Fear

Canadian Fear Campaign: "Islamic Extremists" and the Dubious Role of Intelligence Agencies

By Julie Lévesque

With the killing of a Canadian soldier in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, on October 20, and the shooting on Parliament Hill in Ottawa

on October 22, the Canadian authorities and the mainstream media have already decided. Without evidence, they are blaming "Islamic extremism" for both incidents, even though we know practically nothing about the two men who acted alone.

No terrorist organization has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but we are told that the two young men had converted to Islam and one of them, Martin Couture-Rouleau, who hit a soldier with his car in Saint-Jean, had "self-radicalized over the internet". The Edmonton Sun said that "family and law enforcement try to find out why he followed ISIS kill commands." Is there any evidence that he was "following ISIS Kill commands"?

We were told that both were known by the authorities who had confiscated their passports for fear that they would join terrorist organizations abroad. If the authorities went as far as confiscating their passports for fear they would commit terrorist attacks abroad, didn't they fear that they would commit attacks here?

At this point we can only speculate about the motives of these two men. And one question that the media should ask, is **whether the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had anything to do with these attacks,** since it has a known history of using informants to infiltrate Muslim organizations and issue violent threats against Canadian citizens. Moreover, known and documented ISIS has been supported covertly by the US and its Persian Gulf allies since the outset of the Syrian insurgency in March 2011.

But since the first killing on October 20, rather than being suspicious of the authorities, who have been warning us of the "homegrown terrorist threat" for months, the media relies almost exclusively on security and terrorism "experts" and law enforcement officials to provide "authoritative commentary" and they all agree on the "Islamic extremist" theory and self-radicalization on the internet.

It is very disturbing to say the least that security and terrorism "experts" are unaware that **the root cause of terrorism, as demonstrated by studies, is not Islamic fundamentalism or any ideology, but foreign occupation, not to mention the fact that Al Qaeda affiliated terrorists are supported covertly by Western intelligence.**

Based on research from the University of Chicago's Project on Security and Terrorism, and funded in part by the US Defense Department's Threat Reduction Agency, Professor Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman wrote a book in 2010 called "Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It."

Abdus Sattar Ghazali summarized the book's conclusions in 2010:

In 2000, before the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, there were 20 suicide attacks around the world, and only one (against the USS Cole) was directed against Americans. In the last 12 months, by comparison, 300 suicide attacks have occurred, and

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over 270 were anti-American. We simply must face the reality that, no matter how well-intentioned, the current war on terror is not serving U.S. interests."

The authors examined more than 2,200 suicide attacks across the world from 1980 to the present. **As the United States has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, which have a combined population of about 60 million, total suicide attacks worldwide have risen dramatically** — from about 300 from 1980 to 2003, to 1,800 from 2004 to 2009. Further, over 90-percent of suicide attacks worldwide are now anti-American. The vast majority of suicide terrorists hail from the local region threatened by foreign troops, which is why 90-percent of suicide attackers in Afghanistan are Afghans.

In Cutting the Fuse, the authors pointed out: "Prior to 9/11, the expert debate on the causes of suicide terrorism was divided largely between two explanations — religious fanaticism and mental illness. In the years after 9/11, new research on who becomes a suicide terrorist showed that virtually none could be diagnosed as mentally ill, while many were religious and, most striking, nearly all emerged from communities resisting foreign military occupation." (Abdus Sattar Ghazali, The root cause of suicide terrorism is occupation: New study, OpEd News, September 29, 2010)

Back in 2007, Alexandre Popovic wrote extensively about how CSIS informants "infiltrated the Canadian Muslim community and contributed to portray Islam in a negative way and fuel the stereotypes that Muslims are essentially dangerous extremists." (Alexandre Popovic, Les manipulations médiatiques du SCRS, September 1, 2007)

One of the informants, Youssef Muammar, became the "leader of several organizations such as the International Islamic Foundation of Canada, Petro Action, the International Institute of Islamic Research, the Communauté de la nation musulmane du Grand Montréal, the Grand Mosque, Info-Islam and the magazine Le Monde islamique." (André Noël, «Un drôle d'espion», La Presse, December 14, 2001, p. A7, cited in Alexandre Popovic, Les manipulations médiatiques du SCRS, September 1, 2007)

In other words, through its high-profile informants, CSIS was squarely in position to shape the public perception of the Canadian Muslim community.

Both informants in question are Gilles Joseph Breault, aka "Dr. Youssef Muammar" and "Abu Jihad" from Montreal, and Mubin Shaikh from Toronto. Note that we are not dealing here with mere speculation or an umpteenth conspiracy theory. **First, both individuals publicly admitted working under the orders of CSIS.** On the other hand, their multiple media interventions are largely documented in the archives of print media, which have gone so far as to portray the two informants as spokespersons of the Canadian Muslim community, even as their "leaders".

From 1989 to 1994, Youssef Muammar seems to have been involved in all the controversies, be they large or small and associated directly or indirectly with radical Islam, such as the attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago or the spread of heinous anti-Jewish propaganda […]

After openly supporting anti-Israel terrorism and appealing to murder opponents of the Islamic Salvation Front, an Algerian Islamist party now dissolved, Muammar sent messages threatening of biochemical weapons attacks in the Montreal metro. (*Ibid.*)

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and CSIS have been warning Canadians about "the very real terrorist threat" for months but, say they were "caught by surprise" by the two recent attacks committed by individuals they were monitoring close enough to confiscate their passports.

We were told that in Montreal people who are working in areas with a dense Muslim and immigrant population met with police and imams and were asked to "remain vigilant" and report "any suspicious activity" because they were "expecting something to happen."

This method of relying on civilians to "spy" on their fellow citizens is reminiscent of the East German Stasi, the Ministry of State Security. "One of its main tasks was spying on the population, mainly through a vast network of citizens turned informants, and fighting any opposition by overt and covert measures including hidden psychological destruction of dissidents."

Canadians need to keep in mind that the attacks are being used as a pretext for increased police state security measures and an integration of border security with the United States. The Ottawa shooter was actually identified by US sources

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even before the Canadian police had identified him. This raises serious questions on the extent to which the US and Canadian intelligence services are integrated. The Week reported:

Canadian police are yet to officially identify the suspect but US sources told Reuters he is Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, a 32-year-old Canadian who recently converted to Islam. He was reportedly born and raised in Quebec, and later spent time in Libya and various regions of Canada as a labourer. His father is believed to be Bulgasem Zehaf, a Quebec businessman who appears to have fought in 2011 in Libya, and Susan Bibeau, the deputy chair of a division of Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board. (Michael Zehaf-Bibeau: the gunman behind the Ottawa shootings, The Week, October 23, 2014)

Knowing that most terrorist plots in the US are orchestrated by the FBI, as the extensive Mother Jones research showed, this integration between the two countries is far from reassuring.

We should also remember that NATO has a history of false flag terrorism. Operation Gladio, NATO's secret army, was a clandestine operation to prevent the rise of communism in Europe and was used to commit terrorist attacks against the population, which were blamed on the Communists. The ultimate goal was to have people turn to the state for more security and reject communism. (See also Tony Cartalucci: Canadian Terror Wave: a Modern-Day Gladio)

In the past two days, in addition to calls for increased security measures, we are clearly seeing the glorification of the Canadian military, which has taken part in illegal bombings in the Middle East for many years in the name of democracy and other false humanitarian pretexts. Far from being a solution to terrorism, the Canadian Forces are part of the problem. The bombing of Libya, to cite the most recent example, helped fuel terrorism in the region.

And last but not least, why is it so easy for extremists to use Facebook and other social media to issue death threats and apparently radicalize young fragile minds when until recently Facebook "moderators were told to ban images of breastfeeding if the nipples were exposed"?

But most importantly, the Canadian media should be questioning Canada's foreign policy and Ottawa's military involvement in America's wars instead of focusing on "self-radicalized individuals".

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Al-Qaeda's Future in Pakistan Amid the Rise of Islamic State

By Farhan Zahid

Source:http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42997&tx_ttnews[backPid]= 26&cHash=33ac67e586dc1b78043b4b9834601738#.VEygghaAOW4

Al-Qaeda appears to be on the back foot globally. The Islamic State organization, previously the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and years before that al-Qaeda in Iraq, is dominating the global jihad scene. More than 19 Islamist militant groups worldwide have pledged allegiance to Islamic State amir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, some of whom used to be affiliated with al-Qaeda (Intel Center, October 9). It is unclear how al-Qaeda will compete with this new jihadist group, which threatens al-Qaeda's leadership. However, in Pakistan, where al-Qaeda Central is based, it seems that al-Qaeda does have a future. The establishment of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in September is one major step by Ayman al-Zawahiri to reaffirm al-Qaeda's standpoint concerning Pakistan (*The Express Tribune* [Karachi], September 3).

Pakistan remains pivotal for al-Qaeda as it is home to Al-Qaeda Core or Central. Veteran al-Qaeda leaders still maintain residences in tribal areas of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda maintains close relations with principal Pakistani Islamist militant groups such as: Harkat-ul Jihad-

e-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaysh-e-Muhammad (JeM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and, to some extent, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). [1] The perception that most Pakistani Islamist terrorist groups would sooner or later bandwagon with the Islamic State has not come to fruition. Apart from some members of the TTP, specifically from the Fazlullah group, and a less-known Tehrik-e-Khilafat Pakistan, no major Pakistani Islamist group has pledged allegiance to Islamic State (*The News* [Islamabad], October 15).

Al-Qaeda in Pakistan
There are many reasons why these Pakistani militant organizations would not be interested in leaving al-Qaeda for the Islamic State organization.

Personal Contacts
As stated earlier, al-Qaeda maintains a strong presence in settled areas of Pakistan and in the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan and it has long-standing ties with Pakistani Islamist terrorist groups. These contacts predate al-Qaeda's establishment in Pakistan in 1988 by Osama bin Laden. The leadership, over a period of time, has cultivated contacts based upon personal interactions, sometimes intermarrying with tribal women, establishing strong tribal ties. Al-Zawahiri himself is believed to be married to a woman from the tribal areas after settling there following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (*The Nation* [Islamabad], June 18, 2011).

Financial Support Networks
Al-Qaeda has been providing financial support to Pakistani Taliban and Punjab-based Islamist networks since its arrival in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. This support is pivotal to Islamist violent non-state actors operating in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda's financial network has always been crucial for jihadi groups in the country for continuing their activities and, above all, this support base strengthens the Islamist network in Pakistan by funding religious seminaries, Islamist charity organizations, proselytizing groups and, to some extent, even Islamist political parties.

Taliban and Afghanistan
Osama bin Laden pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban. This act technically made al-Qaeda subservient to the Taliban and, in fact, part of the Afghan Taliban network. Al-Qaeda has high hopes for a Taliban regime returning to Kabul after the withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Al-Qaeda's current amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, renewed the oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar after the rise of the Islamic State organization (al-Nafir, July 20).

Training and Indoctrination
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan had neither had the expertise nor the interest in training Islamist jihadists. They outsourced the training part to al-Qaeda during their rule, giving al-Qaeda a monopoly over training of jihadists from all over the world. During the five years of Taliban rule, al-Qaeda trained thousands of local and foreign jihadists. Al-Qaeda-trained and indoctrinated jihadists are part of many Islamist groups currently operating in Pakistan.

Proximity
Proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan is pivotal in the case of al-Qaeda. The core of al-Qaeda is in Pakistan and continues to guide jihadist organizations, both foreign and local, operating in Pakistan. The Islamic State organization, formed out of territories carved out of Iraq and Syria, is perhaps more interesting for Middle Eastern, North African and European jihadists, but it is far away from Pakistan. From the local jihadist perspective, the Pakistani regime operated hand-in-glove with the United States, therefore the jihadists consider the Pakistani government as "apostate." Joining the Islamic State organization and establishing a new jihadist base in Pakistan would, therefore, be considered a futile effort, as many fronts are already available in the homeland.

Pakistan
For al-Qaeda, Pakistan is crucial. It is a country with a plethora of Islamist groups (violent, political, puritanical and proselytizing with assorted charity wings and non-violent supporters), nuclear weapons, a huge landmass, tribal areas where the organization can operate freely, dense cities in which to find safe havens and a segment of the population sympathetic to Islamist ideals. This is more than the Islamic State organization could acquire in Iraq and Syria. Al-Qaeda can also capitalize on Pakistan-India

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animosities and it maintains ties with Islamist organizations with an anti-India demeanor.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
On the other hand, al-Qaeda is reinvigorating itself with the creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) in early September. Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the establishment of AQIS in a 55-minute video message:
This entity was not established today, but it is the fruit of a blessed effort for more than two years to gather the mujahideen in the Indian subcontinent into a single entity to be with the main group, Qaedat al-Jihad, from the soldiers of the Islamic Emirate and its triumphant amir, Allah permitting, amir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid. [2]
Al-Zawahiri named Asim Umar, a known jihadist ideologue in Pakistani, as the amir of AQIS.
Brigadier General Zahoor Fazal Qadri, an army officer of Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), became the first target of AQIS on September 6 in the Punjab province. The assailants targeted Qadri while he was off duty and offering prayers at a shrine belonging to his family. In a brazen attack on the shrine, the armed assailants killed Qadri and two others while wounding seven more. AQIS spokesperson Usama Mahmood claimed responsibility: "The Sargodha attack should be taken as a warning by the slaves of [the United States of] America in the Pakistani Armed Forces to leave the U.S.-backed 'war on terror' or get ready to face the consequences" (*The News* [Islamabad], September 20).
Just a week after its establishment, AQIS's newly appointed amir Asim Umar claimed

responsibility for a terrorist attack on *Pakistan Naval Ship (PNS) Zulfiqar*, **a Chinese-made F22P-type frigate docked at**

the navy's Karachi dockyard. The attackers unsuccessfully attempted to hijack the frigate and use it to target Indian or U.S. Navy ships in international waters. Interestingly, the perpetrators were all members of the Pakistani Navy. Two were killed during the attempted hijacking while four were arrested after a shootout with security forces. Another four were arrested near Quetta on their way to Afghanistan (*The Express Tribune* [Karachi], September 8).

Conclusion
Apart from all these favorable environs, al-Qaeda is perturbed. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent represents the latest step in trying to reinvigorate al-Qaeda, launch high-profile terrorist attacks in India and Pakistan and flex al-Qaeda's muscles to reassure the masses sympathetic to the group. The worst case scenario would be jihadist competition between al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the Islamic State organization's affiliates in Pakistan. **There is evidence that suicide terrorism is the result of competition among groups with overlapping goals and similar causes.** Group competition, in the case of terrorism, yields greater ferocity in terrorist attacks as rival organizations try to influence their audience by seeking to outdo other groups as far as performance is concerned. [3] Consequently, more high-profile attacks or attempts in the near future by al-Qaeda may occur in order to stay the primary jihadist organization in Pakistan.
In order to stay in operation, al-Qaeda has to capitalize on its available resources. Apart from its current weaknesses (no territorial control, depleted leadership, living in the shadows and a detached network), al-Qaeda still possesses some arrows in its quiver: al-Zawahiri is a seasoned strategist; al-Qaeda still has clear doctrinal beliefs with no counter-narrative; their network is present in over 60 countries; there is a thriving culture of conspiracy theories in Pakistan and elsewhere; and they continue to receive financial support from the global Salafist community.
In the case of Pakistan, the situation still favors al-Qaeda's operations. Exceptions exist, but

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because of their longstanding ties with al-Qaeda, most Pakistani jihadist groups would not support the Islamic State organization over al-Qaeda. With the formation of AQIS, al-Qaeda will probably attempt to reincorporate the Islamist, violent non-state actors operating in Pakistan into its fold. The only scenario in which the Islamic State organization could penetrate the Pakistani jihadist scene would be due to sheer inaction from al-Qaeda. Otherwise, given the more than 25 years of relations with Pakistani Islamist violent non-state actors, it would be rather difficult for al-Qaeda to lose ground in Pakistan.

Notes

1. All have worked with Al-Qaeda. HuJI's leader Qari Saifullah Akhter was close to the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan during the Taliban era (1996-2001) and HuJI's offshoot, Brigade 313, led by Ilyas Kashmiri, later became part of al-Qaeda Central in the tribal areas of Pakistan. HuM amir Fazal ur Rehman Khalil was a co-signer of Osama bin Laden's *fatwa* against the United States in 1998 and was also part of the Bin Laden-led Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a sectarian jihadist group of Pakistan trained its rank and file at al-Qaeda-run training camps in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Jaysh-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba joined hands to perpetrate the Indian Parliament attack in December 2001 to create a military standoff between Pakistan and India in order to provide breathing space to the besieged al-Qaeda leadership along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. HuM and JeM, along with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, kidnapped and assassinated *Wall Street Journal* correspondent Daniel Pearl in Karachi in March 2002. Apart from these activities, scores of terrorist incidents against U.S. and Western interests and against Pakistani security forces were conducted by these organizations in collusion with al-Qaeda. Most importantly, the TTP provides sanctuaries and safe havens to al-Qaeda leaders in tribal areas where TTP operates as an umbrella organization of more than 27 factions. Al-Qaeda planned and executed many of the high-profile terrorist attacks while comfortably staying in TTP-controlled areas.

2. The message can be heard here http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/sep/04/al-qaida-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-islamist-india-video.

3. Please see, Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, June 2007.

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Farhan Zahid writes on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, Pakistani al-Qaeda-linked groups, Islamist violent non-state actors in Pakistan, militant landscapes in Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban.

Is ITV about to kill off Lord Grantham's dog... because it goes by the unfortunate name of Isis?

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2808389/Is-ITV-kill-Lord-Grantham-s-dog-goes-unfortunate-Isis.html

Naming Downton Abbey's beloved Labrador after the goddess Isis seemed like a good idea at the time.

But there are claims the pet could be on her way out - after she was dogged by comparisons to the brutal wave of Islamist violence of the same name.

Tonight's episode raises questions for the first time over Isis' health as she approaches a grand old age of between eight and ten, or 56 to 70 in dog years.

Cora Crawley, the Countess of Grantham, is seen looking at a morose-looking pet splayed on the ground and remarks: 'She's terribly listless. I don't know that she hasn't picked up a germ.'

Lady Mary Crawley adds: 'She'll have eaten a dead squirrel or something equally foul'.

Hugh Bonneville's Robert Crawley, the Earl of Grantham, then chimes in and says he will have the pet looked at by a vet.

To most it would seem like an innocuous point of conversation. Critics and devoted fans, of course, know the ITV drama's writers seldom raise a topic for no reason.

Isis made her first appearance in the period drama in its second series in 2011, replacing

the Earl's previous pet Pharaoh.

As the first series tailed off in 1914 and the second began in 1916, Isis - now appearing in 1924 - is likely to be between eight and ten

"Two things are infinite. The universe and human stupidy.

...and i'm not so sure about the universe."

years old, hardly immune to the ills of old age.

==The yellow Labrador was named after the Egyptian goddess Isis, whose name means 'throne' and became one of the most important deities of ancient Egypt.==

==But the name prompted grim comparisons after the rise of militants branding themselves Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - also known as IS and ISIL.==

One Downton fan account, Lady Mary's Eyebrows, tweeted: 'Is there a TV dog more unfortunately named than Downton's ISIS?'

Jasper Goodheart said: 'You're gonna have to somehow change the name of the dog, Downton . Not sure Isis is currently a world favorite.'

Daily Mail feature writer Guy Adams chimed in: 'I fear that recent events in the Middle East have rendered the name of Lord Grantham's dog ISIS deeply inappropriate.'

ITV has insisted the whole issue is a coincidence, adding that most of the current series was filmed before fans began pointing out the similarity in names. The broadcaster does not comment on future plot twists, but a spokesman said: 'Isis has been the Crawley's family pet since Series 2 (2011) and was named after the Egyptian Goddess.

'Series 1 saw the family pet Pharaoh, with the same themed name.

'At the time the dog was named and up to and including the majority of filming of Series 5, no-one was using that acronym to describe a terror group. It is an unfortunate coincidence.'

Many things other than the dog are named after the Egyptian goddess - including a U.S. metal band, a range of Ann Summers underwear, Oxford's student magazine and the International Student Internship Scheme.

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◄ **Editor's Comment...**

Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors

By Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger, and Polina Beliakova
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/374/html

When does an organization merit the name "terrorist group"? The answer might seem obvious at first: terrorist groups are groups that carry out acts of terrorism. What, however, if that group specializes in forms of political violence other than terrorism and uses terrorism only sporadically? This question has implications beyond theory and seems to apply to an ever growing number of terrorist groups. In the summer of 2014 in the Middle East alone, at least three prominent groups commonly classified as terrorist organizations have been engaged in significant combat operations that posed challenges to their enemies far exceeding the capabilities traditionally ascribed to these types of actors. The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, or ISIS) has been able to extend its stronghold in Iraq and create an imposing presence over large swaths of territory in both Syria and Iraq, while threatening other neighboring countries such as Jordan. The Lebanese Hizballah, dubbed by some analysts as "among the most skilled light infantry on the planet," [1] continues to amass significant battlefield experience through its ongoing involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. Finally, in the Gaza Strip, the militant Islamist group Hamas, which since 2006 is the elected governing party in that territory, has posed formidable challenges to Israeli military forces and civilians using a combination of insurgent tactics.

These trends have applied to other geographic areas and even to the movement perhaps most widely acknowledged as a "terrorist group." As a recent article by jihadism scholar J.M. Berger argued, even Al Qaeda, broadly defined, conducts terrorism only "on the side." Its primary focus at present is to fight wars and insurgencies.[2]

The above mentioned trends beg a series of questions. To earn the "terrorist" label, do groups have to rely exclusively on terrorist tactics? Might they use a variety of tactics as long as terrorism is the dominant form of violence? What if a group uses terrorism only rarely, when compared to other forms of political violence? Does the "terrorist" label then continue to have merit? If so, when and how should that label be employed? If not, what terms and concepts may be used that more accurately portray the nature of these groups' activities?

The aim of this article is twofold. The first is to provide empirical evidence—based on data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland (GTD)—showing that nearly all terrorist groups listed in the GTD database use classic acts of terrorism only part of the time. According to the GTD, between 2002 and 2012 only a single outfit—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—limited its attacks to civilian targets, rendering that group a "terrorist group" in the strictest sense of the word.[3] All other groups aimed their attacks not only at civilians but also at government, police, and military targets—a modus operandi generally associated with guerrilla tactics.[4]

Our second aim is to then reflect on the merits of using the term "terrorist group." Our finding that acts of terrorism constitute only a portion of these groups' overall activities suggests that the common usage of the term "terrorist groups" to describe these actors is, technically speaking, only partially accurate. Such imprecise labeling could even lead to counterproductive policy choices if, by fixating on only one activity in these actors' repertoire, counterterrorism scholars and practitioners de-emphasize or ignore other critical activities of these groups.

While other labels, especially the concept of "insurgent group," offer a technically more accurate description of these groups' activities, this article stops short of calling for the abandonment of the term terrorist groups, for three reasons. First, the authors accept the notion that, once a militant group decides to engage in indiscriminate violence against civilians for political ends, it crosses a certain moral threshold that sets it apart from other groups.[5] **Secondly**, "naming and shaming" such groups for their brutal and indiscriminate acts of violence can serve the important goal of undermining their ability to obtain popular support. **Third**, the use of the terrorism moniker to describe these groups can abet the curtailing of financial and material support they receive, and therefore help undermine their capacity to inflict harm.

That said, we believe that concepts drawn from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and from the study of civil wars, can make significant contributions to the scholarly analysis of terrorism and the groups that utilize this tactic.[6] Closer correspondence and cross-fertilization between terrorism studies, the study of insurgency and counter-insurgency, as well as the literature on civil wars can offer a more lucid and dispassionate conceptualization of these groups; of the full range of their activities; and of the broader context in which they tend to operate. Such an approach, in turn, can improve policies to address the threat posed by these violent non-state actors.

The remainder of this article begins with a review of the existing literature on the relationship between **terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency.** We then provide some empirical analysis in support of our claim that the label of "terrorist group" lacks technical accuracy. Next, we discuss the potential harm to policy-making that can result from using the terrorism label as the sole frame of reference to understand the nature of these groups. We conclude that despite the technical inaccuracy of the "terrorist group" label, governments should continue to use the term in their policy pronouncements due to the moral and legal implications that have become associated with this label. At the same time, as far as the policy analysis informing these pronouncements is concerned, we argue that it is imperative that policy analysts adopt a more nuanced approach in framing this problem set. Adopting concepts and practices from insurgency and counterinsurgency theory—including the term insurgent group as the framework of analysis—serves this goal. Such an approach can help policy analysts adopt and employ a broader array of intellectual tools to understand the complex nature of the threat posed by such groups, and arrive at more adequate, comprehensive, and longer-term solutions to this problem.

The Connectivity between Terrorism, Guerrilla, and Insurgency
The extant scholarship on the definition of terrorism suggests that terrorism is a phenomenon that is distinct from other types of political violence. The distinguishing features include such elements as the targeting of unarmed civilians, the use of extra-normal violence, the desire by the terrorists to instill fear in the target population, or the intent to influence a broader audience beyond the immediate victims of the terrorist attack. [7] Problematically, however, none of these attributions appear to be sufficient for the production of a consistent and clear definition of terrorist groups.

In order to approximate a more precise label, it is necessary first to acknowledge that on the ground, terrorism is usually entrenched in the broader context of violent political conflict. Consequently, a contextualized framework for understanding terrorism is likely to provide a more comprehensive theoretical perspective of the issue and could contribute to more effective policy design.

In particular, discussing the interrelationship between terrorism and insurgency can provide a more detailed picture of actors who utilize different forms of political violence, including terrorism. Common definitions of insurgency describe it as a struggle between a non-ruling group and a ruling government or authority, where the former uses a combination of political and military means to challenge governmental power and legitimacy, while striving to obtain or maintain control over a particular area.[8] Terrorism is usually mentioned as one of the tactics of insurgency, together with propaganda, demonstrations, political mobilization of constituencies, subversion, insurrection, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.[9]

As far as definitions of the actor (terrorist groups/organizations vs. insurgents), as opposed to the action (terrorism vs. insurgency), are concerned, attempts to draw distinctions are generally made on the basis of the following features: Insurgents are usually described as using mixed violent/nonviolent methods; seeking high levels of popular support; enjoying a broader supply of manpower and often a richer resource base; and being capable of controlling territory, among other characteristics. Terrorist groups, in contrast, are said to function in a conspiratorial fashion. They tend to be smaller in size and to employ uncompromising violence. Conventional wisdom holds that the secret nature and small size of terrorist organizations generally prevents them from holding territory, while their focus on extreme violence prevents them from enjoying much popular support.[10] Bruce Hoffman, a leading authority in the field, thus states that terrorists "do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat, are constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and exercise no direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or the national level."[11]

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Complicating this discussion is the fact that there is no consensus as to which of the various features that characterize either insurgent or terrorist groups prevails. Consequently, a group can simultaneously be categorized as a terrorist group based, for example, on the scale of violence it uses, and as an insurgent group based, for instance, on its ability to capture and hold territory.

Furthermore, some scholars argue that the qualitative differences between terrorist and insurgent actors may be due to uneven access to resources, as opposed to differences by design. Daniel Byman thus argues that the majority of the groups that do not hold territory and lack popular support, yet use terrorism as a tactic, can still be considered proto-insurgencies. These groups, Byman believes, are simply unable to attain the other features of insurgency due to numerical inferiority or lack of resources.[12] Along similar lines, Steven Metz states that "pure" terrorist movements are those that are simply incapable of exploiting the complete strategy of insurgency, so they have to resort to terrorism as a tactic in order to attract attention and galvanize potential supporters.[13]

We may infer from the analysis above that the quest for a comprehensive, thorough, and accurate label for groups utilizing terrorism—one that appreciates its multidimensional nature—requires considerations of the complex realities on the ground. A look at the Al Qaeda network exemplifies this complexity because Al Qaeda—the entity probably most widely regarded as a "terrorist group"—increasingly employs a variety of tactics, terrorist or otherwise. In a widely circulated essay published in February 2014 in *Foreign Policy*, jihadism scholar J.M. Berger argued that the present Al Qaeda movement conducts activities that go beyond acts of terrorism. The current Al Qaeda movement, Berger argued, is more akin to a "wide-ranging fighting movement" involved in numerous insurgencies. To that end, it raises funds while mobilizing local, regional, and foreign fighters in a variety of theaters. To be sure, the movement continues to carry out horrific acts of terrorism, but that effort is "secondary in al-Qa`ida's portfolio." Although terrorism made Al Qaeda what it is today, and continues to matter, "it is no longer the main line of business".[14]

Berger's point is well taken. From Africa across the Middle East and all the way to South Asia, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are busy fighting local regimes. Without a doubt, their self-described jihad features classic terrorist activities—acts of extra-normal violence against civilians or noncombatants in the service of political ends, designed to create fear and thereby influence a broader audience.[15]

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"Terrorist groups," however, regularly carry out guerrilla operations as well. Guerrilla attacks typically emphasize extended campaigns of assassination, sabotage, and hit-and-run attacks carried out by small and highly mobile paramilitary units. Like the tactics of terrorism, guerrilla warfare is described in the literature as a "weapon of the weak" designed to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will. Yet where terrorism is in essence an act of psychological warfare used in the hope of turning the targeted population against its own government, guerrilla operations primarily target their enemy's capabilities.[16] Functioning as "small armies," potent guerrilla forces are large and strong enough to seize and hold territory. Moreover, guerrilla tactics differ from terrorist tactics in terms of its main targets. While the prime targets of guerrilla fighters are the enemy's armed forces, police, or support units, as well as general government and economic targets, the targets of terrorist groups are usually understood to be civilians and, at most, noncombatants.[17] As Alex Schmid notes in his magisterial *Handbook of Terrorism Research*, "in the dominant understanding among experts, the victims [of terrorism] are predominantly not members of an armed force."[18]

Whereas terrorist groups have traditionally been considered as distinct from guerrilla organizations, many contemporary militant groups apply both terrorist and guerrilla tactics. As Robert Scales and Douglas Ollivant argue, a growing array of Islamist "terrorists" have turned into "skilled soldiers" who increasingly use a blend of traditional terrorist tactics and modern war-fighting techniques.[19] Contemporary militants continue to use terrorist tactics to intimidate potential supporters and enemies alike, but their modus operandi has evolved into skills that can pose considerable challenges to states and their populations. They now "maneuver in reasonably disciplined formations… and employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages." They rely on ambushes, roadside bombings, sniper fire, and other tactics that in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan have imposed considerable challenges and losses to U.S. forces. Groups such as the Islamic State, Hizballah, and Hamas are able to handle second generation weapons such as Russian RPG-29 and possibly wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and build sophisticated underground tunnel systems.[20]

The above trends, which are highlighted by knowledgeable observers, indicate that in recent years a growing number of actors traditionally labeled "terrorist groups" are

increasingly relying on a combination of tactics that fall squarely within the predominant understanding of both terrorism and guerrilla tactics.[21] In fact, these groups employ both tactics concurrently, sometimes on the same day.[22] The inescapable conclusion is that for a growing number of such militant groups, the terrorist and guerrilla labels apply equally well; these groups are terrorist and guerrilla actors at one and the same time.

The Targets of "Terrorist" Groups: An Empirical Analysis

In order to examine the extent to which the combined use of terrorist and guerrilla tactics applies to a broader array of contemporary "terrorist groups," the authors conducted an empirical analysis. To that end, we examined one criterion by which to measure the growing crossover of terrorism and guerrilla tactics, namely the choice of targets. Specifically, our analysis examined the targeting choices of groups defined as "terrorist groups" by the Global Terrorism Database of START at the University of Maryland, one of the most extensive and widely employed databases available for the subject under consideration here. The authors examined all groups in the period between 2002 and 2012 that carried out at least six attacks—the minimum required to render the statistical analysis meaningful.[23] 2012 is the last year for which GTD data were available at the time of this writing, and we examined a period of more than ten years because a shorter period would have significantly lowered the number of groups that would have reached the set minimum of 6 attacks. Furthermore, focusing on this time period allows for the analysis of contemporary militant actors, thereby rendering our study more policy relevant. These scope parameters left us with 119 groups to analyze. For each group, we recorded the total number of attacks during that period and examined the distribution of target types, with a focus on attacks against civilians, general and diplomatic government targets, military targets, and attacks against the police.[24] We expected a sizeable portion of the targets of these organizations to be military, government, or police targets—a finding that would lend credence to our hypothesis that terrorist groups use a variety of tactics.

As the following analysis shows, the data strongly suggest that groups labeled terrorist indeed use a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, due to conceptual inconclusiveness on the one hand, and limitations inherent in the data on the other hand, our empirical analysis is of suggestive nature only. The first problem is conceptual: attacks against government and police targets can be plausibly regarded as either terrorist or guerrilla attacks. The second problem relates to issues inherent in the coding of GTD data.

12

Chart # 1: Average Distribution by Target type, All (Source: GTD)

Problematically, the GTD's definition of military targets includes attacks against both combatant and non-combatant military targets, with no possibility of ascertaining whether the military target was struck in a combatant or non-combatant context. Theoretically, therefore, if all military targets hit by a particular organization would be non-combatant targets, our assumption would lack empirical support. In our opinion, however, it is unreasonable to believe that all attacks against military targets carried out by the organizations included in this analysis were attacks against military forces in non-combatant situations. Most importantly, our aim in this article is relatively modest: to cast reasonable doubt on the claim that terrorist groups carry out terrorist attacks only. Hence, we believe that the empirical analysis provides qualified support for this article's claim that terrorism is only a portion—and often a small portion—of these groups' overall activities.[25]

The analysis first focused on data for the universe of groups active in that decade. For these 119 groups, the average percentage of attacks against civilians is 32% (with a median of 28.6%). As Chart 1 shows, on average civilians are the favored target for these groups, but such attacks account for no more than a third of all attacks. A total of 16% of the attacks were aimed at military targets, 15.3% against government targets, and 13.4% against police targets. When combined, those targets generally considered typical for guerrilla operations—such as military, government, and police targets—are targeted in 44.7% of the cases—a significantly higher figure than that for civilians, the classic target of terrorism.

The analysis then focused on the ten most active jihadist groups of that period.[26] As the empirical analysis indicates, these groups do not appear to rely exclusively on terrorism either, and frequently appear to rely predominantly on guerrilla tactics. Still, the majority (6 out of 10) target civilians more than any other category, although only Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) does so in more than half of its attacks. Three of these jihadist groups target military targets more than any other, including civilian targets. For example, 45% of AQAP's attacks were aimed at military targets. The GSPC and AQIM also targeted military targets more than any other targets (33.7% and 32.3%, respectively). On average, these ten groups target civilians 30.2% of the time, military targets 21.5%, government targets 13.3%, and police targets 19.2% of the time. The median for these attacks shows a similar tendency. The median for attacks against civilian targets is 28%, for military 18.1%, for government 12.5% and for police targets 20%. Once again, the empirical evidence gathered for the period under review suggests that while civilian targets are the highest on average, non-civilian targets still comprise in total the most attacks with a combined average of 54.4% of the attacks.

While these figures seem to provide empirical support for Berger's hypotheses vis-à-vis Al Qaeda and its cohorts, the authors of the present article expanded the inquiry to non-jihadist groups as well. Of the 10 most active non-jihadist groups in the examined period [27], the authors surprisingly found that they targeted civilians more often, on average, than jihadist groups. Two of the groups, the LRA and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, do so in more than 50% of their attacks (83.6% and 56.7%, respectively). Two of these groups targeted military targets more than any other targets (New People's Army with 24.6% and the PKK with 33.1%) and one group favored police targets more than any other target (ETA, with 19.6%).

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10 most active Jihadi Groups, 2002-2012

■ Target Type

|			
30.17	21.45	13.24	19.70
Civilians	Military	Government (General)	Police

Chart # 2: Average Distribution by Target Type, Jihadi (Source: GTD)

On average, the combined attacks of all groups in this category targeted civilians 38%, military targets 14.2%, government targets 9.8%, and police targets 13.6% of the time.[28] As the data show, non-jihadist movements actually target civilians more than all the other targets combined, with 38% targeting civilians compared to a combined average of 37.7% of all the other targets studied. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in this case, civilians are

still targeted less than 50% of the time and that these groups employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics almost evenly.

10 Most Active Non-Jihadi Groups, 2002-2012

■ Target Type

|			
38.04	14.21	9.84	13.63
Civilians	Military	Government (General)	Police

Chart # 3: Average Distribution by Target Type, non-jihadi (Source: GTD)

In conclusion, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that if terrorist attacks are defined as attacks against civilian targets only, the common labeling of these groups as "terrorist groups" is, strictly speaking, only partially accurate. If that is the case, however, what explains the prominence and perseverance of a label that refers to only a portion of a given group's activity?

The widespread use of the "terrorist group" label is likely due to a combination of psychological and instrumental factors. Psychologically, the use of this label provides a certain degree of emotional satisfaction to societies targeted by terrorism. Terrorism evokes repugnance and fear, thereby stoking an unequivocal rejection of terrorism's means and agents alike.[29] Populations have been trained to reject compromise with terrorists, and want to believe that terrorists are unique in their "evilness," therefore deserving a category of their own. This explains not only why governments and societies targeted by political violence cling to the terrorism label, but also why they often fail to view "terrorism" as part of a broader violent conflict.

Instrumentally, a strong case can be made that "naming and shaming" groups that rely on the most brutal acts of violence can serve a number of goals designed to weaken these actors. Such labels can assist efforts of building an international coalition designed to oppose these groups through legal, political, economic, or militarily efforts. Moreover, repeated emphasis of the most unacceptably violent behavior of such groups can arguably serve the goal of curtailing public support for these groups among their potential constituents. For the purpose of policy pronouncements, therefore, the terrorism label has certain advantages. Despite this value, we argue that policy analysis—including those that directly affect policy formulation and strategic messaging—must adopt a more complex view that better accounts for the evolving nature of terrorist groups and their complex interaction with other tactics and modes of warfare, as well as their interaction with broader conflicts such as insurgency and civil wars.

"Insurgent Groups": The Least Inaccurate Framework for Analysis

The trends emerging out of our data analysis confirm not only our own intuition, but also that of a growing number of other scholars that have begun to appreciate that terrorism is not a sui generis phenomenon. Scholars of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars increasingly recognize not only that terrorism is a tactic frequently used in conjunction with other tactics, but that these violent tactics are employed as part of a broader spectrum of political activities. Boaz Ganor and Eitan Azani, for example, have developed useful models of "hybrid terrorist organizations" that describe the fact that groups such as Lebanese Hizballah or Hamas engage in terrorism and politics concurrently.[30] Cognizant of the challenges in differentiating between terrorist, insurgent, and rebel groups, scholars in the broader field of conflict studies have adopted alternative terms such as "violent non-state actors" or "armed groups."[31]

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We argue that an existing concept, that of the insurgent group, is most useful in describing the predominant contextual realities of terrorism.[32] The concept accounts for the generally observable interplay between violent and nonviolent (i.e., political) means of struggle; for these groups' reliance on either single or multiple tactics; and for the fact that terrorism most often emerges in the context of a broader armed conflict such as civil wars.

The U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual offers a definition of insurgency that synthesizes the dominant view among insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN) theorists. It describes insurgency as "an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control."[33] Subversion and armed conflict—the interplay of political and violent means—are the two main ways in which insurgents seek to attain their goals. The concept of insurgency can help overcome the conceptual difficulties regarding the proper labeling of many contemporary militant groups because theorists of insurgency have long argued that insurgents typically rely on several modes of warfare at once. Although theoretically these modes of warfare do not have to include acts of terrorism - insurgents can rely, for example, on a combination of conventional and guerrilla tactics - they almost always do. Ariel Merari, for instance, observed that "whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes."[34]

Viewing terrorist groups as insurgent groups should not be seen as an attempt to play down the fact that these groups frequently commit acts of indiscriminate violence. Yet it does help place these acts in a broader context of a more complex reality. Based on this understanding, even the most violent groups using the most despicable tactics are likely to spend some or most of their time and energy doing something other than killing civilians—fighting regular troops and government forces and subverting their enemies by means of propaganda and other political means.

Of course, as the late terrorism scholar Paul Wilkinson noted, "it is possible to engage in acts of terrorism without mounting a full-scale insurgency."[35] Self-standing campaigns of terrorism detached from broader conflicts, however, are becoming increasingly rare, and have always been the exception. According to Wilkinson, historically, acts of terrorism have been used as "part of a wider repertoire of struggle."[36] Recent research on the interplay between terrorism and civil wars—the dominant type of warfare since World War II—confirms the ongoing relevance of Wilkinson's assessment. According to data assembled and analyzed by Michael Findley and Joseph K. Young, most incidents of terrorism "take place in the geographic regions where civil war is occurring and during the ongoing war."[37]

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Implications for Theory and Policy

Analyzing the militant actors described above as insurgents while continuing to publicly refer to them as "terrorist groups" will allow governments to enjoy the benefits associated with the use of the terror label while significantly reducing the possible costs of this approach by avoiding some of the blind spots and pitfalls that often accompany the use of the terrorism moniker.

