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ISIS: A Risk Assessment

By Yoram Schweitzer

Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7116

Recent events in Iraq are liable to give new impetus to the ideas and the path that ISIS represents, which are shared by many terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and beyond. Its strong economic capacity could be exploited to support and acquire influence over the operations of terrorist organizations that share its ideas. In addition, enormous quantities of high quality weapons, many of them Western, have fallen into ISIS hands, and they will certainly find their way to terrorist organizations operating in combat zones in the Middle East and even beyond. Like many other countries in the world, Israel is watching the development of the battle in Iraq with great interest. While it appears that at this stage there is no immediate threat to Israel's security from the events in Iraq, the resulting atmosphere could strengthen global jihadi elements operating in countries near Israel.

Since the announcement that the Iraqi city of Mosul fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the media has abounded with apocalyptic scenarios whereby all of Iraq falls into the group's hands. According to media reports, the organization will soon conquer Baghdad and thus complete its takeover of the entire country. It has also been reported that Jordan, Kuwait, and other Gulf states are anxious about facing a similar fate at the hands of this powerful organization, as if it were an emerging superpower. Yet while given its local accomplishments and its murderous actions the threat posed by ISIS is not to be dismissed, its achievements and its strength must be evaluated in a wider context.

An important initial point concerns the group's affiliation with al-Qaeda, mentioned frequently in the media. ISIS is indeed part of the global jihad movement, which seeks to establish a Taliban-style caliphate under Islamic law in the Levant region. However, the serious conflict between ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has resulted in the group's expulsion from the alliance established by al-Qaeda and several of its main affiliates. Therefore, the widespread use of the term "al-Qaeda forces in Iraq" does not suit the situation, and it certainly enhances

the reputation of al-Qaeda unjustifiably, whose strength is glorified to an unwarranted degree.

Furthermore, ISIS victories in Iraq result more from Shiite Prime Minister al-Maliki's lack of public legitimacy, the weakness of the Iraqi army, and the failed leadership of its commanders, than from unprecedented military power and talent. Until recently, a considerable portion of the group's operations in western Iraq involved hit-and-run raids, token demonstrations of a military presence in places it had conquered, and demonstrative military parades. ISIS succeeded in hanging its flags primarily in areas that evinced a lack of interest and resistance by the local populace, which sometimes even assisted the group because of their repudiation of al-Maliki, perceived as a corrupt tyrant who blatantly discriminates against Sunnis. This resentment concerning the Shiite regime has led residents of the areas conquered in western Iraq to perceive ISIS, at least thus far, as the lesser of all evils. The inevitable confrontation between the organization and the local population once it attempts to impose its rigid, extremist Islamic way of life on the residents - as it did previously in Iraq and in the past year in Syria - is postponed to the future.

The arrogance displayed by ISIS and the media circus surrounding it far exceed what warranted by its size. First, the numbers floated in the media about the exact number of troops available to the organization in Iraq are not necessarily credible. However, even if we take them seriously, the estimate does not exceed some 10,000 men, some of them foreign volunteers. It is clear that this is not sufficient to capture and manage Iraq's capital, Baghdad, which the al-Maliki government has a fundamental interest to protect as part of the defense of the integrity of Iraq. Furthermore, in practice, ISIS lacks the ability to fully control and manage the other regions it has conquered in Iraq, and even more to force the residents of these areas to accept the government under the fundamentalist Islamic law to which it aspires. In Syria, too, the organization is far from controlling large parts of the country, and it is mainly making do with control of

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the Raqqah region and parts of Deir ez-Zor.

The concern in the countries bordering Iraq, mainly Iran, Turkey, and Jordan, can be expected to pose an obstacle to continued ISIS success. Thus if ISIS nevertheless continues to surprise and achieve significant territorial gains in Baghdad and become a direct threat to its neighbors' national security, it will encounter resistance in the region and probably US intervention, even if limited because the United States fears additional entanglement in the investment involved in a massive military presence in Iraq. Iran would certainly mobilize to aid the Shiite al-Maliki government, which it considers its ally, in order to maintain its influence over the Iraqi regime. It will also use force to prevent the danger of a hostile Sunni, jihadi Islamic regime on its borders. Presumably Turkey will not sit idly by either if such an extreme scenario is close to being fulfilled.

Nonetheless, the danger posed by recent events in Iraq is that they are liable to give new impetus to the ideas and the path that ISIS represents, which are shared by many terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and beyond. The main danger comes from the enormous economic capital the organization accumulated in Iraq when it took over the banks in areas abandoned by the Iraqi army - and which the local police failed to protect. In addition, the group boasts considerable income from its takeover of the oil and energy reserves. This strong economic capacity could be exploited to support and acquire influence over the operations of terrorist organizations that share its ideas. In addition, enormous quantities of high quality weapons, many of them Western, have fallen into ISIS hands, and they will certainly find their way to terrorist organizations operating in combat zones in the Middle East and even beyond.

Like many other countries in the world, Israel is watching the development of the battle in Iraq with great interest. It will need to increase its intelligence focus on ISIS and its ties to organizations operating along Israel's borders in order to prevent the deterioration the group is liable to ignite. At this stage, while it appears that there is no immediate and direct threat to Israel's security from the events in Iraq, the resulting atmosphere could strengthen global jihadi elements operating in countries near Israel. Indeed, from Syria, it appears that the potential threat to Israel is actually from Jabhat al-Nusra, which is present, alongside members of the Islamic Front, in the Syrian Golan Heights and on the border with Jordan. Thus far, these organizations have not turned their weapons against Israel, and they cannot be directly linked to most of the incidents of sporadic firing and sabotage carried out against Israel from the Syrian side of the border. However, the potential for escalation in this sector exists. The ideological and rhetorical approach of ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda, which have publicly declared their intention to attack Israel, strengthens the assessment that in the future, these groups will attempt to carry out their threats. Indeed, ISIS was tied to certain foiled terrorist: a group with operatives from East Jerusalem and Jenin planned, with supervision from Gaza and guidance from Pakistan, to join ISIS operatives in Syria and carry out suicide attacks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It is not clear whether this indicates a trend toward infiltration of Israeli territory by ISIS or whether it was an isolated attempt. In any case, the self-confidence the organization has gained from its achievements in Iraq and Syria and the tremendous capital at its disposal, which has made it quite wealthy, cannot help it conquer Iraq. However, they are most likely to spur the group to exploit these resources to expand its operations to other arenas, including Israel, and even to help fund the operations of its ideological affiliates.

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Yoram Schweitzer, an expert on international terrorism and head of the INSS Program on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict, has been a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), which incorporated the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), since February 2003, following a distinguished career in the Israeli intelligence community as well as in the academic world. Among other positions, he served as a consultant on counter-terror strategies to the prime minister's office and the Ministry of Defense, Head of the Counter International Terror Section in the IDF, and a member in a Task Force dealing with Israeli MIAs at the Prime Minister's Office. Mr. Schweitzer was a researcher and head of Educational Curriculum at the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) at the Inter

Disciplinary Center in Herzliya. Schweitzer has lectured and published widely on terror-related issues, and serves as a consultant for government ministries on a private basis. His areas of expertise include al-Qaeda and its affiliates – also known as the "Afghan alumni phenomenon," suicide terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism. Among his publications are The Globalization ofTerror: The Challenge of Al - Qaida and the Response of theInternational Community *(co authored with Shaul Shay, 2003) and* Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism *(with Sari Goldsetin Ferber, 2005), and he is the editor of* Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? *(2006). Schweitzer's current research involves extensive meetings with failed suicide terrorists and their operators in an effort to analyze their motivations and objectives. Schweitzer holds an MA in military and diplomatic history from Tel Aviv University.*

How the Iraq crisis unfolded from AD 632 to 2014

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/06/how-iraq-crisis-unfolded-from-ad-632-to.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+terrorismwatch%2FJTvK+%28Terrorism+Watch%29

Chaos in Iraq, a diverse nation that stands as a buffer zone between the mostly Sunni Mideast and mostly Shiite Iran, is troubling around the world.

It's crumbling so quickly: Just two-and-a-half years after American troops came home, Iraq is back in crisis.

And chaos in Iraq, a diverse nation that stands as a buffer zone between the mostly Sunni Mideast and mostly Shiite Iran, is troubling around the world.

There were plenty of warnings, of course.

A look at how we got here:

When did the trouble start?
The answer depends: How far back do you want to go?

AD 632: The centuries-old split between the Shia and Sunni denominations dates to the death of the Prophet Muhammad and a dispute over who should succeed him as leader of the Muslims. Sunnis are the largest branch of Islam. But Shiites outnumber them in Iraq and make up the overwhelming majority of neighboring Iran.

1916: The uneasy borders dividing the Middle East were set during World War I, when the French and English divvied up the lands of the defeated Ottoman Empire with little regard for religious or ethnic differences. Through wars and upheaval, the national borders they drew have pretty much held, largely by the force of autocratic rulers.

