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Terrorist concerns grow as Olympics draw near

Source: <http://www.vindy.com/news/2016/jun/24/terrorist-concerns-grow-as-olympics-draw/>

June 24 – Brazil's federal police is closely watching a man who reportedly received military training in a city under the control of the Islamic State. Ibrahim Chaiboun Darwiche, of the city of Chapeco in southern Brazil, is wearing an ankle bracelet through the Summer Games and while police build a case against him.

He has been charged with breaking national security law and incitement of crime. Police found a video in which he defended the attacks against the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a handwritten note with activities he practiced such as sniper shooting.

Bin Laden's bodyguard released from Guantanamo after 14 years in custody

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160623-bin-laden-s-bodyguard-released-from-guantanamo-after-14-years-in-custody>

June 23 – **Abdel Malik Abdel Wahab al-Rahabi, a Yemenite who was one of Osama bin Laden's bodyguards, has been released from Guantanamo after being held for fourteen years in custody without charges filed against him.**

The Department of Defense cleared al-Rahabi for release in March 2014, but he release was delayed



because of the war in Yemen. Instead of Yemen, **al-Rahabi has been sent to Montenegro to be resettled there.**

Al-Rahabi is the second former Gitmo inmate to be resettled in Montenegro.

CBS News reports that al-Rahabi had been held at Guantanamo since it opened in 2002. The Pentagon had said that he had travelled from Yemen to Afghanistan and that he was "almost certainly" a member of al-Qaeda.

The Pentagon said the decision to release him was taken after it had been determined that he no longer posed a security threat.

Lee Wolosky, the special envoy for Guantanamo closure at the State Department, said the U.S. government was grateful to Montenegro for accepting the former prisoner.



He said: "Montenegro now joins other U.S. friends and allies in Europe in accepting multiple detainees for resettlement, bringing us closer to our shared goal of closing the facility."

Send Ground Forces to Destroy ISIS?

By Thomas R. McCab

Middle East Quarterly

Summer 2016

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6045/send-ground-forces-to-fight-isis>



There is no other way to destroy the Islamic State (or ISIS as it is commonly known) apart from the substantial commitment of ground forces. In the absence of viable alternatives to the Bashar al-Assad regime (whose demise is the Obama administration's expressed objective), the weakness and incompetence of the Iraqi government, and Turkey's doubtful commitment, exclusive reliance on air attacks is an assured recipe for a strategic stalemate that will enable a degraded ISIS to consolidate its position and to inculcate its jihadist ethos into both the society it controls and widening international pools of cohorts. This will in turn make future ground intervention a far tougher and bloodier experience.

The Coming Strategic Stalemate

What was optimistically termed the "Arab spring" has since evolved into what looks like a long and ghastly "jihadist winter," in which ISIS has seized the leading role for a number of reasons:

The weakness of Iraqi and Syrian security forces. Even before ISIS's conquest of Ramadi (late 2014-early 2015) and Palmyra (May 2015), some 30,000 anti-ISIS troops and Shiite militia took a month's time and heavy casualties to retake the not-very-heavily defended town of Tikrit while the late 2015 Ramadi offensive took several months to recapture a largely deserted city held by a small number of ISIS defenders.^[1] A large part of the regular Iraqi security forces (ISF) will need to be comprehensively rebuilt, a task widely expected to take years.^[2] Anti-ISIS militias, with the possible exception of

Hezbollah, are generally much better at defending than attacking and have not been notably effective on the offensive. For example, in the battle for Tikrit in March 2015, while the Shiite militias claimed they were being deliberately slow in their advance, this was probably just doublespeak to explain lack of progress due to heavy casualties on the ground.^[3]

While usually more highly rated as fighters, the Kurdish militias may also be of uncertain capability.^[4] In any case, it is questionable whether the Kurdish peshmerga will be willing to expend lives capturing traditionally ethnic Arab areas from ISIS except for those parts they might ultimately want to include in an independent Kurdish state.

In Syria, Assad regime forces, heavily supported by Russia as well as Iran and its Hezbollah and



other Shiite proxies, and its Hezbollah proxy, have been unable to do much more than maintain a stalemate with the very fragmented insurgents. The burgeoning Russian intervention, which has not yet fully engaged ISIS, is unlikely to do much more than escalate the stalemate because the Assad regime has admitted that its basic problem is a lack of manpower, and Russian air strikes and a couple thousand Iranian and Hezbollah fighters will not change that.^[5]

Source: David Pollock, "ISIS Has Almost No Popular Support in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Lebanon," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Oct. 14, 2014.

The effectiveness of ISIS forces. The self-proclaimed Islamic State has built a reasonably effective military that so far has been able to contain enemy forces in Syria and Iraq.^[6] Credible past estimates placed the size of its military at more than 50,000.^[7] Reasonably well-trained militias that are willing to die can be a tough fight for even well-trained troops, especially in urban areas, as was demonstrated during the second battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004.^[8] *The consolidation of control.* ISIS has established a minimally functional governing regime in the areas it controls and has ruthlessly worked to suppress or co-opt any potential opposition in those areas.^[9] So far, it

many of the Shiite militias can be as enthusiastically murderous as ISIS.^[11] Iraq's Sunni Arabs may likely see it as a war of intended extermination.^[12] Certainly in Syria, the Assad regime's war is already viewed that way. It remains to be seen if Iraqi prime minister Haider Abadi will be able to reform the Iraqi government enough to appeal to non-ISIS



Sunni Arabs. As of this writing, the results do not look promising as the Iraqi government, increasingly challenged by militant Shiite factions (e.g., the Sadrists), has been at best reluctant to support Sunni Arab forces, at worst, has removed Sunni Arab officers from the Iraqi security forces, and is struggling to avoid collapse.^[13]

Continuation of current trends is all too likely to result in the consolidation of a de facto ISIS state with a strategic impasse that could last for years as has already happened in Syria, and the longer the impasse, the deeper ISIS will dig in.^[14] Time is on ISIS's side. This will clearly have dire implications. It is widely agreed that a consolidated ISIS will be a continuing humanitarian disaster and constitute an immediate and major threat to its neighbors and to regional peace and stability. Among its planned atrocities, ISIS has announced the intention to annihilate all Shiite Muslims.^[15]

A wider threat. The Islamic State will also pose a major threat to Europe and the United States, driven as it is by a global jihadist mission with its self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr Baghdadi, justifying his position by right of conquest in a worldwide religious

Reasonably well-trained militias, willing to die, can be a tough fight for even well-trained troops.

has managed to avoid provoking a major rebellion of the Sunni Arab tribes as happened in the 2006 "Anbar Awakening" during the previous round of the Iraqi civil war. Even if a popular rebellion were to arise that ISIS could not immediately suppress, the most likely result would be a situation parallel to Syria with a multi-sided civil war in which ISIS would be at least strong enough to maintain control over significant areas.

Any major at-tempt by a fundamentally unreformed Iraqi government to retake Sunni Arab majority areas—especially if attempted by Shiite militias or Iranian troops—is all too likely to be viewed by the Sunnis as an attempted reconquest by a hostile Shiite regime.^[10] Since



war.^[16] It should be remembered that al-Qaeda's ideology, from which ISIS doctrine is largely derived, has always been one of world conquest, intending the subjugation of the international community to the rule of Islam.^[17] In the words of Sheikh Abu Muhammad Adnani ash-Shami, ISIS spokesperson:

We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to us; He is glorified and He does not fail in His promise. If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market.^[18]

ISIS has already expanded its franchises into various ungoverned areas in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia and has announced plans for expansion into other territories, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, as well as its intention to attack Israel.^[19] The presence of numerous foreign jihadists in ISIS's ranks undoubtedly reinforces an inclination to undertake foreign operations and provides a resource base for doing so.

Since many or most foreign recruits are attracted to ISIS's extreme violence and fanaticism, their willingness to engage in terrorism if and when they return to their countries of origin is to be expected. Baghdadi has already threatened to stage a mass-casualty attack against the United States.^[20] Whether this is just the natural outgrowth of his jihadist mentality, an attempt to deter Washington from expanding its anti-ISIS operations, or conversely, to provoke it and thereby advance the narrative of a U.S. war against Islam, is immaterial.^[21]

The November 2015 Paris attacks and the March 2016 Brussels bombings may very well be the Islamic State's coming out party in the West. There is an increasing likelihood, especially if boxed into a corner, that ISIS will do something so monstrous that it will make a major U.S. intervention unavoidable as was the case with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after 9/11.

Mainstreaming Jihadism and "Martyrdom"

While polling indicates that jihadists in general have continued to retain a degree of support in both Muslim-majority countries and among Muslims world-wide,^[22] there seems not to have been a massive groundswell of popular

support for ISIS, either within Iraq, Muslim-majority countries, or the world at large. In a poll reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 94 percent of those polled in Iraq, including Sunni Arabs, considered ISIS a terrorist organization, as did 82 percent of Yemenis, 73 percent of Jordanians, 72 percent of Syrians, and 72 percent of Libyans. ISIS is also reported to have almost no support in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt.^[23] It was only in Syria that a significant minority (27 percent of people polled) did not consider it a terrorist group. This polling was reported to include people in areas occupied by ISIS.

Many Iraqi Sunni Arabs consider ISIS the lesser of two evils compared to the Iraqi Shiite government.

However, despite occasional passive and even armed Iraqi resistance to ISIS, numerous Iraqi Sunni Arabs have considered the organization the lesser of two evils compared to the Iraqi Shiite government.^[24] This is even more the case in Syria where the fragmented state and the barbarities of the Iranian-aligned Assad regime leave few palatable alternatives.

Should ISIS manage to survive in its territory and consolidate its rule, one must expect to see over time the "mainstreaming of jihadism." Within areas it controls, considerable portions of the society, especially young males—the "cubs of the Caliphate"^[25]—will be indoctrinated to think in jihadist terms even if they did not when ISIS took over initially.^[26] Ultimately, this will produce both a cadre of fighters and, to some degree, a society that will embrace the jihadist assumption that dying in battle to defend—or advance—the Islamic State against those defined as enemies of Islam is an honorable if not a preferred death. Should the West engage ISIS in ground combat at such a time, it must be prepared to deal with a militarized regime and, to some degree, a population of religious fanatics who will be prepared to die fighting rather than surrender.

This must be seen as a paradigm shift in the use of suicide tactics. Until the emergence of ISIS, such tactics were largely the equivalent of special operations. A single person or a small team of suicide bombers, either alone or in coordination with others, would



attempt to reach a target before setting off the bomb. But suicide tactics have never been used routinely in conventional or even irregular warfare with the exception of the Japanese World War II Kamikaze attacks and Tehran's

ISIS recruiting campaigns make clear that recruits should come prepared to die.

"human waves" tactics during the Iran-Iraq war where thousands of children were sacrificed to clear Iraqi minefields.^[27]

It will be a profoundly different situation if suicide tactics and fighting to the death are regularly used. ISIS routinely deploys massed suicide bombers.^[28] While ISIS appears to prefer that its "martyrs" be volunteers, its combatants can be ordered to undertake "martyrdom" operations as the organization's recruiting campaigns make clear that recruits should come prepared to die.^[29] This means that should Washington or other Western powers find it necessary to fight a ground war in order to destroy ISIS—at a time when the organization has been given ample time to consolidate and inculcate its jihadist ethos—troops must expect to face a fight to the death against suicidal defenders.

So far the Obama administration's strategy of air strikes, retraining the Iraqi security forces, rebuilding Sunni support in Iraq, and backing "moderate" Syrian factions shows few signs of success. Even if the Iraqi government is able to reform enough to attract some support from its Sunni Arab citizenry, to rebuild its army and government-aligned forces into effective offensive forces, and to reconstruct the conditions that enabled the Sunni tribal uprising against ISIS's predecessors—three very big "ifs"—it remains to be seen if this strategy will ultimately work. All things considered, it is all too likely to fail in due course.^[30]

Other regional forces such as the Turks, Saudis, and Jordanians so far show no sign of being willing to provide a major commitment of ground troops, and any major intervention by the Iranians will likely drive Sunni Arabs further into the arms of ISIS. Washington and its allies must then decide whether they are willing to settle for merely containing ISIS. In practical terms, this means accepting both the dismemberment of Iraq and Syria and the ongoing threat that ISIS will seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.^[31] If ISIS's

opponents choose to be proactive (or, more likely, reactive as a result of massive provocation), it is critical to think long and hard about what strategy and tactics will need to be used against an enemy like the Islamic State.

^[32]

Confronting Fighting to the Death

It is, of course, possible that ISIS will not embrace a strategy of fighting to the death as a routine matter;^[33] at the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001, for example, Osama Bin Laden authorized his surviving men to surrender.^[34] But anyone who considers fighting a consolidated ISIS on the ground, especially in major urban centers, must expect a grim struggle against a dug-in enemy. Troops deployed into such a scenario must work under the assumption that not only enemy combatants but also civilians may intend to kill them or die trying.

ISIS will use its readiness to sacrifice the innocent to overwhelm its opponents' will to fight.

The Islamic State can also be expected to organize masses of people to attack what might be viewed as Westerners' spiritual or moral center of gravity. It will probably use jihadists' extreme violence and willingness to die, as well as a readiness to sacrifice the innocent, to target their opponents' morale and attempt to overwhelm their will to fight. A key part of ISIS's likely strategy will be to involve as much of its entire society as possible since the psychological impact of such tactics will be increased enormously, particularly against Western troops, if those willing—or forced—to die are nominally civilians, especially children.^[35] At the very least, it should be expected that ISIS will forcibly keep civilians in place as human shields^[36] as they have evidently already done with their command facilities and at Fallujah.^[37] As such, should Western troops end up confronting ISIS on the ground, they will have no choice but to drastically modify their own strategies and tactics. The following are likely factors that should be taken into account.

The preferred U.S. strategy of rapid and decisive victory will be irrelevant.

This strategy is based on the use of superior U.S. military technology and precise firepower,



especially airpower, to stun the enemy, disrupt its government and military, inflict strategic and operational paralysis, destroy its will to resist, and enable U.S. and allied forces to win decisively and quickly with minimal friendly losses and limited enemy losses and collateral damage. This is unlikely to work against a jihadist government and society. For ISIS militants and those parts of society it has radicalized, religious fervor is likely to make their will extraordinarily resistant to collapse as they will consider fighting and dying a religious duty. Militarily, even if U.S. forces are somehow able to paralyze the ISIS command structure—a presumption not borne out by observation of their behavior in the field as the organization has demonstrated an extremely resilient military and political command structure^[38]—it will be immaterial at the tactical level. At that level, militants will either regard them-selves as undefeated, will expect to die even if defeated, or both.^[39]

The focus of any air campaign will not be at the strategic level. Western powers cannot expect a strategic air campaign to decisively affect the war. Despite claims to the contrary, ISIS's strategic centers of gravity may be largely invulnerable to air attack; these include its command structure; Sunni Arab resentment of the Iraqi and Syrian governments; Sunni-Shiite religious hostility; ISIS rivalry with other jihadists, and ISIS's relations with its subject populations.^[40] Attacking the economic underpinnings of ISIS by targeting its ability to export oil may disrupt its mobility due to fuel shortages, but oil exports are only one of ISIS's revenue streams.^[41] Thus, the focus of an air campaign will primarily be at the tactical level, damaging ISIS's ability to deploy artillery and heavy forces, disrupting its ability to control and move forces, isolating and fragmenting the battlefield, and attacking its equipment and defensive positions as they are identified.

The ground war will need to be slow and methodical. Western forces should not expect a "race to Baghdad," an air-to-ground blitzkrieg operational strategy, to be successful. Attacking forces will need to be prepared to literally dig out and kill every defender. This may mean a return to tactics of annihilation based on massive rather than precision firepower or to a tactic based on massive, precision firepower. Since enemy troops in cut-

off or bypassed units and positions will likely be prepared to die in place, they will need to be treated not as defeated remnants but as bypassed centers of resistance. Mopping up cannot be treated as an afterthought, and such enemy units and positions will need to be tightly encircled and contained until destroyed, which will require a large force of ground troops and large munition supplies. Rear areas will need to be carefully secured. One study proposed a force of 25,000 ground troops.^[42] Unless such forces can be supplemented with

If the West fights a ground war with ISIS, it must expect to operate in a virulently hostile media environment.

large numbers of competent local troops, this, also, is likely to be too small a number.

Tactics do exist as in Pacific theater fighting during World War II. This might need to be a war of annihilation. With an enemy who refuses to surrender, it may well become necessary to kill nearly every combatant encountered as with the Japanese during World War II. This will be a fight against a medieval, theocratic, fascist system that has the support of at least part of its population and coerces the rest, and which may use both non-uniformed irregulars and civilians, including children, as combatants.^[43]

As a result, war at the tactical level will be even grimmer than usual. E.B. Sledge, in his classic work *With the Old Breed* (about Marines in the Pacific in World War II), noted that frontline infantrymen hated the Japanese troops with a raw passion, due in part to the Japanese use of the same kinds of tactics ISIS jihadists are likely to use, for example, "playing dead and then throwing a grenade, or playing wounded, calling for a corpsman, and then knifing the medic when he came".^[44] Since the hatred was mutual, this led to savage and ferocious kill-or-be-killed fighting. Although this attitude did not extend to enemy civilians, it is reasonable to expect that if civilians had joined the fighting and used such tactics, they would have been treated the same way by U.S. troops.

If ISIS militants and civilians use tactics like these, it is likely to lead to the same kind of attitudes and the same type of fighting. Even if parts or most of society are opposed to ISIS and are prepared



to welcome or not resist anti-ISIS troops, how many false surrenders or attacks by civilians will it take to poison the well, so that in the interest of survival, Western troops begin to shoot first and ask questions later?

Information operations will be critical. If the West fights a ground war with ISIS, it must expect to operate in a virulently hostile media environment where many Muslims and their Western acolytes will be eager to believe that the West is wantonly murdering innocent civilians. At the strategic communication level, the public and troops need advance warning of the nature of the enemy, the war they are facing, and the tactics ISIS routinely uses. It will need to be clear that fighting this kind of war is not the West's preference, but if ISIS decides to fight such a war—with routine use of military and civilian suicide tactics—the West will have no choice but to respond as outlined here with extensive destruction and likely massive numbers of civilian casualties an inevitable result.

Reappraising International Laws of War

Beginning in the nineteenth century, if not earlier, the West has come to esteem a series of treaties and declarations that have been termed the "laws of war." Certain behaviors have been deemed unacceptable both in armed conflict and in behavior toward civilians during times of war. In the late twentieth century, there emerged a general consensus of what could and could not be done to one's enemy even during war.

The behavior of the Islamic State upends all those notions and compels those who might need to engage them in battle to re-examine whether the laws of war pertain in a war with an enemy that conducts itself as ISIS does. How can Western protagonists deal with a would-be state that is openly and enthusiastically criminal and thrives on advertising its war crimes to the entire world?

Facing such a foe requires readdressing the perennial legal issues posed by warfare with totalitarian states that are utterly contemptuous of the laws of armed conflict and proud of that contempt. If the jihadist state wages war as a total war, with no distinction between military and civilians, will it be possible for the West not to wage one as well? When fighting jihadists, should clerics be automatically defined as noncombatants and religious sites as non-

targetable even though both may well be regularly and directly involved in combat operations? If a *madrasa* (Islamic school) provides military training to its students, or a mosque is used as a weapon depot or as a base for an ISIS unit, does that make them legitimate targets? Should one even consider taking prisoners if those surrendering may actually only want to get close enough to kill the people trying to capture them? Can ISIS's wounded be treated if those wounded try to kill the medical personnel treating them? Clearly, Western powers contemplating taking on such an enemy need to examine the international law and war crimes issue before engaging in combat, lest their enemies use "lawfare" against them in spite of the undisguised criminality of ISIS.^[45]

The Strategic Future

Deterrence relies on persuading an enemy that the costs of doing something exceed the likely benefits. But how does one deter an enemy who views the status quo as a crime against God, whose strategy is based on a willingness to die, and who believes that the act of dying is its own reward? Washington and the rest of the West should not expect strategies of deterrence by punishment—nor deterrence based on persuading the enemy that its efforts will fail—to work. As with al-Qaeda, any expectation of dissuading such an enemy from its goals is delusional.

This kind of warfare will differ dramatically from anything the United States has faced recently. How does one fight not only armies but potentially parts of society that mean it when they say they will fight to the last and are even eager to do so? How is it possible to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants when the enemy intends to blur or obliterate the line between the two? And perhaps most problematic, how does one wage war against a foe willing to deliberately expend masses of civilians as a combat tactic and whose civilians may actually be willing to die in support of the regime?

Those contemplating destroying ISIS need to understand an organization, movement, and people whose thinking is profoundly alien to that of the West. The Western nations will need to update their understanding of totalitarianism



and fascism and move it beyond twentieth-century secular ideologies because what is at issue here is deeply intertwined with religion. The West must become reacquainted with the depths of human malevolence and the power of malignant idealism and organized hate. Western societies must take seriously an ideology whose adherents embrace mass murder, genocide, and slavery because they believe those practices have been ordained by God. The West also needs to understand individuals and whole societies where religious fanaticism is central to their psychology. Above all, the West needs to understand that the jihadists and their ideology are not at the lunatic fringe of Islam but are instead the fanatic core of Islam with deep and enduring roots in the faith's history and thinking, especially in the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.^[46] The bottom line is that this enemy is not going to just go away even if Washington or the West eventually destroys the Islamic State. A war with ISIS has ample potential to be a long and incredibly nasty war. The dynamism and relative success of ISIS continues to draw a steady stream of foreign recruits, especially younger jihadists.^[47] Even if ISIS in its current form is defeated on the battlefield, the aftermath of the conflict will require a comprehensive occupation, a major rebuilding campaign after the fighting, a comprehensive "de-jihadization" of the society, and extensive

war crimes trials. If undertaken and mishandled by what eventuates as Iraqi or Syrian authorities, de-jihadization and war crimes trials could become a cover for a massive vendetta against Sunni Arabs, which will just reignite the situation. Foreign "Christian" powers will be ill-suited to operate persuasively and effectively in such a setting.

At the same time, the West should not underestimate the ability of the jihadists to self-destruct and defeat themselves as they have done with impressive regularity as in Algeria and the 2006 "Anbar Awakening" during the previous round of the Iraqi civil war. But no one should count on that happening. This is an enemy who sometimes learns from his mistakes. So, prudence alone demands that Western powers considering action ought to at least start thinking about how to deal with the worst case if it occurs.

During the euphoric days of the "Arab spring," many fervently hoped that the Muslim Middle East was finally about to start moving forward to the "broad sunlit uplands" looked forward to by Winston Churchill during Britain's darkest hour. Tragically, but not surprisingly, that did not

happen. If anything, the Muslim Middle East—and the world—will be very lucky if it does not move any further into the dark bloody highlands than it already has. But it would not be prudent to bet that it will not.

► References are available at source's URL.

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Jihadist Threat Persists in Kosovo and Albania Despite Government Efforts

By Ebi Spahiu

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45551&no_cache=1#.V3Nnc6KWsgU



Bujar Hysa, jailed imam in Albania who pledged his support to IS (Source: ina.online.net)

June 24 – Since the emergence of Islamic State (IS), more than 1,000 people from countries in the Western Balkans have flocked to the group as foreign fighters,



predominantly from Muslim majority areas in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, and from minority Muslim populated areas in FYROM, Serbia, and Montenegro ([Illyria Press](#), August 7, 2015). These numbers peaked following the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Local security and intelligence services have since taken action, responding to concerns voiced by international partners. Meanwhile, both



Albania and Kosovo have adopted legislation aimed at curbing the participation of their citizens in foreign conflicts ([Bota Sot](#), March 26, 2015).

Following a wide-ranging crackdown between the summer of 2014 and the spring of 2015, the number of IS recruits from the Western Balkans has dramatically declined. That may in part be a result of the changing dynamics of the war in Syria, as airstrikes degraded IS territorial strongholds and financial resources, but the state authorities like to attribute the drop in numbers to the measures they have taken at home. In fact, officials from both Albania and Kosovo boast that since spring 2015, no individuals have traveled to Syria to join the conflict ([Koha Jonë](#), February 29). That claim is, however, disputed.

Facing territorial losses in both Syria and Iraq, IS has ramped up support for organized cells abroad, including in the Western Balkans, and encouraged so-called lone wolf actors. A report provided to the U.S. Senate by CIA Director John Brennan acknowledges that IS is still in “formidable” shape and is focused on extending its global reach ([Ora News](#), June 16). As a consequence, both Kosovo and Albania continue to see a very real threat from

the group. In the Western Balkans, IS presents not only an immediate security risk, but also a threat to social cohesion among the Balkans’ religiously heterogeneous populations.

Weaknesses in Terrorism Trials

Since the summer of 2014, Kosovo’s authorities have investigated and arrested more than 100 people allegedly involved in terrorist activities ([Reporter.al](#), May 7). In May, Albania’s High Crimes Court sentenced nine individuals, including two self-proclaimed imams, for facilitating and financing the recruitment of terrorists. The men were arrested in March 2014 when Albanian authorities raided two key mosques located in the outskirts of Albania’s capital Tirana ([Ora News](#), March 11, 2014). One of the jailed imams, Bujar Hysa, pledged his support to IS during a taped interview with a local journalist who recorded an interview with him in prison. Hysa also called the court process “a farce” and accused the authorities of undertaking “a war against Muslims.” [2]

The security crackdown and subsequent terrorism trials have revealed weaknesses within the state apparatus. Proceedings have

been plagued by a lack of judicial experience in dealing with terrorism trials, and punishments appear overly harsh ([Reporter.al](#), May 7). Some of those accused face minimum sentences of 15 years, the harshest in the region. [1] This in turn has damaged the credibility of the judiciary, while police operations have continued to target a wide range of activities, including more than 15 humanitarian NGOs accused of posing as a cover for extremist supporters in Kosovo ([Radio Evropa e Lirë](#), February 13).

State Oversight of Islamic Institutions

The authorities often boast about their collaboration with the officially-recognized Islamic communities – BIK (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës) for Kosovo and KMSH (Komuniteti Mysliman Shqiptarë) for Albania – to counter extremist religious messages. These groups, however, have little



influence over the mosques and other religious organizations that are increasingly being established without oversight from officially-recognized Islamic institutions.

Ilir Dizdari, the former head of the State Committee on Religious Cults, another institution mandated to control the management of religious cults in Albania, claimed that more than 200 mosques are outside the jurisdiction of KMSH and other state authorities. Previous claims by intelligence services had put the number of such mosques at 89 ([Ora News](#), December 16, 2015; [InfoAlbania.al](#), November 11, 2015).

To its credit, Albania's KMSH has been able to regain control of the infamous Mëzez mosque near Tirana, which was allegedly instrumental in recruiting more than 70 Albanian citizens to IS ([Bota Sot](#), November 19, 2015). Other areas were also targeted, including the village of Leshnica, where Almir Daci, a 32-year-old former imam and later IS recruiter, now thought to have died while fighting in Syria, was found to be targeting people in his village and nearby areas ([Reporter.al](#), April 6). Despite these efforts, however, reports suggest the KMSH imams are struggling to regain control of the community's daily religious life, leaving this instead to groups of Daci's supporters "until Friday prayer when the KMSH imams show up" ([Reporter.al](#), April 6). This also speaks to the dwindling credibility of KMSH among followers, who often accuse imams of corruption and affiliation with the Turkish Gulen Movement, which largely funds KMSH operations.

Wahhabist Influence

Albania's KMSH also struggles with funding from more conservative Wahhabist and Salafist groups and more recently with an investment from Turkey's Muslim community in the large mosque of Namazgja, inaugurated by Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which when complete will tower over the secular Albanian parliament ([Albeu](#), May 13, 2015). Separately from the KMSH, Prishtina's BIK has also been bolstered by Wahhabist funding since the end of the war in the late 1990s.

The divisions are arguably more pronounced now. One Tirana-based security official, who wishes to remain anonymous due to security concerns, commented: "In 2010, sectarian narratives became even more visible than ever

before, and now they are at the core of the rifts between Muslim communities." [3]

Following the Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria, networks established in the 1990s among the local populations were revived to recruit men and women to join conflicts in the Middle East. Although local media tends to portray these tensions as rifts between more moderate imams versus those of Salafist and Wahhabist identities, the struggle is increasingly that of power and control over religious institutions and their followers ([Zëri](#), April 6).

People of the Balkans have historically practiced Sunni Islam based on Hanafi jurisprudence, inherited after centuries of Ottoman rule. Traditionally, there have been strong interfaith relations between Catholic, Christian Orthodox, and Muslim communities. That tradition is particularly visible in Albania, where interfaith marriages and shared religious celebrations are the norm ([Terrorism Monitor](#), May 15, 2015). The conflicting dynamics and the polarizing effect of religious issues presents a challenge for counter-extremism initiatives that aim to avoid politicizing the factors that drive individuals into the hands of violent extremist groups.

National Action Plans

Both Kosovo and Albania have adopted comprehensive national strategies and action plans to counter violent extremism and religious radicalism. They aim to drive grassroots approaches to countering violent extremism by working with communities and civil society. [4]

Both the rhetoric and the reality appear to be different. At an interfaith summit in Prishtina in early June organized by Kosovo's ministry of foreign affairs with more than a hundred interfaith groups from around the world represented, Kosovo's counter terrorism unit director stressed the drop in foreign fighters was solely due to the work the security forces had conducted against targeted mosques and Islamist NGOs and the work civil society is currently doing.

Similar statements have been frequently reiterated by Albanian officials who attribute zero travels by IS supporters to Syria and Iraq to its own abilities and commitment to



fight homegrown Islamist cells ([Koha Jonë](#), February 29).

While some Kosovar civil society groups have in fact been actively engaging with schools and religious leaders to address the problem of extremism, Albania has been lagging behind. Instead it has focused on more top-down approaches, including a recent agreement between the United States and Albania aimed at setting up a Bureau of Investigations modeled after the United States' own FBI and ongoing efforts at justice reforms needed to advance Albania's aspirations to join the EU ([Balkan Insight](#), February 12).

Increasing Radicalization

While overt calls by local religious leaders for people to partake in jihad have grown much rarer since last year's the security crackdown, the radicalization of Western Balkan individuals continues. IS propaganda and official communications are often translated into Albanian. This has included recent speeches by IS spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, who called for lone wolf attacks during the month of Ramadan in messages disseminated via a blog titled "Hilafeti," the Albanian for the word for Caliphate.

As state institutions lack credibility, radical imams and similar groups are filling the vacuum, displacing moderate religious leaders and other local actors. Several testimonies from local civil society groups based in northeastern Albania describe the rapid transformation of local religious life and an increased commitment among local youth toward following imams. In the absence of a strong school system and meaningful employment opportunities, the lives of these individuals are increasingly shaped by religious doctrine.

Similarly, a recent questionnaire on public perceptions on violent extremism developed by the Kosovar Center for Security Studies found

that 57 percent of respondents place a greater level of trust in religious institutions than in the judiciary ([Gazeta Express](#), June 13). Previous reports have also found that Kosovar youth are also becoming increasingly conservative, with their main reference points for spiritual and intellectual guidance being local imams ([Tema](#) [Tirana], August 10).

Radicalization is also taking other forms. Sibel Halimi, a sociology professor at the University of Prishtina who looks at the role of women in the recruitment process, speaks of the "radicalization of social issues" as one of the key strategies used to control followers. She stresses that issues around sexuality, such as rules around virginity and family relations, are components that are increasingly highlighted by more conservative female recruiters and religious leaders to exert control.

"We need to stop looking at women as victims in the issue of radicalization and participation in violent extremism. We need to start taking into account that there are active women who partake in the recruitment process," she said. "There are women who actively engage with younger girls to radicalize them." [5]

While religious adherence has been an integral component of Western Balkan society, the increasing influence of Salafist and Wahhabist ideologies has led to a shift in views and attitudes and rifts between community leaders. Furthermore, this has contributed to a greater openness to the message of IS. Added to this, state responses have struggled, due largely to limited capacity and a lack of experience in tackling radicalization. While both countries look toward EU integration and their populations maintain positive views toward the West, growing geopolitical rifts, an IS presence, and the influence of radical Sunni Islam previously alien to the region's indigenous Muslim populations could change the balance.

NOTES

1) Vendimi: 9 "xhihadietë dënohen me 126 vjet burg, Ora News, May 3, 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5a3ujjgrTUI>

2) Te Paekspozuarit: "Ne, të dënuarit e besimit", intervista ekskluzive nga burgu, Ora News, May 19, 2016

3) Author's interview, Tirana (June 16, 2016)

4) Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020, Republic of Kosovo, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY_parandalim_-_ENG.pdf

5) Author's interview with Sibel Halimi (June 19, 2016)



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What The Brexit Means For ISIS: US, EU Terrorism Battle Against Islamic State After UK Vote Could Be Strained

By Clark Mindock

Source: <http://www.ibtimes.com/what-brexit-means-isis-us-eu-terrorism-battle-against-islamic-state-after-uk-vote-2386430>


June 26 – The United Kingdom will no longer be a part of the European Union and, to hear the prime minister tell it that may play right into the hands of the Islamic State group.

“Who would be happy if we left?” Prime Minister David Cameron said last month ahead of the so-called Brexit vote last month, before predicting that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would favor a vote to leave. “Putin might be happy. I suspect al-Baghdadi might be happy.”

Now, as a wave of uncertainty washes over international markets after 52 percent of U.K.

The U.K. is one of the most ardent supporters in the EU of American foreign policy, and its leaving could mean European countries will be less inclined to match up with U.S. operations and goals. That means, according to an Atlantic Council report looking into the referendum, coordinated operations in Syria may become less effective.

Meanwhile, the straight numbers impact on defense is striking: Britain accounts for just 14 percent of EU gross domestic product and yet provides 20 percent of the Union’s defense budget. The U.K. is joined by France as the



voters voted Thursday to ditch the EU, it appears Cameron had a crystal ball. ISIS supporters quickly praised the exit Friday and called for attacks on Berlin and Brussels — both high-profile European capitals — in order to destabilize what is left of the Union. The decision to leave could also have an important impact on the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as defense capabilities of Europe as they continue to fight the terror group.

only two nuclear countries in the EU, which means that soon just one country in network will have a full military arsenal at their disposal. In light of all of this, defense was a major argument in favor of staying.

“Keeping our people safe from modern terrorist networks like Daesh [an Arabic name for ISIS] and from serious crime that increasingly crosses borders, means that we simply have to develop much closer



means of security cooperation between countries within Europe,” Cameron said recently.

As for ISIS supporters, the immediate goal is — according to a message on an encrypted messaging service popular with ISIL militants — to paralyze the West.

“At a time when Muslims are uniting under the flag of the Caliphate, Europe is choosing to divide and split. The victory is close with the help of God,” one ISIS supporter tweeted. “The rise of the Islamic State brought about the sinking of Britain and the collapse of the European Union.”

And yet protecting the U.K. from ISIS was also a key argument for advocates of leaving the EU in the first place. Among the many concerns weighing on the minds of voters was the uncertainty and fear that the terror group has produced, increasing with each refugee who has stepped foot on European shores.

Before the European Union was created in 1993, the U.K. didn't really have much of an immigration experience or problem. But, between that time and 2014, the number of foreign-born people in the country more than doubled from 3.8 million to 8.3 million, according to Oxford researchers. And, following the 2008 financial crisis, the number exploded, with people from poorer EU countries like Spain, Italy and Portugal flocking to greener pastures on the large island to the north.

With Syrian refugees coming to the continent in record numbers, fleeing the violent civil war, pro-Brexit campaigners ramped up the immigration control rhetoric. And voters responded to that argument: A May poll found that 52 percent of British voters thought that a Brexit would improve the U.K. immigration system.

Clark Mindock is a breaking news reporter for IBT. He grew up in Idaho, but only knows a couple of cool facts about potatoes. He's reported for the Philadelphia Inquirer, CQ Roll Call, OpenSecrets.org and the Arizona Daily Sun.



The Importance of Experience In Operating Security Equipment

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2016/06/the-importance-of-experience-in-operating-security-equipment/>

June 22 – **Even the best security equipment in the world will amount to nothing if the operator isn't of the highest level.** The situation today is such that many operators of such equipment, like X-ray machines in airports, lack experience. Investing in new and expensive equipment without investing in training the operators is negligent and is a risk to human lives.



Israel has accumulated vast knowledge in training operators for such equipment, but many other countries still use expensive equipment new equipment next to operators who lack the most basic understanding of them.

Experts say that although a lot of this equipment is designed to operate “automatically”, there's no way it can operate optimally with the knowledge and experience of the operators.

Israeli experts say that this field is left unattended and there for strict international standards must be set. “The same way that governments can refuse malfunctioning

planes or unauthorised pilots to fly in its skies, there must be a mechanism to prevent countries from operating security equipment with anything but highest level of experience,” said one expert and explained that a country must be able to refuse to operating flights in its territory if it knows those flights arrived from a place not using the best equipment or experienced operators. Today no country has the ability to do so and that, says the expert, is becoming quite the issue.

“In certain countries the operators are of the lowest levels and the proof for that is that in the US, for example, undercover inspectors manage time after time to smuggle weapons and explosives into the area and into the planes.”



As mentioned, all the experts are united in thinking that only international standards and a way to enforce them can change the situation.

When it's obvious that the terrorism will only increase, the line of defense made up of explosive and weapons detection systems must be operated by experienced and knowledgeable people, otherwise there's just no point investing in expensive and sophisticated equipment.

Somalia: Deadly al-Shabab attack on Mogadishu hotel

Source <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36629678>



June 20 – **An attack by the Islamist group al-Shabab in a hotel in the Somali capital Mogadishu has left at least 14 dead, police say.**

Security forces retook the Naso-Hablood hotel after gunmen stormed it and took hostages, officials said. Those killed are reported to include security guards, civilians and some of the attackers.



Al-Shabab militants frequently carry out attacks in the city in their bid to topple the Western-backed government.

A suicide bomber first detonated a car with explosives at the gate of the hotel, and the attackers moved in, officials said.

Once inside, the gunmen shot randomly at guests, a witness said.

"They were shooting at everyone they could see. I escaped through the back door," Ali Mohamud told the Associated Press news agency.

A gun battle then erupted between the attackers and security forces.

Police said at least four men were involved in the assault.

The victims included women working outside the hotel, Capt Mohamed Hussein said. It was not immediately clear if guests had also been killed.

The Naso-Hablood hotel, in southern Mogadishu, is often used by politicians and tourists.

The group said it targeted a place "frequented by the apostate government members", Reuters news agency reported.

Earlier this month at least 10 people were killed and 50 injured in an attack on another hotel in the Somali capital, which was claimed by al-Shabab.

The al-Qaeda-linked group was driven from Mogadishu in 2011 but still remains a threat and frequently carries out attacks in the city.



The government, with the help of African Union forces, is fighting al-Shabab militants in several parts of the country.

Bulgaria Moves to Make Radical Islam a Crime

Source: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-moves-to-criminalize-radical-islam-06-23-2016>

June 25 – **Preachers of radical Islam in Bulgaria face up to three years in prison and fines of up to 5,000 leva [around 2500 euros]**, under changes to the penal code adopted on a first reading by MPs on Thursday.

The proposal to criminalize radical Islamic preaching, proposed by the nationalistic coalition Patriotic Front, PF, was approved by a majority of 106 votes.

Only three deputies voted against while ten abstained. MPs from the ethnic-Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms party, MRF, left the plenary session before the vote.

"The problem with radical Islam is already a fact in Bulgaria. Such acts and structures are funded by external factors and the penal code has to clearly define and incriminate them," Krasimir Karakachakov, one of the leaders of PF, told journalists before the vote.

The adopted amendments stipulate six hypotheses of preaching an ideology that could be qualified as "radical".

Among them are agitating for the creation of an Islamic state or Caliphate, calling for the enforcement of Sharia law and calling for jihad against non-Muslims.

Recruiting followers, agitating for or collecting funds for terror organizations, "whose ideology is based on the Islam", will also be considered a crime if the legal changes make it past the second reading.

During the debates, the MRF's vice-chair, Aliosman Imamov, called the draft law an unsuccessful attempt to draw a line between religion and radicalization.

"We are against radicalization but I... deem it profane for someone from this tribune to try to convince me that my religion creates terrorists," he said, warning that the text will "affect millions [of people]".

Imamov protested that the draft law targets Muslims alone and not radicalization in other religious communities, accusing some of his fellow MPs of Islamophobia.

He added that his party would support the legal initiative if it covered radicalization in all religious ideologies in Bulgaria, because "that would be the right approach".

In response, the second co-chair of the Patriotic Front, Valeri Simeonov backed the new law as a move to prevent an invasion of radical Islam.

He also accused the MRF of being the only party in Bulgaria to exploit religion for political purposes.

The criminalization of radical Islamic agitation comes just a week after MPs gave broad support to a new bill banning the wearing of garments covering the face in public, which is known as "the burqa ban".

The Muslim veil has already been banned on a local level in several other towns and cities, including Pazardjik, Sliven, Burgas and Stara Zagora.

No Bulgarian citizens are known to have joined the ISIS as foreign fighters.

However, in July 2015, prosecutors charged 14 Muslims - including the controversial imam Ahmed Moussa - from Pazardjik and nearby Plovdiv, Asenovgrad and Startsevo, with inciting religious hatred through their preaching and with promoting ISIS propaganda.

A New Study Indicates Right-Wing Lone Wolves May Kill More Than Lone Islamic Terrorists

Source: <http://uproxx.com/news/lone-wolf-right-wing-islamic-terror/>

June 25 – There have been a lot of terrible and terrifying acts of violence throughout the world over the last couple of decades. Lone wolf terrorism seems to be fomenting in places we can't quite pin down. Not all terrorism or

terrorists stem from the same set of circumstances — some of it is based in religious dogmatism, some of it originates with far-right



rhetoric, and other segments stem from a far-left agenda.

The Royal United Service Institute, or RUSI, has been studying the numbers from deadly lone wolf attacks carried out in Europe between 2000-2014. Since they only studied lone wolf attacks, the events in Paris and Brussels fell outside their purview. RUSI [set up a study](#) that “seeks to improve understanding of lone actor terrorists, their behaviour, and their activities in the period leading up to their intended attack.” Basically, they want to know why are people carrying out attacks solo, and how do we stop someone who operates outside a known terror network. Not an easy task.

There are not a lot of easy answers in the data. RUSI found that “Right-wing extremists kill and injure more people in lone wolf attacks than Islamic terrorists acting alone.” The numbers between 2000-2014 added up to the following:

94 people were killed and 260 were injured in attacks by far-right terrorists. In contrast, religiously inspired lone attacks killed 16 and injured 65 people.

RUSI also found that mental health is a contributing factor, but only around 1/4 of the time. 24% of the perpetrators of religious-inspired attacks had a history of mental illness. While 28% of far-right inspired attackers had a history of mental illness. Interestingly, but maybe not surprisingly, 96% of the perpetrators who carry out lone wolf attacks are men. RUSI concludes that more access to mental health care is needed to stem these acts of violence.

With mental health only being a factor in a quarter of the cases, RUSI makes it clear that there is a lot more that needs to be done. [The](#)

[study of the data showed](#) some harrowing numbers in law enforcement’s ability to stop lone wolf attackers before they actually carry out their attacks. When it came to catching a far-right extremist, “it was established that 40% of right-wing extremists were uncovered by an element of chance.” Part of that is because “only 18% of lone wolf far-right extremist talked about their plans.” So, basically, the majority of these attacks were stopped by blind dumb luck. Conversely the same data also shows that when it comes to “religiously-inspired terrorism ... 88% of interventions were intelligence-led.”

Moreover, 45% of religiously-inspired lone wolves talked about their plans openly. That’s 88% of all the lone wolf terror plots that were stopped directly due to the intelligence and law enforcement community.

That is a lot of plots. RUSI cites that our law enforcement is actually getting better at this and terror groups are noticing:

Intelligence agencies and law enforcement have become increasingly adept at detecting and disrupting large-scale terrorist plots, potential attackers have instead turned to smaller scale, less sophisticated assaults. In part, this trend reflects a decision by wider extremist groups to adopt lone actor terrorism as a tactic.

This seems to be a puzzle that we are only now getting a handle on. The numbers don’t lie, but what we do with those numbers matter. At the moment the [study concludes...](#)

The media, and consequently public attention, is largely focused on violent Islamist extremists; while this may reflect the broader threat, it is at odds with that from lone actor terrorism.

► You can read the whole [study here](#).

Jordaniana stole CIA weapons shipped to Syrian rebels – and sold them on the black market

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160627-jordaniana-stole-cia-weapons-shipped-to-syrian-rebels-and-sold-them-on-the-black-market>

June 27 – **Jordanian intelligence chiefs stole millions of dollars worth of weapons sent by the CIA to Jordan for Syrian rebels — and sold on the black market**, the *New York Times* reports.

Among the weapons stolen and sold are thousands of Kalashnikov assault rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. The CIA shipped the arms to Jordan so they could be delivered to rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.



Jordanian intelligence officers were able to steal the weapons because they had direct access to the cargo. These officers “regularly siphoned truckloads” of the arms, delivering only a tiny fraction of them to the moderate Syrian rebels.



A joint investigation by the *Times* and *Al Jazeera* reports that the Jordanian officers “reaped a windfall” from sales, using the money to buy iPhones, SUVs, and other luxury items.

The Pentagon became aware of the scheme a few months ago, after CIA informers who track the Middle East arms bazar s reported that arms dealers were bragging that they had large stocks of CIA weapons.

Jordan, acting on U.S. complaint, said it had arrested several dozen “low-level” officers involved in the scheme, but that these officers were later released.

Experts say the stolen weapons ended up in the possession of criminal networks or ISIS sympathizers.

The *Telegraph* reports that Jordan is one of the U.S. and Britain’s closest and most reliable allies in the Middle East, and that U.S. dependent on Amman for assistance in the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the revelation is unlikely to cause serious damage to U.S.-Jordan relationship.

