Countering Boko Haram: can a regional approach help Nigeria?

By David Mickler

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Feb 25 – **Nigeria and its neighbors have proposed a regional taskforce to tackle the brutal Boko Haram insurgency, which has waged war in the northeast of the country since 2009. But will it work?**

largest democracy, albeit a fragile one. But Nigeria has faced an increasingly brazen campaign of violence and terror by Boko Haram.

Attacks occur almost daily on both government

Impact of Boko Haram violence in Nigeria over 2014 and January 2015 (as of 20 January 2015). Map created by MapAction (2015). Data Sources: Basemap data: GADM, SALB, OCHA, NGA, OSM. Situational data: IDMC, ACLED.

Boko Haram has killed more than 10,000 people and forced more than a million others to flee. It has captured 30,000 square kilometers of Nigerian territory, has reported links to al-Qaeda, and has been dubbed "Africa's ISIS."

So, where has the plan for a regional taskforce come from? What does it propose to do? And will it have UN Security Council authorization?

What's happening in Nigeria?

Nigeria is home to Africa's largest economy and its largest population. It is also Africa's

and civilian targets, and recent events have raised the stakes. In April 2014, Boko Haram sparked international outrage by kidnapping nearly 300 schoolgirls from Chibok. In January this year, ten-year-old suicide bombers were reportedly used in attacks and militants decimated the people and town of Baga.

Boko Haram has also expanded its attacks into Cameroon, Niger, and now Chad.

This has made stopping it more than just a Nigerian problem.

The Nigerian government, a leader in African peace and security governance, has been unable to counter this violent challenge. Declaring a state of emergency in three northeastern states, it has deployed under-resourced Nigerian army forces and been accused of extra-judicial killings of suspected insurgents. Its failure to halt attacks has been a source of frustration and criticism.

The crisis even threatens Nigerian democracy. National elections due to have been held on February 14 were postponed for six weeks. The government claims this is due to an inability to securely conduct the poll in the affected states.

In October 2014, the LCBC agreed on a plan to deploy a Multinational Joint Task Force to counter Boko Haram. Under the terms of regional and global security governance concerning the legitimate use of military force, the proposal needed formal authorization by the African Union and the UN Security Council.

In January, the African Union formally authorized the taskforce for an initial 12-month period. It has called on the Security Council to do the same, and to provide financial and logistical support.

Most recently, the LCBC and partners met in Cameroon in February to hammer out the final operational details.

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Towards a regional response

The Nigerian government has used its regional power and influence to control how Boko Haram features on African and international security agendas. However, it has reluctantly come to accept that it needs external help.

As the Boko Haram insurgency has spread, Nigeria's neighbors have sought to co-operate to halt its progress. In mid-2014, the search for a regional solution gathered momentum. Representatives from Nigeria and its neighbors in the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, met with counterparts from Benin, France, the United States, and the U.K.

Following the Chibok abductions, in May 2014 the UN Security Council added Boko Haram to its list of terrorist groups under travel, financial and weapons sanctions.

What would the taskforce look like?

The taskforce would consist of 8,700 military, police, and civilian personnel. It would conduct coordinated military and intelligence operations to prevent Boko Haram's expansion and to stabilize areas previously under its control. It would also protect civilians, help displaced people to return home and enable some humanitarian assistance.

However, the extent to which neighboring countries would actually be allowed to operate their forces on Nigerian soil is not clear.

Nigeria's role in the development of a regional approach has been and remains crucial. As a member of both the African Union Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, Nigeria has slowly

allowed the issue of Boko Haram onto their agendas — but it has largely directed the international response.

What happens now?
The UN Security Council will now consider the taskforce proposal. This will include sorting out who will pay for the taskforce and logistical issues.

The Security Council will also consider how human rights would be protected in any UN-authorized counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram. Many observers have criticized the Nigerian government's human rights record during the response so far, and the impunity with which abuses have been committed.

The Nigerian government is gearing up for a major operation against the insurgents and claims it can defeat them within the six weeks

before the delayed election. The immediate tasks are to contain Boko Haram from spreading into the wider region, and then to begin making inroads into the significant territory under its control to protect vulnerable civilian populations.

There are deeper issues regarding the conditions that have enabled Boko Haram to flourish, which are beyond the mandate and capacity of any regional intervention force. These include political marginalization and socio-economic underdevelopment in the predominantly Muslim regions of Nigeria's north, religious radicalization, and wider governance challenges, such as corruption, in the Nigerian polity.

These are issues for the Nigerian people and their governments to address, starting with the rescheduled national elections on March 28.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Cartoon on page 3!

"I'm down for a Jihad": How 100 Years of Gang Research Can Inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism

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By Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz

How can the study of gangs, gang members, and gang crime provide insights and guidance for the study of radicalization, extremism and terrorism? It is our contention

in this short Research Note that lessons learned in the study of gangs have direct applicability to understanding terrorist groups and acts. While the study of political radicalization has a long tradition, the recent global concern over terrorism has focused increased attention and resources on the issue. Many criminologists paid little attention to acts of terror prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United

States.[2] Thus there has been some "catching up" in understanding radicalization and extremism, with several independent groups of scholars holding that much can be learned through the comparative study of radicalization and extremism with other groups of criminological, political, and sociological relevance.[3]

The study of gangs and radicalized groups share a great deal in common. The two fields of research are similar in that they both study hard-to-reach populations that engage in criminal actions. Both groups are

composed primarily of young men. Gangs and terrorist groups tend to be loosely organized as opposed to maintaining rigid organizational hierarchies. The violence that these groups engage in is public and involves victimization and harm to members of the general public. The violence used by gangs and radicalized groups is also disproportionate to the degree of harm, marginalization, or disrespect experienced among extremists or gang members. Group processes are central to the processes of recruitment, the engagement in violence, mobilization and forms of collective behavior. In both the study of gangs and terrorism there is a "dark" figure of crime, that is, the volume of crime engaged in by these groups is not well known or understood. Much like terrorism, the study of gangs is also plagued by a number of "myths". Such myths (gangs are well organized, gangs control drug sales, gang membership is permanent, gangs are organized globally, only males join gangs etc.) created misunderstandings of what gangs, gang members and gang crime are like. [4]

Of course, there are important differences between gangs and terrorist groups. Notably, gangs generally lack political beliefs and ideology, violence among terrorists has a different motive than that of gangs, and the international component to terrorism differentiates it from the vast majority of local gang activity. There is another difference between gangs and terrorism that is revealed in two recent reviews of the respective literatures. Kris Christman's systematic review of the literature on religious radicalization and violent extremism included 319 works, six of which were published in the 1980s and fourteen in the 1990s.[5] This illustrates the recency of research on such groups. The literature on gangs, on the other hand, is comprised of around 5,000 works that date prior to the 1920s with a fifty-year tradition of empirical research, illustrating the long history gang research has come from. [6] It is against this background that gang research might offer some insights (and mistakes) to research on terrorism and radicalization. Indeed, despite some of the substantive differences between gangs and terrorism, we posit that the overlap is consequential for both areas of study.

This Research Note therefore identifies ways that the study of gangs can inform the study of terrorism, radicalization, and extremism. We examine the overlap between the two areas primarily by focusing on what research on terrorism and radicalization might learn from the history and evolution of gang research. We specifically identify eleven "lessons learned" from gang research that can inform research into terrorism and extremism. Given the long history of studying gangs, and the sheer magnitude of the literature, there are several areas of research that the study of these topics can look to, to find methods, theory, and policy to speed the process of developing models and ways to study these important topics.

Lessons Learned in Gang Research: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

The principles of sound research are equally applicable to a number of areas of inquiry. There are some aspects of social science research, however, that are more important to the study of groups. This includes radicalized extremist groups and gangs. We proceed by identifying eleven principles, in no particular order of significance, derived from gang research that we believe are applicable to research on groups involved in terrorism or radicalized groups. We remind readers that gang research has not reached some broad or final consensus and that there are both strengths and weaknesses in this literature. To be sure, there are also aspects of research on terrorism and extremism that can inform gang research.

First: **triangulation of ideas and methods.** Multi-method, multi-disciplinary studies paint a more diverse and accurate picture of gangs than single method studies; the same is true of terror groups. Much research on gangs depended on either ethnographic studies of a small number of gangs or gang members or law enforcement data. Moreover, the study of gangs originated in the discipline of sociology (Frederic Thrasher).[7] While much of the research on gangs in the last two decades is found in criminology, there is a much more interdisciplinary flavor to the study of gangs today than even as recently as the turn of the century.[8] Of course, triangulating ideas and methods is easier said than done.

Triangulation of multiple data sources is particularly important in a nascent area of research; it allows researchers to describe the group from multiple perspectives and more fully assess the reliability and validity of information. Through the use of

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multiple data sources, gang researchers learned that gangs have many more females, are younger and more diverse when it used school surveys of gang members rather than relying solely on law enforcement data. Combining several methods (trial transcripts, Lexis-Nexus, scenarios, experiments, survey research, school, law enforcement, prison and jail data) pushed the field of gang research ahead. Much of the best research and most developed substantive areas of study on gangs comes from studies that have combined multiple sources of data. Among the best examples is Jim Short and Fred Strodtbeck's Youth Studies Program in Chicago from the 1960s, which combined gang-level data and field notes from detached workers, youth personality inventories and self-reported activities, police records and census reports.[9] A contemporary example is found in the work of Beth Huebner and her colleagues in St. Louis, who combined geocoded data from law enforcement gang intelligence on gang member residences, police records of gun assaults and gun seizures, medical examiner records of drug-related deaths, and U.S. Census data on neighborhood structural conditions.[10] Triangulation often calls for innovative methods, such as the use of social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Indeed, research on terror groups is more sophisticated than the study of gangs on this particular issue.[11] Much terrorist research now is based on data pulled from such social media. The external validity of such data is hard to establish,[12] which is why it is important to combine, for example, online resources with survey or ethnographic methodologies.

Second: **understand the symmetries and asymmetries across the selection and the (dis-) engagement processes into and out of groups.** Gang studies paid virtually no attention to the process of getting out of the gang until recently. So much attention was paid to the risk factors for gang membership and the consequences of gang membership that few realized that the youth and young adults who join gangs invariably leave gangs. It is therefore important to find out what prompts disengagement and whether the disengagement process is the inverse of selection into gangs. If joining gangs is characterized by illicit opportunities, excitement, gang networks, and status voids,

would conventional replacements facilitate disengagement? Gang research found that natural social processes—disillusionment with gang life, maturation, family, romantic relationships—had a good deal to do with getting out of the gang.[13] Dramatic departures were rare as most members just "walked away." This research was bolstered by longitudinal research that demonstrated gang membership was generally of short duration, typically less than two years. Extremism research has shown more interest in the disengagement process and the findings from this work are generally consonant with that of the study of gang disengagement.[14] Linking the process of disengagement from groups to life course theory has also proven to be valuable. Doing so contextualizes the role of gang membership in the life course rather than viewing it as static with no attention to the dynamics of life change. Such an analytic lens also underscores that the vast majority of gang members move past their time in the gang to more traditional activities.

Third: **study the collective—the clique, cell, group, or organization—do not just pay lip service to it.** The study of gangs has taught us time and again that the group is more powerful than the individual. Because groups motivate individuals to act in ways they would not otherwise do, it therefore is critical to understand the collective features of the group and how it relates to crime and deviance. Group structure differs from gang to gang and is not monolithic, which is why it is equally important to understand the role of group process within the group. Focusing on group process naturally leads to asking questions about the catalysts for actions of various sorts. Identifying the steps in engaging in violence, whether in the gang or terror context is important. Both individual and group motivations are important. Understanding the role of group process and organizational structure in recruitment, adopting group norms and engaging in violence are key issues in understanding both gang and terror groups and acts.[15] It is important not to squabble over generalizing whether extremist groups are hierarchical, decentralized, or leaderless, but instead to determine how each of the organizational structures relate to different group processes and accordingly different collective and per capita

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rates of crime and deviance. Admittedly, gang research has largely come up short in studying gangs as groups, instead opting to studying gang members as individuals. We would encourage extremist research to pay strong attention to units of analysis and, what we describe next, levels of explanation.

Fourth: definitions matter. Consistent, validated definitions of gang members, gangs and gang activities are relatively recent in gang research. Such definitional clarity is needed for understanding terrorism, radicalization, and extremism. Indeed, definitions of groups and behavior are the core of a scientific approach to understanding phenomena. A better understanding of the differences within and between groups involved in terrorism as well as groups involved in crime more generally is important to understanding how to respond to such groups. Individuals, groups, and group activities need to be distinguished clearly, as advised by Jim Short.[16] Paying attention to the clear definitions of concepts is key to moving a solid agenda of research on groups of all types ahead. For example, the words terrorism, radicalization and extremism are often used inter-changeably yet these refer to quite different phenomena. A typology of extremism would differentiate between political extremism, religious extremism, environmental extremism, and other forms of extremist beliefs. This raises the important question of whether extremist groups—as well as extremist individuals—are defined by their beliefs or by their behaviors. Gang research has struggled over the years with tautological critiques about the extent to which crime (and even violence) should be included in the definition of a gang.[17] If behavior is a definitional requirement it will change the meaning and magnitude of the problem. An example of this is found in Cheryl Maxson and Malcolm Klein's study of gang homicides, where there found that shifting the definition from motive-based (i.e., homicide to further the collective goals of the gangs) to member-based (i.e., a gang member was involved) produced twice as many gang homicides.[18] We think this has important implications for the study of violent extremism. Efforts should be made to assess the reliability and validity of databases across units of analysis.

Fifth: do not forget the women. Gender matters a great deal for gang activity and group process. While men comprise the largest group

of gang members and terror groups, women exert considerable influence on the behavior and membership of such groups. There is a reason that the cover to John Horgan's book is so captivating, almost shocking—it is unexpected that a woman, smiling with a head cover while holding a weapon, would ever be "walking away from terrorism." In this context, we encourage terrorism research not just to "add gender and stir," which means going behind simply the concentration on acts of terror and the similarities of male and female radicalized extremists.[19] Rather, this means attempting to understand how gender is used to instigate conflict, when it is used as a strength, and when it is–on balance – a source of a weakness in extremist groups. These are issues the gang literature has confronted, albeit not perfectly, for some time.[20]

Sixth: knowledge of the efficacy of programs should be proportional to the investment in such programs. It is curious that interventions are not well understood or evaluated in the gang world. Malcolm Klein and Cheryl Maxson lament in their review of program evaluation that everything is "promising".[21] That said, everything can not be promising. The experience from gang interventions is that there has been forty years of interventions and very few high quality evaluations. Perhaps as much as $100 million has been spent on gang programming and yet we still do not know what works.[22] Programs, policies, and interventions in the terrorism world need to have serious full-scale evaluations, or run the risk of following the futile path of an abundance of 'promising' evaluations attempts at a great expense to funding agencies. This is a tall task in the area of extremist research, where empirical findings rarely come with a control group let alone move outside of the realm of case studies. When rigorous evaluation is hard to come by, it would be profitable to take advantage of natural experiments–random or exogenous shocks–to assess the efficacy of policies and programs.

Seventh: distinguish instrumental from symbolic activities. This relates to our point above about definitions, yet is worthwhile to emphasize it also in the context of motive and method. There is a great deal of braggadocio and symbolic violence in gangs and much less instrumental violence. Separating the one from the other is

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important for theory and policy alike. Similarly, there is a great deal more "talk" about gang violence than actual violence and a lot more talk about "being hard" and riding "missions' for the gang than occur (i.e., "I'm down for a Jihad"). Indeed, gang life is often portrayed as exciting and glamorous and extremist life as "five-star jihad" and revolutionary.[23] The symbology of gangs as well as terror groups has been greatly enhanced by the expansion of online outlets and social media.[24] It is now easier than ever before for gangs and terror groups to express violent messages, whether or not they actually intend to act on those messages. Often the threat of violence – for both gangs and terror groups – is enough to accomplish an objective. Researchers need to integrate approaches to include this reality into their methodology, particularly because official sources tend to exaggerate the extent of the problem and violence related to it. This is counter-productive as it gives groups more recognition than they merit and recognition is an important commodity to such groups,

Eighth: research must be held accountable for false positives and false negatives. Gang research has not done a good job of assessing risk for involvement in crime. We can say with great confidence that gang membership increases criminal behavior—there are scores of studies with rigorous methodology that lend support to such as conclusion. However, not all gang members are criminals and not all criminals are gang members. That is, we know a lot about how rates of criminal behavior are higher between gang and non-gang populations as well as how this behavior changes upon entering and existing gangs. Yet little is known about distinguishing high-rate gang offenders from low-rate gang (and from non-) offenders. The message here is that research on terrorism and radicalization should assess risk carefully and assign interventions accordingly. Phelan Wyrick identifies a "pyramid" of problems and responses, arguing that the small number of the most serious offenders should receive the most serious of interventions.[25] This has served to focus intervention and prevention efforts more effectively and efficiently. This harkens back to the point that blanket labels of "gang member" or "radical" (or extremist) should be used with caution or used in tandem with behaviors rather than beliefs.

Ninth: understand the network of opposition underpinning extra-legal groups. Gangs are oppositional groups that thrive on enemies and conflict, real and constructed. Indeed, no gang could survive without a rival. There is a reason that it is almost impossible to find a city with only one gang. Conflicts and enemies spawn an oppositional culture – a culture in which defeating enemies is more important than achieving goals. Without such elements of an oppositional culture, gangs could not exist. This oppositional aspect of gangs has a direct referent to groups that engage in terrorist activities. The symbols, activities, and causes of radicalized groups reflect their oppositional nature.[26] In most cases the government or certain cultures is the rival for terrorist groups and often a major goal of such groups is to provoke a reaction or in some cases an over-reaction.[27] Indeed this is one of the areas where the correspondence between terrorism and gang research is the strongest: both need enemies to exist and grow.

Tenth: there is a need for theory making and theory testing. Where advances have been made in the study of gang worlds, these reflect equilibrium between theory making and theory testing. Any tilt in the scales will either lead to the over- or under-abundance of ideas that will advance the literature. This was the case in the "golden era" of gang research around 1960, when sociological theory was steeped in the culture of the gang. Yet as Malcolm Klein noted about the state of gang theories in the 1960s: "many of the theoretical statements about gangs currently so widely accepted as fact are nothing of the sort. Rather, they are either undemonstrated, non-demonstrable, or actually demonstrated to be in error."[28] Likewise, much of the gang research over the last twenty years has moved toward empiricism, mostly at the individual-level study of gang members, at the expense of advances in theory.[29] The extremism literature appears to suffer from an over-abundance of theory and an under-abundance of testing.[30] The fact that terrorist acts are rare events in most countries, as are radicalization processes and extremist beliefs, violent extremism researchers are hard pressed to have access to readily available data sources, let alone data capable to testing theories. The survey and

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longitudinal research revolution in the social sciences in the 1980s and 1990s set in motion an explosion of gang research (actually, gang member research) based on many of the ideas and theories found in the fieldwork and theories of prior decades.

Eleventh: **comparative research will offer greater returns to knowledge than research conducted in isolation.** A special emphasis should be placed on the emergence of groups and cultures and how they each differ in form and function. The field of public health inquires whether close contact is required for the transmission of disease. Do gangs and extremist group spread through direct contact with other gang members or extremists or are there some alternative dissemination mechanisms? This was a key issue for gang researchers in the 1980s and 1990s when gang activity expanded greatly across the United States. It was necessary to determine whether gangs were franchising into new territories or whether gang symbology was being adopted by marginalized youth.[31] An analogous vein of this problem is found in Latin America for "pandilla" (i.e., homegrown, localized) and "mara" (i.e., transnational roots, deportation) gangs. These very questions are of unquestionable import to the study of terrorism, radicalization, and extremism, especially with the increasing importance placed on the movement of extremist persons (e.g., foreign fighters) and the transmission of extremist beliefs (e.g., homegrown radicals). By its nature research on terrorism and extremism is comparative and crosses state boundaries, yet a comparative research agenda is ripe for addressing questions that

reach the very core of the study of extra-legal groups. The gang world has only recently embarked on such an agenda with the emergence of the important Eurogang research platform.[32] That platform can be a model for developing consensus definitions, methods, and international collaboration efforts.

Conclusion

There are many points of divergence between the study of, and response to, gangs and groups involved in terrorism. That said, the points of overlap are so substantial that it would be disappointing not to learn from the successes (and the many failures) of gang research. These include characteristics of the individuals involved, the groups and their activities. We would advocate for a theoretical platform organized around Jim Short's levels of explanation and a comparative research platform organized along the lines of the Eurogang program of research. Together this would provide a collection of ideas and theory and a core methodological basis to study them. It took gang research nearly 100 years to reach a semblance of a solid base of scientific knowledge. Malcolm Klein lamented that it took gang research too long to get there and that this process would have been hastened with greater loyalty to a comparative research agenda.[33] Indeed, one only has to look at the homicide counts in the U.S. and see that there have been over 30,000 gang-related deaths since the 1990s to agree with the sentiment expressed by Klein. The threat of extremism and terrorism is too great to ignore the success or repeat the missteps of gang research, practice, and policy.

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▶ **Notes are available at source's URL.**

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User

# Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 16 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-related Subjects
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/407/html

This column consists of capsule reviews of books published by various publishers, with the authors listed in alphabetical order. Please note that most of these books were recently published, with several published over the past several years but deserving renewed interest.

Yaniv Barzilai, 102 Days of War: How Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda & the Taliban Survived 2001 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013). 194 pp., US $ 19.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1612345338.

A detailed, authoritative and extensively footnoted account of how al Qaida, led by Osama bin Laden, succeeded in escaping from Afghanistan into Pakistan, following the United States-led intervention that overthrew the Taliban regime in late 2001. The book also chronicles the Pakistani government's efforts to assist the Taliban's retreat into Pakistan. Al Qaida and the Taliban were not defeated at the time, the author writes, because "The absence of unanimity over the objectives for Operation Enduring Freedom reflected a lack of united strategic vision that would ultimately enable al Qaeda to continue its existence in the region. While most of the [United States] civilian and military leaders recognized that al Qaeda and the Taliban were the enemies, a clear and unified understanding of how to defeat these adversaries never emerged. The President and his subordinates considered the primary objective to be to remove Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorism" (pp. 46-47). In the Epilogue, the author concludes that in contrast to the Battle of Tora Bora, which took place in December 2001, where U.S.-led forces had failed to prevent al Qaida's escape from Afghanistan, the U.S. government, under President Barack Obama, succeeded in finally killing bin Laden in his hideaway in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, because this operation "was planned during a stable and routine time of the Obama presidency," where counterterrorism campaign planners "had the time to proceed through a deliberate and composed decision-making process." (p. 125). The author is a foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State.

Paul Berman, The Flight of the Intellectuals: The Controversy Over Islamism and the Press (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2011). 304 pp., US $ 11.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1935554448.

Taking the form of a polemic, this well-written book examines the intellectual atmosphere in the West that caused prominent non-Muslim intellectuals and journalists, such as Timothy G. Ash and Ian Buruma, to "fumble badly" in their appeasement of Islamist ideas and accompanying terrorist violence, with Swiss- and UK-based Tariq Ramadan (the grandson of Hassan al Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), succeeding in 'deceiving' his Western audience that Islamism is compatible with Western democratic and pluralistic values. This polemic is set against the larger context of how some Western intellectuals responded to the Rushdie Affair (when the Iranian Islamic Republic had issued a fatwa against Salman Rushdie in February 1989 in reaction to the publication of his novel "The Satanic Verses" the previous year), with the author concluding that "The Rushdies of today find themselves under criticism, contrasted unfavorably in the very best of magazines with Tariq Ramadan, who is celebrated as a bridge between cultures – Ramadan, an alumnus of the anti-Rushdie Islamic Foundation in Britain." (p. 298). Paul Berman is an American writer on politics and literature.

Robert J. Bunker and Charles "Sid" Heal (Eds.), Fifth Dimensional Operations: Space-Time-Cyber Dimensionality in Conflict and War [A Terrorism Research Center Book] (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse LLC, 2014). 290 pp., US $ 21.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1491738726.

The contributors to this edited volume examine what is termed "fifth dimensional operations" in conflict and war, which, as explained by Charles "Sid" Heal, one of the contributors, is cyberspace, with the other four consisting of the three dimensional "space" (length, width and height/depth), with the fourth dimension being "time." The fifth dimension plays an important role in counterterrorism, Robert Bunker explains in his introductory chapter, because it is in the "cyber" battlespace that a terrorist operative's movements might come under camera surveillance, which would make it possible to eventually apprehend him in "physical" space. As Mr. Heal explains, "Of critical importance is to understand that each of these five dimensions is fundamentally distinct from one another and rules for one dimension are completely irrelevant for another. For example, speed in space means nothing without time and there is no distance in time. Likewise, in cyberspace, time and space are completely irrelevant for one simple reason: knowledge can reside in more than one place at the same time" (p. 129). Mr. Heal then concludes that "Despite their fundamental differences all five dimensions interact with one another with humans the common 'go between' or element" (p.129). The book is composed of an introduction, 14 chapters (most of which were previously published, beginning in 1998), a postscript, a symbol key and glossary, and appendices. Dr. Bunker is a Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, while Mr. Heal is a retired Commander, Los Angeles Sheriffs Department.