2003: A US-led coalition invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein, and mayhem broke out. Saddam had ruthlessly held the nation together for more than two decades, favoring

his fellow Sunnis while wiping out multitudes of Shiites and Kurds. Americans, flush with the fervor that followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, hoped to replace him with a friendly democracy. They met waves of bombings, massacres and kidnappings in sectarian fighting that peaked in 2006 and 2007, when additional US troops began arriving and helped to temporarily tamp down the violence.

2011: A return to factional warfare has been feared ever since US troops pulled out after nearly nine years in Iraq. Americans urged Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to craft a government that would share power between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds and heal the national wounds. It didn't work out. Sunnis complain they are excluded, imprisoned and abused by al-Maliki's Shiite-dominated government. Kurds have focused on building up their oil-rich autonomous enclave in northern Iraq.

2013: The situation in Iraq began deteriorating rapidly. Sunni protesters took to the streets, al-Qaida-inspired militants stepped up their attacks, and fighting from Syria's civil war spilled over the border into Iraq.

Who are those guys?
The alarming dispatches from Iraq often feature a jumble of letters new to many American ears: ISIL, or sometimes ISIS. ISIL stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a Sunni insurgent group.

Its previous name is more familiar: al-Qaida in Iraq.

The group emerged during the Iraq War as a major player in the

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Shiite vs. Sunni violence that threatened to rip Iraq apart along sectarian lines. The US State Department classified al-Qaida in Iraq as a terrorist organization in 2004.

The Sunni group famously blew up one of Shiite Islam's holiest shrines, the golden domed al-Askari mosque in Samarra, in 2006. It uses beheadings and videotaped executions to enhance its reputation for brutality.

Leaders of the core of al-Qaida objected to the group's attacks on fellow Muslims in Iraq, worrying that would hurt the larger cause of jihad against the West.

The Islamic State aggressively moved into Syria in 2013, two years into that country's uprising. The group changed its name, clashed with other rebel factions and eventually had a falling out with the main al-Qaida organization, which formally disavowed it in February.

Their name is sometimes translated from Arabic as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. That understates the relatively small group's outsized ambition.

It wants to create an Islamic state ruled by Shariah law in Iraq and in "the Levant," a region stretching from southern Turkey into Egypt, encompassing not only Syria but also Jordan and Israel. The group's extremist brand of Shariah orders women to stay inside their homes, bans music and punishes thieves by cutting off their hands.

What's the Syrian connection?

As the US was winding down operations in Iraq in 2011, the Arab Spring protests were underway.

Uprisings forced out the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. In Syria, President Bashar Assad's deadly crackdown on demonstrators sparked a civil war, with no end in sight.

It's a rebellion that reverberates strongly among Iraq's Sunnis: The Syrian rebels are mostly Sunnis, fighting a repressive government dominated by Alawites, an offshoot of Shiite Islam.

The bloodshed in Syria revitalized the flagging Islamic State.

The extremist group joined the fight and began gathering new recruits from among the foreigners pouring in to battle Assad. It set up operations in Syria that serve as a base for the Iraq campaign. It took over a swath of Iraqi and Syrian borderland and turned it into a seedbed for the Islamic State's vision of a caliphate under strict Islamic law.

American intelligence officials worry that this fiefdom could be used to train jihadis with Western passports to attack the United States.

The United States also wants Assad out of Syria. But it is limiting its assistance to Syrian rebels to avoid helping extremists such as the Islamic State.

The group's land grabs, brutality and extreme religious rules alienated even some of its would-be allies on the ground. Heavy fighting for the past six months between the Islamic State and other insurgents has weakened the Syrian opposition.

Is Baghdad on the brink?

The Islamic State's bold and bloody sweep through northern and western Iraq this year belies its relatively small numbers - probably fewer than 10,000 fighters, according to US intelligence estimates.

How could a force that size take Fallujah, site of the biggest battle of the Iraq War, and capture Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq?

For one thing, it's the home team. Many residents of the Sunni heartland prefer the insurgents to al-Maliki's government. That might change later if the group begins to enforce its Taliban-style version of Islamic law.

The Iraqi army is awash in corruption, desertion and battered morale. Many Sunni and Kurd soldiers and police feel little loyalty to Baghdad; they balk at fighting and killing their own people. When Islamic State fighters moved into Mosul, a security force of some 75,000 troops and police collapsed and scattered.

The Islamic State also appears to be getting help from Sunni tribes and elements of Saddam's old Baath Party. The insurgents rolled into Saddam's hometown of Tikrit without opposition.

Despite its threats, the Islamic State probably isn't big enough to overrun Baghdad, the Shiite-heavy capital city of 7 million people, much less conquer all of Iraq.

The real fear is that their campaign will spark a wider Sunni uprising, incite retaliation by Shiite militias and start a full-out religious war that could spread across the Middle East.

Where does Iran come in?

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Maybe on the American side, for a change.

The list of complaints between the United States and Iran is long and grievous: The US accused Iran of aiding Shiite militias that killed American troops during the Iraq War. It says Iran sponsors global terrorists and poses a potential nuclear threat to Israel.

The two nations stand opposed on Syria, where Iran is propping up Assad.

Yet when it comes to Iraq, their interests align, at least in the short term. Both Iran and the US want stability in Iraq; they share a common foe in the Islamic State.

There's also grim history behind Iran's alliance with a Shiite-controlled Iraq.

When Saddam and Sunnis ran Iraq, they invaded Iran and started an eight-year war that cost a million lives. Back then, the United States supported Saddam over Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who held Americans hostage and called the US the "Great Satan."

Today, mostly Shiite Iran badly wants an ally instead of an enemy across the border in Iraq. President Barack Obama's administration has made overtures to Iran about possibly working together on the problem. Obama says that means teaming up to persuade Iraq's government to make amends with the Sunnis and Kurds - not military cooperation.

But Iran already is helping Iraq strengthen its military and Shiite militias to battle the militant Sunni onslaught.

Across the Middle East, that could look like another omen of a spreading religious war.

The globalization of the Hollywood war film

Source: http://www.opendemocracy.net/tarak-barkawi/globalization-of-hollywood-war-film

Recently, Russia and Germany have produced duelling filmic visions of their great contest in World War II.

For a long time, people in other countries had to watch American war films. Now they are making their own. Recently, Russia and Germany have produced duelling filmic visions of their great contest in World War II.

Paid for with about $30 million in state money, *Stalingrad* **(dir. Feder Bondarchuk) grossed around $50 million within weeks of hitting Russian screens in October, 2013. Earlier that year,** *Our Mothers, Our Fathers* **was shown as a three part miniseries on German and Austrian television. On its final night 7.6 million Germans, 24 per cent of all viewers, watched it.**

The duty of the classic Hollywood war film is to make war meaningful. It orders events in a satisfying narrative, with the message that it was all worthwhile. The sacrifices were rational, and for a purpose. Private Ryan had to be saved so that America could live on and prosper after the war.

War films like this try to shape public memory of the nation and its wars in particular kinds of ways. The idea is to reproduce in the future a conservative vision of the country and its patriotic values. Soldiers of the past, and their wartime sacrifices, are made to embody this vision.

To perform their function and make for good entertainment, such films often have to deliver up fantastical accounts of wartime events. While US filmmakers now go in for the hyperrealism of *Band of Brothers* and *The Pacific*: not so in Germany and Russia.

It is as if these countries, in their quest to be ordinary today, need to turn the Eastern Front into something other than a monstrous catastrophe, at least on film. In doing so, what is still most revealing is the violence these films do to wartime events.

Stalingrad starts off by turning the war into a disaster movie, as if it

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were out of human hands. Incongruously the film opens with Russian aid workers rescuing German teenagers from a Tsunami-hit Japanese city. This move recoups in imaginative terms some wounded Russian pride at the contrast with a far more economically advanced Germany.

Bondarchuk viscerally connects his present day viewers to the battle of Stalingrad. In this version, one of the aid workers was conceived during the battle, and becomes the film's narrator. Through this crudely literal but compelling cinematic maneuver, the battle is turned into the womb of the contemporary Russian nation.

As always with war films, gender is key. In the situation *Stalingrad*'s writers set up, the role of the women is to sleep with the right men. Only in this way can the battle give birth to people of good character.

The film is loosely based on the defense of Pavlov's House, a stout four-story building which stood between German lines and a stretch of the bank of the Volga in the fall of 1942. As elsewhere in the city, a group of civilians stayed on in the house during the fighting.

Mostly under the leadership of Sergeant Yakov Pavlov, a platoon held out in the building for nearly two months before relief by counterattacking Red Army troops. One of the civilians, Mariya Ulyanova, played an active role in the fighting.

