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# CBRNE NEWSLETTER TERRORISM

*E-Journal for CBRNE & CT First Responders*



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## Why Al Qaeda thinks ISIS has no future

Source: <https://www.yahoo.com/news/why-al-qaeda-thinks-isis-no-future-120004041.html?nhp=1>

**Al Qaeda's fundamentally different approach to winning the hearts and minds of the world's Muslims – recently thrown into shadow by the bold moves of the Islamic State – is now showing signs of longer-term success.**

Al Qaeda has long espoused "strategic patience" to establish a global caliphate only after gradual persuasion of Muslims through a long war with the West. That approach contrasts starkly with that of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, which declared a caliphate in Syria and Iraq months after breaking with Al Qaeda in 2014.

Now, as ISIS faces mounting pressure from the outside with apparently scant support from the populations it dominates, Al Qaeda's "patience" appears to be paying off.

- **In Syria**, Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra is solidifying both its place within the Syrian opposition and its hold on some pro-opposition communities.
- **In Somalia**, fighters with the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab are making a comeback and taking back some of the territory they lost over recent years, as the country's army fails to repel the group's advances.
- **And in Yemen**, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has backed off its failed declaration of a caliphate in southern Yemen several years ago and is working through local leaders and tapping into local customs and systems to establish support.

**"Al Qaeda is essentially doing the opposite of ISIS by doubling down and developing deep roots in the local societies where it has established a presence,"** says Jennifer Cafarella, a Syria expert at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington. "It's positioning itself as an inextricable presence able to pursue its long-term vision of a global caliphate with local support and legitimacy – something ISIS hasn't been able to do."

With the rise of ISIS, Al Qaeda has faded from global attention. The Islamist terrorist group that carried out the 9/11 attacks may even have struck many as a bygone threat.

But experts say Al Qaeda is purposely lying low, learning from the Islamic State's mounting

defeats and preparing to retake the mantle of leadership of the global jihadist movement.

"Al Qaeda is growing stronger both as a result of circumstances that have the US and others leaving it alone as they focus on defeating ISIS, but also because it is an adaptive and networked organization that has learned from its own mistakes and those committed by ISIS," says Katherine Zimmerman, an Al Qaeda expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. "Al Qaeda is evolving and using this time to build up its grass-roots support in a way that is going to make it more difficult to defeat in the long term."

### Learning from ISIS

ISIS captured the attention – and loyalties – of many of the world's jihadists, attracting foreign fighters and individual Islamists from a wide range of Western, Arab, and other countries through its slick and mesmerizing use of social media. In recent years a number of Islamist extremist organizations – groups in Libya and Somalia are two examples – switched their allegiances from Al Qaeda to ISIS, seeing the latter as the rising expression of global jihadism.

Over the years of ISIS's rise, Al Qaeda has held fast to its strategic approach, even as it has evolved to embrace some of the innovations that ISIS pioneered. "Those two are not mutually exclusive, I think we've seen Al Qaeda stick with its core ideology even as it has adapted to utilize some of the methods that have worked so well for ISIS," says Ms. Zimmerman.

Al Qaeda's evolution has included a savvy use of social media and more public use of the Internet.

"Al Qaeda always used the Internet, but largely to communicate with close followers and often using encryption," Zimmerman says. "ISIS turned that on its head and made it quite public and a conduit for inculcation and a message of immediate action."

Recognizing the importance of digital communication to spreading a global message, Al Qaeda created an online English-language magazine, Inspire, in July 2010. It





has not followed ISIS's lead in posting gruesome videos of shocking beheadings and mass executions – including many involving Muslims.

#### Persuasion vs. Violent oppression

**What Al Qaeda has never veered away from, on the other hand, is its preference for persuasion over violent imposition to advance its vision of Islamist governance.**

In Syria, the Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, also referred to as Nusra Front, has not met with universal acceptance. Recent anti-Nusra protests in some of the northwestern Syrian cities where it is present suggest continuing resistance to its ideology.

But at the same time, signs are proliferating across opposition-held Syria that the group is winning followers, Ms. Cafarella says. She notes, for example, that growing numbers of women wear the full burqa in opposition-controlled Idlib – not because the practice has been imposed, as ISIS has done in areas it controls, but apparently voluntarily.

“Nusra is following the established Al Qaeda approach of keeping a low profile and establishing legitimacy by building local support,” Cafarella says. “That includes slowly introducing its religious agenda and inculcating the local youth – and we’re seeing that phase now.”

Al Qaeda may be benefiting from the US-led coalition's focus on defeating ISIS, but both Cafarella and Zimmerman say Jabhat al-Nusra has also been strengthened by the Obama administration's hands-off approach to the Syrian civil war and in particular by the US reluctance to jump in forcefully on the side of the Syrian moderate opposition.

One reason the administration never wholeheartedly embraced – and armed – the opposition was unanswered concerns that US aid would fall into the hands of extremist groups like Nusra.

Degrading and ultimately destroying ISIS may have appeared as the more urgent objective to pursue, but leaving Al Qaeda to flourish will lead to new challenges for the West down the road, experts say.

“It’s not as though defeating ISIS defeats the message,” says Zimmerman, who adds that deeply implanted communities of support for extremist Islamist ideology – whether in Afghanistan, sub-Saharan Africa, or Western Europe – aren’t going to fade away just because the organization that caught their imagination breaks up.

**“Whenever ISIS is defeated, the radicalized individuals and groups will be looking for leadership,” she says, predicting “that leader will be Al Qaeda.”**

## Obama administration to release secret 28 pages of 9/11 Commission report

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160425-obama-administration-to-release-secret-28-pages-of-9-11-commission-report>

Apr 25 – The Obama administration will release at least part of a 28-page classified chapter from the 9/11 Commission report which implicates high-level Saudis, both inside and outside government, in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Former Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida), a co-chair of the commission, said he believed the Obama administration would make a decision on the issue by June.

The *Daily Mail* reports that the unreleased portion of the report, contains information from the joint congressional inquiry into “specific sources of foreign support for some of the

September 11 hijackers while they were in the United States.”

Graham said an administration official told him that the U.S. intelligence community will make a decision within weeks on whether the entire 28-page classified chapter, or only a few pages from it.

“I hope that decision is to honor the American people and make it available,” Graham told *NBC* on Sunday. “The most important unanswered question of 9/11 is, did these 19 people conduct this very sophisticated plot alone, or were they supported?”



Former Representative Tim Roemer (D-Indiana), a member of both the 9/11 Commission and the joint congressional inquiry, has read the classified chapter three times. He said the twenty-eight pages are a “preliminary police report.”



Bob Graham (pictured) who was co-chairman of that bipartisan panel, and others say the documents point suspicion at the Saudis

“There were clues. There were allegations. There were witness reports. There was evidence about the hijackers, about people they met with — all kinds of different things that the 9/11 Commission was then tasked with reviewing and investigating,” he told the AP.

The *Mail* notes that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi citizens, but that the Saudi government has always denied supporting the attackers.

The Saudis now say that they would welcome declassification of the twenty-eight pages because it would “allow us to respond to any allegations in a clear and credible manner.”

The release of the document comes against the backdrop of growing tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Sunni kingdom argues that the United States has not been sufficiently energetic in confronting Iranian hegemonic ambitions in the region.

The Saudis have also protested pending legislation in Congress which would make it possible for the relatives of 9/11 victims to use U.S. courts to sue Saudi officials, banks, and charities. Such legislation has so far been blocked by a 1976 law which gives foreign nations immunity from such lawsuits.

The Senate bill would stipulate that the immunity enjoyed by foreign nations under the law would not apply when nations are found guilty of terrorist attacks which kill Americans on U.S. soil.

Ben Rhodes, President Barack Obama’s deputy national security adviser, told journalists in Riyadh last week that President Barack Obama had asked National Intelligence Director James Clapper to review the classified chapter for possible declassification.

“When that’s done we’d expect that there will be some degree of declassification that provides more information,” Rhodes said.

The AP quotes Roemer to say that many questions still remain with regard to the

precise role of Fahad al Thumairy, an official with Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, who helped two of the hijackers find housing and transportation after they arrived in Southern California.

In May 2003 the United States denied al Thumairy entry into the United States after the Department of State said he might be involved in terrorist activity. Roemer said there were also questions about Omar al Bayoumi, a Saudi intelligence official who helped the hijackers in both finding housing and registering for flight school.

“We did not discover....Saudi government involvement at the highest level of the 9/11 attacks,” Roemer said.

Roemer, who would later serve as U.S. ambassador to India, added, though: “We certainly did not exonerate the Saudis. ... Saudi was a fertile ground for fundraising for Al-Qaeda. Some of these issues continue to be problems today. That’s why we need to continue to get to the bottom of this.”

In June 2015 a CIA inspector general report said there had been no reliable information confirming Saudi government “involvement with and financial support for terrorist prior to 9/11.”





## EU Research for a Secure Society

[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/research-for-security/security\\_research\\_catalogue\\_2014\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/research-for-security/security_research_catalogue_2014_en.pdf)



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for the benefit of European citizens,  
critical infrastructures, SMEs and industry**

## Belgium 'insulted' by bad press on terrorism

Source: <https://euobserver.com/justice/133201>

Apr 25 – **Two Belgian ministers criticised international media for bad press of government mistakes in the lead up to the terrorist attacks in Brussels and then insisted on reinstalling illegal data retention rules throughout Europe.**

"I'm afraid that our society will have to pay a higher price for its security than is the case now," Belgium's interior minister Jan Jambon told euro-deputies on Monday (25 April).

Jambon was speaking alongside Belgium's minister of justice Koen Geens at the European parliament's civil liberties committee.

Both men praised their intelligence and security

services despite glaring gaps that almost led to their resignations in the immediate aftermath of the Brussels bombings on 22 March that killed 32 and injured hundreds.

They noted that after France, Belgium shares the most data with the EU's police agency Europol.

They say legislation has now been passed that will allow authorities to conduct house searches at night. They are also banning the anonymity of pre-paid SIM cards and have earmarked €400 million in 2016 to tackle home grown terrorism prevention.



They pointed out how their intelligence services dismantled a terrorist cell in Verviers in January last year and that Belgium had convicted 115 people of terrorism offences in 2015, up from seven or eight a year before 2014.

But more than a year after the success in Verviers, the same authorities missed or ignored clues that may have averted the Brussels attacks.

Zaventem airport suicide bomber Ibrahim el-Bakraoui had been arrested and kicked out of Turkey last July and then slipped by Belgian authorities despite having been put on a terrorist watch list and despite having broken his parole.

A police chief in Mechelen, a city near Brussels, had also held onto information for three months that could have led investigators to suspected terrorist Salah Abdeslam because his colleague "forgot to pass on the information of the dossier".

On the day of the attacks, the alert to stop metro lines in Brussels was issued almost an hour after the airport bombing.

Geens said the bad press on Belgium's weak spots to the growing threat of terrorism "not only damaged the country" but "is also an insult".





"Few countries have been attacked so violently by the international press," he said.

He then spoke at length about the need to sweep up people's digital trails in a larger effort to gather evidence and prevent further attacks. Belgium wants new EU legislation on data retention, which the European Court of Justice declared illegal in 2014 for its broad scope and fundamental rights violations.

Geens said Belgium had tried to convince the EU commission and the council, representing member states, to come up with new retention rules after the ECJ ruling but without avail.

"For Christ's sake, let's not exaggerate with regard to privacy when our security is involved, it is just too complicated," he said.

Belgium is instead passing its own rules for data retention, despite broad EU-level

resistance, and the Luxembourg court's judgment.


It plans to extend a new EU law on gathering personal data of people flying into and out of Europe to also cover rail, bus, and ferry travel.

"All modes of transport, so not only aviation, but also international trains and even also ships, busing systems," said Jambon.

They plan to add new police officers in Molenbeek, the Brussels neighbourhood where some of the attackers lived.

Jambon said 16 would be dispatched to the troubled neighbourhood, out of the 300 new posts that will be created for whole of Brussels. Belgium has designated 611 of its nationals as foreign fighters or people who have gone to Syria and returned or planned on doing so.

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Every action is judged from its effectiveness. Every post-action is judged by the common sense. There is no doubt that terrorism is hard to fight mainly because of the element of surprise and the small numbers of those executing the attacks. Belgium failed to counter the recent attacks mainly due to inability to connect the dots and to enforce the measures mentioned in this article. In that respect silence is the best antidote audacity. You speak only when everything possible has been done but proved not enough for this specific occasion. Every country suffering terrorism to that extent is wounded and will take years to restore faith and confidence. This is why it is much better to keep mouths shut and do things ignoring those who believe that "it will not happen to us" or those who think "we are the best". It is time that field professionals will be more actively involved to security issues and politicians let do what they know best: doing nothing!



## Analysis: French tourism counting the true cost of terrorism

Source: <http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/analysisfrench-tourism-counting-the-true-cost-of-terrorism-394890.html>



Apr 25 – With the continued fall-out resulting from the terrorist attacks last November still impacting on travel to the French capital, some hotels have experienced their lowest occupancy rates in 25 years, forcing many to cut their room rates in an effort to stem the shortfall.

A survey by Synhorcat, the French hotel and restaurant operators' union, reported sales in the city's cafés and bars down 44% in the weeks after the attacks, with hotels recording a 57% drop in business.

**Research by hospitality research firm MKG Group found the sector showing a gradual recovery through the early months of 2016, but still off by 11% compared to 2015.**

**France is the most-visited country in the world, with Paris hosting well over 32 million tourists last year, worth €21 billion to the economy.**

Numbers of American and Japanese visitors have been notably down so far in 2016, a situation exacerbated by Donald



Trump's statement that "Europe is a dangerous place right now."

As the holiday season approaches its pivotal point, the French tourist authority has joined forces with state railway operator, SNCF, and the Accor hotel group to extend the #ParisWeLoveYou promotion begun in the aftermath of the November 13 attacks.

SNCF is offering over 220,000 discounted tickets on its TGV trains, while Accor is providing up to 30% discounts on all-inclusive stays in 100,000 rooms.

SNCF chairman Guillaume Pepy said: "This initiative led by SNCF with AccorHotels, and the Greater Paris authorities is unprecedented in terms of its format as well as its momentum." Valérie Pécresse, Greater Paris Regional Council president, echoed the sentiment: "Greater Paris authorities are working side by side with the tourism industry to reinvigorate this vital sector, which has been struggling since the attacks."

Fears of another terrorist attack during the upcoming the Euro 2016 tournament continue to garner media comment across France, with Prime Minister Manuel Valls insisting that security precautions at the stadiums will be sufficient.

With eight million fans expected to arrive in France for the tournament, which runs from June 10 to July 10, Mr Valls said: "France is a great, modern country which is capable of assuring the security of its citizens in the face of the terrorist menace."

Designated fan zones in each of the ten host cities will accommodate various national support groups in large zones ranging from 20,000 to 100,000.

"The strongest answer to terrorists, in addition to the deployment of all intelligence and security measures, is life," Mr Valls said.

"Security in fans zones will be guaranteed with the same measures and methods as in stadiums".

Irish fans made 250,000 ticket applications for Euro 2016, with the first match against Sweden on June 13.

**Despite increasing concerns around extremist attacks, the number of international tourists rose by 4.4% worldwide in 2015 to reach a record 1.18 billion.**

"Last year's results were influenced by exchange rates, oil prices and natural and man-made crises in many parts of the world," said Taleb Rifai, head of the UN World Tourism Organisation.

Referencing extremist attacks, he said: "We are facing a global threat, and cannot anymore say this is the problem of Egypt or France or Tunisia or Turkey or Thailand or Indonesia."

Pointing out that 2015 was the sixth consecutive year of above-average growth in global tourism since the 2009 economic crisis, he added: "The role of tourism is still underestimated and the integration of travel and tourism into national emergency structures and procedures often happens only after a major incident has taken place."

A 2015 study by Moody's Investors Service showed that terrorist attacks significantly weaken economic activity, with long-lasting effects on the economy.

The report, Terrorism's Negative Impact on Economic Activity and Government Borrowing Costs, measured the effect of terrorism on a country's economic and investment growth, government expenditure and cost of borrowing. "In 2013, for example, the ten countries most affected by terrorism took an immediate and significant hit to growth, dampening GDP between 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points," said Merxe Tudela, a Moody's vice president.

"Even worse is that the negative impact continues for years after the attack, taking up to five years for the effects to peter out."

The report found that investment growth is also affected.




**EU SecInCoRe Project**

Source: <http://www.secincore.eu/>

Nowadays, the information exchange relies heavily on spoken language or written text. While human-to-human communication is essential for emergency management, support by information technology is not sufficiently utilised due to risks in changing established organisational structures and due to incompatible systems. Content from preparative and post-operational processes is only accessible via intra-organisational channels and systems.



When disaster relief forces from different countries co-operate cross-border or internationally, the information management situation is getting even more complicated: On the one hand, heterogeneous languages, organisational structures and responsibilities hinder the information sharing; on the other hand, even if these challenges are met, technical incompatibilities obstruct information sharing between first responders and police authorities from a national and international point of view. Neither a concept for a common knowledge base nor standards for information exchange between all first responders and police authorities have been established so far. Concerning information access and exchange there is no 'common information space' providing context based access to structured and unstructured data used for the purpose of security.



SecInCoRe changes this situation. The project identifies processes, information systems and data sets used by first responders and police authorities leading to requirements for a 'common information space'. While taking account established approaches and carefully addressing existent barriers, a system will be designed complementing the potential of information exchange standards on the one hand and communication network and cloud based technology on the other hand. SecInCoRe will evaluate its results involving all types of stakeholders in complementary operational contexts.

### Objectives

In detail the high-level objectives of SecInCoRe are:

**Objective 1)** A pan-European inventory of past critical events and disasters and their consequences (especially in terms of time dimension and costs) focused on collaborative emergency operations and real-time decision making. This objective is highly driven by end-users and targeted by empirical research from the perspectives of economics and engineering taking into account ethics, law, psychology and privacy.

**Objective 2)** Design of a secure, dynamic cloud based knowledge base and communication system concept including the ability to use emergency information by means of a trans-European communication infrastructure. The consortium follows a design science approach a) to define taxonomy of data sets, standards, processes and information systems and b) to formulate a network enabled communication system concept including effects on business models and new possible emergency as well as crisis management models. Latest technological innovations from information management, service provisioning and communication networks will be integrated.

**Objective 3)** Conceptual integration of available technology from the field of information and communication technology into patterns of infrastructure found in first responder organisations. The variety of emergency IT-systems available in Europe and the related






variety of information acquisition devices present a new set of challenges to end-users involved in effective emergency management and law enforcement.

**Objective 4)** Evaluation and validation of all results in representative fields of application. A developed, adapted or already in use system will be used for validation in the project scope. The inventory will be used for SecInCoRe system conception and as a database for cooperative disaster management. As a conclusion, extensions to existing crisis management models and modifications to business models of first responder and Police authorities will be proposed.

### Workplan

The strategy to implement the SecInCoRe concept transfers S/T objectives and the




intended progress beyond the state-of-the-art to interconnected tasks and work packages:

- End-user community inherent actions: WP2 complements end-user activities and workshops by research on ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) and the evaluation of possible effects of SecInCoRe concepts; Lancaster University as a WP leader ensures high quality human-centred research.
- Multi-level pan-European inventory: WP3 builds on representative incidents (see WP2) and performs research on data and processes, information systems and business models. The University of Paderborn as a WP leader brings in background knowledge and coordinates activities.
- Solution oriented design of a 'common information space' concept (complementing usercentred and demand oriented research): WP4 transfers results to a holistic system concept. The TU Dortmund as a WP leader coordinates partners from industry and academia.

SecInCoRe intends to transfer new knowledge to a distinct new capability in terms of FP7 Security. Therefore two elements are added being included in SecInCoRe's high level objectives:

- WP5 subsumes the implementation, the application to use cases, the validation towards requirements and the evaluation towards the expected impact incl. community building. T6 Ecosystems (WP leader) observes the integration and coordinates the evaluation from this position.
- WP6 highlights standardisation, dissemination and exploitation targeting core cross-cutting objectives of FP7 Security (in co-operation with WP2). Airbus DS as a WP leader ensures powerful actions from the perspective of technology drivers.





## Partners

SecInCoRe provides benefits to stakeholders early, continuously and in short intervals. Dissemination as well as community building efforts are inherent to Research and Technological Development (RTD) tasks. Therefore, milestones are defined based on the logical interdependencies and temporal constraints. The project runs all RTD work

packages in parallel; nevertheless three iterations of all WPs can be highlighted extending the quality and availability of knowledge.

## A serious game empowering the prediction of potential terrorist actions

By Raul Sormani<sup>a</sup>, John Soldatos<sup>b</sup>, Spyros Vassilaras<sup>b</sup>, Georgios Kioumourtzis<sup>c</sup>, George Leventakis<sup>c</sup>, Ilaria Giordani<sup>a</sup> and Francesco Tisato<sup>d</sup>

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Source: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2016.1161222>

Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are nowadays taking advantage of a wide range of information and intelligence sources (e.g. human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), image analysis (IMINT)) in their efforts to anticipate potential terrorist actions. However, activity prediction based on these sources requires datasets for training reasoning algorithms, which are not typically available. In this paper we introduce a gaming approach to the generation of datasets that can be used for training reasoning algorithms that are able to predict the likelihood of terrorist actions against specific assets and locations in urban environment. At the heart of our approach resides a two-player game, whose moves map to actions that are usually associated with the various stages of planning, preparing and executing terrorist attacks in urban environments. Apart from presenting the game, the paper introduces also the range of reasoning algorithms that have been trained based on its output. It also explains the terrorist semantics that underpin the implementation of the game and the design/modelling of the rules of the game. Early validation results demonstrate that the presented reasoning algorithms can successfully classify terrorist activity, through distinguishing it from seemingly suspicious but unrelated events that are typically generated by non-terrorist activities.

## Islamic Radicalization in Norway

By Tuva-Julie Engebretsen-Smith (Research Assistant, ICT)

Source: <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1339/Islamic-Radicalization-in-Norway>


Feb 2015 – Within Norway, the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism is considered a shared responsibility, rather than an issue the police should tackle on their own. The Norwegian Action Plan provides specific measures in several ministries and is used as a tool for individuals working directly with children and youth. Radicalization is



commonly seen as a process in which people increasingly accept the use of violence to achieve certain political goals.

Radical communities are emerging in Norway, and an increasing number of Islamic radicals have left Norway to travel to regions of jihad in support of the Holy War (“a war declared in support of a religious cause”). While the influx of Islamic radicals is a relatively new trend in Norway, radicals have become a significant threat to the country, according to the Norwegian Police Security Services (PST). In order to establish effective policies on counter-radicalization, the Norwegian government has drawn on experiences from other, more affected, countries. With that said, the Norwegian government focuses on *preventative actions*.

Mosques in Norway



The following paper aims to analyze the severity of Islamic radicalization as a threat in Norway. Taking the alarming number of Norwegian Islamic radicals in conflict-ridden countries into consideration, the purpose of this paper is to examine the rise of Islamic radicalization amongst Norway's Muslim. The first section of this paper introduces a demographic overview of the Muslim community in Norway by explaining the structure, socio-economic disadvantages, and political participation amongst Muslims in Norway. The second section details the theoretical approach to radicalization, common trends in the process, and internal or external indicators. The third aspect of the paper will explore case studies of Islamic radicalization and the activities of foreign fighters. The point of convergence of the fourth section looks at government responses to Islamic radicalization by considering the Norwegian Exit Project and the Action Plan of 2010 & 2014. The paper will conclude by evaluating key findings, and a final assessment on the threat of Islamic radicals in Norway.

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## Brussels bomber was ISIL jailer of foreign hostages in Syria

Source: <http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/brussels-bomber-was-isil-jailer-of-foreign-hostages-in-syria>

Apr 23 – **Najim Laachraoui, one of the Brussels airport bombers, was identified by several Frenchmen held hostage by ISIL in Syria as one of their prison guards**, sources said Friday.

According to one, four French journalists kidnapped and held in



Syria from 2013 to 2014 had identified a guard known as “Abou Idriss”.

One of the journalists, Nicolas Henin, “has formally identified” Abou Idriss as being Najim Laachraoui, his lawyer Marie-Laure Ingouf said.

Belgian prosecutors have said Laachraoui travelled to Syria in





February 2013 to join ISIL forces.

There was no further trace of the Belgian national until he was registered under a false name at the border between Austria and Hungary in September 2015.

**Laachraoui, 24, was one of the two suicide bombers who struck Brussels airport on March 22, while a third attacker blew himself up at on a metro train, with the two attacks killing 32 people.**

Prosecutors have also linked him to November's attacks in Paris in which 130 people died. They said his DNA was found on a suicide vest and a piece of cloth at the Bataclan concert hall where 90 people were killed.

Police also found his DNA on explosives used at the Stade de France, leading investigators to

believe he was the bomb maker in both the French and Belgian attacks.

**ISIL has identified Laachraoui as Abou Idriss in the latest edition of its magazine, Dabiq, saying he "prepared the explosives for the two raids in Paris and Brussels".**

The former French hostages have identified two Frenchmen as being among their jailers when they were held in Syria.

One, Mehdi Nemmouche, is in custody accused of killing four people in an attack on the Jewish museum in Brussels in 2014.

The other is Salim Benghalem, who has been sentenced in absentia in France for recruiting for ISIL and is listed as a "foreign terrorist combatant" by the United States.

## ISIS Recruitment in Balkans Continues

Source: <http://www.tol.org/client/article/25825-isis-cia-bosnia-brennan.html>

Apr 26 – U.S. intelligence Chief John Brennan was in Sarajevo at the end of last week to meet local anti-terrorism officials, The Associated Press reports. His unexpected visit came on the heels of a journey to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he met with senior officials from six Arab nations to discuss common efforts in combatting the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.



An official agenda of Brennan's meeting was not released, but Bosnia's chief prosecutor, Goran Salihovic, said the country's anti-terrorism group planned to inform the U.S. intelligence service about local efforts to combat terrorism.

According to the anti-terrorism group, an estimated **124 Bosnians are involved in foreign wars** – four fighting in Ukraine and the others for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Some already want to return home, and negotiations are underway to facilitate the process, evidently with lighter sentences offered to those who provide intelligence. Bosnia is far from the only Balkan country where Islamists have successfully recruited locals. A report on the B92 website cites "a dozen to several dozen" Montenegrin citizens fighting alongside ISIS. As just one example, B92 mentioned a former Muslim cleric from

Montenegro who was reportedly killed fighting in the ranks of ISIS in Syria.



In **Albania, 24 citizens** from three villages in the southeast of the country have left to join terrorists in the Middle East over the past three years, Balkan Insight reports. So far, four of them have reportedly been killed.

A total of 51 Bosnians have died so far in foreign armed conflicts abroad while 49 have already returned. Half of those have been taken to court, according to the Republika Srpska RTRS broadcaster. Some 70 people have been identified as suspects in terrorist activity in Bosnia, The Associated Press reports.

John Brennan has been serving as CIA director since 2013. Before that he served as chief counterterrorism advisor to U.S. President Barack Obama.

## Islamic State Moves to Libya

By Jonathan Spyer

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5967/islamic-state-moves-to-libya>

Apr 23 - ... The importance of the Islamic State holding [in Libya] derives from its location and



the number of fighters under Islamic State command in the area.

Islamic State controls an area of about 200km around the city of Sirte on the Libyan coast. The greater part of this area was secured last year against the backdrop of Islamic State setbacks in Iraq and Syria, and general chaos in Libya. The location of Sirte offers the possibility for Islamic State of infiltration into Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb. Sirte was the birthplace of former dictator Muammar Gaddafi. It has extensive infrastructure, including an international airport, a seaport and oil installations.

Members of Islamic State parade through Libya's coastal city of Sirte in a photo released by the Islamist media outlet Welayat Tarablos.

Islamic State is thought to have about 4000 to 5000 fighters in Sirte, and is recruiting African migrants making their way to the

coast. The movement also derives the depth of its support in the Sirte area from the loyalty of tribesmen. Clearly, the goal is to seek to replicate the model for success in Iraq and Syria: once a territorial base is established, a military force can be built up that can be used aggressively to expand the holding.

Islamic State achieved its greatest successes this way, when its forces swept from eastern Syria into Iraq in 2014. In Libya, as in these countries, central government effectively has collapsed and the country is in a state of civil war. Two rival governments vie for power: an internationally recognised authority in Tobruk in the east and an Islamist de facto power in the capital, Tripoli, in the west.

The Islamic State area of control is situated between the two. The organisation hopes to expand east and west. Its immediate targets are the city of Misrata, halfway between Sirte and Tripoli, and Ajdabiya to the east, near the Sidr oil port and the refinery at Ras Lanuff. Notably, Islamic State propaganda has begun to place increased stress on its Libyan holding. New recruits are being encouraged to head for



this area rather than for the Levant. Some prominent commanders of the movement are reported to have relocated to Libya, too.

Islamic State was able to take Sirte last year because it faced little resistance. The local tribes were largely affiliated with the Gaddafi regime and had little reason for loyalty to either of the administrations in the country. Indeed, Islamic State may serve a purpose as a new structure of loyalty and protection for them, analogous to the process in which Sunni former loyalists of the Saddam regime found a home with Islamic State in Iraq.

For a while, both Libyan governments and the West appeared content to let Islamic State fester in its small desert domain. The Tripoli and Tobruk governments are mainly concerned with ruling their own areas rather than striking out against one another. However, as Islamic State prepares to expand towards areas vital for the Libyan oil industry, the issue becomes more urgent and has begun to appear on the radar screens of European policymakers.

In February, US special forces carried out a raid on the town of Sabratha in which 40 Islamic State men were killed. Reports have appeared in the British and French media concerning the presence of special forces from both countries close to Islamic State's holding in Sirte. British and French aircraft are carrying out reconnaissance missions over Sirte. *Le Monde* described what it termed a "secret war" being conducted by French intelligence and special forces personnel against Islamic State on Libyan soil.

At the same time, there appears to be no prospect of a large-scale involvement of Western forces on the ground to vanquish Islamic State in Libya. Rather, the strategy appears to resemble that employed in Syria and Iraq: namely, use air power to partner with local allies identified by intelligence and bolstered by the discreet presence of Western special forces.

Attempts to bring together the two rival administrations in Libya are ongoing but have run aground. An agreement reached for a unity government on December 17 remains unimplemented.

At the same time, the two governing entities with their Western support are far from helpless, and Islamic State, with its 5000 fighters, is far from invincible. This means the Islamic State enclave is unlikely to score major territorial advances. But it is also unlikely to disappear.

Ultimately, Islamic State is part of a much broader problem: the collapse and fragmentation of several formerly centralised Arab states. It grows and flourishes in the environments left by this collapse. Will McCants, an expert on Islamic State and Sunni Islamism recently said more generally that the record suggested such movements tended to overreach themselves. Their inability to accept a limited role leads to their enemies uniting to destroy them.

This may well be the final fate to be suffered by Islamic State. In the interim period, however, it remains powerful and dangerous. ...

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## China Debuts a Terrorism-Fighting Robot as the Military Tech Market Grows

Source: <http://www.techtimes.com/articles/154559/20160428/china-unveils-robot-soldier-controlling-human-riots.htm>

On April 21 at the 12<sup>th</sup> Chongqing Hi-Tech Fair, China got its first taste of a robot that encompassed security capabilities and intelligence skills. Developed by the National Defense University, the bot can potentially be a

key component in the fight against riots and terrorism in China. [AnBot](#), as it's been named, includes intelligent video analysis capabilities and autonomous navigation.





The bot itself only weighs about 171 pounds, and it's less than five feet in height. Its



maximum speed per hour is approximately 11 miles, but its creators believe it shouldn't be underestimated. Its sensors are designed to mimic the human brain, eyes and ears. It can work for up to eight hours at a time without needing to be recharged, and it can patrol a wide area by moving at a speed of less than one mile per hour.

Those who find themselves near AnBot in the event of an emergency can press its SOS button to notify local police. When it's active, AnBot can navigate through a dangerous environment, record video, and deliver

electrical shocks if necessary. The bot is given instructions by a human (of course) who utilizes its remote control.

The development of AnBot may not come as a shock to those who have been closely watching the military security market. A [study](#) published by WinterGreen Research earlier this year discovered that the market for military ground robot mobile platform systems is worth approximately \$3.2 billion. Furthermore, it's predicted to increase to \$10.2 billion by 2021.

Military-type robots are being designed to fight terrorism and engage in dangerous situations. Researchers believe that funding sources for this technology will likely expand beyond the army to the state department and intelligence community.

"The U.S. army is embroiled in change of a different order - downsizing its size, downsizing the number of soldiers deployed," wrote the authors of the study. "This is an all-consuming task, not leaving much bandwidth for the leadership to think about how to combat terrorism with robots. The leadership of the army does have the idea that downsizing will free up budget to invest in technology."

► Watch the related video at source's URL.

## U.S. employs Israeli "roof-knocking" air strike tactic

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160428-u-s-employs-israeli-roofknocking-air-strike-tactic>



Apr 28 – The U.S. military is now employing a controversial air strike technique called "roof-knocking," which was widely used by Israel during the war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip in summer 2014.

The approach involves dropping small munitions in the roof of a house in which terrorists are suspected to be hiding, or which is suspected of



being a storing facility for terrorists weapons. The purpose of dropping the small, harmless munitions on the roof is to alert civilians in the house that they have a few minutes to escape to safety.

After a few minutes, a real bomb is dropped on the target house to destroy it.

*Newsweek* reports that the US tried out the tactics during a strike against an ISIS house in Mosul which stored large amounts of cash.

The reason for the Pentagon's use of the tactics was that surveillance drones noted that a woman and her children were living there in the house.

Major General Peter Gersten, deputy commander of intelligence in U.S. operations against ISIS, [said](#) the United States dropped small munitions on the roof of the building to warn the woman to leave the buildings.

"We went as far as actually to put a Hellfire on top of the building and air burst it so it wouldn't destroy the building, simply knock on the roof to ensure that she and the children were out of the building," he said.

"The men that were in that building, multiple men, literally trampled over her to get out of that building. And we watched her and observed her leaving the building. And she cleared the building, and we began to process the strike."

The tactic, though, failed in avoiding civilian casualties. The woman ran back into the building as the second bomb was being launched and was killed, Maj Gen Gersten said.

"We watched, very difficult for us to watch. And it was within the final seconds of the actual impact," he said.

The Pentagon officially acknowledge US has acknowledged killing forty-one civilians since bombing operations against ISIS began in 2014.

Human rights group insist the numbers are much higher.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights says 391 civilians have been killed in Syria alone – but this figure includes civilians killed by other members of anti-ISIS coalition, and not only U.S. forces.

*Newsweek* quotes Israel's military sources who say the tactics is effective in warning civilians of an imminent strike, especially since Hamas uses the Palestinian civilian population as a human shield.

During the 2014 Gaza war, Israel also texted warning messages to residents of buildings about to be attacked.

A UN report of the 2014 war concluded, however, that roof-knocks "cannot be considered an effective warning given the confusion they often cause to building residents and the short time allowed to evacuate before the actual strike."

The report cited the case of an early morning incident when Israel knocked on the roof of a family home just a few minutes before striking. The bomb killed 19 of the 22 people inside the house.

## Coalition's campaign has seriously weakened ISIS financial position

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160428-coalition-s-campaign-has-seriously-weakened-isis-financial-position>

Apr 28 – The coalition's airstrikes on ISIS-controlled oilfields, the recapturing of ISIS-held territory, and destruction of the group's cash storage facilities – in which up to \$800 million in cash went up in smoke — may have seriously undermined ISIS and its operations in Syria and Iraq, the coalition's military commanders said.

Officials at the U.K Ministry of Defense said earlier this week that ISIS has increasingly been resorting to arbitrary fines, extortion, and gangster-like tactics to compensate for the shortfall in income.

Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer, the senior U.K. official in charge of disrupting ISIS finances, said: "What we are now seeing is that they are running short of cash and they are looking for more imaginative ways to do things. It is early days, but only in the last week we have heard from the sources that we have that the taxation system is becoming more arbitrary, more looking to fines, and so becoming less progressive and less easy to sell to the population." He added that the



gangsterism was damaging the ISIS brand. Deputy U.S. commander for operations and intelligence, Maj. Gen. Peter E. Gersten, said up to \$800 million held in ISIS storage facilities had been destroyed by coalition airstrikes. He said the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS was down by 8 percent.

CNN [reports](#) that the assertions by the two officials are supported by evidence [presented](#) in a study by the Center for Combatting Terrorism.n

The study shows that ISIS now has difficulties paying its fighters. These payments account for 60 percent of the organization's costs.

The documents presented in the study show, for example, that even in oil-rich areas, confiscation now accounts for about 40 percent of ISIS income.

Stringer likened the financial anti-ISIS efforts to the economic warfare waged against Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

"ISIS is trying to get more hard cash through extortion of the local population," Stringer said. "We are starting to see corruption and embezzlement among senior leaders, suggesting we are having success."

The Ministry of Defense says that until recently, 40 percent of ISIS revenue came from oil, 40 percent from forms of taxation, and 20 percent from other sources such as sales of antiquities and profiteering in money markets.

The coalition's sustained attacks on ISIS oil infrastructure have caused these proportions to change, leaving the split closer to 20/50/30.

To date, the coalition has conducted 1,216 air strikes against ISIS oil infrastructure, reducing

production by 25 percent and revenues by 10 percent.

Stringer said: "We have stopped them getting oil out of the ground and transporting it. We have moved them from moving oil to selling it at the wellhead. The coalition has also targeted additives and chemicals that Isis needs to refine its oil products, and what is now being produced is 'crude in every way'."

Stringer noted, however, that much of ISIS's crude oil is not shipped abroad, but sold within the ISIS-controlled territory. "It is nevertheless a major source of revenue, since there is a demand from local businesses and homes with generators," Stringer said.

ISIS's has lost about a quarter of the territory it used to control in Iraq, and 10 percent of the territory it used to control in Syria. The population under ISIS control has declined from 9 million to 6 million.

The cut in pay for foreign fighters has also reduced the number of them joining the organization. The Pentagon said that the number of such individuals entering ISIS territory had declined by 90 percent in the past year.

Gersten said: "When I first got here, we were seeing somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign fighters entering the fight. Now that we've been fighting this enemy for a year, our estimates are down to about 200. And we're actually seeing an increase now in the desertion rates in these fighters. We're seeing a fracture in their morale. We're seeing their inability to pay."

— *Read more in Aymenn Al-Tamimi, [A Caliphate under Strain: The Documentary Evidence](#), Center for Combatting Terrorism (22 April 2016)*

## 30 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/504/html>

This column consists of capsule reviews of recent books from various publishers.

**The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2016* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 504 pp., US \$618.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-85743-835-2.**

The annually published *The Military Balance*, which is published by the London-based The International Institute for Strategic Studies, is considered the most authoritative, comprehensive and detailed assessment of the military capabilities and defense economics of 171 countries. It is widely used as an unclassified reference resource by governments' military and intelligence agencies, as well as public policy research institutes, around the world. The





volume is divided into two parts: Part One, “Capabilities, Trends and Economics,” and Part Two, “Reference.” Attesting to the significance of the terrorist threat facing much of the global community, the editor’s introduction, entitled “Modernising Military Capabilities; Familiar Security Challenges,” begins with an overview of the terrorist threat, as he writes that “A surge in high-profile terrorist attacks at the end of 2015 added to the increasing crises, conflicts and sense of uncertainty preoccupying the planning staffs of defense ministries worldwide.” (p. 5) Given “the reality that combating terrorism was a global, not just a regional issue,” the editor adds that terrorist groups such as ISIS “cannot be eradicated solely by military means. Tackling these groups will require multinational attention and the concerted and long-term application of policies and tools blending political, military, security, information and development capabilities, and agreement on ends as well as means: [with] the track record on such cooperation...mixed at best.” (p. 5) With the volume’s chapters focusing on the military capabilities of global regions and their countries, of particular interest to the counterterrorism community is their detailing of countries’ combating terrorism forces. Thus, for example, it details that the United States’ Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consists of 63,150 active forces and 6,550 civilians (p. 48), France has 3 Special Forces groups (p. 98), that Norway’s Army has 2 Special Forces groups and one Naval Special Forces group (p. 126), the United Kingdom has a large contingent of Royal Navy, Army and RAF Special Forces regiments and squadrons (p. 155), Russia has 489,000 Paramilitary forces, 10,000-30,000 Federal Protection Services forces, and 170,000 Interior Troops, India has 1,403,700 Paramilitary forces and 7,350 National Security Guards (p. 255), and that Israel has 3 Army Special Forces battalions and 1 Special Operations brigade, 300 Naval Commandos, and 8,000 Border Police forces (pp. 333- 335). The appendices include a listing of estimated forces and equipment by selected terrorist groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah, ISIS, and Boko Haram.

**Nick Catrantzos, *Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 363 pp., US \$76.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4398-7292-5.**

This is an authoritative textbook on the manifestations of the insider threat and the methods required to mitigate the challenges presented by the threat. It is divided into three parts: Part I, “Diagnostics” (defining the nature of the threat and the danger posed by such individuals who possess “legitimate access and occupies a position of trust” in an organization that is ultimately betrayed, and various analytical approaches employed to assess this threat); Part II, “Key Players” (the types of ‘insiders’ ranging from those who wage cyber sabotage or breaches on behalf of foreign governments or political causes, those who seek financial gain, to those who engage in workplace violence); and Part III, “Making a Difference” (the role of background investigations in vetting employees who might present an ‘insider’ threat, how to recognize deception by potential insiders, and the components of a preventative program to mitigate such threats to an organization). As a textbook, each chapter includes a summary conclusion, questions for classroom discussion, exercises for group projects, and endnotes. The appendices include additional questions and issues for further discussion. This textbook is ideal for university courses and as a practical handbook for security departments that focus on countering the insider threat. What is especially noteworthy about this textbook is that it was published prior to the insider attacks by Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden – but had its insights and preventative guidelines and protocols been employed at the time could have aided in preventing such costly breaches into the U.S. government’s national security classified information systems. The author, a veteran security director, teaches homeland security and emergency management at the School of Management, University of Alaska.

**Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, *Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 388 pp., US \$98.00 [Hardcover], US \$55.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-442-24944-8.**

This is a comprehensive and detailed account about how social network analysis (SNA) is employed to map and understand what are termed “dark networks” in order to formulate strategies to counter, disrupt, and defeat them. Such “dark networks” are generally covert and illegal in nature. The groups within these networks range from terrorists, criminal gangs, drug traffickers, criminal organizations, to white collar conspiracies. The volume is divided into four sections. The first part presents an overview of SNA, its strategic uses to disrupt dark



networks, and how data about such networks is collected, coded, and manipulated, for example, to formulate disruption strategies; the second part explores the nature of the dark networks in terms of their topographical nature, how to detect subgroups and central actors within such networks, and how to identify the roles of different actors within such networks; the third part explains the use of hypotheses to “dig deeper” into such networks, as well as how longitudinal analysis is used “to identify the causes and consequences of network change...” (p. 267) The book’s concluding fourth part presents a series of lessons learned, such as the important observation that “Analysts should not forget that the actors in dark networks are dynamic entities and not static or one-dimensional” and that “Something as extreme as the removal of one of their neighbors will cause them to suddenly change their behavior, and a series of removals will likely cause the network to look completely different from what the initial investigation revealed.” (p. 297) The appendices include a description of the data and coding used in the discussion and their application to case studies such as the Afghan tribal network, a glossary of terms, analytic software used in SNA, and reference sources. The authors are affiliated with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

**Jolle Demmers, *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 158 pp., US \$54.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-55534-0.**

This book’s objective is to employ a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates a range of theoretical frameworks to “explain and understand how and why (groups of) people resort to violent action against other (groups of) combatants, civilians, organizations or the state.” (p. 2) After defining the field of conflict, including civil war, and mapping the interactions of the primary and secondary parties, including their external environment, the discussion focuses on the actors’ social identity (such as their ethnicity) and how it affects their mobilization to engage in collective violent action, such as inter-group violence. Another chapter discusses the application of rational choice theory to explain the costs and benefits of engaging in conflict, driven by the assumption that “Basically, rational choice theories of conflict start from the proposition that individuals will conduct civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion.” (p. 101) Some of the analysis is overly jargon-laden and difficult to understand, such as his observation that “In his quest to find the ‘true motivation for rebellion’, [Paul] Collier takes an explanatory epistemological stance. That is, he studies social action from without and infers motivation from patterns of observed behavior. In this view, interpretation, meaning or sense-making are merely seen as distortions.” (p. 102) In another example of academic jargon, the author writes that “Social theorists referred to the riots as acts of ‘defective consumers’, as a manifestation of a consumerist desire violently enacted when unable to realize itself the proper way: by shopping” (Bauman 2011); or highlighted how the UK has become a securitocracy (Gilroy 2011).” (p. 139) In an overly long concluding paragraph on “What to do with theory,” the author writes that “Theoretical literacy is thus different from fluency: the end goal is not to have you ‘speak’ the language of constructivist instrumentalism, social identity theory or critical discourse analysis without a flaw. Rather, it is about using these ideas and vocabularies, acknowledging their underlying affinities and tensions, and finding your own voice.” (p. 142) A revised and updated edition of this book is scheduled to be published in 2017, so hopefully its analysis will be written in clear language. The author is a professor at Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

**Frances L. Flannery, *Understanding Apocalyptic Terrorism: Countering the Radical Mindset* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 272 pages, pp., US \$155.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-77954-9.**

This is a highly interesting and authoritative examination of the phenomenon of what the author terms “radical apocalyptic terrorism” – with apocalypticism defined as “an orientation to reality that maintains that the divine (or ‘transcendent’) realm has sent a revelation to a select few persons, the righteous, disclosing the divine view through a transformative or meaningful experience. This revelation affirms that evil forces rule the mundane realm that the righteous now inhabit, but someday there will be divine intervention that will dramatically change the operation of the cosmos by overcoming this evil, allowing the righteous to partake more fully of the divine reality.” (pp. 2-3) Following a general discussion of the parameters and characteristics of apocalypticism as illustrated in the Book of Revelation, two chapters then explore key



changes in how it was interpreted in the Middle Ages, with its largely pacifist ideology transformed into a militant one, which the author then applies to an examination of the case study of a Christian group, the Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord. The succeeding chapters apply the notion of apocalypticism to contemporary terrorist groups such as al Qaida, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), as well as lone actors such as Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, and other American domestic groups. Other terrorist groups and lone actors that fall under this category are also examined, such as James Lee, an eco-terrorist, the Unabomber, and new religious movements, such as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo. The concluding chapter proposes an approach to countering such apocalyptic terrorist groups. Based on long-term multi-targeted efforts to improve governance of marginalized populations where such radical movements proliferate, this approach is driven by counter-messaging campaigns in social media “that come from members of larger, peaceful communities with which a terrorist seeks to identify,” and a “fact-based, informational approach that publicizes an extremist group’s ‘sins’ within its own theological context.” (p. 250) Such campaigns would involve not only government agencies but non-governmental, grass-roots and faith-based organizations, as well as academic experts. The author is a Professor of Religion and Director of the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Terrorism and Peace (CISTP), James Madison University, Virginia.

**Priya Dixit and Jacob L. Stump, editors, *Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies* (New York, NY: Routledge 2016), 216 pp., US \$155.00 [Hardcover], US \$44.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-01872-3.**

The contributors to this edited volume are part of the sub-discipline of what is termed Critical Terrorism Studies, a dissident literature in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. In its dissidence, it attempts to replace the predominant and entrenched modes of knowledge-production of ‘regimes of truth’ about terrorism and counterterrorism with its own epistemologies that “illustrate historical materialism’s emphasis on class antagonism and dialectics, discursive epistemologies that focus on the construction of meaning and its interaction with social processes and institutions, experiential knowledge of postcolonial and nationalistic politics and social processes, feminist standpoint epistemology of the marginalized, de-colonial knowledge of subjugated populations, and filmically depicted stories of ordinary people.” (p. 14) To achieve these stated objectives, the volume’s authors discuss issues such as Foucauldian and realist approaches to terrorism discourse, applying Marxism’s historical materialism to critical terrorism studies, viewing terrorists as co-participants, ecologizing terrorism through ethnographic fieldwork, applying metaphor analysis to study terrorism, using a reflexive postcolonial methodology to study Palestinian resistance in the West Bank, applying marginality as a feminist research method in terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, analyzing the testimony of ex-militants, and an analysis of the visualization through films of the ‘war on terror.’ In the concluding chapter, the co-editors are out-of-date when they repeat an assertion, published in 2008 (which they do not cite), that “Books on terrorism are produced at the rate of one every six hours.” (191) In this case, since their sub-discipline aims to engage in empirically-driven scholarship, shouldn’t they rely on more current estimates? With the co-editors concluding that the objective of their sub-discipline is to dismantle “existing modes of thinking, writing, representing, and communicating terrorism which mainly privileges a ‘Western’ masculinized view of the world,” (p. 198) while there is much ground to criticize mainstream terrorism and counterterrorism studies, this volume, in this reviewer’s judgment, merely presents its own problematic and jargon-laden theoretical approach.

