not? Finally, how many reclaimed their abandoned luggage (in order to be fined later on)? Do all traveling luggage have an identification tag on them? Is anyone checking that before delivering the pieces (and match info with official documents)? It seems that there is a gap in airports' SOPs here!



UK airport terror fears as ISIS flag 'found stitched inside baggage handler's glove'

Source: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/718008/ISIS-airport-security-threat-baggage-handler-ISIS-flag-glove-UK-airport>

Oct 08 – **A baggage handler at a British airport has been found with an ISIS flag stitched to the inside of their glove, in what is believed to be the first case of its kind in the UK.** The discovery raises the alarming prospect that staff at British airports could be operating as part of a jihadi sleeper cell.

A senior security source confirmed to Express.co.uk the discovery of the glove was "not the only case" and that other radicalised airport workers had been identified at more British airports.



The UK airport where the baggage handler worked has not been revealed but Britain's biggest airport, Heathrow, has said it is not aware of any such incident at the west London hub.



Concerns about radicalised airport staff first came to light in France in the wake of the Paris attacks, when it emerged as many as 70 members of staff with airside clearance were stripped of their passes.

At Brussels airport, which was hit by a terror attack in March, security services said at least 50 ISIS supporters were working as baggage handlers, cleaners and catering staff.

Police at the Belgian airport said the workers were in possession of security

badges and even had access to the cockpit of parked aircraft.

And in August this year 300 airport staff at Heathrow had their passes suspended in a major security crackdown.



Cleaners and caterers were caught up in the probe which employer Sodexo said was a precautionary measure and there were no known terrorist links.

It followed news that police were investigating a scam involving airside security passes at Heathrow.

Philip Baum, a leading aviation security expert, said there were numerous examples of people working airside in the UK who had made expressions of sympathy for ISIS.

He said: "You only need one bad egg - and given the tens of thousands of people who work in the aviation industry, and in some airports it's tens of thousands in one airport, it is a huge challenge. "

But he added: "It is not all going to be about using screening technology.

"Ultimately we need to apply common sense, **we need to evaluate people**, that is going to be the most useful technique that can be applied, whether you are looking at passengers or airport employees.

"Airports are making a constant effort in the UK to monitor their staff and people are being encouraged to report suspicious postings that their colleagues might make on social media.

"We need to recognise that in all areas of operations we have to be aware of the airside threat and it is a threat that might be due to psychological problems, such as Andreas Lubitz [who crashed a Germanwings plane into a mountainside].

"Or it might be a threat due to the nature of the industry, it is a global workforce now, or due to people's political ideologies."

Airport staff in the UK are routinely screened in a similar way to passengers but background checks are only carried out when someone is first employed at the airport.

It means there is the potential for workers who become radicalised to be missed if their actions only become sinister once they have cleared their initial criminal record check.

Airport staff in the US are not routinely screened and Mr Baum, editor of Aviation Security International, said this had to change.

Speaking to Express.co.uk, he said: "Considering the US considers itself the global policeman of aviation, from my perspective it has got significant problems with its own system and doesn't meet global standards in many areas."



Raffaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, said: "People are consistently worried about aviation security and groups likely to exploit it. "Having said that, we haven't had a successful attack in UK against an airport yet."

SHOCKING FIGURE! Almost 400 ISIS Terrorists Trained in Iraq and Syria Now at Large on Britain's Streets

Source: <http://en.alalam.ir/news/1870449>



Gianluca Tomaselli (left and right) who fought in Syria, is working as an NHS parking attendant in London

Oct 09 – **Just 14 battle-hardened ISIS fighters who returned to Britain after waging war in Syria have been jailed, the Government has admitted. The shock figure is far lower than Ministers previously claimed and means almost 400 terrorists trained in Syria and Iraq are at large on Britain's streets.**

Experts told media on Sunday they could use the deadly skills with automatic weapons and bombs that they honed on the battlefield to plot atrocities such as the Paris and Brussels attacks in the UK, massacring hundreds.

Figures slipped out in Parliament reveal that the Home Office believes 850 Britons have travelled to fight for the ISIS terror group and although many have been killed by drone strikes and in battle, about 400 have sneaked back into the UK.

Any of them could be prosecuted as it is a crime to attend terrorist training camps and also to be a member of a banned group such as ISIS.

But Ministers admit that only 14 people who have fought for ISIS have been convicted, despite mistakenly claiming the number was 54 earlier this year.

Last night, critics urged Home Secretary Amber Rudd to give more money to the Border Force so it can catch terrorists as they sneak back into the country, as well as ensuring that police and MI5 have enough officers to track down those already here.

Labour MP Khalid Mahmood, who believes thousands of Britons have travelled to Syria and Iraq, said:

'It is a tiny number who have been prosecuted and it's absurd to say this is any form of success.

'If they know who they are, they should be prosecuted but the police and security services don't have the resources to do that.'

Professor Anthony Glees, Director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham, told The Mail on Sunday that the 'minuscule' number of prosecutions was 'very disturbing'.



'These people have been trained to be killers and people will think it beggars belief [that they haven't been prosecuted]. What message are we sending out to the world?

Former Security Minister Lord West of Spithead said: 'We know that people who have been abroad and radicalised are extremely dangerous, Daily Mail reported.

Islamic State **adapting** to loss of road access to Turkish border

Source: <http://www.janes.com/article/64480/islamic-state-adapting-to-loss-of-road-access-to-turkish-border-by-drawing-on-co-operation-from-jund-al-aqsa>

Oct 10 – The Islamic State's most recent territorial losses in Syria are unprecedented in their strategic significance, and pose the greatest threat so far to the group's governance project.

Geographic isolation is forcing the group to adapt by increasing collaboration with Jund al-Aqsa, a jihadist group operating within the Sunni opposition in Idlib and Hama provinces.


The Islamic State is unlikely to seek a pledge of allegiance from Jund al-Aqsa unless the group achieves major territorial gains, such as the capture of the city of Hama, which *IHS Jane's* assesses to be unlikely.

Greece - Parts from stolen cars sold to ISIS

Source: Greek blogs



Oct 12 – An international gang specialized in cutting tracks and pick-ups and selling their spare parts in high demand to Islamists in North Africa (Libya) and Yemen, has been arrested by Greek police authorities in the area of Aspropyrgos (Attica Prefecture). Western secret services have been notified.



Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_TerroristOutcomes_Infographic_Oct2016.pdf

A new infographic summarizes findings from recent research on the effects that the length of the planning process, number of participants and number of preparatory behaviors had on the outcome of 504 plots in the United states from 1980-2015.



Using the Global Terrorism Database: Introduction & Module 1

Source: <http://www.start.umd.edu/using-global-terrorism-database-introduction-module-1>

Description: This module provides a general overview of the world's largest unclassified database on terrorism incidents, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This overview includes discussion of the



data collection process, as this informs the use of the database itself. Participants receive instruction on the analytical strengths of large datasets as well as the limits of this type of analysis. Participants will conduct analytical exercises introducing them to pivot tables and foundational graphing techniques using Excel.

This module is part of series to improve GTD users' understanding of terrorism and terrorism data, and

to improve their analytical and critical thinking skills while advancing their competency in Microsoft Excel. The full training will contain five modules. More information is [available here](#).

Training Objectives: Upon completion of this module, participants will have an understanding of the history and uses of the GTD including the analytical strengths and limitations of large datasets. Participants will be able to optimize their use of the existing data in the GTD.

Intended Audience: Security professionals; Scholars; General public

Duration/Time Requirement: 1 hour and 53 minutes

Delivery Format: Asynchronous Online

Cost: 29.99USD


Registration Info: To rent this module for a period of three months, click on the image below and follow the instructions to:

1. Set up a free personal Vimeo account; and,
2. Submit payment.

Once your payment has been received, you will have unlimited access to the module throughout the rental period (90 days). Your access will automatically expire at the conclusion of the rental period. Rental of this video signifies your agreement to the [general terms and conditions of use](#).

New survey explores Syrian opinions about civil war, radical action, U.S. policy

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_DHS_Syria_BarometerSurvey_30June2016.pdf



A new report explores the results from a study surveying Syrians earlier this year about life in Syria, the civil war, justifiability for ISIL, and opinions on U.S. foreign policy, among other topics. Results indicated that while most participants experienced significant hardships since the onset of the war, they did not blame the Assad government for the war.



Suicide bombing and support for ISIL received almost no endorsement.

Figure 2: How much do you blame Sunni militant groups like al-Qa'ida and Daesh for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame these groups very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 1: How much do you blame Bashar al Assad for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame him very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 4: How much do you blame Turkey for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame Turkey very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 5: How much do you blame Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame Russia very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?





Figure 6: How much do you blame the United States of America for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame the United States very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?



National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Annual Meeting 2016

Quick Fire 1: Counterterrorism, Countering Violent Extremism, Deradicalization

- Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Campaigns presented by Victor Asal
- Comparing Failed, Foiled, Completed and Successful Terrorist Attacks presented by Margaret Wilson
- Government Actions in Terrorist Environments (GATE) presented by Laura Dugan
- Attitudes within American Subcultures presented by Clark McCauley
- ICONS: Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Morocco presented by Devin Ellis
- Catch Them Coming and Going (Foreign Fighters) presented by Marcus Boyd
- Deradicalization of Extremists presented by Katarzyna Jasko
- Empirical Assessment of Domestic Disengagement and Deradicalization (EAD3) presented by Michael Jensen

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AnnualMeeting_QuickFire1.pdf

Quick Fire 2: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AnnualMeeting2016_QuickFire2.pdf

Quick Fire 3: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AnnualMeeting2016_QuickFire3.pdf



Islamist Violence Will Steer Europe's Destiny

By Daniel Pipes

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6322/islamist-violence-will-steer-europes-destiny>

Oct 10 – While visiting predominantly Muslim suburbs emerging outside nearly all northern European cities, one question keeps recurring: **Why** have some of the richest, most educated, most secular, most placid, and most homogeneous countries in the world willingly opened their doors to virtually any



migrant from the poorest, least modern, most religious, and least stable countries?

Other questions follow: **Why** have mostly Christian countries decided to take in mostly Muslim immigrants? **Why** do so many Establishment politicians, most notably Germany's Angela Merkel, ignore and revile those who increasingly worry that this immigration is permanently changing the

face of Europe? **Why** does it fall to the weaker Visegrád states of eastern Europe to articulate a patriotic rejection of this phenomenon? Where will the immigration lead?

There's no single answer that applies to multiple countries; but of the many factors (such as secularization) behind this historically unprecedented acceptance of alien peoples, one stands out as most critical: a west European sense of guilt.

To many educated western **Europeans**, their civilization is less about scientific advances, unprecedented levels of prosperity, and the achievement of unique human freedoms, and more about colonialism, racism, and fascism.

The brutal French conquest of Algeria, the uniquely evil German genocide against the Jews, and the legacy of extreme nationalism cause many Europeans, in the analysis of [Pascal Bruckner](#), a French intellectual, **to see themselves as "the sick man of the planet,"** responsible for every global problem from poverty to environmental rapacity; "the white man has sown grief and ruin wherever he has gone." Affluence implies robbery, light skin manifests sinfulness.


Bruckner labels this the "tyranny of guilt" and I encountered some colorful expressions during my recent travels of such self-hatred. A French Catholic priest expressed remorse over the record of the Church. A conservative German intellectual preferred Syrians and Iraqis to his fellow Germans. A Swedish tour guide put down fellow Swedes and hoped he would not be perceived as one.

Indeed, many Europeans feel their guilt makes them superior; the more they dislike themselves, the more they preen – inspiring a strange mix of self-loathing and moral superiority that, among other consequence, leaves them reluctant to commit the time and money required to bear children. **"Europe is losing faith in itself, and birth rates have collapsed,"** notes Irish scientist [William Reville](#).

The catastrophic birth dearth underway has created an existential demographic crisis. With women of the European Union bearing just [1.58 children](#) as of 2014, the continent lacks the offspring to replace itself; over time, this far-less-than-replacement rate means a precipitous decline in the numbers of ethnic Portuguese, Greeks, and others. To maintain the welfare state and the pension machine requires importing foreigners.

These two drives – expiating guilt and replacing nonexistent children – then combine to encourage a massive influx of non-Western peoples, what the French writer [Renaud Camus](#) calls "the great replacement."





European fertility rates declined greatly in recent decades

South Asians in the United Kingdom, North Africans in France, and Turks in Germany, plus Somalis, Palestinians, Kurds, and Afghans all over, can claim innocence of Europe's historic sins even as they offer the prospect of staffing the economy. As the

American writer [Mark Steyn](#) puts it, **"Islam is now the principal supplier of new Europeans."**

The Establishment, or what I call the 6 P's (politicians, police, prosecutors, the press, professors, and priests), generally insists that everything will turn out fine: Kurds will become productive workers, Somalis fine citizens, and Islamist problems will melt away.

That's the theory and sometimes it works. Far too often, however, Muslim immigrants remain aloof from the culture of their new European home or reject it, as most clearly manifested by gender relations; some violently attack non-Muslims. Far too often too, they lack the skills or incentive to work hard and end up an economic liability.

The influx of non-integrating Muslim peoples raises the profound question whether Europe's civilization of the past millennium can survive. Will England become Londonistan and France an Islamic republic? The Establishment castigates, dismisses, sidelines, ostracizes, suppresses, and even arrests those who raise such issues, demeaning them as right-wing extremists, racists, and neo-fascists.

A sign in Amsterdam warns robbers that they will come under a DNA spray to identify them. Photo: Daniel Pipes



Nonetheless, the prospect of Islamization prompts a growing number of Europeans to fight on behalf of their traditional way of life. Leaders include intellectuals such as the late Oriana Fallaci and

novelist Michel Houellebecq; politicians such as Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, and Geert Wilders, head of the most popular Dutch party.

Anti-immigration political parties typically win about 20 percent of the vote. And while a consensus has emerged that their appeal will stay about there, perhaps reaching 30 percent, they could well continue to grow. [Opinion polls](#) show that very substantial majorities fear Islam and want to stop and even reverse the effects of immigration, especially that of Muslims. In this light, Norbert Hofer recently winning 50 percent of the vote in Austria represents a potentially major breakthrough.

The greatest question facing Europe is who, Establishment or populace, will steer the continent's future. The extent of Islamist political violence will likely decide this: a drumbeat of high-profile mass-murders (such as in France since January 2015) tilts the field toward



the people; its absence allows the Establishment to remain in charge. Ironically, then, the actions of migrants will largely shape Europe's destiny.

Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum.

Securing a future for Middle East minorities after ISIS

By Ben Cohen

Source: <http://www.thetower.org/4015-securing-a-future-for-middle-east-minorities-after-isis/>

Oct 11 – You have to wonder if the barbarians fighting under the flag of the Islamic State still believe that 72 virgins will be waiting for them in paradise once they become “martyrs.”

I say this not because the leaders and foot soldiers of ISIS have suddenly woken up to the possibility that this belief is based, according to several scholars, on a mistranslation of the relevant verse of the Qu’ran; that would be expecting too much of them. I say this because they have already had a taste of that paradise here on earth, as a result of their campaign of genocide against the Yazidi religious minority in Iraq and Syria. One aspect of this horrific slaughter has been the kidnapping of thousands of Yazidi women and girls to serve as sexual slaves to these savages.

A recent report from the U.N. Human Rights Council – a body that spends most of its time condemning Israel for alleged human rights violations – sheds some light on both the scale and the nature of the genocide, which was ignored by the international community for far too long. The campaign against the Yazidis was launched by ISIS over two years ago, in Aug. 2014, when its forces began an assault upon the Yazidi villages in Sinjar, a district in the northern Iraqi province of Nineveh. At least 5,000 Yazidis have been killed during the genocide, while 3,200 women and children remain in ISIS captivity. About 70,000, estimated to make up 15 percent of the overall Yazidi population, are reported to have fled Iraq.

The stories related by the U.N. report will be depressingly familiar to anyone who has studied genocide over the last century. Men and boys are either executed or forcibly converted, while women and girls exist solely for the use and pleasure of ISIS terrorists. The manner of the persecution is gruesome. “After we were captured, ISIS forced us to watch them beheading some of our Yazidi men,” said one 16-year-old girl. “They made the men

kneel in a line in the street, with their hands tied behind their backs. The ISIS fighters took knives and cut their throats.”



Despite this reign of terror, the Yazidis have not been destroyed as a distinctive group. Before the ISIS attacks began, around 700,000 Yazidis are said to have lived in Iraq, the largest single concentration of the religion's followers. Kurdish in terms of their ethnicity, the Yazidi faith is described by scholars as syncretic, which means it combines elements of other religions, including Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. Based on that, it's worth noting that ISIS isn't the only Islamist group that regards the Yazidis as infidels. The theology of more mainstream Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, assigns them a similar status.

Presently, the main focus for the Yazidis is the rescue of their women and girls from the clutches of ISIS. Often this is done through ransom payments, involving middlemen who collect huge sums from their families – one recently reunited family paid a total of \$34,000 for their two daughters – which are then paid to ISIS. After their release, both girls said they didn't expect that they would see each other again, describing their captors as “dirty and abusive,” who subjected them to regular beatings.

What this illustrates is the need for greater physical security for the Yazidis, as well as for other religious minorities in the region, if and when ISIS is defeated. Without that concrete measure, continued religious and



ethnic conflict in the Middle East will target vulnerable minorities first and foremost.

For that reason, the decision of the Iraqi parliament on 4 October to reject Yazidi and Assyrian Christian appeals for separate provinces should spark concern. "The Iraqi people reject any decision that partitions the Nineveh province. The people of the city determine the destiny of their city in the post-Islamic State (IS) stage," said Ahmed al-Jabra, a Sunni member of parliament, justifying the vote. Conveniently, for the Sunni Arab population, the vote also means that Yazidis and other minorities, who have been dispossessed from the region, will be reluctant to come back. Viyan Dakhil, a Yazidi member of the Iraqi parliament, has already said that Yazidis will be wary of returning to the Nineveh province without significant changes in its administration.

It was Dakhil who first alerted the world to the slaughter of the Yazidis in 2014, when her emotional plea to the world to save her people went viral on the internet. In a speech earlier this year at the U.N. in Geneva, arranged by the dedicated staff of the U.N. Watch nongovernmental organization, Dakhil

declared, "The international community has to support us, to call upon the U.N. Security Council to recognize what is happening to us as genocide, and to refer our case to the International Criminal Court." And there are signs that process is in motion, with both the U.S. and British governments formally acknowledging that the Yazidis have experienced a genocide in the legal sense of the term.

What is worrying is that measures to protect the Yazidis from future brutalities have been set back by the Iraqi parliament decision. As Jews from Middle Eastern countries know only too well, being a minority in the midst of profound instability in Arab and Muslim societies is not a fate anyone would want. The only way to protect yourself is by exercising some significant degree of self-determination, including the right of self-defense, secured by international guarantee. After all, we Jews were only able to say "Never again" once we secured the means to prevent further persecution, in the form of the state of Israel. The other religious minorities of the Middle East deserve no less.

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UK report warns of criminals becoming terrorists

Source: <http://www.stripes.com/news/europe/uk-report-warns-of-criminals-becoming-terrorists-1.433524>

Oct 12 – The lines between terrorism and criminality are becoming blurred as an increasing number of former criminals join the Islamic State group and create a "gangster jihad," according to a British report released Tuesday.

Nearly 60 percent of European jihadists studied by researchers had been jailed previously, in essence creating a "super-gang," said the report from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence at King's College London.

Once recruited by IS, these people easily transition to committing violence for a different cause, making the group different from other Islamist organizations such as al-Qaida, which often radicalized students, intellectuals or other previously non-violent individuals to carry out its violent aims, the report said.

"They are the perfect fit," Peter Neumann, the center's director, said of the criminals bolstering the Islamic State group's ranks.

"Islamic State doesn't require any intellectual sophistication. It doesn't ask you to study religion. It makes it all like a computer game."

The researchers said a growing Islamic State offers criminals a chance at "redemption" without requiring a change in behavior.

With recruits who are already accustomed to violence, it is less difficult to persuade them to go further. They are also familiar with weapons and are adept at "staying under the radar" and at logistical planning.

While past efforts to stop extremist attacks focused on tracing the complicated international bank transactions that financed militants, IS attacks don't



necessarily require huge sums of money. **The center estimated that some 40 percent of such plots in Europe are now being financed in part by street crime like selling drugs or counterfeit goods.**

One of those involved in the attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo financed his activities by selling counterfeit sports shoes on the streets of Paris.

The report suggests law enforcement must target all sources of funding to combat the threat.

"Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal

means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing," the report said.

The researchers warn that European prisons will become more important breeding grounds for the jihadist movement as the number of people convicted of terrorism-related offenses increases.

"Institutional silos — for example, the separation between countering crime, customs, and counter-terrorism — need to be broken down," the report said. "With criminal and terrorism milieus converging, the fight against crime has become a national security issue."

One Mission for Active Shooter Response: Saving Lives

By Richard Hunt

Source: <https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/one-mission-for-active-shooter-response-saving-lives/>

Oct 12 – Law enforcement and healthcare organizations – including emergency medical services (EMS), trauma centers, and other hospitals – have a common mission in active shooter attacks: saving lives. Law enforcement stops the shooter, healthcare stops the bleeding, but both must work together to ensure early access to victims and their rapid evacuation.

This article describes the importance of: (a) engaging the public in lifesaving bleeding control; and (b)

promoting cross-discipline collaboration and coordination among law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals. Law enforcement has made significant strides in learning how to prevent and respond to active shooter incidents, which include: adapting tactics based on prior active shooter responses, collaborating with EMS, training on hemorrhage control, and equipping



officers with individual first aid kits that include tourniquets. Similarly, healthcare organizations have made substantial progress in planning and training for active shooter response, and in using evidence-based lessons learned from the military's experience in hemorrhage control that have saved lives.