Considering violent, politically motivated groups that commit acts of terrorism within a broader framework of insurgency provides a more comprehensive perspective for the analysis of the goals, the means, and the context of the violent political struggle waged by these groups, with important implications for countering these actors.

Employing the "insurgency" lens, analysts can gain a better appreciation of the goals that the group is trying to attain by carrying out terrorist attacks, but also of the broader political objectives pursued by the group using alternate means. This approach will place terror attacks within the broader strategic framework of insurgency and can help avoid confusion between means (use of uncompromised violence to cause high level of destruction and human casualties) and ends (e.g., challenging governmental authority). In other words, the adoption of "insurgent groups" as an analytical framework can improve a government's ability to recognize that these groups use terrorism as a means to actively try to engage governments in a competition aimed at the redistribution of power.[38]

Adopting the concept of insurgency also sharpens the analysis of the means of struggle in an additional way: It provides an opportunity to analyze the insurgent group in its early developmental stage, and to trace the process by which it adopts particular violent tactics of struggle, including terrorism. Moreover, considering terrorism as one of several possible

tactics that insurgent groups can adopt can help governments to reach conclusions regarding the conditions that lead militant groups to choose certain tactics over others.

In terms of context, counterinsurgency studies can shed some light on the influence of political, economic and social conditions on the emergence and development of politically motivated groups that adopt insurgency as a strategy, and terrorism as a tactic to reach their goals. Specifically, embracing the "insurgent group" concept emphasizes that governments and violent, politically motivated non-state actors are engaged in dynamic relationships in the course of which governmental actions influence the patterns of the opponent's political behavior—including his selection of tactics.[39]

Finally, considering the use of terrorism in the context of insurgency provides a clearer picture by considering the role of other relevant actors that may have an influence on the conflict dynamics, including the local civilian population, armed gangs, oligarchs, clerics, and educational institutions, among others.[40]

Policy Implications

Adopting the framework of "insurgent groups" can shift the analytical focus away from an enemy-centric approach and towards a condition-centric approach. Such a shift is likely to have a tangible impact on policy making by expanding the scope of policy efforts; changing policymakers' assessments of threats and opportunities; and granting more flexibility to governments in following a course of action. These three aspects will be discussed in turn.

On the issue of policy interest, as Metz has argued, American strategic culture has traditionally adopted an enemy-centric orientation. This approach implies that the conflict is caused by malicious challengers, and can be resolved by destroying the adversary's military capabilities and eroding his will to fight. This focus, Metz believes, has substantially complicated all policy aspects regarding counterinsurgency. In particular, the enemy-centric approach has limited the U.S. security community's ability to gauge the threat in a systematic way and to go beyond the perception that the conflict is induced by "evil people,"[41] and not by a broader set of conditions. That view implies that the physical defeat of the enemy is a main goal of operations, while political, social, and cultural aspects of insurgency are placed lower on the list of priorities.

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In this respect, considering terrorism within the contextual framework of insurgency can help foresee complications and foster the formulation of governmental strategies in accordance with the complex nature of violent challengers. In particular, seeing terror as a tactic used as part of a broader insurgency requires resources to be allocated to population-centric activities aimed at separating the civilian population from the insurgent group and its infrastructure. This approach will aid the goal of undermining the recruitment networks and reducing the likelihood of new terrorist and other violent attacks.[42]

By conceiving of its opponents as insurgent groups, governments can also widen the scope of their policy efforts. Besides aiming at the tactical defeat of the adversary using military means, the insurgency framework highlights the necessity of simultaneously focusing on reestablishing governmental credibility and gaining popular support in problematic areas. In this regard, addressing the social grievances upon which the insurgents' political agenda is based should move to the top of the policy agenda.[43] In other words, a strong case can be made that counterterrorism efforts should be subordinated to classical COIN concerns of winning the hearts and minds of the local civilians, while marginalizing the violent elements.

As far as the discussion of threats and opportunities is concerned, we argue that considering the rival as an insurgent group can uncover certain threats and opportunities that governments focusing primarily on combating terrorism might otherwise overlook. While terrorism is primarily perceived as a security threat, the threats posed by insurgencies are usually assessed more broadly. Well-organized and sustained insurgencies are considered to pose not only tactical security challenges, but broader strategic challenges such as attempts to undermine governmental legitimacy, power, and authority. Adopting the insurgency framework of analysis will lead policy analysts to better assess the potential strategic challenges posed by these groups, and therefore place certain groups - for example, those seeking to establish an alternative authority in particular areas - more prominently in governmental threat assessments.

Even in cases when the establishment of an actual alternative authority is not a major concern of the insurgents, popular support and mobilization may have significant ramifications for the government's legitimacy and ability to enforce security.[44] By

ignoring this strategic aspect of competition, governments risk finding themselves waging an exhausting struggle to address more urgent, immediate threats, while losing focus on the political developments of their adversaries. At worst, the insurgents may not only control certain territories, but also gain broader public support for their cause in the local and international arena, and successfully delegitimize governmental counterterrorism efforts.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the evolution of Palestinian militant groups into politico-military actors highlight the costs of governmental neglect of the non-kinetic aspects of these groups' activities. Thus, while Israel's focus on battling urgent security threats in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the subsequent years resulted in a number of tactically successful military engagements, Israel failed to properly trace and manage the political deployment of Palestinian insurgent groups.[45]

In terms of opportunities, regarding an opponent as an insurgent group may broaden the range of governmental means of political influence over the challenger and his support base. Such strategies may include the delegitimization of the opponent's political cause (as opposed to the mere neutralization of the tactical military threat he poses); undermining the channels of legal and financial support to the insurgent; disruption of the enemy's educational networks; or the prevention of insurgent alliance formation with third parties. Alternatively, regarding the other side as an insurgency also provides opportunities for negotiating with moderate members of the group, including applying reassurance strategies for those who are willing to cooperate, and dealing with the provision of goods and services to the local population.[46] In addition, viewing the nature of the terrorist threat through the perspective of "insurgent groups" may help to foresee the possible impact of governmental actions on the nature of politically motivated violence adopted by insurgent groups—and thereby may help to avoid possible counterproductive policies from being enacted. Conceptualizing these groups as terrorist groups, in contrast, is likely to limit the perception of threats and opportunities to "hard security" domains.

Lastly, the increasingly complex nature of the adversary requires a more comprehensive and tailored policy toolkit on the part of governments. Viewing the terrorist threat as one emanating from "terrorist groups" can limit governmental actions to law-enforcement and military efforts. Adopting the "insurgent group" concept for the purpose of analysis, in contrast, broadens governments' flexibility in dealing with these challenges.[47] Such policies can be better used to address broader, but arguably no less important challenges, such as cutting popular support for these groups, reducing calls for revenge among the constituencies, decreasing the salience of the insurgents' political agenda, and ultimately hampering these groups' recruitment and fundraising capabilities.[48] Conceiving of these groups as insurgencies, in other words, can prevent governments from playing into these groups' hands by responding to their attempts of provocation with an overreaction that will ultimately backfire on the government.[49] In addition, conceiving of the enemy as an "insurgent group" will allow governments to apply carefully adjusted strategies to each type of primary and secondary conflict actor in order to reach a long-term sustainable solution.

It is also important to note that seeing terrorism as an insurgency-related phenomenon will require governments to adjust their counterterrorism policies to better handle the cultural peculiarities of insurgencies. For instance, the analysis of religious, ethnic and cultural underpinnings of insurgency may be crucial for formulating efficient policy options vis-à-vis global insurgencies in order to prevent terror attacks by applying deterrence, assurance or de-legitimization strategies.

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Conclusion

In sum, the official use by governments of the "terrorist group" label to describe groups adopting terrorism as a tactic continues to be an important element in the struggle against terrorism. It can help delegitimize the use of terrorist violence; reduce public support; and undercut financial and material support for terrorist entities.

At the same time, the use of this label must not obscure a far more nuanced reality that acknowledges a number of important caveats: **First**, terrorist groups use, almost without exception, terrorism in conjunction with other tactics, notably guerrilla warfare. **Second**, terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated political actors, with some attempting to provide basic services to the population in an attempt to win over hearts and minds. **Third**, terrorism is rarely a self-standing phenomenon. Instead, most terrorism occurs in the context of broader armed conflict, typically an insurgency and/or a civil war.

We argue that governments should strive to preserve the benefits of applying the terrorism label while avoiding the label's potential entrapments. Perhaps the most dangerous potential pitfall is for governments to fall victim to their own rhetoric. At worst, such a rhetorical entrapment can lead governments to focus on policies designed to address only the specific threat of terrorism posed by these groups. As the above discussion has shown, however, the dangers emanating from these actors are far more variegated. **A government policy that not only** *labels*, **but whose policy analysts also** *examine* **these actors through the narrow lens of "terrorist groups" loses sight of the overall challenges posed by these groups, thereby failing to enact the most adequate policy responses**. For that reason, we argue for an approach that separates the way in which these militant actors are referred to in official statements from the way in which they are examined by specialists and analysts - including those directly informing the government. Official policy statements, we believe, should continue to label actors involved in terrorism as terrorist groups. At the same time, policy analysis informing the government's policy pronouncements and decisions should adopt greater nuance when examining and conceptualizing these militant groups. We believe that in most cases, these groups are best understood as insurgent groups, and hence propose this label for analytical purposes as the most nuanced framework.

The analytical employment of the "insurgent group" concept can contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding of the power distribution challenge that insurgent groups pose to governments by using terror. In addition, the suggested label can be useful in explaining the adoption of both violent (including terrorism) and nonviolent means of political struggle, based on the present political, economic and social conditions on the ground. Furthermore, utilization of the label "insurgent groups" allows for a more comprehensive perspective on the dynamic relations between politically motivated violent actors that use terrorism as a tactic, governments, and other relevant actors. Finally, in terms of policy, the use of the suggested framework will provide a broader perspective of the insurgents' political development, a better grasp of its network of contacts and supporters, and it may also grant considerable flexibility to policy decision-making.

Theoretically, our conclusions also call for **closer intellectual interactions between the terrorism and insurgency studies fields, as well as the study of civil wars.** Closer correspondence between these related fields can help shed more light onto the political aspects of the campaigns in which terrorism occurs. There are already a number of promising examples of fruitful interdisciplinary efforts, such as the increasing prominence of "conflict studies" as a field that combines scholarship from the civil wars, social movement, insurgency, terrorism, and other related sub-disciplines; research centers dedicated to international security issues that offer fellowships to conflict scholars from a range of disciplines; or journals such as *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* or *Terrorism and Political Violence* that encourage submissions from terrorism, insurgency, and civil war scholars alike. These efforts are commendable, but disciplinary insularity is still the prevailing norm. Future steps towards intellectual plurality could include government research grants that encourage cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of international conflicts, or international conferences devoted to the examination of contemporary political violence from multiple disciplinary angles.

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Viewing terrorism as a phenomenon closely related to insurgencies and civil wars will allow analysts to pool the insights and best practices from academic fields that have thus far been treated separately. The study of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars do not only suffer from a disconnect as far as the analysis of their causes are concerned; analyses of how these different phenomena might end are similarly compartmentalized. Insights from the study of the termination of civil wars and insurgencies, for example, are likely to inform future studies of the decline and demise of groups heavily reliant on terrorism, and vice versa.

▶ **Notes are available at source's URL.**

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Polina Beliakova is an M.A. student at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at IDC. Her Master's thesis analyzes governmental deterrence and reassurance strategies for the prevention of political violence by non-state actors in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

## The IS-Caliphate: What Should Be Done to Prevent it from Spinning out of Control?

By Philipp Holtmann
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/384/html

Last year in an Op-Ed in *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Vol. 7, No. 3, 2013) I suggested three possible future scenarios for the Syrian civil war. The worst scenario depicted the emergence of a "Jihadi Super-region from the Euphrates to the Nile and all along the North African Coast and an Extremely Hot Cold War in the Middle East." The announcement of a

that the Islamic State will implode under the weight of its own contradictions.

At the moment the IS-caliphate is like a large honey-pot for global Jihadists: thousands of them from all five continents have, according to IS, been heeding the call of the new caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In the case of the Islamic State, a policy of

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Caliphate by the Islamic State connecting large parts of Syria and Iraq and the enthusiasm with which it was received by many fellow jihadists in the Muslim world has opened the doors for this worst case. IS envisions a Jihadi empire whose ambitions are ultimately global: not only Middle Eastern borders, but all other states and ideologies, are to be crushed in its vision. The West and the rest of the world cannot stand idly by and watch events unfold in the hope

containment rather than one of arming often dubious allies and providing them with air support might turn out to be the best option. If IS is allowed to spread beyond parts of Syria and Iraq, the task of degrading and defeating it will become very costly indeed.

What we have seen so far is that IS has mastered "Blitzkrieg" tactics. Proof for this is the extremely quick rise of IS since

2013. Portraying itself as the saviour of Sunnis from the Syrian and Iraqi regimes and capitalising on the civil war in Syria, IS has catapulted itself to the position of the leading insurgent organisation in the region, despite numbering not more than 20,000 to 30,000 fighters according to one recent US intelligence estimate. Online IS has shown itself to be at least as savvy as on the ground; it has mastered the art of psychological warfare through social media, e.g. under the Twitter-hashtag "AllEyesOnISIS" and the "One Billion Muslim Campaign to Support IS".

IS has sidelined al-Qaeda by being more extreme and more global. It is, as one TV commentator put it: "the son of al-Qaeda on testosterone." The promise to bring back the glory of the Islamic empire has ignited an ideological wildfire that may continue burning, even if a lucky strike by the "Coalition of the Willing" knocks out IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Such a hit – as proven by previous killings of top jihadist leaders—might create a black hole that could be filled by an even more extreme person. Other jihadist factions, among them the Syrian "Islamic Front" and the al-Qaeda allied "al-Nusrah Front," might be joining or might be waiting in order to portray themselves as "moderates" in IS' place. Moreover, as a martyr, al-Baghdadi might enjoy a second life among followers who venerate him and his ideas after his death, turning him into a post-mortem leader with a greater than life charisma. Al-Baghdadi apparently sees himself as a messianic preparer. Some Muslim traditions (ahadith) have it that the establishment of a caliphate in the Levant will be ushering in the return of the Mahdi - according to Islamic prophesy the rightly guided redeemer of Islam, who will return together with Jesus near the end of times. The Mahdi's task is to rid the world of evil, establish Islam on earth (the last caliphate) and prepare for Judgment Day.

Today, the reach of the Islamic State already goes beyond the Euphrates valley. IS exerts a considerable level of ideological-strategic guidance ("virtual leadership") over its followers via the Internet. For example, Algerian terrorists calling themselves "Soldiers of the Caliphate"—former members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—pledged allegiance to IS and claimed to act on orders of "our leader Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi" when they gruesomely murdered their French hostage

Hervé Gourdel. Shortly before, on 21 September 2014, IS-spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had called upon IS cells worldwide to attack Westerners. IS has extended its strategy from fighting the near enemy (the Shiite dominated Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian regimes) to fighting both the near and the far enemies: the "West" and all member states of the "Coalition of the Willing". IS volunteers, inspired by ultra-takfiri [calling enemies apostates] and violent apocalyptic fantasies, are likely to bring their struggle to Europe, possibly trying to recruit susceptible members of Muslim diasporas for their cause.

IS commits unspeakable war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against women; it engages in genocidal policies against religious and ethnic minorities. Yet we have to remember that IS is not the only actor in the Syrian-Iraqi civil war landscape, commiting gross human rights violations and mass atrocities using similar tactics (collective punishment, mass executions, beheadings, torture). The world's reaction to these crimes has been lukewarm and divided so far. Until recently, the U.S. and some other NATO states have been in involved in arms and money transfers by Gulf States to Syrian opposition forces, which contain hardcore jihadist factions, some of them connected to IS. Turkey and some other states in the neighbourhood have even covertly supported IS forerunner "Islamic State in Iraq and the Greater Syria" (ISIS) by buying cheap oil from it and from other jihadist factions which took control of oil fields. Some European oil companies, with the knowledge of European governments and with an eye on Russian energy supply bottlenecks in the coming winter, have also been buying oil through stooges at dumping prices.

A comprehensive strategy for combating IS requires several elements. The oil fields, IS main source of revenue, must be recaptured, and, until then, international companies should be prohibited to buy their crude oil through middlemen. The Assad regime's indifferent slaughter of its own citizens and the Iraqi regime's discrimination of Sunnis have facilitated the large-scale mobilisation and integration of Jihadi fighters into IS-ranks, and both regimes (Assad's and al-Baghdadi's) must be held accountable. A coalition that exerts effective political pressure should include not only pro-

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Western states, but also allies of both Syria and Iraq. A decisive defense plan to safeguard religious and ethnic minorities against IS attacks is urgently needed. Regional actors, such as the Kurdish Peshmerga, should be strengthened without infuriating Turkey, who is afraid of Kurdish separatist aspirations. And finally, a critical task of the West is to communicate with Muslim opinion leaders. 120 Muslim scholars have recently signed an open letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, refuting his theological claims point-by-point. We must remember that hundreds of millions of Muslims do not share IS's ideology. They should be encouraged and enabled to stand up against Jihadi extremists and challenge the so-called "Islamic State". Only through a multi-dimensional counterterrorism strategy – beyond bombing and supplying weapons – will the international community prevent the IS nightmare from spinning out of control.

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The Foreign Fighters' Threat: What History Can (not) Tell Us

By Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/378/html

The New York-based Soufan Group, an international consulting firm, estimated in June 2014 that 12,000 fighters from 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria of which 2,500 originate from Western countries.[1] European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, in September 2014 spoke of no less than 3,000 Europeans who have gone to Syria or Iraq to fight.[2] However, most foreign fighters come from the Middle East and North Africa.

Table 1: Foreign Fighters in Syria from selected countries (as of September 2014) [3]

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Country	Number of foreign fighters
Tunisia	3,000
Saudi Arabia	1,200 – 2,500
Morocco	1,500
Jordan	1,500
Russian Federation	800
France	700
United Kingdom	500
Germany	400
Belgium	300
The Netherlands	120
United States	100

This development has been unprecedented in both its scope and speed. Rallying cries to defend the *ummah* – the Islamic community – have been heard before, with thousands of fighters flocking to Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s and Somalia, Iraq and Yemen in the last decade. Yet Syria has attracted more foreign fighters within a shorter time span.

The ongoing increase in the number of Western foreign fighters going into Syria raises security concerns. Many of these individuals are joining radical jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and lately, the Islamic State (IS, also known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL).[4] Authorities are worried that these fighters will returned radicalized, battle-hardened and determined to launch terrorist attacks in Western countries. Given the high number of fighters, if only a small percentage of those who return would become involved in terrorist activity, it would lead to a handful (if not dozens) of serious terrorist plots in the period ahead.

The recent change in tactics taken by IS, including the beheadings of Western journalists, shows that the organisation understands psychological warfare. These beheadings are full of symbolism (e.g. the Guantanamo Bay-like jumpsuits, Westerners publicly defying their own governments) and they reach very large audiences around the world via social media. It appears to be a text-book example of what Brian Jenkins observed in 1974: 'Terrorists want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead'.[5] Jenkins revised this statement in 2006, saying that '[m]any of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead'.[6] As such, IS has not shied away from mass atrocities either, as exemplified in the killing of prisoners of war.[7]

Given the current situation in Iraq and Syria, there is increased pressure on Western leaders to take forceful measures against foreign fighters. Some suggest stripping foreign fighters of their nationality, imprisoning them upon return or forbidding them to return at all.[8] Such suggestions, in turn, have invited fierce criticism. Richard Barrett, former MI6's Counter-Terrorism chief, noting the debate about presuming British foreign fighters are guilty of involvement in terrorism unless they can prove otherwise, responded that '(t)his fundamental tenet of British justice should not be changed even in a minor way for this unproven threat – and it is an unproven threat at the moment'.[9] However, an attack on a Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014 by a former foreign fighter linked to IS and the statement of David Cameron that IS-linked militants had already attempted six attacks in Europe by September 2014 serve as indicators of the gravity of this threat.[10]

The aim of this Research Note (which is based on the author's Master's thesis) is to provide an assessment of the threat posed by foreign fighters in previous conflicts and relate this to the current threat posed by foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. It must be immediately acknowledged that this is only of limited value when looking at the current situation in Syria and Iraq. Context and dynamics of each conflict are distinct. Nevertheless, when trying to understand current developments, it is helpful to look at similar events in the past. The outcome of this research can certainly not be extrapolated to the current situation in Syria and Iraq but can help to identify certain parameters that are likely to influence outcomes.

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Methodology

Two approaches are used in this Research Note to assess the threat posed by Western foreign fighters in the past. These attempt to answer the following two questions: how many of the former foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity (approach 1) and how many of jihadist-inspired terrorists were former foreign fighters (approach 2)? Three case studies were conducted focusing on foreign fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia. In the results section, problems associated with the quantitative outcomes of such studies will be explained. Regarding the first approach, this Research Note explores the pathways of Western foreign fighters, resulting in a typology based on their post-conflict behaviour.

The second approach looks at the role of former foreign fighters in terrorist plots. It tries to complement the existing works on foreign fighters, especially the works of Thomas Hegghammer, David Malet, Petter Nesser and Aaron Zelin who have studied this issue.[11] Hegghammer's research is most directly related to this research question as he also explored how many foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity in the West. In this Research Note, a different definition and methodology is used to offer another perspective on the threat posed by former foreign fighters in the past.

Before proceeding to the results, a number of elements of the research question must be defined: 'to what extent have Western Muslim foreign fighters been directly involved in jihadist-inspired plots and attacks in Europe between 1979 and April 2013?'. The first element, Western foreign fighters, is defined in accordance to the definition used by David Malet as 'non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts'.[12] In the qualitative part of this study – the three historical case studies – foreign fighters from Europe, the United States and Canada are included.[13] In the second approach that investigates the presence of former foreign fighters in terrorist plots, the plots were limited to Europe. This made it possible to use the list of plots and attacks compiled by Petter Nesser.[14]

Jihadist-inspired terrorism will be defined in accordance with the definition proposed by Edwin Bakker as 'the product of a combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of the jihad (...) in furtherance of the goals of Islam'.[15] Direct involvement in jihadist-inspired plots and attacks excludes passive support such as the financing or mere facilitation of

terrorist attacks. The focus is on those who pulled the trigger or detonated the bombs - in other words, those who posed the highest security risk.

Finally, the time span of 1979 – April 2013 needs further explanation. The year 1979 marks the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, signalling the beginning of one of the largest and best documented mobilisations of foreign fighters in history. It was in many respects the beginning of (Western) Muslim foreign fighting we are still confronted with today. Therefore, this conflict will serve as one of the three historical case studies in part I of this Research Note. The second approach relating to the 'foreign fighter: terrorist ratio' covers the period 1994 – April 2013, relying on the database compiled by Nesser.

The Two Approaches: Choices and Challenges

The second approach attempts to quantify the presence of Western Muslim foreign fighters in terrorist activity in the West. This has been done carefully by Thomas Hegghammer; he concluded that 1 out of 4 terrorists was a (former) foreign fighter. His research is extremely valuable as it is one of the rare attempts to collect empirical data on foreign fighters in the past. This Research Note, however, uses a somewhat different method of measuring this threat as will be outlined below.

One of the main problems with existing research on foreign fighters is the lack of conceptual clarity: what exactly is a foreign fighter? When do we call someone a foreign fighter and when do we call him a terrorist? Foreign fighting is just one form of militant Islamist action, which can take many forms and shapes. However, Muslim foreign fighting is often described by pundits and scholars as directly related to (jihadist-inspired) terrorism. This runs the risk of overlooking some of the complexities and differences between these two concepts. This conflation of foreign fighting and jihadist-inspired terrorism has been criticised by, amongst others, Barak Mendelsohn. In his article 'Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends' he remarks that '[u]sually the discussion of the significance of the foreign fighter problem also suffers from a tendency to bracket all foreign volunteers together'.[16] He continues by saying that a foreign fighter is someone 'fighting in a local conflict that is not his own country's war' while a foreign *trained* fighter is 'a local who goes to another area, receives training only, and comes back to carry out attacks elsewhere, normally in his own country'.[17]

The distinction applied by Mendelsohn can be difficult to maintain, especially with regard to the 'AfPak-region', where (former) Al Qaeda training camps such as Khaldan, al-Farooq or Derunta transformed from sustaining the insurgency against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s to real 'terrorist training camps' once Al Qaeda was established. Despite these difficulties, it is useful to put 'foreign activity' cases into one of the two categories. Individuals who merely go to terrorist training camps but do not partake in civil conflicts are categorised as 'foreign trainees'.

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A second choice made in this Research Note that differs from previous research is the inclusion of a definition of the term 'Western'. This Research Note tries to provide an answer to the question to what extent former *Western* foreign fighters are involved in terrorist activity. To answer this, it is important to distinguish Western fighters from non-Western foreign fighters. The scenario of an Algerian or Moroccan foreign fighter who eventually decides to travel to a Western country to be involved in a terrorist attack is different from that of a British, Dutch or French Muslim leaving to fight and then coming back to launch an attack.

The criteria that are used in this Research Note are as follows: a) being a citizen of a Western country by birth, b) having moved to a Western country before the age of fifteen, or c) having lived for at least ten years in a Western country prior to any terrorist activity. It must be immediately acknowledged that one can disagree with these criteria and that the empirical data for making such distinctions are uneven and often poor.[18] However, it is important to distinguish between the threat coming from 'within' and the so-called 'imported' threat. This is a first (and far from perfect) attempt to do so.

Thus, with these two modifications to existing methodologies – a distinction between fighting and training and the criteria qualifying 'Western' – a new database was built. This database consists of the 'Category 1' incidents included in Petter Nesser's database: incidents where 'the existence of hard evidence that a terrorist attack was planned, prepared, or launched; that an attack struck a specific target or that a target or a type of target had been identified by terrorists; and finally, that clearly identifiable jihadis were behind the planning and the attacks'.[19] The result is a new database consisting of 26 plots with 123 individuals involved.[20] This is admittedly a small database but it is hoped that it can serve as a representative sample of all (major) jihadist plots in Europe due to the inclusion of all 'Category 1' incidents.

The Results

As explained in the previous section, the first approach consisted of three historical case studies because there is a significant gap in empirical data, a gap which impedes us from quantifying the overall presence of terrorists in the foreign fighter population. There is no clear picture of how many individuals became foreign fighters in the first place. William Rosenau and Sara Daly observe that probably hundreds, if not thousands of American Muslims fought in conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s but that subject has not been properly studied.[21]

This gap in knowledge is reflected in the estimates given by authors, ranging from hundreds to thousands. One scholar who tried to address this lack of understanding is investigative journalist John M. Berger. In his book *Jihad Joe: Americans who go to war in the name of Islam*he estimated that at least 1,400 Americans participated in some form of jihad over the last thirty years.[22] For the European situation, it is again Hegghammer who provides some useful estimates of the size of the foreign fighter movements. Regarding the European foreign fighters in the 1990s, Hegghammer provides a conservative estimate of around two hundred individuals.[23] This estimate is based upon different reports that have completely different ranges. One report claims that several hundred Europeans fought while another one puts the number at 2,000 fighters. The total estimate of Western foreign fighters in the years 1990 to 2011 was estimated to amount to 945, according to Hegghammer a very conservative estimate. He used this number to calculate the proportion of foreign fighters involved in terrorist activity in the West. The author found 107 such cases, arriving at the conclusion that there is a 'one-in-nine-radicalization rate that would make foreign fighter experience one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in domestic operations that we know'.[24]

However, there are some reasons to question this. The most important one has been indicated by the author himself as he adds that this must be seen as a maximum rate.[25] This qualification is often overlooked by media, government agencies and scholars, who make this rate seem more 'cast in stone' than the author had probably intended.[26] As this is a conservative estimate, it is based upon continuous rounding down of the subtotals of foreign fighters. The low bar of inclusion for foreign fighters – including foreign trainees and not excluding non-Western foreign fighters – leads to a higher number of foreign fighters, which in turn also raises the radicalization rate. Since it has been estimated that, for instance, between 1,500 and 4,000 Britons have received training in terrorist camps[27], it is difficult to accept the number of 945 as a workable amount of all Europeans who have been trained or who have fought abroad.[28]

Unfortunately, there are not enough open-source based data with more reliable estimates of the total amount of foreign fighters. It can only be speculated that it must be multitudes of the current estimate used. Given this obvious limitation, how then can we get a better understanding of the involvement of foreign fighters in terrorist attacks compared to the overall number of foreign fighters? For this Research Note we looked at three cases, namely Afghanistan (1980s), Bosnia (1990s) and Somalia (2000s). The sample could have admittedly been larger if Chechnya, Iraq or Yemen had also been included. The result is a typology of foreign fighters' post-conflict behaviour. There is no denying that it simplifies the complicated picture of foreign fighters. Nevertheless it provides a framework to structure analysis and to identify knowledge gaps in current research.

Results from Three Case Studies

In this Research Note, there is not enough space to discuss the complete results of these historical case studies. For that readers can turn to a recent ICCT-paper co-authored with Edwin Bakker.[29] One result discussed here is that foreign fighters, based on their post-conflict behaviour, can be divided in five types:

Table 2: Typology of Returned Foreign Fighters

(i) The martyr: a foreign fighter who joins a conflict and is killed on the battlefield. The martyr will pose no further risk to the country of origin unless the martyrdom itself is used as recruiting tool.

(ii) The veteran: an experienced fighter who continues fighting in other theatres of conflict. The veteran sees jihad as a way of life. While the veteran is a risk to people in conflict zones, he is no risk to the country of origin in the West.

(iii) The recruiter: the recruiter is usually a former foreign fighter who returned home to recruit others to fight, often quite successfully because of his "street credibility". However,

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it must be noted that the role of the recruiter has possibly somewhat changed in recent years.[30] Generally speaking, recruiters are not directly involved in terrorist activity but are frequently seen as spiritual guides to future terrorists. They are an indirect risk by constantly 'feeding' the local jihadist community.

(iv) The reintegrated fighter: he is the one-time foreign fighter. After the conflict or his role in it has ended, the reintegrated fighter will return and resume his pre-departure life or will at least not be involved in terrorist activity.[31] Some of these fighters might have been driven by a genuine desire to help the oppressed or might have been motivated by the search for adventure, often without profound knowledge of religion. This fighter might return home disillusioned because the conflict was not what he expected it to be. These fighters are usually no risk to the country of origin. It should be noted the fighter could also integrate in the country he fought in, as happened with some of the Bosnia veterans.

 (v) The terrorist: when he comes into contact with terrorist networks in conflict zones, he becomes convinced that it is not only a priority to fight for the oppressed abroad, but also to target the country of origin. This type of foreign fighter – not infrequently converts to Islam - undergo the most fundamental shift in identity and norms and pose a direct threat to the country of origin.

Now that a typology of foreign fighters has been established, the question arises if it is possible to provide estimates of the proportions of these types. A first observation is that our knowledge of the different categories is uneven. Three of these five categories are better understood: the martyr, the terrorist and the recruiter. Cases of martyrdom are often reported by the foreign fighter movements themselves in online martyrdom notices. The terrorist is directly linked to an attack and can therefore be expected to gain high exposure. The recruiter is often under surveillance by intelligence authorities.[32] **Much less is known about the veteran and the reintegrated fighter.**

Despite the difficulty to give rough estimates about the number of foreign fighters, the anecdotal evidence that formed the basis of the three case studies suggest that the total number of martyrs, terrorists and recruiters comes nowhere close to the total number of foreign fighters. Simply put, thousands of Western Muslim fighters have fought abroad while only a few dozen of them became involved in terrorist activity at home. One tentative finding is that the 'hard-liners' are often not the ones who return but rather the ones who continue to fight somewhere else. They exhibit no motivation whatsoever to return because they have taken, as they say, the path of jihad. Another observation that was evident in all three case studies was the major influence of 'recruiters': foreign fighters who returned to recruit others. Many of the Afghanistan veterans who relocated to European cities like London were pivotal in subsequent foreign fighter mobilisations.[33]

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Finally, it must be said that these categories are not fixed, unchanging nor the only options. Sometimes they might even overlap. However, they are useful for a better understanding of the different types of threats posed. Different types, in turn, ask for different approaches to counter it. Thus, they should be seen as lenses and not as a rigid depiction of an 'empirical reality'.

Second Approach: Involvement of Foreign Fighters in 26 Terrorist Plots in Europe
As part of the second approach, a new list was compiled, consisting of 26 plots with a total of 123 individuals involved (see Appendix I). Of these 123 individuals in the database, just over half (68 or 55.3%) could be categorized as Western.[34] Employing the definition used by Hegghammer that includes both foreign fighters (those who fight in conflict zone) but also foreign 'trainees' (those who train at a terrorist training camp), we find 33 cases of a foreign trip plus two cases of individuals who tried to join a militant group but failed to do so and returned home.

This means that 33 out of 123 (26.8%) of all the individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters according to the common definition.[35] In other words, more than a quarter of terrorists involved in the most important terrorist plots in the West can be categorised as Westerners who went abroad either for terrorist training or fighting. However, if we look at the distribution between fighting and training, we see that 11 of them (33.3%) were foreign fighters who joined an insurgency in a conflict zone while 22 (66.7%) were foreign fighters who went to a training camp. These individuals almost exclusively went to training camps run by Al Qaeda, mainly in Pakistan or Afghanistan, or are confirmed to have met with high-ranking Al Qaeda figures while abroad. Thus, according to the definition of foreign fighting used in this research project, only 11 out of 123 (8.9%) individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters. This would rather point to a rate of 1 out of 11.

There are some other ways of looking at this data that could be useful. In 13 of the 26 plots (50%), there was at least one individual who went abroad to either fight or train. In 5 of those 13 cases (38.5%) of individuals who went abroad, the motivation was because at least one individual joined an insurgency while in the other 8 cases (61.5%) it was because at least one individual went to a training camp. Therefore, 5 of the 26 plots (19.2%) had at least one individual involved who can be defined as a Western foreign fighter. 8 of the 26 plots (30.8%) had a link to a Western individual who went to a terrorist training camp.[36]

The Lethal Plots
A final calculation will look at the relation between lethal plots and foreign fighting or training. Of the plots in this database, 10 resulted in injuries or fatalities other than the perpetrators themselves.[37]. Of the 61 individuals involved, seven were Western foreign fighters or trainees (11.5%). This percentage is considerably lower than the 26.8% of Western foreign fighters and trainees in all the plots (33 out of 123).

Contrary to what is often argued, this could suggest that Western foreign fighters (and trainees) do not make more lethal operatives than non-foreign fighters. However, among these plots is an example reminding us of the danger of a link to foreign training: two of the four London Bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, trained in Pakistan prior to the attacks. While this plot clearly had a foreign link, both of these men cannot be categorized as foreign fighters but should rather be seen as foreign trainees. If we distinguish between foreign fighters and foreign trainees in all these ten plots, we see that all of these seven individuals went to training camps and none of them actually participated in traditional insurgencies. Therefore, not a single case of 'foreign fighting' as defined here has been involved in the most lethal attacks in Europe since 1994.

It must be noted that these findings should not be seen as the result of statistically significant data. This approach calculated the ratio of former foreign fighters involved only in the most serious jihadist-inspired terrorist plots and attacks in Europe since 1994. Further criticism on this database could address its limited scope (only Europe, only 26 plots), its reliance on newspaper articles and secondary literature (which might have led to wrong categorisations), and its working definition of 'Western'. That is why the presented rates should certainly not be interpreted as the 'true' rates, countering findings from previous works. It is, however, an attempt to further build on previous works and critically examine some assumptions that inform our current view on the issue.

Conclusion
The two approaches used in this Research Note show that the extent to which Western foreign fighters have been directly involved in terrorist activity in Europe in the past is rather limited.
Again, it cannot be said often enough that this highly depends on the definitions used. In this Research Note, we summarized findings from three past instances of foreign fighting. The main conclusion from these three case studies is that there is no archetype of the foreign fighter. Rather, based on post-conflict behaviour, they can be divided into five categories: the martyr, the veteran, the recruiter, the reintegrated fighter and the terrorist. These are very simple categories and they do not say much about the motivation of individual foreign fighters nor can they be used to predict who will end up in which category. Further research is necessary to try to understand why and how out of a large group of foreign fighters, some become terrorists while others peacefully reintegrate. A difficult question is to what extent this is caused by internal factors (motivation of the foreign fighter, religiosity, social alienation and so on) and what is caused by external factors (recruitment, radicalization, pressure, and obstructing factors that hinder reintegration). To answer that, however, is beyond the scope of this Research Note.

What this Research Note hopefully did show is that the presence of Western foreign fighters in the most serious jihadist attacks and plots in Europe since 1994 has been limited and is much lower than is often feared. When there is a foreign link, it is, in most cases, a link to a terrorist training camp rather than to actual foreign fighting *pur sang:* defensive jihads in Afghanistan or Bosnia where a civil conflict was already ravaging the country before the influx of foreign fighters (which often made it worse). In European lethal plots, this presence was even lower, which makes the assumption that foreign fighters have proved to be more lethal operatives than those who did not fight questionable. However, to build this database (see Appendix), much information on the included perpetrators was taken from open sources, such as

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newspaper articles (which are not very reliable). Thus, in order to be able to make any substantial claims on this issue, more in-depth research is needed. Again, a phase of refining the definitions, methodologies (a larger and more reliable database) and sources is needed to make any authoritative

Appendix I - the Database [46]

Legend:

Black: individuals who did not fulfill the criteria of 'Western' or could not be categorized as foreign fighters or trainees.

Green: individuals who fulfilled the criteria of 'Western' and could be categorized as foreign fighters or trainees.

Blue: activity of this Western individual can be categorized as training.

Red: activity of this Western individual can be categorized as fighting.

Orange: failed attempt by a Western individual to train/fight.

Plot #	Plot name	Year	Country	Death /injured	Individuals	Country of origin	Western?	Foreign 'trip'	Fighting/training?
1	GIA Air France hijacking	1994	Algeria /France	3	Djamel Zitouni	Algeria	no	GIA member	
					Abdul Abdullah Yahia	Algeria	no	GIA member	
					x	Algeria	no	GIA member	
					x	Algeria	no	GIA member	
2	GIA group	1995	France		Khaled Kelkal	Algeria - moved to France	yes	none	
	St Michel bombing			8/86	Ali Touchent	Algeria	no	GIA agent	
	Arc de triomphe bombing			0/17	Rachid Ramda	Algeria	no	none	
	Lyon railway bomb			plot not executed	Safe Bourada	France	yes	none	
	South Paris bomb			plot not executed	Karim Koussa	Algeria - moved to France	yes	none	
	Jewish school bomb			0/14	Abdelkader Bouhadjar	France	yes	none	
	Maison Blanche bombing			0/12	Nasreddine Slimani	Algeria - moved to France	yes	none	
	Paris train bombing			0/29	Farid Mellouk	Algeria	no	none	
	Lille marketplace			plot not executed	Ali Belkacem	Algeria	no	GIA agent	
	Lille G7 bomb			plot not executed	Boualem Bensaid	Algeria	no	GIA agent	
					Mohammed Drici	France	yes	none	
					Ali Ben Fattoum	Algerian	no	none	
					David Vallat	France	yes	Afghanistan	training
					Joseph Jaime	France	yes	Afghanistan	training
3	Roubaix gang	1996	France	failed	Lionel Dumont	France	yes	Bosnia	fighting

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claims, especially when talking about proportions of foreign fighters subsequently involved in terrorist activity at home. However, this Research Notes has pointed at some avenues for further research and has hopefully raised awareness that careful reconsideration of the assumptions that currently form the basis of our understanding of foreign fighters is necessary.

Finally, a number of observations with regard to the current situation in Syria and Iraq need to be made. As explained in the introduction, extrapolating the research outcomes to the current situation cannot be justified. The sole possibility is to assess the current situation in order to identify issues that require further research. **The following observations should thus be carefully approached.** The initial phase of the conflict in Syria appeared to share many characteristics with the cases that in this research have been labelled classical examples of foreign fighting: Afghanistan and Bosnia (more than Somalia). As Brian Jenkins explained in a testimony in November 2013, '(s)ome of the jihadists are determined to fight, but others seem to be little more than jihadi tourists who stay out of harm's way while taking photos of themselves and boasting to their friends back home on social media'.[38] This clearly echoes stories about past conflicts in which foreign fighters were sometimes called 'Gucci soldiers' or only turned up for the fight during their summer breaks, like in Afghanistan.[39] Until recently, these fighters in Syria were viewed as a greater problem than other former foreign fighters because of the proximity to the West and their volume [40], not because there was some kind of assumed 'qualitative' difference between those fighters and their historical counterparts. Jenkins continues by saying that 'Syria's jihadist groups may not be looking for a fight with Western countries, which are also opposed to Assad. This attitude could change if the West or Western-backed rebels move against the jihadists during a post-Assad civil war'.[41]

Unfortunately, his prediction seems to describe what has happened in the summer of 2014. While Western governments initially supported the rebels and have not backed down from arming them, much has changed.[42] This culminated in US-led air strikes (backed by Arab nations) on IS-fighters in September 2014.[43]This transformed the Islamic rebel groups into direct enemies of Western (and Arab) governments. On September 13, 2014, spokesman for the White House Josh Earnest declared that '[t]he United States is at war with ISIL in the same way that we are at war with al-Qaeda'.[44]

The rhetoric used by rebel groups has also dramatically changed. Jabhat al-Nusra, which has mainly focused on Syria and rejected mergers with IS in the past, has now allegedly joined forces with the latter and threatened the West to 'pay the highest price' for its actions.[45] Clearly, the terms of engagement on both sides have changed. This does not bode well for the future.