**James J.F. Forest, *The Terrorism Lectures: A Comprehensive Collection for Students of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and National Security* [2nd Edition] (Santa Ana, CA: Nortia Current/An Imprint of Nortia Press, 2015), 390 pp., US \$24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-9400503-06-6.**

In this comprehensive and well-written textbook, the author’s aim is “to simulate the experience of a semester-long university course on terrorism. Each chapter represents what is meant to be a 35-40 minute classroom lecture.” (p. xiii). This is accomplished through the book’s five parts. The first part, “Definitions and Historical Frameworks,” discusses how terrorism is defined, its general objectives, David Rapoport’s famous formulation of the four historical waves of modern terrorism, and how terrorist groups, as “learning organizations,” learn





from each other's modus operandi and weaponry. The second part, "Underlying Contexts That Motivate and Facilitate Terrorism," examines the underlying grievances that drive terrorism, how individuals are radicalized and recruited into terrorism, the exploitation of the media and the Internet by terrorists, the economic dimensions of terrorism (e.g., economic conditions as grievances and facilitators, and the economic impact of terrorism on their targeted societies), the financial and criminal dimensions of terrorism (e.g., the nexus between terrorist groups and criminal organizations and engagement by terrorist groups in criminal activities), and the political dimensions of terrorism, ranging from state support of terrorist groups to the competition over control of weak and failed states between terrorist group insurgents and their weak governments. The third part, "Terrorist Group Ideologies and Strategies," discusses the ideological types of terrorist groups, ranging from ethnonationalist/separatist, left-wing, right-wing, to religious. The fourth part, "Contemporary Challenges," analyzes the latest challenges posed by terrorism in the form of al Qaida [which also applies to its parallel variation, ISIS], lone actor terrorism, the use by terrorist groups of the tactic of suicide bombings, and the threats presented by the potential use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. The fifth's part, "Concluding Thoughts," presents the author's take on the future trajectory of terrorism in terms of possible new trends in their organizational formations, ideology, weaponry, areas of operation, and warfare scenarios. As a textbook, each chapter includes a summary, questions for discussion, recommended readings, and endnotes. The comprehensive and authoritative treatment of these subjects makes this an ideal primary textbook for courses on terrorism and counterterrorism. The author is Professor and Director of the Security Studies program at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and the co-editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism*.

**Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism [Fifth Edition]* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 478 pp., US \$250.00 [Hardcover], US \$85.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-19014-6.**

This is the fifth edition of this comprehensive and detailed textbook, which was first published in 2005. Following an introductory overview, the volume is divided into three parts. The first part, "Terrorism," covers topics such as how to define terrorism; the terrorist threat in America and the global context; the nature of religious terrorism; the underlying causes of terrorism, including the processes of radicalization into terrorism, the roles of leaders and followers in terrorist groups, and terrorists' motivations and agendas; how terrorists' use women and children in their warfare; terrorists' objectives, tactics, and targeting, including the types of weapons employed in their warfare, and future trends in warfare, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction; and how terrorist groups are organized and engage in funding activities. The second part, "Counterterrorism," discusses issues such as the nature of America's post-9/11 countering terrorism campaign; the effectiveness of "hard" and "soft" measures in counterterrorism; the issues involved in balancing the need for security and civil liberties and human rights; and, with a special focus on the United States, the roles of prevention and preparedness in managing a homeland security program. The third part, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in News Media and Internet," discusses how the news media covers terrorist events and how terrorists exploit cyberspace for their propaganda and radicalization objectives. While the analysis throughout the textbook is sound and well-written, this reviewer does not agree with the author's conclusion that "an overblown, expensive bureaucracy has not necessarily enhanced [America's] ability to prevent further terrorist attacks, and to effectively respond if terrorists manage to strike," (p. 425) or that the magnitude of the terrorist threat is overblown. Nevertheless, this volume is recommended as a primary textbook for courses on terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The author is a veteran academic in terrorism studies and serves as adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, in New York.

**Joshua D. Freilich and Gary LaFree, editors, *Criminology Theory and Terrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 220 pp., US \$160.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-85826-8.**

This edited volume was originally published as a special issue of the quarterly journal "Terrorism and Political Violence," which focused on criminological approaches to the study of terrorism. Such a disciplinary approach is especially pertinent given the fact that terrorism falls within the domain of criminology since its activities involve, as the editors' note, "the breaking of laws and reactions to the breaking of laws." (p. 1) Interestingly, while terrorist and criminal incidents involve breaking a country's laws, the editors' note that collecting terrorist



incident data is much more difficult in terms of “official” data collected by police, “victimization” data collected from the population of victims, and “self-report” data collected from offenders because terrorist acts “often cut across several more common types of criminal categories,” as well as the fact that victimization surveys are little used in the study of terrorism. (p. 4) Another reason, although not mentioned by the editors, may be the fact that as a national security threat, intelligence agencies that are tasked with countering terrorism operate in a covert environment, where such data is considered classified.

Following the editors overview of criminology theory and terrorism, the volume’s chapters discuss issues such as the application of subcultural theory to analyzing Jihadi and right-wing radicalization in Germany, the use of “rational choice rewards” in studying Jihadist suicide bombers, the influence on the rate of terrorist attacks on country-level social disorganization caused by their operations, applying a criminological approach to analyzing right-wing, left-wing, and al Qaida-inspired extremists in the United States, analyzing the impact of a counter-terrorism campaign’s deterrence and backlash effects on the Spanish ETA group, and an empirical comparison of the victims of ideologically- and non-ideologically-motivated homicides committed by American far-rightist extremists. Joshua Freilich is affiliated with the Doctoral Program in Criminal Justice and the Department of Criminal Justice, John Jay College, City University of New York, and Gary LaFree is affiliated with the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

**David Lowe, Policing Terrorism: Research Studies into Police Counterterrorism Investigations (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 203 pp., US \$80.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4822-2683-6.**

This is an authoritative, practitioner-based socio-legal study by a former veteran UK counterterrorism detective of significant issues involved in terrorism investigations. The volume is divided into two parts. The first part, “The Law Governing Terrorism Investigations,” covers topics such as the legal definition of terrorism, defining and ascertaining evidence that confirms when a religiously extremist activity can be associated with terrorism, statutory preventative measures against terrorism, legal justifications for engaging in surveillance of suspects, and countering the funding of terrorism. The second part, “Investigating Terrorism,” discusses the legal guidelines in conducting intelligence gathering operations by police forces, understanding the signs and activities that accompany radicalization into terrorism (based on a case study from Northern Ireland), police recruitment of informants in counterterrorism investigations, and the laws and policies governing the handling of such informants, including managing their court testimony, immunity from prosecution or reduction in their sentencing. The author is a principal lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University Law School in the UK.

**Lindsay A. Harvell and Gwendelyn W. Nisbett, editors, Denying Death: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Terror Management Theory (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 224 pp., US \$160.00 [Hardcover], US \$54.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-84314-1.**


The contributors to this conceptually innovative edited volume apply Ernest Becker’s Terror Management Theory – a psychological means of self-esteem to provide existential protection to individuals who fear death – to a variety of fields such as political worldviews, civic engagement, public health, crime and law, marketing, suicide prevention, the way emergency first responders communicate, and airport security. With the co-editors receiving their doctorates in social influence and political communication from the University of Oklahoma, Dr. Harvell is an assistant professor at James Madison University, Virginia, and Dr. Nisbett is an assistant professor at the University of North Texas.

**Willem Koomen and Joop Van Der Pligt, The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 284 pp., US \$155.00 [Hardcover], US \$52.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-848-72442-6.**

This is an interesting and innovative conceptual framework for analyzing the primary determinants and backgrounds of different types of radicalization pathways into terrorism. It is based on the authors’ initial research for the Dutch Ministry of Justice, which they have broadened to provide a more international context. In examining the psychology of radicalization into terrorism, the religious, ideological, nationalist/separatist components



are also discussed, including its 'Islamic' manifestations, since they represent the most lethal current threats. Radicalization is focused upon because it "almost always" precedes terrorism, and "is a phase




in which much can be done to preempt that possibility..." (p. 4) The book's chapter's discuss topics such as the root causes of terrorism (e.g., a sense of socio-economic deprivation and discrimination); the impact of perceived threats on the radicalization process; the roles of individual factors, such as personality (such as an abnormal personality trait or an authoritarian personality type, demographics, including socioeconomic or marital status), on radicalization into violent extremism; the roles of social identity in the form of ideology and religion, in driving polarization and collective action; the role of small group processes and community support in driving extremism into violence; and pathways into terrorism, as well as the processes involved in de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism – and the factors that cause the termination of terrorist groups, whether through coercive or conciliatory means. There is much to commend in this book, particularly its comprehensive examination of leading academic theories and approaches and how they apply to actual cases. Also especially valuable is the inclusion of flowchart figures to illustrate and synthesize each chapter's discussion, such as

Figure 9.2 on the "Rise and decline of violent extremism" (p. 235). The authors' finding that "there is absolutely no evidence to support [the] idea" that extremists and terrorists "have abnormal personalities" may be challenged, since many of those who become terrorists, such as those with a criminal background, would not be described as "normal." (p. 111) Also, their finding that "the belief in human inequality that characterizes people with a strong social dominance orientation may also drive them towards the extreme right," (p. 111) is correct – although they should have added that it also drives such individuals into extremist right-wing "religious groups," such as the Jihadists, as well. The volume is highly recommended as a textbook for courses on terrorism and counterterrorism. Dr. Koomen is affiliated with the Department of Social Psychology of the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, where Dr. van der Pligt, who died in 2015, had also served as Professor.

**Max Taylor, Jason Roach, and Ken Pease, editors, Evolutionary Psychology and Terrorism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 202 pp., US \$155.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-77458-2.**

The contributors to this theoretically innovative edited volume apply the evolutionary psychology (EP) approach to psychology to explain the psychology of terrorism and the impact of terrorism on its



targeted society. EP is selected as the volume's conceptual framework because, as explained by the editors, it "offers the best potential for an integrative approach, embracing biological, behavioural and social perspectives operating within a sense of a complex and dynamic system." (p. 6) What is EP? As explained by Max Taylor, in his chapter on "Evolutionary Psychology, Terrorism, and Terrorist Behaviour," it places "explanations of behaviour and psychological phenomena as functional products of adaptation and natural selection within their environments." (p. 19) Following the editors' introductory overview, the volume's chapters discuss issues such as the nature of EP and how it applies to terrorism; how EP can be used to explain how certain individuals decide to engage in terrorism (e.g., "the human propensity for altruism and punishment" (p. 14); the spectrum of psychological and behavioural responses to terrorist attacks that explain why terrorism is so "terrifying"; and





“how different distances from acts of terrorism produce varying levels of fear/terror.” (p. 14) The editors are prominent United Kingdom-based forensic psychologists and academics.

**Michael Fredholm, editor, *Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 312 pp., US \$145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-10051-0.**


This edited volume is the result of an international seminar organized by the editor in Stockholm, Sweden, for the National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT), a working group of the Swedish Security Service, Military Intelligence and Security Directorate, and National Defence Radio Establishment. This was followed as an academic project on lone actor terrorism, with follow-on discussions by the participants. One of the unique aspects of this project is that most of the volume's contributors are European experts – with the exception of this reviewer, who contributed two chapters on profiling the mindsets and activities of different types of lone actors: active shooters and those who become insider threats to their organizations. This reviewer was also added to the project following the holding of these workshops. Aside from this reviewer's chapters, the contributors to this volume examine the relationship between the lone actor (also known as “lone wolf”) and terrorism, historical lessons drawn from early anarchist lone actors, whether left-wing or right-wing, environmental and animal rights extremists operating in the current period, lone actors inspired by al Qaida and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), female lone actors, lone actors who conduct school shootings, lone actor terrorism and CBRN weapons, the mindsets of lone actors, lone actors' online activities, the components of effective countermeasures against lone terrorist actors, and future trends in lone actor terrorism. The volume's editor is affiliated with the Stockholm International Program for Central Asian Studies (SIPCAS), Sweden.

**Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjorgo, *The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process: Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), X, 131 pp., US \$69.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-137-57996-6.**

This is a conceptually innovative examination of terrorists' targeting decision-making processes, using Anders Breivik's July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway as a case study. In conducting their research, the authors (both prominent Norwegian criminologists) were provided unique access to source material about the investigation of Breivik's attacks and the subsequent trial, making the case study highly revealing and authoritative. Although the authors focus on a “solo” terrorist as opposed to a larger organized terrorist group, many of their findings apply to all terrorists, as they write that “this case demonstrates how terrorists – single actors as well as group-based – may have to change their [targeting] plans as things often do not develop as they had intended and expected.” (p. 6) Terrorists' target selection, therefore, is a “highly dynamic process,” involving factors “such as time, capacity and funding...” (pp. 6-7) To examine their thesis, the book's chapters discuss topics such as theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to targeting decision-making (e.g., the relationship between ideology and strategy, and the internal and external factors that influence a perpetrator's tactics); a taxonomy of the types of targets and target categories that serve as a “menu” to terrorists from which to choose in their attacks; the ideology and strategy that drove Breivik to select his targets (e.g., in his case, the strategy of a “massive ‘shock-attack’”); selecting his weaponry in the form of bombs and guns for his intended maximum effect attacks; conducting pre-incident surveillance as well as selecting a farm to conduct his training; and finalizing his attack plan. The remaining chapters reconstruct the attacks and analyze its consequences in terms of the effectiveness of the police response, present an overview of the trial, the results of Breivik's psychiatric examinations, his sentencing; and examine the differences and similarities between Breivik and other lone terrorists in the West in terms of their strategies and tactics, including the constraints facing security services in detecting potential lone actors as opposed to larger terrorist groups. The authors conclude that “in a holistic perspective, solo terrorism cannot be characterized as the gravest threat we face, but it is certainly a serious threat that cannot be neglected.” (p. 114) The authors are affiliated with the Norwegian Police University College, where Dr. Bjorgo is a Professor of Police Science, and Mr. Hemmingby, a research fellow, also serves as a senior advisor in the Norwegian Government Security and Service Organization.



**Unni Turrettini, The Mystery of the Lone Wolf Killer: Anders Behring Breivik and the Threat of Terror in Plain Sight (New York, NY: Pegasus Books, 2015), 272 pp., US \$27.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-60598-910-5.**




In this highly interesting and insightful account of Anders Breivik as an archetypal lone wolf terrorist, the author, a Norwegian attorney and author, set out to write a sociological study on “how Norway facilitated the personality disorders that led to Breivik’s killing spree,” but ended up adding leading psychological approaches to profiling such a mass murderer and his environment. (pp. xx-xxi). In this effort, the author was greatly helped by Dr. Kathleen M. Puckett, a former FBI behavioral analyst, who had earlier co-authored a book on Timothy McVeigh, one of America’s most notorious lone wolf terrorists. Dr. Puckett also wrote the book’s Foreword. Beginning with an account of Breivik’s troubled childhood in which he had trouble connecting with his peers, the author shows how an individual such as Breivik, as a potential lone wolf, “cannot connect with others – nor even in ‘extremist’ groups—these individuals connect with just the ideology of the group, as Breivik ultimately did” in his adulthood—in his case, in the form of his 1,516 page manifesto which presented him as the leader of the struggle, which paved the way for his murderous rampage. Subsequent chapters describe Breivik’s extensive and meticulous planning for his attacks and the early warning signs that were missed by the Norwegian security services. Of particular interest is the author’s profile of lone wolf killers, which she distinguishes from serial killers. Some of the characteristics of lone wolf killers include attachment difficulties, feeling bullied or suffering an injustice, rage, narcissism, a need for release for their rage, and a desire to kill on a societal level, in order “to be seen, to matter.” (p. 183) Also making this account especially valuable is the author’s linking Breivik’s mindset and activities to other lone wolf terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh and Theodore Kaczynski, who are discussed throughout the book. Citing the work of Dr. Puckett, the author concludes that one of the most effective ways to preempt lone wolf terrorists (and active shooters) is to mobilize those who come into contact with such individuals in their communities to alert authorities about their troublesome personalities, especially when it appears they might turn to violence to redress their perceived sense of grievance and injustice.

**Terry D. Turchie and Kathleen M. Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI’s War on Homegrown Terror (Palisades NY: History Publishing Company, 2007), 294 pp., US \$24.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-933909-34-9.**

This is a fascinating inside account by two FBI special agents of their Bureau’s investigation that led to the capture of Theodor Kaczynski (known as “The Unabomber”), one of America’s most notorious lone wolf terrorists, who evaded capture between 1978 and 1995 while killing and maiming his victims in his extremist crusade to halt technological advances in society. By the time Mr. Turchie had assembled his team, which included Dr. Puckett, it took them some 24 months to put together a psychological profile of Kaczynski that ultimately succeeded in apprehending him (with his brother’s assistance). While the story of Kaczynski and his terrorist activities are well known (with extensive inside information provided in this book), what makes this account especially pertinent to the current period is Dr. Puckett’s profiling of the characteristics of a lone wolf, which predated the proliferation of such profiling following the proliferation of lone wolf terrorist attacks in the aftermath of 9/11. Drawing on the characteristics of Kaczynski and other American lone wolf terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh, Eric Rudolph, and others, Dr. Puckett writes that “The Lone Wolf operates outside the observable structure of a group, not because he wants to but because his peculiar psychology makes it impossible for him to fit in anywhere. He adopts a hate-filled ideology as a life companion instead of other people, and he becomes its deadly advocate. Although he has no connection to his victims – has never even met them – he sees them as representing a threat to him and his ideology.” (pp. 275-276) Interestingly, the Lone Wolf, according to Dr. Puckett, will rarely commit suicide at the



conclusion of his murderous rampage, because the aftermath in the form of a trial and imprisonment will enable him to continue his extremist ideological struggle. (p. 241)



**Ronald J. Kendall, Steven M. Presley, and Seshadri S. Ramkumar, editors, New Developments in Biological and Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 185 pp., US \$152.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4987-4756-1.**

The contributors to this authoritative science-based textbook examine the threat of chemical and biological terrorism and the countermeasures that are required in response. The volume's chapters discuss topics such as the state of the science, challenges in predicting the risk of vector-borne diseases, the pathogenic and toxic threats, effects and vulnerabilities associated with biological agents, the threats posed by ricin and palliative responses, countermeasures against cholera toxin, and conclusions and an agenda for future research. As a textbook, each chapter consists of a table of contents, an introduction, numbered sections, suggestions for additional research, and a listing of references.

**Barak Mendelsohn, The Al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp., US \$99.00 [Hardcover], US \$27.95–[Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-19-020561-4.**


This is a largely theoretical account of the impact and consequences of al Qaida' organizational strategy to expand through branching out, absorption of other like-minded groups, unification of multiple groups under its rubric, or serving as an umbrella group to oversee the operations of its like-minded counterparts. One of the problems this reviewer encountered in reading this book is the author's tendency to confuse a reader with pretentious sentences such as the following: "With this book, I seek to elevate the discussion about the al-Qaeda threat through problematizing the group's expansion. A first step is to acknowledge that the organization's branching out is a puzzling development..." (p. 3) In this case, isn't it an academic writer's duty to "explain" rather than to "problematize" an issue? Moreover, is the decision-making behind al Qaida "Central's" branching out strategy really that "puzzling" to any veteran al-Qaida observer? In an example of how this book is more "academic" than "practitioner" based, the author writes that "The organization's inflated self-image required it to stay in the news and prove its relevance; when aggressive counterterrorism measures hindered its ability to operate, organizational expansion became an attractive alternative." (p. 17) Firstly, don't all terrorist groups engage in "inflated self-image", and secondly, what does the author imply by "aggressive counterterrorism?" Wouldn't a clearer description be "effective counterterrorism"? In any case, if "aggressive counterterrorism" had been truly successful, then al Qaida would not have been able to expand to other regions beyond its safe haven in Pakistan in the first place. In another questionable and dubious assertion, the author writes that al Qaida "has also benefited from ISIS's extremism, which has made al-Qaeda appear moderate and almost reasonable in comparison." (p. 212) In conclusion, this is an interesting and important topic for a study, but readers will benefit from other books that are more clearly written and are the products of better analysis. The author is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Haverford College, in Pennsylvania.

**Benoit Gomis, Counter Terrorism: Reassessing the Policy Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 241 pp., US \$69.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4822-3715-3.**

This book is an argument for a reform of current counterterrorism policies to make them "more proportionate, evidence-based, and accountable responses, not only from governments but also from the media and analysts." (p. xviii) Although the author explains that counterterrorism policies differ from one country to another, he finds that Western countries, in particular, tend to engage in "threat inflation and overreaction." (p. xx) As part of its corrective prescription, the book is divided into three sections: defining what the







authors considers to be the actual threat of terrorism, pointing out the “dangers of overreaction” to the risk of terrorism and its negative consequences, and “rethinking the policy response” towards a “more measured and comprehensive response.” (p. xx) To accomplish these objectives, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the legal and academic definitions of terrorism; why the terrorist threat matters (including overviews of terrorist groups such as al Qaida, the Islamic State, and lone wolves); terrorism as a multifaceted problem since it has narco-trafficking and cyber warfare components; how the terrorist threat has been “overestimated” in the cases of the United Kingdom and France; how the overreaction to terrorism in cases such as China, Russia, and the Arab Spring has led to negative consequences by exacerbating the threat; how the terrorist threat has been used by government officials as a “political veil” for other purposes, including infringing on citizens’ privacy; and the components of a more effective policy response. The book is well-organized and well-written, but at times the author tends to make blanket claims that do not stand the test of time. For example, in his discussion of the threat presented by the return of Western foreign fighters in Syria to their home countries, Mr. Gomis downplays the prospect that “these individuals would launch terrorist attacks in their home countries – is not only the most alarming one but also the least likely” (p. 133)

– an assertion belied by recent major attacks and thwarted plots by such returnees in Paris and Brussels. He also dismisses the possibility of cyber terrorism as “a very marginal threat.” (p. 104) On other issues, the author is correct, such as his observation that “most terrorist attacks occur in countries with poor governance, authoritarian regimes, few opportunities for political engagement, high levels of discrimination, a struggling economy, and social inequalities.” (p. 187) Finally, while some of Mr. Gomis’ arguments can be considered one-sided, he still raises important issues that need to be discussed in the formulation of effective counterterrorism campaigns. The author is an associate fellow at Chatham House and at the time this book was written he was a Visiting Scholar at the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS), based at the University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, Canada.

John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, *Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 408 pp., US \$29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-19-023731-8.

This is an account of the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policies and activities since 9/11, as implemented by agencies such as the FBI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security, and local policing agencies, such as the New York Police Department (NYPD). The author’s central argument is that the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts boil down to “ghost-chasing,” which has become “an expensive, exhausting bewildering, chaotic, and...paranoia-inducing process,” (p. 2) particularly given what they claim is a much reduced terrorist threat level facing the United States. While one may disagree with their diagnosis of the threat level – their manuscript was completed prior to the December 2015 San Bernardino, California, murderous rampage by the ISIS-inspired husband-and-wife terrorists and the recent ISIS-related attacks in Paris and Brussels – readers will find the authors’ analytical approach highly useful. To answer the question of “How much terrorist destruction must these [governmental] expenditures have waylaid in order to justify the outlays?” (p. 134), the authors present a cost-benefit and risk-analytic methodology based on “the cost per saved life, acceptable risk, and cost-benefit analysis” (p. 134) which they apply to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism departments and agencies, including, at the local level, law enforcement bodies such as the NYPD. Dr. Mueller is a political scientist at Ohio State University, and Dr. Stewart is professor of civil engineering at The University of Newcastle, Australia.

**Edgar B. Tembo, US – UK Counter-Terrorism After 9/11 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 168 pp., US \$155.00 [Hardcover], US \$48.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-94022-2.**

This volume applies a qualitative analysis to assess the nature and effectiveness of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism strategies undertaken by the United Kingdom and the United States along three policy instruments: intelligence, law enforcement and the use of military force. With the author’s timeframe the period from 2001 to 2011, this account misses the escalation in the terrorist threats facing the two countries – along with their Canadian and



European allies – particularly in the 2015-early 2016 period, so its findings, for instance, that “there has not been a major terrorist attack” against both countries (p. 124), are not up-to-date, but the methodology employed provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding the policy instruments that need to be assessed in evaluating the effectiveness of these countries’ counter-terrorism campaigns. The author is a Lecturer at Sheffield Hallam University, UK.

Robert Mandel, *Coercing Compliance: State-Initiated Brute Force in Today’s World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies/Stanford University Press, 2015), 320 pp., US \$95.00 [Hardcover], US \$29.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8047-9398-8.

This is a well-analyzed account of state-initiated internal and external application of the use of “brute force” to coerce compliance against a threatening adversary. The author defines brute force as the “direct application of physical strength – in contentious confrontations, not the use of coercive diplomacy, threats and ultimatums, economic sanctions, or shows of force.” (p. 4) Moreover, this analysis “emphasizes the broad strategic context for force use, not specific tactics or training and morale methods.” (p. 4) Following an introductory conceptual framework, the author discusses some of the conundrums involved in a democratic government’s use of brute force, such as a potential clash with democratic values in the case of targeted assassinations. The author then applies his conceptual framework to a series of case studies, with external uses of brute force including the American drone campaign in Pakistan and Yemen, the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the targeted assassination of Usama bin Laden, the French intervention of Mali, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Cases of state internal use of brute force include repressions of dissidents by the governments in Bahrain, China, Egypt, Greece, India (in the Kashmir region), Myanmar, and Sudan, Syria and Thailand. In the chapter on “Brute Force Security Impact Patterns,” the author identifies the conditions for measuring their effectiveness, including the risks of possible negative military, political, economic, and social consequences from “state overreliance or underreliance on brute force.” (p. 178) The concluding chapter presents the author’s policy recommendations for effective use of brute force, based on a calculus “involving the right combination of force initiator and force target attributes giving brute force precisely the kind of unique comparative advantage to accomplish the designated mission – often in combination with other policy tools – under appropriate circumstances.” (p. 232) The author is Chair and Professor in the International Affairs Department of Lewis & Clark College, in Portland, Oregon.

**Nicholas Ryder, *The Financial War on Terrorism: A Review of Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategies Since 2001* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 210 pp., US \$145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-64038-1.**

This is an authoritative comparative legal examination of the nature and effectiveness of the measures implemented globally within the context of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ since the attacks of 9/11. Specifically, the volume’s chapters discuss the measures introduced by multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (including the U.N. sanctions against terrorists and the operations of its anti-terrorist sanctions committee), the European Union and the Council of Europe, as well as the governments of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Also discussed is a working definition of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism,’ and how the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ has addressed the new threats presented by jihadist terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic State, and al Qaida. The author concludes that “it has proven extremely difficult for the international community and nation states to limit the sources of funding available to terrorists” because they “are able to manipulate an increasing array of sources of financing through a vast amount of legitimate and illicit financial channels.” (p. 182) The author is a professor of Financial Crime at the University of West England, Bristol, UK.

**Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism [Third Edition]* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 286 pp., US \$90.00 [Hardcover], US \$35.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-4422-4761-1.**


This is an in-depth account of how terrorists exploit a country’s mass media to generate attention for their cause through their violent attacks, as well as how they use social media to communicate directly with their targeted audiences for propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment purposes. Following a discussion of how to define terrorism (whether as state



terror or non-state terrorism), and the nature of terrorism in the 21st century, the author proceeds to define mass-mediated terrorism which “conveys the centrality of communication via all kinds of mass media in the calculus of terrorism on the one hand and media gatekeepers’ preference for shocking violence on the other hand. The idea here is that most terrorists calculate the consequences of their carefully planned strikes and assume that they are very likely to gain access to what I call the triangle of political communication.” (pp. 31-32) What makes this textbook especially useful is the author’s application of these concepts to actual cases, such as how the news media reported the 9/11 terrorist attacks and following anthrax letter attacks (with numerous recent attacks also discussed), as well as how the news media reports on a country’s counterterrorism (CT) campaign, and the impact of media reporting of such events and response measures in shaping a country’s public opinion about the magnitude of the terrorism threat. Also valuable is the author’s discussion of a blueprint for effective public information and media relations during terrorist crises. The author is a veteran academic in terrorism studies and serves as adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, in New York.

**Peter Nesser, *Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press/London, UK: Hurst Publishers, 2016), 288 pp., US \$29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-19-026402-4.**

This is an authoritative and interesting account of the history of jihadi terrorism in Europe from the Air France airliner hijacking by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in December 1994 to the attacks by IS adherents against the offices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015. As the author explains, the book



“aims to explain why these terrorist plots happened when they did and where they did, and to shed light on what goes on inside European jihadi networks more generally.” (p. 1) It also seeks “to demonstrate how jihadi terrorism in Europe emerged through an intricate interplay between foreign and European factors, between top-down and bottom-up processes of radicalization, and between social and ideological motivations.” (p. 1) One of the book’s innovations is the author’s formulation of a typology of jihadi terrorists in Europe, which he distinguishes between “the entrepreneur,” “the protégé,” “the misfit,” and “the drifter.” Such a typology is important, the author explains, because “Each type radicalizes and joins cells differently and plays different roles; they fulfill different functions and influence the behavior of cells in different ways.” (p. 12) This conceptual framework is then applied to the book’s chapters, which cover different phases in the evolution of jihadi terrorism in Europe from what the author terms the “Algerian Factor” (1994-2000); the “Global Jihad in Europe” (2000-2004), which had dual ties to al Qaida and Afghanistan and terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa; the “Iraq

Effect” (2003-2005), which were expressed by the March 2004 Madrid attacks; the “Pakistan Axis” (2004-2006), as expressed by the London transport bombings in July 2005; the “Northern Front” (2005-2008), in which the jihadi terrorist cells increasingly targeted the UK and Scandinavia; “Decentralization” (2008-2010), in which, due to increasing pressure on al Qaida “Central,” lone actor terrorism became prevalent; and the final phase, the “Heterogeneous Threat” (2011-2015), which resulted from the cascading effects of the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamic State. In conclusion, one may disagree with the author’s finding that “the European jihadi phenomenon is driven forward by tight-knit networks of individuals motivated mostly by wars in the Muslim world,” with “societal explanations [having] less impact,” (p. 295) since many of these jihadi terrorists have trouble integrating into and succeeding in Western societies, which forms a crucial component in their radicalization process. The author, however, is insightful when he points out that “cells rarely emerge in the absence of entrepreneurs” which is significant for counterterrorism because altogether ““Extremists need to be monitored very closely to spot suspicious constellations of entrepreneurs, proteges, misfits, and drifters that could be a cell in the making.” (p. 295) The author is a





senior research fellow with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), in Oslo, Norway.

**Peter J. Phillips, *The Economics of Terrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 196 pp., US \$160.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-12191-1.**

This is an application of economic analysis to explain the ‘brutal purposefulness’ of terrorists’ behaviors, choices and strategies. The volume’s chapters apply economic analysis in the form of expected utility theory, which is “complemented by ‘behavioral’ approaches to the determination of preference orderings for risky prospects” (p. 3) to examine terrorism perpetrated by individuals, the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), financing terrorism, how terrorists’ select their attack methods, the geographical locations and timeframes for terrorist attacks, and the role of females in terrorism. One of the author’s conclusions is that “A terrorist group cannot survive without terrorism. It is logical, I think, to expect those groups that survive the longest to be those that have maintained or increased their share of inflicted brutality during their lifetimes.” (p. 185) Interestingly, the author adds that “When brutality is very high, a terrorist group must be more brutal in order to survive. When brutality is low, a terrorist group may be less brutal yet still survive as a terrorist group.” (p. 185). The author is Associate Professor (Finance) at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia.

**Paul Shemella, editor, *Global Responses to Maritime Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies/An Imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016), 344 pp., US \$90.00 [Hardcover], US \$27.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8047-9841-9.**

The contributors to this edited volume examine the components of maritime security such as terrorism, piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal maritime trafficking, illegal fishing and other types of maritime crimes. Following the editor’s introductory overview, the volume is divided into three parts. The first part, “Examining Maritime Violence,” discusses maritime terrorism as an evolving threat, terrorist targeting in the maritime environment, and the armed groups that engage in maritime crime. The second part, “Riding the Storm,” presents the components of port security, strategies to counter maritime violence, assessing the components of a security regime, including its legal framework, and the measures involved in managing violent maritime incidents. The third part, “Case Studies,” examines maritime violence, whether terrorism or piracy, in the cases of Sri Lanka (in countering the LTTE), the Strait of Malacca, the Sulu Sea, the Gulf of Guinea, and Yemen. In the concluding chapter, the volume’s editor writes that because “economic insecurity is a common root cause of most maritime violence” an effective security regime is based on upgrading the two pillars of “governance and capacity.” (pp. 298-299)

**Brian Glyn Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: From Soviet Genocide to Putin’s Conquest* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press/London, UK: Hurst Publishers, 2016), 240 pp., US \$34.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-019-049470-4.**

This is a comprehensive and sweeping account of the origins and evolution of the Crimean Tatars changing relationship with their Vatan (homeland), leading up to their current conflict with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This account is of particular interest to terrorism studies because, as the author explains, it is a “case study in the durability of the political phenomenon of mass-based ethno-nationalism. Such an analysis can also provide considerable insight into the ways in which diasporic national movements can unify and politically mobilize even small, fragmented ethnic groups.” (p. 118) The author is Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth.

**Brian Glyn Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya: The Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings* (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge/An Imprint of University Press of New England, 2015), pp., US \$29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-61168-737-8.**

In this comprehensive account of the history and current developments in Chechnya, the author, a prominent expert on Chechnya, begins with the tsarist conquest of Chechnya and concludes with the major Russian-Chechen wars which were fought in the 1990s, which resulted in the rise of the Chechen terror campaign against Russia – one of Europe’s most lethal homegrown terrorist network. The book’s last two chapters are of particular interest as they discuss the author’s findings about the links between the Chechen terrorist



network and al Qaida's forces in Afghanistan, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 – which he describes as basically nonexistent (p. 221), as well as the presence of Chechen Jihadi fighters in Syria – which he estimates as around 200 (based on BBC claims), with around half coming from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and “many others coming from the refugee diaspora of as many as 190,000 Chechens found in Europe, and of course some from Chechnya itself.” (p. 229) The concluding chapter, “The Strange Saga of the Boston Marathon Bombers,” discusses the radicalization of the Tsarnaev brothers into becoming Jihadi terrorists, as well as whether Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the elder brother, had been radicalized and recruited into becoming a terrorist during his 6-month visit to Dagestan in 2012, with the author finding that it likely had not occurred during that period, with Tamerlan already becoming radicalized prior to the visit, with his terrorist bombing of the Boston Marathon in mid-April 2013 an example of a “vicarious” connection to al Qaida “via the Internet (and via a fellow radicalized American named Anwar al-Awlaki).” (p. 256) The author is Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, where the younger Tsarnaev brother, Dzhokhar, was enrolled as an undergraduate student.

*Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.*

## Why Has The Islamic State Changed its Strategy and Mounted the Paris-Brussels Attacks?

By David C. Rapoport

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/498/html>

When the Paris attacks happened on November 13, 2015 few observers asked why they occurred and/or why they happened when they did.[1] The assumption was that since the Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL and Daesh) was originally an al-Qaeda affiliate, it believed that the West had to be eliminated and would therefore strike the devil whenever it was able to do so. But ironically, one reason the attacks occurred was that hostility between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda weakened the Islamic State during the Syrian Civil War.

Before discussing that relationship, we should examine the explanation the Islamic State provided for the Paris outrage. Dabiq, the Islamic State's English magazine, justified the strikes as retaliation for French air strikes made nearly a year earlier:

*France haughtily began executing airstrikes against the Caliphate. It was blinded by hubris, thinking that its geographical distance from the Caliphate's lands would protect it from the justice of the jihadists. It also did not grasp that its mockery of the Prophet would be avenged. Thus, the Islamic State dispatched its brave knights to wage war in the homelands of the wicked crusaders, leaving Paris and its residents shocked and awed. The eight knights brought Paris down on its knees, after years of French conceit in the face of Islam.[2]*

But Dabiq's reason for striking France does not help us understand the timing of the attack or

what the Islamic State thinks the response will be. To understand these matters, one must consider the organization's recent history. When the Islamic State came to Syria in January 2012, some thought that its principal concern was to help Syrian Sunni rebels overthrow their Alawite dictator Bashar al-Assad. However, it had specified another more important purpose in a plan devised three years earlier to capture the territories of northern Syria and northern Iraq, territories one Islamic religious tradition had identified as necessary for creating the Caliphate.

Obviously, Assad's regime had to be weakened and the Islamic State's forces needed more training, equipment and recruits; both concerns were fulfilled by 2014, and then the Islamic State's true purpose became increasingly clear when it turned its attention toward gaining the territory necessary for the Caliphate. Most of the land still needed was in Iraq, the country in which the Islamic State was born but left to join the Syrian rebels. The Assad regime then avoided targeting the organization to focus on other groups.

A week after the campaign against Iraq began in June 2014, Mosul—Iraq's 2nd largest city—was captured by the Islamic State and the Caliphate was immediately established. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced that he would now be known as



“Caliph Ibrahim.” In the battle for Mosul, over 30,000 Iraqi soldiers were quickly defeated by a tiny force of 1,500 Islamic State fighters. The Iraqis fled without fighting, abandoning large supplies of sophisticated equipment the U.S. had given Iraq. As the Islamic State advanced it hung soldiers, set them on fire and crucified some, practices that made many Iraqi soldiers abandon their uniforms before fleeing in the hope they could survive as civilians.[3]

These spectacular achievements shocked the world, inducing many Muslims to think that only divine intervention could have produced such an astonishing victory, and that meant “paradise” was in the offing, a belief that attracted Sunni recruits from over 100 countries.[4] Indeed, the Caliphate insisted that all Muslims were obliged to immigrate to its territory and all other oaths of allegiance were no longer binding. When the Caliphate came into existence, the Islamic State had around 6,300 fighters. During the next six months over 15,000 foreigners arrived, and a year later, around 10,000 more arrived (according to UN and CIA estimates) which meant the Islamic State had over 31,600 members.[5] Most men came to be fighters, and most women accompanied husbands to live in “paradise” or marry “heroes” and have children. Foreigners also came to fight for the Assad regime but the numbers were smaller and they came from only a few states.[6] By 2015, the Islamic State governed around 8 million people in a territory larger than the United Kingdom. Seizing gas and oil resources enabled it to meet its charitable obligation zakat, the third pillar of Islam, by providing food and various social services. Each member of its armed forces received at least \$1,000 a month, an income higher than the average in the Caliphate’s territories.

In August 2014, the Islamic State captured Dabiq, a Syrian village near the Turkish border—a very crucial conquest because the Hadith, a collection of sayings from Prophet Mohammed, designated it as the place where the beginning of the final world battle would be fought and the apocalypse would begin.[7] After that capture the Islamic State began publishing a monthly English digital magazine named Dabiq; articles in each issue highlight the looming doomsday battle. Amaq, a nearby village, also slated to play a role in the apocalypse was captured and Amaq became

the name of the Islamic State’s semi-official news agency. Dabiq’s importance was emphasized by various videos taken there after its capture. In October 2014, one was released showing some jihadists from Europe sitting on a hilltop in Dabiq daring the West to intervene. “We are waiting for you to come and will kill every single soldier.” A month later, another video taken in Dabiq showed “Jihadi John” speaking with an English accent standing over the very bloody severed head of the American aid worker Peter Kassig announcing, “Here we are, burying the first American Crusader eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive. Ultimately the armies of Rome will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria. After that battle, eternal life in paradise will begin.” (Emphasis added) The video also displays acts designed to demonstrate how the Islamic State imagined the sequence of events in the offing. Jihadi John orders his men to behead 21 Syrian pilots and as they are cutting the heads off, he addresses President Obama, “To Obama, the dog of Rome, today we are slaughtering the soldiers of Bashar al Assad and tomorrow, we will be slaughtering your soldiers and soon we will be slaughtering your people on your streets.”[8] Obviously the claim here is that their ultimate goal is defeating the U.S., which will happen after Americans send troops there.

The apocalypse, one should remember, is a theme in all three Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—and is frequently associated with terrorism.[9] The Islamic State refers to Westerners as Crusaders, a description al-Qaeda used first. Ironically, the Crusades (which lasted two centuries) were driven by an apocalyptic dimension, and Crusaders committed many atrocities including cannibalism, when a starving army ate Muslims. Philippe Buc describes how this cannibalism had two effects: it struck “divine fear in the Muslims... and purged the Christian army of lukewarm elements... cowardly men useless for war.”[10] To make sure that only pious Muslims lived in the Caliphate, the Islamic State committed many gruesome atrocities. After Mosul was taken, major massacres took place in Iraqi villages occupied by the Shabak population (a Shiite offshoot). Hundreds were killed and more than 3,000 fled. Over





125,000 Christians were forced to flee the land that had been their home for nearly 2,000 years. Christian children were beheaded for refusing to convert. The most conspicuous victims were the Yazidis, a Kurdish Islamic offshoot some Muslims regard as devil worshippers. Between 2,000 and 5,000 males who refused to convert were killed. Women and children were abducted and sold as “sex slaves”. Around 50,000 Yazidis were trapped in the Sinjar Mountains, and the U.S. began an air strike campaign in September 2014 that was later joined by eight Arab and Western states in order to prevent a potential genocide. Three months later, Kurdish forces entered the fray against the Islamic State enabling most Yazidis to escape.

Atrocities were committed against many Muslims too. Because Shiites and Alawites “pervert” the Koran, those living in the Caliphate must be killed. The Islamic State emphasizes that common Shiite practices—e.g., worshipping at the graves of imams, and public self-flagellation—have no basis in the Koran. Heads of state in every Muslim country who elevate man-made law above sharia (Islamic law) will meet the same fate. The Islamic State killed Sunni Muslims who committed certain offenses, including those who sold alcohol or drugs, wore Western clothes, shaved their beards, voted in an election, or were lax about denouncing people who were apostates. A UN report estimated that nearly 15,000 civilians were killed in Iraq in 16 months starting in January 2014, and the Islamic State was deemed responsible for the overwhelming majority.

Anjem Choudary, an Islamic leader in Great Britain, described these atrocities as policies of mercy rather than of brutality. The Islamic State is obliged to terrorize its enemies with beheadings, crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.[11] But Muslim leaders everywhere condemned the Islamic State’s obsession with eliminating all “impious” Muslims and insisted that Islam provided no justification for its definitions and actions.

The apocalypse was also crucial to al-Qaeda’s vision, but al-Qaeda insisted that the Caliphate could only emerge after the U.S. withdrew from the Muslim world and that trying to institute sharia immediately when one controlled

appropriate territories would alienate people everywhere.[12] A gradual approach preparing Muslims to accept the Caliphate was necessary before the more provocative aspects of sharia could be implemented (like throwing gays off buildings, chopping limbs off and public stoning practices).[13] Indeed, the campaign of the Al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda’s franchise in Syria) contrasts vividly with that of its rival’s even though the ultimate objective is the same, a difference that a New York Times journalist contended may give al-Nusra a significant long-term advantage in its battle against the Islamic State.[14]

In early 2015 when al-Nusra had a strength of 15-20,000,[15] al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri instructed the group to pursue five goals: integrate the movement in the Syrian revolution and its people, coordinate more closely with all Islamic groups, help establish a sharia court system, use strategic areas of the country to build a sustainable al-Qaeda power base and cease any activity linked to attacking the West.[16] The last restraint was a real surprise, since al-Qaeda had always designated the West as its principal enemy. But clearly al-Qaeda became revitalized by the Syrian conflict after years of dissipation, and became committed to gaining territory for a home base, a goal that could not be achieved if Western troops became involved.

Although the sudden, dramatic and amazing scope of the Islamic State victories against the Iraqi army made many Muslims think that Allah was involved, the Iraqi army had never developed real battlefield capacities because it was always an instrument of domestic politics. The U.S. tried to create an appropriate military force, but when it left the Iraqi tradition was revived—only this time, a Shia rather than a Sunni government was involved, and it made Shia loyalty more important than military competence. Sunnis were confined to the lower ranks, which intensified their reluctance to fight other Sunnis for a Shia government; indeed, many deserted to join the Islamic State.

After its initial dramatic victories, the Islamic State quickly encountered enormous difficulties. It got within 60 miles of Baghdad before Iraqi Shia militias—responding to Iraqi Shiite Grand Ayatollah’s call—stopped them. Then thousands of Iranian Shia trained by Iran’s Revolutionary



Guard joined the Iraqi Shia. Kurdish forces played a significant role as well, when they took the city of Kirkuk (after the Islamic State compelled Iraqi forces to abandon their posts), expanding the Kurdish zone of control in Northern Iraq, an area outside of the control of both the Islamic State and the Iraqi government.

Enormous difficulties emerged by 2015 after it became clear that the Islamic State no longer could expand its territory. Turkey tightened border controls; previously, 60% of the foreign fighters had come through Turkey.[17] Many foreigners left the Islamic State, and over a 100 foreign fighters attempting to desert were beheaded.[18] Many foreign women returned home, upset by how the Caliphate regulated marriages. The United States bombed the Caliphate's oil sites, reducing revenue for services and also resulting in a reduction in the pay of its fighters by one half. Kurdish forces cut principal supply lines and regained some territory lost, including the important city of Kobani in January. Iraqi military forces then recaptured Tikrit in March.

Al-Qaeda, which had included the precursor elements of the Islamic State since its birth in 2004, became deeply offended by its indiscriminate anti-Muslim tactics, for reasons al-Qaeda's history demonstrates. Its important campaign in the 1990s against the "Near Enemy", Arab governments in the Middle East and Africa, failed largely because government tenacity everywhere made the rebels act too indiscriminate, turning Arab populations everywhere against them.[19] Al Zawahiri had been particularly devastated by his own indiscriminate practices when he led Egyptian Islamic Jihad before he joined al-Qaeda, and he was determined not to repeat it.[20] He denounced the Islamic state as "seditious" and pushed it out of al-Qaeda. Then the leader of al-Qaeda's Syrian franchise said, "They assault Muslims, and their ideology completely drifted from the Sunni ideology that we follow, so we have to fight them." [21]

In 2014 the al-Nusra Front initiated many violent attacks near Aleppo, forcing the Islamic State to withdraw from Syria's eastern province. It successfully cast itself as a moderate alternative to the Islamic State, and after crushing the Western-backed Syrian rebel group Harakat Hazm it forged a coalition of Islamist groups to conquer the Syrian city Idlib

in March 2015 but did not impose sharia. Estimates suggest that the battles between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State produced over 3,000 casualties. Ironically, these battles led some Western analysts—including former CIA head David Petraeus—to suggest that the United States and "moderate" al-Qaeda groups could sometimes cooperate.[22]

The Islamic State ignored the West while incorporating sacred territory for the Caliphate. But in September 2014, after the U.S. organized its airstrikes, the Islamic State's chief spokesman "called on Muslims in Western countries ...to find an infidel and 'smash his head with a rock', poison him, run him over with a car or 'destroy his crops'." [23] Two months later a video released in French contained virtually the same message, and a series of strange "lone wolf" attacks followed on three consecutive days, the perpetrators declaring "God is Great" in Arabic. Three policemen were stabbed in Joué-lès-Tours, and vehicles were used to run over eleven pedestrians in Dijon and ten in Nantes.[24] But the only person killed in these attacks was a perpetrator and the other two were imprisoned. Fourteen months later, after the Islamic State lost about 40% of its territories, it changed its strategy towards the West and launched the Paris attacks, the worst France experienced since World War II. On November 13, 2015, nine coordinated strikes with bombs and assault rifles were carried out against sites (a football stadium, concert hall and several restaurants) where many congregated to enjoy themselves, sites that enabled the Islamic State to kill as many as possible and also to attack a style of life they considered reprehensible. These indiscriminate Islamic State attacks—which killed 130 and wounded 367—contrasted dramatically with an earlier one in January of that year by al-Qaeda members who killed 12 persons and injured 11, all of whom were associated with the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. A spokesman for al-Qaeda later claimed the attack was retribution for the magazine's offensive descriptions of the Prophet Mohammed. Comparing the two events, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said the January 2015 attack had a "particularized focus and...rationale that you could attach yourself to somehow and say, 'Okay, they're really



angry’.[25] One could understand why satirizing Prophet Mohammed infuriates virtually all Muslims and why many non-Muslims also find such ridicule inappropriate. Normally one would expect that when situations at home grow more difficult, one would not want to involve hostile powers more deeply. Four possible explanations can be offered for this apparently counter-intuitive ‘decision’. First, the Islamic State may have believed that these attacks were not going to inspire the West to intensify its efforts, and therefore the special benefits the attacks create would not be lost. It is even conceivable that the Islamic State thought that the attacks would induce the West to withdraw completely. It is hard to believe that either explanation makes sense, although it should be noted that four months after the attacks President Obama said the Islamic State’s growing weakness made its leaders think the attacks “would weaken our collective resolve.”[26] The belief that a deeper Western commitment would happen is more probable, and there was good reason to think that would devastate the invaders. The 2003 Iraq invasion aroused the Muslim world and produced the Islamic State’s predecessor. Now since Islamic State had much more capacity to resist, it would be victorious. The fourth explanation is that since apocalyptic visions are so prominent in the Islamic State’s announcements, publications and brutal videos challenging the West to intervene, this seems to have been the real driving force. The change in strategy may stem from both the third and fourth beliefs. In any case, one should be aware of the rationale for the Islamic State’s decision before responding.[27]

Dreadful over-reactions to terrorism occur often. World War I, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 were all catastrophic reactions to terrorist activity that we should learn from. Fortunately, because the senseless invasion of Iraq occurred so recently, we are less likely to repeat that mistake now. Still, the 2016 Republican presidential primary debates suggest that many politicians either fail to understand the dangers of over-reaction or that the present policy towards the Islamic State is in fact working. The U.S. should continue its air bombing support, supplying equipment and advisors to Sunni rebel forces and make much

more effort to cope with the refugee problem too.

Despite its enormous loss of territory, and the reality that its forces are “at its lowest level in two years,”[28] the Islamic State is still strong and continues to launch strikes in Syria and Iraq. In January 2016, the group abducted around 400 Sunni civilians (including women and children) from the Syrian city of Deir-ez-Zor in an assault which left around 135 dead.[29] It made and used chemical weapons in February, 2016.[30] In April it abducted over 170 workers in a cement factory near Damascus.[31]

However, it seems unable to recapture lost territory and continues to lose more. Dissent within the group persists. In early March 2016, nearly 100 men left the Islamic State to join another rebel group in northern Aleppo, claiming they had been mistreated, repeatedly accused of treason and threatened with execution. Residents of Raqqa—the Islamic State’s capital—rebelled on March 7, 2016, and about 200 Islamic State members sided with them.[32] Other similar incidents have diverted elements of Islamic State’s forces needed desperately in the areas where they are facing armies.