A few gestures in this direction aside, in the film the Ulyanova's character's main job is to be protected by the men, in two senses. She must of course physically survive, but also her virtue must be guarded, at least until the appropriate moment.

Bondarchuk thinks his film allows "those who have forgotten history" to "experience what happened at that time". Apparently, this only goes for the men. Some 800,000 Soviet women served in uniform in the Second World War, many in combat roles.

For Bondarchuk, Sgt. Pavlov's successful defense of his position was not sufficient cinematic grist. In a climax reminiscent of *Saving Private Ryan*, the final, apparently unstoppable German tank attack is defeated by the godlike intervention of air power (at least as rendered in English subtitles; the filmmakers may have intended artillery). Unseen Soviet planes (or guns) bomb the building and its environs into oblivion, killing all the film's

remaining characters in a 3-D sacrificial fete, all that is but for Ulyanova.

She has been carried off to safety by a soldier in love with her who consummates the business necessary to the plot before returning to sacrifice his life usefully in the final combat. The Ulyanova character has intercourse—unseen, like the planes—only once and at a morally sanctioned moment. She survives to pass on her values to her son the narrator.

Ulyanova's counterpart across the lines, shacked up with a German officer, has more and more visible sex and is duly killed off by a Russian sniper. This fallen female character is racialized as blond-haired and blue-eyed like the *Wehrmacht* officer she sleeps with.

==The film does not acknowledge that many women caught up in the war and its mass rapes had little choice in their sexual partners, whatever their degree of chastity.==

In another flight from reality, the film promotes the Pavlov character to Captain. This is presumably to identify with the professional and well-off classes in today's Russia, those who can afford to see first run films.

The actual Sgt. Pavlov figured out that the panzers could not elevate their cannon high enough to hit the top floor of his building. There, he placed his obsolete anti-tank rifles, which could penetrate the thin armor on the turret tops. His soldiers saw off many tank attacks quite on their own. He survived the war to become a Russian Orthodox mystic with a large and faithful following who know little of his wartime heroism.

But the complexities and disjunctures of real war stories lack the satisfying resolution of filmic ones.

Our Mothers, Our Fathers also seeks to make death in war meaningful by meting it out according to scales of virtue. The brave officer brother who fights well until he turns against the war's insanity survives. The sensitive, cowardly brother who later becomes a brutal killer chooses suicide. This tidily excuses viewers from apportioning responsibility for the characters' all too human acts.

The innocent and enthusiastic nurse, who makes a tragic mistake but later feels appropriately guilty, survives to marry the conscientiously objecting ex-officer. They are the upstanding national couple who, as in *Stalingrad*, go on to give birth to today's citizens/viewers. The

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vivacious nightclub singer who takes up with a Nazi in order to save her Jewish lover is executed, not unlike Ulyanova's counterpart. Meanwhile, in a swipe at Germany's eastern neighbour, the main purpose of the film's Jewish character seems to be to show up Polish partisans as anti-Semitic. German death camps are nowhere to be seen in the film. The Anglo-Americans are almost entirely excused from their favoured form of the delivery of mass death, for the film makes hardly any reference to the bombing campaigns that flattened and burned Germany's cities.

Real war is capricious and democratic in the way it hands out suffering and death; there is no rhyme or reason as to why some die and others survive. This is one reason why survivors are often tortured with inconsolable guilt.

On film, death in war is part of a rational and moral order. The bad guys mostly die, and if the good ones do too, their sacrifice is purposeful and worthwhile, not random. Only in this way can the war film become a vehicle to tell stories about the nation, about its purpose and meaning in the world.

Historic proportions of Iraq's military collapse raise questions about Iraq's viability

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140624-historic-proportions-of-iraq-s-military-collapse-raise-questions-about-iraq-s-viability

"The scale of Iraq's military collapse is of historic proportions," one military analyst said. A recent assessment of the Iraqi military found that 60 out of 243 Iraqi Army combat battalions "cannot be accounted for, and all of their equipment is lost." American military officials said an evaluation of the state of Iraq's military revealed that five of the Iraqi Army's fourteen divisions were "combat ineffective," including the two that were overrun in Mosul. **The United States has spent $1.7 trillion in Iraq since 2003, of which $25 billion were used to equip and train the post-Saddam Iraqi military.** The United States received no return on its huge investment in Iraq, but it was hoped that at least the Iraqi military, U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped, would provide a solid, professional foundation for a new Iraq. Developments in Iraq this last week proved that this hope was illusory.

Western military analysts say that the performance of the Iraqi military in the last two weeks – or, more precisely, utter lack of performance – in the face of ISIS advances, makes it clear that the army will continue to suffer losses in its fight with ISIS Sunni militants – that is, when it fights them at all — and will certainly not be able any time soon to retake the vast parts of Iraq now no longer under government control.

The *New York Times* reports that Western officials and military experts who analyzed the state of the Iraqi military concluded that about a quarter of Iraq's military forces are "combat ineffective," its air force is minuscule, morale among troops is low, and its leadership characterized by widespread corruption.

Ghost army

A typical salary of a soldier in the Iraqi military is $1,000-1,200 a month, which is much higher than salaries in the rest of the Iraqi economy, where minimum wage is $150 a month. The soldier's salary, however, is only a part – and often, a small part – of what the soldier brings home. Soldiers in the Iraqi army augment their salaries by demanding bribes from civilians trying to pass through checkpoints and roadblocks, and they loot TVs, refrigerators, and other electronic equipment during "searches," then sell the equipment.

Haaretz reports that officers in the Iraqi army make up to $6,000 a month, but senior officer typically enhance their salaries by charging junior officers under their command if these junior officers want the senior officers to write recommendations for promotion. Other high-level officers take money directly from their units' budget, then conceal the theft by reducing the salaries of the men serving under them, so that at the end of the month the units' books look to be in order.

In the Iraqi army, soldiers are often ordered to organize "fund raising campaigns" to buy expensive presents – cars, expensive furniture — for their commanding officers.

One of the most prevalent practices which have seriously undermined the Iraqi army may be described as "ghosting."

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Commanders often list soldiers and officers in their units who have been allowed not to show up for duty – but the money for salaries for these ghost soldiers continue to be sent to the unit. These ghost soldiers do exist — they have an identity card and an address – but they are freed by their commanders from military duties, and in return they have to pay part of their salaries, sometimes more than half, to their commanders.

Haaretz notes that this why we should treat with the suspicion claims that the Iraqi army is 400,000 strong, or that the number of Iraqi soldiers who were positioned in the areas now controlled by ISIS was 50,000-60,000. In addition to the fact that the Iraqi army is an army only part of which is trained, and in which a large number of soldiers do not even show up for duty; there is another problem: most of the soldiers and officers are not subordinate to their commanders — but rather to their political, ethnic, and religious leaders.

Following the collapse of the Iraqi military in the north, al-Maliki has fired forty-nine senior officers, but Maliki's record of running the Iraqi army makes it unclear whether these dismissals are punishment for dereliction of duty or, which is more likely, part of an on-going campaign to purge the army of officers Maliki views as not sufficiently loyal to him.

Limited options
The exceedingly low quality of the Iraqi military, and the culture of corruptions which dominates its ranks from top to bottom, raise questions about the utility of military assistance to Iraq by other nations. After ten years of intensive training by thousands of U.S. officers and instructors, the structures do not exist to absorb, and make meaningful use of, even more advanced military equipment from Western powers.

If ISIS pushes further south from its current positions, it will be met with stiffer opposition since it will be operating in largely Shi'a areas. Similarly, **taking a city the size of Baghdad, most of whose resident are now Shi'a – under Maliki, most of the city's Sunny resident have left – would probably be beyond ISIS capabilities,** especially as Iran has already sent 2,000 troops to help in the protection of Baghdad. Even more importantly, the responsibility for the city's protection has now been assumed by Iranian officers, who

have replaced the incompetent and corrupt Iraqi officers appointed by Maliki.

Still, even if Baghdad and Iraq's south are, at least for now, safe from ISIS incursions, the total collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of about 8,000 ISIS fighters confirmed the worst-case scenarios developed in various war games about the risks Iraq would face after the United States withdrew its troops. These scenarios included the fall of Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, and the militants' capture of several border crossings with Syria.

"The momentum is with ISIS," one Western official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the *Times*. "They grow and grow every day."

Analysts who are not government officials, and as a result have more freedom to express their views, say that there is no point mincing words: the Iraqi Army is a defeated force, a poignant proof of how the animating rationale behind the George W. Bush administration's ambitious Iraq project, and the hopes of the American trainers of the Iraqi military in 2011, when the United States withdrew, were not much more than wishful thinking.

"The scale of Iraq's military collapse is of historic proportions," Michael Knights, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote recently, noting that 60 out of 243 Iraqi Army combat battalions "cannot be accounted for, and all of their equipment is lost" ("Unity With Kurdistan Will Stave Off the Threat," *New York Times*, 15 June 2014).