▶ **Notes are available at source's URL. Same for samples of the data base shown above (p.27).**

Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn *works as a Researcher at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism – The Hague. This Research Note is based on her Master thesis completed at Utrecht University in January 2014.*

German Spies Warn Islamic State Has Anti-Aircraft Rockets: Report

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/10/german-spies-warn-islamic-state-has.html

Germany's intelligence service believes Islamic State jihadist fighters in northern Iraq possess anti-

aircraft weapons that could take down passenger jets, according to a newspaper report Sunday.

The BND federal intelligence service had told German lawmakers about its suspicion in a confidential briefing late last week, reported the Bild am Sonntag newspaper without citing named sources.

In the briefing, the BND reportedly warned that IS fighters possess portable rocket launchers captured from Syrian army stocks. Some

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dated from the 1970s, while others were modern and advanced.

The shoulder-mounted rocket launchers - known as Man Portable Air Defense Systems or MANPADS - were of Russian design but may have been manufactured in other countries including Bulgaria or China, the report said.

NATO: Piracy threats are still active in the coast of Somalia

Source: http://diplomat.so/2014/10/28/nato-piracy-threats-are-still-active-in-the-coast-of-somalia/

October 28 – The threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia has diminished significantly over the last two years but the mission is not yet accomplished, a senior European Union (EU) official leading the counter-piracy operations in the region has warned.

Concerted counter-piracy operations by EU naval forces, NATO as well as independent deployers have helped reduce pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia significantly, with no successful attack witnessed since 2012.

"The threat of piracy is still real and it will remain so as long as the root causes of piracy are addressed ashore, **which we are working on right now,"** said Alessandro Mariani, head of EU's Counter-piracy operations, on board ITS Andrea Doria, the flagship of EU's counter-piracy operation Atalanta.

Launched in 2008, following a UN resolution, the EU has decided to extend operation Atalanta until December 2016.

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> **EDITOR'S COMMENT:** "*We are working on right now*" A Mariani stated. More details would be highly appreciated since no visible actions have been recorded so far. With al Shabaab still active and in control of many parts of Somalia and no land operations nothing will happen towards solving the problem in this African country. On the other hand the big international naval force will remain in place doing what? – other than spending money and occupy valuable personnel needed elsewhere. Unless there are additional reasons necessitating their presence off shore Somalia.

The Power of Fantasy: Bioterrorism, ISIS and Ebola Mania

By Binoy Kampmark

Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-power-of-fantasy-bioterrorism-isis-and-ebola-mania/5410482

Does demagoguery have an inventive side? Only if you assume semi-literacy is virtuous, and that imagination lies in the name of the manipulative. The combination of both Ebola and terrorism are the evil twins of the same security dilemma. It is manufactured. It is a confection. And it is, at the end, worthless in what it actually suggests. The effects of it are, however, dangerous. They suggest that politicians can be skimpy with the evidence yet credible in the vote.

Historically, disease and culture share the same bed of significance. Notions of purity prevail in these considerations. Bioterrorism has become, rather appropriately, another mutation in the debate on how foreign fighters arriving in a country might behave. Individuals such as Jim Carafano, vice president of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation, continue insisting on the need for presidential administrations to form a "national bioterrorism watch system".

When people are just learning about something, something that they regard as a threat, and they haven't integrated all of this information still into their thought process, their sense of anxiety obviously increases.

"While [Ebola] is a dangerous disease that Washington needs to take seriously," writes David Inserra of *The Daily Signal*, "America could face an even greater medical threat in the future: the threat of bioterrorism."[1] While the language here seems to draw distinctions – that those suffering Ebola pose one set of problems, while the use of a bioterrorist agent is another – the ease of placing the two side by side is virtually irresistible.

In the wake of the Ebola outbreak, that old horse of potential bioterrorism has emerged with a convenient vengeance. This is not surprising, given the spectre of WMD fantasies that captivated the Bush administration in 2003. It is not sufficient that there are terrorists with a low probability of waging actual attacks on home soil, be they returning citizens, or simply foreign fighters wishing to stir up a good deal of fuss. Throwing in the disease component is hard to resist.

Rep. Mike Jelly of Pennsylvania decided to direct the bioterror genie the way of Islamic State fighters, suggesting that returning jihadists might cause Washington a good deal of headaches, not merely by their

radicalisation, but by carrying the virus as a strategic weapon of infliction. "Think about the job they could do, the harm they could inflict on the American people by bringing this deadly disease into our cities, into schools, into our towns, and into our homes. Horrible, horrible."[2]

This exotic lunacy was also appealing to Republican Rep. Joe Wilson of South Carolina, who even suggested that Hamas fighters might be daft enough to infect themselves with Ebola and make a journey to freedom land in order to engage in acts of infectious mayhem. Their venue of safe passage would be from the South, where the evils of an open border with Mexico risk allowing a dangerous pathogen into the country. Now that, dear readers, is exactly what such figures think about Mexico.

The moral calculus operating with Wilson is that of irrational, dangerous death – those who "value death more than you value life". Those with such a creed are bound to get up to any old and lethal mischief. "It would promote their creed. And all of this could be avoided by sealing the border, thoroughly. C'mon, this is the 21st century."[3]

As to whether the idea of using such an agent would be feasible is quite something else. Weaponising such a pathogen has proven to be a formidable challenge. Such groups as the Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted to collect the virus while ostensibly on a medical mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a failure of some magnitude. As Dina Fine Maron argues, the "financial and logistical challenges of transforming Ebola into a tool of bioterror makes the concern seem overblown – at least as far as widespread devastation is concerned."[4]

Even the FBI's James Corney suggests that evidence of Islamic

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State's involvement in an Ebola program is highly dubious.

This tends to get away from that old problem that the biggest of trouble makers in the business of death remain states rather than non-state ideologues. States have done more than their fair share of dabbling in the business of rearing microbes of death in the armoury. Be it small pox, botulism, and tularaemia, these have found their way into inventories and laboratories with disturbing normality.

Much of this has also been allowed to get away because of the Obama administration's open confusion on the subject of how to handle the Ebola problem. The excitement has become feverish (dare one say pathological?) in the US, suggesting the double bind that the Obama administration finds itself. The President did not do himself any favours by on the one hand denying there was a grave threat, and then proceeding to appoint an "Ebola Czar" by the name of Ron Klain. This was classic bureaucracy in action – we create positions of unimportance to supposedly fight the unimportant, while admitting their gravity in creating such positions.

Certainly, the President found himself railroaded by events with the unilateral decisions of Gov. Andrew Cuomo (D) and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R) to implement mandatory 21-day quarantines for those returning from Ebola "hot zones". This has

always been the federal, and one might even say federalist headache: what is done in the White House and Washington often stays there. The response by states can often have a foreign sense to them. The US Centres for Disease and Control and Prevention has regarded such quarantine measures as unnecessary, but the CDC's attempt to defuse the situation has not worked.

White House spokesman Josh Earnest had to face the music of disease on Monday, with a reporter suggesting that, if Klain was actually an "Ebola response coordinator", it seemed "that you have a need for some coordinating here."[5]

William Schaffner of Vanderbilt University, a long time student of infectious diseases, sees this as a matter of information, in so far as the more one gets, the less anxious one is bound to feel. "I would like not to call it irrational. When people are just learning about something, something that they regard as a threat, and they haven't integrated all of this information still into their thought process, their sense of anxiety obviously increases."[6]

Schaffner is unduly wedded to the rather unfashionable belief that knowledge somehow enlightens. But it is not knowledge that is driving this debate, but supposition. Facts are the enemy, and they continue to play the roles of silent, some might even say murdered witnesses.

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▶ **Notes are available at source's URL.**

Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.

Germany could be home to 7,000 Muslim extremists by Christmas

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/10/germany-could-be-home-to-7000-muslim.html

German authorities fear there could be as many as 7,000 Muslim extremists in the country by the end of the year. Disenfranchised youths are particularly vulnerable to being recruited, while there are around 450 German extremists in Syria and Iraq.

The extremists all follow the strict interpretation of Islam known as Salafism and believe that jihad is a legitimate tool in their fight against the West, which they believe is an enemy of Islam. Hans-Georg Maassen, who is the head of

Germany's BfV domestic intelligence agency,told rbb-Inforadi that there are currently around 6,300 Islamic extremists in Germany, but this figure could rise to as many as 7,000 by the end of the year, AP reports.

There has been a steep rise in the number of Germans attracted to fundamentalist Islam. Three years ago there were only in the region of 3,800 followers of Salafism in the country, which then rose to 4,500 in 2012.

Speaking in late August in Berlin, Maassen said young Muslims are attracted to Islamic State (IS) because of its brutality. The militant group has become infamous for beheading captives amongst other things. The German domestic intelligence chief also says the group formally known as ISIS, seems to be *"more authentic"* than Al-Qaeda.

"There is a link between the successes IS has had so far in Iraq and the activities here in Germany and the propaganda and canvassing activities aimed at young jihadists," said Maassen, which was reported by Reuters. *"The Islamic State is, so to speak, the 'in' thing - much more attractive than the Nusra Front, the al Qaeda spin-off in Syria."*

"What attracts people is the intense brutality, the radicalism and rigor. That suggests to them that it is a more authentic organization even than al Qaeda," he said. *"Al Qaeda fades besides the Islamic State when it comes to brutality,"* the BfV chief added.

Massen also mentioned that many young people who feel disenfranchised from society are attracted to extremist Islamic groups, as it gives them a sense of belonging and purpose. They hope that by joining such organizations, they will go *"from being underdogs to top dogs."*

It is estimated that around 450 Islamic fundamentalists from Germany have travelled to Syria and Iraq. According to German authorities the majority are German nationals, with about 30 percent coming from a number of nations, which include Turkey, Morocco and Bosnia.

AP quoted a security official as saying that around a quarter of them are converts to Islam.

The BfV estimates that there are currently around 43,000 Islamists in Germany overall, with 1,000 being of serious concern, while 130 are under round-the-clock surveillance.

A report by German security officials also found that the *"most important factor for radicalization"* **was friends.** They had more of an influence than recruiters or radical imams, while the internet was also another important source to gain extremist followers.

The document states that it normally takes around a year for the vast majority of people to become radicalized, which would allow sufficient time for them to be offered help. However, **identifying someone who is going through the process of radicalization is not so easy, with visible changes in behavior only taking place once the person is becoming more extremist**, the report added, according to Der Spiegel.

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Are lone wolf attacks the new face of terrorism?

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2014/10/27/are-lone-wolf-attacks-new-face-terrorism/

This is a rush transcript from "The Kelly File," October 24, 2014. This copy may not be in its final form and may be updated.

MEGYN KELLY, HOST: Joining me now Mike Baker, a former CIA covert operations officer and president of Diligence LLC, a global intelligence and security firm.

And that's the problem Mike, is that if you live in a free and open society, there's only so much we can do to track the lone nutcase. And I

don't mean to diminish what they're doing, these are terrorist acts to be sure, but this guy was also a nutcase. And there's only so much we can do to track them.

MIKE BAKER, FORMER CIA COVERT OPERATIONS OFFICER: That's absolutely right. And the problem -- one of the problems in trying to prevent these lone wolf style attacks is that there are a number, maybe countless number of scenarios of types of individual from, as you mentioned, the nutcase who just latches on, he's drifting through life depressed, mental health issues, whatever it is, and he latches onto something. And in this case, Islamic State or Al Qaeda ramblings online.

And then there's the actual convert or, you know, Muslim who is in sort of a classical sense is radicalized, a true believer.

But from the Islamic State's perspective or Al Qaeda's perspective, they don't care who they attract to carry out these attacks. They don't care whether it's a psychotic individual or whether it's actually a true believer. As long as they commit an act of terror, from their perspective they've won.

KELLY: You know, it's like the Internet has almost in some ways eliminated the oceans that are on the coasts of this country. Because this guy was said to have converted online to have radicalized by himself online. He accessed all sorts of terrorist jihadi propaganda online. And then he came out and put a hatchet in the head of a New York City police officer and axed down another. You know, the public looks at this and they say, "Why couldn't we have known? Why didn't we know that he was posting that stuff on Facebook? Why couldn't they have been tracking him?"

BAKER: Right. And that raises a really interesting point, which is that particularly with the Snowden leaks and all the Snowden supporters who for some time now have been saying, well the government, law enforcement, all they do is sit all day long and read all of our Facebook pages and they're listening to all of our phone calls and they're reading all our e- mails. Well, that's their spin. And it's nonsense.

But it has raised the sense within the population that, "How come we can't stop them?" Because that's what we're doing, but we're not. And you try to talk about that during the Snowden leaks when that was at the height of the story and people would just roll their eyes.

But the truth of the matter is, to open a file, to start an investigation on an individual who's been identified, maybe he's radicalized, maybe he's in the process of self-radicalization, the law enforcement -- you know, the authorities have to jump through a significant number of hoops. It's not like, you know, we were led to believe by the Snowden camp -- and frankly, we don't want to live in that sort of society. You raise a really good point. A society like that where we've locked it down and we can track all these potential lone wolf candidates, that would look a lot like North Korea.

KELLY: What about accessing public information like a Facebook page? You know, what we saw that was public was concerning enough. I mean, do you think this administration is being aggressive enough, federal and state, about looking for these sort of telltale warning signs? Or if they do that, if they just see, you know, Arabic on some of these Facebook page and pictures of a guy who looks like an ISIS fighter, you know, they're going to say that's racial profiling and that's going to get shut down by the civil liberties folks.

BAKER: Right. And I think that's absolutely correct. We're in a dilemma which is that's over the past couple of years, the narrative from the White House has been we've decimated Al Qaeda The war on terror, let's forget about it because, you know, we're tired of it, and we want it to go away. Well, that's not the way the real world works.

But as a result of that narrative, as a result of that desire, we've actually been dismantling to some degree our ability to aggressively take care of this issue of dealing with something like a lone wolf. For example, the Department of Justice advising the FBI that they can't use religion as a factor when doing their threat monitoring. Because, you know, that could go, "We don't want to do that."

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KELLY: Even though some factions of some religions like Islam we've seen have been politicized. It's not the true believer. It's the politicalization and the radicalization of the religion.

Mike, thanks for being here.

BAKER: Sure. Thank you.

How strong is the link between faith and terrorism?

By Reza Aslan

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/26/opinion/aslan-islam-doesnt-cause-terrorism/

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The tragic murder of Cpl. Nathan Cirillo by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau -- "a recent convert to Islam" as every media outlet in the United States would like to remind you -- has added fuel to the already fiery debate in this country over the inherently violent nature of religion in general, and Islam in particular.

It seems that, in the minds of many, the only possible reason a Muslim convert would go on a shooting spree in the Canadian Parliament is because his religious beliefs commanded him to do so.

Of course, it could very well be the case that Zehaf-Bibeau was motivated by his Islamic beliefs. It could be that he read a particular passage in the Quran, understood it to mean he should kill as many Canadian government officials as possible, and then went out and did just that.

After all, there's no question that a person's religious beliefs can and often do influence his or her behavior. The mistake lies in assuming there is a *necessary and distinct* causal connection between belief and behavior -- that Bibeau's actions were *exclusively* the result of his religious beliefs.

The notion that there is a one-to-one correlation between religious beliefs and behavior may seem obvious and self-evident to those unfamiliar with the study of religion. But it has been repeatedly debunked by social scientists who note **that "beliefs do not causally explain behavior" and that behavior is in fact the result of complex interplay among a host of social, political, cultural, ethical, emotional, and yes, religious factors.**

In the case of Bibeau, his violent behavior could have been influenced as much by his religious beliefs as by his documented mental problems, his extensive criminal past or his history of drug addiction. Yet, because Bibeau was a Muslim, it is simply assumed that the sole motivating factor for his abhorrent behavior was his religious beliefs.

Indeed, there's even a term for this idea: Sudden Jihad Syndrome -- an imaginary contagion invented by the neo-conservative commentator Daniel Pipes to describe how any normal-seeming Muslim can suddenly snap for no reason at all and go on a murderous rampage (thus proving Pipes' point that "all Muslims must be considered potential terrorists").

Strangely, this causal connection between belief and behavior seems not to be as aggressively applied if the criminal in question claims a different religion than Islam. Take

the example of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik, who slaughtered 77 people, the majority of them children, in 2011. **Breivik explicitly defined himself as a Christian warrior fighting what he called an "existential conflict" with Islam.**

Nevertheless, a great deal of the media coverage surrounding his actions seemed to take for granted that his crime had nothing to do with his Christian identity -- that it was based instead on his right-wing ideology, or his anti-immigrant views, or his neglectful upbringing, or even, as Ayan Hirshi Ali famously argued, because his view that "Europe will be overrun by Islam" was being censored by a politically correct media, leaving him "no other choice but to use violence."

All of the above explanations for Breivik's behavior, including his religious beliefs, are pertinent in understanding the motivations for his behavior. But to argue that Breivik's or Bibeau's actions were motivated solely by their religious beliefs -- or that their religious beliefs necessarily dictated their actions -- is simply irrational.

And yet, this trope has become exceedingly common among some critics of religion. **Take the following excerpt from the bestselling book "The End of Faith," by the anti-theist activist Sam Harris** (Note: because Harris has repeatedly tried to defuse the significance of his argument and has even gone so far as to accuse those, including me, who quote his words of defamation, I will present the passage in its entirety so that there can be no confusion as to his meaning).

"The link between belief and behavior raises the stakes considerably. Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them. This may seem an extraordinary claim, but it merely enunciates an ordinary fact about the world in which we live. Certain beliefs place their adherents beyond the reach of every peaceful means of persuasion, while inspiring them to commit acts of extraordinary violence against others. There is, in fact, no talking to some people. If they cannot be captured, and they often cannot, otherwise tolerant people may be justified in killing them in self-defense."

Harris' argument is that a person's religious beliefs do not merely influence his or her behavior. They *determine* it. In other words, people holding certain beliefs should be killed, not because those beliefs may lead to violent behavior, but because they necessarily will. Therefore, in order to save ourselves ("self-defense" Harris calls it) we may be justified in killing the believer before his or her beliefs turn into action -- *as they inevitably will.*

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It is true that religious beliefs can often lead to actions that violate basic human rights. It is also true that a great many of those actions are taking place right now among Muslims. But it is ridiculous to claim that the actions of Islamic extremists are either necessarily or exclusively the result of their belief in Islam.

There may be millions of Muslims who share the ultra-orthodox, puritanical strain of Islam -- called Salafism -- that fuels the members of ISIS. But the U.S. is not at war with Salafism (if it were we would have bombed Saudi Arabia long ago). It is at war with ISIS, and not because of what they believe, but because of the actions they have carried out based on their interpretation of those beliefs.

Arguing otherwise leads to the preposterous conclusion that anyone who shares any measure of religious beliefs with a violent extremist is equally guilty for that extremist's violent actions -- regardless of how diverse the interpretations of those beliefs may be. In fact, Harris makes this exact point: "Given the link between belief and action, it is clear that we can no more tolerate a diversity of religious beliefs than a diversity of beliefs about epidemiology and basic hygiene."

The danger of this mistaken view of "the link between belief and action" is that it makes it that much more difficult to counter religious violence. When we condemn an entire community of faith for sharing certain beliefs with extremists in their community, we end up alienating the very people who are best positioned to counter such extremism in the first place.

People should be free to believe whatever they want to believe, no matter how irrational those beliefs may appear to us -- just as people should be free to criticize those beliefs. It is when such beliefs lead to violent behavior that people of all faiths -- as well as those of no faith -- should unite in condemnation.

Reza Aslan is the author of "Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth" and a professor of creative writing at the University of California, Riverside. The opinions expressed in this commentary are his.

Denmark offers some foreign fighters rehab without jail time -- but will it work?

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/europe/denmark-syria-deradicalization-program/

Denmark's program for returning jihadis differs from the UK's approach

When Omar left home in 2013, his parents thought he was going to help out at a refugee camp for the victims of Syria's brutal civil war. But the soft-spoken Danish student wasn't on a humanitarian mission -- he had joined the ranks of a jihadist brigade fighting to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

But Omar -- whose name has been changed to conceal his identity -- soon realized that what he was seeing on the battlefield was different from what he thought he'd signed up for.

"The place I was in, there was some chaos between different groups and there was violence between different groups," Omar, who is in his early twenties, told CNN. "I went there to fight Bashar al-Assad and not to fight other Islamic groups."

Omar didn't want to be a part of that. Fed up with the infighting, he decided to return home.

In 2013, a U.N.-sponsored panel declared Denmark the world's happiest place to live, citing a number of factors including life expectancy, social support and the freedom to make life choices. But the wealthy Scandinavian country is also becoming known for something altogether more worrying -- one of Europe's highest rates of jihadi fighters.

At least 100 Danes are believed to have left the country to fight in Syria and Iraq. Of 25 countries CNN surveyed last month, only three had a higher proportion of Muslims leaving to fight.

The country is facing a dilemma: what to do when these fighters come home?

Aarhus, Denmark's second largest city, thinks it has the answer -- a controversial program for rehabilitating jihadis returning home from Syria that doesn't necessarily involve jail time.

Here's how the program works: Any returning fighter is eligible for help getting a job, a house, an education, and psychological counseling -- just like any other Danish citizen.

Those returning must be screened by police, and anyone found to have committed a crime will be put through the courts and possibly prison.

The program does not try to change the fundamentalist beliefs of the returning fighters -- as long as they don't advocate violence.

Aarhus seems to have an especially acute problem with foreign fighters. More than 30 young people -- including Omar -- left the city last year to fight in Syria. Sixteen of them have since returned.

Omar was pursuing an engineering degree at university before he

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went to Syria. He has been there twice since.

Omar said he wasn't nervous about coming back home. Unlike in some other countries, it is not a crime in Denmark to fight in Syria.

"It wasn't illegal to fight in Syria unless you fought for a group that was a terrorist organization," Omar explained. "It was not a big deal for me to come back and get back to the daily life I had before I left."

Omar knows the people who run the de-radicalization program, but he hasn't joined it because he doesn't think he needs help reintegrating into society. But some of friends have joined the program and are satisfied with it.

Police here say it's a Danish solution that's not particularly special -- it's simply a crime prevention program with a focus on jihadis.

"We can't just put young people in custody because they plan to go to Syria," explained Aarhus Police Commissioner Jorgen Ilum. "It is not illegal according to Danish law to go to Syria, but we could try to persuade the young people not to go to Syria."

"We could tell them about the risks that they might encounter going to Syria. We could tell them about the Danish legislation that makes it illegal to participate in direct terrorist acts and if they did do they might be punished when they come back. We could offer the parents and young people the mentoring help or help from psychologists in order to get some tools in how to deal with this problem."

Of the roughly 30 people that left Aarhus for Syria last year, 22 had some sort of association with the city's Grimhojvej Mosque, according to Ilum. Sixteen have since returned back to Denmark.

The mosque has come under severe criticism from right-wing Danish politicians who say Grimhojvej's leaders are trying to radicalize their followers. Some have even called for the mosque to be closed down.

Mosque officials told CNN they were surprised that so many of their members had left for Syria -- but said they had been working with police on the best way to approach young Muslims.

"The only and the most important thing that we want to see is that they don't consider us as criminals," said Oussama El-Saadi, the mosque's chairman. "They don't consider us as terrorists, and they recognize us as minority living in Denmark and will continue living in Denmark and that we are a part of this society."

El-Saadi said young people from his mosque started traveling to Syria because they wanted to make a difference. And El-Saadi refused to condemn the brutality of the radical Islamist groups -- like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra -- that are running rampant in the war-torn country.

"We are here in Denmark, so far away from the area around there," he told CNN. "We are not condemning or supporting any group down there because we don't have the information."

El-Saadi said that jihadis returning to Denmark were probably turned off by the infighting between the various Muslim groups battling for control of Syria, or that they simply wanted to return to a more normal life of school and work. The Danish program lies in stark contrast to the approach of the United Kingdom. Fighters returning to Britain often face surveillance, terror charges, and jail time.

Officials say that roughly 500 people living in the UK have left to fight in Syria and Iraq. Britain is also looking at measures to ban fighters from returning home under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPims). There is fear that returning fighters might carry out terror activity at home.

Omar criticized Britain's approach to returning jihadis. "The UK government treat the people in a harsh way compared to Denmark," he said. "They start taking away people's passports and start harassing them by raiding their homes, taking some of them to prison and these things."

"I have spoken to a lot of Western people in Syria and nobody has ever talked about getting back to plan to bomb these countries, as they try to make it sound like in the media."

There are several de-radicalization programs in the UK -- mostly aimed at preventing people already in Britain from becoming radicalized -- but none specifically targeted towards citizens returning from Syria. In 2008, the British government spent £140 million on countering extremism. That has now dwindled to just £1.7 million.

A spokesman for Britain's Home Office told CNN: "We take the risk of those returning from Syria very seriously. Some of these people may have been exposed to traumatic experiences and others may be radicalised or vulnerable to radicalisation."

"In the UK we work with our partners, including the police and health service, to determine how we can best support returnees

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from areas of conflict and help them successfully reintegrate into society."

So does the Danish method actually work? Jorgen Ilum seems to think so.

"I should say that in 2014 I can see after we started this contact dialogue with the mosque and the youth center, only one [person] to our knowledge has left to Syria -- in comparison to 30 in 2013 before we had this contact," Ilum said.

Ilum said Danish fighters have to be motivated to be productive members of society. "We see it as a very important crime prevention effort to try to reintegrate these people back into the society," he said. "Many of the people who come back, they are rather disillusioned about what they have seen in Syria. It's not what they had expected or heard or seen over the internet."

"What we have seen is out of the 16 that have returned ... 10 of them are now back in school and have a job -- it seems to us that their focus is on something else other than Syria."

Preben Bertelsen, a professor of psychology at the University of Aarhus, has been involved

with the city's program for the last two years, providing counseling to returning fighters. He is aware the program might not work for everyone.

"If [someone] doesn't want our help, we can't really reach him," he told CNN. "All of these youngsters are screened for criminal acts out there. If they have done something like that, then the other part of society -- police enforcement -- will take over."

It's too soon to know whether the program will be a success in the long term. But police say the alternative would be fighters that return and simply disappear. This program is designed to help while also keeping a close watch.

"Young people have a lot of feelings. So if you are going to be humble towards those returned fighters, they will be humble towards you. If you are going to be harsh towards them, they are going to be harsh towards you. This is how young people think," Omar said.

In the meantime, Omar says he will keep working to complete his education -- and that he plans to go back to Syria after graduation.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Yes! Sure!!! And if does not work, try brain transplantation!

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Interview with an Islamic State Recruiter: 'Democracy Is For Infidels'

Interview Conducted by Hasnain Kazim

Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-interview-with-an-extremist-recruiter-a-999557.html#ref=rss?utm_source=%27Democracy+Is+For+Infidels%27&utm_campaign=%27Democracy+Is+For+Infidels%27&utm_medium=email

How does Islamic State think? How do its followers see the world? SPIEGEL ONLINE met up with an Islamic State recruiter in Turkey to hear about the extremist group's vision for the future.

SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL

The conditions laid out by the Islamist are strict: no photos and no audio recording. He also keeps his real name secret as well as his country of origin, and is only willing to disclose that he is Arab. His English is polished and he speaks with a British accent.

He calls himself Abu Sattar, appears to be around 30 years old and wears a thick, black beard that reaches down to his chest. His top lip is shaved as is his head and he wears a black robe that stretches all the way to the floor. He keeps a copy of the Koran, carefully wrapped in black cloth, in his black leather bag.

Abu Sattar recruits fighters for the terrorist militia Islamic State in Turkey. Radical Islamists travel to Turkey from all over the world to join the "holy war" in Iraq or Syria and Abu Sattar examines their motives and the depth of their religious beliefs. Several Islamic State members independently recommended Abu Sattar as a potential interview partner -- as someone who could explain what Islamic State stands for. Many see him as something like an ideological mentor.

He only agreed to an interview following a period of hesitation. But after agreeing to a time and saying he would name a place in due time, he let the appointment fall through. The next day, though, he arranged another meeting time, to take place in a public venue. And this time, he appears: a man with brown eyes behind frameless glasses. He seems self-

confident and combative. He orders a tea and, throughout the duration of our meeting, slides his wooden prayer beads through his hands.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: As-salamu alaykum.
Abu Sattar: Are you Muslim?

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why does that matter? Religion is a private matter for me.
Abu Sattar: Then why did you say "as-salamu alaykum"?

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Because it means "peace be with you" and I see it as a friendly greeting.
Abu Sattar: So you're not a Muslim. I knew it!

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why is Islamic State so eager to divide the world into believers and infidels? Why does Islamic State see everything as either black or white, "us against the world"?
Abu Sattar: Who started it? Who conquered the world and sought to subordinate all foreign cultures and religions? The history of colonialism is long and bloody. And it continues today, in the shape of Western arrogance vis-à-vis everyone else. "Us against the rest of the world" is the formula that drives the West. We Muslims are now finally offering successful resistance.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: You are spreading fear and horror and are killing innocents, most of them Muslim. You call that successful resistance?
Abu Sattar: We are following Allah's word. We believe that humanity's only duty is to honor Allah and his prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. We are implementing what is written in the Koran. If we manage to do so, then of course it will be a success.
For Salafists like Abu Sattar, the Koran is the only valid law. They are literalists and refuse to interpret scripture, much less to abstract from it. Abu Sattar and the Islamic State idealize the Muslim community that existed during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, believing that it was the epitome of Islamic practice and that the religion was only able to rapidly expand for that reason. Islamic State would like to revive that interpretation and emulate the early Muslims.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you believe that those who behead others are good Muslims?
Abu Sattar: Let me ask you this: Do you believe that those who launch air strikes on Afghan weddings or who march into a country like Iraq on specious grounds are good Christians? Are those responsible for Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib good Christians?

SPIEGEL ONLINE: You are dodging the question. The events you speak of were not undertaken in the name of a religion and were heavily criticized in the West. Once again: What is a good Muslim for you? What kinds of people are you recruiting?
Abu Sattar: A Muslim is a person who follows Allah's laws without question. Sharia is our law. No interpretation is needed, nor are laws made by men. Allah is the only lawmaker. We have determined that there are plenty of people, in Germany too, who perceive the emptiness of the modern world and who yearn for values of the kind embodied by Islam. Those who are opposed to Sharia are not Muslims. We talk to the people who come to us and evaluate on the basis of dialogue how deep their faith is.
Turkey is seen as a key site for Islamic State recruiting. People from around the world -- from Europe, the United States and Central and South Asia -- travel to Istanbul and establish contacts with the extremists. According to Turkish officials, around 1,000 of the country's citizens are also fighting for Islamic State.
The government in Ankara denies that it is supporting Islamic State, but has in the past allowed jihadists to travel to Iraq and Syria via Turkey. There are also indications that the extremists receive food, medical supplies, weapons and munitions via Turkey and that injured terrorists have been treated in Turkish hospitals.
In the last three years, Turkey has been actively seeking the fall of Syrian autocrat Bashar Assad and has been supporting all groups fighting against him, including Islamist groups.
At the very least, it tolerated Islamic State recruitment activities within Turkey.

Abu Sattar periodically glances around to see if he is being watched. He says he is able to continue recruiting, but that "a bit of restraint" is necessary.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: There are an estimated 1.6 billion Muslims in the world today. Many are very democratic, some are liberal while others are conservative and, just imagine, there are heterosexual Muslims and homosexual Muslims among them. Most of them do not share your ideology. But you act as though there were only one kind of Muslim, namely those who think like you do. That is absurd!

Abu Sattar: Democracy is for infidels. A real Muslim is not a democrat because he doesn't care about the opinions of majorities and minorities don't interest him. He is only interested in what Islam says. Furthermore, democracy is a hegemonic tool of the West and contrary to Islam. Why do you act as though the entire world needs democracy? And when it comes to homosexuality, the issue is clearly dealt with by the Koran. It says it is forbidden and should be punished.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Such statements help cast suspicion on all Muslims. In many countries, they are under pressure to distance themselves from Islamic State even though they have nothing at all to do with terror.

Abu Sattar: So? Are they speaking out against us? (Laughs) I think we enjoy much more support than you would like to believe. Those who demand that Muslims take sides are totally right. We go even a step further: All people should disclose whether they submit to Allah or not. Those who are against us are our enemies and must be fought. That includes people who call themselves Muslims but who don't lead their lives as such -- people who drink, who don't pray, who don't fast, who have constantly changing partners and who are unable to recite the Koran.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: There are many Muslims who have consciously chosen such a lifestyle.

Abu Sattar: That may be true, but that is not Allah's will. When we someday have power, inshallah, in the entire world, then Sharia will be imposed. Such people will then have to atone for their behavior.

Religious fundamentalism is as old as religion itself. Islamic State, however, is applying it with the most brutal of consequences. A self-contained worldview that clearly delineates between good and bad, friend and foe, makes it simple for its followers to find their way in a complicated world. Muslims who interpret Islam differently than the Salafists are simply declared to be unbelievers, a practice of excommunication known as "takfir." For those declared unbelievers, it is akin to a death sentence because turning away from Islam is forbidden. The extremists have also shown no compunctions about using religion to justify war crimes. In Abu Sattar's view, all means are legitimate in the fight for "true faith." It is an approach that thousands of people clearly find attractive.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE: You kidnap non-Muslim women and turn them into sex slaves. You crucify or behead those of other faiths, including children. How does that conform to Islam?

Abu Sattar: Why didn't anybody get upset about the many people that Syrian President Bashar Assad has on his conscience? But now that we want to establish a caliphate, it is suddenly a problem? To answer your question: It is every Muslim's duty to fight those of a different belief until only Allah is worshipped around the world. Everybody has the opportunity to accept Allah and to change to the right path. (*Recited in Arabic from the Koran, 5. Sura, Verse 33*) "The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off on the opposite sides, or be exiled from the land."

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Most non-Muslims aren't waging war against anybody. Billions of people, no matter what their religion, are living peacefully with each other, or at least next to one another.

Abu Sattar: (*Once again recites in Arabic, this time Sura 4, Verse 89*) "They (the *Unbelievers*) wish that you reject Faith as they have rejected Faith, and thus that you all become equal. So take not protectors or friends from them till they emigrate in the Way of

Allah. But if they turn back from Islam, take hold of them and kill them wherever you find them and take neither protectors nor friends nor helpers from them."

SPIEGEL ONLINE: You are avoiding the question by confronting a complex reality with religious texts. But if you really want to conduct such an argument: It also says in the Koran that there is no compulsion in religion. In a different spot it says that one is not permitted to "transgress due balance" because God does not love imbalance. What you are doing is a transgression of balance.
Abu Sattar: Yes, that is in the second Sura. But it also says that one should kill or expel unbelievers wherever one finds them.
This is a typical strategy employed by fundamentalists: They choose those sources that support their position while ignoring those that contradict them.
Abu Sattar says that he has been responsible for "several dozen" young men joining Islamic State. He says they were strictly separated according to their countries of origins and would remain separated during their training in camps in Syrian territory. Contrary to some reports, he emphasizes that no training takes place on Turkish soil. Men with battlefield experience, such as those who fought in places like Chechnya or Afghanistan, are particularly highly valued.
Islamic State concentrates exclusively on the fight and the implementation of their version of Islam. The militias even reject mosques because they distract from faith. Monuments and works of art are likewise destroyed because they see them as idols.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: In the golden age of Islam, there was music, dancing, painting, calligraphy and architecture. Yet you are propagating an Islam free of culture and art. It is time to discuss religious content and find a modern interpretation, don't you think.
Abu Sattar: It is not up to us to interpret God's word. There have been repeated errors and lapses in Muslim societies. That which you refer to as the "golden age" was one of them.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Then you should at least be in favor of allowing people to read the Koran in their own language so that they understand how they are supposed to live. Most are unable to speak or understand Arabic. Do you believe that the many calls for fighting and killing would be well received were people to be able to read them in their own language?
Abu Sattar: It is Allah's word just as it is in the Koran. We are also not allowed to translate it. It is unimportant whether what it says is well received or not. We are not allowed to question even a single word.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: You keep the people uneducated to build up your power. That is a strategy used by all extremists.
Abu Sattar: You have your viewpoint and we have ours.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: But you fight against all those who don't share your worldview.
Abu Sattar: Christians and Jews go after those who have access to raw materials but who prevent access to them. Oil is the best example. The US and its allies are constantly intervening in countries where they don't belong only to defend their prosperity. Is that any better? We aren't fighting because we are greedy and selfish, rather we are fighting for values and morals.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: When one looks at your actions in Iraq and Syria, morals and values are difficult to discern. One gets the impression that your actions are driven by an inferiority complex. The same holds true of your recruits: They tend to be people who feel like they don't belong and finally see an opportunity to live out their fantasies of power.
Abu Sattar: It is not true that only those people come to us who have experienced no success in life. Among them are many people who have university degrees, people who were well-established. But they all see the inequities that we Muslims have long experienced and want to fight against them.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: You constantly speak of fighting. Do Muslims not constantly speak of Islam being a religion of peace?

Abu Sattar: It is when people submit to Allah. Allah is merciful and forgives those who follow him.

Parashutist suicide bomber – the new threat?
A future scenario in pictures…

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Do not say it cannot be done! All you need is a suicide bomber with everything, a few hours training in one of the hundrends training schools available and a small airplane (private, hired or hijacked). What do you think now? How can one intercept a parashuter? Evil is genious. Good is snoring! And icon-targets numerous … worldwide!

Watch the video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4PU8qIlUJ_w

Almost half of FARC fighters entered rebel group as minor: Study

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Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/11/almost-half-of-farc-fighters-entered.html

Almost half of the approximately 8,000 fighters in the FARC were recruited by the rebel group as minors, according to a university study on

Colombia's largest guerrilla organization.
After studying official and FARC documents, and interviewing guerrilla deserters, the Bogota-based Sergio Arboleda university concluded that 47% of the FARC's current fighters entered the group when they were still under 18.

According to the Geneva conventions, the recruitment of fighters under 18 is a war crime. Nevertheless, "official documents, and the statutes and other material from the FARC show that the recruitment [of minors] has been part of their practices," Luis Andres Fajardo of the university told Spanish news agency EFE.
According to the report, the guerrillas have mainly allowed the entry of fighters over 15 years old. All armed groups active in Colombia have been responsible for child recruitment, "but the group that absolutely has generated more victims and of who exists most information is the FARC," said Fajardo.
Guerrilla recruitment of minors most prevalent in remote areas with potential mining activities and particularly focused on recruiting

children of Colombia's indigenous minority, Fajardo's report claimed.

"The indigenous are highly appreciated because they know the terrain, move easily and apparently have greater resistance to the natural elements, which allows them [the guerrillas] to receive most benefit from these children," Fajardo told EFE.

While a vast number of minors that enter the FARC do so voluntarily, in principle "all recruitment of minors is forced" as no army is allowed to use or receive children in war.

"The guerrillas take advantage of situations of abandonment by the state and offers the children a salary to send to their parents. However, later they refuse to let them leave … they are put on trial and killed. It's a trap, because a child does not have the free capacity to decide, they are coerced," Fajardo said.

Another trend the university researchers found is that many minors join the FARC with the intention of demobilizing and receiving a government subsidy for demobilized fighters.

Fajardo told EFE his study group decided to tackle the FARC's child recruitment exactly

because of ongoing peace talks with the FARC. The university professor said it was important to not repeat mistakes made during the demobilization of paramilitary organization AUC in the event FARC fighters need to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated.

"En the Justice and Peace process the judicial sentences handed out because of this crime were virtually nil. It would be terrible if we move forward with a process of transitional justice while forgetting the crime that the International Criminal Court has come to consider as the most serious of all," the professor said.

According to Fajardo, his study seeks to "generate debate" in Colombia and make child soldiers the "principal focus" in the event of a disarmament of the FARC.

The rebels and delegates of the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos have been in Cuba since 2012 to negotiate an end of the 50-year-long conflict.

The FARC recently admitted responsibility for victimization and said they agree to be held accountable for their actions as merited by the Geneva conventions on conduct in armed conflicts.

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Peru foils Hezbollah terror plot against Israelis, Jews

Source: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4586432,00.html

Peru's Counterterrorism Unit foiled a Hezbollah terror plot this week when it arrested a Lebanese man suspected of leading a terror cell planning to attack Jewish sites and popular Israeli tourist spots in the South American country.

Peruvian security forces found materials for the production of military-grade explosives, detonators, TNT explosives and gunpowder in the apartment of Muhammad Amadar, 28.