The cease-fire which began February 27, 2016 enabled various government and rebel forces for the first time to concentrate and even cooperate in efforts to destroy both the Islamic State and the al-Nusra Front. In northern Syria, Assad’s army, supported by Russia and Iran, launched two significant offensives against the Islamic State, and the Syrian Kurds are pursuing an additional one close to Raqqa. On March 27, 2016 the Syrian army retook the ancient famous Roman city of Palmyra. Iraqi security forces have created a 2nd front in the east by expanding operations in Anbar province, seizing Ramadi, and preparing to retake Mosul, a crucially difficult undertaking requiring an army of tens of thousands. While the Iraqi army has improved since its disgraceful early flight from Mosul, it still has very serious problems as a military force. A third front is opening up in the south as the New Syrian Army (a rebel coalition, backed by the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council) is launching operations from bases in Jordan to drive the Islamic State from southern Syria. So far, al-Qaeda’s





franchise seems to have coped better with the cease-fire problem.[33]

One obvious question this discussion leads to is the following: if the Islamic State intends to compel the West to send troops to Syria, why hasn't the U.S. been attacked, given that it has been the West's leader in launching the airstrikes that France later joined? It seems clear that France was chosen because European fighters—especially from Belgium and France—joined the Islamic State in far greater numbers than those from America, making it easier for the Islamic State to use them to organize an attack on France.

If the Islamic State is interested in provoking serious reactions why did it take four months for the second major attack to occur on March 22, 2016? It takes time to organize strikes of this sort from a distance. The Brussels attacks, like the Paris ones, aimed to kill a large number of people indiscriminately by striking places where they congregate (i.e. public transportation sites). But they were a smaller effort than the Paris ones, killing 32 and injuring over 300. The Islamic State said it made its "blessed" bombings in Brussels because Belgium was a partner in the Western coalition.[34] But in fact, Belgium had stopped its few air attacks nine months earlier.[35] Further, after two weeks of interrogation, the terrorists involved in the Brussels plot revealed that their original intention was to attack Paris again, but after the French apprehended one member of the group the others became afraid that he might reveal the plot, so Brussels was chosen at the last minute.[36]

So far, the two attacks have not yet provoked European states to demand a ground invasion. But they have invested more in the air campaign and expanded the targets to be attacked. Belgium resumed the air attack role it had abandoned nine months before the Brussels attack. The UK, which was initially reluctant to join the air coalition, did so immediately after the Paris strikes. France intensified its campaign.

Will the U.S. experience similar attacks? No one knows, but I think they are unlikely to happen and if adherents of the Islamic State attempt to do so, they will not be successful. There are three primary reasons for this optimism. First, very few Americans have joined the Islamic State. Over 200 tried and most were stopped before getting to Syria.[37]

Second, the American Muslim population, unlike the European, is fairly well integrated into mainstream society. And finally, U.S. police forces and intelligence services are extremely alert to the issue because of the Paris and Brussels attacks.

Remember too that after the much more devastating 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda did not conduct any more major attacks on American soil. The 9/11 attacks were successful largely because hijacking had diminished so much after the 1980s that security precautions for planes were greatly reduced. But after 9/11, no big attack occurred because the U.S. mobilized its resources. According to the Congressional Research Service, 38 "lone-wolf" attacks were attempted in the U.S., but 31 did not produce casualties; the most violent was Major Nidal Hasan's gruesome massacre of 13 fellow soldiers at Ft. Hood, Texas in 2009.[38] Another reason no more devastating attacks were experienced was that there was no terrorist network in the country. Obviously there was no network in the country before 9/11 either, but the attackers all came from abroad at a time when such matters were not seriously investigated. The situation became very different after 9/11.[39]

The U.S. homeland so far has experienced only one strike that the Islamic State claimed to have had some role, in San Bernardino, CA on December 2, 2015, where a father and mother killed 14 people at a holiday party, the most deadly terrorist attack the U.S. experienced since 9/11.[40] But as with other "lone-wolf" operations, the terrorists were not part of a network and organized this attack themselves.[41]

The Islamic State has reportedly trained and sent back home at least some 400 jihadists, a majority of whom are European citizens or legal residents.[42] The Islamic population there is much larger and less integrated than its American counterpart, so more attacks will probably occur and the pressure to send many troops to Syria may grow immensely.[43] Europe's difficulties with Islam, including the enormous recent refugee problem, has also stimulated important right-wing movements which may create a very difficult situation. That political change could break up the European Union and/or provoke a new wave of modern terror.



Finally, let's conclude with a brief note on our second theme—the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Despite the fact that al-Qaeda has always considered the West its primary enemy, its franchise in Syria was told to concentrate on winning Sunni support and not hit targets in the West because that could provoke Western states to send troops and demolish the territorial base al-Qaeda had been establishing. It is not surprising, therefore, that al-Zawahiri needed three weeks to comment on the Paris strikes. Ultimately, he had to endorse them but he repeated his warning that Muslims should not be major victims, making it clear that differences between the two groups remained.

If the cease-fire holds and permits the Assad regime and the rebel coalition to keep attacking both groups, it is possible (though unlikely) the targeted groups might work together again. If both are forced to leave the Syrian scene, their differences are likely to remain conspicuous. The Syrian struggle induced al-Qaeda to produce the “General Guidelines for Jihad” for its franchises. While it emphasizes that the U.S. must withdraw to “its own shell like the former Soviet Union,” it focuses on how to restrain the struggle in the Muslim world. Wherever possible, al-Qaeda adherents must:

. . . pacify conflicts with local rulers so we can incite believers, recruitment, and fund raising. . .  
 . Avoid fighting deviant Islamic sects like the Shia. If they attack us, our response must be

► References are available at source's URL.

restricted to those . . . directly engaged in the fight. They should not be targeted in their homes, places of worship, their religious festivals and religious gatherings. . . Avoid meddling with Christian and Hindu communities living in Muslim lands. . . Refrain from killing and fighting against non-combatant women and children, even if they are families of those who are fighting against us. . . We shall provide support to the victims of oppression, whether Muslims or non-Muslims.”[44]

If al-Qaeda follows its guidelines, will the Islamic State's indiscriminate attacks give the Islamic State an advantage? It is hard to tell because the available evidence is conflicting. Islamic State franchises are usually composed of deserters from al-Qaeda franchises, but the al-Qaeda franchises are still powerful. It is more likely that the two groups will still employ violence against each other. But if the Islamic State's territories are recaptured, its apocalyptic appeal will evaporate and it will lose its ability to maintain and recruit members. Also, if al-Qaeda has to leave Syria, the growing weakness it had been displaying for years before will continue. But we should remember that the Arab Spring unexpectedly produced sectarian violence throughout the Muslim world, which gave al-Qaeda a chance to rejuvenate itself. Sectarian violence may continue and provide it with more opportunities.

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## Analysing the Processes of Lone-Actor Terrorism: Research Findings

By Clare Ellis, Raffaello Pantucci, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Edwin Bakker, Melanie Smith, Benoît Gomis and Simon Palombi

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/499/html>

This Research Note presents the outcome of an investigation into the processes of lone-actor terrorism which was part of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT)

project. The project aimed to improve understanding of, and responses to, the phenomenon of lone-actor terrorism based on an



analysis of cases from across Europe. The research team created a database covering more than 70 variables and including information relating to 120 individuals. Variables were chosen on the basis of a literature review and consultations with the project's advisory board.[3] The working definition of lone-actor terrorism utilized for this project was: 'The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal-material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others')'.[4]

Given the extensive nature of the enquiries conducted, the results for every variable are not recorded here; instead this Research Note offers a comprehensive outline of the most interesting findings related to the processes of lone-actor terrorism. It focuses on three sets of variables: attack methodology and logistics; political engagement and online activity, and; leakage and interactions with authorities.

#### Limitations

The CLAT database was constructed using open source information, and therefore, despite extensive effort by the research team, it does not contain every lone-actor terrorism plot during the period studied. First, not all plots are in the public domain, especially where they have been abandoned or disrupted by the authorities at an early stage. Second, there are variations across Europe in the way incidents are perceived and reported; for example, some incidents may be reported as a 'hate crime', but meet the criteria for inclusion in the CLAT database. The research team took steps to compensate; however, some cases will undoubtedly have been missed.

There are also some important limitations to the data collected. First, complete information is not always publically available, leading to a number of variables featuring high levels of 'unknown' entries. For some variables, this unavoidably limited the analysis that could be conducted and the strength of the conclusions that could be drawn. Second, there is an inevitable element of reporting bias: whether information is publicly available may depend on whether it was interesting to the journalists investigating the story.

#### Analysis of the Database

Due to the limitations of the data, it did not support detailed and sophisticated quantitative analysis. Instead, a more limited quantitative analysis was used to explore the data and highlight key trends; these were subsequently explored in greater detail through examination of case information. Various techniques were employed: in some cases, it was necessary to find the right benchmarks for comparison with the broader population; in other cases the most useful findings were uncovered through analysis of sub-categories, while correlations between variables also produced valuable insights.

#### Process Variables: Attack Methodology and Logistics

Ninety-eight lone-actor terrorist plots were identified for the period 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2014. They involved seventy-nine led by individuals, twelve by dyads and seven by triads. Among the 98 plots identified, 72 were successfully launched attacks. Of these 60 were perpetrated by individuals acting alone, 6 by dyads and another six by triads. Most plots and attacks took place in Great Britain (38) and France (11). In ten of the thirty countries studied, no lone-actor terrorist plot could be identified across the entire period of fifteen years. On the other hand, four countries had at least five plots, and two had more than five. In other words, lone-actor terrorism in Europe is rare. However, longitudinal analysis suggests an overall increase in lone-actor terrorism in the period under consideration. It is important to keep in mind that information on recent plots is more detailed and more readily available thanks to the rise in digital archives of news reports; however, even acknowledging this potential bias in the data collection, the overall trend nevertheless appears clear.

On average, lone-actor terrorist plots resulted in 1.99 fatalities and 4.58 injuries, with large standard deviations of 8.30 and 24.60, respectively. However, these figures are partly skewed by the attacks perpetrated by Anders Breivik on 22 July 2011.[5] 77 people were killed and 242 injured on that day alone, illustrating the harm a single individual can cause. Therefore, excluding Breivik as an outlier, lone-actor terrorist plots





resulted in an average of 1.22 fatalities and 2.13 injuries, with standard deviations of 3.23 and 4.28, respectively. Even after the Breivik massacre in Utøya and Oslo is excluded as an outlier, the standard deviations remain relatively high, illustrating the degree of variation across the data-set. Of the lone-actor plots, 76 per cent failed to cause any fatalities, while 58 per cent caused not even injuries. These findings underline that while a few lone-actor terrorist attacks can be devastating, a high proportion of plots fail to cause major human loss. Casualty rates were also examined within ideological sub-groups: including the attack by Breivik, it was found that right-wing attacks caused 260 injuries and ninety-four fatalities[6], while religiously inspired attacks killed 16 people and injured 65 more. These results mirror findings across the West more broadly, where 80 per cent of deaths from lone-actor terrorism have been attributed to right-wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements or other forms of political extremism, rather than religiously inspired terrorism.[7]

Civilians are the most common target of plots in the data-set (35 per cent) –many of them are from specific ethnic and religious minorities, are asylum seekers and immigrants. A large majority of religious targets were Muslim. More than one third of lone-actors who targeted civilians were religiously inspired (37 per cent), followed by right-wing perpetrators (25 per cent) and school shooters (20 per cent).

The most frequent types of weapons used by perpetrators were firearms (31 per cent), various types of weapons (21 per cent), explosives (17 per cent) and bladed weapons (such as a knife, machete or axe – 12 per cent). While 92 per cent of bladed-weapons plots and 100 per cent of identified firearms plots led to actual attacks, this was not the case for explosives plots (45 per cent successful). These findings perhaps illustrate the difficulties of acquiring and producing explosives without detection. On the other hand, plots utilizing only firearms or bladed weapons require less planning and present fewer opportunities for law enforcement to intervene.

Moreover, even in those cases where explosives plots lead to detonations, their lethality is low, perhaps due, in part, to the difficulties in successfully producing an

effective explosive. The lethality of explosives was found to be 0.57 fatalities per attack, in contrast to 6.65 for firearms attacks.[8] Across the database, explosives account for only 4 per cent of fatalities, in stark contrast to the 89 per cent caused by firearms. Interestingly, bladed weapons also had a low lethality at 0.36, accounting for only 2 per cent of deaths, illustrating that although such lone-actor terrorist attacks may be difficult to detect and disrupt, they do not often result in major casualties figures.

An analysis of weapons used across the ideological spectrum found that there were no substantial differences; however, there were clear differences between countries. While lone-actor terrorist plots in Great Britain led to 2 fatalities and 17 injuries, none of these were caused by firearms. In contrast, four attacks using firearms in France caused nineteen fatalities and thirty-two injured, accounting for 95 per cent of fatalities and 53 per cent of injuries in that country. In Germany, all five lone-actor terrorist attacks were carried out with firearms. It is interesting to note that firearms attacks were more prominent in countries with higher rates of legal gun ownership; the UK (Great Britain and Northern Ireland) has only 6.5 legally held firearms per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with approximately 30 per 100,000 people in France and Germany.[9]

Overall, our findings suggest that lone-actor terrorist attacks using firearms are more likely to occur in countries with higher rates of legal gun ownership. These also cause more fatalities than attacks using explosives or bladed weapons. Interestingly, across the data-set, 38 per cent of the firearms used in attacks were legally owned.

The CLAT literature review highlighted findings from previous research, a number of which were explored through the database. One such finding was that the level of military experience among lone-actor terrorists is higher than might be expected within the general population.[10] It was also hypothesised that individuals with military training or combat experience may be more 'effective' in conducting their attack, causing greater numbers of fatalities. This is supported by other studies of terrorism.[11] Within the CLAT database, the lethality of perpetrators with



military training was 2.29 fatalities per individual, markedly higher than their counterparts without such experience at 1.47; if Breivik is removed as an outlier, the lethality of non-military perpetrators drops further to just 0.68.

This raises an important issue: the most lethal lone-actor terrorist in the database, Breivik, had no military training; the absence of military experience can therefore not be considered a conclusive indicator that a perpetrator is less dangerous. Therefore, while these findings do offer some support for the hypothesis that, on average, military training or experience increases the lethality of lone-actor terrorists, it is clear that other factors must also be taken into account.

We found that attacks planned by those with military training or experience were prevented in only 18 per cent of cases, a substantially lower proportion than the 36 per cent of perpetrators who had no comparable training or experience. While it is not possible to establish causality, one plausible interpretation could be that such experience may also have increased their ability to avoid detection during the planning and development stages.

#### **Process Variables: Political Engagement and Online Activity**

The suspected ideology of the perpetrators was determined by reports from media coverage or from information that emerged during court proceedings. 86 out of the 120 perpetrators in the database were either religiously inspired (38 per cent) or right-wing extremists (33 per cent), together they accounted for almost three out of four lone-actor terrorists during this time period. Given the intense public preoccupation with religiously inspired terrorism, the finding that right-wing extremists account for an almost similar proportion of perpetrators within the database is remarkable.

In 73 per cent of cases, perpetrators had offered oral or written justifications for their actions<sup>[12]</sup>; however, the format of these expressions differed substantially. Only sixteen perpetrators (13 per cent) wrote and published a detailed manifesto, either online or written on paper. While such documents can potentially offer detailed insights into the perpetrator's radicalisation, the development of attack plans and preparatory actions, such testimonies are

comparatively rare. The pre-attack publication of a manifesto is therefore likely to offer opportunities for intervention in only a limited number of lone-actor plots. In other cases, perpetrators either harnessed the immediacy and reach of social media to publish media files or text documents just a few hours prior to their attacks, or alternatively made significant oral statements just before the attack or during arrest.

Unsurprisingly, the motivations expressed vary greatly across the ideologies represented in the data-set. Perpetrators appeared to harbour a broad range of disgruntlements with sectors of the public, governments or social movements, or they manifested anger over specific events (either personal or political) for which they were seeking retribution.

Among the right-wing perpetrators in the data-set, there was a strong emphasis on immigration issues, a wish to inspire patriotism and to defend their country from alleged 'Islamisation'. This reflects a shift within the broader right-wing extremism, with many groups and individuals denouncing National Socialism, Fascism and anti-Semitism; instead, they define their cause as defence against a perceived threat from Islam.<sup>[13]</sup> However, there remains a significant portion of lone-actor terrorists in the database who appear to have been preoccupied solely with neo-Nazi symbolism and the idolisation of far-right figureheads. Examining the influence of specific events, in Great Britain, there are indications that following the murder of Lee Rigby, 47 per cent of right-wing perpetrators were in part motivated by that attack. These cases of revenge include arson attacks and bombings of Islamic centres.

Within the religiously inspired cohort, there are numerous references to taking revenge for political action, such as Western Europe's foreign policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11, the national government's support for Israel, the treatment of terror suspects imprisoned in Abu Ghraib or retribution for cartoons that depicted the Prophet Muhammad. These references are complemented by attempts to justify their intentions on the basis of the alleged religious obligation to wage a violent jihad.

The majority of lone-actor terrorists in the data-set (58 per



cent) did not appear to be previously politically active.[14] Of those that were politically engaged, 43 per cent had attended meetings and rallies, while 47 per cent had conducted their relationship with their reference group solely through literature and online materials. However, it should be noted that this latter form of engagement is likely to have grown in recent years in line with the rise of social media and the availability of extremist materials in downloadable multimedia format on personal computers. Indeed, 50 per cent of perpetrators conducted at least part of their engagement in a virtual online setting. In some of these cases this involved the downloading of videos, images and literature as well as online interaction on official forums and web pages.

Within ideological categories, right-wing lone-actor terrorists were more likely to be politically active (62.5 per cent) than their religiously inspired counterparts (44.3 per cent). Approximately two-thirds of the perpetrators (67 per cent) had never before been active in an extremist group. Where connections had been established, 65 per cent of links (or 22 per cent of the overall database) were with extremist groups known to advocate or at least condone violence to advance their cause. These would typically be groups with a known history of involvement in violent attacks, groups which are illegal in the country in which they operate. Moreover, 69 per cent of these links to violent groups (or 15 per cent of the overall database) were of recent date at the time of the attack. While the overall level of engagement with extremist groups is low, these findings suggest there is perhaps a need for greater surveillance of groups which advocate violence as well as those who interact with them. Although religiously inspired lone actors were more likely to have a link to an extremist group, the range of organisations linked to right-wing perpetrators was greater.

Within the database, examples of online activity included using the Internet to form relationships with others, to gain the inspiration for the attack or to acquire technical know-how. In recent years, the role of the internet and social media have been particularly prominent in public discourses around lone-actor terrorism.[15] Chronological analysis of the CLAT database shows a steady increase in the use of mainstream social media platforms in plots. This took off from around 2004 onwards,

as platforms became established, grew in popularity and diversified in capabilities.

Prior to the popularisation of mainstream social media, password-protected forums and themed blogs were the most prevalent form of communication for the perpetrators. Many of the small cells (dyads or triads) met on such platforms, where they created their own space to discuss and solidify their attack plans.

Where perpetrators have primarily engaged through social media platforms, the information gathered overwhelmingly indicates a one-way relationship – reading and sharing relevant news, and expressing opinions, rather than utilising these platforms to form connections with other people.

The Internet was used for tactical knowledge acquisition in just under one third of all cases (33 per cent), in the form of downloading manuals, watching training videos, or undertaking basic reconnaissance such as researching the floorplan of a building, finding addresses or searching for lists of individuals in order to identify potential targets. Twenty-one out of the thirty-nine perpetrators who used the Internet to prepare their attack downloaded training manuals (54 per cent), including *The Anarchist's Cookbook* (referenced in six cases), *The Jolly Roger Cookbook* and *The Complete Improvised Kitchen*, which provide instructions for the construction and detonation of explosives. Of these twenty-one cases, only ten successfully launched attacks using explosives; most of the remainder were thwarted by the authorities. Of these ten bombings, only one directly caused fatalities – Anders Breivik's bombing in downtown Oslo which killed 8 people. This outcome raises some questions over the accuracy of training manuals for bomb-making at home.

The proportion of perpetrators who watched training videos appears relatively small (only 5 cases). However, this is likely to become more significant over time given the centrality of training and propaganda videos for some extremist organisations.

#### **Process Variables: Leakage and Interactions with Authorities**

Changes in behaviour can be crucial indicators that an individual is becoming more extreme in his or her views or is considering acts of violence in the near future. The





CLAT database was therefore designed to also capture this type of information. Variables recorded whether open source information indicated a change in the perpetrator's behaviour in the period leading up to the (planned) attack, along with any available details regarding both the nature of the lone actor's behaviour and the context in which it was noted.

Overall, 34 per cent of lone-actor terrorists exhibited a change in behaviour. Moreover, these changes were more prevalent among religiously inspired lone-actor terrorists: 50 per cent of perpetrators in this category exhibited behavioral changes, as opposed to only 15 per cent of right-wing terrorist plotters. Examples of such behaviour include becoming increasingly distant from family members, manifesting sudden and drastic changes in attitude, as well as more specific ones like changing from one social groups to another.

The term 'leakage' was used in the CLAT project to denote situations where the perpetrator has given one or more indications of extreme views or an expressed his intention to act to a third party; such indicators could be intentional or shown unwittingly. Leakage may be limited to behavioural changes but can also be much broader: in some extreme cases it involved outright declarations of an intention to commit a terrorist act.

Variables captured whether or not leakage occurred, its nature and the audience. Overall, 46 per cent of perpetrators exhibited leakage; this level of leakage was consistent for both religiously inspired and right-wing actors, with no significant variation. Leakage took various forms: in 35 per cent of cases it gave an indication of the perpetrator's extremist ideology, but nothing further—for example, in the form of expressing extreme views to friends and family, or being seen to access extremist websites.

In 44 per cent of cases the perpetrator went further and 'leaked' some indication of an intention to act. In some examples this was deliberate, posting online that he or she planned to become a martyr, telling colleagues or sending information to the media. In other cases this was done unwittingly; those around one perpetrator realised he was experimenting with explosives when he was seen with suspicious injuries, while another failed to

dispose of receipts for chemicals which were subsequently found by family members.

In 21 per cent of cases the perpetrator shared at least some details of the planned attack with others. In one example the lone actor told his ex-girlfriend and showed her the weapons in his bag; in another case he informed his parents, while a third lone actor leaked attack details to a third party whom the individual was trying to recruit.

There were striking differences between ideological groups with regard to the audience of the leakage. Religiously inspired lone-actor terrorists were most likely to leak information to friends or family (45 per cent), expressing extreme views to those in their immediate vicinity. In contrast, only 18 per cent of leakage by right-wing extremists was to this audience.

Right-wing lone-actor terrorists were more likely to post telling indicators online; it was on the internet, where 41 per cent of their leakage occurred. Examples include a perpetrator who left a message on the internet forum of a known far-right group, Combat 18: 'Watch TV on Sunday, I will be the star. Death to ZOG! 88!'[16] Another lone actor had joined a number of far-right groups on Facebook including Bloc Identitaire (formerly Unité Radicale), Maison Commune and Belle et Rebelle.

The research team originally thought that younger perpetrators might be more careless in revealing their extremist beliefs or attack plans. However, analysis suggested no such correlation between young age and leakage. Similarly, there was no correlation with mental-health issues: where there was an indication of mental-health issues those perpetrators were no more likely to exhibit leakage.

The timeframe in which leakage occurred was also investigated, in order to ascertain any patterns and to determine whether leakage allowed sufficient time for detection and intervention. Unfortunately, this type of information was either unavailable or unclear in too many cases. Nevertheless, the database provides useful insights into the prevalence of leakage, its nature and, crucially, the audiences that are most likely to encounter be informed in one way or the other.

Variables were also designed to capture whether the perpetrator had been known previously to public authorities such as mental-



health practitioners, social-welfare services or law-enforcement bodies. Separate variables recorded whether the engagement (or investigation) was current at the time of the attack or intervention.

Convictions offer clear evidence of interaction with law enforcement; moreover, the project's literature review highlighted findings from previous studies that showed an elevated level of previous convictions among lone-actor terrorists.[17] These findings were reinforced by data from the CLAT database. It contained evidence to the effect that 33 per cent of perpetrators had a previous criminal sanction; among right-wing extremists, this figure rose to 40 per cent. These figures are notably higher than those for the general population (e.g. in the UK it is estimated that 20 per cent of all adults have a criminal conviction).[18] Although certainly an interesting finding, without examining the nature of any previous convictions and whether these overlap with—or far predate—the perpetrator's terrorist activity, it is not possible to determine whether they offer an opportunity to identify and disrupt plots. Unfortunately, more detailed information regarding interaction with authorities was often unavailable or inconclusive.

Such data limitations also precluded extensive quantitative analysis across the database; however, some trends were nevertheless apparent. Overall, 75 per cent of religiously inspired plots led to an attack, in contrast to 55 per cent of right-wing plots. This disparity could indicate that religiously inspired perpetrators are more effective than their right-wing counterparts. Alternatively, it could indicate that law enforcement efforts are more successful in identifying right-wing extremists; however, further examination appears to preclude this. Excluding cases where a perpetrator was identified during (or immediately following) an incident, it was established that 40 per cent of

right-wing extremists were caught by chance, either as part of an investigation into other offences or because the perpetrator accidentally detonated a device, thereby drawing attention to his or her activities.

One perpetrator sustained serious injuries while testing a device and was airlifted to hospital; the nature of his injuries roused suspicions and a search of his home revealed the presence of additional explosive devices. The bomb-making activities of another perpetrator were discovered when his home was searched as part of an investigation into the possession of child pornography. In a third case, a perpetrator's terrorist activity was uncovered following his arrest for public-order offences—he had urinated on a train platform. These examples stand in stark contrast to religiously inspired cases. Although chance discovery was also evident in some cases—with one perpetrator being identified following a routine traffic stop and another having accidentally detonated a device—overall 88 per cent of interventions were intelligence-led.[19] This disparity suggests that intelligence machinery may be more finely attuned to detecting religiously inspired lone-actor terrorists in comparison to their right-wing counterparts.

#### Conclusion

Analysis of the CLAT database reaffirms a key finding from the literature review: there is no single and consistent profile of a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest itself, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the period leading up to the attack. The policy implications of these findings have been explored in detail in some other reports in the CLAT series.[20]

#### ► References are available at source's URL.

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## ISIS runs fish farms, car dealerships to compensate for lost oil revenues

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160429-isis-runs-fish-farms-car-dealerships-to-compensate-for-lost-oil-revenues>



Apr 29 – The U.S.-led coalition's air strike have crippled the ISIS oil-smuggling-based economy, forcing the organization to rely on fish farming and car dealing as alternative money generating resources, a new report has revealed. In order to close a yawning gap in the organization's once-lucrative \$2.9 billion oil trading scheme, ISIS has now increasingly turned to other revenue streams.





## Europe vs. America: Comparing the Terrorism Threat

Source: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/europe-vs-america-comparing-terrorism-threat>

Apr 30 – It didn't take the Brussels bombings to convince most experts that the terrorist threat to Europe is greater than that to the U.S. homeland. The November 2015 Paris attacks, the January 2015 *Charlie Hebdo* shootings, the 2014 Jewish Museum of Belgium shootings, and other attacks and plots in Europe indicate that Europe's jihadist terrorism problem is greater than America's in both frequency and intensity.

No one factor explains the difference, but I'd compare the danger along several dimensions. The first to consider is simply the goals of the Islamic State, though this is ultimately unsatisfying. As I've argued [elsewhere](#), in contrast to Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. emphasis, Islamic State leaders have primarily focused on their state-building project in Iraq and Syria. Developing [provinces in the Muslim world](#) is another goal. Although most Islamic State attacks still strike regional targets, attacks on the West have risen on the priority list, [particularly after the United States and allies in Europe began an air campaign](#) against the Islamic State. But given that the United States is the leader of the coalition (and [supplying the vast majority of the strike assets](#)), Washington should be at least a rung above Europe on the enemies list. And within Europe, Belgium should be relatively low on the ladder given its [minimal contribution to the anti-Islamic State campaign](#), even discontinuing military operations late last year. So looking solely at the Islamic State's enemies list is not enough.

It's more useful, then, to focus on how easily the Islamic State can strike Europe in comparison to the United States. And here the contrast is clear. [Over 5,000 Europeans](#) have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria; less than 200 Americans have joined the struggle. Europe also shares a land border with Iraq and Syria via Turkey and is logistically far more accessible for Islamic State fighters to go back and forth, while the United States is protected by two great oceans. Even putting foreign fighters and simple geography aside, [Muslim communities in Europe](#) have more radicalized individuals who stay in Europe, and thus a greater native pool of recruits for lone wolf and other attacks.

Beyond foreign fighters and radicalized stay-at-homes, the integration challenge is far greater in Europe. The specifics vary by country, but almost everywhere, the situation is bad. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no direct correlation between education or poverty and terrorism. However, when such problems are rampant within one community, they suggest a problem that is apparent to anyone who walks a Muslim neighborhood in a major European city: a lack of integration. Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens. Trust in the police and security services [is particularly low](#). Some European states embrace secularism and see [visible symbols of the practice of Islam](#) as a threat to this identity, and as jihadist terrorism emerged as a leading issue after 9/11, critics began to link Muslim identity to violence. Each terrorist attack makes this problem worse, with chauvinistic voices denouncing Muslims, making the community draw even more inward. And [more security service raids](#) on Muslim communities only increase their suspicions.

American Muslims, in contrast, [are far better integrated](#) and have regularly [cooperated with the FBI](#), foiling many terrorist plots. The vitriol that has accompanied the 2016 U.S. election – and the embrace of this rhetoric among many voters – risks jeopardizing this robust cooperation, alienating American Muslims and making them less likely to work with the police and the FBI.

Terrorists can move freely across Europe's open borders, but security services cannot – in this way the terrorists are far more "European" than the security services that fight them. The Paris and Brussels [attacks revealed](#) gaping holes in Europe's counterterrorism net: lists of suspects are often not shared, and different countries use different systems of transliteration, hindering basic data searches. Even for countries with effective security services like France, vulnerability is still high, as less proficient neighbors like Belgium create de facto havens where terrorists face far less pressure. In general, I've been on the side of those arguing that the terrorist threat



to the West, while real, is manageable, but I also [warned in 2014](#) that “The problem is particularly acute for small countries like Belgium that have many foreign fighters, but small security services and little history of militancy, forcing them to play catch-up even as the problem escalates.” As long as European security performance is uneven, strong countries will be vulnerable to mistakes or weak efforts by those European countries unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources or establish a proper counterterrorism framework.

So, on balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only because it is simply far easier for the Islamic State to attack Europe. However, if the above factors do explain much of the difference, Europe should focus not just on improving security services, but also on better integrating its Muslim communities. An integrated Muslim community would not only reduce the number of those radicalized, but also make it more likely for the police and intelligence services to discover terrorists and stop them before they strike again.

## One-Third Of Iraqis Believe America Supports Terrorism

Source: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iraq-america-terrorism\\_us\\_5706bbfae4b0b90ac271ab14?section=india](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iraq-america-terrorism_us_5706bbfae4b0b90ac271ab14?section=india)

Apr 30 – A U.S. State Department report found that the United States’ popularity in Iraq has plummeted over the course of a year.

**Nearly 1 in 3 Iraqis believe that America supports terrorism overseas.**

It’s just one of a handful of damning poll numbers showing waning United States-Iraqi relations as part of a U.S. State Department Inspector General’s Office evaluation of the American embassy in Baghdad.

The report, [released online last week](#), used data compiled between October and November of last year. It found that 40 percent of Iraqis believe that the U.S. is “working to destabilize Iraq and control its natural resources.” Nearly one-third “believe that America supports terrorism in general or the Islamic State in Iraq.”

The numbers mean the American embassy in Baghdad has a lot of work to do in terms of improving diplomatic relations. America’s popularity has plummeted since it reentered the country in 2014 to help Iraq battle the self-described Islamic State. The report states that the “Iraqi public [is] already keenly aware of ISIL’s (also called ISIS) true nature” and, at the same time, Iraqis’ image of the U.S. has “fallen from 38 percent favorable in December 2014 to 18 percent in August 2015.”

The State Department blames “active disinformation campaigns,” supported by Iraqi media, on what experts are calling “conspiracy theories.”

**The disillusionment is coming from those who believe the U.S. created ISIS to get at Iraqi oil and others who believe America**



**shows too much support for Sunni Muslims through its support for the inclusive Iraqi government,** John Alterman, director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies told ABC News.

“So if you put those two groups together ... that gets you to 33 percent real quick,” Alterman said. “What they see is the U.S. government saying ‘Stay open to the Sunnis’ and the U.S. government keeps talking about having more troops in Iraq. There are people who argue ... that means the U.S. is creating this environment to serve its own interests.”

The U.S. military now has about 5,000 soldiers in Iraq, a number that is expected to grow, according to the Washington Post. White House officials reportedly see a need to support Iraqi forces more and more, but the new report finds that the military’s presence is being met by little fanfare.

It’s not yet clear how — or if — the current Iraqi mindset can be changed, at least by the embassy. The report out of the State Department found that the embassy “operates without formal strategic planning and goals,” and recommends that it incorporate more public diplomacy into its strategy.



## 'An Amazon for Jihadis': Shop that sold guns to Paris attackers still open for business

Source: <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/511699/amazon-terrorist-paris-attacker-slovakia-kalashnikov-gun-isis>

Apr 29 – AFG Security-Corporation – which sits in a sleepy suburb of **Slovakia** – seems unremarkable from the outside. But it has been the subject of several police probes after weapons were believed to have been bought to kill from the shop. Despite arming some of the most evil men in Europe with weapons of mass destruction its doors are still open for business – and it's entirely legal.

Shoppers can browse deadly Kalashnikov-style rifles and a range of assault weapons manufactured with the intention to kill on its online shopping site.



Hans Bruns, a specialist in European terrorism, believes the shop – and others like it – is like "an Amazon for Jihadis".

He told the Daily Star Online: "The course of several the recents attacks would have been very different if they perpetrators had not been armed with assault rifles.

"As you know, European police forces are lightly armed - if they are armed - and are more or less without a chance initially.


"As I see it, and have advocated for some time, it is necessary with some sort of coordinated

effort on an EU level to decrease the number of military grade weapons on the market. The deactivated weapons are just one aspect of it."

Introduction > Weapons > Rifles > Rifles AK47 cal.7,62x39mm

### Rifles AK47 cal.7,62x39mm

**NEW**




Manufacturer: **Fegyver-és Gépgyár**


SKU: **GL009**


Guarantee: **2 years**


Currently unavailable


Your price: **412,00€** incl. tax  
**343,33€** without TAX



 Add to Compare

 Send to friend

 Goods guard

 Found a better price?

Every terrorist's must-have kit – including assault rifles, balaclavas, bullet proof vests and ammo – can easily be purchased both online and in-store from AFG security.

The most deadly weapons – like an AK-47 – fall into Category A and must be bought over-the-counter.


However a loophole means that deactivated guns - which are modified so they can only shoot blanks – fall into Category D along with handguns and sharp items.

It advertises these "professionally impaired" items in its suggestions for shopping section.

These Category D items can be delivered to Belgium, Ireland, Croatia, Luxembourg, Spain, Hungary, Austria or Germany for between 15 and 20 euro, the website states.







Customers simply need proof they are over 18 – or can type in their ID card number if shopping online. French officials claimed that Paris attackers purchased decommissioned weapons from AFG's website. Then they were able to tinker with them and get them in working order before conducting a three-day assault on the French capital that took the lives of 130.

The assailants in the Charlie Hebdo attacks – which killed 11 and wounded 11 more – also bought their weapons from AFG too, the National Crime Agency revealed last week.

And last year a notorious British crime gang managed to sneak in the largest ever haul of automatic weapons from AFG to the UK, it said.

Their haul of 22 Kalashnikov-style rifles and nine machine guns were smuggled from Slovakia to France and across the channel in a motorboat – proving how simple it is for criminals to move deadly guns around Europe and into our country. Police raided the stash of "mass casualty weapons" when the boat docked in Kent.

## Turkey's Fake War on Jihadis

By Burak Bekdil

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5982/turkey-fake-war-on-jihadis>

Apr 28 – In theory, Turkey is part of the international coalition that fights the Islamic State (IS). Since it joined the fight last year, it has arrested scores of IS militants, made some efforts to seal its porous border with Syria and tagged IS as a terrorist organization. Turkish police have raided homes of suspected IS operatives.



More recently, Turkey's Interior Ministry updated its [list of "wanted terrorists"](#) to include 23 IS militants, and offered rewards of more than 42 million Turkish liras (more than \$14 million) for any information leading to the suspects' capture. But this is only part of the story.

On March 24, a Turkish court released seven members of IS, including the commander of the jihadists' operations on Turkish soil. A total of 96 suspects

including the commander of the jihadists' operations on Turkish soil. A total of 96 suspects



are on trial, including the seven men who were detained but released. All are free now, although the indictment against them claims that they

*engaged in the activities of the terrorist organization called DAESH [Arabic acronym of IS]. The suspects had sent persons to the conflict zones; they applied pressure, force, violence and threats by using the name of the terrorist organization, and they had provided members and logistic support for the group.*

The release of terror suspects came in sharp contrast with another court decision that ruled for a trial, but while under detention, for four academics who had signed a petition calling for peace in Turkey's Kurdish dispute. Unlike the IS militants, the [academics remain behind bars](#). The Turkish government, which [controls the judiciary](#) almost in its entirety, relies on Islamist grassroots supporters of various flavors -- from Islamists and 'lite jihadists' to radicals.

Last year the Turkish pollster MetroPOLL [found](#) that one in every five Turks thought that the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in Paris was the natural response to people who insulted Prophet Mohammed [only 16.4% of Turks thought of the incident as an attack on freedom of expression]. Among the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) voters, the rate of approval of the attack was 26.4%; and only 6.2% viewed it as an attack on free speech.



Only 17.8% of AKP voters thought the attack was the work of radical Islamists. Three-quarters of AKP voters thought Muslims were aggrieved by the attack; while as few as 15.4% thought the victims were the cartoonists who were murdered. Two-thirds of AKP voters thought attacks on Islam by Christian Crusaders were continuing.

The fact that key IS suspects are now free because the government may fear looking mean to its Islamist supporters only partly explains the appalling judicial rulings on jihadists and academics. "The suspects may be holding the Turkish government hostage ... What if they threatened the authorities that they would reveal the government support for their organization in the past? You normally don't walk free over such serious legal allegations," observes one western diplomat in Ankara.

Russia has been [claiming](#) that Turkey keeps supporting the Islamic State through trading the jihadists' oil, their main source of income. A [new report](#) claims that total supplies to terrorists in Syria last year was 2,500 tons of ammonium nitrate; 456 tons of potassium nitrate; 75 tons of aluminum powder; sodium nitrate; glycerin; and nitric acid. The report stated:

*In order to pass through the border controls unimpeded, effectively with the complicity of the Turkish authorities, products are processed for companies that are purportedly registered in Jordan and Iraq ... Registration and processing of the cargo are organized at customs posts in the [Turkish] cities of Antalya, Gaziantep and Mersin. Once the necessary procedures have been carried out, the goods pass unhindered through the border crossings at Cilvegözü and Üncüpınar.*

Turkey's official religious authority recently issued comic books to the nation's children telling them how marvelous it is to become an Islamic martyr

Turkey keeps playing a fake war on jihadist terrorists. At a March meeting with top U.S. officials, King Abdullah of Jordan

[accused Turkey](#) of exporting terrorists to Europe. He said: "The fact that terrorists are going to Europe is part of Turkish policy and Turkey keeps on getting a slap on the hand, but they are let off the hook."



In fact, the Turkish government's secret love affair with various Islamist groups is not always so secret. In March, thousands of supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a global Islamist group, [gathered at a public sports hall](#) in Ankara -- courtesy of the Turkish government -- to discuss the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. In his speech, Mahmut Kar, the media bureau chief of Hizb ut-Tahrir Turkey said:

*Infidels who were enemies of Islam thought they buried Islam in the depths of history when they abolished the caliphate on March 3, 1924 ... We are hopeful, enthusiastic and happy. Some 92 years after ... we are shouting out that we will re-establish the caliphate, here, right next to the parliament.*

(Hizb ut-Tahrir, viewed by Russia and Kazakhstan as a terrorist group, defines itself as a political organization aiming to "lead the

ummah" to the re-establishment of the caliphate and rule with sharia law.)

Guess what else Turkey is doing while pretending to be fighting jihadists?

Apparently, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's declared political [ambition](#) to "raise devout generations" seems to have geared up. Turkey's Religious Affairs General Directorate (Diyanet), the ultimate official religious authority in the country, recently [issued comic books](#) to the nation's children telling them how marvelous it is to become an Islamic martyr.


One comic strip is a dialogue between a father and his son. "How marvelous it is to become a martyr," the father says. Unconvinced, the son asks: "Would anyone want to become a martyr?" And the father replies: "Yes, one would. Who doesn't want to win heaven?"

And this is the country its Western allies believe will help them fight jihadists? Lots of luck!

*Burak Bekdil is an Ankara-based columnist for the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet Daily News and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.*

## Swiss Intelligence Monitoring Online Activity Of 400 Suspected Terrorists

Source: <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/swiss-intelligence-monitoring-online-activity-of-400-suspected-terrorists-1401844>



May 02 – Swiss authorities were monitoring the social media activity of about 400 possible terrorists who might pose a security threat, the NDB federal intelligence service said on Monday.

Switzerland is not a primary target for Islamist attacks because it is not part of the military campaign against groups such as ISIS, but the security threat level has been elevated nonetheless, the NDB's annual report said.

The report showed a photo of a Swiss passport next to an explosive belt posted online by a suspected Swiss terrorist who had travelled to the Middle East, and an ISIS video showing the Swiss flag among the 60 countries seen as targets.

"Attacks in Switzerland are more to be expected from lone wolves or small groups that would be conducted with simple means, little preparation and minimal logistical effort," the report said.

Authorities have been closely tracking suspected terrorists who return to Switzerland from countries, Syria in particular, where they are believed to get training in carrying out attacks.

A Swiss court last month sentenced three Iraqis for terrorism offences, a verdict that the senior prosecutor said should send a message to terrorists not to see the country as an easy target.

The three main defendants, who had denied wrongdoing, were arrested in early 2014 on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks and helping ISIS terrorists enter the country.

The Swiss attorney general's office has more than 60 open cases linked to jihadist militancy, it said on Monday.





## London Set To Elect Muslim Mayor With Ties To Extremism

Source: <http://dailycaller.com/2016/05/02/london-set-to-elect-muslim-mayor-with-ties-to-extremism/>

London is expected to elect its first-ever Muslim mayor Thursday, despite opponents presenting evidence of his past ties to radical Islam.



The NEW Mayor of London (May 07, 2016)

Sadiq Khan, a member of parliament for the center-left Labour Party, holds a 20-point lead in polls going into Thursday's election. If elected, Khan would become the [first Muslim mayor](#) in a major Western capital. But past dealings with radical Islam continue to haunt him.

Conservative candidate Zac Goldsmith, backed by Prime Minister David Cameron, has criticized Khan for giving "platform, oxygen and cover" to extremists throughout his political career.

### Editor's comment

Most notably, Khan campaigned at an event in 2004 [alongside five extremist preachers](#) while running for parliament. He simultaneously served as the chair of the Muslim Council of Britain's legal affairs committee, which defended Muslim scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi when he was subject to a ban from entering the United Kingdom.

Al-Qaradawi authored "The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam," in which he [defends the practice of wife-beating](#), discusses whether gays should be killed and calls suicide bombings against Israeli citizens "God's justice."

Khan said "there is a consensus among Islamic scholars that Mr Al-Qaradawi is not the extremist that he is painted as being," during a testimony in parliament. Al-Qaradawi was later banned from entering the United Kingdom in 2008.

Another headache was handed to Khan Friday when a 1997 video of his former brother-in-law, Makabool Javaid, went viral. The video shows Javaid [preaching anti-West propaganda](#) during a rally for Sharia law in Britain.

"Yet again, Khan is showing terrible judgement on who he associates with," Conservative member of parliament Andrew Bridgen said of the video, in an interview with The Sun. "He's clearly experimented with the wrong company." Khan has condemned his former brother-in-law's beliefs, and says he hasn't had contact with him for more than a decade. He has responded to accusations of sympathizing with

When the future looks dark, do not panic, because future does not exist yet; by using your intelligence, you can always turn it to bright!

Mehmet Murat Ildan

extremists by calling himself "the British Muslim who takes the fight to the extremists."

Despite the allegations, Khan's lead appears to be too large for opponents to catch with just a few days to go.

## Former jihadi 'star' of ISIS propaganda videos reveals why he turned his back on the 'inhuman caliphate'

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3566914/It-s-friends-killing-friends-stand-fake-Former-jihadi-star-ISIS-propaganda-videos-reveals-turned-inhuman-caliphate.html>

May 01 – A former jihadi has revealed he fled the 'inhuman' Islamic State after witnessing 'brothers killing brothers' and 'friends killing friends'.



German-born Harry Sarfo, who grew up in the UK, said he witnessed children taking part in executions and carrying suicide bombs and brutal stonings and beheadings during his three months with the caliphate.

Sarfo, 27, is currently being held at a German prison and is due to stand trial over terror offences after joining ISIS in April 2015. While there he featured in propaganda videos calling for people in Germany to join the terror group. He was arrested upon his return to Europe three months later after fleeing ISIS over its 'extreme interpretation' of Sharia law.



Former jihadi Harry Sarfo, pictured in an ISIS propaganda video, said bombing campaigns in Syria will only cause more people to join the terror group

In an interview with the Independent, Sarfo, who has appeared in an ISIS propaganda video, said: 'I witnessed stonings, beheadings, shootings, hands chopped off and many other things. I've seen child soldiers - 13-year-old boys with explosive belts and Kalashnikovs. Some boys even driving cars and involved in executions.'

Sarfo, pictured, is awaiting trial in Germany for terror offences. He said he left ISIS last summer because of its 'extreme interpretation' of Sharia law

He added: 'The Islamic State is not just un-Islamic, it is inhuman. A blood-related brother killed his own brother on suspicion of being a spy. They gave him the order to kill him. It is friends killing friends.'

Sarfo said Coalition bombing raids would only radicalise more people should they lose family members in the air strikes.

A former Royal Mail worker, Sarfo, who moved to London as a teenager, said he trained with ISIS in Syria and experienced bombings 'nearly

every day', while he also heard jihadis talking about plans to attack the UK and Europe.

Sarfo said he was attracted to the group because of its ideology of uniting people under one flag, and that he told its leaders he would not be prepared to take part in terror attacks.

He became radicalised after being forced to leave the UK in 2010 when he was jailed for a robbery in Germany.


While in prison he spent time with an Al Qaeda-linked recruiter and then joined a radical mosque in Bremen after his release.

Sarfo was then blocked from travelling to Syria on a 'charity mission' and said subsequent police treatment led to him joining ISIS after strict security measures 'destroyed his life' and 'made him the man they wanted'.

Experts say blaming security services has become a typical excuse for radicalised people. Charlie Winter, a terrorism analyst of Georgia State University in the US, told the Independent police treatment alone 'would not cause someone to embrace ISIS ideology'.

He added Sarfo's argument that bombing would cause more people to flock to ISIS' cause was repeating the group's own propaganda.

ISIS has previously cited bombings as part of the reasons for its attacks in Paris and Belgium.



The Pentagon has recently estimated air strikes in Iraq and Syria between September 2015 and February 2016 have killed 20 civilians, bringing the 'official' total to 41 since the campaign against ISIS began.

Meanwhile Britain's bombing raids have wiped out 1,000 Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq, official figures have revealed.



RAF warplanes blitzed secret underground bunkers, jihadists hiding in palm trees, vehicles packed with explosives and deadly sniper and machine gun positions.


Drone pilots, stationed at RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire, spent hours spying on targets as they prepared for battle, before killing them with laser-guided missiles and 500lb Paveway bombs.

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Trials cost citizens money. Same for imprisonment and other restrain measures. Just strip his identity and civil rights and deport him back to Syria or Iraq. A dream when chosen should be lived to the end. It is not an ice cream you have to taste it before you decide you like it. And I am sure all the info he can reveal will add nothing important in the overall war against terrorism. And a touch of propaganda at the end – after all it is british media source – about how victorious the British contribution is. Well if these are their successes, one can only imagine what the Russian contribution to this high from above war is.

## The Maoist Global Web – Analysis

By P. V. Ramana

Source: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/01052016-the-maoist-global-web-analysis/>



Map shows districts in India affected by Naxalites (left wing terrorism). Naxalites are considered far-left radical communists, supportive of Maoist ideology. Source: Institute for Conflict Management, SATP.

May 01 – Naxalites of the Communist Party of India Maoist, CPI (Maoist), Maoists in short, have reportedly formed a global web of linkages. "... the CPI (Maoist) party [has] close links with foreign [M]aoist organisations in [The] Philippines, Turkey, etc.," said the Minister of State for Home Affairs in reply to Question No. 248 in the Lok Sabha on April 26, 2016. The Minister also said that the Maoists are not

"getting backing from [any] foreign agency / country."

**The external linkages of the Maoists are, indeed, wide. They stretch from Latin America to South East Asia.**

These linkages have, essentially, given them visibility and propaganda, and very occasionally weapons.





**According to an internal document of the Maoists, they have, or had, linkages with 21 fraternal groups abroad.** Some of these include: Shining Path (Peru), Revolutionary Communist Party (USA), Maoist Communist Party (Italy), Marxist-Leninist Party (Germany), Revolutionary Communist Party (Colombia), TKP-ML (Turkey) and Communist Party of Philippines.

Way back in March 2001, Oken of TKP-ML of Turkey and Chandra Prasad Gajurel alias Gaurav of the present day Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) attended the Congress of the Maoists, in the latter's earlier avatar as the Communist Party of India — Marxist-Leninist (People's War), or PWG as they were then popularly known.

Moreover, a well-known authority on the Maoists, K. Srinivas Reddy, told this author that, in 1996, Bert de Belder, an important leader of the Workers Party of Belgium (WPB), toured North Telangana, then the flagship guerrilla zone of the Maoists, and wrote articles in the European media praising the Maoist movement there as "the best people's movement he saw anywhere in the world."

