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****Al-Qaeda tried to turn an Oregon ranch into a training camp

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140425-alqaeda-tried-to-turn-an-oregon-ranch-into-a-training-camp

**U.S.-born Muslim convert Eva Hatley testified in Manhattan federal court on Tuesday, claiming that after opening her family’s Oregon ranch to local Muslims to teach them how to grow and can** **vegetables, the men turned her home into an al-Qaeda training camp.** “Carloads” of fellow Muslims she met through her mosque arrived at her 160-acre ranch in Bly in 1999. “It wasn’t anything like I envisioned for the property,” Hatley said, as she testified at the trial of Abu Hamza al-Masri, who is accused of committing multiple terror crimes, including setting up the training camp and conspiring in a 1998 kidnapping in Yemen that led to the deaths of four tourists.

Hatley’s husband at the time, Ivan Rule, was temporarily out of town “shepherding” as the ranch became a training ground. The New York Post reports that al-Masri’s lawyer insisted the camp was more like a “Cub Scouts” club, with men riding horses, in the name of camaraderie.

Hatley refuted al-Masri’s claims, saying that one of the arrivals, Oussama Kassir, boasted about his past experiences with running training camps and being a “hit man” for Osama bin Laden. Kassir also told Hatley that al-Masri was his leader and that al-Masri sent him and others to the Bly ranch to establish a training camp where men could learn to train, shoot guns, and throw knives. “He said he was there to train men for jihad,” she said. “He said that Abu Hamza sent him. He intended to train them to fight.”

Kassir is a Lebanese-born Swede, convicted in 2009 of plotting to help al-Qaeda recruit by setting up a weapons training facility at the ranch and distributing terrorist training manuals over the Internet.

Haley claimed the visitors said the ranch resembled Afghanistan. She noted that some of the men had CDs containing information on how to “kill people” and some men even openly discussed “robbing and killing truck drivers” on nearby roads. Kassir also mentioned to Hatley that there were plans eventually to dig a hillside compound at the ranch for al-Masri to hide out in. “I was shocked,” said Hatley, who claims she fled the ranch in fear in December 1999, four months after moving in.

During the trial, al-Masri’s lawyer painted Hatley as paranoid and her testimony as unreliable. Hatley admitted to exaggerating her financial status before marrying her husband right after their first encounter, but she also said that she was fearful of her husband, who was married four previous times and had eighteen children. Hatley claimed that her husband wanted to kill her and he had “suffocated” his previous wife to death, but neither al-Masri or others at the ranch ever threatened her.

According to the Post, Hatley went into witness protection in 2004 but was removed from the program after telling her neighbors about her secret. Hatley was later removed from a second attempt under the witness protection program after she violated multiple rules, including driving with a suspended license.

Al-Masri is accused of committing multiple terror crimes, including setting up a training camp and conspiring in a 1998 kidnapping in Yemen that led to the deaths of four tourists. Al-Masri faces life in prison if convicted.

**Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure**

**By Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan**

Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/334/html

*Why do terrorist groups endure?  This question is relevant to scholars and policy makers alike. In the past, this issue has not been addressed in a systematic fashion.  Recent work investigates this question using data on transnational groups and finds that factors associated with the home country can influence the group’s endurance  Applying the theory of outbidding to terrorist group survival, we argue that strategic competition among groups predicts group duration.  Using the Global Terrorism Database, we develop a dataset using the terrorist group as the unit of analysis to model the duration of group activity and thus include the largest sample of groups yet.  Controlling for previous explanations of both group duration and terrorism, we find a robust effect for the impact that group competition has on terrorist group survival.*

**Introduction**

Why do some terrorist groups endure?  While this question is certain to interest policymakers and scholars, it has received little systematic investigation.  Several scholars [1] have investigated why terror groups end, usually focusing on specific actions by the state or by organisational dynamics and decline.  These studies have either only examined groups that end [2] or do not provide systematic investigation of the topic [3][4].  Asking why terror groups endure relates to understanding the environment that is conducive to groups that use terrorism.  In short, we seek to understand why some groups who use terrorism survive for 40 years while others last fewer than 40 days.

Recent work demonstrates that the capabilities of the organisations [5] and the states in which they operate [6] explain why some groups endure longer than others. We apply the theory of outbidding [7] to this question and argue that the strategic environment for groups affects their survival. In short, both the numbers of competitors and where the group is in the food chain influences its likelihood of survival.  Finally, we identify some alternative explanations for terrorist group survival relating to the regime characteristics of the state and its societal factors.  Following this discussion, we define terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist group.  We then explain how we conceptualize group survival.  Next, we discuss the research design issues associated with modeling group survival and describe the data used.  After explaining data and methods, we then discuss the results of the statistical analysis.  In the conclusion, we discuss some of the limitations of this particular approach to understanding terrorist group survival and suggest some avenues for further research.

**Why Some Groups Survive While Others Do Not**

Most, if not all terrorist groups end, yet we do not fully understand why.  Previous work on this question has been limited to case comparisons [8] or theoretical discussions without empirical tests.[9]  As Cronin [10] claims, “[t]he question of how terrorist groups decline is insufficiently studied, and the available research is virtually untapped.”  Previous attempts to explain terror group survival and decline have focused on strategic choices made by governments and groups.  These studies generally are single cases that fail to make large comparisons.[11]  Using a cross-sectional database of 457 groups, Cronin argues that groups end because of negotiations, decapitation, internal organisational issues, success, a reduction in popular support, state repression, or a transition into other forms of violence.[12]  While these factors contribute to the end of terror campaigns, we know less about the underlying conditions or environments that promote or inhibit group survival.[13]

 Recent work provides systematic evidence for why groups fail. Blomberg et al. explain some of the variation in *transnational* group survival by examining the environment in which the group operates.[14]  They find that a gap exists between young and old organisations where young groups are the most likely to fail (what they term *one-hit wonders*).  They also find that socioeconomic conditions in the state can influence the duration of the group.  Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are likely to outlive groups in North America.  Populous states encourage the lifespan of the group, and increases in GDP increase the lifespan of the group.  They have the most comprehensive data on transnational groups (1,414 from 1968 to 2007).

Blomberg et al. use a more constrained set of groups (367, 1970-2007) to evaluate the impact that tactics, group size, ideology, region of operation, and base-country characteristics have on duration. [15]  They find that larger, religious groups that diversify their tactics and are based in the Middle East or North Africa survive the longest.   Democratic institutions also positively influence group survival.  To gain information on ideology and group size, they use data from Jones and Libicki that limits their sample size.[16]  These two studies, however, provide a baseline of both theory and evidence to suggest that the characteristics the groups and the states in which they operate influence their survival.  Fortna, using an extensive database of insurgent groups, finds civilian targeting or terrorism prolongs the conflict but that the tactic is ultimately counterproductive.[17]  Abrahms, like Fortna, suggests that terrorism is often self-defeating but does not investigate characteristics of the group or environment to explain the variation in the longevity of groups.[18]  Building on this work, we offer an important characteristic that influences longevity: competition among groups.[19]

**Outbidding and Group Survival**

It is fairly uncontroversial to state that violent groups are affected by the competitive environment in which they operate.[20]  Outbidding, or the use of increased violence to attract support from a domestic constituency, occurs where “groups try to distinguish themselves from one another.”[21]  Bloom [22] argues that violence is a way to “gain credibility and win the public relations campaign.”[23] While a competitive environment may encourage terrorism, it also likely dampens group survival as other organisations drain the pool of potential recruits.  Thus, similar to interest groups operating in competitive environments, some will succeed and some will fail.[24]  Where there are a limited number of groups, these organisations are expected to live longer.[25]

In contrast, interest groups that experience heavy competition, using Darwinian terms, have a higher probability of being selected out. [26]  Similarly, terror groups that are competing for support from populations will survive longer in a state with fewer competing violent organisations.  Kydd and Walter claim that, “outbidding should occur when multiple groups are competing for the allegiance of a similar demographic base of support.”[27]  Cronin concurs and argues that, “[g]roups may…decline because they lose a competition for members or support with other groups.”[28]  This competition should drive groups out of the environment and lead to shorter life spans.  As Bloom argues about the role of suicide bombing in competitive environments, “[a]lthough each bombing episode sacrifices one supporter, it recruits many more.”[29]

Bloom’s theory is focused on how intergroup competition influences the probability of suicide terrorism.[30]  We extend a more general logic of outbidding to terrorist group survival.  For example, Bloom suggests that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) turned to suicide terror as a means to attract supporters.[31]  During the second Intifada, Hamas and other more violent organisations successfully attracted more supporters threatening the PFLP’s survival.  Similar to Blomberg et al., diversifying their tactics, attracted more supporters and thus kept the organisation alive.[32]  The outbidding theory has a longer history in the ethnic violence/politics tradition.[33]  Others scholars, such as Kaufman [34], have applied the theory to civil conflict.  In this formulation elites mobilize civilians by appealing to more extreme demands/tactics vis-à-vis their rivals and other ethnic groups.[35]  Whether the goal is to mobilize co-ethnics, civilian supporters, anger towards another group, outbidding is a potential tool to separate a group from its competitors.  As Brubaker and Laitin suggest outbidding can easily lead to violence and is a powerful mechanism “and a general one, not confined to *ethnic* outbidding.”[36] In sum, the goal of outbidding is to attract supporters from a limited constituency of supporters.  As the number of groups increase, the less likely any group is to survive.

From this discussion, we can derive the following hypothesis:

***Outbidding Hypothesis*:**  Terror groups that operate in a more competitive environment are more likely to fail.

As the discussion above suggests, outbidding as an explanation for group survival is a natural extension of previous arguments.  Additionally, arguments from organisational theory can also add some refined expectations concerning how certain kinds of groups are more likely to fail than others.

Regardless of the nature of the organisation, Hannan and Freeman (1989) citing Stinchcombe (1965) suggest “that organisations face a liability of newness” or that the failure rates of new groups should be higher than for established groups.  New organisations are particularly vulnerable as their members are strangers or at least not properly trained or had enough time to build trust among their participants.[37]  As Baum and Mezias argue in a study of hotel competition in Manhattan, if organisations are in a population are not equal competitors, a count of the number of organisations alone may not adequately measure competition among the groups.[38]

In our case, a count of terrorist organisations may not be enough to explain why certain groups fail more readily than others.  Resource dependence is also another important predictor of organisational failure.[39]  Larger firms and firms with greater resources are expected to survive in an industry longer and the empirical evidence confirms this claim.[40]  To generate terrorist violence requires resources.  If we assume that groups that are more violent, experienced and thus potentially drawing more resources have an advantage in the market, then we can differentiate these groups from less violent groups.  In sum, these characteristics likely separate organisations that are new competitors with industry *Top Dogs*.

Terrorist groups similarly operate in these competitive markets with differentials in size, starting point, and resource endowments.[41] While the number may matter, we expect that being the dominant group in the market may reduce the risk of failure as compared to being newer/less dominant in the market.  In Sri Lanka, for example, during the late 1980s many groups vied to represent the Tamil community in their goal to achieve an independent state from the Sinhalese majority.  As Bloom highlights, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) systemically eliminated other competitors and by 2002 was the sole organisation bargaining with the Sri Lankan state.[42]  The LTTE was advantaged over rivals as they had greater resources through local tax extraction as well as diaspora support disadvantaging competitors and increasing their probably.  Most importantly, the LTTE was the dominant non-state violent actor in the Sri Lankan conflict during this period.  Despite this advantage, the LTTE was dealt a near fatal blow in 2009 after decades of fighting.  However, according to the GTD, the LTTE might have perpetrated at least two attacks since then.  As the research on organisations and this vignette suggest,

***Top Dog Hypothesis*:** Top Dog Terrorist organisations are less likely to fail than their competitors.

In addition to this linear hypothesis, based on the above discussion, we also expect that Top Dogs are less likely to fail as they experience more competition.  As the number of groups increases, we expect that Top Dogs are less likely to fail as compared to their competitors.

In the Palestinian market for violent organisations, Hamas or the PLO may be the Top Dog depending on the year.  Their probability of survival may actually increase as the number of competitors increases.  Smaller groups, such as Jund al-Sham or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, will be more likely to fail as the number of groups increases.  As Blomberg et al. show, terrorist groups, like businesses, often fail in their first year.[43]  Assuming that, on average, as the number of groups increase the power differential between any one of these groups and the Top Dog increases, we should expect the Top Dog to persist even longer.  These less active groups likely suffer from what Aldrich and Auster call *the liability of smallness,* which often correlates with the *liability of newness*.[44]  Holding newness constant, the liability of smallness suggests that groups will be more likely to fail when they lack resources.[45]  If resources can be proxied by more frequent attacks, we should expect that this liability of smallness will make groups with less resources more susceptible to competition than the Top Dogs.

***Interactive Hypothesis*:**  As the number of terrorist groups increase, the less likely Top Dogs are to fail as compared to other groups.

**Alternative Explanations**

Democracy has held a prominent place in the discussion of terrorism beginning with Wilkinson [46] and has been a correlate of cross-national terrorism, albeit with mixed results.[47]  The regime and institutional characteristics where the group operates may also affect likelihood of group survival.[48]  Since democratic societies offer institutional recourse for aggrieved individuals, people have formal mechanisms for resolving their anger towards the state.  This suggests that terror groups in democracies should be short-lived.  While Eubank and Weinberg find that democracies generate more groups, this does not necessarily translate to more attacks.[49]  The Peruvian group *Sendero Luminoso* (The Shining Path), operated in an environment with relatively few competitor groups and generated a huge number of attacks.  As Li suggests, the effects that democracy has on terror can be contradictory.[50]  Civil liberties and democratic participation may encourage groups to organise and generate terror, but a lack of executive constraints may allow states to pursue the requisite counterterror policies to end a group.  Aside from these various regime explanations, other societal and contextual factors could influence group survival and trump capability-related explanations.  We briefly discuss some of these in the research design section.

To date, one of the most comprehensive studies of how terror groups end and what states do to encourage this process is a study from the Rand Corporation.[51]  Jones and Libicki amass a database of over 600 groups and examine the descriptive statistics to explain why some groups end and others do not.  While this study moves beyond case analysis or comparison, they fall short of estimating regression models to control for alternative arguments.[52]  Jones and Libicki identify eight ways that terrorist groups can end including: the group achieves it goals, it experiences partial success, state repression destroys the group, the group burns out, the leadership is killed or imprisoned, there is a generational transition, the group loses popular support, or new alternatives for the group emerge.[53]  While their arguments may explain why terrorism ended today and not yesterday, the current study is concerned with understanding the underlying country-level causes that extends a terrorist group’s survival or facilitates its failure.  Thus, we are interested in assessing what factors affect the longevity of the terrorist organisation’s life span.  To accomplish this task, we amass a large collection of groups from a more comprehensive dataset and estimate the factors that relate to their years of survival.  As discussed above, to our knowledge only a few studies attempt to use a similar approach; these have focused, however, only on the transnational organisations found in ITERATE.[54]  By limiting their group analysis to only transnational attacks, they capture only part of the picture.  In short, the divide between domestic and transnational terrorism may be less important as interactions become more global.  In order to better understand the life spans of all terrorist organisations, the data source should include attacks by organisations regardless of whether they only attack within one country or whether they attack across national borders. In the next section, we discuss how to define and operationalize terrorism, terrorist groups, and terror group survival.

**Defining Terrorism, Terror Groups, and Survival**

Defining terrorism has been an area of heated debate.  As Schmid and Jongman noted, the “search for an adequate definition is still on,” yet “consensus on an adequate social science definition of terrorism…is still lacking, we are…somewhat closer to solutions than we were some years ago.”[55]  After their careful examination of over 100 definitions, Schmid and Jongman came up with a definition that included many moving parts.[56]  This type of definition, or what Munck and Verkuilen call a *maximalist definition*, includes too many elements, which could be difficult to empirically measure.[57]  Further, the definition potentially confuses how these elements then relate to other concepts.  For example, over 15% of the definitions that Schmid and Jongman survey include *the innocence of victims* as an important element of terrorism.[58]  This element would likely lead to the exclusion of any attack on the military as a terrorist act, such as the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 or the 2000 attack on the *USS Cole*.  While we recognize the importance of reducing the definition of terrorism to exclude elements that obfuscate the relationship between terrorism and other concepts in the world (i.e., democracy, economic development, and counterterrorism), a *minimalist definition* is also problematic.  A minimalist definition will have more empirical referents, but will also fail to distinguish unlike events, such as terrorism and insurgency or terrorism and genocide.[59]  By incorporating into the definition an element that requires the target of the violence to be different from its intended audience, then terrorist events can be separated from genocides and insurgencies.[60]  This effort is especially important if we believe that these forms of conflict have different causal mechanisms.

Recent research suggests using different operational definitions of terrorism to explore how sensitive empirical inferences are to definitional specifications.[61]  Thus far, analyses that use various definitional components of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) find that the effects of key indicators on terrorism are robust to its different operational definitions.[62]  The GTD includes incidents that meet all of the following three conditions:

1. ***The incident must be intentional*** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. ***The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence*** - including property violence, as well as violence against people.
3. ***The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.*** This database does not include acts of state terrorism.[63]

In addition, the incidents must fit at least 2 of the following three criteria:

***Criterion 1:* The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal**.  In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion.  It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic  economic change.

***Criterion 2:* There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims**. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention.  As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.

***Criterion 3*: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities**. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non combatants).[64]

By using explicit criteria scholars using the GTD are able to filter the events by adding or subtracting these criteria.  For the purposes of this study we need an operational definition that can identify relevant acts, can relate these acts to other important concepts related to terrorism, and is consistent with some identifiable portion of the GTD.  For this study we define terrorism as *the intentional threat or use of violence by sub-national actors for a political goal intended to convey a message to a larger audience than the victims of the violence*.[65]  This definition is consistent with the GTD, as Criterion 1 suggests that terrorism is used to fulfill a political, religious, social, or economic goal.  Consistent with Hoffman [66], we chose to only add “political” to our definition as “terrorism…is fundamentally and inherently political…[it] is…about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change.”  Economic interests, religious beliefs, or social change may motivate a group to act together, but their goals are inherently coercive to change another individual or group’s behaviour and are thus *political*.  The final important portion of our definition relates to differentiating the audience of violence from the victim.  In other words, the people who are killed are not the audience for the violence.  This audience is often a larger population, a government, or some other third party.  Distinguishing between these groups helps differentiate terrorism from genocide (where the victim and audience are the same) and other forms of political violence.

A terrorist organisation is then defined as a group that uses terrorism as described above.  While this statement has face validity, it leads to some difficult questions.  Are all organisations that use terror, *terrorist groups*?  If a group only uses one act of terror and uses nonviolent means in 99% of its other interactions, should it be labeled a terrorist group?  Since we are trying to identify why terrorist groups (and thus acts of terror) persist or decline, we need to label any group who uses this act as a *terrorist group*.  When they stop using this tactic, then they are no longer coded as a terrorist group.  Using data on terrorist groups from the GTD [67], we created a database of terror organisations.  By using terrorist attacks as a way to establish which groups are terror groups, we avoid subjectively labeling groups as *terrorist* and focus instead on their actions.  Groups that use terror thus are considered terrorist organisations.  As long as they use this act, the group maintains this label.  When the group desists, it no longer fits the criteria. This is consistent with the way scholars who study the reasons why groups deliberately target civilians instead of using some other strategy of resistance, think about the issue.  It is also consistent with the concerns of most governments that face terror campaigns: they want to understand what makes terrorism end.  In sum, terrorist group survival is conceptualized as the time between a group’s first attack and its last attack.  Some operational issues remain and will be discussed in the Research Design section.  We now turn to a discussion of the data and research design.

**Data**

*Terrorist Organisations*.  The GTD chronicles terrorist incidents across the globe from 1970 through 2010 using media reports and other open sources.[68]  When the source attributes an attack to a specific perpetrator, the name is also recorded in the GTD.  Over half of the attacks in the GTD (50.3%) were attributed to at least one specific perpetrator.[69]  In order to construct this dataset, we combined attacks that were attributed to the same organisation to determine its “start” date and its “end” date.  We recognize that this measure of the organisation’s life span is only a proxy because organisations might have attacked outside of our documented span without being attributed to the attack.[70]  Dugan outlines other sources of error when creating an organisational database from the GTD or any other terrorist event database that relies on open sources.[71]  In short, our measure of span represents the lower bound estimate of the true span.  Furthermore, these spans can also be considered the best measure of the organisation’s visible life span.  Since groups who use this form of violence are trying to change a policy, influence a public, or compel a government, claiming credit or ensuring attribution of credit is necessary.  In fact, Rapoport suggests that this issue of taking credit for violent acts is one of the primary differences between terror groups and criminal organisations.[72]

The temporal domain of this study is 1970 to 2010.   The unit of analysis is the group-year, although the individual groups play an important role in this research.   We initially include all 2,223 groups that committed terror acts during this period as recorded by the GTD.[73]  Each group is assigned to the country in which it most often perpetrated attacks over its entire lifespan.  By pairing up each organisation with one country, we assume that this country is the organisation’s *primary country*.  Consequently each country has a set of terrorist organisations that primarily operated within its borders over its lifespan.  We refer to these organisations as the country’s *primary groups*.  This pairing of primary groups with primary countries is key for operationalizing the competitive environment for each terrorist organisation in order to test all three hypotheses.  We acknowledge that the primary country of operation might not be the base of operations for every group, but it is an objective measure based on group behaviour rather than unconfirmed sources.  Finally, by linking the organisation to a primary country, we are also able to use as covariates measures of that country’s capabilities.  However, because we were unable to find measures for all countries, the final number of groups is reduced to 2,051.[74]  Although missing data affects a little less than 8% of the cases, the sample is still substantially larger than any another study on terrorist groups.  As previously mentioned, Jones and Libicki identify 648 groups from 1968 to 2006, but only analyze the 268 that they code as ending.[75]  Blomberg et al. [76] rely on groups identified in the ITERATE dataset to assess the durability of transnational terrorist organisations from 1968 to 2007.  While they have considerably more data than Jones and Libicki [77] with 1,414 groups, this is still fewer than the number of groups from the GTD.[78]  Furthermore, because the ITERATE groups could still be attacking domestically after they cease transnational attacks, by excluding these attacks, the dependent variable in the Blomberg et al. study is likely vulnerable to measurement error.[79]  In fact, a recent study that examines the activity of the 53 most threatening (to the U.S) international organisations found that more than 90% of their attacks against non-U.S. entities were in their home country [80], suggesting that a terrorist organisation’s activity is severely truncated when we only observe their transnational attacks.  In the current research, we use about 600 more groups than those found in the ITERATE data.  Further, the number of incidents perpetrated by these groups is considerably larger, as they include both domestic and transnational attacks.   As LaFree and Dugan explain, about seven out of every eight terror attacks are domestic in nature.[81]

Because the unit of analysis is the group-year, the total possible number of observations is 6,710, based on number of groups and number of years active.  However, once we include the country-level measures to the dataset, the sample size drops to 6,087.  Supplemental analysis is conducted on the original observations and without the country-controls and findings are substantively the same.[82]

*Failure.*  The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that is coded as one if the group stopped operating after the current year, and zero otherwise.

The independent variables fall under the categories of competitive environment, group capabilities, state capabilities, and control variables.  Measures of competitive environment and group capabilities come from the GTD.

*Competitive Environment*.  To test the *Outbidding Hypothesis*, we calculate from the GTD the total number of primary terrorist groups that operated in an organisation’s primary country in a given year (*Number of Groups*).  This value includes the current organisation that may or may not have perpetrated an attack in its primary country for each year it operated.  In order to test the *Top Dog Hypothesis*, we include in the model an indicator of whether the terrorist organisation was the most active primary group its primary country during the current year.  This variable was constructed by first examining the frequencies of attacks by all primary organisations for each country for each year.  The organisations that perpetrated the most attacks in their primary country in a given year are marked as *Top Dog*.  When two or more groups equally perpetrate the most attacks, all are marked as *Top Dog*.  Finally, to test the *Interactive Hypothesis*, we include in a second model the interaction between *Top Dog* and *Number of Groups* (*Top Dog × Number of Groups*).

*Group Capabilities*.  We also include measures that proxy alternative explanations of group survival from previous research.  To control for and proxy a group’s capabilities, we use two variables that were measured during the first 365 days beginning with the group’s first attack.[83]  First, we created a dichotomous measure of whether a group ever used multiple modalities of terrorism.  The measure is coded a 1 if the group has ever done any combination of the following: bombings, assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, armed assaults, facility attacks, and hostage-taking during its first year (*Multiple-Modality*).[84]  Groups that used only one tactic are marked as zero.  We expect that groups that have more flexibility to operate differently across attacks are likely to be more capable and to survive longer.  We created a second variable that captures group capabilities that measures whether the group perpetrated attacks in more than one country (*Transnational*).  This dichotomous measure is coded as 1 if a group attacked in more than one country during their first year of operation and zero otherwise.[85]

*State Capabilities*.  Because the capability of the state to control and even dismantle terrorist organisations might influence the competitive environment and a group’s capacity for survival, we include three measures of state capabilities in the current analysis. Measures of population and gross domestic product come from the Penn World Table [86], and geological terrain comes from research by Fearon and Laitin. [87]  These variables are measured during each year of the analysis, unless they are time invariant.  We use a measure of state capability that is often used in studies of civil war onset and duration, GDP.  In terrorism research, GDP is generally used as a proxy for the level of development in society (*Development*).[88]  GDP is measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars so that the odds ratio will be easier to interpret.  Since another potential measure of state capabilities, the Correlates of War state material capabilities index, leads to an increased number of missing observations, we exclude it from our primary estimations.  We discuss this variable in greater detail in the appendix.  The population of a state (*Population*) might also influence its capabilities and thus the survival of a terrorist group.[89]  We include a logged measure of population from the Penn World Tables.[90]  The final measure that proxies state capabilities is the percent mountainous terrain in a country (*Mountains*).[91]  In civil war research, this is argued to increase the likelihood that rebels can hide from the state and thus survive.

*Control Variables*.  Several control variables are also included in the analysis.  Political measures come from the Polity IV Data Project.[92]  Ethnic and religious measures come from research by Fearon and Laitin.[93][94]  In the online appendix, we list the specific variables and their original source.  To investigate the effects democracy might have on a group’s lifespan, we use a set of covariates related to regime characteristics and institutions.  We use the Polity 2 score as a measure of the level of democracy in a state.  The Polity 2 score (*Democracy*) is created by subtracting the authoritarian score from a general democracy score that results in a measure ranging from -10 (strongly authoritarian) to +10 (strongly democratic).  As previous research suggests [95], different aspects of democracy might encourage or discourage terrorist group acts and survival.  Democracy has had an inconsistent effect on survival with some evidence that under specific conditions it might encourage group longevity.  We also control for the age of the current regime in power in a given state (*Age of Regime*).  Fully consolidated regimes may invite less violent contestation than regimes that are new and have not established regularized means of political participation.  On the other hand, regimes that are older are more consolidated which suggests that dissidents who oppose the current order are weak vis-à-vis the state and thus more likely to use terrorism as opposed to some other violent strategy.  It may be that the older the regime, the more likely groups will challenge it with terrorism.

We also control for other factors that might correlate with our independent variables and the time to group failure.  Ethnic fractionalization or more ethnic groups in society could explain the prevalence of terrorist groups and how long they survive.  To control for this possibility we use a measure of the probability that two people randomly chosen from society will be from different ethnic groups (*Ethnic Fractionalization*).  A similar logic applies to religious heterogeneity.  To proxy for this concept, we use a measure of the probability that two people randomly chosen from society will be from different religious groups (*Religious Fractionalization*).[96]   Some observers claim that certainly terrorism and possibly group survival might be a function of religious belief, especially the desire to build a global caliphate by adherents of radical Salafi Islam.[97]  Religion can bind a group together and make the members see their struggle as a cosmic battle between good and evil.[98]  We also use a measure of the percent of Muslims (*% Muslim*) in society to proxy the effect that this might have on terrorist group survival.[99]  Some might argue that the end of the Cold War ushered a new era of conflict.[100]  To control for this, we include a dummy variable (*Cold War*) for whether groups survived longer during the Cold War than in the period after this era.

We also include control variables for four of the five major regions of the world, *Europe*, *Africa*, *Asia*, and *America*.  The reference region is the Middle East.  Finally, in order to model the time dependence, we include three measures of number of years the group has been in the data (*Life Years*, *Life Years2*, and *Life Years3*).  A simple count of these years would assume a linear hazard.  A squared version would assume a quadratic relationship.  Inclusion of the cubic term allows us to capture temporal dependence similar to common parametric survival models as well as semi-parametric models like the Cox Model.[101]

**Methods**

We begin the analysis by estimating the baseline survival rates for terrorist groups through event history modeling.[102]  This technique allows the analyst to estimate the time to failure or the time until a particular event of interest.  In biomedical research, the event of interest may be the death of a patient after some treatment.  In the study of war, the event of interest may be the beginning of the war.  In our case, it is the number of years until the group stops perpetrating terrorist attacks.  We present the baseline survival rates for all organisations using the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function.

In order to test all three primary hypotheses (outbidding, top dog, and interactive) and the alternative explanations, we add to the model measures of competition, group capability, state capability, and controls.  Because the data are constructed by year for each organisation, discrete-time survival analysis is conducted using stacked logistic regression models that estimate the effect of the independent variables on the probability that the group will fail before the end of the year (i.e., it will not attack again after the current year).  The following model is run:

P(*Failt*=1) = β0 + β1*CompEnvt* + β2*GrCapabilityt1* + β3*StCapabilityt* + β4*Controlst*.         (1)

Recall that the unit of analysis is the group-year.  Thus, most of the independent variables are measured for each year of the study, and are thus denoted by the subscript t.  However, some of the measures are time invariant, and are therefore constant throughout the analysis.  Finally, the group capability measures are only measured during their first 365 days of operation so that longer running groups will not show higher capabilities leading to simultaneity bias.

Turning to equation 1, we recall from above that the dependent variable is a dichotomous value that equals one if the organisation stopped operating after the current year, and zero otherwise.[103] The key independent variables that we hypothesize affects the time that a group endures is a measure of the competitive environment (*CompEnv* in Equation 1).  These variables include *Number of Groupst*, *Top Dogt*, and the interaction between the two (*Top Dog × Number of Groups)t*.  If the *Outbidding Hypothesis* is supported, we would expect the odds ratio for *Number of Groupst* to be greater than one; and if the *Top Dog Hypothesis* is supported, we expect the *Top Dogt* odds ratio to be less than one in the model that excludes the interaction.  Finally, if the Interactive Hypothesis is supported, we expect the odds ratio of the interaction two (*Top Dog × Number of Groups)t* to be less than one.

The next set of control variables relate to the relationship between terrorist group survival (*GrCapabilityt1* in equation 1) and state capabilities (*StCapabilityt* in equation 1).  The group capabilities include *Multiple-Modalityt1* and *Transnationalt1*.  As both measures indicate group strength, we expect their odds ratios to be less than one.  The state capabilities measures include *Developmentt*, *Populationt,* and *Mountains*.  As development and population are proxies for increased state capabilities, we expect their odds ratios to be greater than one (i.e., increasing the probability of group failure).  Conversely, we expect the odds ratio of mountains to be less than one, increasing the chances of group survival.

*Controlst* include *Democracyt*, *Age of Regimet*, *Ethnic Fractionalizationt*, *Religious Fractionalizationt*, *Percent Muslimt*, *Cold Wart*, *Europe*, *Africa*, *Asia*, *America*, *Life Years*, *Life* *Years2*, and *Life Years3*.

**Results**

*Descriptive Statistics*.  Before addressing the hypotheses, we first take a look at the data to get a better sense of how groups in the GTD have operated over time.  We begin by examining the patterns of attack and survival for the 2,223 terrorist organisations found in the GTD.  Figure 1 shows the number of terror attacks (solid line) in the world from 1970 to 2010 and the number of groups (dashed line) who commit more than half of these acts from the GTD.  Most notable is that the two trends seem to track one another relatively closely (r = 0.78).  The deviation of these two lines shows that in the 1970s, while there were many groups, the overall number of attacks per known group was lower than in the 1980s, 90s, or late 2000s (9 to 1 versus 20 to 1).  This suggests that the number of attacks is not uniform across known groups; and other factors such as the economy, the level of democracy, or the international system may influence these levels.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, the high point for both number of known groups and number of attacks was the early 1990s (although attacks per group were not as high as in other periods).[104]


We see in this figure that the number of groups that attacked each year ranges from a low of 42 groups in 1972 to a high of 234 groups in 1992.  This number drops again to another low in 1998 with only 80 groups attacking.  The last decade in the series shows that the number of active groups ranges between 110 and 175.  While the number of active groups never rises above its 1992 peak, we know that there were a total of 2,223 organisations that were attributed to attacks over this period.  This means that a large portion of the groups were inactive during each year.  In fact, according to Dugan [105] a majority of the groups in the GTD were only attributed to one attack; and about another 20% became inactive within their first year.  However, the groups that were active for more than a year were also “responsible” for more than 93% of the attributed attacks.[106]

Figure 1.  Number of Terror Attacks and Groups from 1970 to 2010, Global Terrorism Database




We now examine the survival patterns for the 2,223 terrorist organisations found in the GTD.  On average, they operated for 3.33 years, although a vast majority (1,519 or 68%) stopped operating within their first year.  This percentage is a little lower than that reported in Dugan’s research finding that 74% of the terrorist organisations between 1970 and 2007 ended within their first year.[107]  This suggests that newer groups might be more likely to last longer than one year.  In order to get a better sense of the survival patterns of these terrorist organisations, we estimate the baseline survival rate with the Kaplan-Meier survival function of all 2,223 organisations between 1970 and 2010 shown in Figure 2.  Also included in that figure is the number of surviving organisations at zero, ten, twenty, thirty, and forty years (i.e, number at risk).  By using the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function for the terrorist group data, we can evaluate the probability of surviving conditional on surviving until the current year.  As Figure 2 shows, only about 30% of the groups survive past the first year.  This leads to the same conclusion that about 70% (or 68%) of the terrorist organisations stop operating within a year of their first attack.[108]  After five years, only about 20% of the groups are expected to survive.[109]

Figure 2.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Function for 2,223 Terrorist Organisations, 1970-2010

We turn now to the descriptive statistics for the groups-by-year data presented in Table 1.  Because we only include the group-years for those values that are in the final model, the sample size is 6,099 for all variables.  Turning first to the dependent variable (failure), we see that in a little more than 30% of the group-years, the organisation becomes inactive by the following year.  When we examine the competitive environment, we see that on average a terrorist organisation has about 10 active primary organisations in its primary country (including itself).  The wide range of this values shows that there have been as many as 76 primary competitors in a given year.  A closer look at the data shows that in 1978 there were 76 active terrorist groups in Italy.  Table 1 also shows that in nearly 33% of the group-years, the organisation was a top dog during that year.

Turning to the control variables, we find no surprises.  A relative minority of the group-years used multiple-modalities or attacked in more than one country during their first active year. We see that GDP ranges from around $170.90 to $43,697.50 (recall, that it is measured in values of $100K).  The remaining summary statistics show that all values are within reasonable range.



*Survival Model Results*.  We now address the hypotheses with the odds ratios generated from the discrete time survival models in Table 2.  Model 1 shows the findings for the main effects for the *Outbidding* and *Top Dog Hypotheses*, while Model 2 also includes an interaction between *Top Dog* and *Number of Groups* for the *Interactive Hypothesis*.  Turning first to the competitive environment we see that in both models the odds ratio is above one.  In Model 1, this can be interpreted that with each additional competitor, the odds of failing within the year increases by 0.006, holding all else constant.  In essence, we can think of this number as the approximate increase in the probability of failure that is attributed to an increase of one additional competitor (or primary organisation).  While at first glance, this might seem like a small effect, the average number of primary groups that use terrorism in a country year is 10.6 (see Table 1).  The 75th percentile for this variable is 15.  That means that roughly 25% of all of the terrorist groups attack in a country in which 11 other groups are also attacking in a given year.  In this case, 15 groups in one country during one year would lead to an expected decrease in the survival time of any of the groups by about 12%.  At the most extreme, Italy in 1978 had over 70 groups, substantially decreasing the survival time for any one of those groups.  Thus, the *Outbidding Hypothesis* is supported in these data.