Amadar, who was arrested on Monday, has already gathered intelligence on Israeli and Jewish targets, including the Israeli Embassy in Lima, Chabad houses and Jewish community centers.

Peru security forces outside Muhammad Amadar's apartment.

He was living in Lima's Surquillo neighborhood, close to the neighborhood that houses the Israeli Embassy and the homes of the Israeli diplomats.

In his interrogation, Amadar denied having any ties to Hezbollah and claimed he was on his way to the US, to meet with his Peruvian-American wife.

Peru's Interior Minister Daniel Urresti issued an official statement saying a man with ties to an "international terror organization" was arrested following intelligence information. An arrest warrant was issued by the Third National Criminal Court for Organized Crime.

Muhammad Amadar

According to reports in Peru, the terror cell Amadar put together is linked to **Hezbollah's vast network in the Triple Border area between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, where there's a large Arab population.**

Israeli security forces were briefed by Peruvian authorities on the investigation. Peru has also increased security for the Israeli Embassy in Lima, as well as for Israeli tourist destinations and Jewish centers across the country, particularly in the capital.

Israel's Counterterrorism Unit and the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem refused to comment on the report.

"A Hezbollah operative was arrested in Peru after he started building an infrastructure for terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Peru," Israeli security officials said.

"They found explosives in his apartment. The man is linked to Hezbollah's international terrorism infrastructure. It proves what we've been saying for a long time - Hezbollah, sent by Iran, or Iran via Hezbollah, are building a terror infrastructure in South and Central America to attack Jewish and Israeli targets, Israeli tourists, embassies and Jewish centers. "This infrastructure is also meant to be used for attacks against Western targets and for attempts to smuggle weaponry to the United States," the officials went on to say.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: While the whole world is focusing on Islamic State, Syria and Ebola threats, Hizbollah methodologically continues its infiltration in South America perhaps with covert Iranian support. Something we have to keep in mind towards Rio2016 – the next huge security challenge ahead!

Coallition against Iraq & Syria
Source: http://will-dawson.com/image/100946433504

Terror Shocker: Now ISIS recruits women from India, trains them how to lay honey traps
Source: http://news.oneindia.in/india/isis-terrorism-recruitment-women-hyderabad-training-honeytrap-india-terror-attacks-1551000.html

The ISIS is serious about building a formidable force. Its recent release of guidelines for its women operatives is a sign that it seeks not to build a terrorist outfit but a full fledged army. Recently some women from Hyderabad were picked up from West Bengal and brought back, counselled and let off. When they were questioned, they revealed in detail what exactly their idea was to join the ISIS. The ISIS does not want women in its force for combat.

Questioning details accessed by Oneindia revealed the following: The lady said, "We

felt the need to protect our brothers. We were told that the battle will be a long one and hence we were required to assist them." "We were offered a range of roles that needed to be played. We were told we could cook for the soldiers. If we were interested we could also be part of an operation where we lay honey traps," she added. Speaking to Oneindia, the lady also told, "We were also offered a training course in gathering of intelligence once we reached Iraq. However we were told that we will not be roped in for

direct combat which means we did not have to use arms."

Women want safety of their friends who joined ISIS: These women, who left Hyderabad with a bunch of other men who were their friends, told the police that their utmost concern was the safety of their friends. "We wanted to help them out as we knew the job was tough. In a foreign land they would have felt at ease knowing that we were there to look after them. It was more out of duty than ideology." they told the cops. ISIS recruitment drives suggest that the dreaded outfit has made a call to rope in more women and the message is the same for India as well. The questioning and also the information that the NIA has been gathering from global agencies

suggest that the ISIS wants to be completely war ready.

What's ISIS's real plan for women? They need women to cook, become nurses and run the chores in their camps as the men would enter into the battle field. Women are also being roped in to lay honey traps and collect military intelligence from enemies. It is a complete shift from what the ISIS had earlier proclaimed about a no woman policy. However, now they find the need to have women and this perception changed after they decided to declare the caliphate. This is a worrying sign for the agencies in India. They now need to be on alert for women joining the ranks of the ISIS and al-Qaeda who have been posturing themselves as a full fledged military outfit.

World's first counterterrorism "bank" to finance anti-extremism projects

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141103-world-s-first-counterterrorism-bank-to-finance-antiextremism-projects

Establishment of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) at the Ministerial Plenary meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum in New York on September 27, 2013 /US Department of State

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The world's first counterterrorism "bank" will next year begin funding projects aiming to stop violent extremism in five of the most "at risk" countries.

In his first major interview since the **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) was established in Switzerland** last month, Khalid Koser told the *Guardian* that the bank will soon be awarding grants of **around $10-$30,000 to small-scale counter-radicalization programs in Mali, Pakistan, Nigeria, Morocco, and Bangladesh.** The organization expects to be

financing thousands of such programs over the next decade.

The *Guardian* notes that the initiative was proposed by the Obama administration a few years ago, and is now backed by the United Kingdom, the EC, Australia, Canada, and Qatar, a country accused of financially supporting jihadi groups in Syria. Koser says the bank was created in response to the tens of billions of dollars that have been spent on arms and security in the fight against militants.

"There is a frustration that governments are spending an enormous amount of money on the security and military end," he said. "I think the international community is at last beginning to realize there is a range of policies."

He said that fundraising for the foundation is going well. An initial $25 million has already been pledged to get work under way, and the fund is in talks with Google, as well as with Norway and Denmark, to ensure it can disburse hundreds of millions on a long-term basis.

London-born Koser said he will be assisted by his 14-member board, which will include the Tony Blair Faith Foundation and will be chaired by the former director of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, to help him identify projects to back. **The board will be appointed in mid-November,** and Koser will then fly to Pakistan to start talking to potential project leaders. "This is an urgent issue," he says. "There are communities out there that need the money."

There are few approaches that have proven to work, but Koser admits that identifying the reasons that drive young Western men to join Jihadist groups in Syria, or which encourage Buddhist monks in Burma to slaughter Muslims, is not easy.

"There is an approximate notion of what the drivers of radicalization are, but I don't think it's accurate," he says. "This is about empowering the community with small but impactful grants to give us the answers."

He told the *Guardian* that the kinds of projects he has in mind are, for example, women working for gender empowerment in Mali, or IT students in Pakistan challenging jihadi messages on social media.

Koser concedes that some of these projects appear to be replicating development work, but he insists that the difference is that these prospective projects will have security outcomes in mind, and that funding will specifically target areas of the world at risk of creating violent combatants, but where there are few resources to tackle the issues.

"There are places in Pakistan now where you give a kid $20 and he'll go plant an IED for you," he says. "That kid shouldn't be doing that. Build a football field, give him a job, give him an education. There must be ways to provide constructive alternatives."

There are a few thorny issues GCERF must tackle, such as whether the antiterror bank will only finance secular values, or adopt a strategy of divide and rule, supporting non-violent but seemingly radical groups in order to take on those radicals willing to use violence to advance their aims.

"I recognize there will have to be value judgments made as we go forward," he told the *Guardian*. "We can spend three years debating this or we can just get some money out there and try."

Despite the risks, Koser says donor countries are aware of what they are getting themselves into and expect that some projects will ultimately fail.

"There's an excitement to try this out, and lots of donors who are normally fairly risk averse are willing to take a risk on this."

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U.K. prepared to assist disillusioned Jihadists returning from Syria

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141103-u-k-prepared-to-assist-disillusioned-jihadists-returning-from-syria

William Hague, former British foreign secretary, said that **British jihadists returning to the United Kingdom from Syria and Iraq will be helped by the government as long as they have "good intentions."** Hague said that the U.K. authorities are prepared to assist people who come back to Britain after fighting in the Middle East as long as it can be established that they are not planning attacks in the United Kingdom. The *Telegraph* reports that **around 500 people are believed to have travelled to the region from Britain to fight alongside groups like Islamic State (ISIS).** There have been reports that some of the British citizens have become disillusioned with the militant organizations and its ideology, but

are afraid of returning home in case they are immediately arrested.

Hague acknowledged that there had been more than 200 arrests this year related to people travelling to Syria and Iraq, but he said that the authorities could also help people who had genuinely given up the struggle.

"Our top priority has to be the protection of the security of the people of this country, and that is why we will take action where we think people could be dangerous," he told the BBC's Andrew Marr Show.

"But the Home Office and the police and the health service are also working together on what we can do to assist those people who come back with good intentions, but of course we have to be sure that they do have good intentions."

He said that it some cases it could be possible to use the returnees to help deter other British nationals who were considering trying to join groups in the region.

"We haven't had a lot of those people coming back yet and saying they want to be of assistance, but if they do well then of course the government, the police, the National Health Service, will work with those people and help them to recover and to assist others," he said.

Hague's comments came after William Shawcross, the head of the Charity Commission, warned that there was a "risk" that money given to British charities has been handed to ISIS fighters. Shawcross warned that the situation could cause "huge damage to public trust" in voluntary organizations. The Commission is looking at eighty-six U.K.-based organizations over alleged links to extremism, with four of these charities facing full investigations.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: They traveled to Syria and Iraq just a few months/weeks ago for a reason – and that was not a humanitarian one! And they expect them to have changed their minds and be able to rehabilitate if given the right means and opportunities??? Too much humor is bad for your health … and life (in general).

This article reminded me a video recently watched from the visit of a former Attica Correctional Facility (NY, USA) chief James Conway to a luxurius high-security prison in Norway. You should have seen his facial expressions during the visit! "We do not have life sentences in Norway so one day all these inmates would be your neighbors and we have to train them to adjust in the society!" At the end the American confessed that he was seriously thinking of committing a crime in order to serve his time in this specific prison (Halden Prison).

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2809131/This-prison-utopia-Former-U-S-prison-boss-t-believe-eyes-visits-Norwegian-jail-finds-kitchen-knives-xbox-recording-studio.html

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US to Tighten Airport Screening on European Visitors to Track Islamic Terrorists

Source: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-tighten-airport-screening-european-visitors-track-islamic-terrorists-1472898

The United States is to implement tougher security measures on travellers from Europe and US-allied countries in order to better track Islamist militants who hold Western passports, according to US officials.

Officials revealed that the new screening procedures are to be imposed because of concern over the number of citizens from "visa-waiver" countries that have flocked to Syria to fight for jihadist groups, and the ease at which some can travel across Europe and even to the United States.

Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson announced in a statement obtained by the Washington Post that the security measures are required "to learn more about travellers from countries from whom we do not require a visa."

The new measures are to make millions of travellers from Europe, Australia and other countries disclose vital information for terrorism watch lists such as the number of passports they hold from different countries and whether they have used alternate names or aliases in the past.

"Many of the leading visa-waiver countries are seeing their citizens going to Syria to join [the Islamic State] or al-Qaeda affiliates in that country and potentially returning home with training and new skills," a senior Department of Homeland Security official told the Washington Post.

"We want to ensure that we know exactly who is coming and have the most information possible to make good decisions."

US officials estimate that over 15,000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria to fight for jihadist groups with over 2,000 of those coming from European countries and Australia.

The new measures will expand the **Electronic System for Travel Authorisation** which was implemented in 2008. This system requires travellers to submit information online before receiving an authorisation code to travel to the US.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: This is true! A Greek friend (businesswoman based in Italy) recently traveled to the US and it took her almost 2 hours to go through passport control! But is this the solution to the problem? **Why don't they see it the other way:** track all those interested to travel abroad in support of IS; let them travel to their final destination; cancel all their civil rights (citizenship, passports, social security etc) the moment the flight is in international air space and make them unable to return back – ever! It is their choice to convert and choose another country to live and die in. They will never be able to travel in any country worldwide. You might say that counterfitting can make miraces but it is very difficult to beat modern technology. What is the background of such a proposal? When you keep "terrorists-to-be" inside your country with no way to travel abroad most probably they will steam out against their own homeland. And this might be a big bloody problem especially in huge countries like the US or Canada or EU. Perhaps a naive proposal but who can claim that only complex plans work out well?

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News ⟩ World news ⟩ Islamic State (Isis)

Two teenage siblings were arrested with would-be Isis recruit at Chicago airport

• Siblings aged 16 and 17 not charged despite sharing 'barbaric rhetoric'
• US citizen Mohammed Hamzah Khan, 19, could face 15 years in jail

Associated Press in Chicago
theguardian.com, Monday 3 November 2014 18.37 GMT
Jump to comments (16)

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Entering the Black Hole: The Taliban, Terrorism, and Organised Crime

By Matthew D. Phillips, Ph.D. and Emily A. Kamen
Source: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/945/760

Military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities worldwide have witnessed a shift in recent decades in the behaviour of organised criminal enterprises and terrorist groups. This shift has seen vertically-integrated hierarchical groups focused on either profit or political (or religious) agenda morphing into more decentralised networks with robust capabilities in a multitude of crimes. Experts and scholars recognise that terrorism is not a static threat, but rather a dynamic one that adapts and evolves. Recent evolution has motivated scholars to move away from classic terror paradigms and toward a more modern understanding of insurgencies.

According to Kilcullen (2006), classic insurgency theory considers an insurgent challenger to a legitimate, though perhaps fragile, state (p. 112). Such insurgencies operate from

geographic sanctuaries that allow them to regroup and resupply. Contemporary insurgency and counter-insurgency theory acknowledges a modernisation of insurgencies that includes globalisation (Gilmore, 2011), diversification of monetary sources (Kilcullen, 2006), and the adoption of terror tactics to facilitate a resistance to state occupation rather than revolution (Bergen & Footer, 2008; Kilcullen, 2009). Contemporary counter-insurgency theory continues to deal with sanctuaries, although it distinguishes geographic sanctuaries from electronic sanctuaries such as the internet (Kilcullen, 2006). Sanctuaries, fostered by cooperation among insurgents and global terrorist campaigns (Gilmore, 2011; Kilcullen, 2006), protract conflicts by engaging political, social, economic, and military networks (Hammes, 2005). Importantly, sanctuaries also allow a dangerous amalgamation of crime and terror by insurgents, known as the crime-terror nexus. This nexus has accordingly taken on greater importance for study and understanding.

The gravity given to the crime-terror nexus is well deserved; symbiotic relationships between criminals and terrorists represent insidious threats to regional and international security wherever they exist. According to Makarenko (2004), the penultimate threat to security posed by the crime-terror nexus is a 'black hole' state, in which a single organisation engaged in both organised crime and terrorism can leverage the conditions of a weak or failed state to promulgate and prosper without fear of repercussion from governmental authorities. This black hole state is considered by numerous scholars in the crime-terror literature (e.g. Innes, 2007; Korteweg, 2008).

This article offers an extension of the theoretical literature by merging the crime-terror continuum with black hole theory by specifying the mechanisms by which an organisation can cross into a black hole state.[1] This theoretical extension builds on black hole theory by arguing for the incorporation of organisation-level characteristics into black hole theory, moving beyond the near-exclusive focus on state-level characteristics. Our extension draws on the empirical observations of a mutated crime-terror group currently operating in the context of a black hole, the Taliban. The article proceeds by reviewing the crime-terror continuum and black hole theory in more depth, clarifying the gap between the two, and arraying the necessary organisation-level conditions for entering the black hole. We conclude by discussing the flexibility of this extension and directions for future research.

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The Crime-Terror Continuum

Historically understood as distinct phenomena, organised crime and terrorism were rarely linked by security, military and law enforcement agencies. Since the September 11th attack on the United States, the divide between the two has eroded (Perri and Brody, 2011), and the threat of transnational organised crime emerged in recognition of the natural symbiosis that exists. Makarenko (2004) formalised this symbiosis, developing a continuum by which crime syndicates and terror groups can be evaluated based on their commonalities. The crime-terror continuum suggests that at one extreme exist organised crime groups, purely motivated by profit. At the other extreme exist terrorist factions who participate in politically or religiously motivated activities only. Sensitive to changing capabilities and motivations, the continuum allows for the groups to shift from one end of the theoretical spectrum to the other. This process is consistent with Dishman's definition of 'transformation' (2001; Sanderson, 2004, p. 50).

There is debate in the literature over semantics and proper definitions of terms like 'convergence,' 'transformation' and 'hybrid.' Some conceptualisations of the crime-terror nexus refer to a situation in which a single organisation developing operational capabilities of both organised crime and terror as one of 'transformation' (Dishman, 2001; 2005; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007). Many crime-terror scholars who favour this language of transformation use the term 'convergence' to describe a situation in which two organisations – one criminal group and one terrorist group – fuse themselves into a single hybrid entity (Dishman, 2005; Shelley and Picarelli, 2005). To be consistent with Makarenko's crime-terror continuum, we use the term 'transformation' and 'convergence' as defined above. To avoid confusion when referring to a single organisation that has developed both criminal and terrorist elements, while not abandoning its original organising principle, we refer to such a group as a 'mutated' organisation, borrowing language from Dishman (2001). This is in contrast to a merger of two previously distinct groups, forming a 'hybrid' organisation.

Returning to the crime-terror nexus, Makarenko (2004) categorises the seven points on the continuum into four categories, which include: alliances, operational motivations, convergence, and black holes. Alliances refer to the idea that both factions (criminal and

terrorist groups) form relationships with one another. Typically, alliances are formed in certain regions in an effort to ensure mutual success. However, alliances may be imperfect. Therefore, many groups avoid them in favour of adopting both criminal and terrorist activities within their own groups, attempting to avoid any alliance-related difficulties. As an example, organised crime groups could use terrorist tactics to solidify their criminal enterprise and foster the promulgation of conditions necessary to further their criminal activities. Alternatively, terrorists may engage in behaviours common to organised crime as a way of funding their ideological interests and actions. By each attempting to take on the other's role, criminal and terrorist organisations eliminate the need for alliances. Makarenko defines this as 'convergence.'

The convergence hypothesis refers to the idea that both groups have the ability to adopt the other's characteristics, thus becoming a more potent threat. The advantage gained by convergence is summarised by Acharya, Bukhari, & Sulaiman (2009, p. 104); 'the nexus with organised criminal groups gives terrorists a disproportionate advantage in terms of skills and capabilities. Criminal gangs can help terrorists extend their reach beyond the area of their usual operations'. Further, the continuum suggests that after convergence, it is possible for a group to abandon its original motivations and instead occupy a status on the side of the spectrum from which they did not begin.

At the centre-point or fulcrum of the crime-terror continuum is the 'black hole' thesis. In this situation, a weak or failed state provides the fertile ground allowing for convergence between organised crime and terrorism and creates the 'safe haven' for such groups (whether converged or mutated) to continue their operations largely unimpeded, as in Afghanistan (Makarenko, 2004, p. 138). However, this conceptualisation of the crime-terror continuum does not specify the mechanisms that would lead one organisation to completely reverse its position on the continuum, or transform, while another organisation converges (here, mutates) and enters the black hole.

The Black Hole State

Since the terror attacks of September 11th 2001, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policy has been quite concerned with the notion of the black hole state, sometimes referred to as terrorist sanctuaries or safe havens (Campana and Ducol, 2011; Innes, 2007; Korteweg, 2008; Piazza, 2008). These operating spaces are troublesome inasmuch they provide terrorists opportunities to train, organise, raise revenue, and plan attacks (Piazza, 2008). Precise definitions of such terms are debatable and controversial (Campana and Ducol, 2011), but at the most basic level share the notion that in such spaces (physical or otherwise), legitimate government influence is sufficiently weak as to be unable to assert control over criminals, terrorists, or political insurgents.

Both the political and academic realms have been inundated with the use of terminology to describe a situation in which a failed or failing state is exploited by terrorist actors for nefarious purposes. In arguing over the semantics of what constitutes a black hole state, terrorist sanctuary, or safe haven, scholars and policymakers endeavoured to identify the characteristics of black hole states and the signposts that signal their emergence. Some treatments of black holes and safe havens have focused on the geographic dimensions of states, following the lead set by the 9/11 Commission report produced in 2004 (Innes, 2007, p. 4), examining such factors as porous borders and physical inaccessibility. Others have examined non-physical attributes

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of the state such as demographic and political conditions, for example population density, historical legacies of violence and conflict, poverty, and weak political efficacy. Still others studied less tangible characteristics such as localised power dynamics, social, and religious factors.

However, the extant literature conceptualising black hole states and their empirical relationships to terrorism are overwhelmingly preoccupied with measuring state-level constructs. In other words, variables considered and studied almost uniformly describe some attribute of the state. Campana and Ducol (2011) offer a critique of this limited paradigm, arguing that theoretical formulations of black holes and safe havens be expanded to include local social dynamics (such as clan or tribal governance). This critique argues that local "social space" has remarkable potential to affect order and routine even when centralised government cannot, thus shaping favourable opportunities for terrorists when local populaces are sympathetic, or curtailing crime and terror when the motives of insurgents are not conducive to the social order. Groh (2010) offers a similar argument, providing an in-depth analysis of the Pashtunwali system of local governance in Afghanistan and Pakistan, suggesting that the tribal structure lent itself to prolonged resistance to outside authority.

Merging the Crime-Terror Continuum with Black Hole Theory

Currently, the literature posits two simultaneous but separate contentions. The crime-terror continuum suggests that criminal or terrorist organisations have the potential to change their identities along a continuum based on their actions and motivations. Such organisations could transform from one type

into another, or could mutate or converge into a hybrid organisation with joint terrorist and criminal capabilities. In the context of a failed state, a converged organisation can enter the black hole state. Separately, black hole theory suggests that failed or sufficiently weak states offer terrorist organisations a breeding ground for future operations, and multiple studies examine the state-level correlates of these black hole states or terrorist safe havens.

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What is missing from the literature is an examination of organisation-level characteristics that contribute to the black hole state. Characteristics of organisations are crucial to the crime-terror continuum. To enter the black hole state, the continuum requires an organisation whose operational identity is in flux to converge or mutate, rather than simply transform. To transform is simply to move from one extreme of the continuum to the other. The black hole exists at the centre of the continuum. Thus, a reconciliation of black hole theory and the crime-terror continuum incorporating organisation-level characteristics will have utility in explaining why one organisation in flux transforms, while another converges to enter the black hole state. This article offers a limited initial step toward the theoretical integration of organisational characteristics into black hole theory by examining a mutated organisation currently operating in a black hole state; the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Entering the Black Hole

We offer an extension of black hole theory by considering organisation-level characteristics that contribute to a mutated or hybrid crime-terror group entering the black hole state. To construct our theoretical extension, this article builds on observations of one such group, the Taliban movement of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban provide a useful case study for this purpose inasmuch as Makarenko (2004, p. 138) identifies Afghanistan as a failed state in her paper outlining the crime-terror continuum (as well as others; see Campana and Ducol, 2011; Groh, 2010; Innes, 2007; Korteweg, 2008; Piazza, 2008), and because both

the criminal and terrorist activities of the group are well documented, as will be seen below. Begun for purely religious motivations, the terror group evolved and mutated into an organisation equally adept at organised crime. Although crafted from observations of the Taliban, we argue this extension is flexible enough to explain why some organisations enter the black hole, while others simply transform.

We posit three factors that push a transforming organisation into the black hole state. First, the organisation must be operational within the geopolitical context of a failed or weak state. Second, the organisation must have simultaneous and continued activities in both terrorist operations and organised crime. Third, and most critical, the organisation's original organising principle, or 'raison d'être', must carry continued strategic value to the group. Using the Taliban movement as a case study, each of these factors are elaborated and documented below. It warrants noting the first two factors are *preconditions* for the black hole state, rather than discriminatory factors. In other words, their presence is by definition necessary for a black hole state to exist. We include them here because the operational environment and capabilities of a group are organisation-level characteristics, rather than state-level, even if only preconditions for the black hole state.

Failed or Weak State

Literally central to the crime-terror continuum proposed by Makarenko (2004), the ''black hole' thesis' represents the penultimate threat to international security posed by transnational organised criminal groups. Referring specifically to the melding of organised crime and terrorism, the black hole thesis goes beyond the prior state of convergence in that it occurs in a weak or failed state incapable of counteracting such groups, thus fostering the conditions for the continuation of the groups' criminal operations. This governmental weakness is the first precondition of our extension of black hole theory.

Fortunately, finding empirical examples of black holes is difficult. This is due to the fact that black holes require the simultaneous presence of a failed state and a group that has converged to display both organised crime and terrorist operational capabilities. Afghanistan's status as a black hole state is evidenced by the absence of central authority capable of providing law and order, chronic instability caused by factional feuds between rival warlords, and the sanctuary the country's political situation provided to a number of terrorist groups and transnational organised criminal groups since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (Atran, 2010).

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the Taliban were able to consolidate their control over the country, becoming the de facto ruling government of Afghanistan. As the ruling party between 1996 and 2001 (Reese, 2012, p. 94), the Taliban provided social welfare services, essentially performing some functions of the state (Rashid, 2010). However, the Taliban undertook these projects not for philanthropic reasons, but for self-interested reasons.

Much of the strength of the Taliban movement is found in an equally weakly governed region of Pakistan. Following the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the core group of the Taliban had fled the country and emigrated to Pakistan to reorganise. Concurrently, the Pakistan Taliban emerged, a decentralised amalgamation of local tribes and military commanders loyal to Mullah Omar, but with separate structures and leadership from both the Afghan Taliban and each other (Acharya et al., 2009; Atran, 2010; Rashid, 2010). In the mountainous terrain of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Pakistan Taliban operate a regime capable of functioning well beyond the reach of the Pakistani government (Atran, 2010; Rashid, 2010).

The Taliban movement is capable of operating its criminal and terrorist agenda with relative impunity within its locus of power in Afghanistan and Pakistan precisely because in those geopolitical contexts, the legitimate governments are incapable of removing the Taliban's influence. A failed or weak state – such as that seen in current day Afghanistan (and the FATA and NWFP regions of Pakistan) – is a necessary precondition for a mutated organisation to enter the black hole. However, it is by no means a sufficient condition.

Simultaneous and Continued Operations in Terror and Crime

A second precondition for entering the black hole, an organisation must be chronically engaged in both terrorism and organised crime. In other words, the organisation must be a mutated one, whose threat comes from its duality. The Taliban have a well-documented history of religiously-motivated terrorism. While harbouring Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan, the Taliban trained in and adopted the tactics favoured by Al-Qaeda. These

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include the use of both suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rashid, 2010).

Recent Taliban activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to document the movement's fervour in using violence to advance its ideological agenda. NATO coalition forces, Afghan police, Pakistani military, and ordinary civilians remain targets of the Taliban's lethality (Crilly, 2013; Rosenberg & Shaw, 2014). The widespread violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan is prototypical of the Taliban's target selection patterns and modus operandi, as they attempt to eliminate threats to their extreme ideology.

Although established purveyors of religious terror, the Taliban are equally adept at organised crime. The Taliban's involvement in the opium and heroin trades dates back to their ascension to power in Afghanistan in the mid–1990s. Afghanistan harbours something of a feudal system for which opium and heroin is the lifeblood (Rashid, 2010; Schmidt, 2010), extracting profit at all stages of the trade.

The Taliban's involvement in the opium and heroin trades is an important component of their identity and the threat they pose to regional and transnational security. But equally important is the acknowledgement that their interests in organised criminal ventures became more varied and pronounced. Controlling lucrative trade and commerce corridors, Taliban warlords and their soldiers systematically collect taxes on virtually every shipment moving through the territory (Acharya et al., 2009; Reese, 2012, p. 105), including commodities like electronics, clothing, tea and silk, to contraband like rifles, opiates, and precursor chemicals (Rashid, 2010).

The Pakistan Taliban have expanded their organised criminal activities beyond those of the Afghan Taliban. The various Taliban factions have subsumed hardened criminals from Pakistan to leverage their expertise in committing bank robberies, vehicle thefts, and kidnapping for ransom schemes (Acharya et al., 2009; Freeman, 2012, p. 15). Kidnapping for ransom is thought to be one of the largest sources of revenue for the Pakistan Taliban (National Counter Terrorism Center, 2008; Reese, 2012). The proceeds from all of these endeavours are diverted to Taliban coffers.

Diversification and professionalism are now the hallmarks of Taliban organised crime in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Once a tightly-integrated resistance movement singularly focused on the control of their home country, the Taliban embraced the role as a loosely connected and overlapping network of organised criminals able to generate immense revenue from quite divergent sources. This mutation satisfies the second precondition for entering the black hole.

Strategic Value to Retain the Group's Raison D'être

The third and final component of our extension of the black hole thesis concerns a group that has undergone transformation from a terrorist organisation motivated solely by political or religious ideology into a mutated group equally ensconced in profit generation. Makarenko's (2004) original formulation of the crime-terror continuum holds that it is quite possible for a sort of total transformation in which the group comes to occupy a position on the opposite side of the crime-terror continuum from where it started. However, to enter the black hole state, such an organisation by definition cannot complete this total transformation. In other words, the group cannot abandon its original organising principle, or by extension its religious or political motivations. This organising principle, or raison d'être, must continue to hold strategic value, thus ensuring its retention as part of the group's identity. Else, the principle could be jettisoned, the group transformed, and the black hole state avoided.

Since its inception, the Taliban movement has been organised around its radical Islamic ideology and strict interpretation and implementation of Sharia law (Atran, 2010; Rashid, 2010). This radical agenda was formerly directed and guided by Mullah Omar and the Taliban's Supreme Shura (Rashid, 2010), presiding over a monolithic and hierarchical structure. But the Taliban movement is no longer monolithic (Acharya et al., 2009). The Taliban movement has evolved into 'fragmented, transnational force devoid of many of the group's prior characteristics' (Schmidt, 2010; Peters, 2009). Illustrating the evolution from consolidation to fragmentation, Schmidt (2010) frames the Taliban structure as one that shifted from a 'spider' organization to a 'starfish' organization[2] (see Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006). Essentially, this characterisation reflects changes the Taliban have undergone as they reinvented themselves, and emerged as a new decentralised network.

While Mullah Omar remains the de facto leader of the Taliban, he is something of a figurehead, controlling only the core group in Afghanistan (Peters, 2009; Schmidt, 2010). The larger Taliban are decentralised, their commanders showing greater autonomy for their own factions. The characteristics of the Taliban embody the starfish organisation set

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forth by Brafman and Beckstrom (2006). The removal of any one faction of the Taliban today would not significantly harm the organisation. The factions fund themselves, and cooperate with one another absent any directives from central leadership (Schmidt, 2010).

Part and parcel to their radical ideology, the Taliban are committed to the defence of their home country from outside rule. This resistance to interference from states such as Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States is tied into a local tribal governance known as Pashtunwali (Atran, 2010; Groh, 2010). This ethnically-based system of alternative governance relies on a decentralised tribal network (Campana and Ducol, 2011; Groh, 2010) easily leveraged by and integrated into Taliban authority. The current decentralised structure of the Taliban movement, harkening back to Pashuntwali, is entirely congruent with the norms and mores of the populace with whom the Taliban interface. Because the Taliban soldiers are largely drawn from local populations (Rashid, 2010), structure reinforces commitment to the movement.

In this new and decentralised Taliban movement, abandonment of the group's organising principle is unfeasible. Ideology gives the Taliban shared identity. Although organised crime under the Taliban banner is rampant, profit generation is not the ultimate goal. As a unifying principle, the group is largely focused on the implementation of radical Islam, and eliminating those who violate their religious tenets. Without this identity, the movement likely would fragment (Atran, 2010). Given the number of Taliban factions under the autonomous command of their various warlords, a lack of belonging toward one another could very well cause the factions to become direct competitors. For the Taliban, radical ideology provides identity, and that identify provides unity. Thus we see the strategic value in the Taliban's raison d'être.

Avoiding the Black Hole

Certainly, there are a multitude of nefarious organisations besides the Taliban with operational capabilities in both organised crime and political or religious terrorism. Al-Qaeda, for example, has been clearly documented as a potent terrorist group engaged in such criminal enterprises as money laundering, kidnapping, and fraud (Freeman, 2012). It is also the case that for Al-Qaeda, its original raison d'être retains strategic value. Indeed, it is equally committed to global jihad and radical Islam as (and arguably more than) the Taliban. Its message has been propagated worldwide through their networks of operatives and splinter groups. Much like the Taliban, radical ideology provides Al-Qaeda with identity. But unlike the Taliban, Al-Qaeda has not entered the black hole because it does not operate within a failed or suitably weak state. Al-Qaeda's global dispersal – in contrast to the Taliban's near-exclusive regional focus – rarely allows it to gather sufficient force to challenge legitimate states[3]. Al-Qaeda and its scions remain interested in taking advantage of failed or weak states, but thus far have been unable to do so. Although at the midpoint of the crime-terror continuum, Al-Qaeda has not entered the black hole because it has not met the theoretical precondition of operating in the geopolitical context of a failed state.

It is quite possible for terrorist or criminal organisations to operate in failed or failing states, retain their original organising principle, but not to show both terrorist and criminal capabilities. The narcotics cartels operating in Mexico would serve as a prime example. While not a failed state, Mexico ranks highly on the Fragile State Index[4]. The cartels are efficient and ruthless organised criminals, but are not terrorists inasmuch as they do not attempt to shape the political process. Cartels have not met the precondition of simultaneous terrorist and criminal operations, and thus avoid entering the black hole thesis as defined herein.

Our extension of the black hole thesis is further applicable to crime-terror groups who avoid entering the black hole because they abandon their original organising principle. For example, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is one of the oldest terror groups in the Western hemisphere. Initially committed to supplanting the Colombian government with a populist government in its image, FARC evolved into a premier narcotics trafficker that also made extensive profits through kidnappings in its home country. Many have argued that with the immense profits of Colombian cocaine and heroin, FARC's commitment to its populist agenda waned (Dishman, 2001; Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007). When it lost strategic value, the organising principle was jettisoned, and thus the FARC never entered into the black hole. It bears mentioning that the Colombian government, though weak at times, was buttressed by the United States, offering further barrier to FARC entering the black hole.

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Conclusion

Much has been said of the crime-terror nexus, both of the theoretical connection and the empirical evidence of the melding of crime and terror around the world. The shift from monolithic groups specialising in particular transgressions to decentralised networks of multi-threat generalists sharpens the need for understanding the conditions that erode national and international security. This article endeavours to further the current literature by offering an extension of the black hole thesis, specifying the necessary conditions for a mutated crime-terror organisation to enter the black hole. We have done so by studying one such group operating in a black hole state, the Taliban. We have also endeavoured to merge the crime-terror continuum with black hole theory by considering the organisation-level characteristics necessary to produce black hole states. This article does not present any grand new theory, but instead offers a limited theoretical extension arguing that black hole theory should strive to incorporate organisation-specific variables into future analysis. We argue for moving beyond an exclusive focus on state-level characteristics. In a black hole state, the direct threats to national, regional, and global security emanate not from states, but from the criminal and terrorist actors. Without considering the properties of such actors, theoretical and empirical analyses will be incomplete.

Notes

[1] We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers who provided helpful feedback on this paper.

[2] This characterisation is derived from the nature of the two organisms. Spiders have a head that is clearly distinguishable from its legs. By contrast, starfish have legs radiating from a central hub, but no head. The head of the spider directs the organism, and if removed the spider will die. If a leg is removed from a starfish, the starfish will survive.

[3] A notable exception is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's December 2012 martial takeover of northern Mali. AQIM's attempt to capitalise on Mali's weakness was stymied by international forces.

[4] The index can be accessed at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings–2014.

▶ **Full references are available at source's URL.**

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Human Bombing - A Religious Act

By Mohammed Ilyas

Source: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/944/759

The issue of human bombing, which is popularly known as suicide bombing has become important in the Western world since the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. Since then the issue of human bombing has become important to academia, the media, and security experts. This interest has resulted in much literature attempting to explain why human bombings take place and what motivates the bombers; for instance, the works of Gambetta (2006); Pape (2006); Merari (2010); Hafez (2006, 2007); Wright (2007); Bloom (2005, 2010); Friedman (2005); and Khosrokhavar (2005).

In this short paper I do not discuss why[1] and how human bombing occurs, and instead argue three points. **Firstly,** that human bomber cannot be acting with sacred intention (in the path of God) because this intention is unknown to them and the groups that advocate such attacks**; secondly,** that the standard for sacred intention is impossible to uphold by the bombers**; finally** that, the bombers could be suffering from secondary trauma, therefore falling outside the criteria that legitimates human bombing because of the individuals illness. I contend that these points serve to dissolve the religious criteria and justification for human bombing.

Human bombing: In the path of God

In their martyrdom videos human bombers state that they are acting in the path of God. According to Abu Qatada al-filistini [2] (from here on will use Abu Qatada) what makes the intention sacred are the benefits the act will bring to the community (Hafez 2007: 129–131). Sacred intention is very important, such that any behavior or motivation other than the sacred can serve to dissolve religious legitimization. Abu Qatada contends that intentionality is anchored in the notion of Muslim interests, and gives many examples of hadiths that he relates to the justification for human bombing (Abu Qatada al-Falastini, 1995). Abu Qatada notes:

Plunging into enemy ranks cannot be done for its own sake. It must contain a benefit for Islam and Muslims. In other words, martyrdom is never simply for its sake; its goal must be to raise God's word on earth and advance the cause of Muslims (Hafez 2007: 131).

However, even if the act, as Abu Qatada contends becomes sacred because of the benefits it brings to Muslims, it does not mean that the motivations of the bomber were sacred. In the many hadiths that Abu Qatada quotes and the commentary he gives on them, there is no mention of how one is to verify if the intentions of the bomber are sacred. From the criteria detailed by Abu Qatada it seems that one has to accept the word of the bomber and the group that the individual has volunteered for the mission, he or she had no psychological problems and was entirely motivated to act in the path of God. At face value it may seem feasible to accept what the bomber and the group contend because both enclose the motivations in Islamic terminology. However, once the motivations and the terminology are interrogated a different picture emerges, one that cannot be upheld by the prerequisite criteria that legitimizes a human bombing as sacred.

Academics such as Merari (2006), Pape (2006) and Hafez (2007) argue that human bombers are motivated by nationalistic ideas and redemption for themselves, their family, friends, community or religion. This suggests that human bombers are motivated by reasons other than Islamic ones, even though they may strike fear into the enemy and bring benefits to Muslims. However, there are also other motivations, which are more important to the argument of this paper, and these concern the personal reasons for becoming a human bomber in both conflict and non-conflict zones.

Bloom, in her 2002 book titled Bombshell, notes that personal problems stemming from being involved in activities that have brought shame on to their families leave some Chechen females feeling that they have no choice but to become human bombers. The act, as Bloom (2011: 30–31) argues, allows the women to reinvent themselves and become a source of pride for their families, removing the stigma of shame. Khosrokhavar

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(2005) makes a similar point with reference to the Palestinian human bombers, stating that death 'allows martyrs to recover their spiritual virginity, to wash away their sins, thanks to an enchanted martyrdom that opens the gates of paradise… A beautifying death releases them from their everyday humiliation'(Khosrokhavar 2005: 133). It seems, then that human bombers are escaping from their socio-political conditions and in doing so are taking control over their bodies, their fate, and their future representation because these are denied to them in their everyday life. If we accept that the motivations of the bombers are personal, this means that there acts were not carried out in the interests of the Muslim community, even though the outcome may prove to bring benefit to some Muslims. This undermines the criteria as set out by Abu Qatada and therefore the intentions are not sacred.

Devji makes a similar observation to Khosrokhavar (2005):

Martyrdom constitutes the moment of absolute humanity, responsibility and freedom as a self-contained act shorn of off all teleology. Martyrdom, then, might well constitute the purest and therefore the most ethical of acts, because in destroying himself its solider becomes fully human by assuming complete responsibility for his fate beyond the reach of any need, interest or idea (Devji 2005: 120).

Devji alludes to the idea that martyrdom frees the bomber from the shackles of Islamic proofs and defers responsibility and justification from the bomber; meaning that the act becomes self-referential and there is no need for a sacred text to act as a motivation. Devji (2005: 122) makes another interesting point concerning the monotheistic figures of Ibrahim and Ishmael, with both acting upon uncertainty, and obeying out of trust, rather than evidence of God, which makes God's existence possible. Devji here is pointing out the importance of acting out of belief rather than evidence. The same explanation can be used to understand human bombers. The death of the bomber is an expression of absolute uncertainty because it is based on trust rather than absolute evidence of God's path, the beneficial outcomes of the act or the possibility of afterlife. The bomber can only know and be certain of their sociopolitical circumstances and the need to act.

Aside from the issues concerning uncertainty there is also a problem with the groups claiming that they know the intention of the human bomber, and it being entirely sacred. For example Merari (2010: 128) notes in the case of Palestinian and Israeli conflict that religion is a relatively unimportant factor in the motivation of human bombers. However, for Al Zawahiri human bombings appear to be legitimate and Islamically justified:

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A generation of mujahedeen that has decided to sacrifice itself and its property in the cause of God. That is because the way of death and martyrdom is a weapon that tyrants and their helpers, who worship their salaries instead of God, do not have (Wright 2007: 219).

In the above quote Al Zawahiri seems to be claiming two things. Firstly, that the intention of the bombers to sacrifice themselves is in the path of God. Secondly, that he has absolute knowledge of the intentions of the bombers and the path of God. In stating this, he and groups that advocate and use human bombings as a weapon are arguing that they know the mind of God, thus they elevate their knowledge to the level of God. By logical extension, this means that they are God. In claiming such knowledge they have committed a blasphemous act, which places them outside the fold of Islam.