An Emergent Care Solution

Severe uncontrolled bleeding can kill within minutes – potentially before trained EMS or law enforcement professionals arrive. Thus, lifesaving interventions by members of the public or of just arriving law enforcement officers may be the difference between life and death for survivors of active shooter attacks. The White House "Stop the Bleed" initiative provides the public with basic tools and information on the simple steps they can take to stop life-threatening bleeding. "[Stop the Bleed](#)" has the following goals: (a) the general public will know the phrase "Stop the Bleed" and its associated logo; (b) the general public will know how to stop life-threatening bleeding; (c) the general public will have access to effective personal bleeding control kits; (d) the general public will have access to effective public access bleeding control kits; and (e) every bleeding control kit will provide "just-in-time" audio and visual training.

Substantial efforts are underway in support of the "Stop the Bleed" initiative. For example, the *Washington Post* published a story that included an [infographic](#) on how to use a tourniquet. The University of Georgia has placed 240 bleeding control kits adjacent to their



automatic external defibrillators (AED) on campus; the University plays a “Stop the Bleed” public service announcement featuring their team coaches and stars at their sporting events. Charlotte International Airport has installed public access bleeding control kits next to all their AEDs. Current and future leadership from law enforcement and healthcare organizations to support “Stop the Bleed” will put lifesaving tools in the hands of those who may have the best chance to save a life – the general public. Hopefully in the near future the public will have at least the same access to bleeding control kits with tourniquets as they do to AEDs in public venues.

In support of their common mission to save lives, law enforcement and EMS are planning, training, and exercising together for active shooter responses in many areas. But there is much work left to do – many jurisdictions do not train and exercise together for these events, potentially imperiling both victims and responders due to delays establishing safe victim access. Much of the focus of law enforcement and EMS on active shooter attacks has been on what happens at the scene of active shooter incidents.

Critical Triage Decisions

Deciding which victims of active shooter attacks go to which hospitals can be life or death decisions. On a daily basis, EMS cares for gunshot wound patients on the scene and during transport, and they make decisions on which trauma center or other hospital those patients should go to. Research has demonstrated that these decisions are critical – a 25-percent reduction in mortality for severely injured adult patients who received care at a Level I trauma center rather than at a non-trauma center – the key is to not overwhelm a single trauma center during a mass casualty event when other appropriate options are available.

The transport of victims from the scene of a shooting may include both the formal use of EMS transport, as well as the movement of victims by public responders in personal vehicles. More recently, law enforcement transport of injured patients has emerged as an accepted practice in some locales for daily occurring incidents. Law enforcement may be able to transport severely injured patients to hospitals faster than EMS, which may lead to better chances of survival in some circumstances because of the reduction in time from injury to lifesaving surgical intervention. At the same time, these transports usually occur outside the EMS process and without the medical knowledge that drives appropriate triage decisions. Further, they should only occur when they do not dilute the law enforcement resources necessary to ensure scene access and security.

The large numbers of victims simultaneously requiring care at a trauma center or hospital may exceed immediately available EMS transport capacity. For some active shooter incidents, there simply have not been enough ambulances on the scene that can transport enough survivors fast enough to lifesaving care. Thus, the decision by law enforcement to transport survivors from the scene to a trauma center or other hospital has clearly supported the mission – saving lives. Although this may be considered an atypical response role, such an initiative has likely saved lives.

In future events, it would not be a surprise if the demand for immediate transport of survivors to trauma centers or other hospitals exceeded the capacity of EMS. Contingency plans should be in place for these situations, which may include law enforcement, early mutual aid assignments to multi-victim shooting incidents, mass casualty transport vehicles, and even private transport. Rapid clearance of the scene is important not only to offer victims the best chance of survival but also because the safety of these scenes may be dynamic due to the risk of secondary devices and attacks. Expectations during a mass casualty incident should be clear among disciplines and good incident communications ensured.

With the already realized and future potential for active shooter attacks with large numbers of victims, it is important for law enforcement to have awareness of who does and who does not emergently need surgery at a trauma center. In a mass casualty incident, a life-threatening gunshot wound to the chest needs to go to the operating room at a trauma center; a non-life-threatening gunshot wound to the foot may be cared for, at least initially, at a non-trauma center. Having too many non-life-threatening injuries arriving at the nearest trauma center may compromise its ability to care for those who really need it. Bringing hospitals and trauma centers into the active shooter preparedness collaboration between EMS and law enforcement can help make sure the right survivors get to the right trauma center or other hospital as rapidly as possible.

Unique Requirements

Trauma centers and other hospitals also need to train on the unique requirements that mass violence events present. The operating room, equipment and supplies, and



personnel resources are unique, in that many victims may need immediate surgery and may consume large quantities of resources including blood products. Secondary devices and attacks at the hospital are also possible and must be prepared for.

In addition, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals may be able to support training for law enforcement on how to stop life-threatening bleeding. Planning, training, and exercises for active shooter incidents that integrate all components of the response – law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals – support the mission they all have in common: saving lives. Collaboration between law enforcement and healthcare may be facilitated by healthcare coalitions reaching out to law enforcement and vice versa; state and local health departments should be able to help connect local law enforcement agencies with the closest healthcare coalition.

In summary, the synergies among law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals can save lives from active shooter attacks. By supporting the “Stop the Bleed” initiative, all law enforcement and healthcare organizations can provide lifesaving skills to those who may have the best chance to save a life during an active shooter incident – the general public. By planning, training, exercising, and responding together, law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals will help improve survival from active shooter attacks. Opportunities to improve the chances of saving lives should not be missed. It is a joint mission.

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The “Not If, But When” Fallacy: Active Shooter Preparedness

By Stephen Maloney, Michelle Rosinski and Anthony Vivino

Source: <https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/the-not-if-but-when-fallacy-active-shooter-preparedness/>

Oct 12 – The phrase “It’s not if, but when” may distort how certain organizations perceive emergency preparedness, especially in cases such as active shooter threats. This



common expression leads to inaccurate threat perceptions and can result in leaders becoming complacent. Emergency managers should be aware of this potential odd pairing of a sense of inevitability with complacency, and be prepared to counter it.

Many places (including Ft. Hood in Texas; University of California-Santa Barbara; Charleston, South Carolina; San Bernardino, California; Orlando, Florida; Virginia Tech; Aurora, Colorado; Columbine High School in Colorado; Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut) are now associated with one of the most horrific kinds of criminals imaginable: the active shooter. Not only are these incidents terrible, but their frequency, by all accounts, is increasing. In fact, active shooter incidents are inevitable, with incidents occurring in the United States for at least 100 years.

However, no particular person or occupational role – an emergency manager, a business owner, or a school principal – is guaranteed to experience one of these incidents at his or her particular jurisdiction, business, or school. In some organizations, though – particularly colleges and universities – leadership has interpreted the constant media coverage of active shooter incidents as a direct indication that their institutions will inevitably face an active shooter. Their perspective essentially states that it is a matter of “not if, but when.”

Origins of the Phrase: “Not If, But When”

One of the earliest recorded uses in the English language of the phrase “It’s not if, but when,” or a related derivative, comes from an 1867 English periodical referencing an Italian politician. Recent American usage of the phrase has often involved describing the inevitability of minor or major disasters, such as [cyberattacks](#), [identity theft](#), [terrorism](#), [communicable disease outbreaks](#), and negative impacts of [climate change](#).

Usage in a subdiscipline of public relations known as crisis management is also quite common. Experts and authors in crisis management, often writing from a corporate perspective, emphasize the importance of being prepared to communicate after an incident that has affected the reputation of an organization. The goal is to counter negative media coverage and ensure that employees and the public maintain as positive an opinion of the organization as possible.

Crisis managers may say, “It’s not if, but when,” when they believe that an organization is going to experience one of these reputational crises. There is a chance that any organization will face some sort of crisis at some point in the future. However, it is possible that some leaders have wrongfully conflated the inevitability of simply anything in an organization going awry alongside the active shooter incident, with its much lower likelihood.

Frequency of Active Shooter Incidents

Understanding the frequency of active shooter incidents must begin with an understanding of related definitions. This article employs three definitions to establish frequency:

- [Active shooter](#): “an individual or individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area.”
- [Mass shooting](#): “a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or more locations in close proximity.”
- [Targeted violence](#): “an incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack.”

The definitions above include both incidents when individuals attempted violent acts as well as events that resulted in fatalities. According to the Congressional Research Service ([CRS](#)), a shooting is only considered a “mass shooting” if it results in at least four deaths. This definition aligns with what much of the public thinks when confronted with the term “active shooter” and thus blurs the lines between incidents where a shooter attempts acts of violence, and “mass shooting” events where multiple fatalities occur. Using the CRS’s definition, the United States had fewer than three such incidents per year from [1983 to 2012](#). By the same definition, [2014 and 2015](#) saw eight mass shootings.

Alternately, *targeted school violence* – an incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to a violent attack – increased from fewer than 10 per year in the first half of the 20th century, to close to 100 per year by 2008, according to a 2014 presentation by former chief research psychologist for the U.S. Secret Service, Dr. Marisa



Randazzo, as part of [threat assessment training](#) through Sigma Threat Management Associates. Although this statistic is disturbing, Randazzo urges people to take into account the similarly rising student enrollment rates across the United States in the same period. Indeed, the increase in frequency, when observed in isolation, is alarming. But when placed into context among a commonplace rise in population, the frequency may represent a stable phenomenon, according to Randazzo.

It appears that what is lacking in the public's perspective is context. Federal Bureau of Investigation [research](#) indicates that active shooter incidents in the entire United States have been increasing in frequency, from an average of 6.4 incidents per year between 2000 and 2006 to an average of 16.4 incidents per year from 2007 to 2013. Despite these national averages suggesting a low probability of an incident occurring at any particular location, some leaders still believe these events to be inevitable.

The Psychology

Extensive media coverage of school shootings makes such incidents particularly salient, which may lead to a pervasive public misconception of their frequency. This reliance on easily recalled examples to support decision-making is called the [availability heuristic](#). When concepts are more cognitively available, they are assumed to be statistically more likely than they truly are.

This bias can lead to a phenomenon in behavioral psychology known as [learned helplessness](#), which is a condition of powerlessness observed both in humans and animals when a particular trauma or threat

seems unavoidable. The perceived inevitability for recurrence of such threats leads to predictable behaviors that demonstrate feelings of helplessness or complacency.

Exposure to seemingly uncontrollable events not only alters the individual's ability to see relationships between behaviors and their outcomes, but it can also have a greater [emotional impact](#) than that of controllable events. The availability heuristic leads to systematic biases, particularly with regard to repeated events. In context, this likely manifests as overestimations of the probability of an active shooter incident occurring based on the salience of recent prominent examples. If that overestimation results in a belief of inevitability, learned helplessness becomes a possible threat.

The Danger of Catchphrases

Leaders lead, in part, by creating meaning for their followers. It is natural, then, that even good leaders are drawn to catchphrases that seem to encompass important points. Though certainly well intentioned, the phrase, "It's not if, but when," is ultimately fallacious when referring to the likelihood of an active shooter incident occurring at any particular location. This misuse of the phrase probably arises from extensive media coverage of public shootings, especially at schools. Ironically, the incorrect belief of inevitability can lead to complacency, rather than vigilance. It is essential that leaders choose their words wisely. Prevention and survivorship elements of an active shooter program must be backed by organized and balanced leadership, or their implementation could become haphazard and ineffective.

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'Where was Britain when ISIS conquered Syria?' Russia rebuffs UK claims of 'prolonging' war

Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/362290-russia-rebuffs-fallon-syria/>



Oct 11 – Russia's Defense Ministry issued an indignant comeback to UK Minister of Defence Michael Fallon a day after the British politician said Moscow was likely guilty of "bombing civilians" in Syria and trying to "prolong the civil war" there.

"Before launching into incoherent conjecture about Russia's supposed responsibility for the situation in Aleppo in particular, and Syria in general, it is necessary to think – what has the UK contributed to this poor country?" Major General Igor Konashenkov, the Russian Defense Ministry's spokesman, said in a statement released on Monday afternoon.

"Where was the UK when ISIS [Islamic State/Daesh, formerly ISIL] nearly reached the Mediterranean coast, almost turning Syria into a terrorist caliphate, like Libya. After all, it was you who controlled the skies at the time," he continued.

Konashenkov boasted that Russia has delivered "over 1000 liberated settlements, thousands of tons of humanitarian aid, and thousands of square kilometers freed from ISIS' hold, to which peaceful life has returned."

"How many settlements have been liberated, how much humanitarian aid delivered, and how many square feet have been cleared of ISIS by the UK?" asked the Russian official. At the end of his missive, Konashenkov asked if it is, perhaps, Britain that *"should be held responsible for the birth and nurture of ISIS, and Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front, which is now being effectively subdued by the Russian air forces."*

In an interview with the BBC, Fallon, who assumed his post two years ago, said that Russian air forces were likely behind the bombing of the UN aid convoy headed to Aleppo on September 20, which killed 20 people, and destroyed 18 trucks full of food and supplies.

"It looks as if they [Russia] did target that particular convoy and if that can be established, then yes, they should be held accountable," Fallon told BBC presenter Andrew Marr.

"Russia is determined to prolong this civil war; it is actually conniving with the regime's bombing of civilians and may indeed have been bombing civilians themselves."

With most Western countries accusing Russia of the attack, the incident effectively put an end to months of shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Washington, aimed at establishing a joint operation aimed at eliminating extremist forces in Syria.

The US has now officially suspended bilateral ties with Moscow over Syria, while Russian officials say that the West is still allowing Al-Nusra and other Islamist groups to operate under the guise of the so-called "moderate opposition."



Europe's no-go zones: Inside the lawless ghettos that breed and harbour terrorists


Source: <http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/europes-no-go-zones-inside-the-lawless-ghettos-that-breed-and-harbour-terrorists>

Oct 12 – Last month, French police thwarted an attempted terrorist attack at Paris' Notre Dame Cathedral. Luckily, the cell of radicalized French women who were taking orders from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) commanders in Syria did not get away with it, but it seems that more often than not, they do. How is this possible?

On July 14, when the people of France were celebrating the anniversary of the liberation of the Bastille prison by secular Republican revolutionaries in 1789, an apparent lone-wolf terrorist drove a truck into a holiday crowd in Nice. Eighty-four people were killed and more than 300 were wounded, some of whom may be disabled for life.



Media coverage of the incident followed a now-familiar pattern. At first, it was reported that Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, a Tunisian citizen living in France, had carried out the attack on his own. Initial investigations suggested that he was not religious or interested in Islam, ate pork, drank alcohol, was sexually active and perhaps had “mental problems.” And, of course, the Internet was filled with claims by ISIL that it had masterminded the attack.



French authorities soon discovered that Bouhlel had been planning this for a long time, that he had been visiting jihadist websites and that he had at least seven accomplices — five fellow Tunisians and two Albanian Muslims — who were all well armed. Hours after the massacre, one of his accomplices visited the site to film the reaction of people in and around it. What is worse, is that the evidence strongly suggests that they were planning a second bomb attack a few weeks later, during the height of the French holiday season in August. As there is no death penalty in France, when and if these people are convicted, they will enter a prison system where 70 per cent of the prisoners are Muslims, many of whom have been radicalized behind bars. Other prisoners will treat them like heroes. They will be well protected, even privileged.

Europe is now a hotbed of terrorist attacks by Muslims. In Belgium, on March 22, two suicide bombings took place, at the Brussels airport and the Maalbeek metro station. The terrorists died with their victims. Thirty-two people were

killed and more than 300 were wounded. Security officials searched the airport after the explosion and found another bomb. Again, we can assume that many of those who survived will be disabled for life. And yes, ISIL took automatic credit for the attack.

How is it that in Europe, one of the most advanced and well-organized societies on the face of the Earth, Muslim terrorists seem to just come out of the woodwork — fully armed with

trucks filled with explosives, assault rifles and bombs — and wreak havoc on civilian society? How is this possible, given the sophistication, wealth and training that are the pride of the French and other European police forces, as well as their intelligence and security agencies? The clue to the answer to these questions begins in Molenbeek in Brussels, the capital city of the European Union and the NATO alliance.

Molenbeek is what terrorism and security experts call a “no-go zone.” In Europe, no-go zones are what North Americans would call ghettos. But French and Belgium no-go zones have a distinct profile. They are usually ethnic enclaves in otherwise prosperous cities, like Paris and Brussels. They are almost exclusively populated by Muslims. In France, these are largely Muslims from North Africa and former French West Africa. Some are French citizens and some are illegal residents.

These no-go zones are areas of high unemployment, especially high youth unemployment. Anthropologists and sociologists who study these phenomena point out that inevitably these conditions result in the creation of violent gangs. So, although a significant number of usually middle-aged men and women commute outside their no-go zones to work in the wider society, they come home to these lawless suburbs. Well, not quite lawless, given that a new set of laws is replacing those of secular



France or Belgium in many of these areas.

Gangs dominate these suburbs and make their living by selling drugs. As the young gang members are looking for authority and endorsement, they have turned to the radical Islamic preachers who come from countries like Algeria, and who are members of radical Islamic movements in countries such as Morocco and Iran.

The Saudis and the Iranians often bankroll these preachers and the radical imams who live in these ghettos. Those imams who cannot get financial support from foreign benefactors often collect welfare from the French state and still preach jihad in the ghetto. Mosques become hotbeds of radical activity. They are also ideal places to store and transfer weapons and explosives, to be used in the growing number of terrorist attacks taking place across western Europe.

At the same time, in these no-go zones there is a push for the implementation of Sharia law and Sharia courts. Let us remember that Sharia law condones polygamy and recommends amputation for theft and the death penalty for any apostate who leaves Islam. Non-Muslim wives, and sometimes husbands, of these children of the ghetto are often forced, or pressured, to convert to Islam.

As this dynamic reaches its extreme, non-Muslim owners of apartments and residents of these areas are forced out, often under threat of violence, or after having been attacked. Once radical Muslims have gained control over these no-go zones, the general non-Muslim population does not enter them, out of fear of being attacked. And soon after, the police and the fire departments fear to enter them, as well, and stop patrolling them altogether.

Given the fact that the radical Muslim preachers of these ghettos are fundamentally anti-Semitic in their preaching, Jews in countries like France and Belgium, whose parents may have survived the Nazi occupation, are even more frightened of entering these no-go zones than other citizens. Not surprisingly, their synagogues in nearby suburbs are regularly attacked and vandalized. The state can neither protect Jewish citizens and their property, nor exert its authority in the no-go zones.

Despite the fact that both the liberal American press and numerous think-tanks and research institutes in France, Belgium and Britain have

done studies and written articles about this growing phenomenon, there are still elite politicians like the mayor of Paris who deny that there is any such thing as a no-go zone in the French republic.

In August 2014, the French magazine *Contemporary Values* suggested that France had more than 750 areas of “lawlessness,” a.k.a. no-go zones. In a 2011 study, comprising 2,200 pages, Giles Kepel, a political scientist and specialist on Islam at the Institut Montaigne, and his colleagues conclude that these no-go zones are now becoming separate Islamic societies. In these areas, Sharia is replacing French civil law and the residents are rallying under the banner of radical Islam and violent jihad, against their fellow French citizens.

No doubt a similar dynamic has been taking place in the South Asian Muslim enclaves in Britain, as well as in the Turkish and Balkan Muslim enclaves in Germany.

Not all recent immigrants to Europe behave this way, however. The British Sikhs who moved there in large numbers after the Second World War have, as a group, one of the highest living standards in the country. Many of the Argentinians who entered western Europe during the period of the junta have also mixed effortlessly with their host societies, as have thousands of Poles.

The answer to how these terrorists are able to appear all of a sudden, as if out of nowhere, and strike at the heart of Western civilization should now be clear. The reason apparently lone assassins suddenly materialize in prosperous European cities and are able to kill scores of people and wound hundreds is that they have a state within a state that gives them refuge, the no-go zone. There they do not need a passport. There they can store arms. There they can prepare their attack plans. From there they can quickly go out and wreak havoc. If they get lucky, their co-conspirators can disappear back into the no-go zones, knowing they will be seen as heroes by their neighbours, their religious leaders and the growing number of alienated, drug-dealing youth gangs.

Before the French, Belgian, German and British governments — including their police, courts, schools and housing authorities — offer resident Muslims in



Europe the blessings of a secular society, they will have to take back the ghettos. They will have to disarm the militants, deport scores of preachers, pacify the gangs, cut off the drug supply and cut off funding from Saudi Arabia and Iran. And they will have to persuade key players in the ghetto to stand up to their violent neighbours and instead support the peaceful aims of the state.

However, if the European ruling elites and the mainstream media have stopped believing in

the *liberté, égalité, fraternité* (liberty, equality, fraternity) that was proclaimed on that fateful day of July 14, 1789, then the future of France and much of western Europe will be one of a growing series of terrorist nightmares. They will have lost the war against the jihadists, the authority of the state will wither, and the French and other European majorities will be treated like a conquered people in their own lands. The same fate awaits the British, if they do not soon take preventative action.

EU Report Targets British Media for Telling the Truth About Radical Islamic Terrorism

Source: <http://dailysignal.com/2016/10/12/eu-report-targets-british-media-for-telling-the-truth-about-radical-islamic-terrorism/>

Oct 12 - As Britain starts extricating itself from the European Union, bureaucrats in Brussels continue to hand ammunition to Brexit supporters.

Last week, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) saw fit to advocate British journalists undergo some type of sensitivity training because—get this—they write too much about radical Islamist terrorism.

The 83-page “ECRI Report on the United Kingdom” covers a wide range of alleged manifestations of intolerance in Britain.

Those familiar with the deeply democratic, fair-minded, and civilized Brits will hardly recognize the country. Indeed, nowhere is it mentioned that Britain has never had fringe parties like those on the Continent, such as France’s National Front.