Ophir Falk and Henry Morgenstern (Eds.), Suicide Terror: Understanding and Confronting the Threat (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009). 336 pp., US $ 107.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-470-44776-5.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the threat of suicide terrorism in all its dimensions. This ranges from a general overview, how the global jihad, including al Qaida, employs suicide terrorism, the use of suicide terrorism against Israel and the United States, and how suicide terrorism is employed worldwide in countries such as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, India, Turkey, and Chechnya. They also discuss high-risk future scenarios in suicide terrorism (such as against energy facilities, civilian aircraft, maritime targets, and subways), countermeasures against suicide terrorism, and medical management of suicide terrorist incidents. Much of the material will be of special interest to law enforcement and public safety practitioners as it deals with the types of weapons and tactics employed by the groups and the operatives who carry out suicide bombings. There is also an invaluable chapter by Shmuel C. Shapira and Leonard A. Cole on the medical components in managing those injured by such mass casualty incidents. While most of the incidents covered in the book do involve suicide bombing tactics, a few do not, such as the March 2003 Madrid train bombings. One of the book's future scenarios involves a MANPAD attack against a civilian airliner, which represents a more conventional 'attack and escape' tactic. While the book's sections on profiling the characteristics of suicide operatives are weak, this volume's discussions of the mechanics and modus operandi of suicide terrorism represent an important contribution to the literature on this topic. Mr. Falk, an attorney, is a noted Israeli counterterrorism expert, and Mr. Morgenstern is President of the American-based Security Solutions International.

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Edward Follis and Douglas Century, The Dark Art: My Undercover Life in Global Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Gotham Books, 2014). 288 pp., US $ 28.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1592408931.

This is a highly engaging personal account by a former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent of his 27-year career, including operating as an undercover agent in drug cartel hotspots such as Mexico and

the front lines of counterterrorism in Afghanistan after 9/11, where he served as a DEA attaché at the American Embassy in Kabul, and dealt with the country's criminal drug lords. With the discipline of threat convergence involving the close intersection of terrorism and criminality becoming increasingly prominent in terrorism and counterterrorism studies, readers will benefit from the author's description of his numerous encounters with 'narco-terrorists', including his conclusion that "Indeed, narco-terrorism is now the face of twenty-first-century organized crime. Far-flung groups like the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, and FARC…are two-headed monsters: hybrids of highly structured global drug-trafficking cartels and politically motivated terrorists" (p. 248).

Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region: Corruption, Contraband, Jihad and the Mali War of 2012-2013 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014). 273 pp., US $ 119.95 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1409454755.

A comprehensive account of the historical origins, current manifestations, and possible future trends regarding terrorist and insurgent outbreaks in the Sahara-Sahel region, focusing, in particular, on Algeria, Mali, and Nigeria. The volume includes a discussion of the effectiveness of international and regional initiatives to counter the spread of these insurgencies. Among the author's numerous findings are that "southern Libya may become the Sahara's new terrorist haven now that northern Mali has been largely denied to them," and that "The problems facing Mali are not particular to one country but are regional issues: Islamic extremism and the terrorism it frequently generates; the organized criminal networks that thrive off of the price differentials resulting from arguably artificial borders in the Sahara-Sahel zone; and the problem of corruption in political and economic relations that eats away at the social contract and the economic base of society" (pp. 228-229). Dr. Harmon is a Professor in Pittsburg State University's Department of History, Philosophy and Social Sciences.

Shane Harris, @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex (Boston, MA: An Eamon Dolan Book/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). 304 pages, US$27.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0544251793.

An interesting journalistic examination of the latest technological trends in the American government's attempt to 'control' cyberspace, where its relentless cyber adversaries range from states (such as China and Iran) to sub-state actors, such as the Anonymous hacktivist group and overseas criminal cyber networks. Developing the capabilities to mount such countermeasures is so challenging and pervasive, the author writes, that the American government has mobilized the country's private sector to support the development of cutting edge cyber tools to counter its cyber adversaries, as well as to build up its own cyber 'offensive' capability, with cyber-warfare becoming a crucial component in a state's modern warfare arsenal on the 'ground' and in 'cyber' space. As to future trends, the author points out that, in one such trend, to protect people from cyber threats (especially in the form of cyber breaches of one's bank accounts or other types of personal stored information), companies are likely to create "Internet safe zones," consisting of new domain names for their websites. The author is a senior writer with the "Foreign Policy" magazine and a Fellow at the Washington, DC-based New America Foundation.

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Jennifer Hesterman, Soft Target Hardening: Protecting People from Attack (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015). 321 pp., US $ 62.96 [Hardcover], ISBN 9781482244212.

Since this reviewer wrote the book's Foreword, this should not be considered a review, but a capsule write-up of the book's contents. The volume's chapters cover topics such as defining soft targets (e.g., schools, religious houses of worship, hospitals, shopping malls, sports and entertainment venues), motivations by terrorists to target such facilities, and how such soft targets can be hardened through various security measures to deter terrorists from attacking them. The appendices include various checklists on risk mitigation, including a bomb threat standoff chart. The author is a retired Colonel in the U.S. Air Force who had commanded

emergency response forces at military facilities. She is currently a private consultant.

Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2009). 303 pp., US $ 26.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781933633596.

A comprehensive account of the Pakistani-supported Islamist jihad in Indian-controlled Kashmir, from its inception in 1947 until early 2008. It focuses, in particular, on the rise of Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest jihad group in Kashmir, while briefly discussing other prominent Pakistani jihadi militant groups such as Lashkar-i-Taiba and the Jaish-i-Mohammad. Although the book's coverage is dated, it still provides a valuable background for understanding current developments in Kashmir, especially in light of the author's forecast that "If the jihadis continue spreading their influence, which is the most likely emerging scenario, they will ultimately extend their control to the borders of Jammu and Kashmir in the East and of Afghanistan in the West, connecting the two. If the territory between Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan come under control of jihadis, they would be able to freely move between Kashmir and Afghanistan" (pp. 271-272). While current development in Kashmir likely preclude a jihadi military victory in that territory, the author is likely correct in his prediction of increasing territorial control by the Pakistani-backed Taliban in Afghanistan, thereby providing their Kashmiri insurgents greater incentives to continue their armed struggle in Indian Kashmir. The author is a leading Pakistani journalist.

Roy Licklider (Ed.), New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014). 320 pp., US $ 54.95 [Hardcover], US $ 34.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1626160439.

The contributors to this edited volume examine different categories that characterize the way that states that emerge from protracted civil war attempt to integrate former rival militaries (including terrorist and guerrilla forces) into their newly reformed and reconstituted military armies. The volume's case studies attempt to answer three overarching research questions: "(1) Why has military integration been used? (2) What particular strategies seem to work better under what circumstances? (3) Has successful integration made the resumption of civil war less likely?" (p.3). To apply this conceptual framework, the volume's chapters cover military integration cases such as Sudan (1971), Zimbabwe (1980), Lebanon (1989), Cambodia (1991), Angola (1994), Bosnia (1995), South Africa (1997), and Burundi (2004). The concluding chapter by Roy Licklider is especially insightful, as he discusses the nature of those integration efforts that were most effective (e.g., when former adversaries are integrated as individuals rather than units). He finds that international assistance is often useful, that quotas actually do work, and, citing one of the volume's contributors, that "the success of military integration depends on the political will of the local elites." (pp. 260–261) This volume's conceptual framework and findings are especially pertinent to the current period, particularly in shedding light on the factors that appear to be absent in the unsuccessful military integration efforts in Iraq's Shi'ite dominated military. Roy Licklider is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

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Kirk S. Lippold, Front Burner: Al Qaeda's Attack on the USS Cole (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2012). 408 pp., US $ 27.99 [Hardcover], US $ 16.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1610391245.

A personal account by the commander of the USS Cole of the events that preceded and followed the suicide terrorist attack by al Qaida operatives against his ship when it was docked in the port of Aden in Yemen on October 12, 2000. Seventeen American sailors were killed and 37 were wounded in the attack, with the ship itself being saved and eventually refurbished for future sailing. What makes Commander Lippold's book of special interest is his detailed and objective account, including his inclusion and discussion of numerous government reports and investigations about the circumstances that led to the attack, particularly an examination of the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism force protection measures that were in place at the time, including the threat environment in Yemen. Also of interest is Commander Lippold's account of the aftermath of the attack and the circumstances that prevented him from being further promoted in the Navy.

Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Aftermath (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2014). 272 pp., US $ 19.99 [Hardcover], US$ 13.55 [Paperback], ISBN: 9781935554004.

This is a balanced and objective discussion of the chain of events that followed the 1988 publication of

Salman Rushdie's novel, "The Satanic Verses," that led to the issuance of the fatwa by the Iranian Islamist government the following year. The fatwa called for Rushdie's assassination and the murder of anyone associated with the book's publication or selling. This chain of events, the author writes, also transformed the relationship between the radicalized version of Islam and the West into a war of terror that became unconstrained geographically, leading to its current explosive manifestation. In one of the book's numerous insightful passages about the impact of the Rushdie affair on Western writers, Mr. Malik quotes the British novelist Hanif Kureishi's observation that "The fatwa 'created a climate of terror and fear. Writers had to think about what they were writing in a way they never had to before. Free speech became an issue as it had not been before. Liberals had to take a stand, to defend an ideology [i.e., liberalism and free speech] they had not really had to think about before.'" (p. 202) One may not, however, necessarily agree with the author's conclusion that Western 'overreaction' "helped build a culture of grievance in which being offended has become a badge of identity, cleared a space for radical Islamists to flourish, and made secular and progressive arguments less sayable, particularly within Muslim communities" (p. 210). Nevertheless, the issues raised by Mr. Malik's important book form the very essence of the intellectual debate currently raging in the West about how to deal with integration problems and grievances being expressed by many segments in Muslim communities in Western societies. These can now be better understood within the context of the earlier Rushdie affair. Mr. Malik is an English writer and broadcaster.

Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benar, Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 245 pp., US $ 32.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 9781107437203.

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A detailed and comprehensive examination of the size and demography of Europe's Muslim populations, the origins, patterns and networks of Islamist radicalization, mobilization and recruitment into violent extremist movements in these societies, the nature of jihadist ideology and strategy, case studies of Islamist terrorist operations and tactics in Europe, and the types of responses by the continent's governments against such threats. Also discussed are recent developments, particularly the impact of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria on the radicalization and mobilization of Western Muslims, turning several thousands into becoming foreign fighters on behalf of al-Qaida type insurgents in those conflicts. One of the authors' findings, which is pertinent to the current period, is that "The grievances that propel radicalization and violence are largely vicarious in nature. The motivating factors need not be, and often are not, part of the personal experience of the individual. More frequently, radicalization is fostered by narratives of Muslim oppression in areas of conflict outside of Europe" (p. 192). Both authors are senior analysts at the RAND Corporation.

David Scharia, Judicial Review of National Security (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015). 296 pp., US $ 85.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9780199393367.

An important examination of how the Israeli Supreme Court has developed an informal set of judicial tools, which the author terms "advisory dialogue," that enable it to review the legality of certain types of military actions, particularly within the context of an ongoing counterterrorism campaign (such as a

hostage taking event or imminent targeted killing operation), that require urgent review, to ensure that both expeditious counter-measures against suspected terrorists and the rule of law are adhered to in a timely manner by all government bodies, ranging from the Executive, the Attorney General, the intelligence community, and the military. This is important, the author writes, so that not only in the case of Israel but in other countries, as well, "By exercising judicial review through advisory dialogue courts can overcome several of their institutional disadvantages on questions pertaining to national security. It could mitigate the tension between the wish to promote human rights and the wish to avoid inter-branch conflict in time of emergency" (p. 235) Dr. Scharia is the Coordinator of the Legal and Criminal Justice Group at the United Nations Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). He had previously worked in Israel at the Supreme Court division in the Attorney General's office.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (Brooklyn, New York: Melville House, 2014). 576 pp., US $ 16.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 9781612194851.

This volume, re-published by a commercial publisher, is the complete official declassified and redacted summary report of the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) so-called "enhanced" interrogation and covert detention program established in the aftermath of al Qaida's 9/11 attacks. This unclassified summary report is based on the full report, numbering some 6,700 pages, which remains classified, and which took five years to produce, together with this volume released by the U.S. government in early December 2014. This volume is divided into seven sections, including background on the Senate committee's study, the overall history and operation of the CIA's detention and interrogation program, intelligence acquired through the interrogation program, a review of the CIA's reporting on its interrogation program to the media, the Department of Justice, Congress, and other bodies, and several appendices. This summary report, as well as the full report, have been criticized by the CIA and Republican members of Congress for providing an inaccurate account of the interrogation program and its effectiveness–unlike "The 9/11 Commission Report" (officially known as the "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States"), which was published in July 2004 and was widely praised for its objectivity and insight.

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Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA's Drone War on al Qaeda (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013). 256 pp., US $ 29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1612346175.
A comprehensive and detailed examination of the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence and military services' armed drone campaign against suspected terrorist operatives associated with al Qaeda and its affiliates (including the Pakistani Taliban), whether in Pakistan, Yemen, or elsewhere. Following a discussion of how drones evolved to become an important component in the American counterterrorism campaign against al Qaida–which is illustrated with numerous case studies of their use against such terrorist operatives–the author devotes two chapters to a discussion of the arguments "for" and "against" their use. The employment of drones, the author points out, "have saved civilian lives" by disrupting potential plots to carry out terrorist acts in the West (p. 170), and their "constant threat of attack or surveillance has forced the Taliban and al Qaeda to dismantle their training camps in favor of hidden classrooms or dugouts in the mountains," (p.181). He also finds that drones have weakened these organizations' leadership by eliminating top leaders, thereby forcing them to elevate inexperienced mid-level operatives "to higher positions in the organization" (p.181). Arguments against their use, according to the author, include the fact that they "are not perfect; they can (and do) make mistakes that lead to [collateral] civilian deaths" (p. 213). The author concludes that "drones represent the future of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in remote, unpoliced lands, such as Pakistan's FATA region, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. Where U.S. troops cannot be placed on the ground, drones will increasingly fly to strike at those whom America deems to be its enemies" (p. 229). Brian Williams is professor of Islamic history at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth.

Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

Reviewed by Teun van Dongen
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/406/html

With the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) continuing to make gains in Syria and Iraq, where it controls large swaths of territory, the need to understand the insurgent group is paramount. The problem, however, is that it is exceedingly dangerous to obtain the type of inside information that is necessary to develop a deep understanding of the way the group functions. The Islamic State's atrocities are well-documented, of course, but we have little to go on when it comes to the group's inner workings. Against this background, one would be inclined to welcome the fact that in recent months Patrick Cockburn and Loretta Napoleoni each published a book about the Islamic State.

Cockburn is a veteran Middle East correspondent for the British newspaper The Independent and wrote several books about the conflicts that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein, and Napoleoni is a well-known expert on the financing of terrorism and author of a book about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led al Qaeda in Iraq, one of ISIS' predecessors. But while Cockburn and Napoleoni both have good credentials to write on these issues, their books show that they, too, are finding it difficult to shed new light on the Islamic State's emir Al-Baghdadi and his forces.

Cockburn's book, The rise of ISIS and the new Sunni uprising, is strongly focused on the contextual factors that enabled the Islamic State to emerge victorious in the current Iraqi/Syrian conflict. Cockburn convincingly explains that the Islamic State's rise was made possible by the anti-Sunni bias of the Iraqi Shi'ite government, the export of Wahhabism from Saudi-Arabia and the susceptibility of the Sunni population to media outlets other than state propaganda and unreliable Western reporting.

But while he does a good job explaining the context in which the Islamic State seized power in the portions of territory under its control, the group itself is strangely absent from Cockburn's account. Perhaps because he lacks the information needed to do so, Cockburn says almost nothing about what the Islamic State itself did to get where it is today. Thus, the rise of ISIS comes across as a natural phenomenon that followed necessarily from a confluence of several enabling factors. Some ham-fisted comparisons to Nazi Germany and fascism aside, Cockburn does little to elucidate the nature and actions of the group whose rise he tries to explain.

Unlike The jihadis return, Loretta Napoleoni's The Islamic Phoenix: the Islamic State and the redrawing of the Middle East does discuss the Islamic State directly. Napoleoni ably chronicles the origins and resurrection of the organisation that became the Islamic State and compares it to other terrorist groups that controlled territory, arguing that what is new about the Islamic State is the group's swift success rather than its terrorist nature as such.

Unfortunately, Napoleoni's book, like Cockburn's, is hamstrung by a lack of reliable inside information. The Islamic State puts out vast amounts of propaganda, but keeps a lid on its inner workings, the result being that little is known about Al-Baghdadi's organisation beyond its cruelty and its military successes. As Napoleoni's book is largely based on media reports and analyses of these successes, her account is less than balanced. Indeed, she is so impressed by the Islamic State's sudden rise that she frequently overstates the group's political ingenuity. For

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
instance, she repeatedly stresses the Islamic State's political skills and pragmatism, but fails to observe that the group's publicly displayed cruelty was instrumental in mobilising the international coalition that is currently blocking its northward offensive. Add to this the puzzling claims Napoleoni occasionally makes, the most bewildering being that "[t]he Caliphate is no more violent and barbarous than any other armed organization in recent memory" (p. 45) and that the Islamic State wants to rule "with the consent of the governed" (p. 36), and it is clear that her book is seriously flawed. **All of this is not to say that the two books are outright failures.** They adequately lay down the background and history of the current conflict and will be highly readable introductions for readers who are new to the topic. At the same time, though, lacking new information, Cockburn and Napoleoni do not add much to the freely available media reporting and commentary on the Islamic State, which begs the question to what extent we can know and understand the Islamic State at all. After all, if even the books of two seasoned and rightfully celebrated authors like Cockburn and Napoleoni are ultimately forgettable efforts, perhaps we should accept that the Islamic State will remain a black box, at least for the time being.

Teun van Dongen is an independent national and international security expert. In November 2014 he successfully defended his PhD dissertation 'The Science of Fighting Terrorism. The Relation between Terrorist Actor Type and Counterterrorism Effectiveness' (579 pp.) at Leiden University.

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

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Bibliography: Foreign Fighters of Terrorism
Compiled by Eric Price
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/409/html

Eric Price is a professional information specialist who joined 'Perspectives on Terrorism' as an Editorial Assistant after his retirement from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age

By Cristina Archetti
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/401/html

This article aims to demonstrate that a greater understanding of communication in the 21st century is essential to more effective counterterrorism. In fact, while "strategic communication" and "narratives" are advocated by many analysts as essential weapons in countering extremism, few seem to truly understand the reality of the digital-age information environment where such tools need to be deployed. To contribute to bridging this gap, the article outlines some problematic misunderstandings of the contemporary information environment, provides an alternative communication-based framework to explain radicalization, and draws some counterintuitive lessons for tackling terrorism.

Dr. Cristina Archetti is Associate Professor in Politics and Media at the University of Salford, UK. She is author of 'Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach' (2012, Palgrave). Her research

interests cover the intersection between security, politics, and strategic communication. She serves on the editorial board of the journal 'Critical Studies on Terrorism' and has been teaching the master level course 'Terrorism and the Media' since 2008.

When Terrorists and Target Governments Cooperate: the Case of Syria

By Michael Becker
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/404/html

In the course of the Syrian Civil War, the Syrian government has had an unusual relationship with the numerous groups seeking to overthrow it; at times, the government of Bashar al-Assad has deliberately avoided engaging the more radical elements of the opposition, including the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State, and has also purchased oil from them, effectively bankrolling some of ISIS' operations. This case thus represents an unusual—but not totally unique—instance of indirect cooperation between a militant group and the government being targeted by it. Taking the Syrian case as a point of departure, the Research Note investigates the circumstances under which target governments and militant groups each benefit from having the other as a foil. The findings of the Syrian case indicate that such tacit cooperation is more likely in circumstances where opposition forces are ideologically fragmented, where intervention by external states is likely, and where governments are faced with existential threats.

Michael Becker is a Ph.D. student in political science at Northeastern University, specializing in international security and conflict studies.

France seizes passports of six 'Syria-bound' citizens

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31587651

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French authorities have for the first time confiscated the passports of six nationals who were allegedly planning to travel to Syria to join jihadists.

Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve said the intelligence services believed the men wanted to join the Islamic State (IS) militant group.

The measure is part of new counter-terrorism laws adopted last November.

Meanwhile, France has deployed an aircraft carrier off Bahrain to be used against Islamic State (IS) militants.

Planes from the Charles de Gaulle carrier will be used against IS positions in Iraq, a spokesman for Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said.

The first Rafale fighter jet took off on Monday morning from the carrier as it sailed about

200km (120 miles) off the northern coast of Bahrain.

Correspondents say that the deployment of the warship will halve the time it takes for military aircraft - which normally fly from the United Arab Emirates - to reach Iraq.

France began Operation Chammal in support of the US-led coalition against IS in September.

Phone hotline

Mr Cazeneuve said authorities had acted against the six men after their departure to Syria appeared to be imminent.

Their passports and identity cards have been confiscated for six months, after which the order can be renewed. They have the right to appeal against the move in court.

Analysis: Dina Newman, BBC News

France is not the only European country that can now confiscate passports from would-be jihadists to stop them from travelling to Syria.

In the UK, police can now seize the passports for up to 30 days from nationals trying to leave the country, and can temporarily prevent citizens suspected of involvement with Islamic State from re-entering Britain. The Home Secretary says she has removed passports from 25 suspected jihadists.

German law allows authorities to seize passports, but not personal identity cards that allow entry to EU countries and to Turkey - a gateway to Syria for jihadists. A new draft law would allow the removal of identity cards and their replacement with a document banning foreign travel.

In Sweden, the government is drafting a law that would allow the confiscation of passports from people known to have fought alongside jihadists in the Middle East.

According to French media, some of the men were reported to the authorities by relatives using a newly established telephone hotline, while others were identified by police investigations.

French officials quoted by the Reuters news agency estimate that about 400 French citizens are in Syria, 180 have returned to France, 200 want to go and 200 are somewhere in Europe trying to get there.

France has been on alert after 17 people were killed in attacks on the satirical Charlie Hebdo magazine and a Jewish supermarket in January.

Foreign fighters from Europe involved in Iraq and Syria

Country	Fighters
France	~1400
United Kingdom	~600
Germany	~600
Belgium	~350
Sweden	~300
Netherlands	~170
Kosovo	~130
Denmark	~120
Spain	~70
Norway	~60
Ireland	~60
Finland	~70
Switzerland	~30

Source: ICSR, UK government, German Interior Ministry, Dutch Ministry of Justice, Swedish Security Service, BBC and press reports, Soufan Group

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UK officials think some 600 Britons have fought in Syria, with 300 having returned. Police can now seize passports for up to 30 days from nationals trying to leave the country, in addition to temporarily stopping citizens suspected of involvement with IS from entering Britain.

Last week, three British schoolgirls were said to have left London to travel to Syria through Turkey.

Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey was working intensively with the British authorities to trace the three schoolgirls.

Thousands of foreigners from more than 80 nations have joined Islamic State and other radical groups in Syria and Iraq, many crossing through Turkey. However, correspondents say they only represent a small amount of the total number of IS fighters.

Turkey has said it needs more information from the West if it is to intercept them. Mr Kalin said that his country had already deported 1,400 people suspected of attempting to join extremist groups.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Biiiiigggg mistake!!!

A look at terror rivals: Islamic State and al Shabaab

Source: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/02/23/rivals-islamic-state-al-shabaab-treaten-usa-malls/23899397/

Young Somali-Americans have been targeted for recruitment by two terror groups, the Islamic State and al-Shabab.
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson on Sunday urged visitors to the Mall of America in Minneapolis to be vigilant because of a recent al-Shabab video calling for attacks there and in other U.S. and Canadian malls. The Islamic State terror group has also called on its followers to attack U.S. shopping centers.

Both groups have similar aims and tactics, seeking to create a religious state ruled according to their radical interpretation of Sunni Islam. But the Islamic State is much larger and appeals to radicals across a broader geographical area.

Al-Shabab is based in Somalia. It linked up with al-Qaeda and launched suicide bombings and attacks on international targets. After Kenya joined an international military coalition against al-Shabab in Somalia, the group attacked a mall in Nairobi, killing 67 people.

U.S. drone attacks and troops from neighboring countries have reduced the group's territory and established an interim government in Somalia.

The Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, began as al-Qaeda in Iraq during the Iraq War, when it battled U.S. troops and killed hundreds of Iraqi Shiites with suicide bombings. U.S. troops joined forces with moderate Sunni tribes that turned against al-Qaeda in return for a role in their own security.

When the Syrian civil war began, Syrian leader Bashar Assad released several leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who expanded their operations in Syria. The group changed its name to the Islamic State and extended its control over parts of Syria and Iraq.

The Islamic State has engaged in extreme atrocities that include mass beheadings, crucifixions and burning victims alive — many of them filmed for propaganda purposes. Its operations have spread to parts of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Libya, and it has a presence in at least a half-dozen other countries from Afghanistan to Algeria.

Al-Qaeda is still al-Shabab's sponsor but has rejected the Islamic State's brutal tactics as unproductive.

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Narco-Terror Group Hezbollah Operates Across Latin America and US

Source: http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/10/narco-terror-group-hezbollah-operates-across-latin-america-and-us/

Experts at a National Defense University (NDU) conference warned that the Iranian-backed narcoterrorist group Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, has expanded across Latin American and into the United States.

The Shiite movement group, which is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, generates millions of dollars through drug trafficking, money laundering, and other criminal activities in the Americas, the experts said during a conference at NDU entitled, "Beyond Convergence: A World Without Order."
Iran is considered a state-sponsor of terrorism by the U.S.

Nevertheless, the Obama administration has reportedly conceded to most demands in negotiations over Iran's nuclear program.

In written testimony recently prepared for lawmakers, the **U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) expressed concern about the movement of "special interest aliens" in Latin America.**
Special interests aliens refers to immigrants from countries such as Iran, which have been officially linked to terrorism by the United States.

Breitbart News reported that U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended at least 474 aliens from terrorism-linked countries

attempting to sneak into the United States illegally last year.

"Outside actors are increasingly seeking to challenge the U.S. as the defense partner of choice in the [Latin American] region," testified the defense intel agency. Some speakers at the NDU conference identified Russia, Iran, and China as "outside actors" in Latin America.

The experts' comments at the conference concerning Hezbollah's spread in Latin America came on the heels of reports that an explosive device allegedly linked to an Iranian diplomat was found by the Israeli embassy in Uruguay.