Observers note that since they were launched in 2013, the programs of both the CIA and the Pentagon in Syria have been plagued by problems. Despite these problems, the secret CIA program has successfully trained and equipped about thousand fighters, who have enjoyed considerable success in the first six months of 2015 in pushing back Assad’s forces in north-west Syria. But in September 2015 Russian jets joined the war in support of the Assad regime, concentrating on attacking the U.S.-backed forces, who posed a much greater threat to the Assad government than ISIS.

While the CIA was successful in training Syrian rebels, the Pentagon program was shut down after it failed to train enough fighters.

Malaysia: Eight hurt in Puchong explosion

Source: <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/eight-hurt-in-puchong-explosion>

June 28 — Eight people were injured after a hand grenade exploded on the front porch of the Movida Bar and Lounge in IOI Boulevard here early this morning



Those injured were patrons of the bar who were watching a Euro 2016 football match when the explosion occurred.

According to a staff member at Movida, there were more than 20 patrons at the outlet during the incident.

“What we know for now is that there were two suspects involved, one of them were seen hurling an object believed to be the hand grenade towards the crowd and ran away.

“Four men and four women were injured, including a female Chinese

national, from the explosion,” Selangor deputy police chief Datuk Abd Rahim Jaafar told reporters at the scene.

Abd Rahim said police have yet to establish the motive of the incident.

“At this point it could be anything, the attack could have been fueled by revenge or the suspects could have been targeting specific individuals at the



bar,” he said.

At the time of writing, the police canine unit, Bukit Aman’s bomb disposal unit and officers from the forensic unit were still conducting investigations at the scene.

Investigators found the grenade’s safety lever at the explosion site while the safety pin was discovered along the main road facing the bar.

Italian church disfigured with Allahu Akbar graffiti

Source: <http://tundratabloids.com/2016/06/italian-church-disfigured-with-allahu-akbar-graffiti/>



June 28 – White lettering on one of the symbols of Bologna. In the night between Saturday and Sunday, unknown persons have written with the spray “Allah akbar”, Allah is great, on the basis of the statue of San Petronio, the patron saint of the city, under the Two Towers in the heart of downtown. It is not known yet whether it is vandalism or a token gesture.

The films of the cameras present in the area are being studied by investigators, because they could have taken those who have done the deed.



“I hope it’s just a stunt of some silly. Bologna proved to be a city where different cultures and religions live together for centuries and know how to dialogue, such gestures can not get citizenship.

I have already activated the relevant sector for the cleaning of the monument,” said the mayor Virginio Merola of the Archdiocese of Bologna” strongly condemns the act of those who have smeared with a provocative

inscription on the statue’s pedestal San Petronio, the civil and religious symbol of the city. Use the name of God to offend others is blasphemy.”

“The authorities in charge – underline the Archdiocese sources – the task of identifying those responsible. All citizens ask you not to give in to the logic of conflict and to prevail rather the reasons for the collaboration of all people to peaceful coexistence.”



EDITOR'S COMMENT: Why that particular church??? The Basilica of San Petronio is the main church of Bologna, Emilia Romagna, northern Italy. It dominates Piazza Maggiore. It is the fifteenth largest church in the world, 132 metres long and 66 metres wide, while the vault reaches 45 metres inside and 51 metres in the facade. With its volume of 258,000 m³, it is the largest (Gothic and totally) church built in bricks of the world. In 2002, five men who it was believed were connected to Al Qaeda and were planning to blow up the building, were arrested. Again in 2006, plans by Muslim terrorists to destroy the Basilica were thwarted by Italian police. **The terrorists claimed that a 15th-**



century fresco inside was insulting to Islam. The fresco, painted by Giovanni da Modena, depicts Muhammad in Hell being devoured by demons.



Security, not Zika, is biggest concern for Rio 2016 Olympics

Source: <http://indianexpress.com/article/sports/sport-others/security-not-zika-is-biggest-concern-for-rio-olympics-says-rio-ceo-sidney-levy-2882541/>

June 29 – **The chief organizer of the Rio de Janeiro Olympics says security is his top concern, well ahead of the Zika virus.**

Sidney Levy, CEO of the Rio Organizing Committee, said Tuesday that keeping athletes and visitors safe from terrorism and other crime is his No. 1 top priority. He called the biggest fear “lone wolf” attackers.



“Differently from Zika, security’s at the top of my list the very top of my list,” Levy said at a Council of the Americas event. “We should never forget that these days we live in a society that’s very in danger.” The plan is to have 85,000 security personnel on the streets. Levy said the 2013 visit of Pope Francis and the 2014 World Cup were tests for Brazil.

Francisco Dornelles, Rio’s acting governor, warned on Monday that budget shortfalls could compromise security and transit at the games. Levy said intelligence officials from 100 different countries are in Brazil monitoring potential threats.

Zika, a virus linked to birth defects, has drawn widespread international concern. Levy stressed he does not worry about the virus and said none of the people working for him has contracted Zika. He pointed to expected cooler temperatures during the Olympics in his attempt to assuage fears.

“If I have to write on a piece of paper my top 10 worries today, Zika wouldn’t be there,” he said. “I’m not saying it’s not a public health issue. It is a public health issue. But we are going into the winter months in Rio and if you see every statistic of last year’s mosquitos’ proliferation in the summer and in the winter, it goes very high up in February and reaches the peak, which is the height of the summer. It starts going down, down, down. Right now it’s almost zero.”

Levy said **Rio organizers did not expect this level of concern over Zika**, and he acknowledged that more people around the world are worried about it than Brazilians are. Several high-profile athletes cited it as their reason for withdrawing from the Olympics.

“We thought that there were too many people here in the States talking about Zika and this is too much. This is too much. Too many negative comments,” Levy said. “I think it was good for them to hear other voices.”

Levy was less optimistic about water pollution, saying Rio “failed” on its promise to clean 80 percent of it by the Olympics, which are set for Aug. 5-21. He said four of the five sites on the Guanabara Bay are tested daily for bacteria and will not pose any problems and left open the possibility of moving the other.

“The fifth area is closer to the shore and we’re testing that and **depending on the rain and the wind** sometimes good, sometimes not so good,” Levy said. “If closer to the games we see that this is not good enough, we’re going to change the location to further down the sea. We’re very committed to not put at risk any athlete during the competition.”

The Associated Press has reported that Guanabara Bay has shown astronomically high level of viruses for which the state is not testing.

Another issue is the political turmoil in the country. Levy is unsure about the upcoming vote to impeach President Dilma Rousseff, which likely will take place in August.

“We do pray for the impeachment vote to happen before the games,” Levy said. “If that prayer is not answered, we hope that (will) happen after the games. We asked the president personally about that, but he can’t control his congress and senate. We’re going to have to manage whatever happens. It would be ideal of that to happen before the Olympics.”

Levy said the subway is almost ready and that the light rail is having its soft opening. Because those modes of transportation are new and Brazil has never hosted an event of this magnitude.

“Security is, of course, part of the core of the agenda,” Levy said. “But I would say today the main issue for me is the combination of all that: How to make all that work simultaneously on the very first day. First day everybody’s watching. It’s going to have to work. That’s what worries me.”

Why ISIS Attacks Turkey

By William M. Arkin and Robert Windrem

Source: <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/istanbul-ataturk-airport-attack/why-isis-attacks-turkey-n601081>

Senior U.S. intelligence officials tell NBC News that there are a half-dozen pressing reasons why ISIS would choose to send three suicide bombers to attack the Istanbul airport. **They say that the terror group, which has recently lost territory from its caliphate in Syria and Iraq, is sending a signal to its northern neighbor because:**

- A Turkish offensive against ISIS that started last July and accelerated in October, after an ISIS bombing killed more than 100 civilians in Turkey’s capital city of Ankara, the



deadliest terrorist attack in Turkey's history. Turkish bombers also began taking part in the international coalition airstrikes against ISIS targets.

- Earlier this month, Turkish courts sentenced three ISIS terrorists to 10 life sentences for a March 2014 attack in Turkey. The prison sentences were the first imposed on ISIS members by Turkey.
- A recent agreement between Turkey and Israel to reinvigorate relations, which had been damaged by a 2010 Israeli raid on a Gaza aid ship that killed 10 Turkish activists.
- The Iraqi offensive against ISIS forces in Fallujah, which portends an even larger battle in the near future to retake a much larger prize, the city of Mosul,
- Gaps in Turkish law that make it hard for the country to crack down on ISIS fighters inside its borders.
- The 1000 Turkish nationals who are fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria, who are angry at their own government and are available for missions inside Turkish borders.

Though the Ankara government faces two active internal terrorist groups — the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a leftist anti-NATO group that seeks the overthrow of the Turkish state — the U.S. analysts point out that ISIS activity is not only the largest threat but the most pervasive threat.

The U.S. officials, who spoke to NBC News on a not-for-attribution basis, stressed that there is an ongoing Turkish-ISIS battle inside Turkey that is occurring largely out of public sight.



Firefighters try to extinguish the flames at the scene of a car bomb detonation close to buildings of the Turkish military, in Ankara, capital of Turkey, on Feb. 17 2016. STR / EPA

Turkey has increased its surveillance and apprehension of possible fighters attempting movement or operations in the country. Turkey, U.S. officials say, is the most important chokepoint in the flow of both indigenous ISIS

and foreign terrorist fighters. ISIS itself, U.S. intelligence assesses, has aggressively increased its activity and attacks on Turkish soil in an effort to protect its most important external line of communication through the country to the battlefield in Syria and Iraq.

Istanbul attack: ISIS 'likely' to blame for explosions that killed 41

According to U.S. intelligence, more than 1,300 ISIS suspects have been detained by Turkish police in the past year, some 350 of whom were arrested. Nearly all were Turkish nationals. And since the July offensive began,



Turkish military units along the Syrian border have apprehended more than 150,000 individuals, mostly refugees, attempting to cross illegally. Of the 150,000, most were refugees, but about 1.6 percent were deemed terror suspects. Some were arrested and some were not allowed to cross. Turkey also deported 2,337 suspected foreign terrorist fighters from 85 countries caught at the border in 2015, according to the U.S. State Department.



The Istanbul airport attacks, U.S. officials stress, are not just tied to the domestic battle between Ankara and the so-called Islamic state, but also need to be understood in terms of internal Turkish politics.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said last year that the PKK and its Kurdish affiliates in Syria were more of a threat to Turkey than the Islamic State, an opinion shared by the Turkish Army. But other Turkish officials, U.S. sources say, strongly disagree with Erdogan's assessment. U.S. intelligence officials estimate that there are approximately 4,000 to 5,000 PKK members, most located in northern Iraq, while ISIS fighters and sympathizers number in the tens of thousands.

Turkey also faces some difficult internal legal impediments to international counter-terrorism, according to U.S. sources. Legislation defines terrorism narrowly as a crime targeting the Turkish state or citizens,

and not all courts have interpreted the term more to include all activities associated with foreign terrorist fighters transiting Turkey, including ISIS facilitation networks.



Turkish rescue services outside Ataturk International airport on Tuesday night. Emrah Gurel / AP

Some are even invoking the specter of Pakistan in Turkey's tendency to deport ISIS fighters from other countries while tolerating the terror group's support

networks on its own soil.

A senior U.S. military official who has been involved in the anti-ISIS campaign since its beginning in 2014 warns that the lesson from Istanbul might be that the American press and political leaders not digest their own propaganda about success against ISIS.

"The conventional wisdom is always that attacks are staged in an effort to assert a narrative of victory in the face of losses of territory in Iraq and Syria," the official says. "Meanwhile, our self-congratulating pats on the back ignore that this global insurgency consistently gains strength and sophistication."

Radicalization and the Grain of Sand

By Alexander H. Joffe


Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6093/radicalization-grain-of-sand>

The story of Orlando shooter Omar Mateen, like those of countless other "homegrown" terrorists, is now familiar to the point of cliché. The parents immigrate to the West filled with hope, but their children fail to thrive. They may be successful in some things and fit in with others of their generation, but only superficially. Sometimes they are soccer-playing, rap-aspiring, beer-drinking lads from the neighborhood, whose failures often lead first to car theft and drug dealing. Other times they are outwardly successful, but the contradictions between the terms of that success and an inner reality or aspiration become too much to bear. Within them is a grain of sand that irritates, which forces them to seek out that which they believe is missing in themselves. It is a means

of overcoming individualism, the self, and becoming part of something much larger. It is a path to meaning.

Passions begin to burn over causes, indignities, injustices; the world does not work the way it is supposed to. Visions of perfection begin to loom but the means of realization require commitment to secrecy, lies, and double lives, to violence and inflicting pain. A sense of authenticity and being whole grows until, in a flash, rage explodes outward.

The base instincts of their insecurities, misogyny,



homophobia, and anti-Semitism are given useful scriptural context and legitimation by local mosque sermons. The videos they view online extol jihad with heroic visions of Muslim warriors past and present.

Sometimes outward behavior changes in ways obvious to co-workers, such as the adoption of Islamic dress, strange statements about Islamic supremacism, and complaints about Western "decadence." They become indignant when questioned or mocked by friends about their increasing religiosity.

In a search for authenticity, they make all-important visits to Saudi Arabia or the homelands of their parents, places they left as children or knew not at all, in search of answers about themselves, anxious to understand their place. But they find they belong nowhere, except in the world that ISIS

Jews who became radicalized overwhelming acted in the name of humanity, only rarely for the Jewish people, and almost never for the Jewish God.

The one notable exception to the universalist goals of Jewish revolutionaries is Zionism. But its goals have been more precisely ethnic and national, not religious. Apart from a few marginal groups (e.g. Gush Emunim, an underground cell that sought to blow up the Dome of the Rock decades ago) and "lone wolves" like Yaacov Teitel, Baruch Goldstein, and Yigal Amir, God's will has had little to do with Jewish radicalism.

While Jewish radicals mostly leave Judaism to join universal movements, radical Islamists embrace their religious faith and almost exclusively pursue Muslim goals, both locally (Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, etc.) and globally. No thought is given to bettering humanity, except in the sense of subjugating it to Allah.

Judaism is not very rich source of legitimation for modern violence. Its history of conquest and domination is exclusively local and literary. It lacks Islam's traditions of earthly rewards for conquest and resulting heavenly rewards for heroic martyrdom, and there is no history of individual or mass violence to terrorize conquered populations into submission (even biblical accounts of the conquest of Canaan are sharply debated as to their morality). There is a long messianic tradition, but nothing that seeks to bring the end times through violence that ignites cataclysm.

Jewish (and Christian) religious authorities, with only marginal exceptions, find such violence anathema. Fleeting few Jewish children are socialized to hate in ways that would spark, much less legitimize, indiscriminate violence, nor are they taught to dream of glorious days past that could again become real through such triumphs of the will.

For Jews and Christians, God's plan for this world is opaque, and the shape of the next is vague. For others, and for Muslims in particular, these plans are imprinted deep into their culture, tiny grains that when compressed too far, ignite into fireballs. Such differences are key to understanding the making of Omar Mateens.



claims to be remaking. And they return home with a fire in them, having either enlisted in a larger plot or with their own smoldering inside. Then the countdown begins.

There is nothing quite like this in the non-Muslim world. There have been plenty of self-radicalized Christians and Jews in the past few centuries, but few turned to terrorism and fewer still became terrorists in the name of religion.

Iconic examples of violent Jewish radicals include anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, who attempted to murder industrialist Henry Frick, Communists like Leon Trotsky, and later members of the Weather Underground in America.

But neither the identities nor the causes of these revolutionaries were remotely Jewish. They embraced what they thought to be the inevitable course of history and aspired to awaken the masses to a higher state of being.



Alexander H. Joffe, a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a historian and archaeologist.


41 killed, 239 injured in three suicide explosions at Istanbul Atatürk airport

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160629-41-killed-239-injured-in-three-suicide-explosions-at-istanbul-atat-rk-airport>



June 29 – Turkish authorities say that forty-one people have been killed and 239 injured in a terrorist attack on Turkey's largest airport, Istanbul Atatürk. The airport is Europe's third busiest airport, following London's Heathrow and the Charles De Gaulle in Paris.

Ataturk international terminal: Where the attacks happened



Most of those killed were Turkish citizens, but 13 were foreign nationals. Five were from Saudi Arabia, two from Iraq, and one each from Tunisia, Uzbekistan, China, Iran, Ukraine and Jordan.

The Turkish Ministry of Justice said that two terrorists blew themselves up outside the security checkpoint at the entry to the international terminal. A third terrorist blew himself up in the terminal's parking lot. Police officers at the checkpoint were fired upon from a



close range by one or two persons, and returned fire – but the two men blew themselves up.

No terrorist groups has claimed responsibility for the massacre, but Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım said based on a preliminary investigation that “all signs point to ISIS.”

“According to analyses by our security forces, first indications point at DAESH [ISIS] as perpetrators,” Yıldırım said during a press conference at the airport. “What is noteworthy is that this attack came at a time when our country is putting up a merciless fight against separatist terrorism and recording significant success.”



A spokesperson for the Istanbul police told the *Guardian* that “a bomb exploded at the airport and there are many casualties,” adding that the exact number is not yet known.

Justice minister Bekir Bozdağ told parliament in Ankara that preliminary reports suggested that at least ten people were killed in the attack.



The *Telegraph* quotes a police spokesperson to say that one person, “maybe a terrorist,” opened fire at police guarding the outside of the airport in order to force access to the international terminal, but when the police returned fire, he detonating a bomb, “maybe a suicide bomb.”

State-run TRT television reported that the explosion hit a control point at the international terminal of the airport.

The airport police said that the

attackers used AK-47 assault rifles in their initial attack. A picture of what appears to be an AK-47 rifle on the floor was being circulated on social media.

Police blocked all entry points to the airport and evacuated the international terminal. Some flights have been diverted away from Istanbul.

Recent months have seen an increase in terrorist attacks against Turkish civilians. These attacks have been carried out by both ISIS Islamists and PKK Kurdish separatists.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also condemned the attacks and urged Western countries to take a stronger stance against terrorism.



The attack showed “the dark face of terror that targets innocent civilians,” he said. “This attack does not produce any results, it aims to produce propaganda against our country using the blood and pain of innocent people.

“Despite paying a heavy price, Turkey has the power, determination and capacity to continue the fight against terrorism until the end. Today’s attack targeted 79 million Turkish citizens along with 7.5 billion human beings around the world. The bombs that exploded in Istanbul today could have gone off at any airport in any city around the world, in any airport. I want everyone to understand that, to the terrorists, there is no difference between Istanbul and London, Ankara and Berlin, Izmir and Chicago,” President Erdogan said in a written statement.

“Make no mistake: For terrorist organizations, there is no difference between Istanbul and London, Ankara and Berlin, Izmir and Chicago, or Antalya and Rome. Unless we come together as all countries and as all people, and fight against the terrorists together, all possibilities that we can’t even dare think of right now will come true.”

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Two problems identified (again) in the photos shown herein: (1) A “passenger” with summer clothing during summertime is a good reason for inspection – NOT DONE!; (2) A wounded terrorist with a suicide vest should be immediately shot in the head – NOT DONE! Until next time hoping that problems identified will eventually become “lessons learned”.

Turkish airport hit by difficult terrorism scenario

By J.J. Green

Source: <http://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2016/06/turkish-airport-hit-by-difficult-terrorism-scenario/>



June 28 – Three men arrived at Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, Turkey before 10 p.m. local time Tuesday. Sources with knowledge of the situation told WTOP that security officers became suspicious and after they approached the men, gunfire broke out. During the chaos the sources said the men began detonating suicide devices.

The Turkish Interior ministry confirmed shortly after the attack that it was terrorism, blaming the PKK, The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a militant left-wing organization based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan that has launched deadly attacks in the past.

But other sources reported an ISIL-inspired Turkish cell, including operatives from Central Asia, may have been responsible for airport attack.

The attack is one of the deadliest at an airport since the Brussels attack in March and points to what security experts say is the most difficult scenario to confront inside an airport. In that attack, 35 people were killed and 340 wounded.



“The fact that the initial security stop appears to have occurred outside of the terminal could be viewed as a small degree of success for Turkish officials in that they probably mitigated the body count,” said Mike Maness, Director at TrapWire Inc., former CIA counterterror operations officer.

The attackers were allegedly part of a new genre of terrorists known as suicide fighters. Their objective, according to a U.S. intelligence source, is to go to an attack site armed with automatic weapons and explosives. The source said their first objective is to shoot-to-kill as many people as possible before detonating their explosives.

Maness, familiar with terrorists’ tactics, said those who have been trained as suicide fighters have more than one plan.

“When terrorists arrive at an attack site they are primed and ready to go. If they fail to reach their primary target, they will switch to ‘Plan B’ and search for secondary targets, thus guaranteeing some degree of success,” he said.

In this case, according to an American intelligence source familiar with Ataturk Airport and the region, at least one of the attackers managed to detonate explosives inside the airport.

Experts say discovery by a passenger screener of a person inside the airport with explosives is a difficult scenario to solve.

“In the U.S., this initial confrontation would most likely have occurred inside the crowded terminal, probably leading to even more casualties than in Istanbul,” Maness said.

What happens at an airport when a security screener discovers a person strapped with explosives?

WTOP asked TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger what arrangements are in place to handle such a scenario.

“In advance of any potential scenario like that we have strong agreements with local law enforcement. We work very closely with local law enforcement across the nation but every airport has some version of a police force,” Neffenger said.

No U.S. airport has regular standard explosives screening outside of the terminal for passengers. Neffenger said there are random screenings at airports like Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and regular screening of cargo, but not passengers.

But even if standard passenger screening took place outside of airport terminals, some expert don’t believe that would change the efficacy of terrorists dedicated to attacking an airport terminal.

“The extensions of security zones in the presence of attackers are merely the extension of where the attack happens. It’s not a widening of the safety zone but rather a widening of the attack. It’s the checkpoint lines they want, said Patrick Skinner, a former CIA operative and Director of Special programs at the Soufan group.

“What we hope is that we have enough intelligence efforts in place as well as pre-arrival efforts in place to prevent that and somebody from ever getting to the airport with a with a device like that,” Neffenger added.

JJ Green is the National Security Correspondent at WTOP. He reports daily on international security, intelligence, foreign policy, terrorism and cyber developments. He also provides regular on-air analysis and guidance on global security matters. He hosts the weekly program “The Hunt,” which goes in-depth with experts on al-Qaida, the Taliban and emerging terror threats. He has traveled extensively throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe and Africa covering national security matters. He’s been embedded with the U.S. military in the war zone in Afghanistan three times and has reported from Kandahar, Zabul province and Kabul. He’s traveled to Israel, the Golan Heights, Israel’s borders with Syrian and Lebanon, and Gaza. He is the recipient of a National Edward R. Murrow Award (2009) for “Hidden Hunter,” his reporting aboard a nuclear powered, Los Angeles Class submarine in the Atlantic Ocean. He also won the prestigious Associated Press Douglas S. Freeman award for his investigative series, “Dignity Denied,” which explored decades of neglect at America’s hallowed Arlington National Cemetery. JJ graduated magna cum laude from Hampton University. He’s fluent in Spanish, speaks working level French and Korean and is studying Arabic. An avid athlete, he is an accomplished speed skater, a regular runner, swimmer, cross trainer and is an expert kickboxer.



Turkish forces detain 22 in Ataturk Airport terror attack

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-istanbul-ataturk-airport-attack/index.html>

July 30 – Turkish authorities have now detained 22 people in connection with the Ataturk Airport attack, a Turkish official told CNN on Thursday.

Thirteen people were taken into custody in Istanbul and nine in the coastal city of Izmir, the official said. Three of those detained were foreign nationals, state media reported.

The official also said that Turkey has determined the attackers who carried out Tuesday's shootings and suicide bombings were from Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

No one has claimed responsibility for the attack that hit one of Europe's busiest transit hubs.

Three terrorists stormed the airport Tuesday night, opening fire and detonating explosives in an attack that killed 42 people and wounded hundreds more.

When the attackers arrived at the Turkish airport armed with rifles and suicide bomb vests, two opened fire and detonated their bombs at the international terminal building, according to officials.

A third one died in the parking lot, where he detonated himself as terrified travelers scattered in all directions.

The attack echoed the dual suicide bombings at the main airport in Brussels in March. **Like the attack in Brussels, the terrorists took a taxi to the airport.**

After the terror attack, police interviewed the taxi driver who drove the Istanbul terrorists to the airport and released him, Turkish state news agency Anadolu reported.

'All evidence' points to ISIS

As Turkey flew flags at half-staff to observe a day of mourning Wednesday, questions remained on who was behind the attack.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proclaimed the terror attack "will not divide or split our country." Officials blamed the attack on ISIS, the abhorred terror group based in neighboring Syria.

By killing dozens of civilians, including women and children, Erdogan said, the terrorists are not true Muslims.

"This is not Islamic. Taking one person's life means going straight to hell," he said. "No

terrorist organization will come between what we are."

Erdogan said an attack during the final days of the holy month of Ramadan shows the terrorists had no regard for faith or values.

"All information and evidence" points to ISIS, Interior Minister Ekan Ala said. "But nothing is for certain."

The Islamic State has struck in Turkey before, but has rarely taken credit for those bombings.

History of airport attacks

Preliminary findings suggest all three attackers opened fire then detonated themselves, similar to the mass shooting and suicide bombings at Paris' Bataclan concert hall in November. ISIS claimed responsibility for that massacre, which left 89 people dead.

ISIS has a history of airport attacks. It also claimed responsibility for dual suicide bombings at the main airport in Brussels in March. At least 10 people died in those blasts.

The CIA director said the terror attack mirrors similar ones by ISIS.

"I think what they do is they carry out these attacks to gain the benefits from it in terms of sending a signal to our Turkish partners ... and at the same time not wanting to potentially maybe alienate some of those individuals inside of Turkey that they may still be trying to gain the support of," John Brennan said.

Victims from all over the world

The people killed came from all over the world, but **most of them were Turkish**, including 10 airport staff members, TAV Airports CEO Sani Sener said.

The attack **killed six Saudis** and wounded dozens more, the nation's foreign ministry said.

Other fatalities included **two Iraqis, one Tunisian, one Chinese, one Iranian, one Ukrainian, one Jordanian and one person from Uzbekistan**, a Turkish official said. Three of the foreigners had dual Turkish citizenship.

Of the 239 people wounded, a majority of them remained hospitalized, officials said.



Turkey's vulnerability

Experts say Turkey is especially vulnerable because various terrorists operate there.

ISIS has a reason to detest Turkey. The country is helping the U.S.-led coalition attack ISIS targets in neighboring Iraq and Syria. Turkey allows coalition planes to fly raids from its territory.

Adding to the list of enemies, Turkey resumed hostilities with the PKK -- Kurdish militant separatists -- last year after a ceasefire broke down.

Turkey has spent much of this year reeling from terror attacks as it weathers bombing campaigns by both ISIS and Kurdish militants.

The attack marked the eighth suicide bombing in Turkey this year. At least 140

people have been killed. The violence has also rattled Turkey's tourism industry, a key sector of the national economy. About 39.4 million people visit each year.

Flights resumed

The airport resumed flights Wednesday morning, hours after the attack.

A few shops inside the airport remained closed, but for the most part the terminal where the attack took place was open. A section where one of the bombs went off was cordoned off by boards with advertisements on them. Not too far away, a black table sat covered with roses and a photo of two victims.

French beaches to be patrolled by armed police lifeguards

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160628-french-beaches-to-be-patrolled-by-armed-police-lifeguards>

June 28 – **The vacation season in France is about the start, and the French authorities have decided to place armed police lifeguards – who will also wear bullet-proof vests — on the country's busiest beaches amid fears that terrorists may target beachgoers and vacationing families.**



France has been under emergency regulations since the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.

France's CRS riot police officers have been routinely deployed as lifeguards at beaches and resorts every July and August, but until this year, they have left their guns, flak jackets, and helmets in the police station in favor of swimming trunks and T-shirts when assigned to beach duty.

The *Daily Mail* reports that the police officers will be deployed at beach first-aid centers, and will carry guns in sand-proof holsters, specially designed for use with beachwear. Bullet-proof vests will be kept near the lifeguard posts.

"We will be ready to act if there is an armed attack on a beach," Nicolas Comte, a police union spokesman, said.

Analysts say that the decision was motivated, at least in part, by the need to reassure foreign tourists that France was a safe holiday destination.

Islamist terrorists have recently attacked beach resorts in Tunisia and Ivory Coast.

Some officers welcomed the decision, but critics said the officers would look foolish carrying guns while

wearing swimming trunks.

(Editor's comment: photo – right)

"We will be swimming in ridicule," said Frédéric Lagache of another police union, Alliance. "It is necessary to keep police and tourists secure on beaches, but not in this manner. I don't like the idea of a CRS officer intervening with a gun and a bullet-proof vest while in swimming trunks."

France's beaches are not to only thing the French police must secure. The Euro 2016 will not end until 10 July, and the Tour de France bicycle race is about to begin.

With the demands on the police growing, local councils are contributing unarmed volunteers, firemen, and municipal police to serve along the CRS lifeguards.



Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes

By Alex P. Schmid

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/511/html>

The following text is a slightly expanded version of the author's introduction to a panel titled 'Next Wave of Research Topics and Themes' held at the end of a Research Seminar on 'Radicalisation: From Theory to Practice'. It was held on 12-13 April 2016 in Vienna, Austria, and organised by the European Radicalisation Awareness Network. RAN was set up in 2010 by the European Commission as an EU-wide umbrella network of practitioners engaged to prevent and counter radicalisation to violent extremism. Its Centre of Excellence (RAN CoE) acts as a hub in connecting, developing and disseminating expertise and seeks to develop state-of-the-art knowledge.

The idea that terrorism comes in waves was first introduced by David C. Rapoport, the grand old man of terrorism research who started teaching about the subject half a century ago. He distinguished between four waves:

- the Anarchist Wave (1870-1920s)
- the Nationalist Wave (1920s-1960s);
- -the New Left/Marxist Wave (from the 1960s to the 1980s), and the
- Religious Wave (from the late 1970s to today and beyond)

Rapoport's theory is one of the better theories in terrorism research, although it has not gone unchallenged [1].

This raises the question whether there are also waves in terrorism research and, if so, what are the drivers. Clearly, one of the biggest drivers of terrorism research is government funding which became substantial only after 11 September 2001. Research on what was termed by the European Commission "Violent Radicalisation" began, with few exceptions [2], only after the attacks in Madrid (11/3/2004) and London (7/7/2005). It was a largely political construct; there had been hardly any social science research driven by this particular concept before the early 21st century.[3] The phenomenon of homegrown terrorism emerging from immigrant diaspora communities worried national and European policy makers. The US-UK intervention in Iraq, launched under false pretexts, was widely viewed as an attack on a Muslim country in immigrant circles. It angered many young Muslims in Western Europe, making some of them susceptible to recruitment efforts of Islamist terrorist organisations. Both the United States and European governments had been reluctant to explore the root causes of terrorism after 9/11 and the US-led attack on Iraq. By shifting the public discussion away from Western meddling in the Muslim world to Islamist meddling with Muslim youth in the West in the form of radicalisation and recruitment, politically safe ground was reached for exploring some drivers behind homegrown terrorism—such as the role of certain mosques and other recruitment hot spots such as prisons. A European Expert Group on "Violent Radicalisation" was set up by the European Commission. It was chaired by Fernando Reinares and produced in mid-May 2008 a concise report that was, however, shelved and never officially released.[4] The Expert Group's report interpreted radicalisation as socialization to extremism, manifesting itself in acts of terrorism and observed that radicalisation happens at the "intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory." [5]

Yet to this day the main focus of radicalisation research has been on the "vulnerable individual" who is somehow manipulated into becoming a terrorist, with radicalisation being the Black Box which contains the riddle of "what goes on before the bomb goes off", to use a snappy formulation of Peter Neumann, director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) in London. To this day, the 'enabling environment', has not received the same amount of attention as the 'vulnerable individual'. [6] Even less attention than to the meso-level has been given to macro-level drivers of radicalisation.

For research to become cumulative, one needs to agree on a definition. Despite more than ten years of research we still do not have a generally agreed upon definition of "radicalisation". The definition articulated by the European Union The definition articulated by the European Union—which presumably is the one RAN is following – is short but not very precise:

"Radicalisation: Individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity towards using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy." [7]



If we indeed would take—following this official European definition—democracy, equality and diversity as benchmarks for measuring degrees of radicalization, we would have a great deal more radicalisation in the world, and not just among “vulnerable youth”.

My own definition of radicalisation is one that owes an intellectual debt to the work of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko[8] but goes beyond them:

“an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either

- (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion,
- (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or
- (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes.

The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialisation away from mainstream- or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate.”

There are many other definitions [9] as there are many ways of looking at the problem.

Radicalisation can be viewed as a process of political socialisation towards extremism. Alternatively, radicalisation can be viewed as a process of conflict escalation in terms of increased use of illegal methods of political action when confronting an opponent. It can also be seen as a mobilisation and recruitment process, masterminded by manipulative political or religious entrepreneurs. It can finally be viewed primarily as a conversion process, a life-changing transformation from a more individual-centered personal identity to a new, collective-centered identity which makes the vulnerable individual subservient to the demands of an extremist religious cult while making him or her think of belonging to a superior group of true believers.[10]

Problems with the Concept of Radicalisation

If we look at the history of radicalisation research we find that there was an initial focus on prison radicalisation, followed by one on mosque and madrassa radicalization. More recently the main focus is on internet and social media radicalisation. Should we call this sequence of research ‘waves’?

It might perhaps be better to call the very strong focus on radicalisation itself as one wave of (counter-) terrorism research if we want to stick to this aquatic metaphor. Several leading researchers have expressed unhappiness with this heavy focus on radicalisation in terrorism research. To quote one of them, John Horgan: “We should not have allowed to have radicalisation center stage.(...) We are stuck with radicalisation”.[11] **My own unhappiness with the concept of radicalisation and its use has been expressed in a literature review.[12] It is threefold:**

1. the association of radicalisation with radicalism (rather than extremism; the former is an outflow of the 18th century enlightenment while the latter is regressive and authoritarian rather than progressive and egalitarian);
2. the one-sided use of the term for non-state actors only (as if those holding state power never become more extreme in the course of a conflict); and
3. the almost exclusive focus on the micro-level of the vulnerable individual (rather than a broader focus on the meso-level of the radical milieu or the macro-level of society, state and international system).

There are more problems with the concept of radicalisation. In some cases individual radicalisation follows joining a terrorist group rather than the other way round. In other cases (e.g. defensive vigilantism) those using terrorist tactics were never radicalised. In most cases, those holding radical (as opposed to extremist) views never engage in terrorism. The question “Why some radicalise while most do not radicalise?” is still in need of satisfactory answers.

A Dozen Topics and Themes for Research

If we look not at radicalisation and its opposite concept de-radicalisation but at Counter-Terrorism as a whole, one can note a shift from a (i) law enforcement approach that



treated terrorism as crime to a (ii) military approach in the 'Global War on Terror' which treats counter-terrorism as a special type of counter-insurgency. More recently, we have seen advocacy for a (iii) whole-of-government approach, followed by pleas for a (iv) whole-of-society approach and even a (v) whole-of-UN-approach. Perhaps one could also apply the wave metaphor to these five phases.

Leaving the wave metaphor behind, what topics and themes should be next in terrorism and counter-terrorism research in general and radicalisation research in particular? Here are a dozen suggestions:

1. **Use of primary sources:** Clearly the gap between academic research and counter-terrorism intelligence needs to be narrowed. Intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies often have too many data but lack time and also lack some of the analytical skills available in academia to fully exploit this heap of unprocessed raw data.[13] The problem to get security clearances makes it, however, difficult for researchers to work with primary sources. Most governments keep their in-house information close to their chest. [14]
2. **Re-contextualise research:** Research on terrorism and radicalisation needs to be re-contextualised and linked to the history of a conflict on the one hand and government politics on the other hand.[15] There is a great difference between someone radicalising in Syria or Gaza from someone radicalizing in Brussels or Paris. There is a great difference between radicalisation in a democratic country and under an authoritarian dictatorship. There is a great difference between radicalisation in an occupied country and a free one, between a country at war and one at peace. Looking at radicalisation only from the perspective of those at the top social hierarchies both at home and abroad is bound to lead to biased results and bad policies.
3. **Address rather than avoid the role of religion:** Religion and conversion to a fundamentalist religious worldview needs to be problematised rather than avoided. There has been a tendency in the United Nations but also with many governments to say that terrorism has nothing to do with religion and, more in particular, that Islam is peaceful and terrorism is un-Islamic. Political correctness has stood in the way of unbiased research. It has become customary to use the term "violent extremism" to avoid the term "Islamist terrorism". It is repeated again and again that there is no profile of a terrorist. However, most contemporary terrorist attacks are perpetrated by self-declared Muslims, or recent converts to Islam. Here in Europe many of these radicalised young males in European urban diasporas have an immigrant background from Arab and other Muslim countries, have a history of involvement in drugs and crime, and a not insignificant part of them have been plagued by family (incl. domestic violence) and mental health problems. This does not amount to a single terrorist profile but is more than mere coincidence.
There are two basic approaches to de-radicalisation: one focuses on bringing people back into the community, the other focuses on bringing them back to the true faith. We in the West have stressed almost exclusively the first approach while in Muslim-majority countries efforts are made to bring them back to the "true religion". While there are hundreds of religions, cults and sects, all claiming to be in possession of some special if not the only truth, we should not focus our attention on community only in order to avoid the perplexing world of beliefs. We should take the faith-based ideology of extremists seriously - without ideology radicalisation to a fanatic religious extremism, most terrorism is unlikely.
4. **The role of media-induced contagion** needs to be addressed; what we call radicalisation might, in part, be contagion – imitation of behavioural models seen in social and mass media. The news value system of our commercial media favours conflict over peace, violence over non-violence, action over reflection, perpetrators over victims, and therefore unwittingly promotes violence for effect. As long as our mass media do not distinguish between events which happen anyway and pseudo-events that happen only- or mainly - because there are journalists around and the media are most likely to report about them, we will continue to provide terrorists with free publicity in exchange for the blood of victims.
5. **The silence of the moderates:** We need to examine why the mainstream moderates in Islam are so hard to mobilise against the extremists who get most of the media and public attention. Are the moderates afraid of being killed by more extremist muslims? Are they secretly subscribing to the goals if not the means of the jihadists? Are they too



divided, too disorganized or lacking resources? Or are they raising their voices but we do not hear them? These are issues that need to be addressed.

6. **The paradox of much sympathy but little support for jihadists:** We still have no satisfactory answers why so few radicalise given the fact that so many non-extremists are growing up in the same social circumstances as those who become terrorists. 99 percent of all Muslims have not radicalised but sympathy and sometimes support for jihadists is much more widespread. We also have to ask: what makes some more resilient to radicalisation than others? We need to look not only at pull- and push factors behind radicalisation to violent extremism and terrorism but also at resilience factors that inhibit such radicalisation. Here is my own, admittedly untested, list of individual level resilience factors[16]:
 - A) Negative
 - No family breakdown, with positive father figure;
 - No previous involvement and exposure to violence;
 - No violent friends or criminal gang or drug scene involvement;
 - No signs of mental disorders;
 - No fascination with weapons and martial arts.
 - B) Positive
 - Ability to think and act for themselves rather than accept ideological slogans;
 - Decent employment, with prospect of upward social mobility;
 - Successful integration in immigrants' host society;
 - Acceptance of democracy, freedom and gender equality;
 - Acceptance of information from non-Salafist sources.
7. **The role of the family in radicalisation and de-radicalisation:** Family members of young Muslims who have gone missing often express surprise that their son or daughter suddenly resurfaces in Syria. Through acts of omission or commission families play a role in such developments. Yet their role in both radicalisation and de-radicalisation is under-explored. It is, for instance, remarkable how often terrorist cells contain brothers from the same family or cousins and other kin.
8. **Indicators of Radicalisation:** A comparison of regional and national checklists on outward signs of radicalisation in real life and signs in online behaviour is urgently needed.[17] French authorities, for instance have published a list of such signs of radicalization:[18]
 - They stop listening to music;
 - Stop watching TV and going to the cinema;
 - Dramatically change eating habits;
 - Stop all sport activities;
 - Change the way they dress;
 - Sever relations with old friends;
 - Reject members of their own family.
9. **Evaluation of de-radicalisation programs:** This should have one of the highest priorities. Such programs have mushroomed in recent years. Yet without systematic, rigorous and comparative evaluations of de-radicalisation programs, no real progress towards more promising practices can be made.
10. **Willingness of communities to reintegrate former extremists:** Like the concept of civil society the concept of community is used as a mantra. Yet to which community can de-radicalised former militants go back to? Who is willing to offer him or her employment? Which neighbourhood would accept a former terrorist criminal? Which community in particular should the ex-convict re-integrate to? Probably not the same one he came from. Community building, creating social cohesion, should be high on our national agendas. Yet in most countries it is not.
11. **Professional training of qualified mentors to guide vulnerable people away from the pathways to radicalisation.** There are many social workers and others engaged in this type of work, but proper training has often been lacking. Such mentors might be selected former extremists who have genuinely persuaded themselves and others that they were misled in the past.



12. **Greater focus on collective de-radicalisation:** Since individual de-radicalisation is labour-intensive, greater focus should be on the exploration of the possibilities for the de-radicalisation of a whole group of extremists (e.g. in a prison context).

Conclusion

These then are a dozen suggestions for new topics and themes of research on and around the issue of (de-) radicalisation. Some of them are not new but all are, in my view, under-researched.

What is most needed is that we try to better understand fanatical extremism and how to break or defuse it. To do so we have to have the courage to enter the radical and extremist milieus and talk to the angry, the disillusioned and the forlorn who search for significance and recognition in their lives and hope to find it in fundamentalist religion. How else can we hope to bring them back into the midst of our societies?

► References are available at source's URL.

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A Framework for Assessing the Mobilization of Westerners by Jihadists in Syria and Intervention Points for Counter-Measures

By Joshua Sinai

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/514/html>

This Research Note presents a framework for mapping the radicalization and mobilization pathways of radicalized Western Muslims (who represent a small proportion of their countries' overall Muslim populations) into (1) becoming foreign fighters in Syria to engage in insurgent and terrorist activities or to decide to return to carry out such attacks in their home countries, (2) becoming radicalized in the West by these jihadist organizations and their local surrogates to carry out terrorist attacks in their own home countries without leaving them, and, to validate the framework's preemptive counter-measures, (3) becoming radicalized into deciding to become jihadi fighters in Syria but being prevented from traveling there either at border crossing points, such as Turkey, or through other preventative measures at various stages of their mobilization in their home countries. To accomplish these objectives, the framework presents five categories that characterize such trajectories, which are broken down into thirteen factors, with each factor marked by critical points for preemptive intervention by government security services.

► Read the full paper at source's URL.

Constructions of Terrorism

By Scott Englund and Michael Stohl

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/512/html>

Occupying considerable space in the daily awareness of people across the globe, terrorism is nevertheless an elusive concept, falling prey to politicization, loose definition, and lack of context.

In some ways terrorism has been described as whatever a person wants it to be, which often gives it an out-sized role in public opinion and policy demands. The Constructions of Terrorism Project, jointly undertaken by Abu Dhabi research center TRENDS Research and



Advisory and the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, seeks to approach this slippery concept from multiple directions, employing a variety of research methodologies, from many academic disciplines and policy-making perspectives. The goal is to thoroughly explore the many ways in which terrorism is constructed by academics, political leaders, the public, and those who employ terror to get what they want. It seeks to provide a forum in which the diversity of conceptual understandings of terrorism can be collectively interrogated, believing that from the high-ground of a more thorough, rigorously investigated understanding of terrorism, better, more effective means of confronting it can be developed and implemented.

► You can read the full paper at source's URL.

Scott Englund is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

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Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 7 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

By Joshua Sinai


Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/519/html>

This column is divided into two parts: the first part reviews three books on terrorism and counterterrorism, and the second part focuses on books on the legal aspects of counterterrorism.

Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 208 pp., US \$ 29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-691-14517-4.

Starting with the premise that “To make their opponents feel threatened, extremists do not need to be well armed, or rational, or even very numerous,” the authors examine how such groups’ “extreme risk-taking behavior” is able to attract the sorts of individuals who are inclined to join such violent groups. (p. vii). Answering this question for social scientists is difficult, the authors point out, because “Extremists are few in number, operate underground, and are hard to reach not least because they tend to die young.” (p. viii). To examine these issues, particularly their hypothesis that “engineers are overrepresented among violent Islamist extremists,” the authors utilize available biographical data, especially levels and types of education, as their key variable, to determine why engineers are more prevalent in Islamist groups as opposed to other terrorist groups that are left-wing and secular in their ideological orientation.

What makes this volume highly innovative and an important contribution to the empirical study of radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups is the way the authors frame these questions within the larger context of what they consider to be four questions that characterize extremism: first, the socioeconomic conditions that explain why individuals join extremist groups; second, do some individuals have a mind-set that is especially susceptible to becoming extremists; third, to what extent is the question of who becomes a terrorist “a matter of ‘supply’ – different types of people choosing particular types of extremism – or a matter of ‘demand’ – groups searching for and selecting suitable



recruits?"; and fourth, "Does ideology matter in determining which types of people join certain groups?" (pp. xi-xiii).

To test their hypotheses, the authors focus on certain traits that characterize engineers that might cause them to be more attracted to the Islamist radical ideology vis-à-vis graduates from other disciplines, such as the social sciences and humanities, as well as whether relative deprivation might serve as another cause for their joining such extremist groups. (p. xiii). Finally, as part of their placement of these issues within the larger context of drivers into radicalization, they investigate "the character traits and dispositions that distinguish the various types of extremists" in general. (p. xiv).

Drawing on a dataset of 487 members of violent Islamist groups in the Muslim world active since the 1970s, the authors find that in this cohort "engineers are more likely to join violent opposition groups than non-violent ones, to prefer religious groups to secular groups, and to be less likely to defect once they join an Islamist group. None of these findings seems explicable in terms of relative deprivation." (p. 161).