The British tabloid media is a particular target for the EU investigators. They blame an alleged increase in hate crimes and racism in the U.K. on the “worrying examples of intolerance and hate speech in the newspapers, online, and even among politicians.”

The fifth annual report deplores the British media for describing horrific acts of terrorism—such as those that have rocked France, Germany, and Belgium this year—as motivated by violent, militant Islam. The report says in part:

Where the media stress the Muslim background of perpetrators of terrorist acts, and devote significant coverage to it, the violent backlash against Muslims is likely to be

greater than in cases where the perpetrators’ motivation is downplayed or rejected in favor of alternative explanations.

The ECRI strongly recommends that the authorities find a way to establish an independent press regulator according to the recommendations ... It recommends more rigorous training for journalists to ensure better compliance with ethical standards.

The [British government](#) has firmly rejected the EU demands to censor British media, reform its laws, and impose sensitivity training on British journalists. “The government is committed to a free and open press and does not interfere with what the press does and does not publish, as long as the press abides by the law,” responded Downing Street.

Neither Europe—nor the United States, for that matter—will succeed in stemming the violence that threatens its citizens if the media cannot describe the reality and the root causes of Islamic terrorism. The ideological and religious components of the long war in which the West now finds itself engaged must be honestly understood to be effectively fought.

Of course, these EU demands for censorship of the British media illustrate precisely why the Brexit vote went the way it did.

Reclaiming British sovereignty was at the very heart of the matter for British voters. In case they needed reassurance that the decision to leave the EU was the right one, t

his report should settle the matter.



One Dead, Pilot Hurt In Plane Crash; FBI Investigating Whether It Was Intentional

Source: <http://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-plane-crash-1012-20161011-story.html>

Oct 12 - **Federal law enforcement sources said Wednesday that the FBI is investigating whether the crash of a small plane near the Pratt & Whitney gates was an intentional act.**

The crash of the twin engine aircraft Tuesday afternoon killed one person, and one other was taken to the hospital. The plane, which took off with a student and flight instructor at Hartford-Brainard Airport, crashed around 3:40 p.m. Tuesday.



A state source Wednesday morning confirmed the deceased as Feras M. Freitekh, age 28. Public record show he has lived in Orland Hills, Ill. since April of 2013. He holds a license to fly a single engine plane. Federal Aviation Administration records show he was issued a private pilot certificate on May 29, 2015.

"Nothing is being ruled out at this time, including an accident," said Lt. Josh Litwin of the East Hartford Police Department, who spoke at a press conference at the scene on Wednesday morning. He said the pilot of the plane, who is being treated at a Bridgeport hospital, is expected to survive. He is talking with investigators, Litwin said.

"The investigation is extremely active," Litwin said. He declined to comment further.

Wreckage of the plane remained on the scene of the crash Wednesday, and a stretch of Main Street remains closed.

The State Police Central District Crime Squad is processing the crime scene in East Hartford and detectives from the Fire and Explosion Investigations Unit also have been called into the investigation as have detectives assigned

to the counterterrorism unit from the state police. Investigators from the FBI, the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board were also on the scene.

Police were at an apartment house on Annawan Street in Hartford late Tuesday and Wednesday, searching with dogs and wearing protective gear, the boyfriend of a resident of the three-building complex said. Sources said the person killed in the crash was staying at the location.

Eric Bass, who lives nearby, said the complex has a number of apartments rented out by area flight schools for flight students. He said the students who lived there are from foreign countries, although he did not know where. He said four students lived in the building where his girlfriend lives. Bass did not say whether police took anything out of the apartment. The complex was not evacuated.

Flight students also stay in an apartment on nearby Essex Street, which city records



indicate is owned by local flight school owner Arian Prevalla. A neighbor at 32 Essex St. said the owner of unit E frequently rents to trainees at Brainard Airport, typically young men who stay for months at a time. The unit has so much turnover, she said, that an "unoccupied" label remains marked on the front door for that unit.

Two men had recently been living there, she said, though she didn't have their names. The head of the condominium association was



not immediately available for comment.

The men live on the top floor of the Essex Street building. No one answered the door at the unit Wednesday morning.

A Pratt & Whitney spokesman said Wednesday that the defense contractor was "assisting authorities as needed. We are unable to comment further since this is an active investigation."

Pratt & Whitney workers arriving for work Wednesday said they were still shaken by the crash.

Gregory Bell saw the plane flying unusually low as he drove home from work. "I saw the plane going low," he said. "It was too low." By the time he got down the street, he heard the crash, which killed one person on the plane and injured another.

There were no obvious signs of stepped up security as Bell and coworkers reported to work Wednesday morning.

The crash survivor told investigators that it was not an accident, according to the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the investigation was continuing, according to the Times.

A student and instructor were aboard the twin-engine aircraft when it took off from Hartford-Brainard Airport in Hartford, East Hartford Mayor Marcia Leclerc said. The Piper PA-34 Seneca struck a utility pole and wires, knocking out power to the area, and was immediately engulfed in flames, witnesses said.

The wreckage still sat at the scene of the crash in front of a Main Street credit union as the sun rose behind Pratt & Whitney across the street Wednesday. A minivan that stopped just short of colliding with the plane also remained in the street, its doors wide open.

Two people in the minivan were taken to the hospital with minor injuries, Oates said. Police said the vehicle did not appear to have been hit by the plane.

A stretch of Main Street was still closed Wednesday morning, though nearby highways and highway ramps were not affected.

Kevin A. Dillon, executive director, Connecticut Airport Authority, said the investigation is "ongoing."

East Hartford police Chief Scott Sansom said he asked the FBI to respond because the crash occurred so close to Pratt & Whitney, which he described as "critical infrastructure."

"It will be a lengthy investigation for the next few days," Sansom said, noting that it was too early to tell what caused the plane to crash.

"This ... is a very complex situation with a lot of different agencies and a lot of different moving parts," Oates said.

Jonathan Rucker said he was sitting at a picnic table behind a house on Colt Street when he heard the airplane suddenly go silent.

"I hear planes every day," he said. "I heard a plane, then I didn't hear anything. I looked up and the plane was just tipping over. It tipped to the left and dropped straight down. There was a loud bang, smoke and flame. It tipped to the left and just dropped like a rock."

Matthew Zuerblis of Wethersfield was talking to some coworkers at Monro Muffler at 431 Main St. when they heard a ground-shaking blast.

"You heard an explosion, Zuerblis said. "Telephone poles shook. We thought it was a car accident at first."

He went out to the street near Frank's Willow Inn restaurant and saw that black smoke was billowing from a plane, not a car. A woman who had been in a van that stopped right next to the wrecked plane rushed away from the scene with two children.

"She was just hysterical," he said. "I'm just glad they're OK."

Frank Crandall, who saw the crash while driving, said he stomped on his brakes when he saw the low-flying plane.

"I saw the plane hit the power lines, go into a power pole and then hit just before a minivan and burst into flames," said Crandall, who works in a building next to the crash. "I thought the power lines were going to come down, so I gunned it."

He said he turned around and saw a woman from the van screaming. He went to see if he could help.

"She was fine, she came into our office," Crandall said.

Erick Zapata, who was at a nearby Subway shop while on a break from work, said "out of nowhere a plane crashed into the pole."

"Pieces started flying everywhere," he said. "I was nervous, I was shaking. It was crazy. I've never seen anything like it."

Main Street and several nearby streets were expected to be closed "for a significant period of time," Leclerc said. The crash



could be heard up to a mile away, she said. The crash knocked out power to about 500 Eversource customers in East Hartford, the power company said. Utility crews were making

repairs Tuesday night and most of the homes affected had their power restored by Wednesday morning.

The Counterterrorism Alternate to Reactive Response (Intro)

Published on October 11, 2016

By Dustin Henry

Security Forces Section Supervisor at US Air Force • Available January 2017

Source: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/counterterrorism-alternate-reactive-response-intro-dustin-henry>

[Introduction to a research paper being written for American Military University's NSEC501 course. The final and complete edition will be available as a 'project' under the course.]

Terrorism, prior to the twenty-first century, was an event or continual occurrence in foreign lands. These events would not happen within the United States (US). However, the attacks conducted by al Qaeda on September 11th, 2001, broke the American citizen's model on what terrorism was. No longer was it people on a television screen who spoke a strange language being broadcast days or weeks after the event. The people on the television were fraternal and sometimes literal brothers and sisters to the American people.

The 2001 al Qaeda attack spurred a military response on the opposite side of the world in conjunction with the creation of an entirely new cabinet department within the US federal government. The terroristic attack changed the US deeply and overnight. However, as things began to calm down, there was a new flag rising over the war torn Middle East. A black flag, like that of a pirate's, flew in dark corners of destabilized nations. As it grew and fought against allies, predecessors, and adversaries its name changed repeatedly. To the policy maker in Washington, D.C., the name changes were so repetitious they were redundant. The most up to date, and concise, organizational handle for the group is the Islamic State (IS). This organization has been more successful than any of its peers or forerunners at waging war, claiming land, and inspiring members. In fact, the goals of al Qaeda were to incite a resurrection of Muslims around the world that would take control. This had not come to fruition. IS, alternately, had effectively taken control of a small area in the Iraq-Syrian region.

This fact would be a footnote on a news broadcast, but IS is much more than a simple

jihadi organization. In fact, IS has fruitfully inspired attacks around the world. The pseudo-state carried out attacks in Europe with success, but has inspired stabbings, shootings, and bombings in Europe and the US. But as of late 2016, IS was declining. The organization had followers around the world, but as it lost ground the focus became slightly less about maintaining the *Khilāfah* (the Islamic state also known as the Caliphate). The shift was an external revolution which focused on domestic terrorism in the West.

First, this was a method of deflection for IS, and secondly, this was means for sympathizers to become involved before the fight was lost. Because the West had been locked in a conflict with an ideology, one whose motto appears to be 'at all costs', the US has found itself the victim of domestic terrorism conducted by IS sympathizers. But, domestic counterterrorism (CT) is accomplished atypical in relation to foreign CT. Within the US all persons have rights. Even the individual who enters into the US illegally still possesses amendment rights. The foreigner in the US, one who is believed to be a sympathizer or IS operative, still has Fourth Amendment rights simply because they are on US soil. Moreover, since the September 11th attacks, Muslim communities have been profiled or discriminated against by non-Muslim Americans. Actions of discrimination have been inconsistent, but they lacking respect while leaving a strong imprint on the greater Muslim community. This ostracized mentality has led Muslim communities to isolate themselves. If these communities believe there are being further discriminated against it could lead to additional isolation measures, which could



also cause grievances leading to radicalization. Therefore, domestic CT must be performed like surgery. First for the safeguarding of Constitutional rights. Secondly, profiling and discrimination could easily become counterproductive. Therefore, in the CT fight, agents must be exceptionally well versed in the IS ideology. Next, the US must be able to use that information to identify what communities in the US are at risk for radicalization. Once this is accomplished through evasive maneuvers, CT agents and national leaders must build relationships with the Muslim community leaders. This partnership would lead to a better

understanding of the community and once trust was built it would make the final step significantly easier. Once the community stops self-policing, ignoring, or harboring radical Muslims, CT agents should establish a network of secret confidential informants (CI). Knowing the ideology, coupled with identification of communities at risk for radicalization, makes CI operations far less invasive. Therefore, US domestic CT would adhere to Constitutional rights and protect the Muslim community, while also defending the greater American population.



Source: <http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Islamic-State-Networks-in-Turkey-web-1003.pdf>

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No, Your Drug Use Is **Not** Funding Terrorism

Source: <http://www.vice.com/read/is-the-drug-trade-really-bank-rolling-terrorists>

Oct 13 – **Here's a puzzler. How do you turn violent religious extremists into amoral gangsters, while simultaneously making people who get high look like terrorist funders?**

Simply transform all Islamic militants into "narco-terrorists" who are bankrolled by the drug trade. Abracadabra!—a misinformation missile striking simultaneously at gun-toting jihadists and anyone involved in buying or selling drugs. It's propaganda value for money. What's more, because it's a "marmalade dropper" (a story to shock people as they read the news over breakfast) the media will lap it up.

In 2014, DEA spokesman Rusty Payne described this wicked marriage between terrorists and drug peddlers: "Globally, drug trafficking is not just a criminal issue, not just a health and safety issue, it's a national security issue. Addiction and abuse across the world is funding and fueling insurgents. Much of the world's terror regimes are funded through drug trafficking proceeds, or the taxing of drug routes throughout the world. The threat is real." Thing is, the threat is not entirely real. In fact, says Vanda Felbab-Brown, an expert in international conflict and organized crime, it's a narrative steeped in half-truths and spin



that, in some cases, acts as a cover for the involvement of state officials in the drug trade. "Many of these links are vastly exaggerated, and based on extraordinarily shabby evidence," says Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Washington, DC-based Brookings Institution, one of America's most respected and oldest think-tanks. The "narco-terrorism" narrative, she says, is based on "a lot of drama and myth."

For example, most of the tales portraying the Islamic State as key players in the global supply of heroin are state-sponsored propaganda coming out of Russia. This story is pushed by Russian officials and media outlets because it makes America and Britain look bad. The Coalition's failure to suppress Afghanistan's poppy cultivation after invading in 2001 has led to bumper opium crops that, the story goes, not only fills IS' coffers, but creates what American and British politicians secretly yearn for: millions of heroin-addicted Russians. It's a load of baloney—long-established heroin trafficking routes bypass their territories—but if newspapers carry on printing it, people will soon believe it.

In reality, Islamic State (IS)—currently the biggest global terrorist threat—has very little involvement in the global heroin, cocaine, or cannabis trade. Islamic terrorist groups are far from being a band of bearded Pablo Escobars with international reach.

"IS, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban are not narco-terrorists. They are terrorists who simply tax everything in their area—it is very localized," says Felbab-Brown. She estimates that drugs are one of IS's "smaller income streams."

According to [a report](#) earlier this year into IS' finances by US-based analysis firm IHS, 50 percent of the group's revenue—estimated at \$56 million a month—comes from taxation and confiscation, and 43 percent comes from oil. The remaining 7 percent comes from a mixture of sources, including the sale of electricity, donations, and drugs. The money IS does receive from the drugs trade comes indirectly, as part of a system of taxing all goods and services, such as food, transport, fuel, and raw materials that are bought and sold within their realm of control.

In fact, the links made between global terrorism and the drug trade have often turned out to be

a smokescreen for government involvement. "There are just as many government links to the drug trade as there are terrorist links," says Felbab-Brown. "It's easier to blame terrorists rather than institutional corruption. Remember, the best way of being a drug trafficker is to work for the ministry of counter narcotics."

From entire institutions to rogue individuals, government figures [across north west Africa](#)—in Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone have been linked to cocaine smuggling and methamphetamine production. It is no surprise, then, that the authorities in these countries are particularly keen to spread misinformation exaggerating the role of Islamic terrorists in drug smuggling. It's an old game: state authorities have also been caught knee-deep in the drug trade in countries all over, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Turkey, China, Italy and Peru.

Felbab-Brown points out that most drug traffickers, unsurprisingly, see IS as a dangerous business partner, not just because of their capacity for extreme violence, but because they attract maximum heat from law enforcement and military intelligence. Nor are IS in cahoots with Mexican drug cartels, as claimed in 2014 by Arkansas Republican Senator Tom Cotton. The scare story was based on the mumblings [of a discredited defense analyst](#).

Modern day terrorists rarely get involved in the drug trade beyond their home turf. But this does not mean IS, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban don't make money from the drug trade. They do, but to vastly differing degrees.

The Taliban—responsible for a long list of atrocities, including the murder of 148 children at a military-run school in northwest Pakistan in 2014—has the closest relationship with drug money. As with many big players in Afghanistan, such as the government and Coalition forces, the Taliban realized in 1995 that if it wanted to keep the populace onside it had no choice but to let the opium trade continue.

"Since then, the Taliban have sponsored and taxed poppy cultivation and trafficking within Afghanistan," says Felbab-Brown. "Opium is the economic lifeline in Afghanistan. The Taliban's message now is all about being 'protectors of the poppy,' preserving the nation's livelihoods



against Kabul's 'kaffir government'."

The Taliban's involvement in Afghanistan's domestic opium trade continues despite the country's invasion and occupation by the American-led coalition between 2001 and 2014.

But it is mainly restricted to inside Afghani borders, with external trafficking mostly the privilege of corrupt authority figures in Pakistan.

"The Taliban is involved in some opium smuggling to Pakistan. But this business is dominated by affiliates of the main Pakistani political parties and figures in the Pakistani army and intelligence services. And, like the Afghani politicians who also profit from the poppy trade, they launder the proceeds in Dubai and the UAE," says Felbab-Brown. She estimates poppy cultivation makes up around 30 to 40 percent of the Taliban's income of "tens of millions of dollars a year," with the lion's share coming from fundraising in the Gulf and Pakistan.

What about al Qaeda, the architect of 9/11, one of the biggest terrorist attacks in history? Felbab-Brown says a decade ago there were "dramatized links" made in the media linking the group to the drug trade, "based on dodgy, murky evidence," but the stories have since died down because the group has taken such a beating from the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In some parts of Afghanistan, the white flag of the Taliban has been replaced by the black flag of IS. In Nangarhar Province, IS have prohibited poppy cultivation alongside claims of religious purity, to try to damage the Taliban's credentials. But putting ideology ahead of cold hard cash has been expensive for IS, according to Felbab-Brown. Not only have they spurned a huge income through opium, but their ban on growing poppies—while forcing farmers to become IS soldiers instead—has turned the local population against them.

But Islamic State is not a uniform outfit, and for some bands of IS fighters old habits die hard. In the north of Afghanistan, most IS soldiers are former members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a band which used to smuggle opium and, despite fighting under the IS banner, continues to do so.

In the Middle East, IS appears to have forgotten its puritanical credentials. There are whispers that IS has started to tax hashish

operations and smuggling in and around Lebanon. However, the key ties between IS and drugs comes in the form of the black market amphetamine Captagon, a drug which fell into their laps when they discovered a series of industrial scale factories producing the pills in Syria. There is strong evidence to show that IS, knowing there is a huge market for the drug in the Middle East—especially in Saudi Arabia and Jordan—has decided to tax its production and sponsor its movement across Syria's borders.

Tuesday Reitano, Head of the Secretariat at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, says IS has a conflicted relationship with drug trafficking in the Middle East: "Traffickers caught within IS territory of control have often been executed. Yet Captagon is produced in Syria and trafficked cross border through Turkey and Lebanon. This is not to say that IS is directly involved in either production or trafficking: their funding model thus far has been to tax the movement of goods, both licit and illicit, through their territory, demanding a payment from the traffickers themselves."

Reitano says Libya has become a hub for prescription drug trafficking, and there is evidence that seizures of large quantities of Tramadol in Greece have been destined for IS for use as battlefield medicine, as well as for recreational markets.

According to both Reitano and Felbab-Brown, there is evidence from refugees coming out of Syria, as well as from captured or killed IS fighters, to back up previous [news agency investigations](#) that [Captagon is being used to help fuel IS fighters on the battlefield](#).

However, these stories have to be treated with caution. A deluge of stories in the global press suggesting that the November 2015 Paris attackers injected Captagon to carry out the massacre turned out to be [false](#). No drugs were found in their bodies and the syringes and plastic tubes found at one of their flats turned out to be bomb making equipment, not drug injecting paraphernalia, as the media suggested at the time.

In the past decade, the narco-terrorism narrative has shifted to the emergence of a cocaine route into Europe's back door, from Colombia to West Africa and overland through the Sahara



desert up to the north African coast. It has been alleged that much of the profits of the trade are being reaped by jihadist militant groups in north west Africa, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). But how solid is this, the first link to be made between Islamist terrorists and cocaine, a substance consumed so widely in the West, and one that has enabled drug war enthusiasts to equate buying cocaine with the funding of suicide vests?

A [review](#) funded by the Kofi Annan Foundation into the links between drug smuggling, extremism, and terrorism in the region found that "widespread talk of a drug-terror nexus in the Sahel is misleading." Author Wofram Lacher, an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, said: "Much of the evidence presented as basis for such claims can either be easily debunked, or is impossible to verify."

Crucially, the report concluded that terrorists were far from being the biggest fish in the drug trafficking pond. "Numerous other actors are playing an equally or more important role in drug smuggling, including members of the political and business establishment in northern Mali, Niger, and the region's capitals, as well as leaders of supposedly 'secular' armed groups. The emphasis on links between drug trafficking and terrorism in the Sahel serves to obscure the role of state actors and corruption in allowing organized crime to grow."

Reitano too thinks it's all a bit of a snow storm: "I've traveled extensively around the Sahel since the Mali crisis in 2011, and have never once had a law enforcement official—either international or national—say that they have ever seized drugs with a direct connection to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) or other terrorist groups in the region."

She thinks the links between drugs and terrorists in the region have been exaggerated for political gain, in more than one sense. "I see the threat in the Sahel as having been vastly overplayed because it served a political objective [to those opposing the Islamic forces] both prior and post the [Mali crisis](#)," she says. "In fact, local government officials in Mali's north have probably seen greater benefit from the drug trade than the terrorist groups."

Reitano tells me that while drugs do move across the Sahara, it is predominantly low

value hashish. She says there is "a small flow of cocaine that enters from the West African coastal countries such as Guinea Bissau and Guinea and then travels overland across the Sahara, but this has declined significantly since the French counter-terror operations began".

Rather than dwell on hyped claims of narco-terrorism in the region, Reitano says "the new trend to watch in this space is growing evidence of methamphetamine production. There have been labs and super-labs found in Ghana and Nigeria, and the seizure patterns suggest it may also be produced in Mali, and little is known about the groups controlling this." It could be terrorists, but it could just as easily be people operating within the State. According to Virginia Comolli, a senior analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the evidence from Nigeria shows that terrorists are no more likely than state authorities to be involved in the drug trade, despite [claims from regional observers](#) that Boko Haram is primarily a criminal syndicate rather than one driven by ideology.