Turning now to the findings for *Top Dog*, we see that when a terrorist organisation is the most active in its primary country during a given year, its probability of failure is about 0.46 lower than the other primary groups in that country.  This shows support for the *Top Dog* *Hypothesis*.  Of course, this finding leads to the question of whether Top Dog organisations do better or worse in a highly competitive environment, which is the topic of the *Interactive Hypothesis*.  The results under Model 2 show that the odds ratio of the *Top Dog × Number of Groups* interaction is less than one, supporting the hypothesis.  The Likelihood Ratio Test comparing Models 1 and 2 favors Model 2 (p = 0.000), showing additional support for the *Interactive Hypothesis*.  While we cannot directly interpret the odds ratio for the interaction term because it needs to be combined with the odds ratio for *Number of Groups,* we instead present in Figure 3 the predicted probability of failure conditional on the number of competitors in a given year for Top Dog organisations and Not Top Dog organisations.[110]  This figure shows that when competition is low, each type of group has a probability of failing of around 0.60.  However, as competition increases, the probability that a Top Dog organisation fails drops dramatically, while that probability increases for all other groups.  In a way, this is consistent with the story that a hiker does not have to outrun a bear during an attack, he or she only needs to outrun the person they are with.  It is possible that when governments are busy countering weaker terrorist organisations, the stronger groups are better able to safely operate.


This brings us to the findings for Group Capability.  We see by the low odds ratios in both models that organisations that were using multiple tactics and/or operating across national borders during their first year are more likely to survive into the following year. In fact, their chances of failing are about half that for other organisations in the same county during the same year.

Figure 3.  Probability that a Group Fails Conditional on the Number of Competitors

NOTE: All significant covariates are set at mean, insignificant covariates are excluded.

 Table 2 also shows that controls that influence state capabilities from previous studies also impact survival. Increases in *Development* significantly shorten the life span of terrorist organisations (or increase their risk of failure).  The estimated odds ratio shows that a one unit change in *Development*, which corresponds to an increase of $10,000 in a country’s per capita GDP, is expected to increase the risk that a group fails by roughly 0.3%.  We find weak effects for *Population* as it is only significant in the model without the interaction, and *Mountains* is insignificant.

Finally, we see that *Age of Regime*, *Cold War*, *Africa*, *America* and *Life Years* all show significant effects.  First, every additional year that a regime has been in place (*Age of the Regime*) leads to an average decrease in the risk of a group ending by around 0.4%.  This number seems small, but the average age of a regime in the sample is nearly 35 years with a standard deviation of 46 years.  A one standard deviation increase in the *Age of the Regime* is expected to increase the survival of a group by about 18%.  Second, being involved with the *Cold War* increases the probability a group will fail by more than half.  Third, the geographical indicators show that groups operating in both Asia and the Americas are more likely to fail by the following year than organisations in the Middle East.  Similar to other approaches to modeling time dependence like splines, we are not interested in the significance of the life years variables.  Instead, we plotted the probability of failure conditional on the average values of the independent variables at different values for the life years to examine their impact.  Similar to previous work, the probability of failure is high at the beginning and then subsequently decreases until groups reach the age of approximately 30 years old.  After this point, the probability of failure begins to rise.  Because only a few groups that make it to this age and the recent endings of older groups, such as the New People’s Army in the Philippines or the Irish Republican Army, this rise is quite large.

**Conclusions**

As Crenshaw suggests, “[s]ome processes of terrorism may be independent of government action.”[111]  Our approach has been to identify some of these processes in a cross-national database of terrorist groups.  We find consistent support for our core proposition that as the number of groups who use terrorism in a country increase, the less likely those groups will survive.  Others have found an association between the strength of the state and the frequency of attacks.  We also find a relationship between state capabilities and terrorist group survival using CINC and GDP.  Using more indirect measures like mountainous terrain and population, the result is indeterminate.  The capabilities of the group also matter.  The more the group kills, uses different kinds of attacks, targets multiple states, or uses the most costly forms of attack, the more likely it will survive longer.  While democracy has been associated with the frequency of terrorism events, we find little support for the relationship between democracy and terrorist group survival.[112]  While democracies may be the target of more terrorism, groups facing these regimes are likely to last just as long as those facing autocratic regimes.  One institutional characteristic, the age of the regime, does influence group survival.  Even after controlling for these other known predictors of terrorism and terrorist group survival, the outbidding hypothesis receives unqualified empirical support.

While our approach helps to better understand how certain states encourage or discourage terrorist group survival by evaluating contextual factors like the competitive environment, there are limitations to this study.   First, we do not take into account the proximate factors that might lead to the end of a terrorist group.  To the extent the proximate causes and contextual factors are independent of each other, our findings should be unbiased from this omission.  Instead, investigations of how certain counterterror policies increase or decrease group longevity or how certain organisational choices by groups increase or decrease their likelihood of survival should be complementary to our findings.  Further, we investigated how general repression affects group survival but not at a microlevel.  While repression increased survival time, it did not change any of the inferences from our other contextual variables.   An analysis of these choices looking at events and actions by each group over a shorter temporal unit of aggregation such as daily, weekly or monthly is necessary to model the dynamic interaction between terrorist group and states countering terrorism.  This type of research will be possible as more cross-national data is collected on both the organisational characteristics of terrorists groups [113] and the choices made by counterinsurgents.[114].

**►Notes are available at source’s URL.**

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# Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism

**By Heather S. Gregg**

**Source:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/336/html**

Religious terrorism is typically characterised as acts of unrestrained, irrational and indiscriminant violence, thus offering few if any policy options for counterterrorism measures. This assumption about religious terrorism stems from two challenges in the literature: disproportionate attention to apocalyptic terrorism, and a lack of distinction between religious terrorism and its secular counterpart. This article, therefore, aims to do four things: define and differentiate religiously motivated terrorism from traditional terrorism; investigate three goals of religious terrorism (fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and establishing a religiously pure state); consider the role of leadership and target selection of religious terrorists; and, finally, suggest a range of counterterrorism strategies based on these observations.

**Introduction**

A conventional wisdom has emerged that the current wave of religiously motivated terrorism propagates acts of unrestrained, indiscriminant violence, and that it is irrational, thus offering few, if any, policy options for counterterrorism measures. Jean-Francois Mayer asserts, for example: “When religious beliefs are used for justifying violence, violent actions tend to become endowed with cosmic dimensions, and there is nothing left to restrain them.”[1] Similarly, Bruce Hoffman argues: “For the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other terrorists.”[2]

These assertions about religion’s role in terrorism stem from two challenges in the literature. First, scholarship on religious terrorism tends to focus on one particular motivation—apocalyptic, millennial, or messianic terrorism, in which groups use violence to hasten the end of times and usher in an anticipated new world. Religious terrorists, however, have other goals, some of which are earthly in their aims; these goals are often categorised as political, not religious.[3] Second, religious terrorism has not been clearly distinguished from its traditional more secular counterpart with a definition of what makes it unique from other forms of terrorism, if it is unique at all.

In order to better understand religiously motivated terrorism, this article will do four things. First it aims to define and differentiate religiously motivated terrorism from traditional terrorism, including leftist groups, right wing groups, and ethnic-separatist terrorists. Second, it will provide a range of goals for religious groups and how terrorism serves these goals. In particular, the article investigates three objectives: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and establishing a religiously pure state. Third, within these goals, the article will consider the role of leadership and target selection of religious terrorists for their uniqueness and commonality with traditional terrorism. Finally, the article concludes by offering suggestions for mitigating religiously motivated terrorism.

**Defining Traditional and Religious Terrorism**

Before distinguishing traditional and religious terrorism from one another, terrorism needs to be defined in its own right. There is little consensus on the definition of terrorism, both within academic and policy circles.[4] Walter Laqueur argues that this lack of consensus is largely due to the fact that there is not one type of terrorism and that terrorism, as a tactic, is constantly changing its means, motives and actors.[5] Drawing primarily from Bruce Hoffman, this article defines the tactic of terrorism as a) the use or threat of violence; b) the targeting of civilians, property, or government; c) the intent of creating fear aimed at altering the status quo; and d) a group activity.[6]

This definition stresses that terrorism, first and foremost, is a tactic. As such, non-state and state actors can employ terrorist tactics. This article, however, will focus specifically on non-state actors. Second, this definition stresses the corporate nature of terrorists and their tactical use of violence with the goal of changing the existing political, social, military, or religious order. To be sure, individuals or “lone wolves” can employ terrorist tactics to achieve similar goals, but this article will concentrate on groups that use terrorism to achieve a stated goal. Finally, this definition is particularly useful for exploring religiously motivated terrorism because it considers goals that may not be strictly political, such as changing the social and religious order of a state or region. As will be described, religious groups that use terrorism have political goals, but they also have social and religious goals that are distinct from political objectives.

**Traditional Terrorism: Left, Right and Ethnic-Separatist**

Traditional terrorism is typically divided into three sub-categories: left, right and ethnic-separatist.[7] Terrorism of the left refers primarily to Anarchist, Marxist and socialist oriented ideologies. This type of terrorism was most active in the 20th century, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. Anarchist groups were most popular in Europe around the turn of the 20th century, particularly in Russia, where movements emerged with the aim of destroying the monarchy and the state.[8] Examples of left-wing Marxist groups include the Argentinian Montoneros and ERP, the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader Meinhof group), and the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). All of these groups were inspired by Marxist or socialist ideologies.[9] This sub-category of traditional terrorism, although active during the Cold War, has declined since the 1980’s.[10] Religious terrorism, by-and-large, has not been associated with this branch of terrorism.[11]

Right-winged terrorism refers to groups with racist, fascist, or nationalistic motives and goals. This type of terrorism was strong between the World Wars and reasserted itself beginning in the 1980’s and continues to the present. Early examples include the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, and fascist-inspired movements like the Rumanian Iron Guard of the 1930’s.[12] Resurgent right-wing terrorism includes groups like the neo-Nazis in Europe and the United States, and violent anti-immigration groups.[13] Religious terrorism has often been categorized as a new breed of right-winged terrorism.[14] However, as will be argued below, religious terrorism has traits that look like right-winged racism but also contains elements that do not fit into this category.


Ethnic-separatist terrorism [15] consists of groups that use terrorism to strive for autonomy or independence from a state or military force. Examples of ethnic-separatist terrorists include groups seeking independence from an occupying force, such as the Jewish Irgun in Palestine under the British Mandate, the PLO under Israeli occupation, and the IRA under British occupation.[16] Another example within this subset is groups that seek separation from an existing state such as the ETA in the Basque province of Spain.[17] Academic research also associates religious terrorism with this branch of traditional terrorism.[18] However, it is important to distinguish ethnic-separatist terrorists that contain religious elements but whose primary goals are non-religious from terrorist groups that have religious goals. An example of a religious-ethnic group with non-religious goals is the IRA. Although its constituency is primarily Catholic, the IRA’s aim is to expel British forces in the region and reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic, not to create a religious government or state. By contrast, an example of a religious/ethnic group with religious goals is the Palestinian Hamas, which is pushing for the expulsion of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine.[19] Table 1.1 summarizes traditional terrorism.

Table 1. 1 Traditional Terrorism

**Religiously Motivated Terrorism**

Religiously motivated terrorism, although containing elements of all three branches of traditional terrorism, needs to be distinguished analytically from traditional terrorism in order to better understand its workings. However, similar to discussions on terrorism in general, current literature on religiously motivated terrorism lacks consensus on a definition and how it differs from traditional terrorism, if at all. David Tucker even argues that the term “religious terrorism” is not of much use because of confusion over its definition.[20] Mark Juergensmeyer suggests that religiously motivated terrorism came to the foreground in the 1980s and is marked by extreme brutality and seemingly irrational motivations and goals.[21] Bruce Hoffman argues that religion serves to uniquely legitimate and justify violence in religious terrorism but does not explain how religious ideology differs from Marxist or Fascist ideology in inspiring terrorist acts.[22] Walter Laqueur argues that religious terrorism is the “new terrorism of the right” and that it has more to do with nationalism than religion. But this definition fails to explain movements like Aum Shinrikyo, who desire to destroy the world, not assert their nationalist claims, or Al-Qaeda, which has transnational goals.[23]

Religious terrorism scholar David C. Rapoport offers another argument for what differentiates religious from secular terrorism. He posits that the justification and precedents of religious terrorism differ from traditional forms; religious terrorists use sacred texts and historic examples that are not present in secular terrorism. Secular terrorism, in contrast, develops a culture of actions and boundaries that restrains the scope of violent acts.[24] This argument relies on the internal aspects of religion—its scriptures and traditions—without explaining why these internal traits justify and mandate violence by some groups at sometime and not others. In other words, his argument does not include factors external to a religious group and how these factors may bear on explaining the variation of peace and violence within religions.

Finally, Mark Sedgwick suggests that religious terrorism is best understood by considering its immediate and ultimate objectives. He proposes  that “while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political.”[25] Sedgewick’s observation is useful for realizing that religious terrorists’ goals are not purely religious. However, this article will challenge his dichotomy between short and long term, and non-religious and religious goals, proposing that certain terrorist can have immediate goals that are religious, specifically apocalyptic terrorists, while others can have long-term objectives that are political, such as creating a religious government.

Finally, these debates within the literature and lack of consensus on what makes religiously motivated terrorism unique from traditional terrorism can be clarified by looking not just at the presence of scripture, religious symbols or adherents, but by focusing on uniquely religious goals for which these groups are fighting. In other words, the use of scripture or presence of religious symbols is not enough to distinguish a group and its use of terrorism as uniquely religious. As previously noted, there are examples of groups that use religion as a form of identity or draw from scriptures and symbols to motivate followers, but their goals fall within the confines of traditional terrorism. Furthermore, non-religious factors may cause groups to use terrorism for religiously salient goals. For example, groups may use terrorism with the aim of overthrowing governments that they believe are not upholding the tenets of a particular religion and installing a religious government in its place. The cause of the terrorist act is something outside of the faith, but the goal is uniquely religious.

Therefore, this article proposes that religiously motivated terrorism can be defined as: the threat or use of force with the purpose of influencing or coercing governments and/or populations towards saliently religious goals. The discussion below will elaborate on three goals in particular: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and religiously cleansing a state or area.

**Religious Terrorism’s Goals: Apocalypse, Theocracy, and Religious Cleansing**

In order to better understand religiously motivated terrorism and distinguish it from its traditional counterpart, it is useful to identify specific examples of uniquely religious goals for which groups may be striving. This article highlights three goals in particular: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and religiously cleansing a state. These goals are not exhaustive, but do cover the majority of religiously motivated violence seen today.

Apocalyptic Terrorism

Some groups have apocalyptic goals; their primary aim is to cause cataclysmic destruction to people, property, and the environment with the hope of fomenting the end of time and ushering in religious promises of a new world. This pursuit is uniquely religious and is perhaps the most common stereotype of religiously motivated terrorism. Apocalyptic terrorism exists both within traditional religions and “cults” or New Religious Movements (NRM). For example, Rapoport argues that apocalyptic terrorist groups—what he calls millennialist groups—are inspired by longings for the coming of the messiah, which will coincide with the end of the world.[26] Mayer argues that apocalyptic imagining is a cause of terrorism in cults and NRM but, by itself, does not usually result in violence. Rather, groups that turn to terrorism are responding to a mix of millennialism, real world threats, and internal disputes.[27]

An example of an apocalyptic group within an existing religious tradition is the Gush Emunim in Israel. In 1984 members hatched a plot to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock Shrine in Jerusalem, the third most holy site in Islam, in order to spark a nuclear and chemical confrontation between Israel and Muslim countries. The goal was to create “catastrophic messianism,” disastrous circumstances that would hasten the coming of the messiah.[28] The most common example of a NRM group that used terrorism with apocalyptic aims is the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which deployed Sarin gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995. Its overarching goals was instigating World War III and ultimately “destroying the world to save it.”[29] The attacks killed 13 and injured more than 700 people.

Of the three religious goals outlined here, apocalyptic terrorism is the most dangerous for two reasons. First, the paradox of ‘destroying the world’—causing catastrophic death and destruction—to create a new and better world seems the furthest removed from rational thought and negotiation. This makes counterterrorism measures especially difficult; it appears that there is little the U.S. government, or anyone else, can give these groups to alter their aims.

Second, the goal of destroying the world is particularly ripe for the use of WMD as a means of achieving such ends, which makes apocalyptic groups particularly dangerous. However, it is also important to note that many apocalyptic terrorists have turned their violence inward in order to foment the apocalypse, as opposed to attacking those outside the group. Some examples of inwardly violent groups include the apocalyptic cult The People’s Temple, headed by Jim Jones, in which over 900 members committed suicide en masse in anticipation of an apocalyptic standoff with the U.S. government. Another example is Heaven’s Gate, which believed that suicide would free the members’ souls.[30] The standoff between U.S. Federal agents and the Branch Davidians at the Mount Carmel compound in Waco, Texas, also fulfilled apocalyptic expectations of the cult group, and resulted in the death of 76 men, women and children.[31] Mayer notes that examples like these, while apocalyptic and violent, may not fall under the definition of terrorism per se, because their goals do not extend beyond the confines of their immediate group.[32] Nevertheless, they offer important clues about the conditions under which apocalyptic thinking emerges and results in mass violence.

The Creation of a Religious Government

Groups also use terrorism as a means of creating a religious government. This goal is most commonly associated with militant Islamic groups and their desire to establish a government run by Shari’a law. For example, the Lebanese Twelver Shia organization Hezbollah has used terrorism against the state of Israel and against its own government with the ultimate goal of creating a religious government in Lebanon, inspired by the theocracy in Iran. Somewhat similarly, the Sunni Palestinian Hamas has used terrorism against Israel with the immediate aim of ending its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and potentially all of Israel, but with the ultimate aim of creating a religious government in Palestine.[33]

The desire to create a religious government also exists in other traditions. “Reconstruction Theology” is one interpretation of Christian scriptures that calls for the creation of a Christian theocratic government in the United States. Reconstruction Theology has inspired groups such as the Christian Identity Movement, which is linked to the paramilitary training camp the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). This movement aims to use terrorism as a means of compelling change within the U.S. government. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh had ties to both Christian Identity and CSA.[34]

Terrorists vying for the creation of a religious government are often confined within a state’s borders, such as the Christian Identity Movement in the United States. These groups, however, can also have transnational ties and goals through sponsorship from likeminded groups outside their borders and from other states. This is true of the Lebanese Hizbollah, which receives financial and material support from the government of Iran, which is also Twelver Shia.[35] Transnational ties are also evident in Kach and its successor organizations, which receives considerable support from likeminded Jews in the United States.[36] Hamas is also reported to receive money from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Iran.[37]

Transnational ties of religious terrorism groups also appear to stem from leaders that have ties to groups in other countries. This is true of Kach/JDL, whose leader, Meir Kahane, was born in the United States and co-founded the JDL there but then immigrated to Israel and formed Kach, which is made up primarily of American-born Jews who have moved to Israel.[38] Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbollah, has personal ties to Iran and Iraq, especially through his seminary training in both countries.[39]

In addition to the goal of creating a religious government within a state, there are groups vying to create religious regions or super-states. Currently, some groups are working to establish a pan-Islamic entity that will transcend state borders. Perhaps the best example of this type of transnational religious terrorism is Al-Qaeda. Following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989, Al-Qaeda spread its ideology of jihad through leadership ties and training centers to Muslim countries around the globe. After September 11th, bin Laden called for the restoration of the Caliphate as a necessary objective to unite and protect the worldwide Muslim community.[40] Like-minded groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula share these goals. Likewise, groups like Jemiyyah Islamia in Southeast Asia have named the creation of a regional Caliphate as one of their stated objectives.[41]

It is worth noting that non-violent pan-Islamic movements exist, which attempt to achieve their ends by means other than terrorism. The most notable example is the Muslim Brotherhood, which exists in over 70 countries, and is strongest in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Although initially a movement that used violence and terrorism, the Brotherhood has called for the creation of a pan-Islamic government by the “da’wa”, or calling Muslims back to the faith, and through political reform, education and service to Muslims, generally not by means of terrorism and violence.[42] Another organization that eschews violence, Hizb ut-Tahrir, has made the restoration of the Caliphate one of its stated goals.[43] Both of these groups, despite their official claims to non-violence, have been implicated in spreading intolerant ideologies that inspire acts of violence within cells or individuals acting on their own. For these reasons, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir are regarding with caution by countries in which they are active.[44]

The creation of religious governments, through violent or peaceful means, presents important domestic and international security concerns to the United States and the international community. The treatment of religious minorities and secular groups is a problem under governments that embrace and promote a particular interpretation of a religion, and could lead to basic human rights violations and spark internal instability. Regionally, the creation of theocracies could prompt refugees to flee an ideology they do not espouse. Theocracies could also stir up religious fervor in like-minded religious adherents beyond its borders, causing regional instability. The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 is a case-in-point for both domestic and international security concerns sparked by the creation of a religious government. Iran’s theocracy has been notoriously intolerant towards religious minorities, particularly the Baha’i, as well as to secular opposition groups. Regionally, Iran has caused instability by spreading religious fervour to countries with Shia populations, especially Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, in addition to an all-out war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988.

Lastly, it is useful to note that groups agitating for the creation of a religious government often disagree among themselves as to the nature and scope of religion’s involvement in the state. For example, religious political parties exist in countries ranging from Israel (Jewish) to India (Hindu) to Pakistan (Islamic and Christian) to Sri Lanka (Buddhist), but within each of these countries, there is a wide variance of opinions on how a religious state should work. Sri Lanka presents an interesting example. In 1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) ran on a platform that promised to give Buddhism a preferential place in the country, along with other allowances to the Sinhalese majority, which is primarily Buddhist. When the government failed to deliver on these promises, a Buddhist Monk assassinated the prime minster in 1959. Buddhist discontent later led to the creation of a Buddhist revolutionary movement that used terrorism to agitate for a Buddhist theocracy in Sri Lanka.[45] Somewhat similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was assassinated in 1995 by the Israeli Yigal Allon because he believed that Rabin was compromising the true integrity of the Jewish state by negotiating with the Palestinians.[46] Therefore, efforts aimed at creating a religious state are destabilizing because they throw into question what the state should look like and who speaks for the religion.

Terrorism and Religious Cleansing

Religious terrorists also aim to eradicate “infidels”—the unfaithful within their tradition or in other religions—in order to create a religiously pure state.[47] This goal differs from the creation of a religious government in that groups aim to make all the citizens within a state’s border or region conform to their interpretation of the faith; it is religious cleansing, which includes battles with other religious groups as well as those within a religion whose interpretation of the faith differs from the group’s.

Religious cleansing can be expressed in specific terms, such as the eradication of another group, or in broad terms, such as the cleansing of a culture, ideas or norms that do not conform to the group’s worldviews. For example, Jewish settlers associated with the JDL/Kach movement in the West Bank, particularly in Hebron, have named as one of their goals the expulsion of non-Jews from land that they believe is divinely theirs.[48] This is a battle against other religions. In addition, however, the movement is battling Jews who do not conform to their interpretation of the faith along with the Israeli government, which it believes is not upholding the tenets of the faith. Rabbi Meir Kahane, the co-founder of the JDL and the founder of Kach stated in an interview in the 1980s that it is the requirement of Israel, as a Jewish state, to create a government based on the Torah, and that those who do not see this, are not truly Jewish. “A Jewish state means that, at a minimum, there must be a majority of Jews; a Jewish sovereignty with the power to make our own laws…My hope as a religious Jew, which is the hope of every sincere and religious Jew, is to have a state governed by the Torah.”[49] As previously noted, Kahane and his organisations inspired violent actions aimed at achieving these goals, including assassination, murder, and attempted destruction of religious sites.


Terrorism aimed at religious cleansing appears similar to non-religious terrorism aimed at ethnic cleansing. However, religious cleansing is different for the important reason that religion, not ethnicity, is the salient defining characteristic of both the terrorist group and the target. This means that religious terrorist groups can be multi-ethnic, such as Al-Qaeda, which is made up of Muslims from all over the worldwide community, but not multi-religious; they are all Muslim. Furthermore, terrorism aimed at religious cleansing may also look like religious fratricide, where violence is intra-religious. In these cases, groups use terrorism to rid an area or country of co-religionists that they believe are corrupting or not upholding the true tenets of the faith. In both cases, the salient characteristic between these groups is faith, not differing ethnicities. Table 1.2 summarises the goals of religious terrorism.

 Table 1.2 Religious Terrorism

**Leadership and Targets of Religious Terrorists**

In addition to the goals for which groups are fighting, religious terrorism has additional attributes that distinguish it from its traditional counterparts, including unique sources of leadership and some of its targets. A common perception is that religious groups that use terrorism are led by a cleric, or a similar religious leader, such as an imam, ‘alim, rabbi, or swami. However, not all leaders of terrorist groups have such bona fide leaders; rather the origin of the religious leader’s authority comes from several key sources. For example, religious authority can be self-appointed, such as Shoko Asahara, the spiritual leader and founder of Aum Shinrikyo.[50] Religious authorities can also be charismatic figures from outside the clergy of a traditional religion, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, the key leaders of Al-Qaeda.[51] Religious authorities within terrorist groups can also be individuals who are trained as religious clerics or scholars. Examples of this type of authority are Sheikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Hizbollah, who was trained as a Shia cleric in Najaf, Iraq, and Qum, Iran, and Meir Kahane of the JDL and Kach, who was trained as a Rabbi in the United States.

These different types of leadership in religiously motivated terrorism may seem puzzling at a glance, but they emphasise that religious power has more than one source and its legitimacy resides with the followers. In the case of bin Laden, his influence was derived from a combination of charisma and admiration for his purported success as a warrior in the Afghan-Soviet war and with various terrorist operations. With others, such as Nasrallah and Kahane, it was religious training. Still, with some it is self-proclaimed divine connections, as will Asahara and Koresh. Nevertheless, despite the source of their religious authority, the presence of a religious leader who is recognised as legitimate and who is given the authority to speak on behalf of the faith by his or her followers is typical to most religious terrorist movements. Religious authority, in other words, rests with group’s followers.

Similarly, religious terrorists have an array of different targets, which reveals important clues about their goals. Broadly speaking, religious terrorists tend to have two types of targets: tactical targets that serve specific, earthly goals and are no different from other forms of terrorism; and symbolic targets.

Tactical targets are means to a bigger, earthly campaign. For example, terrorists seeking to create a religious government target the workings of the state, including attacks on heads of state and government officials. Examples of these types of targets include the Egyptian Gamaat’s assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 andYigal Amir’s assassination of Yitzak Rabin in 1994.[52] These types of attacks also include targeting a government’s infrastructure and sources of power, such as the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma in 1995, believed to be inspired in part by the Christian Identity Movement.[53]

Religious terrorists also target the presence of foreign governments within their borders or region, including military forces, such as Israeli soldiers in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. Palestinian Islamic militants have targeted Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as part of their aim of liberating the land from foreign occupiers. Likewise, the Lebanese Hizbollah targeted IDF soldiers occupying southern Lebanon with the aim of their expulsion.[54] Religious terrorists also targeted U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden named the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, the home of Islam’s holiest cities, as threatening and humiliating to Islam. In 1996 and again in1998, he declared that attacks against “Satan’s U.S. troops” were necessary for the protection of Muslims and for cleansing infidel forces “out of all the lands of Islam.”[55] Another example of these targets is religious terrorist groups who have attacked foreign embassies, including Egyptian Islamic extremists’ bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan in 1995 and Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

In addition to specific domestic targets, religious terrorists often have targets that extend beyond the borders of the state in which they reside. Religious terrorists have targeted third party states that support domestic regimes. For example, radical Islamic militants in Egypt named the United States as one of its targets for its support of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes, which they saw as oppressive and un-Islamic.[56] Likewise, Islamic militants in Pakistan have named the United States as a target for its support of the Pakistani regime, which is mainly secular in its outlook and goals.[57]

These tactical targets look no different than secular, Marxist, anarchist or ethnic-separatist terrorists bent on political change or revolution.[58] For example, Anti-U.S. sentiment is strong within the non-religious Colombian FARC terrorist group, particularly for U.S. aid to the current Columbian government.[59] This sentiment could potentially translate into attacks on U.S. civilians and property.[60] Likewise, British troops in Northern Ireland have been the target of republican terrorist groups with the end-goal of expelling these forces and reuniting Northern Ireland with the Republic, which is not a uniquely religious goal.[61] What makes terrorism towards these targets ultimately religious is that they are stepping-stones to greater religious goals—the creation of a religious government.[62]

In addition to tactical targets aimed at changing regimes or compelling the withdrawal of foreign influences, religious groups also use terrorist tactics to attack individuals and groups that they believe are threatening their interpretation of the faith. For example, religious terrorists target citizens and property that represent the religious “other.” Examples include attacks on Christian churches in Indonesia in December of 2000, believed to be the work of Islamic terrorists in the region, and more recent attacks on Christians in Pakistan.[63] Other examples include the Indian Hindu militant group  Shiv Sena, which aims to promote Maharashtria Hindus in Mumbai and drive Muslims from India. Bal Thackeray, Shiv Sena’s founder, called for the creation of Hindu suicide bombers to target Muslims in 2002 and 2008.[64] Religious terrorists can also target other groups’ religious sites. Examples include the above-mentioned church bombings, and the plot by Jewish extremists in Israel to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock shrine in Jerusalem. These targets tend to be unique to religious terrorists and support the aim of cleansing the land of the religious “other.”

These types of attacks also include intra-religious attacks on those believe to be apostates within the faith. An example of this type of targeting is takfir violence in Islam, where militant groups draw from religious sources to justify killing Muslims that they believe are not upholding the true practice of the faith. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, for example, has attacked Iraqi Shia, claiming that they are apostates to Islam.[65] These attacks look similar to ethnic-separatist attacks on minorities in regions they believe to be their own, but are unique in that the targets are focused on cleansing an area of perceived religious impurities.

Religious terrorists also have symbolic targets, which mostly operate on an abstract level and tend to be specific to religious goals and objectives. Most notably, religious terrorists can attempt to attack “culture,” values and norms that do not conform to the religious ideals of the terrorist group. Examples of this include attacks on movie theaters, discos, bars and other social gathering points. For example, Muslim extremists set fire to a hotel in Turkey in 1993, targeting “leftist writers and intellectuals,” killing over 40 people.[66] Warring fundamentalist groups in Algeria violently suppressed Rai music in the 1990s for its mix of Western and Mediterranean styles, including attacking and then eventually exiling the singer Khaled.[67] In India, Hindu militants have destroyed numerous paintings of Muslim artist Maqbool Fida Husain, particularly works depicting Hindu deities.[68] In the United States, Christian Identity activists bombed a lesbian bar, targeting what they perceive as symbols of the secular, immoral state.[69]

These targets are abstract because the definition of culture is largely amorphous; it is difficult if not impossible to find the source of culture and remove it fully. Therefore, unlike the state, the source of culture cannot be targeted specifically and abstract targets become the only real choice. Abstract targets, however, require a certain degree of decoding by counterterrorism forces and often the meaning and significance behind certain attacks may be missed.


Finally, apocalyptic groups aim to maximize violence and mass casualties; the goal is chaos with the hope of ushering in a new era, either in this world or the next. Aum Shinrikyo, for example, sought total destruction, which knows no bounds between domestic and international and names no specific targets. For groups such as these, the end-goal, at least on an earthly plane, is mass violence and destruction. The cataclysmic nature of apocalyptic terrorism is an additional reason why this specific type of religious terrorists needs to be considered as a distinct and unique category. Its use of violence to achieve transcendent goals is different from other forms of religious terrorism with more limited goals.[70] Table 1.3 summarizes religious terrorisms domestic and international targets.

Table 1.3 Religious Terrorism’s Targets

**Conclusion**

This article has argued that religious terrorism has characteristics that make it uniquely different from traditional  secular left-wing and right-wing terrorism, specifically in the goals for which religious terrorists are striving. Three salient religious goals were presented: the apocalyptic aim of destroying the world, the creation of a religious government, and the creation of a religiously pure state. Of these three goals, apocalyptic actions aimed at ‘destroying the world to save it’ are the most threatening because they suggest the use of WMD with mass casualties and damage to property. In addition to goals, religious terrorism is also differentiated by the presence of religious leaders, which do not derive their authority from one source, but rather are given legitimacy by their followers. Finally, religious terrorists tend to have two types of targets, specific and abstract. Specific, tactical targets include the state or adversarial groups; as such, they look similar to targets of left and right wing terrorists. However, religious terrorists also have symbolic targets that represent secular or other religious cultures and values, both within states and internationally  targets that are unique. Apocalyptic terrorists make no distinction between domestic and international, specific and abstract. Instead, they are concerned with the one pursuit of cataclysmic destruction.

These arguments suggest several counterterrorism measures aimed at mitigating or eradicating terrorism performed in the name of religion. All of these courses of action require a basic understanding of the group, its leadership, and the goals for which the group is fighting. Furthermore, none of these types of religiously motivated terrorism can be countered by the use of force alone.

First, apocalyptic terrorism presents unique counterterrorism challenges. Groups that believe that causing mass casualties and chaos will hasten the end of times are operating on a rationale that does not conform to earthly logic. Their acute worldview and goals suggest that they are not open to negotiation or compromise. With this in mind, a strategy of containment combined with targeting leadership is the best path to undermining these groups. Specifically, counterterrorism strategies should first focus on preventing the spread of the group’s apocalyptic worldview. An important means to this end is to avoid fulfilling the group’s prophecies. If the group is anticipating persecution or a fiery confrontation with the  alleged ‘forces of evil’, a state’s excessive use of force could make this dream come true. Rather than targeting the group, a better counterterrorism approach would be to understand the role that leadership plays in generating the apocalyptic worldview and, if the group is driven by one or a few key leaders, target those individuals. Research and empirical examples suggest that apocalyptic groups are highly leadership driven, especially in New Religious Movements; therefore targeting the leaders may cause the group to fall apart.[71] The goal with this approach is to change the group’s worldview by taking out its propagator or, at a minimum, render the group unable to carry out its apocalyptic dreams.

Groups that use terrorism with the goal of creating a religious government have several counterterrorism options. As previously described, groups vying for the creation of a theocracy often disagree on how the state should look and who should speak for the faith. These fissures offer important opportunities for creating in-fighting within and amongst groups and weakening the overall movement. In particular, if governments can help foster a culture of debate and create public opportunities for airing groups’ plans for creating a religious government, these disagreements could build. The overall goal with this strategy is to cause the movement to implode. Using force against these groups and their leaders may be counterproductive, especially if the groups have a base of support, active or passive, and the population is not supportive of the state. In these cases, force would most likely validate the group’s criticisms of the state and could possibly turn popular support in the group’s favour.

Groups that use terrorism bent on religiously cleansing an area within a state are best countered by treating these groups as criminals and by using law enforcement to monitor and punish their actions. This approach serves two important counterterrorism functions. First, treating these groups and their acts as criminal and illegitimate undermines their ideology and authority. Second, using law enforcement, as opposed to greater, more kinetic approaches, minimises national and international exposure of the group and makes them appear like any other criminal group, as opposed to a world-changing religious movement. In other words, deploying greater force against these groups could send a message that they are a big threat and raise awareness of their cause and seeming success. The goal, rather, is to minimise the group’s publicity and de-legitimate their actions. The challenge with this approach is that states may not have the law enforcement capacity to monitor, arrest, and prevent these groups from taking action. Anti-Christian terrorism in Nigeria is a case-in-point.