The groups attempt to resolve these issues, place themselves back into the fold of Islam, and convert intention into sacred intention in an interesting way. I contend that the groups have reconstructed 'God' into one that will justify human bombings. In order to do this, the groups convert the various acts that inform phrases, such as 'acting in the path of God', and the benefits of such acts to Muslims, into symbolical representations of God through projective identification and cast this into the future. Consequently, the symbolic God then provides the sacred intention, justifications and ways to pursue the 'path of God'.

The key features of human bombing seem to be everything but sacred. The motivations appear to be personal and arguments for their sacredness are full of uncertainty. As Asad (2007) argues, the best explanation for the motivations of human bombers is the assertion that the bombers may not even be certain of his or her motivations. The other entail issues concerning the groups that they claim to know the intentions of the bomber and the path of God are central in determining whether the act of human bombing can be authenticated as Islamically permissible. As I have detailed above these intentions are un-knowable by the groups, yet they claim to know both, taking them outside Islam. The groups overcome both problems by using a rhetorical device that reconstructs 'God' to justify the bombing and provide the sacred intention.

The standard for acting in God's path is too high to reach

As we have seen in the previous section it is difficult to ascertain if the bombers intentions are scared. In this section I contend that even if we accept that the bomber has sacred intention it is impossible to uphold. I base my argument on an incident that took place during the battle of the 'Ditch' involving the fourth Caliph, which clearly demonstrates that intention derived from anger and revenge nullify sacredness. I use extracts from the 2006 Transatlantic Airline plotters martyrdom videos to support this argument.

The incident outlined above was a fight, between Ali the fourth Caliph and Amr bin Abdu Wud, the champion from the Quraish tribe. At one point Amr bin Abdu Wud found himself in precarious position with Ali sitting on his chest, from which position Ali asked him to embrace Islam, however Amr bin Abdu Wud refused and spat on Ali. In response to this, Ali 'rose calmly from Amr's chest, wiped his face, and stood a few paces away, he gazed solemnly at his adversary, and responded by saying, ''O' Amr, I only kill in the way of Allah and not for any private motive. Since you spat in my face, my killing you now may be from a desire for personal vengeance. So I spare your life. Rise and return to your people'' (Grande Strategy 2012).

If we consider the motivations of the foiled 2006 Transatlantic Airline plotters we see that they were motivated by their anger and the necessity to gain revenge, and redemption and gain the rewards of the afterlife. For example perpetrator, Umar Islam stated in his martyrdom video that, 'this is revenge for the actions of the USA in the Muslim lands and their accomplices such as the British and the Jews. As you kill, you will be killed. And if you want to kill our women and children then the same thing will happen to you… We are doing this in order to gain the pleasure of our Lord and Allah loves us to die and kill in his path' (BBC 4 April 2008). Tanvir Hussain, another member of the plot, stated in his video, 'I only wish I could do this again, you know come back and do this again, and just do it again and again until people come to their senses and realise, you know, don't mess with the Muslims' (BBC 4 April 2008). In the cases of Umar Islam and Tanvir Hussain, anger, revenge and redemption for Muslims play a big role in their motivations.

Comparing the incident involving the fourth Caliph to the 2006 Transatlantic Airline plotters, we see that the Caliph decided not to kill Amr bin Abdu Wud because the act would have been carried out during a moment of anger; by contrast, the intentions of the plotters seem to be determined by anger and the need to seek revenge. For the Caliph acting out of anger is incompatible with acting in the path of God, thus emotions such as anger cannot play a role in sacred intention. If emotions such as anger and revenge become part of the bombers intention, I contend this nullifies the sacredness of them.

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Vicarious trauma and human bombers

In the previous sections I have argued that the intention of human bombers cannot be considered as sacred, and acting with sacred intention is such that sacredness is impossible to uphold. In this final section I make a tentative claim that both successful and foiled human bombers that lived in the UK could have been suffering from secondary trauma, as a consequence of visiting conflict zones and from watching videos detailing Muslims enduring violence. Secondary trauma, as Speckhard (2012) notes, is traumatization occurring vicariously through empathetic engagement with a victim of trauma by visiting conflict-zones or watching videos detailing violence and suffering. Aid workers and therapists, for example experience secondary trauma because they start to identify with the victims of traumatic events (Pulido 2012).

By forwarding secondary trauma as an explanation I am discussing two things. Firstly, if we accept that human bombers were suffering from secondary trauma, and it is a clinical condition, they are fulfilling the criteria of sacred intention as set out by Abu Qatada. Secondly, that the emotional conditions generated by trauma may act as mechanisms for one to acquire and act upon extreme ideas as an antidote to the trauma. This leads to two further questions, which are possibly more important but difficult to answer, at least in this paper. The first is more general to Muslims: are there a specific constellation of experiences that we can argue produce 'Muslim trauma' and how does this manifest itself in the lives of Muslims that experience the trauma? The second is specific to terrorism and especially human bombing in non-conflict zones: to what severity does one have to experience secondary trauma in order to propel them to become a human bomber. From Abu Qatada's criteria for what constitutes a legitimate martyrdom operation it is clear that someone suffering from any form psychological illness cannot take part or be

considered a martyr (Abu Qatada, 1995). From the work of Speckhard (2012) and the various media reports documenting the journeys that successful and foiled human bombers took makes it appear that the bombers had experienced secondary trauma. However, in the case of the UK human bombers, we see that they experienced secondary trauma through the combination of contact with victims of traumatic events and by watching videos detailing Muslims enduring traumatic events. Speckhard (2007) notes that:

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We find that in nonconflict zones the traumas that are occurring in conflict zones are used to motivate potential recruits. This tactic makes use of the concept of secondary traumatization in which witnessing film clips or photos of real or misconstrued injustices are used to create a traumatic state in the one witnessing it so much so that the outrage and trauma can motivate them to take action on behalf of the victim(s) of such injustice(s).

In the cases of the 7/7 bombers and the foiled 2006 Transatlantic plot we see that they not only visited conflict zones but also watched videos displaying the suffering of their brethren. This combination fostered secondary identification with the victims such that, it not only compelled them to acquire extreme ideas but also act upon them. In the transcription (see below) of the martyrdom video of Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the 7/7 bombers, we see that he strongly identified with, and seems to have been deeply affected by the suffering of his Muslim brethren:

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our target. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation (The Sunday Times 2 September 2005)

Although Khan has not been a victim of any traumatic event, enduring the suffering of others vicariously seems to have played a significant role in him deciding to become a human bomber. Khan's vicarious experience not only made him feel humiliated and angry but also fomented a desire in him to gain revenge. In the martyrdom video of Shehzad Tanweer, another of the 7/7 bombers, he states:

I know they've killed and maimed civilians in their strikes because I've seen it with my own eyes, my brothers have seen it, I've carried the victims in my arms; women, children, toddlers, babies in their mother's wombs.

Like Khan, Tanweer's video transcript clearly indicates his identification with his Muslim brethren and that he has been intensely affected by the suffering he has witnessed. His experiences suggest that he could have been suffering from secondary trauma similar to

that which Speckhard (2012) details in discussing what leads a person to become a human bomber in conflict-zones.

The cases of the 2006 Transatlantic Plot members follow a similar trajectory. Abdulla Ahmed Ali, the ringleader of the plot, stated during his trial that in 2002 he went to a refugee camp in Pakistan to help refugees fleeing from the US attacks. He recalls his experience and details the harrowing effect that it had on him:

There were lots of deaths in the camps daily. We had to go to a lot of funerals daily. It was mostly kids that were dying, children, young children. He had been interested in politics since he was a teenager. When I was about 15 or 16 I remember the Bosnian war going on and I remember images of concentration camps, of people looking like skeletons and things like that. I was aware they were Muslims' (Guardian 8 September 2009).

Ali clearly indicates the impact of working in a refugee camp and watching videos of the Bosnian war that detailed Muslim suffering. Two significant issues emerge from Ali's trial: the suffering of children and the images from the Bosnian concentration camps. The impact of the camps on Muslims in the UK has been grossly underestimated. Islamists that I have interviewed noted that the Bosnian war and the consequent suffering of Muslims was a watershed moment regarding their thinking on what it means to be a Muslim in Europe. The camps were Muslim where held during the war also reminded the interviewees of the WWII holocaust.

Although the members of the foiled 2004 Crevice plot were not human bombers, their trial reveals how secondary trauma imparted through visiting conflict-zones and by watching videos that detailed Muslim suffering fomented a desire in them to engage in violence to gain revenge. For example, during his trial, Anthony Garcia recalled watching videos that displaying the atrocities perpetrated by Indian forces in Kashmir. The impact of these videos had on him is demonstrated by Garcia stating that:

It was the worst thing anyone could have seen. Little children sexually abused and women… and I still remember it quite clearly. The effect of these videos, as Garcia recalls made him cry while watching the videos and as a consequence he decided to do something to help his fellow Muslims in Kashmir (BBC 30 April 2007).

While Garcia experienced secondary trauma through watching videos, and identified with the victims through the register of Islam and violence, Salahuddin Amin another member of the plot embraced extreme ideas after his experiences in a refugee camp in Pakistan:

There were a lot of stalls on the main road - on the Mall Road," he said. "The stalls were set up by the Mujahadeen, the fighters fighting in Kashmir. I was walking up and down at one point I heard a lady making an emotional speech about the atrocities that were happening in Kashmir that was under Indian rule - how women were raped and kidnapped all the time and they had to move from there to Pakistani Kashmir and were in difficulties. She made a very emotional speech and that affected me. (BBC 30 April 2007).

For Amin the effect of hearing about the violence experienced by Pakistani Muslim women at the hands of Indian soldiers captivated him such that he decided to donate money, in addition to attending meetings held by Islamists in his hometown of Luton (BBC 30 April 2007). He identified with the woman speaker and the victims through the registers of ethnicity, Islam and violence.

The experiences of the above individuals highlight how violence experienced, especially by women and children, that can be identified with can foster a state of trauma. If we accept that the individuals were traumatised by their secondary experiences, this means that they have not fulfilled the prerequisite criterion that legitimates human bombing as documented by Abu Qatada.

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Conclusion

I have argued that it is impossible to consider human bomber to be motivated by sacred intention, even if bombers and groups claim as such, on the basis of three issues that I consider to undermine the religious criteria outlined by Abu Qatada.

The first issue is one of identifying the motivations of the bomber. It is clear that the bombers have multiple motivations, including, escapism, family honour and politics of representation.

Moreover, the human bomber is not acting from absolute knowledge of God's path and certainty of the outcomes that will be beneficial to Muslims, but on trust and uncertainty of the outcomes. Even, if we accept that the bomber may have sacred intention, the standard

is such that Ali, the fourth Caliph found it difficult to uphold, as the story documenting the battle of Ditch highlights.

The second issue is the groups assuming that they know the 'real' motivations of the bomber and these motivations are in the path of God. In declaring knowledge of both, the groups are assuming that they know the mind of God and thus elevate themselves to the God's status. This places the groups in a precarious position because and outside the fold of Islam.

The final issue is the possibility of the bombers suffering from secondary trauma. Speckhard (2012) argues that secondary trauma played a big part in compelling individuals to engage in human bombing missions as I have outlined. She contends that secondary trauma can occur in people that live in conflict-zones, as well as those who live outside them. I have argued that the 7/7 bombers and the members of the foiled 2006 Transatlantic plot not only visited conflict-zones and witnessed violence first, they also watched videos that detailed Muslim suffering; thus they were suffering from secondary trauma and did not fulfill Qatad's criteria.

If we accept that the occurrence of either one or all of the aforementioned issues, then this ensures that no scared intention can exist, which means that human bombings falls outside the fold of Islam and can only be explained by non-religious arguments.

Notes

[1] There are a number of explanations used for the act of human bombing and the bombers themselves. Although Merari notes four types of explanations, I place them into two categories. The first category focuses on the individual, looking at religious fanaticism, poverty, personal trauma, revenge, and psychopathology. The second category tends to focus on political grievances, utilitarian concerns, and cultural reasons (Merari 2010: 125).

[2] Abu Qatada al-filistini was an extremist preacher who operated out Finsbury Park Mosque, London until his detention under anti-terrorism act in 2002. In July 2013 he was extradited to Jordan to face terrorism charges.

▶ **References are available at source's URL.**

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Tensions over Islam find their way to U.S. campuses

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141104-tensions-over-islam-find-their-way-to-u-s-campuses

November 04 – **University of Central Florida (UCF) professor Dr. Jonathan Matusitz is facing backlash from some groups claiming his class on terrorism and communication is based on biased view and a hatred of Islam.** According to the school's course catalog, the class aims to explain "how terrorism is a communication process. How mass media, symbols, linguistic devices, e-terrorism and theoretical dimensions play a role in terrorism. How communities respond to terrorist attacks." Matusitz said he wants to leave students with a better understanding and an increased awareness of the role of terrorism.

Central Florida Future reported that **a video recording of a Matusitz on-campus public presentation, "How Culture Shapes Terrorism,"** delivered on 31 January 2013, was criticized as presenting anti-Muslim hate and bigotry. The Florida Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-FL), which aims to "enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding," posted a video of Matusitz's presentation on YouTube. "Why do so many Muslims relative to other religions want to kill us? **The answer is easy. Very easy. It's seven letters: culture," Matusitz says in the video.**

In a letter to the dean of UCF's College of Sciences, CAIR-FL wrote, "his presentations on these

subjects are full of anti-Muslim bigotry in the form of hate speech, inaccuracies, sweeping generalizations and stereotypes that would mislead students to believe that all Islamic societies are nothing more than violent, hate-filled terrorist factories …"

Matusitz has responded by saying that claims about his hatred toward Islam are false. "I have nothing against Muslims. I have a problem with Muslims who want to impose radical Islam and Shariah on our lens. So the problem is not the average Muslim," he once said.

Representatives of the Muslim Student Association at UCF continue to protest Matusitz's teachings, insisting that UCF perform a review of the class. Instead, UCF officials continue to voice support for Matusitz's work on campus. "Dr. Matusitz is expressing his opinion, which is his right. He is not speaking on behalf of the university and we do not endorse his views," an official UCF statement read. "One of the university's five goals has been to 'become more inclusive and diverse,'" said UCF spokesman Grant Heston. "However, freedom of expression is fundamental to a university's mission, even when we disagree with it."

Another protest against speakers who, some believe, share anti-Islamic sentiment occurred last week when some students at the University of California-Berkeley began to protest the university's selection of television personality Bill Maher as the mid-year commencement speaker on 20 December. The Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian Coalition at UC Berkeley launched an online petition to withdraw the invitation, describing Maher's comments on Islam as racist, divisive, and offensive to many students. UC Berkeley should not "invite an individual who himself perpetuates a dangerous learning environment," the petition said in part.

Citing Maher's right to free speech, UC Berkeley chancellor Nicholas B. Dirks has said that "the invitation will stand, and (I look) forward to welcoming Mr. Maher to the Berkeley campus." The university's decision is not meant to signal an endorsement of Maher's views, "but this university has not in the past and will not in the future shy away from hosting speakers who some deem provocative," an official university statement read.

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Islamic state in Iraq. In the name of Allah most Gracious and Merciful .We have received news that the demand in Women and Cattle market has sharply decreased and that will affect Islamic state revenues as well as the funding of the mujahdeen (fighters) in the battlefield, therefor we have made some changes. Below are the prices for Yazidi and Christian women (slaves).

Price for Yazidi or Christian Women between the age of 40-50 is 43$US
Price for Yazidi or Christian Women between the age of 30-40 is 75 $ US
Price for Yazidi or Christian Women between the age of 20-30 is 86$US
Price for Yazidi or Christian Women between the age of 10-20 is 130$
Price for Yazidi or Christian Women between the age of 1-9 is 172$US

Costumers are allowed to purchase only 3three item (slaves) with the exception of costumers from Turkey, Syria and Gulf Countries. Obey and follow the rules and laws of the Islamic state or you be killed.
Dated and sealed by IS in Iraq 21 dhu alhidjah 1435 Islamic calendar October 16. 2014

IS Slave Price List

What about Yazidi & Christian SLAVES?

The 3-step guide to de-radicalizing jihadists

By Arie W. Kruglanski

Source: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/11/05/the-3-step-guide-to-de-radicalizing-jihadists/

It might seem hard to believe but, according to psychological science, even the most hardened jihadists can be de-radicalized.

To understand how it is done involves appreciating how radicalization happens in the first place. The term is defined as holding and acting on radical attitudes that deviate from accepted norms. Attitudes, however, are malleable and susceptible to change. Individuals can be radicalized, de-radicalized and even re-radicalized.

It is one thing to observe that de-radicalization can occur, and quite another to understand how it came about. Simply put, de-radicalization depends on three Ns: need, narrative and network.

The **first step** toward de-radicalization involves recognizing the needs of jihadists, which shape their motives, beliefs and reality. Often we only see what we want to see and believe what we want to believe. Valid arguments, however strong, are can be utterly unpersuasive if they run counter to our needs.

The **second step** is to devise a narrative that acknowledges a person's need for relevance and respect and provides a nonviolent means to address that need. That is why current de-radicalization programs in Muslim countries, or countries with significant Muslim populations, employ much more than theological arguments against violence. Programs in Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Iraq address detainees' need for significance by providing them with vocational education, finding them jobs and, in some cases, even wives.

The **third step** is to recognize that the social network in which militants are embedded is crucial to their radicalization — and de-radicalization. People's attitudes and beliefs are firmly anchored in the shared reality of their group. Radicalization occurs in a social context that is shaped by family, friends and charismatic leaders. De-radicalization cannot take place in a social vacuum, either.

Sophisticated de-radicalization programs such as those in Saudi Arabia or Singapore break the dynamics of militants' groups by separating detained leaders and core members from their followers. They also make wise use of militants' families, who are called upon to exert a moderating influence on graduating detainees, helping to prevent their slide back into extremism.

So what are the obstacles to de-radicalization?

One factor is the drop in militants' self-perceived significance after leaving the battlefield. In our work with de-radicalized Tamil Tigers, for instance, the former militants often voiced the complaint that their new jobs weren't as exciting—or "significance bestowing" — as what they did in their fighting days.

Another factor is a militant's seniority in an organization. Leaders can gain a higher level of personal significance from the organization than foot soldiers. This can mean they are more resistant to change than their followers.

Resistance to de-radicalization may also depend on how much attitude change is necessary. Disavowal of all violence on moral or religious grounds requires a more profound attitudinal change than personal disengagement from violence, which can be done while still condoning it for others. Similarly, complete rejection of violence is more difficult to embrace than a limited rejection, such as that committed against other Muslims.

Abandoning fundamentalist beliefs that have been ingrained in one's worldview from childhood requires the most far-reaching change, and hence evokes the greatest resistance. In short, it is crucial to determine what kind of de-radicalization is sought and what is realistically possible.

With thousands of militants detained in facilities around the globe and thousands more about to return home once the fighting is over, the issue of de-radicalization is more pressing than ever. Though the psychological principles of de-radicalization aren't mysterious, their application requires skill, creativity and resources.

There is no better way to respond to this threat, however. Governments cannot "kill our way out of this mess," as former GOP presidential

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candidate Mitt Romney aptly quipped, nor should they.

De-radicalization of militants is a global imperative that merits our utmost diligence and

commitment. It is the quintessential challenge for our time.

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Is the 3-step procedure applicable to him as well?

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Amid Terror Attacks, Iraq Faces Water Crisis

Source: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/11/141104-iraq-water-crisis-turkey-iran-isis/

Viewed from afar, the two-mile-long Mosul Dam is an impressive sight on the flat, sunbaked northern plains. Move closer, though, and its appearance has a menacing air. The bullet-riddled causeway and abandoned guard posts tell of the dam's seizure by Islamic State terrorists in early August, and the bomb craters and flattened armored vehicles are evidence of its recapture by Kurdish fighters 12 days later.

The sorry state of Iraq's biggest dam, about 31 miles (50 kilometers) northwest of Mosul city on the Tigris River, shows how water has become another weapon in the terror group's arsenal. But its steadily retreating reservoir tells another story, one of how Iraq's water shortage is growing more urgent by the day.

Built in the early 1980s to supply water, irrigate fields, control floods, and generate electricity, the dam offers an apt metaphor for the war-torn country's shaky foundation. Its dry spillways are plastered with cement to fill cracks, while the permeable gypsum base has required injections of grout to prevent its collapse since it opened.

Iraq was grappling with water woes long before the Islamic State jihadist group surged through its northwestern provinces and routed much of its army over the summer. But the sudden loss of prime agricultural land and the swift appropriation of scarce water

resources have intensified the crisis.

This army of extremist Iraqis and foreign fighters, which now rules considerable territory in Syria and Iraq, has demonstrated a willingness to use water to defeat its foes. Iraqis in endangered areas whose livelihood depends on a reliable supply are panicked.

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More Precious Than Gold

Ahmed Jemili, whose melon and mango farm in Kirkuk governorate stands about 7 miles (11 kilometers) from the front line, feels this fear keenly. Years of drought and cheap food imports have driven most neighboring farms out of business, and the grizzled Kurd's small

landholding now lies isolated amid distant oil wells and a hastily constructed roadside encampment for refugees.

"For us, water is more precious than gold, and Daesh are just hoarding it," Jemili said, using an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, as the group initially branded itself.

"Going to them for water isn't an option," he added, with a pained smile. "That would be like doing a deal with the devil." Last year, an irregular water supply damaged his fruit crop, and he fears another ruined harvest this year if Islamic State commanders divert irrigation channels away from his property.

Until recently, the Islamic State controlled about two-fifths of Iraq's wheat-producing fields, according to the United Nations. Its defeat at the Mosul Dam has deprived the group of its most prized water asset. But it has retained its hold on the Fallujah Dam, which it hijacked in April, enabling the group to flood government-held farmland near Baghdad and displace up to 40,000 inhabitants.

The Islamic State also controls much of Baqubah's water infrastructure in the country's east, putting pressure on the Shiite militia defending the town. In Al Anbar Province, the jihadists have besieged the Haditha Dam for several months. They have continued their assault despite heavy American bombardments in recent weeks.

Until recently, the Islamic State controlled about two-fifths of Iraq's wheat-producing fields.

Analysts familiar with the militants' tactics say their drive to seize dams is part of a strategy to take over critical government functions to cement their declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq, modeled on the caliphs who ruled the region after Muhammad's death in A.D. 632.

"Water facilities, like grain silos, are important for the Islamic State's presentation of itself as an actual state and not a mere group dealing with locals," said Aymenn al-Tamimi, an authority on Iraqi jihadists at the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum.

Underscoring its long-term vision, the Islamic State has even assigned experts within its ranks to administer its water riches. A Sudanese engineer is said to preside over the Fallujah Dam, while at the Mosul Dam, the terrorist in control of nearby Tal Afar who is a trained hydrologist took command and allegedly beat workers who refused to reduce electricity flow to Mosul city.

Iraqi Politicians, Distracted by Violence, Fail to Protect Water Flow

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The chaos sparked by the Islamic State's territorial gains has worsened the country's water crisis, but Iraq's inaction in the face of other threats is perhaps a greater problem.

For more than a decade, politicians in Baghdad have done little as Turkey and Iran pursued accelerated dam-building programs upstream on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries. The nearly unbroken years of violence after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 and the political stalemate stemming from antagonism between the nation's Shiite and Sunni leaders have weakened its institutions and minimized its leverage over its regional rivals.

In Iraq, which receives little rainfall beyond its Kurdish mountains and is almost entirely reliant on the two rivers for its water, this is a potentially catastrophic situation. The oil industry, which is responsible for 95 percent of Iraq's revenues, needs about 1.8 billion cubic meters of water a year for extraction purposes.

"We're facing a very critical period," said Hamza Hasan Shareef, an adviser to the Iraqi National Security Council and member of the High National Water Committee, which is chaired by the new prime minister. "There are many reasons for this, but it's mostly because of neglect and the aggressive policies of our neighbors."

In Iraq, which receives little rainfall beyond its Kurdish mountains and is almost entirely reliant on the two rivers for its water, this is a potentially catastrophic situation.

Reliable statistics on how much the flows of the Tigris and Euphrates have been cut are hard to come by: The stakes are so high that all sides come armed with their own facts. Among Iraqis, however, there's a consensus that water flow has fallen by at least a third, with some experts suggesting it has declined by up to 60 percent.

There's evidence to bolster Baghdad's claims. The Tigris and Euphrates lost 144 cubic kilometers from their combined basins between 2003 and 2009, or roughly the amount of water held in the Dead Sea, according to NASA researchers. With 40 percent of the Euphrates basin and 54 percent of the Tigris basin in Iraq, the mostly arid country appears to have borne the brunt of this reduced flow.

The volume of the Euphrates is expected to drop by at least half by 2025, according to another study conducted by the UN. Already the city of Nasiriyah on the Euphrates south of Baghdad takes water from the Tigris to make up the shortfall.

A crater at the Mosul Dam's entrance is evidence of the fight for control of the key resource between

Kurdish and Iraqi forces and the Islamic State militants. Photograph by Youssef Boudlal, Reuters

Dams in Turkey and Iran Diminish Tigris and Euphrates

Iran has been the closest ally of recent Iraqi governments, and so its continued dam construction is seen as a betrayal by many politicians. It has blocked or diverted 22 of the 42 waterways that pass from its territory into Iraq, according to officials in Baghdad. Residents of Khanaqin, on the Iranian border, have taken to using the dry riverbed of the nearly obstructed Alwand tributary as a crosstown highway in the summer months.

But it's Turkey's dam-building projects that are really infuriating Iraqis. Ankara has 635 big dams, according to International Rivers, which works to protect waterways, and most of the largest are within the Tigris and Euphrates basins. The reservoir of the almost completed Ilısu Dam on the Tigris is expected to hold at least another ten billion cubic meters when it's filled, but Turkey still plans to build more to meet its burgeoning electricity requirements.

Iraqi officials insist Turkey has violated the 1946 water treaty, which obliges upstream Turkey to inform downstream Iraq and Syria of any consequential water moves, but repeated protests have been ignored. The absence of any senior Turkish officials at a transboundary water conference in Istanbul last month suggests the stronger party is not yet willing to talk.

My concern is that if we don't reach some kind of water treaty, agriculture is going to die in the land in which it was born.

Azzam Alwash, head of Nature Iraq and the man who spearheaded the restoration of the country's marshlands in the south, maintains the Turks are intent on turning water into a commodity. "They're trying to sell water for oil. They see it as something bought and sold," he said. "They say, 'We don't tell you what to do with your oil, so why should you tell us what to do with our water?'"

Alwash believes it's imperative for Iraq to cut a deal with its neighbors over water use. "My concern is that if we don't reach some kind of water treaty, agriculture is going to die in the land in which it was born," he said. "As things stand, it's a when, not an if."

The Iranian foreign and agricultural ministries did not respond to requests for comment, while the Turkish foreign ministry, which is responsible for fielding queries about the country's dam program, declined to answer questions.

Men work to move a boat stuck on the banks of the Euphrates River in Iraq; the water level declined after access to a dam farther upstream was blocked in April 2014. Photograph by Mohammed Sawaf, Getty Images

An Independent Iraqi Kurdistan Could Heighten Water Crisis
Iraq's water issues could become even more muddled if the nation's Kurdish minority decides to break away to create an independent state. The new country would likely assume control over much of Iraq's portion of the Tigris basin, while also inheriting the only reliably rain-fed areas, the Zagros Mountains that rise in the northeastern region. (See "The Kurds May Seize the Moment to Break Free of Iraq.")

The Haditha Dam (shown here in September), on the Euphrates River in Iraq, has been under siege by Islamic State fighters for months. Photograph by Azhar Shallal, AFP, Getty Images

Kurdish officials, however, appear to be as unfocused on river issues as their Iraqi counterparts. Only one of the 18 agricultural ministers for Kurdistan since 1991 came from

a science or water-related background; the current minister is a cleric. "The only thing ministers care about water is the water they put into their whiskey," said Talib Murad Elam, an adviser to the prime minister of the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government.

But the Kurdish government has proposed its own dam-building program, and its continued control of the Mosul Dam suggests its leaders are wising up to water's usefulness as a pawn in future negotiations with Baghdad.

Farmers Struggle With Polluted Water in Low Rivers

Meanwhile, ordinary Iraqis and Kurds are suffering the consequences of their homeland's bleak environmental outlook.

Kawa Ali Mohammed Amin has farmed near the Tancero River outside the Kurdish city of As Sulaymaniyah for more than two decades, but declining water quality worsened by reduced river flow means he can no longer grow rice or okra. He depends now on tall grass that he cultivates for animal feed.

"There's no way anyone can sell their stuff in the markets. The water is too polluted," he said. "I'm continuing, but for every me there's a hundred farmers who just give up."

Farmers bear some responsibility for this poor water quality and the shrinking volume of usable water. They adhere to ancient Sumerian flood irrigation practices, which lift salt to the top of the soil and wash it back into waterways. At the same time, farmers have bored many of Kurdistan's more than 14,500 illegal wells, which has lowered the water table and doubled the depth to which new wells must be dug, putting additional pressure on the rivers as a water source.

Nabil Musa, a local environmentalist from the Waterkeeper Alliance, is despondent about the sewage and lack of water in rivers and streams.

While staring at a filthy, pitifully low Tigris tributary, he said, "We shouldn't call this a river. It's not swimmable, it's not drinkable, it's not fishable."

Hezbollah Terrorism Returns to Latin America

By Ely Karmon

Source: http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-terrorism-returns-to-latin-america/

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November 06 – On February 26, 2014 and March 13, 2014, General John F. Kelly, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), presented SOUTHCOM's 2014 posture statement to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees respectively. Kelly maintained that "Iran's involvement in the Western Hemisphere is a matter for concern" and that he remains concerned that Hezbollah "maintains an operations presence" in the region and stated that "Islamic extremists visit the region to proselytize, recruit, establish business venues to generate funds, and expand their radical networks."

In its 2013 terrorism report, the State Department evaluated that "there were credible reports that Venezuela maintained a permissive environment that allowed for support of activities that benefited known terrorist groups" and that individuals linked to

Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters, were present in Venezuela. The United States also has imposed various sanctions on Venezuelan individuals and companies for supporting Iran and Hezbollah.

Since January 2012 Iran and Hezbollah were responsible for a worldwide campaign of terrorist foiled and failed attacks against Israeli targets, and probably Western targets, from Thailand and Georgia to Cyprus, from India to Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, involving Iranian, Lebanese and local citizens. On July 18, Iran and Hezbollah finally staged a "successful" attack in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian citizen and wounding some 30 Israelis.

On October 21, I published an article on Iran in Latin America since the election of the new President Hassan Rouhani in June 2013.

In my conclusion to the article I argued that Iran and Hezbollah continue to plan and stage terrorist attacks worldwide, albeit more cautiously because of the

sensitivity of the ongoing nuclear negotiations, with preference in countries which have little experience about their modus operandi and which, they evaluate, will act leniently against their operatives and agents, due to diplomatic pressure and possibly threats of retaliation. I evaluated that historical experience and the 2012 operations by Iran and Hezbollah tells us that Latin America is not immune to the threat. Indeed, **on October 28 the Peruvian Police**

has arrested the Lebanese citizen Muamad Amadar, a suspected member of Hezbollah, in the Surquillo district of Lima, Peru's capital. According to media reports, the arrest was made after information, probably provided by the Israeli Mossad, indicated that Amadar's mission was targeting Israelis and Jews in Peru, including areas popular with Israeli backpackers, the Israeli Embassy in Lima and Jewish community institutions.

From the latest information published by the Peruvian media Amadar arrived for the first time in Peru on November 3, 2013 and on November 15 he married a Peruvian woman, Carmen Carrion. Amadar knew Carmen through Internet chat from Beirut and married her in Yurimaguas. They probably met in another country before the marriage. She was divorced from a DEA U.S. agent and had American citizenship.

The couple left the country after two weeks and on July 8, 2014 Amadar arrived at the Lima airport from Sao Paolo and waited for his wife who came from Florida by plane.

He was arrested, immediately liberated and put under surveillance by the Police.

The couple did nothing besides lunching and dining in different restaurants. They used to pass a lot of time at a local gymnasium, the "Geovanni Gym". They did not work and received unknown quantity of money through Western Union.

Carmen Carrion left Peru for the States two weeks before her husband's arrest and he stayed in the apartment most of the time since.

The Grupo Especial de Inteligencia (Gein) looked in his garbage near his home, discovered rests of explosives and then he was arrested by the Counter-Terrorist Directorate (Dircote) of the National Police. The police has found in the basement of his house TNT, residues of detonators and black powder and is checking his cell phones and banking account.

A member from the Lebanese consulate visited the Dircote headquarters to inquire about Muamad Amadar after his arrest.

The use by terrorist organizations of marriages with local women in order to achieve entrance permit and cover for their operatives is an old method of penetration in foreign countries.

Peru itself is a good example. In 1970 a PFLP Palestinian terrorist married a young Indian woman in a village in Peru who never left her home. He took her to London and sent her alone on an El Al plane to Israel on the pretext his parents will receive her at the airport. On arrival an explosive was found in her luggage, which fortunately did not explode.

Contrary to the Triborder Area between Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina or Isla Margarita in Venezuela, Peru was not known to be a country were Hezbollah or Iran have developed a terrorist infrastructure. There are however some historical examples of anti-Jewish terrorist attacks in Peru.

In 1981-1982 there were several anti-Semitic attacks, mainly bombings against synagogues and other Jewish targets.

On 16 July 1988, three members of the Abu Nidal Organization (Fatah-Revolutionary Command) in Lima, including two locally recruited Arabs, were charged with gathering information on synagogues and cars owned by Jewish community leaders and Israeli diplomats, with a view to carrying out terrorist attacks.

On 24 July 1990, Yaakov Hazon, the secretary of the Jewish community in Lima, was seriously wounded when he was shot at by three men and a woman who fired at him from a passing car. The attackers were alleged by the authorities to have been members of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) terrorist organization.

Finally on 18 December 1990 a bomb exploded under the car of a member of the Jewish community parked near the Sephardi synagogue in Lima. The Shining Path (Sendero

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Luminoso) organization claimed responsibility. It will be interesting to follow the investigation of the Peruvian Police and learn if Hezbollah has succeeded to build a new infrastructure in the Andean country.

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Jerusalem Pedestrians Are The New Intifada Target

Source: https://www.vocativ.com/world/israel-world/car-intifada/

Jerusalem natives are looking over their shoulders as they walk the streets due to an increase in so-called "Run-down" attacks targeting pedestrians. Two attacks in as many days have seen Palestinian militants plow vehicles into gatherings of pedestrians at high speed, causing death and injury. The latest attack, which took place on Wednesday, left one dead and 14 injured, when a minivan slammed into a group of pedestrians at a tram crossing. The attack took place in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, a high-tension flashpoint where settlers have recently moved into a number of houses.

Translation: Run over them oh Hebron's sun. oh, sun of Jerusalem, keep your foot on the gas and terrify the Zionists.

The lo-fi attacks are unnervingly simple, and the fact that they don't involve any weaponry or explosives means that every car in Jerusalem with a motivated individual behind the wheel is now viewed as a potential weapon of mass destruction—and impossible for security forces to screen. The technique is far from new—Israel has seen dozens of similar attacks since the end of the 80's. But in the context of Jerusalem's heightened tensions, with many saying a "third intifada" is just around the corner, this accessible means of causing terror has found favor with Palestinian militant groups again.

Translation: In Palestine, speeding is a way for Jihad

"Anyone who has a knife, a club, a weapon, or a car and does not use it to run over a Jew or a settler to kill dozens of Zionists, does not belong to Palestine", said Hamas' spokesperson Fauzi Barhoum during the Gaza war last summer. Hamas has claimed responsibility for the most recent attack, hailing the perpetrator as a hero. The driver was shot by police after fleeing the car and continuing his rampage with a steel bar.

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Yesterday, official Hamas forum and supporters have launched a social media campaign ==titled "Cars Intifada"==, glorifying the new method and encouraging further attacks. "Keep your foot on the gas and terrify the Zionists", they say in the campaign.

Prominent vehicular attacks in Jerusalem.
Source: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20726

Four of them using heavy equipment, killing five Israelis and wounding more than 100:
1) On the afternoon of **October 22, 2014**, a Palestinian terrorist operative from the Silwan neighborhood in east Jerusalem carried out a vehicular attack at the Ammunition Hill light railway station in Jerusalem. He killed a three month-old infant girl and wounded eight other people. One of them, a 20 year-old female tourist, was critically injured and later died.
2) On **August 4, 2014** (during Operation Protective Edge) a 360-degree excavator was driven off a building site in the center of Jerusalem by a Palestinian terrorist and used to run over a nearby pedestrian. The driver than used the excavator's blade to overturn a bus. The bus was empty except for the driver and another employee of the company. The two sustained minor injuries and managed to leave the bus. A member of the Israel Prison Service shot and killed the terrorist, Muhammad Naif Ja'bis, from **Jabal Mukaber**. He had a criminal record and was known to the police.
3) On **March 5, 2009** a Palestinian driving a front loader near the Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem rammed into a police patrol car and lowered the blade in an attempt to crush it. The patrol car had been called out because of a traffic accident and was parked at the side of the street. Two policemen in the car at the time sustained slight injuries. The terrorist was Mara'i al-Radeideh, 24, from **Beit Hanina** in northern Jerusalem. He was shot by three policemen and a taxi driver. He was critically wounded and died on the way to the hospital. His brother, Younes al- Radeideh, carried out a vehicular attack at an IDF base near A-Ram on October 17, 2013.
4) On **July 22, 2008**, a Palestinian took a tractor from a construction site near the Yemin Moshe neighborhood in Jerusalem and drove it at high speed along a main road. On the way he rammed into a number of vehicles and after 250 meters was shot by a Border Police soldier. He wounded 24 people, one of them seriously. He was shot and killed by Israeli security forces. He came from **Umm Tuba** in east Jerusalem.
5) On **July 2, 2008**, a Palestinian terrorist operative from **Sur Baher** in east Jerusalem used a large Caterpillar tractor to attack civilians in a crowded area in the center of Jerusalem. He sped from the construction site to a main road, where he drove into cars and pedestrians until a policeman, security guard and off-duty soldier shot and killed him, ending his rampage. **The attack killed three people and wounded more than seventy**.

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Revealed! Al Qaeda plans to play its terror trump in India

Source: http://news.oneindia.in/india/revealed-al-qaeda-plans-to-play-its-terror-trump-in-india-1555373.html

Revealed! what Al Qaeda plans for India New Delhi, Nov 8: The NIA and the intelligence agencies in India have found evidences of a possible merger between the Al Qaeda and the Indian Mujahideen. Deciphering the code encrypted conversations between Indian Mujahideen founder Riyaz Bhatkal and his top lieutenants, the agencies have deciphered that the Al Qaeda has created a new cell in the Uttar Pradesh. However, any concrete proof regarding the same is yet to be found. Agencies are also bothered about the fact that Riyaz Bhatkal is hiding in Pakistan and is keen on merging the IM and the Al Qaeda. One of

Riyaz's lieutenants Yasin Bhatkal was arrested last year at Nepal border. In September, Qaeda had announced a branch for the subcontinent, vowing to attack India and other countries in the South Asia. Indian intelligence officials now believe that Bhatkal's men are being trained by Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Waiting to play its trump card in India
With an aim to corner India, the Al Qaeda has asked the Indian Mujahideen to abduct Israelis from India and bring them to

Afghanistan where they could be kept as hostages. In turn, the Al Qaeda agreed to train IM cadres. Senior intelligence officers rue,"This confirms our worst fears. It means now you can have a terror strike in India as revenge for something in USA or Syria." One such evidence are the Bodh Gaya blasts in Bihar. The IM said that it had carried out the blasts as a revenge for alleged atrocities by Buddhists in

Myanmar against Rohingya Muslims. ISI's gradual exit The relation between ISI and Indian Mujahideen has soured ever since the latter joined hands with the Al Qaeda. In fact, in the decrypted conversation, Riyaz called the ISI "dogs". Experts now believe that the MUjahideen now sends one member every month by rotation to train with the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Canada's False Flag Terror: Fingerprints of U.S. Involvement
By Barrie Zwicker
Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/canadas-false-flag-terror-fingerprints-of-u-s-involvement/5412838

The "Terrorist" Events of Wednesday October 22nd in Ottawa and two days earlier in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu bear all the hallmarks of a coordinated cross-border one-two punch false flag operation.
The first, the left jab hit-and-run killing of a Canadian soldier, would be the psychological softening up for the follow-up right cross, the killing of another Canadian soldier in Ottawa. Together they dazed the public to an extent that even the ostentatiously-iconic murder at the National War Memorial alone might not have achieved.
The context was within the intensification of the so-called "global war on terror" and in concert with the pro-military Stephen Harper government's
deployment of warplanes supposedly fighting "the terrorists" of the suddenly-emerging "Islamic State." The first bombing sorties of Canadian F-18s took place hours after the violent acts of supposed "homegrown" and "self-radicalized" supporters of "Islamic jihad."