"The collusion of state authorities is at the core of the problem in the region and given that it goes way back in time, it is extremely hard to eradicate," says Comolli. "There have been rumors linking Boko Haram to Colombian cocaine traders, but the group is not involved in a big way. They've been involved in low level local drug smuggling, but drugs have never represented a significant source of funds, unlike other criminal activities such as bank robberies and extortion. Nigerian newspapers say Boko Haram fighters have been caught in possession of 'hard drugs,' but this is usually cannabis for their own use." Perhaps the obsession with terrorists and the drug trade is shackled to the past, where this symbiotic relationship—like the Taliban in Afghanistan—has flourished. Until the new peace agreement, the FARC in Colombia have been the most obvious benefactors of the cocaine trade, alongside the Shining Path and Sandinistas in Peru. And despite their denial, both sides of the religious divide in the Northern Ireland conflict received income from the illicit drug trade.

In Africa, Mokhtar "One Eyed" Belmokhtar, also known as Mr. Marlboro because of his role in cigarette smuggling across the Sahel region, used illegal drug



smuggling as a way of buying weapons. In the Middle East, drug production and trafficking has long funded violent conflict. The PKK, Tamil Tigers, and Hezbollah have consistently dabbled in the drug trade. Occasionally, drugs have been the currency used in the commission of specific terrorist attacks: as Spanish prosecutors alleged was the case in the 2004 Madrid bombings.

But there is a downside to hyping the narco-terrorism narrative. Because the more the truth about groups like Islamic State—and how they operate—becomes clouded by baloney and hype, the less likely they are to be defeated. The more emphasis there is placed on the drug trade, the more attention is diverted from tackling more lucrative income streams. There is a much vocalized dream that if only the drug trade can be stopped, so too can the terrorists.

Felbab-Brown warns that it is leading to misguided policies. "These fallacies are

actually damaging to counter terrorism: the fallacy that if you disrupt the drug trade you will defeat terrorists. There is not one example of this happening—be it Peru, Colombia, China, Burma, Lebanon, or Thailand—because they are not bankrolled by drugs; or the fallacy that we can't negotiate with terrorist groups because they are criminals with no political agenda because they are involved in drugs."

This skewed narrative is also sending us on another dud mission on the war on drugs, where already demonized players in the drug trade, such as drug users and street dealers, are now being tarred with funding Islamic terrorism, turning them from selfish undesirables into virtual enemies of the state. As if fighting terrorism was not hard enough. As if the drug war needed ramping up a notch: the over-hyped narco-terrorism construct looks set to become yet another foot-shooting move in the fight against those most elusive enemies, drugs and terror.

AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing

Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 20

By Michael Horton

Source: <https://jamestown.org/program/aqap-southern-yemen-learning-adapting-growing/>

Oct 14 – During the nearly two years of the Yemeni civil war, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has gone from an organization that was under pressure and struggling financially, to an organization that is larger, more formidable and better armed than it has ever been.

The civil war in Yemen is being fought between the Houthis and their allies – based in northwest Yemen – and a disparate mix of militias that nominally support Yemen's internationally recognized government-in-exile in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen months of unrelenting conflict has reduced most of the country's infrastructure to ruins, devastated an already weak economy and further impoverished the Middle East's poorest nation.

Amid the conflict, AQAP has lost territory, most significantly the Yemeni port city of al-Mukalla, which was retaken by forces backed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on April 24, 2016 ([al-Jazeera](#), April 25). However, this loss of territory has not significantly diminished the group's capabilities. On the contrary, AQAP, which has consistently proven itself to be a highly adaptable and deeply pragmatic organization, has benefited from having a much smaller territorial footprint. AQAP's strategic retreat from al-Mukalla, and other parts of the governorate of Hadramawt, prompted it to once again recalibrate its tactics and organizational structure to take maximum advantage of what is an ideal operational space for a terrorist organization: a politically fragmented and desperately poor country.

Strategic Retreat

In March 2015, AQAP took over al-Mukalla, Yemen's fifth largest city. This was soon after Saudi Arabia and its partners commenced Operation Decisive Storm. After the takeover of al-Mukalla, AQAP quickly established itself as a relatively benevolent power in the city and

handed over day-to-day governance to a council of elders. During the year that AQAP maintained control of the city, the organization, for the most part, followed a strategy outlined by its now deceased former leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi. [1] The strategy



advocated a gradualist approach to governance that adapted itself to the local political and strategic environment. This gradualist strategy was informed by the lessons learned from AQAP's 2011 takeover of parts of the governorates of Abyan and Shabwa. There, it had tried (but failed) to quickly impose its understanding of sharia or Islamic law. The organization lost what local support it had. Its relations with critically important tribal elders frayed to the point where the tribes turned on them and, with the support of parts of the Yemeni Army and with some outside assistance, forced AQAP from its strongholds in Abyan and Shabwa.

AQAP's gradualist strategy served it well during its yearlong occupation of al-Mukalla. It built on existing relationships with some members of the Hadrawmi elite and enjoyed limited support from the local populace. In most cases, this support was not for its militant Salafist ideology, but for AQAP's ability to maintain relatively high levels of security and for its attempts to reestablish public services. Beginning in January 2016, AQAP began moving forces and the heavy equipment that it had captured out of al-Mukalla. The equipment and forces were dispersed and repositioned in AQAP's former strongholds in the governorates of Abyan and Shabwa. In April, forces backed by KSA and UAE reoccupied al-Mukalla in a battle that lasted a day. AQAP's withdrawal from the city was hailed as a crushing defeat by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. KSA and UAE based spokesmen claimed that at least 800 AQAP fighters had been killed ([The New Arab](#), April 25).

The withdrawal, however, was well coordinated and carried out well in advance of the city's reoccupation. AQAP claimed it lost less than 10 fighters and declared that its withdrawal was to save civilian lives ([Arab News](#), April 30). While AQAP typically has little regard for civilian lives, this declaration was likely partially true – sizeable civilian losses would have cost it the support and popularity that it had worked to build over the previous year. Additionally and most importantly, AQAP's leadership saw that holding al-Mukalla in the face of Saudi and Emirati air power was neither tenable nor desirable.

AQAP's leadership has time and again proven that it is able to quickly learn from the mistakes that it makes and from the mistakes that other

terrorist organizations, such as Islamic State (IS), make. It is likely that AQAP was already beginning to see that the IS' large territorial footprint and its increasingly conventional forces were becoming a liability. In Iraq and most particularly in Syria – where Russia intervened at the behest of the Syrian government – IS had already suffered considerable losses by January 2016.

While the loss of al-Mukalla was a blow to AQAP's finances (AQAP collected a range of taxes and "tributes" in al-Mukalla, as well as running a lucrative fuel smuggling network), the loss did not diminish AQAP's ability to project power and coordinate offensive actions against its enemies ([Reuters](#), April 8). On the contrary, AQAP's strategic retreat has enhanced its ability to project power and influence.

Blurring the Lines

AQAP's phased withdrawal from al-Mukalla allowed it to leave the city with almost all of the weaponry that it had seized from military installations in and just outside the city. Most importantly, the withdrawal from al-Mukalla allowed AQAP to leave with its ties to many Hadrawmi elites intact.

The group's yearlong occupation of al-Mukalla was something of a master class in governance and community engagement for the organization. The resources seized by AQAP – which included at least \$100 million from the Yemeni Central Bank – allowed it to buy influence within numerous impoverished communities ([al-Jazeera](#), September 16). Some of the money was used to fund aid programs, food distribution, and to pay the salaries of those working directly and indirectly for AQAP. During the year in which AQAP occupied al-Mukalla and much of the southern half of the vast governorate of Hadramawt, AQAP worked assiduously at refining its already well-developed community engagement strategy.

The leadership of AQAP has, since at least 2011, recognized the importance of building relationships with local communities. While it has often failed at this due to its heavy-handed tactics, it has incorporated the lessons it has learned in the previous five years.

The organization now places an emphasis on "outreach" and engagement. Efforts include the payment of cash indemnities to



the families of those killed in drone attacks, public works like the drilling and refurbishment of water wells, and even paying for those who need to travel for medical treatment. [2] AQAP is now effectively leveraging its community ties across south Yemen and its organizational efficiency to make itself a key player in the fight against the Houthis (sworn enemies of AQAP) and loyalists of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well as those core parts of the Yemeni Army that remain loyal to Saleh and his sons.

Forces under the command of AQAP and forces allied with it are active on the frontlines in Yemen's civil war ([BBC](#), February 22). [3] In particular, AQAP is playing a key role in the ongoing battle for the strategic city of Taiz and in the battle for the equally strategic town and governorate of al-Bayda. Both of these areas have long been viewed as chokepoints that, if controlled, facilitate access to northwest highlands and most critically, the capital of Sanaa.

AQAP's relationship with the groups fighting against the Houthis/Saleh loyalists is complex. [4] It is likely that pro-government-in-exile militias tolerate AQAP because of its superior organizational efficiency and fighting skills. One of the key factors that has impeded the efforts of the pro-government militias is corruption and a lack of efficiency. Many of them are only nominal supporters of the deeply unpopular government in exile. A significant number of the men who have taken up arms have done so simply to earn enough to feed their families. As a result, the inability of their commanders to pay their salaries has caused militia members to look elsewhere for employment.

AQAP is one organization to which some of the men turn. It pays more (as much as \$1,100 a month for senior fighters), it pays on time and its fighters are well supplied with arms and food. This stands in stark contrast with many of the disparate KSA backed pro-government militias and army troops that are poorly paid, if they are paid at all, and who often run short of critical supplies ([New York Times](#), September 12). The lines between pro-government fighters and those fighting alongside AQAP are increasingly blurred. However, this is not to say that anything close to a majority of those fighting with the pro-government militias and reconstituted army units identify with AQAP's militant Salafist ideology.

Just like many, if not most, of the men who join it, AQAP is an organization driven by pragmatism and a desire to survive. AQAP's leadership has always been quick to spot opportunities for advancing the interests of the organization and ensuring its long-term survival; and that is the group's first and foremost concern, trumping ideology.

Islamic State: From Enemy to Ally?

Sixteen months ago, IS posed a significant threat to AQAP. Following in the wake of its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq, IS threatened to metastasize in Yemen just as it has in Libya, the Sinai, Iraq and Syria. Some midlevel members of AQAP's leadership switched their allegiance to IS, and the two groups fought a number of pitched battles in al-Shabwa and Hadramawt in 2015.

While AQAP, like IS in Syria and Iraq, has lost territory, there is a marked difference between how the two organizations have managed their retreats. As argued above, AQAP's withdrawal from al-Mukalla was strategic. The withdrawal, just as was envisioned by AQAP's leadership, added to rather than detracted from the organization's prestige. In contrast, IS' hyper-violent approach in the areas where it operates, including Yemen, has cost it much of the support that it briefly enjoyed.

The IS presence in Yemen has always been limited. IS allied operatives in Yemen have focused on small but deadly operations that primarily target government officials, those allied with the Houthis and, to a lesser degree, tribal and pro-government militias. As the power and influence of IS has declined in Syria and Iraq, so too has the influence and reach of IS in Yemen. While IS in Yemen continues to carry out small but deadly attacks, including a September 29 attack on a pro-government colonel in Aden, the organization is likely on the wane due to its tactics and its deteriorating finances ([Barakish.net](#), September 29).

The weakness of IS in Yemen will not have gone unnoticed by the leadership of AQAP. AQAP, in comparison with IS in Yemen, is well funded, well placed and well-armed. It is AQAP that can now set the terms by which the two groups cooperate or quite possibly merge. There is a long history of such mergers in Yemen. AQAP itself is a product of a nearly two-decade long evolution



that saw multiple jihadist groups merge and reconfigure themselves into organizations that were almost always more capable than their previous iterations.

While IS' standards for recruits are generally lower than for those of AQAP, IS in Yemen undoubtedly has a number of skilled and committed operatives among its ranks. [5] These men – those who are, ironically, not too radical for AQAP's tastes – could well find a home within the group. While it is too early to write off IS in Yemen as a spent force, at a minimum its weakness and more limited financial resources make it more likely to cooperate with AQAP in areas where their interests overlap ([Middle East Monitor](#), September 9). While there is no hard open source evidence, patterns of activity may indicate such cooperation. The tempo of AQAP's attacks in Aden has declined while attacks by IS are increasingly limited to the area in and around Aden. It is probable that AQAP now views IS as an ally of convenience that, when appropriate, can either be absorbed or eliminated. What is certain is that in addition to being driven by pragmatism, AQAP takes the long view of its war for territory and hearts and minds in Yemen.

Patience and Time

It is unlikely that members of the AQAP leadership read Tolstoy, but they readily incorporate his views on war. In *War and Peace*, the Russian General Kutuzov says of his troops who are outnumbered by Napoleon's army, "they must understand that we can only lose by taking the offensive. Patience and time are my warriors, my champions." [6] This approach to war is at the heart of AQAP's evolving strategy. The current AQAP leadership, which is clearly more than able to absorb the losses inflicted on it by U.S. drones, is focused on what it sees as a multi-decade war where patience and time will do more than anything else to wear down their enemies.

While AQAP is certainly not opposed to taking and holding territory, it is not afraid to give it up when such a retreat is to its advantage. AQAP took heavy losses in 2013 when it attempted to defend its first self-declared emirate in Abyan. The air strikes, skillfully aided by the United States, and most especially ground forces made up of units from the Yemeni Army and tribal militias who knew the terrain and local

actors, devastated AQAP, both its rank and file and its leadership. Just as it has in the past, AQAP learned from this experience and is now "like sand in the desert: always moving with the wind, but always accumulating." [7]

AQAP's proven ability to learn and evolve, combined with what are now ample funds and materiel, mean that it is able to further enmesh itself within communities, militias and urban populations that are subject to rapidly rising levels of poverty and insecurity. As was demonstrated in al-Mukalla, and to a lesser degree in other areas in the south that it continues to control, AQAP is able to set itself up as a viable and in some cases more efficient and effective alternative to the internationally recognized Yemeni government-in-exile. The civil war in Yemen, and the consequent fragmentation of what was already an incredibly complex political terrain, has provided AQAP with an abundance of opportunities to expand its organization and make itself even more resilient.

Looking Forward

Barring some kind of negotiated settlement, the civil war in Yemen is likely to continue, at least at a low intensity, for years. This is welcome news for AQAP. The war has already helped AQAP go from an organization that was struggling to one that is thriving. The dire humanitarian situation in Yemen – more than 80 percent of Yemenis are in urgent need of aid – will help AQAP fill its ranks with new recruits and allow it to continue to demonstrate its ability to act as a surrogate for the state by providing aid and security ([The Guardian](#), March 2016).

Add to this the fact that Yemen, which was already awash in weapons, has seen a dramatic increase in the flow of weapons and materiel, largely from KSA and UAE. It is worth noting that, despite the war, prices for small arms in Yemen have plummeted in the last year. [8] Most significantly, the influx of arms has not been limited to small arms. More advanced weapons such as anti-tank missiles, which can easily be repurposed, have been provided to a range of militias, some of which fight alongside AQAP.

While AQAP is currently devoting most of its energies to fighting what it defines as the "near enemy," namely the Houthis and



their allies, there is little doubt that the organization will once again turn its attention to the “far enemy”, the United States and its allies. When AQAP’s focus returns to the far enemy, it will be better equipped, better funded and most importantly far more resilient.

The war in Yemen and the extraordinary destruction that it has wrought have created ideal conditions for an organization that has proven itself to be highly capable and adaptable. The future for AQAP has rarely looked brighter.

NOTES

[1] See: <http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-gaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf>

[2] Author interview with Yemen-based government official (September 2016).

[3] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sP_1eatAQDk (Yemen: Under Siege, relevant footage begins at 08.00); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JvTiCDp3-zg>; also based on author interviews.

[4] It is notable that Yemeni president in exile Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi appointed Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar as his vice president on April 3, 2016. The general’s ties to militant Salafist groups are well documented (*The Guardian*, March 21, 2011). Before al-Ahmar and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh turned against one another, General al-Ahmar often acted as Saleh’s liaison to militant Salafist groups who were used as proxy fighters against first southern separatists and then the Houthis.

[5] See: Kilcullen, David, *Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism*, Oxford University Press, 2016, p.204

[6] Tolstoy, Leo, *War and Peace*, Book 13, Chapter 17

[7] Author interview with Yemen-based analyst (September 2016).

[8] There is now such an abundance of Steyr AUG assault rifles (used by and provided by Saudi Arabia) in Yemen that the price for the rifle is generally under \$50. Yemen’s always well supplied arms markets (the country has long acted as an arms emporium for the region) are now stocked with advanced weaponry like BGM-71 TOW missiles, 9M133 Kornet anti-tank missiles and a dizzying array of night vision equipment.

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Kuwait – Security restrictions amid IS threat

Source: <https://jamestown.org/program/briefs-251/>

An Egyptian man crashed a garbage truck into a vehicle carrying five U.S. servicemen in Kuwait on October 6 in an apparent attempted suicide attack. The incident was initially thought to be an accident, with the soldiers, who appear to have been traveling in a civilian vehicle, helping the truck driver who suffered multiple injuries in the collision. But Kuwaiti investigators later reportedly found a suicide belt, an Islamic State (IS) banner and a handwritten note pledging allegiance to IS in the man’s vehicle (*Kuwait Times*, October 7). The attempted suicide attack, if that is what it was, appears to have been a lone wolf incident. An embassy media statement released in the following days said U.S. authorities were not aware of any credible threats against U.S. citizens in Kuwait (*US Embassy*, October 9).

IS previously carried out a devastating attack in Kuwait City. In June 2015, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the city’s Shia Imam al-Sadiq Mosque, killing 27 people and wounding hundreds more (*al-Jazeera*, June 27, 2015). Authorities have since mounted a security crackdown. In July, the state news agency announced security forces had thwarted three IS plots, including plans for another mosque bombing during the Eid holiday (*KUNA*, July 3). That suggests that while IS may have inspired the apparent failed attack by the Egyptian truck driver, it remains focused on attempts to foment sectarian conflict. Even the reported failed attack came at a time of potentially heightened tensions – ahead of Ashoura, a major Shia festival marking the death in the battle of Karbala of Imam



Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed.

Kuwait has historically been relatively free of Sunni-Shia tensions, with Shias – who make up between 15-30 percent of Kuwait's population – living side-by-side with their Sunni counterparts. Nonetheless, Kuwait must safeguard against any stoking of tensions, whether through terrorist attack or on social media, something of which the leadership is well aware ([Arab News](#), June 28). Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah has himself done much to soothe tensions. After the 2015 bombing, he quickly attended the


scene at the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque, against the advice of his security services.

Opportunistic lone wolf attacks, however, are more difficult to defend against. Kuwait faces the same difficulties as its international allies in this regard. As a consequence, Kuwaitis have had to put up with a tightening of security in public places and restrictions on crowds, including a ban this year on open-air Eid prayers ([Gulf News](#), September 19). Such efforts will be familiar to many of the Gulf state's allies, particularly in Europe, where concerns about IS have also led to greater policing of public events.

U.S. ships defend themselves from 3rd missile attack off Yemen's coast

Source: <http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/us-ships-defend-themselves-from-3rd-missile-attack-off-yemens-coast>

Oct 16 — The U.S. Navy on Sunday began investigating a possible overnight missile attack from Yemen on a group of American warships in the Red Sea amid uncertainty about what transpired.



Vessel HAD to be on the right side of this yellow line. Yellow line is the EEZ of both [#Somalia](#) and [#Yemen](#). [#USSMason](#) was in int. waters.

The Red Sea and the nearby strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait, a crucial chokepoint for international shipping and crude oil, have been the scene of what the U.S. describes as at least two missile attacks from rebel-held territory in Yemen. American forces have fired back once with Tomahawk missiles, destroying mobile radar positions in the first shots fired by the U.S. in anger in the stalemated conflict.



In the latest incident, a group of American warships in the Red Sea on Saturday night "had indications of a possible inbound missile threat and deployed appropriate defensive measures," said Capt. Paula Dunn, a spokeswoman for U.S. Navy Forces Central Command. She said in a statement that all ships and sailors were safe, without elaborating.

An American defense official told The Associated Press on Sunday that one of the ships saw on radar what sailors believed to be missiles being fired on it out of Yemen at night. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of the incident not yet made public.

Yemen's Shiite rebels, known as Houthis, and their allies did not immediately comment on the incident Saturday. Previously, the Houthi-controlled SABA news agency ran dispatches denying rebels ever fired on American warships.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said earlier Saturday the destroyer Mason appeared "to have come under attack." The Mason, an Arleigh Burke class of guided missile destroyer whose home port is Norfolk, Virginia, has been targeted twice before by missile fire out of Yemen, according to the Navy.

Also known to be in the Red Sea near the Mason are the destroyer Nitze and the amphibious transport dock Ponce.

Previously, an Emirati-leased Swift boat came under rocket fire near the same area as the Mason and sustained serious damage. The United Arab Emirates described the vessel as carrying humanitarian aid and having a crew of civilians, while the Houthis called the boat a warship.


Yemen has been at war since September 2014, when the Houthis swept into the capital, Sanaa. A Saudi-led coalition of Sunni Arab nations launched a campaign against the Houthis in March 2015.

Yemen's war is largely overshadowed by the conflict against the Islamic State group elsewhere in the Middle East, though rights groups have mounted increased criticism of the Saudi-led airstrikes in recent months for killing civilians. The U.N. and rights groups estimate the conflict has killed at least 9,000 people and displaced nearly 3 million more.

The U.S. had been providing logistical and intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, but had begun to withdraw its support in recent weeks over the civilian casualties from its air campaign.