Within these three types of religious terrorism, paying attention to leadership is critical. As argued, religious groups that use terrorism have leaders that are recognised as legitimate by their followers, but do not necessarily possess bona fide qualities such as religious education or clerical training. A useful path for undermining these religious leaders is through other religious leaders that also have legitimacy. For example, beginning in 2002, key leadership of the Egyptian Gamaat have written treaties and spoken out against Al-Qaeda’s leadership and interpretations of Islam, especially Jihad.[72] One of the leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Dr. Fadl, followed suit in 2008 with his own denunciation of Al-Qaeda’s ideology.[73] These debates suggest that scriptures, beliefs and tenets are open to debate and that no single leader can corner the market on truth.

Finally, it is important for counterterrorism forces to pay attention to what religious terrorists attack, because these targets offer important clues for the groups’ goals, which in turn affect the type of countermeasures employed. Groups that are focused on state targets are more likely to be vying for political control, whereas targeting other groups within the faith or other religions suggest a goal of religious cleansing. Mass casualties and damage that seem indiscriminate, illogical and excessive suggest apocalyptic aims.

Just as there is more than one type of religious terrorism, there is more than one countermeasure to undermine a group’s goals. Better understanding of such groups, their leadership and goals, will allow for a more nuanced approach and, hopefully, lead to greater success in undermining their message and their use of terrorism in the name of religion.

**►Notes are available at source’s URL.**

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**“Counterterrorism Bookshelf” – 27 Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects**

**By Joshua Sinai**

Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/340/html

This column consists of two parts: capsule reviews of nine books on terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics, and — continuing the series begun in previous columns of highlighting books by significant publishers (listed in alphabetical order) — capsule reviews of 18 books published by Hurst, Oxford University Press, Polity Press, and Rowman & Littlefield. Please note that most of these books were recently published, with several others released over the past few years but deserving renewed interest.

**Note**: Future columns will review books by publishers such as Routledge, Springer, Stanford University Press, and the University of Chicago Press.

**General Reviews**

Eli Berman, Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009. 314 pp., US$ 24.95 [Hardcover], US$ 18.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0262516679.

A methodologically innovative account of how certain radical religious sects turn to terrorism to achieve their religio-political objectives and the methods they employ in managing such entities, including recruiting and indoctrinating their operatives to conduct such warfare on their behalf.  The author’s conceptual framework is applied to the cases of Hamas, Hizballah, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban. Readers may not agree with the author’s thesis that such religiously-based terrorist groups are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife or in imposing rigid theocracies over their societies, but are “rational altruists” in pursuit of generally secular objectives, such as improving their own communities. However, he makes the valid point that, like their secular terrorist group counterparts, these groups are successful at maintaining the loyalty of their operatives and supporting constituencies through various mechanisms such as what he terms “the defection constraint” and the provision of basic social welfare services, including educational institutions. The author recommends that government counterterrorism services need to incorporate into their response measures components that provide alternatives to such social welfare services in order to effectively turn their supporting constituencies over to the government side in order to defeat religiously-based terrorism in the long term. The author is Professor of Economics at the University of California, San Diego.

Raul Caruso and Andrea Locatelli, eds., Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd., 2014. 300 pp., US$ 124.95. [Hardcover] ISBN-13: 978-1783508273.

The contributors to this highly interesting edited volume apply methodologies from the disciplines of economics, social science and political science to examine the phenomenon of terrorism. Chapters focus on topics such as defining terrorism, examining the identity, strategy and values of terrorism as “a political world,” the economic determinants of terrorism, modeling terrorist attacks, using the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) to measure the impact of terrorist attacks, using economic analysis to examine lone wolf terrorism, examining the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism, analysing cyberterrorism, examining the link between terrorism, organised crime and what the authors term “new wars,” and examining the effectiveness of the components of security measures against terrorism. Raul Caruso is a professor at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, and Andrea Locatelli is a professor at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, both in Milan, Italy.

Christopher C. Harmon, A Citizen’s Guide to Terrorism and Counterterrorism. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 170 pp., US$ 19.95, [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0415709422.

An interesting, comprehensive and succinct overview of terrorism and counterterrorism. Focusing primarily on the United States, the book is divided into three parts: the threat (the nature of terrorism and citizens’ vulnerabilities to being attacked by terrorist actors), the strategy (the components of a grand counterterrorism strategy), and the future (what needs to be done in response and how terrorist groups have been defeated in the past). The author, a veteran academic expert on terrorism and counterterrorism, is Horner Chair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University, in Quantico, Virginia.

Benjamin Ginsberg, The Value of Violence. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2013. 250 pp., US$24.95. [Hardcover] ISBN-13: 978-1616148317.

A theoretically interesting account of the role of violence in political life, whether as “law-preserving violence” to maintain social order or as a means, such as insurrection, to bring about social and political change. The book’s chapters cover topics such as governmental bureaucracy and violence, America as a “tough nation,” the balance between morality and violence, and the role of violence in bringing about change. The author’s conclusion, while highly provocative, is also quite insightful: “Violence is terrible, but its alternative is not the Kingdom of Heaven. Not only is violence a great engine of political change but, much as we dislike admitting it, violence is also the great driver of science and even culture. After all, along with love, violence inspires poetry, art, music, and literature.” (p.176) The author is the David Bernstein Professor of Political Science and the director of the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Charles Husband and Yunis Alam, Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction? Bristol, UK/Chicago, IL: The Policy Press/Distributed by The University of Chicago Press, 2011. 272 pp., US$ 36.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1847428011.

An empirically-based examination of the impact of the relationship between the policies that promote social cohesion and those that promote judicial and law enforcement counterterrorism measures in resolving the problem of violent extremism in the United Kingdom. The authors point out, for example, that the imposition of counterterrorism measures often serve to erode fundamental civil rights within Muslim communities, thereby undermining policies that attempt to promote social cohesion in such communities. To examine their thesis, the authors discuss the basis for their conceptual framework, the nature of the governmental policies that promote social cohesion at the community level, the components of British counterterrorism policies in the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005, the prevalence of what they term “anti-Muslimism” in British society, and the implications of their data on the implementation of the British governments’ community cohesion and counterterrorism measures. Charles Husband is a fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, and Professor of Social Analysis at the University of Bradford, UK, and Yunis Alam is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Bradford.

Jeffrey Kaplan, Helene Lööw, and Leena Malkki, eds. “Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, January – March 2014, Vol. 26, No. 1, 258 pp. [Paperback]. ISSN: 0954-6553.

The contributors to this special volume of the quarterly journal had initially presented their papers at the conference “Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism” that was held at Uppsala University, Sweden, under the auspices of the university’s Center for Police Research, on September 24-26, 2012. Following an introductory overview by the special issue’s editors, the contributors discuss issues such as counterinsurgency, law enforcement tactics, lone wolf terrorism, profiling lone wolf terrorists, governmental responses to lone wolf terrorists prior to the First World War, case studies of lone wolves such as Carlos Bledsoe, Anders Breivik, loners and autonomous cells in the Netherlands, school shootings as examples of lone wolf violence, lone wolf terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and detecting “linguistic markers” for signs of extremist violence in social media. Although one might argue that some of the lone wolves discussed in the volume may have actually been part of larger “packs of wolves” and were radicalised in social media by more “conventional” terrorist groups, this volume represents an important contribution to advancing our understanding of this important phenomenon.

James D. Ramsay and Linda Kiltz, eds. Critical Issues in Homeland Security: A Casebook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014. 384 pp., US$ 30.00 [Paperback]. ISBN-13: 978-0813348278.

A valuable handbook for courses on homeland security which examines in an interdisciplinary manner how to address significant issues in homeland security through the examination of all- hazard type case studies of major state and national events. Each chapter begins with an overview and two cases that illustrate those topics. The chapters cover issues such as law and policy (e.g., the use of drones in counterterrorism), terrorist incidents (e.g., the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and eco-terrorism), environmental security (e.g., arctic security and the impact of hurricane Katrina on the U.S. Gulf Coast’s security), the role of intelligence (e.g. how terrorists used intelligence in conducting their attack on Mumbai, India, in November 2008), critical infrastructure protection (e.g. the impact of cyber threats against critical infrastructure), transportation security (e.g., the impact of the 9/11 World Trade Center attack on transportation), and emergency management (e.g., lessons learned from the 2010 Haiti earthquake). James D. Ramsay is the chair of the department of Security Studies and International Affairs at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Linda Kiltz is director of a master’s program in public administration and policy at Walden University.

Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013. 344 pp, US$ 28.99, [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1610391498.

A highly interesting and authoritative account by a veteran American military journalist of the operations of the various elite units that make up the United States special operations forces in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The author is currently a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.

Andrew Silke, ed., Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 312 pp., US $ 150.00 [Hardcover], US$ 45.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0415810371.

The contributors to this conceptually innovative volume apply a multidisciplinary approach to analyse all the dimensions involved in prison radicalisation and effective countermeasures. The book, which is divided into five parts, covers theoretical topics such as an overview of the processes of prison-based radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement from violent extremism, issues in prison management, risk assessment and reform, as well as case studies from the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Indonesia, German Federal Republic in the 1970s, and Spain. This reviewer, for full disclosure, contributed a chapter on a model of prison radicalisation, including (in the worst case) post-release re-incarceration.  The volume’s editor is Head of Criminology and Director of Terrorism Studies at the University of East London.

**Hurst/Oxford University Press**

Mikel Buesa and Thomas Baumert, eds. The Economic Repercussions of Terrorism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. 216 pp., US$ 110.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-0199577705.

The contributors to this conceptually innovative volume assess the economic impact of terrorism in all its manifestations, focusing on the bombings of the Madrid trains in March 2004 as their primary case study. The volume’s chapters discuss issues such as how terrorists fund their operations, theoretical approaches to analysing the economic impact of governmental responses to terrorism, the direct and sectoral impacts of the attacks on Madrid including the country’s stock market, and the effect of the terrorist attacks on the outcome of the 2004 Spanish election. Mikel Buesa is Professor of Applied Economics at the Computense University of Madrid and Thomas Baumert is Professor of Applied Economics at the Catholic University of Valencia.

Anicee Van Engeland, Civilian or Combatant? A Challenge for the 21st Century. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. 192 pp., US$85.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-0199743247.

An authoritative, comprehensive and important examination of the challenges involved in applying and enforcing international humanitarian law in prosecuting those suspected to be engaging in activities that target civilian populations such as genocide, asymmetrical warfare, and terrorism. As the author points out, effective prosecution requires making the important distinction between the deliberate targeting of combatants and civilians. This is explained in chapters covering topics such as the principle of distinction in identifying civilians and combatants; the protection afforded to civilians, the rights of combatants; the shift in such categories, with civilians, under certain circumstances, falling under the concept of direct participation in hostilities; blurring the concept of combatant, and the impact of trends in warfare, especially the use of weapons of mass destruction, in the evolution of such conflicts in categorising civilians and combatants. The author concludes that “The role of international humanitarian law is to regulate the conduct of conflict and to protect civilians and individuals hors de combat,” which is why it should be distinguished from laws governing armed conflict. (p. 162). The author, an international human rights jurist, is a lecturer in law at the University of Exeter, UK.

George Kassimeris, Inside Greek Terrorism. London, UK: Hurst & Company, Ltd./New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013. 256 pp., US$ 29.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 9780199333394.

An important account of the origins and evolution of terrorism in Greece, which was expected to have terminated in summer 2002 with the downfall of the 17 November group (17N). However, due to a number of factors that are explained by the author, other types of anarchistic urban terrorist groups have emerged since then, accompanied by an upsurge and intensification of violence. Following an introductory chapter that provides  historical context to political violence in Greece, the author discusses the nature of 17N in terms of its leadership, organisation, activities, and eventual downfall. This is followed by a discussion of the new terrorist groups that have emerged since then, such as the Revolutionary Struggle (RS) and The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF). The author concludes that the threat of terrorism is likely to worsen because “The fault lines in Greek society are deepening,” especially due to the increasing popularity of the Golden Dawn neo-Nazi party, with “its supporters [staging] pogroms against immigrants and [doing] battle with leftist youths and anarchists” (p.121). Such worsening polarisation and division in society are likely to put Greek democracy “at unnecessary risk,” the author concludes. (p. 121). The author, a long-standing analyst of Greek terrorism, is Reader in Terrorism Studies at Wolverhampton University, UK.

Samuel Justin Sinclair and Daniel Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. 192 pp., US$ 39.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 9780195388114.

An important empirical and theoretical examination of the psychological impact of terrorism in spreading fear and anxiety throughout its targeted society. The authors analyze how terrorism affects its targeted population on various levels, whether individual or societal. The authors also point out that while the fear induced by terrorism negatively impacts people and societies, such fears can also be reshaped to build resilience and post-traumatic growth following such incidents. Also discussed are topics such as how to communicate threat warnings prior to expected terrorist attacks (which may also be thwarted) in order to build resilience among the targeted populations. Mr. Sinclar is Assistant Professor at Harvard Medical School and Mr. Antonius is Assistant Professor at the University of Buffalo, State University of New York.

**Polity Press**

Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism. [2nd edition] Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008. 160 pp., US$ 69.95 [Hardcover], US$24.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0745640761.

Part of the publisher’s “Key Concepts” series that provides concise overviews of significant topics by leading academic experts, this is an updated edition of the author’s previously published 2000 book. Fundamentalism, the author explains, especially as it applies to violent movements, aims “to reshape the world at large” through violence (p.7) because of its opposition to secularising and egalitarian (especially in male-female relations) forces of modernity at the communal and individual levels. ‘Fundamentalists’ are those who “claim that some source of ideas, usually a text [such as a religion’s holy book], is complete and without error” (p.12) . They seek to return to “the existence of some perfect social embodiment of the true religion in the past” (p.13). This general framework is then applied to discuss Islamic fundamentalism and Christian fundamentalism in the United States. The author’s conclusion is worth noting: “Why some people respond by becoming fundamentalists while others do not is a matter for the particulars of each circumstance. There is simply no need and no warrant for constructing fundamentalism as a gross psychological abnormality that deserves an explanation based on the idea of abnormality” (p.122). The author is Professor of Sociology at the University of Aberdeen, UK.

Roland Dannreuther, International Security: The Contemporary Agenda. [2nd edition] Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013. 340 pp., US$ 84.95 [Hardcover], US$ 28.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-5377-8.

This well-written textbook provides a comprehensive examination of key security threats, challenges and developments affecting global security. The book is divided into four parts, with each of the eleven chapters concluding with a section on further reading, questions for research and discussion, and useful reference resources, including websites. The first part, “Analytical Framework,” discusses how to theorize about security in the post-Cold War era. The second part, titled “The ‘New Wars’ and Intervention,” covers topics such as the nature of contemporary wars and conflicts (including terrorism), dilemmas and challenges of intervention, and the nature of collective security, alliances and security cooperation. The third part, “Environment, Resources and Migration,” examines the nature of environmental security, the competition over scarce resources such as oil and water, and the migration of populations and refugees as a security issue. The fourth part, “Asymmetric Power and Asymmetric Threats,” discusses significant threats facing the international community in the form of international terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the new threats of cyber-warfare. The concluding chapter presents the author’s summation of significant issues raised by the preceding chapters. The author is head of the department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, UK.

Brad Evans, Liberal Terror. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013. 224 pp., US$ 69.95 [Hardcover], $ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0745665313.

A well-written, theoretical examination of whether the conventional (i.e., liberal) governmental approach to security towards the perceived threats represented by terrorist attacks, natural disasters or other unexpected catastrophes, is, in fact, making the world safer. The author criticises the way liberal governments and their security services respond to such perceived threats [as described in the book’s back cover] as “a new catastrophic topography of interconnected planetary endangerment,” which is accompanied by a “desire to securitise everything,” thereby rendering “all things potentially terrifying.” This leads, the author argues, to a liberal paradox in which “The more we seek to secure, the more our imaginaries of threat proliferate. Nothing can therefore be left to chance. For everything has the potential to be truly catastrophic. Such is the emerging state of terror normality we find ourselves in today.” While such a polemic against the liberal approach to countering the spectrum of disasters, ranging from man-made (i.e., terrorism) to natural, is not entirely faulty, the study would have benefited from an equally critical treatment of the terrorist adversaries, especially since those who are religiously fundamentalist-based, represent the very anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, and anti-egalitarian tendencies that surely must offend the author’s sense of righteousness. The author is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristol, UK.

Robert E. Goodin, What’s Wrong With Terrorism? Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006. 256 pp., US$ 59.95 [Hardcover], US$ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0745634982.

A provocative discussion of what the author considers as “the distinctive wrong of terrorism” in the form of what he terms the “morally disvalue” acts of killing, maiming and kidnapping civilians and destroying property not belonging to them (p.1). At the same time, he argues, since terrorism is “first and foremost a political tactic: frightening people for political advantage,” (p. 1), it should be judged with greater nuance because of its political component. Moreover, in the author’s analysis, states can be considered as terrorists; profiling potential terrorist suspects can, like ‘terrorism,’ also instill fear in a targeted population; and government warnings about potential terrorist attacks can (since they are generally ‘exaggerated’) be ‘misheard’ and misunderstood, thereby spreading the very types of fears they are originally intended to redress. Although the book is well written, its short sections make it appear more as a diatribe than a well-researched academic study. The author is Distinguished Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Australian National University.

Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013. 180 pp., US$ 59.95 [Hardcover], US$ 19.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-5119-4.

A highly interesting conceptual and descriptive account of the origins and evolution of the strategic appeal to states of using proxy insurgents to battle their adversaries as a form of ‘warfare on the cheap.’ The book’s chapters discuss the rise, nature and appeal of proxy wars, the major players engaged in such state-sponsored warfare, how such warfare is fought, and the future of such warfare. The author is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK.

Igor Primoratz, Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013. 224 pp., US$ 69.95 [Hardcover], US$ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0745651446.

An interesting and authoritative philosophical examination of how to define terrorism in all its manifestations, and whether it can be considered morally justified. To accomplish these objectives, the book’s chapters discuss how to define terrorism, state terrorism, and counterterrorism; whether terrorists are justified in targeted civilian populations as ‘complicit’ to their perceived injustices; the consequences of terrorism, and whether terrorism is morally distinctive since it involves the deliberate targeting of civilians (as opposed to the armed military). The author’s conceptual framework is applied to the case studies of the British air force’s bombing of German cities during the Second World War and Palestinian terrorism against Israel. The author is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Professorial Fellow at Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia.


Eric Y. Shibuya, Demobilizing Irregular Forces. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012. 208 pp., US$ 59.95 [Hardcover], US$ 19.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0745648866.

A highly interesting account of the important role of the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants into their societies in the aftermath of conflicts, because in the absence of such a process, the affected combatants will likely hold on to their weapons and resume their warfare. The author points out that an effective DDR process is not based on a 'one size fits all' approach because a conflict’s unique social and psychological contexts need to be taken into account in promoting the trust by all contending sides that is essential for DDR to succeed in the long term. The author is Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, in Quantico, Virginia.

**Rowman & Littlefield/Lexington Books/Scarecrow Press/University Press of America**

Anna Bennett, The Power Paradox: A Toolkit for Analyzing Conflict and Extremism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012. 168 pp., US$ 60.00 [Hardcover], US$ 29.99 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0761857976.

An interesting thesis about the influence of what the author terms as a society’s “power dynamics” in shaping the way conflict and extremism are analyzed. In the book’s first part, the author bases her conceptual framework on Michel Foucault writings on power and discourse, where she finds that mainstream views of power relations, especially where power is used repressively, tend to restrict the conceptual insights needed to resolve conflict, whereas in situations where power is used progressively, there is greater understanding of how such conflicts can be resolved. In the book’s second part, this conceptual framework is applied to examining the case studies of American far right militias, the Branch Davidian standoff against the FBI in Waco, Texas, Pauline Hanson’s far-right and anti-government party in Australia, Theodore Kaczynski (“the Unabomber), and the United States-led “war on terrorism.” The author is a teacher of foundational sociology at the University of Newcastle, Australia.

Christopher L. Daniels, Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2012. 254 pp., US$ 65.00 [Hardcover], US$ 30.00 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0810886940.

A well-informed and authoritative account of the origins and magnitude of the threat of Somali piracy and terrorism plaguing the waters of the Horn of Africa. The author explains how the collapse of the Somali state and the ensuing chaos and anarchy created the environment for piracy and terrorism to proliferate and become major threats – embodied in the rise of terrorist groups such as al Shabaab and sharp spike in pirate attacks off the Somali coast. The author concludes with a critique of the measures employed to mitigate such security threats and offers a series of recommendations, such as establishing an all-inclusive reconciliation process, increased funding for peacekeeping operations, port security, eliminating ransom payments, challenging the religious legitimacy of terrorist organisations, monitoring and countering the internet propaganda by terrorist organisations, and developing other long-term strategies. The appendices include a timeline of major events in Somalia, a listing of the country’s clans, key people and institutions, and definitions of terms and acronyms. The author is professor political science at Florida A&M University.

John Davis, ed., Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010. 324 pp., US$ 100.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-0739135754.

The contributors to this important edited volume discuss the expanding threat of terrorism in Africa in terms of the affected states, terrorist groups and critical issues that shape the context for understanding these dynamics. As explained by the volume’s editor, the book is divided into three themes: (1) the diversity of the terrorist threat among states in the region (e.g. terrorism in Somalia, West Africa, and North Africa), (2) the nature of the dynamics of terrorism (e.g. terrorism and Islam, terrorist safe havens), and (3) regional solutions to the threat of terrorism in Africa (e.g.  evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Africa, the roles of good governance and developmental assistance, and assessing the progress of regional organizations such as the African Union in countering terrorism). This volume is one of the very few studies that examine the threat of terrorism in Africa and counterterrorism measures in response in all their dimensions, making it indispensable for those studying these issues. The editor is professor of political science and international relations at Howard University.

Jack A. Jarmon, The New Era in U.S. National Security: An Introduction to Emerging Threats and Challenges. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 312 pp., US$ 85.00 [Hardcover], US$ 35.00 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1442224117.

This textbook comprehensively and authoritatively covers the significant threats challenging United States national security and the governmental mechanisms established to respond to such evolving threats. Following a discussion of the national security apparatus and its policies, much of the volume discusses the nature of the threats against specific sectors, such as the maritime supply chain; the nature of cyber threats against critical infrastructure; the distinction and similarities between terrorism and crime; the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction; and the response measures required to counter such threats, including through public-private partnerships. The author is a veteran academic expert on national security issues and has taught at several universities.

Christine Sixta Rinehart, Volatile Social Movements and the Origins of Terrorism. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2013. 166 pp., US$ 80.00 [Hardcover], US$ 39.99 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0739177709.

An interesting and important account of the role of certain types of social movements in originating and causing terrorism. The author points out that while many terrorist organizations had begun as social movements seeking to achieve their objectives through nonviolent tactics, over time terrorist tactics became their “method of choice.” To explain how such transitions from non-violence to violence occurred, the author examines the individual characteristics, group dynamics, and external forces in how such phenomena occurred in the case studies of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Basque ETA in Spain, the FARC in Colombia, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The author finds that terrorist groups emerge from social movements under certain conditions that include the presence of frustration “that led to aggression” and leadership by a charismatic leader that possesses a “violent personality” (pp.141-142). Also of interest is the author’s recommendation for future research, particularly the call for scholars to “study why terrorist organizations disaffiliate or die.” (p.143) The author is assistant adjunct professor of political science and women’s and gender studies at the University of South Carolina.

Pete Simi and Robert Futrell. American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s Hidden Spaces of Hate. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010. 184 pp., US$49.95 [Hardcover], US$ 19.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1442202092.

An important account of the neo-Nazi White Supremacist movement in the United States. Drawing on extensive field work, including numerous interviews, the authors explain the movement’s various groupings, their “infrastructure of hate,” their extremist ideologies and agendas, how they radicalise, recruit and indoctrinate their members (including through private homes, “hate” parties, rituals, music festivals and online), and response measures to effectively counter and marginalise the influence and activities of these militant groups. The appendix includes a valuable guide for academic researchers to make contact and develop rapport with such militants (while avoiding the ethical dilemma of building “too much” rapport with them) in order to understand their mindsets and activities. Pete Simi is associate professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, and Robert Futrell is associate professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska, Las Vegas.

James P. Terry, The War on Terror: The Legal Dimension. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013. 192 pp., US$ 60.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1442222427.

An authoritative, comprehensive and well-written examination of the legal dimension in countering terrorism by the United States government, focusing on the cases of responding to terrorist insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The author is a leading expert on these topics, having served as a former Marine Corps judge advocate and legal counsel to the U.S. Defense Department. The book’s chapters cover topics such as the legal dimension required in the operational context of counterterrorism, including the use of covert action; the international legal and political context for countering state-sponsored terrorism; the law of self-defense as applied to the terrorist threat; developing rules of engagement in countering terrorism; the application of Habeas Corpus in the detention of enemy combatants; torture and the interrogation of detainees; the dilemma of turning to federal courts or military commissions in trying suspected terrorists; international law and maritime terrorism and piracy; outsourcing military support operations in counterterrorism; the legal dimension in countering cyberterrorism, and the relationship between counterterrorism and media access to information. The concluding chapter presents the author’s views on future perspectives in countering the terrorist threat.


***About the Reviewer:* Dr. Joshua Sinai** is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

## Demand for terrorism insurance remains strong

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140428-demand-for-terrorism-insurance-remains-strong

The fourth edition of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Report has found that demand for terrorism insurance remains strong and the renewal of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (TRIA) plays a key role in making coverage available and affordable.

The 2014 Marsh & McLennan Companies survey of roughly 2,600 clients found that the demand and price for terrorism insurance has remained constant since 2009. Education organizations purchase property terrorism insurance at a higher rate, 81 percent, than companies in any other industry segment surveyed in 2013, followed by healthcare organizations, financial institutions, and media companies.

**Insurance Journal notes that findings from the report were presented at the U.S. Capitol earlier this month as part of a roundtable discussion that brought together industry leaders, clients, and policymakers to encourage Congress to renew TRIA. Uncertainty over the extension of TRIA when it expires at year’s end is affecting the availability of terrorism coverage, although demand remains constant.

“We believe TRIA is a model public-private partnership. Marsh’s new report confirms there is strong, long-term demand for the insurance it backstops with more than six out of ten companies in the survey purchasing coverage,” said Dan Glaser, president and CEO of Marsh & McLennan Companies, who hosted the roundtable discussion. “The existence of the federal program plays a major part in the availability and affordability of the coverage.”

**Findings from the report also include:**

* In 2013 the percentage of Marsh clients purchasing terrorism coverage was 62 percent, unchanged from 2012.
* Massachusetts has the highest property terrorism insurance take-up rates (84 percent) among all states in 2013, followed by Maryland at 81 percent. Hawaii has the lowest take-up rate, at 36 percent.
* Median rates for companies with total insured value (TIV) of less than $100 million rose slightly in 2013 to $51 per million from $49 per million of TIV, while median rates for companies with TIVs of more than $1 billion, fell slightly to $18 per million from $19 per million in 2013.
* Construction companies paid the most for terrorism insurance in 2013, a median rate of $66 per million TIV, followed by power and utility companies, which paid a median rate of $48 per million of TIV.
* Healthcare companies paid the least for terrorism insurance in 2013, a median rate of $14 per million of TIV, followed by education and manufacturing companies, which each paid a median $17 per million of TIV.

The Boston Marathon bombings highlighted the need to reauthorize TRIA and to include a streamlined process and shorter timeframe for determining if an event can be classified as terrorism (see “Boston bombing spurred small, midsize businesses to buy terrorism insurance,” HSNW, 23 April 2014). A recently introduced Senate bill would reauthorize TRIA for seven years while increasing the industry’s co-share on losses but insurers are against the proposed co-share increase.

A report to Congress by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets found that private insurers could not financially support the demand for terrorism insurance if TRIA is not renewed, but the report also agreed that an increase in insurers’ co-share could occur without hurting the availability or affordability of terrorism insurance.

**►Read the report at:**

http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/Marsh2014TerrorismRiskInsuranceReport.pdf

# In Canada’s immigration law, anyone can be a terrorist

Source:http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/04/27/in\_canadas\_immigration\_law\_anyone\_can\_be\_a\_terrorist.html

Oscar Vigil and his wife Carolina Teves. As a university student in El Salvador in the 1980s, Vigil acted as a contact between foreign journalists and rebel leaders during his country's civil war. After 13 years in Canada, Vigil is about to be deported as a "terrorist."


One elderly woman’s only political act was to stitch together uniforms for armed rebels in Ethiopia, then ruled by a murderous tyrant named Haile Mariam Mengistu.

Another man, now in his 60s, once donated the equivalent of $50 to the militant opposition in his country.

Yet another man used to act as an informal contact for foreign journalists who were seeking interviews with anti-government guerrillas in El Salvador.

None of these three people ever engaged in political violence themselves, and yet all of them – along with dozens and perhaps hundreds of others – face the threat of deportation on the grounds that they pose a security risk to the people of Canada, under a catch-all provision of this country’s immigration law that many lawyers decry as unfair and excessive.

“It’s an extreme overreaction,” says Ontario legal-aid lawyer Andrew Brouwer. “Their stories are so compelling. There’s not a single allegation of ever being involved in any kind of violence, much less a terrorist act.”

Brouwer is referring to a class of thwarted would-be immigrants to Canada who have been caught in a legalistic snare that would very likely have prevented Nelson Mandela from gaining residence in this country, had he been forced to apply.

Behold: **Section 34 (1) (f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which has been in force since 2001.**

Just 37 words long, the section bars admission to Canada to any person who has ever supported an organization “that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in” acts of subversion or terrorism, a description that in many countries in this conflict-ridden world could easily apply to almost anyone.

If taken literally, says Toronto immigration lawyer Angus Grant, the provision would block admission by any member of the U.S. or British military — past, present, or future – because both those organizations sought to subvert the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq following Sept. 11, 2001.

As for the likelihood that Mandela himself would have been turned away from Canada’s shores — for being a member of the anti-apartheid African National Congress — a spokeswoman for Citizenship and Immigration Canada declined to state an opinion, but she did not rule it out.

“It would be inappropriate to speculate on a hypothetical question concerning an individual case,” Nancy Caron wrote in an email to the Star.

In the real world, many Canadian immigration lawyers are critical of what they regard as an unjust statute being manipulated by high-handed federal bureaucrats to punish law-abiding people who ought to qualify for refuge or residence in Canada.

“The breadth is breathtaking,” says Grant, now working toward a doctorate at Osgoode Hall Law School, focusing on issues of security and admissibility. “It’s outrageous.”

It is also the law of the land, Salvadoran native Oscar Vigil knows better than almost anyone.

A journalist himself, Vigil once acted as an informal contact for foreign reporters seeking interviews with leaders of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, the armed rebels who fought against U.S.-backed government forces during the civil war that ravaged El Salvador from 1980 to 1992.

Following the war’s end and after the rebels laid down their arms and reinvented themselves as a legitimate political party, Vigil briefly acted as their press secretary. Nine years later, along with his wife and their three children, he sought asylum in Canada after receiving death threats from right-wing groups in his country.

The entire family was granted refugee status and, earlier this year, became Canadian citizens — all except Vigil himself.

Formerly the executive director of the Canadian Hispanic Congress, Vigil, 48, was instead declared “inadmissible” to Canada under section 34 (1) (f) of the immigration code. In February, he was ordered to get out, an outcome that will almost certainly wrench his family apart.

His three children are mostly grown up and are thoroughly Canadianized after nearly 14 years in this country.

“They are not going to leave,” says Vigil. “That’s clear. What is not clear is the case of my wife.”

Her name is Carolina Teves, she works as communications coordinator at a refugee centre on Oakwood Ave., and she will have to choose between remaining in Canada with her kids or returning to El Salvador with her husband.

Vigil’s legal options have mostly played out, but he continues to fight the removal order in the political arena by means of a publicity campaign, including an online petition urging that he be allowed to remain. But Citizenship and Immigration Minister Chris Alexander has yet to give any indication that he is influenced by such appeals — or that he cares.

“All applicants, including Mr. Vigil, have the right to due process,” Caron said in an email, “but when an individual has exhausted all due process, we expect them to respect Canadian law and return to their home country.”

For Vigil, the prospect of deportation is only too real. Since 2002, the Canadian Border Services Agency has expelled 37 people under the section 34 (1) (f).

“The problem with using a blunt instrument like this is you don’t have a process of filtering out those for whom the law was never intended,” says Grant. “And then you just have the blunt instrument.”

Just ask Jose Figueroa, another Salvadoran asylum-seeker who is fighting a deportation order issued under the section that has snagged Vigil.

Figueroa has also been ordered to leave Canada, while his wife and their three children will be permitted to remain.

Holed up in a Vancouver church to avoid being marched out of the country by border officials, Figueroa acknowledges he once supported the FMLN and even recruited members on its behalf, but he denies involvement in acts of political violence – not that it matters.

Under section 34 (1) (f), it makes no difference whether someone has engaged in violence or subversion themselves. It is enough that they once supported an organization that at some point in the past possibly did engage in subversive activities or that at some time in the future possibly will.

“Many were members of minority groups fighting against a repressive regime,” says Brouwer.

In the case of El Salvador, it was the U.S.-backed military, and not the armed rebels, who most people would say were the real terrorists in a brutal, 12-year conflict that claimed roughly 70,000 civilian lives.

In the wake of the fighting, a truth and reconciliation commission blamed government security forces and freelance right-wing death squads for 95 per cent of the carnage. The FMLN, it said, was responsible for just 5 per cent of the killings.

Far from being a subversive outfit now, the former rebels have served as the democratically elected government of El Salvador for the past five years and were re-elected in a close presidential vote only last month. The government they head enjoys full diplomatic relations with Canada.

It is for having supported this organization — and not for any misdeeds of their own – that both Vigil and Figueroa are to be deported.

“If 40 people a year in Canada were wrongly convicted of really grave crimes, that would cause an outrage,” says Grant. “But this doesn’t get the same degree of outrage. Some of these people are truly inspiring individuals. They just have not done anything wrong.”

The prospect of deportation is not all that Vigil and Figueroa have in common. Through their respective lawyers, both applied under section 25 of the immigration act to have their deportations waived on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (an avenue of appeal that no longer exists for more recent security-related immigration cases). Both had their applications rejected by the same federal civil servant.

Her name is Karine Roy-Tremblay, director of case determination in the case management branch of the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration in Ottawa.

A former diplomat — she once served as a visa officer in the Canadian embassy in Rabat, Morocco — Roy-Tremblay has earned a reputation among immigration lawyers as an especially hard case.

“Reading these decisions is incredibly disappointing,” says Laura Best, a Vancouver immigration lawyer. “I think it would be disappointing for all Canadians . . . These decisions aren’t being made in a contextual manner.”

Best was so upset by one of Roy-Tremblay’s recent decisions that she issued a request under Canada’s access-to-information law to find out how the bureaucrat had ruled in other cases.

Last month, she got an answer.

Since the beginning of 2013, Roy-Tremblay has ruled on five humanitarian-and-compassionate applications from individuals such as Vigil and Figueroa — people declared inadmissible on security grounds — and she rejected them all.

In Vigil’s case, Roy-Tremblay did not bother to write up her own decision, leaving it to a citizenship and immigration officer named A. Holmes to draft a one-and-a-half-page letter sent on Feb. 11.

The letter makes no specific mention of the special circumstances Vigil had cited in his request for an exemption, including his extensive community work as well as the near certainty that his deportation would cause the break-up of his family.

**Since 2006, the case management branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada has considered 24 requests for humanitarian and compassionate waivers of deportation orders issued under section 34 (1) (f) and reached decisions on 12 of those, according to figures provided in response to Best’s access-to-information request.**

In what appears to have been an honest mistake, CIC failed to specify how many of those decisions were favourable to the applicant and how many were not, making it difficult to say whether the agency has toughened its handling of these cases in recent years.