Dr. Matt Levitt, director of the Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, pointed out that Iran has "created a foreign Shiite legion" that includes thousands of members of Hezbollah and the Quds Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

He compared the manpower behind Iran's "Shiite foreign legion" to estimates of foreign militants fighting for the Sunni jihadist group Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL) in Iraq and Syria.

"We are completely fixated and for good reason on the Sunni foreign fighters — some 20,000 foreign fighters from around the world… and about 5,000 from the West," said Dr. Levitt. "That should get your attention, but there are at least as many Shiite foreign fighters."

"These guys are not going to simply hang up their coats and go back to being farmers or what not because, at the end of the day, this is something that Iran is going to have in its back pocket — that's its network to leverage horrible kinds of things at the end of the day," he continued.

Dr. David Asher, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, explained that Hezbollah exemplifies a convergence between terrorism and criminal activities such as drug trafficking.

"Hezbollah has morphed from being a terrorist organization and resistance movement to becoming a transnational criminal resistance organization fueled by a huge illicit financial and business apparatus," said Dr. Asher.

"I consider Hezbollah today to be one of the largest exporters of illicit narcotics from South America and certainly one of the largest facilitators of the export of illicit narcotics from South America to West Africa and into Europe," he added. "And they are probably the world's largest money laundering organization."

U.S. officials had indicated that Hezbollah presence in South America was limited to the region's tri-border area, which includes Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil.

However, Dr. Levitt said the group has expanded beyond that region to other parts in Latin America.

Dr. Asher added that Hezbollah draws part of its memberships from the Lebanese diaspora in Latin America and the United States, which includes thousands of individuals.

He cited illicit criminal activity linked to the group in U.S. courts.

"In Latin America, transnational threats such as drug- and arms-trafficking and special interest alien transit, coupled with porous borders, have increased insecurity and challenged stability and prosperity," the U.S. defense intel agency told lawmakers.

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Violent extremism vs. Islamist extremism

By Hisham Melhem

Source: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/02/22/Violent-extremism-vs-Islamist-extremism-.html

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"
Ludwig Wittgenstein

President Obama is a wordsmith. His relatively short political life has been chiseled and shaped by the possibilities and the limits of his language. He bursts on the national stage when he delivered a memorable keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention. In fact, he defined his campaigns and his presidency by few pivotal speeches

that tried to explain his vision of America, domestic decisions, and how he sees the world. Obama the wordsmith struggled with his language the way Obama the president struggled with his decisions. And just as his leadership style and some of his decisions were characterized by tentativeness, excessive caution and deliberation, his between that which is inspirational ambiguous, deceptive and of the Syrian conflict and his extremes of doing nothing or language can also oscillate and that which is deliberately downright Orwellian. His framing claims that his options were the invade Syria are a case in point.

Of terrorists and sophists
President Obama inherited from his predecessor many burdens; a debilitating economic crisis and America's two longest wars, in addition to an illegitimate ugly child named the "War on terror." If former President George W. Bush was known for not doing nuance, for tripping over his tongue and for his absolute "us vs them" formulations, including the "War on terror" and "Islamo-fascism", President Obama is the President who lives in a parallel territory where words and their meanings are at best implied and much more elastic and nuanced to a fault. Towards the end of George W. Bush's presidency, some of his senior officials dropped the much maligned term War on terror when it lost its original meaning (the war against Al Qaeda) and after it became in many Arab and Muslim eyes synonymous with a war on Islam.

President Obama's obsession with leaving the burdens of Iraq, Afghanistan and the wars on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups behind him has muddled his political approach to these challenges and muddled his diction.

President Obama did the right thing when he dropped this term (after all terror is a tactic) and tried to frame the conflict as one against a specific enemy with a known name; Al Qaeda. But Obama and his aides wanted so much to be the antithesis of Bush, to the point where they wanted to drop the word terror and to deny any connection, even if very fuzzy between the terrorists they were meeting on the battlefields and their professed Muslim religion, even where it was clear that the faith has been distorted or highjacked. Thus, the "War on terror" evolved in Obama's world into the "overseas contingency operations, a term reminiscent of the way the Pentagon designated the war in Vietnam as an international armed conflict. Other verbal gems followed. When Major Nidal Hasan attacked his supposed comrades in arms at Fort Hood, the

professional sophists in the Obama administration, bent on denying the politically motivated crime, neutered the word terror from the deed and gave us the term workplace violence.

Leaving the burdens
President Obama's obsession with leaving the burdens of Iraq, Afghanistan and the wars on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups behind him has muddled his political approach to these challenges and muddled his diction. Obama told the nation at the beginning of last year that America must move off a permanent war footing while almost simultaneously denying the mounting threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) describing it in an interview with the New Yorker as a junior varsity basketball team.

The verbal obfuscation and intentional ambiguity of the President and his aides regarding the terror employed by groups that wrap themselves with a perverted Islamist cloak like ISIS and those inspired by it, is disingenuous and downright insulting. When a man claiming allegiance to ISIS attacked a kosher deli in Paris killing four Jews, because of who they were, President Obama suggested that "a bunch of folks" were "randomly shot." And when ISIS in another ritualistic act of savagery slaughtered 21 Egyptian Christians in Libya, because of who they were, the White House statement condemning the killing deliberately omitted their faith. In his recent Op-Ed in the Los Angeles times, the president had to restore their faith. This is the same president who told CNN's Fareed Zakaria in January "I don't quibble with labels. I think we all recognize that this is a particular problem that has roots in Muslim communities."

Countering violent extremism
This week the White House held a three day seminar, strangely dubbed as "a summit," to

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empower local communities, and protect youth against the seductive and sleek online propaganda of ISIS and other terrorist groups. Community and religious leaders, including American Muslims, civil society organizations and government officials deliberated and highlighted their experiments in three "pilot" programs in Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston. The last day included a session in which the President and foreign representatives in the international coalition against ISIS, including foreign ministers from some Arab countries spoke briefly.

The semantic presidency
It was time for the semantic presidency to employ its considerable evasive lexicon for a final framing of the issue at hand. The president had to address the criticism of his administration's refusal to concede that groups like ISIS, Al Qaeda, al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan are "extremist Islamists" because they are animated by a body of literature of fanatical interpretations of the sacred texts of Islam, intolerant religious rulings and fatwas and selective use of religious dogma to justify their horrific ritualistic violence and their warped eschatology. Understanding the "theoretical" underpinnings of these groups, particularly ISIS, will go a long way in developing an equally powerful counter-narrative that admittedly Arabs and Muslims should wage.

The president first stated the obvious "We are not at war with Islam; we are at war with those who have perverted Islam." Then came the counterattack. "Leading up to this summit, there's been a fair amount of debate in the press and among pundits about the words we use to describe and frame this challenge, so I want to be very clear about how I see it," the President said to the conferees. He added "Al Qaeda and ISIL and groups like it are desperate for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as religious leaders, holy warriors in defense of Islam." But President Obama said that "we must never accept the premise that they put forward, because it is a lie." These pretenders "are not religious leaders- they are terrorists."

In his Op-Ed, the president wanted to say that violence and terror is not and should not be identified with a single group, by mentioning the "tragic killings at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin in 2012 and at a Jewish community center in Kansas last year." Obama talked also about the three young Muslim Americans who were brutally killed in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, while acknowledging that we still don't know why they were murdered, but "we know that many Muslim Americans across our country are worried and afraid." But surely, while these acts of violence are abominable, they are or maybe hate crimes carried out by individuals driven by religious and/or ethnic hatred. They cannot and should not be equated with the terror campaigns waged by the likes of ISIS, Al Qaeda and others capable of paralyzing states and whole geographic regions.

The September 2001 attacks exacted a tremendous economic and political cost and led the U.S. to the two longest wars in its history. ISIS's brutality and challenge have forced President Obama to deploy a small contingent of American advisors and Intelligence operatives.

What's in a name?
By not acknowledging the "theological" underpinnings of ISIS, perverted as they may be, President Obama's academic approach and evasive vocabulary muddies the intellectual and religious counter-narrative that should accompany the military assault on ISIS. Political and intellectual clarity in identifying the enemy and the way it frames its ideology and how it sees the world, is an imperative. To deny that ISIS and Al Qaeda have nothing to do with that long history of "Muslim grievances" real or manufactured, or their identification with marginal and extreme historic "scholars" behind some of the most perverted interpretations of Muslim teachings and sacred texts, is to deny that the Crusades or the Inquisition have nothing to do with extreme interpretations of Christianity.

The Israeli settlement drive in the occupied Palestinian territories, notwithstanding its grounding in economics and politics, cannot be fully understood without its Jewish underpinnings.

Marxian purists claim, somewhat correctly, that Leninism distorted Marxism; but there is no denying that Leninism could not have been the powerful movement that it was in the early 20th century, had it not been the illegitimate child of Marxism. A similar relation exists between the theoreticians and

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ideologues of some Islamist movements such as Sayyid Qutb, the radical, intolerant and powerful theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and his atavistic and warped interpretation of the Islamic corpus. Osama Bin Laden's rants echoed loudly and clearly with Qutb's fanatical views.

President Obama urged the nations represented in the conference (mostly the Muslim ones, although he did not say so explicitly) to address the economic and political grievances in their societies and expand the space for human rights and empowerment. These are intrinsically positive demands, although poverty, as he himself admitted does not explain why some people are drawn to terror and violence, or why most terrorist leaders and ideologues happen to be educated and well to do, and operate in advanced and democratic societies, as the history of terrorism in the West since the French Revolution shows. But the President did touch on an important issue that is at the core of the propaganda of Al Qaeda and ISIS against the West.

The victimhood narrative

The President said that Muslim scholars and clerics have a "responsibility to push back not just on twisted interpretations of Islam, but also on the lie that we are somehow engaged in a clash of civilizations; that America and the West are somehow at war with Islam or seek to suppress Muslims, or that we are the cause of every ill in the Middle East." There is no denying that the "West" bears some responsibility for the sorry state of affairs in the Arab world (The legacy of colonialism, military interventions, support for autocratic regimes, and not enough opposition to Israel's denial of Palestinian rights) there is also no denying that

a "victimhood" narrative has been developed over the years and it has been peddled by many Arab scholars, public figures and commentators, be they Islamists or Arab nationalists, claiming that outsiders are in the main, responsible for the miserable conditions in most Arab states and not the Arabs themselves.

At times Arab autocrats, who were supported by the U.S. - such as former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak - encouraged their media to demonize the West, particularly America and Israel (sometimes in ugly anti-Semitic tones) and blame them for almost all the ills that the rulers are responsible for. Wild conspiracy theories are employed to interpret complex and not so complex issues and developments such as the U.S or Israel are behind ISIS, or the 9/11 terror attacks, America wants to divide Iraq or even Egypt, or the West exploits Arab oil.

In recent years the Islamists have waged this propaganda campaign with renewed vigor using the incredible proliferation of the Arabic speaking satellite television channels (owned by Arabs and non-Arabs) and the social media. Yes, it is true that the terrorists are small numerically, but let's remember that great events and revolutions, political movements AND terrorist groups were led by numerically small minorities, highly motivated and determined "vanguards," and yes they have changed history, and not necessarily for the better. There is a minority of radical fanatical Islamist Jihadists, aided by many "useful idiots" in the academic world and media, that enjoys the "soft support" of a significant number of people in a number of Arab and Muslim countries for the Islamists dark views of their own societies, and their animus against the West, particularly the United States.

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Hisham Melhem is the bureau chief of Al Arabiya News Channel in Washington, DC. Melhem has interviewed many American and international public figures, including Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, among others. Melhem speaks regularly at college campuses, think tanks and interest groups on U.S.-Arab relations, political Islam, intra-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli issues, media in the Arab World, Arab images in American media , U.S. public policies and other related topics. He is also the correspondent for Annahar, the leading Lebanese daily. For four years he hosted "Across the Ocean," a weekly current affairs program on U.S.-Arab relations for Al Arabiya.

Mysterious Drones Spotted Flying over Paris

Source: http://news.sky.com/story/1433062/mysterious-drones-spotted-flying-over-paris

Feb 24 – French authorities have been left puzzled by sightings of at least five unexplained drones flying over Paris.

The first drone was spotted in the skies **above the US embassy** (photo below) in the early hours of Tuesday morning, a security source said.

Others were later seen over the **Eiffel Tower** and the **Place de la Concorde**.

Their appearance marked the latest in a series of unexplained drone sightings across France.

A security source said there have "never been so many drones appearing in one night".

Despite stepping up security measures in the wake of January's Charlie Hebdo attacks, authorities have been unable to identify the operators of the drones - including those seen last night.

"It could be a coordinated action but we don't know for now," the source said.

"We did everything to try and catch the operators but they were not found," another source close to the investigation added.

Last month a pilotless aircraft was spotted over the presidential palace in Paris.

There have also been reports of dozens of drones flying over French nuclear power plants in recent months.

In France it is illegal to fly small civilian drones over sensitive areas like nuclear facilities.

They are protected by a no-fly zone that spans a 1.6-mile radius to a height of 1,000 metres.

Terrorism Experts Raise Concerns of More Attacks after U.S. Leaves Afghanistan

Source: http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Terrorism-Experts-Raise-Concerns-More-Attacks.html

Feb 18 – **The United States faces immediate threats from lone-wolf terror attacks and in three years could see more mass casualties if al-Qaida rejuvenates after the American military leaves Afghanistan, terrorism experts said** Tuesday at a Manhattan security conference.

The sobering assessments about the threat of a terror attack by individuals — such as last year when four NYPD officers were attacked by a hatchet-wielding man in Queens — were shared by two prominent counterterrorism experts speaking at the NYPD-sponsored conference at police headquarters.

"I would say the increase in moderate- to small-scale attacks in the West that we have seen since last summer by individual extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely, most immediate threat to the homeland will in fact come from homegrown violent extremists," Nicholas Rasmussen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told hundreds of private and public security experts.

Former CIA deputy director **Michael Morell** agreed with Rasmussen about the danger of lone-wolf strikes like the Paris attack in January that killed 17 people, including three terrorists, and the Denmark shootings this past weekend where the gunman and two others died.

"The lone-wolf kind of attack, that threat to our homeland, the United States of America, has never been greater," Morell said, referring to al-Qaida, its offshoot group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Islamic State group. Those groups use slick Internet campaigns to inspire individuals to attack the West, he said.

Rasmussen briefs President Barack Obama and other White House officials on terrorism. Morell was with President George W. Bush the moment he learned of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. He was with Obama in 2011 when Osama bin Laden was killed. The war against terror has undercut the ability of extremists to hit the United States in a catastrophic Sept. 11-style attack, Rasmussen said, but he and Morell shared the view that continuing the pressure on terrorists groups was key to keeping them off balance.

When the United States leaves Afghanistan, Morell said, he feared the Taliban would gain ground and allow al-Qaida's return. There are about 10,800 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan with a reduction to 5,500 planned by the end of the year. Obama has pledged to bring all troops home except for those guarding the U.S. Embassy in Kabul by the time he leaves office in 2017.

"If they [al-Qaida] go back across that border into Afghanistan and the pressure is taken off them and they have safe haven, they will develop the capability to attack us pre-9/11 style in, I will say, three years," Morell said.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Former CIA Deputy Director "fears"… "IF they go back" … "in three years"… It seems that he is a man with great sense of black humor! Since we ALL presume that Talibans will go back and take over Afghanistan why they withdraw? I am not asking the "no good answer" question "why they invated Afghanistan" – I am asking why they do not change policy to do it right instead of waiting for three years to do it again (wrong)?

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
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If IS falls, Canada must be ready for the return of foreign fighters

By Bessma Momani and Lorne Dawson

Source: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/if-is-falls-canada-must-be-ready-for-the-return-of-foreign-fighters/article23149285/

Feb 25 – **Canada's involvement in the military campaign against Islamic State (IS) carries an added risk if we win: the return of foreign fighters to home soil. Canada's Bill C-51 is ill equipped for this unintended consequence and we need to prepare.**

The academic literature on terrorism is largely informed by understanding and combating al-Qaeda, but IS poses new challenges. Al-Qaeda's strategy was to create as many world franchises of its terror model as possible, by supporting and financing cells to carry out attacks. It resembled a network of semi-autonomous nodes that adopted its perverse ideology.

Battling al-Qaeda posed a challenge because defeating or suppressing a node did not root out the organization. Plenty of other nodes filled the ideological and political vacuum. This is why the military fight against al-Qaeda was often described as a whack-a-mole strategy. While there were self-proclaimed commanders and leaders headquartered in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, analysts often noted how al-Qaeda did not have full control over its franchises; the self-declared independence of IS from al-Qaeda is testament to the stark limits of its control.

IS is an entirely different creature than al-Qaeda, and this may have an unintended consequence for Western governments fearful of a wave of foreign fighters going to fight with IS. Unlike al-Qaeda, IS operates with a much tighter and hierarchical command and control structure. IS has a charismatic leader at the helm that runs a tight ship. Holding on to a defined territory allows IS to play the role of a quasi-state, at least in a substantive, if not legitimate sense.

The military battle against IS continues to be ramped up with added muscle, training, and determination of both Western and Arab governments to attack IS's territorial holdings. But, herein lies the risk: if the coalition is successful in crippling IS, reversing its successes, and perhaps killing the top rung of IS commanders (especially the charismatic leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), the leaderless foot soldiers will not have the directive or direction to continue, and they will begin to flood home. Or, if Mr. al-Baghdadi is simply backed into a corner, he will lash out with more direct attacks on the West to protect his diminishing charismatic authority.

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With estimates on the IS force at 30,000 (numbers range from 10,000 to 50,000), the elimination of the top cadre means IS recruits will be without a rudder. That may seem like a good thing, but what we haven't given serious enough thought to dealing with the thousands of foreign fighters with Western passports, including the 40 or more Canadians who have left to join IS.

The provisions of Bill C-51 attempt to stem the supply side of terrorism, by censoring online conversations and beefing up CSIS and RCMP capacities. But the bill does not have a strategy to tackle the demand side of the problem, such as de-radicalization programs, building capacities and resilient communities through political empowerment, and supporting alternative narratives in vulnerable demographic groups. Security measures have a troubling tendency to feed back into the radicalization process itself. If IS is decapitated, the threat posed from returning fighters is theoretically higher than if it is simply contained, and it is unlike the consequences of defeating al-Qaeda for the radicalization of Western youth.

<mark>What can be done?</mark> Investing in prevention tools can help stop the feedback loop that could further radicalize new recruits and returning fighters. Prevention means we need to understand the appeal of IS as a cult, couched in medieval misinterpretations of an otherwise peaceful religion. **Stemming the supply and re-offence of returnees requires detoxing wannabe fighters; understanding how vulnerable youth and misfits are searching for identity online; working with religious and community leaders to help would-be radicals discern the difference between scripture and propaganda; and de-glorifying the violence and militancy of travelling to Syria or other fronts.** Disillusioned returnees can be used to describe the mundane and hypocritical life under IS rule. Some of the fighters who have returned to civilian life tell tales of how quickly they became disenchanted, as they were assigned to cleaning toilets and working Twitter accounts, and not trusted with combat or decision-making roles. This

is not to say that we can expect a flood of 'innocent' returnees, but there will be some and we ought to be prepared with a variety of tools to suppress further radicalization other than our prison system. Investing in de-radicalization/reintegration programs will address the demand side of terrorism that Bill C-51 does not. This will cost money and require considerable ingenuity, but other nations facing a much more severe threat from returnees, such as Germany and Denmark, have initiated such programs. The government should acknowledge that using the law may seem like a quick and cheap fix, but ignoring the need for a more "sociological" approach will cost more in the long run.

Bessma Momani is an associate professor at the University of Waterloo and a senior fellow at the Centre of International Governance Innovation (CIGI).

Lorne Dawson is an associate professor at the University of Waterloo.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Just another "academic" article that counters reality. It seems to me that international academia on both sides of the ocean are thrilled with the given possibility to explore distorted brains and are highly excited with the challenge to reboot mindsets. Modern technology and global intelligence sharing can track all those travelled to rogue states and keep them there for ever. This would be a fine example for those making similar dreams instead of letting them return home and pay them to lecture on toilets and missed opportunities to kill other people!

Iraqi Army Downs Two British Planes Carrying Weapons for ISIL Terrorists

By Fars News Agency
Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/iraqi-army-downs-two-british-planes-carrying-weapons-for-isil-terrorists/5433089

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"The Iraqi Parliament's National Security and Defense Committee has access to the photos of both planes that are British and have crashed while they were carrying weapons for the ISIL," Head of the committee Hakem al-Zameli said, according to a Monday report of the Arabic-language information center of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.

He said the Iraqi parliament has asked London for explanations in this regard.
The senior Iraqi legislator further unveiled that the government in Baghdad is receiving daily reports from people and security forces in al-Anbar province on numerous flights by the US-led coalition

planes that airdrop weapons and supplies for ISIL in terrorist-held areas.

The Iraqi lawmaker further noted the cause of such western aids to the terrorist group, and explained that the US prefers a chaotic situation in Anbar Province which is near the cities of Karbala and Baghdad as it does not want the ISIL crisis to come to an end.

Earlier today, a senior Iraqi provincial official lashed out at the western countries and their regional allies for supporting Takfiri terrorists in Iraq, revealing that US and Israeli-made weapons have been discovered from the areas purged of ISIL terrorists.

"We have discovered weapons made in the US, European countries and Israel from the areas liberated from ISIL's control in Al-Baqdadi region," the Al-Ahad news website quoted Head of Al-Anbar Provincial Council Khalaf Tarmouz as saying.

He noted that the weapons made by the European countries and Israel were discovered from the terrorists in the Eastern parts of the city of Ramadi.

Al-Zameli had also disclosed in January that the anti-ISIL coalition's planes have dropped weapons and foodstuff for the ISIL in Salahuddin, Al-Anbar and Diyala provinces.

Al-Zameli underlined that the coalition is the main cause of ISIL's survival in Iraq.

"There are proofs and evidence for the US-led coalition's military aid to ISIL terrorists through air(dropped cargoes)," he told FNA in January.

He noted that the members of his committee have already proved that the US planes have dropped advanced weaponry, including anti-aircraft weapons, for the ISIL, and that it has set up an investigation committee to probe into the matter.

"The US drops weapons for the ISIL on the excuse of not knowing about the whereabouts of the ISIL positions and it is trying to distort the reality with its allegations.

He noted that the committee had collected the data and the evidence provided by eyewitnesses, including Iraqi army officers and the popular forces, and said, "These documents are given to the investigation committee … and the necessary measures will be taken to protect the Iraqi airspace."

Also in January, another senior Iraqi legislator reiterated that the US-led coalition is the main cause of ISIL's survival in Iraq.

"The international coalition is only an excuse for protecting the ISIL and helping the terrorist group with equipment and weapons," Jome Divan, who is member of the al-Sadr bloc in the Iraqi parliament, said.

He said the coalition's support for the ISIL is now evident to everyone, and continued, "The coalition has not targeted ISIL's main positions in Iraq."

In late December, Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Commission MP disclosed that a US plane supplied the ISIL terrorist organization with arms and ammunition in Salahuddin province.

MP Majid al-Gharawi stated that the available information pointed out that US planes are supplying ISIL organization, not only in Salahuddin province, but also other provinces, Iraq TradeLink reported.

He added that the US and the international coalition are "not serious in fighting against the ISIL organization, because they have the technological power to determine the presence of ISIL gunmen and destroy them in one month".

Gharawi added that "the US is trying to expand the time of the war against the ISIL to get guarantees from the Iraqi government to have its bases in Mosul and Anbar provinces."

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Salahuddin security commission also disclosed that "unknown planes threw arms and ammunition to the ISIL gunmen Southeast of Tikrit city".

Also in Late December, a senior Iraqi lawmaker raised doubts about the seriousness of the anti-ISIL coalition led by the US, and said that the terrorist group still received aids dropped by unidentified aircraft.

"The international coalition is not serious about air strikes on ISIL terrorists and is even seeking to take out the popular (voluntary) forces from the battlefield against the Takfiris so that the problem with ISIL remains unsolved in the near future," Nahlah al-Hababi told FNA.

"The ISIL terrorists are still receiving aids from unidentified fighter jets in Iraq and Syria," she added.

Hababi said that the coalition's precise airstrikes are launched only in those areas where the Kurdish Pishmarga forces are present, while military strikes in other regions are not so much precise.

In late December, the US-led coalition dropped aids to the Takfiri militants in an area North of Baghdad.

Field sources in Iraq told al-Manar that the international coalition airplanes dropped aids to the terrorist militants in Balad, an area which lies in Salahuddin province North of Baghdad.

In October, a high-ranking Iranian commander also slammed the US for providing aid supplies to ISIL, adding that the US claims that the weapons were mistakenly airdropped to ISIL were untrue.

"The US and the so-called anti-ISIL coalition claim that they have launched a campaign against this terrorist and criminal group – while supplying them with weapons, food and medicine in Jalawla region (a town in Diyala Governorate, Iraq). This explicitly displays the falsity of the coalition's and the US' claims,"

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri said.

The US claimed that it had airdropped weapons and medical aid to Kurdish fighters confronting the ISIL in Kobani, near the Turkish border in Northern Syria.

The US Defense Department said that it had airdropped 28 bundles of weapons and supplies, but one of them did not make it into the hands of the Kurdish fighters.

Video footage later showed that some of the weapons that the US airdropped were taken by ISIL militants.

The Iranian commander insisted that the US had the necessary intelligence about ISIL's deployment in the region and that their claims to have mistakenly airdropped weapons to them are as unlikely as they are untrue.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Should we be surprised? Should we be frustrated? Should we accept the fact that we are considered as low IQ stupids? Should we call it propaganda? Shoud we call it Iraqi misinformation? Or simply should we re-adjust our position to our comfortable sofas and watch the

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movie "Aliens Invation"? – One of my favorites!