In May 1996, Kobad Ghandy alias Rajan, Central Committee Member of the CPI (Maoist) and head of the Central Propaganda Bureau, who is presently under detention in Tihar Central Jail, New Delhi, participated in the annual International Communism Seminar hosted by the WPB and presented a paper entitled "Armed Struggle in India: Our Experiences". Ghandy also visited Canada and the United Kingdom for close to two months in 2005. He is believed to have visited Vancouver, Toronto, London, Birmingham and Bradford, and is said to have distributed 400 CDs containing two Maoist propaganda films – Blazing Trail and Bhoomkal — and a few documents of the outfit. The objective of the visit was to build support. The result was hardly encouraging.

Further, in 2004, the Maoists had organised a conference of like-minded organisations known as "Mumbai Resistance 2004" (MR 2004). Besides Indian groups, a total of 24 international outfits participated in MR 2004. Participants at the event and in the massive public rally were mobilised from Balaghat, Gondia and Gadchiroli districts, all relatively close to Mumbai, and where the Maoists claim

to have established a guerrilla zone of domination.

The Maoists are also said to have been associated with the founding of the International Association of People's Lawyers in 2000 in The Netherlands and the International League of Peoples' Struggle, which too was founded, and is headquartered in, The Netherlands.

The Maoists have also been the founding members of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) that was founded in June 2001, and which is, perhaps, defunct now. As the Minister noted in his reply to Question No. 248 mentioned earlier, "The Maoist parties of South Asian countries are members of this conglomerate." The Minister also said that "[i]nputs indicate that some senior cadres of the Communist Part of The Philippines imparted training to the cadres of CPI (Maoist) in 2005 and 2011."

The Maoists have also had non-fraternal linkages which were entirely opportunistic and meant to procure weapons or receive training. As one senior Intelligence officer told this researcher, during 1989-90, renegade cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) trained the then PWG in fabricating landmines, something which they mastered later on with chilling lethality and stunning accuracy. Besides, on December 10, 1991, as a then Member of Parliament, Bandaru Dattatreya, the present Union Minister for Labour, said in the Lok Sabha that the then PWG had procured 60 AKs and 20 Sten guns from the LTTE.


All these external linkages have served one important purpose for the Maoists. It has given them visibility and propaganda in different parts of the world. Thus, they have been able to mobilise international political support from fraternal groups. Moreover, these linkages have only very occasionally brought in money and weapons. Nevertheless, it is important for all Indian Missions abroad to closely monitor these international groups to counter the propaganda campaign that they unleash from time to time and refute their false claims. Finally, it would also be useful to probe whether these linkages would, in future, help in establishing an arms supply chain.





## Secret 28-page section of 9/11 report should remain under seal: CIA director

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160503-secret-28page-section-of-9-11-report-should-remain-under-seal-cia-director>



May 03 – John Brennan, the director of the CIA, has said that the 28-page secret section of the 9/11 Commission Report which details Saudi Arabian funding for the attacks, contains “uncorroborated, un-vetted” information and should not be released. Brennan expressed his strong preference for keeping the secret section from the public domain for fear of fueling unfounded rumors and speculations.

ABC News reports that Brennan insisted the section was “thoroughly investigated and reviewed” by the official inquiry into 9/11.

Brennan also maintained that the United States had a “very strong” relationship with Saudi Arabia, a country from which fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers hailed.

“This chapter was kept out [of the public domain] because of concerns about sensitive methods [and] investigative actions,” he said on NBC’s *Meet The Press*.

He said the report was “a combination of things that are accurate and inaccurate.”

He argued that the inquiry into 9/11 “came out with a very clear judgment that there was no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution, or Saudi officials or individuals, had provided financial support to al-Qaeda.

“I think some people may seize upon that uncorroborated, un-vetted information...to point

to Saudi involvement, which I think would be very, very inaccurate,” he said.

Those who argue for the release of the redacted section for public scrutiny include families of the 9/11 victims, but also former lawmakers with national security experience, led by former Florida senator Bob Graham (D), who worked on the report.

“The twenty-eight pages primarily relate to who financed 9/11, and they point a very strong finger at Saudi Arabia as being the principal financier,” Graham said.

On a separate occasion, he told media: “One thing that irritates me is that the FBI has gone beyond just covering up, trying to avoid disclosure, into what I call aggressive deception.”

Brennan, responding to these claims, said: “I’m quite puzzled by Sen. Graham and others.”

ABC News notes that the families of the 9/11 victims are waiting to see whether Congress would pass legislation which would allow them to sue the Saudi government over its role in the terrorist attacks, something which current “sovereign immunity” law prohibits.

The Justice against Sponsors of Terrorism Act measure has passed the Senate but has not



yet been brought to a vote in the House.

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Is it only the financial issues that might come up or something bigger verifying existing speculations, conspiracy theories and experts' testimonies speaking a different truth on what really happened that bloody day?

## What is the reality of the threat posed by Islamic extremists in Ireland?

Source: <http://www.irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/analysis/gardai-develop-units-to-counter-extremism-and-the-terror-threat-to-ireland-396021.html>

May 03 – The public's knowledge of the threat posed by Islamic extremists in Ireland is as limited as the amount of information provided to it by the authorities. As part of ongoing reports on this area, **Cormac O'Keeffe was given a rare in-depth interview with the head of the Garda's security services, Assistant Commissioner John O'Mahoney, about the reality of the situation here and what is being done about it.**

**Also present was Sergeant Dave McInerney, who, as the head of the Garda's Racial, Intercultural, and Diversity Office, has a key role in developing an accurate understanding of, and good relationship with, the Irish Muslim community.**

BAR the bizarre 'Jihad Jane' plot in 2010, the issue of Islamic extremism in Ireland has rarely come up as a significant issue in the eyes of gardaí and the Department of Justice.

However, this has shifted in the last year. It changed forever in June 2015, when three Irish people — Athlone couple Laurence and Martina Hayes and Meath woman Lorna Carty — were murdered on the sunny beaches of Sousse in Tunisia by a gunman inspired by Islamic State (IS). Last November, Irish couple Katie Healy and David Nolan narrowly escaped with their lives from the Bataclan massacre in Paris.

Shortly afterwards, Ireland was included by IS as being part of a "coalition of devils" in a slick Hollywood-style propaganda video.

In the High Court, meanwhile, a deportation case is being heard involving a person who gardaí allege is the "foremost organiser and facilitator" of IS fighters in Ireland and a "senior operative" for the terrorist group.

Last March, a week before the Brussels attacks, five Irish citizens, three of them children, escaped death as a suicide bomber blew up an Istanbul shopping street.

Three weeks ago came dramatic, and, according to some gardaí, reckless claims at the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors (AGSI) that gardaí here would "panic" and "run around like headless chickens"

if there was a Paris-style terror attack in Ireland.

The AGSI conference agreed that there was a need for information, briefings, and training to equip frontline gardaí and supervisors in relation to the threat here and how to respond to any attack.



Shaykh Muhammad Umar Al-Qadri – founder and CEO of the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council.

Shortly after that conference, news broke of the capture in Syria — and subsequent

release — of Laois man Joshua Molloy, who was fighting with a Kurdish group against IS.

And throughout the last year, there have been increasing signs of divisions, and, at times, public disagreements, among the leaders of the Irish Muslim community here on the vexed issue of how to respond to the threat posed by extremism.

These developments in the Irish mindset have been framed by the devastating, indiscriminate, and unpredictable nature of the attacks in Paris and Brussels.

The targets of the atrocities — pubs, restaurants, sports stadiums, music venues, metro stations, and airports, as well as the institutions





of the European Union — have heightened levels of anxiety and fear.

Two weeks ago, there were intelligence reports that IS was planning attacks on beaches and other holiday resorts of southern Europe popular with tourists, Irish included.

And just last week, the US National Intelligence chief James Clapper said IS terror cells were active in Britain, Germany, and Italy and were planning further attacks.

Also last week, it emerged that an Algerian-Irish citizen was among thousands of foreign fighters listed in IS records which were obtained by international media.

But what is the threat here? What is being done about it and what is the understanding of, and relationship with, the Irish Muslim community?

### Threat level

“First and foremost, this country is a safe environment to work in and live in,” says Assistant Commissioner John O’Mahoney, head of the Garda Crime and Security Section. “This is important, so as not to scare people.”

The reality, he tells the Irish Examiner, is this: “We do not consider ourselves in any way in the same league as the United Kingdom, nor in the same league as France or Belgium.

“That’s not to say we would be in any way complacent with it, and we prepare. A lot of preparation goes in to ensure we mitigate. I could never come out and say ‘No, we could never be subject to an attack’.”

So, what is the threat level?

### Perhaps not widely known, we have five levels in Ireland:

**Low:** An attack is deemed unlikely;

**Moderate:** An attack is possible, but not likely;

**Substantial:** An attack is a strong possibility;

**Severe:** An attack is highly likely;

**Critical:** An attack is imminent.

The threat is currently at moderate, upgraded from low last year.

“The assessment is not something just pulled out of the sky,” says Mr O’Mahoney. “It’s based on intelligence we generate ourselves, our assessment of intelligence that’s provided by other police forces and security services, it’s based on us looking at what’s happening around the world from open sources, the

climate that is there. They are the driving factors.”

He says the assessment was not “put up on a shelf” once it was done. It is “continuously assessed”, but has remained at moderate after the Brussels attacks.

He says that while the “threat overall” is that an attack is possible, but not likely, within that there were areas which they “look at more closely than others”.

“Obviously Shannon Airport, for very good reasons, is one of those, multinational companies is another and embassies — certainly the UK, US and Israeli embassies.”

He says they police Shannon Airport, a number of US multinationals, and the embassies on a “24-hour basis”.

Some security sources say the US tech giants, some with their European headquarters here, would provide the type of ‘spectacular’ target that might attract IS.

In relation to the common travel area with the UK — another possible reason why Ireland might feature in IS plans — Mr O’Mahoney says they kept “close co-operation with law enforcement in the UK, both at a policing level and a security level”.

The release of the IS online video last December was thought to be the first time that Ireland was included in its list of enemies. The Irish flag was pictured along with those of other countries that formed what IS called a “coalition of devils”.

At the time, a number of security analysts told the Irish Examiner that the video suggested Ireland was “a legitimate target” for IS supporters here, but stressed it did not mean Ireland was under threat of an attack.

“We had a very close look at it,” says Mr O’Mahoney. “It’s one part of the assessment and one part only, with a whole load of other things that come to our attention.”

He says a key component was “capability and intent” of the IS network or supporters here.

### Foreign fighters

One of the main potential threats is from returned foreign fighters — Irish citizens who have gone to fight in war zones, such as Syria and Iraq, and have, or may, return home.

In the region of 5,000 citizens of EU countries have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq, according to a



European Parliament briefing paper, published last March, citing figures from The Soufan Group, a New York-based security research body.

Most of the fighters (3,700) come from four countries: France (1,700), the UK (760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470). An estimated 30 Irish citizens are included in the figure. As a percentage of the population, Belgium comes top (42 per million), followed by Austria (35), Sweden (31), and France (26).

Ireland's rate (7 per million) is similar to Germany's (9), and higher than Spain (3).

"These individuals are perceived as a serious security threat to EU member states because they may have become further radicalised and acquired combat experience and therefore be


capable of carrying out deadly terrorist attacks once they return to Europe," said the EU briefing document.

Credit: European Parliamentary Research Service

"These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that some jihadist groups have urged Muslims in the West to undertake such attacks."

The Irish figure of 30 is an estimate. Numerous sources have pointed out that it was not possible to know all of those who have gone out. Many could fly out to Britain or mainland Europe and at that stage purchase an onward flight to Turkey.

"They're various figures out there," says Mr O'Mahoney. "There's figures of 40 and talk of 50. But people go out for various reasons:



Some for humanitarian reasons, some go to fight with ISIL, some go with the intention of fighting against ISIL.”

He says Garda policy is to engage with those going out and coming back.

“We’ve had direct contact with some people before they go out, and our policy certainly is to engage with people when they return.”

He accepts people could travel out, and in, without their knowledge: “It’s not possible to know everyone who has gone out and everyone who has come back. We depend on our intelligence. We hope we know everyone who has gone out. There could be people out there we are not aware of.”

While a small number of EU countries (UK, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium) have criminal offences to prevent travel for terrorist purposes, the majority of member states, including Ireland, do not.

The EU briefing document notes there is a difficulty in proving such an offence, but it does provide authorities a power of arrest and detention pending prosecution.

Mr O’Mahoney declines to speculate how many foreign fighters have returned. Garda sources have previously told the Irish Examiner it was very difficult to know, with some sources estimating about half of the fighters have returned.

The EU briefing said the threat from foreign fighters must be assessed on a case by case basis, as they could also come back disillusioned.

It said one study found that one in nine of fighters “returned to perpetrate attacks in the West”.

Mr O’Mahoney says: “People have returned, and we’re quite happy, particularly some of those who travelled in the earlier years, they are not a threat to this country.

“Where people are returning and where we assess there is a threat they are a particular interest to us.”

Asked how many people there is in that group, he declines to say. He says they were part of a wider group, including those involved in recruiting and financing, that they were watching.

On the size of the wider group, Mr O’Mahoney again declines to comment.

“There’s a very small core of people who we are particularly interested in, [including] for suspicion of recruitment or potential for

recruitment and potential for provision of finances. Where we see people actively engaged we dedicate resources to that.”

Pushed on numbers, he will only say “very small numbers”.

Other sources suggest this could range anywhere from five to 25. Some of these individuals are thought to be referred to Garda by foreign security services.

The reality of IS recruitment in Ireland is currently being played out in a dramatic deportation case before the High Court.

The State contends that a 52-year-old Middle Eastern man was “a senior operative of ISIL” and its “foremost organiser and facilitator within the State”.

A sensitive area that Garda security services are currently working is the potential exploitation of the migration crisis by IS and foreign fighters.

Earlier this month, the EU border agency warned that potential terrorists, including returning foreign fighters, were using the crisis to travel unchecked through Europe.

“That’s something we have taken very seriously,” says Mr O’Mahoney. “There is a vetting procedure in place. We have sent people from [Garda] Counter Terrorism International along with Department of Justice officials to Greece to assist in the vetting process.

“For the vast majority this is a human tragedy, yet it would be very naive to think the possibility wasn’t there that people working with ISIL with evil intent would avail of that crisis. We, obviously, would look to mitigate against those risks.”

Linked to the threat posed by recruitment and returned fighters, is it danger from so-called lone wolf attacks, or people acting on their own.

This was a danger highlighted by Garda Commissioner Noírin O’Sullivan after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015.

Mr O’Mahoney agree this is a particular difficulty: “When you look at lone wolves, it’s very, very difficult. It’s a huge challenge, for someone on their own, to get information.”

But he says that, by studying some lone wolves, such as Anders Breivik in Norway (who killed 77 people in July 2011), there were “tell-tale signs that weren’t picked up”. He says the gardaí and agencies





worldwide were learning to spot those signs — such as people acting out of what is normal for them, travelling on a regular basis, being less open about their activities.

AC O'Mahoney says much of this information comes from the community.

### **Muslim community**

Mr O'Mahoney says that the strategic decision within the Garda Síochána in the late 1990s to set up a Racial and Intercultural office, in order to create links with ethnic communities, including the Muslim community, was crucial.

"While we had the Twin Towers attacks in 2001, I don't think anyone envisaged Europe being under attack," he says. "Fortunately, because of the work we have done that is standing to us now."

Sergeant Dave McNerney headed up this office in 2001, and has run it since. In first making contact with the Muslim community, he went to the South Circular Rd mosque in Dublin.

"It was a wonderful place to start and all very positive," he says. "It's not possible to do this work from Garda HQ. The only way to understand the Muslim community is to go and meet them."

"For police, it's very important to know where people are from, what languages they speak, what are their cultural differences and, at a time of crisis or investigation, to have a point of contact."

He says there are now around 270 Garda ethnic liaison officers across the country, for whom interaction with minority communities is part of their workload.

"They call into the mosque, ask 'how are things going, is everything okay'," explains Sgt McNerney. "They go to Friday prayer, meet the imam, speak to people after Friday prayer."

"People in the mosque would know how to contact Gardaí if there is some problem."

He accepts that this level of interaction depends on the number of jobs the force has to do and overall resources at district level, with staffing numbers severely hit under austerity and only now beginning to return.

"The thing is, we got in at the start [back in 2000]," he says. "I have been working with these communities for so long. They want a fair response, fair treatment, they want to be treated respectfully, but they want the police to work and are willing to help us."

He says this included providing information on anyone giving cause for suspicion: "If they feel there is something wrong in the community, if you engage with the community, you hear things. You will, absolutely."

"If somebody converts to Islam and people think there's something wrong, you hear bits and pieces, if their actions and beliefs are strange, and they are concerned. The Muslim community is very concerned about who is coming to the mosque. It is something that will come to our attention if they feel it is of concern."

He says that, for example, the mosque in Clonskeagh (Islamic Cultural Centre) and the Shia mosque (also in Dublin) "always assist us in relation to any crisis within the community".

Sgt McNerney is keen to correct the bad press the Muslim community often receives.

"Unfortunately, it's the negativity people want to hear about," he says, adding that there seemed to be a fear of the Muslim community in broader society.

"The Muslim community have been here since the 1950s. I cannot remember any serious incident with the Muslim community here regarding the State. They are a very easy community to police, very respectful. They believe in a peaceful way of living."

"It's unfortunate they have these extremists within their community, but the Muslims we engage with want the good name of the community upheld and are happy to work with the police."

He says it required "sustained engagement" and was something Gardaí "must constantly work on".

A related area Sgt McNerney is concerned about is Islamophobia and the emergence of anti-Islamic group Pegida, albeit small in number, in Ireland.

"Those groups [Pegida] we would worry about," he says. "It's tough enough for the Muslim community when there are terrorist attacks."

"Our concern is that there would be Islamophobia. But, so far, so good, there hasn't been a major rise."

He says Ms O'Sullivan has begun bringing all the ethnic liaison officers to Templemore College for a briefing from senior management.

"There is more of a mandate now to go out and meet the minorities. There is more of a focus now on



the vulnerabilities of minorities, especially the vulnerabilities of the Muslim community, because of what's happening throughout Europe.”

### Lessons from the rest of Europe

The importance of the relationship with the Muslim community, the issue of radicalisation, and Ireland's preparedness for an attack are some of the lessons from Europe that both Sgt McNerney and Ms O'Mahoney are mindful of. One of the commonalities of the lessons from Britain, France, and Belgium is the tenuous, indeed fractured, relationship between wider society and the parts of the Muslim population. Experts have referred to push and pull factors for many young recruits, some of them on the fringes of criminality.

In Britain, a key part of their 'Prevent' security strategy, in the words of London Met counter-terrorism boss Richard Walton, is to “prevent radicalisation from germinating” and identify those “on the cusp of extremism”.

Mr O'Mahoney said he is aware of the Prevent strategy: “I have been briefed on the Prevent strategy. I was over there only last month.”

Asked should we have a similar overall strategy, he replies: “We are in a much different situation. First of all the population [here] is considerably smaller and secondly, we have an ‘in’ with the community, which the UK didn't always have. They are trying to get into the community and are catching up.”

But some senior Islamic leaders in Ireland, including Shaykh Umar Al-Qadri of the Sunni Blanchardstown mosque in Dublin, Shia imam Shaykh Ali al-Saleh of Dublin's Milltown mosque, and Ahmadiya Muslim Association or Ireland imam Ibrahim Noonan, based in Galway, have all repeatedly raised concerns at the threat, although small now, posed by extremism and radicalisation.

They have also highlighted and criticised the silence, as they see it, of many of the largest mosques in not accepting there is a threat from radicalisation and actively trying to tackle it.

There have been concerns expressed at the lack of regulation within the Islamic community of weekend Koran and Arabic schools as well as prayer rooms.

All these issues played a part in Shaykh Al-Qadri resigning earlier this year from the Council of Imams, traditionally dominated by

the Clonskeagh mosque and, to a lesser extent, the South Circular Rd mosque.

The differences, indeed divisions, within the community has become more visible in the last year and has even spilled onto national radio.

Shaykh Al-Qadri has called on the Government to become involved in encouraging a more representative Islamic council.

The three clerics have highlighted that there is a small number of Irish Muslims sympathetic, and even supportive, of IS — visible on Facebook and Twitter.

Some of the imams, including Shaykh Al-Qadri, have received abuse and threats on social media.

Ms O'Mahoney is reluctant to comment in detail on these concerns or the alleged silence of the mainstream mosques.

“In any community there's different views and the Muslim community is no different,” he says.

“Our job is to deal with all of those communities in the same way and we make up our own minds. I am not getting into the differences, [but] I am aware of tensions.”

Sgt McNerney says he is also aware of these issues: “You talk to people all the time and if they are not happy they will talk about the politics.” He said he was also aware of a related issue raised by the imams mentioned — about foreign speakers invited to talk to Muslim student organisations here and who some describe as radical.

“We were aware of that, but it's a hard one to control. It is a reality. Some might have a hard view, a rigid view, an old-fashioned way, but it's a hard one to gauge. If we hadn't got that relationship with the community we wouldn't have known.”

An international cleric from South Africa spoke in Trinity College earlier this month and said there were linkages between radical speakers, extremism, and violence.

“You can't say you don't want the violence, but not do anything about extremism,” said Shaykh Owaisi al-Madani.

Shaykh Al-Qadri, who is also chairman of the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council, drafted an Anti-Extremism Declaration which he wants all foreign speakers to sign up — and wants it incorporated into Department of Justice visas.

Sgt McNerney says he has heard of concerns that many Muslim student organisations were a bit



old-fashioned and that a “certain message is being delivered that maybe wouldn’t conform with modern thinking”.

He accepts it is a “huge issue” in Britain, but says it wasn’t an area gardaí were involved in as such, unless the security of the sState was at issue. “I wouldn’t say we have a structured relation with the students’ groups, but that may change.”



### **GARDA structures**

Speaking of structures: What is the state of the Garda structures and our preparedness for Paris or Brussels-style attacks?

Last week, the AGSI said their members had not received information, briefing, or training related to the threat from terrorism or how to respond to an attack.

One unnamed delegate even claimed gardaí would run around “like headless chickens” if there was an attack.

Mr O’Mahoney declines to comment on the unattributed comment but said he recognised the entitlement of the association to raise issues.

“We have been training and have been doing so for years, in physical exercises and table-top exercises.”

He said there were multiagency exercises, involving the Army (including the elite Ranger wing), the ambulance service, and fire brigade service. Asked what the exercises were preparing for, he says: “In response to attacks — how we deal with attacks in the nature of what we’ve seen in Paris and Brussels”.

He says “operational commanders” had been trained to respond to such attacks and that chief superintendents had been trained as “strategic commanders”.

He says they had received briefings “both at an operational level and a strategic level” from the French and, very soon, from the Belgian authorities into the IS attacks on their soil. The briefings have taken place both here and abroad.

“The information we receive from the briefings from those countries are done in the spirit of ‘look, this is what we need to be doing in the future’. Out of those briefings there are learnings and that’s put into our plans and also from a training perspective.”

He says the Paris and Brussels attacks involved a “quickly evolving marauding terrorist-type attack” not usually seen in Europe before.

AC O’Mahoney says the suicidal nature of such attacks “inherently poses a risk to the community” as well as first responders from the gardaí.

He says they were examining the use of the armed regional support units (RSU) as part of the response to terror incidents.

“We are looking at the way we are using RSUs into the future... to have an armed response that is capable of responding to threats at any given time, whether its organised crime or dissident republicanism or international terrorism.”

The new RSU for Dublin, due to become operational in the autumn, will have the airport as part of its responsibility.

AC O’Mahoney says the Garda security services had “more experience than anyone else from a European perspective” in dealing with domestic terrorism and that this know-how carried over to dealing with Islamic extremism. In relation to structures, Counter-Terrorism International (CTI), a dedicated section within the Special Detective Unit, is the operational arm.

It was renamed two years ago and is tasked with monitoring and investigating international terrorists, including IS recruiters, returned fighters, and active supporters.

Its size is kept a secret — something that Mr O’Mahoney refuses to throw any light on. Garda sources have previously given various estimates as to its strength, but the balance of sources suggest a staffing of around 20 members.

Sitting above CTI is the Security and Intelligence (S&I) section at Garda Headquarters, headed by Detective Chief Superintendent Peter Kirwan, who sat in on our interview. S&I has separate units for domestic and international terrorism. It gathers and analyses intelligence supplied by all gardaí and intelligence officers, as well as informants in the Covert Human Intelligence Source, which has a specific CTI section.

S&I also directs any surveillance or interception of communications of CTI suspects. The numbers targeted are thought to be very small. S&I also directs the





National Surveillance Unit and liaises with foreign intelligence and police services.

AC O'Mahoney reveals that two co-ordinating groups were set up in the force regarding international terrorism.

"There has to be a wider approach in how we do our business, we're all working together in the organisation, he says.

"We have a co-ordination group, at operational level and at strategic level."

He says the strategic group, which he chairs, include officers from Garda National Immigration Bureau, Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation (which investigate terrorist financing), Criminal Assets Bureau (as necessary) and Crime and Security.

The operational group, which Chief Kirwan chairs, includes members from S&I, CTI, SDU and local units from the six regions.

### Gaps

The Irish Examiner has previously reported gaps in the security services, including what is believed to be a lack of officers competent in Arabic as well as the absence of a unit to track IS supporters and militants online.

"I have heard all the doubts cast in relation to our linguistic skills," says Mr O'Mahoney. "From an operational reason, I am very, very happy that we have adequate skills to deal with the situation."

Repeatedly asked could he not say he has people with Arabic skills, he refuses to confirm or deny, other than to repeat he has adequate skills. Separate sources have suggested the gardaí have available experts from outside security services or from Interpol.

The lack of expertise or a dedicated unit to identify Irish IS activists and sympathisers and foreign fighters online is considered by some experts to be a particular failing in our structures.

Mr O'Mahoney says: "We have work done in that area. We do it ourselves. We leverage very much on Europol as do other European countries in relation to open source information."

Europol has a dedicated Internet Referral Unit tasked with combating terrorist propaganda and violent extremist activities online. Gardaí have a liaison officer in the EU police agency.

Asked about reports that the gardaí were exploring adopting specific software the PSNI has developed to analyse social media, Mr O'Mahoney declines to comment.

But he does say that the gardaí were looking to expand the CTI unit.

"Absolutely: Numbers, expertise. These are issues. This is an issue, it's a new issue to us. We have responded to it, but we're looking at what is happening, the landscape that is out there. Obviously, we have to look at further expanding on what we have currently."

He says there were many different areas and that "investigative skills was certainly one".

There have been some suggestions that the Garda Síochána should adopt the model used in the Criminal Assets Bureau and hire professional civilians for particularly expertise.

In CAB, forensic accountants have been taken on. In the Garda security services they could hire in specialists in Arabic, digital forensics and social media analysts and other IT experts. While these are gaps, a benefit seen by many is that the Garda Síochána is both the police and security service. There have been criticisms of the models in France and Belgium, which are hampered not only by separate police and security agencies but little fiefdoms within the police service, between frontline and elite units.

"It [our unitary model] cuts out the bureaucracy, first of all, everybody talks to everybody," says AC O'Mahoney. "I also see the garda on the beat as part of the security service."

It is a point that dovetails with the importance that Sgt McNerney places on community policing in the overall strategy.

"People don't realise how important community policing is," he says. "If you have proper community policing throughout the world, if marginalised people felt they could trust the police, you wouldn't have a lot of these issues. You wouldn't have extremism or radicals, because people would see police as fair, the State as fair.

"There is something going right here [in Ireland]. But it's something you must constantly work on. You have to engage all the time."





## Isil 'CVs' reveal British electronic engineer, Norwegian pilot and Turkish Nato officer

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/28/isil-cvs-reveal-british-electrical-engineer-norwegian-pilot-and/>

Apr 28 – From an experienced electronic engineer at a British company to a Turkish Nato officer and a Norwegian helicopter pilot, leaked “CVs” of some of Isil's most elite fighters reveal just how experienced the group's foreign command are.

The files contain the names of [368 Islamic State fighters](#) enrolled at a training camp for

in Canada said he had a degree in electro-mechanical engineering and had trained as an airplane mechanic for 11 months.

**A Norwegian calling himself Abu Amir al-Russi wrote that he was a competent helicopter pilot, and under language skills put English, Russian, Norwegian and “some Arabic”.**



Abu Huthaf al-Azari served in the Saudi army for 10 years, while Chechen fighter Saleemeh al-Chechani gained military experience in Russia's naval artillery force, where he served for two years.

**One of the most alarming is a Turkish jihadist using only the name Abu Bakr who had gained his fighting experience by “serving in the ranks of Nato as an officer for 18 months”.**

More than 30 per cent of the jihadists listed in the documents had military knowledge which most of them gained by

senior leaders near Raqqa in Syria.

**The documents entitled “Camp Database” and dated June 2014** - around the time Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq - reveal an extraordinarily organised group from the moment of its inception.

They show how rather than being a ragtag army like many of its rival opposition groups, Isil had a large number of educated, highly skilled and militarily competent jihadists, which they trained together in an attempt to combine their expertise.

**A 62-year-old British jihadist using the assumed name Abu Ismail al-Indonesi said he worked as an electronic engineer in a “leading” British company where one of his tasks was monitoring communications.**

According to the files, [which were leaked along with thousands of others to the Syrian opposition newspaper Zaman al-Wasl](#), dissatisfied with his life in the UK he left to join Isil in early 2014.

**Also selected for training at the camp was Abu Musa al-Kanadi, a Canadian, who had been working as a chemical engineer in the city of Toronto.** Another who had been living

serving in their countries' armies, including Russia, Turkey, China, Algeria and Saudi Arabia.

Some showed off their sporting prowess, including the German who said he was a professional kickboxer and a fighter from the Tatarstan republic in Russia who said he holds the title of karate champion.

It is estimated that nearly 30,000 foreigners have travelled to the region since fighting broke out in Syria in 2011 - more than the total who travelled to Afghanistan during its 10-year war.

While the most senior positions within Isil are usually held Syrians and Iraqis, trusted foreign fighters with expertise move up the ranks.

For example, British jihadist Mohammed Emwazi or “Jihadi John”, who studied computer programming at Westminster University, became the group's posterboy and appeared in many of their propaganda videos.

The files reveal that roughly a third finished sixth form and a quarter had a university education - a level of education higher than the average for many of the countries the men came from.



Brian Dodwell, deputy director of the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, said: "Those who listed their educations had

Ph.D.s, master's degrees, MBAs. "They are perhaps more educated than we would expect and come from all walks of life."

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** This article is dedicated to all those that still believe that terrorist are poor ignorant fanatics. It also brought into my memory an anecdote from the past: A Greek military officer was participating in a NATO working group. During one of the meetings he was surprised by recognizing a colleague from a neighboring country sitting opposite to him as the "known beggar" sitting for a long time outside his own camp back home begging for some money to survive!

## How the ISIS operates in Singapore

Source: <http://www.oneindia.com/india/how-the-isis-operates-singapore-2088761.html>

May 04 – The arrest of 13 Bangladeshis in Singapore for their alleged ISIS connections is a grim reminder that the outfit continues to use this country as a happy hunting ground. Singapore has been a favoured route for many operatives wanting to join the ISIS and India too saw one of its citizens vanish from the radar after he made his way to the ISIS through Singapore. According to the ongoing investigations, these men had crossed over into Singapore from Bangladesh



and were attempting to join the ISIS in either Iraq or Syria.

When they realised that it would be difficult they decided to stay back and build a group. The ultimate goal was to create a strong module that would overthrow the existing regime in Bangladesh.

### Singapore a transit point

For most of the ISIS recruits Singapore has been a preferred transit point. One may recall the journey of Haja Fakkruddin from Parangipettai in Tamil Nadu to Singapore. Once he was radicalised, Haja decided to join the ISIS.

He is said to have first applied for a work permit in Singapore.

He stayed in Singapore for a couple of months before making his way to Syria along with his family members, investigations in India show. The man in Singapore who was handling most of these cases goes by the name Gul Mohammad.

For several months he had been the ISIS' official handler in Singapore and would make arrangement for recruits from India and Bangladesh. Mohammad was however deported to India.





During his questioning he explained in length the modus operandi. He said that the operatives would be brought to Singapore on a work permit.

They would stay there for four months before being sent to Iraq or Syria depending on the requirements of the outfit. He also said that Singapore was a safe bet for them when compared to trying to fly in Syria or Iraq through other countries.

## New START model forecasts the flow of foreign fighters

Source: <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/new-start-model-forecasts-flow-foreign-fighters>



May 04 – A new report from START assesses the possible transportation corridors used by foreign fighters when travelling to and from territories controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The model presented by START's GIS researchers forecasts large flows of persons/materials and shows how potential deterrence/mitigation activities can impact those flows.

Though most open-source reporting focuses on refugee flows from Greece to Macedonia, Serbia and then further into the European Union, the new START model identified chokepoints in places both expected (Limassol, Cyprus; various Grecian Islands) and unexpected (Igoumenitsa, Greece; Odessa, Ukraine).

The START model can be used to inform decision makers, allowing them to test outcomes of potential policy decisions or forecast how closing

chokepoints could alter current pathways. This methodology can assist in a cost/benefit analysis necessary to manage assets to thwart returning ISIL operatives.

► To read the full report, [click here](#).

## Mass Violence and Extremism

### Information for Educators and School Administrators

Source: <http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/ADL-START-Mass-Violence-and-Extremism-Backgrounder-for-Educators-and-School-Administrators.pdf>

Fears of extremism, radicalization and mass violence in our schools have unfortunately become all too common for educators and school administrators across the United States.

Mass violence, defined as an attempt to kill multiple individuals, may or may not stem from extremism. It can stem from a multitude of reasons including but not limited to: domestic terrorism, availability of guns, romanticizing violence, and/or multiple risk factors operating simultaneously (e.g. depression, narcissism, alienation, lack of trust, poor coping skills, fascination with violence-filled entertainment, revenge fantasies, past suicide attempts etc.). Extremism is defined as a political, social or religious ideology and aspiration that rejects the status quo and also rejects the legitimacy of alternate ideas or the expression of freedom of choice. Radicalization is the process of adopting extremist ideas and aspirations.

Statistically, schools and students are at greater risk of incidents of mass violence than of the radicalization of students or acts of terrorism – violent acts intended to promote extremist ideology. However, several studies have identified strong parallels between mass violence and terrorism, including school rampage shootings and cases of lone-actor



terrorism. These parallels include similar underlying causes and similar observable warning signs. As a result, experts are suggesting that if the challenges are similar, then the solutions to prevent them might also be similar.

This backgrounder delves into some of the causes and observable signs of student violence and extremism and provides a set of steps for schools to take that may aid in discouraging attacks.

By combining mass violence and violent extremism into one document, the backgrounder strives to provide comprehensive information that is relevant as well as appropriate for all school districts.


► Read the full paper at source's URL.

## Overview: Profiles of individual radicalization in the United States-Foreign Fighters (PIRUS-FF)

Source: [https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START\\_PIRUS-FF\\_InfographicSeries\\_April2016.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS-FF_InfographicSeries_April2016.pdf)

### Foreign militant groups in PIRUS-FF

The PIRUS-FF data show that U.S. foreign fighters have been associated with 33 foreign militant groups across 14 unique conflicts since 1980. In just a few short years, individuals traveling to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have outpaced those that have sought to join both al-Qaeda core and al-Shabaab. ISIL affiliated individuals make up 23% of the database, compared to 17% for al-Qaeda core and 14% for al-Shabaab. A significant number of U.S.-based individuals have also sought to join the Taliban in Afghanistan, typically out of a desire to engage in combat against U.S. forces. Despite the group's involvement in several high-profile attempts to launch attacks in the United States, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has drawn relatively fewer fighters from U.S. soil, ranking behind both Jabhat al-Nusra and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).



► Read the overview at source's URL.

## Security Concerns Surround Summer 2016 Rio Olympics

By Amanda Vicinanza (Online Managing Editor)

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/security-concerns-surround-summer-2016-rio-olympics/0e26b7d55cedfe76666fce9ecaec1e1.html>



May 02 – This summer, the largest sporting event in the world—the Olympics—will be coming to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Just last week, iconic buildings around the world were illuminated with the colors of the Brazilian flag in anticipation of the first Olympic Games in South America.

But with political scandal, the Zika Virus, water quality issues, and a crippling recession looming over the country, security professionals are growing increasingly concerned over the potential security risks to the athletes and crowds gearing up for the games.

In addition to political chaos and economic turmoil, Brazil must also grapple with the possibility of a terrorist attack on the games. In November, shortly following the attacks in

Paris, a suspected Islamic State member posted a threat against Brazil on Twitter.

"Brazil, you are our next target," the tweet said. However, preparations for the event are well underway, and progress has been promising. The Rio Olympics will feature 85,000 security officials — twice as many as the 2012 London Games—to protect the anticipated 800,000 tourists and 15,000 athletes traveling to Brazil for the games. Nearly all the stadiums and sports centers where athletes will compete are now complete.

Brazilian authorities are confident the games will go off without a hitch. Speaking to journalists in Rio on April 27th, 100 days before the opening ceremony, Mayor



Eduardo Paes said, “I am enormously proud that we have arrived at the 100-day mark with nearly everything ready. Many people were skeptical but we have demonstrated our abilities. We have delivered on time and on budget.”

Joseph Ryan, professor and chair of the Department of Criminal Justice and Security at Pace University, told *Homeland Security Today* that in the current threat environment, dangerous security incidents are no longer a matter of “if” but of “when.” However, he is optimistic that the games will be safe.

“You can always expect something is going to happen,” said Ryan. “Security teams must be absolutely vigilant.”

Prof. Ryan chaired an Advisory Group for the US Department of Justice that developed security strategies for the 1996 summer Olympics. He is also a 25-year veteran of the New York City Police Department and was their expert on evaluations of all levels of police management, and on community policing and violence.

“Right now, there are no red flags,” said Ryan. “If we go back to Egypt to the Arab Spring Uprising, if something like that were to happen in Brazil—which I am more than confident will not—that would be a major red flag.”

Ryan added, “I am presuming that from all the lessons learned from previous games, particularly the Munich games where we lost so many lives, Brazil is really going to crack down and make sure the security of the athletes is the number one priority. There is no reason that I am currently aware of to suspect any concerns regarding security.”

Based on his experience, Ryan said security personnel will likely be on the lookout for several indicators leading up to the Olympic Games, including chatter and unusual activity at sports facilities prior to the games. Security personnel should not wait for day one of the games to begin securing these facilities---vigilance is needed now to ensure nothing

dangerous is entering two or three months beforehand.

Moreover, during the games, screening checkpoints play a vital role in securing these facilities, but technology has its limitations. Ryan explained, “We have not reached the end of innovation on behalf of terrorists to get something inside. You could carry one piece and I could carry another piece, and 10 to 15 other people could be carrying the other pieces, which could eventually become an explosive device.”

Security teams should also go in expecting the worse to happen in order to minimize damage and keep casualties limited in case an attack does occur. In the event of an attack, crowd control is essential to prevent mass chaos.


“When you bring security personnel into the event, they are not coming to watch the games, they are coming to watch the crowds,” said Ryan. “Their backs should not be to the crowds, they should be facing the crowds.”

If political instability in the region were to spiral out of control, signs of an Arab Spring-type event could include massive demonstrations in the street. The size of the demonstration and demeanor of the crowd signify when a demonstration has gone beyond normal parameters. Additionally, police will often be standing by instead of controlling the crowds, indicating they are siding with the demonstrators.

However, Ryan believes this situation is unlikely at this time and there is currently no evidence that the impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who is accused of violating fiscal laws, will plunge the country into utter chaos.

“Brazil is a relatively stable democracy,” said Ryan. “I haven’t seen any outward sign of an uprising like in Egypt. We have to be optimistic that Brazilians are cognizant. They fought to get the games, and they do not want to ruin their image.”

**EDITOR’S COMMENT:** It is strange that just a few days before the 2016 Olympic Games, there are so many articles addressing security issues. It is also odd that most of them, after analyzing a lot of scary possibilities, end up with the same conclusion: it is possible but nothing will happen! Perhaps this is what we call politics or diplomacy... Perhaps all these people belong to the same group that nominated Brazil for the Games the moment they knew about the burdens and threats that could ruin this mega event in case they materialized into reality. The famous Brazilian football player Ronaldinho was the only stating that “Do not come to Brazil; it is dangerous!”





## Clinton and Trump: Where Do They Stand on Islamism?

By Ryan Mauro

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/clinton-and-trump-where-do-they-stand-islamism#>



May 05 – Donald Trump is the all-but-declared Republican presidential nominee and Hillary Clinton on the cusp of winning the Democratic nomination. It is time for voters to begin weighing the national security consequences of each candidate's potential administration.

You can read our full profiles of the candidates' positions related to Islamist

extremism by clicking [here](#) for Donald Trump and [here](#) for Hillary Clinton. **Below is a summary of six policy areas where they differ:**

# 1

### Defining the Threat

Trump defines the enemy as "radical Islam." Clinton defines it variably as "jihadism," "radical Jihadism" "Islamists who are jihadists."

# 2

### Defeating the Ideology

Trump said in his [foreign policy speech](#) that "containing the spread of radical Islam must be a major foreign policy goal of the United States." His policy proposals include a vague commitment to use the U.S. military more aggressively, deterring terrorists by killing their families, closing down the most radical mosques and banning Muslim immigration into the U.S. until the homeland is secure and an effective vetting process is established.

Trump is adamantly opposed to democracy-promotion and overthrowing regimes; instead, he favors alliances with authoritarian rulers who cooperate on counter-terrorism. He says, "our goal must be to defeat terrorists and promote stability, not radical change."

He criticizes Clinton for supporting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Bashar Assad in Syria. However, a reputable senior foreign policy adviser to Trump, Dr. Walid Phares, is an [expert on combating the Islamist ideology](#) and believes in promoting human rights and civil society.

Clinton's national security [platform](#) calls for "defeating ISIS and global terrorism and the ideologies that drive it." Her strategy emphasizes civil society and a foreign policy that promotes freedom, women's rights, free markets, democracy and human rights, all of which she believes are necessary in order to "empower moderates and marginalize extremists."

Clinton says the U.S. needs an "overarching strategy" to defeat the ideology like the U.S. used to win the Cold War. Clinton wants the State Department to better "tell our story" overseas by confronting anti-American propaganda via public engagement.

Clinton's [speech on foreign policy and ISIS](#) also includes confronting state sponsors of extremism like Qatar and Saudi Arabia and identifying "the specific neighborhoods and villages, the prisons and schools, where recruitment happens in clusters, like the neighborhood in Brussels where the Paris attacks were planned."

# 3

### ISIS, Iraq and Syria

Trump says he will appoint effective generals who will quickly crush the Islamic State. He believes the U.S. has "no choice" but to send 20-30,000 troops to fight the Islamic State. He

would also attack the families of Islamic State members, bomb oil sites held by the Islamic State and then seize them for U.S. companies to rebuild and own.



He would not support Syrian rebels against the Iran-backed Assad regime; Trump supported Russia's military intervention in Syria to save the dictatorship. Trump believes he can be a [partner with Russian President Putin](#). He says he would establish safe-zones in Syria to stop the flow of refugees, but neighboring Arab countries like Saudi Arabia would have to pay for it.

Clinton's [speech on ISIS](#) emphasized her opposition to a large ground campaign by U.S. forces, but she does support President Obama's deployment of about 5,000 troops to Iraq with a limited role. She disagreed with President Obama when she urged U.S. support for Syrian rebels at the beginning of the civil war in order to prevent Islamist extremists from gaining ground.

Clinton also supported using the U.S. Air Force to implement a no-fly zone in Syria and to create safe zones for refugees. Clinton remains committed to ending the civil war in Syria by forcing Assad to resign from power as part of a political transition.

In Iraq, she favors direct U.S. military assistance to Sunni tribes and Kurdish forces fighting ISIS and expanding the U.S. forces' role to include embedding personnel in local Iraqi units and assisting with airstrikes.

## 4

### Iran

Trump would terminate the nuclear deal with Iran immediately and pledged to "dismantle" Iran's global terrorism network in his [speech about Israel and the Middle East](#). He supports placing severe sanctions on Iran to pressure them into a deal that dismantles their nuclear program and ends their support for terrorism.

Clinton supports the nuclear deal with reservations. She has released a [5-point plan](#) to respond to the deal's negative consequences, Iran's sponsorship of terrorism and human rights abuses of the Iranian regime. She supports expanding sanctions on Iran for these actions.

Neither candidate has explicitly endorsed overthrowing the Iranian regime, but Clinton [took a step in that direction in 2010](#) when she said she hopes there will be "some effort inside Iran, by responsible civil and religious leaders, to take hold of the apparatus of the state." She regrets that she and the Obama Administration did not more forcefully support the 2009 Green Revolution and promises "that won't happen again."

## 5

### Muslim Brotherhood

Neither candidate has endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act and concerns have been raised about both candidates' advisers.

One of Clinton's closest aides, Huma Abedin, was the [assistant-editor of an Islamist journal](#) with her family members, some of whom have Muslim Brotherhood links. She has not directly said anything extremist and is married to a pro-Israel Jew. Critics point out that although she has a security clearance, her familial ties may influence her advice to Clinton.

In her book, Clinton seems to understand that the Brotherhood is hostile to the U.S., deceptive and closely linked to Hamas. However, she seems to accept Islamist political parties like the Brotherhood as potential democratic partners. Her State Dept. operation in Egypt [gave election training](#) to Brotherhood members and a Clinton Foundation member [belonged to the Brotherhood](#).

One of Trump's top campaign aides, Paul Manafort, was a [lobbyist](#) for Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and a lobbyist for a [Pakistani ISI intelligence front](#) in the U.S. that was [also closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood](#).

Trump has never said anything kind about the Muslim Brotherhood and wanted the U.S. to help keep Egyptian President Mubarak in power.

*Ryan Mauro is ClarionProject.org's national security analyst, a fellow with Clarion Project and an adjunct professor of homeland security.*

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** What a dilemma will Americans face: Trump or Clinton! Something like having to choose between Scylla and Charybdis! It is amazing that out of 322,762,018 people in the country they came up to have to choose these two...



## Intelligence Official: Islamic State Growing in Somalia

Source: <http://www.voanews.com/content/intelligence-official-islamic-state-growing-in-somalia/3316326.html>

May 05 – **Pro-Islamic State Somali militants have grown in numbers and are receiving financial and military support from Yemen**, a top intelligence official told the VOA Somali Service.

Abdi Hassan Hussein, the former Director of the U.S.-backed Puntland Intelligence Agency (PIA) said when the pro-IS Somali faction was founded in October last year it had about 20-30 men, but has since set up training camps and recruited more fighters. He said the group's fighters now number between **100-150 fighters**. "They have graduated their first units and they have received their military supplies," he said.

Hussein led PIA until a year ago when he was replaced. His main job was to detect militant threats and plan counter-terrorism operations.

He said Islamic State has welcomed its Somalia branch and has started delivering supplies through their affiliate faction in Yemen.

"They received military supplies from Yemen – weapons, uniform, ISIS sent trainers who inspected their bases, and they have started sending financial support," he said. "The weapons' shipment was delivered by sea from Mukallah city in Hadramouth, it has arrived from the Red Sea coast of Somalia in February and March this year."



Hussein pointed to a recent video posted by the group that he said shows the group received new uniforms. He said there is also evidence that the group has received financial support from Islamic State. "Evidence of financial support can be seen in the area; they are buying supplies, they are buying vehicles, they bought livestock, they invested in the community by delivering water supplies to nearby community affected by the drought," he said.

Hussein said reports he has received indicate administrations in Somalia have underestimated the threat of the pro-IS group led by former al-Shabab cleric Abdulkadir Mumin. He criticized the Somali government and regional administrations for not taking the threat seriously. He said Islamic State will pose tougher challenge than al-Shabab. "Daesh is more dangerous than al-Shabab. They are known for committing large scale destruction. They have more finance. They have more impact. They declared to start attacks within Somalia, and they readied units to carry out attacks."

He said the faction now has a base in Al Bari Mountains in Puntland, where it gives training and has erected a flag used by Islamic State militants. He said the base also provides logistics, and has cemented connections with Yemen.

He said opportunity was missed to neutralize the group at early stage. "It would have been better to destroy them when they were 20 or 30 men, before they adapted to the





environment; but now the terrorists got used to the climate, they secured access to water wells, routes, and hiding places,” he said. “Now to defeat them would require the same resources and effort that was placed against al-Shabab.”

The Somali military this week said they destroyed a training camp by pro-IS Somali and foreign militants in Jannaale town area, about 120 kilometers south of the Somali capital, Mogadishu. It followed after Islamic State for the first time claimed credit for an attack against African Union forces just outside Mogadishu last month.

Hussein said the government and African Union troops can't win against al-Shabab or IS factions militarily, and urged them to confront the groups ideologically. “The youth they are sending are assets, but misguided; they need to be saved from harming the people and harming themselves,” he said.

“They need to be confronted ideologically, they need to be shown different ideology, given an opportunity to leave the group, given protection against prosecution from the government and retaliatory attacks from Al-Shabab if they decide to leave group. We need to create opportunities for the youth,” Hussein said.

## Only Sufism can defeat Islamic terrorism

By Jyotika Teckchandani

Source: <http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/only-sufism-can-defeat-islamic-terrorism.html>

May 07 – At a time when the world is trying to grapple with the unprecedented scale of terror activities, the growing trend of various terror outfits seeking affiliation to the brute Islamic State (ISIS) is baffling as it is not the deadliest jihadi organisation in the world. As per the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, ISIS killed 6,073 people in 2014, while Nigerian group Boko Haram has 6,644 deaths to its credit. Even al-Qaeda, which ruled the terror world for over two decades, has faded in front of the growing craze among the radical Islamists for ISIS.

What has caused this sustained interest in ISIS?