This book is also highly valuable for its discussion of the psychological drivers that characterize radicalization into violent extremism, such as "cognitive simplicity," "intolerance of ambiguity," and "need for closure" (NFC).

Diego Gambetta is professor of social theory at the European University Institute, Florence, and official fellow of Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. Steffen Hertog is associate professor of comparative politics at the London School of Economics.


Sam Mullins, 'Home-Grown' Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the US and UK (Hackensack, NJ: Imperial College Press, 2016), 324 pp., US \$ 88.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 45.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-78326-486-5.

This conceptually innovative and empirically-based book utilizes open source materials to examine the evolution of Islamist terrorism in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to and since 9/11. Specifically, it attempts to explain in each of these two countries, and relating to the Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ), "who the terrorists are, how they operate and how they are being dealt with by the security services." (p. xii). To capture such historical developments over time, the author's sample consists of individuals who were active in Islamist terrorist-related activity in the two countries from the 1980s through September 11, 2013. This includes 365 individuals in the U.S. and 427 individuals in the UK. (p. xiii)

To examine these issues, the book's chapters discuss the emergence of the homegrown Islamist terrorist threat in the West, their various motivations and operational manifestations in the U.S. and the UK, and the investigatory measures used by the counterterrorism services in the two countries and their legal outcomes.

There is much to commend in this important book. In addition to its comprehensive, yet concise analytical treatment of these issues, it utilizes quantitative techniques to assess the more than 750 cases which enable the author to systematize the findings into seven tables. These tables, which are used to illustrate the text, present findings on topics such as completed Islamist attacks in the West, the pre-disposing and direct factors that drive radicalization into terrorism, a statistical summary and background variable information, including operational activities of American and British jihadists before and after 9/11, and the types of investigative and legal processes used to arrest and prosecute such Islamist operatives.

Among the book's many interesting findings are that "the phenomenon has become increasingly home-grown since 9/11 in the sense that offenders are more likely to have been born and/or raised in the US/UK and to have radicalized there as opposed to being sent from abroad with the a priori intention of committing acts of terrorism. Rates of



terrorist activity have also increased since 2001 and offenders have become more diverse in terms of ethnicity and socioeconomic background” (p. 259).


Although the book is based on a large empirical dataset of jihadi terrorist activity in the two countries, the author admits that its findings are limited by the sampling timeframe which ended in September 2013, with the involvement of jihadist terrorist groups in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, which have introduced a “new era in jihadi terroris.” (p. 265). The author finds that this new era has greatly escalated the threat of Islamist violent activities in the West, including the travel of many of their adherents to these conflict zones. New trends introduced by these conflicts include their exploitation of the Internet to ‘virtualize’ the processes of radicalization, as well as the use of many Western fighters of their social media accounts to provide daily updates on their activities, including offering advice to others on how to join them in Syria.

The book concludes with a series of recommendations to strengthen U.S. and UK counterterrorism measures, such as greater selectivity in choosing partners in local Muslim communities to partner in countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, more clearly defining the criteria for success of such programs, and, in prosecuting returning foreign fighters, distinguishing between those who should be criminally prosecuted and those who can be de-radicalized and reintegrated into their Western communities.

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Richard Jackson, (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 312 pp., US \$ 240.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-41574-376-1.

The contributors to this edited handbook examine the achievements of the discipline of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) in its first decade. CTS was established in 2004 as an alternative to what its academic authors term as the prevailing “orthodoxy” in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. As outlined by the volume’s editor, Richard Jackson (one of CTS’s main founders), the “orthodox”



establishment is faulted for wrongly using the “terrorist” label on all opposition groups, for engaging in insufficient “primary research,” for “exaggerating” the magnitude of the terrorism threat, for the “gendered aspect of terrorism research,” and “other key issues.” (p. 2) Now that CTS has “succeeded in establishing itself as a unique and recognizable approach within the broader security and terrorism studies field,” Prof. Jackson adds, “it is now recognized for its particular critical theory-influenced ontology, its epistemological concerns, its methodological pluralism, its skepticism towards official counterterrorism culture and practice, and its sustained normative critique of the war on terror and Western counterterrorism practices.” (p. 2)

While there is much in contemporary terrorism and counterterrorism studies to criticize, this handbook’s contributors’ over-use of academic jargon and self-congratulatory tones do not contribute to the understanding that is needed to analyze and explain the nature and magnitude of the types of threats and challenges presented

by contemporary terrorism and the components of counterterrorism required to address such threats. In one such example, in the chapter on “Critical Epistemologies of Terrorism,” James Fitzgerald observes that this reviewer, in a 2007 article, finds that “terrorism studies has yet to achieve the status of a hard science due to continuing difficulties in ‘problem areas’, such as reaching a consensus definition of terrorism and a lack of uniform coding and counting rules across a range of terrorism incident databases.” (p. 51) Prof. Fitzgerald, however, does not add to my 9-year old critique by explaining what a “consensus definition of terrorism” would constitute or how a new set of “uniform coding and counting rules” can be established to upgrade the utility of



terrorism incident databases in explaining the magnitude of the terrorist threat (a point I had emphasized in my article).

In fact, the handbook's only attempt to formulate a consensual definition of terrorism is found in the chapter on "The Definition of Terrorism," by Timothy Shanahan, in which terrorism is defined as "the strategically indiscriminate harming or threat of harming members of a target group in order to influence the psychological states of an audience group in ways the perpetrators anticipate may be beneficial to the advancement of their agenda." (p. 110) Without the inclusion of "the resort to violence," which distinguishes terrorism as a particular type of armed warfare, it is doubtful if Prof. Shanahan's provisional definition is ever likely to gain acceptance in the discipline or by government counterterrorism practitioners.

The resort to academic jargon is so pervasive throughout the handbook's 27 chapters that, as George Orwell, had observed in his famous 1946 article on "Politics and the English Language," one can say that it is being "used to dress up a simple statement and give an air of scientific impartiality to biased judgements." Examples of such obscurantism include the chapter on "Methodology and the Critical Study of Terrorism," by Jacob L. Stump, who writes that "Given the monist philosophical ontology on which a relational methodology operates, neither the neo-positivist conception of language (as a mirror) nor the CR [critical realism] conceptualization of discourse (as having multiple possible functions) is adequate." (p. 95)

Some of the other chapters feature statements that make little sense. In the chapter on "Critical Evaluation of Counterterrorism," Sondre Lindahl writes that "Importantly, a CTS framework of counterterrorism does not aim to provide solutions to terrorism in a problem-solving manner." (p. 221) Unlike the author's observation, however, isn't one of the objectives of uncovering the root causes of terrorism to enable analysts and counterterrorism campaign planners to understand the underlying causes that need to be resolved? Moreover, how does this differ from his recommendation that an "emancipatory commitment" to counterterrorism should provide "an alternative to orthodox counterterrorism..." (p. 221).

Another statement that makes little sense is found in the chapter on "Media Coverage of Terrorism," with Ben O'Loughlin writing, in a confusing manner, that "Terrorism is newsworthy, but terrorism only exists when covered by news." (p. 284)

In other chapters the authors critique the "orthodox" treatment of terrorists, but without any evidence to substantiate their claims. An example is the chapter on "Terrorism and Peace Studies," by Ioannis Tellidis, in which he claims that "the 'terrorist' label has been applied not only to extremist actors but also moderate nonviolent groups that sought to rectify grievances caused by states' policies." (p. 303). No examples are provided, however.

Finally, the chapter on "New Versus Old Terrorism," by Alexander Spencer, relies in its discussion on "orthodox" terrorism analyses that are generally more than a decade old, with significant new trends not covered, such as terrorists' exploitation of new means of communications, such as the Internet, and their impact on command and control, radicalization, and mobilization of new adherents, as well as its impact in "franchising" the decision to conduct terrorist attacks on its loosely affiliated, lone wolf Western adherents.

Those who subscribe to CTS's jargon-laden and partisan approach will find much to admire in this handbook. George Orwell, on the other hand, would be flabbergasted.

The handbook's editor, Richard Jackson, is Professor of Peace Studies and Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand.

Counterterrorism – Legal Issues

Clive Walker, *Terrorism and the Law* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 720 pp., US \$ 300.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-19-956117-9.

This comprehensive legal handbook is divided into five parts. The first part, "Introduction," discusses the phenomenon of terrorism, how terrorism is defined, legal strategies for counter-terrorism, and the roles of parliament and the courts in reviewing terrorism legislation. The second part, "Investigation and Policing," discusses the components of terrorist investigations (e.g., the use of surveillance, parameters for disclosing information about terrorism investigations, and domestic and international legal aspects in arresting and treating



detainees following their arrest). The third part, “Criminal Law and Criminal Process,” discusses the components of terrorism-related criminal offenses within and outside anti-terrorism laws, international aspects of the criminal process, court sentencing, and the provisions of the post-punishment phase. The fourth part, “Other Legal Controls,” discusses terrorism-related executive powers over individuals, including comparisons with foreign country practices; the application of legal mechanisms to proscribe the activities of extremist organizations; countering terrorist funding; legal provisions in protective security, such as protecting critical facilities; and providing compensation to victims of terrorism. The final part, “Other Jurisdictions,” discusses the application of UK anti-terrorism laws in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Clive Walker is Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds.

Clive Walker, *Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation [Third Edition]* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 712 pp., US \$ 110.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-19-967792-4.

This is a highly comprehensive and detailed survey and analysis of anti-terrorism legislation as it is applied in the United Kingdom, although it also includes references to such legislation in the European Union (EU), in international conventions, and in other Western countries. As a compendium, it includes key extracts from legislative texts, which are analyzed and critiqued. It covers terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics such as the phenomenon of terrorism, how it is defined and categorized; the components of counterterrorism; the evolution of anti-terrorism legislation since 2000; the application of anti-terrorism legislation to proscribing extremist organizations, their funding and property; counter-terrorist powers, including their application to conducting terrorist investigations; consideration of criminal offenses within anti-terrorism legislation; the application of executive measures against individuals suspected of terrorist activity; criminal offenses related to the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as attacking critical infrastructure sectors such as transportation; the application of anti-terrorism legislation to Northern Ireland; and legislative and other types of reviews of anti-terrorism laws. The appendices reproduce important anti-terrorism legal documents, such as the UK’s Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006, the “Counter-Terrorism Act 2008,” and the “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.” An extensive bibliography is also included.

Genevieve Lennon and Clive Walker, (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 486 pp., US \$ 210.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-414-87037-5.

This edited handbook’s 30 chapters present a comprehensive and authoritative overview by leading legal experts of the application of legal measures in countering terrorism in all its manifestations. The handbook’s four parts are based on what are widely considered to be the principal components of counter-terrorism: prevent, prepare, protect, and pursue. Beginning with the editors’ introductory overview, the first part, “The Boundaries and Strategies of National Counter-Terrorism Laws,” discusses terrorism as a legal concept and the application of national laws to counter-terrorism and to states of emergency; the relationship between counter-terrorism and the laws of war; and the interactions between terrorism laws with human rights, constitutional accountability, and legal accountability. The second part, “The Pursuit of Terrorists Through National Criminal Justice Process and Executive Measures,” examines issues such as anti-terrorism laws vis-à-vis the employment of surveillance and intelligence measures; the application of the laws of war to the detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects; counter-terrorism policing; the arrest and trial of terrorists, including the use of evidence in trials; the handling and disclosure of sensitive intelligence-related information and materials; and legal issues in compensating the victims of terrorism. The third part, “Protective Security,” examines the application of legal measures in homeland security; legal issues involved in “stop and search” of terrorist suspects in the US and UK; securing the transport system; and legal instruments to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. The fourth part, “Preventive Measures,” presents a comparative survey of counter-terrorism legal measures in the UK, Malaysia, and Pakistan; the social impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policies in Muslim communities in Western countries; legal issues involved in countering terrorists’ activities via the Internet; countering extremism while adhering to civil liberties; and guidelines in sentencing of terrorists following their trials. In the concluding chapter, the volume’s editors observe that effective



counter-terrorism laws and judicial measures in a democratic society should aim “to deliver as much human security as national security.” (p. 467).

Genevieve Lennon is Chancellor's Fellow at the School of Law, University of Strathclyde. Clive Walker is Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds.

Diane Webber, Preventive Detention of Terror Suspects: A New Legal Framework (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 296 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-93689-8.

This is a comprehensive and authoritative examination of the use of preventative detention as a tool to preempt terrorist attacks. This is an important issue, the author argues, because “Preventative detention as a counter-terrorism tool is fraught with conceptual and procedural problems and risks of misuse, excess, and abuse. It is sometimes necessary to use it to save lives, but it has numerous drawbacks” (p. 2). It is also important to study this issue, the author adds, because “to date no one has examined together and comprehensively detention under the law enforcement model, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) model, and the international human rights model, and compared each one against the others.” To fill this analytical gap, the author analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the laws relating to detention of terror suspects in seven countries (the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and France). Following the author's introductory overview, which also presents a definition of terrorism, the book is divided into three parts. The first part, “Detention Provisions in Human Rights Treaties and Geneva Conventions,” discusses how preventative detention provisions are contained in various international conventions. The second part, “The Seven Countries,” examines how the preventative detention provisions are applied in practice in the countries under examination. The third part, “Recommendations,” presents a list of ten principles to form a “global core of detention principles.” These includes recommended measures such as clarifying the requirements for preventative detention to be based on grounds authorized by law, working towards eliminating indefinite detention, and providing a mechanism for independent oversight of detention.

The author is a British solicitor who received her doctorate at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC, which formed the basis for this book.


Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

Phil Gurski. The Threat from Within. Recognizing Al-Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism in the West.

Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016. 179 pp.

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/517/html>



This book is the result of 15 years of study of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Its author, Phil Gurski, recently retired from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). The volume is meant as a primer on understanding the terrorism threat in Canada and the West. The goal, however, is not purely academic; the main focus is on practice and detection of AQ-inspired terrorism in the West. Phil Gurski rightly observes that the religious nature of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism is often downplayed; he therefore devotes a whole chapter to explain the key Islamic concepts used by Al-Qaeda in its radicalisation efforts. The author emphasizes that “Muslim communities and leaders cannot pretend that these terms are not being used or simply dismiss their ‘misuse’ as wrong, hoping that they will just go away” (p.71). This is an important observation, as politicians but also academic observers have often hesitate to make such a link between terrorism and religion for fear of being



accused of Islamophobia.

There are about one million Muslims in Canada. One opinion poll conducted in 2007 among a sample of them concluded that 5 percent held that the performance of terrorists acts in Canada, as planned by the so-called “Toronto 18” was “fully justified”, 7 percent thought that it was “partly justified” while a further 15 percent were uncertain, answering “It depends”. That translates into, respectively, 50,000, 70,000 and 150,000 individuals or 270,000 in the aggregate – or 27 percent of the Muslim population of Canada (p.13). That is the pool of Muslims terrorist recruiters can try to (further) radicalise. Canada is, in this respect, not unique—sympathy and even support for anti-Western terrorism is astonishingly widespread among young Muslims in Western diasporas. While most Muslims are unlikely to put deeds by their words, it creates a problem for intelligence services to detect in time the few who become violently extremist and start preparing acts of terrorism. What are the predictive indicators to look out for? Phil Gurski presents a list of twelve “tangible, observable behaviors and attitudes of violent radicalisation” as a tool for analysts (pp.75-92,161):

1. Sudden increase in intolerant religiosity/change in behavior;
2. Rejection of different interpretations of Islam;
3. Rejection of /intolerance for, non-Muslims;
4. Rejection of Western ways;
5. Rejection of Western policies (domestic, military, foreign, social, etc.);
6. Association with like-minded people/ changes in social circles;
7. Obsession with Jihadi and violent-extremist websites and social media;
8. Obsession with/ Belief in, the common narrative;
9. Desire to travel to conflict zones/Obsession with foreign conflicts;
10. Obsession with violent jihad;
11. Obsession with martyrdom;
12. Obsession with End-Times.

In chapter 3, the author discusses these indicators in detail as these apply to 17 cases of foiled and completed attacks in Canada, participation in foreign terrorist plots, as well as foreign fighter experiences (at least 130 Canadians went abroad for jihad in Syria and other places). These 17 cases Gurski describes in the fourth chapter—where converts to Islam and immigrants and sons of Muslim immigrants figure prominently, with difficult youth, drug abuse, a crime record and occasionally mental health issues surfacing. While there are commonalities between the cases, Gurski notes “...that there is no single process of radicalisation. There is also no model predictive of who will move from advocating violent extremism to engaging in violent action” (p.122).

In the fifth chapter the author discusses soft (counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation) and hard (security- and law enforcement) responses to radicalisation toward terrorist violence. He admits that “In the war of ideas, we are being beaten badly” (p.138). While he concedes that Al-Qaeda’s single narrative “...should not be seen as unassailable” (p.139), he asks, “If an individual chooses to fight and die because they [sic] believe that God has asked them to do so, what human authority or agency can convince them otherwise?” (ibid.) Faith is blind and true believer terrorists generally have “closed minds” that make them “fact-resistant”. Yet some fanatical extremists have returned to reason and humanism. One of the approaches described in Gurski’s book refers to a Canadian government funded project which seeks to produce original counter-narrative films to tell stories of former violent extremists.

The volume contains several appendices, including one featuring a Radicalisation-to-Violence Matrix (pp.163-165) that further details the twelve indicators cited above. While the focus of the book is on Canada, many of its observations and insights also apply to other Western countries with Muslim diasporas. The volume is lucidly written, clearly structured, and carries the authority of someone who has been benefiting from decades of all-source access to classified intelligence information. **Phil Gurski is not, as so many others, blowing up the threat of jihadist terrorism to the West. However, he is right on spot in identifying Islam-based religious extremism as being at the heart of the problem.**

About the reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is editor-in-chief of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ and former co-editor of ‘Terrorism and Political Violence’.



Terror at the airport: Our view

Source: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/06/30/travel-terrorism-airport-istanbul-editorial-debates/86568994/>

June 30 – Before Independence Day 2002, the first after 9/11, the White House issued this message: “As Americans gather for July 4th it will be a time of both celebration and vigilance.”



Almost 15 years later, the nation's mood is much the same as it heads into another patriotic holiday weekend. Americans will rejoice in their freedom but will remain on alert after the latest deadly terrorist attack, this one on the international airport in Istanbul.

Terrorism has become even more difficult to prevent as Islamic State fanatics, some operating as lone wolves, have widened their hunting grounds to nightclubs, restaurants, train stations and subways — any place where people gather with scant security.

Still, a decade and a half after the 9/11 hijackings, terrorists seem fixated on aviation. With jetliners now far more secure, they attack airports instead, first in Brussels and now Istanbul. Protecting these crowded spaces and learning from each attack are essential.

As CIA Director John Brennan told *Yahoo News*, “I’d be surprised if (the Islamic State) is not trying to carry out that kind of attack in the United States.” The comment is less of a prediction than a statement of reality.

In the wake of Brussels and Istanbul, adding more armed police at the doors of major U.S. airports is smart. (Ataturk had moved its first line of security to the front doors, and the roving armed guards likely prevented even

greater carnage.) Los Angeles and Atlanta, home of two the nation's busiest airports, promised to harden security at their airports this week, while looking at lessons to be

learned from Istanbul. At Los Angeles International, police also check vans, stop cars at random and watch for suspicious activities on the airport's access road. Roving armed security patrols, a bigger presence of canine units, and police checks on access would all provide deterrence.

The federal Transportation Security Administration, whose main job is checking passengers and baggage, has a particular responsibility to keep the lines moving at checkpoints, to prevent the lines themselves from becoming the

ripest targets. Wait times, a problem in the spring, have been reduced considerably, the TSA says.

TSA can also expand use of its so-called VIPR teams, which include bomb-sniffing dogs and armed U.S. marshals, to patrol airports. But all these steps cost money, so the ultimate decision on how much extra security will be added, and for how long, is really up to Congress or state and local governments.

Success also depends on not wasting money on “security theater.” At Chicago's O'Hare, for example, about 300 uniformed aviation police patrol the airport *unarmed*, according to a CNN report. (Airport officials say that's because they work in conjunction with armed Chicago city police.) The aviation officers have been told to run and hide if terrorists or other shooters strike. Good advice for civilians. Ridiculous for police.

Terrorists willing to commit suicide are, of course, particularly difficult to stop: They can strike anywhere at anytime because they are not even looking for an escape route. Plug one security gap, and they will pop up elsewhere.

Not every soft target can be protected, and the best defense remains a good offense. Only a multi-pronged attack on the



Islamic State can hope to keep America safe. That means hitting its leaders in Syria and Iraq or wherever they lurk to orchestrate or incite violence. It means strangling their finances and countering their propaganda. And it means anticipating their moves through intelligence.

While each terrorist attack, and every life lost, is a tragedy, America's record on thwarting attacks is an enviable one. Nearly 90 Islamist

terrorist plots have been hatched against the U.S. since 9/11, but more than 85% have been foiled, according to a count kept by the Heritage Foundation.

Americans should remain vigilant on this patriotic holiday, especially at airports, but most of all they should celebrate knowing that they enjoy the freedoms that the terrorists despise.

New death threats targeted Charlie Hebdo's editorial staff

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160630-new-death-threats-targeted-charlie-hebdo-s-editorial-staff>

June 30 – **French security services are investigating death threats made towards the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*.**

Le Parisien reports that a source close to the investigation told the newspaper the first threat was posted on the magazine's Facebook account before being removed by an unknown person.



The threat said that several members of the editorial team would be the targets of an attack.

A similar threat, using similar language, was sent directly to the magazine's editor.


The police source told *Le Parisien*: "The messages raise the idea of killing several members of the editorial team, again."

Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, two brothers who became ISIS followers, attacked the *Charlie Hebdo*'s Paris offices on 7 January 2015. They killed eleven people and injured a further eleven, before being killed by

the police.

The magazine's offices have since been placed under enhanced security.

The *Local* reports that the magazine is now based at a top secret location, after initially moving from the offices where the attack took place to the offices of the daily newspaper *Libération*.



Global Threat Intelligence Report 2016

Source: <https://www.nttcomsecurity.com/en/landingpages/gtir-2016/>

Security incidents happen. And when they do, organisations must be prepared to respond. But are businesses doing enough to prepare for these attacks? This year's Global Threat Intelligence Report 2016 illustrates how prepared organisations are, the types of incidents observed, and the steps that should be considered for an effective incident response.



Incident Response Trends

One year on from the last report, there has been little improvement:

74% ➔ 77% The 2016 GTIR report shows that the number of organisations that do not have a formal incident response plan has increased from 74% in 2015 to 77%. And organisations often purchase incident response support services after an incident has occurred



15% the year-on-year increase in spear phishing attacks (2% in 2014; 17% in 2015)

33% Malware-specific response activities down by 33%

12% DDoS-related attacks down by 12%

The 2016 GTIR is the most comprehensive report to date, pulling information from 24 security

Vulnerability Trends

Organisations are failing to patch, which is a basic security measure:

12% More than 12% of vulnerabilities were over 5 years old, and over 5% were more than 10 years old

16 years – some vulnerabilities were from as far back as 1999

312% the jump in the number of publicised Flash vulnerabilities from 2014 levels

39% DoS/DDoS attack volume fell by 39% from 2014 levels

24% of web application attacks during 2015 were injection-based (26% in 2014, so minimal change in one year)



operations centres, seven R&D centres, 3.5 trillion logs, 6.2 billion attacks and nearly 8,000 security clients across six continents. It gives security personnel and decision makers the information they need to enable their organisations to disrupt attacks. Practical application of a comprehensive, integrated solution and strategy will not only enable efficiency and effectiveness, but also support the security lifecycle of the entire organisation.

Iran foils 'biggest terrorist plot': state TV

Source: <http://counteredreport.co.uk/iran-foils-biggest-terrorist-plot-state-tv>

June 30 – Iranian intelligence officials have broken up “the biggest terrorist plot” ever planned to target Tehran and other provinces in the Islamic republic, the country’s state television reported on Monday. An anchor on state television read off a statement attributing the information to Iran’s Intelligence Ministry. Officials could not be immediately reached for comment to elaborate. Several suspects have been arrested and are under interrogation over the plot after agents seized ammunition and bombs, the state TV said.

The semi-official Fars and ISNA news agencies quoted Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, as saying the attack was timed to hit during Ramadan. Iran’s state-run Irna news agency, citing the Intelligence Ministry, said the attack was supposed to come on the anniversary of the death of the Prophet Mohammad’s (PBUH) wife, Khadija, which was commemorated in small ceremonies across Iran on Thursday.







Three killed, 91 injured in Madagascar 'terror blast'

Source: <http://counteredreport.co.uk/three-killed-91-injured-in-madagascar-terror-blast>

June 27 – A toddler died in hospital Monday following a grenade attack in Madagascar's capital, bringing the death toll to three in what the president called "an act of terrorism".

The blast struck the Mahamasina municipal stadium in Antananarivo at around 1600 GMT Sunday, just as a free concert was taking place to mark the nation's 56th anniversary of independence from France.

According to the gendarmerie, the attack immediately killed two teenagers aged 16 and 18.

"There are now three dead," including the 14-month-old girl who died of her wounds, Prime Minister Olivier Mahafaly Solonandrasana said Monday, adding that 91 people were injured in the attack and an enquiry was under way.

President Hery Rajaonarimampianina, who visited the wounded in hospital, blamed the attack on tensions with political opponents in the Indian Ocean island nation.

"There may be differences of opinion between us, but these acts of destabilisation are unacceptable," he said in a statement broadcast on national television, describing the attack as "not just a destabilising act but an act of terrorism".

Bangladesh siege: Twenty killed at Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36692613>



July 02 - Twenty people, most of them foreigners, have been killed in an attack on a cafe in Bangladesh claimed by so-called Islamic State.

Gunmen stormed the **Holey Artisan Bakery cafe in Dhaka** late on Friday before troops entered almost 12 hours later.

Six attackers were also killed and one was arrested, officials said. Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina has declared two days of national mourning.

At least nine Italians and seven Japanese were among those killed.



Italy's Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni said one other Italian was still unaccounted for. Many of the Italians reportedly worked in the garment industry.



Japan said eight of its nationals were in the cafe. One was among 13 people rescued but the other seven died.

All were consultants for Japan's foreign aid agency and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said they "were giving their all for the development of Bangladesh".

The army had initially said all hostages killed were foreigners, but later reports said some Bangladeshis also died.

The siege began as diners gathered to break their fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.



Who are the victims?

Nine Italians named by the Italian foreign ministry as: Cristian Rossi; Marco Tondat; Nadia Benedetti; Adele Puglisi; Simona Monti; Claudia Maria D'Antona; Vincenzo D'Allestro; Maria Rivoli and Claudio Cappelli

Seven Japanese. Names not released

Three Bangladeshis. Names not released

One Indian. Tarushi Jain, 18, who was a student at the University of California, Berkeley



Bangladesh's Daily Star newspaper said the **gunmen tortured anyone who was unable to recite the Koran.** They provided meals overnight for only the Bangladeshi captives, it said.

"It was an extremely heinous act," Ms Hasina said in a televised statement. "What kind of Muslims are these people? They don't have any religion."

Sumon Reza, a supervisor at the cafe in the Gulshan district of Dhaka, managed to flee to the roof when the attackers burst in.

"The whole building was shaking when they set off explosives," he told local media. He later jumped from the roof and escaped.

"From 08:00 it all started," said Rashila Rahim, who lives near the cafe. "Gunshots, tank sounds... It was like we were in the middle, and gunshots from all around."



Brazil has 'total confidence' in Olympics security, plays down fears of terrorist attack

Source: http://www.firstpost.com/sports/brazil-has-total-confidence-in-olympics-security-plays-down-fears-of-terrorist-attack-2864264.html?utm_source=FP_CAT_LATEST_NEWS

June 30 – **Brazil has "total confidence" that it can ensure security for more than half a million tourists and athletes attending the Rio Olympics this August,** a senior official said Wednesday.

Andrei Rodrigues, secretary for major events at the justice ministry, said that a heavy police presence on the ground and international cooperation on intelligence gathering would overcome potential terror threats and the danger of violent crime.



"I have total confidence in our preparations for the security of the Games," Rodrigues told reporters a month ahead of the August 5-21 Olympics, which he described as "the biggest event on the planet."

Street crime is on the rise in Rio where budget cuts have left emergency services stretched, with police demonstrating on Monday to complain that they don't have enough funds for fuel or even toilet paper in their stations.

In a grim reminder of Rio's often brutal realities, local newspapers reported Wednesday that a mutilated body had been found — and witnessed by bathers — on Copacabana beach, where Olympic beach volleyball and other events will take place.

Police could not be contacted to comment on the reports in *O Dia* and *O Globo* newspapers.

Boots on the ground

Rodrigues said that 47,000 police officers and 38,000 soldiers, whose tasks will include securing transport corridors, will keep a lid on crime. This is double the number deployed in the 2012 London Olympics.

He also played down fears of a terrorist attack in Rio following a string of bloody, low-tech assaults in France, Belgium and this week Istanbul airport, where jihadists fired into crowds, then blew themselves up, killing 41 people and injuring 239, according to the latest count.

"Brazil today is adopting the best international practices for security at major events and in the specific case of countering terrorism we have adopted all possible practices," he said.

"We are not going to alter our plans. We will be ever more vigilant."

International cooperation on intelligence will be key to stopping terrorism, he said, and **Brazil is hosting a coordination center with 250 officers from 55 countries to exchange information.**

Unprecedented intelligence gathering

"It's the biggest operation of international police cooperation — not just in Brazil but for Interpol," Rodrigues said.

A separate joint anti-terrorism center currently brings together officers from seven countries, along with Brazil: neighboring Argentina and Paraguay, plus Belgium, Britain, France, Spain and the United States.

"It's the first time there's been this type of capability... for security at the Olympic Games," he said.

Rodrigues said that almost 394,000 people had undergone background checks so far and that 1.8 percent of these had been barred from the Olympic Games. In all, he expected 600,000 background checks to be made.

Also Wednesday, authorities announced measures to ensure security at airports in Rio and to prevent attacks involving aircraft.

"Despite all our efforts to prepare, events like yesterday's (in Turkey) put us on the alert. The (transport) ministry has met to boost scrutiny in these areas. The forces are ready. We have measures that will be adopted and which we cannot reveal for security reasons," said Transport Minister Mauricio Quintella.

One measure will be requiring private jets to first go through a security check at an airport outside Rio before continuing to the city during the hours of 8.00 am and 10.00 pm. "If not, planes will only be able to land between 2.00 am and 8.00 am when there is no mass gathering in progress. This will be another measure for minimizing possible attacks," a government statement said.

Istanbul Attack Shows the Dangerous New Face of the Islamic State

Source: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/istanbul-attack-shows-the-dangerous-new-face-of-the-islamic-state-russia-central-asia-soviet-putin-terrorism/>

June 30 – On Tuesday, three men arrived in a taxi and walked into Istanbul's Ataturk Airport wielding assault rifles and suicide bombs. They indiscriminately shot their way past a security

checkpoint and then set off their bombs, killing 44. The tactic was a familiar one, practiced in Paris and Brussels, but the nationalities



of the perpetrators were not: Russian, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz.

It's not unusual to find Central Asians fighting in Syria or Iraq for the Islamic State or the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, said Seth Jones, a former Defense Department official and now analyst at Rand Corp. "What's unusual is for them to be at the tip of the spear conducting attacks in Turkey."

And that raises a pair of new security challenges for a Turkey still reeling from one of the worst terrorist attacks in its history. Large numbers of migrants from former Soviet nations like Uzbekistan already live and work in Turkey, so militants sent into the country from Syria or Iraq have a tight-knit community of expatriates they can disappear into. That means, in turn, that Turkish security personnel who have long focused on their country's restive Arab and Kurdish populations must now look for signs of radicals hiding among their Caucasian and Central Asian communities as well.



Turkish police have identified Ahmet Chatayev, a Chechen terrorist, as the mastermind of the attack, according to the Turkish newspaper *Yeni Safak*. He is described as working for the founder of the Caucasus Emirate and joined the Islamic State in 2013. Chatayev is currently wanted in Russia on terrorism charges and is sanctioned on a U.N. terrorism list for "training and redeploying" Russian-speaking militants in Syria back into Russia. Quoting unidentified intelligence sources, the Turkish newspaper said Chatayev planned the attack in a rental house in an Istanbul neighborhood near a shopping mall. And it said surveillance video shows the terrorists taking a taxi from the shopping mall to the airport on the day of the attack.

Although Turkey and Western governments believe the Islamic State was linked to the massacre, it remains unclear if the attackers were dispatched to Turkey by top Islamic State leaders. But if the effect of the Istanbul bloodshed persuades the group's commanders

to call on Russian-speaking cadres to launch more terrorist attacks, it would mean the extremists have committed some of their most capable fighters to their foreign terrorist enterprise.

"They punch way above their weight," said Patrick Skinner, director of special projects at the Soufan Group, a private security consultancy, and a former CIA case officer who worked on counterterrorism issues. Compulsory military service in the former Soviet republics means the Islamic State doesn't have to provide basic training, and with the region awash in weapons, they have what Skinner called a "lifelong exposure to AK-47s." Former Soviet states provide the third-largest number of foreign fighter recruits for the Islamic State behind Western Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, according to the Soufan Group and U.S. government reports.

The number of foreign fighters from Central Asian countries has markedly increased in recent years, according to experts and Western officials. The Soufan Group reported that a total of approximately 2,000 volunteers came from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In August 2015, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the early 2000s, formally joined the Islamic State. Official estimates from Moscow place the number of Russians fighting in Iraq and Syria at more than 2,000.

Turkey remains a major destination for Central Asian students, laborers, and tourists and citizens from the region — who are able to travel there without a visa. And with its porous border to Syria, Turkey has emerged as the main transit point for foreign fighters from Central Asia and other former Soviet states en route to join the Islamic State there.

A 2015 [report](#) commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development assessing trends in violent extremism in Central Asia suggested that the U.S. government should consider launching programs in Turkey to provide assistance to "economically marginalized" ethnic Uzbek immigrants and prevent their potential recruitment.

It also said the United States "faces a highly coordinated and well-funded information assault" in Central Asia from Islamist



extremists that poses a difficult challenge for the U.S. government.

The specter of radical Islam has loomed large in the minds of the Kremlin and Central Asia's autocratic and secular governments. During Tajikistan's devastating 1992-1997 civil war, extremist militants from across the region joined a conflict that left more than 50,000

reportedly forced 13,000 men to shave their beards while police have also pressured shops and vendors to stop selling Islamic headscarves. Similarly, Tajikistan's regime outlawed the sole legal Islamic political party in Central Asia in September 2015, long seen as one of the region's few moderate religious voices.



people dead. In 1999, a series of car bombings linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan rocked the Uzbek capital of Tashkent and left 16 dead and 120 wounded. Following the declaration of the Islamic State's caliphate in June 2014, these fears have only grown among the region's leaders, many of whom are still former Soviet-era Communist Party bosses.

But in response to the growing threat, Central Asian governments have used heavy-handed tactics that experts say will only fuel radicalization. In Tajikistan, authorities have

"Throughout Central Asia, the leaders have a view that the more people pray, the more they can be radicalized," said Erica Marat, a Central Asia expert at the National Defense University. "This leads to a forceful impulse to try to control religion, which can often backfire."

In recent months, the Islamic State has bombarded social media with Russian-language propaganda aimed at attracting new recruits, as well as Uzbek-language appeals. That media offensive intensified after Russia entered the Syrian civil



war in September to prop up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Screenshots from an Islamic State propaganda video showing Russian and Uzbek militants. Michael S. Smith II/Kronos Advisory That offensive has targeted the Caucasus and Uzbekistan, according to Michael Smith, the COO of the security consultancy Kronos Advisory, which tracks jihadi propaganda. On June 19, fighters in the Islamic State's Furat province released a video about the attacks in Orlando and France that included statements by Russian, Uzbek, American, Indonesian, and French operatives.

"The signal was clear: The Islamic State intends to mobilize its members from around the world for attacks in the West," Smith said. "If the terrorists responsible for the attack in Istanbul were indeed Islamic State members, it would seem that signal was amplified with their attack."

There has been an increase in arrests of Islamist extremists reported across the former Soviet Union in the past few months, which could signal ramped-up activity by Islamic State cells, according to Caitlin Forrest of the Institute for the Study of War. But it remained unclear if the attack at the Istanbul airport marked the first of a wave of attacks using Central Asian recruits.

Facing repression at home, many of Central Asia's extremists have left the region for Iraq and Syria. Similarly, Moscow is believed to have deliberately turned a blind eye to people on watch lists leaving the country to join groups in the Middle East, while cracking down with extreme force on the radical elements that remain. According to a March report by the International Crisis Group, it has been Russian policy to allow Islamist radicals, many from the North Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Dagestan, to leave the country unimpeded.

"Russian security services allegedly opened borders for local radicals to leave the North Caucasus before the [2014] Olympics," the report said. "Since the second half of 2014, however, the authorities have reduced the outflow and systematically hunted down recruiters and fundraisers, as well as potential fighters."

Anna Borshchevskaya, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said so far few of the militants who left have returned.

"But Russian officials are very concerned that in the future they will come back, and when they do, it will turn very bad," she said. "This is a trajectory that has been many years in the making."

Worried about the threat, the Russian legislature recently passed sweeping counterterrorism laws that once signed by President Vladimir Putin will grant authorities far-reaching surveillance powers, including access to all telecommunications records in the country for six months. Moscow has also sought to forge closer security ties to its Central Asian neighbors in the name of combating terrorism.

As the Islamic State has marched across Iraq and Syria, battle-hardened fighters from Chechnya and Dagestan have contributed to its military victories. Abu Omar al-Shishani — a pseudonym that means "Omar the Chechen" — rose to become a top commander in the Islamic State and served as its "minister of war." U.S. forces said they killed the red-bearded militant in a March airstrike.

According to Skinner, the former CIA officer, it was rare for experienced fighters under Shishani's command to carry out suicide missions. His well-trained operatives were simply too valuable to be dispatched on operations that would likely claim their own lives.

But the use of Russian-speaking operatives in Istanbul may signal a shift in tactics that could be the result of the Islamic State's battlefield losses.

But the use of Russian-speaking operatives in Istanbul may signal a shift in tactics that could be the result of the Islamic State's battlefield losses.

Western-backed forces have, in recent weeks, liberated significant swaths of territory under Islamic State control, including the Iraqi city of Fallujah, and have entered Manbij in northern Syria. The setbacks may have prompted the group to "shift the battlefield to the Istanbul airport," Skinner said. Losing on the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields, the Islamic State's calculus on how to best deploy its experienced fighters may have changed, he added.

So as the Islamic State keeps losing territory, expect more of these attacks. The campaign against the Islamic State, CIA Director John Brennan said two



weeks ago, has “not reduced the group's terrorism capability and global reach.”

“As the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the

global terrorism agenda,” Brennan said, using an alternate name for the militant group. The Istanbul airport attack may have validated that prediction.

Brazil lends \$895 million to Rio de Janeiro for Olympics security

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160701-brazil-lends-895-million-to-rio-de-janeiro-for-olympics-security>

July 01 – **Brazil's government has loaned 2.9 billion reais (\$895 million) to the state of Rio de Janeiro to cover some of the security costs of the Olympic Games, which open on 5 August.** The state of Rio de Janeiro last week declared a state of fiscal emergency.

CNN reports that the president of Brazil signed off on the emergency loan, and that it was published on Thursday in the government's *Official Gazette*. Government officials said the loan was meant to guarantee safety and security at the Olympic Games. As many as half a million foreign visitors are expected to arrive in Rio during the state's worst financial crisis in decades.

Some of the money will be used to complete a subway line (#4) connecting the city center to Olympic



venues in the neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca.

Brazil is in the midst of the worst economic recession since the 1930s, which, among other things, has led to a growing wave of street crimes.

It was not supposed to be like this: These are the first Olympic Games to be held in South America, and when, ten years ago, Brazil was selected to host them it was viewed as a rising global power. Now, however, the games will be held against the backdrop of a deepening recession; spreading political scandals which have already led to the suspension of president Dilma Rousseff; and an outbreak of the Zika virus.

There are serious doubts about whether all the infrastructure work for the games will be finished in time. The unfinished subway line is now expected to be finished days before the opening of the games, but the stations along the lines will not be completed in time.



Aurora movie theater owner seeks \$700,000 from families of mass shooting victims

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160701-aurora-movie-theater-owner-seeks-700-000-from-families-of-mass-shooting-victims>

July 01 – A Colorado jury ruled that Cinemark was not responsible for the 2012 massacre in an Aurora, Colorado, movie theater, in which twelve people were killed and seventy injured – and now Cinemark, the owner of the movie theater, is demanding that the families of the victims of the mass shooting pay \$699,187.13 to cover the company's legal costs defending itself.

In the original lawsuit, the victims' families argued that the theater chain should have provided more security to prevent the shooting from taking place. On 24 June, a jury found Cinemark not liable.


The Denver Post reports that following the Not Guilty verdict, Cinemark has filed a "bill of costs" against the victims' families, requesting \$699,187.13. Under Colorado law, winners of civil cases are allowed to recover the costs of litigation.

"The Court concludes that a reasonable jury could not plausibly find that Cinemark's actions or inactions were a substantial factor in causing this tragedy," U.S. District Judge R. Brook Jackson wrote in his ruling last month.

Sandy Phillips, a mother of one of the moviegoers who were killed in the shooting, on Friday tweeted her response to the lawsuit.

"Please boycott Cinemark," Phillips said on Twitter. "Don't add to their \$194 million profit while they come after Aurora victims who have lost everything."

Lawyers for the victims' families are now considering whether to appeal to the case. Legal experts note that in most cases, "bill of costs" requests are dropped when no appeal is filed.



Explaining the Istanbul bombing: Turkey's six foreign policy sins

By Sibel Oktay

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160701-explaining-the-istanbul-bombing-turkey-s-six-foreign-policy-sins?page=0,1>

July 01 – You don't have to be an avid follower of international news to have heard about the terror attack at Istanbul's Ataturk airport – Turkey's biggest and Europe's third largest hub for air travel. Most likely carried out by ISIS, the attack killed forty-five people and wounded hundreds of others on 28 June. The attack overshadowed two major headline events. Both these events, ironically, had to do with Turkey attempting to change course on policies that may well have opened the door to the airport bombing.

As a scholar who focuses on foreign policy analysis and political leadership in Europe and the Middle East, I'd like to explain how all of these events can be seen in the broader context of what I call Turkey's six foreign policy sins.



The overshadowed headlines

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan recently sent a letter of [apology](#) to Russian President Vladimir Putin, expressing his [regrets](#) for downing a Russian jet in late 2015 near the Turkey-Syria border.

The news surprised many. [Since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2012](#), Turkey [emphasized its right](#) to take any necessary measures against airspace violations. Erdogan's apology suggests either an admission of negligent behavior – Russia has [denied](#) allegations of violation – or an indirect confession of how badly Turkey needs Russia. It may be both. A [plunge](#) in the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey might explain Erdogan's apology, not to mention Moscow's [embargo](#) on Turkish agricultural products or the constraints that [Turkish businesses face in Russia](#).

Erdogan's apology to Putin came amid a recent [deal between Israel and Turkey](#). The two countries have been in a rift since May 2010. That's when the Israeli navy intercepted a [humanitarian aid](#) flotilla headed to Gaza. The shipment was [sent](#) by Turkish charity organizations. In stopping it, Israeli soldiers killed nine Turkish citizens. The parties agreed yesterday to restore diplomatic ties. Turkey accepted Israel's blockade of Gaza and its authority to monitor Turkish aid to Gaza. In return, Israel agreed to allocate \$20 million to compensate the families involved and agreed to allow Turkish businesses to develop water and energy [infrastructure](#) in Gaza. Israel is also expected to work with Turkey to transport natural gas to [Europe](#).

Both of these developments now pale in the face of Tuesday's horrific attacks. Those following Turkish foreign policy say the country is [“paying for its sins of the past.”](#)

Problems close to home

Turkish foreign policy has experienced tectonic shifts over the last decade. Whereas the AKP's initial foreign policy playbook was dubbed [“soft Euro-Asianism,”](#) emphasizing Turkey's southern and eastern neighborhood including Russia, it later morphed into [“zero problems with neighbors.”](#) Under this new approach, Turkey would use its rich historical and cultural capital in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus to create a zone of political and economic influence. Championed by its architect Ahmet Davutoglu, the “zero problem” policy was meant to forge new economic and security ties across the region, generating peace and stability.

Sadly, things did not go as [planned](#). As Piotr Zalewski [explains](#), the “zero problems with neighbors’ policy” soon turned into “zero neighbors without problems.”

Erdogan [walked out on Israeli President Shimon Peres](#) at the World Economic Forum in 2009. The fragile detente with [Armenia](#) fell apart in 2010. Friction with [Azerbaijan](#) and [Israel](#) followed. Against the backdrop of the Arab Spring revolutions, relations with [Egypt](#) deteriorated.

The last and biggest domino to fall was Turkey's [Syria](#) policy. Although Turkish-Syrian relations were turbulent throughout the 1990s, the AKP government managed to rebuild ties. They opened [their borders to each other](#). The Erdogans even cultivated family relations with the Assads, inviting them to join them on

[vacation](#). This ended when Assad began to brutally repress civilian revolts in Syria. Erdogan and the AKP government pledged to remove Assad from power. [“His days are numbered,”](#) Erdogan said in 2011.

What are Turkey's past sins?

Turkey's six deadly sins

That's when Turkey committed what I see as its [first sin](#). The country began to provide support to moderate Syrian rebels like the [Free Syrian Army](#) to topple Assad. It was later revealed that Turkey also supported more radical groups such as [Jabhat al-Nusra](#) and [transferred weapons to others](#) to oust Assad.

Meanwhile a new radical movement was [maturing in Iraq](#). It was known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, before rolling out in Syria and becoming ISIS. As ISIS got stronger, elements from the Free Syrian Army [joined](#) its ranks as well as those of others such as al-Nusra. Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of “zero problems” foreign policy, called it [“a group of angry young men”](#) in 2014, spectacularly discounting their cause and capabilities — committing the second sin. ISIS had occupied the [Turkish Consulate in Mosul](#), Iraq that same year, taking forty-nine consulate staff hostage and not releasing them until 101 days later. A Turkish daily revealed in 2015 that Turkey had [transferred arms to ISIS](#).