**However, figures supplied by the Canadian Border Services Agency do show a recent spike in security-related removals. During the past three years, 21 individuals have been deported under Section 34 (1) (f), an average of seven per year, compared to just 16 during the nine years before that, an average of 1.8 per year.**

Toronto immigration lawyer Lorne Waldman says the system for deciding these cases is flawed because civil servants like Roy-Tremblay are expected to make independent rulings while being employed by the same ministry whose orders they are charged with assessing and possibly overturning.

“Minister-delegates are not independent because they are so close to those running the (ministry),” he says. “It’s hardly surprising that most of the time the decisions reflect what the government wants.”

As for Oscar Vigil in Toronto, he continues his fight but few legal options remain.

“They don’t even mention his wife and family, his accomplishments in Canada,” says Vigil’s lawyer, Steve Foster, referring to immigration authorities such as Roy-Tremblay. “There’s not a word about that. I think they really don’t care.”



# Low-Tech Terrorism

**By Bruce Hoffman**

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AMONG THE MORE prescient analyses of the terrorist threats that the United States would face in the twenty-first century was a report published in September 1999 by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman commission. Named after its cochairs, former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, and evocatively titled *New World Coming*, it correctly predicted that mass-casualty terrorism would emerge as one of America’s preeminent security concerns in the next century. “Already,” the report’s first page lamented, “the traditional functions of law, police work, and military power have begun to blur before our eyes as new threats arise.” It added, “Notable among these new threats is the prospect of an attack on U.S. cities by independent or state-supported terrorists using weapons of mass destruction.”

Although hijacked commercial aircraft deliberately flown into high-rise buildings were not the weapons of mass destruction that the commission had in mind, the catastrophic effects that this tactic achieved—obliterating New York City’s World Trade Center, slicing through several of the Pentagon’s concentric rings and killing nearly three thousand people—indisputably captured the gist of that prophetic assertion.

The report was also remarkably accurate in anticipating the terrorist organizational structures that would come to dominate the first dozen or so years of the new century. “Future terrorists will probably be even less hierarchically organized, and yet better net-worked, than they are today. Their diffuse nature will make them more anonymous, yet their ability to coordinate mass effects on a global basis will increase,” the commission argued. Its vision of the motivations that would animate and subsequently fuel this violence was similarly revelatory. “The growing resentment against Western culture and values in some parts of the world,” along with “the fact that others often perceive the United States as exercising its power with arrogance and self-absorption,” was already “breeding a backlash” that would both continue and likely evolve into new and more insidious forms, the report asserted.

Some of the commission’s other visionary conclusions now read like a retrospective summary of the past decade. “The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances,” says one, while another disconsolately warns that “even excellent intelligence will not prevent all surprises.” Today’s tragic events in Syria were also anticipated by one statement that addressed the growing likelihood of foreign crises “replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.”

Fortunately, the report’s most breathless prediction concerning the likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has not come to pass. But this is not for want of terrorists trying to obtain such capabilities. Indeed, prior to the October 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had embarked upon an ambitious quest to acquire and develop an array of such weapons that, had it been successful, would have altered to an unimaginable extent our most basic conceptions about national security and rendered moot debates over whether terrorism posed a potentially existential threat.

But just how effective have terrorist efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction actually been? The September 11, 2001, attacks were widely noted for their reliance on relatively low-tech weaponry—the conversion, in effect, of airplanes into missiles by using raw physical muscle and box cutters to hijack them. Since then, efforts to gain access to WMD have been unceasing. But examining those efforts results in some surprising conclusions. While there is no cause for complacency, they do suggest that terrorists face some inherent constraints that will be difficult for them to overcome. It is easier to proclaim the threat of mass terror than to perpetrate it.

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS attacks on September 11 completely recast global perceptions of threat and vulnerability. Long-standing assumptions that terrorists were more interested in publicity than in killing were dramatically swept aside in the rising crescendo of death and destruction. The butcher’s bill that morning was without parallel in the annals of modern terrorism. Throughout the entirety of the twentieth century no more than fourteen terrorist incidents had killed more than a hundred people, and until September 11 no terrorist operation had ever killed more than five hundred people in a single attack. Viewed from another perspective, more than twice as many Americans perished within those excruciating 102 minutes than had been killed by terrorists since 1968—the year widely accepted as marking the advent of modern, international terrorism.

So massive and consequential a terrorist onslaught naturally gave rise to fears that a profound threshold in terrorist constraint and lethality had been crossed. Renewed fears and concerns were in turn generated that terrorists would now embrace an array of deadly nonconventional weapons in order to inflict even greater levels of death and destruction than had occurred that day. Attention focused specifically on terrorist use of WMD, and the so-called Cheney Doctrine emerged to shape America’s national-security strategy. The doctrine derived from former vice president Dick Cheney’s reported statement that “if there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.” What the “one percent doctrine” meant in practice, according to one observer, was that “even if there’s just a one percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it’s a certainty.” Countering the threat of nonconventional-weapons proliferation—whether by rogue states arrayed in an “axis of evil” or by terrorists who might acquire such weapons from those same states or otherwise develop them on their own—thus became one of the central pillars of the Bush administration’s time in office.

In the case of Al Qaeda, at least, these fears were more than amply justified. That group’s interest in acquiring a **nuclear weapon** reportedly commenced as long ago as 1992—a mere four years after its creation. An attempt by an Al Qaeda agent to purchase uranium from South Africa was made either late the following year or early in 1994 without success. Osama bin Laden’s efforts to obtain nuclear material nonetheless continued, as evidenced by the arrest in Germany in 1998 of a trusted senior aide named Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, who was attempting to purchase enriched uranium. And that same year, the Al Qaeda leader issued a proclamation in the name of the “International Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and Crusaders.” Titled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” the proclamation declared that “it is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.” When asked several months later by a Pakistani journalist whether Al Qaeda was “in a position to develop chemical weapons and try to purchase nuclear material for weapons,” bin Laden replied: “I would say that acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.”

Bin Laden’s continued interest in nuclear weaponry was also on display at the time of the September 11 attacks. Two Pakistani nuclear scientists named Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed spent three days that August at a secret Al Qaeda facility outside Kabul. Although their discussions with bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and other senior Al Qaeda officials also focused on the development and employment of chemical and biological weapons, Mahmood—the former director for nuclear power at Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission—claimed that bin Laden’s foremost interest was in developing a nuclear weapon.

The movement’s efforts in the **biological-warfare** realm, however, were far more advanced and appear to have begun in earnest with a memo written by al-Zawahiri on April 15, 1999, to Muhammad Atef, then deputy commander of Al Qaeda’s military committee. Citing articles published in *Science*, the *Journal of Immunology* and the *New England Journal of Medicine*, as well as information gleaned from authoritative books such as ***Tomorrow’s Weapons*, *Peace or Pestilence* and *Chemical Warfare***, al-Zawahiri outlined in detail his thoughts on the priority to be given to developing a biological-weapons capability.

One of the specialists recruited for this purpose was a U.S.-trained Malaysian microbiologist named Yazid Sufaat. A former captain in the Malaysian army, Sufaat graduated from the California State University in 1987 with a degree in biological sciences. He later joined Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the “Islamic Group”), an Al Qaeda affiliate operating in Southeast Asia, and worked closely with its military operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, and with Hambali’s own Al Qaeda handler, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—the infamous KSM, architect of the September 11attacks.

In January 2000, Sufaat played host to two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who stayed in his Kuala Lumpur condominium. Later that year, Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged “twentieth hijacker,” who was sentenced in 2006 to life imprisonment by a federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, also stayed with Sufaat. Under KSM’s direction, Hambali and Sufaat set up shop at an Al Qaeda camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where their efforts focused on the weaponization of anthrax. Although the two made some progress, biowarfare experts believe that on the eve of September 11 Al Qaeda was still at least two to three years away from producing a sufficient quantity of anthrax to use as a weapon.

Meanwhile, a separate team of Al Qaeda operatives was engaged in a parallel research-and-development project to produce ricin and chemical-warfare agents at the movement’s Derunta camp, near the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad. As one senior U.S. intelligence officer who prefers to remain anonymous explained, “Al Qaeda’s WMD efforts weren’t part of a single program but rather multiple compartmentalized projects involving multiple scientists in multiple locations.”

The Derunta facility reportedly included laboratories and a school that trained handpicked terrorists in the use of chemical and biological weapons. Among this select group was Kamal Bourgass, an Algerian Al Qaeda operative who was convicted in British courts in 2004 and 2005 for the murder of a British police officer and of “conspiracy to commit a public nuisance by the use of poisons or explosives.” The school’s director was an Egyptian named Midhat Mursi—better known by his Al Qaeda nom de guerre, Abu Kebab—and among its instructors were a Pakistani microbiologist and Sufaat. When U.S. military forces overran the camp in 2001, evidence of the progress achieved in developing chemical weapons as diverse as hydrogen cyanide, chlorine and phosgene was discovered. Mursi himself was killed in 2008 by a missile fired from a U.S. Predator drone.

Mursi’s death dealt another significant blow to Al Qaeda’s efforts to develop nonconventional weapons—but it did not end them. In fact, as the aforementioned senior U.S. intelligence officer recently commented, “Al Qaeda’s ongoing procurement efforts have been well-established for awhile now . . . They haven’t been highlighted in the U.S. media, but that isn’t the same as it not happening.” In 2010, for instance, credible intelligence surfaced that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—widely considered the movement’s most dangerous and capable affiliate—was deeply involved in the development of ricin, a bioweapon made from castor beans that the FBI has termed the third most toxic substance known, behind only plutonium and botulism.

Then, in May 2013, Turkish authorities seized two kilograms of sarin nerve gas—the same weapon used in the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system—and arrested twelve men linked to Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Al Nusra Front. Days later, another set of sarin-related arrests was made in Iraq of Al Qaeda operatives based in that country who were separately overseeing the production of sarin and mustard blistering agents at two or more locations.

Finally, Israel admitted in November 2013 that for the past three years it had been holding a senior Al Qaeda operative whose expertise was in biological warfare. “The revelations over his alleged biological weapons links,” one account noted of the operative’s detention, “come amid concerns that Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria are attempting to procure bioweapons—and may already have done so.”

Indeed, Syria’s ongoing civil war and the prominent position of two key Al Qaeda affiliates—Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—along with other sympathetic jihadi entities in that epic struggle, coupled with the potential access afforded to Bashar al-Assad’s chemical-weapons stockpiles, suggest that we have likely not heard the last of Al Qaeda’s ambitions to obtain nerve agents, poison gas and other harmful toxins for use as mass-casualty weapons.

NONETHELESS, A fundamental paradox appears to exist so far as terrorist capabilities involving chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are concerned. As mesmerizingly attractive as these nonconventional weapons remain to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, they have also mostly proven frustratingly disappointing to whoever has tried to use them. Despite the extensive use of poison gas during World War I, for instance, this weapon accounted for only 5 percent of all casualties in that conflict. Reportedly, it required some sixty pounds of mustard gas to produce even a single casualty. Even in more recent times, chemical weapons claimed the lives of less than 1 percent (five thousand) of the six hundred thousand Iranians who died in the Iran-Iraq war. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo succeeded in killing no more than thirteen people in its attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995. And, five years earlier, no fatalities resulted from a Tamil Tigers assault on a Sri Lankan armed forces base in East Kiran that employed chlorine gas. In fact, the wind changed and blew the gas back into the Tigers’ lines, thus aborting the attack.

Biological weapons have proven similarly difficult to deploy effectively. Before and during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army carried out nearly a dozen attacks using a variety of germ agents—including cholera, dysentery, bubonic plague, anthrax and paratyphoid, disseminated through both air and water—against Chinese forces. Not once did these weapons decisively affect the outcome of a battle. And, in the 1942 assault on Chekiang, ten thousand Japanese soldiers themselves became ill, and nearly two thousand died, from exposure to these agents. “The Japanese program’s principal defect, a problem to all efforts so far,” the American terrorism expert David Rapoport concluded, was “an ineffective delivery system.”

The challenges inherent in using germs as weapons are borne out by the research conducted for more than a decade by Seth Carus, a researcher at the National Defense University. Carus has assembled perhaps the most comprehensive database of the use of biological agents by a wide variety of adversaries, including terrorists, government operatives, ordinary criminals and the mentally unstable. His exhaustive research reveals that no more than a total of ten people were killed and less than a thousand were made ill as a result of about two hundred incidents of bioterrorism or biocrime. Most of which, moreover, entailed the individual poisoning of specific people rather than widespread, indiscriminate attacks.

The formidable challenges of obtaining the material needed to construct a nuclear bomb, along with the fabrication and dissemination difficulties involving the use of noxious gases and biological agents, perhaps account for the operational conservatism long observed in terrorist tactics and weaponry. As politically radical or religiously fanatical as terrorists may be, they nonetheless to date have overwhelmingly seemed to prefer the tactical assurance of the comparatively modest effects achieved by the conventional weapons with which they are familiar, as opposed to the risk of failure inherent in the use of more exotic means of death and destruction. Terrorists, as Brian Jenkins famously observed in 1985, thus continue to “appear to be more imitative than innovative.” Accordingly, what innovation does occur tends to take place in the realm of the clever adaptation or modification of existing tactics—such as turning hijacked passenger airliners into cruise missiles—or in the means and methods used to fabricate and detonate explosive devices, rather than in the use of some new or dramatically novel weapon.

THE TERRORISTS have thus functioned mostly in a technological vacuum: either aloof or averse to the profound changes that have fundamentally altered the nature of modern warfare. Whereas technological progress has produced successively more complex, lethally effective and destructively accurate weapons systems that are deployed from a variety of air, land, sea—and space—platforms, terrorists continue to rely, as they have for more than a century, on the same two basic “weapons systems”: the gun and the bomb. Admittedly, the guns used by terrorists today have larger ammunition capacities and more rapid rates of fire than the simple revolver the Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich used in 1878 to assassinate the governor-general of St. Petersburg. Similarly, bombs today require smaller amounts of explosives that are exponentially more powerful and more easily concealed than the sticks of TNT with which the Fenian dynamiters terrorized London more than a century ago. But the fact remains that the vast majority of terrorist incidents continue to utilize the same two attack modes.

Why is this? There are perhaps two obvious explanations: ease and cost. Indeed, as Leonardo da Vinci is said to have observed in a completely different era and context, “Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.” The same can be said about *most* terrorist—and insurgent—weapons and tactics today.

Improvised explosive devices (IED) and bombs constructed of commercially available, readily accessible homemade materials now account for the lion’s share of terrorist—and insurgent—attacks. The use of two crude bombs packed in ordinary pressure cookers that killed three people and injured nearly three hundred others at last April’s Boston Marathon is among the more recent cases in point. Others include the succession of peroxide-based bombs that featured in the July 2005 suicide attacks on London transport, the 2006 plot to blow up seven American and Canadian airliners while in flight from Heathrow Airport to various destinations in North America, and the 2009 attempt to replicate the London transport bombings on the New York City subway system.

The account of the construction of the bombs intended for the New York City attack presented in the book *Enemies Within* vividly illustrates this point. Written by two Pulitzer Prize–winning journalists, Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, the book describes how the would-be bomber, an Afghanistan-born, permanent U.S. resident named Najibullah Zazi, easily purchased the ingredients needed for the device’s construction and then, following the instructions given to him by his Al Qaeda handlers in Pakistan, created a crude but potentially devastatingly lethal weapon:

For weeks he’d been visiting beauty supply stores, filling his carts with hydrogen peroxide and nail polish remover. At the Beauty Supply Warehouse, among the rows of wigs, braids, and extensions, the manager knew him as Jerry. He said his girlfriend owned hair salons. There was no reason to doubt him.

On pharmacy shelves, in the little brown plastic bottles, hydrogen peroxide is a disinfectant, a sting-free way to clean scrapes. Beauty salons use a more concentrated version to bleach hair or activate hair dyes. At even higher concentrations, it burns the skin. It is not flammable on its own, but when it reacts with other chemicals, it quickly releases oxygen, creating an environment ripe for explosions. . . . Even with a cheap stove, it’s easy to simmer water out of hydrogen peroxide, leaving behind something more potent. It takes time, and he had plenty of that.

Preparing the explosive initiator was only slightly more complicated, but considerably more dangerous. Hence, Zazi had to be especially careful. “He added the muriatic acid and watched as the chemicals crystallized,” the account continues:

The crystals are known as triacetone triperoxide, or TATP. A spark, electrical current, even a bit of friction can set off an explosion. . . .

The white crystal compound had been popular among Palestinian terrorists. It was cheap and powerful, but its instability earned it the nickname “Mother of Satan”. . . .

When he was done mixing, he rinsed the crystals with baking soda and water to make his creation more stable. He placed the finished product in a wide-rimmed glass jar about the size of a coffee tin and inspected his work. There would be enough for three detonators. Three detonators inside three backpacks filled with a flammable mixture and ball bearings—the same type of weapon that left 52 dead in London in 2005. . . .

He was ready for New York.

These types of improvised weapons are not only devastatingly effective but also remarkably inexpensive, further accounting for their popularity. For example, the House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, which investigated the 2005 London transport attacks, concluded that the entire operation cost less than £8,000 to execute. This sum included the cost of a trip to Pakistan so that the cell leader and an accomplice could acquire the requisite bomb-making skills at a secret Al Qaeda training camp in that country’s North-West Frontier Province; the purchase of all the needed equipment and ingredients once they were back in Britain; the rental of an apartment in Leeds that they turned into a bomb factory; car rentals and the purchase of cell phones; and other incidentals.

The cost-effectiveness of such homemade devices—and their appeal to terrorists—is of course not new. Decades ago, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) demonstrated the disproportionate effects and enormous damage that crude, inexpensive homemade explosive devices could achieve. In what was described as “the most powerful explosion in London since World War II,” a PIRA fertilizer bomb made with urea nitrate and diesel fuel exploded outside the Baltic Exchange in April 1992, killing three people, wounding ninety others, leaving a twelve-foot-wide crater—and causing $1.25 billion in damage. Exactly a year later, a similar bomb devastated the nearby Bishops Gate, killing one person and injuring more than forty others. Estimates put the damage of that blast at $1.5 billion.

Long a staple of PIRA operations, in the early 1990s fertilizer had cost the group on average 1 percent of a comparable amount of plastic explosive. Although after adulteration fertilizer is admittedly far less powerful than plastic explosives, it also tends to cause more damage than plastic explosives because the energy of the blast is more sustained and less controlled.

Similarly, the homemade bomb used in the first attack on New York’s World Trade Center in 1993—consisting of urea nitrate derived from fertilizer but enhanced by three canisters of hydrogen gas to create a more powerful fuel-air explosion—produced a similarly impressive return on the terrorists’ investment. The device cost less than $400 to construct. Yet, it not only killed six people, injured more than a thousand others and gouged a 180-foot-wide crater six stories deep, but also caused an estimated $550 million in damages and lost revenue to the businesses housed there. The seaborne suicide-bomb attack seven years later on the USS *Cole*, a U.S. Navy destroyer anchored in Aden, Yemen, reportedly cost Al Qaeda no more than $10,000 to execute. But, in addition to claiming the lives of seventeen American sailors and wounding thirty-nine others, it cost the U.S. Navy $250 million to repair the damage caused to the vessel.

THIS TREND toward the increased use of IEDs has had its most consequential and pernicious effects in Iraq and Afghanistan during our prolonged deployments there. As Andrew Bacevich, a retired U.S. Army officer and current Boston University professor, has written, “No matter how badly battered and beaten, the ‘terrorists’” on these and other recent battlefields were not “intimidated, remained unrepentant, and kept coming back for more, devising tactics against which forces optimized for conventional combat did not have a ready response.” He adds, “The term invented for this was ‘asymmetric conflict,’ loosely translated as war against adversaries who won’t fight the way we want them to.”

In Iraq and Afghanistan, both terrorists and insurgents alike have waged low-risk wars of attrition against American, British, allied and host military forces using a variety of IEDs with triggering devices as simple as garage-door openers, cordless phones and car key fobs to confound, if not hobble, among the most technologically advanced militaries in the history of mankind. “The richest, most-trained army got beat by dudes in manjammies and A.K.’s,” an American soldier observed to a *New York Times* reporter of one such bloody engagement in Afghanistan five years ago.

Indeed, terrorists and insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the effectiveness of even poorly or modestly armed nonstate adversaries in confronting superior, conventional military forces and waging a deadly war of attrition designed in part to undermine popular support and resolve back home for these prolonged deployments. Equally worrisome, these battle environments have become spawning grounds for continued and future violence: real-life training camps for jihadis and hands-on laboratories for the research and development of new and ever more deadly terrorist and insurgent tactics and techniques. “How do you stop foes who kill with devices built for the price of a pizza?” was the question posed by a *Newsweek* cover story about IEDs in 2007. “Maybe the question is,” it continued, “can you stop them?”

At one point, IEDs were responsible for nearly two-thirds of military fatalities caused by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq and a quarter of the military fatalities in Afghanistan. According to one authoritative account, there was an IED incident every fifteen minutes in Iraq during 2006. And, after the number of IED attacks had doubled in Afghanistan during 2009, this tactic accounted for three-quarters of military casualties in some areas.

These explosive devices often were constructed using either scavenged artillery or mortar shells, with military or commercial ordnance, or from entirely homemade ingredients. They were then buried beneath roadways, concealed among roadside refuse, hidden in animal carcasses or telephone poles, camouflaged into curbsides or secreted along the guard rails on the shoulders of roadways, put in boxes, or disguised as rocks or bricks strewn by the side of the road. As military vehicle armor improved, the bomb makers adapted and adjusted to these new force-protection measures and began to design and place IEDs in elevated positions, attaching them to road signs or trees, in order to impact the vehicles’ unarmored upper structure.

The method of detonation has also varied as U.S., allied and host forces have adapted to insurgent tactics. Command-wire detonators were replaced by radio-signal triggering devices such as cell phones and garage-door openers. These devices were remote wired up to one hundred meters from the IED detonator to obviate jamming measures. More recently, infrared lasers have been used as explosive initiators. One or more artillery shells rigged with blasting caps and improvised shrapnel (consisting of bits of concrete, nuts, bolts, screws, tacks, ball bearings, etc.) have been the most commonly used, but the makeshift devices have also gradually become larger as multinational forces added more armor to their vehicles, with evidence from insurgent propaganda videos of aviation bombs of 500 lb. being used as IEDs. In some cases, these improvised devices are detonated serially—in “daisy chain” explosions—designed to mow down quick-reaction forces converging on the scene following the initial blast and first wave of casualties.

By 2011, the U.S. Defense Department had spent nearly $20 billion on IED countermeasures—including new technologies, programs, and enhanced and constantly updated training. A “massive new military bureaucracy” had to be created to oversee this effort and itself was forced to create “unconventional processes for introducing new programs,” as a 2010 New America Foundation report put it. Yet, as the British Army found in its war against Jewish terrorists in Palestine seventy years ago, there is no easy or lasting solution to this threat. IED attacks had in fact become so pervasive in Palestine that in December 1946 British Army headquarters in Jerusalem issued a meticulously detailed thirty-five-page pamphlet, complete with photographs and diagrams, describing these weapons, their emplacement and their lethal effects. Even so, as military commanders and civilian authorities alike acknowledged at the time, IEDs were then as now virtually impossible to defend against completely.

Perhaps the most novel and innovative use of IEDs, however, has been when they have been paired with toxic chemicals. Much as the Iraq conflict has served as a proving ground for other terrorist weapons and tactics, it has also served this purpose with chemical weapons. Between 2007 and 2010, more than a dozen major truck-bomb attacks occurred in Iraq involving conventional explosions paired with chlorine gas.

The most serious incident, however, was one that was foiled by Jordanian authorities in April 2004. It involved the toxic release of chemicals into a crowded urban environment and was orchestrated by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder and leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. **The Amman plot entailed the use of some twenty tons of chemicals and explosives to target simultaneously the prime minister’s office, the General Intelligence Department’s headquarters and the U.S. embassy.** Although the main purpose of the coordinated operations was to conduct forced-entry attacks by suicide bombers against these three heavily protected, high-value targets, an ancillary intention is believed to have been the infliction of mass casualties on the surrounding areas by the noxious chemical agents deliberately released in the blasts. An estimated eighty thousand people, Jordanian authorities claim, would have been killed or seriously injured in the operation.

The above attacks in Iraq and the foiled incident in Amman all underscore the potential for terrorists to attack a domestic industrial chemical facility with a truck bomb or other large explosive device, with the purpose of triggering the release of toxic chemicals. In this respect, the effects of prior industrial accidents involving chemicals may exert a profound influence over terrorists. In 2005, for instance, a train crash and derailment in South Carolina released some sixty tons of liquefied chlorine into the air, killing nine people and injuring 250 others. Considerably more tragic, of course, was the 1984 disaster at a Union Carbide chemical facility in Bhopal, India. Some forty tons of methyl isocyanate were accidentally released into the environment and killed nearly four thousand people living around the plant. Methyl isocyanate is one of the more toxic chemicals used in industry, with a toxicity that is only a few percent less than that of sarin.

THE WAR ON terrorism today generates little interest and even less enthusiasm. A decade of prolonged military deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan has drained both the treasuries and willpower of the United States, Great Britain and many other countries, as well as the ardor and commitment that attended the commencement of this global struggle over a dozen years ago. The killings of leading Al Qaeda figures such as bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki—along with some forty other senior commanders and hundreds of the group’s fighters—have sufficiently diminished the threat of terrorism to our war-weary, economically preoccupied nations.


But before we simply conclude that the threat from either Al Qaeda or terrorism has disappeared, it would be prudent to pause and reflect on the expansive dimensions of Al Qaeda’s WMD research-and-development efforts—and also to consider the continuing developments on the opposite end of the technological spectrum that have likewise transformed the threat against conventionally superior militaries and even against superpowers. Like it or not, the war on terrorism continues, abetted by the technological advances of our adversaries and thus far mercifully countered by our own technological prowess—and all the more so by our unyielding vigilance.

***Bruce Hoffman*** *is a contributing editor to* The National Interest*, a senior fellow at the U.S. Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center, and a professor and director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University.*

# Country Reports on Terrorism 2013

# START provides 2013 statistical annex for Country Reports on Terrorism

Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/news/start-provides-2013-statistical-annex-country-reports-terrorism


April 30 – Today, the U.S. Department of State released the congressionally mandated report, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013." The report includes an Annex of Statistical Information prepared by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). START contributed the annex for the U.S Department of State’s 2012 version of the report as well.

The Annex of Statistical Information is a summary of worldwide terrorist activity as reported by unclassified sources. In the statistical annex, START describes the 2013 patterns of worldwide terrorist activity with respect to changes during the year, geographic concentration, casualties, perpetrator organizations, tactics, weapons and targets.

The 2013 statistical annex documents 9,707 attacks worldwide. These attacks resulted in more than 17,800 deaths and 32,500 injuries. In addition, more than 2,990 people were kidnapped or taken hostage. On average there were 808.91 attacks per month and 1.84 fatalities and 3.36 injuries per attack, including perpetrator casualties.

**Casualties due to terrorist attacks worldwide, 2013**

According to the annex, the 10 countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2013 are the same as those that experience the most terrorist attacks in 2012.

Although terrorist attacks occurred in 93 different countries, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than half of all attacks (57%), fatalities (66%), and injuries (73%) occurred in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. By wide margin, the highest number of fatalities (6,378), attacks (2,495) and injuries (14,956) took place in Iraq. The average lethality of attacks in Iraq was 40 percent higher than the global average and 33 percent higher than the 2012 average in Iraq.

**Tactics used in terrorist attacks worldwide, 2013**

Information about the perpetrator group responsible was reported for 32 percent of terrorist attacks in 2013. Of those attacks, more than 20 percent were attributed to the Taliban, operating primarily in Afghanistan. In addition to carrying out the most attacks, the Taliban in Afghanistan was responsible for the greatest number of fatalities in 2013.

The 10 most active perpetrator groups of 2013 include: the Taliban (641 attacks); al-Qaida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (401 attacks); Boko Haram (213 attacks); Maoists (India)/Communist Party of India-Maoist (203 attacks); al-Shabaab (195 attacks); Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (134 attacks); New People’s Amy (NPA) (118 attacks); al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (84 attacks); Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (77 attacks); and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) (34 attacks).

The 2013 report marks the second year the statistical annex was provided by START. In preparation for compiling the statistical annex for 2012, START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) team developed new tools to improve the efficiency and thoroughness of its data collection process and evolve its data collection methodology to improve the reliability, efficiency and thoroughness of the process. The dataset used to generate the statistical annex is a subset of the GTD, based on a more narrow definition of terrorism that is consistent with that used by the Department of State.

As a result of these improvements in data collection methodology for the GTD and definitional differences between the GTD and the statistical annex dataset, the statistics in this report are not directly comparable with the GTD or data from previous reports. START's GTD team continues to collect information about additional descriptive variables for 2013 terrorism incidents and will release the updated GTD later this summer.

►**You can read/download 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism at:**

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/index.htm

**Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe Overview** – Greece

Source: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224822.htm

**Overview:** In 2013, Greece continued to experience intermittent small-scale attacks like targeted package bombs or improvised explosive device detonation by domestic anarchist groups. Generally, these attacks did not appear to aim to inflict bodily harm but rather sought to make a political statement. Overall, Greek government cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism remained strong.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:**

* On January 20, two homemade bombs exploded on the first floor of a shopping center near Athens injuring two private security guards. Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei claimed responsibility for the attack.
* On July 30, the Greek coast guard seized a boat near the island of Chios after a routine check revealed illegal arms and ammunition, including anti-tank mortar rounds, hand grenades, guns, bullets, and explosive devices. The Greek police confirmed that among those arrested in connection with the boat seizure was Hasan Bieber, wanted in Turkey for attacks claimed by the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front.
* On November 1, two unidentified persons shot and killed two members of the Golden Dawn political party and injured a third person in front of the party’s office in the Athens suburb Neo Heraklion. The “Militant People’s Revolutionary Forces” claimed responsibility for the attack; police were still investigating it at year’s end.
* On December 24, a group called Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front threatened to poison certain Coca-Cola products in Greece with hydrochloric acid, causing a recall of those products from store shelves.
* On December 30, an unknown group fired approximately 60 rounds at the German Ambassador’s residence in Athens. The attackers remained at large at year’s end.

Greece’s two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, experienced frequent, relatively small-scale anarchist attacks that used inexpensive and unsophisticated incendiary devices against the properties of political figures, party offices, private bank ATMs, ministries and tax offices, and privately-owned vehicles.

One incident was reported against U.S. interests. On January 14, unidentified perpetrators used flammable liquid to attack the Citibank branch office in the Athens suburb Neo Heraklion. Minor property damage was sustained. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Article 187A of the Greek Penal Code codifies the terrorism statute. In addition, Article 28 (1) of the Greek Constitution subjects Greek citizens to applicable International Laws, to include terrorism. Article 28 (2) and (3) subjects Greek citizens to applicable EU Laws, including the EU law against terrorism. The Police Directorate for Countering Special Violent Crimes (DAEEV) is responsible for counterterrorism in Greece. DAEEV is extremely proactive and attracts highly motivated and educated young police officers. This unit has demonstrated a high capacity to collect information, but it lacks capacity to utilize the volume of data it collects and to share with other services within the Greek police and Coast Guard.

Greece has a weak border document system for its passports. The national ID card is extremely vulnerable to alteration and photo substitution, and it has not incorporated any new security features such as digitized photo and biometrics.

On April 3, five members of Revolutionary Struggle were convicted by an Athens appeals court; three of them received maximum prison sentences. Two of the lead members were convicted in absentia, as they have not been located since they disappeared in 2012, although press reports in October noted police suspicion of their involvement in a series of bank robberies throughout the country. Three other members were acquitted due to lack of sufficient evidence.

The trial of 19 suspected members of Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, which began in 2011, was repeatedly postponed due to work stoppages by judges and judicial postponements in 2012. The trial continued in 2013 with the last session taking place on October 25.

The porous nature of Greece’s borders is of concern. While Greek border authorities have had success in the past year stemming the flow of illegal migration at the land border with Turkey, their ability to control large-scale illegal migration via sea borders is limited. Recent regional upheavals have intensified illegal migration to and through Greece via the Greek Aegean islands. In June and July respectively, DHS/ICE provided computer security and border security training to Hellenic National Police and the Greek Coast Guard.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. The Foreign Ministry’s Sanctions Monitoring Unit is tasked with ensuring that Greece meets its commitments to enforce international sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions. The Financial Intelligence Unit inspected 3,318 suspicious transactions in 2013, but did not discover evidence of terrorist financing in Greece.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Greece engaged constructively on counterterrorism initiatives in international fora and regularly participated in regional information exchange and seminars through such bodies as the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

**Country Reports: Europe Overview** – Brasil

Source: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224822.htm

The Brazilian government continued to support counterterrorism activities, including investigating potential terrorist financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, Brazilian security forces worked with U.S. officials to pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects. Brazil has a sophisticated and competent financial intelligence unit, the Council for Financial Activities Control.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Brazil has four pieces of terrorism legislation pending in Congress: one would deny visas to persons and/or expel foreigners convicted or accused of a terrorist act in another country (introduced in 2011); another defines terrorism in the Brazilian Constitution (introduced in 2013); a third updates the Brazilian penal code to include sentencing guidelines for terrorism crimes (introduced in 2012); and the fourth defines specific crimes, including terrorism, during and preceding the World Cup (introduced in 2011).

Brazil’s law enforcement capacity, as it pertains to proactive detection, deterrence, and prevention of terrorism within its borders, appears adequate but is limited as law enforcement priorities are almost singularly focused on counternarcotic activities. Interagency cooperation and coordination need improvement, particularly regarding information sharing. While problems exist at the State level between enforcement agencies and their investigative counterparts, these are much more pronounced between Federal and State level law enforcement agencies. Coordination between civilian security and law enforcement agencies and the Brazilian military is hindered by inter-service rivalries.

**Brazil has three law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities**, ranging from the investigation of terrorism to interdiction and response. They are the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF), through its Antiterrorism Division (DAT) and Tactical Operations Command (COT); the state-level Military Police Departments, through their respective Police Special Operations Battalions (BOPE); and the state-level Civil Police Departments through their respective Divisions of Special Operations (DOE).

All three of Brazil’s law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities have benefitted from U.S. capacity building training. The U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program delivered courses to security and law enforcement personnel covering topics such as tactical command, vital infrastructure security, crisis incident management, digital network security, and bus and rail security – all with the goal of enhancing investigative capabilities, building border security capabilities, and supporting the Government of Brazil’s efforts to prevent terrorist attacks at the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. Training courses had the added benefit of bringing together disparate agencies, which enhanced the Brazilian interagency communication effort. Likewise, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation offered courses to the aforementioned units ranging from interview and interrogation techniques, terrorist financing and money laundering investigations, and Hostage Rescue Team tactical subject matter expert exchanges.

Brazilian authorities continued to work with other concerned nations – particularly the United States – in combating document fraud. Since 2009, multiple regional and international joint operations successfully disrupted a number of document vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking networks. Since 2008, DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have trained Brazilian airline employees on identifying fraudulent documents.


The U.S.-Brazil Container Security Initiative (CSI) in Santos, which began in 2005, continued to operate throughout 2013. The CSI promotes secure containerized cargo – shipped to the United States – by co-locating DHS CBP personnel overseas to work with a foreign customs administration, specifically to target, detect, and inspect high risk cargo and containers that are potentially associated with terrorism while facilitating the movement of legitimate trade. Brazil continued to reach out to CBP International Affairs and Office of Field Operations to learn best practices and conduct joint workshops to bolster supply chain security and port security.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Brazil is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional body (FSRB). Brazil gives FATF recommendations high priority and has created a working group chaired by the Ministry of Justice to incorporate these recommendations into legislation and regulation. Brazil seeks to play an active leadership role in its FSRB and has offered technical assistance to Argentina to implement FATF recommendations. Brazil updated its money laundering legislation in 2012, establishing stricter penalties but it did not criminalize terrorist financing as a stand-alone criminal offense.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Brazilian government continued to invest in border and law enforcement infrastructure and has undertaken initiatives to control the flow of goods—legal and illegal – through the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Brazil’s intelligence and law enforcement forces also work with their regional and international partners. Brazil participates in regional counterterrorism fora, including: the OAS and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the Union of South American Nations, and Mercosur’s working group on terrorism and sub-working group on financial issues – the latter of which discusses terrorist financing and money laundering among the Mercosur countries.