All Islamic terrorist groups' claimed goal is to wage jihad to re-establish puritanical Islamic society. Till the birth of ISIS, al-Qaeda hogged all the terror limelight, especially for the 9/11 misadventure. Despite massive American backlash, al-Qaeda maintained its position as number one Islamic terrorist organisation, but it lost the crown to ISIS after the brute force captured part of Iraq and Syria and grabbed the headlines. Moreover, ISIS' unique techniques like declaring Caliphate and maintaining uninterrupted supply of enemy girls and women as sex slaves to keep its mercenaries entertained worked wonders.

Moreover, when fundamentalists are fighting to establish an utopian Wahabi Islamic state which is purged of heretics like Shias, Yazidi, Jews, Christians and all other kafirs, al-Qaeda's loss of popularity among the Islamists was also due to the dilution of its principles. For

example, after the seizure of the Yemeni port city of Mukalla in April 2015, al-Qaeda commanders didn't hesitate to ink a pact with local tribal leaders to allow music at parties or men wearing shorts — both considered un-Islamic by the radicals.

The growth of ISIS in West Asia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Shabab in Kenya continues to testify resilience, sustenance and appeal of extremist Islamist ideology, notwithstanding the powerful, relentless international and Islamic condemnations against the same.

A part of the explanation to this trend lies in the covert and overt support of State actors to such non-state actors in order to protect, advance and defend one's own narrowly defined “national interest”. The “internationalisation of Islamic terrorism” in Afghanistan was partly due to the support extended by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. If the US facilitated the grouping of international mujahedeen in Afghanistan primarily to check the erstwhile Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf, the Saudis' support to Sunni-Pastun Taliban was meant to check the influence of Shia Iran through Shia-Hazara Afghani militants in Afghanistan. Whereas Pakistan saw in Afghanistan crisis a golden opportunity to mobilise resources — money and arms (primarily through US-Saudi nexus) — to advance its nuclear programme, to settle the border with Afghanistan, and finally to use Taliban terrorists as foot



soldiers to fight in Kashmir and conduct other terrorist operations within India.

ISIS is the product of inter-State West Asian politics as it stems from the failure of Arab Spring to institute a democratic transformation in the region. However, ISIS thrived on account of support extended by the nexus of the US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The US indirectly supported ISIS by ignoring its activities in order to grind its own axe — to check the growing Iranian influence in the region following the US invasion of Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Qatar connived with ISIS for “Sunni mobilisation” against Shia Iraq and its protégé Syria. Turkey trusted ISIS as “resistance forces” to the Bathist regime in Syria, as well as to nip in the bud the bid to establish Kurdish state on Syrian-Turkish border.

As long as ISIS confined its activities to political capture of Iraq and Syria, it was tolerated and supported by the West and Sunni Gulf monarchies as it suited their national and regional agenda. However, **with its malignant growth, claiming caliphate, ISIS posed the existential threat to conservative Islamic Gulf monarchies and to the interest of the West in the region.** Therefore, ISIS became a pariah. Similar was the case with Muslim Brotherhood. Saudis and other Gulf countries nurtured the organisation and provided safe haven in their countries to the persecuted members of Muslim Brotherhood to undermine the Nasserite regime in Egypt and to destabilise post-Nasserite regimes. **However, when Muslim Brothers democratically occupied the Egyptian State they turned a threat to be eliminated. The West, Saudis and other Gulf monarchies provided all supports to the Al-Sisi regime to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt. The same happened to FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria during 1990-1991.**

Such political use of non-State actors by the State and regimes has not been without consequences. It often proved counterproductive to their interests, and even posed the existential threat to the regimes. Al-Qaeda nurtured by the US in Afghanistan extracted the superpower's blood in the form of 9/11 and put the lives of Americans at risk globally. Similarly Pakistani's support to Taliban boomeranged as it has recorded a spurt in terror activities in that country. Turkey

too has begun to feel the heat of ISIS backlash following blasts in Ankara, and Istanbul.

However, beyond the political use of Islamic terrorist groups by States, the historical roots of this menace lies in development of Wahhabism. The modern colonial context unleashed the process of redefining Islam as an ideology at least since 18th century. Almost all post-Wahhabi Islamic movements in the Muslim world have operated within the discursive field of Wahhabi Salafism and shared in varying degree the Wahhabi vision of Salafism and its political imagination of sharing the State power. The process gradually gave birth to the idea of an “Islamic state”, an idea that was intensified more against the backdrop of the abolition of caliphate by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. Though the idea remained incoherent, it continues to express aspirations of a section of Muslim community domestically and internationally — both peacefully and violently. One consequence of this process is the emergence of Islamic terrorist organisations, which are not only influenced by the resistance discourse of pan-Islamism. The terrorist outfits try to fit themselves into Wahhabi orientation that is distinctively sectarian, supremacist, thoroughly opportunistic in nature and places no consideration of universal moral values to their “Islamic” mission.

The political Islam of any variety, whether Wahhabi or AKP type, cannot be an effective counter discourse to Islamic militant or terrorist organisations such as ISIS or al-Qaeda. Founded on the notion of “other” and being inherently “immoral” both on account of its ideological construction and non-acceptance of “modernist politics”, the creed of political Islam lacks sufficient moral and ethical resources to wipe out the influence of Islamic terrorism.

The only recourse to such political contingency lies in the resurrection of universal moral and ethical vision of Islam in the public life of the nation and community. In this regard the support extended by the Modi Government to four day-long World Sufi Forum, which was organised by the All-India Ulama and Mashaikh Board (AIUMB), the apex body of dargahs, tombs of Sufi saints, in March 2017, is an important step.

Though some fundamentalist Muslim scholars and leaders see in Modi's policy an attempt to divide the Muslim community and



to weaken it further, others find this Sufi initiative as an expression of internal power struggle within Islamic religious groups. It cannot be denied that Sufi's culture and

ideology represents Islamic syncretic tradition that alone would resist the forces of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

*Jyotika Teckchandani is a visiting faculty member, Amity University, Noida.*

## Is ISIS Building A Navy?

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2016/05/is-isis-building-a-navy/>

May 06 – After establishing a reign of terror on lands in the Middle East and certain regions in Northern Africa, ISIS wants to extend its grip to international waters, especially after it has expanded its influence in the Mediterranean region: The Islamist terror organization is now reportedly planning to build its own navy to terrorise the seas.

Libya's collapse into chaos and the terror group's seizure of the coastal city of Sirte has prompted alarm about ISIS using navy as one of its weapons.

According to retired Adm. James G. Stavridis, the Islamic State would love the symbolic aspect of going after a ship at sea and The US Navy must be on alert, vigilant and prepared to counter the terror threat to its deployed forces.

The chief of NATO's Allied Maritime Command, Vice-Admiral Clive Johnstone has also expressed concerns that the rise of Islamic State in the Mediterranean means it is striving to mount seaborne operations, endangering commercial and passenger sea lane.

**"We know they have had ambitions to go off shore, we know they would like to have a maritime arm, just as Al-Qaeda had a maritime arm,"** said Johnstone, and added that Korean, Chinese and Russian hardware was being acquired through various means by various extremist groups in the region, including the Islamic State group.

While ISIS has suffered severe financial losses from the US led coalition's airstrikes, in which the group has lost much of its main source of income from oil reserves, and while some may dismiss the idea of ISIS building a navy, the West should not dismiss the group's flare for spreading terror among its enemies.

## UK Border Guards "Powerless" To Stop Returning Jihadists

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2016/05/uk-border-guards-powerless-to-stop-returning-jihadists/>



May 06 – According to an anonymous whistleblower, British border guards are "virtually powerless to stop and detain" returning jihadists fighters, Britain's Telegraph reports.

UK Border Force officers have "zero discretion" to apprehend or question returning travellers if they hold a British passport and haven't been "flagged" by security forces. This means that the officers tasked with protecting Britain's border have

practically no authority to protect the country from "cleanskin" jihadists who haven't previously come in contact with authorities.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, British immigration officers have the authority to "stop, question and detain" anyone who they think could be "concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism." Unfortunately, these authorities have never been actually granted to Border Force agents.





The whistleblower called it a “glaring omission” that officers are prevented from exercising the powers granted to them.

**“If we are satisfied they are British, their passport is genuine and their name is not ‘flagged’, we have no powers beyond that to stop them.** They have conferred no specific powers under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act on immigration officers in arrivals halls. It would be unlawful for them to detain a Brit,” the whistleblower told the Telegraph.

**Travellers can only be detained if their name appears on the “Warning Index” database.** Suspects with British passports must be allowed through the border with no checks if their name doesn’t appear on the database.

“It’s not enough to rely on laws which allow immigration officers to stop suspects who are on the anti-terrorism databases,” the whistleblower said. “What about the ones the security services do not know about yet? Strangely enough, some people do things for the first time.”

## Mysterious ‘Terrorist Organisation’ Haunts Kosovo Judiciary

Source: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/mysterious-terrorist-organisation-haunts-kosovo-judiciary-05-06-2016>

May 07 – **Despite a Pristina court’s recent sentencing of two Kosovars for joining an alleged terrorist group in Syria called ‘Harausham’, no Kosovo institution can provide proof of the organisation’s existence.** One suspect says he has “no clue” where the prosecution found the group.

The case of two Kosovars convicted of terrorism-related crimes after pleading guilty earlier this year may not be over yet.

Arben Livoreka and Nexhat Behluli each received three-and-a-half year sentences from a first-instance court in Pristina in January after being [found guilty of ‘participation and organising for a terrorist group’](#).


The two were arrested in September 2014 on suspicion of joining a terror organisation called ‘Harausham’ that is allegedly affiliated with the militant group Al Nusra in Syria in November 2013 - July 2014.

However, a BIRN investigation found that ‘Harausham’, the group the men are alleged to have joined, may only exist in the prosecution’s indictment and in other related court documents.

‘Harausham’ does not appear in detailed searches of official lists of groups fighting in Syria and Iraq. The suspects’ statements contained in court documents are the only direct evidence of the organisation’s existence.

The Special Prosecution indictment, which BIRN has seen, refers to ‘Harausham’ and says Al Nusra controls the fighting group. The

indictment continues that the defendants chose to leave the organisation and return to Kosovo after ISIS sought to take control of the group. However, the document compiled by Chief Special Prosecutor Reshat Millaku contains no evidence of ‘Harausham’s’ existence, nor does it detail its alleged ties to Al Nusra.



Millaku declined BIRN’s interview requests about the case, and the Special Prosecution Office also failed to provide any explanation on this particular indictment.

When asked by BIRN if they could prove, or had any evidence at all for the existence of ‘Harausham’, Ekrem Lutfiu, a spokesperson from the General Prosecution Office said the proof was in the suspects’ statements.

“The ‘Harausham’ organisation, according to the statements of the suspects, is a group that acts in the frame of Al Nusra terrorist organisation,” Lutfiu said. Lutfiu did not provide any supportive evidence beyond what



was already written in the Special Prosecution indictment.

The group does come up in online searches, but only in references to the prosecution indictment made in BIRN's published articles on the trial.

Nexhat Behluli, one of the two suspects, told BIRN he has no clues about the existence of the alleged fighting force, and claims that his statements have been tampered with.

"I am not aware of the 'Harausham' organisation. I gave a different statement to the police and yet, I have been confronted with a different one during the trial," Behluli said.

Behluli claimed to have been a member of the Free Syrian Army, and that his admission of guilt was made under harsh duress because it was the only way for him to be released from detention.

BIRN could not reach the other suspect, Arben Livoreka, who, like Behluli, has allegedly confessed to being part of 'Harausham', according court records.

Defendant's lawyers from other terrorism cases have previously voiced concerns that clients were being pressured into pleading guilty to avoid being held in custody while on trial.

Security officials from Kosovo and Albania contacted by BIRN, speaking under conditions of anonymity, also said that prior to this case they never encountered the name of 'Harausham' during interviews with returned fighters or through information exchange with security agencies from other countries.

Skender Perteshi, a Pristina-based expert on security and violent extremism, told BIRN that he is unaware of the organisation's existence.

"Based on my research and investigation on violent extremism and radicalisation, I have not encountered an organisation called 'Harausham'," Perteshi said.

He said that another organisation that sounds similar – Ahrar al Sham – has come up during his research and work in the field.

### **Kosovo challenged by 'who's who' in Syria**

Even if the prosecution had misspelled the name of the alleged terrorist organisation, Ahrar al Sham may have not met the necessary requirements for a successful indictment anyways.

The Kosovo justice system defers to United Nations resolutions and lists in determining whether an organisation or group is to be

deemed terrorist or not. The UN does not consider Ahrar al Sham a terrorist organisation. 'Harausham' does not appear in those lists either, and therefore the Kosovo Special Prosecution used its alleged ties to Al Nusra – which the UN does consider a terrorist organisation – to produce an indictment.

Yet the Special Prosecution's knowledge of the organisations and fighting groups in Syria and Iraq may be limited even when it comes to more well-known and notorious factions, such as ISIS, Al Qaeda and Al Nusra.

In another indictment of 32 suspects being jointly tried on terrorism-related charges, which BIRN has seen, the prosecution was unable to make a clear distinction of 'who is who' when it comes to terrorist organisations.

"ISIS, known also as ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham], has close ties with Al-Qaeda, and is also known as Al-Qaida in Iraq, established in 2004, which is part of the terrorist organisations as sanctioned by the United Nations," the indictment says.

The indictment was written July 2015, whereas in February 2014, Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri denied any links with ISIS and accused the latter of being too radical even by Al-Qaida's standards.

While Al Nusra is part of Al-Qaida, this is not the case for ISIS, and the two groups have engaged in several bloody clashes and shaky truces over time. Still, more than a year later, the Kosovo prosecution didn't know they were different organisations.

On April 29, a first-instance court in Pristina sentenced nine of the 32 suspects being tried together on terrorism-related charges, with prison sentences ranging from six months to four-and-a-half years. The presiding judge, Aferdita Bytyqi, told the court that the evidence at hand proved the defendants were guilty of their crimes.

Naser Avdyli was among the 32 defendants and received a four-and-a-half year prison sentence for 'participation and organisation' in terrorist groups. His lawyer, Hazer Susuri, said he would appeal the verdict.

"The [UN] resolution that ISIS, Al Nusra and other groups are terrorist organisations has not been confirmed by the Kosovo parliament," Susuri told BIRN.

In the same indictment, where several of the suspects are accused of joining ISIS ranks, the



prosecution refers to UN resolution 1822 to establish the legal grounds that ISIS is a terrorist organisation.

The resolution was voted on in 2008, before ISIS had come to prominence, and it imposes sanctions against members and/or associates of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban. ISIS and Al Nusra do not appear in the Kosovo official journal, where all upcoming legal introductions are published.

BIRN also asked the Special Prosecution for the list of terrorist organisations that Kosovo recognises as such, along with the respective legal references.

"I inform you that the United Nations have established which organisation has been determined terrorist, but there are particular states which have declared several organisations to be terrorist," Liridona Kozmaqi, a spokesperson for the prosecution said.

Kozmaqi did not release a list of terrorist organisations that the Special Prosecution refers to, despite repeated requests from BIRN. BIRN also requested the same list and its corresponding legislation from the Ministry of Interior, which said to contact the police instead.

"The matters you are raising have, in due time, been addressed by the relevant institutions to which you should address your request," the reply from the police information office said.

They did not specify the 'relevant institutions' they were referring to, despite repeated requests from BIRN.

Shpend Kursani, a Senior Research Fellow at the Kosovar Center for Security Studies, and author of a report on [Kosovars involvement as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq](#), believes Kosovar institutions lack the necessary understanding of the war in Syria and the role that religion plays in the conflict.

"While arrests have been carried on the suspicion of participating [in terrorist organisations] in Syria, there is little [institutional] knowledge on developments in the field and fighting groups," Kursani said.

Before the sentencing of the nine men, Judge Bytyqi's office released a timetable of the court's hearing in March, and had written in the name of the case as "ISIS-es" ("ISIS-at" in Albanian).

The latter is a derogatory term used in urban slang in both Kosovo and Albania, not to describe alleged ISIS fighters, but rather refers

to Muslim practitioners who hold conservative views.

### Guilty as charged?

The court's verdict in the case of Arben Livoreka and Nexhat Behluli, which BIRN has seen, provides no evidence or clues of the 'Harausham's' existence or its alleged ties with Al Nusra.

Like the prosecution's indictment, the verdict refers to the suspects' statements, which at least one now claims has been tampered with.

The verdict also fails to mention any administered evidence at all on the case, despite being a prerequisite of any verdict issued by courts in Kosovo.

After spending several months in detention, both Behluli and Livoreka pleaded guilty and were subsequently placed under softer custody orders while waiting for a final court decision.

"I would have come up to make the irregularities of my case public, even if you had not contacted me," Behluli told BIRN, stressing that his statement given to authorities had been forged.

Hedije Ademi, Behluli's lawyer, has appealed the verdict because she thinks the three-and-a-half year sentence is too long considering Behluli pled guilty. She also said the prosecution provided no information on the alleged terrorist organisation that his client allegedly joined.

"If it is proven that 'Harausham' does not exist this would be a shame, because it means that innocent people have been tried and found guilty, and we would consider addressing the case to the Supreme Court," Ademi said.

Kosovo is arguably the country with the highest number of terror-related prosecutions in Europe, with nearly 120 arrests and 60 individuals being tried for offences including: recruitment to commit terrorist acts, facilitation and support of terrorist activities, organising and participating in terrorist organisations and illegal possession of firearms.

Some 40 are accused of having joined ISIS or Al Nusra in Syria and Iraq during 2013 and 2014.

Four Kosovars were jailed between 2015 and early 2016 for participation in terrorist groups, namely ISIS and Al Nusra. All have entered guilty pleas and expressed remorse.





But several of the indictments BIRN has seen are only a few paragraphs long and contain no evidence apart the suspects' statements, or a photograph of them wielding a weapon or in some cases, a photo of Bin Laden and a plane ticket to Istanbul.

Security expert Shpend Kursani said he believes that Kosovo institutions recklessly carried out several arrests and indictments.

"Putting these people on trial... to a certain degree has a political background, for Kosovo institutions and politicians to look good before their international friends, which explains the arrests and prosecution of so many people so hastily and with little evidence," he noted.

## **Terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins on terrorists and technology, and the tradeoffs of freedom and security**

Source: <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-brian-michael-jenkins-podcast-20160504-htmlstory.html>

May 07 – Through decades of change, Brian Michael Jenkins has studied the nature of terrorism. In an interview, the senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation assesses the state of terrorism today and how it could affect the direction of this country.



The announcement, on a Sunday night five years ago, from President Obama: "Tonight, I can report to American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda, and the terrorist responsible for the murders of thousands of innocent men, women and children." Terrorism is as old as humankind, and as new as Twitter, and keeping up with its faces and changes has occupied Brian Michael Jenkins for four decades. He's a senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation, and one of the world's foremost analysts and experts on terrorism, as his body of writings

and his work consulting for national and international agencies attest. Here, he sizes up the new direction and demands of terrorists, and how this country is coping with them.

### **What, for your purposes and ours, is terrorism?**

Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence that's calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm that will cause people to exaggerate the threat posed by the terrorists and the importance of their cause.

### **In the 40 years you've been studying this, what's the arc of how terrorism has changed?**

In terms of the basic tactics there have been incremental changes, but this is still about killing people, it's about taking hostages. The basic arsenal of the terrorists has remained pretty much the same, with striking exception: and that is when we think about arsenals, we tend to think only about weapons, when in fact communications are very much part of the struggle. Because terrorism itself is about the manipulation of perceptions, it's about communication. When we were, back in the late 1970s, trying to figure out what would be

the weapons of the future that terrorists might incorporate into their tactics, one we missed of course was the Internet.

That has had a tremendous impact on the trajectory of terrorism. Indeed, if this is violence aimed at the people watching, then the ability to reach an audience of global proportions through the news media enhances the utility of terrorist tactics.

But the Internet took it further, because that enabled these groups to reach audiences unmediated by an editor, and with social media, to go even a step further and to have terrorists talking directly to their supporters and others they want to recruit into their cause.

### **Have the goals of terrorists, and who they are, substantially changed?**

In some cases, yes. Certainly terrorist activities associated with the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s; it was associated with ideological



conflicts, and separatist movements in the 1970s and '80s, the Basque separatists in Spain, the Irish Republican Army, other groups like that. There was a shift, however, in that in the '80s we began to see increasingly ideologies drawn from religion become the driving force of much of the terrorism. If the violence was carried out on behalf of either an ideology or a specific set of political goals, then that meant there was a constituency. The existence of a constituency imposed constraints on the terrorists themselves. Terrorists worried, If we go too far, we will alienate our supporters -- and they imagine themselves to have legions of supporters. But if you move it into the realm of ideologies drawn from religion, then your constituency is God. That reduces the constraints. And what we saw beginning in the 1980s was an escalation in terrorism, not just an increase in the volume.

You know, the worst incidents of terrorism measured in terms of lives lost in the 1970s were in the scores of individuals: 70 people, 80 people, 90 people. In the 1980s, this ascended into the hundreds of people and it kept creeping upward. Of course on September 11, it went into the thousands.

**How well have understandings of this threat evolved? There has been a great deal of resistance in this country to even using the word "understanding," and where they're coming from, which is necessary of course to combat it. People don't want to understand -- they say, We just want to get 'em.**

The word understanding is slippery and therefore dangerous in this territory. If you say we need to understand our terrorist adversaries -- how do they view the world? On the one hand, of course, that's something obviously you would do in any type of an armed struggle. We paid a great deal of attention during the Second World War to understanding the strategy and tactics of the German generals. I mean, General Patton said of his foe General Rommel, when he defeated him in North Africa, Rommel, I read your book!

During the Cold War, we devoted a great deal of scholarship to trying not simply to count the number of Soviet nuclear armed missiles that were pointed at the United States, but to understanding how the Soviets thought about

the world. In fact, our strategies were based upon that understanding.

But when it comes to terrorists, there's a tendency to say, Terrorists are evil, witches are wicked, why are we wasting our time understanding them? And indeed, that slides into the perception that one is being understanding OF terrorists, which is completely unacceptable. Much of what we do in terms of our own counter-terrorism measures are based upon an understanding of our adversaries.

Now we do face a dilemma in this country. We agree that we will use military force against terrorism. And I'm a former soldier. I'm not squeamish about the use of military force when it's absolutely necessary, and appropriate. It's one component of the things we do.

But at the same time we now find ourselves in a state of perpetual war. I remember testifying before the Senate only months after 9/11. I was asked by one of the senators, Mr. Jenkins, it's been three months since 9/11, nothing has happened -- are we through it yet?

And I responded that this wasn't some episode of "The West Wing." That was a question you could ask me in ten years. Well, we're coming up to the 15-year mark now and it's still ongoing.

Perpetual warfare is new territory for Americans. It's not just a matter of patience; it's what does this begin to do to our institutions? You know, if we were in a finite battle, we would say, Okay there are certain specific measures we have to take, security measures, measures to enhance our ability to collect intelligence. At the end of the war we would then say, alright, the threat is over, we can now dismantle this.

**As we did in the Second World War -- declare victory and go home.**

That's the kind of war that we like. But if it's open-ended, an involves not only threats from abroad but the possibility of radicalization and recruitment of people in this country into terrorist activity, then these measures that we put into place become a permanent feature of the landscape. And we really have to take care that we don't incrementally walk ourselves into a tyranny.

**So we're not doing very well, then, in being realistic about what's out there?**



In some cases we don't have a realistic view of it. And by the way, I am ferociously nonpartisan in terms of politics. But understanding terrorism and how to combat terrorism is very difficult in an election year, because it's popular to pound the podium and to use very tough-sounding language about what we're going to do. When people actually arrive in office they find out that it's not that easy. If it was easy, we would have solved this one decades ago.

We have done, actually, in many respects, remarkably well. It would be erroneous to say that we have savaged civil liberties since 9/11. We Americans fortunately are a cantankerous bunch. We push back when we think our privacy is being invaded too much, or when security gets too heavy-handed.

Our intelligence has been remarkably successful in terms of uncovering and thwarting terrorist plots since 9/11. Our FBI and police departments are batting about 900; about 90% of the plots are being uncovered and thwarted. Only a handful are slipping through.

**The United States has liked to position itself as morally superior, that we have civil liberties in this country, that we have due process, versus people who will as soon kill you as look at you. How much does that factor into the larger "war on terrorism"?**

There is a moral issue in terrorism. Even in warfare, nations have agreed that there will be certain rules which will for example try to limit violence against civilian non-combatants, that they will not harm hostages, that there be certain kinds of targets that will not be attacked. And over the centuries, we have agreed upon these rules.

Terrorist tactics deliberately violate those rules. And so therefore there is a moral quotient when we look at combating terrorism. It is important that we maintain the moral high ground.

First of all, in part, the terrorists hope to create this atmosphere of fear and alarm which will provoke us into taking extreme measures which then will attract recruits to their cause, and say, They're no different than we are.

**How good have we been at not taking the bait?**

It clearly is a mixed record. I don't want to set the bar so high; the idea that one can apply surgical military force is not realistic. We do, in the United States armed forces, really go out of

our way to try avoid or minimize the risk of civilian casualties. Can I say therefore that all U.S. military operations are absolutely clear of any civilian casualties? No. you cannot say that. That's simply not realistic. But we do make an effort in doing so; we don't always succeed.

As to broader values -- and I would say here American values, things that we value in our society, courage, self-reliance, tolerance -- it is extremely important that we hold on to those. It's not a matter that those are some sort of luxuries that we're going to toss overboard when we get into stormy waters.

It is those values that motivate our own soldiers and sailors and marines. It is those values that, despite the mistakes we have made in the world, that still have many of the people in the world desperate to come to the United States. It is those values that prevent us from alienating populations that could otherwise provide support to our adversaries.

So these aren't luxuries; they are weapons. And we want to be very careful about not giving those up.

**As a student of the humanities and a historian, you would know to some extent whether this century becomes the critical century the way, say, the 14th century was.**

There are several directions we could go. The hopeful one is that we will keep this in perspective, we will effectively deal with it. At times it's going to be scary, it's going to be tough, we're not always going to get it right.

But ultimately, we will contain this threat and our society as we understand it will prevail.

Other, darker futures include sort of the re-creation of a neo-medieval society in which we are surrounded by walls. They may be modern electronic forms of walls, but we are surrounded by walls, live behind moats, dash from inner perimeter to inner perimeter.

Another dark vision is that ultimately we will decide that our freedom is a luxury, that we will impose upon our own society whatever surveillance is necessary to maintain our everyday security. This has been something we have been struggling with now in its contemporary form for 40, 50 years.

**It's the admonition from Ben Franklin that those who would sacrifice essential liberty in exchange for a little security**





**deserve neither liberty nor security.**

I think ultimately, one, we are a tough nation; that ultimately we will prevail not because of how many bollards we plant in front of public buildings or how many procedures we install at airports or how many cameras we put up. We will prevail because of our essential values.

**You fly tens of thousands of miles year. Do you ever get exasperated with TSA?**

You know, not really. I understand it, and therefore you adopt the position that I know why these procedures are here. I can take you through a security checkpoint like an archaeological dig: I can point to every machine and every procedure and say, That came about because of that incident in 1988, that came about because of that incident in

2001. We take off our shoes because there was a shoe bomber, we have restrictions on liquids because there was a plot involving liquid explosives.

Now, having said that, on a busy day when you're waiting in line, yes it's annoying. I think we are becoming smarter about this with some of these new programs like Precheck, that basically says, Look, everyone's not an equal threat. We know more about some people than others. So we can distribute our limited resources in a way that's going to be more effective in getting people through this.


Some day, we may have an x-ray for a man's soul and we won't need all of this elaborate stuff. But until we have that, we're going to face these more burdensome requirements.

**Who Bombed the Hilton?**

By Rachel Landers (author – Apr 2016)

Source: <https://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/books/who-bombed-the-hilton/>

I unpick and put in chronological order thousands of pieces of paper — lay out the facts as they arrived the first time, unadorned, uninterpreted, flying in from dozens of sources and every corner of the world.



with the evidence to unravel this complex cold case in forensic detail, exposing corruption, conspiracy theories and political intrigue – and a prime suspect.

"Rachel Landers' *Who Bombed the Hilton?* is a terrifying tale written with sparkling good humour and panache. Landers takes a 'tatty, fractured saga' of

What really went on? Were the police corrupt? Did the conspiracy theorists believe what they wanted to believe?

Who *did* bomb the Hilton?

On 13 February 1978 a bomb exploded outside the Hilton Hotel in George Street, Sydney. Two garbage collectors and a police officer were killed. Often called the first act of terrorist murder on Australian soil, the crime is still unsolved.

Award-winning filmmaker and historian Rachel Landers wrestles



the horrific terrorist attack in the heart of Sydney, and, backed by remarkable research, she brings it to life. She makes of it a testament to the victims and the investigators, as well as a warning to us in our own age of terror. As we struggle with terrorism, and with the danger of damaging our democracy by our measures to counter it, we do well to remember this story of 'the one who got away.' " – Anna Funder

*Rachel Landers is an Australian filmmaker with a PhD in history.*

## Subhan Allah' Adverts To Run On London, Birmingham And Manchester Buses During Ramadan To Help Syrian War Victims

Source: [http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/subhan-allah-adverts-to-run-on-london-birmingham-and-manchester-buses-during-ramadan-to-help-syrian-war-victims\\_uk\\_57303a25e4b0ade291a20b53](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/subhan-allah-adverts-to-run-on-london-birmingham-and-manchester-buses-during-ramadan-to-help-syrian-war-victims_uk_57303a25e4b0ade291a20b53)

May 09 – Hundreds of buses across England will carry adverts praising Allah as part of a drive to highlight the plight of Syrians fleeing civil war during Ramadan.

**Britain's biggest Muslim charity, Islamic Relief, is funding the campaign to roll out posters on buses in London, Manchester, Birmingham and Bradford, reading "Subhan Allah", meaning "Glory be to God" in Arabic.**

The charity says the adverts will portray Islam and international aid in a positive way.

They will be carried in London, Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford and Leicester from May 23. Ramadan runs between June 6 and July 7.



Organisers of the operation hope it will encourage Muslims to channel anger about the war in Syria into humanitarian work.

Imran Madden, the UK director of Islamic Relief, said: "In a sense this could be called a climate change campaign because we want to change the negative climate around international aid and around the Muslim community in this country.

"International aid has helped halve the number of people living in extreme poverty in the past 15 years, and British Muslims are an incredibly generous community who give over £100 million to international aid charities in Ramadan."



England cricketer Moeen Ali has said he supports the initiative, and wants the adverts to encourage debate and increase understanding.

The posters will hope to drive up donations in the weeks leading up to Ramadan. The Holy month marks the Prophet Mohammed's revelation of the Quran.

It is celebrated worldwide, with the annual occasion unfolding on the 9th month of the Muslim calendar, and sees all eligible Muslims fast between sunrise and sunset.

Transport for London (TfL), which regulates adverts on the capital's buses and Underground networks, does not permit posters linked to a "political party or campaign".

It does not prevent religious ads, though.

The Liberal Democrats equalities spokesperson and peer Baroness Hussein-Ece condemned the move, saying religion should be solely "a private matter".

In April 2012, former London mayor Boris Johnson banned a Christian charity from advertising 'gay conversion therapy' from TfL following a public outcry.

"We do not believe that these specific ads are consistent with TfL's commitment to a tolerant and inclusive London," a spokesperson for the authority said at the time.

## London's New Muslim Mayor: Extremist or Opportunist?

By Meira Svirsky


Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/londons-new-muslim-mayor-extremist-or-opportunist>

May 08 – Majid Nawaz's assessment of London's new Muslim mayor, the newly elected Sadiq Khan, is that he is not an Islamist extremist. He is merely a manipulative politician willing to use guile and duplicity to achieve his electoral aims -- not so different from the average politician.

**Leading up to the mayoral vote, questions arose about Khan's association with extremists, which constitutes a long list in the new mayor's political history.**

### Consider:

- In 2001, Khan was the lawyer for the American radical Islamist group Nation of Islam, successfully arguing in front of the UK's High Court to overturn the ban on its leader, Louis Farrakhan.
- In 2003, Khan appeared at a conference with Sajeel Abu Ibrahim, a member of the banned al-Muhajiroun group that was founded by hate preacher Omar Bakri Muhammad (now prohibited from entering the UK) and led by hate preacher Anjem Choudary (whose many organizations have been said [to have contributed](#) "the single biggest gateway to terrorism in recent British history"). Sajeel also ran a terrorist training camp in Pakistan attended by 7/7 bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan.
- In 2004, Khan testified to the House of Commons as head of the Muslim Council of Britain's legal affairs committee. As council legal head, Khan argued in parliament that the [Muslim Brotherhood's](#) spiritual leader Yusuf Al-Qaradawi "is not the extremist that he is painted as being." Qaradawi (also banned in the UK for his extremist views) advocates, among other [sharia](#) principles, for wife beating and suicide bombings against Israeli citizens. After the [murder of an Ahmadi Muslim in Scotland](#) for wishing his Christian customers a peaceful Easter, the council "condemned" the incident by pointing out that Ahmadis are not Muslims.
- Khan was the [defense lawyer for Zacarias Moussaoui](#), a 9/11 terrorist and confessed member of Al Qaeda.
- Khan attended events for the extremist group [CAGE](#) and wrote a forward for one of their reports. CAGE is a primary supporter of the Islamic State executioner known as "Jihadi John," who they [described as](#) a "beautiful young man."
- Khan appeared on panels with Muslim community leader and cleric Suliman Gani, a supporter of the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), no less than nine times.
- In 2010, Khan shamelessly played the Ahmadi card, flaring up sectarian hatred in his reelection bid to the parliament when faced with stiff competition from Nasser Butt, an Ahmadi who had opposed the war in Iraq unlike Khan who had voted in favor of it.





Defending himself against charges of extremism, Khan points to his [record on supporting rights](#) for homosexual and transsexual rights. Since he was first elected to parliament in 2005, that support has been unwavering.

Khan has been an outspoken [critic of anti-Semitism](#). Most recently, he stated he was “embarrassed and sorrowful” about the glaring anti-Semitism that has been spotlighted in his own party.

As the Muslim Public Affairs Committee in the UK (MPAC-UK) derogatorily pointed out in a [comment piece on their website](#) posted just two days before the election, “A Vote for Sadiq Khan in the London Mayor Elections is a Vote for Israel.”

Much to MPAC-UK’s chagrin and dismay, Khan is an opponent of the anti-Israel BDS movement. Although he called for sanctions against Israel in 2009, he says he has [since changed his mind](#).

On the last day of his campaign, it was revealed that in an interview Khan gave in 2009 on Iranian television, he referred to Muslims fighting extremism as “Uncle Toms.” (He has since apologized.)

Still, Majid Nawaz insists that Khan is no extremist. Khan was Nawaz’s lawyer when he was arrested in Egypt for working for the banned Islamist group [Hizb ut-Tahrir](#). Nawaz, now a prominent counter extremism campaigner, says he is forever indebted to Khan for visiting him in Egypt’s Mazra Tora prison, “while the world gave up on me.”

Ironically, it was Nawaz’s counter-extremism foundation [Quilliam](#) that were targeted by Khan in his “Uncle Tom” remarks.

Nawaz refrained from commenting on Khan and his electoral bid until after the election. In his first piece penned after the election, Nawaz paints a picture of Khan as a realist (read: opportunistic) and consummate politician.

“When push comes to shove, gaining power becomes more important for politicians from all parties, than defending principles,” writes Nawaz. “And sadly, extremists remain among the most powerful organized forces in Britain’s Muslim grassroots.”

Nawaz explains the unfortunate political climate in today’s Britain: “By 2009, extremism had grown so rife among my own British Muslim community that, in a sign of our times, a Muslim government minister for *Social Cohesion* [Khan] would find it politically expedient to call a group of Muslims, who were not in government, ‘Uncle Toms’ simply for criticizing extremism.”

Yet, Nawaz doesn’t give Khan a free pass, saying, “It did not need to be like this. As a column in the *Wall Street Journal* [recently noted](#), ‘Other Muslim leaders took a different approach.’

“The struggles that [reforming liberal and ex-Muslims face](#) every day, the dehumanization, the delegitimization, the excommunication, the outcasting, the threats, intimidation and the violence makes this inexcusable ... Why is it okay for a mayor to have shared panels with all manner of Muslim extremists, while actively distancing himself from, and smearing, counter-extremist Muslims?”

**A good question it would behoove the new mayor to answer.**

*Meira Svirsky is the editor of ClarionProject.org.*

## Munich stabbing: One dead after man 'shouting Allahu Akbar' launches attack at railway station in German town

Source: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/munich-stabbing-suspected-islamist-shouts-allahu-akbar-before-launching-attack-at-railway-station-in-a7021816.html>



May 10 – One person (German, 27 years old), has been killed and several injured in a knife attack by a suspected Islamist at a railway station near Munich.

The suspect shouted “Allahu Akbar” (“God is great”) as he started stabbing passers-by in the town of Grafing, to the south-east of the German



city, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported.

The attack took place at around 4.50am on Tuesday and the suspected perpetrator was arrested shortly afterwards.

A spokesperson at the Bavarian state criminal investigation office told *The Independent* one of the victims was initially in a critical condition but died later in hospital.

Three other men were injured, one seriously. The spokesperson said she could not confirm whether the attack was terror-related or give information on any suspected motive.




## The Jihadi Dictionary: The Essential Intel Tool for Military, Law Enforcement, Government and the Concerned Public

By Dr. Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin (Author)

- Paperback: 286 pages
- Publisher: Multi Educator, Incorporated (May 9, 2016)

Source: [http://www.amazon.com/Jihadi-Dictionary-Essential-Enforcement-Government/dp/1885881991/ref=sr\\_1\\_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462894032&sr=8-1&keywords=Nancy+Hartevelt+Kobrin+the+Jihadi+Dictionary](http://www.amazon.com/Jihadi-Dictionary-Essential-Enforcement-Government/dp/1885881991/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462894032&sr=8-1&keywords=Nancy+Hartevelt+Kobrin+the+Jihadi+Dictionary)



The Essential Intel Tool for Military, Law Enforcement, Government and The Concerned Public – What makes the jihadis enact such vicious crimes not only against humanity but also their own people? The Jihadi Dictionary holds the key to getting at the root cause of their confusing, terrifying behavior as it defines and demystifies the unconscious motivations behind their unspeakable actions.

*Dr. Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin is a psychoanalyst, Arabist, and internationally renowned counter terrorist expert who has worked extensively with military, law enforcement, and mental health professionals.*

## Afghan 'Islamists' held in Italy 'targeted London'

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36256675>



two of whom may have gone back to Afghanistan, Italian media report.

Video clips and photos on the two detainees' mobile phones suggest that they were targeting landmarks in Bari, Rome, Paris and London for attacks.

They included hotels in **London's West India Quay**

May 10 – Police in the port city of Bari in southern Italy have arrested two Afghan men suspected of plotting jihadist attacks in Italy, France and the UK.

Three other Afghans are still being sought,





and Royal Victoria Dock.



London's West India Quay



Royal Victoria dock (bridge)



Circus Maximus



Colosseum



Bari port



Bari Palese Airport

The detained suspects were named as Hakim Nasiri, 23 (photos), and Gulistan Ahmadzai, 29. Several photos released by police show Mr Nasiri posing with a rifle in a shop or warehouse. The apparent targets they picked in **Rome were the Circus Maximus and Colosseum**. Police believe the Afghans had formed a jihadist cell linked to so-called Islamic State (IS).

### Suspicious surveillance

The Bari investigators said one of the suspicious images showed a famous mosque in Mecca tinted blue - a colour associated with Islamic paradise and devotion - and the Eiffel Tower tinted violet - a colour associated with death and struggle.

Another photo showed Hakim Nasiri next to the Mayor of Bari, Antonio Decaro, during a march organised on 10 September 2015 in solidarity with immigrants.

Both suspects held by police have been living in Italy with humanitarian protection status. Mr Nasiri is accused of international terrorism and Mr Ahmadzai of assisting illegal immigration.

In **Bari they had filmed the Ipercoop shopping mall, the inside of Bari Palese airport and the port area.**

The police swooped after one of them was spotted using his smartphone to photograph the Ipercoop mall.





Police say the suspects' recordings included video tributes to friends and relatives of suspected Islamists held by the US authorities in Guantanamo, Cuba.

## Euro 2016 Paris fan zone 'magnet for terrorists'

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/10/euro-2016-paris-fan-zone-magnet-for-terrorists/>



May 10 – A huge fan zone near the Eiffel Tower during Euro 2016 will “offer terrorists a chance for a massacre,” the former chief of

“It’s madness to think you can put 100,000 people in the area below the Eiffel Tower every night for a month without risk.

In the wake of the Paris and Brussels attacks, the prospect of the fan zone terrifies me,” said Mr Péchenard, now a senior official of the main centre-Right opposition party, The Republicans, and deputy head of the Paris Regional Council with special responsibility for security.

**Fan zones in Paris and nine other French cities will attract up to seven million people during the June 10 to July 10 championship, with another 2.5 million spectators attending matches.** Record numbers of British fans are expected to travel to France as England, Wales and Northern Ireland have all qualified. Many will go without tickets and are likely to watch the

matches in fan zones.

Mr Péchenard insisted that the Euro 2016 should not be moved out of France. **He is more relaxed about fan zones in**

French police fears.

Frédéric Péchenard, who headed the national police until 2012, urged the authorities to scrap plans for the Paris fan zone, where spectators will gather to watch matches on giant screens.





other French cities but unconvinced by government assurances that the 130,000 square-metre area in Paris — equivalent to 30 football pitches — will be guarded round the clock. “It will take a lot of police officers, who won’t be available for counter-terrorism operations.”

Police will be posted outside the perimeter, with 400 private security officers inside. Metal detectors will be installed at entrances, with pat-downs, CCTV and sniffer dogs. After the November 13 attacks in the French capital, the security budget for all 10 fan zones was doubled to nearly £19 million, two-thirds of which will be spent on policing the Paris area.

The French sports minister, Patrick Kanner, told Europe 1 radio: “The fan zones will be extremely secure. You’ll be much safer in a fan zone than in a bar.”

Mr Kanner said some French sports clubs were suspected of promoting Islamist radicalisation, but declined to name those involved or

estimate their number. “When a club refuses to accept women or holds prayers during intervals, that’s suspicious and we must be

## UN ESPACE DE 130 000 M<sup>2</sup> AU CŒUR DE LA CAPITALE



vigilant,” he said.

Football authorities on the French Riviera have banned clubs from allowing players to pray beside pitches.

France remains in a state of emergency declared after the November attacks claimed 130 lives.

**EDITOR’S COMMENT:** For a country still in a state of emergency it is (at least) stupid to add more problems to those already anticipated within the mass gathering areas (stadiums/venues) security. For Gods’ shake it is only football! Let people watch the games from their TV sets at home or wherever they want to go for it. Keep the security forces in high alert and concentrated into strategic posts and most important of all, pray that nothing will happen! Also it would be interesting to know if there is a provision for a worst case scenario like a RDD or a chemical CED or CDD. Can you imagine the decon problems that might arise in a huge open area with hundreds escape routes available?

## Is Brazil ready to fight terrorism during the Olympic Games?

By Carolina Torres

Source: <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/sports/2016/05/10/is-brazil-ready-to-fight-terrorism-during-olympic-games/>

May 10 – The terrorist threat at the Olympic Games is real, authorities say, but questions remain about whether Rio de Janeiro is prepared to prevent and react to one.

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), which is partially responsible for the country’s

security during the Games this August, confirmed that Brazil has been singled out by a member of the Islamic State (ISIS) as a potential terrorist target.



The information was released by the director of counterterrorism, Luiz Alberto Sallaberry, who admitted that possibility of a terrorist attack has increased in recent months. The ISIS threat was made on Twitter shortly after the bombing that killed more than 150 people in France in November, ABIN confirmed.

"Brazil, you are our next target. We can attack this shit country," the message, whose author is 22-year-old Maxime Hauchard, said.

Hauchard was identified as one of the men who appears in videos of ISIS executing Syrians. Despite the threat, ABIN says the country is ready to combat and prevent possible terrorist attacks during the Games.

Agency spokespeople say they will draw on the experience of hosting other major events including the World Cup in 2014, World Youth Day in 2013 and the Pan American Games in 2007.

The head of Brazil's Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, Admiral Ademir Sobrinho, is confident in the country's ability to host a successful Olympics.

"We're testing our security plans and the readiness of the troops in July, and we are all coordinated and prepared to deliver a safe and quiet games," he said. "The armed forces are acquiring a lot of expertise in personnel preparation."

According to the government, a contingent of 38,000 military will join 47,000 police, municipal police, public security and civil defense personnel on security work during the games.

The Secretary of Great Events in Rio de Janeiro, Roberto Alzir, told Fox News Latino that protocols have been developed for many potential situations. "We did a series of exchanges with other police forces around the world, with courses in various fields such as counterterrorism, control of explosives, coordination. There are action protocols for all of the most serious situations [we could face], such as a terrorist attack."

The economic and political crisis facing the country is also a concern for its security forces. Social protests turned into clashes with the police and riots during the Confederations Cup in 2013 – and to a lesser extent at the 2014 World Cup – and with an economy that has completely tanked, a corruption case embroiling a large number of people at the upper echelons of government and industry and a nasty political fight over the

impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, there is no reason to expect that can't happen again.

"We don't know what will the economic and political situation will be during the Games," Alzir said. "It could be a major or a minor problem."

According to the Ministry of Justice, security investment for games stands at \$100 million. The funds have been used to acquire protective equipment for personnel, training tools, anti-terrorism and other training of police officers, firefighters and municipal guards, as well as the expansion of electronic monitoring systems.

According to the ministry, the training has occurred during Olympic test events, such as equestrian, triathlon, rowing and cycling competitions, and also in the Olympic torch relay, which arrived in the country on May 3.

Criminal violence, a major problem in Rio, is also a security concern during the Games. Street crimes such as robberies, have increased dramatically in the city, according to the official statistics from the Public Security Institute (ISP).

**The latest data from the institute shows that there was an increase of 40 percent in phone thefts, with 659 more cases in the first three months of this year compared to 2015. There was an increase also in theft of pedestrians (724 more cases, which is a 6.7 percent rise) and car thefts (up 14 percent, with 610 more cases).**

This could change during the Olympics. According to Alzir, the increased police presence and monitoring will lower robberies.

"Urban violence is a risk, especially small theft and shoplifting. Large crowds always draw criminals, but we try to allocate more resources of police," Alzir said. "There will also be camera monitoring and helicopters."

**One of the new technologies we're employing are the Games are stationary balloons that will be about 200 meters [about 650 feet] high in the four Olympic zones, recording everything that occurs in a radius of 360 degrees, and can capture images to help police prevent or catch bad guys."**

João Trajano, a researcher at the Laboratory for the Analysis of Criminal Violence at the State University of Rio, also believes that street crimes will spike during





the competitions in tourist zones. He also warns that the rest of the city will be more vulnerable to criminals.

"The attention [of security personnel] will be focused on the events and ensuring the smooth operation of the Games," Trajano told

FNL. "So the areas that are already neglected will end up suffering the most, and this is unacceptable. The challenge that we can never win is to provide equal security to all places and all city dwellers."

*Carolina Torres is a freelance journalist living in Rio de Janeiro.*

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** It seems to me that if we do not speak about bad things (CBRNe) they will not happen at all! On the other hand, if we speak about things we know (e.g. petty thefts, gang crime, narcotics, kidnapping etc.), we feel confident and mighty to counter them as we usually do. If we have no actual terrorism experience we tend (or would like) to believe that terrorism and crime fighting are the same, so if we can deal with criminals we can also deal with terrorists. All these attitudes and assumptions might compromise Olympic security and in case of a real incident response will be catastrophic despite modern technologies introduced. Finally let us not forget where all casualties end – hospitals, and ask ourselves: are hospitals ready to deal with a variety of threats never countered before?

## How well is Brazil prepared for security challenges marching ahead of Rio Olympics 2016?

By Larry Anderson

Source: <http://www.sourcesecurity.com/news/articles/brazil-prepared-security-challenges-rio-olympics-2016.20537.html>

May 11 – **The largest global event of 2016 – and the year's biggest security challenge – will no doubt be the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Around 15,000 athletes from 206 countries are expected to compete at the Olympic games, August 5-21, 2016, and about 7.5 million tickets will be issued.**

In our age of terrorism, organisers of any event on the scale of the Rio Olympics must consider the possibility of an attack or other security breach during the more than two weeks of the event. Ever since the 1972 Munich massacre, in which 11 Israeli Olympic team members were taken hostage and eventually killed (along with a German police officer), organisers of Olympic games have been keenly aware of the possibility of violence. The threat of terrorism raises the stakes even more.

Recent events aggravate concerns about the safety of the Olympics, including the deadly Paris terrorism attacks in November of 2015 and the Brussels bombings earlier in 2016. The big stage of the Olympics would provide a temptingly high profile to any group wishing to foment terror by attacking the game venues,

facilities nearby, or the **500,000 tourists expected to attend.**

Devoted to avoiding such a catastrophe will be a huge security effort at the Rio Olympics, including more than 85,000 forces – 47,000 Brazilian security professionals and 38,000 members of the armed services. An Anti-Terrorism Centre will promote sharing of information, training and knowledge among police, law enforcement and intelligence. **Officials from more than 90 countries will work together on the effort.** It will be the largest security operation in Brazilian history. In contrast, only 40,000 agents were used at the London Olympics in 2012.

**Several additional factors could impact security in Rio in August. They include:**

**Need for awareness/ preparedness.** Brazil has a history as a peaceful country, has no declared enemies, and has previously faced little threat of terrorism. It also has little intelligence expertise. Only recently did Brazil legislate to make terrorism a crime punishable by up to 24 years in prison. Might the South American country therefore be



complacent to the possibility of an attack?