[Third](#), Turkey did not tighten border controls on its southern border until [late 2015](#). By that



time ISIS had already established itself in Syria and in southeastern Turkey. The city of [Adiyaman](#) became a well-known hub for ISIS militants. The reports suggest that [at least two](#) terror attacks that took place in Turkey last year can be traced back to this hub.

By August 2014, the international community had realized the severity of the power vacuum in Syria and how it facilitated the reincarnation of Islamic terrorism. Although the United States was initially reluctant to lead the global effort to curb ISIS, it later decided to take initiative only to find out that Turkey's preferences were simply [misaligned](#) with the Obama administration's. Thanks to the power vacuum, the Kurds living in the northeast provinces of Syria not only declared their autonomy, but also proved to be the [most effective](#) element in the region to fight against ISIS. They took [Kobane](#) back from ISIS, demonstrating their ability to engage in armed resistance. The United States therefore thought Kurds would make a powerful proxy to fight against ISIS, while Turkey saw them as the top threat against its own national security. The wave of [sympathy that the Syrian Kurds received](#) became a concern for Ankara, which later committed the fourth sin: engaging in [airstrikes](#) against the Kurds in northern Syria in October 2014.

The rest is history. Turkey's aggression toward the Kurds [disappointed](#) the United States and others in the West. While the West was counting on Turkey's commitment to eradicate ISIS, Turkey chose to go after the Kurds and Assad instead. Eventually, Turkey's behavior raised questions about its willingness to curb the terrorist group at all, undermining its credibility in [NATO](#) as well as [in Washington](#). (That's [sin #5](#).)

By the time Russia intervened to cushion the Syrian regime, Turkey was fighting allegations

of giving material support to ISIS, including by purchasing [oil](#) from the organization. When Turkey downed the Russian jet (sin #6), the country was already on the blacklist of the international community for turning a blind eye to Islamic radicalism brewing in its backyard. Indeed, ISIS committed four other heinous attacks in Istanbul, Ankara and the southeastern city of Sanliurfa in [the last twelve months](#).

So this week Turkey proposes a clean slate to both Israel and Russia. It attempts to bounce back from the depths of its foreign policy fiascoes. [Turkey's tarnished membership in NATO](#) will likely improve now that it has agreed to lift its veto against Israel to [align with NATO's wishes](#). Relations with Russia should also normalize soon.

More importantly, Turkey's attempts to bridge the rifts with Russia and Israel signal more substantive changes in its foreign policy. Turkey might finally give tacit support to Russian activity in Syria, even if it means leaving Assad in power for now. Rebuilding ties with Israel will lead to intelligence sharing between Turkish and Israeli agencies, which should help Turkey strengthen its increasingly disappointing security apparatus.

The efforts to normalize relations with Israel and Russia are bold initiatives from the Turkish leadership, which had become much less flexible and more aggressive in its foreign policy rhetoric in recent years. Burying the hatchets with Russia and Israel might make Turkey more secure in the region, and signal to the rest of the international community that more substantive positive changes in Turkish foreign policy are yet to come. Only time will tell if they would include a more resolved Turkish response against ISIS.

Sibel Oktay is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Global Studies, University of Illinois at Springfield.

New tool to measure homeland security risks

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160701-new-tool-to-measure-homeland-security-risks>

July 01 – Researchers have validated a new risk assessment tool that can be used by the Department of Homeland Security to help evaluate decisions and priorities in natural disasters, terrorist events, and major accidents.



DHS has a broad and complex mission, with priorities that include preparing for and responding to a range of terrorist events, natural disasters, and major accidents. Russell Lundberg of the Department of Security Studies at Sam Houston State University and Henry Willis, Director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, recently applied a tool originally developed to address risks in environmental policy, the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risk, to aid in strategic planning for security. Their findings were published in *Homeland Security Affairs* and the *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*.


SHSU says that the study was in response to a National Academy of Sciences recommendation that the DHS adopt qualitative risk assessments as part of the strategic planning process. The **Deliberative Method for Ranking Risk has five-steps, which include defining and categorizing risks to be ranked, identifying the risk attributes to be considered, describing the risks in a summary document in term of the attributes, selecting participants to assess the risks, and performing risk ranking, and finally analyzing and describing the issues identified and the resulting rankings.**

To test the validity of the method, a second study examined ten key hazards under the purview of DHS, including earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados,

pandemic influenza, nuclear detonation, explosive bombing, anthrax attack, cyber-attack on critical infrastructure, accidents involving toxic industrial chemicals, and oil spills. By searching existing literature, Lundberg and Willis identified the key attributes of each hazard based on health and economic damages as well as social, psychological, environmental, and political concerns.

Among the top attributes identified were:

- Greatest number of deaths in a single episode
- Average number of deaths per year
- Average number of severe injuries or illnesses per year
- Average number of less severe injuries or illnesses per year
- Average amount of economic damages per year
- Greatest economic damage from a single episode
- Average number of individuals displaced per year



A Comparison of Average Lives Lost Per Year and Greatest Lives Lost in a Single Event

The method was tested on twenty-six individuals in groups assembled in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Santa Monica, California. Although the sample was not representative of the city, state, or nation, it did provide a glimpse into citizen concerns over homeland security issues.

Among hazards prompting the highest concerns were pandemic influenza, hurricanes, and earthquakes, while the hazards prompting the least concerns were oil spills, anthrax attack, or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.


The method can be useful to support strategic decisions across the homeland security enterprise, from individual buildings to the nation as a whole.

— Read more in Russell Lundberg and Henry Willis, “Assessing Homeland Security Risks: A Comparative Risk Assessment of 10 Hazards,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 11, Article 10 (December 2015); and Russell Lundberg and Henry Willis, “Deliberative Risk Ranking to Inform Homeland Security Strategic Planning,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 13, no. 1 (April 2016).

Bulgaria Freed Alleged Istanbul Terrorist Mastermind

Source: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/alleged-istanbul-attack-ringleader-released-by-a-court-in-bulgaria-07-01-2016>

July 01 – **Bulgarian police detained the suspected mastermind behind the recent Istanbul airport bombing in 2011 on the border with Turkey**, as Russia wanted him for “participation in an armed group and for the recruitment of persons for terrorism and for financing terrorism”, a Bulgarian judge told Bulgarian national radio on Friday.



However, the **Bulgarian courts refused to extradite him**, saying his refugee status, which Austria granted him in 2003, remained valid in all countries that were signatories to the Geneva Convention, which included Bulgaria.

Akhmad Chatayev, who comes from Chechnya in the North Caucasus region of Russia, is accused of being the brains behind the massacre at Istanbul's Ataturk airport, which left 43 people dead and over 240 seriously wounded on Tuesday.

Following reports in the Turkish media who claimed that the man who planned the attack was nicknamed “Akhmad the One-Armed”, Michael McCaul, chairman of the US House Committee on Homeland Security, confirmed the information to CNN.

Chatayev was on the US, Interpol, UN and Russian lists of suspected terrorists as a top ISIS recruiter for Europe and the North Caucasus.

He has been wanted in Russia since 2008 as a suspect for recruiting extremists and fundraising for a terrorist organization.

A court in the south Bulgarian city of Haskovo at first allowed his extradition to Russia, but this decision was later annulled by an appeal court in Plovdiv. He was then released and sent back to Austria.

Numerous international rights groups, including Amnesty International and the Anna Politkovskaya Fund, had called on the Bulgarian authorities to release him.

Three other countries – Ukraine, Sweden and Georgia - also arrested Chatayev and later refused to extradite him to Russia, his former Bulgarian lawyer Veselin Georgiev told BTV on Friday.

Chatayev was detained in Georgia after a clash between alleged militants and security forces in which 14 people were killed. **A court declared him innocent in January 2013.**

The Turkish authorities still have not announced the names of all the suspects behind Tuesday's airport massacre, but have said the three suicide bombers were citizens of Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Turkish media have reported that the three men arrived in Istanbul to commit the well-planned terror attack straight from Syria




How technology could help predict terrorist attacks

By Sheryl Prentice

Source: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/how-technology-could-help-predict-terrorist-attacks/>

July 02 – The internet has become a weapon for terrorists, who use social media and other technologies to organise, recruit and spread propaganda. So is it possible to turn technology around and use it to not only catch terrorists but predict and potentially stop terror attacks before they happen?

[And others](#) have used text analysis software to show that language patterns used by certain extremist groups differ in the months leading up to a violent attack. For example, the language may show less cognitive complexity – a more simplistic way of viewing the world – if it uses less complex structures, with more short



One thing we can do is use technology to search for patterns in the activity and language of terrorists and their supporters online. If we can spot trends that typically occur in the run up to an attack, it may be possible to automatically identify when future acts of violence are being planned. In a [new study](#), researchers from Harvard University attempted to do just this. They used computer simulations to show how unofficial groups of online Islamic State (IS) supporters spread and grow through social networking sites and how this relates to the timing of violent attacks.

This [follows research](#) into how messages on Twitter can be classified to predict whether someone will support or oppose IS. [Other researchers](#) have used data-mining techniques on social media data to try to work out when supporters “begin to adopt pro-IS behaviour”.

words or sentences.

[My own research](#) with Paul J Taylor and Paul Rayson at Lancaster University has used linguistic software to detect patterns in the language used by various Islamic extremist groups and narrow down potential clues in a message. **Using the method of collocation, which measures the strength of association between words or between a word and a concept, we showed you could automatically establish whether extremists' messages were portraying people or places positively or negatively.** For example, some personal names were significantly associated with the negative term “agency” (referring to people acting as enemy agents), while others were significantly associated with the positive term “heroic”.



This method could indicate potential terrorist targets by highlighting people or places to which violence or contempt is felt. For example, we might find that the terms “target”, “targeting”, “attack” or “kill” were strongly associated with the name of a particular place, person, or organisation. We could then look at the context of where and how these words were used in the text to work out if they suggested that person, place, or organisation may be in danger.

Other technologies

However, the limitation of this sort of approach is that it excludes attacks that may have happened without this kind of online build up. Each of these studies focuses only on a small aspect of the wider ecosystem of terrorism. So unless we can show that these patterns occur in all types of terror-related situations, we have to be careful not to exaggerate their importance and remember that other factors including political and personal situations can drive acts of violence.

Terrorists' online communications are only part of the picture. We also have ways of studying terrorists' offline communicative behaviours by measuring levels of stress or anxiety, or detecting patterns associated with deceit. For example, we can use sensors, infrared scanners and brain imaging technologies such as fMRI to monitor changes in the body or track people's face, body or eye movements. Some

argue that if we deployed this kind of technology in airport security, it might alert us to those intending to carry out an attack.

In 2002, [researchers at Honeywell Laboratories](#) in the US showed how thermal imaging technology could identify a heat pattern that occurs around the eyes when people try to deceive someone. They suggested this technique could be used to rapidly screen air travellers during pre-flight interviews “without the need for skilled staff”.

Human factor

But such a system [wouldn't be foolproof](#). There are a [number of reasons](#) why an individual may be anxious at an airport, which may have nothing to do with attempts to deceive airline staff. Perhaps they have a fear of flying. These technologies are not 100% accurate. They tend to be tested in lab-based environments and trained on fake attempts to deceive rather than in real-life situations.

[Some argue that technology does not have three vital qualities that humans possess: experience, values and judgement. This means that machines may miss something that only a human could detect.](#)

So while technology offers exciting possibilities for tracking terrorist communications and predicting attacks, it isn't a replacement for human judgement and should be used with caution.

Sheryl Prentice is a Post-doctoral researcher in linguistics, Lancaster University

Dhaka terrorists were highly educated: Police


Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2016/07/dhaka-terrorists-were-highly-educated.html>

July 03 – The terrorists who massacred 20 foreigners and Bangladeshi at a popular cafe here were **highly educated and most came from wealthy families**, a minister said on Sunday. “They are all highly educated young men and went to university. No one is from a madrasa,” the Bangladeshi media quoted Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan as saying.

Asked why they would have become militants, The Daily Star quoted Khan as saying: **“It has become a fashion.”**

The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the massacre. The militants, who seized the cafe on Friday night, also killed two policemen.


Six of the seven attackers were shot dead. A seventh was arrested.



At least 4 killed in suicide blast near one of Islam's holiest sites in Medina

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/07/04/bombings-strike-shiite-mosque-in-saudi-arabia.html>

July 04 – At least four security officers were killed and five injured in a suicide bombing Monday outside an Islamic holy site in Medina, according to the Saudi Interior Ministry.



The Monday evening attack took place just as thousands of worshippers were about to hold sunset prayers in the mosque where the Prophet Muhammad is buried in Medina.

The mosque is visited by millions of Muslims from around the world annually performing pilgrimage in Mecca.

The ministry statement, carried Monday on the state-run al-Ekhbariya news channel, said the attacker set off the bomb after security officers raised suspicions about him. The attack took place in a parking lot outside the sprawling mosque complex.


The bombing happened the same day that two suicide bombers struck different cities in Saudi Arabia, one of them near a U.S. consulate. No group has yet claimed responsibility for any of the attacks.

Qari Ziyaad Patel, 36, from Johannesburg, South Africa, was at the mosque when he heard a blast just as the call to sunset prayers was ending. People were breaking their fast with dates so the mood was subdued, he said. Many at first thought it

Terrorist Attacks and Threats in Saudi Arabia

A count of all attacks since 1970 that took place in Saudi Arabia. A terrorist attack is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.

Number of Attacks



Source: [Global Terrorism Database](#).

As of 2014. Data for 1993 is not available from the source.

[See more details >](#)

GRAPHIQ

was the sound of traditional, celebratory cannon fire, but then he felt the ground shake.



"The vibrations were very strong," he said. "It sounded like a building imploded."

The sprawling mosque where the Prophet Muhammad is buried is visited by millions of Muslims from around the world each year during pilgrimages to Mecca. The area would have been teeming with pilgrims for prayer during the final days of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which ends this week.

Earlier Monday, a suicide bomber carried out an attack near a U.S. diplomatic site in the western Saudi city of Jiddah wounding two security guards, according to the Interior Ministry. Also, a resident in the largely Shiite eastern Saudi region of Qatif said a suicide bomber and a car bomb struck a neighborhood there, but that no injuries were immediately reported.

Mohammed al-Nimr told The Associated Press the bomber in Qatif detonated his suicide vest Monday evening when most residents of the neighborhood were at home breaking the Ramadan fast.

Qatif is heavily populated by Shiites, who are a minority in the Sunni-ruled kingdom. Al-Nimr says that near the body of a suicide bomber was a car bomb that also went off around the same time.

The attacks struck next to a Shiite mosque. The Islamic State group has in the past attacked Shiite places of worship in Qatif.

Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have condemned the blasts in Saudi Arabia.


Egypt's Foreign Ministry said the reported attack during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan near one of Islam's most sacred places confirms that terrorism "knows no religion or belief or any meaning of humanity."

A Foreign Ministry official in the UAE was quoted in the state-run WAM news agency as saying the stability of Saudi Arabia "is the main pillar of the stability of the United Arab Emirates and the whole of the Gulf Arab region."

The secretary general of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is headquartered in Saudi Arabia, says the attacks are an attempt to destabilize the kingdom. Iyad Madani says the kingdom's security is "the cornerstone of security and stability in the region and the Islamic world."

2015 Global Terrorism Database now available

Source: <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/2015-global-terrorism-database-now-available>



Map is interactive

(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/images/START_GlobalTerrorismDatabase_TerroristAttacksConcentrationIntensityMap_45Years.png)

June 30 – The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has released an update to its [Global Terrorism Database \(GTD\)](#), the largest, most comprehensive open-source database including information on terrorist attacks that took place around the world between 1970 and 2015. The GTD, which is updated annually, now includes data on events that occurred through December 2015. In addition, the GTD team continually works to improve the data on earlier attacks. Perhaps most notably, with this new update the GTD is now fully geo-coded for the first time, allowing users to



conduct geo-spatial analysis on [terrorism worldwide across five decades](#). Additional details about what is new in the latest GTD update can be found in the [GTD Codebook](#).

Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on domestic as well as international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes data on more than 150,000 events.

The data are available for download at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/contact/>.

Below are major findings and trends from the 2015 Global Terrorism Database numbers:

- The total number of terrorist attacks and total deaths due to terrorist attacks worldwide decreased by 12% in 2015, compared to 2014. This was largely due to fewer attacks and deaths in Iraq, Pakistan, and Nigeria. This represents the first decline in total terrorist attacks and deaths worldwide since 2009.
- In several countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines, Syria, and Turkey, terrorist attacks, total deaths due to terrorist attacks, or both increased sharply in 2015.
- Although terrorist attacks took place in nearly 100 countries in 2015, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than 50% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Philippines), and 69% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Yemen).
- While the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was responsible for 10% fewer terrorist attacks in Iraq, the number of attacks carried out by ISIL in Syria increased by 58%. The geographic reach of attacks by ISIL and its affiliates expanded as several existing terrorist groups pledged allegiance to ISIL. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIL branches were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. More than 15 perpetrator groups self-identified as "provinces" of the Islamic State in 2015, compared to four in 2014.
- The number of attacks in which victims were kidnapped or taken hostage declined in 2015; however, the number of kidnapping victims and hostages increased. This was primarily due to an increase in the number of attacks involving exceptionally large numbers of victims.

The Entebbe rescue, 40 years later

Source: <http://www.thetower.org/3596-the-entebbe-rescue-40-years-later/>

July 05 – **On 4 July 1976 — 40 years ago Monday — Israeli commandos carried out a daring raid to rescue over 100 Jewish and Israeli hostages held by Palestinian and German terrorists at the Entebbe airport in Uganda.**

A week earlier, two terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and two German terrorists from the Baader-Meinhoff gang had hijacked Air France flight 139 as it took off from

Athens bound for Paris, the final leg of its journey that had begun in Tel Aviv. The hijackers demanded the release of several dozen of imprisoned terrorists and sympathizers in exchange for the hijacked hostages.


[The old terminal building showing holes from raid](#)

After a stop in Libya, where additional terrorists boarded the plane, the flight



continued on to Uganda, then under the dictatorial rule of President Idi Amin Dada. Ugandan troops aided the hijackers in guarding the hostages.





When the plane landed in Uganda, the Jewish and Israeli passengers were separated from the others. "Even now, as I am telling you the process by which the terrorists selected their hostages, it hurts me to say it," recalled Avi Mor, a member of the IDF's rescue mission who had escaped from the Nazis in Poland along with his family. "It was a similar selection process the Nazis administered when selecting who would go work and who would be sent to the gas chambers."

According to another account, one of the hostages showed his tattoo to one of the German hijackers, who reportedly responded "I'm no Nazi! ... I am an idealist."

The hijackers extended the deadline for meeting their demands until 11:00 a.m. on 4 July.

With imperfect intelligence and minimal training, the IDF nevertheless received authorization to launch its rescue mission on 1 July. The mission's main commander, Dan Shomron (later to become the IDF's chief-of-staff), got final approval for the plan from Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur, Defense Minister Shimon Peres, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Two hundred elite IDF soldiers flew four American-made Hercules transport planes 2,000 miles under cover of night to rescue the 103 hostages. Despite the complexity of the mission, the IDF had two advantages. One was the element of surprise. The other was that the old terminal building, where the hostages were being held, was originally built by an Israeli firm, which shared blueprints with the IDF and allowed it to build a replica of the terminal to rehearse the rescue.



In the first plane was the rescue teams, led by Yoni Netanyahu, the older brother of current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Also on the plane was a black Mercedes, a replica of the car used by Amin, in which the lead team would make its way to the terminal.

After the plane landed and the Mercedes emerged, the rescue team encountered a Ugandan guard. Though the operation's second-in-command of Muki Betzer did not believe that the soldier posed a threat — Betzer had previously

trained the Ugandan military — the commandos shot him with silenced guns.





Prime Minister Netanyahu on Monday kicked off a four-nation tour of Africa in Uganda at the old terminal building to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the historic rescue.



Can we **predict** who will become mass shooters?

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160705-can-we-predict-who-will-become-mass-shooters>

There are inherent challenges in trying to identify people who are at high risk of committing an extremely violent act such as a mass shooting. And one of the biggest challenges in carrying out research in this area is that because the event rate is extremely low,

Warning signs in the soon-to-become mass shooter can take the form of [overt or veiled threats](#) – known in the field as “leakage” – for example, Elliot Rodgers’s “Day of Retribution” video made before he killed six people and injured fourteen others near the campus of University of California, Santa Barbara in 2014.



As pointed out by Fox and DeLateur, these telltale warning signs or indicators are “yellow flags that only turn red once the blood has spilled” as they are often identified in the aftermath of tragedy with crystal clear hindsight.

Warning signs

Relatively little is understood about what the warning signs are in a future mass shooter, and our current understanding is limited to past experience. That said, [a number of features](#) in the “typical mass shooter” have been identified. **We know that in 95 percent of cases the mass shooter is male, they are typically Caucasian** (nearly two thirds are white), and older than murderers in general. [Research shows](#) that **half of mass shooters are older than 30**, with just 12.2 percent under the age of 20, and 38 percent between the ages of 20 and 29.

Mass shooters also tend to have common psychological and behavioral characteristics such as depression, resentment, social isolation, the tendency to externalize rather than internalize blame, fascination with graphically violent entertainment, and a significant interest in weaponry.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to pick up these factors in individuals before they embark on a shooting spree because these psychological and behavioral characteristics are fairly prevalent in the general population. For example, the [National Alliance on Mental Illness](#) in the United States says **that about 20 percent of Americans suffer with mental health disorders in any given year** – that is more than sixty million individuals.

As a result, the [profiles and checklists](#) that have been developed to attempt to predict rare events – such as mass shootings – have a [tendency to over predict](#), which results in a large number of “false positives.”

It has also been suggested that school shootings and mass shootings are quite often committed by people with neuro-developmental disorders – such as criminal autistic psychopathy or Asperger’s syndrome – with often a good deal of warning based on the person in question’s writings on the Internet and elsewhere.

In light of this, I was lead researcher in a team that recently looked for the presence

of autism spectrum disorders in a sample of **seventy-five mass shooters selected by Mother Jones**, a reader-supported and non-profit news organization that made the **selection to avoid possible in-built bias**. In this study, we found six cases – or **8 percent of the total number of mass shooters in the sample** – who either had a diagnosis of autism, or whose family and friends **suspected they had an autism spectrum disorder**. But although this is about [eight times higher](#) than the rate of autism spectrum disorders within the general population, the findings don’t suggest that people with autism are more likely to become mass shooters.

[Work published earlier this year](#) also outlined a theoretical model to help us better understand how an individual with an autism disorder could engage in intended violence, such as a mass murder. In particular it considered the lead up to violence in the case of Adam Lanza, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter [with Asperger’s](#) who [spent some time compiling](#) a seven-by-four foot spreadsheet [chronologically detailing](#) about 500 events of mass murder.

Finding the answers

But there may be some hope, as [highlighted in our previous papers](#) – research techniques currently used for extremely rare but dangerous diseases could in fact also be used to investigate mass shooting events.

So while at the moment relatively little is known about the early warning signs in a potential mass shooter, it may well be possible to detect mass shooters in advance if we change our approach in researching the area.

It is imperative that we further our understanding of the potential stressors or triggers, psychological traits, and antecedents which contribute to such extreme violence. Such research would aid the identification of individuals who are more at risk of engaging in mass killings or are on the pathway to intended violence in order that preventative strategies and, if necessary, appropriate strategies are implemented in order to reduce the occurrence of such extreme violence.

One recommendation is that every time a mass shooting event occurs, as much information is collated on the individual’s background (for example, their



mental health) and behaviors in the lead up to the event (which could be years) in order to

build up a database which could eventually be used by researchers to identify patterns.

Clare Allely is Lecturer in Psychology, University of Salford.

Applying public health models to gun violence

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160705-applying-public-health-models-to-gun-violence>

July 05 – Yale University sociology professor Andrew Papachristos leads a team of researchers that collects information on an all-too-common occurrence in cities like Chicago, Boston, Newark, Cincinnati, and Oakland, California: gun violence.

The work focuses not on mass shootings or isolated incidents of violence; Papachristos' team has worked to gather data on populations that face persistent threats of [gun-related attacks and homicides](#), often connected to gang and drug activity.



Papachristos' research shows they have properties similar to epidemics of disease.

That means they affect particular communities disproportionately and multiply through exposure and can spill over into new areas after reaching a certain threshold. Papachristos says, however, those same characteristics also provide some insight on how to

treat gun violence. The NSF notes that with the support of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences directorate, he is gathering information aimed at helping policymakers do just that. Namely, research shows that solutions community-based economic and social approaches may be most effective at thwarting gun violence.

"Scientists, especially social scientists, have to address the hard questions," he said. "This is one of them."

Papachristos' work seeks to understand the patterns of gunshot victimization, including that in Yale's hometown of New Haven, Connecticut. His research team analyzed years' worth of information on shootings and arrests in those cities. By doing so, they were able to identify the social networks of those charged as shooters, including incidents of "co-offending" involving multiple suspects and defendants, all associated with one another. Their results showed that a high concentration of shooting victims were actually connected within the same social networks as the accused shooters — and that, as an individual becomes exposed to more gunshot victims, his or her own chance of victimization increases. During a recent visit to NSF, he described his research.

Q. What's the focus of your current work?

A. My research looks at how gun violence is concentrated and moves among high-risk populations. The basic idea is to take the analogies about an "epidemic" of gun violence more seriously, applying what we know from public health and epidemiology to understand, quite literally, who gets shot. We can use that information not only to understand gun violence

better, but to leverage it for intervention and prevention.

Q. When this problem is depicted in media, it's often in terms of bad actors, good actors and the innocent people in between. You seem to talk about redefining who victims are.

A. This is where science and policy need to come into



conversation with each other, because the majority of victims are young men with criminal records, and for a long time, the policy toward those people has been to lock them up — to treat them as offenders, not victims. If you want to drive the number of victims down, you have to care about saving those lives. Period. You can't move the homicide rate without saving the lives of young men with criminal records, and that means treating them differently than we have in the past.

This requires different solutions — different employment opportunities, different services. If they're coming out of jail, they're likely to be homeless, they're often unqualified for any family-sustaining jobs or have a difficult time getting those jobs that are available. Educational opportunities for them are abysmal.

Q. Why is it important from a research standpoint to have information about who the victims of gun violence are?

A. Part of the goal is to better understand the victims of gun violence, so they don't just get lumped into categories. When we think about risk factors, that doesn't help you understand who the *individual* victims are. Our research applies the methods we've learned in other areas of science to understand how particular individuals may or may not be in harm's way. The idea is to understand who within a community is at the most elevated level of risk today, not just to create a set of aggregate risk factors. Those are often the people who don't get the attention of services and systems, and I think they need not only research attention but policy attention.

Q. How is gun violence like an epidemic?

A. It's an epidemic on at least two fronts. On the first, most basic level, it's an epidemic in terms of its unequal effect on the population. Young black men are affected at a rate much higher than young white men. The level of violence among that population is at an epidemic level. What my research shows is that it also moves in epidemic-like patterns throughout populations.

Q. Can you talk about some of the cascading effects you've seen in your research?

A. A cascade is when a shooting happens, and then sometime later someone else in your

network gets shot, and then sometime later someone else in that person's network gets shot and so on. We had a hypothesis that would happen, but I didn't know just how prevalent it would be.

Q. Are you seeing commonalities among the communities you've studied, or are these individualized?

A. There are more similarities than differences. The networks in Chicago work like the networks in Cincinnati and the networks in Boston and the networks in Hartford. We actually see similar rules regardless of the city.

Q. How do you define a "network" for this research?

A. We're looking at behavioral networks of co-offending or co-arrest. So two people that engage in a crime together (and are arrested by the police) have a link. We look at entire populations of people who have been arrested for the people who have been engaged in acts of co-offending.

Q. This type of violence often seems to be an area where people seek simple solutions, but you talk about the idea of social system-wide solutions — of addressing the problem from the prenatal ward all the way up to the ER. Why is that important?

A. The long-term solution, in terms of addressing the inequities in gun violence — not just the absolute number of shootings, but the differences among populations — comes down to fixing communities. We know the effects of education on reducing harm and trauma are massive. There have been studies that have shown that when a kid is exposed to a homicide, he basically loses three months of school. But what mitigates that is having a mentally healthy mother. Having health care for a mother isn't trivial.

The kinds of support systems I'm talking about have to do with monitoring and supporting communities from a public health standpoint. When a community experiences a shooting or experiences violence, there should be systems in place that can be put into effect. The networked approach can provide a useful tool for interventions in the here and now, and hopefully create some room to work on larger community level change.



Japan lacks capacity to handle terror threats

Source: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/05/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-lacks-capacity-handle-terror-threats/#.V34CPqKWsgV>

July 05 – Following the terrorist attack last week in Bangladesh that left seven Japanese among the nearly 30 people — hostages, security personnel and perpetrators — who were killed, Japan's government is facing the harsh reality that it lacks the capacity to ensure the safety of its citizens from terrorism abroad.



Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Cabinet ministers observe a moment of silence Tuesday morning to mourn the victims of Friday's terrorist attack in Bangladesh.

The attack in an upscale Dhaka restaurant resulted in the largest number of Japanese casualties in an act

of terrorism since 10 Japanese were killed during a hostage crisis at a natural gas plant in Algeria in 2013. The Japanese government has found no easy answer to tackling the threat of the Islamic State militant group, which claimed responsibility for the attack at a restaurant and bakery frequented by expatriates in the Bangladeshi capital.



During a stump speech Sunday ahead of the July 10 Upper House election, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, "We plan to take all possible measures to protect Japanese at home and abroad."

But with the attack still fresh in peoples' minds, the remark fell short on persuasiveness.

A source pointed out that during the Algerian hostage crisis the government failed to sufficiently share information provided by private companies and other entities.

This led to the formation of the National Security Council, which handles crisis management, and the International Counterterrorism Intelligence Collection Unit, which is charged with gathering intelligence on global militant groups.

After the murder of freelance journalist Kenji Goto, who had been held hostage by Islamic State, a government inspection committee stressed in a May 2015 report the importance of "accurately analyzing and using information that has been collected."

It further emphasized "the necessity to work toward improving intelligence gathering, the aggregation of information and enhancing the powers of analysis."

But whether any lessons have been learned in last weekend's attack is the big question.

As was the case in the Algerian hostage crisis, the government dispatched a special plane to repatriate the bodies of the seven Japanese victims and one survivor of the attack.

"We've been reminded that we never know when or where a terrorist attack will happen," a high-ranking official in the Foreign Ministry said.

Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters Sunday: "We have no defense attache in Bangladesh. I feel there is a need for more intelligence gathering on militants amid the sharp increase in terrorism," suggesting the possibility of examining new measures or working together with neighboring countries to combat terrorist threats.



Japan is limited in what it can do alone to collect and analyze intelligence on terrorism abroad, and cooperation with other countries is key.

The G-7 Action Plan for Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism adopted in May at the Ise-Shima summit calls for a policy of cooperation from the Group of Seven industrialized nations to support areas in Asia threatened by terrorism.


The G-7 nations agreed on the importance of devising a plan to work toward the spread of moderate Islamic groups and building a society that can root out terrorism.

Islamic State shifts strategy from building territory to spreading terror worldwide

Source: <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-islamic-state-attacks-20160704-snap-story.html>

As a U.S.-led coalition claws away territory from Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the extremist group is shifting its emphasis

He summarized their message: “You the international community did not want us to become a state, focused on our land. Now we



away from building a caliphate to spreading terror around the world, according to terrorism experts.

Its tactics, on display in four attacks over the last week that claimed 228 lives, come from the playbook of Al Qaeda, an ally until an acrimonious split in 2013.

The attacks follow losses of territory in Iraq, including the city of Fallujah last week, and in Syria, where Islamic State militants are now being forced out of the northeast town of Manbij. The losses have compromised their ability to function as a state, experts said.

“What they are saying is, ‘The more you hit us, the more we will become Al Qaeda,’” said Mathieu Guidere, a professor at the University of Paris who monitors audio, video, texts and social networks of major terrorist organizations as part of a project to track radicalization.

will move on to a clandestine, terrorist mode of organization.”

One difference, he said, is that while Al Qaeda preferred to use Arab fighters who were vetted and trained, Islamic State has deployed volunteers from non-Arab states and to work with other local terrorist groups on the fly.

Another is that its reach is far greater than that of Al Qaeda. The carnage attributed to Islamic State is rising by the day.

In Istanbul last week, at least 45 people were killed and more than 200 injured when three gunmen from Russia and Central Asia equipped with suicide belts attacked the main airport. Although Islamic State did not claim credit — and almost never does in Turkey — the Turkish government said the



assault had all the earmarks of the group.

The militants did claim credit in Baghdad, where a van packed with explosives was detonated early Sunday amid a crowd of families gathered at a shopping mall to break the Ramadan fast. At least 157 people were killed, many of them children.

In Saudi Arabia on Monday, assailants set off a bomb in Medina outside the Prophet's Mosque, one of the holiest sites in Islam. Though no one claimed immediate responsibility for the attack, which killed four people, or for two other bombings in other parts of the country, Islamic State has long been at odds with the Saudis.

The group has also taken responsibility for a growing number of attacks initiated by sympathizers or groups whose affiliations are unclear.

Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack Friday in the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, in which members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, a local Islamic militant group, stormed a cafe in the diplomatic zone and took foreigners hostage. Twenty-two people were killed.

Rohan Gunaratna, who heads an institute on terrorism at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the group recently created an external operations wing that operates outside Syria and Iraq, trains and dispatches fighters abroad and offers guidance to supporters around the world. The Bangladeshi extremist group had become part of the network, he said.

Reuven Erlich, a retired Israeli colonel who heads a center on intelligence and terrorism at the Lauder School of Government in Israel, went further, saying that Islamic State directed the Bangladesh attack.

Paul Pillar, an academic who spent nearly three decades with the CIA, said that given the

carefully designed infrastructure of the caliphate, it would be surprising if Islamic State did not have a department for foreign terrorism operations. But details on its connection to the Bangladeshi militants remained murky, he said. It "could be a tenuous relationship" or a case of "the attraction of a known brand-name and being associated with something much bigger" than the local cause, he said.

The reasons for the timing of the upsurge in attacks is also unclear.

It corresponds with the holy month of Ramadan and the second anniversary of the declaration of the Islamic State and the caliphate by Abu Bakr Baghdadi on June 29, 2014.

The announcement that he'd reestablished the center of Islamic rule, which had been in Turkey until it was abolished in 1924, became a magnet that drew thousands of Muslim militants to travel to Iraq and Syria to join Islamic State. So did the fact that the self-proclaimed caliphate controlled substantial territory in Syria and Iraq.

In the case of Turkey, it is also possible that the attack is retribution for the country's rapprochement with Israel, said Magnus Ranstorp, who directs the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defense College. Another possible factor is Turkey's decision a year ago to open Incirlik Air Base to U.S. warplanes for attacking Islamic State targets in Syria.

Whatever may have motivated the latest spate of attacks, the terrorism experts agreed that while Islamic State may be losing territory, it is likely to adapt to the situation and work to regain it.


"They know how to fight the Americans," Ranstorp said. "They will blend in. They will use suicide bombings. And they will blend in again."

You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia

Source: <http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/5717157.html>

July 05 – The dramatic arrival of Da'ish (ISIS) on the stage of Iraq has shocked many in the West. Many have been perplexed — and horrified — by its violence and its evident magnetism for Sunni youth. But more than this, they find Saudi Arabia's ambivalence in the face of this manifestation both troubling and inexplicable, wondering, "Don't the Saudis understand that ISIS threatens them, too?"





It appears — even now — that Saudi Arabia's ruling elite is divided. Some applaud that ISIS is fighting Iranian Shiite "fire" with Sunni "fire"; that a new Sunni state is taking shape at the very heart of what they regard as a historical Sunni patrimony; and they are drawn by Da'ish's strict Salafist ideology.

Other Saudis are more fearful, and recall the history of the revolt against Abd-al Aziz by the Wahhabist Ikhwan (Disclaimer: this Ikhwan has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan — please note, all further references hereafter are to the Wahhabist Ikhwan, and not to the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan), but which nearly imploded Wahhabism and the al-Saud in the late 1920s.

Many Saudis are deeply disturbed by the radical doctrines of Da'ish (ISIS) — and are beginning to question some aspects of Saudi Arabia's direction and discourse.

War on Terrorism – Everything Must Change

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2016/06/war-on-terrorism-everything-must-change/>

June 30 – As long as these were isolated and relatively rare terrorism attacks, the global war on terrorism could still use the same old tools and methods used twenty and thirty years ago,



but no more. All the experts are united in saying that a change of perspective is needed — and fast, both in countries who are suffering

terrorism for years as well as those who are new to the phenomenon.

All this is because of the planning of modern terrorism. Whoever thinks Islamic terror is basic or borderline primitive is completely wrong. Whoever thought this terror will keep using knives, IEDs and light weapons is completely wrong.

The Islamic terror is aspiring to be much more, and whoever remains with the same way of thinking will lose the battle and the war.

Every large terror organization — ISIS and Al-Qaeda — have been going to great lengths to acquire more advanced weapon

systems. I don't mean necessarily dirty atom bombs or chemical materials, but most certainly sniper rifles with a range of over



1.5 km and explosives – and that's not all. Every intelligence information points towards these organizations keeping close ties with criminal arms dealers, trying to obtain the most effective lethal weapons. What does this mean for the other side?

For many years now, counter-terrorism units in the US and Europe are designed to fight criminal events such as hostages scenarios, for instance by bank robbers. This fixation which drives the US government and many European states mostly causes these counter-terrorism units to remain unchanged.

This must be fixed immediately. We're talking mostly about equipment, such as an independent real-time intelligence capability freeing these units, in the US' case, from needing to wait for the FBI.

Modern terrorism does not offer local police departments the privilege of waiting around for the federal units. Response must be immediate, like that of a trained military unit

with tools to handle almost every situation. It's true that even a military unit may need air or artillery reinforcement, but for counter-terrorism units, this applies much less. Every delay may cause the number of civilian casualties to double if not more. This isn't just about budgets, but a change in the whole attitude towards terrorism, to its extent and to the need to treat it on a local level – not a police force sealing off the parameter and waiting for the FBI, but a police force that can at least create a halt in the event until the big guns arrive.

Israel has understood it for some time now, and changes are being made, though more will be required.


The rest of the world is behind, first because it doesn't understand the extent of the war declared on it, and second because of politicians who don't wish to appear too aggressive.

Whoever fails to realize the need for an immediate change will pay the price.

Death toll of Baghdad attack climbs to 250

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160706-death-toll-of-baghdad-attack-climbs-to-250>

July 06 – The Iraqi government said that the number of dead in Sunday's massive suicide truck bombing near a central Baghdad shopping mall has reached 250, making it the deadliest attack in Iraq



since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.




The Iraqi health ministry said the number of dead is likely to rise as more bodies are being pulled from the rubble, and more of those seriously injured die in hospitals.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that it was part of the organization's on-going campaign against Shi'a Muslims.

Iraq's interior minister Mohammed al-Ghabban has resigned, saying the authorities "had failed in having the different array of security forces work under a unified plan in Baghdad."

The BBC [reports](#) that in a press conference in which he announced his resignation, Ghabban called on the government to hand over responsibility for the security of the country's cities to the interior ministry,



describing the hundreds of checkpoints deployed around the capital as "absolutely useless."

He said the explosives-rigged refrigerator truck came to Baghdad from Diyala province north of Baghdad, which means that it had to pass through dozens of security checkpoints on the way into the Iraqi capital.

The BBC reports that the responsibility for security in Baghdad is divided among the army, federal, and local police.

Women's connections, role in extremist networks

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160706-women-s-connections-role-in-extremist-networks>

July 06 – **A study reveals that although women remain under the radar in terrorist organizations, they hold the networks together**

A team of researchers at the University of Miami who examined the role of women in extreme networks or organizations, such as terrorist groups, dispelled the common assumption that women are lured into these dangerous environments solely to offer support while men are recruited and tend to be the key players. Instead, the researchers found, **women are better connected within the network, essentially becoming the glue holding the system together, fueling its vitality and survival.**

"The research examines the assumption that, as any kind of real-world situation becomes more dangerous and aggressive, men will

dominate — and hence in any network operating under extreme conditions, it is the men that will hold things together," said Neil Johnson, a physicist in the College of Arts and Sciences. "We had a feeling that the issue of women's roles — and more generally the role of any numerical minority in human groups or populations that are under stress — is one of prime interest that has not been looked at in sufficient depth."

For the study, titled **"Women's Connectivity in Extreme Networks,"** researchers analyzed detailed data from two separate and extreme terrorist organizations: the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA, which operated entirely offline from 1970 to 1998, and the Islamic State, or ISIS, which is functioning in the current digital age.

“The **PIRA network dataset** isn't only a network of ‘who knows who,’ but it gives the connections between individuals regarding

demonstrated that **although men dominated these groups numerically, women had the most effective connections within the network, acting as a far stronger glue than men in regard to holding the network together, which the study identifies as high “betweenness centrality” (BC).**

Pedro Manrique, a postdoctoral associate in the physics department and first author of the study, explains: “A crucial measure in covert networks is related to the capacity of a node (e.g. actor) to serve as a bridge for communications, a flow of

participation in attacks, which require innovation and planning,” Johnson said. “At the same time, we started collecting information online about pro-ISIS supporters. Taking these two datasets together enabled us to do the study.”

UMiami reports that for the study, which was published in the journal *Science Advances*, Johnson and his team monitored individuals on *Vkontakte*, a social media network based in Russia with more than 350 million users. Pro-ISIS groups normally last longer on *Vkontakte* than Facebook, which shuts down these groups. The researchers pinned down pro-ISIS followers by using specific social media hashtags displayed in open source information on the internet, and then tracking the groups they belonged to using a software system. On *Vkontakte*, the researchers uncovered 41,880 individuals in a two-month period, 24,883 of whom were men, and 16,931 women (66 declared no gender).

For the offline portion of the study, the team used a detailed PIRA database, which was easier to assess as the data was previously collected and built as a manual social network listing members, their actions, and demographic information. Of the 1,382 total number of registered PIRA members listed, 1,312 were men and seventy women.

Based on their online and offline research of PIRA and pro-ISIS groups, the researchers


resources or ideas, and brokerage. This quantity is called betweenness centrality. An actor with high betweenness centrality is critical to keep the channels of communication active and efficient, and its removal could cause a higher cost and potential risk, to the extent of the disruption of the network.”

The study proposes women in the pro-ISIS groups have a high BC and hence play a central role by passing on vital information, from recruitment messages to files, or video and audio ISIS propaganda. Women in the PIRA network, the study suggests, were inclined to act as team players who spread this team ethic to other members.

One practical finding from the research, Johnson says, is that it suggests authorities investigating extreme networks should engage female members, even if they are the minority and not deemed key figures.

“Our work also feeds into current discussions about the role of women combatants in conflict and terrorism, and how this can differ from stereotypes in which women adopt a minor role,” Johnson said. “I think all this could be of interest in a more general setting as well, beyond physical conflict and terrorism, since our findings suggest a need to reexamine how we judge the importance of any minority group in a network.”

— Read more in Pedro Manrique et al., “Women’s connectivity in extreme networks,” *Science Advances* 2, no. 6 (10 June 2016).



Dhaka cafe attackers were lightly armed, shared single gun for photos

Source: <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/dhaka-terror-attack-bangladesh-dhaka-cafe-hostage-crisis-terrorism-dhaka-gunman-2896086/>



July 06 – **The five men who carried out Friday's terrorist attack in Dhaka shared a single Kalashnikov lookalike to pose for photographs** that were circulated online by Islamic State, Bangladesh intelligence sources have confirmed to The Indian Express.

Sources also said that the weapon has been confirmed to be the same one that was carried into the Holey Artisan Bakery by the gunmen, with distinctive scratch-like markings visible above its trigger.

The fact that one lookalike Kalashnikov was used in Friday's attack — along with four pistols and grenade-type improvised explosive devices — suggests that the attackers did not have access to sophisticated assault weapons. In most terrorist attacks around the world, the attackers have used assault weapons, such as the Kalashnikov AK47 and its variants, or the Armalite 15.

French Officials Admit Terror Attacks Could Have Been Avoided

"Our intelligence services have failed."

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/french-officials-admit-terror-attacks-could-have-been-avoided_us_577cd335e4b0a629c1ab393b

June 07 – **The French intelligence services failed in their duty and could have avoided the worst of the deadly terrorist attacks that rocked Paris in 2015**, a [scathing report](#) to be released next week finds.

The country's parliamentary commission outlined the report on "the worst attack on French soil since the end of World War II" ahead of publication on Tuesday. The 30-member commission was created in January to examine the coordinated assaults in France's capital that killed 147 people. The Islamic State militant group claimed responsibility for the November attacks, which followed a deadly shooting spree by extremists on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015.

Georges Fenech, president of the commission, said that better coordination among the French intelligence services would have prevented the deadliest of the November attacks, at Bataclan concert hall.

"Our intelligence services have failed," he said at a news conference on Tuesday that announced the commission's findings and proposals. "All, I say all of them, the attackers of



the Bataclan, those of Charlie Hebdo, those of the Hyper-Kosher (store) ... and others were all on the radar of our services.”

“We could have avoided the attack of the Bataclan if there had not been these failures,” Fenech added. He noted that Saleh Abdeslam, a surviving attacker from the November massacres, was able to escape to Belgium afterward, and Abdelhamid Abaaoud — the man authorities believe was a key organizer — had traveled freely in Europe despite European authorities’ awareness of his radical activities.

The commission made 40 recommendations for reforms, including the creation of a centralized counter-terrorism intelligence agency like the National Counterterrorism Center that the United States created after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

It also proposed increasing France’s role in efforts to drive the Islamic State out of Iraq and working with Turkey to secure its border with Syria. Abaaoud fought with the extremist group in Syria before returning to Europe.