# New movie: “The Attack”


# Source:http://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/04/prweb11733144.htm

TotalRecall Publication announced today the publication of "The Attack" by the multi-award winning Bob Doerr, a former Air Force investigative and security officer who specialized in criminal investigations and counter-terrorism. Doerr uses his military background, including coordinating with the FBI and CIA, plus masters degree in international relations to immerse readers in the gritty realism of a terrorist attack.

The story opens as a terrorist team has just set off four explosive devices in an international airport close to New York City. The leader of the terrorists, Ahmad Khalin, survives the attack and plans to attack a second U.S. airport within the month.

As Khalin makes his escape from the New York area he's involved in a shooting in Connecticut. Clint Smith, a U.S. government agent assigned to an ultra-secret agency, is at a restaurant across the street when the shooting occurs. He responds to the scene to see if he can help, but Khalin is gone. On a hunch, Teresa Deer, Smith’s boss, sends Smith after Khalin.

Smith’s hot pursuit turns international and takes him to Bar Harbor, Maine; Wiesbaden, Germany; the Costa Brava, Spain; Northern Scotland; Lake of the Woods, Ontario, Canada; and finally into Saskatchewan, Canada, where the final confrontation takes place. Throughout the pursuit, a number of interesting characters add to the subplots and try to survive their involvement in the chase.

'The Attack' is available in hardcover, paperback, and Kindle editions from Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble, Books-a-Million, and other booksellers.

**Bob Doerr grew up in a military family, graduated from the Air Force Academy, and had a 28-year career in the Air Force, where he specialized in criminal investigations and counter-intelligence.** His work brought him into close contact and coordination with the investigative and security agencies of many different countries and with the FBI and CIA. This background helped him develop the fictional plots and characters in his series of five Jim West mysteries. He also has a Masters in International Relations from Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, and is now a full time author, with five mystery/thrillers and a middle grade fantasy adventure already published. A seventh book was released in late 2013. Four of Doerr’s Jim West novels have been recognized in a variety of book competitions.

**The Military Writers Society of America selected him as its Author of the Year in 2013.** His book Cold Winter's Kill was a finalist for the 2010 Eric Hoffer Award, and in 2011 his book Loose Ends Kill was also selected as an Eric Hoffer finalist! Additionally, Loose Ends Kill was awarded the 2011 Silver medal for Fiction/mystery by the Military Writers Society of America. Another Colorado Kill won the same medal for 2012 and was also awarded the Silver for General Fiction in the 2012 Stars and Flags national book contest. No One Else to Kill was awarded First Runner up for Commercial Fiction in the 2013 Eric Hoffer Awards.

TotalRecall Publications Inc. was founded in 1998 by Bruce Moran, a former NASA IT professional who transitioned into computer instruction and educational materials. The company began with the introduction of study guides and Q&A testing software for various computer and financial certification exams and expanded into library and information science textbooks in 2007. Since 2008, the publisher has been developing a fiction product line by debut authors that focuses on mysteries, thrillers, and military action. Additionally, TotalRecall has expanded into general nonfiction and now publishes more than 200 non-fiction and fiction titles, all distributed worldwide through book retailers and wholesalers and via eBook databases such as ebrary, EBSCO, and Books24x7.com.

# Minnesota teen allegedly plotted to bomb schools, kill his family

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/05/02/minnesota-teen-allegedly-plotted-to-bomb-schools-kill-his-family/

Authorities said Thursday that they prevented an "unimaginable tragedy" by foiling a teenager's elaborate plot to kill his family and bomb the junior and senior high school in the southern Minnesota city of Waseca.

Police arrested the 17-year-old suspect Tuesday and charged him in juvenile court Thursday with four counts of attempted first-degree murder, six counts of possessing explosive or incendiary devices and two counts of criminal damage to property. The charges say he told police he intended to kill "as many students as he could."

Capt. Kris Markeson told reporters that authorities believe the teenager was acting alone and would have carried out the attack in the next few weeks if he hadn't been caught. Markeson said he was disturbed by the amount of guns and other material the youth obtained. He said he could not divulge if specific students were targeted. He said police were tipped by a resident who reported a suspicious person at a self-storage facility.

"This case is a classic example of citizens doing the right thing in calling the police when things seem out of place. By doing the right thing, (an) unimaginable tragedy has been prevented," Markeson said.

School Superintendent Thomas Lee said the 11th-grader was known to school officials but they had no major issues with him. He said teachers tried to reach out to him, but he was shy.

"We have escaped what could have been a horrific experience," Lee said.

The investigation began in late March after three small explosive devices were discovered at an elementary school playground in the city of 9,400 people, about 80 miles south of Minneapolis. The youth allegedly admitted setting off practice bombs there.

**According to the charging documents, The Free Press of Mankato reported, the suspect kept a 180-page notebook that detailed his plans. He allegedly told police he planned to shoot his mother, father and sister, then start a fire in a rural field to distract first-responders while he went to the school to set off pressure-cooker bombs in the cafeteria.**

**He also allegedly planned to throw Molotov cocktails, gun down students and kill a school liaison officer while he helped injured students.**

**He said his ultimate goal was for a SWAT team to kill him.**

The teen allegedly referenced the Columbine, Virginia Tech and Sandy Hook school shootings in his notebook, and idolized the Columbine shooters.

Police got a break Tuesday with the tip. **An officer found the teen in a storage unit that had numerous materials that could have been used to make bombs.**

According to the documents, the boy was initially defensive but told officers he would tell them what he was doing if they could guess correctly. When an officer guessed he was making explosive devices, he allegedly said "Yes" and agreed to speak. He allegedly told police he would have shot the responding officer if he had brought a gun to the storage unit.

He told police he had ammunition, guns and bombs in his bedroom and provided a key to his gun safe to officers. Police recovered seven firearms, ammunition and three functional bombs from the boy's home, along with black clothing and a ski mask, KARE-TV reported.

The 17-year-old made his first court appearance Thursday and was sent to a juvenile detention center in Red Wing, the Star Tribune of Minneapolis reported. His next court date is May 12.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: A plot equal to best organized terrorist group with a good chance to be successful. Of equal importance is the contribution of the police officer and his ability to connect the dots! |

## Governments more likely to negotiate with terrorists as violence increases

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140502-governments-more-likely-to-negotiate-with-terrorists-as-violence-increases-study

For decades, the hard line approach to national terrorism cases has called for governments not to negotiate with terrorists. This approach also asserted that terrorism is ineffective. A new study is proposing, however, that in certain cases the opposite may be true.

The American Journal of Political Science has just published an article titled “***Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War***,” in which author Jankana Thomas, an associate professor at Michigan State University, attempts to find the reality in the long-standing debate over the effectiveness of terrorism.

In a Washington Post feature, Thomas writes that “Instead of asking whether terrorism is effective, we should be concentrating on when and for what purpose is terrorism effective, especially since the empirical record shows that terrorism has both hurt and helped the causes of violent organizations that have employed the tactic. Very little extant research, however, helps us understand this variation.”

Thomas’s own exploration has found that governments involved in civil war in Africa from 1989 to 2010 were exponentially more likely to negotiate with terror groups as the acts of violence perpetrated by those groups increased. She also cites recent examples such as the extreme and effectual violence of Boko Haram in Nigeria.


She also points out the shifting understanding of what terrorism can accomplish, saying that “one of the limitations of current research is that it relies on concessions as the sole measure by which the success of acts of terrorism can be evaluated. That is, studies consider groups successful when they are able to extract a great deal of concessions from their targets, and unsuccessful when they are not…Researchers argue that groups have also used terrorism to disrupt peace deals (spoiling) and to divert support from other organizations (outbidding).”

She goes on to explain that further increased violence eventually will force a government to submit. “Why would terrorism increase the odds of rebels participating in talks?” Thomas asks. “In short, it is because it hurts. Recurrent acts of terrorism undermine the state’s credibility,” she answers, adding “When both terrorism and counterterrorism inflict massive costs on civilians, the population is left with a choice of two bad options…For these reasons, governments should be expected to pursue negotiated settlements to stop the pain caused by terrorism and to strike deals.”

**►Read the full study at:** http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12113/pdf

TouchScreener

Source: http://www.veracitysecurity.com/home/



The TouchScreener™ utilizes a patented biometric technology to electronically assess a person’s emotional reactions.

A person answers questions using Veracity’s highly sensitive touch screen, the device amplifies and measures miniscule, but significant, variations in the person’s touch. Data is then analyzed to assess the emotional impact each screening question has on the person. Based on the results, Security Professionals can then make more informed decisions on the best course of action.



Veracity’s Touch Screener is the next evolutionary step in a line of truth verification tools such as Polygraph and Voice Stress Analysis.

In testing, Veracity has demonstrated a near 100% correlation with Voice Stress Analysis results. Field testing has yielded accuracy higher than 90% when ground-truthed to chemical drug tests. This evidence shows how effectively Veracity captures psychometric and biometric responses to stress.

Veracity is ready to place TouchScreener™ kiosks in areas where security and personnel processing take place. This can be accomplished quickly, unobtrusively and at low cost.

The TouchScreener™ can be customized with questions that compliment current screening processes. A new layer of objective and biometric security that will save time and money, can be added with minimal effort and set-up cost.

http://veracitysys.com/wp-content/themes/veracity/images/logo.png►**Watch two very interesting videos at source’s URL.**

# Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal

Source: http://www.nmiotc.gr/#training/Publications/journal\_en.htm

# MH 370: Hand of Al Qaeda Terrorists Behind Missing Malaysia Possible, Say Officials

Source: http://www.microfinancemonitor.com/2014/05/05/mh-370-hand-of-al-qaeda-terrorists-behind-missing-malaysia-possible-say-officials/

Terrorists with links to Al Qaeda may have been behind the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370, said one officer with the Counter Terrorism Division of Malaysian Special Branch.

Confirming that the unit has made 11 arrests so far and questioned them for their links with the terrorist outfit al Qaeda, he said, “The possibility that the plane was diverted by militants is still high on the list and international investigators have asked for a comprehensive report on this new terror group.”

The possibility that the plane was diverted by militants is still high on the list. he said and that the global intelligence officials are seeking comprehensive report on this new terror angle," the officer said.

In the last two weeks, a total of 11 terrorists were arrested in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur and in the state of Kedah. The suspects are said to be members of a new violent terror group and its members include those aged 22 to 55. The militants are said to be consisting of students, odd-job workers, a young widow and business professionals.

The missing Malaysian flight MH 370 was bound to Beijing with 239 passengers on board when it disappeared without trace on 8 March, 2014. Some hundreds of millions of dollars were spent in an international search operation with ships and planes deployed to scour the air and the seas in the Indian Ocean looking for the wreckage.

**A Russian newspaper had earlier said that flight MH370 was in fact, hijacked and landed in Afghanistan where passengers were being held hostage.** The sources of the story are from the country’s top intelligence wing FSB secret service, the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets said.

In the past, Briton suspect Sulaiman Abu Ghaith claimed that he had been asked to give a **shoe bomb** to the Malaysians. **"I gave one of my shoes to the Malaysians. I think it was to access the cockpit,"** he said.

Sulaiman or also called Badat, who spoke via video link from some unknown place in the UK, told a New York court that the Malaysian plot was part of its mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of 9/11.

Some reports said the passengers may have been held captive by a terrorist organisation.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: There are certain technicalities that make landing of such big aircraft in Afghanistan a bit impossible. But life has shown so far that the unexpected always happens! |

# red-arrow-down-left-png.pngAl Qaeda and the Malay Flight

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/05/fast-draw-al-qaeda-malay-flight/

If the latest information is correct we’re facing a new stage in global terrorism. After a long period of relative calm it seems that al-Qaeda and its affiliates have renewed their attacks on global aviation.

The suspects have been arrested in the capital Kuala Lumpur. They’re all between the ages of 22 and 55, including students, businessmen and a widow. After intensive interrogations the incident is now believed to be the result of a terror attack, with the plane hijacked by armed militants. The international investigators have requested a comprehensive report on al-Qaeda, while some of the suspects admitted they have planned terror attacks in Arab states – although they denied being involved in the passenger plane hijacking.

The investigation is ongoing, now joined by many western intelligence agencies. Over the last few years there has been a drop in terror attacks on civil aviation, unfortunately accompanied by reduced security measures in a few countries.

Experts say that in some countries airport security is “ridiculous”, only implemented for the sake of appearances. Some claim that weapons can be easily smuggled onto flights in several places. The investigation into the affair is ongoing, alongside efforts to locate the plain’s wreckage, perhaps shedding more light on these latest suspicions.

# Assailants target Yemen's main oil pipeline, power lines

Source: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/yemen-oil-blast-idUKL6N0NT0SI20140507

May 7 – Assailants blew up Yemen's main oil export pipeline, halting crude flows, local officials said on Wednesday, while other gunmen attacked electricity lines, causing a power outage in most of the country's northern cities.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but Yemeni tribesmen often attack oil pipelines and power lines. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also carried out such attacks.

The attacks late on Tuesday and early on Wednesday coincided with an offensive by Yemeni government forces in mountainous areas of southern Yemen that led to the capture of the militants' main stronghold in that region.

**The oil pipeline was bombed twice in less than 12 hours late on Tuesday in an area between the central Maarib province and the capital Sanaa, the local officials said, an area that has suffered numerous attacks since 2011.**

The pipeline carries crude from the Maarib fields in central Yemen to the Ras Isa oil terminal on the Red Sea. Before the spate of attacks began three years ago, the 270-mile (435-km) pipeline carried around 110,000 barrels per day to Ras Isa.

**Separately, gunmen forced the closure of the Maarib gas-fired power plant after twice attacking its power transmission lines late on Tuesday and in the early hours of Wednesday, the state news agency Saba reported**.

It was the **third attack in less than 48 hours** by gunmen who targeted other lines that transmit power between Maarib and Sanaa, Saba said.

Major Powers have pressed Yemen to curb the Islamist insurgents and to restore order in the south to prevent threats to top oil exporter Saudi Arabia next door. They also want to reduce any risk of Yemen being used as a springboard for attacks on Western targets.

## Al Qaeda and the U.S. Intelligence

**By Brian Michael Jenkins\***

Source: http://acdemocracy.org/al-qaeda-and-u-s-intelligence/

On April 30, 2014, the State Department issued its latest Country Reports on Terrorism. Dealing with 2013, it confirms what we have known for some time: that the numbers of terrorists and acts of terrorism are rapidly increasing and that, in one way or another, these numbers and events are by and large about the activities of al Qaeda and its affiliates.

[](http://acdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Ahrar-al-Sham-posts-Abu-Khalid-2.jpg)In 2013, terrorist attacks worldwide rose 43 percent over 2012.  Terrorists killed some 17,891 and wounded another 32,577.  Nearly 3,000 people were kidnapped or taken hostage in 2013. Al-Qaeda affiliate ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) doubled the number of people it killed in 2013 as opposed to 2012.  The State Department provides statistics on the “efficiency of attacks.”  ISIS’s efficiency increased to 4.30 deaths per attack from 3.58. Why this statistic?  Good question.

Left: The Late Abu Khaled al-Suri

On the “good news” side, in 2013 U.S. killed and wounded by terrorists amounted to 16 and 7 respectively. Of the 3,000 people who were kidnapped only a dozen were Americans.  Characteristically, the report does not evaluate the threat to U.S. security and political and economic interests that would necessarily have increased by nearly 50 percent in 2013.

The report is at pains to note that al Qaeda has “splintered.”  This phenomenon of internal splits and even battles, however, is still taken to mean that the death of Osama bin Laden left al Qaeda without central control. It points out that Al-Qaeda affiliates operate in a wide range of theaters against a growing number of adversaries and targets.  Accordingly, the report considers activities as independent and locally/regionally restricted. But, if one follows the news it is clear that al Qaeda through its affiliates can surely select and pursue U.S. targets.  Many affiliates—such as those in Syria and Somalia—have, of course, stated their intention to target the United States when they are able. And many those who go to fight in Syria, receive training only to return to the West to practice their new skills when the opportunity presents itself and when they receive instructions to act.

The State Department also notes a vast worldwide expansion of anti-terrorist campaigns.  The report, however, does not particularly analyze their effectiveness.  That the anti-terrorism effort is obviously less than effective is mostly due to the lack of intelligence.  While rifts within and between al-Qaeda affiliates surely present opportunities for intelligence gathering impossible with a centralized operation, our tactics focused on eliminating those we track by drones, instead of building networks of local informants to gather intelligence to develop a winning strategy such as the U.S. had in Anbar during the surge in Iraq.

**As Brian Jenkins argues in his study of the rifts among terrorists, the opportunities of the current situation can only be exploited with “the creation of a dedicated task force to act as a focal point for analysis and action.”**

**Brothers Killing Brothers – The Current Infighting Will Test al Qaeda’s Brand**

**By Brian Michael Jenkins\***

Terrorists often resolve internal disputes the old-fashioned way: They kill each other.

This was demonstrated on February 22, 2014, when members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are believed to have carried out the suicide attack that killed Abu Khaled al-Suri, a founding member and leader of Ahrar al-Sham, a rival coalition of Islamist rebel groups in Syria. ISIL denied responsibility in a formal press release, and factional killings are not uncommon among Syria’s rebels, but ISIL had already acquired a reputation for killing its rivals. (In November 2013, ISIL apologized for beheading another al-Sham leader, claiming that it mistakenly thought he was a Shiite militiaman, and it has publicly announced executing rival commanders since then.)

Until recently, ISIL was al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq, but when the group asserted its authority over Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), another al Qaeda affiliate fighting in Syria, JN’s leader objected. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s leader, sided with JN and instructed ISIL to back off. At the same time, Zawahiri dispatched al-Suri to resolve the dispute between the two groups.

Al-Suri had credentials and credibility in the jihadist universe. A comrade-in-arms of Osama bin Laden, al-Suri had fought in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Trusted by Zawahiri, he was presumed to also wield considerable influence among ISIL’s fighters. The dispute was to be settled by litigation, and al-Suri was empowered by Zawahiri to set up a Sharia justice court to rule on the matter. None of this impressed ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared that he answered only to God, not Zawahiri. Not surprisingly, then, ISIL’s opponents blamed Baghdadi’s group for the killing of Zawahiri’s messenger.

Al Qaeda’s Expulsion of Its Affiliate in Iraq

Faced with this open defiance, Zawahiri took the unprecedented step of publicly expelling ISIL, suspending its franchise, and stripping it of its claim to be part of al Qaeda’s global enterprise. The split will test the value of al Qaeda’s brand.

Quarrels have become commonplace within al Qaeda—both between the core organization and its affiliates around the region and within the affiliates themselves. Although al Qaeda’s leaders have quarreled in the past over strategy, tactics, and targets, an open break like this is unprecedented and creates real risks for both ISIL’s and al Qaeda’s leadership. What happens next?

The rebellious ISIL is not likely to back down. And now that al Qaeda’s supreme leader has declared ISIL a renegade, he cannot allow it to succeed in creating a rival center of power. That sets up a showdown that could turn an internal dispute into a schism that cleaves across the jihadist universe.

A Challenge for Al Qaeda, an Opportunity for the United States ISIL’s disobedience suggests that al Qaeda’s recent expansion, opening more jihadist fronts, may have weakened its central control while increasing its exposure to centrifugal forces and internal fissures. In addition, the organization’s dysfunction could create new intelligence and propaganda opportunities for the United States. The internal purges and personal dangers resulting from the infighting could prompt defections and betrayals. And instead of defending Islam against perceived infidel aggression, new volunteers to al Qaeda now face the prospect of killing or being killed by rival jihadists, a less-attractive proposition.

[The current dispute in al Qaeda] sets up a showdown that could turn an internal dispute into a schism that cleaves across the jihadist universe.

A number of issues divided ISIL from its allies in Syria. ISIL’s brutal tactics against Muslim civilians risked alienating the entire rebellion’s local support and discouraged international backing. However, this should not be overstated. It is not clear how much popular support Syria’s rebels actually have, and as for imperiling the rebellion’s finances, while ISIL’s deliberate savagery turned off fastidious Western governments, the jihadists’ private bankrollers in the region appear to be less squeamish.1

And it certainly does not mean that JN, al Qaeda’s chosen banner-carrier in Syria, or the other Salafist groups fighting there practice a kinder, gentler mode of warfare. Clearly, some of the worry about killing innocents is anti-ISIL propaganda, although JN and the other Sunni Islamists in Syria may indeed want to avoid the kind of brutality that alienated Sunnis from al Qaeda’s predecessor in Iraq while ISIL continued its campaign of unlimited violence. ISIL itself claims that it has learned the lesson of Iraq’s Anbar Awakening, when the barbarity of al Qaeda’s local affiliate caused the population to turn against it. ISIL’s foes could also exploit a nationalist theme—JN and the other groups are seen as being mostly Syrian, while ISIL reportedly has a greater number of foreign commanders and fighters.

Perhaps a bigger factor fueling the conflict among Syria’s Islamists has been the growing strength and predominance of ISIL.

ISIL posed a threat to al Qaeda’s distant leaders in Pakistan, but that is an internal al Qaeda problem, which Syria’s rebels have little interest in solving. More seriously, ISIL’s rapid growth threatened the other rebel groups who became increasingly concerned that it would come to dominate the rebellion while following its own agenda.

**Accusations and Open War**

Occasional skirmishes between fighters of the Islamic Coalition, an assemblage of Syrian Islamist rebel groups, and ISIL units escalated in January 2014 after JN announced that it would join forces with other groups fighting ISIL. The anti-ISIL rebels justified their assault on ISIL, declaring that the people of Syria could no longer tolerate being abused by foreign fighters, by which they meant ISIL’s Iraqis and other foreigners. ISIL responded by calling on its fighters to crush the other rebel groups. To underscore the point, ISIL’s men promptly began executing captured rebel fighters. The next day, ISIL’s opponents struck back, seizing ISIL’s headquarters in Aleppo. In retaliation, ISIL assassinated the commanders of two rival groups. Syria’s rebels had started their civil war.

Zawahiri signaled his support for the anti-ISIL forces in early February, when he publicly stripped ISIL of its al Qaeda affiliation. Then, on February 26, JN issued an ultimatum to ISIL, giving it five days to accept mediation to end the fighting or be expelled from the region, warning, “By God, if you reject God’s judgment again, and do not stop your arrogant overlording over the Muslim nation, then [we] will be forced to launch an assault against this aggressive, ignorant ideology and will expel it, even from Iraq.” (The inclusion of this last phrase raises suspicions that al Qaeda’s central leadership may now be working with JN to lay the ground- work for JN to eventually replace ISIL in Iraq.)

ISIL answered that it would not rule out arbitration, but it complained that JN’s leaders tried to defeat it “when they saw it was becoming more powerful.” It accused JN of mounting a military and propaganda campaign aimed at harming the image of ISIL and turning the people against it.

By March, according to some sources, as many as 3,000 had been killed in the fighting, but information on the ground is thin, and it is hard to say exactly what is going on.2 ISIL was forced to abandon (or it strategically retreated from) some of its positions in Northern Syria to consolidate its strongholds in the eastern part of the country. It is not clear whether ISIL’s withdrawal was forced or the group simply wanted to avoid an all-out war with other Islamists. In January, ISIL had warned that if its rivals did not lift their siege of its forces, it would withdraw from Aleppo, a move that would lead to the reoccupation of the city by Syrian government forces.3 Meanwhile, Syrian government forces have taken advantage of the rebels’ disarray, driving them from a number of key towns.

The expulsion of ISIL means that al Qaeda now has no affiliate in Iraq, turning what once was the vanguard of its global jihad and for a while the principal recruiting attraction for young fighters drawn to bin Laden’s ideology into a costly internal struggle. Al Qaeda faces a rival jihadist upstart in the heart of the Arab world.

Zawahiri may have feared that if he did not move against ISIL, it would grow to become a rival center of power and eventually dominate the global jihad.

To take the extraordinary step of expelling it, Zawahiri, a strategist, had to calculate that the benefits of separation and the danger of the potential confusion it might cause outweighed the risks of continued association. Zawahiri’s statement blamed ISIL for causing the catastrophe in Syria. Al Qaeda’s central leaders may also have feared that ISIL’s insubordination and unchecked growth would create a greater threat to its authority in the future than the risks resulting from an open break.

Remote leadership by an already weak central command requires making the right guesses—al Qaeda central cannot impose its authority but must align itself with the realities in the field. Stripping ISIL of its al Qaeda credentials could have been a miscalculation. Zawahiri, perhaps misled by JN’s own assessments, may not have an accurate appreciation of the relative strengths of the forces in Syria. If ISIL turns out to be the stronger movement, al Qaeda’s command over the global movement would be seriously weakened. But Zawahiri may have feared that if he did not move against ISIL, it would grow to become a rival center of power and eventually dominate the global jihad.

What are Zawahiri’s options now? Al Qaeda’s central command initially may have thought that expulsion would suffice to force ISIL’s prodigal leader to mend his ways and accept mediation. Zawahiri’s statement left room for discussions leading to some sort of reunion. Whether Zawahiri genuinely sought reconciliation is not clear, but ISIL’s assassination of al-Suri and the escalation of fighting among Syria’s jihadists ended the possibility.

JN and the Islamic Coalition could pound ISIL into insignificance or push it back into Iraq, where ISIL is also trying to hold on to Fallujah and other territory it continues to control. That could turn out to be a long and bloody contest among the rebels, and Syrian government forces would be the ultimate beneficiary. Facing universal condemnation from respected jihadist clerics, declining financial support, and defections from his forces, ISIL’s commander might be persuaded to return to the fold. That seems unlikely. Alternatively, he could be overthrown or betrayed by his own lieutenants, which could be followed by the welcome return of his fighters.

A political settlement is possible through the mediation mentioned by Zawahiri in his earlier communications, an offer renewed by JN and not entirely rejected by ISIL. Each participant in the dispute would name its judges and abide by their collective decision. That, however, could be seen to make Baghdadi and Zawahiri equals before the court and therefore a humiliation to the al Qaeda commander. Or the schism might spread through al Qaeda, dividing the jihadist movement into pro- and anti-Zawahiri factions or shattering it altogether.

While the fighting between ISIL and its rivals continues in Syria, both sides are pursuing propaganda campaigns to sustain the loyalty of their own fighters and outflank their opponents politically. This part of the contest can be seen through postings on official websites, alleged leaks appearing on Twitter, and other social media postings. It is not possible to verify the veracity of these on the ground, but they offer fascinating glimpses into the thinking of the contestants.4

Neither of the belligerents wants to appear unreasonable and reject mediation outright. Each pretends to be the aggrieved party while blaming the other for the impasse. Without naming ISIL but clearly referring to the group’s actions as “sedition,” Zawahiri, in a message issued on April 4, 2014, called on every Muslim to “disavow all those who refuse arbitration” by an independent Sharia court.5

Some of ISIL’s foes have asserted that it is a creation of the Syrian government, designed to sow dissension among the rebels and destroy their reputation. ISIL’s supporters have responded by comparing their Syrian opponents to the Iraqis in Anbar province who, during the war in Iraq, betrayed the resistance to cooperate with the American occupiers against al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda has sent respected and reliable veterans to Syria—men who can match Baghdadi’s jihadi street creds and lure his fighters away. Both sides are reaching out to the jihadist ulama, soliciting clerics to support their position with religiously sanctioned rulings and calling for members of the rival camp to defect.

The fluid loyalties of the rebel movement facilitate switching sides. It is not a matter of Syrian soldiers defecting to the rebels, which is now dangerous to do, or of rebels defecting to the government. Syria’s rebels move from one rebel group to another, following their commanders, looking for better salaries, or seeking more action. The ability of fighters to make their own decisions about whom they will follow can work both for and against defections. One ISIL commander warned that if forced to publicly swear allegiance to ISIL’s leader, he would lose half of his fighters. Another commander admitted to confidants that he wanted to leave ISIL, but his lieutenants opposed a switch. If he did not swear loyalty to ISIL, his life would be in danger from his own men.

Both sides are determined to portray their own ranks as solid. ISIL reportedly has demanded new oaths of loyalty to its leader. Loyal clerics intensified their sermons, warning that defection would result in execution and eternal damnation. Security detachments have been established to identify and eliminate any internal faction that poses a danger. Defectors were warned that they would be treated as heretics, for whom the sentence is death. A secret security apparatus assassinates dissenters and defectors. One senior ISIL commander reportedly argued for ISIL publishing the names of those who had been eliminated in order to discourage others from contemplating defection. Anyone publicizing a defection is subject to a death sentence. When defections did occur, they were covered up by pronouncements of new pledges of support.

In a move that would be familiar to many politicians, both sides are lining up endorsements from prominent figures in the jihadist universe outside of Syria. A pro-ISIL website regularly announces pledges of support from other al Qaeda fronts. These may, in fact, not reflect official endorsements by leaders of these fronts; they may be comments by individual commanders within the groups.

The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, an al Qaeda-linked group operating in the Sinai and Gaza, came out publicly in support of ISIL. This is not surprising, since earlier reports indicated that volunteers from Gaza had joined ISIL. Decisions by local al Qaeda affiliates to support ISIL appear to be influenced by the allegiances of the foreign fighters in Syria. Many volunteers from Gaza, Tunisia, and Libya joined ISIL, causing affiliates in those countries to lean toward ISIL in the dispute. Somalia’s al Shabaab appears to be on Zawahiri’s side. Conflicting statements from some of al Qaeda’s other affiliates suggest that the split between al Qaeda central and ISIL may exacerbate internal divisions within their own ranks. Underlying fault lines are hard to discern. And as any political campaigner would recognize, there are fence-sitters who will wait to see which way the wind blows.6

**Al Qaeda’s Rapid Expansion Has Unleashed Centrifugal Forces**

Could this have happened under Osama bin Laden? Bin Laden remained suspicious of anything outside his immediate control. After prolonged negotiations with groups aspiring to the al Qaeda franchise, some lasting years, mergers happened because he was unable to stop them. Other aspirants were successfully resisted.7 Following bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri, his longtime lieutenant, managed to stay in charge of the disparate al Qaeda enterprise, but he did not inherit bin Laden’s moral authority and was viewed less as al Qaeda’s commander than as its ideological commissar. Under Zawahiri’s weakened command, the process of mergers and the creation of new affiliates accelerated.

In part, al Qaeda’s rapid expansion reflected opportunities offered by the Arab uprisings. That does not apply to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or al Shabaab, both of which took the field long before the Arab Spring. Al Qaeda’s geographic spread over the past several years has been interpreted by some analysts as a sign of its growing strength—certainly it demonstrates that the al Qaeda banner still has appeal. But it might equally be seen as a sign of al Qaeda’s weakness—a lowering of the bar to member- ship, evidence of its growing dependence on its affiliates and allies and its inability to impose its will on rebellious and recalcitrant field commanders. In the long run, al Qaeda might be able to reel in its more unreliable components, assert more control over them, demand their obedience, and call upon their resources to assist in global operations. But without a stronger center, perhaps operating from safer bases in Pakistan or a new base in Afghanistan after the Americans withdraw, the possibility of that achievement seems remote.

For now, it appears that future action by al Qaeda central will most likely take the form of propaganda—orchestrated denunciations of ISIL leader Baghdadi’s betrayal of the global jihad and his behaving in a way that creates al Qaeda’s dreaded disunity (fitna) and prolongs Assad’s rule. Al Qaeda has already given advance approval to anyone inside ISIL who decides to remove Baghdadi and has endorsed the armed offensive against ISIL. Meanwhile, al Qaeda’s leaders could wait for Iraqi government forces to bloody ISIL’s fighters in Fallujah, then move in to create a new affiliate on the remains of the old.

Zawahiri and his colleagues holed up in Pakistan will make further pronouncements—they want to be seen as having influence, but the fact is that they are distant observers with only limited ability to affect the situation on the ground. Infighting weakens the organization, and a weakening organization encourages more infighting. Zawahiri will have great difficulty extricating al Qaeda from this vicious circle.

**Terrorist Infighting Has a Long History**

Battles between rival rebel groups and within terrorist organizations are not uncommon. Disputes derive from differences over ideology that are often incomprehensible to outsiders, strategy, tactics, rules of engagement, and negotiations to end a conflict. Terrorists may compete with each other, sometimes in deadly battles, for the control of sources of financing. Some of the internal struggles are about leadership.

A recurring issue of contention is whether to employ terrorist violence without limits or to operate within self-imposed constraints to avoid alienating local communities and distant supporters. The escalation of terrorism over the past several decades and the apparent determination of today’s terrorists to kill in quantity without discrimination would seem to indicate that the self-imposed constraints that governed earlier terrorist behavior have eroded. But even al Qaeda’s bloody-minded leaders worry that killing too many civilians, especially Muslims, alienates support in the Muslim community. However, others, like Baghdadi, see utility in unbridled violence. It gets attention, creates terror, and attracts recruits of a particular bloody-minded type.

This kind of tension seems built into terrorist groups. Ideologues resort to terrorist tactics to achieve their goals, but their campaigns attract hardline recruits for whom violence seems an end in itself. They reject any self-imposed constraints as faint-hearted. If things are not going well, it is because the violence is insufficient. If things are going well, more violence will accelerate progress.

Another especially divisive issue is any sort of dialogue that could end the fighting. Terrorists see this not merely as betrayal of the cause but, in the case of al Qaeda, as being against God’s will. To many, peace-seeking is a personal threat. Terrorist groups are composed not of conscripts yearning for the fighting to end so that they can go home, but of self-selecting volunteers who, often dissatisfied with their lives, seek the risks and opportunities that membership in a terrorist group offers—a new identity, a new life, assumed status as a self-proclaimed warrior, the excitement of courting death, a presumed license to kill, pleasure in pursuing baser instincts. It is a sad comment that terrorist groups do not recruit in the conventional sense. They exalt violence and invite participation.

The foreign fighters who have assembled under ISIL’s banner exemplify this tendency. To begin with, many of ISIL’s members are Iraqi, and they are a wild bunch even by terrorist standards. Attracted to ISIL by its reputation for unlimited violence, foreign fighters, including a number of Chechen commanders, have also become associated with its bloody campaign. They have no postwar futures and little interest in ending the conflict.

Devoted exclusively to their causes, terrorists should be immune to material gain. They are not. Financing terrorist groups often involves criminal activity—armed robberies, ransom kid- nappings, extortion, smuggling—which can be lucrative. For some, maintaining cash flow becomes an end in itself that can be threatened by ending the conflict. We have seen this in al Qaeda and in other terrorist groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was deeply involved in extortion and insurance fraud, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) became deeply involved in ransom kidnapping and drug trafficking.

**Internal Feuds, from the Russian Revolution to the Palestinian Civil War**

Quarrels between Russian socialists, Bolsheviks, and anarchists often turned deadly. In his book Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell described the demoralizing internal disputes and liquidations that consumed the Spanish Republic during Spain’s civil war.

The IRA has a long history of schisms that turned lethal. Its agreement to end its campaign against the British in return for independence for the island’s 26 southern counties in 1922 was repudiated by the group’s hardliners and led to a bitter civil war between the holdouts and their former comrades who made up the Irish Republic’s new army. Michael Collins, the IRA’s own commander, who negotiated the agreement, was assassinated. Hundreds more died in the struggle, which was marked by summary execu- tions and atrocities. The civil war ended in 1923, but the IRA did not renounce its campaign against the Republic until many years later.

George Orwell described the demoralizing internal disputes and liquidations that consumed the Spanish Republic during Spain’s civil war.

Dissatisfaction with the feeble official IRA response to the growing civil strife in Northern Ireland led to the formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1969. After decades of terrorism, it too agreed to a truce with the British in 1997, prompting the irreconcilables, calling themselves the “Real IRA,” to initiate another murderous internal feud.