**Border security.** Geographically, Brazil has more than 14,000 miles (23,000 kilometres) of borders that are difficult to control, much of them through Amazon jungles. The largest country in South America, **Brazil shares borders with 10 other countries**, and lack of controls in unpopulated regions is one factor in Brazil's historic struggles to combat drug and arms trafficking. **A 90-day visa waiver during the games, approved by Brazil's congress, will help to attract more tourists, but at what cost to security?** (Waivers are limited to visitors from nations seen as low-risk, including the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.)

**Securing areas surrounding Olympic venues.** Just steps from some of the largest Olympic venues are areas of Rio de Janeiro plagued by poverty and crime. Slums, or "favelas," are within half a mile (less than 800 metres) of Maracana stadium, where opening ceremonies will kick off the games. Slums are also located near popular beaches and expensive hotels. Other problems of poverty – open sewage, destroyed houses and violence – are also concerns. Slums are controlled by drug traffickers and armed gangs, and police are few and inadequately armed. Many places are unsafe to walk at night.

**Violent crime.** Protecting the Olympics includes keeping the entire city safe. Brazil has about 52,000 murders a year, and there are **around three per day in Rio**. Crowd violence is often a problem at Brazilian soccer matches.

**Budget cuts.** In March, the government in Brazil decreased its security budget by 30 percent (about 550 million US dollars), with much of it targeting future investment. However, concern is that the cuts might undermine plans such as creation of an Urban Pacification Police in slum areas near the airport.

**Brazil's political climate.** Brazil's president is facing possible impeachment, and the nation's economy is in a recession freefall; might additional security risks result from the crisis?

**The Zika virus.** Brazil has been hardest hit of any nation by the Zika virus, which is spread by mosquitoes and has particular risks for pregnant women and their unborn children. If the outbreak persists, might it cast a negative shadow over the Olympic games (or add another risk factor)?

**To prepare to meet the security challenges of the Olympics, Rio officials have undertaken several initiatives, including:**

**Applying lessons they learned from hosting other big events.** Large international events are not new to Brazil, which hosted the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the 2014 Va'a World Sprint Canoeing Championships, and the 2012 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. Brazil also has experience managing the large annual Carnival celebrations in Rio and elsewhere.

**Surveying best practices by visiting other locales where large events were held.** Brazilian officials will use past Olympics games as models. Officials have also visited other locations that sponsored big events, such as the Tour de France and the Boston Marathon, to see what they can learn. Hundreds of Brazilian police visited the Pan-Am Games in Toronto last summer to learn newer techniques. They are also implementing best practices from other international events such as the IAAF World Athletics Championships in Beijing and the Baku 2015 European games. The Rio Olympics' head of security traveled to Washington to increase cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and other US agencies.

**Creating a huge command and control centre.** Technology to secure the Rio Olympics includes a large security command and control centre in downtown Rio, featuring walls covered with dozens of screens displaying views from thousands of cameras installed throughout city and in Olympic venues. Soldiers will control access to stadiums, X-ray machines and metal detectors.

**Screening visitors as they arrive.** Officials will receive real-time data about airport passengers as they check in from their country of origin.

As the days count down to the Rio Olympics, officials appear to be leaving very little to chance. However, with all attention focused on Rio during the Olympics, might the event be too tempting for a terrorist to resist? Given global threats and general security vulnerabilities, organisers of the Rio Olympics may need more than preparation to protect the games.

**They might need some luck, too.**



*Larry Anderson is an experienced journalist and long-time presence in the US security industry, Larry is SourceSecurity.com's eyes and ears in the fast-changing security marketplace, attending industry and corporate events, interviewing security leaders and contributing original editorial content to the site. He leads SourceSecurity.com US Edition's team of dedicated editorial and content professionals, guiding the "editorial roadmap" to ensure the site provides the most relevant content for security professionals.*

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Decoding some words from this article, provides some pessimistic conclusions: (1) Brazil borders with 10 countries (23,000 Km); (2) Three murders per day in Rio; (3) Security cooperation of experts of more than 90 countries (let's hope that some of them focused on CBRNe threats as well); (4) Poverty and ongoing political instability (on May 11<sup>th</sup>, Brazilian President Rousseff will temporarily step aside after Senate votes to go ahead with impeachment proceedings); and (5) Terrorism legislation (how on earth they got the Games without valid terrorism legislation?). It seems that the last short sentence of this article is the best we can all hope ("they might need some luck too"). But automatically comes into my mind the quota of the IRA spokesperson following the unsuccessful terrorist attack to murder late former UK PM Margaret Thatcher: "They have to be lucky all the time. We have to be lucky only once!"

## Northern Ireland terror threat level raised in Great Britain

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36267052>

May 11 – **The threat level from Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Great Britain has gone up from moderate to substantial.** It means an attack in England, Scotland or Wales is "a strong possibility".

Home Secretary Theresa May said the level, set by security service MI5, "reflects the continuing threat from dissident republican activity".

**The level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Northern Ireland remains "severe", meaning an attack is "highly likely".**

Mrs May confirmed the change of threat level relating to Great Britain - meaning three of the four countries of the UK - in a written statement to Parliament.

"As a result of this change, we are working closely with the police and other relevant authorities to ensure appropriate security measures are in place," she wrote.

The public should "remain vigilant and report any suspicious activity to the police", she added.

At Easter the New IRA, the group responsible for the murder of prison officer Adrian Ismay in March, warned that its members were "determined to take the war to the age-old enemy of our nation".

The threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Great Britain was raised from moderate to substantial in 2010 then reduced back to moderate in 2012.

The threat level to the UK from international terrorism is currently set at severe. For this measure, Northern Ireland is not rated separately.





## ETH Zurich – Center for Security Studies

Source: [http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/CSS\\_Analysis\\_EN](http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/CSS_Analysis_EN)

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich would like to draw your attention to the following new publications:

### **Peace and Violence in Colombia No. 191**, by Enzo Nussio

For Marxist guerillas in Latin America, the end is near. The government of Colombia is negotiating with the last of the rebels, FARC and ELN. But a peace agreement will not make the widespread violence disappear, as the criminal underworld is expected to reorganize and everyday violence will continue. The example of urban innovation in Medellín gives reason for hope.

### **Transatlantic Energy Security: On Different Pathways? No. 192**, by Andreas Beyer and Severin Fischer

The growth of domestic oil and gas extraction has changed the role of energy in US politics. While some observers already see the US on track to becoming a geostrategic energy superpower, the EU is increasingly focusing on the security of energy supply in the context of developing an energy union.

## Will ISIS Attack Germany? Poll Reveals Germans Fear Terrorism, Say Islam Has No Place In Their Country

Source: <http://www.ibtimes.com/will-isis-attack-germany-poll-reveals-germans-fear-terrorism-say-islam-has-no-place-2367888>

May 12 – **Nearly three of four Germans fear their country will suffer from a terror attack by Islamic radicals in the near future, and nearly two-thirds say the religion of Islam has no place in their country, a poll indicated** Thursday. The survey was released as tensions in Germany have continued to rise concerning a large, predominantly Muslim refugee population.

**Around 64 percent of respondents said Islam has no place in German culture**, with only 34 percent saying it did, a poll from German research agency Infratest Dimap indicated. Those numbers were up from a similar survey in August 2014 when 55 percent of those queried said Islam had no place and 44 percent said it did.

**Terrorism fears have also been high, according to the same survey in which 72 percent of those polled said they feared they would see a terror attack on German soil.** Concerns over a growing terror threat have mounted throughout Europe in the past year following terror attacks in Paris and Brussels that killed nearly 200 people and injured hundreds more.

**More than 1 million people have sought asylum in Germany in 2015, with many of them fleeing a five-year violent conflict in Syria.** The vast majority of refugees in Germany are Muslim, and after a series of sexual assaults allegedly carried out by asylum-seekers New Year's Eve in Cologne, as well as a stabbing earlier this week allegedly executed by an Islamic extremist, fears

continued spiked.

Controversy erupted in the German politics earlier this week after the right-wing, anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) declared Islam was not compatible with the German constitution, triggering ire from several of the establishment parties.

"What the AfD has decided on is an attack on almost all religions," Armin Laschet, deputy chairman of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union, told ARD television. "They have identified Islam as a foreign body in Germany. That is divisive, and startling to a Christian Democratic party for which faith has meaning."

Around 1,000 people were surveyed for the Infratest Dimap poll May 2-3. The margin of error was unavailable.



## Montclair State launches homeland security certificate program



**MONTCLAIR STATE**  
UNIVERSITY

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160513-montclair-state-launches-homeland-security-certificate-program>

May 13 – Beginning in fall 2016, Montclair State University will offer a fully online certificate program in Homeland Security aiming to prepare students for careers in what the school describes as “a growing and dynamic field.” The program will be taught by security professionals and practitioners, and it will accommodate up to forty students who already hold a bachelor’s degree.

Montclair State says that the launch of the program reflects societal and global changes since 9/11, which have created a new need for security management in the United States.

“We no longer live in an insulated bubble,” says Norma Connolly, deputy chair of Montclair State’s Department of Justice Studies and the program’s coordinator. “We now recognize that terrorism isn’t our nation’s only threat – today we also need to focus on emergency management and preparation. This is a reality of 21st-century life.”

The 12-credit program addresses such challenges with four courses: Fundamentals of Homeland Security; Intelligence and Homeland Security; Bioterrorism and Homeland Security; and Current Issues in Homeland Security. Students will take two consecutive eight-week courses in the fall semester and again in the spring semester, to earn the certificate in a single academic year.

“The Homeland Security Certificate provides our many students interested in employment in the homeland security area with an additional academic credential and a skill set for potential employment,” explains Connolly. “Graduates in Justice Studies and other related fields can go immediately into the workforce but still continue their studies, while professionals in other sectors can gain the training and credential they need to make a career change and enter this expanding industry. Since this is a strictly online program, we hope to reach a large pool of students – both from New Jersey and around the nation.”

“Students who earn the Homeland Security certificate will gain crucial insights into emergency management, criminal investigations and intelligence,” says Justice Studies Professor Christopher Martinez. “When they sit down for job interviews, they’ll be able to intelligently discuss current issues and how to mitigate them.”

Martinez pulled from his own experience as a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agent and senior manager to develop online content for the program’s four courses. “I hope to bring the lessons and textbooks to life through first-hand experiences and industry cases.”

Montclair State notes that career opportunities in homeland security exist in both the public and private sectors. These positions range from security management specialists and intelligence analysts, to adjudication officers, emergency planners, and special agents.

The school adds that the application fees will be waived for those registering for the first cohort to begin this September.

► Learn more by visiting [www.montclair.edu/online/online-programs/homeland-security-cert/](http://www.montclair.edu/online/online-programs/homeland-security-cert/)



## Are We Ready for a “Fedayeen-Style” Attack?

By Jason McNamara and William Rosenau

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/special-are-we-ready-for-a-fedayeen-style-attack/a9e59a9bdc9f22036d28137db5964ef.html>

May 10 – The ability to adapt is one of the defining features of high-performing armed groups. In Syria and Iraq, the tactics of the Islamic State (ISIS) have evolved in response to airstrikes and other military operations by the United States and partner nations.

But ISIS’s ability to adapt is not confined to the Middle East battlespace. In Paris on November 13, 2015, and in Brussels on March 22, 2016, local men affiliated with ISIS



carried out deadly “Fedayeen,” or “men of sacrifice,” operations—that is, multiple, coordinated attacks on lightly defended “soft targets” intended to produce maximum civilian casualties, generate media coverage, and overwhelm emergency services.

In the years since September 11, 2001, US officials have directed policies, programs, and resources towards preventing attacks on iconic infrastructure targets. The incidents in Paris and Brussels suggest that ISIS—and by implication, other terrorist groups—may be focusing increasingly on mass casualty attacks on civilians in multiple locations.

Carrying out a Fedayeen-style attack in the United States would not be easy—but it is possible. In fact, it has already taken place, albeit in a form that was relatively unsophisticated by Islamic State standards. The April 20, 1999 massacre at Columbine High School, which left 12 students and one teacher dead, and more than 20 injured, involved firearms, homemade bombs, and arson.

Since then, first responders have developed effective protocols for responding to such incidents and reducing the loss of civilian life. But more needs to be done at all levels of government.

### Assessing the threat

Multiple attacks on civilian targets have been part of the repertoire of armed groups for decades. It was an Al Qaeda affiliated organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was responsible for the November 26-29, 2008 attacks in Mumbai. LeT carried out a series of shootings and bombing attacks lasting four days across Mumbai. These attacks established what one analyst calls “a gold standard for how a small group of suicidal fanatics can paralyze a major city, attract global attention, and terrorize a continent.”

Mumbai illustrated the massive impact of such operations, but also highlighted the challenges associated with successfully mounting these kinds of attacks. They are, in essence, commando operations that require training, intelligence and logistical support, and communications security. There is considerable evidence that LeT received assistance from Pakistani intelligence officers. Similarly, Abdelhamid Abaaoud and other participants in the Paris attacks were reportedly trained for the operation in Syria.

Although hundreds of American citizens and long-term residents have gone—or have attempted to go—to Syria, according to FBI Director James B. Comey, there is no publicly available evidence to confirm that any have received the training required to carry out a sophisticated Fedayeen-style attack.

With respect to the threat from ISIS, it appears that the greatest danger is posed by relative amateurs inside the United States who are inspired by the Islamic State’s call to build the caliphate, but have no direct operational ties to ISIS. The husband and wife team responsible for the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015 fit this profile.

The good news is that such individuals are likely to be less capable than those responsible for the terrorist attacks in Europe and South Asia. The bad news is that given their lack of any obvious international connection, they may be harder for intelligence agencies to identify and track ahead of time.

### Developing a response

The experience captured from dozens of school shootings in the United States has significantly altered tactical thinking over the past 15 years, and has dramatically raised the stakes for rank-and-file patrol officers who first arrive on the scene. In fact, the basic active-shooter protocol in the United States has been fine-tuned to take into account multiple shooters, suicide vests and other dangers that were once close to unthinkable.

First responders are now trained in response tactics that concurrently secure the situation by killing or disarming the attackers, and provide aid to the wounded through immediate deployment of emergency medical technicians to the scene.

The Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS), sponsored by the National Counterterrorism Center and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since 2010, has helped numerous large cities in the United States discover capability gaps, apply best practices, and leverage available resources from local, state, federal and private sector organizations to mitigate a complex, multi-incident, terrorist attack.

Similar examples of successful interagency coordination, interoperable communications, and tactics that minimize the loss of life should be widely adopted in





anticipation of the next mass casualty incident, regardless of the motivations of the perpetrators.

Overall progress on this front was demonstrated following the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, which resulted in three deaths and more than 260 injuries. These were the first Improvised Explosive Devices to cause mass injuries in the United States, but over a decade of training on mass casualty events by the emergency managers in Boston's medical community – including exercises based on a Boston Marathon scenario – prevented the loss of many more lives.

The nation's challenge in the face of the increased likelihood of terrorist attacks targeting the homeland is not only how to prevent these attacks, but also – and of equal importance – how we will mitigate the consequences of these incidents as they unfold. Those communities that already have, regrettably, experienced mass casualty incidents, along with the major US cities that have benefited from the JCTAWS program, have clearly shown that enhanced training programs and modified response tactics can save lives.

But more needs to be done. DHS and other US government agencies should focus more resources, on a nationwide basis, towards improving police, fire, and emergency medical response to mass casualty incidents. Although these attacks may be more demanding for our first responders, a vast body of knowledge exists, including after-action reports, lessons learned, and international expertise that could contribute to even more effective training and information sharing across the public safety community.

Rather than drawing an artificial distinction between the immediate response to acts of

terrorism versus the response to other domestic mass casualty incidents, it may be more useful to compile the lessons learned from both types of incidents to discover the most effective response tactics.

In fact, the similarities between acts of terrorism and domestic shooting incidents that result in mass casualties suggest that public safety and law enforcement officials could adopt – and in many cases already have adopted – a more consistent approach to incident response that would contain the damage already done, and minimize the loss of additional lives.

### Conclusion

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, much of the US government adopted a “never again” mentality with respect to terrorism. Working to prevent attacks is essential, of course, but it is also important to recognize that despite our best efforts, some terrorists will hit their intended targets. If the Paris and Brussels attacks are any indication, ISIS may be adopting Mumbai-style tactics, particularly in the West.

It would be irresponsible for American policymakers to assume that the United States is somehow immune to such attacks. Policymakers and practitioners should continue to build on the progress they have made since Columbine. Although their motives may differ, school shooters, Islamic State supporters, and violent right-wing extremists—whom US law enforcement considers the most dangerous domestic threat—sometimes have employed similar modus operandi.

**Looking at mass-casualty violence holistically can help first responders develop more effective means for containing and reducing civilian casualties.**

*Jason McNamara is Senior Director for Emergency Management Programs at CNA, a federally funded research and development center in Arlington, Virginia. He served as chief of staff for the Federal Emergency Management Agency from 2009 – 2013.*

*William Rosenau, Ph.D. is a senior analyst at CNA's Center for Strategic Studies. The views expressed here are those of the authors.*

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** This is down to earth article (despite the old fashion Feadeen reference).. It is for sure that we will manage to hunt and kill the terrorists at the end. The big challenge is how fast we will respond and how many people will be killed/injured before we do this (the last sentence of the article). Exactly what happened in recent Paris and Brussels attacks...



## London Mayor Sadiq Khan on Religious Extremism, Brexit and Donald Trump

Source: <http://time.com/4322562/london-mayor-sadiq-khan-donald-trump/>

May 09 – Sadiq Khan, 45, was declared the new mayor of London in the early hours of Saturday, becoming the most powerful Muslim politician in Europe. A Transport Minister in the Labour government of former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Khan came under severe attack during the campaign from his Conservative opponent, Zac Goldsmith, for sharing platforms with extremists during his earlier career as a human-rights lawyer.

Fresh from his victory, Khan sat down with TIME on Sunday in his new office in City Hall, a bulbous glass building overlooking Tower Bridge. In these excerpts from the conversation, Khan claims he is the “antidote” to extremism, reveals that the prospect of a Donald Trump presidency might force him to meet U.S. mayors before the end of the year, and explains why he’s campaigning to keep the U.K. in the European Union ahead of June’s In/Out referendum.

**You’re the first Muslim mayor of a major western city. Do you feel an extra responsibility to tackle religious extremism?**

One of the things that’s important to me as a Londoner is making sure my family, people I care about, are safe. But clearly, being someone who is a Muslim brings with it experiences that I can use in relation to dealing with extremists and those who want to blow us up. And so it’s really important that I use my experiences to defeat radicalization and extremism. What I think the election showed was that actually there is no clash of civilization between Islam and the West. **I am the West, I am a Londoner, I’m British, I’m of Islamic faith, Asian origin, Pakistan heritage, so whether it’s [ISIS] or these others who want to destroy our way of life and talk about the West, they’re talking about me.** What better antidote to the hatred they spew than someone like me being in this position?

**How do you win around impressionable young Muslims who could be lured into extremism?**

You say to youngsters you can be British, Muslim and successful. You point to successful British role models. The biggest export we’ve got is [former One Direction singer] Zayn Malik. The most successful British sports person ever is Mohamed Farah, a double Olympic champion and a world-record holder. Who won the Great British Bake Off? Nadiya Hussain. We can point to, when we speak to young Brits of Islamic faith, successful role models. You can go in to business, you can go in to medicine, you can go to politics, dare I say it.

So, when somebody comes along and tries to brainwash them with a sort of nihilistic view of life and say the way to get success in this world and the hereafter is to get a Kalashnikov and go to commit — in inverted commas — *jihad* is to say, “you know what? That’s not true.”

**The Conservatives linked you to extremists in what has been viewed as one of the most vicious campaigns ever waged in the U.K. How did that feel?**

My experience in relation to taking on the preachers of hate was saying to them it’s compatible being British, being Western, being Muslim. I’ve experienced the receiving end of this extremism, whether it’s the extremists campaigning against me when I stood for Parliament in 2005 and 2010 and 2015, saying somehow it was haram — sinful — to vote, let alone to stand for Parliament. I’ve been on the receiving end of a fatwa when fighting for equality in relation to same sex marriage [in 2013], so I understand what that’s like.

**Do you think London’s reputation has been damaged by such a divisive campaign?**

London chose to come out in record numbers, the highest turnout there’s ever been in a mayoral election, and — I say this not with arrogance it is what others have said — the single biggest mandate a British politician has ever received. That shows what a wonderful city we are. We’re not simply tolerating each other — you tolerate a toothache, I don’t want to be tolerated. We respect, we embrace, and we celebrate, which is fantastic.



**You accused the Conservatives of using a “Donald Trump playbook.” What’s your view on a potential Trump presidency given his remarks on Muslims?**

Clearly [I’ll visit] before January in case Donald Trump wins ... Hope, I think, is a good way of persuading people to vote for you, energize and enthuse people. I think to try and look for differences, to try and turn communities against each other is not conducive to living successfully and amicably.

I think Bill de Blasio is doing interesting housing stuff in New York, Rahm Emanuel is doing interesting stuff with the infrastructure bank in Chicago. I want to go to America to meet with and engage with American mayors. If Donald Trump becomes the President, I’ll be stopped from going there by virtue of my faith, which means I can’t engage with American mayors and swap ideas. Conservative tacticians thought those sorts of tactics would win London and they were wrong. I’m confident that Donald Trump’s approach to politics won’t win in America.

**Update, May 10:** After this interview was published, Trump suggested Khan would be exempt from any prohibitions on Muslims entering the U.S. “There are always exceptions,” he told the New York Times. “I think [his election] is a very good thing,

*and I hope he does a very good job ... If he does a good job and frankly if he does a great job, that would be a terrific thing.”*

**What would happen to London’s position as one of the world’s leading financial centers if the U.K. voted to leave the European Union?**

I think leaving the European Union would be catastrophic for our city. The E.U.’s GDP is bigger than China, is bigger than the U.S. We’ve got a market of 500 million people in the European Union. They’re not just a market, they’re our cousins. If you look at London, there are huge social benefits, huge cultural benefits, huge benefits to our security, but the economic benefits are massive. More than half a million jobs in London are directly dependent on the E.U. Sixty percent of the world’s leading companies, including Sony, AIG insurance, China Telecom, have their E.U. headquarters here in London. Half of London’s exports go to the European Union. I’m going to be a Labour mayor campaigning with a Conservative Prime Minister for us to remain in the European Union. It’s crucial going forward.

*This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity*

**EDITOR’S COMMENT:** There is a lot of criticism on the new Mayor of London. It is only TIME that will prove if what he declares is true or not despite his past activities, beliefs and actions.



**'Kill Me Now, I Have to Be in Heaven by Four'**

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/news/kill-me-now-i-have-be-heaven-four>

**May 12 – An ISIS prisoner captured by the Peshmerga near Mosul demanded to be executed immediately since he had to be in heaven by 4pm.**

He informed his captors the day of his capture was the Muslim festival of Isra and Mi'raj, which celebrates the famous night journey of the founder of Islam Muhammed to Jerusalem and his temporary ascension to heaven to receive instruction from Allah. The fighter claimed he wanted to attend a commemoration ceremony for this event in heaven, which he said would start at 4pm.

One of the fighters of the Peshmerga who was assigned to the prisoner said the armed man told him “Don’t take care of me, you are an infidel.”

A lieutenant-colonel in the forces of the Peshmerga, Salim al-Surji, bandaged the wounds of the prisoner. He spoke to Rudaw media after a battle at Telskuf in which several Peshmerga fighters were killed.





"While I was filming the ISIS men on my phone" Surji said, "I saw that one of them was moving his ankle. So that's when I put my hand on his chest and found that he was breathing. He was also conscious and talking. His explosive belt had not detonated and he was hurt in his ankle due to the explosion of one of his comrades. He was unable to walk. He told me 'you are infidels, kill me.'"

Al-Surji didn't listen to him and bandaged his ankle.

"While I was bandaging his wound I asked him where he was from and he said he's from Samarra (a city in Iraq) and that he came to fight here with 50 other armed men. They were supposed to commit suicide using their suicide belts because today is the anniversary of the Isra and Mi'raj celebration. He told me 'all of us must be in heaven by 4pm, kill me.'"

## Islamic State alphabet app educates kids with pictures of guns, bullets, rockets

Source: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-12/islamic-state-release-alphabet-app-for-children/7408554>

May 13 – The Islamic State group is well known for being technology savvy, and now it has launched a mobile app aimed at children.



There are pictures of tanks, guns, and rockets, all apparently designed to help lure a new generation of fighters.

When the **app Huroof** — an Arabic word for alphabet — launches, its appearance looks harmless at first, colourful and bright like any other children's app.

But the alphabet game uses pictures of canons, rifles, rockets and bullets beside letters.

It is the group's first crack at indoctrination for toddlers via an app.

Huroof first appeared two days ago and though some download sites have blocked it, the World Today found it inside messages on a well-known platform.

Identifying and blocking these sorts of accounts takes time, and for every blocked account, another can just as easily be set up.

Telegram, one of the big instant messaging platforms, claiming 100 million users, published a tweet that said "this week we blocked 78 ISIS-related channels across 12 languages".



**'It's like a hydra; you shut down one and they pop up'**

Anthony Cuthbertson, a technology reporter for Newsweek, spends time on apps in groups that ISIS and its supporters have founded.

"It's just another tool in their armoury, and

apps like Telegram and Wickr and Kik, they all offer methods of both communicating securely amongst members but also sharing propaganda and instructional videos and also just as a tool for recruitment," he said.

Media player: "Space" to play, "M" to mute, "left" and "right" to seek.

"And you see them on Twitter, you see the cyber caliphate there, but they were being shut down a lot. They've now moved to Telegram and from there they're moving to other platforms."



Brendan Koerner from Wired Magazine said IS's strategic marketing plan for online warfare origins can be traced to a report written a decade ago.

"If you go back to a document called The Management of Savagery, it's an e-book — by a jihadist cleric who wrote under the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji — that came out in 2004," he said.

"He really made a point of saying that the West has been so successful in its efforts to subjugate the Muslim world because of its mastery of media, and that jihadists had to study Western media practices and techniques if they wanted to triumph in this clash of civilisations.

Mr Koerner said Islamic State media now rarely uploaded videos of executions and other atrocities.

"Many of them are portraying everyday life in the Islamic State as this blissful, wonderful experience," he said.

"They tailor all their videos to specific audiences around the world, both through language and also the customs and aesthetics of these videos.

"You may have one video targeted towards Bosnian recruits, that's in Bosnian and takes into account Bosnian customary practices, and another targeted towards say, Filipino communities.

"They're very savvy about narrow casting and tailoring their content to specific audiences around the globe."

And now they are targeting children, or as Islamic State refers to them, "cubs".

## Should the U.S. Build an 'ISIS Wall'?

By Raymond Ibrahim

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5995/should-us-build-an-isis-wall>



May 05 – Of all the reasons a majority of Americans support the plan of businessman and U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump to "build a wall" along the U.S.-Mexico border, perhaps the most critical is to avoid letting terrorists into the country. Drugs enter, the victims of traffickers enter, but the most imminent danger comes from operatives of the Islamic State (ISIS) and like-minded groups that are

trying to use this porous border as a way to smuggle weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) into the United States and launch terror attacks that could make 9/11 seem like a morning in May.

Just last week, "One of the American men accused in Minnesota of trying to join the Islamic State group wanted to open up routes from Syria to the U.S. through Mexico... Guled Ali Omar told the ISIS members about the route so that it could be used to send members to America to carry out terrorist attacks, prosecutors alleged in a document."

ISIS, however, did not need to be told by Ali about the route. Nearly a year earlier, ISIS explored options on how it could smuggle a WMD "into the U.S. through Mexico by using existing trafficking networks in Latin America."

**The Islamic State's magazine *Dabiq* last May (issue #9) published the following scenario:**

Let me throw a hypothetical operation onto the table. The Islamic State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call on their wilāyah [province] in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region. ... The weapon is then transported over land until it makes it to Libya, where the mujāhidīn [jihadis] move it south to Nigeria. Drug shipments from Columbia bound for Europe





pass through West Africa, so moving other types of contraband from East to West is just as possible. The nuke and accompanying mujāhidīn arrive on the shorelines of South America and are transported through the porous borders of Central America before arriving in Mexico and up to the border with the United States. From there it's just a quick hop through a smuggling tunnel and hey presto, they're mingling with another 12 million 'illegal' aliens in America with a nuclear bomb in the trunk of their car.

The ISIS publication added that if not a nuke, "a few thousand tons of ammonium nitrate explosive," which is easily manufactured, could be smuggled.

**Such thinking is hardly new. Back in 2009, a Kuwaiti cleric explained how easy it would be to murder countless Americans by crossing through the Mexican border:**

Four pounds of anthrax — in a suitcase this big — carried by a fighter through tunnels from Mexico into the U.S. are guaranteed to kill 330,000 Americans within a single hour if it is properly spread in population centers there. What a horrifying idea; 9/11 will be small change in comparison. Am I right? There is no need for airplanes, conspiracies, timings and so on. One person, with the courage to carry 4 pounds of anthrax, will go to the White House lawn, and will spread this 'confetti' all over them, and then we'll do these cries of joy. It will turn into a real celebration.

Plans aside, ISIS and other Islamic terrorists are based in and coming from Mexico. The evidence is piling up. In August 2014, Judicial Watch reported that ISIS was "operating in the Mexican border city of Ciudad Juarez and planning to attack the United States with car bombs or other vehicle borne improvised explosive devices." Months later in April 2015, ISIS was exposed operating in the northern

Mexican state of Chihuahua — eight miles from the U.S.

The Israeli-built border fence between Israel and Egypt, completed in December 2013, put a complete stop to illegal infiltration from Egypt into Israel.

In October 2014, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif) said, "I know that at least 10 ISIS fighters have been caught coming across the Mexican border in Texas." The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) emphatically denied Hunter's claims, called

them "categorically false" and added that "no credible intelligence to suggest terrorist organizations are actively plotting to cross the southwest border." Days later, however, it was confirmed that "4 ISIS Terrorists" were arrested crossing the border into Texas.

On September 20, 2015, "U.S. Border Patrol nabbed two Pakistani men with ties to terrorism at the U.S.-Mexico border. ... Both men ... took advantage of smuggling networks or other routes increasingly used by Central American illegal immigrants to sneak into the U.S."

This is uncomfortably reminiscent of the scenario outlined in the ISIS magazine: after naming Pakistan as the nation from which to acquire nukes — the two men arrested for "ties to terrorism" were from Pakistan — the *Dabiq* excerpt explained: "The nuke and accompanying mujāhidīn... are transported through the porous borders of Central America before arriving in Mexico and up to the border with the United States. From there it's just a quick hop through a smuggling tunnel."

On December 2, 2015, "A Middle Eastern woman was caught surveilling a U.S. port of entry on the Mexican border holding a sketchbook with Arabic writing and drawings of the facility and its security system." Around the same time, "five young Middle Eastern men





were apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol in Amado, an Arizona town situated about 30 miles from the Mexican border. Two of the men were carrying stainless steel cylinders in backpacks..."

These arrests clearly indicate that Islamic terrorists are crossing the border into the U.S. For every illegal person caught, how many are not? One estimate says that at best only half of those illegally crossing the border are ever apprehended. **Under Obama's presidency alone, 2.5 million illegals have crossed the border. And those are just the ones we know about. How many of these are ISIS operatives, sympathizers or facilitators? Border guards cannot even be "especially alert" for terrorists: many easily blend in with native Mexicans.**

Three facts are undisputed: 1) ISIS and other terrorist groups see Mexico as a launching pad for terrorist acts in the U.S.; 2) ISIS and other terrorist groups have bases of operations in Mexico; 3) Members of ISIS and other terrorist groups have been caught trying to enter through the border.

In other words, it is just a matter of time. As Rep. Duncan Hunter once put it:

**If you really want to protect Americans from ISIS, you secure the southern border. It's that simple. ISIS doesn't have a navy, they don't have an air force, they don't have nuclear weapons. The only way that ISIS is going to harm Americans is by coming in through the southern border — which they already have.**

Just as before 9/11 — when U.S. leadership had received ample warnings of a spectacular terrorist attack targeting the U.S. — this problem may well be ignored until a spectacular attack occurs: San Bernardino was apparently too small, it did not count. Then, it will be more of the usual from the comatose media and many politicians: "shock," hand-wringing, and appeals against "Islamophobia."

**Securing the U.S.-Mexico border — with an electronic fence, which has worked so effectively in Israel — is more urgent than we think.**

*Raymond Ibrahim is a Judith Friedman Rosen fellow at the Middle East Forum and a Shillman fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center.*

## UK police apologise for Muslim phrase 'Allahu akbar' used in terrorism training exercise

Source: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-11/uk-police-apologise-for-muslim-phrase-in-terror-exercise/7403196>



**May 13 – British police have apologised after officers shouted the Arabic phrase "Allahu akbar!" during a terror training exercise in a shopping centre in northern England.**

In video footage of the exercise broadcast on British television, a fake Muslim terrorist dressed in black could be seen running into the complex in Manchester shouting the words before setting off a bomb and falling to the floor.





"On reflection, we acknowledge that it was unacceptable to use this religious phrase immediately before the mock suicide bombing, which so vocally linked this exercise with Islam," said Garry Shewan, a senior officer at Greater Manchester Police.

In a statement, Mr Shewan said the scenario had been based on "a suicide attack by an extremist Daesh-style organisation" — Daesh being an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State militant group — but added: "We recognise and apologise for the offence that this has caused."

The phrase "allahu akbar" is Arabic for "God is greater."

Tony Lloyd, mayor of Greater Manchester, said using the phrase was "ill-judged, unnecessary and unacceptable", while activists accused police of racial stereotyping.



#### Editor's comment as well!

"It didn't add anything to the event, but has the potential to undermine the great community relations we have in Greater Manchester," Mayor Lloyd said.

The role play exercise on the outskirts of Manchester involved 800 people, including actors made up to resemble gunshot victims with horrific injuries.

Police said there was no specific threat in Manchester and the exercise was devised in December a month after the Paris attacks which killed 130 people and were claimed by Islamic State jihadists.

Britain's terror threat level remains at severe, which means the security services consider an attack to be "highly likely".

## Police chief says Trafford Centre terror drill was a success, but 'we have learned lessons'

Source: <http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/terrorist-training-exercise-success-police-11327800>



May 13 – Chief Constable Ian Hopkins hopes that a three-day terror training exercise will raise vigilance amongst the public.

Despite being tarnished by controversy he believes the drill, based on real life incidents, was a success.

Its timing this week came as the threat of a terrorism attack linked to Ireland rose from moderate to substantial, and the threat of an international strike remains severe.

The event started with a fake suicide bomber at the Trafford Centre, and ended with a siege situation at a former children's home in Newton-le-Willows, where terrorists armed with Ak47 rifles, were eliminated.



Mr Hopkins said: "It has gone very well. It was a testing exercise to put our agencies through their paces.

"There is currently a high level threat to the UK and we can only combat terrorism by standing together. By allowing the media to cover this event we can make it clear to the public that they need to be a bit more vigilant."

**About 2,000 people took part in the drill with officers from GMP, the North West Counter Terrorism Unit, the military, intelligence agencies, and fire and ambulance services.**

GMP issued an apology after the 'bomber' shouted 'Allahu Akbar' when detonating his device.

But Mr Hopkins said: "The religious phrase that was used and caused offence was not scripted and did not involve any police officer or GMP employee.

"I can't comment on who it was. The people taking part in the exercise did not know what was going to be said."

**The events included three scenarios based on the attack on the Westgate Shopping Centre, in Kenya in 2013, followed by a manhunt similar to the one after the Paris attacks last year. It concluded with a Bataclan-style siege with added complexity as it took place across two locations.**

Mr Hopkins added: "Recent events in Paris, Brussels and around the world have shown us that the response from agencies has to be robust if we are to save lives.

"I want to ensure we are ready to protect the people of Greater Manchester and the UK if the unthinkable was to happen.

"We want to be able to make mistakes now in safe environment so that we can get it right when the call comes.

"We have undertaken a swift debrief of the exercise with those who helped to develop it. There are many lessons we can learn that will improve the national response to a potential terrorist attack and help to protect people.



**"One learning point has been that future exercises need to take more cognisance of cultural and religious sensitivities at the planning stages and community groups should be brought in to advise. We have raised this with the directors of the exercise."**

## Terrorism Is Profitable for US Weapons Manufacturers

By Mark Karlin (Editor @ Buzzflash at Truthout)

Source: <http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/terrorism-is-profitable-for-the-us-weapons-manufacturers>

May 11 – The National Priorities Project recently sent out an email with the subject line, **"Terrorism means business, if you're a defense contractor."** The message bluntly states:

If you're a defense contractor, terrorism means business, and business is good.

According to recent reports, the corporate defense behemoth Lockheed Martin's revenue rose 15.7% and shares rose 1.5% following the news that President Obama was committing an additional 250 troops in Syria.

Lockheed Martin was the biggest federal contract in 2014, pulling in more than \$32 billion in federal contracts, including \$25 billion in Pentagon contracts. Its federal haul makes it practically an honorary state.

In fact, the Project states that the contracts received by Lockheed Martin in 2014 exceed federal grants allotted to each individual state, with the exceptions of the high-population states of California, New York and Texas.

In a blog entry on the National Priorities Project site, research director Lindsay Koshgarian states, "Lockheed and its defense industry companions have made enough profits from taxpayer dollars. It's past time to show them that terrorism doesn't pay."

The Project email brought to mind a March Los Angeles Times article, which revealed, "CIA-armed militias are shooting at Pentagon-armed ones in Syria." Yes, the two major halves of the US war machine were backing anti-Assad factions who were fighting each other with United States-supplied arms:





Syrian militias armed by different parts of the U.S. war machine have begun to fight each other on the plains between the besieged city of Aleppo and the Turkish border, highlighting how little control U.S. intelligence officers and military planners have over the groups they have financed and trained in the bitter 5-year-old civil war.

## WAR IS ROBBERY — GENERAL EISENHOWER

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed.

This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children...



This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron  
— President Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Supreme Allied Commander in WWII  
Chance for Peace speech, (1953)

In the absence of newly declared war, how would the military-industrial complex prosper without terrorism? (Image: KAZ Vorpal)

The fighting has intensified over the past two months, as CIA-armed units and Pentagon-armed ones have repeatedly shot at each other as they have maneuvered through contested territory on the northern outskirts of Aleppo, U.S. officials and rebel leaders have confirmed.

In mid-February, a CIA-armed militia called Fursan al Haq, or Knights of Righteousness, was run out of the town of Marea, about 20 miles north of Aleppo, by Pentagon-backed Syrian Democratic Forces moving in from Kurdish-controlled areas to the east.

The rest of the Los Angeles Times article describes a maelstrom of chaotic US involvement in a conflict that appears more like a circling firing squad than a strategic military effort. Not only is the US involvement in the Syrian war to be lamented, it appears to resemble a Three Stooges segment. At times, yes, terrorism is good for the armaments industry.

In today's edition of Truthout, Gareth Porter documents that the US is still backing forces working with al Qaeda in Syria:

The gradual erosion of the cease-fire in Syria over the past month is the result of multiple factors shaping the conflict, but one of the underlying reasons is the Obama administration's failure to carry out its commitment to Russia to get US-supported opposition groups to separate themselves physically from the Nusra Front -- the al-Qaeda organization in Syria....

The administration's vacillation on the issue reflects the reality that the US-supported armed opposition has no intention to withdraw from its close military collaboration with Nusra Front. It also reflects deep divisions within the administration over Syria policy. Obama has leaned toward working with Russia on a cease-fire as an alternative to reliance on the armed opposition to put pressure on Bashar al-Assad, but senior officials in the Pentagon, CIA and US State Department remain strongly committed to ramping up military assistance to anti-Assad forces.



Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry continues to dangle out the hope of a "permanent" ceasefire" for the umpteenth time.

Of course, the Syrian calamity is further exacerbated by the US and NATO effort to "defeat" ISIS (also known as Daesh). One of the challenges in relation to ISIS is its forces are well-armed in large part because they have seized US weapons from overrunning Iraqi army positions.

All of this must, as the National Priorities Project notes, make the arms manufacturers elated -- to see terrorism literally pay, in terms of profits and multi-billion dollar contracts from the Pentagon and CIA.

After all, in the absence of new declared wars -- for the moment -- how would the military-industrial-intelligence complex prosper without the so-called "war on terrorism"?

In the war on terror, one often can't tell if the US is intentionally creating terrorism, or just ineptly wasting taxpayer dollars so corporations can profit and militarized bureaucracies can flourish.

**There's money to be made in terrorism, all right; lots of it. It makes you wonder if our government's goal is to eliminate terrorism or to perpetuate it.**

## Number of suspected terrorist entering Germany as refugees doubles

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160512-number-of-suspected-terrorist-entering-germany-as-refugees-doubles>

May 12 – **The German federal police agency, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), said it is investigating the possible arrival of forty Islamist militants among more than 1.1 million refugees who have entered the country during since the beginning of 2015. The BKA said it had received 369 reports of possible extremists and found that forty of the cases required more investigation.**

to launch attacks in Germany," a spokesperson for the BKA said.

"More attacks by Islamist terror cells cannot be ruled out."

The *Globe and Mail* reports that several of the terrorists who carried out the November 2015 Paris had passed through Germany on their return from Syria, travelling on fake documents.

French investigators say that two more jihadists were supposed to join the terrorists but were prevented from reaching Paris after being detained for questioning at a refugee center in Austria.

Salah Abdeslam, who is now in French custody, picked up one of terrorists in the southern German city of Ulm in October last year. He drove to Ulm with Osama Krayem, who faces charges in Brussels for his involvement in both the Paris and Brussels attacks.

Several suspected Islamists have been arrested in Germany since the Paris and Brussels attacks.

Hans-Georg Maassen, the head of Germany's domestic intelligence agency (BfV), said ISIS was attempting to "send a political signal" by using the refugee route to stoke fears and mistrust in Europe.



This is an increase relative to numbers the BKA released in January, when eighteen investigations were found to be warranted after 213 warnings had been received.

"German security officials have indications that members and supporters of terrorist organizations are being smuggled in with refugees in a targeted, organized way in order



"I am not telling you a secret when I say that I am concerned about the high number of migrants whose identities we don't know because they had no papers when they entered the country," he said.

The number of refugees entering Germany peaked at more than 10,000 a day last autumn,

but has since dwindled to a trickle as a result of the closing of the Greek border with Macedonia and a deal between the EU and Turkey.

**Some 800 Germans are believed to have joined ISIS as foreign fighters.**

## Italian police cannot unlock Bari terrorist iPhone

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160512-italian-police-cannot-unlock-bari-terrorist-iphone>

May 12 – **The Italian security services have been unable to unlock the Apple iPhone 6 plus of a suspect member of a terrorist ring in the city of Bari.**

Analysts say the development will likely result in another stand-off between Apple and a government fighting terrorism, similar to the stand-off between Apple and the U.S. government over the iPhone used by the San Bernardino terrorists.

The *Local* quotes Roberto Rossi, a prosecutor in the southern port city of Bari, who said police had been unable to penetrate an iPhone that belonged to a suspect named as Mansoor Ahmadzai.

Rossi said investigators had been able to analyze the contents of two Samsung Galaxy phones which were used by two other suspects who were arrested, and that the phones had provided valuable photographic and video evidence of "inspections" that had allegedly been made of various sites.

"It must be said that here we have found the same difficulty that found was encountered by the FBI, because we seized an iPhone that we were unable to breach. This is a real problem ... because the balance between protection of privacy and the protection of the person is a serious problem that must be viewed on an international level," Rossi said, according to the Italian daily *La Stampa*.

The *Local* notes that on Wednesday, FBI director James Comey said there would be more cases in which the U.S. government would take companies to court if they refuse to allow access to their devices. **Comey told reporters that FBI experts have examined about 4,000 devices since October and have been unable to unlock approximately 500.**

The three suspects who were arrested in Bari on Tuesday were part of a terror cell that was plotting possible attacks in Italy and the United Kingdom.



## Through the Eyes of an Islamist Extremist: The World according to Bosnia's Fatmir Alipahić

By Gordon N. Bardos

Source: <http://acdemocracy.org/through-the-eyes-of-an-islamist-extremist-the-world-according-to-bosnias-fatmir-alipahic/>

May 10 – Over the past twenty-five years, the militant Islamist movement in Bosnia & Herzegovina has developed a broad range of electronic and print propaganda vehicles designed to draw recruits and spread ethnic and religious intolerance.

These propaganda outlets include the openly pro-ISIS websites *Put Hilafeta* ("Way of the Caliphate") and *Vijesti Ummeta* ("News of the Community"), to the pro-Al Nusra *Put Vjernika* ("Way of the Believer"), to a host of other websites and publications which are more narrowly Bosnian Islamofascist in orientation. Typical of the latter are websites such as [dersovi.com](http://dersovi.com) and [minber.com](http://minber.com), which host sermons by prominent Islamist extremist clerics in the region.

The views these individuals publicly promote range from the absurd to the deranged to the psychopathic. One popular Islamic cleric in Bosnia, the Jordanian- and Saudi-educated





Safet Kuduzović maintains that Muslim women should not be allowed to travel more the fifty miles alone, and are only allowed to go to the beach in January and February, and even then only with their eyes closed.[1]

Unfortunately, his other views are less laughable.

Concerning freedom of expression, Kuduzović argues: cursing and insulting the Prophet is a sin for which one is to be killed. He who curses the Prophet is killed. Whether he repents or does not, it does not matter. If he curses and insults the Prophet, he should be killed. Even if he repents before all the people, he has to be killed. He has to be punished because he is a criminal that has to be judged.[2]

Unfortunately, Kuduzović is not alone in his extremism.

One of the most visible and active proponents of the militant Islamist movement on the Bosnian public scene is **Fatmir Alispahić**, a



contributor to the Islamist extremist publication *Saff* and host of the weekly television program *Defter Hefte*, which airs on Sarajevo's "Muslim TV Igman." *Saff* was founded by indigenous members of the Al Qaeda unit in Alija Izetbegović's army during the Bosnian jihad, the El Mudžahedin battalion, and is a frequent outlet for Islamist extremists such as Alispahić, Nezim Halilović-Muderis, the imam of the Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, and Mustafa Cerić, the former grand mufti of Bosnia. *Saff's* editorial position is essentially a form of Bosnian Islamofascism, with a steady stream of virulent hate-speech directed against Croats and Serbs, and articles overwhelmingly anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Semitic in tone. A typical example of the type of article *Saff* publishes was a recent "expose" on "the Zionist conspiracy—how they have taken control of the banks, founded Israel, directed two world wars, and have begun to poison us with medicines." [3]

A survey of Alispahić's views over the past decade reveal the bizarre world of Bosnian Islamists, and the incredible intellectual and semantic acrobatics they perform to sustain their arguments. Alispahić, for instance, vehemently maintains that he is a democrat devoted to human rights, multiethnic and

interconfessional tolerance, and a just world order. For most people his views reflect quite the opposite.

#### Consider, for instance, the following:

##### **On the United States and the 9/11 attacks:**

"[T]here is incontrovertible evidence that America attacked America on 9/11 . . . only time separates us from the recognition that there is no difference between Hitler's Germany and this America . . . America remains closer to Hitler and Brejvik than to the palaces of Bosnian multiculturalism and natural antifascism." [4]

"On September 11<sup>th</sup>, a coup d'etat was carried out in the United States, with the goal of starting a 'new world war,' that is, robbing the American budget for the needs of the Zionist military-industrial mafia." [5]

##### **On the Holocaust:**

"For years in the West, there have been attempts to provide a scholarly alternative to the product of Jewish suffering in the Second World War. Nevertheless, none of this research is reaching us. Understandably, since the political power that Jews possess does not allow for tampering with the 'truth' of the Holocaust. Scholars who have attempted to contradict the official version of facts have been brutally persecuted. Nevertheless, through this media fog, some theses have succeeded in breaking through to us which provide a completely different light on the textual products by which until today we have unreservedly believed that Hitler killed six million Jews. [These scholars] claim that the 'gas chambers' were built for tourists who visit Auschwitz . . . The crematoria are a particular discussion. The official history claims that the Nazis could cremate bodies in ten minutes, but science claims that two hours are needed for that process. It is



claimed that no depository of ashes has been found anywhere, [whereas] 'six million cremated Jews would have created at least one hill of dross.' These scholars believe that the claim of six million killed Jews is an ordinary lie because on the territory under Nazi control there were four million Jews, of which two million fled to Russia. It is asserted that only 300,000 Jews died, and that as a result of typhus and exhaustion in concentration camps."

#### **On Israel:**

"Today there is no more humanistic ideal than hatred towards Israel."

"Mercenaries exist in the Muslim countries where, for the Zionist so-called Islamic State, false revolutionaries and terrorists can be bought . . . Zionist agents could have comfortably kidnapped and liquidated Croatian citizen Tomislav Salopek and carried out the whole operation under the codename of the so-called Islamic State. Those masked butchers of ISIS are with good reason hiding their Zionist identity . . . The so-called Islamic State has no connection with Islam and every Muslim is obligated to fight against this Zionist evil."

#### **On the Charlie Hebdo attack:**

"In France today, a critical mass knows that French intelligence agents killed the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists."

"It is logical to assume that Mossad terrorists were in a position to carry out the bloody theater of January 7<sup>th</sup> to strengthen the project of moving Jews."

#### **On the 13 November terror attacks in Paris:**

"Terrorist theater is a new type of theater . . . Now we are establishing terrorist theater as some form of performance, where people fall on the street, they spread ketchup on themselves, some terrorists show up. Some strange things are happening. That's why we are saying that that which happened a month ago in Paris, the 13<sup>th</sup> of November, still has not been explained. It is the 13<sup>th</sup> of December, and some important questions are hanging over these events. For instance, people are asking, what happened to the victims? They say that in that concert hall, a lot of people were killed. Where are the names of the victims? Where is the mass funeral for those victims? Where are

the pictures? Where are the names? Where are the coffins?"

#### **On the future of France:**

"[the Eiffel Tower] will become a minaret in accordance with democracy and human rights, given the fact that within forty years there will be more Muslims in France [than other peoples]."