Threat to Attack Malls in America is Real, Says Terrorism Expert

By John Burger

Source: http://www.aleteia.org/en/society/article/threat-to-attack-malls-in-america-is-real-says-terrorism-expert-5817401123799040

The headlines in the days since a Somali terrorist group threatened to attack shopping malls in the west pretty much agreed: "No credible threat to shoppers."

Stephen C. Coughlin is not so quick to write off the threat.

Coughlin has been studying terrorism for years. An attorney, decorated intelligence officer and noted specialist on Islamic law, ideology and associated issues as they relate to terrorism and subversion, he worked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff beginning in 2001. As a Major in the United States Army (res.), Coughlin was later assigned to USCENTCOM where he served in both an intelligence and strategic communications/information operations role. He has since retired from the Reserves.

He is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, which is publishing his book *Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad* next month.

He spoke with Aleteia about ongoing threats to the homeland in the age of ISIS.

What do you think of the threat to malls in the US and other western countries? Is it serious?

It was al Shabab that bombed that mall the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. I think we are aware that we have people in places like Minnesota, where they have large Somali

populations, that there's a contingent of al Shabab there. What happens when their budget doesn't allow them to go to Africa to shoot people in a mall and they still want to kill somebody? Well, they have malls right here. I'm being a little glib, but I think al Shabab functions in the jihadi space as groups like al Qaeda do in the Arab world. You can make the argument that they're associated at some level. I think we can identify a series of events that are starting to materialize that make terrorism in this country more probable than not this year.

Such as?

This is the 10th year of the 10-year [Programme of Action to make defaming Islam a punishable crime]. I don't think it's an accident that within the first week of the 10th year we saw Charlie Hebdo, which had to do with the cartoons they first protested in 2006. Then you saw the killings in Copenhagen, and they also had to do with defamation of the Prophet of Islam. I think what we're going to see is that this narrative ratchets up this year and there's going to be some pressure for that to happen. This is the year, I think, we're going to see groups like ISIS go on the offensive; this is the year when, if we ratchet up

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our attacks on ISIS over there, we're going to find out that they're going to open up a front here.

What's the chance that a group like al Shabab can pull something off—at a mall or elsewhere?

If they decide to act, I think it's 100%. There are a lot of malls. One of the things I would point out is that at the end of the day al Nusra in Syria and ISIS in Syria and Iraq are al Qaeda. They come from them, they're the more militant wing of them right now, but as long as they're making gains, al Qaeda's not going to do anything to stop them, and if they are successful they'll all reconcile with one another.

Al Qaeda puts out *Inspire* magazine, and they're talking about what targets they'd like to attack, with what types of weapons. So we're on clear notice. All you have to do is go to *Inspire* magazine and see photos of what they'd like to attack. If you take a look at the first two months of this year, they went and executed people for not standing back in defaming Islam.

Are we looking at threats both from "lone wolves" and organized terrorist groups working within our country?

There's no such thing as lone wolf terrorism. That's the term we use to mask the real term, "individual jihahd."

An expert interviewed on Fox News felt that the video is merely a fundraising tool on the part of al Shabab.

Al Shabab doesn't need to make videos just to advertise. … You have a terrorist group that openly advocates violence. They act according to what they say. And we should understand that when they say they're targeting malls, they've hit malls in Africa, and people who discount that are underestimating the threat.

What kinds of things should people be on the lookout for?

How easy is it for someone to walk into a mall with a gun, or say to everybody, "Let's meet at the east gate of the mall and everybody bring a gun and let's just start shooting people up? I'm not saying that's going to happen, but if the decision is made to execute then they'll execute, and I just hope the FBI has people in those systems to catch it. If a terrorist organization says they're going to strike we should assume that they mean it.

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John Burger is news editor for Aleteia's English edition.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Although possible, this specific target (Mall of America) might be not an easy target since it has an Israeli-based defense policy using among other measures the "perimeter human screening methodology" by undercovered employees. A method that should have been applied in all hard and soft targets around the globe.

How much does it cost to watch a suspected militant? Lots!

By David Wise

Source: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/22/fighting-terror-the-complex-factors-in-deciding-who-to-watch/

In 2011, U.S. intelligence informed French authorities that a French citizen had slipped into Yemen, probably for terrorist training. In November, the French security services placed the man, Said Kouachi, under surveillance. They wiretapped his mobile phone, as well as that of his younger brother, Cherif. By the end of 2013, French intelligence had dropped its surveillance of Cherif, and Said's was terminated in mid-2014. After three years, the brothers, born to Algerian immigrants, were judged to be no longer dangerous.

On Jan. 7, however, the brothers, heavily armed and dressed in black, stormed the Paris office of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical newspaper, and

massacred 12 people. It happened at least partly because the French security services are unable to monitor all of France's suspected jihadists, even those considered high risk because they returned after fighting in Syria or Iraq.

The French experience demonstrates that tapping cellphones of terrorist suspects is not enough. Physical surveillance by humans is crucial. Because terrorists have learned to avoid phones. "The phone tapping yielded nothing," Marc Trevidic, the chief terrorism investigator for the French judicial system, told the *New York Times*. "If we had continued, I'm convinced it wouldn't have changed anything. No one talks on the phone anymore."

But physically monitoring suspects is an expensive and complicated proposition — in both money and manpower. A former French anti-terrorism official stated, "The system is overwhelmed."

U.S. intelligence experts are well aware of the problems of mounting a 24/7 round-the-clock surveillance on suspects. "It's a manpower eater," said Phillip A. Parker, a veteran former FBI counterintelligence agent, "and it takes away from other cases."

To keep a target under continuous surveillance, according to one experienced FBI source who asked to remain anonymous, could require three eight-hour shifts or perhaps two 12-hour shifts, with four special agents each shift. Several cars would be needed, sometimes even airplanes. If only one car was used, the person might quickly realize he was being followed.

"If you are just sitting around in the street, somebody's going to notice you," Parker explained. "If it's a real sensitive case, you just cannot be made. You would run five or six cars, maybe seven or eight. If you don't want any chance of the target making you, the average is three shifts, four guys to a shift, two cars — that's a minimum. Three shifts, so 12 agents. If it's a really important case, you could easily double that." That minimum translates into 24 agents in three shifts of eight agents to keep watch on a single target.

Parker, who spent much of his career tracking Soviet and Russian spies, noted, "Most surveillance subjects are not moving more than a few hours a day. So you may also have to set up an OP [observation post]," often a house or apartment overlooking the target.

Just as the French services wiretapped the cellphones of the Paris terrorists, the FBI does not limit itself to physical surveillance of a subject. "You would also have technical means," one surveillance specialist, who asked to remain anonymous, said. "If you run 24-hour surveillance, you have telephones, both cell and land lines, MISUR [microphone surveillance] and stationery lookouts."

Agents might also lock onto the GPS of the suspect's car, to see where he or she is going. In one high-profile espionage case, the FBI placed radio receivers at fixed points around the Washington area and was also able to plant an electronic device in the suspect's car. When the target car passed by one of the receivers, the time and location were recorded. This setup was similar to the E-ZPass system, which is used by commuters to breeze through toll plazas without stopping.

With so much manpower required to monitor just one suspect, FBI supervisors often resist mounting a 24/7 surveillance. It takes away agents who might be working other cases. A smaller field office might not have enough agents.

Even FBI headquarters might need to scramble to find agents for a surveillance. One senior FBI official involved in the surveillance and eventual arrest of Aldrich Ames, the CIA officer who spied for Moscow, told me, "I was constantly asking for more resources." Spies, he observed, "often use SDRs," or surveillance detection routes. "They might drive around for four or five hours 'dry-cleaning' themselves" to try to lose their FBI pursuers.

Because of the FBI's reluctance to assign large numbers of agents to surveillance operations, the bureau also uses a Special Surveillance Group, known as "the G's." These are not special agents, but members of a unit whose sole job is to track suspects. They are trained to look like anything except FBI agents. The G's may be dressed as joggers, cyclists, pizza-delivery men, mothers pushing strollers or street-repair workers wielding jackhammers. That scruffy guy on a skateboard, that hard-hat repairman up on a telephone pole, the street vendor selling hot dogs — all may be G's. They look, in other words, like ordinary citizens going about their business.

How much does a round-the-clock surveillance cost? Because FBI agents and G's are already on the FBI payroll, measuring the actual

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cost of a particular operation can be complicated. Though there is clearly a cost in manpower assigned to surveillance duties and so unavailable to other investigations.

Still, it is possible to estimate 24/7 surveillance costs by looking at the salaries of FBI agents and the number of hours involved. FBI salaries range widely, depending on grades and years of service. But a typical mid-range special agent earns roughly $64,000 a year, which translates into $1,230 a week. On a round-the-clock surveillance with 24 agents, that adds up to $29,500 a week in agent time — or almost $128,000 a month. Add in three rental cars, used in rotation to avoid notice, and it comes to roughly $30,700 a week. A major surveillance like this might last weeks or even months.

More experienced agents can earn around $120,000 a year, so the totals could be a lot higher. As a result, it is not surprising that round-the-clock surveillances are not routine.

Statistics show why. The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, for example, maintains a "watch list" of alleged terrorist suspects. In 2011, the database had 420,000 names, according to a *New York Times* story, including some 8,000 Americans. About 16,000 people, including 500 Americans, were prohibited from flying. That list has been widely criticized for errors. But obviously — given the numbers — the FBI could not watch all the people on the database. And, thankfully, it doesn't.

Surveillance is a double-edged tool. Catching terrorists is vital to protect the country. But we also want to live in a society where liberty and security are balanced, and the government does not follow people around without good reason. From that perspective, the high cost and difficulty of maintaining a continuous surveillance on a suspect may not be entirely bad in a democracy.

David Wise writes frequently about intelligence and espionage. His most recent book is "Tiger Trap: America's Secret Spy War with China." His other books include "Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America."

Over a quarter of British Muslims have sympathy for the Charlie Hebdo terrorists. That is far too many!

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Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11434695/Over-a-quarter-of-British-Muslims-have-sympathy-for-the-Charlie-Hebdo-terrorists.-That-is-far-too-many.html

This morning the BBC published **details of a major poll of the attitudes of Britain's Muslims**. The headline on the front of the BBC

It's a reassuring headline. It's also wrong. Many Muslims - a majority - do indeed utterly oppose the murderous killings in Paris. But a

British Muslim attitudes to Charlie Hebdo attacks

(bar chart with categories: "I find it deeply offensive when images of Prophet Mohammed are published", "Organisations which publish images of Mohammed deserve to be attacked", "Acts of violence against publishers of Mohammed cartoons can never be justified", "I have some sympathy for the motives behind the CHarlie Hebdo attacks"; legend: Agree (blue), Disagree (red), Don't know (black))

website linking to the research states: "Muslims 'oppose cartoon reprisals'". This of course relates to attitudes within the Muslim community towards the **recent Charlie Hebdo attacks**.

very, very large number of Muslims don't. Presented with the statement "I have some sympathy for the motives behind the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris", 27 seven

percent agreed with the statement. A further 2 per cent refused to answer the question. And an additional eight percent said they were unsure whether they had some sympathy or not.

That is a shocking figure. And an utterly shaming one for Britain's Muslim community. If this poll is accurate, over a quarter of British Muslims overtly sympathise with the motives of those responsible for the cold blooded murder

the statement "Muslim clerics who preach that violence against the West can be justified are out of touch with mainstream opinion". 49 per cent agreed. Meaning again, that a majority of Muslims either disagree or sit on the fence.

All of this raises two serious questions. The first relates to the BBC's reporting. Let's set aside their use of the word "reprisal" in the headline (reprisal for what, exactly?). Imagine if the BBC had commissioned a poll **in the wake**

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
of 16 journalists, police officers and Jews.

Below the report is an article by BBC Today program reporter Sima Kotecha**.** It begins: "Islam is a religion of peace and love - not violence: sentiments that have been expressed numerous times here in Bradford. Out of the dozens of people I've spoken to, an overwhelming majority have said they're angry that their interpretation of Islam has been eclipsed by an extreme ideology that is too often projected in the media."

That statement - and those sentiments - are simply not compatible with the BBC's own research. In a separate finding, the BBC found 68 per cent of Muslims believed "acts of violence against those who published such images [of the prophet Mohammed] could never be justified". Which means 32 per cent of those questioned take a different view. Another question asked respondents if they agreed with

of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and that poll had found 27 per cent of white Britons agreed with the statement "I have some sympathy for the motives behind his stabbing". Imagine if, in an additional finding, 32 per cent of white Briton's refused to endorse the statement "acts of unprovoked violence against black men can never be justified".

Rightly, there would be outrage at those findings. And the BBC would be leading the charge. The focus, correctly, would be on the large number of people who expressed sympathy with the attacks. We would certainly not have religious propaganda masquerading as news analysis in the middle of the BBC's report.

But a much fundamental question relates to the poll's actual findings. There is no point continuing to stick our heads in

the sand: a large number of British Muslims think the Charlie Hebdo attacks were in some way justified. People may not want to accept that. I don't want to accept it. But it's a fact.

We are going to have to start to reassess what we mean by "moderate Islam". At the moment, we essentially define a moderate Muslim as any Muslim who doesn't go around blowing things up, or who doesn't go round overtly advocating other people should blow things up. It's ludicrously simplistic, sickeningly patronising, and actually represents a form of inverted racism.

More importantly, it also has the practical effect of marginalising and undermining the significant number of genuinely moderate Muslims who want nothing to with the "I wouldn't have done it myself, but…" Charlie Hebdo apologists within their community.

If you think the Paris killings were justified - in any way - then you're not a moderate. By definition, you're an extremist. Fine, you're not a terrorist. But just because you wouldn't personally walk into a Jewish supermarket and start indiscriminately murdering people does not of itself make you a case study in moderation. We set the bar a little higher than that.

Over a quarter of British Muslims have some sympathy with the Charlie Hebdo attacks. That is sickening, reprehensible and unacceptable. And we have to say so. Rather than patting the

other three quarters who don't have sympathy on the head, and saying "Well done. You're the good Muslims".

Two weeks ago I took part in a debate on free speech, hosted by the Islamic Education and Research Academy. It was a good discussion, well attended, with an almost exclusively Muslim audience. Near the end, one audience member began to defend the killing of apostates. I challenged him, as did the other non-Muslim panelists. None of the Muslim panelists challenged him. No members of the audience challenged him. Instead, when he'd finished defending the murder of apostates, a significant section of the audience applauded him.

It's not good enough. It's not good for people inside and outside the Muslim community to continue to turn a blind eye to the extremism that continues to fester in the heart of the Muslim community. It's not good enough for Muslims to keep delivering vacuous homilies about "the religion of peace" when surveys show 27 per cent of Muslims have sympathy with the Charlie Hebdo murderers. And it's not good enough for us to deploy spurious moral relativism in a misguided attempt to place extremism behind a shield of religious tolerance.

The BBC is wrong. Many Muslims have sympathy with the Charlie Hebdo killings. Far too many.

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Islamic State destroys 8,000 rare books and ancient manuscripts in Iraq

Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-islamic-state-destroys-8000-rare-books-and-ancient-manuscripts-in-iraq-2063976

The Islamic State has reportedly destroyed the Mosul public library, which had about 8000 rare books and manuscripts. The books and manuscripts in question have been burned into oblivion. "ISIS militants bombed the Mosul Public Library. They used improvised explosive devices," said Ghanim al-Ta'an, the director of the library to Western media outlets. Reportedly, known figures in Mosul tried to persuade ISIS members to spare the library, but they failed.

The lost collections of the Mosul library were manuscripts from the eighteenth century, Syriac books printed in Iraq's first printing house in the nineteenth century, books from the Ottoman era, Iraqi newspapers from the early twentieth century and some old antiques like an astrolabe and sand glass used by ancient Arabs. The library had hosted the personal libraries of more than 100 notable families from Mosul over the 20th century.

This is not the first time the library has come under attack though. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the library was looted and destroyed by mobs. However, the people living nearby managed to save most of its collections and rich families bought back the stolen books and they were returned to the library, according to the report.

"900 years ago, the books of the Arab philosopher Averroes were collected before his eyes...and burned. One of his students started crying while witnessing the burning. Averroes told him... the ideas have wings...but I cry today over our situation," Rayan al-Hadidi, an activist and a blogger from Mosul, told the media.

The library's website stands suspended.

"What a pity! We used to go to the library in the 1970s. It was one of the greatest landmarks of Mosul. I still remember the special pieces of paper where the books' names were listed alphabetically," said Akil Kata who left Mosul to exile years ago.

Apparently, on the same day the library was destroyed, Islamic State demolished another old church in Mosul: the church of Mary the Virgin. The Mosul University Theater was burned as well, according to eyewitnesses. In Western Iraq, the book-burning campaign has managed to destroy 100,000 titles, according to local officials. In December 2014, ISIS burned Mosul University's central library.

The report further states that 'Iraq, the cradle of civilization, the birthplace of agriculture and writing and the home of the Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian, Babylonian and Arab civilizations had never witnessed such an assault on its rich cultural heritage since the Mongol era in the Middle Ages.'

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Stanford's 'Terror, Freedom, Blasphemy' Panel: Blithering Academic Incoherence

By Cinnamon Stillwell and Rima Greene
Source: http://www.meforum.org/5054/stanford-panel

What does the Islamic terrorist attack on the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in January have to do with the 2014 police shootings of African-American men in Ferguson, Missouri and Long Island, New York; San Francisco's troubled Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood; and the Occupy Wall Street movement? A recent panel discussion at Stanford University, "Terror, Freedom, Blasphemy: Reflections on Citizenship in Our Times," used the connection between the struggles—both real and imagined—of minorities in the U.S. and those attributed to Muslims worldwide to deflect attention from Islamic radicalism in the West.

Sponsored by the Sohaib and Sara Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, the afternoon discussion took place in a Center for

International Security and Cooperation conference room with a long, narrow table in the middle, at the head of which sat the panelists. Approximately forty people—a mixture of students and locals, many of them eating lunch—were seated at and around the table, some spilling out into the hallway. Framed posters lined the walls with slogans such as, "China Builds the Bomb" and "International Arms Control," but none spoke to Iran's highly-contested efforts to build a nuclear weapon.

In his introduction, Shahzad Bashir, Lysbeth Warren Anderson Professor in Islamic Studies, explained that:

The idea for this event came from a discussion between myself and [fellow panelists] Robert Crews, [and] Aishwary Kumar, and grew out of a general frustration about the state of the world.

According to Bashir, the latter included such disparate subjects as:

[T]he torture information that came out of the U.S. Senate; what's happening in Iraq and Syria; what's happening in Ferguson, Missouri and Long Island; events in Nigeria, and what happened in Paris most recently. . . . We wanted an occasion where we could draw the connections between these events.

The inclusion of Destin Jenkins, a PhD candidate in Stanford's history department who delivered a completely unrelated talk titled, "Citizenship, Debt, and Structural Violence: From Hunters Point to Ferguson" and who admitted that, "I am somewhat of an interloper, working on San Francisco, nothing about Paris or Islam," achieved the organizers' goal. As Jenkins put it:

I want to use this as an opportunity to think about the troubling connections between the enactment of citizenship and the structural violence against the African-American community of the Hunters Point neighborhood [in San Francisco] after WWII.

He thanked co-panelist Robert Crews, history professor and director of the Sohaib and Sara Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, for "reaching out" to him. Later, Bashir ratcheted up the absurdity by directing an audience question about the European migration of jihadists to Jenkins, who responded, predictably, by discussing Hunters Point.

Crews began his talk by stating that, "African-Americans are subjected to legal state violence and massive incarceration." Later, he

described American foreign policy as "The fetishistic abuse of brown and black, Arab and African bodies" and referred to "Latinos" being "targeted in . . . operations." After stating his intention to "focus first on the American context and its relationship to global militancy,"

Crews detailed an extensive list of grievances against the U.S., including "widespread torture," "Abu Ghraib," "Guantanamo," "solitary confinement," "black sites," "war crimes," "the military justice system," and "films like *American Sniper*, *Lone Survivor*, *Zero Dark Thirty*."

Turning briefly to the subject at hand, Crews expressed his displeasure not with the perpetrators of the Paris attacks, but with the Western response, which he ascribed to anti-Muslim bigotry and media manipulation:

The media presents [sic] all the values of Western civilization under vicious assault by the forces of barbarism, savagery, and unreason. Citizens everywhere identified with the slogan "Je Suis *Charlie Hebdo*." Civilization against the humorless and thin-skinned Muslims who fail to accept the conventions of modern times, citizenship among them. What was the incidence which demanded the presence of global elites? It was perfect for the global media stage.

Of the attack's victims or the savagery of mass murder, he said nothing.

Aishwary Kumar, an assistant professor of modern South Asian and global intellectual history, opened by citing a European Law Enforcement Agency (Europol) report to allege a low level of Islamic terrorism, concluding that, "the war on terror" is as much "militaristic" as it is "a war against our own depressed psychologies." He then lamented that the huge solidarity march in Paris following the *Charlie Hebdo* attack was "led by a roster of some of the greatest war criminals you will ever find on the streets . . . there was [British Prime Minister] David Cameron." He excoriated Cameron and the other "war mongering leaders" because, of all things, "None of these leaders came out for Occupy Wall Street." That Cameron and other world leaders would as readily camp-out with the professional agitators of the now-defunct "Occupy" movement as they would join forces against a murderous, global ideology is a farce that only a professor could conjure.

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Instead of defending free speech against the imposition of Islamic blasphemy laws, Thoraya Boumehdi, an Arabic instructor at the Stanford Language Center, attacked the very concept of freedom of speech:

[T]here is no freedom without respect. . . . If someone attacks the beliefs of others, that is an assault on his freedom; freedom stops where others begin.

"We must not allow hatred to hide behind the excuse of humor," she added, before reaching the asinine and ahistorical conclusion, "Islam has been a great civilization which has been haunted for centuries by populations that were not Muslim." The many non-Muslim victims of Islamic supremacy over the centuries, particularly those today suffering at the genocidal hands of the Islamic State (ISIS), would beg to differ.

French political scientist Denis Lacorne, a then-visiting scholar at Stanford from Sciences Po in Paris, provided the sole exception to the parade of apologetics among the panelists. Lacorne gave a robust defense of secularism and free speech, noting that, "The attack against *Charlie Hebdo's* cartoons . . . reproduces France of the eighteenth century as if the Enlightenment had not taken place." In reference to French philosopher and playwright Voltaire's 1736 play "Mahomet," which portrayed Islam's prophet Mohammed as a violent fanatic, he asked, "Can we perform today his play? The sad answer is, no we can't. It's too dangerous. No one is going to do it." As

proof, he detailed the role of Swiss academic and Oxford University professor of contemporary Islamic studies Tariq Ramadan in preventing the play from being performed in Geneva in the 1990s, noting that it "has not been performed since then."

The question and answer period offered few challenges from the audience, with one member pronouncing sycophantically, "what a wonderful event this was" and "how it exemplified the best of Stanford's higher education." A man seated nearby could be overheard making the bizarre claim that former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "would have chased everyone here away" were she still teaching "global dominance" at Stanford, but for the heroic "students who protested too much at her classes." In fact, Rice—a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, located next door to the building housing the panel—currently teaches at Stanford and she gets high marks from her students for including a variety of viewpoints. For others, however, political diversity is a vice.

Despite the panel's stated aim of offering a better understanding of the issues of "terror, freedom, and blasphemy" surrounding the Paris attacks, speakers proffered a cacophony of grievance politics, victimology, and obfuscation. Rather than enlighten, they sought to whitewash. **It was just what we've come to expect from the "experts" filling the ranks of Middle East studies.**

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*Berkeley resident **Rima Greene** co-wrote this article with **Cinnamon Stillwell**, the West Coast Representative for Campus Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum.*

Terrorism finance: experts worry ISIS already using Bitcoin

Source: http://i-hls.com/2015/02/terrorism-finance-experts-worry-isis-already-using-bitcoin/?utm_source =Israel+Homeland+Security+%28iHLS%29&utm_campaign=166224a382-Newsletter_English_25_2_ 2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8ee2e16ed1-166224a382-87373033&mc_cid=166224a382& mc_eid=521c0e089a#sthash.gNZsLjDm.dpuf

Financial and terror experts are concerning about the ability to move cash around national borders could help ISIS fund attacks in the West. This seems to be the MO adopted by an Al Qaeda group, which allegedly funded the attacks in France back in January.

Bitcoin fans may not benefit from the government's attention. Nevertheless, they

should be flattered: it means the technology they are developing is powerful stuff.

According to *Defense One*, at a recent forum that brought together government officials and bitcoin entrepreneurs to discuss the future of the cryptocurrency, praises for the protocol's efficiency mingled with law enforcement's concerns over it. Jennifer Shasky Calvery, head

of the US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is the agency in charge of fighting money laundering and terrorist finance, voiced her concern that powerful payment technologies could facilitate 'rogue actors'.

Last summer, *Sky News* reported that one pro-ISIL blog discussed using bitcoin to fund the militia's attempts to impose its extreme view of Islamic law on Syria and Iraq. It's not clear yet if bitcoin is, or ever will be, a significant part of the group's fundraising. ISIS current funding is largely reliant on cash from hostage ransoms and illegal sales of crude oil. That said, the very ability to move cash across national borders could help the organization finance attacks in the West. An Al Qaeda group in Yemen apparently funded the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France the same way.

Bitcoin – transparent in its reporting of how much got transferred and when, but lacking the intermediaries to report suspicious activities the way the regulated banking system does – provides a lot of cover for anyone who wants to move money around without triggering the usual alarm bells associated with giant transfers of cash.

"If you want to be a part of the US financial system, if you want to be part of the global financial system, that's no small thing," Calvery said. "When you start talking about global point-to-point transactions and pseudo-anonymity and instantaneous movement of value over borders – this poses real risks as well."

In other words, while it's common for start-ups to see themselves as potential world-changers, Calvery said that bitcoin entrepreneurs might be underestimating what their companies are capable of doing.