The commission leaders added that other countries’ intelligence failures and the lack of coordination between France and its European partners enabled the attacks, rather than French missteps alone.

Abdeslam’s name did not appear on a European Union data, despite the fact he was known to Belgian authorities as an extremist. French authorities stopped Abdeslam’s car near the border with Belgium hours after the November attacks. They allowed him to proceed when his file showed a criminal record, not a history of terrorism involvement.

The commission recommends improving Europe-wide terrorist prevention efforts in response to this. These include granting Europol, the EU’s police agency, and Frontex, its border control agency, full access to the Schengen Information System — a master list of missing and wanted individuals.

It is expected to release its full report on the November attacks next Tuesday.

The commission’s recommendations are not binding, but they are likely to ratchet up pressure on the French government and other European countries to enact major changes. Last year’s Paris attacks, along with bombings in Brussels in March that Islamic State claimed, have revealed major gaps in European security policies.

Brazil Seeks to Reassure Olympics Visitors About Security

Source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazil-seeks-to-reassure-olympics-visitors-about-security-1467820887>

July 06 – **Brazilian authorities tried on Wednesday to calm concerns about the country’s security preparations ahead of the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in August, saying police forces will have all the resources they need to ensure people’s safety.**

Security forces are ready to handle local crime, Justice Minister Alexandre de Moraes said at a press conference, and Brazil hasn’t received a single indication from other countries of terrorist threats, Defense Minister Raul Jungmann said.

Mr. Jungmann declined to rule out completely the possibility of such threats, but said there is no evidence of terrorist infiltration in Brazil.

“Can it rain tomorrow? It can. But is it probable, given the forecast? No,” he said.

The federal government began this week to assume responsibility for certain security functions in the city of Rio. Their duties will include patrolling the streets around Olympic sites and offering support to the security forces of the state of Rio de Janeiro where necessary. The armed forces have deployed 6,000 people, and the number will rise to 21,000 this month, Mr. Jungmann said. Tourist sites, such as Sugarloaf Mountain and the statue of Christ the Redeemer, will continue under the control of state police, he said.

Land, air and maritime forces will be deployed to Rio from states across the country, as well as cybersecurity and bio- and nuclear-security units, said Adm. Ademir Sobrinho, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of Brazil’s armed forces. Adm. Sobrinho emphasized that some details—such as the number of vehicles to be deployed to Rio—remained to be nailed down.

But even as officials try to reassure the public that the games will be safe, some analysts say the government could be underestimating risks from within Brazil.



"The borders are irrelevant," said André Luís Woloszyn, a former intelligence analyst for the Brazilian government and currently an independent security consultant. "The biggest risk comes from lone wolves, Brazilian nationals."

Looming Problems Ahead of the Rio Olympics

Just five weeks before the Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro faces unusual problems that pose challenges for one of the largest sporting events in the world. Photo: Getty

Foreign intelligence agencies have identified a number of Brazilians who declared allegiance to Islamic State, Mr. Woloszyn said. The radical group recently began to post Portuguese-language propaganda to encrypted web pages and messaging platforms.

Mr. Moraes on Wednesday said Uruguayan authorities told Brazilian authorities that they had lost track of Syrian native Abu Wa'el Dhiab, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee who was resettled in Uruguay in 2014 and may have entered Brazil, but he added that there were no indications that Mr. Dhiab was in Brazil.

Concern about the financial situation of the state government of Rio de Janeiro, another problem for the Games, has eased after the federal government transferred 2.9 billion reais (\$878 million) to the state to help it plug a gaping hole in its budget. Police who hadn't received all or part of the salaries in recent months will get their back wages on Wednesday, Mr. Moraes said.

The justice minister sought to quell concerns about rising crime in Rio, arguing that the new inflow of money will permit the state to equip police to deal with any local security issues during the games.

"The resources are being liberated, and we will mobilize trained and capable forces," he said. Messrs. Jungmann and Moraes said Brazilian security forces have perfected the coordination of state and federal security forces, such as the military police, federal police and armed forces, since the country hosted the World Cup two years ago and the Pan-American Games in 2007. All security cameras from across the city will be streamed into the Integrated Center of Command Control, built before the World Cup, he said.

"The World Cup was an apprenticeship," said Mr. Moraes. "We are doing all the necessary tracking, all the intelligence gathering, to give peace to the Brazilians and foreigners coming to the Olympics."

Unlike during the World Cup, there is no plan for the armed forces to occupy the city's informal, working-class neighborhoods known as favelas, though there will be forces available to support state police if necessary.



Brazil Finds Portuguese-Language Islamic State Social Media Threatening Olympics

Source: <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/07/06/jihadist-threat-looms-rio-olympics/>

July 06 – **The Spanish newspaper *El País* reports that Brazil's Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has evidence indicating that the Islamic State and other terrorist groups are looking to encourage attacks on tourists and athletes in Rio de Janeiro this August.** The newspaper cites reports in Brazilian publication *Veja* suggesting that ISIS is working to encourage "lone wolves," using the term not to mean individuals with no ties to ISIS (as it is often used in the United States) but to refer to jihadists connected with ISIS online but not controlled by a terror leader on the ground in Brazil.

An ABIN document obtained by *Veja* allegedly states that "one of the greatest government concerns is following the radicalization of individuals ideologically aligned with the Islamic State." This is not the first time such reports surface of the threat of ISIS rising in Brazil. As early as March 2015, Brazilian law enforcement officials warned that the nation could be a soft target for jihadists, particularly because, due to its lack of a history with terrorist activity, Brazil does not have anti-terrorism laws on the books that would allow for the online monitoring necessary



to catch threats before they develop.

Authorities have intercepted some jihadi correspondence, and have found that the Islamic State has developed a Portuguese-language channel on the encrypted communications app Telegram, popular with jihadists because it offers privacy from governments. A national security source told Reuters: "We understand that the creation of an account can be the opening of a door to radicalize Brazilian."

While Brazil does not have much of a history of Sunni Islamist activity, Shiite organizations tied

more difficult for Sunni groups to establish a prolonged organizational presence there but would not effect terrorist activities by individuals inspired by Sunni jihadists abroad.

The *El País* report confirms at least the transient presence of Islamist suspects in the region. A national security analyst confirmed the existence of a human trafficking ring passing through Brazil, helping individuals from the Middle East with suspect backgrounds reach the United States.

At least one of these individuals is Jihad Ahmed Diyab, a former Guantánamo Bay detainee with ties to Al Qaeda who had lived for years in Uruguay. Diyab allegedly left Uruguay to spend Ramadan in Brazil, but this week Brazilian officials confirmed they had no record of Diyab entering the country. Authorities believe he is using a fake passport, and have not indicated that they know where Diyab may have gone. Diyab walks on crutches and cannot speak Spanish, Portuguese, or English, limiting his ability to blend-in inconspicuously.

The last time Brazil became an attractive target for ISIS was in



to Iran have a long-established presence in a region known as the "Tri-Border Area," which straddles Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. Hezbollah has established numerous "cultural centers" and fronts there, according to American national security experts. The presence of Shiite terrorist groups may make it

2014, when they were still the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and Brazil was hosting the FIFA World Cup. At the time, ISIS terrorists used their online accounts to threaten Brazil, hijacking the hashtag #WorldCup to post photos of severed heads and doctored photos of explosions over World Cup venues.

Neuroscience of terrorism: Inside the mind of a Takfiri terrorist

Source: <http://presstv.ir/Detail/2016/07/05/473695/Neuroscience-terrorism-mind-Takfiri>



July 07 – Imagine you are contacted by a recruiter and have been asked to go get an explosive belt from their agents. Then you are instructed to go to one of the most crowded places near you and kill as many people as you can before you detonate your vest. Yes while you are still wearing it.

Probably you cannot imagine that. Or you may be thinking what kind of psychological illness

you should have to be able to even picture such a scene. But at the moment, there are quite a large number of people around the world who are following such instructions.

What can make a sane human being be able to commit mass murder? What is the voice inside their heads when they are about to kill themselves on their own volition for the cause of a group or organization? Almost none of these people suffer from any form



of acute or chronic mental illnesses. They are not intrinsically deranged or psychotic. So how do they do evil? What's going on in their brains that can hush their instinctive urge not harm themselves or others?

Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, from the US Marine Corps, who was part of a study on the cognitive and social underpinnings of Daesh, argues that Takfiri terrorists are not abnormal – in the sense that they are suffering from any specific kind of malady – as they are actually behaving in accordance with the norms of rationality within their own organization.



“What we classify as evil is influenced by the local moral order or culture in which we live. It has been said before and remains historically valid that what one culture calls a terrorist another culture calls a freedom fighter.”

In only the past few weeks, terrorists – most of them followers of Daesh Takfiris -- killed hundreds of civilians around the world. As the group is losing land in the territories under its control, the Takfiris are becoming a sophisticated stateless terrorist institution. This is because they recruit locally. But how?

Most of the recruits join terrorist groups because they feel frustrated, estranged or disenfranchised, or believe they are the victim of some sort of injustice.

Political psychologist John Horgan, who is a professor of global studies and psychology at Georgia State University and has written a number of books on terrorism, says scientists have been trying for over 50 years to understand the defining characteristics of a terrorist mind; the continuous ebb and flow of

chemical and cultural influences that make a terrorist.

Psychologist Steve Taylor, a senior lecturer at Leeds Beckett University, believes that adolescent boys are more prone to recruitment and radicalization because at this age they are looking for a sense of purpose and belonging.

Us versus them

Once the young recruits feel they are part of a family, the leaders start developing the us-versus-them mentality that will enable them to turn off or hold back their empathy for the victims of the group's terrorist operations. This also help the recruiters make perfect operatives because the new members are less likely to form independent opinions as an individual and more likely to support the group's decisions or actions. The groupthink will even further their radicalization.

Social psychologist Clark Richard McCauley, the director of the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College, notes

that stripping recruits of individuality will make them place the goals of the group first, and points out that this is a strategy used by modern militaries. This way, even a member who disagrees with a group's decision will remain silent for the fear of consequences of voicing dissent, and won't be able to leave the group either because such groups have no sympathy for deserters.

Despite the Islamophobic propaganda abounding in the Western mainstream media, it is too facile to blame the ideology of the group since the Takfiri faith that Daesh uses to justify their killings has nothing to do with any religion, let alone Islam. However, young converts to Islam are more vulnerable to radicalization because they lack a deeper knowledge and understanding of the religion that can help them reject extremist arguments.

According to Max Abrams, a professor of political science at Northeastern University, members of groups like Daesh are “ignorant



people with respect to religion and are generally the newest members to the religion.” Now it’s on us to try to understand the source of agony that drives the youth to the path of terrorism and not to simply call terrorists evil. As philosopher Alain de Botton says, to be

mature is to learn to imagine the zone of pain in others in spite of the lack of much available evidence. People may not look as if they are going through a psychological ailment but “we need to imagine the turmoil, disappointment, worry, and an aggressive surface.”



Islamic State Boils Seven of Its Fighters Alive for Deserting Battle

Source: <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/07/05/islamic-state-boils-alive-7-jihadist-deserters/>

July 05 – The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) reportedly boiled alive seven of its own jihadists Monday as punishment for deserting an Iraqi battlefield.



“The terrorists ran away from a conflict in Sharqat in the Salahuddin province and were killed by order of Islamic State on Monday,” reports the *Daily Mail*.

Unnamed local sources reportedly revealed that “before being thrown into a giant cauldron of boiling water, the seven absconders had their hands and feet bound tightly making absolutely sure of no escape.”

An anonymous informant in Fallujah, which was one of two major ISIS strongholds in Iraq until it was recently liberated, told the American Herald Tribune that the jihadist group had executed 19 of its own fighters last month for fleeing battles.

91% of EU citizens believe ISIS will pose threat to Europe in next 5yrs - poll

Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/349638-isis-threat-eu-poll/>



July 06 – A majority of EU citizens believe Islamic State will pose a serious threat to Europe over the next five years and that attacks such as those that rocked Paris in November 2015 could happen again, a recent poll revealed.

The survey ‘Project 28’ conducted by the Szazadveg Foundation, an independent think-tank organization, was [concluded](#) in April this year. However, it was only published after the Brexit referendum in the UK.

One of the questions the think-tank asked was: “How likely do you expect that a terrorist attack like what just happened in Paris could happen in your country?”


The Paris attacks, claimed by Islamic State (IS, formerly



ISIS/ISIL) militants, killed at least 130 and injured more than 400 people in November 2015.

According to the poll, 36 percent answered *“it is very likely”* that a Paris-style attack would happen in their country. Another 50 percent believe the attack is *“likely”* to happen. Only 13

HOW LIKELY DO YOU EXPECT THAT A TERRORIST ATTACK LIKE WHAT JUST HAPPENED IN PARIS COULD HAPPEN IN YOUR COUNTRY?




percent think IS attacks won't happen in Europe in the nearest future, the poll added.

Europe is on high alert after the recent terror attacks in France and Belgium that claimed about 180 lives. Numerous reports have emerged, saying that IS plans to attack European cities this year.

According to the poll, respondents saw a direct link between mass illegal migration and terrorism, with 65 percent *“agreeing with the statement that the migrant wave increases the threat of terrorism in their country.”*


PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU FIND THIS STATEMENT TO BE TRUE OR UNTRUE: THE INFLUX OF IMMIGRANTS TO THE COUNTRY WILL INCREASE THE THREAT OF TERRORISM



The majority of respondents (91 percent) believe IS will be “a serious threat” to Europe over the next 5 years.

“ISIS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks, so the assessment of Islamic State gaining ground

HOW SERIOUS A THREAT DO YOU BELIEVE ISIS WILL BE IN EUROPE OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS?



was also an important part of our research. We asked the respondents how much of a



threat they felt that the Islamic State will pose in Europe over the next five years. In response ...61 percent thought it will be a very serious threat and 30 percent thought that it will be a somewhat serious threat.”

In April, *Das Bild* newspaper reported that Islamic State is planning terrorist attacks on resorts in southern Europe, including France, Italy and Spain, adding that suicide bombers are expected to be disguised as beach vendors.

In 2015, Hungarian media repeatedly said that terrorists disguised as refugees may easily sneak into Europe. Later, it was revealed that Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Paris attacks' mastermind, boasted how easily he had slipped into the EU disguised as a refugee.

Five officers killed by a sniper in Dallas

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160708-five-officers-killed-by-a-sniper-in-dallas-updated>

July 08 – Five police officers were killed, and seven officers and two civilians injured, on Thursday by **25-year old Micha Xavier Johnson**, who opened fire on the officers during a protest march in Dallas.



During a 3-hour standoff with the police, Johnson said he was not associated with any group or organization, and that his only purpose was to kill White people – especially White police officers. It was the deadliest attack on law enforcement officers since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Three suspects, whose relationship with Johnson is being investigated, have been arrested – one near the place of the shooting, and two others after being stopped at a traffic light.

Johnson was killed by a police bomb, which was carried to where he was hiding by a police robot.

The march in Dallas, like similar marches which took place at the same time in other cities, called for justice after the police officers in Louisiana and Minnesota shot and killed two African Americans – 37-year old Alton Sterling and 32-year old Philande Castilo – earlier this week.

The *Washington Post* reports that Johnson said “more will die,” claiming to have planted explosives throughout the area.

The suspect “told our negotiators that the end is coming and he’s going to hurt and kill more of us, meaning law enforcement, and that there are bombs all over the place in this garage and downtown,” Dallas Police Chief David Brown said.

“We are being very careful in our tactics so that we don’t injure or put any of our officers in harm’s way, including the citizens of Dallas, as we negotiate further,” he added.



Chief Brown said the shooting had been carried out by snipers who fired down on a demonstration in the city's downtown area that until that point had been peaceful, the chief said.

They "planned to injure and kill as many law enforcement officers as they could," Brown said.

"Some were shot in the back," the chief said. "We believe that these suspects were positioning themselves in a way to triangulate on these officers."



Brown said he was not sure if there were more suspects at large. "We still don't have a complete



comfort level that we have all the suspects," he said.

Mayor Max Geron tweeted to say that no explosives were found in two searches of the downtown area.


Another suspect turned himself into police voluntarily. He was later released by police.

"We still don't have a complete comfort level that we have all the suspects," Brown told reporters

earlier. "We will continue a rigorous search of downtown until we are satisfied that all suspects have been captured."

When Brown spoke to reporters, he said that two suspects were positioned on top of a downtown parking garages and had purposely targeted police officers. "They planned to injure and kill as many law enforcement officers as they could," he said.

"We are reaching out to the families of these officers and bring them to the hospitals," Brown said in a press conference.



It has now emerged that Johnson was the only shooter, and that the police – and march participants – initially thought there were several shooting because of the echo effect of the many shots Johnson had fired.



Michael Krol, Patrick Zamarripa and Brent Thompson are three of five men killed

The Dallas Public Transportation System (Dart) said on Twitter that all bus and rail services had been suspended after the attacks. The FAA also issued a temporary restriction on all flights over the downtown area.

“There has been a vicious, calculated and despicable attack on law enforcement,” President Obama told reporters Friday morning after a meeting with European leaders in Warsaw, after speaking by phone with Mayor Mike Rawlings of Dallas.

Obama went on: “Police in Dallas were on duty doing their jobs, keeping people safe, during peaceful protests. These law enforcement officers were targeted, and nearly a dozen officers were shot. Five were killed. Other officers, and at least one civilian, were wounded. Some are in serious condition, and we are praying for their recovery.”

Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch said Friday that federal officials were on the scene and working with local law enforcement to help investigate the attack.

“This has been a week of profound grief and heartbreak and loss,” Lynch said during remarks Friday. Noting that the attack in Dallas happened during a protest sparked by police shootings, she added: “After the events of this week, Americans across our country are feeling a sense of helplessness, uncertainty and fear ... but the answer must not be violence.”

Police say officers have been targeted in Missouri, Georgia and Tennessee

Source: <http://fox2now.com/2016/07/08/police-say-officers-have-been-targeted-in-missouri-georgia-and-tennessee/>

July 08 – Police say officers have been targeted in Tennessee, Georgia and Missouri in the aftermath of two high-profile killings of black men by law enforcement.

The attack in Tennessee occurred hours before the killing of five police officers in Dallas on

Thursday night during a protest. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation says the attacker told authorities that he was frustrated by the recent killings by police of



black men in Louisiana and Minnesota.

Police have not disclosed a motive in Friday's attacks in Georgia and Missouri, which have been described as ambushes.

In a fourth attack early Friday, a motorist fired at a police car as the officer drove by. In all, four officers were wounded. The officer wounded outside St. Louis is in critical but stable condition. The wounded officers are expected to survive.

A suburban St. Louis police chief says a motorist shot an officer three times as the officer walked back to his car during a traffic stop.

Ballwin Police Chief Kevin Scott said at a news conference Friday that the attack happened around 11 a.m. and was captured on video.

St. Louis County Police Chief Jon Belmar says the suspect, who is in his 30s, "ambushed" the officer, who is in critical but stable condition. His identity wasn't released.

The shooting comes amid heightened tension following an attack in Dallas in which five police

officers were killed and seven others and two civilians were wounded.

Dallas police say the slain suspect in the killings of five police officers had bomb-making materials, ballistic vests, rifles, ammunition, and a personal journal of combat tactics at his home.

They also say that people they interviewed have described 25-year-old Micah Johnson as a loner.

The department also said in a statement Friday that detectives have interviewed more than 200 members of law enforcement and that "it appears at least 12 officers" fired their weapons when someone opened fired on police Thursday night. It happened during a demonstration to protest the recent killings of black men by police in Louisiana and Minnesota.

Police killed Johnson using a robot-delivered bomb after negotiations failed.


They say detectives are in the processing of analyzing the information contained in the journal.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: How protective is the vest seen in this photo? One of the officers was shot just below the vest. And it was not the first time! Change vests before it is (again) too late...



A new shift on terrorists' modus operandi?



In an apparent first, Dallas police used a robot to deliver bomb that killed shooting suspect

Source: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/07/08/dallas-police-used-a-robot-to-deliver-bomb-that-killed-shooting-suspect/>

July 08 – A standoff between police and one of the suspects in a Dallas shooting spree, which left at least five police officers dead and seven others wounded Thursday night, ended after **the suspect was killed when a robot delivered and detonated explosives** where



he was holed up, according to local law enforcement officials.

The move represents a potentially unprecedented use of robots to deliberately deliver lethal force in domestic policing, according to experts, raising questions about how local law enforcement officials are deploying the high-tech tools that increasingly fill their arsenals.

"We saw no other option but to use our bomb robot and place a device on its extension for it to detonate where the subject was," Dallas Police Chief David Brown said at a news conference Friday morning. "Other options would have exposed our officers to grave danger."

Attempts by a hostage negotiator to persuade the suspect to surrender were unsuccessful, and he exchanged fire with the police during the standoff, Brown said. Three other suspects are in custody, according to police. A senior U.S. law enforcement official familiar with the investigation identified the deceased suspect as Micah Xavier Johnson.

The shootings in Dallas occurred at the end of an otherwise peaceful demonstration spurred by police shootings this week that killed Philando Castile in Minnesota and Alton Sterling in Louisiana.

The Dallas Police Department did not immediately respond to inquiries about the exact robot used in the standoff.


But bomb disposal robots typically work like advanced remote-controlled vehicles, featuring camera feeds that are transmitted back to operators so that they can direct the units in potentially dangerous situations from afar.

According to N.R. Jenzen-Jones, the director of weapons research group Armament Research Services, robots of the likes used to examine explosive devices and manipulate small obstacles have been used frequently to deliver different types of explosives to help breach doors or clear obstacles. Jenzen-Jones said, however, that he had never heard of a robot delivering a payload that was meant to kill a subject, and was surprised that Dallas police had been so forthcoming about that information.

Peter Singer, a New America senior fellow who specializes in the future of security, also believes this to be the first time such a bot has been used to deliver an offensive explosive in a domestic policing action. However, similar tactics have been used in war zones, he said.

In his book "**Wired for War**" Singer noted incidents when U.S. troops in Iraq jury-rigged primitive remote-controlled robots to deliver antipersonnel mines into alleys where they believed insurgents were hiding. Those situations were ad hoc uses, Singer told The Post, not an established policy per se. But he noted reliance

on robotics is on the rise in the military and by local law enforcement.



"The military has over 12,000 robotic systems today — and police all over the place use robots for bomb disposal and surveillance," he said.

The way the robot was used in the Dallas case is likely legally no different from sending an officer in to shoot a hostile suspect, according to University of Washington law professor Ryan Calo.

Still, the Dallas Police Department's decision to use the unit in this way could have a major

effect on how the public views the increasing integration of robots into daily life, he said.

"Obviously, if one of the ways we start regularly using robots is to kill people, their deployment will cause people to have a severe, potentially fearful, reaction," he explained.

However, Calo doesn't think that this instance signals a descent down a slippery slope to a dystopian robotic police state.

"I don't expect police to use robots like this except in extreme situations as happened in Dallas," he said.

I'm Already Tired of the 'Lessons' of Chilcot. What Can We Learn from a Report That Ignores Iraqis?

If Blair and Bush were sincere about the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, they would have invaded North Korea

By Robert Fisk

Source: <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/07/07/im-already-tired-lessons-chilcot-what-can-we-learn-report-ignores-iraqis>



So where are the Titans now? I've often asked that question but today, I realise, Blair wanted to be a Titan. Up there with the Churchills and the Roosevelts and Titos and — dare I suggest — the Stalins. Men who made the earth move. Maybe that's why Chilcot's achievement was not to prove that Blair was a war criminal but that he was a midget.

Just take that cringing quotation to Bush on 28 July 2002. "I will be with you, whatever." Sure, we understand the political importance of this tosh. Blair was trying to sound Titan-like. but proved in legal terms that what he meant was: I will be with you — whatever the British people think.

But it's got deeper roots than that. I have a hunch this was the Blair version of the infinitely more powerful words of Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal representative to wartime Britain, who — exhausted, but asked to speak to an audience in Glasgow — looked down the room at Churchill and tried to express his love for the great man's stand against Hitler and Roosevelt's support for Britain as she stood alone against Nazi Germany. Hopkins quoted the Bible. Churchill wept as he spoke. "Whither thou goest," Hopkins said, "I will go... Even unto the end."

And the best our little Tony could say was: "I will be with you, whatever." It's the "whatever" bit that gives the game away, of course; a kind of tossed-out line, the midget's version of "even unto the end", an "aw-shucks come-hell-or-high-water, you can rely on me".

"If we brought in the real human beings called Iraqis, their evidence would have indeed been worth a Nuremburg trial."

And this, remember, was not a spokesman for the US president telling the British prime minister that he could depend on America. Wee Tony tweaked the whole sorry quotation to turn himself into Roosevelt, and Bush into Churchill. So earnest was he in the imitative role he had constructed for himself that Blair

could not see, when he used these words, that they undermined any moral foundation the future invasion of Iraq might have had in British eyes.

But I'm already tired of the "lessons" of the Chilcot report. We must learn from what we did



wrong, we mustn't do it again – Cameron repeated the same doggerel, although he might apply it to his own knavish Brexit tricks – and we really, really must get it right before we blunder into more wars that cost hundreds of British lives, millions of dollars and tens of thousands of other chaps who got in the way but don't feature as human beings in the Chilcot report.

That's the real problem, I fear, with the flagellation of Lord Blair. Yes, he sure was a nasty piece of work, lying to us Brits and then lying to us again after Chilcot was published, and then waffling on about faith and "the right thing to do" when we all know that smiting vast numbers of innocent people – and even bringing about the smiting of a vaster number of the very same Muslims, Christians and Yazidis up to this very day – was a very, very bad thing to do. For these victims – anonymous and almost irrelevant in the Chilcot report – we cannot say "even unto the end", because they are dying unto the present day. The real "end" for these victims cometh not even yet.

But here's an underlying dishonesty about Chilcot's reflection on Blair's dishonesty. The evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was not strong enough, but it was – according to Lord Blair – still worth getting rid of Saddam. But surely if he was really sincere about the dangers of WMDs, he and Bush would have invaded a nation which undeniably did possess and boasted about them: North Korea.

Now there's a crazed dictatorship, butchering its own people, threatening the world – in 2003, just as today – yet not once has anyone, let alone Blair, suggested we should invade North Korea even unto the end and all the way up to the Yalu river. And we know why. Because North Korea really *does* have WMDs. Lord Blair and Bush would never have dared consider a military adventure against the beloved Kim Jong-un. For the same reason, Blair would never have advocated the invasion of a Muslim nation which is packed with Islamist extremists who knife, shoot and burn to death their infidel enemies and who also possess nuclear weapons, WMDs writ large and boasted about and tested: Pakistan.

I'm leaving out here a peace-loving Middle East nation which possesses even more nuclear weapons than Pakistan and North Korea combined, but mercifully treats all those it occupies with immense respect, never steals their land and always treats those others with whom it comes into contact during colonisation projects with total respect for their human rights. Yet why not mention, for that matter, the Iranians? Blair has an odd habit of targeting enemies which are also hated by the aforesaid peace-loving nation – and would presumably like to assault before they actually are able to possess nuclear weapons and therefore immediately become un-invadeable.

Poor old Saddam, he told the truth – that he didn't have WMDs – and thus doomed both himself and the poor old Iraqis to mass death.

And that's the point, isn't it? The Arabs of Iraq – and now Syria – endure human disaster on an unprecedented scale because of the Blair-Bush lies, yet all Chilcot can produce with his seven years of literary endeavour and volumes to break the strength of any library shelf is a puny little domestic report on British politics and the self-righteousness of the midget who got it all wrong.

We weep for our British military martyrs, for such is how the Arabs refer to their wartime dead, yet scarcely a single suffering Arab was to be heard in the aftermath of Chilcot. The Iraqis were not allowed to give evidence; the dead Muslims and Christians of Iraq had no-one to plead for the integrity of their lives. Had their case been made, Chilcot's report would have gone on to the crack of doom. It would have been longer than the Holy Bible, the Holy Koran, the entire corpus of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov, Proust, Shakespeare and Dante – though the latter's circles of hell would certainly have caught the measure of the suffering of Iraq and Syria.

No. It was, in reality, a midget report on a midget man. That's why, if we brought in the real human beings called Iraqis, their evidence would have indeed been worth a Nuremburg trial. And yet, in the end, weren't the ranks of obsequious, strutting, lying and defeated Nazis on the bench at Nuremburg also midgets? Even unto the end. Whatever.

Robert Fisk is Middle East correspondent for The Independent newspaper. He is the author of many books on the region, including [The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East](#).



Should Security Perimeter Around Airports Be widened?

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2016/07/should-security-perimeter-around-airports-be-widened/>

July 08 – **The terrorist attack on Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul has again renewed the debate among security experts about whether the United States and other countries under threat should widen the security perimeter beyond the airport terminal.**

Some have suggested that the Transportation Security Administration should explore ways to screen passengers and luggage offsite, perhaps in satellite parking lots or access roads, as it's done in Israel and some conflict zones, or at least at the entrance to the terminal.

Others argue that layering on more security might just create more inconvenience than additional safety. A wider perimeter requires additional resources to keep it secure. And a confrontation can only be pushed back so far and for so long: wherever there's a checkpoint, there's usually a crowded line, and nothing is as vulnerable to mass casualties as a crowd. And it turns out that Turkey was screening passengers at the entrances of its airport.

In a recent interview former DHS security adviser Fran Townsend acknowledged that terrorists have demonstrated an ability to modify their tactics whenever new security measures are added. But she also suggested that

identifying and engaging with attackers further from an enclosed space makes sense.

"So, in the example of Turkey, they do have a preliminary screening right as you come in through the main door. And every time you harden, and push out your preliminary screening point, they find another vulnerability," Townsend said. "The Turkish response, the law enforcement response there, was very quick. The numbers could have been much worse."

"You have to come to grips with the idea in a free and open society and public spaces, they're never 100 percent secure. We can take measures to mitigate these risks, but you're never going to get it to zero," she concluded.



Another Dead Blasphemer—in Scotland

Source <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/06/another-dead-blasphemer-in-scotland.html>

July 08 – **Asad Shah was a much-loved Muslim shopkeeper in Scotland's first city of Glasgow. Embodying the slogan of his mosque: Love for All and Hatred for None, he would post inclusive social media messages such as "a very Happy Easter, especially to my beloved Christian nation," and the locals loved him for it.**



Yet, on the eve of Good Friday this year, Tanveer Ahmed, a fellow Muslim, appears

to have driven 200 miles from Bradford to Glasgow in his licensed Uber car in order to stab Asad 30 times all over his body, stamp on his head and then sit laughing on his chest.

Asad, tragically, died from his wounds later that night. With her nation in shock, Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon attended a vigil in Asad's memory, and he was buried just over a week later.

The truth behind why Asad was killed makes for uncomfortable and ugly reading.

Mohammad Faisal, a friend of the Shah family, described the murderer as "bearded," wearing a long Muslim "religious robe" and addressing Asad in his native language before killing him.

Police have in fact charged the suspect Tanveer Ahmed with "religiously prejudiced" murder. For Asad was an Ahmedi Muslim,



a minority sect persecuted as “heretical” by much of Pakistan’s Sunni Muslim majority. With these facts in mind, Asad Shah has probably become Britain’s first spillover case of Pakistan’s ongoing and vicious blasphemy inquisition being waged by that country’s increasingly belligerent mullah mafia.

The Ahmedis emerged in North India under the British Raj in the 1800s, and their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmed from Qadian claimed to be the embodiment of Jesus the Messiah, returned. Such a claim has certainly caused controversy among the Sunni Muslim majority within the Indian Subcontinent.

Regardless, only the stone-cold and heartless could ignore the campaign of persecution that has been unleashed since upon Ahmadis by my fellow Sunni Muslims, especially those of the Barelwi denomination. Many would expect extremists, such as the Khatme Nubuwwat group that enforces the Finality of the Prophet, to celebrate Asad’s murder online. Beyond that, we would prefer to assume the best in Muslims, and insist that the extremists are but a “tiny minority.” A closer look reveals a dispiriting and disturbing truth.

Just how widespread and institutionalized this persecution is, are questions that few want to ask.

This is because, as the previous case of Salmaan Taseer highlighted, to defend “blasphemers” in Pakistan is likely to get you killed even if you’re the powerful governor of Punjab, Pakistan’s richest province. Taseer’s killer, Mumtaz Qadri, was recently executed by the Pakistani state, but nevertheless glorified and anointed by the inquisitor mullahs as a “*ghazi*” (warrior), who died a “*shaheed*” (a holy martyr), while defending *namoos-e-Rasool* (the honour of the Prophet).

After Qadri’s execution, the Barelwi Muslim leadership held widespread street protests in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, demanding that the government accept a list of their demands. These included imposing their version of Sharia as law, to immediately execute all blasphemers including Aasia Bibi (the allegedly “blasphemous” Christian woman Salmaan Taseer died defending), the immediate release of all those convicted for killing to defend the “honor of the Prophet,” for the state to officially declare Mumtaz Qadri a “*shaheed*” on national media, to expel all members of the Ahmedi

community from Pakistan (that’s 2 percent of the population), and to terminate immediately the positions of Ahmedis working in government departments.

Most devout Barelwi Sunni Muslims in the West take their religious instruction directly from Pakistan, and there remains a powerful flow of ideas coming from their leaders in the Punjab.

Nearly a week before Asad’s murder the imam of Scotland’s largest mosque, also in Glasgow, Maulana Habib Ur Rehman, used the messaging platform WhatsApp to show his support for the now-executed Mumtaz Qadri. In messages seen by the BBC, the Imam said that he was “disturbed” and “upset” at Qadri’s execution. He then added the epithet “*rahmatullahi alaihi*” after mentioning Qadri’s name. This is a religious blessing usually given to devout Muslims and meaning “may God’s mercy be upon him.”

In another message, he says: “I cannot hide my pain today. A true Muslim was punished for doing which [sic] the collective will of the nation failed to carry out.” This, from the most senior imam at Glasgow Central Mosque, a role which involves leading prayers and giving religious guidance to an entire community.

Police are also investigating links between Sabir Ali, head of religious events at Glasgow Central Mosque, with Sipah-e-Sahabah, a banned Pakistani terror group from the Deobandi sect that persecutes Shia Muslims, also for alleged “blasphemy.” And yet, just as Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon had attended the vigil in memory of Asad Shah, she also chose the Glasgow mosque to hold a minute of silence after the recent Brussels attacks.

Few in wider society are prepared to acknowledge just how deep Sunni prejudice against alleged blasphemers can run.

This thirst for an inquisition is not found only among extremist groups, nor limited to these key figures in the U.K.’s largest mosques. It is also present to worrying levels in the wider community.

Recently, *Luton on Sunday*, a local newspaper, carried a double-spread advertisement celebrating 125 years since the Ahmadiyya movement was founded. That paid advert prompted such a level of complaints from the wider



Sunni Muslim community in Luton that it led to this groveling response by the newspaper:

"Last week the *Luton on Sunday* carried an advertisement from the Ahmediyah... We would like to make it clear that we completely disassociate ourselves from the content of the advertisement... On Friday we met with representatives from the Muslim community to discuss the advertisement which we had accepted in good faith but now understand has caused offence to members of the Muslim Community in Luton."

Included is a quotation from one of the "community leaders" the newspaper met with which thanks them for their sensitivity over a matter relating to the "fundamental beliefs of all Muslims."

But as with all things, the mosque imams and "community leaders" find succor in the stance taken by those in authority among them. Look no further than the Pakistani High Commission in London to behold the truly institutionalized nature of this "Blasphemy Inquisition."

Any British dual-national seeking to apply for a passport, or even an identity card, to travel to Pakistan visa-free is asked to partake in the persecution. Upon applying for our papers we are expected to sign a declaration attesting—among other religious interferences by the state—that "I consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmed Qadiani to be an imposter nabi (prophet) and also consider his followers whether of the Lahori or Qadiani group to be non-Muslim." Hundreds of thousands of British-Pakistani Muslims have had little choice but to participate in this ritual that normalizes the Blasphemy Inquisition, in order to gain their identity cards.

If we contextualize Asad Shah's murder by placing it in this hostile climate, as we must, then we begin to realize the horrifying level of persecution facing those deemed heretical, such as Ahmedis or other "blasphemers."

Over the years, in survey after survey, British Muslim attitudes have reflected dangerously high levels of support for enforcing "blasphemy" taboos. A 2007 poll found that 36 percent of young British Muslims thought that apostates should be killed. A 2008 YouGov poll [found](#) that a third of Muslim students claimed that killing for religion can be justified, while 33 percent expressed a desire to see the return of a worldwide theocratic Caliphate. A ComRes poll commissioned by the BBC in 2015 found that a quarter of British Muslims sympathized with the *Charlie Hebdo* "blasphemy" attacks.

By any reasonable assessment, something has gone badly wrong in Britain, and a solution must start on the ground, within the communities where the problem has festered for so long. It starts from a recognition that religious extremism has gained *significant enough* traction for it to pose a danger.

For Asad Shah's sake, for all those persecuted for their religious choices, or lack of, we must speak up. Just as all of us, black or white, are responsible for challenging racism, and just as all of us, gay or straight, are responsible for challenging homophobia, all of us, Muslim or not, are responsible for challenging this religious extremism. Denial that a generational struggle, no less than the civil struggle to challenge racism, lies ahead of us is no longer a viable option.

Is AQIM Preparing an In Amenas-Style Attack?

By Jessica Moody

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45608&no_cache=1&mc_cid=d42ab590af&mc_eid=6b175f7276#.V4HpX6KWsgU

July 08 – In late May, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed it had attacked an Areva-operated uranium mine in Arlit, northern Niger ([Alakhbar](#), May 24). AQIM attributed the alleged assault to its al-Nasser brigade and said the attack was carried out with Grad-type missiles ([Alakhbar](#), May 24). There were no reported injuries or damage as a result of the attack and the Nigerien government even denied the assault had taken place ([Alakhbar](#), May 26). Areva made no comment.

AQIM said its alleged attack had taken place in spite of strict security measures at the facility, although security at the mine has come under some scrutiny in recent years ([Alakhbar](#), May 24).

The Arlit facility was bombed in 2013. The attack, which left one person dead and 14 others injured, was blamed on the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Mourabitoun ([Le Sahel](#), May 23, 2013; [Middle East Online](#), May 24, 2013).





The purported rocket attack on the Arlit facility came amid a series of AQIM attacks on soft targets in West Africa that include: a hotel in Bamako, Mali in November 2015; a hotel and a cafe in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in January 2016; and a beach resort near Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire in March 2016 ([RFI](#), November 20, 2015; [le faso](#), January 16; [Koaci](#), March 15).

The Arlit assault, however, also follows a rocket attack carried out on a gas facility run by BP and Statoil in Krechba, Algeria in March. These attacks raise questions about whether the group intends to target more high-profile foreign owned or operated assets going forward and if AQIM has the capabilities to conduct such attacks ([TSA](#), 21 March).

AQIM's Intentions

It is highly likely that AQIM intends to carry out further attacks on infrastructure and extractive facilities in West Africa. Such assaults are key to recruitment efforts, enabling the group to tap into widespread grievances in the region surrounding resource management and the perceived "theft" of resources by international organizations.

Shortly after AQIM claimed responsibility for the alleged Arlit attack, the group issued a warning to other multinational organizations in West Africa that they were also targets for AQIM attacks. The group stated that the region was "not a place for theft" and that "[their] wealth should not be extorted" ([MEMRI](#), May 26).

This echoes sentiments expressed after the Krechba attack in Algeria in March and the Burkina Faso attack in January. Following the latter assault, AQIM declared that the attack had been carried out as a result of deals being made "to rob the wealth of Africa" in that country ([RCSS Middle East](#), February 3).

The statement appeared to be a reference to the transitional period between late 2014 and early 2016 in Burkina Faso. During this period,

numerous demonstrations were launched against foreign mining companies for allegedly stealing local wealth without investing in longer term development ([le faso](#), June 5, 2015).

In the case of Niger, the rocket attack occurred just weeks after Areva was faced with strike action at Cominak, its other uranium mine in Niger ([Pulse.ng](#), May 3). Workers protested over the company's alleged failure to pay promised bonus payments in full ([Pulse.ng](#), May 3). AQIM likely hopes that the conduct of such attacks will help it to play into these local grievances, potentially assisting the militant group in its recruitment efforts.

Potential for High-Profile Attack

Although the latest infrastructure attacks in Algeria and Niger will have concerned foreign companies, they have not caused nearly as much damage as the 2013 In Amenas attack in Algeria, which left more than 30 foreign hostages at the gas plant dead ([RFI](#), January 19, 2013). It is likely, however, that AQIM will seek to replicate that more effective and conspicuous assault.



Its desire to stage an In Amenas-style attack is closely linked to the way in which AQIM has become bolder and more aggressive in its assaults since it re-allied with al-Mourabitoun following the Bamako attack in November 2015 ([RFI](#), December 5, 2015). The merger of the two groups has contributed to an apparent rejuvenation of AQIM, which had struggled to carry out any significant attacks between 2007 and 2015 and had largely restricted itself to hit and run attacks in northern Mali.

The reunion has brought Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al-Mourabitoun and the alleged mastermind of the In Amenas attacks, back into AQIM. Belmokhtar, who believes conventional warfare against Western forces is ineffective, and who is known for his penchant for “spectacular” attacks, is likely to push AQIM to conduct ever more high-profile assaults on extractive facilities.

The rivalry between AQIM and Islamic State (IS) will further entice the group to carry out a more significant attack in West Africa. The increasing frequency of AQIM attacks and their timing, which has often coincided with IS assaults, suggests the group is trying to ensure it is not out-done by the more radical agenda of IS.

The Bamako attack, for example, came just 10 days after the IS Paris attacks in November 2015; and the Ouagadougou attack occurred almost immediately after IS carried out an attack in Jakarta, the group's first assault in Southeast Asia.

A “spectacular” attack similar to In Amenas would likely attract new followers and enable AQIM to draw back some of its support base, which it has been hemorrhaging to IS in recent years (see [Terrorism Monitor](#), March 3). Several key militant groups in the AQIM stronghold of Algeria, including the al-Ansar Brigade, al-Ghuraba Brigade, and Jund al-Khilafa, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria, have declared their affiliation with IS since its proliferation ([al-Jazeera](#), September 14, 2014; [al-Jazeera](#), March 8, 2015).

Expanding Militant Network

The attacks carried out in Algeria and Niger, in March and May of this year respectively, display AQIM's ability to launch missile attacks on extractive and infrastructure facilities in the region. However, as far as the available information shows, the attacks were not

particularly effective – neither was reported to have caused any damage or injuries.

This implies that while AQIM might be contemplating an In Amenas-style assault, this type of attack is at present beyond the group's capabilities. Such an assault would require extensive planning and personnel and possibly more advanced weaponry. Such requirements could explain why, despite targeting extractive facilities twice in the past six months, AQIM has favored less complex missile assaults in both cases. Neither attack has caused anywhere near as much damage – either physical or reputational – to its foreign targets as the In Amenas assault.

Nevertheless, the task the group faces in conducting a more significant infrastructure attack may become gradually easier over the coming months. AQIM demonstrated during its assaults in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Grand Bassam that it has been expanding its networks and links to local militant groups throughout the Sahel. This expansion has enabled AQIM to carry out attacks some distance outside of its traditional strongholds, including one in southern Cote d'Ivoire in March ([Global Observatory](#), April 6).

Ethnic groups, including the Fulani, the Bambara, and the Songhai, have all been sought out to join the group, and AQIM has formed a number of battalions from these various ethnicities ([MG Africa](#), February 14; [Global Observatory](#), April 6; [al-Jazeera](#), January 17, 2013). Meanwhile, the group has ties to the Force de Libération du Macina (FLM) and Ansar Dine, which are active in central and southern Mali ([Global Observatory](#), April 6).

Under a more aggressive AQIM leadership, an expanded following may be capable of carrying out more sophisticated assaults on infrastructure and extractive facilities. The weakness of security within the region and the vast and increasing availability of weaponry will also make the planning of such an assault feasible in the medium term.

Security forces in West Africa are frequently weak and corrupt; militaries are often undermanned, and borders lack adequate security measures and checks ([Vanguard](#), June 18, 2015).

Tracking a single militant can require considerable resources. It has been suggested that all of



France's Operation Barkhane's resources have been required to arrest a single insurgent or destroy large caches of weapons. [1] This situation has been exacerbated by the effects of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the Malian crisis, which have seen weapons and ammunition flood the Sahel, allowing militant groups to easily obtain large stores of heavy weaponry ([Reuters](#), November 24, 2011).

AQIM has also proved itself to be extremely adaptable. Despite Operation Barkhane's efforts to destroy vast quantities of weaponry in the region, the group's members in northern Mali have learned how to build their own bombs using fertilizers. [2] Additionally, the flexibility of AQIM and its use of various divergent cells makes it much harder for security services to predict, prevent, or stop attacks. A Malian military officer in 2009 said that AQIM groups evade capture by ensuring they "move fast and never stay in one place" ([BBC](#), November 23, 2009). Added to this, AQIM's *Katibas* (brigades) operate largely autonomously, meaning that while security personnel may be monitoring the central command, they struggle to track all of the affiliated battalions simultaneously.

Heightened Security

Amid regionally weak security, the effect of the In Amenas attack on multinational organizations and local militaries has almost certainly been to force them to increase their security measures and review risk planning at extractive facilities, ideally better preparing them for a similarly "spectacular" attack.

This was most apparent after the Krecbba assault in which security forces reacted quickly, mounting a security operation around the gas field, killing four militants and wounding another three ([Alalam](#), March 21; [PressTV](#), March 20). Both BP and Statoil withdrew their staff from the facility, preventing any hostage situation from unfurling, and Sonatrach employees later claimed that production actually increased in the aftermath of the attack ([Algeria Press Service](#), March 22). Although the withdrawal of BP and Statoil staff was undoubtedly costly and administratively taxing, the level of impact was in stark contrast to the In Amenas attack, which caused much more prolonged reputational and physical damage to the gas

plant. Consequently, an attack on the scale of that assault may be much harder for AQIM to carry out now than it would have been for al-Mourabitoun in 2013.