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Domestically the second outrage occurred on the very day the government was to introduce legislation giving the RCMP, CSIS and CSEC [CSEC is changing its name (to CSE) so that it can continue to spy – and indeed do more spying abroad – but not have the word "Canada" associated with this spying. "Spy agency CSEC says goodbye to Canada" is the headline over an October 31st Toronto Star story by Tonda MacCharles.]
These coincidences of timing, I submit, are not coincidences at all but quite deliberately planned to maximize the intended impacts: greater public support for a new war in the Middle East, better chances for faster and less-questioned support in Parliament for the increased police and spy powers, and enhanced public approval ratings for the Harper government in the run-up to next year's general election.
This article delves deeper into the timing including that the events happened, to the day, as military-intelligence "exercises" were taking place that precisely mirrored the "surprise" events. Other hallmarks include the prior involvement of government agents with both of the supposed jihadists, the fact that both were easy-to-manipulate "human wreckage" and the early "terrorism" branding led by the Prime Minister. Other hallmarks include the unfolding parade of memorable iconic elements and images, the "lone wolf" narratives, the dual role of the media in general to both to reinforce the official narrative and to fail to ask fundamental questions about it.
Ottawa shooter Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, especially, is tied to the "war on terror." At the highest level of visibility, he's a pawn marketed for public consumption to reinforce "global jihad" rhetoric.
On a subterranean level are two sets of fingerprints. One set shows the involvement of both Canadian and U.S. spy agencies and possibly other of the so-called "Five Eyes" (the others being the UK, Australia and New Zealand), not to mention the grotesquely corrupt FBI, with its record of mounting scores of false flag ops, that will be referred to later.

The second set of prints shows the work of the agencies' gatekeeper "assets" in the media, in this instance in the USA as well as in Canada. They manipulate "the news."

Telltale hallmarks of false flag ops
1 The timing. The exquisite timing of the National War Memorial outrage on the very day new laws were to be introduced by the Harper regime giving expanded powers to spook agencies – as well as additional cover for their "informants" so deep as to be impenetrable – is one hallmark of a world-class false flag op.

Added police powers at all times in any country, when an atmosphere of hysteria has been generated, are railroaded into laws in a flash, historically speaking. The new or expanded laws take decades to undo or ratchet down, if they ever are.

As Prof. Graeme MacQueen, author of an insightful and detailed new book, *The 2001 Anthrax Deception: The Case for a Domestic Conspiracy*, (Clarity Press, Inc.,www.claritypress.com, writes, the timing of the 2001 "anthrax letter attacks" or the "anthrax attacks" was just as the USA Patriot Act "was being hurried through Congress." The notorious bill, propagandistically entitled "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism" Act, was signed into law October 26th, 2001, about three weeks after the first news of an "anthrax attack" broke. Bush followed up by giving his approval "to the first bulk domestic spying by the National Security Agency (NSA)." Such are the sea changes set into motion by perfectly-timed false flag ops. (Watch for an upcoming review of MacQueen's book in Truth and Shadows.)
Interestingly MacQueen notes that

> *"gradually the hypothesis became widespread that the [anthrax] attacks were the second blow in a 'one-two punch' delivered by terrorists, the first blow having been the attacks of 9/11."*

Ottawa has gone the U.S. government one better by compressing the time between introduction of "anti-terror" legislation and a false flag "terror attack" to hours. Ottawa also subjected MPs and others on Parliament Hill to the sounds of gunfire amidst fearful uncertainty, in a fast-moving operation, again outdoing the Americans.

These events have also taken place during the lead-up to Remembrance Day. Government TV ads are in heavy rotation featuring World War I and World War II footage in black and white and colour, as well as video clips of Canadian peacekeepers. They send us to http://www.veterans.gc.ca/iremember. Stirring and nostalgic, these ads cannot be divorced from consideration of the impact of the Ottawa events. The ads (and much else) knit together in the public consciousness.

My wife and I almost always attend the Remembrance Day ceremonies at Toronto's Old City Hall.

I tend to agree with predictions that turnout this year may exceed previous years. Remembrance Day speeches, as well as the whole setup of Remembrance Day ceremonies, tend to ennoble if not glorify war. This year the homilies are certain to make reference to the events in St-Jean-sur-Richeleau and Ottawa.

More than ever, this year the understandable sentiments of many will be channeled into reinforcing belief in the "reality" of the "war on terror." Emotions will be manipulated into support for a militarized monopoly capitalist anti-life system of perpetual war and ever-increasing inequality.

Metrics are being reported that bear this out. A front-page story in *The Globe and Mail* on November 7th reports "a steady stream of support for the military in the days leading up to Remembrance Day."

Under the headline "Poppy sales a sign support for military surging after attacks," Tristan Simpson reports. "Legion officials say those events have become emblematic of a renewed patriotism – and have sparked an increase in military support."

2 Prior "involvement" of agents of the state
"Prior contact" with alleged terrorists is a virtually guaranteed hallmark of false flag ops.

Both Zehaf-Bibeau and hit-and-run killer Martin Couture-Rouleau were "known to authorities." As the main front page headline of the *Toronto Star* had it of Couture-Rouleau on October 22nd:
"RCMP had suspect on their radar for months."

On page A4 on the next day in the same paper, an edition dominated by 17 pages of coverage out of Ottawa, is a half-page devoted to how much "a Canadian security source" knew about Zehaf-Bibeau's past.

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The usual phraseology is that agents of CSIS or the RCMP "had been in contact with" the criminals or "had (these individuals) under surveillance" or "had been monitoring their activities."

Is it entirely coincidental that both "terrorists" – as Harper labeled both early and often – were Quebeckers? Quebeckers as a generality are cool to Harper and his "war on terror" rhetoric. But they might be expected to warm up to his "national security" agenda on the basis of fear — insofar as they buy the official narratives.

Canadian authorities, it was reported, asked the FBI to assist in the investigation of the "terrorist" events in Canada. The FBI's record shows that the assistance would most likely be in sharing with their buddies north of the border in the finer points of how to mount a false flag op. Investigative reporter Trevor Aaronson's book *The Terror Factory* exposes the FBI's inside role in creating "false flag terror." He writes that as of 2011 the FBI was involved in more than 500 cases of "manufactured" terror.

References here can be found at : http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/0…ainst-america/

In a 2011 article in Mother Jones, Aaronson wrote:

> *Since 9/11, there have been hundreds of arrests of "terrorist suspects" and 158 prosecutions. Of all the reported "major terror plots," only three can't be directly tied to terror suspects who were directly recruited, trained and supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Truth is, we also have questions about the other three.*

In the case of the "**anthrax attacks**" the spider web of government agents and suspicious civilian players interacting with those initially put forward as anthrax terrorists and/or 9/11 "hijackers" was almost monolithic. Most were in Florida, within close geographic proximity. As MacQueen writes:

> *Academic researchers have largely tended to dismiss the Florida connections by accepting the FBI's coincidence theory. … The question, however, is not whether actual hijackers were involved in sending out letters laden with anthrax spores: the question is whether fictions, verbal or enacted, were intentionally created to make this narrative seem credible. The [alleged hijackers] did not have anthrax, but the script portrayed them as likely to have it. [page 138]*

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The U.S. government repeatedly attempted to link the "anthrax attacks," the "9/11 hijackers" and Iraq (remember Colin Powell's now totally discredited dog-and-pony show at the UN?). But when those attempts fell apart, the domestic terror purveyors turned to Plan B, as MacQueen persuasively shows. Plan B was to finger a domestic "lone wolf," scientist Bruce Ivins, who then became conveniently dead. "The evidence suggests a grand plan, not an opportunistic foray," writes MacQueen.

3 The chosen miscreants are "human wreckage"

It was Webster Tarpley, author of *9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA* who described the typical patsy recruited for manipulation by spy agencies as "human wreckage."

It's easy to understand how such individuals can easily be manipulated through bribes, other inducements, threats or psychological pressure up to and including sophisticated brain-washing techniques. These are known to have been developed by "spy" agencies over decades and in this country go back at least to the CIA's self-admitted funding of "psychic driving" experiments under the Project MK-Ultra mind control program on unknowing civilians at McGill University from 1957 to 1964 under the direction of Dr. Donald Ewen Cameron: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Ewen_Cameron).

Frequently mentally-disturbed people have been in trouble with the law. This was true of Zehaf-Bibeau and Couture-Rouleau. Zehaf-Bibeau was desperate, on the edge, unpredictable, wanted to die. Spy agencies find such people easily. The "chosen ones" will have Arabic names and be converts to Islam. Or have Middle East connections. Many combinations fill the bill to help the label "suspected terrorist" stick.

Run-ins with the law render disturbed individuals additionally vulnerable. Police or "intelligence" agents can promise to use their influence to gain shorter sentences if they've been convicted, more leniency if they've already been sentenced. Or get them off altogether. Conversely agents can threaten to use their influence to make things much worse for these individuals. Those promising or threatening often are in a position to deliver.

In this connection, the lead article in the Focus section of *The Globe and Mail* on October 25th by Doug Saunders actually describes, without his using the term, false flag ops by U.S. "authorities."

It's worth excerpting that section of his piece:

> *Authorities in the U.S. adopted the practice of catching lone-wolf figures in sting operations, in which they'd find disturbed young men online, provide them with prefabricated terror plots and (fake) weapons, and arrest them a moment before they were about to carry out their planned attack. This approach has been numerically successful – that is, it has intercepted a lot of putative terrorists – but many wonder if it's simply making the problem worse, and turning police agencies into terrorism enablers.*
>
> *"Often these are down-and-out losers in society who wouldn't be able to pull off a decent attack on their own," Dr. [Ramon] Spaaij, an Australian scholar with Victoria University and author of* Understanding Lone Wolf *Terrorism, says, "but the undercover police provide the weapons and suggest the targets ... what that does is it has sown a lot of bad blood in Muslim communities – we're out there preying on vulnerable young people and turning them into terrorists."*

What Saunders, whose body of work I happen to greatly admire, fails to note is that these "sting" (e.g., false flag) operations generate thousands of fear-inducing headlines; this may be their main purpose. Readers, listeners and viewers are led to believe that police have caught "real terrorists." These false flag ops contribute the bulk of the "proof" for the so-called "war on terror." It's a continuous psychological assault and distortion of reality through manufacture of "reality." The impact goes 'way beyond "sowing bad blood in Muslim communities." It's a main driver of the fictional "war on terror."

Besides, "bad blood" in Muslim communities would be one of the goals of the authors of this continuous fakery. This "bad blood" would fulfill at least two functions. One is to keep many Muslims in docile fear mode in which they can be more easily controlled. Second is that less docile Muslims, especially young unstable men, will react with anger and possibly go off the deep end. Perfect.

This is the same entrapment technique used to create the "Toronto 18." And this is the same *modus operandi* the police use when they enable or program or bribe or threaten their patsies to cause violence.

As University of Guelph professor Michael Keefer wrote:

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> *The theatrical arrests of 18 (mostly young) Muslims in Toronto in the Summer of 2006 reinforced media-driven paranoia that homegrown terrorists were everywhere. The unraveling of the case two years later exposes to view yet again the sinister and disgraceful behavior of Canada's security intelligence apparatus, which has formed a habit of confecting false accusations of terrorism against Canadian citizens. The threat to Canadian society is not a bunch of Muslim boys playing paintball, it's an ideologically driven government willing to curtail our civil liberties.*

4 The "lone wolf" or "lone gunman" narrative

Without doubt there are instances of demented individuals who perform outrages single handedly. The USA provides the most examples by far, with a plethora of berserk gunmen mowing down innocent citizens in malls, on college campuses and elsewhere.

In politically-charged false flag ops, by definition in virtually all cases agents in the shadows pull the levers to bring about the outrages. In the three highest profile assassinations of the last century and arguably most impactful historically, those of JFK, RFK and MLK, the establishment narrative has been that lone gunmen were responsible, in each case in the face of much evidence to the contrary. Lee Harvey Oswald was known to have worked for U.S. intelligence. He's a classic "lone gunman" who wasn't. Others include James Earl Ray, allegedly the killer of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who wasn't, as proven in a civil trial in Memphis in 1999. The half white half black jury returned a verdict that civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. was the victim of an assassination conspiracy involving the CIA and the U.S. Army and did not die at the hands of an unaided lone gunman.

In the case of Zehaf-Bibeau the likelihood of enablers is rendered very high because of many unanswered questions. Among them, how did a deranged misfit living in shelters obtain both a gun and a car needed for him to go on his rampage?

5 "Lone wolves" tend to become quickly deceased

From Lee Harvey ("I am just a patsy") Oswald to Rolando Galman (who gunned down Benigno Aquino, Jr., former Philippine Senator, as he stepped off his plane, and then himself was gunned down) to the "Boston bomber" Tamerlan Tsarnaev, patsies or hired assassins tend to become deceased – quickly. Dead men tell no tales. Typically, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau and Martin Couture-Rouleau are no more.

In 2002 U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft named scientist Steven Hatfill a "person of interest" in connection with the "anthrax attacks" of a year before. As Graeme MacQueen writes: "The FBI concentrated on investigating him, publicly and aggressively. A year later Hatfill sued the Justice Department for libel and eventually he received $5.82 million in compensation…"

The FBI – presumably after a massive search for patsy material – decided in 2008 that the "anthrax killer" was Dr. Bruce Ivins, who had been working on an anthrax vaccine at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

"This time," MacQueen writes, "the FBI faced no serious challenge from its chosen perpetrator because Ivins died shortly before he was to be charged with the crime. He was said to have committed suicide." Tellingly, no autopsy was performed.

The death of an actual *bona fide* terrorist or, much more often the case, a recruited patsy (the classic being Oswald) obviates the possibility of a trial in a court of law (as distinguished from trial in the "court of public opinion"). Trial in a court of law carries with it the possibility of evidence emerging that could be damning to the state and the Crown's case.

The bodies of killers, alleged killers or dead "terrorists" frequently are not dealt with appropriately. As Prof. John McMurtry of Guelph, author of *The Cancer Stage of Capitalism: From Crisis to Cure*, wrote in an October 29th Global Research essay: Zehaf-Bibeau

> *"…went on a killing spree, with no known blood testing afterwards for the drugs he was evidently driven by, in the video record of his frenzied and super-charged behaviour, just as there was no known test of the body of crazed drive-over killer, Martin Couture-Rouleau. How extraordinary. How unspoken in the lavish profusion of other details… All such strange coincidences are part of the now familiar covert-state MO."*

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The de facto executions of the killers or alleged killers are, however, less a necessity than a convenience to the national security state. This is because in those cases where the patsies, killers or alleged killers survive, their trials uniformly are fixed, as was the case with the "Toronto 18," who rapidly became the Toronto nine, as charges were dropped against many of the teenaged "terror suspects."

6 The branding

The St-Jean-sur-Richelieu events were instantly defined as "terrorism" by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in the House of Commons and thereafter were widely so defined by the military, by "intelligence experts," RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson and by many media players. (There are honourable exceptions to the general rush to judgment within the media. We identify some later.)

The "anthrax attacks," MacQueen writes, "were the result of a [domestic] conspiracy meant to help redefine the enemy of the West, revising the global conflict framework from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror."

The events in Ottawa were not meant to replace the global-conflict framework but rather to reinforce the new 2001 model: "Islam" as the permanent mortal enemy of "the West."

The rhetoric, like ad copy, is part and parcel of the branding.

Buzzwords ("war on terror,"), code words ("national security"), snarl words ("terrorists," "radical Islam," "threats") and purr words ("our allies," "security") as semanticist S. I. Hayakawa dubbed them, displace rational thought.

Equal in impact to that of language repetition, if not greater, were the iconic elements. The National War Memorial and Parliament are about as iconic as one can arrange in Canada. So to have the shooter start at one, then skedaddle over to the other on the same crazed mission is to do so on iconosteroids.

Add to that: two worthy soldiers representing Everyman, all Members of Parliament, the Prime Minister, a car-jacked driver, a hero in the person of the gun-toting Sergeant-at-Arms, the heart-wrenching footage of Corporal Cirillo's five-year-old son wearing his father's regimental hat, the corporal's pet dogs, the grieving spouses and relatives and more.

It would be a mistake to overlook that the flesh and blood victims, Corporal Cirillo and Warrant Office Patrice Vincent, also were symbolic. They represent "Canada's military,"

"our men and women in uniform" who "serve our country" who "made the ultimate sacrifice."

Many of the iconic themes of October 22nd were pre-echoed in the Toronto 18 trials, one of them being the alleged planning by the teen-aged patsies and dupes of "blowing up Parliament" and "beheading the prime minister."

7 "Security exercises" and the false flag curiously overlap

A hallmark of false flag ops is that military, security, police or "intelligence" exercises precede or run simultaneously with a false flag operation. Run-throughs are necessary for all complex maneuvers. A drill also justifies assembling the human and other resources required.

Perhaps the most egregious exercise was the one admitted to be taking place at the time of the "London 7/7" tube "terror bombings" of July 7th, 2007. Peter Power, managing director of crisis management for the firm Visor Consultants, in a live interview on *ITV News* that was aired at 8:20 p.m. on the evening of the bombings, tells the host "…today we were running an exercise …. 1,000 people involved in the whole organization … and the most peculiar thing was that we based our scenario on simultaneous attacks on the underground and mainland station and so we had to suddenly switch an exercise from fictional to real." Elsewhere he said the exercise specified the same stations that the "surprise bombers" targeted, which would qualify as one of the most far-fetched coincidences of all time.

On the day of 9/11 a minimum of five military drills were underway. One of them, Vigilant Guardian, involved the insertion of false radar blips onto radar screens in the Northeast Air Defense Sector, a fact that even made it into the fraudulent *9/11 Commission Report* (although the others did not, which made the appearance of Vigilant Guardian a limited hangout).

All of which is relevant to what Mark Taliano wrote about the events in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa on the Global Research website on October 31st:

> *"The theory that U.S agencies were somehow implicated in the [Ottawa] tragedy is further reinforced by … Operation Determined Dragon, a joint Canada/U.S counter-terrorism drill…"*

The first Canadian event, the fatal hit-and-run carried out by Couture-Rouleau, occurred on the first day of that drill, October 20th. From that day to 29th was the "execution phase" of a joint Canada-U.S.-NATO military-intelligence "linked exercise" named Determined Dragon 14 (in internal documents called "Ex DD 14").

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For details of Determined Dragon 14 one need look no further than the National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces website http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-exercises/ddragon.page:

"Ex DD 14 will primarily focus on the lateral interface between NORAD, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) specifically in cyber and space domains," visitors to the site are informed.

Among the strategic objectives specified on the are to "enhance interagency partnerships" and to "institutionalize battle procedures with partners such as regional and component commanders, the Strategic Joint Staff, the Associate Deputy Minister (Policy), and the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command." Another is to enhance "bilateral planning with USNORTHCOM and USSTRATCOM; and CJOC coordination with NORAD.

Under the heading "Linked Exercises" the Canadian site says that Ex DD 14 "is bound to other allied exercises by a common scenario and linked through multiple events:

- Ex VIGILANT SHIELD, a NORAD-USNORTHCOM exercise focused on homeland defence and homeland security missions; and
- Ex GLOBAL THUNDER, a USSTRATCOM-led exercise with the primary emphasis on exercising nuclear command and control capabilities.

It concludes that Ex DD 14 "offers an opportunity for regional joint task forces (RJTF) to leverage their own exercises.

For someone paying close attention to *CBC-TV*'s The National on October 25th, *CBC* senior correspondent Adrienne Arsenault came close to giving away the game. Anchor Peter Mansbridge begins by saying there are "lots of questions" about the day's events. After he hears the usual line from regularly seen Ray Boisvert, "ex-CSIS," Mansbridge turns to Arsenault, "who's been looking at this whole issue of radicalization for the past year or so" and asks her what she can say. Arsenault replies:

(http://www.globalresearch.ca/canadian-authorities-ran-war-game-drills-depicting-isis-attack-scenarios/5409707)

> *They [Canadian authorities] may have been surprised by the actual incidents but not by the concepts of them. Within the last month we know that the CSIS, the RCMP and the National Security Task Force engaged in, I suppose they, ran a scenario that's akin to a war games exercise if you will where they actually* imagined literally an attack in Quebec, followed by an attack in another city, followed by a tip that that "hey some guys, some foreign fighters are coming back from Syria." *So they were imagining a worst case scenario. We're seeing elements of that happening right now. ... [Canadian authorities] may talk today in terms of being surprised but we know that this precise scenario has been keeping them up at night for awhile." [my emphasis]*

Mansbridge shows no interest in this remarkable statement by his senior correspondent.

But truth activist Josh Blakeney of the University of Lehbridge who also was one of the first out of the block in nailing these events as false flags, comments:

> *What an amazing coincidence that Canadian intelligence ran a drill envisioning an attack first in Quebec, then another city. What are the chances that these mock terror drills are just a coincidence? In nearly every instance of a major terrorist occurrence in the West, it has been revealed that intelligence services were conducting war games exercises mimicking the very events that later come to pass. And now we have confirmation that Canada's intelligence services were doing the same thing.*

All of which would seem to reflect adequate "information exchanges" with "our U.S. partner" and other "allies." Yet Harper's new "anti-terror" legislation will merge Canadian spooks and military even more into the global apparatus that can manufacture terror incidents pretty well anywhere any time.

8 Media manipulation on both sides of the border

On the crucial propaganda front the evidence is that "U.S. officials" initiated journalistic input, and government agents planted within the media on both sides of the border meddled with journalistic output.

Key mainstream media stories as well as tweets "disappeared." Stories disappeared from Google. Both U.S. and Canadian mainstream reports were altered significantly. This could only be carried out by internal gatekeeper agents. Inputs and outputs left permanent fingerprints of the overt as well as behind-the-scenes manipulation.

Students of false flag operations have learned – just as regular detectives have learned in regard to standard non-political crimes – the first 24 or 48 hours provide critical evidence, before the criminals can begin covering their tracks.

Amy MacPherson of Free The Press Canada (https://www.facebook.com/FreeThePressCanada) hit the ground running in those first hours and days. On Tuesday, October 23rd she posted a lengthy piece, carried the next day on GlobalResearch containing damning evidence of rolling censorship on social media including Twitter and in mainstream media including the *Toronto Star* and the *CBC*.

Equally if not more damning are her frame grabs showing that U.S. news outlets were fed information by "U.S. officials" identifying Zehaf-Bibeau as the Ottawa shooter prematurely, before Canadian media were able to identify him.

With accompanying grabs, MacPherson writes: "While Canadian news personalities were at police gunpoint, American outlets like *CBS News* and the [always suspect]*Associated Press* had a full story to sell, complete with the dead shooter's name."

At 10:54 a.m. Eastern, when the National War Memorial crime scene was not yet secured, *CBS News* stated: "The gunmen [sic] has been identified by U.S. officials to *CBS News* as Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, a Canadian national born in 1982." MP Charlie Angus described gunshots around 10 a.m. American media had solved the murder 54 minutes later.

"By 4:58 p.m." MacPherson notes, "the [*CBS*] story was edited to remove the shooter's name, or any mention of the U.S. government's knowledge." She continues: "The only problem is no one could update the Google database quick enough with these changes, so the original information still appeared with general search results.

> *"The story was altered again in the evening, when the Canadian government* allowed *[her emphasis] the name of a shooter to be released and American media added law enforcement to their list of official sources. They also added a middle name, Abdul, to emphasize the suspect's Islamic ties with an accusation of terrorism."*

She asks:

> *"...how American intelligence knew the name of a 'possible terrorist' as the mayhem was still unfolding. How did Americans know when Canadians didn't, and how was this information so widespread that American media and Google had access to distribute, but domestic reporters on the scene did not?*
>
> *"Canadian parliamentary bureau chiefs didn't possess the same information as their U.S. counterparts and faced the barrel of police guns as a press narrative was provided on their behalf by another country. If this is dubbed an act of terrorism that American sources had knowledge about to pre-report, then why weren't steps taken to prevent the violence?"*

Then there are the all-Canadian media anomalies. "The *Toronto Star* reported [that] multiple witnesses saw [Couture-Rouleau] with his hands in the air," writes MacPherson, "when at least one police officer opened fire. They also say a knife was 'lodged into the ground near where the incident occurred.'

"Well," MacPherson continues, "that's what the original story by Allan Woods, Bruce Campion-Smith, Joanna Smith, Tonda MacCharles and Les Whittington stated. A syndicated copy had to be located at the *Cambridge Times,* because a newer, edited version at the *Toronto Star* appeared dramatically altered by Tuesday."

That article (changed without disclosure) claims Couture-Rouleau was an Islamic radical who emerged from the vehicle with a knife in his hands. No mention of eyewitnesses who saw his hands in the air and the knife lodged in the ground (an image seen later on *CBC-TV* news).

As MacPherson writes: "The article was more than edited and qualifies as being replaced entirely, having lost its tone, facts and spirit from the original published version.

If it weren't for smaller papers carrying *The Star*'s original syndicated content, there would be little or no proof of the first comprehensive version, she adds.

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9 Failure of media to ask fundamental questions

These include, first and foremost: "Is it possible that agents of the state had a hand in this outrage?"
This question might not be as difficult to raise as one might imagine. Suppose it were handled this way:

"There's a long and well-documented history of authorities staging iconic events aimed at stampeding their publics into supporting government initiatives, especially initiatives supporting existing or proposed wars. Examples include Colin Powell's introduction at the United Nations of alleged compelling proof – subsequently proven false – that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. [pause] Can it be ruled out definitively that behind-the-scenes actors in government circles in Canada had *no hand whatsoever* in the events of October 22nd?"

Of course, for any media person to ask such a question would pre-suppose that those who reach the level of Parliamentary correspondent or, higher still, anchor of a national news program would have developed deep skepticism based on hard-won knowledge of the history of such operations.

It would further pre-suppose that, had they developed such a grasp of history, they would be promoted to those levels.

What can we say? We can say: "These things ain't going to happen."

Tihe "failure" to ask fundamentally important fully justified questions based on documented history known to many readers, listeners and viewers deserves extensive treatment in itself. The "failure" represents, from the point of view of a cover-up, success for the real perpetrators.

Such unasked questions are masked by the repetitive posing of essentially superficial questions and questions that beg answers. Press conferences are rife with the acceptance of the official line along with questions about minutiae within the line. One also hears a lot of really dumb and repetitive questions.

The graphically impressive front page of *The Globe and Mail* had it on October 23rd: "The murder of Corporal Nathan Cirillo, the storming of Parliament and the **tough questions** [my emphasis] arising from the chaos."

The phrase "tough questions" in this context suggests – and their subsequent rollout reinforces – a central theme that buttresses the official line: that there have been "security lapses," that these lapses are serious, that therefore "security agencies" need "more resources" to do their jobs "protecting our security" and "making us safe," and so on and on.

Included among the questions most frequently trotted out by the media: "How can we strike a balance between "the need for greater security" on the one hand, and "the protection of privacy," on the other.

This endlessly posed question has embedded within it several unexamined major premises, concealed significant historical facts and trends, as well as an ambiguity serving both concealments and that drives conclusions among readers, listeners and viewers that are ill-based, self-defeating and that inoculate those who are so manipulated against gaining greater understanding.

The premises include that privacy is ever and always a stand-alone good; that every person's privacy is at risk equally with every other person's; that privacy for each person or group means the same as for every other person or group; that in fact the two sides of the equation *are* security vs. privacy (as opposed, for instance, to security vs. freedom, although that equation – much more relevant – is raised fairly frequently) and that it is the good-faith activities of "security forces" that endanger "privacy." Left out of the equation are the proven bad faith activities of "security forces."

The concealments include that the threat to citizens can come from the good-faith actions of "security forces," yes, but that in fact by a large preponderance come from rogue actions of "security forces" and "intelligence agencies," both of which are virtually out-of-control now.

On protecting the identity of "intelligence sources

The historical record – not in the slightest acknowledged by the "security vs privacy" equation – shows conclusively that those most spied upon, whose personal security is threatened repeatedly, are those who question authority, those who are peaceful dissidents, those who seek and act for improvements to the status quo, specifically for more equality and justice, those who are left-of-centre up to and including revolutionaries. The danger posed to loss of privacy among those on the left is *much greater* than it is for those on the right or for those not politically involved at all, which is to say the vast majority of citizens. This historical record goes unaddressed in 99% or more of the discourse about the dangers of "loss of privacy."

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The large majority of people have little reason to fear the state, because they pose no perceived threat to the state. Accordingly, their need or wish to protect their privacy – for instance about their personal sex or financial lives – is of less interest to, is far less important to, the national security state than are the personal facts and political beliefs or acts of those on the left who pose a perceived threat to the status quo, however lawful or justified their words or actions may be.

Providing deeper, almost impenetrable, cover for informants, otherwise known colloquially as rats or ratfinks, is far from a pressing need for national security.

Rather, the history of informants shows that the majority, and in particular those who are chosen or come forward to "intelligence" agencies (or are assigned by these agencies), are owed much less protection from identity than they even now enjoy.

The case of RCMP informant Richard Young is just one that should give pause.

Young was recruited by the RCMP in British Columbia (he approached them) prior to 2007. He convinced them he had information on drug operations. An accomplished con man, he suckered the Mounties big time.

While they, through failure to carry out due diligence among other things, came under his spell he was taken under their witness protection program. Doing so is labour intensive and expensive. Under it, Young committed a murder, which is uncontested. The Mounties then did all in their considerable power to shield him from the consequences of that. This and more was documented by two *CanWest* reporters and then a *Globe and Mail* investigative team in 2007.

At the heart of the stupidity, naivete and wrong-doing by the RCMP was the continued insistence on protecting Young's identity. Ultimately the Mounties' failure and the harm done (wasted public money, a man getting away with murder under the protection of the RCMP, and the RCMP not properly held to account) were exposed by less than a handful of dedicated reporters.

A compelling but illegitimate reason for these agencies to seek total anonymity for their "informants" is that so many of these do not even qualify as such, but rather are individuals planted to manufacture false "intelligence" or carry out dirty tricks on targets chosen by

these agencies. Documented history shows that typically the targets are law-abiding, well-informed, politically active (on the left) and even courageous citizens who nevertheless are considered "enemies of the state" by the security apparatus and its overlords.

Remember that the RCMP spied on Tommy Douglas to the extent that his dossier numbered 1,100 pages, only a few of which CSIS, which inherited the RCMP dossier, has released. The grounds for CSIS's refusal are that it must protect the informants. This is the very group of unsavoury snitches that the Harper government wants to give deeper cover.

The otherwise much-touted need for transparency and accountability is not only forgotten within "terrorist threat" hysteria. It is turned on its head. It is claimed that transparency and accountability are *threats* to the public! And that anyone who suggests otherwise also is a threat. In a world of fear the good becomes bad and the bad becomes good.

The so-called "war on terror," fed by the national security state to the public like slops to pigs, paves the way through regression to a world of "military tribunals" (an oxymoron), of Star Chambers, to a new Dark Ages.

Outcomes of this particular false flag op

- It makes the task much harder for those warning the public of the dangers of the government's legislation endowing intelligence agencies with greater powers, more resources, fewer restrictions and less transparency.
- Providing the RCMP and other spy agencies with even more anonymity for informants is a particular danger, as noted at length above.
- If the laws being pushed by Harper today go through, the RCMP, CSIS or CSEC in a similar case in the future would be even more enabled to waste the time of personnel and of other resources, and of taxpayer public money, for little or no gain in public safety or security.
- Reduction of civil liberties: easier detentions, extraditions
- Increased invasion of privacy
- Intimidation of legislative branch, as happened in spades in the USA in response to the "anthrax attacks."
- More pressure on the judiciary to bow to omnipresent low-level "terrorism" hysteria
- Marginalizing of both the legislative and judicial branches
- Increased integration of Canadian spy agencies with those
- of "our" allies, so that the globalist integrated deception apparatus can operate even more freely and in ever more sophisticated ways.
- Buttressing of the grand made-in-Washington pax Americana imperial design.

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Honourable exceptions in the media

In fairness, quite a number of voices of reason, caution, skepticism and outright objection to the Harper government's obvious exploitation of the events of the week of October 20th to forward its militaristic pro-American pro-Israeli agenda could be found. Unfortunately, as usual with false flags, these voices accepted the government's version of *what happened.*

With this fundamental *caveat* in place, however, here are just a few individuals within the Canadian mainstream who made cogent arguments of dissent.

In the *Toronto's Star*'s 17 pages of coverage on October 23rd **Martin Regg Cohn** cautioned:

> *"The risk is that we will overreact with security clampdowns and lockdowns that are difficult to roll back when the threat subsides. The greater risk is that we will hunker down with over-the-top security precautions that pose a more insidious menace to our open society."*

Tom Walkom pointed out the events were not unprecedented. In 1984 a disgruntled Canadian Forces corporal killed three and wounded 13 in Quebec's national assembly. "We know," Walkom continued, "that in a situation like this, facts are secondary," and "at times like this, it is easy to lose all sense of proportion." **Haroon Siddiqui** asked why, "if Martin Rouleau, a.k.a. Ahmad the Convert," was in the crosshairs of CSIS and the RCMP for months, he was not being tailed.

> *"Smoking out such suspects and throwing the book at them requires good policing, not wars abroad or the whipping up of fears at home for partisan political purposes."*

On October 27th in *The Globe and Mail* **Elizabeth Renzetti** quoted extensively from James Risen's new book, *Pay Any Price: Greed, Power and Endless War*. "The war in question is the war on terror, which Mr. Risen, a Pulitzer-Prize winning security reporter for *The New York Times*, says has been used as an excuse to conduct a largely secret campaign to undermine Americans' civil rights, spy on their communications and line the pockets of security consultants. As one reviewer said, it reads like a thriller – except, unfortunately, it's not fiction."

She quotes Risen:

> *"Of all the abuses America has suffered at the hands of the government in its endless war on terror," Mr. Risen writes, "possibly the worst has been the war on truth."*

On the same day in the *Toronto Star* **Tim Harper** wrote:

> *"Here's a vote for the power of time and perspective." "And here's a vote of confidence in a Parliament that will not jump to conclusions in the heat of the moment and a government that will resist the temptation to use October's events as an impetus to move into new, unneeded realms."*
>
> *"Before we move too far, time and perspective should force us to ask whether we were dealing with mental health issues last week rather than terrorism, even as the RCMP said Sunday it had 'persuasive evidence' that Michael Zehaf-Bibeau's attack was driven by ideological and political motives." "We must twin increased powers with increased oversight."*

On November 2nd, the *Toronto Star* published a long lead editorial headed "'Terrorism' Debate: Get beyond the word."

The second paragraph:

> *"Down one path is a U.S.-like response to the perceived, though unsubstantiated, threat of terror: increased police powers and indiscriminate state snooping, the chipping away of civil liberties. This the way of the government."*

Down the other "is a more considered, deliberate approach that takes the rule of law as primary…" The choice, the editorial continues "ought to be fertile ground for a pivotal public debate but so far that conversation has been eclipsed by a lexicographical matter: whether we can rightly call the attack on Ottawa 'terrorism.'"

It concludes:

> *"As long as our leaders insist on reducing these complex issues to a binary debate over a slippery word, we cannot have the conversation we need nor choose the country we'll become."*

Many writers of letters to the editors of these papers are in no mood to be panicked by inflated "terror" talk. "Denying [Zihaf-Bibeau and Couture-Rouleau] their passports had the equivalent effect of putting them in cages and poking at them with a sharp stick. They broke out and two soldiers are dead." This was from a retired RCMP officer, in *The Globe and Mail*.

False flag events benefit the Canadian right

Some commentators to their credit have observed that these events as played are calculated to pay off domestically to increase the Harper government's chances of re-election next year.

Harper now holds a couple of aces for a winning electoral hand. One is his rightwing anti-taxes stance tied to producing a federal money surplus whatever the cost to the environment, science, social services (including more help for the mentally ill) and more. Some of that surplus is already being earmarked in the highest-profile ways as bribes (with their own money) to Canadians with children.

Last week's events now constitute another ace. "Family-friendly" leaders seen as standing tall against an external enemy almost always benefit electorally. But this second ace is a fixed card. In this game there are five aces: clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds and false flags.

Only when a politically relevant portion of Canada's and the world's people understand the dominant agenda-setting function of false flag operations can decent people the world over begin a successful effort to replace the vast global inequality-and-death structure with a life-sustaining and fair socio-economic structure.

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As Prof. John McMurtry of Guelph put it on October 29th in an essay entitled "Canada: Decoding Harper's Terror Game. Beneath the Masks and Diversions" published by Global Research:

> *"If the stratagem is not seen through, the second big boost to Harper will be to justify the despotic rule and quasi-police state he has built with ever more prisons amidst declining crime, ever more anti-terrorist rhetoric and legislation, ever more cuts to life support systems and protections (the very ones which would have prevented these murderous rampages), and ever more war-mongering and war-criminal behaviours abroad.*

Adds McMurtry:

> *"Harper rule can only go further by such trances of normalized stupefaction now reinforced with Canadian blood."*

Barrie Zwicker is a renowned Canadian journalist, best selling author and documentary producer.

Can Islamic State Survive without Baghdadi?

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Source: http://www.meforum.org/4883/can-islamic-state-survive-without-baghdadi

In the wake of US-led air strikes on an Islamic State (IS) convoy near the Iraqi city of Mosul on Friday, media have been awash with rumours that IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed or injured.

The apparent silence of IS sources on the issue could be evidence that something has happened to al-Baghdadi. But there was a similar lack of official IS denial of rumours that the group's spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had been killed in air strikes earlier this year - something that later turned out to be unfounded.

A Twitter account purportedly belonging to Adnani has claimed Baghdadi should be on his way to a speedy recovery, but the account is almost certainly fake, as it refers to Adnani in the third person at one point. Were it real, Twitter would have deleted it some time ago, having cracked down on all traces of an official IS presence on its platform.

Regardless of the veracity of the present reports, it is of interest to assess what impact Baghdadi's death would have on the fortunes of IS.

IS is heavily invested in the image of Baghdadi, who had projected himself as a caliph for a year before a caliphate was declared in June 2014.

One of the signs of this was Baghdadi's original declaration rebranding the group as ISIS - the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria - in April 2013, an evolution from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

ISIS implied an Islamic state entity whose presence in Iraq and Syria was a mere geographic accident, and subject to future expansion.

ISI, on the other hand, had implied an independent emirate that could perhaps be subsumed into the long-term global project of al-Qaeda.

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Who else?

The shift from ISI to ISIS was marked with slogans such as "the promised project of the caliphate" and songs like "Close ranks and pledge allegiance to Baghdadi".

Thus, IS's basis for claiming to be a state and caliphate is closely tied to Baghdadi's persona, which initially thrived on hiding behind audio messages.

Key also to Baghdadi's legitimacy in the eyes of IS supporters is his claimed lineage from the Prophet Muhammad's family and tribe, as well as his scholarly knowledge of religious jurisprudence.

The problem for IS is to find a viable successor to Baghdadi in the event of his death. No other figure in IS is publicly cultivated to claim the position of caliph, with credentials of education in Islamic law.

In addition, the persona of Baghdadi is credited with ISI's rise to a transnational entity that controls contiguous territory and has all the trappings of a state.

Senior figures within IS - such as members of the Shura Council, which supposedly gave legitimacy to the caliphate declaration - remain otherwise unknown.

Nothing suggests that other high-ranking IS figures, such as Adnani and field commanders Omar Shishani and Shaker Abu Waheeb, are being projected as potential successors to Baghdadi.

'Winning horse'

Therefore, IS could find itself in disarray in the event of Baghdadi's death if it cannot immediately achieve consensus on a successor who can live up to his legacy and command allegiance from the world's Muslims.

Indeed, the group's rank-and-file is by no means monolithic. Many members - particularly from likeminded jihadi groups such as Jamaat Ansar al-Islam - have pledged allegiance on the notion that IS is a "winning horse" that can project itself as a caliphate.

If that credibility disappears, the pledges of allegiance, which it should be noted are made to Baghdadi as "caliph of the Muslims", could well vanish. Members would then revert to their original group identities, reducing Islamic State's ranks.

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4 Tipping Points That Could Spur Societal Chaos

By Joseph Mattera

Source: http://www.charismanews.com/opinion/the-pulse/46103-4-tipping-points-that-could-spur-societal-chaos

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The sentiment in the United States recently has been so fragile and fraught with anger and fear, that it can perhaps take only one major event to result in a tipping point towards societal chaos. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 taught us that not even the great USA is immune to confusion and mass chaos.

The following four tipping points could result in societal chaos in the USA:

1) Race riots

The riots that took place recently in Ferguson, Missouri, demonstrate that there is still much distrust among people of color when it comes to social justice issues. A similar outbreak could have easily taken place in NYC several months ago when Eric Garner died after being placed in a chokehold during an arrest.

Whether the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson was justified and/or the chokehold of Eric Garner was necessary is beside the point. A society where there is abundant trust between divergent ethnic groups and/or between minority communities and the police (and the judicial system) can handle a controversial shooting or unintended death during an arrest.