Washington lawyer Carol Van Cleef, who represents financial services firms on enforcement matters, observed, in the framework of the *Foreign Affairs*-hosted forum that "the first adopters of new payments systems, without a doubt, are the criminals." Cryptocurrency entrepreneurs should be aware, if they are not already, of the numerous instances of frauds that had already been uncovered at major nodes in the financial ecosystem.

As companies which use bitcoin technology continue to push into the mainstream, they are getting better at protecting their customers as well as at working with regulators. Calvery notes that the technological savvy that inspires entrepreneurs in financial innovation also helps them in doing a better job of cooperating with the government.

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Jihadi John identity revealed as Mohammed Emwazi

Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11436821/Jihadi-John-identified-What-we-know-about-Mohammed-Emwazi.html

'Jihadi John', the man who has killed at least five hostages in slickly produced videos from Islamic State, has been named by the Washington Post as Mohammed Emwazi.

The jihadist, believed to be from West London, first appeared in the killing of James Foley, an American journalist, in August, dressed in black with only his eyes visible.

He reappeared in videos of the beheadings of Steven Sotloff, another US journalist, the British aid worker David Haines, Peter Kassig, an American aid worker and the British charity worker Alan Henning.

What do we know about Mohammed Emwazi so far?
According to the Post, he was born in Kuwait and moved to the UK when he was six.

Adam Goldman, one of the reporters who broke the story, said that Emwazi was 20 when he went to Tanzania in May 2009, and so **should now be 26 years old**.

The Post reported that Emwazi was identified by his friends, with one saying: "I have no doubt that Mohammed is Jihadi John. He was like a brother to me [. . .] I am sure it is him."

A spokesperson from the **University of Westminster**, where he reportedly **studied**

Information Technology, said:

"A Mohammed Emwazi left the University six years ago. If these allegations are true, we are shocked and sickened by the news. Our thoughts are with the victims and their families.

"We have students from 150 countries and their safety is of paramount concern. With other universities in London, we are working to implement the Government's Prevent strategy to tackle extremism.

"We are setting up a dedicated pastoral team to provide advice and support. In the meantime, we urge any students who are concerned to contact the Student Support and Well-being team."

He lived in a middle-class neighbourhood, the Post reported, and would sometimes pray at Greenwich mosque.

Reports that "Jihadi John," the British-accented narrator of ISIS snuff videos, is Mohammed Emwazi — an educated young man from a middle-class background — ought to put the final stake in

In an article from 2010, The Independent wrote that he **was stopped by MI5 in Tanzania as he tried to go on safari and deported to Amsterdam, where he was accused of being a member of al-Shabaab** and of trying to reach Somalia.

Emwazi was said to be obsessed with Somalia, according to a former hostage and reportedly made hostages captured by Isil watch videos relating to al-Shabaab.

The terrorist group is allied to al-Qaeda and its most notorious attack was the assault on Nairobi's Westgate Mall in September 2013 in which 67 people were killed.

The episode appeared to anger Emwazi. Asim Qureshi, research director at the rights group, Cage, told the Post: "Mohammed was quite incensed by his treatment, that he had been very unfairly treated."

The BBC tweeted a court document from a case involving another suspected militant and the Home Secretary, Theresa May, in which Emwazi is named as an associate.

Its home affairs correspondent, Dominic Casciani, said another "core member" of this same group of West London jihadis, Bilal Berjawi, was subsequently killed in a drone strike in Somalia.

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Empowering Jihad: The Deadly Myth of a 'Root Cause'

By Phyllis Chesler

Source: http://www.meforum.org/5059/jihad-root-cause-myth

the pretense that poverty and a lack of education and opportunity fuel Islamist hate. This mistaken idea seems to be Obama administration policy.

Marie Harf, the US Department of State deputy spokesperson, recently said:

We cannot win this war by killing [jihadists]. We need to go after the root causes that lead people to join these groups, whether it is lack of opportunity for jobs. . . We can work with countries around the world to help improve their governance. We can help them build their economies so they can have job opportunities for these people.

Of course, the news about "Jihadi John" is only the latest evidence to the contrary. These terrorists are often well educated and even wealthy. Osama bin Laden certainly was. Many Islamist terrorists are physicians: Maj. Nidal Hasan (the Fort Hood shooter) and al Qaeda's current leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. "Lady Al Qaeda" Aafia Siddiqui (the terrorist whom ISIS wanted to trade for James Foley, then for Steven Sotloff) was a scientist. Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 crew, was an engineer and the son of a solidly middle class family. Another engineer: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Underwear Bomber, who is the son of a wealthy Nigerian businessman.

William A. Wulf, former president of the National Academy of Engineering, has noted, "In the ranks of the captured and confessed terrorists, engineers and engineering students are significantly overrepresented."

Dr. Marc Sageman, a former CIA officer with a PhD from NYU as well as his MD, is the author of the landmark 2003 study "**Understanding Terror Networks**."

This found that "two-thirds of al Qaeda's members had a university education" and that "the vast majority of terrorists came from solid, middle-class backgrounds; their leadership hailed from the upper middle class. They came from caring, intact families."

Blaming Islamist horrors on poverty only obscures the true problem: Jihadists are driven by an ideology — one that yearns to "restore" a mythical caliphate, one governed by the most austere version of Sharia law.

In a 2002 working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Alan Kreuger and Jitka Maleckova found that "**poverty and low education don't cause terrorism**." Indeed,

[A]ny connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak. . . Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.

Which brings us to the way that President Obama and others are part of the problem. The Western liberal elites who reinforce the belief that Muslims and Arabs have been persecuted, profiled, spied upon, discriminated against, etc. are enhancing the ressentiment at the root of radical jihad.

This is just a new version of a long-standing problem on the left.

In "The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt" and "The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism," Pascal Bruckner observed that Western left-wingers turned their romance with totalitarian communism into a dangerous flirtation with Third World struggles. Delusions of solidarity with and compassion for "the wretched of the earth," he notes, empowered anti-Western, anti-Semitic and anti-colonial hatreds.

Safely situated leftists engaged in "pseudo-revolutionary posturing" and "political playacting," which sacrificed women, infidels, dissidents and apostates.

Western elites view themselves as anti-racists ushering in a better world. Too bad they never think it through: Down with the Evil Western Empire, up with the . . . Even More Evil Islamist Empire?

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
Phyllis Chesler *is a CUNY emerita professor of psychology and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. Her books include "Women and Madness" and "The New Anti-Semitism."*

DNI's 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment

By Jack Goldsmith
Source: http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/02/dnis-2015-worldwide-threat-assessment/

Feb 27 – I highly recommend that Lawfare readers peruse the **annual the *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,*** as well as DNI Clapper's opening statement before the SASC yesterday. I read both quickly (though I did not watch the hearing). Both seem less watered-down than usual. Some highlights: **"Cyber" is at the top of the (implicit) hierarchy of global threats.** Cyber threats are "increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact." So too are the "ranges of cyber threat actors, methods of attack, targeted systems, and victims." The report suggests that we will see "more cyber operations that will change or manipulate electronic information in order to compromise its integrity (i.e. accuracy and reliability) instead of deleting it or disrupting access to it." However, "the likelihood of a catastrophic attack from any particular actor is remote at this time." Clapper says that the Russian cyber threat "is more severe than we've previously assessed." And the Threat Assessment brags that "[a]lthough cyber operators can infiltrate or disrupt targeted ICT networks, most can no longer assume that their activities will remain undetected" because "[g]overnmental and private sector security professionals have made significant advances in detecting and attributing cyber intrusions." It also names names – for example, attributing the Las Vegas attack last year to Iran, and the Sony attack to North Korea. The deterrence aims of these statements are obvious. But the Report weakens the effect of the statements when it later acknowledges that "[d]istinguishing between state and non-state actors within the same country is often difficult—especially when those varied actors actively collaborate, tacitly cooperate, condone criminal activity that only harms foreign victims, or utilize similar cyber tools."

Terrorism is third on the list of threats, after counterintelligence. Not a whole lot of news on this front that I can see. Except perhaps

this: Clapper in his statement says in the first nine months of 2014, there were 13,000 terrorist attacks around the world which killed 31,000 people, and adds that when all of the data is in, 2014 "will have been the most lethal year for global terrorism in the 45 years such data has been compiled." As for the Islamic State's threat to the homeland, the report says that "[i]f ISIL were to substantially increase the priority it places on attacking the West rather than fighting to maintain and expand territorial control, then the group's access to radicalized Westerners who have fought in Syria and Iraq would provide a pool of operatives who potentially have access to the United States and other Western countries." It adds: "Since the conflict began in 2011, more than 20,000 foreign fighters—at least 3,400 of whom are Westerners—have gone to Syria from more than 90 countries."

WMD and proliferation are next in line. The report says that "Iran does not face any insurmountable technical barriers to producing a nuclear weapon, making Iran's political will the central issue." It adds that "Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them," and adds that "Iran's progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)." Clapper says in his statement that Iran's Supreme Leader "wants sanctions relief, while at the same time preserving his options on nuclear capabilities." On North Korea, the DNI says that its "nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security environment in

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
East Asia," that it has "expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces," and that it continues to export ballistic missile and related technology. The Report also describes China's expanding nuclear forces and Russia's new intermediate-range cruise missile (which the USG says violates the INF Treaty).

The Report also discusses space and counterspace, transnational crime, economics and natural resources, human security (infectious diseases, extreme weather, political instability, etc.), and then has a discussion of regional threats.

Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and co-founder of Lawfareblog.com. He teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003-2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002-2003.

▶ **Read the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community at:**
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf

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EDITOR'S QUESTION
Are we (especially Italy, Greece and Spain) ready to deal with piracy incidents in Mediterranean Sea with a terrorist potential?

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## Japan: Was brutal murder of boy, 13, inspired by ISIL?

Source: http://www.euronews.com/2015/02/28/japan-was-brutal-murder-of-boy-13-inspired-by-isil/

Three teenage boys have been arrested in Japan after the brutal murder of a thirteen-year-old.

Ryota Uemura's naked body was found slashed and beaten just over a week ago near a river in the Kawasaki suburb of Tokyo.

According to one of his friends, he had feared for his life after being subjected to escalating bullying by a group of older boys.

The eldest of the three suspects, an 18-year-old, has chosen to remain silent, while the other two – both 17 – deny any involvement.

The arrests were based on security footage recorded near where his body was found, as well as Uemera's posts on an online messaging application.

Weekly magazine Shukan Shincho reported the injuries appeared to indicate Uemero's killers may have been trying to decapitate him.

The publication quoted an unnamed police source as saying the killers were suspected of attempting to mimic the execution of hostages by ISIL.

Feb 2015 – The Muslim population in Japan is tiny but growing because of an influx of students and workers. Hirofumi Tanada, a Waseda University professor and an expert on Muslim communities, estimates the number at about 130,000, compared with roughly 60,000 in 2000.

Indonesians make up the largest group, followed by people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Iran and Turkey.

Still, the total is just 0.1% or so of Japan's population. In the U.S., the figure is less than 0.8%, and in France, 7.5%, according to the Pew Research Center.

There were just two mosques in Tokyo in 1970, while now there are 200 mosques and musallahs, or temporary sites used to pray.

Isis killer Mohammed Emwazi had link to 2005 London bomb plot

Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/28/mohammed-emwazi-isis-london-bomb-plot-links

Feb 28 – **Mohammed Emwazi, the Islamic State (Isis) extremist behind the beheading of western hostages, was able to flee Britain and the scrutiny of the security services, despite being a member of a terror cell that was known to have links to the failed 21/7 attacks on London in 2005,** the *Observer* can reveal.

One leading member of Emwazi's network had a telephone conversation on the day of the attacks with Hussein Osman, who was later jailed for life for placing an explosive at Shepherd's Bush tube station.

The security services were also aware that associates of the 12-strong west London terror group had joined the four 21/7 bombers at a training camp in Cumbria a year before the attempt to bring carnage to London's streets.

The revelations, contained in court documents seen by this newspaper, raise urgent questions over how Emwazi, who became known as "Jihadi John", was able to evade surveillance, slip out of the country in 2013 using false papers and re-emerge in Syria a year later to become the world's most wanted terrorist.

Not only was Emwazi a "person of interest" for MI5 as a member of a London jihadi cell set up in 2007 to recruit for al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida affiliate, but at least one member of his network had a connection with one of the most infamous crimes in British history.

The failed 21/7 attacks came a fortnight after four men blew themselves up on tubes and a bus, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700, the worst terrorist atrocity committed on British soil.

The shadow home secretary, Yvette Cooper, called for an urgent review into whether the coalition's decision to weaken counter-terrorism laws had played a role in Emwazi being given the chance to travel to Syria and become a figurehead for Isis.

MI5 had been aware of Emwazi for six years before he appeared on a hostage video for the first time in August 2014, but appears to have been unable to control the network of which he was a part.

It is understood that three members of Emwazi's network had been subject in 2011 to control orders brought in by the last Labour government, which meant they had to live outside London. However, those control orders were disbanded by the coalition; they were instead subject to Tpims – terrorism prevention and investigation measures – which allowed them to return to London and re-engage with Emwazi.

Two of the men on these weakened orders – known only as BX and CC in court documents – later absconded. Emwazi fled to Syria shortly afterwards.

Cooper said: "We need to know whether Theresa May's decision to ignore all our warnings and weaken counter-terror powers have made

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it easier to organise and recruit for Isil [Isis].

"Suggestions of possible links between those carrying out atrocities on behalf of Isil [Isis], and those behind the 21/7 planned attack on London, are very concerning.

"It has been clear from the outset that Tpims are too weak, and it is striking that only one person is currently on a Tpim, despite everything we have been told about the increased threat. At the very least, the prime minister should now ask the intelligence and security committee to examine the period following the scrapping of control orders. Parliament needs to know whether the legislation to alter counter-terror powers affected the UK's ability to prevent known terrorists continuing to develop networks in London."

A former deputy chief of MI6, Nigel Inkster, told the *Observer* that it had now become clear that the previous control-order regime had been a better way of monitoring and controlling subjects.

"Control orders seem to be rather more effective than what has replaced them. They [the government] need to be careful about coming up with new measures of the Tpims variety, which clearly haven't been wildly successful.

"The problem with UK counter-terrorism legislation over the past decade is that it has become a patchwork of knee-jerk responses to specific events, rather than something that has really been thought through," Inkster added.

The home secretary did seek to deport the man who spoke to Osman on the day of the 21/7

attacks – known in court papers only as J1 – on national security grounds in 2011. The 35-year-old, who has lived in the UK since 1990, won an appeal in 2013 on the grounds that it would be an infringement of his human rights to be sent back to Ethiopia.

Former home secretary David Blunkett said he, too, was concerned that the coalition had weakened its efforts to engage with Muslim communities. He said that while the former Prevent strategy, which had been criticised for funding groups with links to extremists, had "room for improvement", it had been "quite wrong" for the coalition to "throw the baby out with the bath water".

A Home Office spokesman said: "Control orders were not working and were being struck down by the courts. Tpims have been endorsed by the courts, counter-terrorism reviewers, the police, and the security service. Following a review of the powers available to manage the terrorist threat, the range of measures available under the Tpim Act is being extended, including a measure to allow Tpim subjects to be relocated to different parts of the country.

"Additionally the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, which became law this month, will bolster our already considerable armoury of powers to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to fight, reduce the risks they pose on their return, and combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism."

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ISIS is recruiting children of rich Nigerians studying abroad

Source: http://pulse.ng/student/terrorism-and-education-isis-is-recruiting-children-of-rich-nigerians-studying-abroad-nic-dg-id3532480.html

Nigerian students studying abroad are being radicalized by agents of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an extremist Islamist rebel group that controls territory in Iraq and Syria.

The shocking revelation was made by the Coordinator of the National Information Centre, Mr. Mike Omeri who cited intelligence reports.

Speaking during the weekly briefing on the war against terrorism in the country, Omeri said the Islamist group is using social media and other sources to target susceptible students.

"At this point, the centre wishes to alert the nation of intelligence reports, indicating the radicalisation of our youths through the social media and a variety of other sources," he said.

Omeri who is also the Director General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) said students from riach homes are the main targets of the extremists.

"The reports show that these youths who are mostly children of the rich and affluent are being recruited into ISIS."

He asked parents with wards abroad to keep an eye on them before they get radicalized.

"We, therefore, call on parents and guardians, especially those whose wards are schooling abroad, to closely monitor the activities of these students who may be susceptible to the antics of the promoters of the ISIS ideology," he added.

It will be recalled that the alleged mastermind of the deadly Nyanya twin bomb blast that killed nearly 100 Nigerians and left scores physically damaged for life, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, was radicalized while studying abroad.

The British born terrorist is an indigene of Orokam, Ogbadibo LGA, Benue State, Nigeria and was a student of Arabic Language at the International University of Africa, Sudan.

With this warning by the NIC DG, parents in the North would be worried, given that many Northern states send their students to countries noted for radicalisms.

In July 2014, the Sokoto state government said it will spend about N800 million to sponsor four hundred and twenty (420) students abroad.

Of this number, 160 will be studying at in Sudan, same country where Ogwuche studied.

Two sides of on the same issue

Britain's intelligence net needs repairs

By Michael Glackin

It is hard not to fear for the defense of the realm these days. When the head of the government body charged with overseeing the British intelligence services is daft enough to be duped by reporters pretending to be directors of a fictitious Chinese company you really are in trouble.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the powerful chairman of Parliament's Intelligence Services Committee, along with a former foreign secretary, Jack Straw, one of the loudest cheerleaders for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, both offered to "use their influence" as senior politicians to help the fictitious company in return for payments of at least $7,500 per day.

Rifkind, who was forced to resign as chair of the ISC following the revelations, told the undercover reporters he could arrange "useful access" to every British ambassador in the world. He said he could meet "any ambassador that I wish to see" in London. "They'll all see me personally."

Luckily it was a bunch of reporters exposing his sordid avarice rather than a terrorist group posing as a fictitious company. The headlines could have been very different.

With someone like this in charge of overseeing intelligence and security, it is unsurprising that the services themselves are facing criticism for being inept. The intelligence and security services consistently warn that the greatest threat to national security comes from British jihadis who become radicalized fighting with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and who then return home bringing the violence they have learned to the streets of Britain.

Yet intelligence and security services appear incapable of stopping not just British nationals going to Syria and Iraq in the first place, but even known terror suspects.

The ISIS executioner known as "Jihadi John," who was finally publicly named by the Washington Post last week as Londoner Mohammed Emwazi, is a case in point. Emwazi, a 27-year-old from west London, was able to escape to Syria despite being on an MI5 terror watch list which prohibited him from leaving the United Kingdom. In fact, Emwazi was so well-known to intelligence services and detained so often by MI5 that he actually filed a formal complaint against them with the Police

Complaints Commission in 2010.

Yet the former University of Westminster computer student, who MI5 had linked to a number of Islamist terror groups including Al-Shabab, managed to slip out of the United Kingdom unnoticed in 2012 to join ISIS. He is the best known of an estimated 2,000 Britons thought to be fighting alongside Islamist extremists and butchering innocents in Syria and Iraq.

The latest recruits appear to be three runaway schoolgirls from London. Clearly the intelligence services cannot monitor everyone, and, unlike Emwazi, the schoolgirls had no record of terrorism. However, one of the schoolgirls is believed to have been recruited through Twitter by Aqsa Mahmood, a so-called "jihadi bride" who fled Glasgow for Syria two years ago.

Mahmood's social media have been monitored by intelligence agencies ever since she disappeared. This is not lost on her family, who said the security services had "serious questions to answer" over her alleged contact with the missing schoolgirls.

It gets worse. It is understood that the schoolgirls were also in contact via social media with a school friend who ran away to Syria in December. The government, not slow to see an opportunity, insisted that the case reinforced its argument to grant greater powers to the intelligence services so they could intercept social media and digital messages. Prime Minister David Cameron wants encrypted communication services such as WhatsApp and Snapchat to be opened up to the security services.

But Steve Hewitt, an expert on security intelligence and counterterrorism at the University of Birmingham, recently told me that mass eavesdropping programs such as Tempora, through which GCHQ secretly gained access to millions of private communications, could actually be hampering intelligence work.

"One of the issues raised by the Snowden disclosures is the vast amount of information the intelligence agencies take in. Frankly it is way too much, and they simply cannot process it all. They need to prioritize more," Hewitt remarked.

They sure do. Emwazi is merely the latest terror suspect of whom the intelligence services have lost sight, only to see him return to haunt them.

Despite extensive so-called "intrusive" surveillance of Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, both men slipped through the intelligence net and murdered an off-duty soldier, Lee Rigby, in broad daylight on a busy London street in 2013. Like Adebolajo, Emwazi has also claimed MI5 tried to recruit him.

The leaders of the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, which killed 52 people, were also on the radar of the intelligence services, but again slipped through the net. After the attack, MI5 insisted two of the bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, were just "petty fraudsters." However, at least one surveillance transcript of the pair later emerged which contained eight pages detailing plans to train for and take part in terrorist attacks.

These are systematic failings. Hewitt adds: "It's inevitable that some suspects could slip through their net, and that the occasional lone attacker may not stay on their radar and then later emerge to attack someone. But ultimately that is preferable to hundreds being killed in a single incident, and the security services have successfully prevented those sort of terror attacks."

Maybe so, but as the old adage goes, the terrorists only have to get lucky once, and the more of them that are allowed to slip through the net, the luckier they are likely to be.

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Michael Glackin, a writer in the United Kingdom, wrote this commentary for The Daily Star.

Don't blame the intelligence agencies for jihadism

By Matthew d'Ancona
Source:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/01/intelligence-agencies-jihadism-radicalisation

We have refined our collective critique of Big Brother with the precision of picky consumers rather than principled citizens. Most of the time

we don't want BB around and complain of his intrusions, real or imagined. But when things go

wrong – when a young Londoner suddenly becomes a global figurehead of murderous Islamism, for instance – we resent the state even more. To put it plainly: the only thing we object to more strenuously than MI5 taking action is MI5 failing to do so.

This is the paradox that has been evident once again since the naming of "Jihadi John" as Mohammed Emwazi. It is a commonplace to argue that the intelligence agencies in the country are powerful (and power-hungry) to an extent that threatens the fibre of democratic society. Yet good old doublethink enables such a claim to coexist with the charge that the security service was somehow responsible for Emwazi's actions by its sins of commission (trying to recruit him) and omission (letting him "slip the net" and flee to Syria). Over the weekend politicians rushed towards the controversy, megaphones in hand. David Davis, a big beast whose talents would have been better deployed as part of the coalition, made the baffling claim in these pages that the spooks settle for a "disruption and management" strategy when they and their colleagues in the police and CPS should be pursuing and prosecuting Islamic extremists.

Would that such a simple choice were available. The problem facing any intelligence agency is precisely that the evidence required to mount a prosecution is so often lacking. It follows that a suite of counterterrorist powers must be made available to such agencies by parliament and, quite rightly, subjected to regular review and structures of accountability. But what powers, applied where, and with what degree of severity?

The coalition is at present split over the ban on extremist speakers at universities. Vince Cable, who is responsible for higher education, wants only explicit incitement to terrorism to be prohibited in the guidelines; Theresa May seeks a broader definition. Both cabinet ministers, please note, are potential leaders of their respective parties: with only 66 days to go before the general election, everything they say, or allow to be known, is entangled with these ambitions.

David Cameron's government, of course, has already replaced Labour's control orders with Tpims – terrorism prevention and investigation measures – which have proved to be only a couple of notches up from useless. To date,

two militants have escaped this weak system and absconded to Somalia.

Yvette Cooper, the shadow home secretary, was quite right to argue on The Andrew Marr Show that the power of relocation, which removed the terror suspect from his geographic network, should be restored. But what will parliament actually do when it considers the question, almost certainly after the election? And will there be a stable government to lead opinion at Westminster?

To delve into such questions, one must remember that politicians, like generals, are usually fighting the last war. In the long years of opposition, many Tories came to regard the counterterrorist measures proposed by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as a subcategory of New Labour authoritarianism rather than a legitimate response to the post-9/11 threat. The Conservative party postured as "hard-nosed defenders of freedom", which is up there with "predistribution" in the annals of political nonsense. For decades the Tories had been the party of security and law and order. Yet faced with Big Blair and Even Bigger Brown, many of them embraced a retro-libertarianism that owed more to Magna Carta than Shami Chakrabarti.

This surge of "Runnymede Conservatism" reached its apogee in Davis's resignation as MP for Haltemprice and Howden in 2008, in protest at Brown's plan to extend the limit for pre-charge detention of terror suspects to 42 days. This strand of contemporary Toryism also helped to cement the coalition. As the Cameron-Clegg programme for government put it: "The [coalition] believes that the British state has become too authoritarian, and that over the past decade it has abused and eroded fundamental human freedoms and historic civil liberties."

The pieties of 2010 have been eroded by the experience of office. As home secretary, May has found herself thwarted by loopholes – notably when she sought to deport Abu Qatada – rather than reining in the supposedly tyrannous state created by New Labour. To understand the Conservative urge to renegotiate Britain's position in Europe and the status of the European Convention on Human Rights look no further than

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ministers' exasperation over the pursuit of terror suspects and the limitations imposed by Brussels and Strasbourg.

The intelligence agencies themselves are constrained by a legal web, and rightly so. No less inevitably, they have limited resources.

There is a weekly meeting at MI5 at which senior officers discuss which "persons of interest" are to be monitored intensively, round the clock. There are several thousand such people – Emwazi was one – but only a few can be subjected to round-the-clock surveillance. How could it be otherwise?

When we speak of suspects "slipping the net", we imply counterterrorist agencies can intercept every such jihadi on his way to commit violence, every such plot to spill blood at home or abroad. Given the odds, it is frankly remarkable any are stopped at all.

It cannot be stated too often: contemporary jihadis are not like the IRA, or the UDA or Eta. They exploit what the greatest guide to the post-9/11 world, Philip Bobbitt, calls the "unique vulnerabilities of globalised, network market states" and a "connectivity that allows a cascading series of vulnerabilities to be exploited".