Two rival organizations—the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Algerian National Movement (MNA)—claimed to represent Algeria’s independence movement during the early years of the Algerian War. Efforts to unite the two failed, and the struggle turned violent. Both organizations were determined to drive the French out of Algeria and were willing to use terrorist tactics to do so, but both also aspired to control Algeria after independence. The immediate issue, however, was determining who would control the collection of funds willingly donated or extorted from the Algerian population, especially the better-off Algerian expatriates working in France. This led to the so-called “café wars,” a bloody contest of assassinations and bomb attacks in the cafés of Algiers and Paris directed at each group’s operatives and supporters. Between 4,000 and 5,000 were killed, and more than 10,000 were wounded in the infighting.

In the 1970s, Argentina’s urban guerrillas included the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Montoneros, each of which represented a sliver of left-wing ideology. Overall, the guerrillas commanded significant numbers of combatants and resources, but they were plagued by internal divisions. The ERP split into the ERP-Red Faction and the August 22 Faction, while FAP split into FAP-17 (for October 17) and FAP-CN (for National Command). Dissident members of the FAR and FAP-17 then joined the Montoneros, while FAP-CN went to the ERP. Some of these schisms reflected narrow ideological differences. Others reflected differences about tactics and targets—e.g., was it proper to assassinate corrupt union officials? The internal divisions, which encouraged defections and betrayals and facilitated infiltration by the authorities, may have been more costly to the guerrillas than the information extracted by torture.

Guerrillas opposing the Colombian government fielded the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC, and the 19th of April Movement (M-19), which often divided into further factions, leading to defections and assassinations. Guerrillas in Peru’s Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) fought each other and killed dissidents in their own ranks.

As the bewildering array of group names and initials attest, the Palestinian movement from its beginning was riven with factions. Yasir Arafat, the leader of al Fatah and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella group of paramilitary groups and terrorist organizations, frequently faced internal opposition, principally from hardliners who opposed anything that hinted at ending the violent confrontation with Israel. For the most part, these disparate groups rarely attacked each other; they simply competed to carry out the most spectacular terrorist attacks, thereby attracting support and recruits and satisfying their various state sponsors.

Arafat managed to keep control of extremists in his own ranks by fielding new, more violent groups, using new names to avoid Fatah itself being designated as a terrorist organization but still under Fatah control. Black September and the al-Aqsa Brigades are examples. To maintain his leadership and the overall unity of the Palestinian movement, Arafat was obliged to reject even advantageous offers to settle the conflict with Israel. The transition to political legitimacy was dangerous. Giving up the armed struggle risked infighting, as evidenced by the split between Hamas and Fatah, which led to a brief civil war in 2007 in which several hundred fighters and dozens of bystanders died. Hamas won, and the Palestinian Authority lost control of Gaza.

Few of the quarreling factions in these historical examples ever managed to reconcile their differences. Not surprisingly, men already dedicated to violence generally settle their differences violently or via betrayals to the authorities, even if at great cost to their stated cause.

Nevertheless, the internal divisions did not doom the movements. Some were weakened by infighting, but Algeria’s FLN defeated its rival and went on to drive the French out of Algeria. Irish extremists and South American guerrillas fought on for decades. In some cases, divisions fostered competition that led to higher levels of violence, but this often provoked public outrage, enabling governments to pursue a harder line.

**Al Qaeda’s Internal Quarrels**

Al Qaeda’s leaders place great importance on maintaining unity. In their view, disunity—fitna—is the cause of Islam’s weakness. Disunity prevented a unified response to the Crusades. Disunity allowed external foes to conquer and occupy Muslim territory piecemeal. Al Qaeda’s recent expansion, combined with a diminishing central role and the ever-present danger of centrifugal forces, Zawahiri [said] that the current infighting in Syria reminds him of Algeria in the 1990s, when jihadists belonging to the Armed Islamic Group . . . descended into internecine warfare and the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims.

Al Qaeda, therefore, has tried hard to maintain unity, but there have been a number of serious internal differences. In the late 1980s, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a co-founder of al Qaeda, quarreled with bin Laden, then his deputy, about strategic priorities—Azzam wanted to focus on the Palestinian issue, while bin Laden was more determined to bring down secular Arab regimes. Azzam was killed by a roadside bomb shortly after the quarrel. Some suspected that Zawahiri, who disagreed with Azzam’s strategy, may have been behind the assassination or that he was at the very least responsible for inciting Azzam’s murder by spreading rumors that Azzam was an American spy. However, there is no concrete evidence, and there were other suspects as well. Azzam’s death led to a period of chaos and strife among the jihadists in Afghanistan as others jockeyed to take control of the movement.

Zawahiri’s April 4, 2014, message refers to past divisions in al Qaeda, including a warning from al-Suri that he saw in Syria “the seeds of sedition, which he experienced in Peshawar” in the early days of the Mujahideen struggle. Zawahiri went on to say that the current infighting in Syria reminds him of Algeria in the 1990s, when jihadists belonging to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) descended into internecine warfare and the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims. This led to the “spiritual death of that group followed by [its] physical death.”8

Problems with defiant al Qaeda commanders occurred before the present split. In 2005, Zawahiri counseled Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al Qaeda’s newly created affiliate in Iraq, that his killing of fellow Muslims and all-out assault on Shias could cost al Qaeda support in the broader Muslim community. Zarqawi, who had never easily placed himself under bin Laden’s command and who proudly called himself the “sheikh of slaughter,” ignored Zawahiri’s advice and escalated his attacks. The following year, Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike. Some suggested that al Qaeda itself had betrayed him to the Americans. This was not the case, but it underscores the paranoia that permeates the terrorist universe.

Al Qaeda also faced divisions in its North African affiliate, AQIM. The decision by Algerian fighters belonging to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) to put themselves under al Qaeda’s banner appears to have been little more than a marriage of convenience—AQIM never entirely bought into al Qaeda’s global jihad; its objectives remained primarily local. Troubles within AQIM derived from a personal rivalry between Abdelmalek Droukdal, AQIM’s overall commander, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM’s commander in the south. Geographic distance and fun- draising through criminal operations gave Belmokhtar increasing autonomy and independent power. The break came when Droukdal tried to restore his authority by making Belmokhtar subordinate to a new southern commander, then later expelling him from AQIM. Belmokhtar promptly formed his own group, while pledging his continuing loyalty to al Qaeda. The two entities now operate independently. Distance probably has prevented an open clash.9

The 2012 decision by al Shabaab’s leader, Moktar Abdirahman Godane, to become al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia provoked internal resistance. By 2013, internal disputes, in particular Godane’s dictatorial style of leadership, escalated into open warfare between the factions. Godane ordered the arrests and executions of a number of senior al Shabaab commanders. Others, including Omar Hammami, an American who became a popular spokesman for the group, left the group but were later killed by Godane’s faction. Disillusioned and disgusted by the infighting, a number of al Shabaab fighters quit the movement and left Somalia. Some may even have defected to the government.

**Can Al Qaeda’s Internal Disputes Be Exploited?**

External actors have exploited the internal battles of terrorist groups for their own reasons. The British government had an interest in seeing the hardliners defeated in the IRA’s civil war in the 1920s and provided arms and ammunition to the Irish Free Forces. British authorities similarly wanted to destroy the hardline groups that could disrupt the truce it negotiated with the IRA in 1997. Israeli authorities saw an interest in preventing Arafat from establishing leadership over a united Palestinian movement and actively encouraged Islamists in Gaza, hoping they would be an effective counterweight to Arafat’s nationalist forces; but the Israelis also found it necessary to go after his hardline opponents, including Hamas. South American governments were able to exploit the divisions in the ranks of the left-wing guerrillas who opposed them. When Zawahiri’s letter criticizing Zarqawi’s brutal tactics in Iraq was intercepted, U.S. authorities decided to discredit Zarqawi by making it public.

As the al Qaeda enterprise adds new affiliates and its central command continues to be weakened by constant pressure from U.S. and allied counterterrorism operations, it will face increasing centrifugal forces. While these divisions may weaken the overall jihadist movement, they do not necessarily lessen the immediate terrorist threat.

The split in Syria confirms the reality of a divided al Qaeda with a weakened center, but divisions in al Qaeda’s ranks will not end the worldwide jihadist terrorist campaign. Palestinian groups, fragmented by ideology and personalities, competed with one another in spectacular violence. Rivalry between groups in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru did not slow their terrorist campaigns.

Zarqawi answered Zawahiri’s complaints about killing Muslims by carrying out a massive terrorist attack in Jordan in which 60 people, mostly Muslims, died. (The attack, however, brought tens of thousands of Jordanians into the streets to denounce al Qaeda’s terrorism.) In part to demonstrate his independent power, AQIM’s Belmokhtar launched a major attack on the Amenas gas facility in Algeria, killing 68 people, more than half of them Muslims. And to underscore the power of its hardline global jihad faction, al Shabaab carried out an attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi, killing 67.

Replacing one big al Qaeda with many smaller al Qaedas does not reduce the total number of terrorists, but it may reduce their overall strategic capability. And while internal divisions do not get the United States out of the terrorists’ line of fire, they will preoccupy al Qaeda’s leaders, while quarreling jihadists may spend more of their time and resources killing each other.

When adversaries are bent upon self-destruction, the best course is to let them get on with it, but there will be developments that call for action; doing nothing becomes a decision. A fragmented al Qaeda poses greater intelligence challenges, but it also potentially opens up new sources of intelligence. Shifting loyal- ties may increase opportunities for infiltration, and there may be some “walk-ins”—terrorists who are disillusioned, on the run from their own side, seeking revenge, or simply eager to betray their opponents.

The biggest opportunities may lie in countering al Qaeda’s future recruitment. What al Qaeda now offers the young and rest- less is opportunities for violence under the cover of moral certainty. Infighting creates uncertainty. Denunciations, emirs threatening to crush one another, the murder of respected jihadist leaders, the prospect of killing or being killed by fellow jihadists ought to be less attractive propositions. Assuring the widespread exposure of this ugly reality could be useful, and it has the additional benefit of being true.

Exploiting the favorable circumstances created by the current divisions in al Qaeda requires detailed local knowledge and political-warfare know-how—generally not America’s strong suit. In Iraq, the United States benefited from having American troops on the ground, enabling it to recruit a network of local informants. A dedicated effort enabled the American command to recognize and exploit growing local hostility to al Qaeda’s ruthless extremism and turn Sunni tribes against the jihadists. These capabilities are more difficult to develop remotely. There is no large American presence in Syria, and the Syrian situation is more complex than the Iraq situation was. Moreover, U.S. goals transcend Syria and should be aimed at al Qaeda’s global enterprise. Pursuing this unprecedented opportunity will require the creation of a dedicated task force to act as a focal point for analysis and action.

**Notes**

1 For a description of the dynamics driving Syria’s civil war, see Jenkins, 2014; see also Jenkins, 2012.

2 “ISIL Says It Faces War with Nusra in Syria,” 2014.

3 ICT Jihadi Monitoring Group, 2014.

4 One of the most interesting sources is a series of tweets from a Twitter user calling himself @wikibaghdady. These appeared in Mortada, 2014a, b.

5 Joscelyn, 2014.

6 For additional discussions of the al Qaeda split, see Gartenstein-Ross, 2014; Lahoud and al-Ubaydi, 2014; al Tamimi, 2014; Watts, 2014a, b; “Jihadi Competi- tion After al Qaeda Hegemony—Part 3 of Smarter Counterterrorism,” 2014.

7 I am grateful to Andrew Liepman for this point.

8 Joscelyn, 2014

9 Liepman, 2013.

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**\* This article was originally published at:**

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE123/RAND\_PE123.pdf

***Brian Michael Jenkins*** *is a senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation and author of numerous books, reports, and articles on terrorism-related topics, including Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (2008, Prometheus Books). He formerly served as chair of the Political Science Department at RAND. On the occasion of the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, Jenkins initiated a RAND effort to take stock of America’s policy reactions and give thoughtful consideration to future strategy. That effort is presented in The Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to Terrorism (Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges, eds., 2011).*

## Would real-time tracking have helped missing flight MH370?

**By Geoffrey Dell**

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140508-would-realtime-tracking-have-helped-missing-flight-mh370

The introduction of constant tracking of commercial aircraft during the whole journey has been raised by Malaysian authorities in a preliminary report into missing flight MH370.

It’s been two months now since Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 was declared missing on 8 March and search and rescue authorities are still no closer to locating any potential crash site or finding any actual wreckage.

The five-page report released last week by the Malaysian government details some of the efforts being taken to find the missing flight over a wide area, including extending the search to the Southern Indian Ocean.

It doesn’t mention by name but refers to the two-year search for wreckage of the Air France 447 Airbus jet that disappeared into the Atlantic between Brazil and Africa in 2009.

There have now been two occasions during the last five years when large commercial air transport aircraft have gone missing and their last position was not accurately known.

The report then says the Malaysian Air Accident Investigation Bureau recommends that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) looks at the potential safety benefits of real-time tracking of all transport aircraft.

This would involve establishing a means of tracking aircraft even when they are outside of established radar coverage.

It would not be practical or cost effective to extend surface based radar coverage to include all the world’s oceans, so tracking aircraft positions mid ocean would doubtless have to include monitoring by satellite.

**Can’t GPS help?**

Unfortunately global positioning satellite (GPS) technology such as that used by the common smartphone (or in car navigation systems) could not be used for this.

That technology involves only one-way transmissions from the GPS satellite constellation which are received by the phone. This allows the phone to work out its geographical location with considerable accuracy but the GPS system does not have any information on the actual location of the phone.

For any real-time location technology to work there must be two-way communication in order for the system to know where the receiver actually is.

So, probably the cheapest and simplest way to achieve this would be for each aircraft to “ping” a satellite periodically, say once a minute, with a packet of information that includes the aircraft’s altitude, latitude and longitude.

Continuous communication would be most beneficial to establish the location of any potential crash site but it would also most probably be too cost prohibitive, so once a minute or so would be a compromise without impacting too much on knowing the actual aircraft location.

Any such real-time tracking system would no doubt also mean the launching of additional satellites to ensure global coverage, so the costs of implementation would not be insignificant in any case.

**Existing technology**

Most of the modern passenger transport aircraft already have the capability to transfer data back to the ground via satellite, although the communication is not continuous.

The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (**ACARS** - photo) allows technical information from the aircraft — such as engine performance data — to be automatically sent back to the airline. In return the airline uses the system to send operational information — such as flight planning information and other advisories — to the pilots.

Flight MH370 was fitted with ACARS. Even though it may have been disabled during the flight the Malaysian report says it was still “logged on to the network.” That means the system was pinging a satellite periodically throughout the flight.

It was the Doppler Effect on six of these signals which has been the basis for the Inmarsat analysis which indicated the aircraft possibly flew south west toward the Southern Indian Ocean.

**Why not transmit the black box data?**

If real-time tracking is to be developed and implemented then consideration should also be given to the routine transmission of key flight data recorder parameters at the same time.

Modern digital flight data recorders can record upwards of 2,000 parameters so cost and bandwidth might be a barrier to transmitting all the information.

But the transmission and remote storage of key flight data such as altitude, airspeed, heading, engine power, fuel remaining, vertical, lateral and longitudinal acceleration and flight control, flap and undercarriage positions would be very useful in cases such as MH370.

There would still be a need to locate the wreckage for moral and humanitarian reasons. But theoretically the more flight data transmitted and stored remotely from the aircraft, the lesser the need to recover the flight recorders.

This would also allow a more comprehensive crash investigation to begin even before the physical site of a crash was located.

But I can foresee issues being raised by flight crew associations globally relating to confidentiality and potential misuse of the data sent from the aircraft, especially if it was to include encrypted and compressed audio files of recorded cockpit voice recorder data.

**Safety improvements**

There is little doubt that as the search for MH370 continues without finding evidence of the actual site of the wreckage, and the associated search costs continue to rise, changes to air safety will be made.

Already there is a suggestion to increase the duration of the recording time of the cockpit voice recorders from two to twenty hours.

The emphasis on looking for alternate means of tracking transport aircraft, and the interest in establishing systems for routine transmission and remote storage of flight data, will also grow within governments globally.

**Geoffrey Dell** is Associate Professor/Discipline Leader Accident Investigation and Forensics at Central Queensland University.

**Will Terrorism Soon Invade the World of Bitcoins?**

Source: http://www.counteriedreport.com/news/will-terrorism-soon-invade-the-world-of-bitcoins

While Android, Motorola, the social media, and virtual reality are all being warned by the Department of Defense’s Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), bitcoin is also being listed as an area of concern posing threats to national security.

“The introduction of virtual currency will likely shape threat finance by increasing the opaqueness, transactional velocity, and overall efficiency of terrorist attacks,” according to the Advance Planning Briefing for Industry as released by CTTSO on January 2014.

CTTSO’s mission is to identify and analyze the capacities of counter-terrorism and explore irregular combat and developing threats. Their main concern involving bitcoin is the ambiguity built into its architecture as the “miners” involved in bitcoin trading are kept unidenfied. Internet’s ability to transact faster coupled with the privacy in bitcoin transactions are factors that are pinpointed to cause unlawful transactions.  
There had been a number of prestigious cases putting bitcoins in hot water. To name a few are the shutting down of the Silk Road by the FBI, an online black market accepting bitcoin payments which served as an avenue for its users and even professional assassins to transact guns and drugs. Money laundering charges of Charlie Shrem (Bitcoin Foundations’ Chairman and BitInstant Head) involved bitcoins as well. And just recently, Mt. Gox, a Tokyo-based bitcoin exchange, filed bankruptcy due to the $425 million worth of loss due to hacking.

Although the Treasury Department has not found any evidence yet on the use of an online currency like bitcoin to fund terrorism, there is still a potential for it to be used for terrorist attacks.

Part of the CTTSO’s plans it to design and develop a modular web-based training package for explosive detection technologies. This training aims to analyze the different virtual environments and devices such as bitcoins and know the science behind them as potential avenues for terrorism, and eventually develop an explosive trace detection technology which includes the device set-up, threats, maintenance, and troubleshooting strategies and solutions. One of CTTSO’s main goals is to create innovative solutions in enhancing new ideas for underpinning the understanding on the role of virtual currencies as a means to finance threats against the United States.

Boko Haram Recent Attacks


Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport\_BokoHaramRecentAttacks\_May2014\_0.pdf?utm\_source=START+Announce&utm\_campaign=545bf792d4-START+Background+Report+ Radioactive+Theft&utm\_medium=email&utm\_term=0\_a60ca8c769-545bf792d4-14081393

On Tuesday, April 15, 2014, the terrorist organization Boko Haram attacked a girls’ school in Chibok, Borno state, in northern Nigeria, abducting between 250-300 young school girls. Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, released a video on May 5, threatening to sell the girls as “wives” and citing ideological opposition to the education of young girls. The abduction and subsequent developments have prompted several nations to send logistical support teams and the Nigerian government to offer a $300,000 reward for information leading to the girls’ rescue. On May 5, Boko Haram took advantage of a distracted military and attacked the unprotected town of Gamboru Ngala, reportedly killing up to 300 civilians. START has compiled the following background information on the history and networking relationships of Boko Haram, and updated data from a previous background report on the group.

**Ideology**

Boko Haram is a violent Sunni jihadist group founded by cleric Mohammed Yusuf, who was previously a leader within a Salafist group in the 1990s, and was inspired by 14th century fundamentalist scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.11 As Boko Haram’s alliances with al-Qa’ida–linked groups, such as al-Qa’ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), have strengthened, its interpretation of violent jihad has changed, increasing the scope of its targets and areas of activity beyond the borders of Nigeria.

**Specific goals**

* Boko Haram wishes to expel the political community of northern Nigeria which they believe has been seized by corrupt and false Muslims12 and to establish a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) across all of Nigeria.13
* The group also advocates against Western influence in Africa and has allied with several militant organizations to fight government forces in Mali and Nigeria.
* As evidenced by the increasing number of attacks against educational targets, Boko Haram also seeks to rid Nigeria of any Western education, including schools for girls.

**Target types**


Boko Haram most commonly targets private citizens and property (25% of attacks), police (22% of attacks), government targets (11%), religious figures and institutions (10% of attacks), and the military (9% of attacks). Boko Haram’s major attacks on churches and religious figures have at times been followed by rioting and retaliatory attacks against Muslim targets, exacerbating religious polarization of the Nigerian population.


**Attacks on educational institutions**

Boko Haram’s name and ideology indicate antipathy towards Western educational norms. Despite this, Boko Haram did not initially target schools, with only three attacks recorded prior to 2012. In 2012, Boko Haram started targeting schools on a regular basis, with 47 attacks that year resulting in 77 fatalities.

While attacks on schools decreased in 2013, perhaps due to frequent school closures in its areas of operations, Boko Haram carried out 14 attacks on schools in which 119 people died. In February 2014, Boko Haram attacked a boarding school in Yobe state, killing 29 male students but sending the female students away with admonitions to get married.

**Boko Haram in context**

More than 480 perpetrator groups committed terrorist attacks during the time period that Boko Haram has been active. From 2009-2013, Boko Haram was responsible for 2.34 percent of more than 34,000 terrorist attacks that took place worldwide. Additionally, Boko Haram was responsible for 5.9 percent of fatalities from terrorist attacks during this same period. The group is now among the deadliest in the world.

**Boko Haram relationships (2008-2013)**

**►Read the full paper at source’s URL.**

## Is Boko Haram An “Intelligence Asset”? Terror Attack in Nigeria Opens Door to Africom


Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/is-boko-haram-an-intelligence-asset-terror-attack-in-nigeria-opens-door-to-africom/5381612

The establishment media has yet to report on a deadly attack in Gamborou Ngala in the Borno State. According to a report posted today by Vanguard, a Nigerian newspaper, the jihadist terror group Boko Haram stormed the town and killed around 300 people.

Boko Haram’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which translated from the Arabic means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” The group is a Takfiri offshoot of the Salafi movement. Salafi-Takfiris attack other Muslims and Christians they consider apostates. Boko Haram has worked to impose sharia law in Nigeria, north Cameroon and Niger. It has killed Christians, bombed churches, attacked schools, police stations, government installations, and has kidnapped western tourists.

Prior to the attack, the establishment media covered an announcement on Monday issued by the Obama administration stating the United States will send military, intelligence and law enforcement advisors to Nigeria to help the government there locate and rescue more than 270 teenage girls abducted by Boko Haram.

According to the Los Angeles Times, the team will not be used for military purposes and will share intelligence investigative services in the search for the students kidnapped April 14 from a rural high school in Nigeria’s predominately Muslim northeast. Obama said the abductions may “mobilize the entire international community to finally do something against this horrendous organization.” In October 2013, the U.S. designated Boko Haram a terrorist group.

In 2012, Obama invoked the War Powers Resolution to increase the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to Nigeria. The incoming Commander of the U. S. Africa Command (Africom) at the time, Gen. David M. Rodriguez, said Boko Haram operations threatened Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Mali and Chad. Rodriguez said the U.S. has authority in Africa in response to the threat posed by al-Qaeda.

In 2012, The Nigerian Tribune reported Boko Harm’s funding was traced to the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, specifically from the Al-Muntada Trust Fund. In 2005, The Center for Security Policy stated “Al-Muntada has, incidentally, been particularly active in promoting Wahhabi-style Islamism in Nigeria… Al-Muntada… pays for Nigerian clerics to be ‘brainwashed’ in Saudi universities and imposed on Nigerian Muslims through its well-funded network of mosques and schools.”

Similar schools, known as madrassas, were established in Pakistan during the CIA’s covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They were financed by Saudi Arabia and its network of charities. “Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East would pass their baptism under fire with the Afghan mujahideen,” writes Phil Gasper. The Afghan mujahideen would ultimately produce al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

In addition to support by the Saudis, Boko Haram has received indirect assistance from NATO via Libya’s al-Qaeda mercenaries.

“During an interview conducted by Al-Jazeera with Abu Mousab Abdel Wadoud, the AQIM leader states that Algeria-based organizations have provided arms to Nigeria’s Boko Haram movement ‘to defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders.’ It remains highly documented that members of Al-Qaeda (AQIM) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who fought among the Libyan rebels directly received arms and logistical support from NATO bloc countries during the Libyan conflict in 2011,” writes Nile Bowie.

AQIM and Boko Haram, however, pose less of a threat in Africa than China does. “The US and France plan to counter the threat along with Africa’s puppet government’s that will pose a challenge to China’s economic and diplomatic influence in the region,” writes Timothy Alexander Guzman.

Nigeria is the 13th largest oil producer in the world. The western Africa nation’s other natural resources include natural gas, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc and arable land.


“The US and French governments want to assure themselves that the new Chinese leadership will not continue its beneficial relationships with resource-rich African nations that have been a success in the past.  Therefore, the ‘War on Terror’ will create instability and will disrupt China’s economic growth.  AFRICOM mission is to create war in the name of fighting terrorism and that is what ‘US national security interests’ in Africa is really about.”

# U.S. Reveals Global Terrorism on the Rise

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/05/u-s-reveals-global-terrorism-rise/

**Statistics show that despite years of action to counter its growth, terrorism is increasing.**

The world was victim to 9,707 terrorist attacks in 2013, resulting in more than 17,891 deaths and over 32,500 injuries. In addition, more than 2,990 people were kidnapped or taken hostage. Despite the work of nations such as the United States, terrorist attacks grew in frequency and potency in 2013 when compared to the year prior.

The U.S. Code defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” In a nutshell, suicide attacks, bombings, shootings, murders, maiming and intimidation are all on the rise. Ten attacks used chemical or biological agents of mass destruction. There were 13 hijackings recorded. Also, 510 suicide attacks occurred, resulting in more than 3,800 deaths and 7,700 injuries. These were just the unarmed attacks!

On average, 808.91 terrorist attacks occurred per month. The Boston Marathon bombing in April last year was just one such incident. Think of the other 807.91 attacks that would have taken place in the same month! While many were not in America, or perhaps didn’t claim as many lives, the staggering number still stands as a testimony to the magnitude of the problem.

The government report explained that the 10 countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2013 were the same as those that experienced the most attacks in 2012. Adding greater condemnation to the figures, the total number of attacks increased for nine of those 10 countries.

Although terrorist attacks occurred in 93 different countries in 2013, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than half of all attacks (57 percent) and fatalities (66 percent), and nearly three quarters of all injuries (73 percent) occurred in three countries: Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

According to the Trumpet the irony of this is that the U.S. has invested billions of dollars and vast amounts of resources and soldiers to the Middle East in an effort to bring stability to an otherwise volatile region. Iraq was occupied by U.S. forces until the start of 2012, yet look at it today.

Compared to 2012, there were more than twice as many terrorist attacks reported in Iraq in 2013. Likewise, the total number killed increased 162 percent and the total number wounded increased 125 percent over the previous year.

# The Future of Airport Security

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/05/future-airport-security/

**The combination of terror threat, the shortcomings of existing technologies and governments’ willingness to spend, provide for a new fast growing** Airport **Security market in the coming decade.**

**According to HSRC’s latest report Global Homeland Security & Public Safety Market – 2014-2022, nearly 25% of current airport operating costs are related to the costs of purchasing and running security technologies (compared with only 8% pre-9/11).** Despite these costly expenditures, the performance of these systems leaves much to be desired. Unacceptably high false alarm rates, overlooked threats, poor passenger experience, as well as the high cost of personnel will continue to drive the market for high-end technological solutions.

There is no “silver bullet” security protocol or technology that can keep up with the increasing sophistication of the 21st century terrorists. Thus, **HSRC forecasts that in the future, multi-threat, interconnected detection modalities that are fused with security and other databases will dominate the market.**

**Some of the detection signatures include:**

* Passenger background info. (e.g., security and other databases, driver license database, IRS)
* X-ray systems
* Explosives trace detectors
* Checked luggage EDS
* Metal detection portals
* AIT
* Airport perimeter security fences
* Airport worker/visitor biometric ID
* Smart video surveillance
* Cell phone airport surveillance
* Black lists
* Face recognition standoff biometrics, and more

## China University to recruit anti-terrorism students

Source: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/203691/8623730.html



The People's Public Security University of China will recruit 80 students across the country for its newly set subject of anti-terrorism.

The move was aimed at facilitating fight against violent terrorism which is seriously threatening national security and social stability, Li Yan, deputy director of the university's admission office, was quoted as saying by Guangming Daily.

Major courses of the subject, set under the department of public security intelligence, include research on terrorist organizations, international cooperation against terrorism, security risk assessment as well as reconnaissance and evidence collection of cyber crimes, according to the Beijing Youth Daily.

Practical courses are also opened to enable students to master tactics and command for settling terrorist attacks.

# Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition

***Asia Report N°256 12 May 2014***

Source: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/256-afghanistan-s-insur gency-after-the-transition.aspx?utm\_source=afghanistan-report&utm\_medium=1&utm\_campaign= mremail

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The war in Afghanistan entered a new phase in 2013. It now is increasingly a contest between the insurgents and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Many within and outside the government are more optimistic about stability in the wake of a relatively successful first round of presidential elections on 5 April 2014. However, any euphoria should be tempered by a realistic assessment of the security challenges that President Karzai’s successor will face in the transitional period of 2014-2015. Kabul may find these challenges difficult to overcome without significant and sustained international security, political and economic support.

**The overall trend is one of escalating violence and insurgent attacks.** Ongoing withdrawals of international soldiers have generally coincided with a deterioration of Kabul’s reach in outlying districts. The insurgents have failed to capture major towns and cities, and some areas have experienced more peace and stability in the absence of international troops. Yet, the increasing confidence of the insurgents, as evidenced by their ability to assemble bigger formations for assaults, reduces the chances for meaningful national-level peace talks in 2014-2015.

**A close examination of four provinces – Faryab, Kunar, Paktia and Kandahar – reveals underlying factors that may aggravate the conflict in the short term.** Historical feuds and unresolved grievances are worsening after having been, in some cases, temporarily contained by the presence of international troops. In Faryab, these are largely ethnic tensions; in Kandahar they are mostly tribal; but in all transitional areas there is a variety of unfinished business that may result in further violence post-2014. Similarly, clashes among pro-government actors may become more frequent, as predicted by local interlocutors after recent skirmishing between government forces in Paktia. The situation in Kandahar also illustrates the way mistreatment of Afghans at the hands of their own security forces, operating with less supervision from foreign troops, breeds resentment that feeds the insurgency. Finally, despite its rhetoric, Pakistan has not reduced safe havens and other support for the insurgency, while Afghanistan’s hostile responses – especially in Kandahar and Kunar – risk worsening cross-border relations.

None of these trends mean that Afghanistan is doomed to repeat the post-Soviet state collapse of the early 1990s, particularly if there is continued and robust international support. In fact, Afghan forces suffered record casualties in 2013 and retreated from some locations in the face of rising insurgency but maintained the tempo of their operations in most parts of the country. Afghanistan still has no shortage of young men joining the ANSF, offsetting the rising number of those who opt to leave them or abandon their posts. The government remains capable of moving supplies along highways to urban centres. ANSF cohesiveness, or lack of it, may prove decisive in the coming years, and Paktia notwithstanding, only minor reports emerged in 2013 of Afghan units fighting each other. As long as donors remain willing to pay their salaries, the sheer numbers of Afghan security personnel – possibly in the 370,000 range today – are a formidable obstacle to large-scale strategic gains by the insurgents.

That will not stop the Taliban and other insurgent groups from pushing for such gains, however. Despite a short-lived gesture toward peace negotiations in Doha, the insurgents’ behaviour in places where the foreign troops have withdrawn shows no inclination to slow the pace of fighting. They are blocking roads, capturing rural territory and trying to overwhelm district administration centres. With less risk of attack from international forces, they are massing bigger groups of fighters and getting into an increasing number of face-to-face ground engagements with Afghan security personnel, some of which drag on for weeks. The rising attacks show that the insurgents are able to motivate their fighters in the absence of foreign troops, shifting their rhetoric from calls to resist infidel occupation to a new emphasis on confronting the “puppets” or “betrayers of Islam” in the government. The emerging prominence of splinter groups such as Mahaz-e-Fedayeen is a further indication the insurgency will not lack ferocity in the coming years.

**For the first time, the insurgents inflicted almost as many casualties on Afghan security forces in 2013 as they suffered themselves, and several accounts of battles in remote districts suggested the sides were nearly matched in strength.** There are concerns that the balance could tip in favour of the insurgency, particularly in some rural locations, as foreign troops continue leaving. President Karzai has refused to conclude agreements with the U.S. and NATO that would keep a relatively modest presence of international troops after December 2014. The two presidential runoff candidates have vowed to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the U.S., which would in turn allow for a NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). While retaining a contingent of foreign soldiers would not be sufficient on its own to keep the insurgency at bay, its absence could prove extremely problematic. The ANSF still needs support from international forces, and signing a BSA and a SOFA would likely have knock-on effects, sending an important signal of commitment at a fragile time, thus encouraging ongoing financial, developmental and diplomatic support.

With or without backup from international forces, the Afghan government will need more helicopters, armoured vehicles, and logistical support to accomplish that limited objective. Such additional military tools would also permit the government to rely increasingly on the relatively well-disciplined Afghan army rather than forcing it to turn to irregular forces that have a dismal record of harming civilians.

Certainly, the future of the Afghan government depends primarily on its own behaviour: its commitment to the rule of law, anti-corruption measures and other aspects of governance must demonstrate its concern for the well-being of all Afghans. However, responsibility also rests with the international community; its patchy efforts over a dozen years to bring peace and stability must now be followed not with apathy, but with renewed commitment.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

To help Afghan security forces withstand a rising insurgency

**To the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:**

1.  Sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the U.S. and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO.

2.  Take urgent steps to reduce casualties among Afghan forces, including a large-scale effort to train police and soldiers in the basics of emergency medical care.

3.  Strengthen anti-corruption measures to ensure that security personnel receive their salaries and other benefits, and confirm that ammunition, diesel and other logistical supplies reach Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) units.

**To the government of the United States:**

4.  Significantly increase the size of the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) program, so that sufficient ANSF quick-reaction units are available to handle many of the worsening security trends of 2014-2015 and beyond.

5.  Find a way, possibly by working with other donors, to expand Afghan capacity for tactical air support, including more helicopters in support of government efforts to retain control over remote district centres.

**To all donor countries:**

6.  Convene a meeting of donor countries as a follow-up to the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, with a view to expanding annual pledges of support, realising them on schedule and allowing the ANSF to maintain for the time being personnel rosters approximately equal to their current levels. Those ANSF levels are not indefinitely sustainable or desirable, but reductions should progress in tandem with stabilisation.

7.  Support anti-corruption measures by the Afghan government to ensure, inter alia, that salaries are distributed to all ANSF members and logistical supply chains function as required.

To reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan

**To the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:**

8.  Increase diplomatic outreach to regional governments, including Pakistan, to find ways of reviving peace talks with the insurgents; maintain, at a minimum, lines of communication between Afghan and Pakistani civilian and military leaders; and explore ways to increase bilateral economic cooperation as a way to ease tensions with Pakistan.

9.  Refrain from taking direct military action inside Pakistan or supporting anti-Pakistan militants.

To strengthen the rule of law

**To the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:**

10.  Reduce reliance on and ultimately phase out the controversial Afghan Local Police (ALP) program, given the ALP’s abuse of power and destabilising effect in most parts of the country.

11.  Respond with transparent investigation and disciplinary measures as appropriate to any report of ANSF failure to protect or deliberate targeting of civilians, in violation of obligations under Afghan and international law.

**To all donor countries:**

12.  Assist with programs aimed at encouraging the ANSF to respect the constitution and the country’s obligations with regard to human rights and the laws of armed conflict.

To improve political legitimacy and state viability:

**To the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:**

13.  Encourage open public and media discussion and debate of security problems so as to find solutions and keep policymakers informed; and acknowledge that, aside from the conflict’s external factors, internal Afghan dynamics such as corruption, disenfranchisement and impunity also deserve attention.

14.  Strengthen efforts to make the Afghan government more politically inclusive, particularly at the provincial and district level.