American military officials said an evaluation of the state of Iraq's military revealed that five of the Iraqi Army's fourteen divisions were "combat ineffective," including the two that were overrun in Mosul. Tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers left their gear behind and fled in the face of ISIS advances, and Iraq said it would try to create new military units from the remnants of the old unit.

"It will be a mammoth task to put these units back together and rearm them," Knights said. "Just as important, the defeated army needs to be turned around."

The *Times* notes that a measure of the desperate straits in which the Iraqi military now finds itself is the fact that it – and the Iranian commanders now planning Baghdad defense – now must rely on assistance from hundreds of thousands of Shi'a volunteers and a smaller number of highly trained

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members of Iranian-supported Shi'a militias. American military analysts noted that for army units to add volunteers who have little or no experience is of questionable benefit.

Iraq's air force consists of only three Cessna aircraft capable of delivering American-made Hellfire missiles, but one of the Cessnas has been grounded for a while, and the military was running out of missiles.

American officials say Iraq's counterterrorism force, which the United States has been training at the Baghdad airport, are of better quality, but that since the United States withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the skills of Iraqi forces have declined.

Analysts note that the Iraqi military is not well-practiced in fighting and maneuvering on the battlefield, and instead is now mostly a "checkpoint army," that is, a force capable of performing low-level police tasks such as checking identification but incapable of taking the fight to the enemy.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Just imagine what one or more *logic* governors could do with all that TRILLIONS of money spent on weaponry, training etc!

THE CURRENT CRISIS

1.1 Billion people lack access to clean drinking water*

2.5 million people die each year due to waterborne-related disease. 90% of which are children under the age of 5*

The World Health Organization (WHO) has declared a **worldwide water crisis** among the world's poorest people*

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PIA flight attacked midair in Peshawar, woman killed

Source: http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/06/25/national/woman-dead-flight-steward-injured-as-pia-flight-is-attacked-at-peshawar-airport/

June 24 – **A woman was killed and two others were reportedly injured** when unknown armed men fired at a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) airplane that was about to land at the Bacha Khan

International Airport late on Tuesday.

According to details, PIA flight PK 756 coming from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was about to land at the Peshawar airport when the incident took place at around 11pm. At the time of the incident around 178 passengers and 12 crew members were on board the **PIA flight and the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 1,500 metres.**

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Confirming the incident, airport officials said one passenger was killed while flight stewards identified as Ijaz Afridi and Wajid were injured in the incident. The injured have been shifted to the Combined Military Hospital. They said that **12 bullets had pierced through the aircraft's body** but the pilot, Captain Tariq Chaudhry managed to land the aircraft safely. They said that flight operations had been suspended at the airport following the incident.

Police sources said that the aircraft was targeted from the University Road area in Tehkaal and police and security forces had cordoned off the airport premises and launched a search operation in the area to trace the perpetrators.

This is the third such incident at the Bacha Khan Airport.

On April 29, rockets were fired on Bacha Khan International Airport (BKIA) that hit an army barrack on Khyber Road. On February 26, two rockets landed inside Peshawar airport however no damage was reported.

The suspected attack follows a major Taliban assault on Karachi airport earlier this month that killed at least 32 people, including all 10 Uzbek terrorists affiliated with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The security was put on a high alert around the Bacha Khan Airport area amidst the military's ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb against terrorists in North Waziristan Agency, one of the country's seven semi-autonomous tribal agencies next to Khyber Paktunkhwa province of which Peshawar is the capital.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: As far as I can recall this is the **first time** that such *modus operandi* has been employed. Airport security authorites worldwide should reconsider/update their defense plans to avoid repetition. Perhaps the only solution is the one I support for all major targets: a second perimeter security web in varying distances from main target – i.e. airport, embassy, military camp, gov offices.

Experts debate the vulnerability of Midwest cities to terrorist attacks

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140625-experts-debate-the-vulnerability-of-midwest-cities-to-terrorist-attacks

The crises in Syria and Iraq have increased worries about terror cells taking aim at American targets, specifically New York, Boston, and Los Angeles. **As larger cities step up their counterterrorism efforts, however, analysts debate whether less populated cities in the Midwest are safe or just as vulnerable to terror attacks.** Former FBI special agent and security expert Manny Gomez explained to CBS-DC that Midwest cities may be more vulnerable to terror attacks because these cities lack the

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resources larger cities allocate to counterterrorism efforts. "Certainly, the Midwest is an easier target without a doubt," Gomez said. "However that doesn't necessarily equate that terrorists would target those cities, **because you get less bang for your buck**. They want a high value target such as New York City. It has always been and always will be their crown jewel. They want to attack the greatest population to get international notoriety. It's also the financial heart of the country. It's always been and quite frankly will always be the number one target."

Anthony Lemieux, a researcher with the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, believes that cities in the Midwest are not more vulnerable to terror attacks. "I don't think cities in the Midwest are at a higher risk than cities like New York City," Lemieux said. "One of the

biggest cities in the Midwest is Chicago and certainly there have been plots there in the past. Any time that you have a popular center of any magnitude that will make it a more attractive target." He added, "I don't think there would be any kind of shifting because there is increased security in bigger cities." Lemieux is concerned with home grown terrorism. Analyst say the recruitment efforts of young Somali men in Minnesota by al-Shabaab and the return of foreign fighters from the Syrian civil war represents the greatest potential for a terror attack in the United States. "Kansas City had an attack and we are seeing terrorism in some of these Midwest pockets," he said. "The Jewish center shooting is terrorism by any definition. The Las Vegas attack is terrorism by any definition. Everywhere has potential strengths and vulnerabilities to face a terrorist attack at the end of the day." Still, larger cities like New York are higher valued targets for terrorists and that is likely to remain the case.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Please remember this small article and the names of the "experts" mentioned herein for the next time that something real will happen in a "small city". **It is this short of mentality that proves the fact that after so many years fighting terrorism we still DO NOT know the enemy…**

Terrorism and Jihad: Differences and Similarities
By Philipp Holtmann
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/352/html

What many Westerners call criminal *terrorism* is, in the eyes of many Islamists, legitimate *jihad*. They say they are opposed to terrorism but by this they mean certain uses of force against one target but not again another. Are we talking about different phenomena when we talk about terrorism and jihad or are these basically the same? Jihad is sometimes translated as *holy war*, i.e. religiously sanctioned warfare. In Islam, jihad has been around for more than 1300 years. Terrorism as we know it is, as a doctrine, little more than 200 years old when we take the *Terreur* phase of the French revolution (1793-1974) as point of departure, or little more than 140 years old when we look at non-state propaganda-by-the-deed type terrorism of the anarchist sort. In the meantime, both terrorism and jihad have evolved, at least to some extent.

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It is well-known that the United Nations has not managed to arrive at an internationally binding legal definition of terrorism. This has been mainly due to the ambiguity of war doctrines of Western states during the Cold War and the opposition from Islamic and Arab regimes who were eager to allow certain Islamist and leftist liberation movements to engage in dubious tactics against Israel and India – tactics they would not permit if used against their own regimes. There is a greater degree of agreement on a definition of terrorism in the academic world where a consensus definition has emerged, characterising terrorism as a "...conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties." [1]] That is the *practice* side of terrorism. However, terrorism also refers to a doctrine of unconventional or irregular warfare and indeed, jihad can contain elements of terrorism – in terms of ideology, strategy and tactics. At the same time, it also has various different meanings in modern Muslim culture, such as an effort towards a "religiously commendable goal," or simply a "crusade," such as "a crusade against smoking," which might, for example, be used as a slogan in a Muslim country to boost a public health campaign.

Some modern Muslim scholars claim that the goal of true jihad is to "establish a just social order"; others add that the way to realise this objective is through violent struggle. [2] In addition, some classical and modern Muslim thinkers divide jihad into a "struggle by the heart and soul" (fighting evil), "struggle by the tongue and pen" (spreading the word of Islam), "struggle by the hand" (political action or protest), and "struggle by the sword" (armed fighting). Yet the dominant meaning of "jihad" in Sunni Muslim culture remains "Islamic warfare," which refers to war, more specifically to fighting with the intent to kill (*qital*). This interpretation of jihad is paramount in Islamic texts and has been addressed in Islamic juridical sources since the very beginning of the canonisation of Islamic law.

The canonised body of Islamic law texts (Quran, traditions, interpretations and legal opinions by the four main Sunni law schools) that surrounds the concept of "jihad" is much larger and more developed than similar concepts of holy war in other religions.[3] This idea

materialises in thousands of stipulations and allegedly "sound" (i.e. authentic) traditions by the Prophet and his companions. It refers to conduct in war, treatment of civilians or incitement to jihad. These have been collected around two centuries after Muhammad's death, but some are even older.