#### **On the death of Lady Diana:**

"Lady Diana was killed [by the British government] because she was going to become the mother of a Muslim"

#### **On homosexuals:**

"Fascism = Pederasty."

"Pederasty = Terrorism"

"Pederasts are the Fathers of Pedophiles."

"Pederasts are the new Al Qaeda."

"For Americans, pederasts are important, not Muslims, because no one is allowed to beat pederasts, but America itself beats Muslims . . . the Nazis, the Zionists, and the pederasts are genuine masters at making themselves out to be victims [even when] no one is bothering them. That is how Hitler burned the Reichstag and blamed the Jews. That is how the Jews prepared 9/11 and blamed the Muslims. That is how pederasts often beat themselves and then blame others. Let us not forget that pederasty is a totalitarian ideology, ready to engage in manipulations, corruption, lies, and violence, and thus prepared to engage in terrorism as a form of struggle to impose its view on the world."

#### **On the gay rights movement and the Zionists:**

"are we talking about a conspiracy to reduce the population of the planet or a Zionist project which aims for the global destruction of the culture of the family, so that Jewish families would survive as the foundation for new world rulers?"

Unfortunately, such views find a ready-made audience in certain sections of the public. A Bosnian-émigré organization named Alispahić their "Person of the Year," and *Saff* is rapidly gaining in popularity. One indicator of this rise is the fact that the number of "likes" *Saff* had in the period between November 2014—April 2016 increased by



almost eighty percent (from 14,757 to 26,351). By way of comparison, in proportion to the sizes of the relative populations, *Saff* has more Facebook likes in Bosnia than the *New York Times* has in the United States.

The growing popularity of Islamist extremist media in Bosnia has both external and internal implications. Externally, given the plethora of

such propaganda outlets in the country, it is no surprise that Bosnia is widely considered to have produced more ISIS and al Nusra front volunteers per capita than any other country in Europe. Internally, meanwhile, the popularity of individuals such as Alispahić and the views he maintains goes a long way towards explaining the failure of multiethnic democracy in Bosnia.

► Footnotes are available at source's URL.

*Dr. Gordon N. Bardos is president of SEERECON, a strategic advisory and political risk analysis firm specializing on southeastern Europe. This article is exclusive to ACD.*

## 'No evidence' Munich attacker linked to terrorism: police

Source: <http://www.thelocal.de/20160510/no-evidence-munich-attacker-linked-to-terrorism-police>

May 10 – **There is no evidence that a man arrested for an early-morning knife attack outside Munich is linked to terrorist individuals or organizations, police said on**



### Tuesday afternoon.

Police said at a Munich press conference that they had arrested the man without resistance just minutes after the attack at a local train station in Grafting, east of the Bavarian capital. The attacker still had a 10-centimetre knife stuck in his belt which he had used to inflict grievous wounds on four people just before 5 am.

Although the four victims were brought to hospital using a helicopter and ambulances, one of them died soon after and another is in a critical condition.

Senior officers said they had so far determined that the assailant, originally from Gießen in the central German state of Hesse, arrived in Munich on Monday by train.

He hung around the Munich main train station after finding he couldn't afford any of the hotels nearby before taking an S-Bahn train to Grafting, a sleepy commuter suburb of 13,000 people, early in the morning.

Security video footage shows that he arrived there at about 2 am and remained at the station until the attack.

### No police record

Police and state prosecutors at Tuesday's press conference confirmed that the man has no criminal record and has no known links to terrorism or religious fundamentalism in either police or intelligence databases.

Neither is there any evidence that he might have become radicalized through online materials such as videos.

Both the perpetrator himself and a witness confirmed that he shouted "Allahu akbar" - "God is great" in Arabic - during the attack.

But officers were unable to get from him an explanation as to why he called out those words or - as another eyewitness reported - shouted at people nearby in German that they were "unbelievers".

Neither could they discover any reason why he had travelled to Munich or on to Grafting, apparently "a crime scene chosen at random," Petra Sandles, deputy head of Bavaria's detective force, said.

Police in the man's home town of Gießen had been called to some





kind of disturbance he was involved in two days ago, but released him.

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Police was right! The right procedure is like this: You go to the metro station during rush hour. You take a written statement out of your pocket and shout: Now hear this! Now hear this! (twice). When you get commuters' attention you read your statement giving special emphasis that you are a terrorist working for X group or organization (preferred). Then you emphatically sign the paper and show it to all the people around. Then you take your knife out of your jacket and shout what your moto is. Last step is to start killing innocent people. If you do this you will cause no conflicts among people survived opinions and facilitate police authorities that now they do not have to spend hours of paper work to define who you are and why you did it, If you survive and not killed yourself, with a good lawyer you can claim insanity (not necessary if you are in Skandinavia – you will love their jails) or perhaps to a be transferred to a de-radicalization school to become a new person (No! genetic engineering is not yet available).


## The ISIS Apocalypse

### The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State

By William McCants (Author)

Source: <http://us.macmillan.com/theisisapocalypse/williammcants>

The Islamic State is one of the most lethal and successful jihadist groups in modern history, surpassing even al-Qaeda. Thousands of its followers have marched across Syria and Iraq, subjugating millions, enslaving women, beheading captives, and daring anyone to stop them. Thousands more have spread terror beyond the Middle East under the Islamic State's black flag.



How did the Islamic State attract so many followers and conquer so much land? By being more ruthless, more apocalyptic, and more devoted to state-building than its competitors. The shrewd leaders of the Islamic State combined two of the most powerful yet contradictory ideas in Islam—the return of the Islamic Empire and the end of the world—into a mission and a message that shapes its strategy and inspires its army of zealous fighters. They have defied conventional thinking about how to wage wars and win recruits. Even if the Islamic State is defeated, jihadist terrorism will never be the same.

Based almost entirely on primary sources in Arabic—including ancient religious texts and secret al-Qaeda and Islamic State letters that few have seen - William McCants' *The ISIS*

*Apocalypse* explores how religious fervor, strategic calculation, and doomsday prophecy shaped the Islamic State's past and foreshadow its dark future.

## World's largest Muslim group denounces Islamist extremism

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/10/asia/indonesia-extremism/>

Mar 13 – An Indonesian religious group that claims to be the world's largest Muslim organization issued an unusual declaration on Tuesday, denouncing fellow believers for the rise of violent extremism across the world.

The **Nahdlatul Ulama** identified elements within the Islamic world as being "the most

significant factor causing the spread of religious extremism among Muslims."

The group, which was founded in southeast Asia in 1926 and boasts tens of millions of followers, also accused un-named Middle Eastern governments of deliberately nurturing religious



extremism by exploiting sectarian differences. "By 'weaponizing' sectarian differences, these governments have sought to exercise both soft and hard power, and exported their conflict to the entire world," the group announced.

It was a thinly veiled denunciation of Saudi Arabia and Iran -- rival Sunni and Shia Muslim states -- and their support for groups battling each other in Syria and Yemen.

The Nahdlatul Ulama announcement came after the group hosted an international, two-day meeting of moderate Islamic leaders in the Indonesian capital.



### Challenging extremists

Some counter-terrorism experts applauded Nahdlatul Ulama's denunciation of religious intolerance within the Islamic world.

"They're not afraid to connect Islam and terrorism," said Magnus Ranstorp, an analyst with the Swedish Defense University who attended the conference in Jakarta.

"I don't see any other Muslim leaders standing like a tower and saying we are prepared to take this on," he added.

Nahdlatul Ulama religious scholars say they are using Islamic law to challenge the arguments extremist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have used to legitimize their campaigns of violence. The initiative appears to have the support of the Indonesian government.

Vice President Mohammed Jusuf Kalla spoke at the opening of the two-day conference, saying he hoped religious leaders could help

"straighten" the extremist ideology that has taken root in some Muslim communities.

In their statement, Indonesian scholars also identified poverty and political injustice as contributing factors to religious terrorism, which they said in turn contributes to the rise of Islamophobia in Western societies.

## Britain's Muddled Priorities?

By Douglas Murray

Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8029/britain-terrorism-priorities>

May 14 – **Sometimes you can see a whole society's self-delusion in under a minute. Consider a single minute that occurred in Britain this week.**

On Monday night, Greater Manchester Police staged a pre-prepared mock terrorist attack in a Manchester shopping centre in order to test emergency responses capabilities, readiness and response times. At one stage, an actor playing a suicide bomber burst through a doorway in a crowded part of the shopping centre and detonated a fake device.

It turned out that the actor pretending to be a suicide bomber had shouted the words "Allahu Akbar" ("Allah is Greatest") before the simulated attack. This may have helped make the simulation more realistic, but it had an immediate backlash. Nobody complained about the simulated attacks. What disturbed some people was the simulation of the signature Islamist sign-off.

**Within hours, the simulated moral outrage machine, social media, began deploring the outrageousness of the exercise.**

Soon, community spokesmen were on the airwaves, deploring the use of the crucial phrase. Assistant Chief Constable Garry Shewan said, *"[O]n reflection, we acknowledge that it was unacceptable to use this religious phrase immediately before the mock suicide bombing, which so vocally linked this exercise with Islam. We recognise and apologise for the offence that this has caused."*

Greater Manchester's police and crime commissioner, Tony Lloyd, tried to explain that, *"it is frustrating the operation has been marred by the ill-judged, unnecessary and unacceptable decision by organisers to have those playing the parts of terrorists to shout 'Allahu*



*Akbar' before setting off their fake bombs. It didn't add anything to the event, but has the potential to undermine the great community relations we have in Greater Manchester."*

By now, most of the national papers and the 24-hour news programs were all over the story. That is where the revealing minute happened. On Sky News, interviewer Kay Burley was interviewing one Jahangir Mohammed, who was introduced as a "community worker." Mr. Mohammed spent some time commenting:



*"Like everything, there's a securitised approach to these things and that's necessary in training like this. But I think sometimes there's also a need for them to have a bit of religious and cultural context when they're doing training like this in a wider setting about the possible implications and the effects on wider society and communities within that society."*

Ms. Burley thanked Mr Mohammed for his illuminating contribution and went onto the next news item. In other main stories, she said, *"One man has died, three others injured after a knife attack at a train station near Munich. The attacker -- a 27-year-old German -- shouted 'Allahu Akbar' according to witnesses, before stabbing people at the station in Grafing. He was overpowered at the scene and is now in custody."*

**The combination of these two news stories took about one minute.**

Whether or not the Grafing attacker turns out to be a non-Muslim with psychiatric issues, as the

press is currently suggesting, or an Islamist with or without such issues, **this single minute of broadcast footage says so much about the problem that societies such as Britain's are now in.**

**On the one hand, the overwhelming cause of our current security problems is Islamist terror.** It is the number one cause of concern to our police, intelligence services and everybody else with the nation's security at heart. The public expects to be protected from such terror and expects that protection to come from that security establishment. Yet all the time, a vocal lobby of Muslim and non-Muslim figures tries to pretend that the threat is not what it is, or that an attempt to depict any and all efforts to protect the country -- even one phrase said by one actor in one simulated attack scenario -- is some terrible crime of bigotry.

**Of course, there would have been no social media backlash and no swift apology from the Greater Manchester Police if the terrorist simulation had involved a "far-right" terrorist.** But there is always a backlash if the scenario reflects the real security threat that all our societies are facing. This is yet another occasion in which the general public's view of people's priorities is legitimately raised. Why would any Muslim or anyone else genuinely opposed to terror object to the realistic simulation of such an event? One can see, of course, that it may be offensive to somebody's religion. But if so, what is more offensive to their religion: one actor saying "Allahu Akbar" as part of one simulation, or countless Muslims around the world shouting the same phrase before real attacks in real time?

**If I were a Muslim, I would spend every minute of my waking life trying to persuade my co-religionists not to kill people right after shouting about my Allah. I do not think I would bother for a second if a police force, trying to keep people safe, chose realistically to simulate the behaviour of my co-religionists. It is a matter of priorities, and across Britain and many other countries in the world today, our priorities are now seriously awry.**

*Douglas Murray is a current events analyst and commentator based in London.*





## National shortage of armed cops is leaving Britain vulnerable to terror attacks

Source: <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/7152009/National-shortage-of-armed-cops-is-leaving-Britain-vulnerable-to-terror-attacks.html>

**A national shortage of armed cops is leaving Britain vulnerable to terror attack,** according to the Police Federation of England and Wales.



Officers' aren't volunteering to carry guns over fears of being "hung out to dry" and treated like suspects if they discharge their weapon, the policing organisation has claimed.

The federation's chairman, Steve White, warned that Government's plans announced last month to train another 1,500 firearms officers to deal with the terror threat looked "doubtful".

**The warning comes as a survey of 16,800 officers shows that while 40 per cent fear they will be attacked at work, just 20 per cent have or want personal firearms.**

Mr White told the Press Association: "Before we even start talking about recruiting the extra 1,500, we are struggling to fill the vacancies we have currently got because of the lack of understanding and protection that officers would have if they have to discharge their firearm.

"That's what this survey says - we do fear violence, but officers don't want to carry firearms because they are concerned that if they discharge it, they are going to get arrested for murder.

"But it is all connected with how officers are feeling - they are feeling vulnerable, they are feeling under threat.

"And if they are feeling like that ordinarily, why would they take the extra step to volunteer to carry guns? It is just more pressure, it is just more potential criticism.

"The Government has got to provide a message to the service, not that it has a get out of jail free card, but that officers will be supported appropriately and fairly in order to encourage officers to step forward and take on additional responsibility."

David Cameron announced last month that money will be ring-fenced to boost the number of armed cops after the jihadi terror attacks in Brussels and Paris.

Mr White **warned there are "worrying" inconsistencies in the service nationally leaving some forces without firearms officers and relying on neighbouring forces for coverage.**

## Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practitioner's Manual for Predicting and Identifying Terrorist Activities

Source: <https://www.crcpress.com/Terrorist-Recognition-Handbook-A-Practitioners-Manual-for-Predicting-and-Identifying-Terrorist-Activities/Nance/p/book/9781466554573>


First published in 2003, Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practitioner's Manual for Predicting and Identifying Terrorist Activities remains one of the only books available to provide detailed information on terrorist methodology—revealing terrorist motivation, organizational structure, planning, financing, and operational tactics to carry out attacks.

This fully revised and updated third edition contains the detailed analysis and history of prior editions with completely new case studies and information on new and emerging terrorist practices and trends. Updates to the third edition include:



- The newest geopolitical challenges and terrorism to emerge from the geopolitical climate post-Arab Spring
- Details on the newest attack tactics and procedures of al-Qaeda including al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic Maghreb, and East and North Africa
- Lessons learned from recent terrorist operations and information gained from plots foiled by the FBI in the U.S.
- Current strategic factors and regional variables affecting global terrorism and regional insurgencies
- Potential points of failure in terrorist operations where plots can be most easily detected and disrupted
- The increasing trend of self radicalized, Internet-educated "lone wolf" operations, as demonstrated in the Boston Marathon bombing
- The rebirth of U.S. and European militia groups

Written for counterterrorism practitioners who risk their lives to uncover planned attacks on civilian populations, this book will serve as a guide to train intelligence operatives, law enforcement entities, and military intelligence agents and soldiers to recognize and disrupt the various stages of developing terrorist plots.



#### Features

- ✓ Teaches counterintelligence, military, and law enforcement professionals how to conduct terrorism intelligence analysis in the field
- ✓ Outlines the known terrorist groups and how they are classified and organized
- ✓ Illustrates the phases of a terrorist plot and how the covert surveillance, planning, and logistics of an operation ultimately culminate in an attack
- ✓ Presents the entire range of attack tactics, techniques, and methodologies of known terrorist groups, including high-profile attacks that have occurred in the last several years

## American Homegrown 'Violent Extremists' All Linked to Islamists

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/news/report-homegrown-violent-extremists-all-linked-islamists>



Map showing violent extremists in the U.S. from the recent report by the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness

May 15 – Amid the unprecedented rise in foiled terrorist attacks in the United States, [a recent report found](#) at least 75 "homegrown violent extremists" were operating



across the U.S. in 2015. Of those extremists, nearly half tried to travel overseas – presumably to join terror groups – but only four percent succeeded.

Close to one third were found to be plotting terrorist attacks in the United States and were caught either before or after executing the attack.

Figures issued by New Jersey's Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness show that 65 of these extremists were affiliated with the Islamic State, while the rest were linked to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Nusra Front, or other Islamic extremist groups and ideologies.

In addition, the New Jersey agency reported radicalized extremists were able to enter, operate and thrive in the U.S.

"In 2015, [homegrown violent extremists] demonstrated an ability to operate in New Jersey and throughout the United States while connecting with like-minded individuals online and acting independently from organized terrorist groups," security officials said. "Since late 2014, a variety of radical groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have encouraged [extremists] to attack in their home countries."

Extremists were found be operating particularly up and down the East Coast as well as in Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Alabama, Kansas, Texas and southern California.

Commenting on the report, the *Washington Free Beacon* states, "Congressional attempts to investigate the immigration histories of at least 113 foreign-born individuals snagged on terror charges since 2014 have been stymied by the Obama administration. There remain at least 1,000 open investigations into ISIS members residing in the United States."

In other news, a former member of the 9/11 Commission that investigated the most lethal terrorist attack in the history of the U.S. said that, contrary to the official report, a classified section said six Saudi individuals may have been involved in the attack.

John Lehman, the former commission member, revealed that one of the Saudis involved is a man who worked at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California (near Los Angeles).

Lehman, along with former federal prosecutor Richard Ben-Veniste called for a new investigation and the release of the 28 pages of classified documents from the original investigation.

## 'I was Raised by an Islamist Terror Cult in America'

By Ryan Mauro

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/exclusive-i-was-raised-islamist-terror-cult-america>

May 16 – The Clarion Project has been in contact with a woman who grew up within Jamaat ul-Fuqra, a cultish Sufi Islamist terrorist group that now goes by the name of Muslims of the Americas.

**The group is best known for establishing "Islamic villages" on U.S. soil, for example, its "Islamberg" headquarters in New York state.**



She has agreed to anonymously come forward with her heartbreaking story. We have removed details for her safety. She provided photographs and specific facts that are unavailable in the public sphere that we subsequently confirmed.

**The following is her testimony provided to Clarion Project national security analyst Ryan Mauro. It is one of the very few first-hand testimonies from someone who was inside Jamaat ul-Fuqra when it committed terrorism under that name:**

*I still know many Muslims and I know that Jamaat ul-Fuqra is nothing like them, but there are violent ones who will take issue with what I say and do. They believe you should be killed if you decide not to be Muslim or practice*





*Islam the way they do because, to them, it's "apostasy," and that's a capital offense under Islam. I do believe some of those violent Muslims may attempt to kill me.*

*From my point of view as a kid in Michigan, everything was great even though my mom and dad got a divorce and I was living with my mom. My first introduction to X [a Fuqra member] was when he hit me for breaking rules I knew nothing about. My name was also changed to be Islamic.*

*We lived at 52 Ferris Street in Highland Park, Michigan, a three-story building with six apartments on each floor. The entire building was occupied by black Muslims, some who came from Detroit. Non-Muslims were not allowed to move in. Armed guards were at the front entrance.*

*Living in the building was like living in a Muslim country. We didn't go outside much because they didn't want us to be influenced by non-Muslims. Us kids didn't have any friends outside of the building. We were very poor and slept on the bare floor with no beds. Sometimes we didn't have heat or hot water. We didn't have any furniture whatsoever. We ate on the floor out of large platters with our fingers. Food was also sometimes scarce.*

*Once my mother was making the only food we had in the house: Beans and rice. As she was seasoning, she mistakenly poured the entire bottle of salt in it. I watched her break down crying because this was the only food she had to feed her children. Someone told her to use a potato to suck the salt out of the food so we could eat it.*

*The building was like a house of horrors. Some of the kids were tortured by their parents or beaten by the "brothers" in the building. There was one kid in particular I remember who was treated really badly. He would be beaten severely for little things like taking food from the refrigerator for himself. He and some others would sometimes not be allowed to stand up and forced to hop around like a bunny for days on end. They'd make him run errands throughout the building, hopping up three flights of stairs.*

*He was also starving and I remember him coming to our door begging for food. There was a fire set by one girl who was also known to be beaten badly and kept separate from the rest of the kids. Years later, I met the boy again and he just broke down crying. It was heart-wrenching. He wanted to know why no one helped him.*

*There were exercise classes in the basement. The brothers were training for whatever Muslim war they continuously told us was coming. Our schooling was irregular and not formal. There were no science classes and math was deficient. Mostly we learned to read and write English and Arabic. I learned later about the gaping holes in our education. Sometimes there was class once a week, sometimes not at all. We were not allowed to listen to music or watch commercials. They didn't want us to be influenced by them. There were some odd rules like the children couldn't have cabbage patch dolls. They were called "evil." The Smurfs were considered demonic.*

*This was true of my entire time with Fuqra. There was a tape recorder that I'd use to secretly record kids shows on the TV like Kids Incorporated. I only learned the pop songs from that time by hearing them sung on that show. I didn't even hear Michael Jackson's "Beat It" until much later in life. I'd try to memorize the songs in a closet because I couldn't be caught listening to them.*

*Growing up, I thought all Muslims were like us. Later, I realized these were just the odd rules of our Muslim cult and that most Muslims did not follow most of the same rules as we did. Just like most Muslims are not terrorists and some Muslims don't wear full coverings, every sect is different.*

*We would hear all kinds of fearful messages. I was told that in my lifetime the Muslims would have to fight the kafirooms (non-believers) and I would have to make sure I was on the right side of the war.*

*The females, including myself, wore what we called jilabias; a head-to-ankle length traditional Muslim garment. We usually made them ourselves. We sewed our own clothes when I was a kid, which was fun. We had different colored jilabias.*

*It was also common for men to have several wives. I was molested by one man, who I know also molested another girl. It causes feelings of shame that can affect you the rest of your life. It changes your brain chemistry.*

*The leader of our community was a man known as "Imam Musa." It's important to note that we were not Nation of Islam Muslims. In fact, we were taught that the Nation of Islam members aren't really Muslims.*

*One day, there was a lot of commotion and we were told that a sheikh from Pakistan was coming to visit our little community inside the building. His name was Sheikh Mubarik Ali Gilani. They said he was a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. It was all anyone*



talked about and some said he was coming to the U.S. seeking recruits for jihad in Afghanistan. Everyone in the building was about the sheikh. Every disagreement was deferred to the Sheikh. The Sheikh and his wife would even name his followers' babies.

When the sheikh arrived, I met him very briefly because I had a weird dream about the Prophet Mohammed. I couldn't really remember the details. It was supposed to be a big honor to meet the sheikh. The leaders of our community met with him and some changes were made.

One of the first things that happened is that the sheikh married one of the girls who was around 14 years old and he was probably in his 40s. The marriage was supposed to combine our community with the sheikh's community in Pakistan. It was the kind of marriage that reminds me of ancient times where a father would marry his daughter off to someone important in order to have a treaty with that community. She left to live with him in Pakistan and her father became the new leader of the community.

The sheikh renamed our community at this point to be "Jamaat ul-Fuqra," which means "community of the impoverished."

His followers in America are primarily African-American converts to Islam, but I believe our community was the first, or one of the first, he visited in the United States. Several of the "brothers" from the building went to Pakistan to meet with the sheikh, and when they returned, they were even more militant and religious than before. It was as if they had been hypnotized.

We were told that they prayed a lot and had mysticism circles. I vaguely remember something about them praying and going up to see Prophet Mohammed. They carried out small "missions." Various sources on the Internet said that Fuqra carried out various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and early 1990s across the U.S. I heard about one of them.

There are press reports about Fuqra members bombing a building that housed a cleric. I knew one of them and that he had gone to visit the sheikh in Pakistan. Somehow, during the attack, the door to the basement got locked behind them and they died in the ensuing fire. The rumor in our community was that the CIA locked the door and trapped them inside. The men who died were considered "martyrs for the cause of Allah" in our community.

When we were there, one day I overheard people saying something about the FBI watching the building in navy blue cars outside. I looked out the window and, sure enough, there was a navy blue four-door sedan sitting out there. After that day, I noticed it was out there all the time.

In the 1990s, I heard several rumors. I heard that Sheikh Gilani was barred from entering the U.S. because he was suspected of being involved in a terrorist attack involving an airplane. I heard that Sheikh Gilani lives in a luxurious compound in Pakistan and that his family is extremely wealthy. His wives have expensive jewelry and servants and even their own seamstress.

I don't know if these rumors are true first-hand, but supposedly there is a big dichotomy between how luxurious the sheikh and his family live and how poor his followers in the United States live.

Not long after the sedan was noticed, the sheikh sent an order from Pakistan that all Muslims in the building had to disperse across the country. This was devastating for me because I couldn't see my friends anymore. I was very lonely. The community members went to California, Washington D.C., South Carolina, Georgia, New York and maybe other places.

I knew that Fuqra had bought land in rural areas of New York and Georgia for followers to settle at where they could follow strict religious codes. A group of us went to New Orleans in Louisiana and we didn't have to wear our jalabias because we had to be incognito.

We lived in a two room shack behind someone's house. The leader drove a cab. We moved frequently. I suspect that when they couldn't pay the rent, they'd get evicted and move. In between moves, we'd live with other families and that was fun because we could play with other kids. I remember seeing scary and loud fights between the women married to the leader. A knife was pulled one time and another time a pregnant woman was kicked.

We drove to Brooklyn to hear the sheikh speak in a large mosque during one of his trips to America. His wife was there in a private room and she was revered in the community. I'll always remember the shoes she wore. They looked like shoes that a genie would wear; gold and curled at the tip.

During that visit, I saw something that left a lasting impression on me. All the females were called to the basement of the mosque. There had to be 30-40 of us in a circle on the floor.



They brought a chair out and put it in the middle of us. Then they brought out Y [a Fuqra member] and she had to sit backwards in the chair with her back facing the crowd. A woman came out with a big stick and gave her 10 lashes while the crowd of women said “shame on you!” with each lash.

At first, she just winced in agony. Eventually she was crying pretty hard. The entire scene was traumatizing for me and I felt bad for the children seeing it. She didn't immediately go back to New Orleans, but did after some time.

The leader of the New Orleans community continued to be abusive and beat kids. I remember him beating one boy for peeing standing up. I guess Muslim men are supposed to sit down when they used the restroom. It really upset me.

One time I walked into the living room and saw one of the boys getting beaten. He looked at me with pain and fear in his eyes. I immediately screamed for the leader to stop hitting him and then I started shaking with fear. No one talked back to him. He told me to leave a room and continued the beating with a belt as the boy hunched and crawled into a corner. I felt helpless. It was the catalyst for me deciding to leave.

I took some pocket change and ran away. I didn't know where to go, so I just walked up and down random neighborhoods and ended up at an outdoor mall. Eventually, I was falling asleep and had to go back home. My mom was crying when I walked in and I told her I wanted to go live with my dad.

I ran away again only days later and was hit with a belt when I came home. This time, I fought back and began screaming for someone to call the police. It made him give up and walk away in a huff. I later ran away again and got to a pay phone where I called my dad in Michigan. He had tried to take me away when I was growing up but was stopped by guys with guns. I knew he'd rescue me.

He called a cab to bring me to the airport and I sat there and waited for hours. Then I saw my grandpa come out of the airport and he paid the taxi that had been waiting forever. We flew back to Michigan.

After I left, most of the Muslims left the New Orleans site and went to other Fuqra places. I know some did not move to other Fuqra communities and I suspect that some of them stopped being a part of Jamaat ul-Fuqra.

It was time to start my life over in Michigan but I still suffer a lot from all I experienced to this day.

*Ryan Mauro is [ClarionProject.org](http://ClarionProject.org)'s national security analyst, a fellow with Clarion Project and an adjunct professor of homeland security. Mauro is frequently interviewed on top-tier television and radio.*

## Boko Haram sending fighters to help ISIS in Libya: U.S.

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160516-boko-haram-sending-fighters-to-help-isis-in-libya-u-s>



May 16 – U.S. officials said on Friday that there is evidence that Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists are sending fighters to join ISIS in Libya.

This is only the latest manifestation of the growing cooperation

between the two groups.

The *Telegraph* [reports](#) that Nigeria has been asking the United States for military gear, including aircraft, to fight Boko Haram. Congress, however, has restricted the sale of

U.S. military equipment to Nigeria because of rampant corruption in the Nigerian armed forces and government, and because the Nigerian military has been engaged in systematic violations of basic human rights of Nigerian civilians.

The scope of the cooperation between ISIS and Boko Haram is not known, but Western governments have been worried for some time about ISIS's growing sway in north Africa. Growing cooperation between ISIS and Boko Haram could lead to the jihadists pushing south from Libya into the vast, ungovernable Sahel region.





The *Telegraph* quotes U.S. deputy secretary of state Antony Blinken who said that there were “reports” Boko Haram fighters were going to

Blinken said Nigeria made several requests for military hardware. “We are looking very actively at these requests,” he said.



Libya, where ISIS now has about 6,000 fighters.

“We’ve seen that Boko Haram’s ability to communicate has become more effective. They seem to have benefited from assistance from Daesh,” he said, using the Arabic acronyms for ISIS. There were also reports of material and logistical aid.

“So these are all elements that suggests that there are more contacts and more cooperation, and this is again something that we are looking at very carefully because we want to cut it off,” Blinken told reporters in Nigeria.

Blinken said the United States was helping Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram with armored vehicles, but he refused to comment on Nigeria’s request for U.S. aircraft.

Earlier this month U.S. officials said that the administration is considering selling twelve A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to Nigeria, but Congress would need to approve the sale.

Nigeria’s foreign minister Geoffrey Onyeama said that the Buhari government had established reporting mechanisms inside the military to prevent human rights violation, and he said he hoped these mechanisms would convince Congress to approve the sale.

Blinken said the military under Buhari had made “important efforts” to address human rights but that the United States was “troubled” by an [Amnesty International report](#) last week which documented the death of children in military detention.

Blinken said the United States was also concerned about the Nigerian army’s massacre of hundreds of Shi’ites in northern Nigeria in December.

He said a state commission to investigate the killings should provide a “transparent and credible report.”

## Newly declassified documents reveal “chilling” details about 9/11 Saudi connection

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160516-newly-declassified-documents-reveal-chilling-details-about-9-11-saudi-connection>

May 16 – Investigators describe the details revealed in a series of declassified memos relating to the 9/11 attacks as “chilling”: These details offer information about Saudi support for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.



A former 9/11 Commission staff member told the *Guardian* that the newly released material largely duplicates the classified 28-section of the 9/11 Commission report, a section which has not been made public.

The *Guardian* [reports](#) that Fahad al-Thumairy, a 32-year-old Imam and former Saudi diplomat deported from the United States in 2003 because of terrorist links, was questioned in Saudi Arabia by members of the 9/11 Commission in February 2004.

A member of Commission staff told the newspaper that “it was so clear Thumairy was lying.”

“It was also so clear he was dangerous.”

The investigators described the scene as “chilling”.

Al-Thumairy denied any knowledge of Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national who befriended two of the 9/11 hijackers, even after he was presented with evidence of dozens of phone calls between them.

[The document states](#) that when al-Thumairy was subjected to more aggressive questions during his interrogation, “his posture changed noticeably.”

Al-Thumairy crossed his arms, sat back in his chair, and relied more heavily on the interpreter when questioned about his connections to two Saudi hijackers who had lived in southern California before 9/11.

The interviews were conducted between 2002 to 2004 by investigators for the 9/11 Commission, and have now been [published by the National Archives](#).

According to notes from [an interview](#), members of the Islamic Council of the Saudi government said: “Funds were probably misused. Saudis have an obligation to give to charity. People don’t ask questions about where the money goes.”

“We used our money. But we did not want our money to be used to attack the USA, or to be turned against us.”

An [interview with al-Bayoumi](#) is also listed in the memos, in which he “agreed that he had some telephone contact with al-Thumairy, which involved discussion of [al-Bayoumi’s] questions on religious matters”.

The document states that al-Bayoumi “considered al-Thumairy his religious advisor,” but denied that he was ever his teacher, and “expressed surprise that he might have held a position at the Consulate.”

In to released documents, both al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi deny any connections to terrorists.

Former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, who was a member of the 9/11 Commission, said that the classified 28-page section of the report shows that as many as six Saudi officials could have supported the 9/11 hijackers.

Those individuals worked for the Saudi Embassy in the United States, Saudi charities, and the Saudi government-funded King Fahd Mosque in California, Lehman said.

The 9/11 Commission’s report concluded, however, that “no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded” al Qaeda.

Lehan said: “Our report should never have been read as an exoneration of Saudi Arabia.”

The Saudi government has said it was “wrongfully and morbidly accused of complicity” in the attacks.

The George W. Bush administration rejected calls for publishing the classified part of the report, saying publication would reveal “sources and methods that would make it harder for us to win the War on Terror.”

## Al-Qaida turns to Syria, with plan to challenge Islamic State

Source: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/Al-Qaida-turns-to-Syria-with-plan-to-challenge-Islamic-State/articleshow/52290727.cms>

May 16 – Al-Qaida’s top leadership in Pakistan, badly weakened after a decade of CIA drone strikes, has decided that the terror group’s future lies in Syria and has secretly dispatched more than a dozen of its most seasoned veterans there, according to senior US and European intelligence and counterterrorism officials.

The movement of the senior al-Qaida jihadis reflects Syria’s growing importance to the terrorist organization and most likely foreshadows an escalation of the group’s bloody rivalry with the Islamic State, Western officials say.



The operatives have been told to start the process of creating an alternate headquarters in Syria and lay the groundwork for possibly establishing an emirate through al-Qaida's Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front, to compete with the Islamic State, from which Nusra broke in 2013. This would be a significant shift for al-Qaida and its affiliate, which have resisted creating an emirate, or formal sovereign state, until they deem conditions on the ground are ready. Such an entity could also pose a heightened terrorist threat to the United States and Europe.

Al-Qaida operatives have moved in and out of Syria for years. Ayman al-Zawahri, the group's supreme leader in Pakistan, dispatched senior jihadis to bolster the Nusra Front in 2013. A year later, al-Zawahri sent to Syria a shadowy al-Qaida cell called Khorasan that US officials say has been plotting attacks against the West. But establishing a more enduring presence in Syria would present the group with an invaluable opportunity, Western analysts said. A Syria-based al-Qaida state would not only be within closer striking distance of Europe but also benefit from the recruiting and logistical support of fighters from Iraq, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

Al-Zawahri released his first audio statement in several months in early May, and it seemed to clear the way for the al-Qaida figures to use the Nusra Front to form an emirate in Syria with his blessing. Some Nusra leaders, however, oppose the timing of such a move, so the affiliate has not yet taken that step.

"The combination of an al-Qaeda emirate and a revitalized al-Qaeda central leadership in northern Syria would represent a confidence boost for the jihadi organization's global brand," Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, wrote this month in Foreign Policy.

"Al Qaeda would present itself as the smart, methodical and persistent jihadi movement that, in contrast to the Islamic State, had adopted a strategy more aligned with everyday Sunni Muslims," Lister wrote.

Al-Qaida and the Islamic State have the same ultimate objective to create an Islamic state, but they have used different tactics, Lister and other scholars said. The Islamic State moved quickly to impose harsh, unilateral control over territory in Iraq and Syria and declare its independence. The Nusra Front has

painstakingly sought to build influence over areas it wants to control and with other Syrian rebel groups opposed to the government of President Bashar Assad.

US officials say the Islamic State has largely eclipsed al-Qaida in the global jihadi hierarchy, with al-Qaida hemorrhaging members to its more brutal and media-savvy rival. Many of the Khorasan operatives, including their leader, Muhsin al-Fadhli, have been killed in eight US airstrikes in northwest Syria since September 2014.

The Islamic State has between 19,000 and 25,000 fighters, roughly divided between Iraq and Syria, US intelligence analysts estimate. The Nusra Front has about 5,000 to 10,000 fighters, all in Syria.

An emirate would differ from the Islamic State caliphate in the scale of its ambition, in that a Nusra emirate would not claim to be a government for all the world's Muslims.

Some senior US and European intelligence and law enforcement officials say the small but steady movement of important al-Qaida operatives and planners to Syria is a desperate dash to a haven situated perilously in the middle of the country's chaos. These officials say al-Qaida operatives in Syria are determined but largely contained.

"There's always been a steady trickle, and it remains," said Col Steve Warren, a military spokesman in Baghdad for the US-led campaign in Iraq and Syria.

Nonetheless, the presence of a senior cadre of experienced al-Qaida leaders in Syria — some with multimillion-dollar US bounties on their heads — has raised alarms in Washington as well as in the allied capitals of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

"We have destroyed a large part of al-Qaida," John O Brennan, director of the CIA, said this month on NBC's "Meet the Press." "It is not completely eliminated, so we have to stay focused on what it can do."

The evolving assessment about al-Qaida and the Nusra Front in Syria comes from interviews with nearly a dozen US and European intelligence and counterterrorism officials and independent analysts, most of whom have been briefed on confidential information gleaned from spies and electronic eavesdropping. They also analyzed the public statements and social media





commentary among al-Qaida and Nusra Front members.

One of the operatives Western intelligence officials are focused most intently on is Saif al-Adl, a senior member of al-Qaida's ruling body, known as the Shura Council, who oversaw the organization immediately after Osama bin Laden was killed by Navy SEALs in Pakistan in 2011. It is unclear whether al-Adl is in Syria, North Africa or somewhere else, US intelligence officials said.

The government of Iran released al-Adl and four other senior members of al-Qaida early last year as part of a secret prisoner swap with al-Qaida's branch in Yemen, the group holding an Iranian diplomat, Nour Ahmad Nikbakht.

Al-Adl, a former colonel in the Egyptian military who is believed to be in his 50s, is listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist list and was indicted in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa. He is the subject of a \$5 million US bounty.

"As a senior adviser to al-Qaida's networks in Syria and proximate environs, al-Adl could be especially useful in helping to define strategies that will help the group achieve confidence-inspiring successes," said Michael S Smith II of Kronos Advisory, a terrorism research and analysis firm.

The other four men released by Iran are also suspected of being in Syria. They are Abdul

Khayr al-Misri, an Egyptian who formerly led al-Qaida's foreign relations council; Abul Qassam, a Jordanian who was a deputy to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founder of the organization that later became the Islamic State; Sari Shibab, a Jordanian operative; and Abu Mohamed al-Misri, an Egyptian who helped orchestrate al-Qaida's major attacks before September 11, 2001, according to US officials briefed on details of the transfer. They agreed to discuss the matter on condition of anonymity because of the issue's confidential nature.

It is unclear how and when al-Qaida might form an emirate in Syria that would hold territory and most likely harden its position toward more moderate Syrian opposition groups. The Nusra Front was created in 2012 as an offshoot of al-Qaida's affiliate in Iraq — which under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi later declared itself the Islamic State — to fight Assad's government. That same year, the United States designated the Nusra Front as a terrorist organization.

But in 2013, the Nusra Front balked at joining al-Baghdadi when he announced the creation of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, and instead pledged allegiance to al-Zawahri in Pakistan. This ignited an often bloody rivalry between Nusra and Islamic State fighters in Syria.

## Terror warnings on Euro football championship

Source: <https://euobserver.com/justice/133471>



The Stade de France near Paris. Security in and around stadium has been stepped up since last November's terror attacks. (Photo: Jean Marc)

May 19 – Next month's European football championship in France could be a target for jihadist terror groups, French and German intelligence have warned.

**"France is now clearly the country most targeted" by**

**Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda jihadist groups,** the head of the French domestic intelligence agency (DGSI) Patrick Calvar told MPs in a hearing last week.

"We know that Daesh [IS] in planning new attacks," he said, according to a transcript of the hearing published on Wednesday (18 May).



Calvar said IS would try to strike "as strongly and as rapidly as possible" in order to create a diversion from its difficult military situation in Syria and Iraq and as a retaliation against the international coalition's air strikes.

He said France could be faced with a "new kind of attack" and that the question was not "if" but "when and where" attacks would take place.

**The risk is "a terror campaign characterised by leaving explosive devices in places where large crowds gather",** he said.

"This type of action would be multiplied to create a climate of panic," he said.

The intelligence chief gave no further details, but he spoke just a month ahead of the Euro 2016 tournament that will be held from 10 June to 10 July. Fifty-one matches will be played in 10 cities.

In an interview with Germany's Die Welt newspaper last weekend, Europol chief Rob Wainwright said Euro 2016 was "an attractive target for terrorists" and that he was looking at the event "with great concern".

**The French sport minister said earlier this year that between seven and eight million people were expected to come to see the competition inside and outside the stadiums.**

**Security in and around the stadiums, especially in the so-called "fan zones" where people would watch the games on giant screens, have been a particular**

**concern** since the 13 November attacks in Paris.

The attacks started with the explosion of two suicide bombers outside the Stade de France, where 80,000 people were attending a match between France and Germany.

**Ten thousand soldiers will be deployed during the competition as well as around 12,000 private security around fan zones.**

Exercises simulating attacks in stadiums have been organised, including one simulating a chemical attack.

#### 'Crusader nations'

**In addition to the crowds of supporters, another target could be the participating teams,** according to a German criminal office (BKA) report leaked by German tabloid Bild.

"A successful attack on teams from 'crusader nations' including Germany would have a symbolic value," Bild quoted the report as saying, referring to teams from mainly Christian countries.

Twenty-four countries qualified for the competition. Among them only two, Albania and Turkey, have a population which is not mainly of Christian background.

According to Bild, the BKA report said France was a target because of "its colonial history in North Africa, its military involvement in Mali as well as its military support in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria".

## FARC to free last child soldiers

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160517-farc-to-free-last-child-soldiers>



May 17 – The FARC, Colombia's largest rebel group, has said it will release all child soldiers under 15 years of age, thus ending an especially poignant chapter in the country's 5-decade conflict.

The FARC announcement comes as the negotiations between the rebel group and the Colombian government are continuing in Havana under the auspices of the UN.

The *Bogota City Paper* [reports](#) that it is not know how many child soldiers are still serving in FARC ranks. **The UN says**

**that since 1999, the insurgents have freed almost 6,000 child soldiers, and that currently there are only 348 left.** FARC says it has stopped recruiting child soldiers and that it has only fifteen fighters under the age of 15 still in service.



President Juan Manuel Santos announced the agreement on Sunday, posting this Twitter message: *"Logramos histórico acuerdo en La Habana para sacar a los niños de la Guerra."*

"One of the biggest horrors of a conflict is when we drag our children and young people into combat," said Humberto de la Calle, a chief government negotiator.

**Since 2012 the government has been negotiating with the FARC in an effort to end the conflict, which began in the early 1960s, killing more than 220,000 people and forcing about six millions from their homes.**

"It's for this reason that this agreement is a crucial advance in the process of bringing this war to a close," de la Calle said.

The agreement calls for the FARC and the government to determine an immediate "exit" for those under 15 years of age and develop a "road map for an exit for the remaining minors," those between 15 and 18. **FARC made extensive use of children between 8 and 16 – what the organization called "pisa suaves" – to sneak into military camps, police stations, and other government facilities to set bombs and other types of booby traps.**

Dr. Shelly Whitman, executive director of the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, welcomed the move by Colombia to prioritize child soldiers in the peace agreement.

**"Colombia is the last place in the Americas to use child soldiers, so it is something the whole country recognises as a big issue,"** she told the *Telegraph*.

"And credit must be given to the government, who have a national two-year rehabilitation program for child soldiers which I believe is the most comprehensive in the world."

She cautioned, though, that the government will now have to be careful that the children do not fall prey to drug cartels, "and go from one deadly situation to another."

## What ISIS Women Want?

Source: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/17/what-isis-women-want-gendered-jihad/>

May 17 – **What do Western women who join Islamic State want?** One prominent theory is what these women "really" want is to get laid. Another is that they don't know what they "really" want,



because what they want has been decided for them by male jihadi "groomers." Both theories are meant to resolve a seeming paradox: How can any woman who enjoys democratic rights and equality before the law join or support a group which actively promotes her own oppression? **But both are misconceived. Indeed, they say more about the gendered assumptions of those who proffer them than**

**about the women they are trying to explain.**

The idea that Western Islamic State "fangirls" — as they are often derogatively called — "just wanna have fun" (to paraphrase Cindy Lauper) is the thesis of, among others, Shazia Mirza, a British comedian whose latest show is called "The Kardashians Made Me Do It." The show's title references a comment made by one of the sisters of the [three East London schoolgirls](#) who absconded to Syria in February 2015. "She used to watch *Keeping Up With the Kardashians* and stuff like that, so there was nothing that indicated that she was radicalized in any way — not at home," Sahima Begum [said](#) about her missing sister, Shamima. This gives Mirza's show its central theme, which is that the Western girls who join the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, share the same banal and all-too-human concerns as their non-jihadi Western peers —including, and especially, when it comes to love. Mirza's argument is that the Islamic State, for teens like Begum, is just another teenage crush. Indeed, the Islamic State, she suggests, is like a [boy band](#) — only with guns.

"I'm not being frivolous," Mirza said in a recent [TV interview](#), "but, these ISIS men, as barbaric as they are, you have to admit, they are hot. They're macho; they're hairy; they've got guns. And these girls think, 'These are a bit of all right.' What they've done is sold their mother's jewelry and bought a one-way ticket to Syria for some halal meat." Or as






Mirza [phrased](#) it in her 2015 Edinburgh show, referring to the three East London runaways: “They think they’ve gone on a Club 18-30 holiday to Ibiza.... They’re not religious; they’re horny.”

This is funny — and Mirza, after all, is a comedian. But it isn’t serious as a commentary on the motives of the Western women who have joined, or aspire to join, the Islamic State. Yet many news organizations have taken up the idea as though it were. Earlier this year, for example, CNN ran a [news story](#) titled “ISIS using ‘jihotties’ to recruit brides for fighters.” This was only slightly more cretinous than a BBC Newsnight [report](#) from March 2015 proclaiming, “Attractive jihadists can lure UK girls to extremism.”

Another way of not taking Islamic State “fangirls” seriously is to suggest that they have been “groomed” over the Internet by shadowy, charismatic men into believing that the Islamic State is the solution to all their problems. In March 2015, Hayley Richardson [wrote](#) in *Newsweek* that militant fighters “are using similar online grooming tactics to paedophiles to lure western girls to their cause.” Sara Khan, the founder and co-director of the anti-extremism NGO Inspire, echoed this. “Just like child abusers groom their victims online and persuade them to leave their homes and meet them,” she [claimed](#) in the *Independent*, “male jihadists contact women through social media and online chatrooms, and build trust with them over time.”

This is a gendered reading of radicalization: Young men are not “groomed” by charismatic women who prey on their emotional weaknesses and naivety. Only women are groomed. Only women lack the necessary agency and political engagement to *want* to support or join the Islamic State. Mirza’s reading of women’s radicalization is similarly patronizing, but it at least puts women on an equal footing with male Islamic State jihadis, who, presumably, from within her one-dimensional worldview, also want to get laid.

The problem with the grooming narrative is that it seriously misrepresents women’s radicalization as an essentially passive process and obscures, as [numerous studies show](#), the striking degree to which young women themselves are actively involved in recruiting like-minded “sisters” to the cause. It also presents an unreal picture in which women and young girls are somehow “targeted” and then seduced by online recruiters, drastically overestimating the recruiter’s powers of selection and persuasion. Everything we know about [radicalization](#) suggests [otherwise](#): that potential recruits actively seek out the message and the messenger (and that the decisive facilitator in radicalization is typically not an anonymous predatory online recruiter, but a trusted friend or family member).



Over the past year, I have spent an unhealthy amount of time tracking the social media activities of Western English-speaking female Islamic State supporters as part of a wider research project on the subculture of Western jihadism. (Most of their accounts have since been shut down.) And what these women — or at least the more brazen and vocal among them — want they have made abundantly clear. Far from being slaves to their sexual desires or victims of the predatory machinations of men, many Western women join or aspire to join the Islamic State because they *want* to — because the Islamic State, unlike the secular liberal democracies in which they live, makes sense to them and reflects their fundamental moral and political convictions. What they want is to live in a properly authentic Islamic state in which Islamic law — sharia — is fully implemented. Specifically, they want to live under the “caliphate,” which, they believe, it is their divine duty to support. What they do *not* want is to live in the West, for a multitude of reasons. They do not want freedom, as understood by classical liberal scholars as [negative freedom](#) — the freedom to do what you want, so long as you don’t harm others. And they do not want feminism.

Consider, for example, [Umm Muthanna](#), a 22-year-old British woman and former university student who left for Syria earlier last year. In a flurry of tweets, posted in November 2014, just months before she left Britain, Umm Muthanna [recorded](#) an incident in one of her university lectures. It provides fascinating insight into the



**anti-feminist mindset of the Western women who leave to join the Islamic State:**

Today's lecture was on Feminism.... Then on came the seminar.... Subhan'Allah the tutor started discussing gender differences and roles in society. Fine, I will listen and make notes but does not mean I accept your constricted ideologies. Short time after, the tutor asks a question... "Raise your hand if you are a feminist". I wanted to burst out with laughter, which my niqab helped contain. Result?... Majority of the women, 18/20 put their hands up. I sat there whilst everybody glanced at me! Haha, I felt proud, but pity for their souls.... Then, here it where it gets interesting. The tutor asked, so those who are not feminists, explain why. Everybody turned to me basically.... And I said clearly, Islam has given all my rights to me as a woman and I feel liberated, I feel content and equal in society and all. I explained to them, how both men and women have rights in Islam, given us to in the Qu'raan, (at this point everybody was screwing). I explained to them not everything which a man can do, a woman can also compete with and try do. It's to do with biology. I explained how this western society has made you think in a certain way, pressurised you to feel weak and always thirsty to make money. Pressurised you to compete with men, when in reality if you knew your place as a woman, if there was Shari'ah implementation, you would not be complaining like you are now. I said all this and basically everybody tried refuting me. These feminists are deluded!