However, the O.J. Simpson trial several decades ago demonstrated that there is still a huge racial divide when it comes to perception. The whites largely thought O.J. was guilty and the people of color largely believed he was innocent. The Ferguson issue can become a huge tipping point that can trigger unrest beyond their region because, if riots erupt if the police officer who shot Michael Brown is exonerated by the grand jury, then it can potentially lead to a collapse of the judicial system in that region and beyond.

This can indeed become a huge tipping point across the nation because of the unresolved, seething issues of perceived racism, which evidently trumps the judicial system—one of our major pillars for peace and civility.

2) A viral pandemic

The response of the present administration to the Ebola outbreak in Africa demonstrates that the USA is ill-prepared to deal with a potential pandemic.

Furthermore, we have been hearing for years that the frequent (and often unnecessary) use of antibiotics among the population as well as the ability of super viruses to mutate and adapt make a huge pandemic in the USA more likely as time goes on.

I doubt Ebola will ever spread in our nation. However, there are far more dangerous strains of viruses that can eventually cause a tipping point towards societal chaos and confusion.

3) A terrorist attack

It has been a major miracle that the USA has not experienced another terrorist attack on the scale of Sept. 11, 2001. It is not only due to the great job of the FBI, Homeland Security, various police agencies and CIA, but in my opinion, due to the grace and mercy of God. With the advent of weaponized drones (that can spew dangerous chemicals or ignite a nuclear weapon) and the proliferation of groups like Islamic State that now have access to raw materials to produce weapons of mass destruction, it will be far easier in the future for radical jihadis to wreak havoc across our nation. This can be a tipping point that could cause mass hysteria and unrest.

4) An economic meltdown

Although many think the economy is doing well today, there are a number of events that could trigger a collapse of the stock market: a terrorist attack, an Ebola-like pandemic, mass rioting resulting in mass unrest and more—**all of these fall under the category of a "Black Swan," which in this context has to do with an unpredictable event that can catalyze a tipping point towards economic chaos.** As we have seen, people are volatile and mercurial and so is the stock market—any one of the above tipping points can result in a huge economic crash.

Furthermore, some believe that if the U.S. currency is ever replaced with other national currencies (something I do not think will happen very soon), then the U.S. federal government will not be able to continue to print money to pay down the national debt—something that will cause a huge financial implosion in our nation.

In conclusion, only God can protect our nation. It is up to the church to be vigilant in prayer, since the enemy who wants to destroy our soul also wants to destroy our nation. Ultimately, if the Lord doesn't protect our nation, then no political leader, military leader or church leader will be able to prevent an event that can tip our nation over into chaos.

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Joseph Mattera is overseeing bishop of Resurrection Church and Christ Covenant Coalition, in Brooklyn, New York.

Algeria: Islamic State to Rewrite Qur'an

Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/201411110361.html

Amid reports that the Islamic State (ISIS) intends to rewrite and edit the Holy Qur'an, academics, scholars and religious leaders are voicing the need to confront the group on its ideological home turf.
According to Iraqi channel Afek, "The Islamic State organisation decided to rewrite the Qur'an, and delete some verses."
Turkish daily Aydinlik also reported that ISIS had announced its intention to rearrange verses of the Qur'an.
The extremist group claims that the verses they want to delete were put in by "forgers".

But according to Cheikh Mohamed Arbaoui, the imam of the mosque of al-Bashir Ibrahimi in Algiers, "Sunni scholars and the community believe in the total integrity of the Qur'an from distortion, switch, change, and lack or addition in any way."
"This is why Sunni scholars and the community say that whoever claims the existence of distortion in the Qur'an is an infidel, and those who say something that could mislead the nation are infidels," the imam added.

Cheikh Arbaoui warned against "schemes aimed at fragmenting the Umma by extreme violence, murder and terrorism ideas".

ISIS has "nothing to do with Islam", the imam said.

He called for "disseminating the true Islamic religion, and deploying and supporting centrist thought, as an impregnable barrier against these terrorist organisations and their plans".

Religious law professor Sadiq Nabti said that ISIS ideology was derived from distorted interpretations of verses and sayings of the prophet.

The organisation's view of takfir is rejected by Sunni clerics and scholars, since it excommunicates broad segments of Muslims, the academic noted.

"They reject the statements of religious scholars and clerics, and only accept those who agree with their approach," the professor explained.

Nabti added: " Excommunicating all those who disagree with them, excessive killings and torture... are contrary to God's law".

Yet for extremist groups such as ISIS, the common denominator is extreme savagery, said Zubair Arous, a sociology professor at the University of Algiers.

"Violent organisations adopted a completely different ideology, which requires that we review our analyses," he said at a recent Echorouk forum.

No-fly zones over Disney parks face new scrutiny

Source: http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-disney-airspace-20141110-story.html

The "Happiest Place on Earth" has some of the strictest airspace in America.

One day last month, an odd pair of security

California and central Florida.

The sky over Disneyland in Anaheim (photo) and Walt Disney World in Orlando is

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alerts appeared on the Federal Aviation Administration's website, reminding pilots that they are not allowed to fly into two areas in Southern

"national defense airspace." Intentionally violating Mickey and Minnie's airspace, the alerts warn, could result in interception,

interrogation and federal prosecution.

These no-fly zones are known as temporary flight restrictions, like the ones that surround

Administrator Michael P. Huerta testified before Congress last year that, if the congressional mandate were removed, the agency would not

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the president when he travels or those put in place above Ferguson, Mo., during protests over the summer. Wildfires, air shows and large sporting events regularly get temporary flight restrictions.

Banner towers used to make money with their banner tows around Disneyland; now they're not allowed to. ... You can fly [around] Knott's Berry Farm, Six Flags, no big deal. - Mark Skinner, owner of Anaheim Helicopters

Yet there is nothing temporary about the restrictions over the Disney properties. Such limits do not exist over competing theme parks such as Universal Studios (photo above) or Knott's Berry Farm.

The Disney restrictions have been in place since 2003, thanks to a provision quietly slipped into a massive congressional spending bill weeks before the Iraq war. Defense and counter-terrorism officials did not appear to ask for the Disney protections, which were instead urged by at least one Disney lobbyist, according to an Orlando Sentinel investigation in 2003.

The restrictions effectively ended a war between Disney and aerial advertisers who had buzzed over the parks for years before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

otherwise grant requests for no-fly zones over Disney properties under existing FAA rules. That 2003 law also made no-fly zones over sporting events permanent; if that law were lifted, an FAA spokeswoman said last week, the agency would consider requests for such zones on a case-by-case basis and consult with other agencies.

Defenders of the zones have said the Disney parks merit special protection because of their importance to American culture and the large crowds they draw. Critics say that the zones, which ==each cover a three-mile radius==, would be useless against a true terrorist attack and that the restrictions instead mostly harm pilots who tow advertising banners.

"Banner towers used to make money with their banner tows around Disneyland; now they're not allowed to. ... People can't take aerial photography shots," said Mark Skinner, owner of Anaheim Helicopters. But "you can fly [around] Knott's Berry Farm, Six Flags, no big deal," he said.

According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Assn., nearly 100 aerial advertising firms went out of business after

Congress codified the no-fly zones over the Disney parks and sporting events. (Pilots have been especially critical of the sporting event no-fly zones, which may last just a few hours but are implemented thousands of times a year.)

Craig Spence, vice president of operations and international affairs for the association, said the restrictions served no real security purpose.

Skinner said even if terrorists attacked Disneyland, no one was actively patrolling the park's airspace. "If something bad were to happen, how quickly could they get something up there? Not quick enough," he said. "A plane can cover three miles in literally a minute."

Richard W. Bloom, director of terrorism, intelligence and security studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Ariz., said although the no-fly zones were "certainly not foolproof," they "definitely have a deterring value" as one of many layers of security designed to protect American airspace.

A Disney spokeswoman said the no-fly zones protected the public. "We believe the airspace restrictions over large gathering places like sports stadiums and our theme parks continue to make sense for enhancing public safety," Cathi Killian said.

When the no-fly zones were approved, however, some of Disney's public remarks suggested the company was not solely concerned about terrorist attacks.

"The sole and exclusive motivation for seeking these restrictions is for the safety and enjoyment of our guests," Disney spokeswoman Leslie Goodman told the Orlando Sentinel after the restrictions were created. But Goodman added that "enjoyment" included keeping out "banner ads from trial lawyers" and pilots "buzzing the parks."

The no-fly zones have been challenged in court, without success.

A Christian group, the Family Policy Network, sued the government in 2003 to allow a pilot to fly a banner that read "Jesus Christ: Hopeforhomosexuals.com" over Walt Disney World during Gay Day. In its court filing, the group argued that the no-fly zone was unfair because Disney didn't own the airspace and that other theme parks or potential terrorism targets, such as downtown Chicago, didn't have similar zones.

In response, government attorneys mounted a strident defense of the Disney no-fly zones, saying terrorists could plow planes into crowds of tourists, drop bombs on them, or spray them with chemical or biological agents.

"No building or wall protects bare flesh from the impact of even a small plane. No window or duct tape protects lungs from the invasion of airborne chemicals or germs," wrote two federal attorneys, one from the Justice Department in Washington and the other an assistant U.S. attorney in Florida. Disney's place in the American psyche, they argued, warranted the three-mile protective space.

A federal judge threw out the Family Policy Network's arguments, writing that combating terrorism required "unquestioning adherence" to Congress' action.

More than a decade later, the attorney who fought the Disney no-fly zone, Steve Crampton, chuckled when he was reminded of the government's arguments. "Reading it now, it's kind of a 'you've got to be kidding me, right?' reaction. Give me a break," said Crampton, chief counsel for the American Center for Constitutional Rights.

"In the past 10, 12 years since those cases were argued, we've seen no further terrorist attacks of the type that took place at the World Trade Center and no real threat in these fly-over zones. I would say, today, that the case for protecting Disney is even weaker than it was when we argued those cases," Crampton said.

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EDITOR'S COMMENTS: (1) The last paragraph is another fine example of the "it will not happen to us" generation… (2) If Disney World is "protected" then both Universal Studios and Knott's Berry Farm represent targets of choice for this kind of terror attacks. I have been there and the crowd is almost equal to that of DL/DW. If you strengthen the door you weaken the windows! (3) Eager to know if Disneyland in Paris have a "no fly" zone as well – nope!

France - Prohibited airspace

All traffic is prohibited above the City of Paris. Exceptions include military aircraft and civil airplanes flying no lower than 2,000 meters. Authorizations are either given by the Ministère de la Défense, for military aircraft, or by the Préfecture de Police de Paris and the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile for civil ones. Moreover, flying of helicopters within the limits of Paris (materialized by the Boulevard périphérique) is also forbidden. Special authorization can be granted by the Préfecture de Police for helicopters undertaking precise missions such as police air-surveillance, air ambulances but also transport of high profile personalities.

Though not within Paris boundaries, the business district of La Défense has been placed under prohibited airspace in response of 9/11.

Protecting the U.S. food supply from agroterrorism

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141112-protecting-the-u-s-food-supply-from-agroterrorism

Researchers at the University of California-Davis' (UC-Davis) Western Institute for Food Safety and Security (WIFSS) are studying vulnerabilities of the U.S. agricultural system to the threats of agroterrorism. **Documents found in a 2002 U.S. military raid on an al-Qaeda warehouse showed that** potential ways in which crops or animals could be given some kind of disease agent that would create a major catastrophic event," said Dr. Bennie Osburn, director of outreach and training, and Dean Emeritus for the School of Veterinary

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The Multiscale Epidemiological/Economic Simulation and Analysis (MESA) model simulates outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease. A simulation map shows the percentages of infected animal facilities by Day 50. Areas in red represent counties in which more than 75 percent of the facilities have been infected.

terrorists sought to contaminate the U.S. food supplies. The documents included detailed instructions for attacking U.S. agricultural assets.

WIFSS, founded in 2002 and funded in part by DHS and the Food and Drug Administration, has been a primary source for solving the country's food-security issues. "We look at the

Medicine at UC-Davis. "There's concern about botulism, for instance, getting in the food supply, or ricin."

California's Yolo county accounts for 90 percent of the canned and processed tomato production in the United States, and Sacramento is home to 1.5

million acres of farmland. The region's agricultural assets make it an inviting target for agroterrorism, a subset of bioterrorism which targets crops and livestock as a medium for warfare by introducing dangerous pathogens and biological agents meant to disrupt economies and kill people. The United States experienced a form of domestic agroterrorism in 1984, when followers of cult leader Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh infected ten salad bars in Oregon with salmonella, leaving 750 people sick.

Osburn sees WIFSS as a model for preventing future disasters. It offers farmers, veterinarians, and public health officials DHS-certified courses on how to respond to agroterrorism events. **"Homeland Security is looking at more than agroterrorism now,"** he said. "They have us looking at all hazards that disrupts the food supply or causes contamination that leads to further problems. And then, how do we help these folks plan for that so there's better coordination? We're trying to sustain the food supply."

Though a large-scale agroterror attack has yet to materialize, DHS and FDA officials remain concerned, citing the easy access to major crops and livestock systems in the United States. **"For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do,"** said Tommy Thompson during his 2004 farewell speech when he left his post as U.S. secretary of Health and Human Services.

Craig McNamara, a Yolo County walnut grower and president of the California State Board of Agriculture, believes the security of the U.S. agriculture sector can be credited to vigilant farmers and security measures put in place. "In California, we're doing everything we can in agriculture to ensure we're not susceptible," he told the *Sacramento Bee*. "First and foremost, farmers are tremendously optimistic. Do potential threats exist? Certainly they do. But on the other hand, we're on our land and monitoring is taking place."

WIFSS operates a series of research farms where researchers can introduce controlled forms of salmonella and E. coli bacteria into the soil or crop's irrigation systems to understand how far and quick the bacteria may spread in the field. For the 2006 E. coli outbreak which originated in a spinach crop in the Salinas Valley and caused three deaths and sickened 200 people, researchers at WIFSS found wild pigs to be the carriers of the bacteria.

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Who is supporting Whom?

German MG3 machine guns in the hands of IS jihadists! Any ideas about who is supporting whom?

How many guns are there in Australia and where do they come from ?

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/11/how-many-guns-are-there-in-australia.html

A Senate inquiry into gun violence held its first public hearing on Monday, with committee members debating the extent of the problem of illicit guns.

So it's worth asking the question: **how many guns are there in Australia, and how many of these are illicit?**

The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) conducted an investigation into illegal firearms in 2012 and has presented some of the unclassified findings in its submission to the Senate inquiry.

The ACC submission identifies multiple "markets" for firearms in Australia. The licit, or legal market, is comprised of all guns that are registered and held by a person with a licence.

Then there's the grey market, comprised of rifles and shotguns that weren't registered or surrendered under the National Firearms Agreement in 1996.

The illicit market contains both grey market guns and guns that have been illegally imported, illegally manufactured or transferred from the legal markets in some way, such as by theft.

The ACC estimated there were over 250,000 rifles and shotguns and 10,000 handguns in the illicit market in 2012. For comparison, there were some 2.75m registered guns held by 730,000 licence holders.

So the number of illicit guns is just under a tenth of the legal ones. The ACC does, however, point out that estimating the size of the illicit market is inherently difficult given the clandestine nature of gun trafficking, so the actual number of illegal guns may be significantly higher or lower than this.

Another report into firearm trafficking in Australia by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) examined the composition of the illicit market and looked at how guns were obtained.

The AIC report analysed records for 2,750 firearms seized by police between June 2002 and October 2011 in the national firearm trace database. Of the guns seized, most were long-arms (rifles and shotguns), with a mix of restricted and nonrestricted weapons. Restricted guns are defined as those that would be subject to the 1996 buy-back.

The grey market was by far the largest source for both restricted and nonrestricted long-arms, at 92% and 86% respectively. This represents unregistered guns that have been diverted into the illicit market in some way.

For handguns, the sources were completely different, with the highest source of guns being false deactivation and theft. Deactivation is when guns are rendered incapable of firing, which in some states means the guns are no longer tracked and deregistered. Criminals can then potentially return the guns to working condition.

The theft of guns and security of storage is on the inquiry's agenda. Nationals senator Bridget McKenzie downplayed the issue by saying only six handguns had been stolen in Victoria in 2013-14. However, figures from the Australian Institute of Criminology show there were 525 firearms of all types stolen in Victoria in the same time period. The last national total of gun thefts is from 2008-09, and puts the total figure at 1,570.

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Wanted British 'White Widow terrorist killed in Ukraine', claims Russian news agency

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2831714/Wanted-British-White-Widow-terrorist-killed-Ukraine-claims-Russian-news-agency.html

November 12 – A British woman terrorist suspect dubbed the 'White Widow' has been killed in Ukraine, it was claimed on Wednesday.

Samantha Lewthwaite, 30, was gunned down by a Russian sniper two weeks ago, alleged Regnum news agency in Moscow.

One of Britain's most wanted people, she was reported last month as fighting for the Islamic State's terrorists in Syria. The extraordinary Russian claim could not be verified last night.

Lewthwaite was married to 7/7 suicide bomber Germaine Lindsay, 19, a Jamaican-born Yorkshireman, and allegedly left Britain in 2009 before being linked to atrocities in Africa.

'One of the world's most wanted terrorists Samantha Lewthwaite who fought as part of a Ukrainian battalion has been killed by a volunteer sniper,' said the news agency report.

'According to our information, the White Widow fought on the side of Ukrainian volunteer battalion Aidar as a sniper.

She was killed by 'a volunteer sniper who came to fight at the Lugansk front from Russia'.

The report continued: 'The Russian sniper who killed the British terrorist now has a

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© AFP/Getty Images

price of nearly one million dollars on his head from Ukrainian special services.'

The extraordinary unconfirmed claim came amid a welter of propaganda from Moscow and Kiev over the Ukrainian crisis.

The claim that Lewthwaite is dead could be an attempt by Russia to bolster its anti-terrorism credentials at a time when it is controversially massing armour and troops in Ukraine.

NATO today warned that Russian military equipment is entering Ukraine on a large-scale.

'Across the last two days we have seen the same thing that OSCE is reporting. We have seen columns of Russian equipment, primarily Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air defence systems and Russian combat troops entering into Ukraine,' said US General Philip Breedlove, supreme allied commander.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said: 'The level of violence in eastern Ukraine and the risk of further escalation remain high and are rising,' said Michael Bociurkiw of the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission.

In response, Ukraine has said that it's preparing for all-out war.

Ukrainian Defence Minister Stepan Poltorak told a cabinet meeting: 'The main task I see is to prepare for combat operations. We are doing this, we are readying our reserves.'

Reports last month claimed Lewthwaite - a former soldier's daughter - joined Islamic State earlier this year and became one of the most powerful women in the network.

Born in Northern Ireland and schooled in Aylesbury, she was not previously linked to Ukraine.

She was responsible for training a special team of female suicide bombers in Syria, it was alleged.
Lewthwaite allegedly trained and mentored British converts who volunteered to fight for the IS.
The 7/7 attack on the London transport network on 7 July 2005 killed 52 people.
Lewthwaite had been viewed as the innocent Home Counties' wife of a suicide bomber but was later seen as 'the world's most dangerous female terrorist'.
In June 2012 two men and a white woman - believed to be her - wearing Islamic dress killed three and injured 25 at a beer garden in Mombasa after throwing grenades at foreigners watching England play Italy at Euro 2012.
She was also linked to another grenade attack which killed security guards in an upmarket restaurant.

UPDATE: It seems that "White Widow" is alive and in South Somalia with her jihadist husband Marko Kosta…

UN authorises patrols against Somali pirates

Source: http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-others/un-authorises-patrols-against-somali-pirates/#sthash.zaW3D4OI.dpuf

The UN Security Council has voted unanimously to authorise international ships to keep patrolling sea lanes off Somalia and protecting shipping in the Indian Ocean from pirates who threaten the delivery of humanitarian aid and the safety of key maritime routes.

The resolution adopted yesterday said counter-piracy efforts by states, regions, organisations, the maritime industry and others "have resulted in a sharp decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011."

But the council expressed grave concern at the threat that pirates pose not only to commercial shipping but to fishing activities and the safety of seafarers and at the "increased pirate capacities" and their expansion into the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas.

The resolution authorises anti-piracy patrols for another year by foreign ships including vessels from the European Union, NATO, South Korea, New Zealand, the United States, China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia.

UN political chief Jeffrey Feltman told the council in October that the last time a large commercial vessel was hijacked was over two years ago. But he warned that Somali pirates are still holding 37 people.

The International Maritime Bureau has said there were only seven attacks and attempted attacks off Somalia last year, down from 49 in 2012 and 160 in 2011, the epidemic's peak.

"This positive trend shows that the international community's counter-piracy strategy is working," said the spokesperson for Britain's UN Mission, who customarily is not named.

"However, we need to remain vigilant as the underlying causes of piracy remain."

Somalia has been trying to rebuild after establishing its first functioning central government since 1991, when warlords overthrew a longtime dictator and turned on each other, plunging the impoverished nation into chaos. Al-Shabab rebels have been pushed out of key cities but they are not yet defeated and the government remains weak.

The resolution recognises that ongoing instability is an underlying cause of piracy "while piracy, in turn, exacerbates instability by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime and corruption in Syria."

The council urged all 193 UN member states to criminalise piracy under their domestic laws and called for prosecution of all those involved in pirate attacks and the immediate release of all seafarers being held.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: The UN Resolution recognizes that ongoing instability is an underlying cause of piracy…I recognize that too! You recognize that as well! SO WHAT? Me and you cannot do much about it. THEY can! But the do not! This is the problem in Somalia!

Vets, victims' family members suing European banks for supporting terrorism

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141113-vets-victims-family-members-suing-european-banks-for-supporting-terrorism

November 13 – About 200 U.S. veterans and family members of soldiers killed in Iraq filed a lawsuit on Monday in the U.S. District Court in Brooklyn, New York, claiming five European banks were partly responsible for a series of shootings and roadside bombings in Iraq. **The lawsuit brought under the 1992 U.S. Anti-Terrorism Act, which permits victims to bring private suits against alleged financiers of militant and terrorist operations, claims Barclays Plc, Credit Suisse Group AG, HSBC Holdings Plc, Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, and Standard Chartered helped financed terror by masking wire transactions for Iranian banks in order to evade U.S. sanctions. The result of the conspiracy, according to the lawsuit, was that four Iranian banks were able to divert more than $150 million to Iran-sponsored militant groups attacking U.S. troops in Iraq.**

"The defendants provided Iran with the means by which it could transfer more than $150 million to the I.R.G.C.-Q.F., Hezbollah and Special Groups, which were actively engaged in planning and perpetrating the murder and maiming of hundreds of Americans in Iraq," the lawsuit read.

The banks have acknowledged transferring millions of dollars on behalf of Iranian banks. *Insurance Journal* reports that since 2009, the five banks have agreed to pay about $3.2 billion to the U.S. government to resolve allegations that they processed financial transactions in violation of sanctions against countries such as Iran, Libya, and Cuba. All five banks signed deferred prosecution agreements with the U.S. Justice Department. The agreements did not allege a link between the transactions and militant operations.

A similar lawsuit was resolved in September when jurors found Arab Bank liable for financing twenty-four Hamas attacks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories between 2001 and 2004. That case linked Arab Bank directly to wire transfers, which alleged Hamas leaders used to pay suicide bombers and Hamas militants. This new case does not claim a direct link between the European banks and the attacks on U.S. soldiers, instead the lawsuit claims the banks indirectly facilitated the attacks by assisting in the transfer of funds. "Each defendant understood that their conduct was part of a larger scheme engineered by Iran," said Gary Osen, one of the lawyers who filed the suit. "At a minimum, he said, the banks were "deliberately indifferent" about the transactions they processed for Iran."

The lawsuit cites several e-mails and conversations taken from the banks' previous settlements with federal prosecutors that share insight on the banks' position on U.S. sanctions against Iran. The*New York Times* reports that in one e-mail, an executive from Standard Chartered replied to concerns raised by an employee in New York of the alleged transactions. Referring to Americans, the executive reportedly said, "Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we're not going to deal with Iranians?"

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Shooting-detection system will help police locate a shooter within a school building

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141114-shootingdetection-system-will-help-police-locate-a-shooter-within-a-school-building

For the past two years, law enforcement officials in Methuen, Massachusetts have been testing an active shooter detection system installed in a local school as part of the city's

threat detection program, which includes prevention and emergency training protocols for school staff and students. The system provides real-time data on the location of shots fired inside a building, thereby eliminating the time police officers spend in rooms and closets in search of the shooter. "Nobody would know what's going on inside the school (in absence of a detection system)," police Chief Joseph Solomon said. "Police response would have been delayed by minutes."

Eagle Tribune reports that on the detection system's floor plan of the two-story school are two dozen green dots, representing sensors in the walls and ceilings of the building. At a live test run of the system on Tuesday, a Methuen police lieutenant fired a gun filled with blanks at different locations. Soon, dots lit up on the floor plan near the system's media center and a text-message was automatically sent to the cellphones of the entire Methuen Police Department and selected school and city officials.

The $70,000 Guardian Indoor Gunshot Detection System includes dozens of small square panels equipped with infrared cameras and microphones which send data to a command center when gunfire is detected. "It's new to the market, but each panel has $50 million of research in it," said Christian Connors, president of Shooter Detection Systems of Rowley. The company provided the city the system at no cost, requiring that Methuen used its police officers and equipment for testing and training. The system does not need monitoring after initial setup and testing, but the sensors have a 10-year lifespan and require replacement or upgrade at that point. Other than that, "we don't need to be involved," Connors said. "It's a stand alone system."

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The U.S. military has used the system in both Afghanistan and Iraq to detect gunfire and to alert combat troops. "It has worked very well for our troops and has saved many lives that otherwise would have been lost," said Congresswoman Niki Tsongas (D-Massachusetts), who serves on the U.S. House Armed Services Committee and represents the Methuen area.

UAE names 83 extremist groups as terrorists

Source: http://www.thenational.ae/world/uae-names-83-extremist-groups-as-terrorists

The UAE on Saturday named 83 organisations it considers terror groups.
They include the Muslim Brotherhood, its UAE branch Al Islah, ISIL, Al Qaeda and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Although a number of organisations on the list had previously been named, it is the first the Government has released an official list.
This follows the passage of Federal law 7 of 2014 on combating terrorist organsiations. The law was discussed in an extraordinary session of the Federal National Council earlier this year

when the 40-member body was summoned amidst their parliamentary break to debate the law.
The law required the full list of groups the UAE sees as terrorist organisations to be published in media for "transparency and to raise awareness among all members of society of these organisations".
The list also includes a number of groups in Egypt and Syria, as well as Yemen, Palestine, and Lebanon.

The Government has supported Saudi Arabia's designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist group but has not explicitly named it until now.

Naming the terror groups comes as the UAE implements more assertive policies at home and abroad to counter the spread of political Islam.

The government backed the decision last year by Egypt's military to remove the Islamist president Mohammed Morsi after large-scale demonstrations against his rule, and when Islamist militias in Libya took over Tripoli this year the UAE offered support to the democratically elected government in the east of the country.

The UAE has also joined the US-led coalition against ISIL and its air force is involved in airstrikes against the militants in Syria.

"We have been an integral part of the operation," the commander of the UAE air force, Major General Ibrahim Al Alawi, told The Washington Post. "We have shown that we can do the job."

Along with well-known groups such as Ansar Al Sharia and the Pakistani Taliban, the terror list include lesser known organisations such as the Islamic Association in Finland and the Cordoba Foundation in the UK. The list also includes the Union of Muslim Scholars in Qatar, headed by the inflammatory preacher Youssef Al Qaradawi; the Badr Organisation, an Iraqi Shiite political party and militia backed by Iran; and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, the Emirati Jihad cells, Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Tawhid Brigade in Syria.

Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a professor of political science at Emirates University, described the list as the most comprehensive by the UAE that he knew of.

The international scope of the designations underscores how the UAE, one of the few bastions of stability in the Middle East, is enacting tough measures against extremist groups to prevent any threat to its security.

"I think the UAE has gone to a policy of what I would call pre-emptive defence, meaning going to the source before they reach here," Prof Abdullah said.

He pointed out that updated antiterrorism legislation had taken effect in August, with harsh punishments for anyone found guilty of extremist actions or affiliations.

While the list shows the breadth of the UAE's definition of terrorism, making it public is also a step towards making government policy more transparent.

Mr Abdullah said the lists inform people "in the country that these are the bad guys, to stay away from them and to stay away from financing them".

The decision to combat Islamists has not been without repercussions. On Thursday, car bombs exploded outside the shuttered UAE and Egyptian embassies in Tripoli.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, blamed the attack on Ansar Al Sharia and the Fajr Libya Islamist militias.

The UAE's strong stance has increased tension with Qatar, which backs groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

That support has also put Qatar at odds with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which included the Brotherhood on a list of terror designations released in March.

Prof Abdullah welcomed the UAE's release of its own list. "It's a rather long list. The UAE has taken upon itself a hard job in fighting these bad guys," he said.

But the effort was aimed at keeping "the homeland as safe and secure as possible".

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The following is the list of organisations designated as terrorist that has been approved by the Cabinet (▶ Source: http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates-international/1395272478814.html)

- ✓ The UAE Muslim Brotherhood.
- ✓ Al-Islah (or Da'wat Al-Islah).
- ✓ Fatah al-Islam (Lebanon).
- ✓ Associazione Musulmani Italiani (Association of Italian Muslims).
- ✓ Khalaya Al-Jihad Al-Emirati (Emirati Jihadist Cells).
- ✓ Osbat al-Ansar (the League of the Followers) in Lebanon.
- ✓ The Finnish Islamic Association (Suomen Islam-seurakunta).
- ✓ Alkarama organisation.
- ✓ Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM or Tanzim al-Qa idah fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami).
- ✓ The Muslim Association of Sweden (Sveriges muslimska forbund, SMF)

- ✓ Hizb al-Ummah (The Ommah Party or Nation's Party) in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula
- ✓ Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL, Partisans of Islamic Law).
- ✓ Det Islamske Forbundet i Norge (Islamic Association in Norway).
- ✓ Al-Qaeda.
- ✓ Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST, Partisans of Sharia) in Tunisia.
- ✓ Islamic Relief UK.
- ✓ Dae'sh (ISIL).
- ✓ Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) in Somalia (Mujahideen Youth Movement)
- ✓ The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) in Britian.
- ✓ Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
- ✓ Boko Haraam (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad) in Nigeria.
- ✓ Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) of the Global Muslim Brotherhood.
- ✓ Jama'at Ansar al-Shari'a (Partisans of Sharia) in Yemen.
- ✓ Al-Mourabitoun (The Sentinels) group in Mali.
- ✓ Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan).
- ✓ The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation and groups.
- ✓ Ansar al-Dine (Defenders of the faith) movement in Mali.
- ✓ Abu Dhar al-Ghifari Battalion in Syria.
- ✓ Jama'a Islamia in Egypt (AKA al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, The Islamic Group, IG).
- ✓ The Haqqani Network in Pakistan.
- ✓ Al-Tawheed Brigade (Brigade of Unity, or Monotheism) in Syria.
- ✓ Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABM, Supporters of the Holy House or Jerusalem) and now rebranded as Wilayat Sinai (Province or state in the Sinai).
- ✓ Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers, or Army of the Pure, or of the Righteous).
- ✓ Al-Tawhid wal-Eman battalion (Battalion of Unity, or Monotheism, and Faith) in Syria.
- ✓ Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) group.
- ✓ The East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Pakistan (ETIM), AKA the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Turkistan Islamic Movement (TIM).
- ✓ Katibat al-Khadra in Syria (The Green Battalion).
- ✓ Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen Fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis (the Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, or MSC).
- ✓ Jaish-e-Mohammed (The Army of Muhammad).
- ✓ Abu Bakr Al Siddiq Brigade in Syria.
- ✓ The Houthi Movement in Yemen.
- ✓ Jaish-e-Mohammed (The Army of Muhammad) in Pakistan and India.
- ✓ Talha Ibn 'Ubaid-Allah Compnay in Syria.
- ✓ Hezbollah al-Hijaz in Saudi Arabia.
- ✓ Al Mujahideen Al Honoud in Kashmor/ India (The Indian Mujahideen, IM).
- ✓ Al Sarim Al Battar Brigade in Syria.
- ✓ Hezbollah in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
- ✓ Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (Caucasus Emirate or Kavkaz and Chechen jidadists).
- ✓ The Abdullah bin Mubarak Brigade in Syria.
- ✓ Al-Qaeda in Iran.
- ✓ The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
- ✓ Qawafil al-Shuhada (Caravans of the Martyrs).
- ✓ The Badr Organisation in Iraq.
- ✓ Abu Sayyaf Organisation in the Philippines.
- ✓ Abu Omar Brigade in Syria.
- ✓ Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq (The Leagues of the Righteous).
- ✓ Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
- ✓ Ahrar Shammar Brigade in Syria (Brigade of the free men of the Shammar Tribe).
- ✓ Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq.
- ✓ CANVAS organisation in Belgrade, Serbia.
- ✓ The Sarya al-Jabal Brigade in Syria.
- ✓ Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas in Syria.
- ✓ The Muslim American Society (MAS).
- ✓ Al Shahba' Brigade in Syria.
- ✓ Liwa al-Youm al-Maw'oud in Iraq (Brigade of Judgment Day).
- ✓ International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS).
- ✓ Al Ka'kaa' Brigade in Syria.

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✓ Liwa Ammar bin Yasser (Ammar bin Yasser Brigade).
✓ Ansar al-Islam in Iraq.
✓ Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe.
✓ Sufyan Al Thawri Brigade.
✓ Ansar al-Islam Group in Iraq (Partisans of Islam).
✓ Union of Islamic Organisations of France (L'Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, UOIF).
✓ Ebad ar-Rahman Brigade (Brigade of Soldiers of Allah) in Syria.
✓ Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra Front) in Syria.
✓ Muslim Association of Britain (MAB).
✓ Omar Ibn al-Khattab Battalion in Syria.
✓ Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant).
✓ Islamic Society of Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland).
✓ Al-Shayma' Battaltion in Syria.
✓ Jaysh al-Islam in Palestine (The Army of Islam in Palestine)
✓ The Islamic Society in Denmark (Det Islamiske Trossamfund, DIT).
✓ Katibat al-Haqq (Brigade of the Righteous).
✓ The Abdullah Azzam Brigades.
✓ The League of Muslims in Belgium (La Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique, LMB)

Foreign fighters flow to Islamic State

Source: http://www.stripes.com/news/us/how-an-american-suicide-bomber-s-travels-went-unmonitored-1.308143

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Note: Figures for fighters from Western Europe are from the International Center for the Study of Radicalization's high estimate category. All other numbers are from the Soufan Group. Per-country fighter estimates determined from a date range of Dec. 2013 to Oct. 2014.

Small numbers of fighters are also reported to have come from Bangladesh, Chile, Ivory Coast, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries are not shown because they are off the map.

Countries from which citizens or residents have reportedly gone to fight.

Anti-Naxal ops: First women commandos team deployed in jungles

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/11/anti-naxal-ops-first-women-commandos.html

For the first time in the country's history, a special squad of women troops has been deployed deep inside jungles to undertake active and prolonged operations against Naxalites.

With the induction of these CRPF commandos in their trademark camouflaged 'Khaki' uniform, India has become one of those few countries to deploy women personnel in live combat situations in one of the most violent and high threat theatres of conflict.

The country's largest paramilitary force CRPF, top sources said, recently has sent two small squads of its women commandos to fight the red ultras shoulder-to-shoulder with their male colleagues by not only living at the ground locations but also carrying out patrols.

While one contingent is undertaking operations in the worst Naxal-affected area of Bastar in Chhattisgarh, the other has been based at an undisclosed location in Jharkhand.

Sources privy to the development said **the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) deployed these two women contingents, of a 'platoon' (about 35 women in each) strength,** after creating basic living facilities for them at its locations in these two Maoist violence affected states.

"This is for the first time that women have been deployed in active operations in a high-risk and sensitive area where contact with the enemy is regular and very dynamic. The squads were placed at two locations about a fortnight back and they have begun operating," a source said.

The exact location of these women squads is only known to a handful of commanders and personnel keeping in mind the early days of their induction, the sources said.

Officials say there are specific reasons and operational benefits

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for deploying these women personnel in LWE areas.

While they can interact with the local women folk which not only helps in gathering good intelligence, it also helps in bringing forces closer to the villagers. A similar model of has been found successful in West Bengal where the Naxal movement is at an all-time low.

"Women have an edge in such operations. Under the new blueprint prepared to tackle this most important internal security challenge, it was felt necessary to use the female strength as their presence not only results in making good friends for the force among the locals and tribal women but instances of human rights violations are also kept under check," the source said.

Officials working in the anti-Naxal operations grid said as the over 3-lakh personnel strong CRPF is the lead security force against these ultras, a plan to induct women personnel of the force was conceptualised in the middle of last year which has just been accomplished.

The Union Home Ministry cleared the CRPF proposal before these women personnel were deployed, they said.

According to the current policy, women officers or troops in defence or paramilitary forces are not inducted in those areas where they are likely to be exposed to direct line of fire by the enemy.

"This particular instance is an exception which is aimed to obtain specific results in Left Wing Extremism hit areas," they said.

After conducting some small drills and trainings for over an year with these women, it was finally decided a month back to deploy them full-time.

Their continuance in the area will be reviewed from time-to-time, they said.

The CRPF has deployed over 90,000 personnel (90 battalions) for these duties across Naxal violence affected states, of which the force considers Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand to be the toughest owing to their difficult terrain and harsh topography interspersed with jungles, hills and water bodies.

The force, which has the maximum number of women security personnel among all police and paramilitary forces, is also proposing to add 2,000 more women constables in the next five years which will bring the total strength of females in uniform in CRPF to 5,000 from the current 3,000.

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Global terror attack deaths rose sharply in 2013, says report

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-30086435

The number of deaths from terrorism increased by 61% between 2012 and 2013, a

study into international terrorism says.

There were nearly 10,000 terrorist attacks in 2013, a 44% increase from the previous year, the **Global Terrorism Index 2014** report added.

The report said militant groups Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and the Taliban were behind most of the deaths.

Iraq was the country most affected by terrorism, the report said.

The report by the Institute for Economics and Peace says that nearly 18,000 people died from terrorist attacks in 2013.

"Not only is the intensity of terrorism increasing, its breadth is increasing as well," it notes.

Steve Killelea, IEP executive chairman, told the BBC the latest increase in deaths from terrorism was primarily due to the civil war in Syria, which began in 2011.

"The destabilisation in Syria, which has now overflowed into Iraq, is where we feel the upsurge in terrorism," Mr Killelea said.

The report, which investigates terrorism trends between 2000 and 2013, uses data from the US-based Global Terrorism Database.

It includes rankings of countries by the impact of terrorist activities, based on the number of terrorist attacks, deaths and injuries from

terrorism, and damage to property.
Five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria - accounted for 80% of the deaths from terrorism in 2013. More than

Global terrorism index 2014

10,000 terror attacks in 2013

17,958 deaths. That's a 61% increase on 2012

14,722 deaths in just five countries: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria

6,362 deaths in Iraq - the country worst-affected

60 countries around the world recorded deaths from terrorism

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace

6,000 people died in Iraq alone.
India, Somalia, the Philippines, Yemen and Thailand were the next five, with between 1% and 2.3% of global deaths by terrorism.
Although Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries only experienced 5% of all deaths from terrorism since 2000, they suffered some of the deadliest attacks, the report said.
These included the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2005 London bombings, and the bombing and shooting attack in Norway in 2012.
During 2013, Turkey and Mexico were the OECD countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism, at 57 and 40 respectively.

Religious or political?
The report said that the four main groups were responsible for 66% of all deaths from terrorist attacks in 2013: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Boko Haram and the self-styled Islamic State.
All four groups used "religious ideologies based on extreme interpretations of Wahhabi Islam", it added.
"To counteract the rise of religious extremism, moderate Sunni theologies need to be cultivated by credible forces within Islam," the

report said, but it was important that "moderate Sunni countries and not outside influences" led such a response.
The report added that religious ideology was not the only motivation for terrorism.
"There are many peaceful Muslim-majority countries that do not suffer from terrorism such as Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait, underscoring how there are other social, political and geopolitical factors at play," the report said.
In many parts of the world, terrorism was "far more likely to be driven by political or nationalistic and separatist" movements.
The report said the three main factors found globally to correlate with terrorism were:

- High social hostilities between different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups
- The presence of state-sponsored violence such as extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses
- High levels of overall violence, such as deaths from organised conflict or high levels of violent crime

Mr Killelea said religious figures in some moderate Sunni countries were already speaking out against extremism.
It was "very, very hard" for Western countries to counteract radical religious ideology, he added.
However, "the West can certainly be supportive in trying to create better mechanisms of policing... and also in terms of being able to address some of the underlying issues which cause group grievances".
The report only includes data until the end of 2013.
Mr Killelea said: "I don't want to predict the outcome for 2014, but it's certainly hard to imagine things being any better."
However, the report stresses that while terrorism is on the increase, it is important to keep the numbers in context.