Today's Islamist militants do not operate within a cellular hierarchy, but more closely resemble local holders of a global franchise. They are self-starters, morphing capriciously from one role to another (the Madrid bombers were essentially book-keepers who became suddenly ambitious). Mohammad Sidique Khan, the presumed leader of the 7/7 plot, had indeed come to MI5's attention a year earlier, in Operation Crevice. Yet, in 2004, he was still a relatively peripheral figure.

What made Emwazi become what he has become, able to do what he has done? What we call "radicalisation" – the walk from one side of the flaming bridge to the other – often occurs in a very short space of time, for reasons that resist pat psychological speculation: to know the reasons why would be to decode the secrets of the soul. Against such mysteries it is not the power of the state that is truly frightening, but its weakness.

***Matthew d'Ancona** writes a weekly column for the Guardian. He was previously editor of the Spectator and also writes for the Evening Standard and GQ. He was the Sunday Telegraph's political columnist for 19 years. He is a visiting research fellow at Queen Mary University of London, author of several books including In It Together: The Inside Story of the Coalition, and chairman of the thinktank, Bright Blue.*

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Norway Mullah: Those Who Do Not Respect Islam "Have No Right To Live

Source: http://patdollard.com/2015/03/norway-mullah-those-who-do-not-respect-islam-have-no-right-to-live/#tReYjX6EflurH5me.99

The words offer chilling insight into the mind of a radical Islamist: "We will defend our religion with our blood."

Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, known commonly as Mullah Krekar, was arrested on Thursday because of what he said in an interview with Norwegian TV station NRK.

The words offer chilling insight into the mind of a radical Islamist: "We will defend our religion with our blood."

Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, known commonly as Mullah Krekar, was arrested on Thursday because of what he said in an interview with Norwegian TV station NRK.

Norwegian authorities have wanted to expel Krekar to his native Iraq since 2003, but have declined to do so because the Islamist would face the death penalty if he were to be extradited, Newsweek noted.

Krekar has long been in the sights of the international security community for his incendiary speech, and his latest arrest came just one month after he was released from a three-year prison stint — which he served because of death threats he'd made against a politician.

Al Qaeda felt 26/11 was more spectacular than 9/11

Source: http://www.oneindia.com/feature/al-qaeda-felt-26-11-was-more-spectacular-than-9-11-1670742.html

The al Qaeda wanted to stage a 26/11 styled attack in Europe and the nod of the Osma Bin Laden was sought for the same. This was a revelation made at the Brooklyn Federal court which is trying Abid Naseer, a 28-year-old Pakistani who is accused of plotting to launch an attack on the New York subway system.

It may be interesting to recall here that the original plan to attack Mumbai on 26/11 was not that of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It was the al Qaeda which had originally planned on hitting the city and the entire plan was designed by the outfit only to be stolen by the ISI and handed over to the Lashkar.

Whose idea was 26/11?
The original plan of the 26/11 attack was designed by Ilyas Kashmiri. He headed the 313 Brigade, a wing of the al Qaeda. The 313 brigade was the operations and combat wing of the al Qaeda.

Two years prior to the attacks of 26/11, Kashmiri has shown interest in waging a war in Kashmir. He felt that the time had come to make a foot hold in India and espouse the Kashmir cause.

Kashmiri also felt that for them to build up a strong network in India, they would need to carry out a spectacular attack on Indian soil and hence began the plan to attack Mumbai.

Kashmiri roped in nearly 25 persons for the attack and began training them. He was in touch with David Headley who was inclining towards the al Qaeda at that point in time.

Headley during one of his visits to Pakistan even discussed the attack and promised to scout for targets in Mumbai.

The Lashkar had begun to crumble
However there was a problem within the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its operatives had started to disintergrate. This was a worrying sign for the ISI which wanted to keep the outfit united. The cadres in the Lashkar had complained that they were not doing enough and had threatened to quit the outfit and join the al Qaeda in Afghanistan to battle against the United States of America.

The ISI got wind of the idea being floated by Ilyas Kashmiri. They summoned Kashmiri and told him point blank that he shall not go ahead with the attack and even directed him to share the plans with them.

The Lashkar was roped in and the plan details shared with them. The Lashkar trained for the attack and the rest is history.

Why did the al Qaeda want to replicate 26/11 and not 9/11?
The latest trial at Brooklyn shows that the al Qaeda had sought Bin Laden's nod to execute a 26/11 styled attack in Europe. The same al Qaeda which had carried out the 9/11 attack which had left the world stunned however chose a 26/11 styled attack instead.

Several analysts say while 9/11 was huge, the 26/11 attack had a much bigger impact. The 9/11 attack was over in a matter of a few hours while the 26/11 attack dragged on for almost three days. Attacks that drag on have a major impact on the minds of the people.

Moreover in a 26/11 styled attack a terrorist group gets the fodder to bargain as there is also a hostage crisis involved. Governments tend to crumble during such attacks and hence the al Qaeda preferred replicating the 26/11 attack.

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Steganography and terrorism: Why ISIS relies on it so much

Source: http://www.oneindia.com/feature/steganography-and-terrorism-why-isis-relies-on-it-so-much-1670728.html

Cryptography

Steganography

Watermarking

A book titled **Gideon's Spies – The Secret History of the Mossad** has revealed that terror groups such as the ISIS are using encrypted messages on eBay, Reddit, and pornographic websites. This technology where secret information is concealed within a digital file and this can be accessed by the other person who is supposed to read the message.

This technology which the ISIS has been using is known as steganography. It is through this technology that secret messages are concealed and investigations have found that several messages which were encrypted had information about future attacks.

The Mossad had learnt that there was an increase in the flow of internet traffic following the Charlie Hebdo attack. This was made use of by terrorist groups who used steganography to post encrypted messages on the internet. The Mossad decoded hexadecimal characters and prime numbers which the terrorists were using to conceal the information.

What is steganography

<mark>Steganography is considered to be an art through which files, messages, image or a video is concealed within another file. To the naked eye the messages are not visible. Loosely translated it would mean it is invisible ink in a letter.</mark>

While cryptography is the practice of protecting contents of a message, steganography is concerned with concealing the fact that a secret message is being sent, as well as concealing the contents of the message.

The sender of a message would chose an image file and adjust the colour of every 100th pixel to correspondent to a letter in the alphabet.

Al-Qaeda relied on steganography

When investigators from the United States of America dug deep into the Al-Qaeda's network it was found that they had extensively used steganography to pass on messages.

Groups such as the Hizbollah, Hamas and Al-Qaeda had used steganography to pass on messages beween each other. Once the messages were encrypted, the Al-Qaeda members downloaded the files using various software to execute several terrorist plots.

Traces of the technique being used during the 9/11 attack were also seen during investigation.

Using their imagination

Steganography has most of the time been used by terrorist groups on pornographic files. The messages are embedded into a pornographic file. To anyone watching the file it is a normal pornographic picture. However the person on the other end would know exactly what to look for.

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This means that the receiver would need to use his imagination to detect which picture has the message encoded into it. The receiver of the file would look close into the picture. He would look for a time stamp on the picture or a unique word on the subject line of the picture.

Detection is difficult

For an investigating officer detecting steganography is a nightmare. There is absolutely no record to show that the sender and the receiver had ever communicated. They do not exchange calls or emails.

What investigating agencies have been doing is keeping a track of all downloaded pictures on the web. Pictures that are downloaded in places where the terrorist networks are strong are part of the data base. They would then keep a watch on these pictures closely to see if there are messages coded into them.

New counter-terrorism duties: what schools need to know

Source: http://www.theguardian.com/teacher-network/2015/mar/02/counter-terrorism-duties-schools-need-to-know

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, which became law on Thursday 12 February, puts a responsibility on schools to participate in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and challenge extremist ideas that support or are shared by terrorist groups.

The provisions for schools are expected to come into force in the next few months, subject to further potential parliamentary law changes.

The new Act includes a more rigorous set of expectations for schools when compared with current advice on working with other agencies to protect against terrorism. These are outlined in draft statutory guidance issued for consultation before the Act was passed; we can expect final guidance to follow soon. In the meantime, here are five key points all headteachers need to know to meet new duties.

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Assessing the risk of students being drawn into terrorism

Under the new rules, headteachers and governors should be assessing whether any students are at risk of being drawn into terrorism. Your reflections should be based on your local environment: are they likely to be exposed to terrorist ideology, including extremist ideas, beyond the school gates?

Ofsted inspectors already look closely at how schools keep students safe from such risks, so you will need to show that you have robust safeguarding policies in place. For example, if your school hosts visiting speakers, then your policies should set out a clear protocol for ensuring that these are suitable and appropriately supervised on the premises.

As a senior researcher specialising in safeguarding at The Key, I've been fielding lots of questions from school leaders on how to meet existing requirements for safeguarding pupils and promoting fundamental British values. For example, headteachers and governors have asked about policies on preventing extremism and guidance on how to explain the associated risks to students of different ages.

Further education settings and sixth-form colleges are expected to carry out more substantial checks. In the case of visiting speakers, for example, staff should ask to see the event content ahead of time, including any presentations and footage that will be used. They should also be willing to cancel the event if necessary.

Working in partnership with your local authority

When putting in place measures to safeguard students from terrorist ideology, your governing body or proprietor should consider how your local children's safeguarding board approaches this issue. When redrafting your child protection policy, be sure to adhere to government guidance and refer to locally agreed inter-agency procedures.

Training staff to identify at-risk children

Do your staff have the knowledge and confidence to identify children who are at risk? Are they able to challenge extremist ideas used to legitimise terrorism? Do all staff know where and how to refer children and young people for further help? Addressing these questions is the

key to identifying training gaps and giving your staff the skills they need. Prevent awareness training will play a key part in this.

Keeping students safe online

You can help to keep children safe from terrorist and extremist material by setting up appropriate levels of filtering on the school internet. Internet safety policies in further education should make specific reference to the new duty. The new rules recognise that older students and staff may need to research terrorism and counter-terrorism as part of their studies, but they expect institutions to be able to identify where online materials are accessed for curriculum purposes.

Managing prayer and faith facilities

While there's currently no equivalent expectation on schools, further education institutions and sixth-form colleges are expected to have clear policies on the use of prayer rooms and other faith-related activities. Such policies should cover arrangements for managing the facilities and any issues that arise, including how access is managed after hours.

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Amy Cook is a senior researcher at The Key, which provides leadership and management support to over a third of the schools in England and Wales.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: It is interesting to see how a country is adjusting to the demands of minorities with the excuse of terrorism. It would be a good idea for Key researcher to pay some visits to some schools around the country to see how reality is. Internet supervision is of no value if similar processes are not applied at home as well! Do all parents are in control of Internet at home? I doubt it! Also: are teachers "safe" when reporting strange activities at their schools? I doubt that as well!

Transportation securityTerrorists shift focus of attacks from air transportation to rail systems

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150304-terrorists-shift-focus-of-attacks-from-air-transportation-to-rail-systems

March 04 – Terrorists have shifted their focus in recent years away from attacking airlines to attacking subway and rail systems, according to an analysis of terrorist attacks over a 30-year period from 1982 to 2011 by a leading and safety researcher.

In his study — "Has Successful Terror Gone to Ground?" — Professor Arnold Barnett of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management writes that statistically significant evidence points to a growing focus

of terrorist attacks against ground mass transit. The deadliest attacks against air and rail in the decade 2002-2011 were against subway and commuter rail systems, taking 200 lives apiece. In a previous analysis for the period 1968 to 10 September 2001, the author concluded that air travel within the United States entailed a greater risk of a terrorist attack than "virtually any other activity."

The new Barnett paper, which reaches a different conclusion,

appeared in the online version of *Risk Analysis*, a publication of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA).

An SRA release reports that Barnett notes that the statistical risk posed to travelers by criminal/terrorist acts against air and rail are minuscule, but he argues that successful acts of terror have ramifications beyond their immediate consequences. For example, many observers believe that the Madrid commuter-train bombings in 2004 changed the outcome of the Spanish national election shortly thereafter. Barnett argues that "if terrorists give weight to demonstrated success," then the vulnerabilities illustrated by recent rail bombings from Great Britain to Sri Lanka could be precursors to further attacks. Because there is little evidence that attacks on rail systems can be thwarted while in progress, the greater

terrorist interest in railroads "heightens the urgency" of intercepting terror plots in advance. Barnett concludes by noting that a planned 2009 New York subway attack was thwarted by good intelligence work, not by security measures at Times Square or Grand Central Station.

In his analysis, Barnett excluded the 2,765 ground deaths suffered during the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States because his analysis focused on risks to air and rail passengers. The 9/11 casualties would have overwhelmingly dominated the analysis had they been included, raising the danger that the understandable preoccupation with the 9/11 calamity would "obscure less extreme patterns related to acts of terror."

Identifying such patterns was the main point of the article, the author notes.

— Read more in Arnold Barnett "Has Successful Terror Gone to Ground?" Risk Analysis (13 February 2015)

Qatari fatwa: Destroy Egypt's pyramids, Sphinx!

Source: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/variety/2015/03/03/Qatari-fatwa-Destroy-Egypt-s-pyramids-and-Sphinx-.html#.VPYqn_yGb4Q.linkedin

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March 03 – A fatwa from a Qatari-owned online portal has been widely circulated by Egyptian press this week after it called for the destruction of pharanoic monuments on the grounds that they are contrary to Islam.

The religious edict, issued by Islam Web, was picked up by several independent Egyptian news outlets, such as Youm 7 and al-Fagr. It suggested the destruction of the historic monuments were a "religious duty" that Egyptians must fulfill.

But Egyptian newspapers carrying the story failed to notice the fatwa was first issued in December 2012. It has nevertheless sparked prime-time talk show discussions in Egypt.

Screengrab from Egyptian news site Youm 7, covering the fatwa story this week. (Click to enlarge)

The fatwa, which had been issued in response to a user's question to the Islam Web's administrator, had stated: "The demolition of the pyramids and the sphinx is a religious duty," before referring to the monuments as "idols."

Screengrab from the Islam Web fatwa in Arabic on destroying the Sphinx and pyramids. (Click to enlarge)

It added: *"(The destruction of) monuments is a duty by Sharia (Islamic) law, as many texts have stipulated … Texts on this issue are many and well-known but (implementing) them is restrained to one's ability… And so, if it's not possible to destroy the pyramids and the Sphinx as a result of the presence of an authority preventing that, Muslims would not be committing a sin."*

Screengrab from the Islam Web fatwa in Arabic on destroying the Sphinx and pyramids. (Click to enlarge)

In 2012, Egyptian scholars denounced any fatwa calling for the destruction of pharanoic monuments.

Under the radar

Islam Web is affiliated to the Qatari ministry of endowments, with Doha's government website advising users seeking online fatwas to "enter the official website of Fatwa Center on Islam Web."

Screengrab from a Qatari government website advising users seeking fatwas to write to Islam Web. (Click to enlarge)

The portal has previously been under the radar following a fatwa issued in 2006 permitting the burning of people to death. The edict was titled: "The Burning of Ias bin Abdul Yalil by Abu Bakr" which visited a historic case study to conclude that burning people as a form of punishment is permissible.

But last month, the fatwa was reportedly removed from the site and retracted hours after ISIS burned Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh alive.

Islam Web has also attracted controversy for issuing a fatwa that legitimizes insulting Christianity, which was also widely reported on.

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Relations between Qatar and Egypt have been tense since the 2013 ouster of former Islamist President Mohammad Mursi, who hails from the Doha-backed Muslim Brotherhood.

US air traffic control computer system vulnerable to terrorist hackers

Source: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/us-air-traffic-control-computer-system-vulnerable-to-terrorist-hackers/

The US system for guiding airplanes is open to vulnerabilities from outside hackers, the Government Accountability Office said Monday. The weaknesses that threaten the Federal Aviation Administration's ability to ensure the safety of flights include the failure to patch known three-year-old security holes, the transmission and storage of unencrypted passwords, and the continued use of "end-of-life" key servers.

The GAO said that deficiencies in the system that monitors some 2,850 flights at a time has positioned the air traffic system into an "increased and unnecessary risk of unauthorized access, use or modification that could disrupt air traffic control operations." What's more, the report said the FAA "did not always ensure that sensitive data were encrypted when transmitted or stored." That information included stored passwords and "authentication data."

Among the findings:

While the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken steps to protect its air traffic control systems from cyber-based and other threats, significant security control weaknesses remain, threatening the agency's ability to ensure the safe and uninterrupted operation of the national airspace system (NAS). These include weaknesses in controls intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computer resources, such as controls for protecting system boundaries, identifying and authenticating users, authorizing users to access systems, encrypting sensitive data, and auditing and monitoring activity on FAA's systems. Additionally, shortcomings in boundary protection controls between less-secure systems and the operational NAS environment increase the risk from these weaknesses.

The flying public's safety is in jeopardy until there's a fix to the system used at some 500 airport control towers, the GAO said.

"Until FAA effectively implements security controls, establishes stronger agency-wide information security risk management processes ... the weaknesses GAO identified are likely to continue, placing the safe and uninterrupted operation of the nation's air traffic control system at increased and unnecessary risk."

The report chided the agency for failing to perform basic functions:

Additionally, the agency did not always ensure that security patches were applied in a timely manner to servers and network devices supporting air traffic control systems, or that servers were using software that was up-to-date. For example, certain systems were missing patches dating back more than 3 years. Additionally, certain key servers had reached end-of-life and were no longer supported by the vendor. As a result, FAA is at an increased risk

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that unpatched vulnerabilities could allow its information and information systems to be compromised.

national airspace system, which the traveling public relies on each and every day," said John Thune (R-S.D.) and Bill Nelson (D-Fla.).

ATCT (Air Traffic Control Towers)

ARTCC (Air Route Traffic Control Centers)

TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control)

GPS (Global Positioning System) Satellite

SBSS (Surveillance & Broadcast Services System) Ground Station

ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast) Signals

Source: GAO based on Federal Aviation Administration information. | GAO-15-221

Senators immediately demanded an explanation from the Transportation Department, which oversees the FAA.
"These vulnerabilities have the potential to compromise the safety and efficiency of the

The transportation agency said it was working to correct the problems and has achieved "major milestones" toward that goal.

Security Jam – Spring 2015
Source: http://www.friendsofeurope.org/media/uploads/2015/02/SecurityJamReport2014-finalLR.pdf

Top 10 recommendations
1. The new EU & NATO leaders should update their organisations' security strategies, coordinating more closely to ensure greater coherence and mutual reinforcement in shaping the security environment.
2. EU & NATO governments' strategic communications efforts must be made more coherent and effective so as to counter hostile narratives and underline universal values of democracy and selfdetermination.
3. NATO, the EU and the OSCE should stimulate the creation of an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East with countries in the region.
4. NATO's Defence Planning Process should be faster and more innovative to spur nations and industry to deal more effectively with rapidly changing threats.

5. NATO should build resilience to absorb asymmetric threats and unconventional attacks by coordinating the work of its Centres of Excellence to this end.

6. The EU should set up and maintain an up-to-date and public common picture of migration, asylum and human trafficking flows and operations to ensure an integrated, comprehensive and coherent approach, just as ReliefWeb does for disaster response.

7. EU & NATO gender-inclusiveness efforts should, in the context of UNSCR 1325, be strengthened by substantial increases in the number of women in the forces on the ground engaged in intelligence and information operations.

8. The UN Special Envoy to Syria and others engaged in mediation should reinforce the importance of UNSCR 1325, seeking to ensure that women, including female combatants fighting IS, are fully represented at all stages of the peace and reconciliation process.

9. National and regional cybersecurity bodies should promote the creation of an international 'Cyberpol' cybersecurity agency supported by major international organisations such as the UN, EU, IMF, World Bank, NATO and the OSCE.

10. The EU, NATO and governments should actively encourage and support universities in cybersecurity research and education.

▶ **Read the full paper at source's URL**.

DNI: 'Confirmed' That 116 Former Gitmo Detainees Returned to Terror or Insurgencies; If More Are Released More Will

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Source: http://cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/dni-confirmed-116-former-gitmo-detainees-returned-terror-or

The Director of National Intelligence released a report this week indicating that the United States has "confirmed" that 116 detainees "transferred" out of the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, subsequently reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities. The report also warned: "Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred."

The DNI first publicly warned more than four years ago--in December 2010--that the number of then already "transferred" Guantanamo detainees returning to terror and insurgent activity would increase as time passed and that if additional detainees were released in the future some of those would also return to terrorist and insurgent activities.

Despite this warning, the DNI's new report indicates that between Jan. 14, 2014 and Jan. 15, 2015 the U.S. government released an additional 33 Guantanamo detainees.

As pointed out in a statement released by House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul (R.-Texas), the number of "transferred" Guantanamo detainees confirmed to have returned to terrorist or insurgent activity increased by 12 during that same January 2014 to January 2015 time frame.

Responding to the DNI's new report, House Intelligence Chairman Devin Nunes (R.-Calif.) said the administration should abandon its efforts to close Guantanamo.

"It is simple common sense that the most radical and dangerous Islamist terrorists--which are who we hold at Guantanamo Bay--will return to terrorism if given the chance," Chairman Nunes told CNSNews.com. "That is why the Obama administration should stop hunting for pretexts to release them in a misguided attempt to close down the prison."

As of Jan. 15, according to the DNI's report, 647 detainees had been "transferred" from Guantanamo. Of these, 116 (or 17.9 percent) were confirmed to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities and another 69 (or 10.7 percent) were suspected of having reengaged.

Together, 185 (or 28.6 percent) of the 647 released Guantanamo detainees were either confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorism or insurgent activities.

According to the DNI's report, a detainee released from Guantanamo is "confirmed" to have returned to terrorist or insurgent activites when a "preponderance of information identifies" that specific former detainee as having done so. A former detainee is "suspected" of having returned to terrorist or insurgent activity when "plausible but unverified or single-source reporting" indicates that he has done so.

In a previous report on "transferred" former Guantanamo detainees that was released a year ago (on March 5, 2014), the DNI qualified its assessment that "transferred" Guantanamo detainees would return to terror or insurgencies.

In that report, which included data through Jan. 14, 2014, the DNI said: "Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred **without conditions** from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose a particular problem." [Emphasis added.]

The DNI's reengagement reports released in 2013 and 2012 incorporated the same or similar language as the March 2014 report, including the qualification that it was from among the detainees "transferred without conditions" that some would return to terrorism.

But the most recent prior reengagement report, published on Sept. 5, 2014, and the latest one released this week, do not include the phrase "without conditions." After stating that if

additional Guantanamo detainees are "transferred" some of them "will" return to terrorist and insurgent activity, the latest report says: "Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as activie recruitment" by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose particular problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions."

The initial reengagement report published on Dec. 7, 2010, said the number of those already released reengaging in terrorism would increase and if additional detainees were released some of them would return to terrorism.

"A February 2010 review of GTMO detainees' release dates compared to first reporting of confirmed or suspected reengagement shows about 2.5 years between leaving GTMO and the first identified reengagement reports," said that 2010 report. "Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent acitivities."

The 2010 intelligence authorization act required the DNI to submit these periodic public reports assessing the number of released Guantanamo detainees who had reengaged in terrorism. The 2012 intelligence authorization renewed that mandate.

The initial Dec. 7, 2010 report said that as of Oct. 1, 2010, 598 detainees had been "transferred out" of Guantanamo.

"The Intelligence Community assesses that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities after transfer," said that 2010 report. "Of the 150 former GTMO detainees assessed as confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities, the Intelligence Community assesses that 13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 remain at large."

Two days after he first took office in 2009, President Obama issued an executive order calling for Guantanamo to be closed. That order also called for officials to

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review what should be done with each individual transferred from the prison. The DNI's reengagement reports separately account for those released from Guantanamo before and after this executive order.

"On 22 January 2009, the President signed Executive Order 13492, calling for a comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently detained at Guantanamo Bay," said the 2010 report. "Every decision to transfer a detainee to a foreign country under this review was made after a full assessment of intelligence and threat information.

"Since the implementation of Executive Order 13492 and under the enhanced interagency review process, 66 of the 598 detainees noted above have been transferred," said the 2010 DNI report. "Of those 66 individuals transferred since January 2009, 2 are confirmed and 3 are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities."

(The percentage of Guantanamo detainees released after President Obama's executive order who have been confirmed to have returned to terrorist or insurgent activity has been less thus far--5.2 percent--than it has been for detainees released before the executive order, which is 17.9 percent.)

By January 14, 2014, according to the DNI report released last March, the number of detainees released from Guantanamo had grown to 614. That included 104 who were confirmed to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities and 74 who were suspected of having reengaged.

Of the 82 that had been released between Obama's Jan. 22, 2009 exectuve order and Jan. 14, 2014, according to the DNI's March 2014 report, 5 were confirmed to have reengaged in terrorism and 2 were suspected of reengaging.

The report that the DNI released this week, which includes data through January 15, 2015, indicates that the total number of detainees released from Guantanamo has climbed to 647 (not counting 9 who died at Guantanamo and one who was transferred to the U.S. to face a civilian trial). The number released after Obama's executive order grew from 82 last January to 115 this January.

Thus, the U.S. released an additional 33 Guantanamo detainees during the year.

From January 2014 to January 2015, the number of "transferred" Guantanamo detainees confirmed to have reengaged in terrorism or insurgent activities grew from 104 to 116—an increase of 12.

The number of detainees released after Obama's Jan. 22, 2009 order who were confirmed to have reengaged increased during the year grew from 5 to 6.

In light of the new DNI report, House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul criticized President Obama's policy of releasing Guantanamo detainees.

"At a time when Islamist extremists are surging worldwide, President Obama's policy of releasing hardened terrorists from the Guantanamo Bay facility is replenishing their ranks," said McCaul in a statement. "This administration must reassess its reckless detainee policies and stop freeing terrorists."