While in the longer term AQIM will aim to carry out a significant attack on foreign extractive assets, such an attack is unlikely in the immediate future. The attacks on soft targets in Bamako, Ougadougou, and Grand Bassam were relatively effective and required limited planning and resources. The likelihood is that these more "cost-effective" assaults will remain a staple for the foreseeable future, while the group builds its capacity over the next 12-18 months.

Possible Future Targets

AQIM has cited troop contributions to the UN's MINUSMA mission in Mali and other counter-terrorism operations across the Sahel as its main reason for conducting attacks outside of Mali ([Global Observatory](#), February 29; [Alakhbar](#), May 24). Niger is involved in the peacekeeping mission and is home to a French intelligence and a US-drone base, making the country a key target. It is highly likely that if AQIM is able to conduct a more sophisticated infrastructure assault in the longer term, it will take place in another West African country involved in the peacekeeping mission.

It is also notable that both Algeria and Niger are involved in long-running resource management disputes with their populations. AQIM called the attack in Arlit a response to "crusader thieves" who had "plundered" Niger's resources ([MEMRI](#), May 26). Facilities in countries with equally controversial resource management regimes provide much more "legitimate" targets for AQIM, enabling the group to more effectively tap into local grievances over resource nationalism.

The purported Arlit rocket attack should serve as a warning to extractive companies that more aggressive insurgent assaults on multinationals are on militant groups' agendas and are likely to become more pervasive as insurgencies throughout the region gain prominence.



NOTES


[1] Author interview with Francois Rihouay, freelance journalist based in Bamako (May 16, 2016)

[2] Ibid

Daesh lost 12% of territory in Iraq, Syria since 2016

Source: <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/07/10/474535/Daesh-IHS-Syria-Iraq>

July 10 – **The Daesh Takfiri terrorist group has lost 12 percent of the territory it already held in Syria and Iraq in the first half of 2016, a British think tank says.**



According to a report released by the **IHS Conflict Monitor** on Sunday, the territories under the control of Daesh, which started its reign of terror in Iraq and Syria in 2014, are increasingly shrinking due to a string of setbacks it suffered last year and in the past months.

In 2015, Daesh territory “shrunk by 12,800 square kilometers to 78,000 square kilometers, a net loss of 14 percent,” the IHS said, adding, “In the first six months of 2016, that territory shrunk again by 12 percent. As of July 4, 2016, it controls roughly 68,300 square kilometers in Iraq and Syria.”

On December 22, 2015, the IHS reported that the terror group had lost control over more than 13,000 square kilometers of the territory it

controlled in the two Arab countries since January, a net loss of 14 percent.

In another report on March 16, the think tank said that Daesh had lost a further eight percent since the beginning of January.

“Over the past 18 months, it has continued to lose territory at an increasing rate,” said Columb Strack, a senior analyst at the IHS and lead analyst for the IHS Conflict Monitor.

As Daesh territory “shrinks and it becomes increasingly clear that its governance project is failing, the group is re-prioritizing insurgency.

As a result, we unfortunately expect an increase in mass casualty attacks and sabotage of economic infrastructure, across Iraq and Syria, and



further afield, including Europe,” Strack added.

On April 18, the think tank reported that revenues obtained by the terror group had dropped by about 30 percent since the previous year, forcing the terrorists to impose a new array of taxes on people under their control.

It added that **as of March 2016, Daesh's revenue dropped to USD 56 million, as its oil production, comprising 43 percent of its revenues, had gone down from 33,000 barrels per day to 21,000.**

About 50 percent of Daesh's revenue come from taxation and confiscation of businesses and property. Drug smuggling and the sale of electricity and donations have made up the remainder, the April report added.

According to Strack, in the coming year it is likely to see more towns and cities become isolated from the terror group, as was the case in Ramadi and Fallujah in Iraq.

“This could enable the fragmentation and gradual defeat of the Islamic State as a

conventional force,” he added, using an alternative for Daesh.

Firas Abi-Ali, a senior principal analyst at the IHS, said as Daesh suffers more losses in the two Arab countries, it further expands its terrorist attacks outside these countries to make their followers and other people believe that “it is still gaining support and expanding its influence, despite setbacks in Iraq and Syria.”

He noted that for groups like Daesh, “the battle for hearts and minds is just as important, if not more important, than the military confrontation.”

In February, the European Union's criminal intelligence agency, Europol, said up to 5,000 trained members of Daesh were at large in Europe. Some 30,000 militants from over 100 countries have reportedly traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2011 to join the ranks of Takfiri terrorist groups.

Wahhabism, which forms the ideology of Daesh, is the radical ideology dominating Saudi Arabia and freely preached by clerics in the Arab country.

Terrorist recruitment

By Dr Fawad Kaiser

Source: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/11-Jul-16/terrorist-recruitment>

July 11 – **One of the more dreadful features of the Islamic State's regime is that it has managed to recruit suicide bombers to die for a country that doesn't even exist, and which, if did would not even be their own.**



Until recently, suicide bombing was a tactic practised by civilians in revolt against an occupying army. But in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and Europe, the Islamic State has used this tactic aggressively. Nonetheless, the brutal nihilism of the jihadi movement continues to attract young men and women from Europe, the US, Middle East, Central Asia and the subcontinent. None of the

simple explanations for this stands up to reality. Simply western foreign policy cannot be blamed since the Islamic State is fighting a sectarian war against almost entirely Muslim armies, and its most effective enemies, Iran and its allies, are also enemies of America and Europe.

Difficulty is finding the level of socially disparate groups that recruits to the global jihad, and this is unfortunately outside the scope and competence of the intelligence agencies. The growing threat of terrorism stems from the eagerness with which many young men and women from other parts of the world are being lured by religious fanatics. Nothing confirms this better than the increasing involvement of radicalised youths from Europe, United States Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. It is this globalisation of terrorist networks that spells doom for many countries though the hand of foreign recruits is also evident in the barbaric acts carried out by the so-called Islamic State.



Recruitment tactics in the current global jihad is a phenomenon that has been studied by government, security services, academia and the media throughout the US and Europe up until the rage of recent terrorist attacks surprised the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh. The gravity of attention to this phenomenon will take further time, but the indispensability of such endeavours became quite clear with the attacks in Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. Previously seen as a relative backwater in the war on terrorism, Middle East and Asia are now on the frontline. It is trench warfare, the harder you get at them the stronger they come back.

The recent geographical extension imposed by the Islamic State necessitates serious concern. Strictly speaking, it would be impossible to consider the Saudi Arabia dimension of the global jihad as an isolated phenomenon. Instead it is intertwined with individuals, organisations, ideologies and situations across the world. Jihad is truly global in nature, and it would amount to folly to ignore its close links to the Middle East, South East Asia, Central Asia and North Africa. The idea for the terrorist analysts is to examine the level of changing pattern of recruitment activity as it unfolds in Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia, and whether it has a direct impact on the US and Europe, or affects other countries.

While some may be surprised by the actual number of individuals being recruited for terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh, this may not be the case. Since to present reliable figures on Saudi Arabia terrorists would require access to restricted government information across Saudi kingdom, needless to say, this would not possible to obtain, nor is it actually desirable. Several recent remarks by officials from European security services state that terrorist recruitment is on the rise.

Taking these remarks into consideration, and at the same time assuming that evidence exists to verify claims, focus remains on the general trends exemplified by specific cases. An obsession with numbers would likely result in a skewed and potentially misleading analysis. Central question that should be answered is **what future trends are to be expected in the recruitment to jihad in Europe and Islamic countries.** In short, will Europe and Islamic countries experience a decline or an increase

in recruitment to “Islamist” terrorism in the near to mid-term future? One is inclined to argue that they are likely to see increased participation in the global jihad.

This development could lead to the assumption that threat from IS terrorism has not been annulled. While it is true that some terrorists have been put under considerable pressure, this perspective emphasises the organisational structure of a more or less defunct terrorist organisation, and does not take the wider social context into consideration. To simplify the argument, the war on terrorism has not been successful because although the al-Qaeda has suffered irretrievable losses IS has simultaneously managed to metamorphose into a new rapidly growing terrorist threat.

Something that unites a very diverse group of militant Islamists is their decision to make a link to jihad. Previously, the radical mosques facilitated these contacts and served as important recruitment localities. But by constantly applying pressure on militant circles they either became exposed or have slowed down their activities considerably. This approach however, did not eliminate the further recruitment of terrorists but it has pushed IS militants to consider other options. **There are signs that recruitment pattern has changed due to the intensive surveillance of radical institutions, which has forced militants further into different thinking.** Instead they have now formulated a different strategy to recruit, and the continuing terrorist attacks signal a new development in which IS seems to be operating.

Another stage in the war on terrorism has reached where young Muslim men educated in prestigious colleges and universities and raised in affluent backgrounds are being recruited. More importantly, after selection they are reported missing, or they disappear from their homes for months and their parents seem to have no knowledge about their whereabouts or information about the radicalisation of their children except for them becoming more interested in religion. In spite of the police reports registered by their parents there has been no information about what they were doing during their disappearance.

The behaviour profile emerging from the individuals involved in Pakistan, US, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh terrorist attacks



suggest that the first signs of such a development were invisible for the law enforcement agencies in their terrorism risk analyses. There is a strong case to argue that this may no longer be a simple case of missing children scenario, but the hidden act of terrorist recruitment in process.

Anti-terrorist operations and arrests of suspects are the visible element in contemporary counterterrorism. These are, needless to say, indispensable, but do not address the roots of the problem. **Intelligence and security**

services should also, while fighting terrorism, concentrate on behavioural profiling that will allow them to better understand the ideological, cultural, educational, and social factors of this phenomenon in order to counter it efficiently. Averting the next attack obviously is a priority, but this can only be done when there is a thorough understanding of the changing tactics of IS recruitment strategies. The role of security services is vital but is only the tip of the iceberg.

Fawad Kaiser is a professor of psychiatry and consultant forensic psychiatrist in the UK.

French journalist goes undercover with Islamic State terror cell

Source: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-11/undercover-with-an-islamic-state-terror-cell/7583246>

July 11 – A French journalist has infiltrated a group of self-radicalised young men, secretly filming them for six months, to understand what motivates them to aspire to be terrorists.

The Muslim reporter, who uses the alias Said, told Four Corners he could "go to places that my colleagues can't".

"With a tiny hidden camera, I am going to try to show what happens behind the scenes of this organisation that controls its image so strictly, to show what is really going on in their heads," he said.

Said, using a third party to communicate to protect his identity, told Four Corners he found an angry, menacing group of young men, with little understanding of Islam, using faith as a cover for their violent intentions.

"For me the principal lesson is, they have no fear," he said.

"They are some lost people without reasons to fight and without real ideology.

"If you search into their past, you will find the real reason: a failure, a girl, absent parents ... they need to find a reason to be happy."

Said used social media to first make contact with the group, setting up a Facebook account using a pseudonym, following radical groups who support the Islamic State (IS) group and engaging with users who preach extremist views.

It did not take long for him to receive dozens of friend requests from people with similar profiles.

Over several weeks, Said attempted to build trust across the social networks.

Eventually, one member of a group invited Said to join Telegram, a secure messaging platform where messages are encrypted and self-destruct.

The contact called himself Abu Oussama in tribute to Osama bin Laden and went on to introduce the journalist to other members.

Next, Said arranged a face-to-face meeting with Oussama, the 20-year-old French-Turkish citizen, the "emir" of the group, who lives at home with his father.

Oussama boasts of his five-month jail term served for terrorism — and the ease with which he tricked authorities to release him on "good behaviour".

He tells Said he wants to join the fight in Syria, and displays a hypnotic attraction to a martyr's death and the riches that would follow.

"I want to throw myself upon the infidels," he said.

"I want to kill them and I want to die afterwards. I want Allah to make me a martyr."

'I was impressed at how easy it was to bypass authorities'

Online, the group's extreme militancy becomes quickly apparent.

They use Telegram to express their fanatical views and organise themselves, without any fear of censure or exposure.

"What surprised me was that the police couldn't do anything against encrypted messaging and false identity," Said said.



"I was impressed at how easy it is to bypass authorities."

During several clandestine meetings, conducted in parks and fast food restaurants — all captured on film — Oussama outlines to Said his plans to carry out attacks on military bases, newspapers and television studios in France.

"Blood needs to run. It needs to run a lot," he said.

"They have to die in their thousands. In thousands, in thousands. I want to see thousands of French people dying."

'You're a dead man'

On several occasions, Said was put to the test to see if he could be trusted.

In one instance, he was instructed to collect a message from an anonymous militant who had recently returned from Raqqa, the ISIS heartland.

As Said waited on a train platform, a woman in a niqab walked over and handed him a handwritten letter.

The note laid out shocking plans for an attack in France:

"We can aim for a place with lots of people ... nightclubs or cabarets in Paris ... perverted places that are frequently attended by the disgusting infidels. We'd need one or two suicide bombers

inside ... Once he's inside he can wait until it's filling up and then he can go for it."

After receiving their instructions, the group's plans escalate.

Oussama uses Telegram to organise the purchase of guns, and Said secretly films the group going to the location where the weapons are concealed.

But before he can take his findings to authorities, police conduct surprise raids on the group, arresting several of the members and foiling their plot.

Oussama was arrested, and Said believes many of those he met are now in prison.

But he has cut off all communications with the group.

After the raids, he received a warning text message from one of the members: "You're a dead man."


He remains concerned for his own safety.

"I have to be careful, I can't go anywhere and I can't put pictures of myself on the web," he said.

"Last week, I left a party because it was being filmed and broadcast live on the internet."

Said hopes that in showing the deluded, fanatical and amateur behaviour of the young men susceptible to IS radicalisation, his film will reveal them for what and who they really are.

"I see lost, frustrated, suicidal boys, easily manipulated," he said.



CounterTerrorism Calendar – 2016 Edition

Source: https://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar.pdf

This edition, like others since the Calendar was first published in daily planner format in 2003, contains many features across the full range of issues pertaining to international terrorism: terrorist groups, wanted terrorists, and technical pages on various threat-related topics. The Calendar also marks dates that terrorists may believe are important if planning attacks to commemorate particular events.

Why Islamists (Occasionally) Desecrate Islamic Holy Sites

By Tarek Fatah

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6104/why-islamists-desecrate-islamic-holy-sites>

Monday's suicide bombing outside the tomb of Prophet Muhammad in Medina, Saudi Arabia, sent shock waves throughout the Islamic world. The fact a Muslim carried out this act of terror during the holy month of Ramadan has left many followers of the Islamic faith in disbelief. Too many Muslims have fallen for the common refrain, trumpeted by Islamists, that no Muslim could carry out such an act and hence neither Islam nor Muslims can be held accountable for it in any way.



These arguments have been used every time Islamist terrorists engage in mass killings, from 9/11 in New York to the massacre in Dhaka, Bangladesh, last week. But the facts tell us a different story regarding the turbulent history of Islam and the roles played by Muslims within it.

Academics and scholars are reluctant to discuss these historical facts for fear of being accused of bigotry and racism. Thus ordinary Muslims, to say nothing of non-Muslims, do not commonly know them.

The result is a Muslim community unaware of its own often bloody history, going back centuries, when both our holy cities -- Mecca and Medina -- were attacked, ransacked and destroyed, not by the "kuffar" (non-Muslims), but by Muslim leaders.



They fought for power, using Islam as a tool to enhance or entrench their political hold on the states they created.

Fanatical, politically motivated, and radicalized Muslims have never hesitated to desecrate Islam's holy sites.

As early as October, 683 AD, the Umayyad caliph of Damascus invaded Mecca, then under the control of a rival caliph, and bombarded the ancient shrine of Black Kaaba, the holiest site in Islam.

The Kaaba, where Muhammad preached, was destroyed in the fighting. A new one was constructed, but the worst was yet to come.

As schisms increased within the Muslim world based on who was the rightful heir to Islam, in 899 AD a new sect of Islam emerged known as the Qarmatians. It embraced elements of Ismaili Shia Islam with Persian mysticism and was based in what is today Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province.

The "Hajarul Aswad" (Black Stone) embedded in the eastern corner of the Kaaba



During the Hajj season of 930 AD, the Qarmatians invaded Mecca, destroyed the Kaaba and stole the pre-historic "Hajarul Aswad," the Black Stone that was embedded in the eastern corner of the Kaaba itself.

They further desecrated the Zamzam Well by stuffing it with corpses of the defenders. It wasn't until 22 years later that the Black Stone was brought back and placed back into the Kaaba's eastern corner.

Skiping over the centuries, we have the 1805 invasion of the Prophet's city, Medina, by the first Saudi state.



Imbued with a fierce zealotry, the Wahhabi warriors of Muhammad Ibn Saud overran Medina and started to destroy Islamic shrines. They even tried to destroy the magnificent dome structure over the tomb of Prophet Muhammad, removed all precious objects from his gravesite and looted the treasury of the mosque itself.

After occupying Medina these Muslims, who came from the neighbouring region of Nejd, systematically leveled the "Jannat al-Baqi" cemetery, the vast burial site adjacent to the Prophet's mosque that housed the remains of many of the members of Muhammad's family, close companions and central figures of early Islam, including his beloved daughter, Fatima.



These acts of sacrilege were re-enacted by a new generation of Wahhabi zealots led by Abdel-Aziz Ibn Saud during the second Saudi state, a century later.

Juhayman al-Otaybi after his capture

On April 21, 1925 the rebuilt tombs and domes in Medina were once again bulldozed. Had it not been for intervention and diplomacy by

then Prince Faisal (later King), who was in command of the regular Saudi army, the Wahabbis would have destroyed Prophet Muhammad's tomb as well.

As recently as November 1979, radicalized Muslims from around the world, including the U.S., Pakistan and Egypt, led by Saudi fanatic Juhayman al-Otaybi, took over the Holy Kaaba and killed many people during a two-week siege.

The moral of the story is that no matter how often Muslims refuse to acknowledge our history, it will not hide the mess we have created that we now refuse to cleanse. Let us own up to it and stop blaming others for it.

Tarek Fatah, a founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress and columnist at the Toronto Sun, is a Robert J. and Abby B. Levine Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

ISIL transfers suicide bombers from Syria to Europe through Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia: Report

Source: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-transfers-suicide-bombers-from-syria-to-europe-through-azerbaijan-cyprus-georgia-report>

July 11 – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants have begun using a new route through Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Georgia to transfer their suicide bombers from Syria to Europe, Turkish daily Milliyet reported on July 11, citing intelligence officials.

According to the daily, Turkish intelligence officials, who cooperated with foreign intelligence services, determined that ISIL recently tasked its militants from Azerbaijan and the Northern Caucasus to carry out attacks in Turkey and Azerbaijan. ISIL planned attacks in Turkey and Europe after

suffering defeats in the hands of U.S.-led coalition forces in Syria, the report also said.

The jihadist group planned to continue targeting Turkey, due to the latter apprehending the former's members and carrying out operations against it, according to the intelligence officials.

In addition, it was determined that ISIL formed a group of 20 to 25 militants in Syria and tried to send them to Turkey a short while ago after the IDs of a number of its militants were exposed in operations



carried out in the country. The General Directorate of Security sent a warning notice to provincial security directorates in April regarding these developments, according to reports.

The General Directorate of Security reportedly sent another warning concerning ISIL attackers from Azerbaijan and the Caucasus in June, saying the militants were planning suicide attacks in Turkey and Azerbaijan. The aforementioned militants planned to attack police officers and their families in Azerbaijan, the report said.

Meanwhile, another warning which was sent to provincial security directorates after ISIL's attack on Istanbul's Atatürk Airport on June 28,

which left 45 people dead and scores wounded, reportedly informed the police on the jihadist group's new targets in Turkey. The warning, which was sent on June 30, stressed that ISIL militants in Ankara and Istanbul were planning attacks on military and police buildings with bomb-laden cars.

ISIL wanted to assassinate Kurdish public officials, journalists and military and intelligence officials working in Ankara, Istanbul and the western province of İzmir, the warning also said.

Turkey has been on high alert, as the country has been rocked by a series of suicide and car bomb attacks which claimed many lives and wounded hundreds.

Brazil cops arrest man over 'planned airport terror attack' three weeks before start of Rio 2016 Olympics

Source: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/brazil-cops-arrest-man-over-8395185>

July 11 – Brazil cops have arrested an African over a 'planned airport terror attack' three weeks before the start of the Rio 2016 Olympics.



The 32-year-old immigrant was held in the city of Sao Sebastian near Brasilia after his wife claimed he was preparing a massacre .

She told cops he was planning to “blow up” the capital's Juscelino Kubitschek International Airport.

The couple were being quizzed this morning after an initial search of the suspect's house failed to uncover any explosives - but located a return plane ticket to Pakistan.

Local reports said the detainee had entered Brazil as a refugee during the 2014 World Cup and he was born in Algeria despite ID documents pointing to him being from Pakistan.

His wife told police they wed outside Brazil and he had married again after arriving in South America using fake documents so he could obtain a visa to stay.

The 2016 Summer Olympics are due to start in Rio on August 5.

Earlier this month Rio de Janeiro state police officers who claim they are owed months' pay greeted tourists arriving at the city's main airport with a sign saying “Welcome to Hell” - claiming it was not a safe place.

The run-up to the games has been affected by increasing concerns over police brutality and police officers' ability and desire to keep people safe.”

Brazil has one of the highest levels of



homicides in the world, with around 42,000 people killed with guns every year according to Amnesty International.

Brazil's national intelligence agency warned in April the threat of a terror attack by Islamic State sympathisers was rising.

A tweet sent by an ISIS member last November declared: "Brazil, you are our next target."

Brazil's Counterterrorism Director Luiz Alberto Sallaberry confirmed it was genuine.

Leaked images appear to show the dead body of Dallas killer Micah Johnson

Source: <http://metro.co.uk/2016/07/11/leaked-images-appear-to-show-the-dead-body-of-dallas-killer-micah-johnson-5999936/>



Images have emerged purportedly showing the dead body of Dallas sniper Micah Johnson after he was killed by a 'bomb robot'.



In the unverified photos, what seen lying on a pile of rubble. The authenticity of the images Police Department, but a former

they are consistent with the remote controlled bomb that was used to kill Johnson. Speaking to MailOnline, Bryan Woolston said: 'The most significant injuries would have resulted from the blast over pressure generated by the detonation.

'This would have created a blast wave of pressure far higher than normal atmospheric pressure, causing catastrophic injuries to the cardiac, respiratory, gastrointestinal organs and other soft tissue. These injuries alone could cause death.

'Additional injuries would have resulted from the secondary fragmentation created by the blast. But unlike an explosive device such as a hand grenade, that is designed to fragment, bare explosives have no casing and therefore do not have a primary fragmentation danger.'

Johnson was killed after police used a bomb robot to detonate a plastic explosive as he crouched behind a wall.

The 25-year-old former Army reservist told police he was upset about the recent shootings of black suspects, after killing five police officers.

appears to be Johnson's body can be alongside a sniper rifle.

is yet to be confirmed by the Dallas US Army explosive technician says that



It is the first time that the technology has been used to neutralise an armed suspect in America, and Woolston believes that 'catastrophic' internal injuries would have killed him.

The photos of Johnson's body surfaced on the website of author and lawyer Mike Cernovich, who claims to have received them from an unidentified source.

How Much Should Israel Fear ISIS?

Israel Broadcasting Authority

July 12, 2016

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6112/daniel-pipes-how-much-should-israel-fear-isis>

IBA: Dr. Daniel Pipes is the founder and president of the Middle East Forum and a prolific commentator on the Middle East. He joins me now to discuss the threats on Israel's borders. Dr. Pipes, welcome.

Pipes: Thank you.

IBA: What should Israel be more concerned by: ISIS in the north or ISIS in the south?

Pipes: The northern situation is certainly more dangerous to Israel than the southern, in that Egypt is a stable government at this point, and it's just a matter of some hundreds of marauding ISIS affiliates. Whereas in the north, there is of course no stability whatsoever, and the dangers are much greater.

IBA: Yes, but in the immediate term, we have ISIS pressed up against the Egyptian border, and in the north they're kept away by slightly less unsavory territory.

Pipes: Well, actually, an ISIS-affiliated group, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, is right at the border with Israel, and it's quite striking that neither has this ISIS affiliate attacked Israel nor have Israeli forces attacked it. Which I think points to the fact that the Israelis perceive ISIS as less of a threat than the Iranian-backed Syrian regime and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah organization—which is an assessment I would agree with.

IBA: That might explain why we haven't hit back at ISIS, but it doesn't explain why ISIS hasn't hit Israel, and that's a flourishing conspiracy theory in the street to explain why we haven't experienced a Brussels or a Paris. Why is that?

Pipes: Well, there have been efforts, I think, by ISIS, to penetrate Israel and to have explosions and attacks within Israel. But for this ISIS affiliate on the border of Israel to attack Israel would be suicidal. Its firepower is far less than that of the IDF. And while ISIS overall has shown very little strategic vision and is willing to attack everyone and anyone, I think even ISIS understands that this would not be a wise undertaking.

IBA: In terms of the suicide explosion, God forbid, in one of Israel's cities, along the lines of Paris or Brussels—

Pipes: That would certainly be advantageous to ISIS, but for this ISIS affiliate on the border to attack Israel directly in a military operation would be suicidal and would not attain its goal.

IBA: They're afraid of an Israeli response.

Pipes: Right. But I think they do want to attack within Israel, as they want to attack almost everywhere.

IBA: So is the reason they haven't succeeded the strong efforts of the Israeli security forces, or is this for want of trying?

Pipes: It's both. I mean, the Israeli security has been effective and they have not been focused on Israel. Israel is an ultimate goal of a group like ISIS, but far more immediate are the Muslim countries. In particular, Saudi Arabia, but also Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Jordan—

IBA: Right, on the question of Saudi Arabia—what was ISIS thinking, attacking a major Muslim shrine?

Pipes: As I said, ISIS is not very strategic. ISIS does not think how to gain friends and influence people. ISIS just goes and attacks. It's doing the same in Turkey. It had a pretty good working relationship with the Turkish government and now it's killed hundreds of people in multiple violent attacks. In Jordan, it had pretty good standing in Jordan, and then it burned alive a Jordanian pilot.

IBA: But there was definitely a strategic switch, where it went from focusing on building a caliphate to attacking the far enemy, which had always been al Qaeda's strategy. Why was that?

What's it hoping to gain from attacking European cities?

Pipes: It's hoping to win the support of Muslims, and indeed that does happen. At the same time, I would argue that while there are some Muslims, who you can number in the



thousands, who say ISIS represents the caliphate, the vision of Islam that they endorse—I would say far greater numbers of Muslims are repulsed by it, are scared of it. So, again and again, ISIS is not strategic, ISIS is just going directly at the goal and ignoring the many enemies—look at the enemies it has throughout the region, with the slight exception of the Turkish government, the Qatari government, the Saudi government, but even there, they've turned against it.

IBA: Looking at other regional actors then, today marking ten years since the onset of the Second Lebanon War, and we've seen an unprecedented period of calm on the northern front. Under what circumstances might Hezbollah decide that it's time for another round?

Pipes: I think Hezbollah will likely decide that when its duties in Syria are over and it can retreat to Lebanon and can then focus on Jerusalem as its goal as opposed to Damascus, but at this point that's not an imminent prospect.

IBA: Okay. Dr. Pipes, thank you very much.

Pipes: Thank you.

ISIS prepares followers for end of caliphate

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160713-isis-prepares-followers-for-end-of-caliphate>

July 13 – In the face of an ever-more-effective campaign by the U.S.-led coalition — a campaign which has substantially reduced the size of the ISIS-controlled areas in Iraq and Syria; decimated ISIS's oil-production and distribution infrastructure; killed many senior commanders and operatives; and, with the help of Turkey, choked off the flow of foreign fighters to replenish the organization's dwindling ranks — ISIS leaders have begun to prepare followers of the Islamist organization for the fall of the ISIS-established caliphate.

Fox News reports that ISIS has increased its terror attacks in other countries, but that in Syria and Iraq its position is rapidly deteriorating. Security experts note that the latest spate of terrorist attacks shows that even if ISIS is defeated in Iraq and Syria, the organization will still remain dangerous abroad.

"Where Al Qaeda was hierarchical and somewhat controlled, these guys are not. They have all the energy and unpredictability of a populist movement," Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden (Ret.) told the *Washington Post*.

ISIS officials have not minced words in describing the dire situation the organization faces in Iraq and Syria, grimly informing ISIS fighters that all could be lost soon. The *Post* reports notes that an editorial in ISIS's weekly Arabic newsletter acknowledged

that the territory it has controlled for two years could be lost.


ISIS officials insist that, in the long run, the organization's vision of a, Islamic caliphate across the Middle East is still viable, even if, in the short run, the caliphate experiment may fail. The organization's leaders also note that faced with the prospect of losing their territorial base in the Middle East, the group had "shifted some of our command, media and wealth structure to different countries."

"They don't want to lose territory," Cole Bunzel, a doctoral candidate at Princeton University's Near Eastern studies department who translated ISIS's editorial on the future of the caliphate, told the *Post*. "But they're trying to remind people that the group has a long history and they're going to persist, just as they did in earlier times."

Will McCants, a Brookings Institution researcher who also detailed the history of ISIS in a 2015 book (*The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State*), says that ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani has acknowledged that the group had made errors in its losses. According to the *Post*, an ISIS operative told a

Western journalist that some of the Islamist militants had become disillusioned because of commanders' mistakes. However, he added that once Raqqa falls, it would be avenged.

"There is a message to all members of the coalition against



us: We will not forget, and we will come into your countries and hit you,” he said, “one way or the other.”

ISIS leaders have not yet offered specifics about the organization’s post-caliphate strategy, but European officials say that this strategy is already being implemented.

“They are ... challenged as we adapt our strategy to their initial one, in order to start ‘de-sanctuarizing’ them,” a French security official told the *Post*. “But they will now expand to other tactics and start executing much more insidious and covert ops, in big cities. The next step, has begun.”

Truck-driving terrorist kills dozens celebrating 14 July in Nice, France

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160714-truckdriving-terrorist-kills-dozens-celebrating-14-july-in-nice-france>



July 14 – A big truck deliberately plowed into a crowd of people celebrating France’s 14 July Bastille Day, killing “several dozen” (“des dizaines de morts,” according to *Le Monde*) and injuring more than 100. **[84 dead; over 150 injured]**



The area where the attack occurred — Promenade des Anglais — is a broad boulevard which was closed to vehicular traffic in order to allow revelers celebrate into the night.

President Francois Hollande, Prime Minister Manuel Valls, and Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve are heading an emergency meeting of the French security cabinet.





Le Figaro reports that police officers positioned at the entrance to the Promenade des Anglais shot at the truck's cabin in order to stop the driver from entering the no-drive area, but the driver managed to



evade the shots and plowed into the crowd. Witnesses said that the driver accelerated in order to run over more people. With the police in tow.

Initial reports said that after the truck came to a stop, the driver was roughly pulled out of the cabin by angry people, who then handed him over to the police. The police has now confirmed, though, that police officers shot and killed the driver.





2012-2016 Terror attacks in France

March 2012: A French Algerian killed three soldiers, a teacher and three young students at a Jewish school in Toulouse. He was later shot dead.

23 May 2013: A convert to Islam named as Alexandre Dhaussy stabbed a French soldier in the neck at La Defense in Paris. The soldier survived the attack.

December 2014: A French national born in Burundi attacked several police officers at a station in Joue-les-Tour. He had a knife and shouted "Allahu Akbar". He was shot dead.

7 January 2015: Said and Cherif Kouachi shoot dead 12 people at the offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris.

8 January 2015: Amedy Coulibaly kills a policewoman before entering a Jewish supermarket in Paris where he shot dead four others. Both Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers were later shot dead by police.

26 June 2015: In a chemical factory near Grenoble, one man was beheaded and several others were injured. One man was arrested in what President Francois Hollande called a terror attack.

21 August 2015: Three off-duty marines overpowered an armed gunman on a high-speed train from Amsterdam to Paris. Three people including the suspect were injured. The Americans and several other passengers held the man down until police arrived. He was later arrested in Arras, northern France.

13 November 2015: Scores dead as men armed with Kalashnikovs and grenades carried out a series of attacks at restaurants, a concert hall and outside Stade de France in Paris. President Hollande has closed the borders and declared a state of national emergency.

13 June 2016: Police officer and his wife, a police secretary, stabbed to death inside their home near Paris by a man who said he had pledged allegiance to Islamic State.

14 July 2016: More than 70 people killed and scores injured when a terrorist drove a lorry into a crowd of Bastille Day revellers in Nice.



The Black Lives Matter Movement Is Heading To The Rio Olympics

By Travis Waldron (Sports Reporter, The Huffington Post)

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-lives-matter-rio-brazil-olympics_us_5786f996e4b08608d332f81f



Silvia Izquierdo/ASSOCIATED PRESS – A man protesting in Rio de Janeiro in April holds a sign featuring the images of people killed during police operations in favelas. The sign reads: “Rio, Olympic champion of killing Indians and black people for 450 years.”

July 14 – As protests continue throughout the country over the police killings of [Alton Sterling](#) and [Philando Castile](#), the latest African-American men to die at the hands of police, a coalition of [Black Lives Matter](#) activists will take their movement to a new place next week: Rio de Janeiro.

It's the latest effort to expand the Black Lives Matter message across the globe, and it comes at an important time. With less than a month to go before [Rio hosts the 2016 Olympic Games](#), the activists hope they can take advantage of the spectacle to highlight the city's rising levels of police violence and connect with Brazilian activists who are fighting a similar struggle.

“Police brutality is global. And Brazil has its own form of ruthlessness,” [Daunasia Yancey](#), the founder of Black Lives Matter's Boston chapter, told The Huffington Post. “The movement that came before and during and after Ferguson has been really intentional about a global struggle and understanding that our freedoms are all tied to each other.”

Yancey, one of the organizers who met with presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton in October, is part of a [coalition of activists](#) that plans to meet with organizations fighting police violence in Rio. The group will also include Rev. John L. Selders Jr. and Pamela Selders, who together led [Moral Monday protests](#) against police violence in Connecticut, and other activists who have worked with the Black Lives Matter movement.

Their trip to Rio is the work of Elizabeth Martin, the founder of [Brazil Police Watch](#), a Boston-based organization that has sought to draw American attention to police brutality issues in Brazil.

Martin formed the organization after Rio police shot and killed her nephew in 2007. She has since [organized petition drives](#) that call on the International Olympic Committee and soccer governing body FIFA to work with the Brazilian government to reduce the number of police killings in the country.



Last week, Sterling and Castile became [the 122nd and 123rd African-American men](#) shot and killed by police officers in the U.S. this year, [according to data compiled by The Washington Post](#). Police also shot and killed 258 black men in 2015, the Post found. A similar survey from The Guardian found that African-American men are [nine times more likely to die](#) at the hands of police than members of any other demographic group.

But the Black Lives Matter activists who travel to Brazil this month will encounter a comparable and perhaps even more widespread problem in Rio. Brazil is home to some of the world's deadliest police forces, and escalating violence in the years before the Olympics has only worsened the situation.

[Police in Rio de Janeiro state](#) have killed more than 2,500 people since the International Olympic Committee chose Rio as the 2016 host in 2009, according to Amnesty International. Police-related shooting deaths increased 40 percent in the state from 2013 to 2014, the year Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup, according to Amnesty's numbers. They rose yet again in 2015, when police in the state killed 645 people.

Seventy-nine percent of the victims of [police killings in Rio state](#) between 2010 and 2014 were black men, and 75 percent were between the ages of 15 and 30, according to Amnesty's figures. [More than half of Brazilians claim African heritage](#), with 7.6 identifying as black and 43.1 as mixed race.

"We're about all black lives," Yancey said. "For no police violence, for no state murders, of anyone under any circumstance."

'They're killing for you.'

Violence in Rio has recently escalated amid government efforts to regain control of many of the city's favelas — the low-income and long-neglected neighborhoods that dot Rio's landscape and are sometimes controlled by drug gangs. The program, launched just before Rio learned it would become the host of the 2016 Olympics, established Pacifying Police Units — or UPPs, their acronym in Portuguese — in neighborhoods like Rocinha, the city's largest favela.

The takeovers often led to violent military and police occupations of many favelas. And though the "pacification" process was initially supposed to include programs that brought basic social services to neighborhoods that had long lacked them, Brazil's ongoing economic crisis and other factors have gutted the social elements of the UPP program, often leaving occupation and violent interactions with police as their most visible legacy.

"The youth don't walk around here anymore because [they know they will be harassed \[by the police\]](#) anywhere they go," said Monique Cruz, a resident of Manguinhos favela, where a UPP was installed in 2013, according to news site RioOnWatch.org. "If there are boys who, by some chance, have a police record, they are already stalked by the police and are always accused of committing crimes, besides being black and young."

Black children have overwhelmingly been the victims of the escalation of violence between police and local gangs. A black Brazilian child is [the victim of homicide every 23 minutes](#), according to figures commonly cited by activists, and the number of [children and adolescents murdered in Brazil](#) — the majority of them black — has doubled in the last 20 years, UNICEF reported last summer.

Those deaths are not all the result of police killings. But [police were responsible for 1 in 5 homicides](#) in the city of Rio in 2015, according to Human Rights Watch.

In October, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child directly linked Rio's military police to an ["elevated number of summary executions of children."](#) The motivation, the UN body alleged, was an effort to "clean the streets" of street children in order to "present a problem-free city to the world" during the Olympics.

Local organizations and activists held protests in Rio last week to remember and draw attention to some of the children who were recently killed. One demonstration dramatically re-enacted [the 2015 deaths of five black and mixed-race youths](#), all between the ages of 16 and 25, who were driving home from a party in Rio's Morro da Lagartixa neighborhood when police sprayed their car with up to 30 shots (four police officers were arrested, three of them charged with murder).

Another recalled [the shooting of Eduardo de Jesus](#), a 10-year-old boy killed by police while he sat on his front stoop in the Complexo do Alemão favela in April 2015.

But those demonstrations were overshadowed by a group of Rio police officers who staged their own protest in the city's main airport. The officers, angry that Rio state's



crunched budget has left them unpaid for weeks, stood behind a sign that welcomed incoming travelers with the message, [“Welcome to hell!”](#) Another noted that 52 police officers had died in shootouts this year.

The message was clear. A month before hundreds of thousands of international tourists would swarm Rio, police officers in one of the world’s most violent cities were warning them: [“Whoever comes to Rio de Janeiro will not be safe.”](#)

The [security concerns](#) are real. Olympic athletes have been assaulted. Attacks on public buses have increased. In Rio’s North Zone last weekend, angry crowds stormed the streets and stole cars.

But activists, human rights groups and security experts worry that the segment of Rio’s population most vulnerable to police crackdowns has been left out of the “security for all” mantra that once defined the city’s regeneration efforts.

Activists like Martin and Yancey see similarities in the attitudes that underlie police brutality in Brazil and the United States. In the name of overall public safety, police in both countries have disproportionately targeted a group of people that they, and society as whole, have deemed undesirable and a threat to that security. And those people — primarily black, many of them poor and thus easily written off as gangsters, thugs, “bandidos” — in turn become *less* safe.

“The notion is that the police are keeping people safe,” Martin said. “Well, which people? And safe from who?”

Martin wants Rio’s Olympic tourists, especially those from a nation in the midst of its own conversations about police killings, to understand that Rio’s desire to ensure their security has an ugly cost.

“If the police are cleaning up — if they’re killing people — so that you can go to the Olympics, they’re killing on your behalf,” Martin said. “They’re killing for you, so you can be a spectator at the Olympics.”



CHRISTOPHE SIMON via Getty Images – Protesters in Rio de Janeiro hold a Brazilian flag littered with holes to mark the number of shots fired at a group of young men killed by police in 2015. Police killed 645 people in Rio de Janeiro state last year, according to human rights groups.

‘Everywhere the Olympics goes, state terror follows.’

Facing protests from community organizations and scrutiny from human rights groups, Brazil’s federal and state governments have [instituted some reforms](#) to reduce the number of police killings and tackle what human rights groups have called a “culture of impunity” for law enforcement officers who use lethal force.



Brazil has increased community policing training, installed cameras on law enforcement vehicles and reduced the use of rifles. Sao Paulo state, which will host Olympic soccer matches, passed [laws prohibiting police from driving injured individuals to the hospital](#) so officers would not interfere with a crime scene or even murder the person in transit to cover up a crime.

Rio state officials say the number of police-related killings has declined over the last decade, though many admit that there is still work to do.

[“We need much more training](#) to prepare the police for territories where we still have a lot of difficulty working,” Col. Robson Rodrigues, a retired member of the Rio state police, told The New York Times last year. “Policing activities still need some correcting.”

But if the number of police killings in Rio and across Brazil are any indication, reform efforts thus far have fallen short.

“This is not a problem that is ignored in Brazil,” said Paulo Sotero, the director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. “It’s just very, very hard to tackle, as the recent and recurring experience in the United States is highlighting.”

The Olympics may only make it harder, leaving behind a legacy of violent “pacification” efforts once the three-week party ends and tourists go home.

In Rio, 85,000 members of the police and military will be tasked with securing the city during the Olympic Games, and the government has invested heavily in new surveillance and security infrastructure to help.

This could all be useful for protecting tourists and athletes. But it might also have demonstrably negative effects on Rio’s poorest residents, who already endure the most scrutiny from law enforcement, especially because that infrastructure tends to remain in place once the Olympics end.

[“I come to ask that the Olympics do not leave a legacy of tears and blood.](#) But rights and a dignified life,” said Rio resident Ana Paula Oliveira, whose 19-year-old son was killed by police in 2014. Oliveira spoke at an event organized by Amnesty and other human rights organizations to denounce the violence, according to Brazilian news outlet Estadão.

“The middle-class and upper-middle-class people will continue to live behind security enclaves that they can afford,” said Kim Schimmel, a Kent State University professor and expert in the security legacies of major sporting events. “The poorer people will be even more at risk.”

Yancey shares these worries. She and Boston’s Black Lives Matter chapter [organized their own Olympic protests in 2015](#), when Boston launched a bid to host the 2024 Games. The Olympics could only worsen the problems the city’s black residents are facing, they argued, particularly their relationship with law enforcement.

“Everywhere the Olympics goes, state terror follows,” Yancey told HuffPost.

It is possible, too, that the Olympics could further limit Brazilians’ ability to demonstrate against such violence.

Law enforcement officials [violently cracked down on protests](#) across Brazil before the 2014 World Cup, including demonstrations over the disappearance of Amarildo de Souza, a Rio man whose death at the hands of police later [led to the arrest of 10 officers](#). But police could have even more power during the Olympics, thanks to new laws passed by Brazil’s federal legislature in 2015: an “anti-terrorism” bill that activists believe could be used to criminalize public gatherings, and a “General Law of the Olympics” — essentially required by the IOC — that Amnesty says [puts rights of public assembly and expression even further at risk](#).

Human rights groups’ fears about a lasting reduction of basic rights “are pretty well-founded,” said Pete Fussey, a criminologist at London’s University of Essex who has closely examined the security legacies of that city’s 2012 Olympics. “If you look at the history of Olympic security, that’s pretty much exactly what happens.”

“It’s difficult to know what [policies] will remain in place,” Fussey said, “but I think it will increase impunity, reduce accountability and foster an acceptability of an exceptional level of security.”





CHRISTOPHE SIMON/AFP/Getty Images – A boy holds a sign that says “We deserve to live without fear of dying,” during a 2015 protest against police violence in Rio. Activists fear that new laws passed to help secure the Olympics could limit public assembly and expression rights in Brazil.

“There isn’t much one can say right now that’s positive, other than, like in the United States, you have people confronting the issue,” Sotero said. “I hope people use the opportunity of the

Olympics to highlight the problem.”

That is exactly what the group of activists heading to Rio next week plan to do. Their trip will end on July 23, the 24th anniversary of the [Candelaria massacre](#) — a mass execution of Rio street children that is one of the worst incidents of police violence in Brazilian history. The Olympics will begin in Rio just 13 days later.

“This is about the globalization of police brutality,” Martin said. “There’s a job we have as citizens of the world to pay attention to this.”

Self protection issues...



Two French women outside the house where the Nice terrorist was living in.

EDITOR’S COMMENT (on photo): Both have pony tails – not very clever for close combat encounter. Bulletproof vest (left) protects only thorax (and that not 100%) – why? Gun belt quite loose – why? Sometimes photos reveal many little gaps that can be indicative of the overall big picture of training and readiness.





A shift in terrorism weaponry?

Incidence target	Means of attack				
	Knives; hatchets	Speedboat; jet-skis	Heavy vehicle; cars' swarm	VBIED	Light airplane
Demonstration/protest			✓	✓	✓
Train/bus stations	✓				
Crowded sea-side concord	✓		✓	✓	
Crowded beach (on- shore)	✓				
Crowded beach (off- shore)	✓	✓			
Sea-side hotels & resorts	✓	✓			✓
Luxury cruisers (dock)	✓	✓			✓
Luxury cruisers (off dock)	✓	✓			



Palm trees and jihad: How the French Riviera became terrorism breeding ground

By Nicholas Vinocur

Source: <http://www.politico.eu/article/palm-trees-and-jihad-how-the-french-riviera-became-terrorism-breeding-ground-nice-attack-news/>



July 15 – A few kilometers inland from Nice's ritzy beachfront lies an alternate reality — one of housing projects, rampant crime and a jihadist culture as virulent as anywhere in Europe.



This hidden side of the French Riviera has produced dozens of candidates for jihad and a

major domestic plot thwarted by police in 2014. It was also home to Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian delivery man who lived in a housing development not far from the beach — and who on Thursday killed at least 84 people by driving a truck through a crowd of Bastille Day revelers.

It was still not clear Friday night whether there was any direct link between the Nice attack and Islamic terror groups, and France's leaders were sending mixed messages about it throughout the day.