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About 50% of terrorist attacks claim no lives, while 40 times more people are killed in

murders than in terrorist attacks, according to a UN report for 2012.

TERRORIST INCIDENTS MAP 2000-2013

● All attacks since 2000 scaled by number of fatalities
● Worst attacks in 2013

▶ **Read the full report at:**
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf

Prayer massacre: Three Americans among four rabbis killed as Palestinian militants storm Jerusalem synagogue

Source: http://www.aol.com/article/2014/11/18/three-americans-among-four-rabbis-killed-as-palestinian-militants-storm-jerusalem-synagogue/20995279/

November 18 – **Three of the four rabbis killed Tuesday in an Israeli synagogue during a frenzied attack by Palestinian militants are American, authorities said, the other is British.**
Rabbis Aryeh Kopinsky, 43; Calman Levine; Moshe Twersky, 59; and Avraham Shmuel Goldberg, 58, were hacked, stabbed and shot to death around 7:00 a.m. by two unnamed terrorists, according to police. Twersky, a well-known Jewish scholar and the son of a Harvard University lecturer, has already been laid to rest following a massive funeral procession through the holy city.
The first three men are dual U.S.-Israeli citizens and fourth is a dual British-Israeli

citizen, authorities told CNN. The FBI is now involved in the murder investigation because U.S. citizens were killed.
Two militants -- identified to the New York Times by relatives as cousins Odai Abed Abu Jamal, 22, and Ghassan Muhammad Abu Jamal, 32 -- stormed the west Jerusalem synagogue wielding knives, axes an a handgun, according to reports.
"They carried out this operation because of the fire in their hearts -- they were under pressures, pressures, pressures and in one ripe moment, the explosion took place," a relative told the Times.
"I say in full mouth, it is a religious war which Netanyahu has

started," the relative added. "It will end the way we like."

The cousins' personal intifada ended when they were killed in a shootout with police responding to calls for help from the roughly 30 people in the synagogue at the time of the

attack, according to the Jerusalem Post.

Six other people were injured during the attack, including two police officers, and have been

rushed to a nearby hospital, police told CNN.

(UPDATE 19 Nov: One of the police officers died).

"To see Jews wearing tefillin and wrapped in the tallit lying in pools of blood, I wondered if I was imagining scenes from the Holocaust," Yehuda Meshi Zahav, the veteran leader of a religious emergency-response team, told the Times of the ritual straps and prayer shawls worn by the worshipers.

"It was a massacre of Jews at prayer."

Wintesses described the horrific assault that left pools of blood everywhere and shattered the calm of an otherwise ordinary Tuesday.

"I turn around and I see a man with a pistol who starts shooting point blank at people next to him," Rabbi Yosef Pasternak told Israeli

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radio, according to the Times.

"Immediately after, someone enters with a knife, a butcher-type knife, and also goes on a rampage in all directions," Pasternak recalled, adding he escaped death by hiding under a chair.

Another Rabbi inside the building as the attack unfolded said he and his 13-year-old nephew also hid from the attackers under chairs. Blood spattered on the young boy as he cowered in fear.

"People were in the middle of prayer and people could not respond," said Rabbi Shmuel Pinchas, according to the Times.

"There is nowhere to hide as the synagogue is closed on all sides."

Officials immediately condemned the attack.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the slaughter "the direct result of the incitement" stoked by Palestinian leadership, and called on his military to "respond with a heavy hand to the brutal murder of Jews who came to pray and were eliminated by despicable murderers."

Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas also denounced the attacks.

"We condemn the killing of civilians from any side," he said in a statement. "We condemn the killings of worshipers at the synagogue in Jerusalem and condemn acts of violence no matter their source."

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had earlier called on the Palestinian government to condemn the attack, which he said was "a pure result of incitement.

"The Palestinian leadership ... must begin to take serious steps to restrain any kind of incitement that comes from their language, from other people's language, and exhibit the kind of leadership that is necessary to put this region on a different path," said Kerry.

Members of Hamas, previously classified by the West as a terror organization but also voted into power during democratic elections in Palestine, praised the attacks as "a normal reaction to the Israeli oppression." Another Hamas leader, in a Facebook post, hailed the attackers as heroes and called for more assaults in the future.

"The new operation is heroic and a natural reaction to Zionist criminality against our people and our holy places," wrote Mushir al-

Masri. "We have the full right to revenge for the blood of our martyrs in all possible means."

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has since taken credit for the brutal attack, but a police spokesperson told the Times that officials are still trying to determine if other parties were also involved.

Unrest over the attacks has led police to tighten their grip over several neighborhoods in the predominantly Muslim areas of eastern Jerusalem, according to BuzzFeed.

Mushir al-Masri, a Hamas spokesman posted: "Where are they?"

Images from Rafah, in Gaza, show heavily armed, masked militants handing out cookies to people celebrating the attack.

Masses of jubilant Palestinians poured into the streets to join in the morbid revelry as posters of the alleged attackers were cheered.

Palestinian radio hailed the cousins as "martyrs," according to the Post, and loudspeakers at mosques cheered the men on.

"Hamas calls for the continuation of revenge operations and stresses that the Israeli occupation bears responsibility for tension in Jerusalem," a Hamas spokesperson told the Post.

The attack came only hours after the Israeli government drew criticism for authorizing the building of a further 200 homes in east Jerusalem.

Kerry said through a spokesperson that he was "deeply concerned" by the decision, and expressed fears it would only further escalate tensions between the two constantly-at-odds countries.

Tuesday's attack was the worst on a synagogue in the country since 2008, it will no doubt only pour gasoline on the raging inferno of mutual Palestinian-Israeli hatred.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: The methodology used reminded me the Kunming attack in China… Perhaps more similar incidents will follow. *Modus operandi* seems more efficient than traditional suicide bombings and weaponry is easy to find while the impact might be similar to IS murders.

The **2014 Kunming attack** was a terrorist attack in the Chinese city of Kunming, Yunnan, on 1 March 2014. The incident, targeted against civilians, left **29 civilians** and 4 perpetrators dead with more than **140 others injured**. The attack has been called a "massacre" bsy some news media.
At around 9:20 pm local time, a group of eight **knife-wielding men and women** attacked passengers at the city's railway station. Both male and female attackers were seen to pull out **long-bladed knives** and

proceed to stab and slash passengers. At the scene, police killed four assailants and captured one injured female. In the afternoon of 3 March, police announced that the six-man two-woman group had been neutralized after the arrest of three remaining suspects.

No group or individual stepped forward to claim responsibility for the attack. Xinhua News Agency announced within hours of the incident that it was carried out by Xingjiang separatist terrorists, while *Time* and *The New York Times* reported that Uyghur Muslims were involved in the attack.

UN: ISIS has sufficient quantities of arms to carry on fighting for two years

November 19 – **A new report prepared for the United Nations Security Council warns that Islamic State (ISIS) has in its possession sufficient reserves of small arms, ammunition, and vehicles to wage its war for Syria and Iraq for up to two years.**

The size and diversity the Islamist organization's arsenal allow the group durable mobility, range, and a limited defense against low-flying aircraft. The report notes that even if the U.S.-led air campaign continues to destroy the group's vehicles and heavier weapon systems, such a campaign "cannot mitigate the effect of the significant volume of light weapons" Isis possesses.

These weapons "are sufficient to allow [ISIS] to continue fighting at current levels for six months to two years," the UN report finds, describing ISIS not only the world's best-funded terrorist group but among its best armed.

The UN report concludes that ISIS, together with the Nusra Front, ISIS former rival but now its tactical ally, are sufficiently equipped to threaten the region "even without territory."

The *Guardian* notes that the 35-paqge report recommends the UN implement new steps to cut off ISIS access to money and guns.

The ISIS arsenal, according to the UN assessment, includes T-55 and T-72 tanks; U.S.-manufactured Humvees; machine guns; short-range anti-aircraft artillery, including shoulder-mounted rockets captured from Iraqi and Syrian military stocks; and "extensive supplies of ammunition."

Most the ISIS weapons stocks, particularly "state of the art" weaponry stolen from the U.S.-backed Iraqi military, were "unused" before ISIS fighters seized it, the report finds. Some of the relatively complex weapons, however, "may be too much of a challenge" for ISIS effectively use or maintain.

The *Guardian* notes that earlier this year, speculation focused on ISIS potential ability to produce chemical weapons after it seized Iraqi facilities that had contributed to Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons programs, but the UN report says it is doubtful that ISIS possesses the "capability fully to exploit material it might have seized." The UN report also questions whether ISIS can manufacture its own chemical or other weapons of mass destruction.

The intelligence services of one member state involved in contributing to the report provided information about "chemicals and poison-coated metal balls" placed inside ISIS homemade bombs to maximize damage. In October, Kurdish forces defending the Syrian town of Kobani from ISIS complained of skin blistering, burning eyes, and difficulty breathing after the detonation of an ISIS bomb – all symptoms of chemical weapon use.

The UN Security Council is will begin consideration of the report today (Wednesday). The report recommends the UN adopt new round of sanctions aiming to disrupt the economic well-being of the well-financed ISIS. A major element of these sanctions would be for states bordering ISIS-controlled territory to "promptly seize all oil tanker trucks and their loads" coming in or going out.

The report warns that ISIS has several revenue sources, and it does not assert that oil truck seizures can eliminate ISIS oil smuggling money, it does say that raising the costs to smuggling networks and trucking companies will deter them from bringing ISIS oil to market.

The report also says that it is important to disrupt ISIS ability to

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resupply its weapons stocks and launder money, and the report recommends the UN prohibit any aircraft originating from ISIS-held territory from landing on airstrips in member states, and prohibit flights into ISIS-held territory. The only exemptions would involve humanitarian relief planes.

Last month, a report to the Security Council on ISIS manpower, assessed that 15,000 fighters from eighty countries have arrived in Syria and Iraq to fight ISIS ranks.

— Read more in The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant: report and recommendations submitted pursuant to resolution 2170 (United Nations Security Council, 14 November 2014)

An Israeli system will protect German Air Force aircraft from shoulder launched missiles

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/11/israeli-system-will-protect-german-air-force-aircraft-shoulder-launched-missiles/

Shoulder launched missiles in the hands of extremist terrorist groups pose a threat to both civil and military aviation. This threat is further underscored these days, when fundamentalist organizations such as ISIS continue to occupy additional areas and territories and menace aircraft.

Continued civil aviation is crucial to the global economy, for any damage to this industry, let alone any shut down due to terrorists shooting down a jet using a shoulder-launched missile, could seriously cripple global commerce, tourism and other sectors of the world's economy.

Elbit Systems announced today that it was awarded a contract from DIEHL BGT Defense GmbH & Co.

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KG ("DIEHL Defense") to provide J-MUSIC Multi-Spectral Directed Infrared Counter Measure (DIRCM) systems for the first phase of the German Air Force's Self-Protection program for its new Airbus A400 aircraft. The contract will be performed over approximately one-year and is in an amount that is not material to Elbit Systems.

Designed to protect large military and commercial aircraft against attacks by ground to air heat seeking man-portable missiles (MANPADS), the J-MUSIC systems, will be integrated into a multi-turret DIRCM system, ensuring 360° protection of the aircraft.

Elbit Systems has completed extensive testing of the J-MUSIC system and has already delivered systems to equip several types of aircraft to various customers.

Bezhalel (Butzi) Machlis, President and CEO of Elbit Systems, commented: "We are proud of our cooperation with DIEHL Defense on

DIRCM that has resulted in this initial contract for the protection of the German Air Force's A400M aircraft. Our DIRCM systems provide effective protection to the growing threat of MANPADS, and we hope that additional customers will follow and select our systems as their preferred solution".

Hovering UAVs secure Jerusalem's light train

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/11/hovering-uavs-secure-jerusalems-tram/

The disturbances and riots which broke out in Shue'fat immediately after the murder of Muhammad Abu Khdeir in early July this year, and spread all over Jerusalem, **the light train's infrastructure was targeted at numerous points, and all the CCTVs along the tracks and in the stops had been vandalized.**

Even after the initial repeated attempts to constant target for law enforcement and security whereabouts, and controling events.

reconstruction works of the light train system and cars, amid return to business as usual, the CCTVs kept being the destruction and damage by the rioters, thereby preventing forces from effectively monitoring the light train and its

Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat personally contacted BLADEWORX, following which an extraordinary cooperation unfolded between the company, Israeli Police and Jerusalem's Municipality, in the framework of which a squadron of 6 'Phantom' UAVs (DJI-made unmanned multi-rotor airborne systems) equipped with video day cameras imaging for nighttime was operated for an 24/7.

and thermal entire month

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The lines, the

'Phantoms' hovered over the light train's track and the train cars, the light train's maintenance sections and over those **areas where** **the riots focused and posed a risk to the light train's ongoing** **operations**.

In the absence of any actual ability to monitor the events along the light train line and control them, operating the light trainhas become too risky and unsafe – as long as an imminent attack on the light train's cars and passengers cannot be identified without monitoring and visual means.

Rapid, quality, operational and professional coordination between Israeli Police's air unit, the Civil Aviation Authority, Jerusalem's Municipality and BLADEWORX, has led to operational activity which bore immediate fruit, achieved command and control over the events along the tracks and allowed the forces on the ground to focus on the areas requiring immediate attention, whether of police action or engineering teams.

Live video feed from the hovering 'Phantoms' was carried out relatively simply and efficiently to both the municipality's dedicated situation room and to the police operations HQ. In addition, each (authorized) police officer on the ground and each relevant

Jerusalem security official was able to receive the video broadcast on their smartphones, using a tailored application.

BLADEWORX began operating in Israel only a year ago. The company focuses on, inter alia, the highly important field of operating unmanned aerial vehicles. In fact, the company was among the first in Israel and among the first worldwide, to receive a license to fly multi-rotor UAVs near residential zones (while maintaining eye contact with the 'Phantom'). The company received specific licenses to operate the UAVs in unique operational deployments, such as over Shue'fat, without having to maintain eye contact, and over built-up areas.

BLADWORX was established in the framework of the Be'er Sheva technological incubators Forum Group. The company runs the bulk of its activity from Be'er Sheva. Most of its operations focus on providing highly diverse videos to the media sector. Among the company's clients: the Sports Channel and Channel Two. BLADEWORX is also the exclusive representative of one the world's largest UAV manufacturers, Micro Drones.

The Islamic State: Another Angle of the Threat

Source: http://acdemocracy.org/the-islamic-state-another-angle-of-the-threat/

The struggle against the Islamic State (IS) organization led by the United States and its allies appears thus far to be something of a Sisyphean war: ineffective, limited to scratches on the surface of the Jihadi pyramid, beyond the roots of the phenomenon, unable to end the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, and relegated to serve as another layer in the existing chaos in Syria and Iraq, and soon perhaps in part of Lebanon as well. The destruction plaguing the Middle East is accompanied by a frightening thought in the Western world of IS alumni returning to their native countries to undertake terror attacks, and the Western world has become increasingly anxious. It finds relief in airstrikes and partial humanitarian aid for the millions of refugees created by civil wars in the Middle East.

The Syrian chaos in particular evokes conflicting interests among the various forces on the one hand, and a strange commonality of interests on the other, although this has still not led to practical alliances or actual cooperation among the various warring factions. At the center are President Bashar al-Assad and his regime; for its part, the Western coalition is unable to determine its position toward them. Assad has an interest in leaving IS and other organizations of its ilk intact so that the West will view them as the greater Satan. To the

moderate liberal forces in Syria, which have largely disappeared from the public arena, it is not clear who is more evil, Assad or IS. Turkey is entering this labyrinth and giving mixed messages. Iran, Hizbollah, and the Kurds are also players, and their position in the various equations is not clear. Iran, after years of being the nuclear terror of the West, has become an ally of sorts of the United States. At times it seems that the United States and the Obama administration still fear the volatility of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more than anything taking place in Mesopotamia.

The destruction and devastation plaguing the Middle East is accompanied by a frightening thought in the Western world of IS alumni returning to their native countries to undertake terror attacks, and perhaps even behead innocent civilians. There is much panic, and coupled with the fear of the Ebola epidemic, the Western world has become increasingly anxious. It finds relief in airstrikes and partial humanitarian aid for the millions of refugees created by civil wars in the Middle East.

However, the more the fight against IS takes the form of airstrikes and Western leaders do not even venture to hint that they might send ground troops into Iraq and Syria, the more attention is diverted from another aspect of

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the IS problem. Alongside IS are many other such elements – the "classic" al-Qaeda; Jabhat al-Nusra, which is supposedly more moderate than IS; the Taliban, which is poised to take over Afghanistan again once the United States leaves; other violent jihadi groups throughout the world; and several hundred Islamist clerics, who by virtue of the freedom of the internet, are galvanizing their flock and moving them in apocalyptic directions. The West should be worried by the question of what causes so many young and not-so-young people from the West, Muslims and non-Muslims who have converted to Islam, second- and third-generation immigrants, to be so influenced by IS/jihadi propaganda that they join the struggle in relatively large numbers.

This phenomenon is not new. It began during the struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and a similar situation developed during the war in Iraq in the 2000s. Those were years of phenomenal growth for the jihadi internet, which brought the Islamist struggle to every young person with a keyboard. Even beheadings were shown on the internet since 2002. Nevertheless, there were few such incidents and the number of volunteers was limited. Furthermore, in Iraq in the 2000s, most of the volunteers for jihadi organizations were Saudi extremists, but particularly over the past year, volunteering for IS and similar organizations seems to have become much more international, diverse, extensive, and on the rise. More and more, volunteering for the jihadi ranks in Mesopotamia has become similar to volunteering for the International Brigades organized in the 1930s for the Spanish Republicans' struggle against fascism. Why are analysts and commentators in the West not as publicly disturbed by the growing number of volunteers for IS and similar organizations who are citizens of Western countries and by their motives, given the potential flood of terror liable to take place when these volunteers return home?

Likewise noteworthy is the ease of volunteering and the short time that elapses between a decision to volunteer and implementation of the decision. Already in the past, a short transition from a decision to carry out a suicide attack/self-sacrifice to the actual execution, sometimes only a few days, was a known phenomenon. This was seen among population groups that underwent prolonged mental training, not necessarily organized, for the struggle against the enemy. There were many such examples among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; Afghanis; Sunnis in Iraq; and Shiites in southern Lebanon in the 1980s. These populations and societies had undergone training that included Islamic propaganda and justifications for the struggle against the occupier. The efforts to persuade young people from these societies to sacrifice their lives ran deep in society, were socially acceptable, and were infectious as well. Furthermore, among groups such as the Palestinians, in which many of those who perpetrated attacks were students with an academic education, sacrifice/suicide attacks were also carried out because the perpetrators saw themselves as being part of the social elite, whose role was to lead the masses in the struggle against the Israeli occupation.

Such a vision, which smacks of romanticism and perhaps even altruism, appears to be typical, at least in part, of those who volunteer for IS and other such organizations at this time. It is difficult to explain why several thousand Muslims who live in the West want to go to Syria and join IS, while a large number of them have already realized this desire. Most are well integrated among the middle class, have a higher education, are not unemployed, and did not stand out for their ties to Islamist elements before they decided to volunteer. Their process of radicalization took place very quickly, within a few months, and led them to a quick decision to go to Syria.

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These volunteers serve as very fertile ground for the influence of the propaganda of IS and other such organizations. This propaganda says that the organization's struggle in Iraq and Syria is a heroic struggle to save the entire Muslim world, which is suffering/oppressed/deprived (mustaz`afin in the Islamic term) due to tyranny that is ultimately, according to their belief, a clear result of a Western, "crusader" plot.

At this point, Israel, Judaism, and Jews are still not in the actual circle of enemies of IS and similar organizations, other than the radical groups operating in the Sinai Peninsula. But there is considerable concern that the day will come when they are viewed as targets for attack. A substantial number of the attacks in Europe in the past two years were against Jewish institutions. The unswerving faith in the righteousness of the Islamic

struggle and the great speed with which IS is advancing – not only in Syria and Iraq, but primarily in the arena of threats to the entire West, in addition to threats against Arab countries – are stoking the imagination of younger and older Muslims in the West and very rapidly loosening the fetters of their decisions. The September 11 attacks gave rise to feelings that the end of days was near and to a belief in the approaching victory of Islam. Similarly, many who write on jihadi web sites today express apocalyptic feelings, either between the lines or in them.

Western countries must take this significant aspect of the phenomenon into account with the same seriousness with which they calculate

their military moves in the Middle East. To crush the head of the serpent with a bomb or a missile is in no way sufficient for a successful war against the phenomenon. Today it is seen in IS and other similar organizations, but no one knows how this will develop in the coming decade.

Israel is also involved in protecting the Jews of Europe, who are a vulnerable population and a preferred target for organized and independent terrorists. Therefore, it must pay attention to the speed and scope of IS recruitment, and in coordination with security officials in European countries, it must think how to reduce the emerging threat and how to respond to it if it materializes.

The Maldives-Syria Connection: Jihad in Paradise?

By Animesh Roul

Source:http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43117&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=c843f6b70fc4509c9c15aea8f22a463b#.VG-0jcmAOW4

The Maldives, the Muslim-majority archipelago country in the Indian Ocean, is going through a tumultuous time, facing increasing Islamist activities at home, an exodus of radicalized youth to join the jihad in Syria and a growing domestic clamor for the implementation of

Screenshot from Abu Turab video in Divehi (Source: YouTube)

Shari'a law. This has been accompanied by the targeted abduction and intimidation of local Maldivians who hold progressive ideals and secular values. Although the country is better known as a romantic honeymoon destination, these developments – which include the establishment of the "Islamic State of the Maldives" (ISM) group – have exposed the deep extremist undercurrents in Maldivian society and are increasingly drawing the attention of local and international security forces.

Syrian Connections

In October 2013, some of the first cases of radicalized Maldivian youths attempting to travel to Syria were reported when two youths were detained at the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport (INIA) in the capital Malé (Haveeru Online, June 1). Since then, about 100 Maldivians are believed to have joined the Syrian conflict and most of these are said to have joined up with al-Qaeda's official affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (or al-Nusra Front/the Support Front). Several recent incidents shed further light on the ongoing jihadist exodus. In October, Sri Lankan security officials detained three Maldivians, including an 18-year-old woman, who were suspected of planning to travel to Syria through Turkey. Separately, another Maldivian family – comprising a 23-year-old radicalized man, his mother and his 10-year-old sister – was reported to have travelled to Islamic State-held territory in Syria or Iraq, from where they sent a message home stating that the Maldives is a "land of sin" and an "apostate nation." These statements were perhaps an early indication that jihadists might someday regard the Maldives itself as a legitimate target (Minivan News, October 30). Meanwhile in November, it was reported that at least six more people from the Fuvahmulah and Meedhoo areas of the Maldives

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had travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State organization, illustrating that the flow of jihadist recruits to the Middle East continues (Minivan

News, October 30; November 6).

As of November 8, at least five Maldivians have reportedly died in Iraq and Syria fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra. The dead have been identified, under their assumed jihadist aliases, as Abu Turab, Abu Nuh, Abu Dujanah, Abu Ibrahim and Abu Fulan. Of these, Abu Turab and Abu Nuh were reportedly killed in late May; both died in Syria fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front's (IF) Suqur al-Sham brigade (Minivan News, May 27). Prior to his death, Abu Turab sent a message via YouTube that he was joining the jihad to establish an Islamic State and to implement "Allah's Shari'a." Urging all Muslims to join the struggle, he said, in his native Divehi language, that "Enemies of Allah are spreading democracy all over the world, as fast as they can. So in return for every person they lead astray, I want to – even if by myself – kill as many enemies of Allah as I can." [1] Some of these militants appear to have also made an impression on other foreign fighters; an Australian jihadist with Jabhat al-Nusra has feted Maldivian fighters as "courageous and well-mannered mujahideen." [2]

As with other foreign jihadists in Syria, social media is vital for relaying their message to

audiences back home. A key social media tool used by Maldivian jihadists is their online media forum, Bilad al-Sham Media (BASM), is run by a group of Maldivians in Syria to publicize the activities of Maldivian jihadists and their perceived heroics on the battlefield. According to information circulated in the BASM-run blog, the group currently fighting in Syria are mostly young university students of Maldivian origin who have travelled to Syria through a third country with the aim of "liberating" the Islamic world and establishing the global Islamic caliphate. The managers of BASM appear to be closely involved in fighting units; the latest slain Maldivian fighter killed in early November was Abu Fulan, who was a disciple of another slain Maldivian identified as Abu Dujanah. Dujanah was BASM's founding editor. According to reports, Abu Dujanah was killed in September this year and since then BASM has been run by another group of Maldivian mujahideen. [3] Abu Dujanah was later identified as Yameen Naeem, from the Maafannu area in Malé; he had decided to travel to Syria while studying in Egypt (Haveeru Online, November 8; Minivan News, September 2).

Amid these fast unfolding developments, the establishment of the so-called "Islamic State of Maldives" (ISM) group, which claims to be a local organization affiliated with the Islamic State organization, emerged in the last week of July. This coincided with the Maldives' Independence Day celebrations and an Islamic State flag was hoisted for the first time in Malé's Raalhugandu area in the same month. Islamic State flags were also seen during an early August protest march against the Israeli attacks on Gaza City. On September 5, hundreds of pro-Islamist protesters, including veiled women and children, marched in the streets of Malé holding Islamic State flags and banners, calling for the implementation of Shari'a law in the country. Some of the banners read: "We want the laws of the Quran," "Islam will eradicate secularism" and "Shari'a

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will dominate the world" (Minivan News, September 6).

Domestic Radicalism
The flow of recruits to Syria has been accompanied by radical elements in the Maldives becoming more assertive and violent. Most notably, this has involved taking liberal and progressive individuals hostage or threatening them with serious consequences if they speak out against radical Islamism. The latest victims of such Islamist vigilantes are the journalist Ahmed Rilwan, who has been missing since early August, and a web administrator of the Ranreendhoo Maldives pro-opposition Facebook page (Minivan News, November 13). In addition, Islamist-linked criminal gang members (e.g. from the Bosnia, Kuda Henveiru, Dot and Buru gangs) have participated in attacks on scholars, journalists and free speech activists for their allegedly "anti-Islamic" activities (Minivan News, September 22). The gangs have also issued threats through text messages on mobile phones, threatening to violently attack anyone they regard as "laa dheenee" (non-religious) (International Federation of Journalists, August 8). Physical attacks on such dissenters are also common, and there are also reports of

Islamist vigilantes abducting and interrogating young men in order to force them to identify online activists advocating secularism or professing atheism through social media sites (Minivan News, June 9).

Although politicians in the Maldives have engaged in a public blame game over the visibly deteriorating situation, there is little doubt that the root cause of the rise in visible Islamist radicalism is the growing popularity of Salafist ideologies among some sections of the population, notably the younger generation. In particular, years of grooming by visiting clerics and radical preachers have played a key role in fermenting radicalism and anti-Western sentiment in the archipelago. Known radical English-language preachers with substantial online presences such as Bilal Phillips, Zakir Naik and Anjem Choudary have also notably played a key role in popularizing radical Islam in Maldives, a trend which is now merging into rising support for transnational jihadism. [4] At present, however, the government seems oblivious to the serious long term implications of this grassroots Islamist surge and it is likely to continue to attempt to sweep such issues under the carpet, even as evidence grows that the Islamic State organization's brand of Islam has now reached its shores.

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Notes
1. Please see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6ZIn3B33EA.
2. Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Australi said that "Maldivians are some of the most courageous and well-mannered Mujahideen," on his now suspended Twitter account (@abusulayman321) on May 25, 2014.
3. See, "Q & A with Bilad al-Sham Media: Maldivians in Syria,"
http://biladalsham.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/part-1.pdf.
4. See video message of UK-based Anjem Choudary exhorting Maldivians to protect Islam and take up jihad: http://www.maldivestimes.com/video/message-muslims-maldives-anjem-choudary-shariah4maldives.

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RAND study assesses threat posed by Americans joining jihadist fronts abroad

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141120-rand-study-assesses-threat-posed-by-americans-joining-jihadist-fronts-abroad

November 20 – Only about 100 Americans have left their homeland to join jihadist terrorist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq, including the Islamic State, according to a new RAND Corporation analysis.
Although it is difficult to pin down the exact numbers of Western fighters slipping off to join the jihadist fronts in Syria and Iraq, U.S. counterterrorism officials believe that those fighters pose a
clear and present danger to American security.
A new analysis from RAND concludes there is no mass exodus to Syria and Iraq. Brian Michael Jenkins, RAND terrorism expert, outlines some of the potential fates of these people: some will be killed in the fighting, some will choose to remain in the Middle East,

but some will return, more radicalized than before and determined to continue their violent campaigns back in the United States.

RAND CORPORATION

Perspective
Expert insights on a timely policy issue

When Jihadis Come Marching Home
The Terrorist Threat Posed by Westerners Returning from Syria and Iraq

Brian Michael Jenkins

The incorporation into ISIS of a large number of foreign fighters from Europe as well as the United States who seem to have little future in any peaceful society will have long-term consequences. It means that the Islamic State can never be stable, Jenkins said. Either the thugs are killed off or they find new killing fields on its frontiers or beyond. Armies of fanatics are difficult to control.

Jenkins notes that the United States has had past experience with Americans who left for other jihadist fronts, which provides some clues as to the threat now posed by the ones who have gone or tried to go to Syria or Iraq.

Most who attempt to leave the United States to join a jihadist group are arrested en route. Of those who escape arrest, 40 percent eventually return. As the jihadist groups tend to use Westerners as suicide bombers or cannon fodder, many of those who do return to the United States will not have gained useful experience abroad.

Even so, Jenkins says federal and local law enforcement officials will want to review their cooperation protocols, especially in regards to surveillance of returning fighters. The returning jihadists are potentially valuable sources of intelligence and public knowledge that some returning fighters are being used as informants could in turn isolate other returning fighters in the extremist community.

The study, *When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The Terrorist Threat Posed by Western Fighters Returning from Terrorist Fronts in Syria and Iraq,* is available for downloading. The study includes an appendix listing those Americans who have left to join jihadist fronts. For more

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— Read more in Brian Michael Jenkins, When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The Terrorist Threat Posed by Western Fighters Returning from Terrorist Fronts in Syria and Iraq (RAND, 2014)
▶ *http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130/RAND_PE130.pdf*

Terror network: Bangladesh-West Bengal-Hyderabad link comes to fore

Source: http://m.firstpost.com/india/terror-network-bangladesh-west-bengal-hyderabad-link-comes-to-fore-1815815.html

The arrest of 28-year-old Khalid Ahmed, a Burmese national, in the old city area of Hyderabad on 18 November has added a new dimension to the city's terror links. While Hyderabad's connection with Pakistan-based outfits is no secret, what has come as a surprise to the intelligence agencies is the city's terror links to Bangladesh and Myanmar for well over a decade. This has also renewed concerns over the illegal immigrants in the city.

Tracing the terror links to Bangladesh, Additional Commissioner of City Police Anjani Kumar said: "The first ever human bomb, outside Jammu and Kashmir and after the

assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, was the attack on Special Task Force office at Begumpet in Hyderabad on 12 October \2005. This was carried out by Dalin, a Bangladeshi national, in which one constable was also killed."

Another major incident he recalled was the Dilsukhnagar blasts on 21 February 2013. The principal accused, Yasin Bhatkal and Riyaz Bhatkal, of Bhatkal village on the Karnakata-Maharashtra border had maintained a strong Hyderabad-Bangladesh-Pakistan connection.

"They not only used Indian Mujahideen for their work, but they also depended on sleeper cells who were working on behalf of the ISI through logistic support from teams entering India through Bangladesh," said Additional

Commissioner of Police. He also said that they had "strong contact" with Ameer Raza Khan, who was rated "very high" in his links with the ISI.

Referring to the Tuesday's arrest of the Burmese national Khalid Mohammed, the Inspector-General of Police of National Investigation Agency (NIA) Ravishankar Ayyanar said that several member of the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation were trained by Tehreek-e-Taliban for executing terror strikes against Buddhists in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Several thousands of them were suspected to have migrated through West Bengal into Hyderabad.

Khalid Mohammed is suspected to be an expert in making explosives, improvised explosive devices and reportedly organised terror camps on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.

The NIA officials recovered "incriminating videos of training materials, literature relating to poisons, IED making, bomb making, explosives and Jihadist literature including that of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)" from Khalid Mohammed.

Khalid was born and brought up in Maungdaw city of Burma. He migrated to Hyderabad a year ago along with his mother and began living in Royal Colony where Rohingya Muslim refugees also live. His father Khaleemullah is a construction worker in Jeddah for the last one decade.

He taught at children for several months in Balapur area. His sister Khaleda Parveen was married to Bangladeshi national, though his mother, Hameeda, said that they could never visit Bangladesh owing to security reasons. However, Khaleda Parveen used to visit them in Hyderabad. He was married a couple of years ago and has a year-old child.

Khalid reportedly admitted to having been trained by Tehreek-e-Azadi-Arakan which has drawn the trainers from Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan.

The NIA has identified that Khalid was staying in Hyderabad faking his identity and did not have valid documents to prove his nationality or legitimacy of stay. The agency feels that a network was forming in West Bengal where jihadists, who were working against Bangladesh and Myanmar, and Khalid was a "vital link between terror organisations in Bangladesh and Myanmar working from West Bengal and also other parts of India.

The 2 October explosion in Burdwan district of West Bengal blew the lid off and exposed the terror links of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen of Bangladesh with their outfits in West Bengal and Hyderabad.

The terror link with the bank robbery at Choppadandi in Karimnagar district of Telangana and the subsequent purchase of lands with the stolen cash in Hyderabad and Tirupati by the "robbers" was exposed after the Burdhwan explosion on 2 October.

The NIA is silently working to straighten the maze of terror links, even as Hyderabad is sitting on a powder keg.

A ballpark figure of Bangladeshi families overstaying in Hyderabad is put at 10,000, while the approximate number of Burmese families in the city would be anything around 5,000, according to knowledgeable sources. While the legality of migration needs to be checked, political pressure comes as a stumbling block in the process. For, the immigrants would have settled

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down for years together and they would have obtained voter ID, Aadhaar Card, ration card, etc to reinforce their claim to the benefits offered to any other citizen in the city.

Up to 300 Swedes fighting with ISIS: official

Source: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/22/Up-to-300-Swedes-fighting-with-ISIS-official-.html

November 22 – **As many as 300 Swedes could have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgency, whose brutal tactics in Iraq and Syria have shocked the world, Sweden's intelligence chief said Saturday.**

"A hundred cases of people who have left to join the fighting have been confirmed, then there are the presumed cases..., and then there are those that have not been counted, which brings the total to between 250 and 300," said the head of the intelligence services, Anders Thornberg, on SR public radio.

Thornberg said the flow of youths leaving to become militants in Syria was rapidly rising.

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"A certain number of young Swedish men are leaving and training in camps, learning to become terrorists to use explosives and weapons," he said.

"They're going beyond the limits of human behavior," he said. "They're fighting and killing other people."

On their return to Sweden, some are seen as ready to commit terrorist acts at home and have been placed under strict surveillance, the intelligence official added.

Sweden announced late October that it would pass a law banning citizens from taking part in foreign armed conflicts. The previous month, the EU coordinator for anti-terrorism, Gilles de Kerchove, estimated that 3,000 Europeans have joined the ultra-hardline ISIS group, which has caused global revulsion with its regular videotaped beheadings of hostages.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: If they know the number they surely now the persons. And if they know the persons they have to do something about it! Like not letting them come back "home". If they choose another country to fight for they would be more "useful" there than in Sweden!

More British 'mercenaries' join fight against ISIS

Source: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2014/11/23/More-British-mercenaries-join-fight-against-ISIS-.html

November 23 – More and more British citizens are joining other Westerners battling jihadists in Syria and Iraq, Britain's Independent newspaper reported over the weekend.

James Hughes, former British infantryman who fought in Afghanistan, is understood to be in northern Syria backing Kurds in their fight against militants belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the daily said.

Information gleaned from Hughes' Facebook profile shows that he left the British army this year after five-year service.

Hughes, who is now a de facto "mercenary," is fighting on the behalf of the Kurdish People's Protection Units, the YPG. He is not alone as his compatriot Jamie Read, whose Facebook page shows that he trained with the French army, is fighting alongside his friend.

Anti-ISIS Western fighters in Syria. (Photo courtesy: Lions of Rojava's Facebook page)

American recruiter
According to the paper, the Britons appear to have been recruited by Jordan Matson, an American who in October was revealed to have joined Kurdish forces in their fight against ISIS.

Jamie Read, (R), and Jordan Matson in an image posted on Twitter.

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On behalf of the "Lions of Rojava," a Facebook page run by the YPG, Matson urges people to join and help "send [the] terrorists to hell and save humanity" from ISIS.
On Sunday, he posted a picture of Westerners all donning military uniforms, with a caption: "It is better to live one day as a Lion than a thousand days as a lamb."
The Facebook page has more than 17,800 likes.

Matson, who has reportedly been wounded in fighting against ISIS, told The Independent that Hughes and Read were with him, sending an invitation to the paper: "U can travel to Rojava n meet them."
Aman Banigrad, of London's Kurdish Community Center, told the paper that "some are travelling for humanitarian reasons, but others are going to the frontline with the YPG. People have been killed; one of our members lost a cousin fighting in Kobane two weeks ago."
Meanwhile, the Metropolitan police are investigating the whereabouts of a 17-year-old British woman who travelled by Eurostar last week and was last seen in Belgium believed to be making her way to Syria.
According to the paper, she is potentially the first known case of a British female fighter joining the anti-ISIS battle.
A Canadian woman – 31-year-old Gill Rosenberg – was recently identified as the first foreign female to join the Kurds.
In mid-October, the Dutch public prosecutor said that motorbike gang members who have reportedly joined Kurds battling ISIS are not necessarily committing any crime.

British Prime Minister David Cameron also emphasized that there was a fundamental difference between fighting for the Kurds and joining ISIS.

Ransom ban among new anti-terror measures

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-30173238

November 24 – UK-based insurance companies are to be banned from covering the cost of terrorist ransoms, Home Secretary

GETTY IMAGES

Theresa May is set to announce.

The government hopes firms and families will be deterred from paying ransoms if the money cannot be claimed back.

Ministers maintain that paying ransoms encourages kidnapping and it says Islamic State militants are taking hostages to fund their operations.

It is one of several measures proposed in response to the terror threat.

The UK's terror threat level was raised from "substantial" to "severe" earlier this year in response to conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

A week-long police initiative, involving more than 3,000 officers, has begun to remind the public how they can help fight terrorism.

More than 6,000 people at schools, universities, airports, shopping centres, cinemas and farms across the UK will be briefed by counter-terror officers.

Police officers and theatre groups will be speaking to students about the Prevent strategy, which provides practical help to people who may be drawn into terrorism.

Officers will also be providing counter-terrorism information to passengers and staff at railway stations.

In addition, police dogs will be tasked with finding large amounts of money at ports, airports and railway stations to prevent cash leaving the UK for terror purposes.

Mrs May, who will address a counter-terrorism event in London later, is to set out the

proposed insurance legislation that she hopes to fast-track through Parliament.

The Home Office says current laws criminalise terrorist financing but there has been an element of "uncertainty" about whether insurers were prohibited from paying claims made by companies and families who had met ransom demands.

The Home Office says the Terrorism Act 2000 will now be amended to make it an explicit offence for insurers to reimburse such payments.

It says it hopes the change will also discourage insured companies and individuals from making payments in the belief they would be reimbursed.

This week, the home secretary will set out various other measures, also part of the Counter Terrorism and Security Bill:

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- **Allowing the cancellation of the passports of suspects who are overseas, so they can only return to the UK on the government's terms**
- **Changes to TPIMs - Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures - to allow the authorities to force suspects to move to another part of the country**
- **Making it compulsory for public bodies like schools, colleges and prisons to work to prevent terrorism**
- **Forcing firms to hand details to police identifying who was using a computer or mobile phone at a given time**

The Liberal Democrats said it was "good news" that the Home Office had "finally got round" to producing plans to give police powers to find out who was using a phone or computer at a certain time.

'Recently radicalised'

Meanwhile, Britain's counter-terrorism chief has warned that police officers alone "cannot combat" the threat of extremism.

Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley - the Association of Chief Police Officers' national policing lead for

counter-terrorism - said: "So far this year, we have disrupted several attack plots and made 271 arrests but the eyes and ears of law enforcement and other agencies alone cannot combat the threat."

The threat posed by violent extremists has "evolved", he said.

"They are no longer a problem solely stemming from countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, far away in the minds of the public," he said.

"Now, they are home grown, in our communities, radicalised by images and messages they read on social media and prepared to kill for their cause."

He said "nearly half" of those from the UK joining Islamic State, a militant group which has taken control of large areas of Syria and Iraq, were "recently radicalised and weren't previously on our radar".

On Sunday, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police told the BBC that four or five terror plots had been stopped this year.

Police have previously prevented on average one plot a year, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe said.

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CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter

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10 Years of

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter

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CWAs

BWAs

WE have to be lucky all the time. THEY have to be lucky only once!