Traditional references to jihad are often confusing and contradicting each other. It must be assumed that different Muslim leaders tried to protect their own interests by forging traditions in order to improve their standing in the intra-Muslim conflicts during the rampant factionalism in the early centuries of Islam. Between the 11th and 13th centuries, new legal works on jihad, for example by the scholar Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198) or by the puritan renewer Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) emerged. Averroes explained the positions of all four major legal schools in Islam on jihad. Ibn Taymiyya expounded on the religious and moral doctrine of jihad, first and foremost as expansionist Islamic warfare, but also as defensive warfare against rulers and invaders who were only Muslims in name (like the Mongol invaders). Jihad was also used when referring to the quelling of rebellious Muslim groups. This indicates that Muslims were in need of clarification regarding the Islamic core concept of jihad. It also shows that changing circumstances led to dynamic changes in the interpretation of jihad. Modern Salafist jihadis have taken bits and pieces out of classical legal debates to justify what are essentially terrorist tactics, sometimes in the name of "defense," at other times as an instrument of "deterrence," but also to justify aggressive, i.e. "offensive" measures. Yet the psychological element that underlies all three of these justifications remains the same: causing fright, fear and panic that goes beyond the direct targets of violent attacks – something that terrorism tries to achieve too.

Specific elements of endemic warfare and tribal culture have influenced the classical Islamic worldview and doctrine of war. The early Islamic *ummah* saw itself as a tribe at war with the surrounding non-Muslim rulers and empires. In such a situation, Muslims saw it as their duty to expand the Islamic territory and to bring as many new converts under its rule as possible. The classical core concept of jihad is thus one of war for the purpose of imperial conquest, embellished by a religiously beneficial ideology. Moreover, the normal state of affairs among pre-Islamic Arabic tribes was one of constant warfare, interrupted by temporary truces. Codes of chivalry of tribal fighting forbade the killing of some categories of non-combatants, especially children and women. These rules were incorporated into the Islamic legal doctrine of war, the development of which was largely completed by the end of the second (8th century CE) century after the *hijra* (emigration of Muhammad from Mekka to Medina).[4]

Yet, such chivalry had its limits. The vast corpus of Islamic traditions on war contains numerous cases in which the Prophet Muhammad or other influential opinion leaders of the original Muslim community allowed the killing of prisoners, non-combatants and civilians - either for deterrence or in the form of acceptable collateral damage; there are specific rules on both in Islamic law. There are, however, conflicting legal opinions on these issues in the different legal schools of classical Islam.

These old debates are still relevant when it comes to the question: what exactly is the role of terrorism in jihad? The suppression and consequent radicalisation of Islamist oppositional groups in the second half of the 20th century in the Middle East and North Africa ushered in a period of simplified and politicised theological interpretations as Islamic warfare doctrines were re-interpreted by young revolutionaries without a formal religious education. These Islamists were soon joined by educated clerics who had become radicalised themselves. Most of had emerged from the Salafist fundamentalist strands of Sunni Islam. These sub-state actors adopted and adapted bits and pieces from classical jihad concepts to their needs – e.g. the justification of assassination and terrorist tactics, as was, for instance, demonstrated in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat on October 6, 1981.

Their theological justification of "jihad" as "legitimate terrorism" (*irhab mashru*) continues to this day. Since the 1990s, this has been leading to a shift away from the mere use of terrorist tactics to the formulation of genuine terrorist strategies. Doctrinaire "jihadis" regard terrorism as "legitimate," since their goal - establishing a "just" Islamic order - allegedly justifies indiscriminate political violence. Revolutionary and militant Muslim actors like Osama Bin Laden and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri have formulated specific doctrines merging terrorism and jihad. One oft these ideologues, Dr. Fadl, wrote a handbook on assassination tactics and issued the general guideline that "terrorism is part of Islam." [5] When this Egyipan jihadist ideologue was caught and imprisoned, he and four other historical leaders of *Al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya* (IG) had second thoughts and called Al-Qaeda's jihadism an unlawful and murderous deviation from the traditional interpretation of jihad.[6]

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Yet terms that are frequently translated as "terror" and "terrorising" appear also in the Quran. For example, Surat al-Anfal 8:60, commands the following: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know." [7] Numerous legal interpretations by classical and modern Islamic scholars have treated this injunction to justify deterrent and frightening war tactics. Modern extremists have come to the conclusion that this verse legitimises terrorism and the killing of civilians. Yet, this extremist view cannot stand up to a careful weighing of arguments, such as advocated by a reformed Islamic jurisprudence. The terrorist jihadists overlook that the classical stipulation merely commands to "prepare" terrorising, frightening tactics - as a psychological weapon to facilitate conquering the enemy or defeating him, which is a classical war tactic. This particular Sura is therefore not a blank endorsement for the indiscriminate killing of civilians.

Cherry-picking such verses from the Quran, seemingly provides salafi jihadists with a licence to kill indiscriminately. They have thrown all scrupels, all rules and any notions of mercy over board in their attempt to achieve with their atrocities all-pervasive shock and fear. Their doctrinaire jihadist terrorist strategy is based on a theologico-political justification of "legitimate terrorism" which includes "terrorist deterrence" strategies and specific terrorist tactics. The formulation of such concepts has certainly been influenced and continues to be supported by some of the extremist members of fundamentalist ideologies of Sunni Islam (Salafism and Wahhabism). However, there are salient differences between the extremist terrorist jihad concept and the broader Islamic warfare concept. In the broader concept, the question whether civilians may or may not be attacked is subject to debates and qualifications. The broader concept of Islamic warfare is not a revolutionary one but is dominated by an imperialist worldview which has as its goal the conquest of territory. In the broader concept of Islamic warfare, "terrorism" is but one element and it is mainly used for deterrence and for tactical purposes. Classical expansionst jihad is first and foremost a collective duty (*fard 'ala al-kifaya*), which is considered to be fulfilled once a certain number of warriors appointed by the ruler are sent into battle. Contemporary terrorist jihad, on the other hand, is mostly interpreted by sub-state actors as an individual religious obligation (*fard 'ala al-'ayn*) that depends on personal initiative and on "God's guidance."

Yet, both concepts may merge if jihad becomes defensive and Muslim people are subject to attack and not capable to defend themselves: in that case, the legal schools stipulate that all Muslims who are capable to assist their brethren under attack must do so. Numerous Sunni Muslims, including state-clergy in Islamic countries, refute terrorist jihad, although they would most certainly support an official jihad-war in case their country's leader authorises it. In such a case, they might also be willing to support terrorist tactics. A good example of scholarly fexibility is the role of Egypt's official al-Azhar clergy in the 1970s. In the 1973 "Yom Kippur War" with Israel the clerics were at the forefront of declaring this conventional offensive war a "jihad," advocating the "instillation of fear and terror in the enemies hearts." Yet only a few years later, some of the very same clerics also managed to find theological justifications for the U.S.- brokered peace treaty with Israel in 1979 (*sulh, musalaha*).[8]

In conclusion, "jihad" stands for a broad culture of Islamic warfare by state and, more recently, sub-state actors. On the one hand, it includes clearly formulated concepts related to terrorism and psychological deterrence. Yet, on the other hand, it also includes clearly formulated rules regarding the safeguarding of civilians and non-combatants in times of war. In the mainstream interpretation of jihad by the four primary Sunni schools of law, individuals and non-state actors cannot declare jihad; this is the sole prerogative of political authorities of a state. However, like other religious doctrines, the concept of jihad is malleable and prone to abuse by those religious and revolutionary entrepreneurs who manage to impose their idiosyncratic definition of power on the concept. In the hands of fanatic true believers, jihad becomes not just an instrument of warfare but a recipe and licence for terrorism and war crimes.

Let me conclude with a word of caution: we should be very careful not to regard "Islamic warfare" practices *per se* as worse, less humane and more unethical than their Western equivalent. While many Westerners regard Islam's martial culture as inferior due to its gruesome connection to terrorism, this view does not stand the test of careful historical analysis but is based on cultural bias.

War crimes, including terrorism, have been, and continue to be, frequent occurrences in Western forms of conflict-waging. Propaganda tends to blacken the historical record of an adversary's culture and whitewash one's own past . This tends to be true for all sides involved in armed conflict.