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Boko Haram Generates Uncertainty With Pledge of Allegiance to Islamic State

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/africa/boko-haram-is-said-to-pledge-allegiance-to-islamic-state.html

March 07 – With thousands of fighters and some parts of northeastern Nigeria under its control, Boko Haram is believed to be the largest jihadi group to pledge fidelity to the Islamic State. But terrorism experts say that the practical significance of the move announced Saturday is as yet unclear.

Some experts say that the pledge, or "bayat," made by the leader of Boko Haram is a spiritually binding oath, which indicates that the

Nigerian Islamist group has agreed to accept the authority of the Islamic State.

But as with similar pledges to the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, by other extremist groups, there are few details about how much direct control the Islamic State leaders have over their distant proxies.

If confirmed, the agreement with Boko Haram would mirror the

steps taken by Islamic State affiliates in Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Afghanistan and beyond. In each case, a group's leaders swore allegiance in a public message posted online. Weeks later, the oath was formally accepted by the Islamic State, in a statement issued by the group's spokesman.

homogeneous group and it behaves as different factions. So it's too early to tell for sure if Boko Haram will fall directly under ISIS command, and to what extent they will act as an ISIS proxy."

Since its inception, Boko Haram's targets, goals and language have been almost

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
"It's quite clear that since at least mid-January, the Islamic State has had some level of connection with Boko Haram," said Aaron Y. Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute who tracks propaganda by Islamic extremists. "The key question is whether the Islamic State dispatched individuals from Syria or Iraq, or else from Libya, down to northern Nigeria to help out with operations on the ground, or else with methodology, or in terms of governance activities."

Boko Haram is estimated to have up to 6,000 fighters and at least some level of control over about 20,000 square kilometers, or about 8,000 square miles, of northeastern Nigeria, according to Ryan Cummings, chief Africa analyst for red24, a crisis management group based in Britain, who has been following the group since 2011. Mr. Cummings raised questions about the kind of command-and-control structure that could exist between the two groups.

"It seems at the moment that this is a statement that is akin to saying, 'We are on the same page,' " he said. "But the biggest issue with Boko Haram is that it's not a

exclusively Nigerian, and the focus of its hate remains the Nigerian state and its agents.

Moreover, the group's brutality is unlikely to be altered by a new alliance. Paul Lubeck, a Nigeria expert at Johns Hopkins University, said Saturday that Boko Haram had been practicing the signature tactics of the Islamic State — beheadings and enslavement — even before the Islamic State.

Professor Lubeck said there was some significance to Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance, if true, because the group had until now maintained its autonomy from larger groups like Al Qaeda. But he was unable to say what practical consequences an affiliation with the Islamic State might have.

An American intelligence official also reacted cautiously, saying that while Boko Haram would not turn down money or material support from the Islamic State, it was unlikely that it would take orders from it. "It's probably more for propaganda purposes than anything else," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters.

For roughly 18 months, there have been growing signs of at least links of solidarity between the organizations, as well as suggestions that the Islamic State has been grooming Boko Haram for entry into its network.

Last year, Boko Haram's leader declared his support for the leader of the Islamic State, and began using the Islamic State battle hymn as the soundtrack for videos documenting his atrocities.

Analysts have also noted a growing professionalism in Boko Haram's videos, which had previously been shot with hand-held cameras and posted haphazardly on YouTube. The new videos were noticeably more polished and used images that mimicked the visual vocabulary of the Islamic State.

Not just a turf war: Reasons why has ISIS become drug reliant?

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/03/not-just-turf-war-reasons-why-has-isis.html

If one has to run a terrorist outfit in Afghanistan the primary source of income would be earned from the sale of drugs. The Taliban and the al Qaeda earned their bread and butter for long from the sale of drugs.

Joining the list of drug dependant terror outfits today is the ISIS and although they have not completely established themselves in Afghanistan they still managed to **earn 1 billion US dollars through drugs in the past one year**.

Making use of the drug route
Unlike the Taliban or the al Qaeda the ISIS still does not have direct control over the drug market in Afghanistan. However they have

A report by the Russian Federal Drug Control Service say that heroin traffic goes through areas in Iraq which are controlled by the ISIS.

What the ISIS has managed to do is rope in several peddlers from Afghanistan and deal in drugs. The ISIS has assured the peddlers of a safe route through Iraq which has paid off. The peddlers rely on the ISIS for security while taking a large produce of both heroin and poppy through Iraq.

Interestingly the drugs that are peddled through Iraq make up for half the poppy and heroin consumption in the European nations.

The drug network would help in Afghanistan
The ISIS is not just looking for territory to control in Afghanistan. In its battle against the Taliban and the al Qaeda, it would look to take over the drug market as well. However there would be no teething hurry for the ISIS to get into a drug territory war with the Taliban.

The ISIS has enough and more through the oil wells it controls. Moreover the drugs routed through Iraq are funding the ISIS an additional 1 billion dollars a year.

been benefitted by the fact that <mark>at least 30 to 40 per cent of the drugs from Afghanistan pass through areas in Iraq which is controlled by the ISIS.</mark>

Why is ISIS investing in drug trade
The investment into the drug trade is a clear indication that

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the ISIS is looking to expand territory. When it began its battle in Iraq it had taken control over several oil wells and relied on it for funding. The ISIS however realized that while these oil wells would ensure that they are self sufficient in Iraq and Syria, it would not be enough for them to expand into other parts of the world.

Several persons had raised doubts about how long the ISIS could last or how well they could expand if they relied just on oil.

The ISIS appears to have given this a thought and gradually began indulging in extortions, donations and theft to raise money. However they felt that the drug venture would pay them better and this in turn would help their expansion plans.

Moreover the ISIS is seriously looking at Afghanistan.

Looking at the various outfits that operate in Afghanistan it becomes clear that they have relied solely on the drug market to raise funds. It comes as no surprise that the ISIS too is going the Taliban way at least when it comes to raise money for their activities.

Defusing Terror in Indonesia

By Endy Bayun

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/opinion/defusing-terror-in-indonesia.html?_r=0

This country, the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, has been relatively untouched by Islamist terror attacks since the bombing of two Western hotels here in the capital in 2009. But its future is by no means assured.

While some extremist groups have been contained, Indonesia is not immune to threats from the Islamic State, now menacing the Middle East and North Africa. If and when the self-proclaimed caliphate decides to spread its wings to Southeast Asia, Indonesia, where Muslims make up 90 percent of the country's 250 million people, is particularly vulnerable.

Government officials here believe that as many as 200 Indonesians have gone to Syria to fight with ISIS. At least 10 of them are believed to have returned. Public rallies in support of ISIS were held last July in several major towns, as well as one in an Islamic university just outside Jakarta (they were not well attended).

The government's response to ISIS has been confined to declaring it a "banned ideology." Support for the group is prohibited, and the police have prevented any more pro-ISIS rallies from being staged. Recruiting for ISIS is now illegal, although literature about the group and its activities remains freely available on the Internet.

Terrorism in Indonesia has been largely defused thanks to a combination of stronger democratic governance, a more stable political environment and steady economic development that has lifted millions out of poverty. While many Indonesian Muslims may share the ISIS goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate, they are most likely to wage their battles by democratic means, not by violence.

Democracy is the best defense against Islamic extremism. By democracy I mean the whole package, not just freedom of speech, civil rights and open elections, but also credible law enforcement.

There is no reason why Indonesia should change its overall approach in facing the ISIS menace, but the government should tread carefully. To breach democratic norms under the guise of fighting terrorism is counterproductive.

Governments must strictly enforce the law, a crucial element for any democracy to function. This means putting the police on the front line against terrorism, with the military as a backup when needed. It also means improving the overall capacity of the police force, including its intelligence-gathering ability.

Indonesia has done exactly this since suicide bombers killed more than 200 people in terror attacks on Bali nightclubs in 2002. The

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terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda that was implicated in those attacks, has been crippled. Indonesia's Special Forces anti-terrorist squad, Densus 88, has also claimed to have foiled several bombing plots in recent years.

Credible law enforcement includes upholding due process, even for suspected terrorists. Indonesia has resisted the temptation to re-enact the draconian anti-subversive law, the equivalent of the Internal Security Act that neighboring Malaysia and Singapore have used to arrest anyone the authorities wish to without a warrant and to imprison people indefinitely without trial in the name of national security.

The prosecution of those suspected of having connections to terrorist networks — and there have been several hundred of them — has followed proper legal procedures. This includes the cases of the three chief perpetrators of the Bali bombings, who were sentenced to death and executed in 2008.

Many others convicted of terrorism have been released after serving time in prison, but not before undergoing a government-run "deradicalization" program. Here, the record is mixed: While some have renounced extremism, others have rejoined terrorist groups.

The main battle against Islamic extremism has always hinged on winning hearts and minds. Many Muslims are radicalized during indoctrination sessions held in small Quranic reading groups. A handful of Muslim boarding schools, known as pesantren, are suspected hotbeds of radicalism, and police intelligence is vital to penetrating them. But the battlefield that counts the most is the public square. We must fight terror with the full force of the law, but fight ideology with ideology.

Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, who between them ruled Indonesia from 1945 to 1998, made the mistake of outlawing radical Islamists at times, pushing them underground. Disparate Islamist groups then joined hands to fight their battles together. They became invincible and deadlier.

That changed in 1998, when Suharto was forced to step down, paving the way for Indonesia's first truly democratic elections in four decades, in 1999. Since then, various Islamist groups have formed political parties and have won enough votes in the last four general elections to become junior partners in successive coalition governments. Nevertheless, political Islam doesn't enjoy widespread support — the majority of Muslims in Indonesia have consistently voted for secular political parties.

The concept of an Islamic caliphate may resonate among some Indonesians, but many Muslim groups here have denounced the Islamic State for its barbaric violence. Even Abu Bakar Bashir, the Jemaah Islamiyah leader who is serving a 15-year prison term, lost many supporters after he reportedly led a handful of inmates last July in declaring support for the Islamic State. A month later, one of his sons clarified that they had pledged support for a caliphate, but did not recognize ISIS as its representative.

Different interpretations of Islam are as old as the religion itself, but Indonesia's free and democratic environment has allowed these differences to flourish. Muslims of different schools and Indonesians of other faiths now live peacefully, side by side.

In dealing with the ISIS threat, Indonesia should never trade its freedom and rights for a little security. After all we have been through, we should have faith in democracy.

Endy Bayuni is a senior editor of The Jakarta Post.

The International Campaign against ISIS

Source: http://acdemocracy.org/the-international-campaign-against-isis/?utm_source=The+International+Coalition+Campaign+against+ISIS+-+Initial+Analysis&utm_campaign=The+International+Campaign+against+ISIS&utm_medium=email

On September 10, 2014, American President Barack Obama announced the initiation of a comprehensive campaign against ISIS aimed to "degrade and ultimately destroy" it. The campaign strategy had several aspects:

intensive airstrikes in Syria and Iraq; strengthening local forces in Syria and Iraq (the Iraqi army, the Kurdish forces, the so-called moderate Syrian rebel

organizations); damaging ISIS's sources of power (especially its financial resources); and improving the methods used by the United States and the international community to cope with the incidence of foreign fighters joining ISIS. All that was intended to weaken ISIS without significant American forces on the ground in Syria or Iraq.

The international campaign focuses on Iraq and Syria, however, during the past half year it has been faced with a series of challenges in other countries. The main challenges are the spread of ISIS to other Arab-Muslim countries; the influx of foreign fighters joining the ranks of the jihadi organizations; the increasing jihadi terrorism in Western countries and the strong

attraction of Salafist-jihadi ideology in both the Arab-Muslim world and the Muslim communities in the West. As the coalition campaign continues, it will have to reexamine its concepts and strategies in the face of those challenges.

The coalition campaign against ISIS is expected to last several years (at least until 2019, according to some American estimates), and may extend beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq. However, at this point, half a year after the anti-ISIS campaign began, it is possible to give an initial assessment of its impact on ISIS, and of the strengths and weaknesses of the coalition's strategies.

The first six months of the campaign indicate no clear-cut balance between success and failure: **Syria and Iraq**

- The coalition, with the support (significant, in ITIC assessment) of local forces, has succeeded in containing the spread of ISIS to other regions and has kept it from cleaning out pockets of resistance in extensive areas under its control (the provinces of Al-Anbar in Iraq and Deir al-Zor, Al-Raqqah and Al-Hasakah in Syria). ISIS's most outstanding failure during the past half year was the blow dealt by the reinforced Kurdish YPG forces in Kobanî (Ayn al-Arab) after four months of fighting (which began after the coalition campaign began). In Tikrit, north of Baghdad, ISIS is currently facing an attack launched by the Iraqi army to retake the city.

- The coalition attacks resulted in a significant decrease in ISIS' revenues, especially oil revenues. That harmed its ability to govern (i.e., providing civilian services to the large population under its control). However, the continuing airstrikes and the decrease in revenue have not yet shaken its hold over the extensive areas it conquered in Syria and Iraq, especially its two main strongholds, Mosul (Iraq) and Al-Raqqah (Syria).

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ISIS's successes beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq:

- While contained in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is establishing itself in other Middle Eastern countries, using local jihadi organizations which swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and created "provinces" of the self-declared Islamic State. Its most prominent successes have been in Libya and Egypt (focused in the Sinai Peninsula). Thus ISIS has created a potential threat to Egypt, Israel, and the countries of North Africa and southern Europe.

- ISIS also had two important successes in the international arena the past half year: one was that the influx of foreign fighters who joined its ranks has continued (although it has faced certain difficulties created by the preventive measures taken by various countries). The other was that jihadist operatives in Western countries (not necessarily those who joined ISIS in Syria) responded positively to ISIS's propaganda campaign and carried out attacks in their own countries against government and Jewish targets, especially in the coalition countries (so far apparently the attacks were not orchestrated or organized).

- ISIS's jihadist ideology is spreading rapidly and its image and brand as a leading jihadi organization remain undamaged and intact. ISIS is ahead in its rivalry with Ayman al-Zawahiri's Al-Qaeda, at least for the present.

*The full analysis is available on **The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center**, originally published on March 4, 2015 as The International Coalition Campaign against ISIS – Initial Analysis* (First Six Months)*

Was the Nemtsov assassination an act of Islamic terrorism?

Source:http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/03/was_the_nemtsov_asassination_an_act_of_islamic_terrorism.html

One of the six men authorities believe were involved in the assassination of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was cornered by police at his hiding place in Grozny, Chechnya and blew himself up with a grenade.

confessed to the crime. Dadayev has connections to the highest level of the Chechyen government, being an associate of the Kremlin-backed pupett leader Ramzan Kadyrov He appeared in courtf flashing the "one God" hand sign and proclaiming "I love

Boris Nemtsov's last known movements

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Five other suspects appeared in court yesterday (March 07).. Two have been charged in the Nemtsov killing while 3 others have yet

to be indicted. One of those charged in the assassination, Zaur Dadayev, is said to have

the prophet Mohammed"
Kadyrov suggested the reason Dadayev killed Nemtsov was because he was a "devout Muslim" who was angered by Nemtsov's condemnation of the Charlie HEbdo massacre.
The Guardian: "I knew Zaur as a genuine Russian patriot," the Chechen leader wrote on his Instagram page on Sunday evening, confirming that Dadayev had served in one of his battalions. "He was the deputy commander of the battalion, and one of the most fearless and courageous soldiers of the regiment."
Kadyrov said Dadayev was "fully devoted to Russia" and suggested the murder may have been in

response to anger over Nemtsov's support for the Charlie Hebdo cartoons.

"Everyone who knows Zaur says he is deeply religious person and like all Muslims was very shocked by the actions of Charlie [Hebdo] and by comments supporting the printing of the caricatures," wrote Kadyrov. "If the court finds Dadayev guilty then by killing a person he has committed a grave crime. But I want to note that he could not do anything that was against Russia, for which he has risked his own life for many years."

Kadayov and Dadayev are not Chechen separatists, but Moscow enforcers hired to keep a lid on violence in the restive region. The suspect who blew himself up, Beslan Shavanov, has no criminal record. There is no record of what religion the other suspects belonged to, but Islam is the dominant religion in the region.

Why Muslims from Chechnya?

An expert and journalist covering the North Caucasus, Orkhan Dzhemal, sees the allegation as a predictable development, and the kind the FSB may consider easy for the Russians public to accept, with "a Chechen trail" and Nemtsov being "a sacred victim" ordered by the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion fighting in Ukraine against pro-Russian rebels—even thought Nemtsov was one of the most outspoken Russian critics of those rebels and of Russian President Vladimir Putin's support for them.

By this somewhat convoluted reasoning, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western "Chechens killed Nemtsov on purpose to harm Putin," Dzhemal said in an interview for Russian independent network Dozhd TV. Dzhemal also said that he expected to hear that Nemtsov's murderers came from anti-Maidan revolution circles and that according to his knowledge and understanding that the order to kill Nemtsov did not come from the government of Ukraine.

The core question remains unanswered: Who ordered the murder of Boris Nemtsov?

The politician's daughter Zhanna Nemtsova, a television journalist at RBC channel (and no relation to the author of this article), doubts that the real murderers of her father are going to be punished. In an interview with *Bild am Sonntag*, the largest-selling Sunday paper in Germany, Nemtsova said that she was convinced her father was killed "because he was against of the Kremlin."

Nemtsova insisted that the "contract murder" of her father was committed with "full support of the authorities," and that her father's killers "knew for sure that they would never be punished."

Just what did Dadayev confess to? Some Russian media outlets are going with the story that "forensic evidence" establishes that Dadayev pulled the trigger. That same report quotes a source as saying, "law enforcement authorities have identified foreign contacts of the Nemtsov murder suspects, so a theory about a foreign trail is also being actively investigated,"

By tossing out the theory of an Islamist terror attack being the motivation for Nemtsov's killing, the FSB plays to a well worn script when it comes to explaining political assassinations. Don't misunderstand; there have been plenty of Islamic terror attacks in Russia over the years. But obfuscating the truth by presenting Muslim patsies to the Russian public in high profile political murders has been the modus operandi of authorities since Putin came to power.

We will follow the trial of the alleged assassins with great interest.

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Malaysia to Join Ranks of Nations with Laws Against Terror

Source: http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Malaysia-Join-Ranks-Nations-Laws-Against-Terror.html?elqaid=25900&elqat=1&elqTrackId=3FF8AD8C50289978C26F7D55AFEA766A

March 04 – **Malaysia will join the ranks of other countries that have in place anti-terrorism laws when a bill is tabled in Parliament this month.**

Among those countries that have laws to combat the threat of terrorism are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States and the Philippines.

In the United States, the Homeland Security Act 2002 was a response to the Sept. 11 terror attack on the New York World Trade Center in 2001.

That law paved the way for the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to protect the United States from terrorists and in the event of natural disasters.

Malaysia's neighbor in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, has an anti-terrorism law called the Human Security Act 2007.

It was created to curb militants such as the Abu Sayyaf group, which has been linked to al-Qaeda terrorists, accused of carrying out bombings in the region.

That act enables three days of detention without a warrant but arresting officers must immediately notify a judge of the arrest.

The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 in Australia is a move to tackle any potential terrorists in that country.

Under the law, a person can be jailed for life if found guilty of even funding a potential terrorist.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: The second sentence of this article raises a big question**: "Which are the countries with no anti-terror legistation?"** For example: does Brasil have similar laws given the fact that 2016 Olympic Games are only16 months away?

'To Valhalla!': Crack Norwegian 'Punisher' troops sent to Iraq to help take on fanatical ISIS army

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2980663/Crack-Norwegian-Punisher-troops-help-train-Kurds-ISIS-Iraq.html#ixzz3TeWfweWv

March 09 – Dozens of soldiers from a battalion famous for using the emblem of a vicious comic book avenger to strike fear into the enemy in Afghanistan are heading to Iraq with ISIS in their sights.

The Telemark Battalion is an elite mechanised infantry unit of the Norwegian Army which has been involved in the fight against the Taliban as part of the NATO-led security mission since 2003.

Around 50 soldiers from Telemark will be heading to the city of Irbil in northern Iraq to train Kurdish forces to help them in their fight against Islamic State, the Norwegian ministry of defence has confirmed.

It is thought the mission will begin in early April.

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
The patch worn by Telemark Battalion soldiers (left), recalls the Punisher symbol of Marvel's comic book vigilante (right), with the words 'Jokke - we will never forget' honoring fallen comrade Claes Joachim Olsson

The battalion has been involved in the fight against the Taliban as part of the NATO-led security mission since 2003 and lost two soldiers in the conflict, including Olsson

Some instructors will also be sent to the Iraqi capital Baghdad in the hopes of stemming an insurgency which now controls large tracts of northern Iraq and Syria.

The Telemark Battalion attracted headlines in 2010 when reports emerged some of its soldiers were spray-painting the Punisher symbol on houses and property belonging to Afghans suspected of being members of the Taliban.

The Punisher is a Marvel Comics antihero and vigilante who slaughters criminals and mobsters and has a striking skull-shaped emblem.

Since the death of Claes Joachim Olsson - known by his nickname 'Jokke' - in January 2010, some members of the unit took to wearing patches featuring the Punisher logo and the words 'Jokke - we will never forget'.

The 22-year-old was killed when the storm tank he was travelling in was hit by a Taliban roadside bomb southeast of the village of Ghowrmach in northwest Afghanistan.

The insignia of the Telemark Battalion

The wearing of Punisher patches was subsequently banned by the Norwegian military leadership, though some soldiers reportedly continued to do so.

Following Olsson's death a video emerged of company commander Major Rune Wenneberg firing up his troops with a rousing battle cry name-checking Valahalla, the mystical hall of Norse mythology where specially chosen warriors go after they've been killed in combat.

During the footage Wenneberg reportedly cries: 'You are the predator. Taliban is the prey. To Valhalla!', as his troops punch their weapons in the air in support.

One former soldier knows who firsthand how ferocious Telemark fighters can be is American Charles Stanley, who helped provide logistics for units from the Norwegian battalion when they underwent two weeks of cold weather training in preparation for deployment to Bosnia in the late 1990s.

The 51-year-old, who is a former sergeant in the 82nd Airborne Division of the US Army, told MailOnline they would be a fierce asset to Kurdish Peshmerga troops in their efforts to combat murderous extremists.

He said: 'ISIS should fear them for sure. They didn't hold back in work or play and when they went to the task of battle that was all of the business they cared for until the mission was completed.

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
ISIS has now expanded its reach across much of northern Iraq and holds the city of Mosul, around 90 kilometres from the Kurdistan capital Irbil, to where the 50 Telemark soldiers are being sent

'ISIS is a force of uncontrolled chaos and they have no discipline or defined battlefield strategy other than overcome by force.

'This well-trained and disciplined unit of Norwegian soldiers would be able to make very short work of any ISIS soldiers they encountered.'

Now a director of technology at a Catholic high school in Modesto, California, Mr Stanley added: 'My take on them is that they were a very aggressive and rugged team of warriors.

'They had the attitude of whatever comes our way we will demolish it, be that from eating chow to driving their mechanised vehicles.

'There was no half way with them - it was all or nothing in everything they did. I have a long history with airborne paratroopers and they are some of the toughest soldiers in the army, on and off duty - they train hard and play even harder.

'The Telemark Battalion guys were every bit if not more rough and tumble.

'I would say compared to other country's soldiers they were among some of the most competitive and competent warriors that I have ever worked with.

'When we were in [Operation] Desert Storm [against Saddam Hussein in 1990] their equivalent would have possibly been the French Foreign Legion soldiers as far as ferocity and competence goes.'

Kyle's logo, with the Punisher skull and cross hairs

The 11-year veteran of the 82nd Airborne and father-of-one, whose son is currently serving in the US Army, says the Punisher symbol was not being used when he worked with the soldiers.

He said: 'That incident didn't happen until later in Afghanistan and I was aware of it and heard the stories.

'That type of scare tactic has been employed for many years by many armies - the Vietnam War had its death card ace of spades, and now they have moved to spray-painted skulls and comic book reference symbols.

'Chris Kyle the American Sniper had his also.'

Kyle is known for using a variation of the Punisher symbol himself, featuring the words 'Despite what your momma told you...violence does solve problems'.

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RAND Review (March-April 2015)

Source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP22-2015-03.html

The cover story explores homegrown terrorism, with a focus on recent RAND research about American jihadists and lessons learned from recent terrorist attacks in France. A second feature presents research and analysis from RAND Europe about the problem of drug-resistant superbugs and the estimated economic costs of antimicrobial resistance. The Q&A features war veteran, caregiver, writer, and RAND researcher Kayla Williams. The POV column features Judith Rodin, president of The Rockefeller Foundation, on resilience building in cities and institutions. The Voices column by RAND president and CEO Michael Rich takes a look at what research says about profiling. We also report on a $1 million gift to the Pardee RAND Graduate School from Donald B. and Susan F. Rice.

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Crime or Terrorism?

Source: http://nation.com.pk/editorials/10-Mar-2015/crime-or-terrorism

The Islamabad High Court on Monday upheld the conviction of Mumtaz Qadri – the murderer of former Punjab Governor Salman Taseer – under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and declared the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act as null and void. What this means is that the judges agree that Qadri unlawfully killed Taseer, which is why they've upheld the death sentence, but they do not view the murder as an act of terrorism. This has at least one clear implication. The death sentence under the PPC is compoundable unlike under ATA, which means that the family is allowed to pardon the culprit. The court has done no favours to Taseer's family by putting them in a position where they may be blackmailed and pressurised to strike a bargain. Regardless, they shouldn't have any power to decide Qadri's fate. Only the direct victim should have the right to forgive, and in his regrettable absence, the killer cannot be allowed to escape punishment under any circumstances. It appears that the IHC considered more than just law to decide the outcome of the case. It is rather disappointing that a man being shot 32 times in broad daylight by a lunatic in the name of religion doesn't qualify as terrorism in the infinite wisdom of the honourable judges.