Missile Attacks on U.S. Warship

Twice this week AlertsUSA subscribers were notified that a U.S. warship had come under suspected cruise missile attack while patrolling off the coast of Yemen near the entrance to the Red Sea. [According to a report published by the U.S. Naval Institute](#), in one of the two incidents, the USS Mason fired off two [SM-2 missiles](#), one [Evolved Seasparrow missile](#), as well as used its [Nulka anti-ship missile decoy](#) (photo left) to intercept the two missiles fired from land-based installations operated by Iran-backed Houthi-forces. Also operating nearby was the Afloat Forward Staging Base USS Ponce.



Following these two incidents, on Wednesday [the U.S. Navy launched Tomahawk missiles](#) from the destroyer USS Nitze in the Red Sea at three radar sites on Yemen's western coastline, destroying targets associated with the missile attacks on the U.S. ships. The DoD followed the strikes with a warning that it would not tolerate similar actions in the future. Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook said President Obama authorized the strikes upon the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. [The Houthi Rebels have denied](#) firing on the U.S. warships.



Hezbollah cell charged with laundering Colombian drug money in Miami

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161017-hezbollah-cell-charged-with-laundering-colombian-drug-money-in-miami>

Oct 17 – **Three men linked to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah were accused of laundering drug money on behalf of the Colombian cartel after authorities said they illegally moved \$500,000 into Miami banks,** the *Miami Herald* [reported](#) last Tuesday.

The apparent ringleader of the money laundering scheme, 31-year-old Mohammad Ahmad Ammar from Medellin, Colombia, “was quietly booked into a Miami-Dade jail last week to face state felony money laundering charges,” the *Herald* wrote. Ammar’s arrest “underscores increased law-enforcement scrutiny on the role of Middle Eastern terror groups who use financial networks in Latin America to earn untold millions off drug profits,” the paper added.

Another Hezbollah operative who was charged in the case is Hassan Mohsen Mansour, a dual Lebanese and Canadian citizen. He is currently detained in Paris and facing similar but separate prosecution in South Florida.

A third member of the cell, Ghassan Diab, is believed to be on the run either in Nigeria or Lebanon. According to court papers, he is a relative of a “high-ranking member of Hezbollah who has access to numerous international bank accounts.”

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) first set sights on Ammar in early 2014, introducing him to an informant who covertly recorded their meetings. Ammar was asked by the informant to launder \$250,000 worth of Australian dollars, which was actually DEA cash, into Miami bank accounts that were set up by the feds. Through encrypted communications with Mansour in Paris, Ammar arranged for the money to be transferred to Dubai, “where the anything-goes banking system remains out of reach of U.S. authorities,” the *Herald* reported.

The money was then broken up and transferred to Al Haitham Exhibition and Conference Organizers, which is believed to be a front company for money laundering. According to the 42-page arrest warrant, the money then disappeared. Soon afterwards, the

accounts in Miami began receiving funds from obscure companies accompanied by bogus invoices for ill-defined products and services.

After the first scheme succeeded, Ammar told the DEA informant that he worked with La Oficina de Envigado, the chief cartel in Medellin, and struck a second deal to launder \$250,000 in September 2014. The money was again transferred to Dubai and the event planning company, with a note explaining that it was for the purchase of a four-carat diamond ring. Payments were then made to the Miami banks through more bogus transactions, including one claiming to be for 50-kilogram bags of rice.

Over the course of the investigation, Ammar boasted of his ties to Hezbollah and mentioned his contacts at a Colombian airline who could smuggle drugs to Miami, according to the warrant.

The DEA [announced](#) in February that it arrested several individuals after investigating a “massive” international drug trafficking and money laundering operation run by Hezbollah. The agency said that Hezbollah worked with La Oficina and other cartels to supply cocaine to the United States and Europe, then laundered the proceeds in a scheme that helped “provide a revenue and weapons stream for an international terrorist organization responsible for devastating terror attacks around the world.”

In a 500-page indictment in 2013, the late Argentinian prosecutor Alberto Nisman [outlined](#) Iran’s terror network in South America, including Hezbollah’s involvement with drug traffickers. Amir Touraj and Benham Ben Taleblu, analysts for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, [wrote](#) in *U.S. News and World Report* last month that Iran is falsely complaining about American non-compliance with the nuclear deal because it “feels it can get even more merely by hinting it might walk away.”

Iran, Hezbollah’s sponsor, [remains](#) the world’s greatest money laundering risk. Despite



charges that the U.S. is unfairly impeding its participation in the international financial system, the sanctions [remaining](#) on Iran are

due to its failure to clamp down on money laundering and continuing funding of terrorist organizations.

ISIS fighters coming home after Mosul defeat pose threat to EU countries

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161019-isis-fighters-coming-home-after-mosul-defeat-pose-threat-to-eu-countries>

Oct 19 – **ISIS supporters who left Europe to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq have been fleeing from Mosul in the face of the U.S.-led coalition offensive – and European security officials say that as they come back home, they would pose a “serious threat” to European security.**

“The retaking of Isis’s northern Iraq stronghold, Mosul, may lead to the return to Europe of violent ISIS-fighters,” the EU’s security commissioner Julian King told German newspaper *Die Welt* on Tuesday.

Even a small number of returning jihadists would pose “a serious threat we must prepare for,” he added.

Security experts say that about one-fifth of ISIS’s fighters – about 3,700 people – are residents or citizens of Western Europe, including 1,200 fighters from France alone.

HOW DO THEY KNOW???

These experts say that 4,000 to 8,000 militants are currently in ISIS ranks inside Mosul, the Islamist group’s last major stronghold in the country.

Turkey has expressed its own worries about ISIS fighters crossing into Turkey as the group continues to lose territory not only in Iraq, but in Syria as well.

“When [ISIS] militants are ousted from Mosul, where will they go? Not to France or Germany, but to Turkey, which is closer, and that is a threat to us,” Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus said at a media conference on Monday.

ISIS has been in control of Mosul since 2014 – and although the 30,000 Iraqi army troops and Kurdish peshmerga now engaged in the effort to capture the city face only about 7,000-

8,000 ISIS fighters, these fighters are among the most fanatic members of the organization, and are not going to surrender.

Moreover, ISIS fighters have placed thousands of mines and IEDs throughout the city, dug tunnels, booby-trapped bridges, and took other measure to make any advance into the city very costly for the coalition forces.

There is another problem: most of the city’s residents are Sunnis, while most of the Iraqi soldiers are Shi’a, as are all the members of the various Shi’a militias who are assisting the Iraqi military.

In the past, when the Iraqi army and the Shi’a militias liberated Sunni-majority towns from ISIS control, the safety of the Sunni residents of those towns was not a primary concern. This has led to bitterness and anger among Iraqi Sunni, already feeling disenfranchised by the government in Baghdad. Any effort to protect the safety of Mosul’s 1.5 million residents would slow down any campaign to liberate the city – and also allow ISIS to use these residents as human shields.

Western intelligence officials say that many ISIS fighters in the areas surrounding Mosul have already fled northern Iraq to go to Raqqa, the caliphate’s capital located in east Syria. Over the past three days, the Kurdish forces have taken several small towns and villages near Mosul without a fight, after the ISIS fighters have abandoned their positions and fled.

The eviction of ISIS from Mosul will bring ISIS’s presence in Iraq to an end. Only two years ago, ISIS was in control of about one-third of Iraqi territory.

As ISIS loses more territory, its fighters must go somewhere – and going back home is the most likely option.

“Learning who ISIS’s fighters are and where they come from is essential to developing effective policy responses to local conflicts



that ISISs effectively links to its ideology and agenda,” Nate Rosenblatt of the New America Foundation said in a study published in July. He warned that as the group loses power, the

fighters will return home and continue the ideological battle on their home turf, even if the group is no longer in control of territory in the Middle East.


America's lone-wolf terrorists are unpredictable in almost every regard—except one

Source: <http://qz.com/807997/lone-wolf-terrorists-gun-control-us/>

Oct 19 - Over the past two decades, lone-wolf attacks have become the dominant form of terrorism in the US, and now top intelligence and law enforcement officials' list of concerns. Jeh Johnson, the US secretary of Homeland Security, says he has placed homegrown violent extremism at the “front and center” of counter-terrorism efforts. “The thing that most keeps me up at night is the next Orlando [or] San Bernardino-type attack by someone who has radicalized in secret,” he said at the Aspen Security Forum in July.

Lone-wolf terrorist attacks are extremely [difficult to prevent](#) because assailants operate solo and, therefore, often under the radar of law enforcement. Their motives are frequently a tangle of personal and political grievances, societal alienation, and mental health issues.

While much remains perplexing about sole perpetrators, data shows one thing for sure: they almost always use guns.



This wasn't always the case. In one of the most famous examples of American homegrown terrorism, Eric Rudolph carried out a string of attacks in the southern US from 1996 to 1998, killing two people and injuring more than 100 with homemade bombs. His use of homemade devices was hardly out of the ordinary.

In a forthcoming book, *The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism: A New History*, Mark Hamm, a criminology professor at Indiana State University, and Ramón Spaaij, a sociologist at Victoria University in Australia, compiled a comprehensive database of lone-wolf terrorist incidents in the US from 1940 to mid-2016.

They found that in the six decades preceding the 9/11 attacks, there were 144 lone-wolf terrorism incidents, 47% of which involved explosives, and 42% of which involved firearms. Post 9/11, lone-wolf terrorism has becoming exceedingly common—there have been 105 attempted attacks in less than 15 years—and just 11% involved explosives compared to 74% involving guns.

Moreover, in the post-9/11 world, essentially none of those attempted bombings did much of anything. Prior to 9/11, there were 234 lone wolf terrorist bombing victims, compared to a mere six victims of such bombings in the past 15 years, all the result of anti-government extremist Luke Helder's foiled plot to plant pipe bombs across the US.



One explanation for the shift is the proliferation of laws making it harder for individuals to build bombs. In the years following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress amended the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 to enact tighter controls for the marking, sale, and transfer of explosive materials. Through other laws, such as the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Safe Explosives Act of 2002, Congress strengthened the licensing and permitting requirements of manufacturers, dealers, and users.

Not so with guns, where legislation has actually somewhat relaxed. In 2004, Congress did not renew its 10-year federal ban on the manufacture and possession of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. Laws that protect manufacturers and dealers have also been passed. The 2003 [Tiahrt Amendment](#), for example, prohibits law enforcement from publicly releasing data showing where criminals buy their firearms, and requires the FBI to destroy all approved gun-purchaser records within 24 hours. The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, passed two years later, gave manufacturers and dealers broad immunity from civil lawsuits.

There has also been a surge in the number of guns manufactured in the past decade, according to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. **About 3 million firearms were manufactured in 1986; by 2014, that rose to over 9 million.**

ATF data also shows that while firearm exports increased from around 200,000 in 1986 to 400,000 in 2014, imports increased from 700,000 in 1986 to 3,900,000 in 2014, which means there many more guns coming in than going out. There are now approximately 350 million guns in the US—the [most ever](#)—equal to about 116 guns per 100 Americans.

In his eight years as president, Barack Obama has addressed Americans 18 times in the wake of mass shootings, all of them perpetrated by sole assailants. After a shooting in Orlando, Florida, that resulted in 49 fatalities, Obama told the nation: “We make it very easy for individuals who are troubled or... want to engage in violent acts to get very powerful weapons, very quickly.”

While a whole national-security apparatus has been built around combating terrorism, it is undermined by laws that allow would-be terrorists, including those already under suspicion and on the terrorist watchlist, to legally buy firearms. As Adam Gadahn, a former al-Qaeda spokesman who was killed in a drone strike in 2015, put it in a [2011 video](#):

America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle without a background check and most likely without having to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?

By [some estimates](#), mass shootings are also occurring more often—and becoming more lethal. “Easy access to guns coupled with extensive media attention makes a mass shooting a more attractive option for a terrorist,” says Adam Winkler, author of *Gunfight: The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms*. As individuals see successful firearm attacks, they start copying those tactics—making these attacks more frequent, and subsequently more frequently copied, says Michael Jensen, a researcher for the Global Terrorism Database, at the [National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses](#) (START). It’s a deadly cycle.

One of the most commonly wielded weapons in [mass shootings](#) and lone-wolf terrorist attacks is the semi-automatic Glock pistol. The handgun is a fast, easy, and accurate way to put rounds in a target, and Hamm says it “has achieved celebrity status amongst lone wolves.” It’s a strong argument for making handguns a part of any gun reform measures.

Ultimately though, it’s just a lot easier and safer to use a firearm than it is to successfully build a bomb. Bomb making requires a certain level of expertise, and there’s always a chance it may explode in your hands, or not explode at all. (Look no further than the [recent undetonated bomb](#) in Manhattan, left by Ahmad Rahami, or most of the other undetonated devices in post-9/11 bomb plots). “Bombs are unpredictable—you’re leaving a lot to chance,” says Jensen. “Guns are very accurate.”

That reliability becomes more crucial as terrorists shift from targeting buildings to targeting people. In the past, Jensen says, terrorists typically went after what researchers call “hard” targets, protected structures such as military installations or government facilities. Now, they are much more likely to attack “soft” targets—unprotected places full of civilians, such as malls or restaurants.

“While attacks involving arson or explosives may be intended to cause only property damage, or both property damage and human casualties, firearms are more often used in



attacks aimed at causing human casualties,” reads [research](#) compiled by START. The group's data show that terrorist attacks with firearms are much more lethal.

This is further supported by Hamm's findings, which suggest that the lethality of lone-wolf terrorism has been at an all-time high since 2011. **The average number of people killed or injured per sole assailant spiked to 8.3 in 2011, from 2.45 in the previous decade.** There have been 235 killed or injured since that spike, almost all of them from firearms, whereas the previous decade saw a total of 105 victims of lone-wolf terrorist attacks.

TODAY'S TERRORISTS “WANT A LOT OF PEOPLE WATCHING AND A LOT OF PEOPLE DEAD.”

Brian Jenkins, a renowned terrorism researcher at RAND, was once fond of saying that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. “At the time that he made the statement, terrorism in many parts of the world was mostly demonstrative, meaning that it was about drawing attention to a cause and not necessarily about killing or injuring people,” Jensen says. Jenkins [updated](#) his statement in 2006; today's terrorists “want a lot of people watching *and* a lot of people dead.”

“Today, most terrorist organizations try to be as destructive as possible,” echoes Jensen. As groups like the Islamic State gain notoriety for their lethality—and expressly promote the killing of civilians to their followers—other groups emulate them. ISIL [glorifies](#) those groups for their imitative actions, further encouraging potential lone wolves. And so the vicious cycle continues.

U.S. Identifies Key Player in ISIS Attacks on Europe

Source: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/u-s-identifies-key-player-in-isis-attacks-on-europe/>

Oct 19 – **Almost a year after Islamic State terrorists killed 130 people in Paris, U.S. intelligence agencies have identified one of the suspected masterminds of that plot and a follow-up attack in Brussels.**

U.S. counter-terror officials said the man, who goes by the name **Abu Sulaيمان al Fransi** (Abu Sulaيمان, the Frenchman) is a **26-year old Moroccan** who once served in Afghanistan as a soldier in the French Foreign Legion. He did prison time for drug running before going to Syria in 2014 and joining ISIS, according to U.S. officials and French court documents. His real name is Abdelilah Himich, according to U.S. counter-terror officials.

Despite his relative youth, Himich's military experience and knowledge of France have made him a key figure in the Islamic State's external operations unit, which has led a terror campaign against Europe, officials said. He is thought to be in Syria.

“We believe he is one of the top guys involved in spearheading the Paris attack and the

Brussels attacks,” a U.S. counter-terror official said. “He was involved in creating that infrastructure” of the external operations unit.

U.S. and European counter-terror officials were interviewed for this story as part of [a report by ProPublica and FRONTLINE](#) about terrorism in Europe.

Officials acknowledged that they have struggled to pin down details about the identities and activities of the ISIS planners. U.S. and European counter-terror officials note that several Islamic State fighters have used the nom de guerre Abu Sulaيمان al Fransi. (The nickname is spelled in a number of ways, U.S. officials say.) In the past,

he has variously been described by European officials and media reports as a blond convert and a former physical education teacher.

But U.S. officials said there was strong evidence indicating that the senior French fighter in question is Himich. They said French intelligence has been informed of



that assessment and agrees with it.

European counter-terror officials interviewed by ProPublica earlier this year said they also suspect that a militant known as Abu Sulaiyman the Frenchman helped to plan the Paris and Brussels attacks. But they did not disclose his full identity.

Officials said that months of investigations and intelligence work in Europe and the Middle East have begun to shed light on the command structure of what the Islamic State calls external operations. The predominantly Arab leaders of ISIS have given senior and mid-level European fighters considerable autonomy to select targets and decide details of plots in their home turf, according to Western counter-terror officials.

Nonetheless, the ISIS unit that plots attacks overseas is also quite bureaucratized, according to U.S. intelligence officials. The unit exerted increasingly direct control over plots in Europe starting in 2015, according to Western counter-terror officials, and is part of an ISIS intelligence structure known as the Enmi.

"ISIS-directed plots in Europe have usually involved several planners and organizers who might change for each project," said Jean-Charles Brisard, the chairman of the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism in Paris, who has been studying the unit. "It's more a team process than a single mastermind's plan."

Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, a Syrian who served as a spokesman for the Islamic State, was a top figure overseeing external operations, counter-terror officials say. A U.S. drone strike killed Adnani in August.

There is hard evidence that another ISIS militant in Syria, a man known as Abu Ahmad, played a hands-on role in the Paris and Brussels cases, according to European counter-terror officials. A laptop computer recovered by Belgian police after the Brussels bombings in March contained encrypted communications detailing Abu Ahmad's direct role in the plot.

During the four months after the Paris attacks, Abu Ahmad discussed targets, strategy and bomb-making techniques from Syria via encrypted channels with survivors of the terrorist cell who were hiding in Brussels. The fugitive suspects referred to Abu Ahmad as their "emir," or leader, according to Belgian counter-terror officials.

The communications in the laptop indicate that the original plan was to hit France again, European officials say. When Belgian police closed in, however, Abu Ahmad told the fugitives to strike in Brussels instead, officials said. The suicide bombings killed 32 people at the airport and a subway station on March 22.

Abu Ahmad was described by two captured ISIS fighters as a lead planner of the Paris massacre as well. The suspects, an Algerian and a Pakistani, told interrogators that Abu Ahmad chose and prepared them for the plot last fall, and sent them to Europe posing as Syrian refugees, according to European counter-terror officials.

When the two landed in Greece in October, however, Greek border guards discovered they were not Syrian, and held them for a few weeks, according to European and U.S. counter-terror officials. After being released, the duo communicated with Abu Ahmad, who sent them money and instructions not to join the rest of the attackers, according to officials. The two suspects were arrested in Austria in December.

The men described Abu Ahmad as a Syrian, according to European counter-terror officials. But the recovered clandestine communications with the plotters in Europe indicate clearly that he speaks French, raising questions about his true nationality, the officials said.

"He has to be French, or speak French well," a European counter-terror official said. "They use French slang."

The investigation shows that Abu Ahmad worked with the senior fighter known as Abu Sulaiyman al Fransi, according to European and U.S. counter-terror officials. During the massacre at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris, witnesses overheard gunmen talk to each other about calling a person named Abu Sulaiyman, according to European and U.S. officials.

Himich, the man identified by U.S. intelligence as Abu Sulaiyman, has an unusual story. He was born in Rabat, Morocco, in 1989, according to U.S. counter-terror officials and French court documents. His family emigrated when he was an adolescent to Lunel, a southern French town about 20 miles from Montpellier, officials say.

Lunel has a population of about 25,000 and a rich history as a Jewish cultural center in medieval times. The town has a large



population of Muslim descent as the result of immigration from North Africa beginning in the 1960s.

In 2006, Himich's name appeared in a Lunel high school newspaper as the author of an article about teenage drinking. Although he went to school in France, he remains a Moroccan citizen, according to officials and court documents. In 2008, he joined the French Foreign Legion, a legendary and hard-nosed force whose soldiers come from all over the world.

Himich "distinguished himself during various missions in Afghanistan," according to the court documents. In 2010, however, he deserted, according to the officials and documents.

"Wanting to attend the burial of his father, he left his post without authorization," the documents say. "After his return to France, he did vocational training to work in the security field and also considered becoming a nurse."

A year later, he got in trouble with the law. French customs police intercepted him arriving on a train from Amsterdam at the Gare du Nord station in Paris on Dec. 13, 2011, according to court documents. Police discovered he was carrying a backpack containing 2.6 pounds of cocaine with a street value of about \$55,000. He also tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.

Himich testified that he had met a Senegalese man at a hookah bar in Paris, and told him he needed money because he had left the Foreign Legion. Himich said the man hired him to bring a package from Rotterdam, offering to pay \$1,600. Himich, whom the documents describe as "adopting an arrogant attitude" during a court hearing, denied knowing that the package contained drugs.

Himich spent five months in jail. He was convicted in April 2013, and sentenced to three years in prison with a year suspended, according to the documents, though it appears he did not spend much more time behind bars. It was his first criminal conviction. He appears to have followed a classic trajectory from crime into radicalization.

Despite its picturesque setting, Lunel has made headlines as a hub of extremism. By 2015, at least two dozen young people — of North African descent as well as Muslim converts — had left Lunel to fight in Syria, where at least six of them died.

Himich joined that exodus in early 2014, according to U.S. counter-terror officials. He rented a car and drove via Italy, Greece and Turkey to Syria, according to Brisard. That route is popular with Syria-bound jihadis who travel with their families, according to Italian police. Himich has a wife and two children, officials said.

In Syria, Himich first fought in an Al Qaeda-linked group, officials say. Then, like many extremists in Syria, he moved to the increasingly powerful Islamic State. He soon became a battlefield commander, according to U.S. officials and Brisard, the French counter-terror expert.