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Notes
[1]Cf. Alex P. Schmid (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. (London & New York: Routledge, 2011& 2013), p. 86.
[2] The above quote is from the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman Malik. Another Muslim scholar, Mahmoud Ayoub, claims that the goal of true jihad is to achieve harmony between Islam faith and righteous living. But other Muslim interpreters of jihad hold that this harmony can only be achieved when all unbelievers have been defeated. – M.C. Jon. Jihad – The Four Forms and the West, accessed June 8, 2014 at http://www.islam-watch.org/home/165-jon-mc/1447-jihad—the-four-forms-and-the-west.pdf.
[3] There are also texts that discuss rules of engagement, looking for solutions to regulate conduct during warfare in the Old Testament or in the Indian Sanskrit text Mahabharata. Yet, these are not to the same degree developed as in Islamic texts. One of the reasons for this is that Christian culture before the 18th century enlightenment period was characterised by a stronger separation, but also competition, between political and religious spheres. As a result, the formulation of concrete warfare doctrines belonged mainly to worldly thinkers like Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645). Such a separation of politics and religion is alien to classical Islam which postulates a seamless connection between state and religion, encompassing faith, politics, society, governance and law – all based on Islamic precepts, core sources and authoritative interpretations.
[4] For this paragraph, I am indebted to Rudolph Peters: Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publ., 1996), pp. 1-3.
[5] See the 1400 pages jihad-encyclopaedia of Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, *Da'wat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya* (Internet: 2004), 'Abd al-Qadir bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, "*Al-Irhab min al-Islam wa man ankara dhalika fa-qad kafara*," http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=jqxigwkz.
[6] Alex P. Schmid. Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: the State of Knowledge. The Hague: ICCT, January 2014, p.26 (available at www.icct.nl).
[7] The Holy Qur'an. Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. (Ware Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2000), p.141.[
[8] Philipp Holtmann, The Transformation of the Jihad-Doctrine in Sadat's Egypt (Munich: Grin, 2009).

Philipp Holtmann *is an analyst specialising in the Middle East, where he has lived and worked in several countries. Dr. Holtmann conducts in-depth research on jihadist media as well as on Muslim conflicts and reconciliation issues. He is a Research Associate of the Terrorism Research Initiative. His publications include 'Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's Jihad Concept' (2009), 'Virtual Leadership: How Jihadis Guide Each Other in Cyberspace' (2012), 'The Symbols of Online Jihad' (2013), 'The Use and Genre of Huda' (encouraging battle songs) versus Anashid (praiseful hymns) in Jihadi Propaganda' (2013), and 'Countering Al-Qaeda's Single Narrative' (2013).*

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"Counterterrorism Bookshelf" – Eight Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects
By Joshua Sinai
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/351/html

Guy Aviad, *The Politics of Terror: An Essential Hamas Lexicon*. Tel Aviv, Israel: Contento de Semrik, 2014. 686 pages, US$18.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-965-550-282-4.
This comprehensive and authoritative handbook about Hamas is the first book in several years to be published about this important Palestinian militant organization. It is divided into three parts. The first part presents a 40-page historical overview of Hamas's evolution from a Palestinian extension of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to its current role as the Gaza Strip's ruling party (with the rival Palestinian Authority in control of portions of the West Bank). Also covered are Hamas's historical origins and its organizational structure, which is discussed in great detail, including in a highly informative chart. The second part – and the handbook's longest portion at approximately 570 pages – consists of more than 300 entries about Hamas that are listed in alphabetical order, such as detailed biographies of its leaders and operatives, military units, funding fronts,

relations with state sponsors such Iran. The third part (approximately 60 pages) is composed of four appendices – the movement's charter, a table containing data about its Legislative Council members, and a listing of major terrorist attacks carried out by its operatives against Israeli targets. Also included is a detailed bibliography of books and articles about Hamas. With significant new developments involving Hamas since the book's publication, it is hoped that a new and updated edition will be published that is also better organized with more clearly differentiated sections, including an index. Nevertheless, this handbook is highly recommended as an indispensable reference resource on Hamas. The author has served as an officer and head of training in the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) history department.

Tore Bjorgo, *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism.*New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 122 pages, US$57.00 [Hardcover], ISBN-13: 978-1137355072.

A comprehensive examination of effective governmental counter-terrorism strategies to reduce the terrorist threat based on best practices drawn from a crime prevention perspective. This is important, the author points out, because "terrorist violence is a serious form of crime and should be treated as such…." (p. 2) As part of the measures required to reduce the threat of terrorism facing a targeted government, the author has developed a holistic model that integrates what are traditionally viewed as the separate tracks or activities of 'prevention' of terrorism and 'responses' to terrorism. In this unified model, nine key preventive mechanisms are identified to enable those involved in countering terrorism, whether as governmental action officers or academic analysts, to conceptualise systematically how to prevent and reduce terrorist outbreaks. These nine preventive mechanisms, which are adapted from criminology (and which constitute the book's major portion), consist of (1) establishing normative barriers to committing criminal acts, such as terrorism; (2) reducing recruitment into terrorism, for instance, by reducing the root causes that might drive individuals into such violent activity; (3) employing deterrence measures through the threat of punishment to get potential perpetrators to refrain from engaging in terrorist acts; (4) disrupting potential terrorist acts during their pre-incident phases; (5) protecting potentially vulnerable targets by reducing the opportunities to attack them; (6) reducing the harmful consequences of terrorist attacks; (7) reducing the rewards from terrorist acts; (8) incapacitating or neutralizing potential perpetrators from being able to carry out terrorist attacks; and (9), where possible, employing desistance, disengagement and rehabilitation measures to facilitate the re-integration of previous terrorists into a 'normal life.' (pp. 11-12)

The author points out that when these nine sub-strategies are applied to actual terrorist threats facing a country at the national and local levels, one needs to determine how the various preventive mechanisms will function to reduce a specific terrorist problem, determine which measures or methods can be used to activate these mechanism, identify the principal actors to implement the various methods, identify the target groups for the various strategies and their measures to apply against, and, in the final two applications, identify the strengths and limitations of the effects of these preventive measures. (p. 24).

The author concludes that in preventing terrorism one of the major challenges is "to find an appropriate balance between short-term and long-term prevention strategies, and between the repressive and constructive measures." (p. 96). To do so, he recommends employing "multiple preventive mechanisms and their pertinent measures instead of focusing on a narrower range of mechanisms and measures [in order to make it] possible to reduce the pressure from each individual measure." (p. 97). By providing such a comprehensive, systematic and integrated framework to identify the components that constitute an effective counter-terrorism campaign, this short book is bound to be considered as one of the classical works in the discipline of counterterrorism studies. Prof. Alex Schmid, this journal's editor, wrote the book's Foreword. This book is part of the publisher's Palgrave Pivot series of books at lengths between a journal article and a monograph. Dr. Bjogo, the author, is Professor of Police Science at the Norwegian Police University College and Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

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Richards J. Heuer Jr. and **Randolph H. Pherson**, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*. [2nd ed.] Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press/Sage, 2014. 384 pages, US$66.00 [Spiral Bound Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-1452241517.

This is the second edition of the authors' textbook which was initially published in 2010, when it gained wide acceptance as one of the leading textbooks used by governmental intelligence agencies on structured techniques for intelligence analysis [the first edition was reviewed in a previous column published in the journal's Vol. 7, No. 2013 issue]. In this substantially revised and expanded edition, five new structured analytic techniques were added to the previous edition's 50 techniques. The new techniques consist of AIMS (Audience, Issue, Message, and Storyline), Venn Analysis, Cone of Plausibility, Decision Trees and Impact Matrix, with the previous Quadrant Crunching technique split into two parts – Classic Quadrant Crunching and Foresight Quadrant Crunching. Four other previous techniques were revised – Getting Started Checklist, Customer Checklist, Red Hat Analysis, and Indicators Validator. Also scattered throughout the textbook are new discussions of topics such as intuitive versus analytic approaches to thinking, a discussion of where structured analytic techniques fit in to various intelligence-related topics, and how such techniques can be used to deal with what the authors describe as "cognitive biases and intuitive traps" that might be encountered by intelligence analysts. (p. xviii). The authors also discuss new directions how structured analytic techniques might be employed in the future. The book provides numerous applications and methodologies for effective structured analysis of terrorism- and counterterrorism-related subjects. The authors are former high-ranking CIA officers who had developed some of the analytic methodologies discussed in the volume themselves. Currently, Mr. Heuer is a private consultant and Mr. Pherson is President of Pherson Associates, LLC, of Reston, Virginia, a provider of training on intelligence analytic techniques.

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Louis M. Kaiser and **Randolph H. Pherson**, *Analytic Writing Guide*. Reston, VA: Pherson Associates, 2014. 85 pages, US$18.97 [Spiral Bound Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0979888021.

This handbook provides highly useful guidance for writing analytic papers, whether for governmental intelligence, military or law enforcement agencies, public policy research institutes, or other entities such as businesses. Since the objective of effective analytic reports, regardless of their length, is to inform their intended reader audiences – who may be busy or preoccupied with other tasks – it is crucial for writers of such papers to be able to communicate the main points of their ideas, information and recommendations in a clear and concise manner. To accomplish this objective, the handbook's chapters cover topics such as how to organize one's analysis (e.g., creating a mission statement, developing an "analytic line of march," and preparing a detailed outline), writing the first draft (e.g., building paragraphs around important topic sentences, ordering the supporting information, and treating peripheral information separately), and refining the draft (e.g., reviewing paragraphs for analytic coherence, 'economizing' on words, and conducting a final review). A glossary covers commonly used terms, proofreading symbols, and recommended readings. Both authors are former high-ranking CIA officers. Mr. Kaiser is an associate of Pherson Associates, LLC, of which Mr. Pherson is the President.

James Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001*. London, UK: Hurst & Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. 379 pages, US$22.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 9781849043748.

A highly authoritative, extensively researched and richly detailed examination of the origins and evolution of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA), which was instrumental in the successful insurgency against Serbian rule over Kosovo in the late 1990s. The book's chapters cover topics ranging from its role as an underground guerrilla army during the period 1950 to 1990, its further evolution in the 1990s (in parallel with other insurgent movements in the former Yugoslavia) against what it perceived as the harsh rule of former Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic. It deals also with its alliance with NATO and its demobilization once Serbian control ended and the newly independent republics of the former Yugoslavia were established. Also discussed is the situation in Preshevo (the Albanian majority inhabited areas of southern Serbia) and Macedonia in 2000-2001. The book's epilogue updates the discussion through 2010, and includes a terrifically insightful discussion of the strategic and tactical successes and weaknesses of the KLA's insurgency within the larger context of modern insurgencies, whether following the model of Mao Tse-tung or what the author terms "the classic Titoist Partisan" paradigm that was based on the Bolshevik experience. (pp. 251-252) The author teaches Balkan history at St Cross College, Oxford University.

Mark Silinsky, *The Taliban: Afghanistan's Most Lethal Insurgents*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/ABC-Clio, LLC, 2014. 263 pages, US$52.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-313-39897-1.
This is a highly comprehensive, informative and authoritative examination of the origins and evolution of the Taliban, the main insurgent movement in Afghanistan. Written as a textbook, the book's chapters cover general topics and also provide fascinating capsule biographies of key Taliban leaders, tables that highlight significant issues (such as the traits of a failed or failing state and its applicability to Afghanistan), and chapter summaries. General topics covered range from the landscape of Afghanistan's history, the nature of its population and Islamic religion, the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the founding of the Taliban in the 1980s (including what the author terms "the mind of the Taliban" in terms of the blend in its religious ideology of Salafism, Deobandism, and Sharia), the nature of the Taliban's rule over Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, its overthrow by the United States-led coalition following al Qaida's 9/11 attacks (which originated in Afghanistan under Taliban patronage), the reconstitution of the Taliban in Pakistan, the creation of Taliban 'self-governing' institutions in Pakistan's tribal regions, and the launch of its insurgency campaign against the newly-formed Kabul government. The author's discussion of the Taliban's 'self-governing' structures in Pakistan, as well as its intelligence and security apparatuses and sets of tactics and targeting in its warfare, is one of the best accounts available. Also highly useful is his discussion of what he terms "Taliban Inc." – the vast criminal enterprises run by the Taliban – based on the country's narcotics growing and trafficking trade – that have made it one of the world's wealthiest insurgent movements. The Taliban's affiliated insurgent groups are also covered, with valuable overviews of al Qaida, the Haqqani network, Tehrik i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as the connections between the Taliban and al Qaida and Pakistan's security services.

The final chapter discusses the effectiveness of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, which is filled with numerous insights, including an innovative table that outlines the legacy traits of the three epochs of counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam and their application to Afghanistan. Also highly useful is the author's formulation of seven rules of effectiveness in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and an additional table that outlines metrics of progress in achieving them. With the United States and its coalition allies scheduled to draw down their involvement in Afghanistan after 2014, this book

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serves as an indispensable handbook for those interested in understanding the extent of progress made so far and the likely security challenges that lie ahead. The author is a veteran senior analyst in a United States Army intelligence agency with extensive experience in covering Afghan affairs.

Alex Strick van Linschoten and **Felix Kuehn**, *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban – Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. 550 pages, US$35.00 [Hardcover], US$24.95 [Paperback], ISBN-13: 978-0199927319.

A well-researched and extensively documented examination of the nature of the ideological and organisational links between the Taliban and al Qaida since the formation of their respective organisations (and their predecessors) more than 40 years ago. To accomplish their objectives, the authors divide the book into discreet historical periods in Afghanistan since 1970 in which the two organisations and their predecessors played significant roles. It is important to study such links, the authors write, because of a prevailing view which they attempt to debunk that the United States-led coalition's involvement in Afghanistan has been predicated on the assumption that defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan would deny al Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan in which to plan and launch its attacks its worldwide. (p. 334) The authors argue that such an assumption is also faulty because the Afghan Taliban are generally not focused on "internationalist jihadi rhetoric" and, with the exception of Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant to the United States who had plotted – and subsequently failed – in September 2009 to bomb the New York City subway system, no Afghans have been "involved in an act of international terrorism…" (p. 334) While this contention can be challenged idiomatically as a 'splitting of hairs' since, as demonstrated by the case of Faisal Shahzad, the 'failed' Times Square bomber in May 2009, he was actually dispatched by the Pakistani (and not the Afghani) Taliban, can one really contend, as do the authors, that the warfare aims of the Afghani Taliban and al Qaida "diverge more often than they converge"? It is likely that the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaida's operatives remaining in Pakistan are likely to cooperate in many ventures. Once the Afghani Taliban succeed in increasing the territory under their control in the coming years, al Qaida's influence (and perhaps presence, as well) in those regions will also likely increase. Aside from such quibbling over the actual linkages between the Afghani Taliban, their Pakistani counterparts, and al Qaida in Pakistan, there is much to commend in this important book, which is well-written, well organized, and, based on the authors extensive field work in Afghanistan, reads like a truly inside account of the Afghani Taliban. The authors, who have worked in Afghanistan since 2006, are the founders of AfghanWire, an online research and media-monitoring group that focuses on local Afghan media.

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
Naunihl Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. 264 pages, US$59.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4214-1336-5.

A highly innovative conceptually and empirically-based examination of the role of military coups in causing regime changes, including the overthrow, in certain cases, of democratically-elected governments. To develop his theory of coup dynamics and outcomes, the author conducted extensive interviews with previous coup participants, and, as part of the study's empirical component, compiled a dataset of 471 coup attempts worldwide from 1950 to 2000. Based on such data, which is discussed the book's third chapter, the author finds that it is essential to analyse the role and dynamics of discreet military factions, which he categorizes in terms of three types of coup origination, as coups from top military officers, coups from the middle ranks, and mutinous coups from low level soldiers. One of the author's findings is that successful coups are characterized by a military faction that projects a sense of impending victory at capturing control of their

targeted government. The analysis of successful military coup attempts, the author writes, is also applicable to the study of counter-insurgency strategy, as he notes that "During a civil conflict, the side that can gather more popular support is more likely to win, even if civilian support is neither necessary or sufficient." (p. 229) At the same time, he cautions, it is imperative for a new regime to address the expectations and needs of the civilian population because otherwise any popular support will quickly diminish. This was, for instance, the case in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's unpopular regime, when such dissatisfaction led to the breaking out of a new insurgency against the new political order. This study's findings are especially relevant in the current period following successful coups by the militaries in Egypt and Thailand and the many challenges facing these new rulers in addressing the needs of their populations. The author is an Assistant Professor of international security studies at the Air War College in Alabama.

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PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Should we be Scared of all Salafists in Europe? A Dutch Case Study

By Ineke Roex
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/346/html

The Salafi movement is an orthodox Sunni Islamic movement. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it has been rooting itself in Europe since the 1980s, due to the arrival of Islamic activists from the Middle East [1]. In the past decade, the movement has gained notoriety for acts of violence that are attributable to jihadist Salafism, a violent offshoot of the movement. Filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered in the Netherlands in 2004, and there were bombings in London (2005) and Madrid (2007) by Islamists. More recently, in 2012 and 2013, jihadists operating as individuals or in groups have carried out acts of violence in Belgium, France and England [2]. As a result, the Salafi movement as a whole is viewed as a security threat [3].

In this article, it will be shown that important sections of the Salafi movement distance themselves from violent extremism. In recent years, prominent Salafi religious leaders have condemned acts of violence committed in the name of Islam. They have also spoken out against young Europeans who go to Syria to fight [4, 5], and have also criticized groups that call for the introduction of Sharia (Islamic law) in Europe [6]. This has led to confusion: radical Salafists are the product of the Salafi movement, but the very same movement is making concerted efforts to stop extremism. How should we understand these anti-extremist attitudes? Are these moderates merely wolves in sheep's clothing? What are their ambitions and views regarding Sharia and jihad? Should we continue to consider the Salafi movement primarily as a security threat, now that parts of it are distancing themselves from violence?