French President François Hollande said he believed the attack was a "terrorist" act that was carried out "to satisfy the cruelty of an individual or possibly a group."

For some, the spread of jihadism in the region is no random phenomenon

Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve said Friday that as of yet there were no known links between Lahouaiej-Bouhlel and Islamic terror groups.

But Prime Minister Manuel Valls said Friday night on French television that Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was a "terrorist likely linked to radical Islam in one way or another."

For local politicians and deradicalization

experts, Valls' statement came as no surprise.



Amelie Boukhobza, a clinical psychologist who has worked with jihadists and their families in the area for more than a decade, said she had thought of a jihadist attack as soon as she heard of a truck plowing through crowds on the Promenade des Anglais.

“Immediately, we knew that’s what we were dealing with,” she said. “We knew that Nice would get hit; we were just not expecting it last night.”

Mohamed Merah factor

According to French Interior Ministry data, the Alpes-Maritimes area that includes Nice and Cannes — better known for movie stars and megayachts — is one of France’s prime breeding grounds for jihadist ideology.

One in ten French volunteers for Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq hail from the area, and authorities are currently keeping watch over more than 200 people suspected of terrorist ties. Two years ago, anti-terrorism investigators dismantled a cell based in the resort city of Cannes that was planning a major attack during Nice’s annual carnival.

For Boukhobza, the spread of jihadism in the region is no random phenomenon. Former members of the Islamic Salvation Front, a hardline group that waged a bloody war against the Algerian state during the 1990s, convened in the Alpes-Maritimes after the end of fighting, she said.

Preaching from underground prayer sites, they converted many locals to their brand of extremist thought.

But while Algerian war veterans planted the seeds, it was another French southerner who proved a more powerful catalyst for the spread of jihadism. Mohamed Merah, who hailed from a housing project near Toulouse much like the ones that surround Nice, became a role model for many lost youths after he killed seven people in a spree of attacks in and around the city in 2012.

“We noticed a change in people’s behavior,” Boukhobza said. “They stopped shaking women’s hands, they would no longer look at you in the eye — the usual signs.”

Trained by hardened Islamist warriors, inspired by a French-bred jihadist, residents of the Alpes-Maritimes region embraced a new form of jihadist ideology that advocated indiscriminate attacks on westerners.

Omar Diaby, a criminal-turned-preacher, was the most prominent graduate of this generation. A product of Nice’s eastern housing projects, he left in 2013 for Syria where he joined the Al Nusra Front and became a prominent French-speaking recruiter, founding a unit composed largely of former Nice residents, according to David Thomson, a journalist and jihadism specialist.

“It’s a city that is highly polarized, which has a bad record of integrating minorities” — *Xavier Garcia, head of the Socialist Party in the Alpes-Maritimes area*

Now Boukhobza, who runs a deradicalization non-profit group called Entr’Autres, said she fears that jihadist ideology is winning a battle for minds in the French south.

After the November 13 attacks that killed 130 people in Paris, authorities cracked down on five “clandestine” prayer sites in the area due to “fundamentalist” preaching. But Boukhobza warned that shutting down sites would not draw a line under the problem.

“We call it the jihadization of the mind,” she said. “It’s a mentality that is winning around here, and that will keep gaining ground without greater efforts to fight it.”

Polarized politics

Xavier Garcia, head of the Socialist party in the Alpes-Maritimes area, blames extreme wealth disparities and failed integration policies for creating a toxic climate around Nice.

Unlike in the port city of Marseille, where populations mix freely, he said that the rich and poor rarely mingled with each other in Nice and Cannes.

“It’s a city that is highly polarized, which has a bad record of integrating minorities,” said Garcia. “Given how many jihadists have left for Syria from here and the attack that was thwarted, this does not come out of the blue.”

While Christian Estrosi, the conservative president of the surrounding region, had invested heavily to secure the downtown area, poorer areas had been neglected. A clash between the city’s Muslims and Estrosi over plans to build a mosque had inflamed tensions between the town’s rich, largely white rulers and the poor people living on its outskirts, he added.



Germany ax attack injures several on train, police kill suspect

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/18/world/germany-train-stabbing/index.html>

July 19 – An ax-wielding man who attacked several people on a train in southern Germany late Monday evening has been shot dead by police, regional police spokesman Lt. Fabian Hench said.

The assailant, armed with a knife and an ax, was identified as a 17-year-old Afghan man living in Ochsenfurt, Bavaria,



Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann said.

Herrmann later said that a hand-drawn flag resembling the one used by ISIS was found in the attacker's room.

The teen came to Germany without his parents, according to Alexander Gross, a police officer in Bavaria.

The attack took place as the train was traveling between Treuchtlingen and Würzburg. The train made an emergency stop short of the station at Würzburg-Heidingsfeld and the assailant jumped out of the train, Hench said.



Police hunted the man down with ground searchers and a helicopter, and he was killed, Hench said.

The attacker's motive is not yet known, Hench said.

Four passengers who were attacked are in serious condition, with the total number of wounded unclear, according to the police spokesman.

Some 14 to 25 people were classified as "in shock" and treated at the scene, according to Gross.



At least four of those injured on the train were from Hong Kong, Hong Kong's chief executive, CY Leung, said in a statement.

Approximately 20 to 30 people were on the train, according to Gross.

A Deutsche Bahn spokesperson confirmed that train service between the two stations has resumed.

Why France? Again?

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/why-france-again#>

July 17 – Perhaps it should come as no surprise that terror struck France on the very day the French celebrate the values of freedom and democracy.

With at least 80 dead, many more wounded and a nation in mourning, it seems as though ISIS could



well have been behind the Nice truck attack. Certainly Islamic State is very active on social media praising the attack and explaining how the French people "[brought this to themselves](#)."

When Paris was struck by terror in November 2015, we wrote piece simply entitled Why France. We have reproduced it here with slight edits, because it says it all:

People are asking why

France in particular was targeted by the Islamic State. The Islamic State detests the entire Western world and seeks to destroy it and replace it with a global Islamist caliphate. Yet it prioritizes which countries to attack and when.

The reasons listed here are by way of explanation from the Islamic State's point of view, to help our readers understand. They are not to be taken as a justification of the Islamic State's actions, which ultimately are caused by their hateful extremist ideology.

Here are the top five reasons why the Islamic State attacked France.

1

France has been fighting the Islamic State and other Islamists.

French President Francois Hollande led his country into [airstrikes against the Islamic State](#), bombing targets in Syria for the past two months. It was the first country in Europe to join America in [bombing ISIS targets in Iraq](#) and has so far been the only European country to join airstrikes against ISIS in Syria.

France also led the fight against Islamists in North Africa, it was French soldiers that liberated Timbuktu from Islamist insurgents belonging to [al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali](#).

The Islamic State is therefore fighting those who fight it the most, in an effort to persuade the civilian population of France that the war is about French foreign policy and not about a global Islamist Caliphate and to cow them into submission through terror.

2

France has specifically named the Islamist ideology as the problem.

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls said after the Charlie Hebdo attacks France is at war with radical Islam. The French Ambassador to America clarified afterwards, saying, "[We are at war with radical Islam](#). It means that right now... Islam is breeding radicalism which is quite dangerous for everybody." Not only has France named the problem but they are

taking active steps against the Islamist ideology within France, not just against groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, but also against groups like the [Muslim Brotherhood](#), which promote the ideology of [Islamism](#) that leads to violent extremism.



3

France is standing up for its values and seeking to integrate Muslims

Prime Minister Manuel Valls explicitly stated, “We seek to [establish a model of Islam](#) that is fully integrated, fully compatible with the values of the Republic.” This is anathema to ISIS as they cannot countenance an integrated Islam which operates peacefully within a broader society. France is proactively attempting to integrate Muslims, which, if successful, would destroy the “Islam vs the world” narrative peddled by the Islamic State.

4

France represents the Enlightenment values of Western civilization.

[France is where much of the enlightenment](#) took place and where modern ideas about citizenship, human rights and the separation between religion and state were first articulated and formed.

For an Islamic State obsessed with symbolism, an attack on France is an attack on European/Western enlightenment values.

5

The Islamic State is obsessed with history and honor.

France is an old country with a long history. The Islamic State has a laundry list of grievances against France going back a thousand years. ISIS also hates Europe in general for its colonial past.

It blames France, in particular, for the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the [abolition of the Caliphate following the First World War](#). France was one of the leading countries involved in the crusades in the 11th century, and it is where the early Islamic Caliphate's advance into Europe was halted by French ruler Charles Martel at the [Battle of Tours in 732](#).

The Islamic State is obsessed with seeing itself as the revived Muslim Caliphate. It is therefore essential to its worldview that Europe's old colonial powers are defeated. For similar reasons, [ISIS has long threatened to conquer Rome](#), which would represent a symbolic victory over the long defunct Roman Empire.

Without that, the Islamic State cannot claim to avenge the centuries old grievances with which it is obsessed and thus cannot fulfil its claims to restore the ‘lost honor’ of the [immah](#).

The Nice perpetrator: Unstable loner with a history of petty crimes, interest in “girls and salsa”



Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160715-the-perpetrator-unstable-loner-with-a-history-of-petty-crimes-interest-in-girls-and-salsa>

July 15 – The driver of the truck was identified as Lahouaiej Bouhlef, a 31-year-old Tunisian, who had a residency permit to live and work in France. He rented a 19-ton white Renault lorry on Wednesday, and drove it into crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, killing eighty-four people.

The French media reports that Bouhlef was born in the town of Msaken, Tunisia in 1985 and had a French residency permit.

French television station BFM TV reported that he was a divorced father of three, and neighbors said he had become depressed after the breakdown of his marriage.

The neighbors told the TV channel that Bouhlef was not particularly interested in religion, adding that he preferred girls and salsa.





They described him as a “loner,” and as “depressed and unstable, even aggressive” of late, adding that this was probably the result of his “marital and financial problems.”

He had brushes with the police, and was brought to court on several occasions, and had convictions for assault with a weapon, domestic violence, threats, and robbery. BFMTV reports that he had also recently caused an accident after falling asleep at the wheel while working as a delivery driver, and was taken into custody following the incident.


His last appearance in a criminal court was March.

The police said he had no known links with terrorism and was not under surveillance.



How they managed **NOT** to protect their fellow citizens?

By the Editor



First you block all roads surrounding the mass gathering – no vehicle is allowed to enter (including motorcycles and bicycles; spike strips on). **Second**, you patrol in the sea – no vessels are allowed near the shore (including jet skis). **Third**, a helicopter is flying over (equipped with infrared cameras). **Fourth**, a second perimeter (in a 1 km radius) is



established (by armed security officers in civilian clothing). **Fifth**, armed security officers in plain clothing are patrolling in pairs within the crowd. Is it this the perfect plan? Of course not! A walking through suicide bomber can easily infiltrate the crowd. But there is always an "acceptable" risk in all security operations. What happened in Nice? Almost none of the above! Will ever problems identified will become "lessons learned"? **By the way:**

How easy it is to instantly immobilize, with existing police weaponry, a moving heavy truck?



Top US commander can see **ISIS** presence in **Latin America**

Source: <http://thehill.com/policy/defense/287734-top-commander-in-latin-america-worrisome-number-of-networks-spreading>

July 14 – **Navy Adm. Kurt Tidd, the top U.S. military commander in Latin America and the Caribbean, said Wednesday he sees the potential of an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria presence in the region.**



"Short answer? Yes," he said, when asked about that potential at an Atlantic Council event on Wednesday. "We see that radicalization is occurring."

"When I talk with my counterparts in various countries throughout the region, all of them recognize that the potential for radicalization — and especially this phenomena of self-radicalization, internet-inspired, or facilitated self-radicalization — is something that they are starting to see crop up," he said.

"It's a challenge we can find literally throughout the region," he added.

Tidd's comments came during an event in Washington where he spoke about the danger

of transnational criminal networks throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region.

He said the networks, which illegally traffic drugs, weapons, gold and other material, could also move people with "known terrorist ties from the Middle East" up through South and Central America across the U.S. border.

"You want to spread an extremist message in the Caribbean and recruit fighters for ISIL? We have a worrisome number of networks engaged in that," he said, using another acronym for ISIS.

Tidd's predecessor, retired Marine Gen. John Kelly, said about 100 people from the region have gone to Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters.

He said the most sophisticated of these networks have highly-efficient logistical infrastructure that span the globe, and control distribution hubs and smuggling routes that lead into the U.S.

He said these networks have a "dense web" of contacts, and in the case of extremist networks, ideologues and influencers who nurture the radicalization process and foster the spread of extremist ideology.

Tidd said "simply stopping the drugs" is no longer enough to combat these networks, and that he has charged Southern Command to do everything it can to help U.S. government colleagues to try to dismantle these networks.

Tidd said Southcom is lending its capabilities to a U.S. multiagency team combating human smuggling in the Americas and hosting an interagency cooperation workshop at its headquarters in Miami, and hope to host one with Latin American partners later in the year.

"Now this may surprise some of you, but we don't often come together like this. We talk a lot



about dismantling networks but we almost never talk about building our own," he said.

"We know that none of us, no single department or agency, no single nation can

do it alone. So if we're serious about combating these networks, it will truly require all hands on deck," he said.

Finland to push for more intel cooperation, write new anti-terrorism laws

Source: http://yle.fi/uutiset/finland_to_push_for_more_intel_cooperation_write_new_anti-terrorism_laws/9029967

July 17 – Responding to the suspected terrorist attack in France that claimed 84 lives and injured >100 people in France late Thursday night, chair of Finland's Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Antti Kaikkonen said that a similar strike is also possible in Finland.

"The likelihood is small but we can't rule out the possibility," Kaikkonen commented during an Yle special broadcast on the Nice attack.

Kaikkonen disclosed that Finland is currently in the midst of reforms to intelligence gathering legislation aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. A working group led by Centre Party MP Tapani Tölli is also looking into possible legal reforms.

"It's mostly a question of the allowing police officials to more closely track suspicious activity online," Kaikkonen expanded.

Kaikkonen said that **Finland is far too dependent on intelligence shared by other countries.** He said that government has beefed up resources for the security and intelligence police Supo, and added that the unit will receive further reinforcements in future.

"We are considering allowing Supo to operate overseas and to gather information itself as well as in cooperation with others," the Centre Party MP disclosed.

Interior Minister: No restrictions yet on public events

Interior Minister Paula Risikko pointed out that although Finland is likely not a high profile target for terrorists, it is part of Europe and "is not in any kind of cocoon."

She said officials in Finland would first have to see what comes out of investigations into the Nice case before deciding on measures in Finland, such as curbs on public events or concerts.

"We are analysing this now. We will first see what has happened in Nice. We are constantly getting new information but after that it will be time for analysis," Risikko said. She said analysis will also take place at the European level to determine "if something should still be done."

"Whenever there is a new method of conducting these kinds of strikes, we have to think if there's something that can be done. We can never be completely prepared but we can be vigilant."

Finland in training ops in Iraq

Kaikkonen said however that there is room for improvement in Finland's record of

international cooperation. He said individual states are too weak when they operate alone.

"However intelligence has successfully prevented a large number of attacks. The reality is, that it's impossible to achieve 100 percent certainty."

The committee chair said that Finland intends to double the size of its 50-member contingent engaged in training operations in Iraq. He said that the purpose of the operation is to weaken terrorist organizations and their functionality. He claimed that the strategy has already begun to yield results.

"On the other hand it could be that terrorist organisations want to prove their existence by engaging in strikes while they are losing [ground] in the Middle East," he speculated.

Problem rooted in exclusion

Kaikkonen pointed out that youth unemployment is a serious problem that causes marginalisation and inspires some people to turn to extremism.

"I think it's important that in our August budget discussions we look for ways to boost employment." He prescribed a



similar approach throughout Europe.

"France also has a serious youth unemployment problem and a great deal of social exclusion. It might also be good for people there to consider whether or not they should pay more attention to this," he concluded.

Risikko echoed Kaikkonen, saying that marginalisation affects individuals and society

negatively. She called for peaceful methods to increase security.

"What can we as a society do to prevent marginalisation and ensure that that people don't feel that no one cares and they should become part of such organizations and that people care about them there? We also need to think about community measures," she added.


Terrorists switch tactics, lob grenades at securitymen from behind stone-pelters

Source: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Terrorists-switch-tactics-lob-grenades-at-securitymen-from-behind-stone-pelters/articleshow/53183182.cms?from=mdr>

July 13 – As a fresh cycle of violence is witnessed in Jammu & Kashmir after the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen terrorist

Burhan Wani, the security agencies are noticing a switch in tactics, with **terrorists now taking shelter behind stone-pelters to lob grenades at security personnel**, increased terror activity in outlying areas of towns and a new sense of belligerence among protesters.

According to intelligence sources, during the protests over the past few days in J&K, it has come to light



that terrorists were using stone-pelting mobs as a shield to lob grenades at police and security forces. It was this trend that was highlighted by J&K chief minister Mehbooba Mufti on Tuesday when she blamed the latest round of unrest on "vested interests".

This tactic serves as a double-edge weapon as it not only targets the security personnel but exposes them to a situation where self-defence may lead them to fire at the protesters, resulting in fatalities among impassioned youth.

"Deaths of young men have a spiralling effect, leading to further protests against use of force and giving terrorists a reason to fan popular sentiment against the security forces in J&K," said an intelligence officer.

use of force and giving terrorists a reason to fan popular sentiment against the security forces in J&K,"



Another new trend visible to the security establishment is that while towns are relatively quiet, outlying areas have become the new terror hotbeds. This is where more terrorists are hiding and being engaged in encounters by counter-terror forces, the officer said.

Interestingly, while the latest round of protests are not huge as far as number of protesters are concerned, they are turning out to far more violent. "The belligerence of protesters is a

bigger problem than their numbers.

It has been noticed while the strength of the protesting mobs may not be huge, they are more belligerent in engaging the security forces in a confrontation," a top officer of the



security establishment said and pointed to recent incidents of violent mobs setting fire to police stations and CRPF pickets and even pushing a policeman along with his vehicle into the Jhelum river. "This shows that if there are indeed 'outsider' elements instigating the mobs, they have succeeded in convincing the protesters to be more belligerent and destructive," said the officer.

While intelligence agencies have recorded the shift in terror tactics and shall accordingly revise counter strategies, a top official expressed concern over "recycling" of surrendered militants. "Around 5-8 surrendered terrorists are said to have turned around in the recent past and rejoined terror ranks," said an officer. Incidentally, Hizbul terrorist Sartaj Ahmed Sheikh, killed along with Wani in the Kokernag encounter on Friday, was also a 'recycled' terrorist. He was arrested and released as part of a surrender scheme but is believed to have rejoined Hizbul ranks in 2014.

French Lesson: Guns not Critical To Jihadi Violence

By A.J. Caschetta

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6116/french-lessons>



July 16 – The Bastille Day attack in Nice, France last night should cause the Democrats to reconsider their gun control approach to counterterrorism. After San Bernardino and then Orlando, Obama, Chuck Schumer and others have been citing jihadi terror attacks to support their domestic legislation agenda.

France is about as close to a national gun-free zone as you can get. Lesson number one from France is that gun laws will not stop jihad terror.

There are no gun show loopholes in France, because there are no gun shows. There are no mandatory waiting periods, and there is no debate about gun control. Everybody agrees that guns are bad, so only the police have them. Or at least that was the plan. But of course the people who don't obey laws have guns. They are called criminals. Lately a lot of them happen to be Jihadis.

Remember the touching father and son scene last November, after a jihad attack in France, where Parisians were consoling themselves in the modern fashion with flowers, stuffed

Lesson #1 from France: gun laws will not stop jihad terror.

animals and candles? A conversation between a reporter, a young father and his little boy was [captured on French television](#) and "went viral."

The boy was worried about all of the bad guys with guns. His father told him not to worry "They've got guns but we have flowers." Lesson number two from France is when your enemy has guns, flowers will not suffice.

So another jihadi has used guns to kill French citizens. This one was also prepared to use grenades (also illegal in France).



But he also used a truck, reminiscent of Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar who in 2006 drove his SUV into a crowd of people on the campus of the University of North Carolina,

Lesson #2 from France: when your enemy has guns, flowers will not suffice.

Chapel Hill injuring nine.

Banning firearms did not prevent the Nice, France attacker from finding and using firearms. It did not prevent the Bataclan killers, or the killers at the *Charlie Hebdo* offices, or the killer at the Hyper Kasher Deli, or the killer at the Jewish school in Toulouse. Nor did it prevent the Moroccan jihadi on the [train in Paris](#), who would have done much more damage had it not been for the valiant efforts of three type-A, gung ho Americans with nerves of steel. While the crew of the French train ran away from the shooter, Spencer Stone, Alek

Lesson #3 from France: only by fighting back can you survive.

Skarlatos and Anthony Sadler ran towards the gunfire and subdued him. Lesson number three from France is that only by fighting back can you survive.

Banning firearms as a way of preventing jihadi terror pretends that jihadis (and others), suddenly unable to find firearms, will give up on their plans. History says otherwise. There will still be black market firearms. And banning

legal firearms makes it very unlikely that civilians under attack will be able to defend themselves. There are not many Stones, Skarlatos or Sadlers in the world.

In Belgium earlier this year the jihadis didn't even use guns but instead bombs – just like the jihadis who attacked the London underground in 2005, the Madrid trains in 2003, the Bali night club in 2002, the World Trade Center in 1993.

Trying to prevent jihadis from acquiring weapons by passing laws that outlaw weapons misses two points: they will ignore these laws and get the prohibited weapons anyway, or they will find things that can be used as weapons. Wasn't that the "tactical" lesson of 9/11?

After 9/11 when the U.S. government created more government (DHS, TSA, ODNI) in response to jihadi terrorism and then began confiscating weapons from airline passengers – scissors, tweezers, nail clippers – rumor had it that the Israelis thought we were crazy. Our attempts to interdict weapons rather than those who would use them seemed counterintuitive to good counterterrorism. All these years later and another president is still chasing weapons. Of course finding those who would use weapons in attacks as part of the global jihad movement – whether they call themselves members of Al-Qaeda, ISIS or the Jabhat al-Nusra Front – requires that one look for jihadists.

A.J. Caschetta is a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum and a senior lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology.

How Britain has been kept safe for a decade

By Peter Taylor (BBC News)

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36803542>

July 17 – Terrorism, like Europe, is an issue that has dominated British politics for decades. I woke up on Friday morning expecting to hear the seismic fallout from Brexit monopolising the headlines yet again. I was shocked when I heard the latest news from Nice - that so many men, women and children had been horrifically mowed down by a terrorist driving a lorry.

I was shocked but not surprised, given that the so-called Islamic State has encouraged such attacks by individuals, who don't need a bomb

or a gun to carry out slaughter on such a scale. Here in the UK the killers of Fusilier Lee Rigby heeded the same call using a knife. The difference is that one of Lee Rigby's attackers was on MI5's radar while the Nice lorry driver was not on France's equivalent - its "S" list of suspects.

Mass casualty attacks, as France, Belgium and the UK know only too well, are the perpetual nightmare that



governments fear - a nightmare that becomes all too real when intelligence fails to detect them.

Since the London bombings of a decade ago, Britain has managed to avoid such a mass attack. But statistics show it has been a close-run thing. Forty terrorist plots have been disrupted since 2005 - including seven in the past 18 months.

Reporting on terrorism and political violence as I have done for more than 40 years has few silver linings. "Don't you ever get depressed?" is a question I'm often asked. The honest answer is "yes" - and Nice only underlines it - however, I still try to make sense of what invariably seems senseless. But there is some good news, although I hate to tempt fate by saying so.

It's no accident that this country has not yet endured a Paris, Brussels or Nice. Britain's defences against terrorist attack depend not just on the watery buffer of the English Channel and our non-membership of Schengen - Europe's border-free area.

Crucially they also rely on the way in which intelligence is now intimately shared between all the agencies: the Security Service (MI5), MI6, GCHQ - and the police. This is the key to keeping Britain safe - although it's by no means guaranteed.

In stark contrast, the situation across the Channel is very different. France has six intelligence agencies - and they're decidedly not joined up, as the failures to detect the Paris attacks in January and November last year clearly illustrate. As I discovered when I investigated the November attacks, there was a fatal lack of communication and co-ordination both before and during those attacks. As a result, this month's French Parliamentary inquiry recommends the establishment of a single overarching agency to improve intelligence sharing - similar to America's National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), or the UK's Joint Terrorism Assessment Centre (JTAC). The inquiry concludes: "The multi-layered, cumbersome intelligence apparatus was like an army of soldiers wearing lead boots."

But effective intelligence-sharing in the UK didn't happen overnight - as the history of combating Irish and Islamist terrorism shows. In many years of covering the conflict in Northern Ireland, I lost count of the number of

times I was assured that intelligence-sharing had never been closer and the IRA was on the run. Both were fictions. In the mid-1970s, I remember one Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, boasting that he would squeeze out the IRA like a tube of toothpaste. Martin McGuinness and some of his former IRA comrades now at Stormont bear testimony to the fiction.

In the aftermath of 9/11, I was still hearing that intelligence-sharing between the police and MI5 had never been closer - but it wasn't. Take this example.

Early in 2004, MI5 surveillance officers were monitoring a cell that was plotting to attack targets in London and the south-east of England. They followed suspects on the fringes of their investigation nearly 200 miles up the M1 to West Yorkshire - and noted the addresses in the Leeds area where they ended up.

To my great surprise, I discovered that MI5 didn't immediately notify West Yorkshire Police Special Branch that the suspects were on their patch. I was subsequently told by two senior West Yorkshire officers - independently and on different occasions - that this was common. The Security Service did not routinely share such detailed operational intelligence with the police. I later had sight of the MI5 officers' log that recorded the journey and confirmed what I'd been told.

The omission was a fatal error. Two of the suspects turned out to be Mohammed Sadique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer. They were the leaders of the four suicide bombers who murdered 52 people when they attacked London's transport network on 7 July 2005 - known as 7/7. To be fair, MI5 was monitoring dozens of cases and several thousand potential suspects at the time and had to prioritise targets and resources.

7/7 was a tragic wake-up call. In its aftermath, structures were put in place to ensure that intelligence was properly shared. Five Regional Counter Terrorist Units were set up across the country. But the change in attitude was as important as the change in structure. Previously, I had been told by my sources in West Yorkshire that its officers were never allowed inside MI5's inner sanctum. Its door was permanently locked.



All that has dramatically changed. The Security Service and local counter-terrorism police officers now work closely together and share all intelligence. The barriers are down. MI5's door is open. This shared intelligence is then passed upwards to the pinnacle of Britain's counter-terrorist pyramid where it's sifted and analysed by MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the police at their weekly meetings in MI5's London headquarters. A further benefit of shared

intelligence is that the agencies and police - both at home and abroad - now all work from a single list of targets - the contents and length of which are a closely guarded national secret.

These are the hard-learned lessons that have kept Britain relatively safe for the past decade. But, as the intelligence services and the police here are at pains to point out, there is no guarantee that it will always be so.

Nice is a grim warning to all of us.

Terror By Truck: The Newest Weapon Of Mass Destruction

Source: <http://www.vocativ.com/341104/terror-by-truck-the-newest-weapon-of-mass-destruction/>

July 16 – The last of the fireworks had just fizzled over the Mediterranean on Thursday night, leaving the swells of spectators along Nice's seaside boulevard to mill about. That's when, officials say, the driver of the large white truck hopped the curb, hit the gas, and began to brutally mow down dozens.




The attacker's ensuing trail of terror stretched more than a mile and left at least 84 dead, ending only after French police fired a hail of bullets at the driver, mortally wounding him. While the suspect, Tunisian-born Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlef, appeared to have no known or immediate ties to the Islamic State or other radicalized militants, he has already fulfilled a horror that many in the world of counter-terrorism have long feared. That something as simple and ubiquitous as a motor vehicle, in the

hands of an assassin, could transform into a frightening weapon of mass destruction, one capable of killing scores while reinforcing a belief that no place in public may be immune from indiscriminate violence.

"It strikes at the heart of normalcy," Patrick Skinner, a former CIA case officer now working at the Soufan Group, a security consulting firm, told Vocativ. "An attack like this literally turns the events of everyday life into targets."

Even as bomb blasts and gunfire remain the common hallmarks of terrorist attacks, the specter of a speeding vehicle crushing bystanders has loomed large. The tactic has long captured the imaginations of jihadists, who have publicly urged their supporters to turn a car or truck into a killing machine. An al-Qaeda scribe giddily detailed how to "[achieve maximum carnage](#)" from behind the wheel of a vehicle in a 2010 article written for Inspire, the jihadist group's magazine. In a 2014 declaration, Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani [specifically mentioned vehicles](#) as he urged jihadist sympathizers to attack "disbelieving" Westerners.

"If you can kill a disbelieving American or European,



especially the spiteful and filthy French.... kill him in any manner or way, however it may be," al-Adnani said. "Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him."

Other Islamic extremists have employed the tactic with deadly precision. In 2006, a young man hellbent on "avenging the deaths of Muslims" [plowed an SUV](#) into a student hangout at the University of North Carolina, injuring nine. Palestinian militants in Israel have killed dozens in a series of ramming attacks over the last decade. Lethal car attacks by individuals with jihadist ties have also cropped up in places as far-flung as Canada and China in recent years.

The embrace of vehicles as weapons by terrorist organizations, and their successful use in a number of attacks around the globe, has prompted U.S. officials to issue alerts about the potential threat in the past. "Such attacks could be used to target locations where large numbers of people congregate, including sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers," [reads](#) one warning issued by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security in 2010, The Daily Beast reported.

But French officials seemed oblivious to the possibility on Thursday evening as thousands in Nice celebrated Bastille Day. As a firework show came to an end around 10:30 p.m., Bouhlel, the suspect, reportedly used a gun to open fire on a crowd gathered along the Promenade des Anglais. The 31-year-old delivery driver then used his box truck to begin plowing into people.

The truck zig-zagged through the sprawling crowd and deliberately targeted those who tried to move out of harm's way, some witnesses said. Others claimed the truck accelerated as it slammed into the panic-stricken throngs. "I saw bodies flying like bowling pins along its route," said journalist Damien Allemand, who was at seaside festivities. "[I] Heard noises, cries that I will never forget."

Police eventually shot and killed the driver.

That the truck was able to drive more than a mile before being stopped seemed to shock some security analysts. "The fact that this truck went for a kilometer means that it went for that kilometer without there being a spike strip, without there being a barrier that it had to hit," said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a national security expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "That's remarkable. And a thing that's indicative, they weren't planning for a crisis where something like this could have occurred."

France's counterterrorism efforts have faced ongoing criticism after ISIS militants launched an orchestrated attack in Paris last November, killing 130. Though a nationwide state of emergency has been in place since, challenges persist.

As France, and the rest of the world, grapple with the country's third major terror attack in 18 months, some seem resigned to a new reality. "The times have changed," Prime Minister Manuel Valls said on Friday morning. **"And France is going to have to live with terrorism."**

EDITOR'S COMMENT: In the title: "disruption" is a more proper word instead of "destruction" – let us keep the latter specifically for nukes. But a real "nuke" is the last sentence coming from top official lips declaring that "terrorists won". **No Sir!** We will **NOT** have to live with terrorism!!! So wrap-up and do your job properly!

Beyond Nice Attack: New-Age Weapons of Terror and Emerging Threats

By Prakash Katoch

Source: <http://www.thequint.com/nice-terror-attack/2016/07/16/beyond-nice-attack-new-age-weapons-of-terror-and-emerging-threat-isis-bastille-day-al-qaida-911-cyber-attack>

July 16 – France suffered another terrorist attack with Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a delivery driver driving his lorry through the crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, zigzagging some two kilometres, killing 84, including 10 children. He reportedly flashed a gun at the end of his mad race on the seafront but was shot down by the French Police. Hundreds are reportedly still in hospital with at least 50 fighting for their lives. Bouhlel had a French passport and his



papers for the truck had passed scrutiny, although he was reported to be regularly in trouble with the law.

President Hollande has declared a state of emergency, anti-terrorist judges have opened an investigation into this mass murder, investigators are busy conducting searches but the question is what next? Truck bombings have occurred in many parts of the world, and are happening periodically in Iraq and Afghanistan these days but these are detonation of vehicles packed with explosives, not driven through crowds in this manner.

Lone-Wolf Terrorist

To answer what lies next, one can start with the past. Consider how 9/11 was executed; using civil commercial aircraft, killing some 3,000 people, hurting US prestige and economy plus indirectly forcing the US to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. These suicide pilot-terrorists needed motivation – remember Japanese Kamikaze pilots who flew their aircraft right into the funnels of opposing naval ships? Look at the multiple Sarin Gas bombings of the Tokyo Subway in 1995, killing 13, severely injuring 50 and causing temporary loss of vision to around 1,000 people.

However, many wouldn't know that the Aum Shinrikyo cult that undertook those subway bombings had enough Sarin to kill one million people, which they planned to spray using two remote-controlled helicopters.

Mercifully, both helicopters crashed during trials and the attacks were undertaken on foot. The Japanese security later discovered that the cult had even smuggled in a Russian Mi-8 helicopter, part by part, which was yet to be assembled. So if a recent 'Lone Wolf' study while examining varying forms of attack surmised that a lone wolf could kill up to one million people using a chemical, biological or radiological device, it should not be surprising.

New Means Available

Remember the ramming of USS Cole by an explosive-laden fibre glass boat, killing 17 US sailors and injuring 39 in the year 2000, for which the Al-Qaida claimed responsibility? With technological advances and suicide bombers, terrorists today can use multiple delivery means through land, sea, sub-surface and air. In 2015, Stratasys Ltd of USA announced that in conjunction with the Aurora Flight Sciences, it had developed the largest, fastest, and most complex 3D printed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ever produced. But then, why should

terrorists go for 3D-printed UAVs or weapons when actual ones are readily available in the global market. Shoulder-fired Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and hand-held EW guns can be used by terrorists against both civil and military targets.

Drones in all shapes and sizes are available for acts, which can even be used in multiples or swarms to get through the limited anti-drone gun cover. Drones with IR cameras could be used by terrorists at night to deliver chemical or radioactive payloads. In 2011, al-Qaida affiliate, Rezwan Ferdaus planned to attack Pentagon and Capitol Hill buildings using a drone, laden with explosives but the plot was intercepted before it could be executed.

Even without weapon payload, drones can sabotage civil and military aircraft during landings, takeoff and flying. New means like the recent innovation of a wall-climbing robot (half-car, half-helicopter), that climbs the vertical walls easily, defying gravity, can be exploited by terrorists.

Advent of Body Cavity Bombs

Terrorists are developing new types of explosives, experimenting with commercially available products like fertiliser and chemicals, coupling them with radioactive-like material to increase destructive power. Body implants and body cavity bombs (BCB) have been on the scene. US intelligence believes the al-Qaida has devised a way to conceal explosives inside the body that can avoid detection by sophisticated scanners. They also claim that al-Qaida has developed an undetectable liquid explosive that can be soaked into clothing and ignited when dry. Terrorist organisations, particularly the ISIS, are developing CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) capabilities, assisted by fissile material available in the black market.



Toxic radioactive agents can be paired with conventional explosives and turned into a radiological weapon. Recovery of a Uranium mine in northeast India in 2014 and the theft of a truck full of Cobalt-60 in Mexico in December 2013, are examples of inherent dangers of CBRN terrorism.

A spokesman of the Aum Shinrikyo Sect, points at a flow chart of agricultural chemical DDVP and denying making sarin, used on Tokyo subway, May 4, 1995. (Photo: Reuters)



Biological Warfare and Cyber-Attack

Cyber-attacks in the past have been successfully launched against pipelines, dams, communications, power and emergency systems at airports, sewage system, nuclear monitoring system, train signaling system, automobile plants, hospital systems, and the like. The ease with which critical infrastructure

of a country can be harmed or destroyed through cyber-attack proves that as global information age progresses, more and more

things are happening outside the control of even the most powerful states.

Notwithstanding the above issues, future surprises cannot be discounted, especially in this age of state sponsored terrorism and use of proxy forces by nations big and small, which raises the threat levels to a higher plane, CBRN and cyber-terrorism included.

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch (Retd) is a Special Forces veteran of the Indian Army.

Was the Nice attacker really an IS "lone wolf"?

By Mia Bloom

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160718-was-the-nice-attacker-really-an-is-lone-wolf>

July 18 – **The Bastille Day terror attack on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice has been claimed by the Islamic State Group – sort of.**

Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, a delivery driver known to police for petty crimes, drove a 19-ton white Renault truck into crowds gathered for a fireworks display. At least 84 are dead.

As they did when Orlando shooter Omar Mateen killed 49 people, IS news agency 'Amaq released a statement calling Bouhlel a "soldier of the Caliphate." IS reiterated the claim in its Bayan Radio news bulletin, adding a warning that "Crusader states" are not safe from its fighters.

However unlike the attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh or even attacks at Bataclan and Brussels airport as yet no pre-attack photos or 'last will and testament' videos have been released to cement the connection beyond a loose and general claim of affiliation, which may or may not be legitimate.

IS fan boys celebrated with glee on IS-linked social media accounts in the immediate aftermath of the attack, but this does not mean that Raqqa, the self-declared capital of the caliphate headquarters in Syria, ordered or organized the attack.

Reasons to doubt an IS link

President Hollande has already determined this to be a terrorist act – even before any real evidence has been found on Bouhlel's cell phone or in his laptop browser history on his laptop beyond a phone number alleged to be connected to Al Nusra Front's Omar Diaby. This is problematic.

According to reports, Bouhlel suffered from depression after his wife divorced him. Stories are circulating that he acted in ways consistent of someone with suffering from mental illness. His own father admitted he had bouts of depression and breakdowns.



With no clear connection to Jihadi groups (and merely a record as a petty criminal), French officials are trying to ascertain whether Bouhlel was a lone actor terrorist or a mentally ill person with whom IS is opportunistically associating.

The idea that a mass casualty perpetrator is likely to be suffering from mental illness is consistent with the research on lone actors conducted by [Paul Gill](#), [John Horgan](#), [Emily Corner](#), and others.

The worst-case scenario is that Bouhlel is so-called “clean skin.” That’s what security officials call a terrorist with no real criminal record who is not under surveillance, and who might be part of a larger plot.

The response by counter terror officials would be very different depending on which of these theories proves to be true.

My research on [suicide terrorism](#) has demonstrated that affiliation with a group is quite different from the research of Criminal Justice professor Adam Lankford of the University of Alabama who insists that **many terrorists are suicidal and not sacrificing themselves for a greater cause** or for some underlying altruistic motivation of self-sacrifice. The implications for policy and the potential for backlash from terrorists and counter terrorists vary greatly depending on which scenario ends up being accurate for Bouhlel, whether he was in fact radicalized or possible mentally ill matters.

At this time, any of these explanations are plausible. It is important to explore what is known, admit what we don’t know, and base any analysis on fact and not speculation.

Why France? Again?

France has suffered three attacks in the past nineteen months. There is a robust literature exploring why Europe and especially France has borne the brunt of Jihadi terrorism.

Explanations include the fact that Muslims (mostly of North African origin) in France have not assimilated into the mainstream of French society. **Muslims constitute a disproportionate percentage of those unemployed, poor living in the banlieus, or suburbs, of urban sprawl.** They are incarcerated at percentages that far exceed their percent of the population, and have fewer opportunities for upward mobility than even

their non-Muslim African counterparts have enjoyed in the United Kingdom and France.

The French government has aggressively banned the veil. The extreme right wing party, the National Front, has soared in the polls and increased its percentage of the seats in the Parliament.

However, one point the news media has largely neglected to mention is that France has been spearheading the bombing campaigns against IS (compared to the Russian bombardment of free Syrian Army positions). It has led attacks against Jihadi groups in Mali and other parts of Africa.

President Francois Hollande’s declaration that, “We will continue striking those who attack us on our own soil” is a not-so-veiled reference to France’s involvement in air strikes in Syria. Hollande’s statement reflects what the French security services already believe to be a **persuasive hypothesis**: even if this attack was not IS-directed, it might have been IS-inspired.

Beyond Syria, France has expanded its counter terrorism operations throughout North Africa as Jihadi groups have proliferated in the aftermath of the downfall of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi. Groups in Morocco, Algeria, and Mali affiliated with Al Qaeda or IS have flourished. The French counter terror operations launched in 2013 to roll back the Islamist militant uprising in the north of Mali, has metamorphosed into a semi-colonial arrangement.

All of this goes a long way to explain why France.

But it is crucial to point out that just acts inspired by IS are most certainly not the same as those planned or at the behest of IS. The connection to IS is not crystal-clear even when groups (let alone individuals) claim affiliation by making a pledge, or *bayat*, to the Islamic State.

According to [the Minerva research team](#) at Georgia State University, the 2014 expansion of IS’ so-called Caliphate, was foretold by “Wiki Baghdady” –a Jihadi insider, but more than likely an Al Qaeda agent – who predicted IS would amass multiple group allegiances and then announce them simultaneously in order to project power and influence.

“It would be as if the pledges came from everywhere,



answering al-Baghdadi's call," WikiBaghdady wrote. Unsurprisingly, within ten months WikiBaghdady's predictions proved correct. Formal pledges from jihadists in Sinai, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, and Algeria were released through IS media in November and were formally accepted by the "emir" three days later.

In essence, the IS expansion strategy follows a pre-set "script." Obvious patterns have

emerged in terms of the types of attacks a group perpetrates – and even IS's use of a standardized logo, font, colors, and branding.

For individuals, the branding is more complex. Unless video emerges of Bouhlel being trained in Mosul or Raqqa or some incriminating materials are found on his cell phone or personal computers, we must treat the situation as unconfirmed until we have more information.

Mia Bloom is Professor of Communication, Georgia State University.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Yet another article from the academia of another Planet! "Muslims constitute a disproportionate percentage of those unemployed, poor living in the *banlieus*, or suburbs, of urban sprawl" ... and ... "it is crucial to point out that just acts inspired by IS are most certainly not the same as those planned or at the behest of IS." Not a single comment on "class of civilizations" and all that goes with that!

Four linked with terrorist groups denied Rio 2016 Olympics accreditation for stadium access

Source: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/other-sports/athletics/four-linked-terrorist-groups-denied-8442256>

July 18 – **Four people with links to terror groups wanted access to the Rio Olympics, Brazilian security forces have revealed.**

The unnamed quartet applied for accreditation to the Games, but their links were uncovered by Brazil's anti-terrorism unit and international intelligence teams.

They were denied passes which would have given them access to 32 venues when the Olympics begin on Friday 5 August.

Security surrounding the Games has been ramped up in recent weeks, following terror atrocities in France where large crowds have been targeted.

To France From Israel: Lessons on Living With Terror

Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/world/middleeast/to-france-from-israel-lessons-on-living-with-terror.html>

July 18 – **For many Israelis, the horrifying images of a truck plowing through crowds for more than a mile in the French resort town of Nice struck a macabrely familiar chord.**



"We had tractors!" said Ami Zini, 49, who runs a boutique on the shopping street of the leafy German Colony neighborhood of Jerusalem. "One of them flipped over a bus with its bucket."

He was referring to [a 2014 attack](#), by a Palestinian resident of the city, that killed an Israeli pedestrian. Nice was an even more direct, if far deadlier, echo of a [2011 rampage](#) in which an Arab-Israeli man's truck barreled down a Tel Aviv street for a mile, killing one and wounding 17.

These followed a [spate](#) of attacks with heavy construction vehicles and cars as weapons in 2008. And since October, according to Shin Bet, Israel's domestic security agency, at least 32 Palestinians have rammed vehicles into people at bus stops, intersections and military checkpoints.



The French prime minister said after the Nice attack, the nation's third mass killing in 18 months, that France "must live with terrorism." That is what Israelis have been doing for decades, through the plane hijackings of the 1970s; the suicide bombers of the [second intifada](#), or Palestinian uprising, which began in 2000; and the lone-wolf [stabblings](#) and [shootings](#) of the past 10 months.

In Israel, ordinary citizens, security officials and experts feel they have seen it all and say they have adapted to a perennial, if ever-changing, threat. They speak of constantly staying alert, exercising caution and growing accustomed to what some may find to be intrusive levels of security, but essentially carrying on.

"There were times when we were afraid to stop our cars at a red light next to a bus," Mr. Zini, whose clothing store is named Rendezvous, to lend an air of French chic, recalled of the years in which buses were a frequent bombing target. **"We live with terrorism. But we are not fearful. It is part of our daily routine."**

That routine includes opening bags for a check and passing through metal detectors at train or bus stations, shopping malls and movie complexes. At the height of the suicide bombings, customers paid a small surcharge at cafes and restaurants to subsidize the cost of a guard at the door.

Hundreds of armed civilian guards have been deployed to protect public transportation in Jerusalem in recent months amid the wave of attacks, which have been glorified by some Palestinians on social media. The guards stand at bus and light-rail stops, and hop on and off buses along main routes, with the same powers to search and arrest as the police.

Israel has also invested hugely in intelligence, its tactics evolving as its enemies change theirs.

Several psychological studies in Israel have found that people habituate quickly to threats, making adjustments to daily life — keeping children at home, for example, rather than sending them to summer camp — and adopting dark humor about the randomness of the threat.

"If I don't get blown up, I will meet you at Dizengoff Center in about 45 minutes," a Tel Aviv bus rider told a friend over a cellphone, in a conversation overheard by Israeli psychologists researching the aftermath of the second intifada.

The survey of 458 people, led by Yechiel Klar of Tel Aviv University, found that **55 percent had changed their behavior — spending less time outside the house, for instance, or making fewer long trips by public transportation.** The other 45 percent said they had made no changes.

A separate study, at Ben Gurion University, found that residents close to attack sites — in this case, those living in Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip — reported a lower sense of personal threat and stress than those in two other communities, one in a Tel Aviv suburb and one in a larger settlement near the occupied West Bank city of Hebron. The research suggested that the religious fervor of the Gaza residents might have been a key factor.

Some Israeli politicians have been disparaging about what they view as European negligence in security matters. After the attacks in March in Brussels, for example, a senior minister, Israel Katz, said Belgium would not be able to fight Islamist terrorism "if Belgians continue eating chocolate and enjoying life and looking like great democrats and liberals."