"He was quickly promoted by ISIS to lead one of its fighting brigades in the first half of 2014," Brisard said. **"His rapid rise within ISIS could be explained by his military service in the French Foreign Legion."**

France and Interpol have issued warrants for Himich's arrest on suspicion of terrorist activity, according to U.S. officials.

Investigators believe Himich is among a group of ISIS militants in their 20s and 30s, predominantly Francophones, who plot against Europe. The group also includes two Muslim convert brothers from Toulouse, Fabien and Jean-Michel Clain, according to counter-terror officials. Fabien Clain is believed to be the Frenchman who read the official statement in which the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks, officials say.

The Clain brothers surfaced in an investigation in 2009 of a French-Belgian extremist network. Suspects in that case had been investigated for a bombing in Cairo and, according to investigators, told Egyptian interrogators they had discussed a potential attack on the Bataclan, the nightclub that was hit in 2015. The suspects allegedly saw the Paris concert hall as a Jewish target because the owners were Jewish and the venue had hosted pro-Israel events.

Given his military experience, Himich's stature is likely to grow after the recent deaths of Islamic State leaders in U.S. air strikes, officials said.

"He's probably one of the most important Frenchmen in ISIS, especially after the death of Adnani," the U.S. counter-terror official said.



How Europe left itself open to terrorism

Source: <https://www.rawstory.com/2016/10/how-europe-left-itself-open-to-terrorism/>

Oct 19 – In June of 2015, a Belgian ex-convict named Mohamed Abrini flew to Turkey, slipped across the border into Syria and reached the Islamic State's capital in Raqqa, where he met up with a boyhood friend planning a devastating terror strike on Paris.

A look at how the region is grappling with terrorism attacks — and how revolving-door prisons could be compounding the threat.

Nicknamed “Brioche” because he had worked in a bakery, Abrini was not a hardcore holy warrior like his brother, who had died in Syria fighting for ISIS the year before. But his jihadi friend, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, won him over. Abaaoud took Abrini to his brother's grave and said France was to blame for his death, according to European counterterror officials. The French were in the coalition bombing ISIS, Abaaoud said. They had to pay.

“Abaaoud really worked Abrini psychologically,” a Belgian counterterror official said. “His main motivation for participating in all this was revenge. Not Islam. He doesn't know Islam. He's a criminal ... a street punk.”

Abrini proved an able operative. He moved confidently across borders, returning from Syria via Britain to pick up cash for the plot, according to Belgian counterterror officials. Back in Brussels, he fended off police who questioned him about a tip that he had been in Syria. Then he set to work leading a group of young extremists who were preparing the logistics for a multi-pronged attack on Paris, officials say.

Intelligence about impending attacks prompted Belgian federal police to begin surveillance on Abrini in October. On November 11, a hidden police camera filmed him leaving his home to drive with the attack team to Paris, according to counterterror officials. But the investigators were not following him, so they did not realize he was working on a plot, or alert French officials to his movements.

Two days later, attackers killed 130 people in coordinated assaults on the Bataclan concert hall, restaurants and a soccer stadium. Nine of the attackers died, but Abrini and other suspected accomplices took refuge in Brussels, where they eluded capture for another four months.

Abrini became notorious in March when Belgian authorities released a grainy security camera image of three men wheeling bomb-laden suitcases into the Brussels airport. Two died in suicide blasts, but police say Abrini lost his nerve at the last moment, fleeing as the bombs went off.

A total of 32 people died at the airport and a subway station. And the world came to know Abrini as The Man in the Hat.

Investigators soon captured him and, as they reconstructed his movements, turned up missed clues that might have prevented a disaster. Such breakdowns inevitably emerge after almost every major terror attack.

But a close look by Frontline and ProPublica at the interconnected assaults on Paris and Brussels brings to light problems that go well beyond the failure to nab Abrini. It reveals a scale of dysfunction remarkable in the annals of modern counterterrorism.

Most of the attackers and their accused accomplices were residents of Europe and well-known to police in their homelands as extremists. Six were wanted on international arrest warrants for terrorism, one for evading parole. At least nine were on terrorist watch-lists. Two had even surfaced in a 2009 investigation in which suspects discussed a potential target in Paris: the very same concert hall where the attackers slaughtered dozens in November.

Nonetheless, the suspects spent months roaming back and forth to Syria and across Europe to prepare the plot, repeatedly crossing borders and fending off police with seeming ease. At least 12 were stopped, questioned and even arrested during border crossings, checkpoint encounters and police inquiries — an excruciating series of lost opportunities.

In unusually candid interviews in recent months, present and former European counterterror officials acknowledged that ISIS exploited a litany of longtime security weaknesses that remain largely unaddressed. The vulnerabilities, they said, arise from core contradictions in the European Union, where internal borders have been abolished for travel and commerce but impede police and intelligence work.



“The flaws in the European system are multiple,” said Jean-Louis Bruguiere of France, who was a top counterterror judge for two decades. He said the Paris and Brussels attacks “should never have happened.”

“I don’t know what we are waiting for,” Bruguiere said. “Do we have to wait for hundreds of deaths?”

If political leaders do not create a more effective security system, European countries will curtail free movement across borders, critics warn. They cite Britain’s vote this year to leave the European Union as a harbinger.

“If European policy is unresponsive, we will be putting up barriers again,” Bruguiere said. “Nobody wants it, but we will not be able to do otherwise if we are incapable of protecting ourselves. And everyone will barricade themselves and Europe will no longer exist.”

In interviews, some on camera with Frontline, counterterror veterans in Europe and the United States outlined systemic problems they said they had warned political leaders about for years. (ProPublica granted some anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly or because of security concerns.) The list includes:

- Weak and uncoordinated enforcement of Europe’s international borders, a situation aggravated by the chaotic influx of refugees from Syria.
- Differences in laws and security cultures that hamper intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation among nations.
- Fragmented and incomplete databases, and the lack of a universal database of terror suspects effectively used and supplied by all European nations.
- Short prison sentences for terrorism and violent crime that have freed ex-convicts to play prominent roles in the jihad.
- Limited resources and support for security forces in some nations, such as Belgium and Greece — a weakness that terrorists have studied and exploited.

“We are not an island, we are the European continent, and the enemy is at our doorstep,” said Marc Trevidic, who was France’s top counterterror magistrate until 2015. “He can come by sea, air, and land. That is the reality.”

Some causes of Europe’s vulnerability are difficult to address. Although their approaches are vastly different, nearly every European country has struggled for decades to integrate Muslim immigrants into the social and economic mainstream. The speed of the radicalization process in the internet era defies traditional law enforcement strategies. Ubiquitous encryption tools are a shield against spy agencies. ISIS has the resources and refuge of a quasi-state.

And Europe has some of the best counterterrorism agencies in the world. Still, the threat posed by ISIS and other militants could be substantially lessened with common-sense reforms and political will, European and U.S. officials say.

“How is it possible after so many years?” said Baltasar Garzon, a former top Spanish judge. “They hit us with exactly the same failings, the same errors and the same discoordination.”

An emblematic example: in 2014, a U.S. intelligence task force assembled a list of thousands of Europeans believed to have joined the jihad in Syria, according to Matthew Olsen, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center. To this day, European counterparts do not have an equivalent resource, he said.

“We had a relatively strong, robust data base of information within the United States, but [that] was a better source of information that the European nations themselves had or were sharing with each other,” Olsen said.

Europe has no equivalent of the FBI, so the security forces of each nation are responsible for fighting terror groups. Today, political leaders are trying to beef up institutions such as Europol, which attempts to coordinate law enforcement and information-sharing among the 28 member states.

“There is a strong consensus,” said Rob Wainright, the director of Europol. “We have to work much more together in the cross-border way. And that includes sharing intelligence as well as understanding the need to pass new European laws.”

More than a dozen of the suspects in the Paris and Brussels attacks came from Belgium, which served as a staging ground for the accused plotters. Leaders of other European nations have criticized the counterterror efforts of Belgium, a linguistically and culturally



divided country where French and Flemish-speaking regions often clash about basic government functions.

Belgium's woes are symptomatic of an approach to security that exists in other nations, especially in northern Europe, that emphasizes privacy and individual rights. However well-intentioned, the result has been to constrain law enforcement, critics say.

"Since the '90s, Belgium has been an outpost for terrorists," said Louis Caprioli, a former counterterror chief of France's domestic intelligence agency. "The difficulty with Belgium is that it is a federal state, with services lacking human and technical resources, and which have very restrictive laws regarding wiretaps, the use of cameras, so they are in a dimension that is insufficient to face the extent of the phenomenon."

Entrenched networks in Belgium figured in terror campaigns by Algerian groups in France in the 1990s, and al-Qaida activity in the decade after Sept. 11, when bombings killed 191 people in Madrid in 2004 and 52 in London in 2005.

But Belgium itself was not attacked and France didn't experience a deadly Islamic terror attack between 1996 and 2012. As al-Qaida lost ground in its haven in Pakistan, European security chiefs felt the threat had become manageable.

The outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2012 transformed the landscape. The self-declared caliphate lured record numbers of militants, including at least 5,000 Europeans. Thousands more were radicalized at home by the Islamic State's slick online propaganda machine.

The level of the threat varied. It was most intense in nations with restive second and third generations of young Muslims. As many as 500 jihadis from Belgium went to Syria — the highest proportional number in Western Europe. Belgium's political leadership was slow to react. And it had a history of neglect of the security forces, critics say.

Belgium's understaffed federal police and prosecution service hurried to more than double the size of their counterterror units in the past several years, officials say. The Belgian intelligence service wasn't authorized to do wiretaps until 2008, and did not hire officers between 2010 and 2015, when 20 were belatedly brought on, according to Andre Jacob, a former counterterror chief of the spy agency.

"It was very frustrating," Jacob said. Belgian political leaders "never had a long-term vision of how to fight against Islamic terrorism."

Although it lacked tools and resources, Jacob's intelligence service worked hard to monitor the tough, predominantly immigrant neighborhood of Molenbeek, where Abaaoud, Abrini and other key plotters of the Paris attacks grew up. It's a difficult task. Long a port of entry for immigrants to Belgium, Molenbeek suffers from high unemployment, particularly among young people, and a sense of disconnection from Belgian society.

In this tight-knit world, many young people turn to violent crime. A friend of Abaaoud named Ibrahim Bakraoui was convicted of using an AK-47 to shoot and wound a police officer in a robbery in downtown Brussels in 2010. Bakraoui served only four years, and he turned radical after his release.

Abaaoud, similarly, was a leader of a neighborhood criminal network that radicalized. The young men embodied a phenomenon that ISIS has accelerated: the blurring of criminality and terrorism. They often retained a gangster lifestyle, making it harder for law enforcement officials to detect their ties to terrorism.

Although Belgian investigators who tracked them were skilled and experienced, the bureaucracy seemed sometimes oblivious to the new threat. In 2014, federal counterterror police had to fend off a proposal that would have barred them from carrying guns off duty. Alain Grignard, a senior officer, warned his superiors that it was the worst possible time to disarm investigators.

Alain Grignard, a senior counterterror official of the Belgian federal police. (Frontline)

"It was rather inappropriate because it was exactly at the moment when we feared things could happen," said Grignard, who speaks Arabic and is an academic expert on Islam.

France has a more muscular security apparatus than Belgium. But because the court system is overloaded, French militants charged with terrorism frequently stand trial alongside robbers and drug dealers in low-level courts where the maximum sentence is 10 years. It is routine in France, Belgium and elsewhere to be released after serving just half the sentence.



As a result, Europeans previously convicted of aiding or fighting for terrorist groups have resurfaced recently. They have become leaders overseas such as Boubaker el Hakim, a prominent Frenchman in the Islamic State who served seven years for fighting for al-Qaida in Iraq in the mid-2000s. Or they have committed attacks such as the vicious murder this summer outside Paris of two police officials, a husband and wife, by an ex-convict who had served two and a half years for recruiting jihadis to go to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

They would probably still be in prison in the United States. In U.S. federal courts, such terrorism-related crimes bring a minimum of 15 years, and often much harsher sentences, according to Olsen, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

"The important thing there is, 15 years for somebody who's in their mid-20s or their 30s, that brings them into their 40s or mid-40s," he said. "And the hope is that by the time they're released, they're not interested or too old to really be involved."

European law enforcement officials worry about convicted terrorists released after relatively brief sentences returning to the fray. But they also caution against overreacting.

"Our system works for a lot of other people who are freed after one third or one half of their sentence," said Eric Van der Sypt, a Belgian counterterror prosecutor. "So we have to punish those people because there are exceptions? Americans don't like to hear that, the easiest way is to put them away for a hundred years, [but] then you have other problems ... No system is perfect."

It was cheap, fast and easy to join the jihad in Syria — and to bring it back home.

The thousands of young people with European passports who flocked to Syria included Abaaoud. He arrived in 2013, followed by friends from Belgium, and soon became influential among foreign fighters.

In May of 2014, a 29-year old Frenchman of Moroccan origin opened fire on the Jewish Museum of Brussels, killing four people. His name was Mehdi Nemmouche.

Nemmouche's name was on a terror watch list. But he took advantage of a gaping hole in Europe's security procedures, one that counterterror officials had been warning about for years.

Nemmouche spent nine months in Syria, where he harshly treated Western hostages, officials say. When he returned to Europe in March of 2014, he covered his tracks by booking flights that took him from Turkey to Asia to Germany.

At the Frankfurt airport, German officials spotted a French alert on him in their data base. But they did not have access to his full travel history or much time to scrutinize him. They informed the French that a suspected jihadi had returned to Europe only after he had left the airport, officials say.

The outcome would likely have been different had Nemmouche flown to New York City, according to European and U.S. security officials. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States adopted a system known as Passenger Name Record, or PNR, in which airlines provide personal data on people preparing to board flights to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Under the system, counterterror officials gain 72-hours advance access to passengers' full itineraries, phone numbers, addresses, emails, credit card numbers, past trips and travel companions. Analysts look for connections to crime and terrorism and for telltale patterns, such as roundabout travel to conceal stops in terrorist havens. PNR is credited with helping identify terrorists such as David Coleman Headley, an American convicted in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

"We know people are coming from certain countries of concern and we have a single system geared to determining who they are before and during their trip to the U.S.," a former FBI counterterrorism chief said. "We have a counterterrorism center where every federal agency is represented. When they get a hit, we at the FBI know before they travel that these guys are on their way. We have time to prepare for them, question them, examine their contacts in the U.S., conduct surveillance if necessary."

European security chiefs had been pushing since 2007 for the European Union to adopt a comparable system. But until recently, legislators in the European Parliament repeatedly blocked the proposals, saying they threaten citizens' privacy.

This impasse reflects fundamental disagreements between Europe and the United States over how to balance security and privacy, according to Wainright of Europol. Wainright compared the chasm to America and Europe's sharp differences on gun control. He said EU policies have been shaped by the memory in countries such as Germany of authoritarian abuses of the Nazis and, later, the Stasi secret police.



“We have maybe a different privacy mindset,” Wainright explained. “Whenever legislation is debated which involves the further collection of personal data, I think lawmakers in many countries and the European Parliament will want to be convinced it’s absolutely necessary to do so, to fight terrorism or other forms of crime.”

Security officials respond that PNR consists of data that airlines already have. If the systematic screening had been in place in 2014, it is likely German officials would have suspected that Nemmouche had returned from Syria, flagged him as a suspicious traveler, and informed the French ahead of time, European and U.S. officials say. This would have probably prompted investigators to put him under surveillance upon arrival, according to Caprioli, the former French counterterror chief.

“I feel that the European legislators are responsible” for failing to prevent the Jewish Museum attack, Caprioli said. “If there had been a PNR, and if it had been well implemented by the services, this person would have been controlled ... It is a flaw of our surveillance system of people circulating in Europe.”

Of course, no screening system is infallible, and French intelligence has itself been criticized for not tracking Nemmouche more closely. Regardless, European and U.S. officials say PNR would have improved the chances of stopping him and other terrorists in high-profile cases in Europe.

After Nemmouche’s arrest, investigators traced his movements and contacts. One name quickly surfaced: Nemmouche had communicated by phone with Abaaoud. Investigators believe the Belgian played a role in directing the Jewish Museum attack.

In August of 2014, the United States, France and other nations began bombing the Islamic State in an effort to roll back battlefield gains that had propelled its forces to the outskirts of Baghdad. This spurred European fighters in Syria to strike back.

“ISIS developed a logic of revenge, which intensified along with the bombardments,” Grignard said. “This meant that the people who wanted to launch actions in Europe gained in authority.”

Soon, Abaaoud again exploited weak border security — this time in person. Although wanted on an international arrest warrant, he managed to sneak back to Europe to direct a group of known Belgian extremists intent on an attack.

Abaaoud oversaw the plot by phone from Greece, and may have ventured into Belgium. His gunmen holed up in a safe house in the Belgian town of Verviers with guns, explosives and police uniforms. Investigators believe they were planning to target police officers, possibly to decapitate them and videotape the beheadings.

With help from U.S. and French intelligence, Belgian security forces had tracked the suspects. On Jan. 15, 2015, commandos stormed the safe house in Verviers, killing two combat-hardened militants and capturing one. Abaaoud fled back to Syria, eluding Greek police who raided his hideout in Athens.

That spring, Abaaoud and the other plotters launched a wave of rapidly trained recruits in solo attacks and foiled plots on France. Intelligence officials estimate that ISIS dispatched as many as 200 operatives during the year and a half before the Paris attacks.

Because many of the operatives were known or wanted, they entered Europe illegally, hiring smugglers to sneak them across the borders of Greece. Others flew from Turkey carrying genuine European passports of people who resembled them, or traveled with forged documents.

“It is very easy to travel in the European Union with fake papers, even in airports, usually you can get through controls,” said Van der Sypt, the Belgian counterterror prosecutor.

European and U.S. security chiefs have complained about the woeful state of EU border control for years. A commander of the counterterror division of the Spanish police described borders as “our Achilles heel.”

Continental Europe eliminated most internal borders in 1995. Driving from France to Belgium is like crossing from Illinois to Indiana. The security of the European Union therefore depends heavily on external land, air and sea boundaries. But resources, skills and enthusiasm vary among nations, and there has been a lack of coordination by the EU, critics say.

“We no longer have internal borders, so we need impenetrable external ones,” said Trevidic of France.

“The means have never been provided to achieve this ... We are in a totally open system.

They can use real papers, real fake papers, fake fake papers, real real papers. It is horrible, but that’s the way it is.”



During the summer, the Islamic State advanced the most ambitious project yet: a spectacular strike in Paris. The plot moved with more speed and agility than the often-ponderous machinery in which security information circulates in the European Union.

Abaaoud served as a field coordinator. Investigators say he enlisted Abrini, his boyhood friend from Molenbeek, to act as the logistics chief in Europe.

After visiting Syria for about 10 days to get his marching orders, Abrini went to Britain from July 9 to July 16. He has said Abaaoud instructed him to obtain money from extremists in Birmingham and Manchester, according to counterterror officials. Abrini also took pictures of soccer stadiums and frequented casinos. The latter may have been for reconnaissance or for leisure, because he was an avid gambler, Belgian counterterror officials say.

From Britain, Abrini traveled to Paris for two days and returned home to Brussels, officials say. Meanwhile, police had been looking into a tip that he was involved in extremism and had gone to Syria. When he heard that, Abrini went to the Molenbeek police station to protest his innocence. Questioned on July 27, he denied everything. He showed officers photos from his travels, claiming he had been on vacation, Belgian officials say.

The police couldn't prove their suspicions. The case remained technically open, but the file moved slowly from local to federal authorities, according to Belgian officials.

Unfazed by the police inquiry, Abrini allegedly set about his mission overseeing logistics. Officials say he worked closely with two accomplices who were on European extremist watchlists, Ahmed Dahmani and Salah Abdeslam.

Abdeslam, a close friend of Abaaoud, had been on the radar of police since the foiled Verviers plot. Dahmani was an ex-convict whose brother and sister had surfaced in the 2009 investigation of militants who had discussed attacking the Bataclan, according to French court documents.

In August, Abrini, Abdeslam and Dahmani got sloppy. They drove to Holland in a stolen Audi Quattro, likely on a trip to buy weapons, officials say. In Holland, all three made phone calls to a number linked to gangsters involved in arms trafficking, drug dealing and murder-for-hire, according to Belgian counterterror officials. When the trio returned to Belgium, the stolen car's theft tracking system went off. Belgian police soon arrested Dahmani, officials say.

Dahmani was a suspected extremist with strong ties to Abaaoud's crew. He had been in contact with arms traffickers in Holland. Weeks earlier, Italian authorities had registered his passage when he and Abdeslam had driven on another mission through Italy to Greece and back, a route used by extremists headed for Syria.

None of these dots were connected. The Belgian police released Dahmani. Counterterror officials did not get the chance to look into a potential lead.

Meanwhile, Europe was on increasingly high alert. Acting on another tip from U.S. intelligence, Polish authorities arrested a jihadi who was a resident of Spain and attempting to return from Syria via Warsaw. He admitted to Polish and Spanish interrogators that he had been sent by Abaaoud to attack Europe. And he gave up the name of a French accomplice, officials say.

French police scooped up the accomplice after he flew from Turkey to France. Questioned by Trevidic on Aug. 15, the suspect gave a chilling, detailed statement about the Islamic State's plans. He said Abaaoud had directed him to await instructions for a mission that would involve shooting up a public place in France, such as a rock concert, according to Trevidic.

"He explained how much Abaaoud wanted to hurt us," Trevidic recalled. "He was very clear: he will do whatever it takes. He wants to commit a huge attack at all costs."

The capture was the result of effective international teamwork on a high-profile operation. But there were other moments in the run-up to the attack that showed the limits of routine cooperation.