The big taboos for many of these women, as for all religious fundamentalists, are related to sex and gender equality. Peer inside their online lives, and it becomes clear that this is a major animating concern. They cannot abide free mixing of the sexes, which they condemn as a "disease." They cannot even abide the idea of revealing their eyes, let alone face, in their Twitter profile photos, since this would imperil their sexual modesty — and hence impugn their devotion to God. And they explicitly warn "brothers" not to "DM [direct message]" them. The Islamic State appeals to these women, not, as Mirza insists, because it has a bountiful supply of "halal meat," but because it perfectly coheres with their militantly conservative notions of sex and gender. Hence, they support the Islamic State not despite, but *because of*, its aggressively patriarchal worldview.



Wife of Shahid @umm\_muthanna3 · Sep 15

For example, my dear sisters the least you can do is not be fitnah online and remove all photos of yourself (includes eyes showing in niqab)

← ↻ 4 ★ 10 ...

[View conversation](#)

**Scott Atran, an anthropologist at Oxford University and France's National Center for Scientific Research, in his current [research](#), describes these women as "post-feminist and post-adolescent."**

He writes, "They are tired of a seemingly endless, genderless, culturally indistinct coming of age. The Islamic State and al Qaeda provide clear red lines: Men are men, and women are women." Which is to say that men are warriors and women are mothers, whose primary duty, as Umm Muthanna put it in one tweet, is "to raise the next generation of lions in Islamic State." "My GOAL," she declared, "is to have lots of sons & send them off all feesabillilah ["in the cause of Allah"] ... under the Islamic State." The hashtag attached to this tweet was #RealWomanGoals. This does not mean, as Atran and other [researchers](#) have made clear, that female Islamic State members or supporters are disapproving of violence. On the contrary, many seek to justify and even to encourage it. Umm Osama, for example, who is an online friend of Umm Muthanna, recently felt brave enough to issue an incitement for suicide attacks, reminding brothers of their heavenly rewards on achieving martyrdom. "To brothers," she tweeted, "when you get so excited hoping for 7ooris" — that is, wide-eyed damsels, or female companions — "remember this n say 'Mahraha adDugma' (u can do it)."

These women's greatest anxieties are related to *dunya*, or the material world, which they condemn as corrupt and polluting. This is why the niqab is so symbolically important: It acts as a protective shield against worldly poison and vice. As Andrew Sullivan perceptively [observed](#), describing the logic of fundamentalism, "Sin begets sin. The sin of



others can corrupt you as well.” Hence the appeal of the caliphate: a state in which sin is violently punished and constantly purged from the public body.

Yet, for all their efforts to escape the polluting stain of the material world, these women are irrevocably marked by it. They enjoy its technologies and blandishments. And, for all their efforts to Islamize their inner and outer selves, there is, as Mirza so humorously shows, an inner Kardashian in these women that coexists uneasily with their righteous selves.

They record the minutiae of their daily lives, posting selfies of their latest niqab styles or photos of food they have prepared.

They record the minutiae of their daily lives, posting selfies of their latest niqab styles or photos of food

they have prepared. They share their admiration for the latest “banging” [nasheed](#), an a cappella hymn. They warn sisters to beware of “spies” and give shoutouts to their imprisoned sisters. One female Islamic State supporter, who uses the Twitter handle “OumDujana,” even lets us inside her bedroom. It is



la tahzan @OumDujana · Apr 29

This new French nashid is a banger 🎵



1



a fascinating spectacle. In a 9-second recording she uploaded, we are shown what appear to be numerous collections of [hadiths](#), an intricately



la tahzan @OumDujana · Apr 27

My niqab is one black, abaya is another black, khimar is another black argh why



5



[View conversation](#)



la tahzan @OumDujana · Apr 22

OK GUYS I NEED TO COMPILE A NASHEED PLAYLIST FOR TOMORROW \*WORKOUT/GYM KINDA NASHEEDS\* but nothing bait bait.. list em below!



pimped-out shrine to the Islamic State, and several boxes of Nike trainers. This woman, unlike the [Islam for Dummies](#) wannabe jihadis, plainly knows her religion. But she also likes her Nike trainers, though not as much as her iPhone 6.

**Who is Oum Dujana?** She is based in London and may have been born in Belgium or France. She is young — 22, she says — and of North African heritage. Like many female Islamic State supporters, she is precocious, and her tweets show a lively intelligence and active political engagement. (Her account has since been shut down.) She appears to be intensely religious. In one tweet, she makes a reference to being under “heavy obbo,” or observation, and in another refers to a police raid on her house. She also alludes to a husband in a warzone, perhaps Syria, Libya, or Iraq. Either she has tried to leave for Islamic State-controlled territory or she is married to an Islamic State fighter — or both. Regardless, she seems deeply committed to the caliphate ideal and to the Islamic State. It is impossible to know how she acquired that commitment. But infantilizing this woman as a vulnerable child or sexualizing her as a repressed Muslim is unlikely to cast much light on this.



No one is more sensitive to this disparagement than the women themselves. “Idiots that are tweeting this trend,” tweeted Umm Waqqas, a Seattle-based Islamic State online recruiter who was [exposed](#) by Britain’s Channel 4 News last year, “should realize that NO SISTER leaves the comfort of their homes just to marry some man.” She was referring to the hashtag [#jihadibrides](#). “They cant fathom the reality,” she immediately added, “that muslims from all ages are leaving to live in a REAL muslim country & to live under the shades of Sharia.” Or as Oum Dujana more succinctly put it last month, “CNN said we [gonna] marry #Jihotties LOOOL.”






## Cannes Film Review: 'Wrong Elements'

Source: <http://variety.com/2016/film/reviews/wrong-elements-review-1201769176/>



May 18 – For films that otherwise so vividly identified and evoked the trauma visited upon child soldiers, Kim Nguyen's Oscar-nominated



"War Witch" and Cary Fukunaga's aptly titled "Beasts of No Nation" made a tactful point of avoiding geographical specifics in their otherwise unflinching portraits of Central and West Africa. **So it's among the most valuable virtues of "Wrong Elements" that it almost**

**pedantically pinpoints the precise wheres and whens of its subjects' suffering.** With chunks of onscreen text and title cards, French-American novelist Jonathan Littell's documentary exhaustively lists the dates and locations marking the rise and still-progressing fall of the Lord's Resistance Army, the Ugandan rebel movement that fed its ranks for decades by abducting and recruiting thousands of unsuspecting adolescents.

**Why do such details matter?** Simple as they are, they lend immediacy to events that could well be presented as a kind of waking nightmare — while giving viewers a contextualizing map and timeline underscores just how under-exposed Uganda's crisis has been relative to contemporary atrocities elsewhere. If Littell's lengthy, firmly structured but stylistically unadorned doc is sometimes a little pedagogic in its approach, that's fair enough: It's unpacking facts that, to many, may be horrifically new. Like Joshua Oppenheimer in "The Act of Killing" and "The Look of Silence," Littell also invites his human subjects to re-examine violations they've already committed or endured. He's either a less probing or less patient interviewer, however, since "Wrong Elements," enlightening and moving as it often is, doesn't amass equivalent moral tension.



“War is supposed to get rid of all the wrong elements in society,” said Acholi spirit medium and rebel leader Alice Auma in 1987 — a quote that opens the film, which is otherwise muted in tone, on a note of bitter irony. For “Wrong Elements” investigates an army that sought not to eradicate corruption, but to foster it across generations — as children, involuntarily indoctrinated into a culture of free killing, grew from victims into perpetrators. What, then, are the parameters of blame or sympathy for those who, taught early to murder without conscience or consequence, amass a kill list as unconsidered as it is long?

Spiritual instruction from on high is what the Acholi people largely accept drove Joseph Kony, then in his twenties, to found the Lord’s Resistance Army as rebellion spread across Northern Uganda following Yoweri Museveni’s divisive ascent to power in 1986. Over 60,000 teenagers were drafted into the LRA over 25 years, with only half that number escaping its clutches alive and receiving amnesty.

**The most compelling material in “Wrong Elements”** concerns a trio of friends and former LRA conscripts in the city of Gulu — motorcycle taxi drivers Geoffrey and Mike, and impoverished mother Nighty — who return to the site of their now-destroyed base camp in South Sudan. Their accounts of the abuse sustained and carried out under the LRA’s control are startling to hear first-hand, with Nighty’s recollections of becoming a 13-year-old bride to Kony himself especially wrenching. (The LRA’s particularly violent mistreatment of female child soldiers is further underlined by reticent interviews with Lapisa Evelyn, a still shell-shocked escapee who alludes to her misfortunes principally through sense memory.) Even the most hard-up childhood isn’t without moments of levity, however, and the doc finds disturbing poignancy in the friends’ giggling reminiscences of games played and jokes shared in the camp — mutual nostalgia not entirely erased by their mature understanding

of their past’s horrifying context. “It was a stupid life,” Geoffrey wistfully acknowledges, “but it was also interesting.”

Littell, best-known internationally for his hefty, Holocaust-focused 2006 novel “The Kindly Ones,” has a sensitive ear for succinctly evocative victim testimony. (“I thought they were cutting wood,” recalls a grieving mother whose children were slain by the LRA in her own yard. There’s no way to sentimentalize such interview material.) “Wrong Elements” has less direct impact, however, the further it gazes up the power hierarchy. In the latter half of the film, the trial of Dominic Ongwen — a former commander of the now scattered and depleted LRA, who emerged from hiding to face prosecution for war crimes at the International Criminal Court — is examined in methodical procedural detail, but with no emotionally galvanizing outcome or point of view.

Littell’s degree of official access is impressive, though it’s his incidental observations of rural community life that resonate most here, whether it’s a lone woman sorrowfully shelling pigeon peas or local menfolk garrulously chatting at urban traffic hubs. “Wrong Elements” is shot with a keen eye, but at 133 minutes, it’s edited with a rather less discerning one: Fewer filler images of rippling grass or parading ants would be a start towards tightening things. And while this man of letters, in his first stab at feature-length filmmaking, shows real awareness of what knowledge the camera can independently glean from its subjects, he occasionally pushes too hard for revelations. Asking reformed killers if they can “feel the presence” of their victims feels forced, even a little crass, in a film that successfully draws less coerced moments of cathartic insight from interviewees.

**As one survivor puts it with a sad shrug: “There is nothing we can do — the only way is to forgive and begin normal life again.”**

## Al Qaeda magazine calls for targeting American business leaders

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/16/al-qaeda-magazine-calls-for-targeting-american-business-leaders.html>

May 16 – The latest issue of Al Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire released Saturday calls on would-be jihadis to undermine the American economy by targeting business leaders



and entrepreneurs, according to analysts who monitor web chatter from the jihadist organization. The newest edition obtained by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) features a cover



with the headline “Professional Assassinations” and the subhead “Home Assassinations,” which the depiction of a hooded killer watching an upscale home from the outside.

Additional photos include in the issue include one of Microsoft founder Bill Gates splatted in blood with a pistol nearby. The magazine is published by Al Qaeda’s main affiliate located in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

MEMRI quotes Inspire’s editor, Yahya Ibrahim, as opening the issue by saying “assassination is an effective toll in warfare,” and notes that “The prophet ordered the killing of many criminal leaders using this method ... And here we are, following the footsteps of the prophet on how he dealt with his enemies and friends.”

Ibrahim adds in this issue that the focus of the previous issue of Inspire was what he called “workplace” assassinations, and hopes to expand on the same topic in the current issue, which

AQAP hopes will lead to training and preparing a more “professional” type of lone wolves.

**“We will never put down our weapons until we fulfill what Allah wants from us. We are determined to keep fighting and striking Americans with operations by organized jihadi groups and by Lone Jihad, [and] pursuing America in its homeland — by the will of Allah,”** MEMRI quotes Ibrahim as saying.

The chart (right) is interactive – click on source’s URL for more

MEMRI also said an analysis of the issue “provides detailed information and instructions on preparing for and carrying out various targeted assassinations. It stresses that an assassin should possess different options

to carry out an attack, which gives him or her a greater chance for success, and elevates the operation to a more ‘professional’ level.”


In addition to the main section on professional assassinations, the magazine also features a section on bomb-making and encouraging radical Islamic terrorists to emulate the Palestinian stabbings of Israelis by walking up to Americans and stabbing them to death.

AQAP was the first to use English publications to reach out to supporters in the West, with the launch in 2010 of its English-language magazine, Inspire.

The online magazine featured commentary by a radical U.S.-born cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was also killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2011.

### Most Deadly Terrorist Groups Between 2000 and 2014

Sum of fatalities and injuries from attacks between 2000 and 2014. A terrorist attack is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.



Source: [Global Terrorism Database](#).

As of 2014 | Depending on the number of linked events and the cumulative total of fatalities, it is possible to have a fraction of a fatality or injury.





## ISIS in the Pacific and the Threat to the Homeland

By Hasan Abdul-Karim (Staff Writer)

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/isis-in-the-pacific-and-the-threat-to-the-homeland/3d880acb-ab68768b3ef9316c1f3e2e48.html>

May 13 – **Reports of ISIS losing ground in Syria and Iraq have not only signified the group's depleting influence in the area, but have also contributed to growing concerns that the so-called caliphate will try to consolidate power in other regions of the world, most notably Southeast Asia.**

Against this backdrop, the House Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence held a hearing on April 27 to assess the threat of Islamic radicalization in Southeast Asia and the influence that ISIS affiliated militant groups have in the region.

"The spread of Islamist terrorism around the globe is a major concern for US homeland security," said Subcommittee Chairman Peter King (R-NY). "Addressing this threat requires steadfast monitoring and proactive actions in every corner where ISIS and Al Qaeda ideology is spreading."

King continued, "While rightfully focusing on Syria and Iraq in our fight against ISIS, we should not ignore the growth of extremist activity and ideology in other parts of the world."

**Between the years of 2014 and 2016 there have been 75 known ISIS linked terror plots against the West, with 43 percent of plotted attacks carried out successfully.**

One-third of these attacks directly involved ISIS while the remaining were inspired by the hardline militant group.

One such attack was carried out in Jakarta, **Indonesia** in January of this year. Gunmen charged a Starbucks coffee house in the downtown area. The attack left four civilians dead and 23 injured following a suicide bombing and an armed confrontation with police. Five terrorist attackers were also killed.

Although Southeast Asia is no stranger to terrorist activity, with a turbulent history of militantism in the region, attacks such as this

one highlight growing concerns of radicalization in the area and the resurgence in power of existing Islamist groups in the region. These include Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesia-based clandestine terrorist network formed in the early 1990s with the purpose of establishing an Islamic state encompassing southern Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the southern Philippines.

Indonesia has the largest population in the Southeast Pacific area and boasts a relatively stable political climate. However, radical elements within the country have caused some concern.

"Indonesia is often touted for its 'moderation' in Islamic thought and practice, a radical Islamic fringe has been part of the Indonesian social and political landscape for a long time," Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies Joseph Liow testified during the hearing.

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world and an estimated 88 percent of its population of 250 million identify as followers of the religion. The radical sentiment in the country represents a minuscule minority. However, King urged caution.

"Many are skeptical that the violent Islamist extremist groups in Southeast Asia could present a real threat to US allies, interests, or the US Homeland," King noted. "This is the same skepticism that ignored the threats from Yemen, Nigeria, and Libya until they had grown out of hand."

There has been an Islamist presence in the region for decades, most notably in the Philippines, which has led to speculation that ISIS may try to unite pre-existing Islamist groups in the region under one banner.

There have already been recruitment efforts in the region with reports of numerous media campaigns being launched by terrorist organizations. **There are more than 3,000 pro-ISIS websites in Southeast Asia, and 70 percent of these websites are hosted on servers in Indonesia,** according to Strategic Policy Analyst Supna Zaidi Peery.



Although efforts to thwart the recruitment of foreign fighters has been largely effective, **an estimated 700-800 fighters from the region have gone to Syria and Iraq**, with the majority hailing from Indonesia.

“Returning fighters pose a threat to national security in the area since the ability to track these individuals by governments of the region are overstated,” Director of Special Projects Patrick Skinner testified during the hearing.

Counter-terrorist operations are becoming crucial in preventing recruitment from already established groups. Task forces, such as Detachment 88, a counter terrorism unit in Indonesia that was founded after the Bali attacks, have proven to be successful in fighting Islamic extremism. The unit, which receives funding from both the United States and Australia, has also established rehabilitation programs in the area with a success rate of 50 percent.

Stabilizing the political region, as well as eradicating extremist rhetoric in the area, is

more crucial than ever, since local and extremist sentiment tends to thrive in areas that are politically and economically unstable. Moving extremist rhetoric away from populations that are vulnerable to radicalization, as well as proactive and aggressive actions from countries within the area will very quickly change the dynamic of ISIS in the region, according to Peery.

The spread of extremist rhetoric in the region poses a direct threat to not only the United States’ interests in the region, but to the homeland itself. Jihadist sentiment directly contributes to the prolonged war on terror and increases the number of attacks that are perpetrated against the United States and its allies in the name of radical Islam.

Extinguishing the flames of radicalism in the Pacific will weaken the capacity and influence of groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, and help to weaken the global Islamist movement as a whole.

## Where nothing is what it seems: Former IS captive explains terrorism

Source: <http://www.hindustantimes.com/books/where-nothing-is-what-it-seems-former-is-captive-explains-terrorism/story-moffXt2pK3NX0sDSztkgXP.html>

May 20 – In a recent interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic magazine, President Obama compared ISIS to the Joker in The Dark Knight (2008). “The Middle East is like Gotham, a corrupt metropolis controlled by a cartel of thugs. Then the Joker comes in and lights the whole city on fire,” he said. The comparison demonstrated Obama’s ability to simplify a deeply-convoluted political reality.

But clearly, there is more to the Middle East than this over-simplified comparison. For instance, why couldn’t the Western powers foresee the implications of a Middle East governed by a cartel of thugs, the so-called kings and princes? Could anyone explain such abrupt love for democracy and human rights, that too for specific countries in the Middle East? The problem is that Western leaders are not willing to accept their poor understanding or their mistakes that have created an unprecedented catastrophe in the region. The mindless pursuit of national interest of some powerful nations is at the heart of man-made tragedies like the Syrian refugee crisis.


Nicholas Henin’s Jihad Academy provides crucial insights into the mistakes of the Western nations, and urges them to look for early resolutions.

Written before the Syrian refugee crisis and Russia’s intervention, the book is obviously bereft of any reference to these headline-grabbing developments. However, it does hint at the depth of the crisis. Incidentally, Henin was held captive by the Islamic State for 10 months along with two dozen Western hostages, including the Americans James Foley, Steven Scotloff and Kyala Muller, and the Russian Sergei Gorbunov. Henin was the only one to be released alive.

What makes his account particularly unique is that his book is not about his own experience of suffering at the hands of Islamic State, which is often the case with books written by victims. Instead, Henin has chosen to reflect on the larger issues concerning the conflict, the circumstances that led to the existence of Islamic State, and



why and how it has had such a long lease of life. He places the blame squarely on the West. That the author has chosen not to make his unfortunate experience a marketable subject and has, instead, used it to reflect on the



growing pattern of security crises causing larger humanitarian tragedies is especially worthy of appreciation. In his words, "Once free, I soon felt shocked -- not by the cruelty of the ordeal I had undergone, but by the mistakes made by the entire international community, which had led the Middle East I love to such a momentous tragedy,"

The chapter entitled Birth of a Jihadist is an interesting one. Here, Henin argues that since the Islamic State is a creation of the Syrian regime, the Assad regime's claim of fighting IS is bogus. His discussion of the Jihadi Highway, which several Jihadis used to pass through the Syrian-Iraqi region mainly to thwart American intervention in Iraq, is based on his meetings with Jihadists between 2002 and 2004 and, subsequently, during the Syrian revolution. He also discusses how the Syrian regime has supported Jihadi groups like Fatah Al Aslam in Lebanon. The Islamic state, according to Henin, is a bogeyman, on which Syrian warfare largely depends. The author is deeply skeptical about the Assad regime's intention to fight the

Islamic State and cites much research to demonstrate this point.

What are the Islamic State's social and economic roots? Enough media reports point to the Islamic State's grip on considerable resources that enable it to run its savage operations in various parts of Syria, Iraq and other regions. It also runs an effective trade network dealing in oil and arms in addition to the information network to figure out various Western strategies.



Nicolas Henin is welcomed by his family and relatives upon his arrival at the Villacoublay military airport on April 20, 2014 in Velizy-Villacoublay, France. (Getty Images)

Using a widely publicized report by Ruth Sherlock, Daily Telegraph's Middle Eastern correspondent, that shared secrets about the complex web of oil trafficking between the Syrian regime and the Islamic State, the author argues that the fight against the Islamic State is not just half-hearted but is also propelled by legitimate business interests. He also recognizes that American air strikes have aggravated human suffering, and that western interventions have given legitimacy to the Islamic State, and its recruitment processes. The Syrian regime, however, has been able to seek support from particular friendly regions with the help of financial support from Russia and Iran. In subsequent chapters, Henin explains how the Western understanding of security and jihadi violence barely recognizes the suffering of local people. He also blames the West for radicalization.

As things stand, the world could perhaps see the end of three distinct states including Syria, Libya and Iraq in addition to the perennially wounded Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yemen too could be added to this growing list. The





failure of the global system of crisis management seems to have created more opportunities for conflict and an arms race than even the Cold War. Western powers do not seem to have any understanding of the Syrian refugee crisis. The allegation, therefore, that the West is not serious about this crisis, despite its engagement in the ceasefire, is credible.

This is an invaluable source for scholars of international security or jihadi politics. Henin uses primary sources such as his own

interviews and the arguments of various experts on the region to advance his narrative. The reader also realizes that the institutions of the post-Second World War have been completely co-opted by Western powers driven by narrow-minded national interests. As a result, their methods of dealing with conflict have become redundant and have opened the possibility for more conflict of this type in the coming years. All in all, this book is an important contribution to the study of terror and the Islamic state.

*Dr Rehman is the editor Communalism in Postcolonial India: Changing Contours (Routledge 2016). He teaches at Jamia Millia Central University, New Delhi, India.*

## Buckingham Palace wall scaled by convicted killer

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36343582>



May 20 – A man who has admitted scaling Buckingham Palace's wall and trespassing in the grounds is a convicted murderer, a court has heard.

**Denis Hennessy, 41, of Wembley, north-west London, was on licence following the murder of a homeless man in 1992.**

He wandered the palace gardens for about 10 minutes before his arrest on Wednesday evening. He had been unarmed, Westminster Magistrates' Court heard.

Hennessy pleaded guilty and was jailed for four months on Friday.

He admitted one count of trespass on a protected site and one count of criminal damage.

### 'Is Ma'am in?'

He had cut his right hand as he climbed over the top of the wall, which is between 8ft to 10ft high, and set the alarm off.

Prosecutor Tom Nicholson told the court that he had repeatedly asked, "Is Ma'am in?" as he was detained.

The Queen was in residence at the time, with the Duke of Edinburgh and the Duke of York. Hennessy told police he had "walked through the gardens admiring the view".

Sikander Choudry, defending, said the unemployed stonemason had drunk "four or five cans of cider" before the incident.



He went to meet a friend in central London, and on his way to Victoria had another drink in a pub before deciding to climb the palace wall, using a nearby tree.

Mr Choudry said: "Mr Hennessy did not have any malicious intent towards the Royal Family - that's not the reason he went to Buckingham Palace."

### Iron bar attack

Recalling Hennessy's previous conviction for murder, Mr Nicholson told the court that Hennessy had been 17 when he was accosted by a homeless man who had asked for money and knocked food out of his hand.

"Hennessy became angry and attacked him with an iron bar, fracturing his skull into small pieces," Mr Nicholson said.

Hennessy, who had been sniffing butane gas before the attack, then jumped on the man's head, killing him.

He was convicted in 1993 at the Old Bailey and released from prison in 2002. The probation service stopped monitoring him in 2013. He also had a conviction for shoplifting in 2016.

Chief magistrate, senior district judge Howard Riddle, jailed Hennessy for four months for trespassing and two months, to run concurrently, for damaging the wires of the alarm system, to the value of £2,000.

### Analysis

By Peter Hunt, BBC royal correspondent

"Man breaches palace security" is an all too familiar headline in recent decades.

The Queen, when in London, is protected - initially - by a 10ft-high wall, not a ring of steel. The security is tighter, the closer one gets to the head of state.

That wall has been climbed by Michael Fagan in the 80s, who wanted to have a chat with the woman he called Elizabeth Regina, and by Jason Hatch more than 20 years later, dressed as Batman while protesting about father's rights.

The latest intruder, Denis Hennessy, was apprehended in the gardens and didn't make it to the palace. That fact is regarded as significant by the police and by royal officials who still shiver when they remember how Aaron Barschak, wearing a peach ball gown, gatecrashed Prince William's 21st birthday party at Windsor Castle and kissed the future king on both cheeks.

The sentencing of Hennessey will, officials hope, deter others from trying to access the Queen's backyard.

There have been several security breaches at Buckingham Palace in the past, including the [case of Michael Fagan](#), who got into the Queen's bedroom in 1982 and spent 10 minutes talking to her before she managed to raise the alarm when he asked for a cigarette.

In 2003, [Daily Mirror journalist Ryan Parry exposed security flaws](#) by getting a job as a footman at the palace using a false reference.

In 2013, a [man scaled a fence and was arrested inside the palace](#). He was found at about 22:20 BST in a room which had been open to the public in the daytime.

Last year [two men got on to the roof of the Queen's Gallery](#), adjacent to the palace, and unveiled a banner in a protest over fathers' rights.

## Suspect shot near White House, in custody

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/20/politics/u-s-park-police-shooting-near-white-house/index.html>



May 21 – A Secret Service agent on Friday shot a man near a security checkpoint close to the White House after he brandished a gun and refused orders to stop.

A Secret Service spokesman said the incident occurred shortly after 3 p.m. ET when a man carrying a gun approached a checkpoint on E Street near the White House. The suspect was given verbal commands to stop



and drop the gun, and when he failed to comply, he was shot once by a Secret Service agent and taken into custody. Secret Service officers and an agent provided medical aid to the suspect, and the city's EMS said he was transported to a local hospital with critical injuries.

The suspect was shot in the abdomen, according to two sources familiar with the incident.

President Barack Obama was not at the White House, and Vice President Joe Biden was secured in the White House complex during the incident.

"No one within or associated with the White House was injured, and everyone in the White House is safe and accounted for," a White



House official said. "The President has been made aware of the situation."

The White House went into a lockdown that was lifted around 4 p.m. ET.

A law enforcement official said investigators have located the suspect's vehicle near the shooting area.

Law enforcement believes it has identified the suspect who approached the Secret Service checkpoint and was shot, two law enforcement sources told CNN.

One of the sources said the man does not have a record with the Secret Service. Police released no other details about him or an

apparent motive. Authorities discovered ammunition for a .22-caliber weapon inside the man's white, four-door sedan, which was parked near the scene, according to two law enforcement officials.

#### Not the first time

People have tried to reach the mansion's grounds for years for a wide variety of reasons. Some suffered mental illness, others wanted to make a political statement and some sought notoriety. One person this year allegedly climbed the fence to try to escape apprehension in a series of robberies he had just committed.

The Secret Service last year added small spikes — or "pencil points" — to the top of the six-foot fence that surrounds the White House complex after a series of incidents in which intruders climbed the fence. Last month, the agency announced a plan to raise the height of the security fence to 11 feet by 2018.


**Perhaps the most serious breach was on Sept. 19, 2014, when Omar Gonzalez (photo) climbed over the north fence and made his way deep into the White House.**

When he was finally tackled by an off-duty Secret Service agent in the ornate East Room, he was found to have a knife in a pants pocket. Two hatchets, a machete and 800

rounds of ammunition were found in his car nearby. Secret Service Director Julia Pierson resigned two weeks later.

But there have been recent incidents as well. Last month, a man threw his backpack over the north fence and climbed over. He was immediately arrested. On March 7, a man in a hoodie climbed over a smaller first barrier but was tackled and arrested before he could reach the fence. And in November, a college student draped in an American flag climbed over the spiked White House fence while the first family was inside the residence celebrating Thanksgiving.


**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Two incidents – one in Buckingham Palace; the other in White House – with a day difference! Another vivid proof that the unexpected always happens (again and again) becoming expected. A few spikes and higher walls and fences are not enough. Security personnel should start thinking as terrorists in order to identify gaps and provide viable solutions. There will be one day that all planets will be inline and bloodshed will result. Some time ago I wrote about a "dome" over White House. Perhaps it is time for a similar drone over UK Palace. There is a forest behind the palace





and few high buildings around. Not sure about the underground and drone defense capabilities but all scenarios should be reviewed and updated.

## Can it happen?



Summer tourist resorts and cruise ships' attacks by ISIS?

## Israel's airport security model may not be suitable for European airports

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160520-israel-s-airport-security-model-may-not-be-suitable-for-european-airports>



May 20 – Israel has a justified reputation as a country offering tight aviation and airport security. Thus, although Israel has been the targets of various forms of terrorism for decades, no one has been killed or wounded inside Ben Gurion airport, or on board an aircraft departing from the airport, for the last forty-four years. The *Telegraph* reports that the airport entrance is located more than two miles from the check-in counters, and that armed guards screen every arriving vehicle and briefly question those inside. By the time travelers are finally allowed to board a plane departing from Israel, they will have cleared no less than twelve layers of security.

Experts note that while European airports apply the same security procedures to every traveler, Ben Gurion employs “risk-based security” – that is, the system aims to identify passengers who are likely to pose a higher risk than other passengers, and subject them to additional, and intrusive, checks.



Most of those subject to additional interrogation are Arabs – even if they are Arab citizens of Israel – especially if they have travelled elsewhere in the Middle East.

**Experts note that Ben Gurion's intensive security is possible because of specific characteristics of the airport – and of Israeli security culture:**

- Israeli security agencies openly employ what Western societies would regard as racial profiling: Arabs are singled out for additional security measures in a manner which would probably be illegal in most European countries
- Ben Gurion airport is small by European standards. Last year, 16.5 million passengers went through its terminals, compared with 75 million at Heathrow and 66 million at Charles de Gaulle in Paris.
- Ben Gurion's passenger traffic is barely half the level recorded by Heathrow's Terminal Five alone.
- Ben Gurion is the only international airport in Israel, allowing Israel's security authorities to focus their efforts on one facility.

Officials who spoke with the *Telegraph* say that Europe cannot emulate all aspects of Israel's approach to aviation security, but that the core idea — that potentially higher risk passengers should be singled out as early as possible before they board the plane – should be adopted, subject to European laws and norms.

## Islamic State threatens attacks in India

Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-islamic-state-idUSKCN0YC0J8>

May 21 – In a rare appeal to India's Muslim minority, Islamic State says it is planning to avenge the deaths of Muslims killed in riots in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's home state of Gujarat and elsewhere.



India, a Hindu-majority country, is home to more than 160 million Muslims, but only a handful of them have joined the Middle Eastern group. Indian leaders and members of the community say this testifies to the strength of the country's secular democracy.

In a video monitored by the U.S. intelligence group SITE, Islamic State mocked Muslims living in harmony with Hindus who worship cows, trees and the sun, and urged them to travel to IS-held territories in the "Caliphate".

"In this land you get to have hatred for the kuffar [disbelievers]. In this land you get to

perform jihad," said an Indian fighter who is identified as Abu Salman al-Hindi operating in the Syrian province of Homs.

"In this land your religion is safe. In this land Allah's Law is the highest. In this land you have nothing that stops you from doing good deeds, from doing da'wah [preaching], from preaching Islam. In this land your life, your honor, your property is protected."

Another fighter then says Islamic State will come to India to liberate Muslims and avenge the violence perpetrated against them in 2002 in the western state of Gujarat as well Kashmir and the destruction of a mosque by Hindu zealots in 1992.

"We will come back, with the sword, to free you, to avenge Babri mosque, Gujarat, Kashmir," the fighter says. More than 1,000 people were killed in Gujarat. Most of them were Muslims, attacked by Hindu mobs in retaliation for the burning of Hindus in a train.

Modi was the chief minister of Gujarat at the time and faced allegations that he did not do enough to stop the bloodshed. But a Supreme Court-ordered investigation has said there was no case against him.

**India has suffered from Islamist attacks. In 2008 a militant group based in Pakistan launched a rampage through the city of Mumbai that killed 166 people and traumatized the country.**



## Islamic Terrorism Was Born on This Mountain 1,000 Years Ago

By Clive Irving

Source: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/21/islamic-terrorism-was-born-on-this-mountain-1-000-years-ago.html>

May 21 – Where did the idea originate of [indoctrinating scores of young men](#) into committing themselves to [targeted, suicidal killings](#)?

Given the [barbarism of the ancient world](#), that might be too specific a question to answer, but there is no doubt about where a particular kind of Islamic death cult began—nor about the fact that it gave the world a universal term for what was a new kind of terror, delivered without warning. This was not Al Qaeda or ISIS, but their distant forebears, zealots from a sect named the **Ismailis**. When they appeared in the 10<sup>th</sup> century they became known as the **hashshashin**, Arabic for those who take hashish. Or, in a word that passed into our language, assassins.

They were sent to the major cities of the time with precise orders to kill. They took their time, often as long as a year. They studied the daily routines of their targets. They took on new identities, adopted disguises. The hardest targets to reach were those at the top—in a few cases, the very top. They had to get close enough to touch. Once the killing was done there was little chance of escape.

Their campaign lasted for a century and a half. It was conducted with high efficiency and depended on maintaining a remarkable level of secrecy about where it was based—every one of the killers came from the same base. Many attempts to locate it were unsuccessful. The Ismailis felt forever invulnerable at the top of a remote mountain accessed by a single, secret path.

**Only in the 1930s was the location of the base established beyond doubt.**

In a way, the person who made the discovery was as single-minded and exceptional as the Ismailis. She was **Freya Stark**, one of that group of obsessive British explorers who suffered from desert lust—the ecstasy that came from binging on the hard-won intoxication of some of the Middle East's most remote landscapes. Stark came a generation after that of Gertrude Bell, the Arabist scholar who, in 1921, arbitrarily decided the borders of a new nation, Iraq, [\[Gertrude of Arabia, 06.17.14\]](#) and of Lawrence of Arabia.



Mary Evans Picture Library / Alamy Stock Photo

Gertrude Bell on an expedition picnic with King Faisal of Iraq, 1922.

Stark has never had anywhere near the same renown as Bell or Lawrence, and had no taste for their kind of political meddling. Yet she ventured where few Westerners had ever been and had a novelist's eye and ear for characters. Through sheer persistence she brought back the first widely read account of the eyrie where terrorism as we know it was conceived.

Stark had a British father and an Italian mother and spent most of her childhood in Italy, often ill and lacking focus. Then, on her ninth birthday, she was given a copy of *One Thousand and One Nights*. From that point she was hooked on "the Mysterious Orient."

In 1931, at the age of 38, fluent in Arabic and Persian, Stark had already made three trips into remote and dangerous regions of western Persia. Now she set her sights on a place named **Alamut**, the "Eagle's Nest," in the largely unmapped mountains that divided the Iranian plateau from the Caspian Sea.





Alamut was, by legend, the Ismailis' secret fortress. The sect and their leader were featured briefly in Marco Polo's account of his travels, as The Old Man of The Mountains, but even in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century its location was unclear.

Stark knew the outline of the Assassins' story. Ten centuries earlier Persia was under the rule of the Seljuks, part of a repressive Sunni empire. The Ismailis were a breakaway hard core Shia sect who believed in a kind of communist utopianism. They were waiting for the coming of The Promised One who would liberate the world from oppression. (When Persia became the primary Shia power in the 16<sup>th</sup> century the Ismailis played no part and remained a fringe heretical sect, surviving today, passively, under the leadership of the Aga Khan. Ironically, it is now Al Qaeda and ISIS acting as Sunni enforcers, with the same fanaticism as the Assassins, who visit terror on the Shia as apostates.)

EPA European Pressphoto Agency/Alamy  
Alamut citadel, located in the middle of the Elburz mountain, is historically known as birthplace of suicidal operations in the 11th century.



And so, while they were waiting, they devised and executed a novel program of terrorism.

A single, anonymous killer was assigned a target and could, using patience and intelligence, reach and destroy some of the highest-placed officers of the Seljuk court—one assassin even killed a sultan and another a powerful vizier. There were, of course, no suicide belts. These assassins had to get up close and knife their victims. If they died—before or after the strike—they were promised a place in paradise. If taken alive they were invariably tortured to death. But (waterboarding anybody?) any names they revealed under torture, supposedly of comrades, were actually those of enemies, frequently achieving—by proxy—another of their murderous objectives.

If they survived and made it back to Alamut they were treated as heroes for the rest of their lives. And smoked as much hash as they liked.

**It proved to be a very effective exercise in asymmetric power. And, as today, in propaganda terms it was a force multiplier:** as the killings steadily increased whole cities and their ruling regimes lived in fear of the sudden flash of a long knife from beneath a cloak. The Assassins didn't bring down any regime, but they exacted the costs to societies we recognize: of contagious fear and the indiscriminate suspicions that come with it, as well as the diversion of resources required for security. What made the cult appear to be invincible was that nobody seemed able to fix the location of its leadership, which for a considerable time was in the hands of one man, Sheikh al-Jabal—"master of the mountains"...or Marco Polo's "Old Man." Numerous expeditions set out for the mountains, but none found the right one.

When Stark returned to Persia in 1931 to search for Alamut the country, under the control of Reza Shah, was in the early throes of being converted to a secular republic on the model of Kemal Ataturk's Turkey, but in many ways it remained a 19<sup>th</sup> century tribal society. The idea of a woman giving out orders to men was close to blasphemy, and in this case it was a white woman with the attitude and voice of an English governess. Undaunted, she set out with a small escort of guides and helpers she had recruited locally (none of whom had met a European before).

The reason for the elusiveness of Alamut soon became clear. In her account of the journey in *The Valleys of the Assassins*, a book published 80 years ago (it was her first and it established her as a great traveler) she wrote:

"Six people would each give me a different name for the selfsame hill: when in doubt they invented or borrowed one from somewhere else to please me.



"This explained the difficulty of locating Alamut, which is neither village nor castle but the main valley." Gradually ascending from the plain toward the foothills, with supplies carried on a few mules (unlike the elaborate caravans required by Gertrude Bell), she passed through country that alternated between barrenness and almost voluptuous oases with freshwater streams and orchards. Of her companions Stark wrote: "They were wild and simple and peaceful. They had not yet reached the point of sophistication where the miraculous is separated from everyday life, and were ready to believe anything in the vast and strange world."

It took more than a week to get to the mountains. All the way Stark made meticulous notes on the geography, preparing the first scientific map of the region. (Her cartography later won her an award from the Royal Geographical Society). Over the previous 50 years a handful of less scientific Western travelers had preceded her, but Stark's skills made her own luck and, suddenly, the payoff came:

"The entrance to the valley was so well hidden that previous expeditions had missed it. We climbed from boulder to boulder over the face of the cliff....it was stifling enough now: the round white stones of the river bed and the red earth walls radiated heat upon us."

There were more days of tough climbing until the seat of Sheikh al-Jabal came into sight.

"The Rock of the Assassins stands out like a ship, broadside on, from a concave mountainside that guards it on the north....I contemplated it with the feelings due to an object that has the power to make one travel so far...."

In the reverse view from the mountain the Ismailis regarded the rest of the world—at least that part of it that they knew—as vulnerable and deserving of their wrath. They had attempted to foment revolution

but the peasants failed to rise to their bidding. But any established power, no matter how mighty and how distant, was a legitimate target for their kind of contract killing. In their eyes assassination had a sacramental quality.

[Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Département des Manuscrits, Division Orientale.](#)

[Siege of Alamut 1213-1214, depicted in the Jami' al-tawarikh by Rashid-al-Din Hamadani.](#)

When Stark finally reached the redoubt her sense of achievement was chilled by the elemental harshness.

"The great Rock looks a grim place. On every side the

natural walls fall away in precipices; and from the highest point, 10,000 feet at least, one can see the great half-circle of the eastern mountains covered with snow, nameless on my map."

In finally meeting their end the Ismailis were to experience another of those salutary lessons in geopolitical wisdom that each century seems fated to relearn: beware of unintended consequences.

In the 13<sup>th</sup> century a French envoy reached the Mongol court at Karakorum, deep in Mongolia. He was amazed to find security measures of an almost paranoid desperation. He was told that more than 40 Assassins, in various disguises, had been dispatched to eliminate the Great Khan Mongke (descendant of Genghis Khan).

The Mongols treated this not simply as a threat but an impertinent insult. It was time for boots on the ground (or, rather, boots in the saddle). In 1255 Mongke ordered his brother Hulegu to take a Mongol army and wipe out the Assassins once and for all. It took all the





Mongol tenacity and skill to breach the mountain redoubt and, when they did they left nothing alive. As she departed the mountain and got back to the foothills, Stark reflected: “The Mongols came, and their slant-eyed armies must have camped in these meadows through the winter months until the Rock capitulated and the devastating horde went by, and the heretical library was burnt and lost for ever.”

Not only did the Mongols wipe out the Assassins; they went on to subjugate the whole of Persia, and eventually rolled on over the whole of eastern Europe, being stopped only in Germany.

Stark’s epiphany would inform the rest of her life.



“This is a great moment, when you see, however distant, the goal of your wandering. The thing which has been living in your imagination suddenly becomes a part of the tangible world. It matters not how many ranges, rivers or parching dusty ways may lie between you: it is yours now for ever.”

In her case, ever was a long time. She carried on traveling until she was 92, building a shelf-full of books, and died in Italy in 1993, at age 100. Like the rest of the world, she then had every reason to believe that the aberration of the Assassins was safely interred on that mountaintop along with all other medieval barbarities. She was not alone in that belief.


*Clive Irving is senior consulting editor at Condé Nast Traveler, specializing in aviation; and the author of Wide-Body: The Triumph of the 747 (Morrow).*

#### Book review

Advances in Hospitality and Tourism Research (AHTR)	2015
An International Journal of Akdeniz University Tourism Faculty	Vol. 3 (2)
ISSN: 2147-9100 (Print), 2148-7316 (Online)	138-140
Webpage: <a href="http://www.ahtjournal.org/">http://www.ahtjournal.org/</a>	

Tourism Security: Strategies for Effectively Managing Travel Risk and Safety. Peter E. Tarlow. 2014. Waltham, MA, Butterworth-Heinemann. ISBN 978-0-12-411570-5

Reviewed by Alfred W. OGLE – School of Business and Law, Edith Cowan University, Western Australia, AUSTRALIA



Insecurity would seem to have become the new normal evidenced by the surge in terror-related activity in 2015. The hyper sensationalized Paris attacks eclipsing the speculated downing of a civilian aircraft in Sinai by terrorists just two weeks prior, the accidental killing of Mexican tourists by Egyptian security forces two months earlier, the deadly bombing of Bangkok’s Erawan Shrine three months before it, and a string of adverse events following the Charlie Hebdo shooting at the beginning of the year. According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization (2015a), safety and security remains a global concern compounded by a highly volatile economic climate buffeted by lower oil prices and currency fluctuations, all adversely impacting on tourism demand.

Consequently tourism security has become a highly touted topic but the linkage between security and tourism has been fodder for discussion by academics since the late 1980s (e.g. D’Amore & Anuza, 1986; Richter & Waugh,





1986). The spectre of terrorism combined with safety and security concerns related to pandemics, global weather and data communication makes Dr. Tarlow's book relevant and a suitable reference for all tourism and hospitality practitioners. In addition, this book is an invaluable resource for law enforcement and the private security sector.

As an authority in the area of tourism security and safety, he provides a comprehensive coverage of the complex phenomenon of "tourism surety", a term that refers to a lowering of the probability that a negative event will occur. The objective of the book is two-fold: the provision of additional tools for the tourism professional, and more profoundly to engender reinforcement of the "principle that yes we are our brother's (and sister's) keepers; that is our responsibility to make the world not only a safer place but also a better place" (p. xxviii) through the reduction of violence brought about by gaining knowledge and changing mindsets.

The book begins with a philosophical introduction to the topic and provides the reader an understanding of the interdependency of tourism, surety and the economy. It then provides a contextualization of security within the lodging sector, and the importance of risk and crisis management. A practical 5-step Risk Management Model is explained.

Chapters on the threats of terrorism in public gathering places, aquatic venues, and on different modes of transportation follow. Coverage on tourism security legal issues is made before the closing chapter which contains case studies of four popular tourist destination in the Americas.

Dr. Tarlow writes in a down-to-earth and easy-to-read style that would also make the book suitable as an undergraduate and graduate student reference. He brings to the reader a wealth of knowledge gleaned from his many years of researching, writing, teaching and consulting in the impact of crime and terrorism on the tourism industry, event risk management, and in tourism and economic development. The use of case studies is highly effective in providing the reader an insight into the real world challenges and opportunities of practitioners. Including case studies from burgeoning global tourist destinations would have greatly enhanced the book. Given that growth in international tourist arrivals to Europe, Asia and the Pacific and the Middle East outpaced that recorded for the Americas (UNWTO, 2015a), and the increasing participation of emerging economies in international outbound travel (UNWTO, 2015b), the need to account for the different practices and perspectives beyond the Western World view (Knox, Hannam, Margry, Olsen, & Salazar, 2014) should be considered.

In his afterword, Dr. Tarlow wondered, as he finished writing the book in early 2014, how tourism security would evolve in the following years. He put forth some guidelines and challenges for consideration.

Sadly, in the period of only one year tourism insecurity has only exacerbated and the tourism and hospitality industries have been dealt with a myriad of severe challenges. For the tourist, caveat emptor prevails and seems likely a complement to the new normal vis-à-vis insecurity. Case in point is the very recent terrorist attack on the Raddison Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali where 19 guests were murdered.

The author laments that "no one knows what the future will bring", but is confident "that the world's largest and perhaps youngest industry is flexible enough to find creative solutions for challenges that will sure occur" (p. 264). Apart from taking proactive measures to achieve tourism surety, he wonders if "perhaps we can ask nothing more but to be vigilant and to face the world with a cheerful and caring countenance" (p. 264).

Would the perpetrators of tourism insecurity and the degradation of our habitat share this naïveté? Perhaps the tourism consumer should assume a bigger role as a co-producer of tourism security together with law enforcement agencies (Pizam, Tarlow & Bloom, 1997) and service provider (Chathoth, Altinay, Harrington, Okumus, & Chan, 2013)?

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## Terrorist Groups Remain Unusually Quiet Following EgyptAir Crash

Source: <http://www.npr.org/2016/05/20/478886111/terrorist-groups-remain-unusually-quiet-following-egyptair-crash>

May 20 – NPR's Ari Shapiro talks with Rukmini Callimachi, who covers terrorism for *The New York Times*, about the curious silence on the part of terrorist groups following the EgyptAir crash.

ARI SHAPIRO, HOST: Egyptian authorities say terrorism is more likely than a mechanical malfunction to have brought down that Egypt Air flight. Rukmini Callimachi says this does not look like previous terrorist attacks that have brought down airplanes. She covers terrorism for The New York Times and joins us now. Welcome.

RUKMINI CALLIMACHI: Ari, thank you for having me.

SHAPIRO: Talk about other recent plane crashes and what we saw in the immediate aftermath with terrorist organizations taking credit.

CALLIMACHI: Well, in terms of ISIS, they tend to take credit very quickly, usually within a couple hours, if not on the outer edge of that days. The Metrojet flight, which went down October 31 of last year. It went down in the morning. And ISIS claimed responsibility for it the same day, so it was a matter of hours. What we're seeing here today is almost the opposite of what happened last year. Last year, officials very quickly came out and said, this is not terrorism and denied that hypothesis for quite some time, even as ISIS came out and claimed it. And eventually, they came around and stated that the Islamic State was responsible. This time around, we have officials essentially pointing the finger at ISIS, or at least to terrorism, and yet the terror group has not claimed it.

SHAPIRO: And so what have you seen on ISIS-supported Twitter feeds, blogs, other publications since this Egyptian plane disappeared?

CALLIMACHI: It's really puzzling, Ari. I mean, there's been nothing. I mean, complete radio silence on the accounts that we consider to be official ISIS outlets. As far as the ISIS sympathizers, there were a couple of little posts in the hours after the plane went missing that seemed to be somewhat celebratory, but nothing on the order of what we've seen in other attacks. And so what's really striking is the silence here.

SHAPIRO: And so what possibilities does that leave?

CALLIMACHI: Look, I've been watching this group for some time. And what's counterintuitive about is people somehow have this perception that ISIS claims everything or that they wrongly claim attacks, and that's just not borne out. There's been very few incidences where they've claimed attacks that officials don't believe they did. And in general, when they do something, they claim it, and they claim it accurately.

SHAPIRO: So one possibility, obviously, is that this was not terrorism at all, but it was, in fact, mechanical failure.

CALLIMACHI: Yes.



SHAPIRO: Another possibility - how realistic do you think it is that perhaps this was a group other than ISIS?

CALLIMACHI: I mean, the only - you know, really, the only other group that is out there that we believe has the capability to do this is al-Qaeda. Now, could it be al-Qaeda? I mean, al-Qaeda has been aiming to take down flights and successfully did, obviously, on 9/11. But since 9/11, their success rate has been almost nil. You know, think of the underwear bomber, the shoe bomber. So have they suddenly now, at a point in time when al-Qaeda is considered to be very much on its back foot - have they suddenly now figured out how to carry out something as catastrophic as what happened to Egypt Air?

SHAPIRO: And so, in the next few days, investigators are pursuing many different threads. You, I imagine, are looking online at all of these accounts associated with these groups. What specifically are you going to be trying to find?

CALLIMACHI: You know, I'm obsessively looking at - I mean, ISIS now has a pretty standardized structure for claiming attacks. They usually go through either Al-Bayan Radio - their radio station - or they go through Amak, which is their semi-official news agency. So all I can do at this point is just watch these channels and see if anything is said. And then, if it's not claimed, I think we're going to end up in a very puzzling and confusing situation, with officials, you know, struggling to make sense of it. And until the group itself claims it, it's actually quite hard to know with some certainty whether - whether they were behind it or not.

SHAPIRO: Rukmini Callimachi covers terrorism for The New York Times and joined us via Skype. Thank you so much.

CALLIMACHI: Thank you, Ari.

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