In a radio interview on Sunday, Yaakov Perry, a former Shin Bet chief now in Parliament, recommended deeper intelligence supervision of neighborhoods "where Muslims, refugees, Daesh supporters of various sorts live," using an Arabic acronym to refer to the Islamic State. He also suggested that the French police were complacent, referring to news reports that the driver in Nice had told officers he was delivering ice cream. "If the driver says he has ice cream, open the truck and check if he has ice cream," Mr. Perry said.

That the attack occurred at a mass gathering for Bastille Day, France's national holiday, had Israelis shaking their heads. Micky Rosenfeld, an Israeli police spokesman, said that to secure a major event like Independence Day celebrations, when tens of thousands of people gather along the Tel Aviv seafront to watch an air and naval display, officers gather intelligence for weeks beforehand, and erect a **360-degree enclosure of the area**, with layers of security around the perimeter.

Main roads are typically blocked off with rows of buses, and smaller side streets with patrol cars. In addition to a large uniformed and undercover police presence,



counterterrorism teams are strategically placed to provide a rapid response if needed.

For intelligence gathering, Shin Bet has used a “basic coverage” method, which involves homing in on a particular neighborhood or population sector that is considered a potential security risk. The agency then builds an intimate system of surveillance and a network of local informers who can point to any sign of suspicious or unusual activity.

Lior Akerman, a former Shin Bet division head, said that while an attack like the one in Nice could certainly happen in Israel, “it should be emphasized that the French, like the rest of the European countries, do not conduct themselves intelligence-wise in this way at all.”

But several security experts acknowledged that with citizens in a democracy, including Israel’s large Arab minority, these methods of intelligence gathering — “neighbors informing on neighbors,” as one put it — can be difficult to balance with civil liberties. These measures are also less effective, they say, in trying to prevent individual attacks that are not affiliated with any organization and that at times appear to have erupted spontaneously.

“The bad news is that even Israel doesn’t have good experience in preventing lone-wolf attacks,” said Boaz Ganor, who heads the International Institute for Counterterrorism at

the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, “or local network attacks, because traditional intelligence is almost nonrelevant in those cases.”

Shaul Shay, a former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council, said Israelis at home and abroad were generally better prepared for terrorism than citizens of other Western societies. “Here we are living with it since childhood,” he said.

Many here said that even if Israel’s security apparatus could not have prevented an attack like the one in Nice, they imagine it would have been ended far sooner — with many fewer casualties.

“It would be impossible here because there is good security,” said Muhammad Anati, 18, a Palestinian resident of the Shuafat refugee camp in East Jerusalem.

Inbal Berner, 37, an Israeli school librarian who was sipping an iced coffee at a nearby bus stop, gave voice to the new normal the French may now face.

“I look around; I don’t go to crowded places if I don’t have to,” she said. It has been that way “forever,” Ms. Berner added, or at least since the bus bombings of more than a decade ago. Because while people do get used to terrorism to some extent, she said, “something always remains.”

EDITOR’S COMMENT: I wrote the comment in p.122 well before including this article herein. Jst a proof that common logic is still available around the globe and no “rocket science” degree is required for doing the job properly!

French Expert Reveals Attack Methods Used by Terrorists

Source: <http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160717/1043152511/france-terrorism-expert.html>

July 17 – “Al-Qaeda, which we often tend to forget about, and Daesh use the so-called ‘lone wolves’ and through English-language magazines like Inspire and Dabiq they are recruiting followers worldwide providing them with detailed instructions,” Alain Rodier said.

In one of its 2010 issues Inspire described a method of using trucks to kill people during public gatherings. As for Daesh, their ‘official representative’ Muhammed al-Adnani mentioned this very same technique their followers could use in their war on ‘infidels.’

“Al-Qaeda and Daesh wrote about these methods in their magazines,” Alain Rodier said.

Speaking about the French government’s decision to extend the nationwide state of emergency by another three months, Alain Rodier said it was a way to go, but added that it still did not rule out a repetition of what happened in Nice.

He said that even in Israel, where a state of emergency is never called off, terrorist attacks do happen, albeit on a lesser scale.

“We have this very same situation here in France. The state of emergency has played a role of course, but, unfortunately, terrorists still manage to do what they do,” Rodier noted.



When asked whether the often criticized Operation Sentinelle, in which combat troops patrol streets and protect key sites, has been effective in preventing terrorist attacks, Alain Rodier said that it meant to show the people that the authorities are looking after them and making the right decisions.

"Despite the purely psychological effect these patrols have on the people, we should not underestimate their actual importance. We have no idea just how many times the presence of army and police units has forced potential terrorists to back off."

Speaking about more radical means the state could resort to in its fight against terrorism, Alain Rodier said that there were no quick fixes he could think of.

"We need long-term measures, we need to step up our intelligence work and have police doing a better job on the ground. Such things don't happen overnight though," he added.

Alain Rodier said the decision to dissolve the General Intelligence Service (Renseignements généraux) had dealt a severe blow to the country's on-the-ground intelligence gathering effort and called to bring it back.

How Serious Is Sweden's Fight against Islamic Terrorism and Extremism?

By Nima Gholam Ali Pour

Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8444/sweden-islamic-terrorism>

July 17 – **Like all other European countries, Sweden is trying to fight against jihadists and terrorists, but it often seems as if the key players in Sweden have no understanding of what the threats are or how to deal with them.**

Mona Sahlin, who was Sweden's "National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism," until she resigned in May amid corruption



allegations, is shown posing with Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan in July 2010. The Swedish government's directives to her agency stressed that it is "important that there is a gender perspective in efforts to prevent violent extremism." (Image source: Social Democratic Party)

In 2014, for instance, the Swedish government decided to set up a post called the "National

Coordinator Against Violent Extremism." But instead of appointing an expert as the national coordinator, the government appointed the former party leader of the Social Democrats, Mona Sahlin. Apart from Sahlin having a high school degree, she is mostly known for a corruption scandal. As a party leader of the Social Democrats, she lost the 2010 election, and as a minister in several Socialist governments, she has not managed to distinguish herself in any significant way. Göran Persson, who was Prime Minister of Sweden from 1996 to 2006, described Mona Sahlin this way: "People believe she has a greater political capacity than she has. What comes across her lips is not so remarkable. Her strength is not thinking, but to convey messages." With such a background, it was no surprise that she was ineffective as National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism. But the fact that

she used her high government agency to help her friends came as a shock to the Swedish public. Sahlin had [hired her former bodyguard](#) for a position at her agency and signed a false certificate that he earned \$14,000 dollars monthly, so that he could receive financing to purchase a \$1.2-million-dollar home.

Sahlin also gave the man's relative an internship, even



though the application had been declined. Before Sahlin resigned in May 2016, she said, "I help many of my friends."

Despite the fact that Sweden has a Ministry of Justice responsible for issues that would seem far more related to violent extremism, Sweden has, for some reason, placed the agency to combat violent extremism under the Ministry of Culture.

While the U.S sees the fight against Islamic extremism as a security issue, Sweden evidently believes that combating violent extremism should be placed in a ministry responsible for issues such as media, democracy, human rights and national minorities. With such a delegation of responsibility, the government seems either to be trying to hamper efforts to combat violent extremism, or it does not understand the nature of the threat.

The lack of understanding of violent extremism, combined with politicizing the problem, has been evident, for instance, in Malmö, Sweden's third largest city. After the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the city councilor responsible for safety and security in Malmö, Andreas Schönström, said that European right-wing extremism is a bigger threat than violent Islamism. And on June 5, 2016, Jonas Hult, Malmö's security manager, wrote: "The right-wing forces in Malmö are the biggest threat."

With such statements, one would think that perhaps Malmö is a city filled with neo-Nazi gangs. Not so. Malmö is a city that usually ends up in the news because of [Islamic anti-Semitism](#) or extremist activists [working to destroy Israel](#). There have been no reports of any neo-Nazi movements in Malmö in the recent past.

When supporters of [Pegida](#) (an anti-Islamic migration political movement in Europe) came to Malmö, they had to be protected by the police due to thousands of extremist activists and Muslims [protesting](#) the presence of Pegida. Of Malmö's residents, 43.2% were either born abroad or their parents were.

Further, the Social Democrat politicians have held local municipal power in Malmö since 1919. To say that Malmö is somehow a place where right-wing extremism is a threat is simply not based on facts. Instead of seriously combating violent extremism, many in Sweden

have chosen -- possibly imagining it easier -- to politicize the problem.

Sweden also has not yet reached the point where the authorities distance themselves from violent extremism. The association *Kontrakultur* (a cultural and social association in Malmö), [receives](#) about \$37,000 annually from the municipal cultural committee of Malmö. On its website, *Kontrakultur* writes that it cooperates with an organization called *Förbundet Allt åt alla* ("The Association Everything for Everyone"). This organization, in turn, according to the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism, consists of violent extremist activists.

The idea that municipal funds should in no way go to organizations that cooperate with violent extremists is something not yet rooted in Sweden. In June 2016, for example, a 46-year-old Islamic State jihadi arrived in Malmö. He was taken into custody by the police for speedy deportation. But when he applied for asylum, the Swedish Migration Agency took over the matter to examine his asylum application, and ordered the deportation stopped. Inspector Leif Fransson of the border police [described](#) the situation:

"As soon as these people throw out their trump card and say 'Asylum', the gates of heaven open."

In August 2015, the Swedish government submitted a document to Parliament outlining the Swedish strategy against terrorism. Among other things, the document [stated](#):

"It is important that there is a gender perspective in efforts to prevent violent extremism and terrorism."

Under the headline "Gender Perspective" in a committee directive from the Swedish government on the mission of the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism you can [observe](#):

"The violent extremist environments consist mainly of men, and in the extremist movements there are individuals who oppose gender equality and women's rights. It is therefore important that there is a gender perspective in efforts to prevent violent extremism, and that norms that interact and contribute to the emergence of violent environments are effectively counteracted."

Perhaps the Swedish government has a secret plan to convince



jihadists to become feminists? But as usual, Swedish politicians have chosen to politicize the fight against extremism and terrorism, and address the issue as if it were about parental leave instead of Sweden's security.

There is no evidence that "gender perspective" is relevant or useful in the fight against extremism and terrorism, yet we see that the Swedish government, in several documents related to terrorism and extremism, evidently believes that "gender perspective" is what should be used in the fight against those threats. This gives just some idea of how strenuously Sweden wants to disregard the problem, or even ask experts for help.

One might argue that this is because Sweden has never been exposed to Islamic terrorism or that extremism is not something that concerns the nation. Sweden has, however, had experience in facing Islamic terrorism. On December 11, 2010, a jihadist blew himself up in central Stockholm. Taimour Abdulwahab did not manage to hurt anyone, but Sweden got a taste of Islamic terrorism and has every reason to want to defend itself against more of it.

Islamic extremism is, unfortunately, becoming more widespread, especially in Sweden's major cities. Gothenburg, for example, has been having major problems with it. In November 2015, there were [reports](#) that 40% of the 300 Swedish jihadists in Syria and Iraq came from Gothenburg. The only country that has, [per capita](#), more of its citizens as jihadists in Iraq and Syria than Sweden, is Belgium.

As facts accumulate, there is much information indicating that Sweden has huge problems dealing with Islamic extremism and jihadism. The Swedish Security Service (*Säpo*), in the beginning of 2015, published a [press release](#) using the words "historic challenge" to describe the threat from violent Islamism. Already in May 2015 the head of *Säpo*, Anders Thornberg, [expressed doubts](#) that the agency could handle the situation if the recruitment of jihadists in Sweden continued or increased.

Experts in Sweden's security apparatus have clearly expressed that violent Islamism is a clear and present danger to the security of Sweden, but the politicized debate about Islamic terrorism and extremism does not seem capable of absorbing this warning.

This general politicization, combined with the failure to prioritize the fight against terrorism and extremism, is the reason Sweden is, and continues to be, a magnet for extremists and terrorists. Jihadists who come to Sweden know that there are many liberal politicians looking for invisible "right-wing extremists", and that there are feminists who think what is really important is using "gender perspective" in the fight against extremism and terrorism.

Jihadists also know that there are large gaps in the Swedish bureaucracy and legislation that can be exploited. These are the policies that have been created by Swedish politicians. One can therefore only question if Sweden seriously wants to fight the threats of terrorism and extremism.

Nima Gholam Ali Pour is a member of the board of education in the Swedish city of Malmö and is engaged in several Swedish think tanks concerned with the Middle East. He is also editor for the social conservative website Situation Malmö. Gholam Ali Pour is the author of the Swedish book "[Därför är mångkultur förtryck](#)" ("Why multiculturalism is oppression").

Man knifes mother and three daughters at French holiday park



Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36837108>

July 19 – A woman and her three daughters have been attacked by a knife-wielding man at a holiday site in the south of France, according to French media.

Three victims were seriously injured and taken to hospital after the attack which happened around 10:00 local time (08:00 GMT) near Sisteron.

A man, 37, was arrested trying to leave the scene in a vehicle.

Some reports suggest the family was targeted for being too lightly dressed but there was no official



confirmation.

A local official was quoted as saying the motive was still "very vague".

The mother and her eldest daughter, who is believed to be 14 years old, are reported to be seriously injured, and the youngest, who is said to be eight, is in a critical condition.



Brazilian Jihadist group pledges allegiance to ISIS on eve of Olympic Games

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160719-brazilian-jihadist-group-pledges-allegiance-to-isis-on-eve-of-olympic-games>



July 19 – **A Brazilian Jihadist group called Ansar al-Khilafah, has pledged allegiance to ISIS** less than a month before the opening of the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.

The SITE Intelligence Group, which monitors extremist and Islamist organizations, reports that **a channel on the Telegram messaging app — called Ansar al-Khilafah #Brazil — has posted a message of support for ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.**

Portuguese and Spanish versions of ISIS's Nashir Telegram channel have also been launched.

The International Business Times reports that it is the first pledge of allegiance to ISIS to come from South America.

The campaign by the U.S.-led coalition have inflicted heavy losses on ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the organization has lost 40 to 45 percent of the territory under its control.

Experts say that ISIS is likely to continue, even intensify, its attacks in the West if it is driven underground.

"These guys have all the energy and unpredictability of a populist movement," said former CIA director Michael Hayden.

ISIS leaders have admitted their losses, but one leader, speaking with a Western reporter on condition of anonymity, argue that the organization and its followers "have been able to expand and have shifted some of our command, media and wealth structure to different countries."

"We do have, every day, people reaching out and telling us they want to come to the caliphate," said the operative in an interview with the *Independent*.

"But we tell them to stay in their countries and rather wait to do something there."

More than 500,000 tourists are expected to arrive in Brazil for the Olympic Games.

Terrorism experts cast doubt on Brazilian group's pledge to ISIS on social media

Source: <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2016/07/20/terrorism-experts-cast-doubt-on-brazilian-groups-pledge-to-isis-on-social-media/>



July 20 – Terrorism experts have doubted the credibility of a Brazilian group's pledge of allegiance to ISIS, arguing that it's probably ISIS social media activity aimed at scaring citizens before the Olympic Games.

Through a messaging app called Telegram, the group Ansar al-Khilafah Brazil, pledged its allegiance to ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on Sunday. Ansar al-Khilafah Brazil disseminated ISIS propaganda in Portuguese and expressed

its commitment to "wage jihad against the enemy of Allah," reported ABC News.

Although it is unknown whether the group exists, terrorism experts have expressed skepticism.

John Horgan, a professor at Georgia State University told ABC that ISIS is quick to take advantage of any opportunity, and, given security concerns in Rio, the Olympics are a prime target.

J.M. Berger, co-author of "ISIS: State of Terror" told the network that the group's "Telegram



channel appears to be the work of an ISIS social media activist rather than reflecting any bricks-and-mortar initiative.”

Moreover, ISIS has little influence in Brazil, a country with few Muslims. According to the Soufan Group, **only 3 Brazilians have left the South American nation to join extremist groups**, compared to 1,700 people who have travelled from France and 250 from the United States.

According to **Matt Olsen**, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Islamic terrorist groups have not had a large impact in the region. However, he expressed concern over the growth of extremism.

On Thursday, the same app was used for another extremist call to action in Rio proposing attack places, methods and targets.

In May, the **U.S. State Department Overseas Advisory Council** released a report

outlining security concerns in Rio, which did not include terrorism. And as of June, “There was no credible ISIS-related threat to the 2016 games,” according to ABC.

Notwithstanding, **U.S. terrorism officials** have argued that all threats should be taken seriously.

“It’s not impossible, but ISIS has other areas in the world where it is much easier for them to operate,” a former U.S. terrorism official told the network.

The **State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security**, which is tasked with ensuring the security of American athletes and tourists at the Olympic Games, said this terrorist threat is an “intelligence matter,” and made no further comment.

Brazilian authorities have stated that terrorist attacks at the Olympics are a big concern due to ISIS’ tendency to target innocent civilians.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Experts are highly susceptible to “subjective influences” — from individual values and mood, to whether they stand to gain or lose from a decision — and, while highly credible, experts often vastly overestimate their objectivity and the reliability of peers.

ICSS: Reviews to Rio 2016 Security Plan 'Good Practice'

Source: http://aroundtherings.com/site/A_56597/Title_ICSS-Reviews-to-Rio-2016-Security-Plan-/292/Articles



July 19 – **The International Center for Sport Security tells Around the Rings the last-minute security changes made for the 2016 Olympics “shows that the host city is making security a priority.”**

Government officials have been reviewing the Rio 2016 security plan after a deadly terrorist attack in Nice, France. Federal government officials have pledged an increase in forces, as well as more roadblocks and increased screenings for spectators on the way inside Olympic venues.

Interim President Michel Temer confirmed the increase in security, while defense minister Raul Jungmann said in a statement that all reviews would “cover any remaining gaps.” Last-minute security drills have already begun around the Olympic city as changes are implemented.

Malcolm Tarbitt, Executive Director, Safety and Security at the ICSS said to *ATR* that security

reviews this close to a mega-sporting event are not unprecedented, and often a necessity as security landscapes remain fluid up until and through the event.

“A good security plan should be flexible so it can adapt to new threats and authorities must be able to adapt to a changing situation quickly and effectively,” Tarbitt

added. “Rio has reviewed its security protocols in light of the recent attack in Nice and has to the best of our knowledge, reacted quickly and appropriately.

“If you look back over the years many cities have had to review their security to respond to last-minute threats or incidents. This is not unusual, rather good practice.”

Tarbitt says that increasing visible security presences such as screenings and adding forces will cause short-term disturbances, but they have the positive effect of keeping the public informed and engaged in Games security.

Both the Sochi 2014 and London 2012 Games saw security reviews



in the final weeks before the celebrations began. London requested an extra number of security forces to cover unforeseen holes in the security plan, while the high profile "Black Widow" terror threat caused Russian authorities to reexamine the safety of the Sochi Games.

For Rio, the addition of a **newly built Integrated Anti-Terrorism Centre** as well as security coordination from over 10 countries around the world show Tarbitt that the 2016 Olympics will have mitigated the risk of a terror attack as much as they can.

Another benefit for Rio organizers is the successful hosting of the 2014 World Cup. Organization of the event was not confined to

just Rio de Janeiro, and featured robust security plans in cities all over the country. Tarbitt said he believes that Olympic organizers would benefit from the transfer of knowledge from World Cup organizers, and shows that Brazil can handle the security aspect of mega-events.

"It's impossible to guarantee 100% security. However, risks can be minimized as low as reasonably practicable, and the chance of swift and effective response enhanced,"

Tarbitt said. "Rio has the benefit that it did not start from scratch, and that there is significant transfer of knowledge from city to city and from organizing committee to organizing committee."



Brazilian police arrest 10 suspected of planning terrorist acts during Olympics

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/21/americas/brazil-olympics-terror-arrests/index.html>



July 22 - **Brazilian police have arrested 10 people suspected of planning terrorist acts during next month's Rio Olympics**, Brazil's Justice Ministry said Thursday.

The group was inspired by ISIS and mostly organized online, Justice Minister Alexandre de Moraes said.

He said no specific targets were mentioned, but the Justice Ministry is still investigating the suspects' computers and cell phones to learn more about the possible plans. De Moraes said the suspects are all Brazilian nationals, and that one minor was mentioned in the conversations.

Another two people have warrants out for their arrests. Authorities said they believe those suspects will be arrested soon.

De Moraes **said the group was not an organized cell, calling it "absolutely amateur -- with no preparation."**

The group essentially said, "Let's start training in martial arts, let's start learning how to shoot," **the justice minister said.**

He noted the group tried to buy a gun online, which no organized cell would do.

Raffaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, said there doesn't appear to be evidence of a sophisticated plot.

Serious threats 'investigated exhaustively'

But Brazil has grappled with a host of threats against the Rio Olympics, now just 15 days away.

This week, Brazil's intelligence agency said it was reviewing all threats after a jihadi messaging channel called for its followers to target the Olympics, which start August 5.

"Many (threats) are discarded and the ones that deserve attention are investigated exhaustively," the agency said.

Earlier this week, a jihadi channel on the messaging app Telegram called for attacks against the games and detailed targets and methods, according to the SITE Intelligence Group.

SITE said a message was posted to "Inspire the Believers!" saying, "Lone wolf from anywhere in the world can move to Brazil now." The message also suggested using the games to target the enemies of jihad, including Western athletes.

But Brazil has vowed it will be ready to handle any terror attempt.

A Western diplomat said venues for the games have been "hardened significantly -- and I believe the government of Brazil has done what it can to make it very difficult to get into the venues here."



Brazilian forces have been working with French SWAT teams to simulate attack scenarios. In one drill, Brazil special forces and a police dog chase down an armed gunman to thwart a possible attack on Rio's subway system.

"There is not a specific threat," Lt. Gen. Luiz Linhares of Brazil's Ministry of Defense said. "You have to screen for a great (spectrum) of threat."

Indonesian security forces kill country's most wanted Islamist militant

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160720-indonesian-security-forces-kill-country-s-most-wanted-islamist-militant>

July 20 – Abu Wardah Santoso, Indonesia's most wanted Islamist militant, was killed in a shootout with security forces, an Indonesian



government senior minister said. He added the



killing was but one indication of the growing effectiveness of the government's counterterrorism campaign against extremists operating in the jungles of Sulawesi island.

Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the minister for security, political and legal affairs, said that Santoso was one of two militants killed in the shootout on Monday. The other was an extremist known as Mochtar, not Santoso's deputy Basri, as police had initially believed.

News.com.au reports that **Santoso, who was the leader of the East Indonesia Mujahideen militant group which, in 2014, claimed allegiance to ISIS, had eluded capture for more than five years.**

The government deployed about 2,500 security personnel, including elite army troops, to Poso,

a mountainous district of Central Sulawesi province considered an extremist hotbed, in an effort to capture Santoso and his followers.

"The strength of this extremist group will definitely weaken after the death of Santoso," Pandjaitan said. "We will increase our forces to pressure the rest of the members."

Security experts questioned the government's



focus on Santoso and the remote Central Sulawesi province, while the activity by ISIS sympathizers was increasing in Java and other parts of Indonesia. In January, four ISIS followers carried out a suicide bombing and shooting in the capital, Jakarta, killing four other people.

Santoso ran a radical training camp in Poso, where a Muslim-Christian conflict killed at least 1,000 people from 1998 to 2002. He has been linked to a number of deadly attacks against police officers and Christians.

News.com.au notes that Indonesian anti-terror police raided a jihadist training camp in a remote part of Aceh in 2010, killing dozens of suspected militants and arresting more than 100 others. Santoso vowed revenge attacks and succeeded



in killing at least six police officers. Security was raised at airports, the presidential palace, foreign embassies, and major shopping

centers in Jakarta late last year after Santoso posted a video on social media, threatening attacks against police and other targets.

State Intelligence Chief Predicts Strike From Santoso Followers

Source: <http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/bin-head-predicts-strike-santoso-followers/>

July 20 – **Militants loyal to Santoso, the country's formerly most wanted terrorist before he was killed on Monday night, are believed to be preparing an attack**, an official said on Tuesday (19/07). State Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief Sutyoso said authorities are "looking forward to the fight" if the militants still at large — who are believed to have pledged allegiance to Islamic State — seek retribution.



"There is no potential threat yet. But We are waiting for them [to strike back]. Our military is ready," Sutyoso said after attending a meeting at the State Palace.

The remaining followers of Santoso's terror group are expected to hide-out in the jungle surrounding Poso before striking against security officials.

"After they get hit in a battle they usually hide for a while," Sutyoso said.

The country's most wanted man Santoso have been killed in a gunbattle with security forces in Poso's hilly jungle on Monday evening.

The body of Santoso had been positively identified after the police carried out DNA testing. The operation is seen as a major victory for the security forces.

Despite the success, Tinombala Operation will not be suspended with supporters still on the run.

US-Backed Syrian Rebel Group Beheads Child

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/news/us-backed-syrian-rebel-group-beheads-child>



July 20 – **US-backed Syrian rebels, screaming "Allahu Akbar", brutally beheaded a child named Abdullah Issa.**

The shocking clip shows fighters from Nour-al-din el-Zanki telling the camera, "These are the prisoners from Liwa al-Quds (Jerusalem Brigade – a Palestinian militia group). He [Assad] can't stoop any lower. He sent us children today, are you sending us children?" America funds Nour-al-din el-Zanki, which fights against the Assad regime.

Liwa al-Quds (The Jerusalem Brigade) is a pro-



Assad Palestinian paramilitary group. The rebel group accused the boy of being a spy. Referring to the prisoner, one jihadi says, "These are the dogs of Assad. These are your people Bashar." Another says, "We shall not leave anyone in Handarat," the Palestinian refugee camp where a battle between regime and rebel forces is currently taking place.

To shouts of "Takbir" and "Allahu Akbar," a fighter from the group saws through the neck of Abdullah Issa. In a grisly scene, he then holds the head aloft and exclaims "Allahu Akbar" several more times.

Reports of Issa's age vary between 11 and 13. Some say he was an 11-year old Palestinian from Handarat; others say he is a Syrian from the city of Homs.

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights manager Rami Abdel Rahman told France Press, "The child is no more than 13-years old. He was arrested today in the area of Handarat, but the slaughtering happened in el-Mashab neighborhood.

"This is one of the most terrible execution acts that I have seen since the revolution began in Syria," he added.

Activists affiliated with the group which killed the boy claimed he was actually 19, and that the video makes him look a lot younger than he really is.

The beheading video was published in the early hours of Tuesday morning on social media networks, according to BBC Arabic.

The rebel group condemned the beheading and said it was perpetrated by individuals who do not represent the group. **"All of the people who carried**

out this violation have been arrested and brought before a disciplinary tribunal," the group said in a statement.

"The movement of Nour al-Din el-Zanki condemns the inhuman violation, since they believe in the principles and the targets of the revolution and the principle of human rights and the international agreements and the sharia. This violation doesn't reflect us and a one-time mistake does not reflect the general policy of the movement," the statement read.

The group also used the statement to blame international actors, saying the group "holds the international community fully responsible for keeping silent about the crimes regime forces are perpetrating which represent the lowest level of barbaric crimes committed under the ears and the eyes of the world and are represented by a killing machine which slaughters thousands of citizens."

Liwa al-Quds denied any connection with the child. A spokesman for the group said, "We don't recruit children, and all of our fighters wear military uniforms not civilian clothes. We are trying to locate the family of the child and find out his story and the place where he was kidnapped from."

Baton Rouge gunman was a member of black "sovereign citizen" group

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160720-baton-rouge-gunman-was-a-member-of-black-sovereign-citizen-group>

July 19 – **Gavin Long**, the 29-year old former Marine who on Saturday killed three Baton Rouge police officers, **was a member of a black antigovernment sovereign citizen group whose members believe they are indigenous to the United States and beyond the reach of the federal government.**



The *Kansas City Star* reports that Long, who also used the name Cosmo Setepenra, last year filed documents with Jackson County, Kansas, declaring himself an antigovernment “sovereign citizen” and a member of the United Washitaw de Dugdahmoundyah Mu’ur Nation.



The document included a “live claim birth” record in which he changed his name to Cosmo Ausar Setepenra.

The Washitaw had an on-and-off collaborative relationship with the Nation of Islam.

The *Star* notes that Long, in many YouTube videos, social media postings, and a book he self-published, gave expression to an all-consuming anger about legal authorities violating the natural law of man — a theme which is common to sovereign citizen groups.

In a video posted on a YouTube channel called “I Am Cosmo” last year, Long ranted against police conduct. “They’re trying to say that the war is being waged against the police when in fact the war is against the people, everybody,” Long said. “It’s against the people.”

The SPLC says that members of “Moorish” sovereign citizen group and other African Americans have for years been taking up the ideas of the antigovernment “[sovereign citizen](#)” movement — a movement whose adherents believe they are outside the reach of most law. The sovereign citizen’s conspiratorial belief system was originally determinedly anti-black, but the racist roots of the movement have become marginalized among as more black



Americans have married the movement’s major tenets with selective interpretations of the teachings of pioneer black nationalist Noble Drew Ali, who founded the exclusively black Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA) nearly 100 years ago.

The SPLC notes, though, that the [Washitaw](#)



[Nation](#), of which Long was once a member, is something different, as it employs pseudo-legal language and theories of “common law” — an ideology developed by American white supremacists in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Washitaw are not white supremacists, and in the bizarre language the group’s leader, a woman named **Verdiacee Turner** — who called herself Empress Verdiacee “Tiari”

Washitaw-Turner Goston El-Bey — decedents of the “Ancient Ones,” the “black ones,” occupied the North American continent tens of thousands of years before white Europeans arrived. Therefore, they fall outside federal authority.

“No doubt at all,” J.J. MacNab, an author who for two decades has been tracking anti-government extremists. “He’s 100 percent sovereign citizen,” MacNab told the *Star*.

“This group [the Washitaw Nation] believes that they are indigenous to the continent and therefore above all federal, state, and local laws,” said MacNab, who also is a fellow at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. “These documents show Long’s attempt to separate his flesh and blood ‘indigenous’ self from his legal entity self.”

Federal authorities consider the sovereign citizen movement a domestic terrorist threat.




European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016

Source: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016>




July 20 – This new edition of the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), which Europol has produced on an annual basis since 2006, provides an overview of the failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks that took place in the EU during 2015, and of arrests, convictions and penalties issued.



Average sentences (excluding non-prison penalties) per Member State in 2015, as reported to Eurojust. The overview does not include Lithuania, where one individual was sentenced to stationary observation at a specialised mental health care facility, and Sweden, where two individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment.





Australian police arrest man over attempted attack on police station

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3701282/Australian-police-arrest-man-attempted-attack-police-station.html>

July 21 – Australian police on Thursday arrested a man for an apparent attack on a Sydney police station, after he drove a car that local media said was loaded with gas canisters into its underground carpark.

A staunch U.S. ally, Australia has been on heightened alert for attacks by home-grown radicals since 2014, having suffered several "lone wolf" assaults, including a cafe siege in Sydney in which two hostages and the gunman were killed.

Police said they cordoned off the station in Merrylands, in Sydney's west, after Thursday's arrest, while officers from the Rescue and Bomb Disposal Unit searched the vehicle.

"The circumstances regarding the incident are in the early stages of being confirmed," New South Wales state police said in a statement, but declined to give further details.

The man had gas canisters in the car and was burned before being detained, media reported, citing police sources. Television broadcast images of fire trucks and emergency vehicles on standby.

No members of the public or police officers were injured during the operation, the police added.



Pro-Al Qaeda group calls to target Olympics, emphasizes attacks on U.S., France, Israel, U.K. athletes

Source: <http://www.foreigndesknews.com/world/middle-east/pro-al-qaeda-group-calls-target-olympics-emphasizes-attacks-u-s-france-israel-u-k-athletes/>



July 21 – **Pro-Al Qaeda jihadis are issuing a series of directives ahead of next month's Olympics urging their followers to carry out so-called 'lone wolf' attacks at the Rio Games**, according to material obtained by The Foreign Desk.

In a list published on social media, jihadis are advised to target American, British, French and Israeli athletes with the notion that "One small knife attack against Americans/Israelis in these places will have bigger media effect than any other attacks anywhere else in sha Allah."

"Your chance to take part in the global Jihad is here! Your chance to be a martyr is here!" the jihadis said, citing the easy process of obtaining visas for travel to Brazil as well as the wide availability of guns in "crime-ridden slums."

Israeli athletes are further singled out.

"From amongst the worst enemies, the most famous enemies for general Muslims is to attack Israelis. As general Muslims all agree to it and it causes more popularity for the Mujahideen amongst the Muslims," they state.

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During the Summer Olympics of 1972, 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were taken hostage by the Palestinian terror group Black September. They later died during a botched rescue attempt by West German authorities. A police officer was also killed.

Spectators are also legitimate targets for attackers who are advised to look for them in packed bars and clubs where drunken targets will be easy to find, but attacks should prioritize important leaders, ambassadors and officials, the list says.

Among the outlandish ideas, the list suggests poisoning food, using toy drones with small explosives and kidnapping Israelis and Americans to "free Muslim prisoners."

They can also carry lubricating oil to pour on highways, the posts says, with sharp curves they hope will cause accidents and "see Israeli Jews flying with their vehicle by the will of Allah."



Following the list's publication, several supplemental posts have also been made, using the hashtag #RioLW or "Rio lone wolf."

Jihadis are reminded to prepare a claim of responsibility, such as an email prior to the attack or a scheduled Facebook post.

Recently, some jihadi groups have expressed concern over terrorist attacks being misinterpreted by the media as in the Orlando shooting being referred to by some as a possible hate crime targeting gays.

ISIS: An Overview and Future Trends

Source: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_21039/E_122_16_1262442672.pdf

1. A year ago I gave a presentation at the First International Intelligence & Special Forces Conference about the campaign conducted by the United States and the international coalition against ISIS. My bottom line was **that the campaign had not yet succeeded in reducing ISIS's military and governance capabilities**, and that the organization was getting stronger.

2. During the past year **the situation has fundamentally changed**: ISIS's momentum, spread and strengthening have been halted. **The campaign against it has become more effective and the areas under its control in Iraq, Syria and Libya are shrinking**. That is the good news. However, there is bad news as well:

A) Despite the difficulties in its core countries, **ISIS and its supporters have significantly increased the scope of their terrorist attacks in the Middle East and around the globe, carrying out attacks more complex and often more lethal**.

B) **Although ISIS has been weakened over the past year, it continues to spread to other countries**. The ISIS brand and its Salafi-jihadist ideology remain attractive and influence many other organizations and individuals, including those formerly affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

3. While the international community has had successes in their **offensives**, their attempts at **prevention** have failed, one after another. I will examine the current situation and describe the challenges and difficulties facing the two coalitions fighting ISIS, beginning with two aspects of ISIS's weakening during the past year.

► Read the full paper at source's URL.

RAF Knife Threat Treated As Attempted Abduction

Source: <http://news.sky.com/story/raf-knife-threat-treated-as-attempted-abduction-10508206>

July 21 – An incident at an RAF base in which two men tried to grab a serviceman is being treated as an attempted abduction.



Police say **two men of Middle Eastern appearance approached the serviceman yesterday afternoon about a mile from RAF Marham and tried to bundle him into their vehicle.**

Norfolk Police say both suspects are aged between 20-30 years old, one with a well-groomed beard and of stocky build and the other clean shaven and slimmer. The first suspect apparently

shouted at the man and tried to grab him but fell to the floor after the victim fought him off.



The second suspect, who was armed with a knife, approached his accomplice which gave the victim a chance to run away.

Detective Superintendent Paul Durham said: "I can confirm we are treating this as an attempted abduction and detailed enquiries are being carried out at the scene to establish the full circumstances."

"The motivation for the attack remains unclear at this time, and whilst we are currently unable to discount terrorism, there are a number of other possible hypotheses.

"We are therefore carrying out a thorough investigation to understand what has happened, why and who is responsible."

A memo sent to all service personnel advised staff to keep a low profile and not to be alone on foot or on a bicycle in any clothing which identifies them as being with the military.

Paris Plage beach festival

Source: <http://www.euronews.com/2016/07/20/paris-plage-beach-festival-opens-amid-heightened-security>




July 20 – The annual Paris Plage beach festival has kicked off in the French capital, amid heightened security measures.

Lorry loads of sand have been dumped along the bank of the River Seine – creating that 'by the coast' feeling.

Cement blocks and barriers have been brought in to stop any vehicles getting close.

France continues to be on heightened alert after the recent attack in Nice, when a truck



was driven through a crowd – killing 84 people.

Other summer events in Paris have been cancelled this time around.

“Security has of course been increased, already last year we had raised measures,” said Paris Mayor



Anne Hidalgo.

“Since the last attacks, particularly in Nice, we reinforced the (road) access from the ramps with cement blocks and barriers which would prevent any vehicle from getting onto what today is still the highway.”

Two Tunisian mayors from Tunis and Sousse, where mass shootings took place in 2015, also attended the opening with Hidalgo.

Sousse, like Nice, is a seaside tourist town and the pair have been twinned since 2012. The aim of the visit is to show solidarity in the face of the attacks that have scarred both countries.

It was arranged before the Nice attack, which was claimed by the so-called Islamic State group.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: Here the main threat might be a VBIED – not a “vehicle-borne” BUT a “vessel-borne” IED close to shore. Let us hope that French security authorities are fast learners and this time will transform problems identified in Nice, France will (finally) become lessons learned!

Life in the Age of Global Terrorism

By Sylvia Caravotas

The events of 9/11 showed not only the United States but the world that the terrorist threat is real and very much a part of life in the twenty-first century. 9/11 was an intelligence failure and proved that terrorists could, with little resources, target a powerful country. Since then, one thing remains certain - terrorist groups may change, but their modus operandi remains the same.

Living with terrorism is becoming a reality for more nations and the recent terrorist attacks raging through Europe continue to be proof of that fact. The U.S. in particular is fighting a very different war from the Cold War years when the enemy and their capabilities were clearly known. Today with the ever-growing advances in technology connecting the world and available at a fraction of the cost, terrorists can crawl out of the woodwork and target the national security of any country.

Global security in Western nations has tightened, but more needs to be done. After 9/11 the U.S. passed the Patriot Act opening up surveillance capabilities in order to protect U.S. citizens. The USA Freedom Act of 2015 restored several of the provisions of the Patriot Act, which had expired such as restoring authorization for roving wiretaps and tracking lone wolf terrorists. Many citizens feel that these laws encroach on their privacy, but these are desperate times calling for desperate measures.



Terrorists target key sectors and facilities, which need constant security supervision and revision. Securing the transportation sector - air, land, sea, and border security is imperative in keeping terrorists out. Revised background investigation procedures are crucial in screening refugees and immigrants moving through the porous borders of the European Union.

Computer networks are heavily susceptible to hackers. ISIS' Cyber Caliphate, their hacking division, continues to cause serious concern by releasing kill lists of law enforcement and military personnel. Financial, military and civilian government facilities, large cities, and high-profile landmarks are always vulnerable to attacks. Daily essential supplies such as water, food, gas, and oil are also targets. Other threats are chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and armed attacks by home-grown terrorists and lone wolves.

Communication systems are perhaps the most vulnerable as this is where terrorists communicate with each other and their supporters, and most importantly how they lure new recruits. ISIS has a very effective propaganda machine that is modern and appealing such as their bold posters and official magazine *Dabiq*. Supporters communicate via apps like Telegram messenger where messages can be set to self-destruct.

With all this in mind, it is no wonder that life in the age of global terrorism has become one of constant suspicion and anxiety. Unfortunately this is now the world we live in and we need to make adjustments in order to keep safe. We should be vigilant and aware of our surroundings. Learn where the emergency exits are located in buildings you frequent and plan how to get out in an emergency. Get to know who lives in your building and make a plan with the building's owner to place portable battery-operated radios, flashlights, extra batteries, first aid kits, hard hats, dust masks, and water on each floor. Have an emergency kit and plan for your family.

Trust your gut. If you do not feel comfortable or something does not seem right in a situation you should leave immediately. Report any suspicious items or activities to local authorities. When travelling, be aware of unusual behaviour. Do not accept packages from anyone and do not leave baggage unattended. Immediately report any unusual behaviour or unattended packages to security personnel. Services such as electricity, water, gas, or oil may be targeted so be prepared to do without these. Terrorism has no warning – all we can do is be prepared.

We can learn from people who have lived with terrorism for years. On Oprah Winfrey's show titled *Living with Terrorism* (aired in 2001) an Israeli woman gave tips on how to cope with terrorism. These tips still apply today. She said:

- Extend your peripheral vision whenever you walk anywhere. Be alert.
- Report anything you see that may be suspicious.
- Large public places are definitely places where something can happen. Avoid going to them during prime times.
- Get a cell phone so that you can contact anyone in your family and so that they can contact you, no matter where you are.
- Teach your children to avoid touching any object found on the streets or sidewalk.
- Make sure your children's schools have security guards at all times.
- Keep busy with activities that are exhilarating or relaxing.
- Return to the classics – it works! Literature will give you a sense of control over good and evil.
- Communicate, bond, and talk to your friends and relatives. Share your fears. It's ok. Everybody feels the same way.
- Live for the moment as much as possible. Always let everyone around you know how much you love them.
- Give your children a big goodbye kiss every morning.
- Don't put off tomorrow what you can say today to family and friends.
- Pray with meaning. Let those words say what you're feeling and they will help you.

The anxiety, stress, and fear of a terrorist attack rests heavily on many. We are constantly receiving images from the media and news of attacks from around the world, which can make one anxious. These feelings can bring about difficulty in concentrating and sleeping, unwanted memories, fatigue, a racing heartbeat, and emotional numbing leading to a number of health problems. Proof of the effects of television were seen after the Oklahoma



City bombing when post traumatic stress disorder symptoms in children were related to the amount of time they watched television shows about the bombing.

In a world where extremism is fuelling attacks on innocent civilians, we can counteract this by spreading goodwill in our communities. We can all keep a close eye on our neighbours, our streets, and surroundings. There are more of us on the streets than law enforcement so it is our responsibility as citizens of our respective countries to be vigilant.

An award-winning investigator, Ms. Caravotas offers advisory and investigation services to governments, corporations, and private clients. She has managed Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) training programs for the U.S. government and is a published author on the subject of terrorism. Sylvia Caravotas runs Satovarac Consulting based in South Africa (Johannesburg Area).

Munich shooting

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/22/europe/germany-munich-shooting/>

**BREAKING
NEWS**

July 22 – At least nine people were killed and 21 others hurt Friday in a shooting rampage at a busy shopping district in Munich, Germany, police said.

Police searched for attackers, thinking there might be three, and found a man who had killed himself on a side street near Olympia shopping mall, police Chief Hubertus Andrae said.

Based on surveillance video and witness statements, police concluded he was the sole gunman, Andrae said.

The unidentified attacker was an 18-year-old German-Iranian who had lived in Munich for at least two years.

The man was not known to police and his motives are unclear, authorities said. No group has claimed responsibility.



Many children were among the casualties. Police said 16 people remain hospitalized.

The shooting comes as recent terrorist attacks have put Europe on high alert.

This week, a teenager who said he was inspired by ISIS stabbed passengers on a German train before police shot him dead. Eight days earlier, 84 people were

killed when a man drove a large truck through a crowd celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France.

Children unable to run away

The gunman in Munich started shooting at a McDonald's across from the Olympia mall around 5:50 p.m. (11:50 a.m. ET), Andrae said.

A witness who wanted to be identified only by her first name, Lauretta, told CNN her son was in the bathroom with a shooter at the restaurant.

"That's where he loaded his weapon," she said. "I hear like an alarm and boom, boom, boom ... and he's still killing the children. The children were sitting to eat. They can't run."

Lauretta said she heard the gunman say, "Allahu Akbar," or "God is great" in Arabic. "I know this because I'm Muslim. I hear this and I only cry."



The gunman moved across the street to the mall, which is adjacent to the site of the 1972 Olympics. Located in a middle-class neighborhood in northern Munich, the shopping mall is the city's biggest and a popular destination for shoppers on Friday nights, German lawmaker Charles Huber told CNN.



Lynn Stein, who said she works at the Jack Wolfskin store in the mall, said she heard several shots. "People were very confused, and they were running and they were screaming," she said. She saw someone lying on the floor of a store who appeared to be either dead or injured. "There's a woman over them, crying."

Profane exchange with a witness

Many citizens posted photos and video of the panic and the shooting on social media. Two videos showed a profanity-filled verbal exchange, between a man on the top level of parking garage and man on a balcony, that ended with gunfire.

The exchange, recorded on two different camera phones, captured an intense conversation that ends in gunfire. The man who appears to be a shooter said insulting things about Turks, did not espouse jihadist ideology and spoke with a German accent.

Police, thinking up to three gunmen might be on the loose, launched a manhunt, putting the city on virtual lockdown.

Police urged residents to stay in their homes. Citizens took to social media to offer help, with one woman tweeting: "Who is stranded in Sendling and shelter needs, PM me and come over"

Shoppers and people on the street stampeded. Tamina Stoll told CNN she was with her grandmother, who lives about three minutes away from the mall, and saw crowds sprinting down the sidewalk.

"There were like 50 people running towards our house to seek shelter, and there was a helicopter circling above us for about 20 minutes and sirens," she said. "And there's still people walking on the streets. They're confused, and nobody knows what's really going on."

At 8:30 p.m., police found a man who took his own life and decided he was the lone gunman, Andrae said.

The investigation will not yield quick answers, he said.

"We have to investigate everything via third person as we cannot question the perpetrator now," he said.



Kabul suicide attack

**BREAKING
NEWS**

[ISIS is claiming responsibility for killing at least 61 people](#) and wounding more than 200 during a peaceful demonstration in Kabul by a minority group Saturday.

Two ISIS fighters detonated their suicide belts among the protesters, according to ISIS' media wing, Amaq.

The attack, the worst in terms of casualties in several weeks, drew attention to ISIS instead of the Taliban, which had been credited with recent bombings.