In June, Turkish police arrested Bakraoui, the Belgian who had served time for shooting the police officer. The Turks suspected Bakraoui of trying to go to Syria to join ISIS, according to Belgian authorities. But Bakraoui convinced Turkish officials to deport him to Holland, where he had a relative, rather than his native Belgium.

The Turks didn't tell the Dutch why they had put Bakraoui on a plane to the Netherlands, and didn't identify him as a suspect to the Belgians until he was gone, according to European officials. But Bakraoui was wanted on a Belgian arrest warrant for failing to check in with his parole officer and violating the terms of his conditional release, according



to Van der Sypt. The Dutch did not detain him when he arrived, so he walked freely back into Europe to resume his role in the attack planning.

Officials said the case illustrates the difficulties of cooperation among European neighbors — and of the European Union with Turkey, which has been a hub for the movement of jihadis and come under criticism for not cracking down on them sooner.

Bakraoui next surfaced in March of this year when Belgium released the photo of the three suicide attackers wheeling bombs into the Brussels airport. In the now-famous image, Bakraoui is the thickset man in a black sweater on Abrini's right.

International cooperation often depends on personal connections and the vagaries of national laws, according to Claudio Galzerano, the chief of an Italian counterterrorism unit based in Rome. An urgent Italian request might get a quick email response from Spanish police while requiring weeks of formal procedures in justice and foreign ministries in northern Europe, Galzerano said.

"Some countries face specific problems, often at a very basic level," Galzerano said. "To obtain car registrations or telephone line registrations it is sometimes necessary to obtain a judicial order. You have to get that from the courts in order to run checks that in our country can be done directly by the police."

As president of an EU working group of police officials, Galzerano learned about these complexities first-hand. He tried to assemble a list of fighters who had joined terror groups overseas. Some nations didn't provide many names. Intelligence agencies were reluctant to give information to police forces, he said.

"There are countries that are more efficient than others ... especially when dealing with foreign fighter investigations," Galzerano said. "Europol has worked very hard to create databases capable of giving us good quality information on the foreign fighter situation. To date, not all countries have contributed to the same degree to these databases."

Intelligence-sharing remains difficult because spy agencies still protect sources and methods, and still guard secrets, counterterror veterans said.

"These services' traditional mission is to safeguard the interests of their country, not to exchange information with their neighbors," said Italian Congressional deputy Stefano Dambruoso, a former counterterror prosecutor. "They are afraid that whatever information they release may then be exploited for other means ... We still need to see a cultural change, a shift in different governments' willingness to share their information."

By late August, the next phase was underway.

A dozen members of the Paris attack squad began to leave Syria for Europe. They capitalized on the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly Syrians fleeing the war, through Greece. The chaos only worsened the interconnected vulnerabilities of border defenses and intelligence-sharing.

Greek enforcement capacities, limited in the best of times, were overwhelmed by the wave of migration. Border guards were only able to conduct thorough screening — meaningful questioning, running fingerprint and database checks — on a third of the arrivals at most, according to European and U.S. security officials. On some islands, police didn't even have consistent Internet access to process boatloads of migrants, officials say.

After being released in Greece, the hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees headed across Eastern Europe in trains, vehicles and on foot, most of them bound for Germany, which had announced it would open its doors to Syrians fleeing the war.

"The refugee influx into one European country without centralized European border protection would be the equivalent of taking a small state like Arkansas and having them responsible for the entire border protection of the United States," said Greg Ruppert, a former FBI attaché in Europe and veteran counterterror investigator.

At a time of a growing terror threat from Syria, security chiefs say Greece should have done more to vet the arrivals. But they also blame Europe's political leaders for failing to help the Greeks screen a flood of refugees that would have overwhelmed any single country. For their part, political leaders focused on addressing a humanitarian catastrophe not seen in Europe since the end of World War II, not terrorism.

All this made it easy for ISIS to take advantage of the chaos. The vast majority of the border-crossers weren't extremists, but they served as camouflage for the ones who were.



“Our borders are a disaster,” a senior French counterterror official said. “Add to that 1.5 million refugees crossing in a couple of years. It’s impossible to control, to screen, to enforce properly. Especially in Greece, with the state it’s in, the economic crisis, the lack of resources, the relatively low level of law enforcement capability. There is no doubt that ISIS infiltrated dozens of operatives, including the attackers for Paris and Brussels, through the refugee flow.”

The Belgian logistics team dispatched Abdeslam to Hungary several times to pick up plotters traveling among the refugees, officials say. Two of the Belgians and three of the Frenchmen he transported were wanted on international arrest warrants. Another Frenchman and Belgian were on watch lists. All crossed international borders unscathed.

So did Abaaoud, one of Europe’s most wanted men. Investigators believe migrant smugglers helped him enter through Greece in September.

Three conspirators had a close call, though. On Sept. 9, 2015, Abdeslam drove a rented Mercedes to a Budapest train station, which was jam-packed with refugees headed for Germany. He picked up two leaders of the attack team who had crossed into Greece in the refugee flow and were using crowds at the Budapest station as cover, officials say.

The new arrivals were Najim Laachraoui and Mohamed Belkaid. Laachraoui, a Belgian, was the bomb-maker. He was wanted on an international arrest warrant for terrorism issued by Belgium.

Belkaid was a coordinator of the plot. An Algerian who had lived in Sweden, he was an associate in Stockholm of Farid Lamrabet, the most notorious ideologue in Scandinavia, according to U.S. counterterror officials. Lamrabet had popped up in terrorism cases linked to Iraq, Pakistan and the United States. Swedish intelligence had been aware of Belkaid’s extremist ties for several years and shared that information with other countries, according to U.S. counterterror officials.

When the Mercedes carrying the trio arrived at the border of Austria, Austrian police stopped it at a checkpoint. Abdeslam handed over his identification papers, while Laachraoui and Belkaid showed forged Belgian identity cards with fake identities, European officials say.

Abdeslam was on an EU watch list. The national security alert in the Schengen Information System (SIS) called for officers to scrutinize him and any associates, record details and advise Belgian counterterror officials of the encounter.

It was another missed opportunity. If the border police had spotted the forged ID papers, the plot could well have been derailed, especially if they had identified Laachraoui and found the warrant for his arrest. But the police didn’t notice anything amiss, officials say, and the Mercedes sped toward Belgium. Belgian authorities only learned about the stop months later while investigating the Paris attacks, prosecutor Van der Sypt said.

The incident remains a mystery. Either the Austrian police officers didn’t find Abdeslam’s name in their databases, or they didn’t react aggressively to a watchlist hit, Belgian authorities say. But counterterror officers in other nations blame the Belgians, saying they should have given him higher priority on the watch list because of his ties to Abaaoud and other suspects.

Given the lack of procedures and systems, situations like the Austria border stop often come down to the attentiveness of the individual cop on the street. The chances of generating an investigation from such interactions, or even timely reports back to the suspect’s home country, are slim, European and U.S. officials say.

“Even if they got a hit, it only gets communicated to us by fax after a while,” the Belgian counterterror official said. “It’s not urgent unless the cop is especially smart or aggressive. And it might not make its way to the right unit of the Belgian counterterror police for weeks, if at all. And because one European police force doesn’t know that well the documents of another country, and the officers didn’t look very hard at the documents, they didn’t realize these guys were carrying fake Belgian IDs.”

The crazy-quilt of laws and intelligence cultures that leave EU databases fragmented and incomplete is a key weakness, officials acknowledged. There are no Europe-wide criteria for how the databases should be fed, according to European and U.S. security officials. As a result, the frequency with which agencies put names in data bases — and even consult the systems — differs considerably, officials say.

“We are dealing with a very complex environment, 20-plus countries, 2 million law enforcement officers in Europe, potentially having access to these sort of systems,” said Wainright, the Europol director. “And perhaps the greatest learning lesson, not dissimilar



actually to the reflection the U.S. went through after 9/11, was that we need to join the dots a lot better than this and we need to have a much more systematic, better hooked-up, centralized system.”

On Sept. 20, another suspected plotter arrived on the Greek island of Leros. He posed as a Syrian refugee, but he was really a Swede of Syrian descent named Osama Krayem, Belgian authorities say. Krayem allegedly adopted the ruse because he knew Swedish police had identified him as an extremist before he had left to join ISIS. He felt confident enough to surrender to Greek authorities as an asylum-seeker. Sure enough, he was promptly released.

On Oct. 3, there was yet another close call. Four suspected operatives landed in Leros in a boatload of 198 people claiming to be Syrian refugees. Greek authorities made an effort to screen them, according to Wainright.

“The Greeks had every last detail of every person on that boat,” Wainright said. “So it kind of showed, to be fair to them, that they were documenting them, that there were security screening them, notwithstanding the huge challenges that they have. But we learned the lesson, we need to go further.”

Two of the men were later described in ISIS propaganda as Iraqi militants. They presented Syrian passports saying they were Ahmad Al-Mohammad and Mohammad Al-Mahmod. One of those passports would be found on November 13 outside the Stade de France stadium, where the duo blew themselves up with suicide bomb vests, according to European and U.S. authorities.

In April 2014, Interpol had recorded that passport in its data base as part of a batch of 1,452 stolen blank Syrian passports, according to Interpol officials. It was well-known that ISIS had stolen or acquired such passports en masse in its territory. Specialists then doctored them in laboratories for the use of Islamic State operatives.

The Interpol data base for stolen passports should have been an essential tool in the task of screening Syrian refugees. But Greek authorities were not regularly using it, according to European and U.S. counterterror officials. Both men were released, their fraudulent passports accepted as genuine.

Greek police did detain the two other alleged ISIS plotters. While questioning Adel Haddadi and Mohamed Usman Ghani, police realized the two had forged Syrian documents. Haddadi was Algerian and Ghani was Pakistani. Greek authorities held them for a few weeks as illegal immigrants, then released them with orders to leave the country.

Haddadi was known to Algerian and European authorities as an extremist, and Ghani was a former member of the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group of Pakistan, according to U.S. counterterror officials. An investigation by police with counterterror expertise might have turned up that information. Surveillance after their release might have spotted their communications to ISIS bosses in Syria. Instead, the two made their way to Austria, and were arrested in December after the Paris attacks.

“We think ISIS excluded them from the [Paris] operation once they had been detained at the Greek border, fearing they might have been burned or followed,” the senior French counterterror official said.

“Theoretically, if there had been a vigorous investigation when they were stopped at the border in Greece, they could have been discovered and traced back to the plot. But there are too many refugees. They were being screened by Greek border police, not antiterrorist police. So in the real world, given the situation at that border and of European law enforcement, it was unlikely.”

Soon, the attack squad convened at safe houses in Belgium procured by Abrini’s logistics crew. But they didn’t know the police were closing in on Abrini.

In October, an overworked counterterror squad of the Belgian federal police decided to revive the Abrini case file that had been sitting largely inactive since July. The alerts from France about imminent attacks caused the investigators to focus on associates of Abaaoud.

There weren’t resources for 24-hour physical surveillance, but investigators hid a camera outside Abrini’s home in Molenbeek. They also tried to monitor his phones, though the wiretaps didn’t produce much, according to Belgian counterterror officials.

In November, as the suspected plotters assembled bomb vests at the safe houses, Abrini was under active investigation. But the surveillance didn’t detect the plot.

On Nov. 11, two days before the attacks, the police camera hidden outside Abrini’s home filmed him getting into a car, probably driven by Abdeslam, according to Belgian counterterror officials. Abdeslam was also under investigation as a suspected extremist with ties to Abaaoud, though he was not being followed or wiretapped, Belgian officials say.



No one saw the two men join the attack squad, officials say. Abrini later told Belgian officials that the group drove with guns and explosives in a convoy to Paris, using a scout car, chase car and other tactics often employed by drug runners.

A gas station camera in France filmed Abrini and Abdeslam together that night.

"If we had had one or two weeks more to investigate, we could have maybe arrested them and prevented the Paris attacks," the Belgian counterterrorism official said. "But you have to remember how many people we were watching."

It was just the last link in a chain of missed opportunities, breakdowns and gaps that had stretched across a continent.

In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, French authorities complained that the Belgians should have cracked down harder on the Molenbeek crew and communicated more about the threat.

"It's not by chance that the whole network was based in Belgium and not in France or Italy," said Bruguiere, the former top French counterterrorism magistrate. "They chose a place that is both the weakest link, and where there were networks that existed for years"

The Belgians respond that there is plenty of dysfunction beyond their borders.

"It's a bit too easy for all these big countries with a lot of police officers and foreign intelligence services to criticize Belgium," said Grignard. "We're a small country, we don't have a police culture and we don't have our own foreign intelligence service. It's impossible to keep an eye on everyone."

After Paris, Abrini and half a dozen other surviving suspects took refuge in safe houses in Brussels, protected by clan and criminal networks. They eluded a manhunt and the high-tech might of U.S. and British spy agencies, which were trying to detect their communications. During the next four months, the fugitives used encrypted messaging to communicate with leaders in Syria about a new plot.

In March, Belgian police finally closed in, killing Belkaid and capturing Abdeslam in raids. The remaining fugitives struck on March 22 at the Brussels airport and subway station. Three bombers blew themselves up. Both Abrini and Krayem, who was at the subway station, failed to detonate their bombs. Airport security camera footage shows Abrini pushing away his bomb-laden luggage trolley, ducking behind a pillar and fleeing, according to counterterrorism officials.

Salah Abdeslam, center, is arrested and bundled into a police vehicle during a raid in Molenbeek. (VTM via AP)

Police captured Abrini in April. In the interrogation room, the pale 31-year-old faced detectives across a table. A burly, ski-masked security officer sat near him. Belgian officials say Abrini wept.

"It feels like I'm waking up from a bad trip," he said, according to the officials. "I didn't know so many people were going to get hurt."

Although military operations have hurt ISIS, intelligence officials warn that battlefield losses could generate retaliatory attacks — and violence from jihadists returning home.

Police in Germany, France, Belgium and other nations continue to dismantle plots. The workload, political pressure and media bombardment have left investigators exhausted and demoralized.

"Young colleagues, colleagues I have recruited, have seen more violence in two years than I have in 30," Grignard said. "That is surreal. It is even possible, that in the end, these people will be afraid of working because they will be criticized for not having done something [on a case] a year ago, or six months ago, etcetera. And if no one wants to come and work for us, who will do the job?"

In response to Europe's security crisis, political leaders have promised reforms. The EU has created a European Coast Guard and Border Agency. Europol has set up a counterterrorism center. After years of resistance, the European Parliament voted this spring to approve PNR airport screening. That system is not expected to be operational until 2018.

"There's been a political realization about the gravity of the terrorist threat that we face," Wainright said. European lawmakers "understood that we need to raise our defenses, raise our security game ... There is still a way to go, I think, to get the right balance between privacy and security."

Counterterrorism veterans warn that the structural problems persist, making Europe as vulnerable as ever.

"What I'm afraid of is that Europe will find itself dealing with attacks such as those seen in Paris and over the past year for a very long time," said Dambruoso, the Italian congressional deputy. "Time is passing and we are no closer to finding substantial solutions."



Terror in Europe” premieres Tuesday, Oct. 18 at 10 p.m. EST/9 p.m.



How you can now report a terrorist anonymously

Source: <https://tuko.co.ke/219494-al-shabaab-terrorists-worried-phone-technology-introduced-kenya.html>

REPORT A TERRORIST ANONYMOUSLY

Name Terrorist Name...	Facebook Account Terrorist Facebook username...
Email Terrorist Email...	Twitter Account Terrorist Twitter username...
Phone Number Terrorist Phone number...	Youtube Channel Terrorist Youtube Channel...
Location Terrorist Location...	Other Accounts Other accounts used...
Website Terrorist Website...	Comments Your Comments...
Submit	

A western intelligence has introduced a website for East Africans that will allow members of the public to report terror cells living among them

Terrorists are a worried lot after a western intelligence service introduced

East Africa Counter-Terrorism Database www.ct-ea.com, which is a website for reporting terrorist on intelligence services.

The form does not require one to fill in any personal details.

It is expected that the

move will significantly reduce terror cells in Kenya's hot spots.



Clowns' terror**First horror clowns are spotted in Almere; US craze reaches the Netherlands**

Source: <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/10/first-horror-clowns-are-spotted-in-almere-us-craze-reaches-the-netherlands/>

Creepy clown craze puts Norwegians on edge

Source: <https://www.thelocal.no/20161012/creepy-clown-craze-puts-norwegians-on-edge>

Sweden police overwhelmed by clown emergency calls

Source: <https://www.thelocal.se/20161015/sweden-police-overwhelmed-by-clown-emergency>

Creepy clown in a hospital gown and pink wig is filmed clinging to the back of a bus in Detroit

Source: <http://dailym.ai/2dBsRGm>

Creepy clown armed with a knife caught on security cameras “trying to break into man's house”

Source: <http://dailym.ai/2dKPhXL>

Creepy clown craze continues! Man wearing clown makeup and carrying a hatchet is arrested in North Carolina

Source: <http://dailym.ai/2dRzIO9>

'Creepy clown' attacks teenagers in Rostock, northern Germany

Source: <http://www.dw.com/en/creepy-clown-attacks-teenagers-in-rostock-northern-germany/a-36108888>

ISIS is using DRONES which are available for sale on Amazon as 'Trojan horses' to blow up its enemies in Iraq

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3837825/ISIS-using-DRONES-available-sale-Amazon-Trojan-horses-blow-enemies-Iraq.html>

Oct 14 – ISIS fighters in Iraq have bought drones which are for sale on [Amazon](http://www.amazon.com) and used them against their enemies, killing two Kurdish militiamen and injuring two French Special Forces soldiers.

Two Kurdish peshmerga fighters were killed and two French paratroopers wounded earlier this month after an ISIS drone exploded after it was brought back to a base near Arbil in northern Iraq to be examined.



Al-Qaeda fighters in Syria recently showed off their drones in a propaganda film (pictured) and now evidence has emerged of them being used by ISIS in Iraq





Drones for sale on Amazon (pictured) can vary in price from £25 to thousands of pounds

A recently video from al-Qaeda offshoot, Jund al-Aqsa, purportedly shows a drone landing on Syrian military barracks.

In another video, small explosives purportedly dropped by the pro-Assad Hezbollah group targeted rebels near Aleppo.

Chris Woods, the head of the Airwars project, said: 'There are a million ways you can weaponise drones - fire rockets, strap things in and crash them.'

'This is the stuff everyone has been terrified about for years, and now it's a reality.'

Peter Singer, author of the book *Wired for War*, said: 'It's not going to change the overall balance of power in the region, but it matters by the very fact that these are things that are normally beyond the capability of insurgents or terrorists groups.'

There are concerns ISIS groups in Europe and even in the United States could experiment with flying bombs over crowded cities.

Wim Zwijnenburg, a security and disarmament policy adviser with PAX for Peace, said: 'You already see things happening in Ukraine, gangs in Mexico are using drones, and in Ireland, gangs there are using surveillance.'

'Add a small amount of explosives to a small drone, and even the psychological factor is pretty significant.'

The Department for Transport is talking to manufacturers about the use of geo-fencing technology in their drones.

Ministers are examining the possibility of introducing a drone registration scheme in the UK, similar to the ones already in place in Ireland and the US.

A US military official has said while it was not clear where ISIS had acquired the drones, they were clearly planning to use them as remote controlled bombs as they tried to defend their territory from the advance of the Iraqi army, Kurdish militia and Syrian regime forces.

Air Force Colonel John Dorrian, US military spokesman in Baghdad, said the incident on October 2 was a 'Trojan Horse' attack.

He said the device had apparently been carrying C-4 explosives, batteries, and probably had a timer on it.

Col Dorrian said: 'There's nothing very high tech about them. They can just buy those as anybody else would. Some of those are available on Amazon.'

'So I don't know exactly how they get them, but they're routinely available. So, you know, they can order one just like anybody else can.'

He said: 'We've seen several reports about ISIS use of commercial off-the shelf drones, including instances where they've used these capabilities to deliver explosives.'

He said the US-led coalition had been working on how to combat the threat and had introduced a system called Drone Defender, although he refused to go into details about what it involved.

France's presidential spokesman, Stephane Le Foll, confirmed two French special forces were seriously injured in the explosion.

ETA: is the terrorist group still active?

Source: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/diego-muro/eta-is-terrorist-group-still-active>

Oct 15 – **Despite the discovery of an arsenal of weapons belonging to ETA in a field north of Paris, few believe the Basque terrorist group has the ability to resurrect its violent campaign.**

People wave Basque flags as thousands of pro independence Basques march demanding the return of all prisoners of ETA, in Bilbao, northern Spain, Sunday April 17, 2016. AP Photo/Alvaro Barrientos. All rights reserved.



An important arsenal of shotguns, pistols and revolvers divided into four drums and buried in a forest north of Paris was found by the French police on 12 October, Spain's national day.

The arms cache belonged to ETA, the Basque terrorist group that ended its violent campaign for independence five years ago on 20 October 2011, but has so far refused to dissolve and decommission its weapons. ETA's terrorist campaign lasted 43 years and claimed [845 lives](#), plus hundreds of displaced and injured people as well as an [estimated cost](#) of about 10 per cent of the Basque region's GDP.



According to [sources](#) of the investigation, ETA wanted to hand over the weapons in the presence of international mediators. It is alleged that the leadership of ETA wanted to negotiate the final disbandment of ETA before François Hollande's term in office ends.

Opinion polls suggest that the next French president will be conservative and unwilling to negotiate with a terrorist group. In the case of Spain, conservative PM Mariano Rajoy has also refused to end the dispersion policy for the 373 imprisoned *etarras* unless the Basque group disbands entirely.

ETA's window of opportunity to gain some concessions is practically closed, as authorities on both sides of the Pyrenees have little interest in providing ETA with a soft landing strip. ETA has not killed since March 2010 and a return to violence is dismissed by analysts. ETA sympathisers and Basque society at large have moved on and the number of people who support ETA is now [marginal](#).