15.  Refrain from interfering in the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Independent Complaints Commission (IECC) processes of disqualifying voters and adjudicating complaints in connection with the 2014 and subsequent elections.

16.  Direct propaganda messages toward front-line insurgents that publicise the absence of international forces in their areas of operation in order to undermine the logic of jihad after the departure of foreign troops.

**To all donor countries:**

17.  Sustain economic assistance for the Afghan government and work with the finance ministry to encourage growth in customs and other forms of government revenue.

18.  Encourage the IEC and the IECC to comply strictly with electoral laws, including requirements to conduct their work in a transparent manner, in the processes of disqualifying voters and adjudicating complaints.

19.  Provide diplomatic support for the Afghan government’s efforts to improve relations with Pakistan and revive peace talks, when feasible, with insurgent factions.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: To make a long story short: when foreign forces go home, situation in Afghanistan will return to its pre-invation status. Simple as that! Talibans possess the virtue of patience and they know that they can proceed to their objectives according to plans. When Alexander the Great invated foreign countries his strategy was not based on killing and submission but on the transfusion of new ways of doing things while respecting locals, their values and traditions. Modern invaders had and still have no idea about their enemies and if you do not know your enemy you cannot prevail no matter how mighty you are! |

## Behind the Boko Haram headlines, slavery in Africa is the real crisis

**By Emma Christopher**

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140514-behind-the-boko-haram-headlines-slavery-in-africa-is-the-real-crisis

The mass kidnapping of schoolgirls by terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria is neither a new nor rare occurrence, though this does not make it any less shocking. Boko Haram has been active in Nigeria for five years and is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Africa’s slavery crisis.

In Nigeria, there are “tens of thousands of people bought and sold every year,” according to Africa expert Benjamin Lawrance. The majority are children: in 2003, the International Labor Organization estimated that as many as six million Nigerian children had been trafficked at some time in their lives.

In Africa as a whole, the scale of the problem is vast and far beyond the resources currently allocated to fight it, let alone sufficient to help victims. **Lobby group and NGO Free the Slaves estimates that $1.6 billion profit (an amount larger than the GDP of eight African countries last year) derives from African and Middle Eastern slavery annually.**

A look at some of the countries involved gives more of an idea of the scope of the issue and how its evil tentacles reach Australian consumer goods. Around 40 percent of the world’s chocolate comes from cocoa produced in the **Ivory Coast**. Children from across West Africa are trafficked to work there: there is no guarantee that those children have not grown the chocolate you enjoy.

In the **Eastern Congo**, seven types of slavery are prevalent. Men and boys are enslaved in the mines of the region, whose products we all have in our mobile phones and other electronics. A covert investigation in 2013 by Free the Slaves found that more than 90 percent of mineworkers were enslaved, the majority through debt bondage or having been kidnapped by armed groups.

Nearby, they found women and girls who had been trafficked to work as prostitutes to serve the miners.

In **Ghana**, people are enslaved in the gold mining and fishing industries, with children being particularly prized by the latter. Seven hundred have been rescued in the last decade from just one fishing location.

In 2008, the **Sudanese** parliament announced that at least 35,000 people — down from the 200,000 once held — remained enslaved there, principally Christians from the South held by Islamic families in the North. Unfortunately, as South Sudan disintegrates into violence, there are reports of both sides kidnapping children for use as soldiers. This practice has become endemic across the continent each time conflict ensues.

The tragic truth is that children are part of warlords’ armory today because they are cheap to feed, easy to kidnap and often fearless. In my own work, I have asked Sierra Leoneans about their community’s oral histories about nineteenth-century slavery, only instead to hear an outpouring of harrowing detail about their own enslavement in the 1990s civil war.

Yet even this is only a part of the problem of enslaved Africans today, since most are trafficked abroad to places where they fetch far higher prices. African domestic workers, often children, can be found across the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. There is a “Nigerian” lane in Amsterdam’s red light district. African prostitutes can be found across Europe and Asia where they are sold as niche items.

Herein lays a large part of the problem with Western strategies for dealing with this issue. Trafficking is by its nature a grey area; a vast, unknown percentage of those trafficked into the western world did so not after kidnap but having been tricked. In their utter desperation — many are from refugee camps, today’s favorite place for slave hunters — they fell for traffickers’ lies.

So it is that the western world sees trafficking in Africa in terms of something to be halted to slow the inflow of immigrants, not to help prevent potential victims per se. The demand to protect our borders, not the centuries of slave trading, is the context for anti-trafficking policies.

Tragically, it often seems that Africans are as regularly portrayed today as “other” — perhaps deemed worthy of our pity but rarely our solidarity — as they did at the height of the transatlantic slave trade.

Until we change that, and focus less on political expediency and more on the suffering and courage of girls like Deborah Sanya who escaped Boko Haram and told her story, justice for the millions who are still bought and sold seems a remote hope.

**Emma Christopher** is Senior Research Fellow in History at University of Sydney.

# Think tank warns separate Scotland could be ‘soft underbelly’ for anti-UK terror

Source: http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/475986/Think-tank-warns-separate-Scotland-could-be-soft-underbelly-for-anti-UK-terror

### SCOTLAND could be used as a backdoor route into Britain by terrorists and criminals if it became independent, senior intelligence experts warned yesterday.

They could enter the mainland through the “soft underbelly” of a Scotland without the security services of the present UK.

The stark warning was issued by the **Royal United Services Institute**, which claimed that the Nationalists’ plans for security had “considerable blind spots”.

The think tank’s Director General, Professor Michael Clarke, said Scotland could become “a very attractive niche for terrorists” if a newly independent government failed to establish a strong security agency.

Alex Salmond insists a new Scottish state would replace MI5, MI6 and GCHQ with its own Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency.

It is a plan which has enjoyed scant preparation or consideration, however.

The institute said national security would be compromised by an open door to terrorists and criminals.

Earlier this year, the institute said the Scottish Government’s plan for a security service had to be urgently reviewed before the referendum.

Mr Salmond claims a new Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency would provide effective security, but using relevant intelligence culled by existing British agencies – an assumption that has raised eyebrows in the rest of the UK.

**Last year Home Secretary Theresa May said Scotland would be denied access to top-secret intelligence and counter-terrorism tools if it became independent.**

Intelligence-sharing and joint security operations would continue, but the “seamless, automatic and natural” collaboration would be slower and more tightly controlled.

Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon was asked last year by Rory Stewart, the Tory MP elected yesterday as the new chairman of the Commons Defence Select Committee, what strategic threats she envisaged for a separate Scotland.

She replied that the country could be at risk of “cyber threat, international terrorism, global instability, the possibility of failed states and international organised crime”.

But in a new report the RUSI says there are problems in Mr Salmond’s plans to tackle such threats – particularly a **likely loss of access to the “Five Eyes” deal to share information between Britain, the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.**

Prof Clarke said: “At the moment, Scotland is not a haven for terrorism.

"But an independent Scotland without an effective intelligence agency will be a very attractive niche for terrorists and organised crime. It will be a soft underbelly.

“Our analysis is that Scotland could not create a meaningful intelligence agency that was credible with others, so the rest of the British Isles would be compromised.”

The Scottish Government says “an independent state will have first-class security services”.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: Do Brits really care about terrorism or just of not loosing Scotland and all that comes with it? Scotland will remain in the same island and if they decide to cut them off important security intelligence they will suffer the consequences themselves as well. So it for their benefit to continue existing collaboration and if possible to fully support the new intel service to be equally effective as before. Security is a very serious issue to be compromised due to childish behavior. |

# Boko Haram: Coffers and Coffins; A Pandora's Box - the Vast Financing Options for Boko Haram

Source: http://www.tracterrorism.org/article/boko-haram-coffers-and-coffins-pandoras-box-vast-financ ing-options-boko-haram

## http://www.tracterrorism.org/sites/default/files/image-library/Screen%20Shot%202014-05-13%20at%203.07.49%20PM.pngOutlets for Fundraising Activity

How can Boko Haram afford to abduct 276 teenage girls? Boko Haram has a wide variety of outlets for its fundraising activity.  Its success in sustaining attacks depends on a well-oiled financial pipeline. Like many other AQ franchises, Boko Haram collaborates with organized crime syndicates for its operations in drug trafficking, kidnappings, bank robbery, and cyber scams, not to mention continuous theft from Nigeria’s security establishment. In addition, Boko Haram raids rural towns and villages; by terrorizing civilians, they can implement random taxes at anytime to quickly fill depleted coffers. During 2014 Boko Haram raided over 40 villages with an estimated 2,000 casualties; many of the villiages were burned to the ground.

## Support from al Qaeda

#### Mohammed Ali

Boko Haram’s financial links to al Qaeda Central Command (AQC) dates between 2000 and 2002 when Osama bin Laden issued two audio messages calling on Nigerian Muslims to wage jihad. During Bin Laden’s time in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, he met Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian who studied at the Islamic University in Khartoum. Bin Laden allegedly instructed Ali to organise an extremist cell in Nigeria and was given N 300 million ($3 million USD in 2000). Ali returned to Nigeria during 2002 and funded extremist groups of which Boko Haram was a major beneficiary.

#### Abu-Mahjin

Boko Haram links with AQC also dates to a Chadian extremist, Abu-Mahjin.  Identified as acting as the intermediary between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda, Abu-Mahjin was known to have “limited ties to al-Qaeda associates,” and in 2009, on behalf of Boko Haram, contacted AQC for funds to facilitate attacks in Nigeria. Boko Haram started its terror campaign two months after the link was reported.

#### Formal Arrangement

In August 2011, Boko Haram leaders met with senior al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage to Mecca, with the intent to finalize both financial and logistical arrangements with AQC. Following the meeting, a Boko Haram spokesperson, Abu Qaqa, boasted of the new intimate relationship: “We enjoy financial and technical support from them (AQC). Anything we want from them we ask them.” In 2012, a Nigerian intelligence report claimed that Boko Haram received a financial donation from an unidentified group in Algeria.  According to the report, Boko Haram received a lump-sum cash support of N40 million ($265,000 USD) from an Algerian terrorist group.  However, Boko Haram has since acquired many more outlets for soliciting cash.

## Kidnappings

**Map: 2014 Map reflect Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria over April/May.

#### Cameroon Operations

Boko Haram began its Cameroon kidnapping operations in 2013. Kidnappings are the “bread-and-butter” of most terrorist groups in Africa, but Boko Haram became quite apt, quite quickly at abductions.  Ransoms are used to purchase arms and expand a regional operational presence, while hostage exchanges assure the return of captured members. Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan also known as Ansaru’s leader, Khalid al-Barnawi, reportedly earned N 50 million ($325,000 USD) as his share of €11 million Euros paid to al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for release of French hostages he participated in kidnapping during 2011. In an attempt to create an alliance with Boko Haram, he donated N 40 million ($265,000) to Boko Haram leader Abibkar Shekau. Rumours circulated that an agreement between Boko Haram and Ansaru had been made, where Boko Haram would provide security cover for Ansaru while Ansaru executed the actual kidnapping.  In exchange each group would receive a percentage of ransom.  Ansaru is suspected of carrying out numerous kidnappings for ransom in northern Nigeria, with relatives paying ransoms of about $10,000 USD.

A declassified 2013 British government report, estimated that at least $70 million USD in ransom payments had been paid to Islamist kidnappers since 2009, of which AQIM received an estimated $45 million.

* On 19 February 2013 Boko Haram kidnapped a French family from the town of Dabanga. Shekau claimed responsibility for the abduction and demanded that the Cameroonian government release all detained Boko Haram members in exchange for the French hostages. The family of seven was released during April 2013 amid speculation that France had paid a ransom of $3 million, the biggest payment to date received by Boko Haram.
* On 13 November 2013 Boko Haram kidnapped a French priest, Georges Vandenbeusch, from the northern town of Koza. Boko Haram again claimed credit for the kidnapping in a statement provided to the Agence France-Presse. Vandenbeusch was released a month after his capture amid claims that French authorities paid a cash ransom to the group. Both France and Boko Haram denied that a ransom was paid.
* The most recent BK abduction was the kidnapping of approximately 250-275 secondary school girls in Government Secondary School, Chibok on 14 April 2014. When recruiting a new member Boko Haram offers recruits a choice of how he wants to be paid: he can have a payment of $3,000, or a virgin. Thus, the kidnapped girls potentially represent over $600,000 that Boko Haram does not have to pay to its new recruits. In addition, if the negotiation process turns out to be successful in obtaining the girls’ release, ransom paid by the Nigerian or other governments could add millions of US dollars to Shekau’s war chest.

## Extortion/Protection Money

#### Areas of Extortion extend beyond Nigeria to Cameroon

Boko Haram heavily relies on extortion to run its day-to-day operations. Affluent businesses, government officials, contractors, even rural poor are subjugated to make payments or face the group’s rage. Boko Haram members in Cameroon residing in Kousseri, Mokolo, Kolofata and Mokolo use similar tactics, with the additional demand that Sharia be implemented and revenues from  trading with Westerners be seized.

#### Government Officials

Boko Haram also receives protection money from governors of the northern Nigeria states of Kano and Bauchi, a BH extortion tactic used since 2004. According to a Boko Haram spokesperson:

"The Northern governors are overwhelmed about the strength of the group and are aware of the capabilities of Boko Haram operatives in their respective states."

Allegations alledge that former Governor Ibrahim Shekarau's administration in Kano made monthly payments of N 10 million ($66,250 USD) to Boko Haram since 2004.  Bauchi governor's spokesman denied such payments were being made in 2009.

#### Control of Local Governements and Municipals

According to Clement Nwankwo (Policy and Legal Advocacy Center in Abuja), Boko Haram has control in various local governments in the northeast and is collecting “taxes and running the show in those places."  Boko Haram controlled at least 10 of the 27 local council areas in Borno by May 2013. Neglected by the national government, in many areas of northeast Nigeria Boko Haram is the only semblance of law and order.

## Cyber Scams

#### From Europe to Lagos

Boko Haram uses a variety of cyber scams. Internet fraud (credit card scams) has been documented throughout Europe, but in 2013 there was evidence of expansion of Boko Haram’s internet fraud activities into southern Nigeria coming out of Lagos.

### Romance May Not be in Your Future with a Boko Haram Match.com Member

What had not been widely reported until 2014 are romance swindles with United States citizens (both male and female) on dating sites.  Match.com is the most documented connection to Boko Haram, leading Match.com to warn its users of Nigerians’ frequent use of their site for financial gain.

#### The Grift

The typical con goes as follows.  A Boko Haram supporter poses as a male or female under a false identity to connect with a potential victim in the United States. The photos used are always of real people, usually very attractive unknown models or actors whose profile pictures have been illegally taken from other social media outlets like Facebook.  After first contact, the Boko Haram member quickly talks the victim into using an external email or chat service outside of the dating site.   Text messaging (SMS), AOL email, and Yahoo Messenger (instant messaging services) are all used but Yahoo Messenger tends to be the preferred choice because Yahoo does not require SMS authentication to get a new account.  Moreover, Yahoo is widely trusted by most people in the United States. Once trust has been gained, the supporter engages in a form of cyber sex.  Sexy photos get passed back and forth until the Boko Haram supporter can get a compromising nude photo of the victim.  The victim is then contacted by either the same or a different member of Boko Haram using a different alias, address and screen name. The victim is told that the images will be made available to friends, family and employers if the victim does not agree to pay a large sum of money. Targets of scams are naturally reluctant/embarassed to admit that someone they have fallen in love with has betrayed their confidence, but some other victims from Nigerian romance scams have reported a $4,500 USD loss. A bank account number is provided and the money is withdrawn in Nigeria.

## Bank Robberies and General Theft from Nigerian Military

  
Image:  2013 Rivers State Police Command thwarts a robberty attack targeted at one of the leading commercial banks in the State.  A cache of weapons was recovered from three vehicles hidden at a mechanic village in Ihugbo. The weapons recovered include:

* Two (2) General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG) with five hundred and ninety three (593) rounds of GPMG  ammunition;
* Eight (8) AK–47 rifles with one thousand, six hundred and thirty five (1635) rounds of AK-47 ammunition and 57 magazines;
* One (1) G3 rifle with magazine;
* Two (2) dynamites with detonators and other explosives canes;
* Two Gas cylinders with welding accessories
* One sledge hammer, one axe and
* Three (3) vehicles in which the weapons were concealed: Volvo S40 car, Mercedes-Benz Saloon car and a Nissan Pathfinder Jeep.

#### Sharp Rise in Bank Robberies across Nigeria

Boko Haram’s successful expansion also explains the sharp rise in the numbers of bank robberies in Nigeria. In 2011 alone, roughly 100 banks were attacked; over 30 of these were directly attributed to Boko Haram.  On February 20, 2013, seven Boko Haram members were charged with bank robberies during 2011. In one incident the accused robbed the Unity Bank of Nigeria Plc, Alkalari branch, carting away the sum of N17.8 million.  Boko Haram gains from bank robberies are estimated at $6 million.

### Theft of Nigerian Military Supplies

Boko Haram’s access to Nigerian military arms and uniforms is attributed to two sources: theft and collaboration with Nigerian military officials. Dressed in official uniforms allows Boko Haram fighters to move more feely, launch surprise attacks, and set road blocks without raising suspicion. On 15 March 2014 Boko Haram fighters launched a surprise assault on the 21st Armoured Brigade of the Nigerian Army dressed in Nigerian military uniforms.  On 19 October 2013 Boko Haram gunmen dressed in military uniforms killed 19 people near the Nigerian border with Cameroon by blocking a highway. During June 2013, the Nigerian Defense Force received 10 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) from the Borno State Governor. Within a year, Boko Haram video footage included Boko Haram units equipped with APCs. How these were attained is speculative, but does seem to support theft as an effective pipeline of arms to the group.

## Islamic Charities

#### http://www.tracterrorism.org/sites/default/files/image-library/Screen%20Shot%202014-05-13%20at%203.44.06%20PM.png

#### Hawalas

Boko Haram uses an Islamic model of financing called the 'Hawala' system. The system allows for the transfer of money through a Hawala broker, and does not require the completion of documentation or use of technology. For example, the Hawala broker in the U.S. will contact a Hawala broker in Nigeria, informing the broker of the amount to be paid to a specific recipient. The Hawala broker pays the amount to the recipient and the two brokers debit or credit their accounts. The system depends on mutual trust between the brokers as no money changes hands.

#### Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)

According to Nigerian newspaper reports, Boko Haram secures funds via Islamic charities. During March 2013, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) placed some banks and charities in Nigeria under watch for allegedly aiding the transfer of funds by Boko Haram. The NFIU opinion was that sympathisers of Boko Haram exploited Zakat donations to the benefit of the group.

## Oil Theft

#### The Case of Kabiru Sokoto

While largely neglected by security and intelligence operatives, theft of crude oil and petroleum products provides a funding stream for individuals and criminal gangs with connections to militant groups. Approximately 55 million barrels of oil a year (one- tenth of the production) is lost through theft and smuggling in Nigeria. The estimated monetary value is approximately $1 billion USD. There are links between oil theft and Boko Haram. It was reported that the escape of Kabiru Sokoto (a Boko Haram commander) from police custody in January 2013 in a suburb of Abuja was facilitated by an army of youths who “are also believed to be responsible for the breaking of oil pipelines in the area”. During February 2014, a Nigerian counter-terrorism operation destroyed more than 260 improvised (and illegal) refineries that turned stolen oil into a crude form of kerosene. Several hundred litres of refined product was discovered at each refinery. Five people were arrested and some boats and other equipment seized. These improvised refineries cost less than $5,000 to set up, employ 15-20 people and generate over $7,000 a month in profit. Early in 2014, Niger River delta police arrested 473 oil thieves. Over two million litres of oil and refined products were recovered and four small refineries were seized and destroyed. These type of illegal refinery operations are known to fund Boko Haram activities.

## Smuggling and Piracy

***Cross-Border Activities***

Nigerian borders are known for the limited presence of law enforcement officials. Those deployed are often inadequately trained and poorly renumerated. Most border communities have been neglected by the government, making it difficult for government officials to restrain illicit cross-border activities. Consequently, Boko Haram is often the only form of governing authority at these rural border towns.  During 2013 the Nigerian Minister of Interior, Abba Moro, said that there are more than 1,499 irregular (illegal) and 84 regular (legal) officially identified entry routes into Nigeria that facilitate smuggling of contraband. As a result, approximately 70 percent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa were reported to be in Nigeria. Boko Haram used the lack of effective border control to smuggle weapons, as evident in the following reported cases:

* 4 August 2013, Bama, Borno State: The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) seized four Toyota Hilux vans, 10 AK -47 rifles and magazines, two G3 rifles and 10×4 40mm bombs, three RPG tubes, and 85 rounds of special ammunition
* September 2013: 5,400 AK-47 rifles were seized from a truck in Maroua, the capital of Far North Region.
* January 2014: Cameroon’s security forces arrested a man attempting to transport 655 guns to Nigeria.
* March 2014, the Nigerian military captured from Boko Haram a cache of formidable modern weapons, including anti-aircraft guns, a clear indication of how well-financed the Islamic insurgency is.

#### http://www.tracterrorism.org/sites/default/files/image-library/CAPTURES-ARMS-650x487.jpg

Photo: March 2014, Weapons cache seized by Nigerian authorites was discovered in a burnt-out church—the result of a previous Boko Haram attack—in Nigeria’s northern Borno State.

#### Use of Women Couriers

Boko Haram’s smuggling tactics include the use of women as couriers.  The women hide AK 47 rifles or conceal improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on their backs covered with their veils as if they were carrying their babies. These women receive between N 5,000 and N 50,000 ($30 and $312 USD), depending on the mission and location of delivery.

**The Exchange of Stolen Crude Oil for Arms/Ammunition is a Well-Known “Trading Activity” Nurtured and Ferociously Protected:**

Militants and organized crime networks trading stolen oil for arms and ammunition is a common practice in Nigeria, often with the knowledge of law enforcement officers. This type of trading occurs more often in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the South-East and South-Western regions. Methods of transportation for smuggling varies from the archaic to industrial; from animals to oil tankers.  The animals most frequently used are camels, donkeys and cows where weapons are concealed in specially crafted skin or thatched bags to remain obscure.  It is under reported that the latest developments are the use of empty fuel tankers, vehicle engines and bags of grains for smuggling transport by Boko Haram.

### Piracy

It is estimated that pirates’ profit margins are between $5-10 million a month from hijacked tankers. According to the IMB Piracy Reporting Center and the US Office of Naval Intelligence, there has been a resurgence of maritime piracy during 2013 off the coast of Nigeria. In Port Harcourt waters there were a 36 reported pirate attacks during 2013, compared to 27 incidents in 2012 and 10 in 2011. The surge in attacks is the highest since 2008, when 40 incidents were reported. Accompanying the surge was a change in tactic whereby offshore kidnap-for-ransom incidents increased with 12 incidents reported during 2013. These incidents reflected an increase of 53% compared to 2012. This shift is attributed to western companies willing to pay ransoms for release of crew members. Though there is no verified links with Boko Haram, the group is more than likely benefitting from offshore piracy.

*Boko Haram's operational area showing their main compound, satellite compounds, and the hard line they have not successfully penetrated.*

## Jihadis Returning /Redeploying from Syria

By Rachel Ehrenfeld

Source: http://www.rightsidenews.com/2014051534287/world/terrorism/jihadis-returning-redeploying-from-syria.html  
  
Several years and many thousands of jihad fighters from at least 70 countries joining the Syrian blood-bath has finally raised the alarm that Syria has replaced Afghanistan as the new training ground for al Qaeda and its like.

Western law enforcement – especially in Great Britain, Canada and even in the U.S. -  are increasingly worried about the increasing numbers of hardened jihad-tourists who either return to their home countries, or continue their travels to recruit and even train others to advance the global jihad.

Some in the West attribute the growing wave of jihadis departing from Syria to infighting. By now, it should have been realized that such struggles only serve whichever side to recruit new members to their fight. Since Islam is the religion of perpetual interpretations, different elements pull in different directions that cause everlasting fighting.

Arab/Muslim countries that provide the vast majority of jihadis and understand the nature of the fighting, show signs of growing anxiety. Al-Shorfa, a UK-based USCENTCOM sponsored web site, reported on May 8, 2014, that Syrian “veterans” had been among 200 people charged in terrorist attacks in Egypt that killed 40 police officers and 15 civilians and Cairo and Sinai.

Last week, Egypt’s Prosecutor General charged 200, of which 98 fugitives who were identified as members of the al-Qaeda-inspired Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group, also known as the Champions of Jerusalem.

The Saudis, who support the Syrian Sunnis, are at the same time very concerned of the return of al-Qadea influenced jihadis, and in February 2014, Saudi king Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz issued a royal decree, saying “that any Saudi citizen who joins extremist religious and ideological groups, or those classified as terrorist organisations…adopting their ideology or promoting them ‘through speech or writing’ would also incur prison sentences.”

As the situation in Ukraine was heating up, the Iranian regime’s mouth-piece, Fars News, had an interesting twist on how the Saudis handle such jihadis:

“A large number of terrorist Takfiri fighters in Syria, who bear Saudi and Chechnian nationalities and receive financial and military backup from the Saudi intelligence agency, have been transferred to the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, on several planes to help the Ukrainian army in its fight against the pro-Russian population.”

The anonymous source quoted by Fars News also added that “The forces have been immediately dispatched to Kramatosk city in Eastern Ukraine, and are now fighting beside the Ukrainian army forces against the pro-Russians under the name of militias who support the government.”

The same source followed up with more details about “A large group of Chechnian militants who were fighting against the Syrian government in the last three years have been dispatched to Tbilisi in Georgia to prepare for terrorist operations on Russian territories.” Of course, there is a possibility that the Iranians are making this up. Nonetheless, this makes for a plausible scenario.

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center has produced an update on its ongoing study of Arab foreign jihadi’s in Syria.

**The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters from the Arab World** [**in the Syrian Civil War**](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20646)**\*** The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Overview[1]

1.   This study examines the phenomenon of foreign fighters from the Arab world in the ranks of the rebels in Syria. According to ITIC estimate, there are more than 5,000 foreign fighters from the Arab world among the 7,000-8,000 who have joined the ranks of the Syrian rebels.[2] Most of them belong to the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria(ISIS), two rival organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. A minority of the Arab foreign fighters joined the ranks of the Free Syrian Army and other rebel organizations.

2.   Some of the Arab foreign fighters are young and have no military training or experience. They joined the ranks of the rebels for ideological or religious-sectarian reasons (e.g., participating in jihad, fighting the Shi’ites). Others were motivated by the desire to raise their socio-economic status. Among other reasons were hostility to the Assad regime, the desire for adventure, and identification with the suffering of the Syrian people. Within the Arab foreign fighters there is a hard core of Salafist-jihadi, Al-Qaeda and global jihad operatives, some of them veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other Islamic combat zones. Most of the Arab foreign fighters come from towns and villages, with only a few coming from the main cities.

3.   In our assessment, the Arab foreign fighters form the backbone of the forces fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS.They also have a high casualty rate and many are killed. In addition, among the foreign fighter suicide bombers in Syria from organizations affiliated Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, the number of Arabs is conspicuous, especially those from Saudi Arabia.[3]

4.   Of the Arab countries from which the largest number of foreign fighters come, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt experienced the regional upheaval. Two other countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are pro-West, and preserved their stability in the era of regional upheaval, with deeply-rooted radical Islamic elements. Initially those five countries did not attempt to stem the flow of their citizens leaving for Syria, regarding them as part of their support for the campaign to overthrow the Assad regime and to confront Iran and Shi’ite Islam. Only during the past year, when the dangers of terrorism and subversion from the Syrian veterans became apparent as they returned to their countries of origin, did some of the Arab regimes take preventive action. They took legislative steps (Saudi Arabia, for example) and prevented the foreign fighters from leaving for Syria, monitored those who returned, and dealt with the local radical organizations providing them with logistical support. However, it is still unclear to what extent the steps taken have been effective.

5.   Some of the foreign fighters joined the fighting in Syria on an individual basis. However, in certain prominent instances local Salafist-jihadi organizations and activists who preach joining the fighting have given the foreign fighters logistical support and dispatched them to Syria. They include, for example, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Ansar and Sharia and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt, Jam’iyya al-Asala al-Islamiyya in Bahrain, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, the Salafist movement in Jordan, Jaish al-Ummah and other Salafist-jihadi organizations and networks in the Gaza Strip.

6.   The Arab foreign fighters in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations are a ticking bomb for their countries of origin, especially countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. That is because in Syria the foreign fighters acquire operational experience and combat skills, are inculcated with the ideology of jihad and radical Islam, and form a network of contacts with Salafist-jihadi organizations and operatives throughout the Arab-Muslim world. They are expected to return to their countries of origin (as some of them already have), join local Salafist-jihadi networks or establish new networks for terrorism and subversion. In some cases, in our assessment, the networks will operate in coordination with or be directed by the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS through contacts made in Syria.

7.   However, in our assessment, so far the involvement of Syrian veterans in terrorism and subversion in the various Arab countries is still nascent. However, there have been cases which indicate what the future may hold: in Egypt it was reported that jihadist veterans of the Syrian conflict were detained for their involvement in terrorist activities against the Egyptian regime, or were killed during a terrorist attack carried out by the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (which is affiliated with the global jihad).[4] In May 2014 the Saudi Arabian ministry of the interior recently announced the exposure of a terrorist network that was in contact with extremists in Syria and Yemen. In Jordan the ISISencouraged demonstrations and riots in the southern city of Ma’an, a hotbed of anti-regime subversive activity. In Israel, two Israeli Arabs were asked by jihadist organizations to carry out terrorist attacks in Israeli territory after they had returned from Syria. In addition, in December 2013 a jihadist network was exposed in east Jerusalem that had been asked to send one of its operatives to Syria for military training and to coordinate terrorist attacks. In Iraq the ISIS, which is affiliated with the global jihad, holds trans-national military-terrorist-subversive activities. The activities do not distinguish between Iraq and Syria, and many expand to Arab countries, Jordan for example.

### Estimates of Arab Foreign Fighters in the Arab World

The countries from which the Arab foreign fighters left for Syria can be divided into four categories, according to the number of fighters from each one:

1) Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia – According to estimates, between several hundred and approximately one thousand fighters.

2) Egypt and Iraq – Hundreds of fighters.

3) Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Qatar, Mauritania and Somalia – Several dozen fighters.

4) Sudan, Yemen and Oman – A few fighters from each country.

The following summarizes the estimates of Arab foreign fighters from the various countries of origin:[5]

**Estimated number of foreign fighters:**

1) Libya: Several hundred to almost 1000 Libyan foreign fighters were joined by non-Libyans who had fought there in the revolution against Muammar Gaddafi.

2) Morocco: Several dozen

3) Tunisia: More than 1000; Some of them fought in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi.

4) Algeria: A few dozen

5) Mauritania: A few individuals

6) Egypt: Several hundred

7) Saudi Arabia: Almost 1000

8) Bahrain: Several dozen

9) Kuwait: Several dozen

10) Qatar: A few individuals

11) Lebanon: Many score: Mostly Lebanese Sunnis and Lebanese of Palestinian origin

12) Iraq: Several hundred

13) Jordan: More than 1000:

14) Somalia: Between one and a few individuals

15) Gaza Strip[6] Approximately 30

16) Palestinian Authority: A few individuals

***Rachel Ehrenfeld****, Director of American Center for Democracy, is author of “Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed – and How to Stop it.”*

# The 'terror mastermind' who was educated in Wales

Source: http://www.channel4.com/news/aminu-sadiq-ogwuche-boko-haram-wales-nigeria

Nigeria is seeking the urgent extradition from Sudan of a Boko Haram terror suspect born and educated - and reportedly radicalised - in Britain, Jonathan Miller reports from Abuja.

**British intelligence tipped off the Nigerian authorities to the imminent arrival from London of a Boko Haram terrorism suspect as recently as six months ago;** a senior Nigerian government offical has told **Channel 4 News.**

The British-born suspect, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, who is understood to have adopted the name Asadullah - or "Lion of God" - is accused of jointly masterminding two recent bomb attacks on the outskirts of Abuja in which around 100 people died.

The first bombing took place on 14 April. Later the same day another Boko Haram group kidnapped the 273 schoolgirls in Chibok, in the northeastern state of Borno. Both bombs exploded in a poor suburb of Abuja called Nyanya, whose sprawling shanties are home to some of 250,000 Nigerians diplaced by the war against Boko Haram in the north.

## International warrant

Mr Ogwuche was arrested in Sudan following the issue of an international warrant and the posting of a £100,000 reward. The Nigerian government says paperwork on his extradition is expected to be completed shortly. On Monday, Nigerian state security paraded five alleged co-conspirators in Abuja.

Mike Omeri, government spokesman and head of the National Orientation Agency (NOA), told us: "In December 2013, we were alerted by the British authorities that they suspected him of working in concert with those involved in terrorist activities. He was picked up coming back from Britain."

Mr Omeri (see video above) said that Mr Ogwuche had later been released into the protective custody of his father, a retired colonel in the Nigerian army. He then absconded and disappeared.


**Channel 4 News** has been unable to clarify the discrepancy between earlier reports that the arrest and disappearance had occurred in 2011. Mr Omeri continues to insist that the intelligence tip-off had been received in December 2013.

According to Mr Omeri, the suspect had been back and forth between Nigeria and Britain for years. On its Facebook page, the NOA Briefing Center states that if Mr Ogwuche "was born in the UK and if he has fully met the citizenship requirements of the UK, then indeed he is British".

In London, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office denied this. An FCO spokesman told **Channel 4 News:** "There is no evidence that a British national was involved in the Nyanya bombing of 14 April."

## Terror watch-list

The FCO refused to comment on whether Mr Ogwuche had been on the radar of Britain's domestic or foreign intelligence agencies, but the apparent tip-off to the Nigerian authorities suggests that he had been on their watch-list.

Although the Nigerian authorities have said that Mr Ogwuche, a former lance corporal in Nigerian military intelligence, may have held dual citizenship, the UK authorities appear certain that this is not the case - although we understand that other aspects of the case are still being investigated in the UK.

These are thought to include reports that Mr Ogwuche became an adherent of radical Islam as a business science undergraduate in Britain between 2007 and 2010. He reportedly dropped out of the course at the University of Glamorgan - now the University of South Wales - without qualifying. He had previously dropped out of military school in Nigeria and deserted.

## Increasingly extreme views

According to a well-sourced news story in Wales Online, Mr Ogwuche lived in Pontypridd and prayed regularly in the university's campus prayer room. A former acquaintance described him as "devout" but his posts on a social media site indicate that his views became increasingly extreme.

Wales Online cites one post in 2011 in which he wrote: "The only punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive to make mischief in the land is that they should be murdered, or crucified, or their hands and their feet should be cut off on opposite sides, or they should be imprisoned."

In another, he wrote: "We warn you to give up your disobeyance to Allah and surrender to him or wait we bring your humiliation [sic] then you will be regretful and on the knees."

**Boko Haram video shows kidnapped schoolgirls**

Security sources say Boko Haram today functions as a franchise operation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), with links to other militant groups in neighbouring countries in the Sahel zone. Some of its commanders have fought and trained with other Islamist fighting groups including Somalia's al-Shabaab.

But although Boko Haram is likely to have received guns and money from foreign jihadi groups, its stated aims have been largely confined to demands for the imposition of a Taliban-style strict and "pure" Sharia state in the predominantly Muslim states of northern Nigeria.

## War against terror

The international links between Boko Haram, al-Qaeda and global jihad have in the past been played up by the Nigerian government in an apparent effort to place what is a relatively local rebellion in the context of a broader international war against terror.

But over more than a decade, the group, whose formal name is Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad (Congregation of Followers of the Prophet involved in the Call to Islam and Religious Struggle) has evolved and morphed into different guises many times.

It may suit the Nigerian government's interests to cast Aminu Oguche as just a global jihadi. Having failed to contain or crush the insurgency, President Goodluck Jonathan, who on Friday flies to Paris for an international summit on what to do about Boko Haram, now needs all the help he can get.