Did they not find evidence of people being terrorised by Qadri's actions? Some context may prove helpful. Salman Taseer was killed for raising his voice against the misuse of blasphemy laws. It is extremely difficult for everyone in Pakistan, be it a common man or a sitting governor or the entire parliament, to remove, revise or even discuss the controversial blasphemy laws.

Why is that? Is it because of lack of sound arguments? Is it because there is a consensus over such laws? How is it that despite so many victims and varying opinions, there is no debate in the parliament or the mainstream media? It is primarily because of fear that stems for the very real threat of violence by zealots like Qadri and other religious personalities and groups that justify Taseer's murder. Salman Taseer overcame fear, ignored threats and spoke up, hoping to secure justice for a hapless Christian woman. What did Qadri do in response? He shot him dead, shutting the debate before it could start, instilling fear in those who share Taseer's views. The message was clear for everyone: shut up or get killed.

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Blasphemy laws are not protected by reasoning or common sense. More than anything, they are shielded by fear and terror. Any action, which serves to reinforce fear and sustain terror, ought to be regarded as an act of terrorism. Is that not what happened here? Who would dare to hold another press conference for a victim of blasphemy laws? Why would it be a daring act bordering on suicide? There's your answer.

U.K.: 3 London girls who traveled to Syria to join ISIS not regarded as terrorists

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150312-u-k-3-london-girls-who-traveled-to-syria-to-join-isis-not-regarded-as-terrorists

March 12 – Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, commissioner of the Metropolitan police (Met), has announced that the three London girls (Shamima Begum, Kadiza Sultana, and Amira Abase attended Bethnal Green Academy, the same east London school attended by another teenage girl who fled to join ISIS in December 2014), who allegedly stole jewelry from their parents to fund a trip to join the Islamic State (ISIS) may return to the United Kingdom without fear of being prosecuted for terrorism. "We have no evidence in this case that these three girls are responsible for any terrorist offenses," said Mark Rowley, the Met's chief of counterterrorism. "They have no reason to fear, if nothing else comes to light, that we will be treating them as terrorists."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Really? Why don't they charge them with prostitution or similar immoral behavior? Has ISIS ANY activity apart from killing, destroying, torturing, burning etc? Three teenagers in a mens brutal world where women are objects – to do what? Other than support or even participate either in satisfaction or killing operations? Unless this is a tricky way to let them return in order to have some first hand inside info about the chaotic situation in that part of the world!

U.S. security officials share a sober view of terrorism challenge

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150312-u-s-security-officials-share-a-sober-view-of-terrorism-challenge

March 12 – **U.S. counterterrorism analysts have painted a pessimistic picture of the years to come, saying the threats from terrorism will continue to challenge the** **grandchildren's generation will still be fighting this fight."**

This attitude contrasts with the feelings most Americans had after the killing of Osama bin

Political Violence Index 2015   verisk Maplecroft

Iraq
Syria
Libya
Sudan
Nigeria
C.A.R
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Yemen
Somalia

Rank	Country	Category
1	Iraq	Extreme
2	Syria	Extreme
3	Afghanistan	Extreme
4	Yemen	Extreme
5	Somalia	Extreme
6	Nigeria	Extreme
7	Pakistan	Extreme
8	Sudan	Extreme
9	C.A.R	Extreme
10	Libya	Extreme

Legend
Extreme Risk
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
No data

United States.
Director of national intelligence James Clapper, in a recent congressional testimony, said terrorism trend lines are worse "than at any other point in history." Maj. Gen. Michael Nagata, commander of U.S. Special Operations forces in the Middle East, told participants on a counterterrorism strategy call that he considers the Islamic State (ISIS) a greater menace than al-Qaeda has ever been. Michael Morell, the former deputy director of the CIA, told audiences at a New York police terrorism conference that he doubts his generation would live to see the end of al-Qaeda and its offshoots. "This is long term," he said. **"My children's generation and my**

Laden in 2011 and the dawn of the Arab Spring, which was initially seen as a first step in a path toward democracy in the Middle East. For U.S. security officials, those optimistic views have evaporated – even as some note that counterterrorism work thrives on pessimism and involves planning for worst-case scenarios. *Tampa Bay Times* notes that **among the reasons for alarm** shared in intelligence circles are **the growth of the Islamic State, the influx of foreign fighters with Western passports joining militant groups, the deteriorating security conditions in Libya, and the fall of the U.S.-backed government in Yemen — which**

could turn both countries into havens for radical Islamist groups — and the recent announcement by Boko Haram of its allegiance to ISIS.

Still, some voices in the intelligence community are more optimistic, claiming the concern over terrorism is overblown. They say that today's terror groups are more focused on securing territory than launching transnational plots. ISIS is primarily occupied with spreading its influence throughout the Middle East as it acquires more land in Syria and Iraq, while Boko Haram seeks to establish a caliphate in Nigeria.

Paul Pillar, the former deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, argues that growing pessimism among counterterrorism officials is partly a result of stress from over a decade of U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. "Everyone should take a deep breath," Pillar wrote in a 2014 article.

"There are people who are alarmed and bewildered. There are also a lot of experts who don't think this is the end of the world," said Daniel Benjamin, a Dartmouth College professor who served as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department. "More people have thrown in their lot with the extremists than has been the case before. But the numbers are relatively small, and our own security is much less imperiled than has been claimed."

John McLaughlin, a former CIA deputy director, disagrees. He argues that even if the prospect of a major terror attack on the West is slim, the risk is accumulating rapidly. "You've got a much bigger counterterrorism problem than you had a few years ago," said McLaughlin. Terrorist groups "have never had territory of this magnitude. Never had this much money. Never this much access to Western passport holders."

▶ **Map source:** http://www.businessinsider.com/map-shows-risks-of-political-violence-in-2015-2014-12

EDITOR'S COMMENT: When "optimism" = "stupidity" ➔ "problem!"
It is nice to see in the map that Greece is "orange" (no attacks) while the rest of Europe is "green" (attacks in France, Denmark); so is Australia (attacked) and of course US (where everything is running smoothly!)

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7,000 detonators, 3,000 explosives seized from Maoist hideouts

Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-7000-detonators-3000-explosives-seized-from-maoist-hideouts-2068792

March 14 – When police asked them to surrender after encircling them, the extremists opened fire, the SP said.

Police on Saturday seized 7,000 detonators, 3,000 explosives and 2,000 kg ammonium nitrate during raids conducted at Maoist hideouts in Rohtas district.

Superintendent of Police Shivdeep Lande said that police had got a tip-off about the

presence of around 60-65 Maoists in the forest area of Chunnhatta village under Nauhatta police station limits.

When police asked them to surrender after encircling them, the extremists opened fire, the SP said.

Police returned fire, forcing the Maoists to retreat deep in the forest, Lande said, adding,

one Maoist operative was nabbed during the operation.

On the basis of information provided by the arrested Maoist, police seized 7,000 detonators, 3,000 explosives, 2,000 kg ammonium nitrate, two tractors and some Maoist literatures from their hideouts in Chunnhatta village, the SP said.

Confused between Maoists and Naxalities? Read on to know the difference

Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-confused-between-maoists-and-naxalities-read-on-to-know-the-difference-1949798

Usually, people confuse themselves over Maoists and Naxalities and cannot exactly trace the difference between the two terminologies. Media seems to be confused with the terms and uses Maoists and Naxalities quite inter-changeably. This creates confusion in the readers' minds over the actual meaning

Naxalism

Naxalism originated as a rebellion against marginalisation of the poor forest dwellers and gradually against the lack of development and poverty at the local level in rural parts of eastern India. It began in 1967 with an armed peasant uprising in Naxalbari village of

THE SPREADING NAXALITE THREAT

AREAS IN INDIA AFFECTED BY LEFT-WING EXTREMISM
- HIGHLY AFFECTED
- MODERATELY AFFECTED
- MARGINALLY AFFECTED

Data: The Institute of Conflict Management

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
of individual terms.

The actual difference between the terms is as follows:

- The difference between Maoists struggle and the Naxalite movement is that both trace their origin to the Naxalbari uprising of 1967.
- But while the Naxalite movement thrives on the original spirit of Naxalbari; the Maoist struggle is an outcome of the 1967 uprising.
- Maoists work with an agenda and use weapons to achieve their aims.
- Naxalism focuses on mass organisations while the Maoism relies mainly on arms.

Darjeeling district in West Bengal. The term 'Naxal' came from the name of the village.

The origin of the Naxals was a result of the split that took place in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967. It led to the formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist and Leninist). West Bengal being the centre of the movement initially, Naxalism spread to the lesser developed areas like Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh.

The CPI-ML has been fighting elections in several states across India. Most prominent among these groups are the CPI-ML (Liberation), CPI-ML (Kanu), CPI-ML (Jan Shakti),

CPI-ML (New Democracy) and others.

Maoism originated in China as a form of

communist theory derived from the teachings of Chinese political leader Mao Zedong.
Maoists were the loyal believers of the Chairman Mao's philosophy that "Power flows from the barrel of the gun."
When the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) was born out of the Naxalbari uprising, a section of communist rebels retained a distinct identity. Along with Marxism

and Leninism, a new concept, which is of Maoism, started emerging in India.
Around 1966, Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed in West Bengal. Keeping a low profile in the earlier years, the group shot into prominence in Bihar in mid-1980s when they killed 54 Rajputs in Dalelchak-Bhagaura village of Aurangabad.
In other words, there are two fundamental differences between the Naxalites and Maoists. While the Naxalites take part in elections and many of them are registered parties with the Election Commission of India, Maoists do not support the elections at all.
Also, the Naxalites may have an armed wing, but the existence of the Maoists depend on their armed militia.

Keypoints
• Maoism originated in China while Naxalism is derived from Naxalbari village of West Bengal. Terrorist, does not belong to any movement or party.
• Naxalite is mostly in the Indian sub-continent and is a member of an armed revolutionary group advocating Maoist Communism.
• Terrorism is use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims.
• Naxalites believe in Maoism and practice terrorism.
Therefore, the two terms (Naxalites and Maoists) should not be used interchangeably as they are not same and their ideologies have different roots.

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Islamic State 'hopes Libya will be gateway to invade Europe'
Source: http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/islamic-state/62576/islamic-state-hopes-libya-will-be-gateway-to-invade-europe

Islamic State militants from Syria and Iraq are planning to use the chaotic north African state of Libya as a "gateway" to Europe, according to a document seen by the British anti-extremist group Quilliam Foundation.
Jihadists hope to sail across the Mediterranean posing as migrants on people-trafficking vessels in a bid to cause "pandemonium" in southern European states, reports the Daily Telegraph.

The plans were said to be outlined in a document written by an IS propagandist in Libya, who goes under the name Abu Arhim al-Libim.
He wrote that Libya, which is around 300 miles from the nearest European mainland, has "immense potential", as well as large quantities of weapons from the civil war.

"It has a long coast and looks upon the

"Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic State"

Translation and Analysis of IS
Recruitment Propaganda for Libya

QUILLIAM

By Charlie Winter

February 2015

southern Crusader states, which can be reached with ease by even a rudimentary boat," he said.

strategically, pandemonium could be wrought in the southern European states and it is even possible that there could be a closure of shipping lines and targeting of Crusader ships and tankers," he said.

More than 170,000 refugees and immigrants arrived in Italy by boat last year, including tens of thousands of Syrians fleeing the civil war.

Egypt's ambassador to London Nasser Kamel has warned Britain to brace itself for "boats full of terrorists" unless action is taken in Libya.

The Telegraph was unable to independently verify the identity of Libim, but Charlie Winter, a Quilliam researcher, said his writing is influential online.

"Twitter has shut down Libim's accounts several times and each time he starts a new one he gets thousands of followers very quickly, which is typical of an influential Isil affiliate," he said.

The document has emerged just days after IS-affiliated militants in Libya released a video of 21 Coptic Christians being beheaded.

Libya has suffered instability since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, with various factions fighting for power. Leaders

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Libim added that "illegal immigration" trips are "huge in number" from the coast. "If this was even partially exploited and developed

from IS travelled to the country last year and won support from several groups in control of Derna in north-east Libya.

▶ Read the Quilliam report at:
 http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/libya-the-strategic-gateway-for-the-is.pdf

كأنها معية الله للمجاهدين
أعطاهم أنهار لتدريب على غزو روما

@y mam98 · 3h   امى الجزراويه16

Global Media @gblmedia36 · 2m
Photo Not in #Libya but caption reads: "Allah has given them rivers so they can train on how to conquer #Rome". #ISIS

EDITOR'S COMMENT: After a first reading one might think: "Yeah! Sure!" But this is the way "mighty" West thinks. On the other side of the moon, aliens think differently: First they have a dream and because it is a "dream" it could be anything – like conquering Europe or the World. Secondly they have the operatives to execute the dream – aliens that are willing to die or explode for the cause – we do not do that; it is cruel. We have long range missiles and 21st generations of warplanes and all. Third, we have almost open endless (mainly sea) borders that are easy to infiltrate via the humanitarian immigrant tsunami. In that respect, **read it again** and take pre-emptive actions. Change the rules of engagement of those confronting the threats in the field. And if there is time and will, try to fix generating causes producing hostility and population movements – i.e water and food. Because the unexected always happens and prevention is much better than treatment – the first thing a medical student learns at medical school but is also applicable to all aspects of life.

Nothing is **Impossible** *the word itself says* **I'm possible**
-Audrey Hepburn

Thousands of Canadians gather to protest Harper's anti-terror laws

Source: http://www.dailysabah.com/americas/2015/03/16/thousands-of-canadians-gather-to-protest-harpers-antiterror-laws

Thousands of Canadians have protested against Canada's new proposed anti-terrorism legislation in a demonstration called National Day of Action against Bill C-51, by gathering in public squares across the country on Saturday.

The Conservative government, led by Canada's Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, introduced the legislation, known as Bill C-51,

in January, which would expand the powers of the Canadian police and country's intelligence agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, (CSIS) by allowing police to detain terror suspects. The country's spy agency would also have new powers in their terror related investigations.

Critiques of the bill have protested the proposed legislation, arguing that it would infringe upon Canadians' civil liberties and right to privacy, especially in their online activities.

Canada's opposition party New Democratic Party, NDP, leader Tom Mulcair joined protestors in Montreal, the capital of Quebec, country's French speaking province.

"It's not dissimilar to what we see with the president of Russia, who uses a minority there, the lesbian, gay, bisexual community ... and he goes after them with great relish because he knows that it's going to resonate with a part of the population," Mulcair said on Friday, comparing Harper to Putin, according to Reuters.

"I'm really worried about democracy, this country is going in a really bad direction, [Prime Minister Stephen] Harper is taking it in a really bad direction," protester Stuart Basden from Toronto, told Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, CBC.

Canada's opposition and rights groups have criticized Harper's approach to Islam, arguing that his hardliner stance damages the values of Canadians across the country, who celebrate multiculturalism and coexistence.

Harper had recently commented on the niqab, a face-covering veil worn by some Muslims, after a women was denied taking her oath in a citizenship ceremony, because it was deemed to be "rooted in an anti-women culture". Harper argues that tougher security measures are necessary to be implemented agains the threat of 'terrorism'.

More than 30 rights groups are backing the countrywide protests, including OpenMedia, LeadNow, Amnesty International Canada, the BC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, the Council for Canadians, Tunnelbear and Women Against Stephen Harper, CBC reported.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Withdrow Bill C-51! Make Canadians happy! Give them back all their civil liberties and endless privacy! Next time that a terrorist attack will happen on Canadian territory blame bad luck and "unexpected!" Political hypocrisy in its entire splendor!

Encyclopedia of Terrorism

▶ **Read it online via source's URL.**

Lone wolvesMore lone-wolf attacks committed by extremists/supremacists than Jihadists

March 19 – **Internal documents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) reveal that more Lone Wolf attacks are committed by white supremacists and individuals with extreme right-wing ideologies than by Islamic extremists.** **Citing academic research, the agency attributes 17% of lone-wolf attacks worldwide to white supremacists causes. Islamic extremists account for 15% of such attacks, while left-wing radicalism and "black power" groups followed with 13%. Anti-abortion activism accounts for 8% and nationalism/separatism causes make up 7%, while 40% of lone wolf attacks showed no clear ideological motivation.**

"Lone actors tend to create their own ideologies that combine personal frustrations and grievances, with wider political, social, or religious issues," note the documents researcher for Michael Peirce, assistant director of CSIS. "This study confirms that lone actor terrorism runs the gamut of ideological persuasions."

The documents obtained by the *Star* were prepared for Peirce's appearance before a Senate committee on national security in October, just five days after Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot Cpl. Nathan Cirillo at Canada's National War Memorial. In a video recorded before the shooting, Zehaf-Bibeau said his actions were in retaliation for Canada's combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Zehaf-Bibeau's attack came days after Martin Couture-Rouleau ran down Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu. According to authorities, Couture-Rouleau conducted the attack after he was refused a passport, allegedly to travel to Syria and fight alongside the Islamic State.

The *Star* reports that both attacks have triggered a national conversation in Canada about domestic terrorism and Islamic extremism, but critics warn that such attention will further fuel anti-Muslim sentiment. Critics also point out that when Justin Bourque killed three Royal Canadian Mounted Police last June in a shooting rampage, it was not automatically branded as terrorism.

Just last month, three people were arrested in an alleged plot to open fire in the Halifax Shopping Center, but Justice Minister Peter MacKay called them "murderous misfits" — not terrorists — because their plan was not "culturally motivated."

"Some of this xenophobia is being stoked by political leaders. And I think that is a problem," said Ziyaad Mia with the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association. "Some of our political leaders need to tone that rhetoric down and actually calm people down … and tell people this is not the right way to go, instead of stoking the fears of xenophobia by talking about the war on terror and (that) we're in

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this sort of apocalyptic conflict with the Islamic State."

The CSIS documents warn that the notion the Western world is at war with Islam has been a recruitment tool for terrorist groups. "International terrorist groups place a high priority on radicalizing Westerners who can be

used to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries," the documents read. "The narrative that the West is at war with Islam continues to exert a very powerful influence in radicalizing individuals and spreads quickly through social media and online fora."

India's diamond trade financing terror?

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/03/india-diamond-trade-financing-terror.html

==Trading of diamonds especially with a gulf country has come under the lens of intelligence agencies here for suspected terror financing and money laundering.==

The matter of suspected terror financing and money laundering was red flagged by the Cabinet Secretariat and discussed during a recent high-level meeting between top government official and revenue intelligence sleuths, official sources said.

The officials discussed a report collaborated by Paris-based Financial Action Task Force and Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units highlighting that diamond trade was allegedly being used for routing of finances for terror activities, they said.

During the meeting, discussion on the report raised some eyebrows as it cited overvaluing of exports of diamonds in absence of any stable price in India and highlighted record increase of trade of the precious stones and minerals with United Arab Emirates, they said.

The Central Economic Intelligence Bureau has been examining the inputs from other intelligence agencies in this regard, the sources said, adding that Financial Intelligence Unit has been asked to find out different typology and sharing of Suspected Transaction Reports with other agencies to check it.

The CEIB is also considering forming an inter-ministerial team of officials from intelligence agencies and commerce and finance ministries, among others, they said.

Intelligence agencies are also relying on the findings of the report that claimed India to be one of the five countries along with Israel, Belgium, Canada and the US where trade

accounts of diamond business have been used to launder illegal funds, the sources said.

The report mentioned instances where diamond prices were overvalued for purposes of laundering and suspected terror financing as there were no set standards of diamond pricing in India.

It cited an unidentified case where some Indian importers based in Surat and Mumbai imported diamonds from Hong Kong and China by grossly overvaluing them, they said.

A commodity wise analysis of imports into India from the UAE has found that pearls, precious stones, metals, **mineral fuels and oils are the major commodity of imports which accounted for about 63 per cent of total imports in 2000-01 and increased to 90.4 per cent in 2012-13.**

Whereas, mineral fuels and oil which alone accounted for 38 per cent of total imports from the UAE to India during the same period, was exceeded by pearls, precious stones and metals accounting more than half of India's import i.e. 52.4 per cent, the sources said citing the report.

With regard to India's export to UAE, it was also found that the group of pearls, precious stones and metals constituted more than half of the total exports in 2012-13.Since 2007, there has been a near three-fold increase in bilateral trade, particularly due to rise in both exports and imports from the UAE of the precious metals and stones group, rather than the oil, they said.

The report suspected 'round tripping' (which can be referred to a deal or transaction that returns to the place from where it had started) in diamond trade between the Indo-UAE bilateral trade as a reason for the emergence of

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JAPAN – Attack shows need to anticipate urban terror risks
Source: http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002020444

March 20 – **Ryotaro Maeda / Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer Tetsuro Ito, former superintendent-general of the Metropolitan Police Department, discussed the matter in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun staff writer Ryotaro Maeda. Ito was deputy chief cabinet secretary for crisis management from May 2008 to December 2011.** The following are excerpts from the interview.

The sarin incident made Japanese police realize for the first time that an act of terror with the use of nuclear, biological or chemical substances could be a real threat.

Until then, the types of terrorist attacks anticipated by police were primarily bombings. The cult's sarin production center was located in what was then Kamikuishikimura village in southern Yamanashi Prefecture.

Prior to the incident, local police had received information from residents around the site that there were suspicious movements by cult followers. But police could not anticipate that sarin would be used for terrorism.

There had been a chance to cut deep into the cult before the incident when the group was charged by Kumamoto prefectural police with violation of the National Land Utilization Law in 1990.

But the police in Kumamoto and other prefectures concerned conducted investigations of the cult separately due to conflicts over jurisdiction, which made it impossible for law enforcement nationwide to establish a system under which they could work together to deal with the cult.

The situation might have turned out differently if the Metropolitan Police Department, equipped with the strongest investigative power among Japanese police forces, had taken part in the probe into Aum. Based on this bitter experience, the Police Law was revised in 1996 to enable investigations beyond the jurisdictional borders of prefectural police.

After the 1995 sarin attack, special forces to cope with terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological or chemical substances were established within the MPD and Osaka prefectural police, among other police organizations.

In cooperation with the private sector, police organizations have been pushing for the establishment of a system through which they would be able to receive information, such as tips on suspicious people who purchased material that can be used for explosives. Unlike natural disasters, which strike regardless of countermeasures prepared beforehand, it would be possible to foil perpetrators' attempts if deterrence against terrorism was enhanced by working out all possible countermeasures. Thus, it is very significant to work out countermeasures against terrorism.

Intelligence activities to collect and analyze information for the purpose of preempting acts of terror are essential, but I must say that our efforts for the establishment of such a system remain inadequate. The United States and European countries have organizations specializing in intelligence operations. Japan has no such organization to conduct intelligence-gathering activities overseas. Amid the progress of globalization, it is imperative to collect and analyze information constantly on terrorism organizations the world over.

Terror threats against this country have been mounting, and an Islamic militant group has mentioned Japan as a target for terrorism. As in the terrorist attack at an Algerian natural gas plant two years ago, Japanese firms will face the danger of being targeted overseas by terrorist groups.

Correct policy decisions cannot be made without correct information. It is necessary, of course, to establish an organization specializing in external intelligence activities, but it would be meaningless if those involved in such activities were not capable. It is essential to foster intelligence personnel with a long-term perspective.

Humans tend to think that "such a thing could never happen." Possibly due to faith in the power

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of language in this country, it has been considered taboo to speak of risk.

Making preparations based on the assumption of all possible situations is the basic for crisis management. Terrorism with the use of biological weapons and radioactive substances must be assumed to be possibilities.

It is necessary to tell the people carefully and thoroughly about the existence of threats and ask them to raise the alert if a symptom of such a threat is detected, so that terrorism can be dealt with by society as a whole

'Islamic State Hacking Division' Posts Kill List With Purported Addresses of U.S. Military Members

Source: http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/03/21/islamic-state-hacking-division-posts-kill-list-with-purported-addresses-of-u-s-military-members/

March 21 – Calling for their beheadings, a self-proclaimed arm of the Islamic State published a list of addresses purportedly belonging to approximately 100 members of the U.S. military late Friday night.

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Identifying themselves as the "Islamic State Hacking Division," the group claimed to have obtained the personal information of military personnel from compromised military servers, databases and emails.
 "[W]e have decided to leak 100 addresses so that our brothers residing in America can deal with you," the group warned.
"Kill them in their own lands, behead them in their own homes, stab them to death as they walk their streets thinking that they are safe," the "Islamic State Hacking Division" added.

A picture included in the document which purports to leak personal information of approximately 100 members of the U.S. military. (Image source: Screen grab)

In the online document, names and photos accompanied addresses purporting to belong to the military personnel. An informal review of the information by TheBlaze appeared to show matches between some names, photos and listed addresses.
A Defense Department spokesperson was unable to authenticate the information, but said the U.S. military is investigating.

 "[W]e are looking into it," the spokesperson told TheBlaze in a short statement. "The safety of our service members is always a concern."
Marine Corps spokesman Lt. Col. John Caldwell told TheBlaze in a statement that "NCIS is conducting in person notifications to the affected Navy and Marine personnel regarding this presently unverified threat/data breach."
"It is recommended Marines and family members check their online/social footprint, ensuring privacy settings are adjusted to limit the amount of available personal information," he added. "Vigilance and force protection considerations remain a priority for commanders and their personnel worldwide."

The Air Force said they are also reaching out to members listed in the document.

"The Air Force is cooperating fully with the DOD on this matter," Lt. Col. Holly Slaughter said. "We are taking the appropriate steps to make sure that everyone who needs to know is notified. As always, force protection is a primary concern."

In January, the social media accounts of the U.S. Central Command was compromised by Islamic State sympathizers. Hackers used Twitter to publish a list of military members and their addresses. At the time, the Pentagon contacted affected individuals and local law enforcement.

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2005 2014

10 Years of CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter

cyber

CWAs

BWAs

RDD

explosives

hostag

mists

WE have to be lucky all the time. THEY have to be lucky only once!