An open engagement with ETA on the part of French and Spanish executives would legitimise indiscriminate violence and would ultimately confirm the view of those who think that terrorism is an effective 'weapon of the weak'. But is this the end for the Basque insurgents? And is it true that ETA's terrorist campaign was wholly ineffective?

From violence to politics

In a recent [book](#) on the rise and decline of ETA, we argue that the Basque group laid down its arms on 20 October 2011 after failing to achieve its strategic goal of creating an independent socialist state for the Basque homeland. Two key factors account for the end of ETA's violent campaign and the adoption of peaceful means to pursue the secessionist goal: the efficiency of counter-terrorist policy and the loss of social support.

The counter-terrorist policy brought the operational decline of ETA and de-legitimised its indiscriminate attacks. The key components

of the security policy were the coordinated actions of the police and the courts, the international collaboration with France and the isolation of the political parties that sympathised with ETA.

The main internal cause was the gradual loss of social support and the realisation by the leaders of ETA that terrorism, defined as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence in the pursuit of political change, was ineffective in gaining policy concessions.



Additional factors that account for the weakening of both ETA and radical Basque nationalism, the ideology and movement that supported the use of violence, were the backlash of public opinion and the post-9/11 international environment, when the fight against terrorism took a global shape.

Ultimately, all these events triggered an internal debate about the usefulness of violence in obtaining policy concessions and its role in resolving territorial disputes. The idea that terrorism was counterproductive for the Basque secessionist movement was internalised by ETA sympathisers and helped trigger the process of internal deliberation in the 2000s.

Terrorism does not work

ETA supporters eventually confronted the question of whether [terrorism works](#) or not. True, terrorism was tactically useful in harming civilians, instilling fear and capturing the attention of an audience. But the indiscriminate targeting of civilians did not force the Spanish and French governments to make substantial policy concessions.

The radical nationalist community that supported ETA came to the conclusion that terrorism was effective in obtaining tactical goals such as producing fear and harm but that it was completely ineffective politically.

The Basque case is consistent with existing research on the effectiveness of terrorism that argues that political violence is generally an unsuccessful way for perpetrators to attain their demands.

In fact, terrorism is an ineffective tactic for inducing government concessions and, as the

current pro-sovereignty movement in Catalonia suggests, it is often the case that peaceful movements are [more efficacious](#).

It is beyond doubt that the counter-terrorist effort was the main cause for the end of ETA's campaign. The coordinated actions of judges, prosecutors, police and intelligence services, not to mention the international campaign to isolate the group, reduced the membership of ETA to a handful of individuals who, in the words of a Minister of Interior, could 'fit in a mini-bus'. However, the realisation that only a [handful of terrorist groups](#) in modern history have managed to accomplish their political aims also played its part.

What now?

The time for public acts of decommissioning, peace processes and negotiation tables is over. ETA will not negotiate a comprehensive agreement with the Spanish and French governments and its inmates will have to take advantage of the opportunities of disengagement and reintegration that the law offers.

The fact that the French authorities discovered the hidden store of 145 weapons last Wednesday indicates the extreme fragility of ETA as an organisation. The little attention devoted to the finding by domestic and international media outlets is also telling, as few believe the group has the ability (or even appetite) to restart its violent campaign.

ETA's network of supporters has been dwarfed and there is little doubt that radical Basque nationalism has finally transformed itself into a political movement where bullets have been definitely [abandoned](#) in favour of ballots.

Swedish court allows the flying of ISIS flag

Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/362929-sweden-isis-flag-facebook/>

Oct 16 – A Swedish court has dismissed a case against a Muslim man accused of inciting racial hatred for flying an Islamic State flag because it is not an expression of hate speech.

The now 23-year-old from Laholm, in Halland County posted a photo of himself posing with the flag as his Facebook profile picture in December 2015, but removed it when it was reported to police in March.


The Syrian-born man was facing felony charges of inciting racial hatred, but Prosecutor Gisela Sjovalles said she had made the decision to drop the charges "after careful consideration back and forth," reports Hallandsposten.

Sjovalles said the waving of the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) flag cannot be considered hate speech because it is not an expression of disrespect towards any

Two things are infinite:
the universe
and human stupidity;

and I'm
not sure
about the
universe.

Albert Einstein



ethnic or minority group, for example, in the same way the swastika could be considered a symbol of racial hatred. Instead, IS are “against everyone except those who don’t belong to IS.”

“Incitement of racial hatred is defined as the public dissemination of statements that threaten or disparage a group of persons with allusion to race, color, national or ethnic origin, religious belief or sexual orientation,” she said.

The man’s defense attorney, Bjorn Nilsson, insisted his client is not a supporter of IS and argued that the flag has been a symbol of Islam for hundreds of years before IS laid their claim, according to GP.

This is the first case in which the IS flag has been up for judicial review in Sweden, reports Svt, and so there was no precedent to help determine the outcome.

Syrian suspect believed to have links to terrorists arrested in Crete

Source: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/212848/article/ekathimerini/news/syrian-suspect-believed-to-have-links-to-terrorists-arrested-in-crete>

Oct 10 – A 51-year-old Syrian arrested in Hania, Crete, on Thursday appears to be linked to Islamist terrorists who carried out attacks in Paris in November last year and Brussels in March, a source in the Greek Police said Friday, explaining that his arrest was part of a coordinated effort between France, Belgium and Greece to apprehend suspects believed to have provided “logistical” support to the attackers.



The unnamed Syrian, **who owns a car rental firm on Crete**, was wanted on a Belgian arrest warrant for participation in a criminal organization and people

smuggling, among other charges that did not include terrorism.

The arresting officers found evidence to support claims he was part of a network smuggling migrants into Europe, but broader investigations are aimed at ascertaining whether he also helped the Paris and Brussels attackers travel to Western Europe via Greece with forged passports.



Australian Islamic terrorist with dual nationality 'will be stripped of his citizenship' in test case under tough new terror laws

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3841370/Australian-extremist-dual-nationality-stripped-citizenship-test-case-tough-new-terror-laws.html>



Oct 16 – The government is preparing to prosecute an Islamic State terrorist with dual-nationality to strip them of their Australian citizenship in the first case tried under new security laws, officials claim.

It is understood the government will enforce a case against a well-known unnamed terrorist under amendments to the Citizenship Act, which was passed in December 2015, The Daily Telegraph reported.

The **Citizenship Loss Board** was created soon after to identify jihadis with Australian citizenship and that of at least one other country. **It is understood there are more than 50 people who fit the profile.**

Mohamed Ali Elomar is believed to be one of the first convicted terrorists who would be deported by the government



The government is reportedly keen to pursue a test case of the controversial law.


Australian Federal Police and ASIO are believed to have recently raised concerns about the burden of proof needed under the new laws.

Officials must show the suspected terrorist is also a citizen of a new country, not that they are simply entitled to dual-citizenship – which could be difficult to prove, The Daily Telegraph reported.

A new parliamentary report published in September backed the government's controversial plan to strip citizenship from convicted terrorists of dual nationality.

Abdul Nacer Benbrika, Mohamed Ali Elomar and Mostafa Mahamed Farag are believed to be part of an initial group of six people the government plans to boot from the country once the law is passed, the newspaper claims.

Benbrika, also known as Abu Bakr, was arrested in 2005 along with 16 other men who were charged with being part of a terrorist group and of planning an attack in Australia. It is believed he was the leader of the group.



Elomar was part of a group found guilty in 2009 of planning an attack in Sydney, after he was arrested in 2005. He was sentenced to 28 years in prison in 2010, and is also the uncle of killed ISIS fighter Mohamed Elomar.

Farag, also known as Abu Sulayman, is believed to be one of the most senior Australian terrorists fighting in the Middle East. Before leaving the country, he preached at a centre in the western Sydney suburb of Bankstown.

Abdul Nacer Benbrika, who was arrested in 2005, is another who could face deportation

Mohammad Ali Baryalei, from western Sydney, is regarded as Australia's highest-ranking IS member and is believed to have recruited up to 30 Australians fighting in the Middle East

The Australian government has been increasingly concerned about the flow of fighters to Iraq and Syria to join extremist groups such as Islamic State, with some **110 Australians reportedly fighting in the region as of last year. As many as 45 have died in the conflict.**

The Attorney-General George Brandis said at the time the law passed that they will not render individuals stateless, but will apply in 'very limited circumstances'.

They cover people who engage in terrorist acts, including training, recruitment and finance, and are convicted of a terrorist offence and sentenced to at least six years in jail.

Those who fight for a declared terrorist group also automatically lose their citizenship.


'Dual nationals who engage in terrorism are betraying their allegiance to this country and do not deserve to be Australian citizens,' Mr Brandis said.



The knife of the warrior

Source: <https://intelgiasp.wordpress.com/2016/10/16/el-cuchillo-del-guerrero-the-knife-of-the-warrior/>

Oct 16 – In the latest issue of the jihadist magazine *Rumiyah*, an article in which the Daesh incites the killing of infidels using as a weapon a knife, the modus operandi proposed differs from previous



demonstrations in which the murders search for great media impact and many victims. This time, it urges the targeted and unitary killing, or the attack to small groups, claming these acts as terrorist operations and attacks and not as lone wolves.

So, there are indicated as suitable places to attack the remote areas, without crowds: parks, alleys or poorly lit places and channels, shorelines and beaches, where the victim is alone.

The profile of the victims, they claim to look for people who are leaving or entering the work on night shift, people who are walking alone, people heading home after a night ... In short, easy prey and most vulnerable possible to ensure the success of the operation; also they encourage that after the murder a note or stop signal to the authorship must to be left.

The psychological component is also present, as in previous. In this publication, the author gives some



guidelines for these terrorist operations, citing several examples and historical facts related to knives attempting attack to legitimize the murder. Also, the article shows how to use a knife and the most vulnerable parts of the human body, mainly advising the attacks on the neck.

Is not the first time that Daesh instigates the use of a knife as a deadly weapon. On this

occasion, there are a number of guidelines and recommendations for use it and, on the other hand, the use kitchen knives are not recommended, as they can be dangerous to the attacker himself.

The author of the article defines what is the ideal knife to commit the murders outlined above, this has to be saved to avoid accidents, it must be clear and precise, strong blade and handle, with good grip to avoid being stolen and an size not too big to favor the concealment of it, being ideal that have a toothed part or serrated. This definition of the ideal knife fully agrees with the Warrior Knife Spyderco Colorado American company, being especially curious that this jihadist manifesto is headed by a photograph of this American knife.

The knife Spyderco warrior, inspired by a Korean martial art, is an American mythic knife, which currently has a price of about 400 dollars. This knife first appeared in the American publication "soldier of fortune" in 1980 as an ideal knife neutralizing sentries. Its main features are that it is made of a stainless (H-1) steel, ideal for Marine applications because it replaces with nitrogen, carbon and therefore is exempt the appearance of rust under any



circumstances, is also remarkable the performance and the power cut and blows. The Warrior is equipped with a non-slip handle and fits perfectly in the hand, being very difficult to disarmament. Its edge is combined, cutting and saw, and its size helps to the concealment.

Spyderco Warrior designers donate for many years about 3% of the sales of this model to a non-profit organization whose purpose is to financially assist American soldiers wounded in combat and to the families of the victims.

It seems possible that, with the continued losses of territory by Daesh and as a result of the recent counterterrorism successes of the forces and the security forces at the European level they are eroding their expectations, so they are likely to have more difficulty seeking martyrs and choose for easier and with less risk of being killed or being arrested. Moreover, given the unavailability of other weapons due to strong control of weapons and explosives by forces and security forces, it could lead to Daesh to use more permissive and easily accessible weapons. Moreover, it is macabre and puzzling that Daesh uses as an example a knife from an American company, which donates part of its sales to help families of American soldiers who committed suicide.



World's worst driver? Woman makes wrong turn into start of marathon

Source: <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/554299/worst-driver-woman-marathon-canada-running>

Oct 17 – The unfortunate driver was caught on camera getting herself into a pickle as hundreds of runners are forced to avoid the vehicle.

The clip begins with the athletes lined up waiting for the gun to start the Prince Edward Island marathon which took place yesterday (October 16) in Charlottetown, Canada.



But as they prepare to start the gruelling 26.2-mile course a maroon Ford Focus suddenly appears.

It begins to drive towards the crowd of runners before the driver realises she's made a very bad move.

But by now it's too late to reverse as the race begins and streams of people run past avoiding the car.

It sits there with its brake lights on as more and more people go past in the race.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: Worst driver ever? Or the best potential terrorist? No lessons learned from Nice; no elementary logic available!

Somali pirates free 26 Asian hostages held since 2012

Source: <http://www.libyanexpress.com/somali-pirates-free-26-asian-hostages-held-since-2012/>

Oct 23 – **Somali pirates have freed 26 Asian sailors held captive in a small fishing village for more than four years since their ship was hijacked in the Indian Ocean**, government officials and a maritime expert said on Saturday.

The sailors from China, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Taiwan were seized when the Omani-flagged **FV Naham 3** was hijacked close to the Seychelles in March 2012, when pirate attacks were common in the area.

"The crew is staying overnight in Galkayo. They will arrive in (the Kenyan capital) Nairobi at 1830 local time tomorrow," said John Steed, East Africa region manager for the Oceans Beyond Piracy group.

The mayor of Galkayo in northern Somalia had earlier said the crew was set to arrive in Kenya on Saturday afternoon.

"The crew did not say if ransom was paid," mayor Hirsi Yusuf Barre told Reuters.

Their period of captivity is one of the longest among hostages seized by pirates in the anarchic Horn of Africa nation.

Steed said one member of the crew had died during the hijacking while two succumbed to illness. Among those released, one was being treated for a gunshot wound on his foot and three were diabetic. The sailors were held in Dabagala near the town of Harardheere some 400 km (250 miles) northeast of the capital Mogadishu. Harardheere became known as Somalia's main pirate base at the height of the crisis.

The Oceans Beyond Piracy group said the crew were brought ashore by pirates when their ship sank more than a year after its hijacking.

Piracy off Somalia's coast has subsided in the past three years, mainly due to shipping firms hiring private security details and the presence of international warships.

The wave of attacks had cost the world's shipping industry billions of dollars as pirates paralyzed shipping lanes, kidnapped hundreds of seafarers and seized vessels more than 1,000 miles from Somalia's coastline.

Taliban uses drones to film attacks in Afghanistan

Source: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/taliban-drones-film-attacks-afghanistan-161023061347421.html>



Taliban spokesman says the video is of an attack which occurred on October 3

The Afghan Taliban has uploaded a drone footage showing a suicide bomber driving into a police base and blowing it up in the southern Helmand province.


The fighters say the footage proves that they can now deploy drones as an "addition to their sophisticated possessions of advanced technologies".



The 23-minute-long video, which begins with a self-proclaimed suicide bomber speaking in front of an explosives-rigged Humvee, was released on Saturday appears to be authentic, according to the Afghan defence

"You can get a drone anywhere, in any shop. They found or bought one, and used it." However, using camera drones near sensitive government sites was banned by the Afghan government in June.

Afghanistan: Who controls what



In the video, the purported suicide bomber, dressed in a black turban and white tunic says: "I am telling the Afghan stooge forces to repent and join the Taliban or we will use this equipment the foreigners gave them, against them and they can't do anything about it".

A drone-mounted camera then films the Humvee speeding towards a compound and detonating in flames blowing up the entire building.

"This proves that we are well step ahead in sending our messages to people of Afghanistan in many sophisticated ways. Anything that helps us in destroying our enemies [Afghan and US forces] will be used with full force," Zabihullah Mujahid, Taliban spokesman, told Al Jazeera.

"This video has proved to be very influential and we have many people supporting us."

Mujahid said the video was of an attack on October 3, when the fighters overran parts of Helmand province.

Reuters says a government official in Helmand also confirmed the attack in which the district police chief and several other officials were killed.

Helmand is strategically important for the Taliban as it is the main source of the country's opium output, worth an estimated \$4bn a year, much of which funds the war.

Provincial officials say the Taliban now controls 85 percent of the province, while only a year ago the government controlled 80 percent.

ministry.

"The remote-controlled drones to capture footage of their [Taliban] fighters conducting attacks is nothing but to instill fear among people and to indicate how far they can get in defeating us, but in fact, using a drone is not something they can call an achievement," Dawlat Waziri, spokesman for the defence ministry, told Al Jazeera by telephone.

Refugees and terrorism – "No evidence of risk": UN

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161024-refugees-and-terrorism-no-evidence-of-risk-un>

Oct 24 – "Overly-restrictive migration policies introduced because of terrorism concerns are not justified and may in fact be damaging to state security," warned the United Nations Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, Ben Emmerson, at the UN General Assembly in New York.

UNHCHR says that Emmerson, presenting a new [report](#) on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on the human rights of migrants and refugees, showed that "while there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity, migration policies that are restrictive or that violate human rights may in fact create conditions conducive to terrorism."



"In the prevailing politicking around migration, we have seen a trend of anti-terror measures being linked to the management of cross-border flows," he said. "This trend is based on the perception that terrorists take advantage of refugee flows to carry out acts of terrorism, or that refugees are somehow more prone to radicalization than others."

"This perception is analytically and statistically unfounded, and must change," the human rights expert stressed recalling that, in 2015, the total number of displaced people worldwide reached 65.3 million. "Even with ongoing attempts to reach resolution in the Syrian conflicts, we are likely to see a continued flow of refugees beyond the current record levels."

The report finds that migration policies that build fences, engage in push-back operations, criminalize irregular migration, and abandon international legal commitments to refugees, lead to restricted access to safe territory and increased covert movements of people, particularly by traffickers. "These conditions may ultimately assist terrorists and lead to increased terrorist activity."

"What is clear is that policies that respect human rights, justice, and accountability, and that manifest the values on which democracy is founded, are an essential element of effective counterterrorism policies," Emmerson noted. "The further we move away from this, the more we concede to terrorist groups."

Several European countries have tightened border controls over the past year in response to security concerns related to the refugee crisis.

ISIS used the crossing over the Aegean Sea to transport members of the cell which carried out the Paris and Brussels attacks back to Europe, using fake Syrian passports.

Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud boasted in an ISIS propaganda magazine of his travels between Belgium and Syria "despite being

chased after by so many intelligence agencies." The article did not specify the method.

Two of the Paris suicide bombers arrived on the Greek island of Leros on the same day last October, with fake passports, while accomplice Mohamed Abrini travelled from Syria under the name Naim al-Hamed and evaded authorities while preparing to launch the Brussels attacks.

Emmerson acknowledged the link, but said there was "little evidence" that terrorists systematically exploit refugee flows to carry out atrocities, while research shows that very few asylum seekers are responsible for attacks.

The expert's study recommends that states recognize that the vast majority of people fleeing Syria and other affected regions are victims of terrorism, and should not be stigmatized as potential terrorists themselves. It also calls on states to respect the fundamental rights of migrants, and warns that push back operations and detention of migrants likely violate human rights and breach State obligations under international refugee law.

"We are here today to correct the misperception that international refugee law is an obstacle when it comes to addressing security concerns," Emmerson said. "In fact, it is in all of our interests to protect refugees and give them the opportunity to create a better future for themselves and their families. It is also the right thing to do."

The UN says that a record 65.3 million people are currently refugees or displaced in their own countries – the highest figure since records began before the Second World War.

More than 320,000 asylum seekers have arrived in Europe by sea so far this year, a much lower number than last year's total of more than one million, with at least 3,600 dying in treacherous boat crossings.

Terrorists, hackers, corrupt officials: Game theory need updating to catch up with today's chaos

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20161024-terrorists-hackers-corrupt-officials-game-theory-need-updating-to-catch-up-with-today-s-chaos>

Oct 24 – **Game theory has long been used to apply mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.**

However, our world has evolved from great power conflicts to one where many of our major problems are spawned not from monolithic blocks of self-interest, but from a vast



array of single entities making highly individual choices: from lone wolf terrorists to corrupt officials, tax evaders, isolated hackers, or even armies of botnets and packages of malware.

Game theory needs to catch up and new research by mathematicians, led by Professor Vassili Kolokoltsov at the University of Warwick, has just found the way to do that by giving game theory calculations an enormous army of “agents.”

University of Warwick says that in a paper, Kolokoltsov, from Warwick’s Department of Statistics, has been able to take game theory far beyond some of its early applications of two opposing sides in zero



sum games, and equipped it with the ability to model the impact of a vast array of individual actors - an “infinite state-space of small players.”

The paper says the new tool can be “applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, banks and firms merging [...] and many others.”

To take just one application: tax fraud costs the U.K government £16 billion a year, according to the National Audit. HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) has faced

questions about both how it decides to deal with individual large companies and how it balances its efforts between pursuing large corporations and individual tax payers.

This evolution of game theory could greatly assist it in simultaneously model the best approach to manage the great number of participants in the process and create efficient disincentives for both individual and corporate tax evasion.

The modelling tools this evolution of game theory will provide can also deal with a tax system’s budget inputs and the potential for corruption within any tax system.

Professor Kolokoltsov comments: “Our method has a potential to be used in a variety of situations where one big player, referred to as the principal agent, confronts the behavior of a large pool of individuals with different agendas.”

“Of course, as usual for the applications of mathematical tools to socio-economic systems, any concrete applications of the method would require a serious additional input of concrete experimental data to feed various key parameters the model relies upon,” he continues.

UW notes that Kolokoltsov is now working with colleagues to apply the new game theory technique to specific types of problem such as internet Denial of Service attacks by botnets.

The preliminary progress of the method was presented by Professor Kolokoltsov’s Ph.D. student, Stamatis Katsikas, in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) for Britain event in the House of Commons.

— Read more in Vassili Kolokoltsov, “The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration,” [arXiv:1412.1269 \[math.OC\]](https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.1269) (20 November 2015).





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