Terrorism and transnational organised crime in West Africa

**By Freedom C. Onouha and Gerald E. Ezirim**

Source: http://www.tribune.com.ng/quicklinkss/features/item/5069-terrorism-and-transnational-organised -crime-in-west-africa

Across the world, the existence of militant groups, organised criminal gangs and the nexus between them is not a new phenomenon. In recent times, however, their manifestation and intricate linkages in Africa have become growing sources of concern at national, regional and international levels. In West Africa in particular, “terrorist” footprints are increasing due to the activities of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) in addition to other sleeper militant networks. Further complicating the security landscape is the increase in the outbreak of transnational organised crime (TOC) that feed into the so-called terrorist loop in West Africa.

**Understanding West Africa**

West Africa is a highly complex region caught between affluence and affliction. The region is made up of 16 states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Apart from Mauritania, the remaining states are members of the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975. The region’s states vary in territorial size, colonial history, economic strength, internal cohesion, and external linkages. They also differ in terms of population size, levels of development, stages of state building, and nature of resource endowments. They are confronted with different levels of security, governance and development challenges that have made them poor despite being greatly endowed with natural resources.

Although West African states gained political independence before any other region in colonial Africa, they have failed to achieve a high degree of political stability due to  corruption, weak or failed governance institutions, conflicts and porous borders among others. Overall, they all share a common feature of multiple layers of insecurity, associated with conflicts and crime at community and national levels, often across borders and with regional ramifications. Threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, piracy, and arms trafficking have acquired worrisome transnational dimension in recent times. Consequently, terrorism and TOC have emerged as formidable threats to human security and is now taking on a singular importance in terms of national, regional and international engagements.

**Overview of militancy in West Africa**

The threat posed to security, stability and development by terrorism is not new in Africa in general. However, it was not until few years after the 9/11 attacks in the United States that the issue of the vulnerability of West Africa to domestic and transnational terrorism assumed centre stage in policy and academic debates. Notwithstanding that Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) had first set foot in northern Mali in 2003 and began forging ties with the local population (through marriage and protection of smuggling routes), there was a collective security nascence concerning the growing vulnerability of West Africa to domestic and transnational terrorism.

As of 2006, the debate centred on whether terrorism was a real, emerging or imagined threat in West Africa. The situation has changed dramatically in the last few years. In fact, the rising number of attacks, the multiplicity of active terror networks and the growing links between and among these groups have transformed the threat of terrorism from imagined or emerging to a real security challenge in West Africa.

At the core of this is the attacks AQIM has mounted on West Africa as well as the tactical, weapons and ideological support it extends to groups such as Ansar Dine, Ansaru, Boko Haram, and alongside other sleeper cells dotting the region. Countries such as Niger, Nigeria, Mali and Mauritania have witnessed new outbreaks or escalation of attacks. Groups hitherto considered as domestic groups, such as Boko Haram and MUJAO, have successfully launched transnational attacks or struck at international targets, thereby fundamentally changing their prior description and designation.

AQIM and sleeper cells affiliated with it are behind several cases of kidnapping and the murder of Western tourists, aid workers, and soldiers, as well as attacks on government targets, security posts, and foreign diplomatic missions such as in Mauritania. In July 2011, AQIM attacked a military base in Bassiknou, near Nema, in southeastern Mauritania. AQIM’s ties with Mali Islamists have equally emboldened such groups to mount audacious attacks. Mali slipped into instability after the March 2012 coup that created a power vacuum enabling predominantly the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), backed by a patchwork of Islamist forces – Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO – to take control of nearly two-thirds of the country. The MUJAO has since then mounted audacious attacks.

An offshoot of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, MUJAO is believed to maintain good relations with the Sahrawis (natives of the Western Sahara) and the Polisario Front. It has grown in reach and sophistication since October 2011 when it became active, carrying out some deadly attacks in northern Mali. It has claimed responsibility for attacks like the 5 April 2012 abduction of seven Algerian diplomats in Gao, Mali.

The intervention of French forces in the Mali crisis has seen these groups re-strategise in two principal ways. First was retreat into the mountainous region of northern Mali and second was the adoption of hitherto tactics such as suicide bombings and guerrilla attacks. On 8 February 2013, Mali witnessed its first suicide bombing when an attacker blew himself up in the chief city of Gao. Two days later, a second suicide attack rocked a military checkpoint at the city’s entrance. Between 9 February and 22 May 2013, Mali experienced twelve suicide attacks.  The MUJAO has also expanded their attacks into neighbouring countries, demonstrated by the 23 May 2013 twin suicide bombing in Niger. No fewer than 26, mostly Nigerien soldiers, were killed and about 30 injured.

The growing audacity of the Nigerian Boko Haram is one among many developments that have made West Africa a region of growing terror concern. Following an anti-government revolt it waged in July 2009 that attracted worldwide attention, Boko Haram members have escalated attacks targeting mainly security and law enforcement agents in addition to civilians, public infrastructure, community or religious leaders, places of worship, markets, and media houses among others. Its tactics include use of improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings and suicide bombings. The Boko Haram attacks are estimated to have cost more than 6000 lives since 2009, including deaths caused by the security forces. The 26 August 2011 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja that killed 23 people was devastating evidence that the group aims to internationalise its acts of terror.

The rise of Ansaru adds another dimension to the landscape of terrorism unfolding in West Africa. Ansaru, an abridgement of a name that roughly translates as “Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa,” is less well known than the Boko Haram. Since its emergence, however, Ansaru has claimed responsibility for various acts of terrorism in Nigeria such as the November 2012 armed attack on a detention facility in Abuja; the January 2013 ambushing of Mali-bound Nigerian soldiers at Kogi State, and the February 2013 kidnapping of seven foreign expatriates in Bauchi State. The 9 March 2013 murder of the seven kidnapped expatriates remains the biggest of its kind since the outbreak of violence in northern Nigeria.

Beyond the threats posed by AQIM, Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Boko Haram, Ansaru, and other sleeper cells in West Africa, the gradual infiltration and expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Hezbollah into West Africa are emerging concerns. The arrest and indictment of two Nigerians for accepting thousands of dollars from AQAP to recruit potential members from Nigeria suggests that Al-Qaeda’s most aggressive affiliate is seeking to boost its presence in West Africa.  Similarly, terror scouts are helping Hezbollah – the Lebanon-based military organisation – with fundraising and recruiting in Sierra Leone, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Gambia. Most of these groups generate funds for their operations through the facilitation of TOC.

**TOC and links to militancy in West Africa**

Quite a lot of TOC pervades the West African region including drug trafficking, natural resource smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, arms trafficking, money laundering, and maritime piracy, among others. Small arms and light weapons (SALWs) trafficking is increasingly undermining peace and security in West Africa. Out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide in 2004, it was estimated that about 100 million were in sub-Saharan Africa, with eight to ten million concentrated in the West African sub-region. Traffickers constitute West African nationals and their foreign collaborators.

Given ineffectual national security systems, porous borders, and growing demand for arms by criminals and militants, cartels specialising in arms trafficking have devised methods for concealing and conveniently trafficking arms across borders in West Africa. The audacity of militants operating in West Africa grew with the proliferation of weapons in the Sahara-Sahel region following the destabilisation of Libya. Libyan arms first obtained by AQIM and other mercenaries have been transferred to groups such as Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and MUJAO, emboldening and enabling them to mount more deadly attacks.

With sophisticated weapons in their hands, militants have been able to abduct persons for ransom. By kidnapping Westerners in the region, AQIM fetched an estimated $70 million in ransom payments between 2006 and 2011. AQIM has also assisted Nigerian affiliates, Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) and Boko Haram, to carry out kidnappings, thus adding a complex dimension to the funding of militant operations. Boko Haram for instance kidnapped a French family of seven in Cameroon on 19 February 2013, transported them to Nigeria, and freed them on 18 April 2013 after allegedly collecting $3.15 million as ransom.

AQIM and Boko Haram had equally relied on bank robbery to generate funds for their sustenance and operations. The attacks of Boko Haram explain the sharp rise in bank robbery in Nigeria in recent years. In 2011 alone, about 100 bank installations were attacked, and over 30 of these were attributed to Boko Haram.

Oil theft in Nigeria is another organised crime that could be a potential source of terrorism financing. While neglected by security and intelligence operatives, theft of crude oil or petroleum products could be a funding stream for individuals and criminal gangs with connections to militant groups. For instance, it was reported that the escape of Kabiru Sokoto (a Boko Haram commander) from police custody in January 2013 in Abaji, a suburb of Abuja, was facilitated by an army of youths, who “are also believed to be responsible for the breaking of oil pipelines in the area”.

Also related to this is the escalating threat of maritime piracy off the coast of West Africa. There is growing speculation of a possible link between piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the financing of regional Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, Boko Haram among others. Some of the millions paid to the oil gangs are thought to have made their way to Islamist rebels linked to Al-Qaeda in northern Nigeria.

Furthermore, West Africa’s drug smuggling routes provide opportunities for militant organisations to generate funds. West Africa is now a major transit hub and destination of drugs coming from Latin America and sometimes destined for Europe and America. Transportation is done by land, air and sea. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) claims that cocaine seizures in West Africa peaked in 2007 with 47 tons netted. At least fifty tons of cocaine (worth $2 billion) transit through West Africa per year, with about one ton slipping through the “narco-state” of Guinea-Bissau. The arrest of a former Chief of the Guinea-Bissau Navy, Rear-Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, by the US Drug Enforcement Agency for drug trafficking as well as the seizure by UK Border Force officials of cocaine worth over £17 million at the Port of Tilbury in Essex, both in April 2013, signpost a dangerous trend.

Other forms of transnational criminal activity that originate from, transit through or destined for West Africa include cigarette smuggling, human trafficking/smuggling (including illegal migration) and counterfeit medicine. Money laundering is also a major challenge in the region due to corruption, weak governance and deficient rule of law institutions. Together with other factors like poverty and widespread unemployment, these trafficking flows contribute to instability as well as sustain terrorism in the region.

**Towards suppressing militancy and transnational organised crime in West Africa**

The imperative of addressing security challenges has inspired the adoption of several regional mechanisms and instruments for enhancing security, development, good governance and conflict management in the region. Some of these instruments aiming to collectively suppress these challenges include the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and Mutual Assistance in Defence (1981); the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (December 2001); the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (June 2006); and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008). Of note was the recent adoption of the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, which provides for the regional Counter Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan to help member states combat terrorism. In spite of these interventions, terrorism pervades West Africa. Its manifestation could increase in scale if urgent steps are not taken to arrest the trend.

The challenge therefore has not been the regional lack of frameworks and instruments to respond to these threats, but rather the failure to address the underlying factors contributing to the outbreak of these crimes as well as the complex linkages between them. In order to deal effectively with the threats of terrorism and TOC, there must be a broad approach that integrates efforts at the national (member states) and regional (ECOWAS) levels into a robust strategy, focusing on improving governance, development and security in the region.

**The following is recommended:**

**Governance**  
1) The strengthening of all institutions and processes that promote efficiency,  accountability and transparency in the management of national resources across West Africa;

2) The creation and strengthening of institutions that promote the rule of law, enforce sanctions for human rights violations and diligently prosecute criminals and militants;

3) The broadening and democratisation of the political space to accommodate people and groups that have been marginalised along ethnic, religious or racial lines.

**Development**   
1) Robust partnership between governments and the private sector to initiate and sustain functional microcredit schemes for the poor, especially the unemployed youths;

2) Implementation of targeted development interventions in border communities to earn their goodwill so as to support governments’ efforts at combating TOCs facilitated across borders;

3) Implementation of a region-wide security consciousness and awareness programme for people;

4) Evolution of broad-based strategic communication or information operations strategy to counter growing extremism and jihadist narrative radicalising the minds of impressionable youths.

**Security**  
1) Establishment of a Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) for warehousing intelligence and information on militant activities to inform proactive responses;

2) Initiation partnership with Central and North African states to develop a robust tri-regional mechanism combating the flow of drug, arms, weapons, explosives and fighters in the Sahara-Sahel region;

3) Reform and professionalisation of state security forces to ensure they effectively respect and protect human rights, including during counter terrorism operations.

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### Lessons learned from 6 big terrorist windfalls

Source: http://www.terrorfinance.org/the\_terror\_finance\_blog/2014/05/terror-finance-trials-over-the-last-ten-years-have-frequently-involved-transfers-by-individuals-of-a-few-thousand-dollars-to.html?utm\_ source=Lessons+Learned+from+6+Big+Terrorist+Windfals&utm\_campaign=Lessons+learned+from+6+terror+windfall&utm\_medium=email

Terror finance trials over the last ten years have frequently involved transfers by individuals of a few thousand dollars to terrorist organizations abroad. Sometimes those cases get as much attention from the news media and law enforcement as multi-million dollar cases of funding terrorism.

This tendency is unfortunate because it causes us to lose sight of the big time patrons of terrorism and their methods. Small transfers are likelier to involve individual actors, small groups, and criminal activity. High-dollar terrorist transactions are likelier to involve state sponsorship, or at least large organizations such as major charities, and sometimes corporations which are targeted for extortion or kidnapping-for-ransom schemes by militants. Consider:

* France paid $15 to $20 million to the Taliban for the 2011 release of reporters Stéphane Taponier and Hervé Ghesquière. France may have also paid a $34 million ransom to Al Qaeda in North Africa for the release of four captives last year, and an $18 million ransom just last week to release four journalists abducted by Syrian rebels.
* The Holy Land Foundation, largest Islamic “charity” in the U.S. in the early 2000s, gave $12.4 million to Hamas. George W. Bush said that the money HLF raised was “used by Hamas to recruit suicide bombers and support their families.” The leaders of HLF were found guilty of providing material support to terrorism and received sentences ranging from 15 to 65 years in federal prison.
* Qatar has spent an estimated **$3 billion** (or, less credibly, $5 billion) to fund Al Qaeda-linked rebels in Syria. In so doing they’ve helped turn Syria into a charnel house with over 150,000 dead since 2011.
* Carlos the Jackal received, according to different accounts, either $20 million or $50 million from the Saudi government in 1975 to release the OPEC ministers he had taken hostage. Allegedly, this money wasn’t used by Carlos himself but was pumped back toward international terrorist causes. Eventually, Carlos the Jackal was caught and sentenced to life in prison in France on separate charges.
* The Born brother heirs to the multinational Bunge and Born corporation were forced to pay a $60 million ransom to leftwing Montoneros terrorists in Argentina in 1974. Some of the money may have been kept in shadowy Argentine and Cuban banks. Mario Firmenich, mastermind of the plot, was convicted in 1987.
* The Palestinian Authority just pledged another $74 million to spend as incentives and stipends for terrorist “martyrs” and their families from their annual budget.

**Several lessons should be learned from the above sampling of terrorist jackpots:**

1. **Don’t pay ransoms**. Paying ransoms is the quickest way to fund millions of dollars worth of future terrorist attacks and to increase the likelihood of larger ransom demands down the road.

2. In cases of suspected terrorist financing, **always look at both the source and the beneficiary of the funding**—not just one party in isolation. With the Holy Land Foundation, we tend to focus mostly on HLF as a contributor, without examining how Hamas uses Islamic charities in the West to finance its operations. Likewise in the Taponier and Ghesquière case, what little coverage there was in English language media focused on the ransom negotiations and French foreign policy, while completely ignoring the aftermath of what the Taliban and the Baryal Qari group did with the money. We learn more from each case when we look at both sides of the equation.

3. **Recognize the magnitude of the money involved in these cases**. Recall that Al Qaeda’s budget before 9/11 was about $30 million and carrying out the 9/11 attack cost about a half-million in direct expenses. A ransom payment of “just” $15 million is an enormous sum to terrorist groups who can use it for training, recruitment, arms, websites, bribes, fake identity documents, travel, explosives, and wages for dozens if not hundreds of operatives for a year.

4. **Identify state sponsors**. It is gratifying that several of these big-timers like the Holy Land Foundation and Carlos the Jackal were brought to justice. But notice that when a national government is the sponsor of the activity, no criminal prosecution takes place. The nations involved aren’t even fined like banks would be for committing similar violations. Rather, these cases are handled rather through diplomatic back channels. France has never been held accountable for violating international agreements against the payment of ransoms to terrorists. Qatar has yet to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism despite ample evidence that it is. Sometimes it seems like those with the deepest pockets and links to the terrorist underworld—groups like Islamic Relief, men like Dawood Ibrahim, banks like Al-Rajhi, and spy agencies like the ISI—have escaped the same level of scrutiny that smaller fish receive.

5. **Keep probing**. The news media is naturally focused on “news.” Their inclination is to stop reporting on stories like these after the financing has been revealed, stopped, or somebody has been convicted. But there is still a great deal of reporting that could be done on each of these major plots. For example, after the Bush administration took on the Holy Land Foundation, their plan was to continue prosecution of related entities and front charities, but the Obama administration put those investigations to a halt (which allowed Islamic Relief USA to continue operating). And there is still a great deal of confusion and conflicting accounts about exactly why Carlos the Jackal accepted the OPEC ransom payment rather than killing Saudi official Sheikh Zaki Yamani, which Carlos was supposedly under orders from Wadi Haddad to do.

6. **Don’t underestimate Islamist motives**. The temptation in the West is to ascribe the same motives to terrorists that tempt us in our own culture and in secular societies: money and power. But in several of these high-dollar cases, the donors received no tangible benefits from their gifts, and the recipients used the money to further a larger cause—neither for private financial gain nor for raw political power. Keep in mind that demands for ransom to release infidels are permitted under the Qur’an (47:4). Islamic law also mandates that a portion of zakat be given to holy warriors (Q9:60). The transfer of funds to Hamas offered little private gain for the leaders of the Holy Land Foundation, but the leaders did it anyway in keeping with the principles of zakat. **An assumption that these transactions are “purely business” is a culturally biased assumption.**

## Boko Haram and the West’s Military Intervention in Nigeria

By Kola Ibrahim

Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/boko-haram-and-the-wests-intervention-in-nigeria/5383236

The kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls in Chibok town some three weeks ago has drawn widespread global opprobrium. Instinctively, Nigerians and people globally, pricked by human feeling, have seen the latest barbaric onslaught on poor Nigerians by the murderous Boko Haram terrorists, as an assault on human dignity and safety. To most people, this terror sect has reached its crescendo with the abduction of innocent schoolgirls.

**Jonathan Government’s Stunning Callousness**

Ironically, the Nigerian government, led by Goodluck Jonathan did not see reason why it must be bothered about kidnap of schoolgirls. For it, the logic that this is not the first time justifies its lukewarm attitude. This explains government’s careless attitude to the plight of the pupils and their parents. Even at the peak of the outcry by the parents to the government, the Jonathan government did not issue a single statement, at least to console the parents. On the contrary, it exploited the issue for its political interests. For instance, while the government did not sanction senior security chiefs who misled the nation by claiming that most of the schoolgirls have been rescued, many protesters, especially in the north were illegally arrested.

Tragic-comically, the president’s wife, Patience Jonathan, whose husband could hardly lift a finger for two weeks, was quick to issue ‘order’ for the immediate release of the schoolgirls. She even arranged a tear-shedding session with journalists. Interestingly, the following day, two of the selfless and concerned parents, leading the campaign for the release of the girls were clamped into detention, because they ‘embarrassed’ the government of the madam’s husband.

The President, at a media chat, was busy asking journalists to help him find the missing girls, because they (the journalists) know more about security and defence of the country than the Commander-in-Chief does! The same president that budgeted close to a trillion naira for defence last year was asking journalists to guide him on national security! Prior to this time, the President, in a show of pure callousness attended a political rally in Kano dancing, while in the nation’s capital city, Abuja, more than seventy lives were burning to ashes in a terrorist bomb blast. Surely, Nigeria is in deep shit, when it comes to governance.

**Imperialist Intervention: An Assured Failure**

Consequent upon these official shenanigans, not a few people will be ready to accept any means possible to rescue these kids and reunite them with their parents. However, in our quest for immediate release of the girls and end to terrorism, we must spare thought for the kind of solutions on offer. The current messianic status being accorded western imperialist governments of the United States (US), Britain, France, etc as being expressed in major newspapers in the country and internationally, is misplaced and indeed dangerous. Of course, behind the latest imperialist intervention is Nigeria’s bankrupt, corrupt capitalist ruling class, through is rotten politics, which has failed Nigerians in all areas. While the western governments claim that only a few military and intelligence forces will be involved, the reality is that the country is in a protracted foreign military hostage.

The US and other western government’s military involvement in the Boko Haram issue will not guarantee peace in the northern Nigeria or elsewhere. In fact, it has the capacity to draw in stronger forces of global terrorist network into Nigeria, as the country will be seen as another outpost of western imperialism against terrorism (a seed capitalist imperialism sowed in the first instance). Whether the Chibok schoolgirls are found or not, the US and western imperialist militaries will use the opportunity to seek a permanent base in the country, and play more roles in the internal security policies. With this will be deeper involvement of western imperialism in the politics and economics of the country. He, who controls the defence, dictates the pace of the politics and by extension controls the economy. A review of western media editorials and reports suggests that there is a conclusion being drawn that Nigeria is a failed state, and the government is incapable of addressing not just security situation but also the problems confronting the polity. This is a background to placing western capitalist governments as savior of Nigeria.

Already, western militaries, with US African Command in the lead, are playing decisive roles in the Gulf of Guinea, with the possibility of building military bases in the coast of Nigeria around Lagos. This is being done under the guise of combating oil bunkering and piracy. The Nigerian government, under Goodluck Jonathan, has already surrendered Nigeria’s coastal defence to the western imperialist forces. With the latest involvement in northern Nigeria, in the name of fighting terrorism, the cycle may be complete. Moreover, the US drone bases have been situated in Niger, which borders Nigeria, while France has presence in Mali and other francophone African countries. There have also been previous attempts to set up a drone base in Nigeria without success. Just few years ago, Nigerians rejected citing of US African Military Command (AFRICOM) base in Nigeria; but today, western militaries may have achieved more than they dreamt. Nigerians must reject western military intervention.

This is in addition to gross human rights abuses this will engender. For instance, while one of the excuses of western imperialism in Afghanistan is the need for women liberation, the country, thirteen years after, has seen further degeneration of women’s conditions with abduction, rape, etc being the order of the day. In Nigeria, half of over 1500 deaths in the first quarter of this year alone in the terrorist campaign were attributed to Nigerian military’s indiscriminate killing, with many of those killed by the military suspected to be innocent people or detainees awaiting trials, according to Amnesty International report. Should we forget that the same Nigerian military razed a whole town sometimes last year, killing hundreds of people (the Baga massacre). Indeed, western intervention can only worsen these situations. The drone killings in Afghanistan and Pakistan are clear examples.

By helping to find the schoolgirls, western imperialisms will become an important factor in the counter-terrorism policy of the government, and the overall defence system of Nigeria. On the contrary, if the girls are not found, it will justify protracted involvement in Nigeria’s internal security. Already, according to the UK Guardian, the British foreign policy experts and politicians are discussing using the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, a 2005 principle agreed to at the UN, which has been used by imperialism for predatory interventions in Darfur, Libya, Yemen, Mali, etc. Also, some sections of US security and diplomatic corps are considering the Yemen option. This means having unfettered right to locate and destroy enemies (potential and real), using lethal weapons including drones, without approval or oversight from local government. It will also involve control of a country’s intelligence network, which will mean direct profiling of citizens. Why these may not be on immediate agenda, they are open options depending on how far western imperialisms are allowed by Nigerians. For instance, without strong opposition from the working people, western imperialism will be mired in deeper engagement with terrorists, not only in Nigeria but throughout the continent, using Nigeria as a launch pad.

**The “#BringBackOurGirls” Campaign**

The current social media campaign, especially the #BringBackOurGirls twitter campaign, while playing vital role in drawing international attention to the terror campaign in Nigeria, without clear background to the underlining causes, may be feeding the imperialists’ interventions with confidence and authority. A one-line slogan hides a lot of information about the role of western governments in the germination and growth of terrorism itself. It, on the contrary, makes open-ended what kinds of solutions are needed to rout terrorism, thus leaving the initiative to the imperialist forces. A parallel can be drawn with the #Kony2012 campaign, which allowed imperialist forces to invade not just Uganda, but other countries like DR Congo, South Sudan, etc under the guise of finding Joseph Kony of the LRA (the Uganda rebel group, which has unleashed murderous terror on children and women).

While Kony has not been found, the US and other European military forces are still domiciled in the continent. With this, the US AFRICOM has been able to secure semi-permanent bases in many east African countries. In other parts of the continent, especially North Africa, US and European forces, under the guise of fighting terrorism and stopping genocide have secured bases in such countries as Mali, Djibouti, Niger, CAR, etc. While terrorism, genocide and piracy have not stopped, western forces are still present in Africa than ever. Therefore, the current social media campaigns, which may lose steam without clear mass mobilization campaign, need a class-conscious analysis to determine what solutions are needed and who should provide them. It is surprising that discredited capitalist politicians like David Cameron (who wanted to wage bloody war against Syria), Gordon Brown, Tony Blair (who, alongside George Bush, was the architect of the imperialist wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), Hillary Clinton, etc are now using the campaign to rescue the girls as a whitewashing and image laundering tool. Moreover, this campaign, without a clear-cut slogans as the tendency to gloss over worse atrocities being perpetrated. For instance, just few days ago, over 300 lives were again wasted in Gamboru Ngala, in Borno State. This definitely cannot be covered by a #BringBackOurGirls campaign.

**What is the way forward?**

Consequently, Nigerian working people must understand that the capitalist classes, whose policies provided the breeding ground for terrorism to thrive, cannot genuine end terrorism. At best, they can only replace one terror with another. In ending terrorism, capitalists have created more problems than solution. Therefore, the genuine solution can only come from the working people themselves. As immediate measure:

1.  NLC and TUC must call a 48-hour general strike with mass protests across the country, to mobilize popular mass movement against terrorism, and the flippant manner the Jonathan government is handling it. Such mass movement must also reject imperialist intervention but mobilize for working class and community based defence committees. This strike and mass movements should be linked with all the other basic socio-economic demands of the people. By mobilizing mass movement across the country, Boko Haram will be isolated, and Jonathan government will need to justify its continued existence.

It is important to note that where mass of working and oppressed people are united in their collective struggle against anti-people policies, divisive tendencies of terrorism and fascism are easily subsumed. This is because, as stated earlier, divisive tendencies like terrorism are product of suffering wrought by globalised capitalism. Therefore, only mass movements of working and oppressed people can detach and erode the base of these divisive groups. Throughout the January 2012 protests and strike against hike in fuel price in Nigeria, no single bomb was thrown, neither was there any terror attack. However, a day after labour leaders botched the protests; a terror attack killing scores of people was carried out in the city of Kano. Indeed, the defeat of sit-tight regimes in the Arab world was not accomplished by bombs but by mass movements of workers, youth and the oppressed. Indeed, where mass movements develop, terror forces are isolated.

2. Democratic community and workplace defence committees should be set up across the country, especially in the north, as a counterweight to brutality of the terrorists and the Nigerian military. These defence committees should organize defence of communities, including intelligence gathering, searches, armed resistance, etc. The excuse that people will be killed does not suffice, as people are already being killed senselessly and without opportunity of self-defence. In fact, Chibok community people, including women organized a search and rescue team in the wake of the military’s pusillanimity. According to a Dr. Manaseh, whose sister was among the abducted, “after the incident, over 204 people including volunteers from Chibok mobilized a day after the attack and stormed Sambisa forest with many contributing N15, 000 each for fuel to be used in their motorcycles for the rescue…” (Vanguard, 11 May 2014). Who says working and poor people cannot organize?

Will such self-defence committees not be abused? This is why there is need to put such committees under democratic control of communities, with every household involved in the formation and control of such committees. These committees will be different from the so-called Civilian JTF currently existing in Borno State, which has become an appendage of the deadly military forces, aside not being under democratic control of communities. It is nevertheless important to emphasize that the spontaneous rise of the Civilian JTF (a form of community defence committee), though not on democratic basis, shows the potential for independent organization by working and community people, if there is a national lead. The leadership of the labour movement, youth movement and the Left, in such initiative can make such committee serve as revolutionary platform.

3. Working and oppressed people must organize to bring down this bankrupt Jonathan capitalist regime and the rotten, neo-colonial capitalist system it superintends over. This system is the root cause of terrorism. How do you convince a 20 year old that book is not haram when all he ever saw in the past 14 years of civil rule is poverty, hunger, joblessness, oppression, injustice and obscene display of wealth by a rich few? How will you convince a young Nigerian who has not seen the wonders of chemical reaction or the importance of electromagnetism that book is not haram? The last 14 years of civil rule has seen unprecedented wealth accumulation in the country, which can take Nigerians to the Space more than 20 times, yet it is a miracle for Nigerians to have safe transit from Lagos to Kano. A government that can commit a trillion naira to defence, but can hardly spend less than a quarter of this on education and healthcare is a government of social terror.

**Conclusion**

We must end capitalism before it ends us all. Build revolutionary workers’ party now! Workers should take over their unions and rebuild them on democratic, anti-capitalist and revolutionary basis! Build democratic revolutionary committees linked up from grassroots to the national level to replace this corrupt regime. Working people need a revolutionary socialist government that will put mainstay of the economy under democratic public ownership. With this, the enormous resources of the country, rather than being cornered by the rich few and multinational corporations, will be committed to developing infrastructures, creating decent and secure jobs, educating the youth, providing adequate  healthcare, and industrializing the country. This is the only way divisive and deadly forces of religious fundamentalism, ethnic chauvinism and social annihilation can be ended.

With the economy of the country under democratic ownership, control and management of the working people, communities, professionals, etc, we can plan how the resources and wealth of the country will be best utilized, on an environmental sustainable basis, to secure decent and fulfilled lives for all Nigerians and incoming generations. This will also require the working people in Africa, and globally to rise to defeat globalised capitalism, and enthrone a democratic, revolutionary working peoples’ governments. For instance, with revolutionary working people’s governments in West Africa alone, enormous resources – human, material, natural, etc – can be harnessed to develop the region, as a prelude to forming a Socialist Federation (or Confederation) of Africa. That terrorism is fast spreading in Africa, and the world, underscores the fact that only an internationalised united working class struggles to end capitalism can permanently defeat terrorism. This is why the working people in Nigeria must build mass movements across borders to defeat both terrorism and globalised capitalism that is at the root of terrorism. The current wave of solidarity protests across continents shows that it is possible to build a trans-continental movement against capitalism.

Even if the Boko Haram sect is defeated, without working class revolutionary and socialist alternative, other divisive forces will tear society apart based on the present rotten arrangement. We need a working class political platform to lead the struggle for a socialist revolution.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: Too much focus on kidnapped girls in Nigeria – this is good. But aren’t we forgetting the kidnapped Christian girls kidnapped in Egypt?  In a 2012 report commissioned by Christian Solidarity International titled **Tell My Mother I Miss Her** and written by George Washington University professor Michele Clark and Coptic human rights activist Nadia Ghaly, **500 cases** were reported of Coptic females having been kidnapped and forcibly converted to Islam.  ►**Study source:**  http://www.csi-usa.org/TellMyMotherIMissHer.pdf |

‘Problems’ With Security at Federal Buildings ‘Persist,’ Subcommittee Hears

**By Anthony Kimery** (Executive Editor HSToday.com)

Source: http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/problems-with-security-at-federal-buildings-persist-subcom mittee-hears/8077c37354a387144d74e96ee9575d53.html

**Penetration testing done by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Federal Protective Service (FPS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has revealed that fake bomb components, knives and guns have been able to be snuck past security at federal buildings across the nation, a congressional panel heard Wednesday.**

FPS protectS and deliverS integrated law enforcement and security services to more than 9,000 facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA) and safeguarding their more than 1.4 million daily occupants and visitors.

“The oversight of contract guards and their training needs improvement and, while the guards are armed, they lack training and clear direction on active shooter situations. Partnerships with local law enforcement agencies are patchy, raising questions as to whether state and local law enforcement agencies are clear on their authority to respond to incidents on federal property,” said Rep. Lou Barletta (R-Penn.), chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, which examined the security of federal buildings at a hearing on the matter Wednesday.

“The facility risk assessments conducted on federal buildings to help identify their risks and needed security measures are behind schedule and sometimes ignored by customer agencies,” Barletta said. “And on top of all of this, confidence in FPS may be eroding. Just this month, DHS has taken steps to remove FPS from overseeing security at its Nebraska Avenue Complex.”

“FPS continues to face challenges ensuring that contract guards have been properly trained and certified before being deployed to federal facilities around the country. In September 2013, for example, GAO reported that providing training for active shooter scenarios and screening access to federal facilities poses a challenge for FPS,” Mark Goldstein, director of GAO’s Physical Infrastructure Team, told the subcommittee. “According to officials at five guard companies, their contract guards have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Without ensuring that all guards receive training on how to respond to active-shooter incidents at federal facilities, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat.”

Similarly, GAO found that **“an official from one of FPS’s contract guard companies stated that 133 (about 38 percent) of its approximately 350 guards have never received screener training.** As a result, guards deployed to federal facilities may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to use raising questions about their ability to fulfill a primary responsibility of screening access control points at federal facilities,” Goldstein said. “GAO was unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have received active-shooter response and screener training, in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight. GAO also found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and certification requirements.”

Although FPS agreed with GAO’s 2012 recommendations that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on guards’ training, certifications and qualifications, Goldstein said “it still does not have such a system. Additionally, **23 percent of the 276 contract guard files GAO reviewed did not have required training and certification documentation.** For example, some files were missing items such as documentation of screener training, CPR certifications, and firearms qualifications.”

GAO concluded that assessing risk at federal facilities remains a challenge for FPS. The congressional investigative agency “found in 2012 that federal agencies pay FPS millions of dollars to assess risk at their facilities, but FPS is not assessing risks in a manner consistent with federal standards,” Goldstein told lawmakers. In March 2014, he said, “GAO found that this is still a challenge for FPS and several other agencies. The Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities standard requires federal agencies to develop risk assessment methodologies that, among other things, assess the threat, vulnerability and consequence to undesirable events.”

GAO said risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risks and implement protective measures. But “instead of conducting risk assessments,” Goldstein said, “FPS uses an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term solution."

But, Goldstein said, "MIST does not assess consequence (the level, duration and nature of potential loss resulting from an undesirable event). Three of the four risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. Thus, FPS has limited knowledge of the risks facing about 9,600 federal facilities around the country. FPS officials stated that consequence information in MIST was not part of the original design, but they are exploring ways to incorporate it.”

In response, FPS Director Leonard E. Patterson told the subcommittee that "MIST ... compares the disparities identified against the baseline level of protection specified in the ISC standards, thereby operationalizing those standards and enabling mitigation of the vulnerabilities identified. The FSA report is a historical record and informative report provided to FPS stakeholders to support their decision making in risk mitigation strategies."

"FPS is continually reviewing risk assessment methodologies to improve assessments and recommendations and I am pleased to report that the second-generation tool, MIST 2.0, is currently in systems acceptance testing," Patterson said. "This system will feature, among other improvements, an enhanced user interface, web-automation capability, and automated visibility of protection measures across the FPS portfolio. At this time, FPS expects system deployment to begin by the end of this fiscal year."

“Problems persist,” Barletta said. “Over the past five years, the Government Accountability Office and others continue to identify very real deficiencies.”

However, Barletta said, “we should also put all of this in context. The reality is building security is difficult. If it were not, these problems would have easily been resolved years ago. We have seen that even with the best security, there is still a risk a terrorist could be successful. And there have been improvements, including FPS’s revamping of its risk assessments, improved partnerships with local law enforcement, particularly here in the nation’s capital, and a strengthened working relationship with [the] General Services Administration.

“We need to understand the challenges and problems, but we also want to hear solutions,” Barletta said. “Ultimately, whether it’s the members of the public or federal workers, those who come to federal buildings must have confidence we are doing all we can to protect them.”