This article is based on the PhD dissertation *Living Like the Prophet in the Netherlands. About the Salafi Movement and Democracy* [7]. It sought to answers these questions on the basis of extensive fieldwork carried out within and around the Dutch Salafi movement. Although it provides insight into how the Salafi movement has developed in the Netherlands, it is also relevant to the manifestation of the movement in other parts of Europe. Indeed, the movement has a strong transnational character and exists throughout the continent. It will be shown that the Salafi movement can manifest itself in extremely diverse ways and is developing in various directions. This is apparent in its religious and political organisation and participation, as well as on the ideological level. Given the continuous evolution and diversity, it is at the very least problematic to present Salafism by definition as a threat to democracy. Indeed, some Salafi groups respect democracy and are explicitly committed to combating violent factions.[8]. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, all Salafi currents have the same belief (*aqidah*) but use different strategies alongside given answers to contextual political issues. He distinguishes three currents: purists (quietists),

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politicos and jihadis. The dissertation research summarised in the present article consisted of participatory observation within organisations and the Salafi community at large, and informal conversations and interviews with religious leaders and other people [9]. More than 50 participants in the networks around the As-Soennah mosque in the Hague, the El Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven and the youth organisation Alfeth in Roermond were interviewed while a few other Dutch Salafi organisations (see following section) were also visited. These networks and organisations can be categorised as either purist or political. However, during fieldwork, it was found that a few jihadists also visited the facilities mentioned on an incidental basis.

This study is unique since it describes both the organisational forms and the ideology proclaimed by religious leaders as well as the multifaceted daily religious practices of those who connect to the Salafi movement. Other researchers in Europe have described the ideological developments and historical roots of Salafism, but either they do not provide an insight into the movement in practice [10] or they largely failed to look at internal arguments and existing oppositions within the Salafi movement [11]. Research that did reveal the internal ideological arguments and conflicts in Salafism failed to adequately address their practical implications in the daily lives of European Muslims [12]. Research into the Salafi movement in the Netherlands touches primarily on the organisational level of Salafism [13], focusing only on the context of Salafism, omitting the religious and organisational embedding or concentrating on individual cases [14]. It also failed to deal with the question how the Salafi movement relates to democracy [15].

Forms of political and orthodox Islam, including Salafi Islam and its relationship with democracy, are generally considered problematic [16]. The Salafi movement is seen as anti-democratic because its teachings supposedly legitimise hate, coercion and violence, and promote the repression of women and those who think differently. There is concern that the Salafi movement poses a threat to the democratic rule of law because of its anti-democratic and anti-integrative character, which emerges from Salafi dogma and can result in intolerant isolationism, exclusivism and the creation of parallel social structures (based on Sharia). In addition to the fact that the Salafi movement is considered a potential hotbed of radicalisation to violence, the non-violent aspects of the movement are also seen as problematic. There is concern that Muslim enclaves in which democratic freedoms are not recognised will be formed in the midst of Western societies [17]. The Salafi movement is primarily perceived as a security threat since Salafi Jihadists are held responsible for violent acts in many countries [18]. In short, the jihadist movement is viewed as only the tip of the iceberg of the much larger problem of political or jihadist Islamism [19].

In various models of explanation for terrorism, it is assumed that processes of non-violent radicalisation precede acts of violence [20]. The policy consequence of this assumption is that non-violent groups are by definition suspect, being viewed as potential terrorists. As a result, forms of expression that occur in the Salafi movement – such as the wearing of the niqab (face veil), informal marriages and the refusal to shake hands with persons of the opposite sex – are considered as potential indicators of a political security threat [21]. In the first place, a clear distinction must be made between social and societal problems (socioeconomic disadvantage, dealing with cultural and religious diversity, etc.), which require a social policy, and security problems (such as coercion and violence), for which a judicial approach is required. Should the entire Salafi movement be looked at from the perspective of security? And how is non-violent Salafism related to this jihadist movement?

To answer these questions, empirical research was conducted on the following aspects of quietist and political Salafi networks in the Netherlands in the light of the threat of jihadist Salafism: 1) religious disciplining, 2) forms of organisations, 3) political views and 4) forms of participation. Relevant questions asked were: Do these networks legitimize coercion and violence in their religious disciplining? Can the movement be characterized as a sect that isolates itself from the rest of society? Is it worrisome that the movement is becoming professionalised? Do the Salafists want to implement Sharia law? Does participation in the movement lead to clear-cut radical identities, isolation and the development of Muslim enclaves in which democracy is not recognised?

Religious Disciplining: Intolerant Perfectionism, Tolerant Behaviour
The Salafi movement is a Sunni reform movement that pursues the restoration of 'pure' Islam through the moral re-education of the Muslim community, a literal reading of the Koran and *hadith* (report of the words and deeds of the Prophet and other early Muslims),

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the rejection of religious innovations, and the imitation of Mohammed and his companions in the early days of Islam [22]. Salafists claim that their religious interpretation is the only one that is true to Islam. They seek to form a moral community of true believers and claim to be the representatives of the only legitimate Islam [23]. The movement has developed in a multitude of forms around the world and is particularly characterised by internal polemics, theological disputes and conflicts despite but also due to its quest for religious purity. The movement includes both violent and non-violent branches, also in Europe [24]. A few Salafi networks have rooted themselves in the Netherlands since the 1980s, and some of these have a more formal character, such as the As-Soennah Foundation/Centre Sheikh al Islam Ibn Taymia in the Hague (in which Abou Ismail and Imam Fawaz Jneid are the best known figureheads; the latter was recently fired), the El Tawheed Foundation in Amsterdam, the Islamitische Stichting voor Opvoeding en Overdracht van Kennis (ISOOK -Islamic Foundation for Education and the Spread of Knowledge) in Tilburg (led by Suhayb and Ahmed Salam) and the Al Waqf al-Islami Foundation/El Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven. In addition, there is a quietist network around Imam Bouchta, based on a scholar named Madkhali, and there are about ten smaller Salafi-oriented networks and organisations, such as Alfeth (led by Ali Houri, alias Al Khattab) in Roermond and Stichting Moslimjongeren (Foundation of Muslim youth) in Utrecht. During fieldwork all of these were visited.

The moral re-education and reformation of the Dutch Muslim population form the basis of the Salafi movement's activism in the Netherlands. The Salafi movement is a utopian movement that attempts to reorganise Muslims' daily lives according to an idealised image of the past. Salafists create a way of life that they experience as more satisfying and just, contrasting it starkly with a world of immorality, repression and temptation [25].

One of their instruments is religious disciplining, which flows from the principle of *hisba* (commanding good and forbidding bad – *al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy 'an al-munkar*). It takes a variety of forms. The Salafi movement assumes to be in possession of a superior truth in its interpretation of Islam. Because of this, the movement allows no room for moral or religious pluralism. According to Salafists, this pluralism does not exist in Islam; there is only one correct interpretation of the faith [26]. This suggests that there might be an unequivocal authority within the movement, but this is not the case. Paradoxically, in its endeavour to attain moral purity, the movement is strongly fragmented. Because of the endless internal disputes over the precise content of this truth – which is a result of Salafist rejection of blindly following Islamic scholars or schools of law, and their search for direct evidence based on the Quran and the Sunna, which led to contesting religious leadership – there is in practice no single authority, which can place moral boundaries to the discussion. The recognition of moral and religious pluralism is an important condition for a democratic system [27]. This implies that a person may believe in an apparently objective moral authority or a superior truth. From a normative democratic perspective, however, this individual may not conduct him- or herself in such a way that the political rights of others are violated. People must recognise democratic rights and refrain from using violence or coercion. However, do Dutch Salafists legitimise coercion and violence in the disciplining of their followers?

According to Sharia law, there are indeed punishments (corporal and otherwise) for committing sins, apostasy and failure to follow Islamic rules. This indicates that there are formal means of coercion in the Salafi movement. Nonetheless, Dutch quietist and political Salafists in the researched networks insist that these punishments should never be carried out in a Dutch context. In the eyes of Salafists, *da'wa* (Islamic missionary work, the call to Islam) and *nasiha* ('friendly' advice) are the only permitted means of confronting Muslims with their bad behaviour and sins, and non-Muslims with their non-belief. In their view, individuals can only be tried according to Sharia law in an Islamic state. This means that Muslims may not take the law into their own hands, and must subject themselves to the prevailing democratic authority. Nonetheless, Salafists will never approve of acts that are forbidden by Islam. They justify this by appealing to their freedom of speech and religion [28]. Therefore, Dutch Salafists make a clear distinction between their position in a European context and in the context of an Islamic country.

Takfir is the process by which a Muslim is accused of apostasy. In the international Salafist movement, this is an important theme and it has led to internal arguments and schisms [29]. The discussion about *takfir* is important because it often forms a crucial part in the justification for the use of violence [30]. Salafi networks agree on the conditions that can lead to denunciation, but differ regarding the definition and interpretation of these conditions. The various interpretations can be ambiguous [31]. In recent years, the Salafists in the networks that were researched here have presented themselves as non-extremist, 'moderate' Muslims,

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condemning the practices of *takfir* prevalent in jihadi circles. In their rhetoric of moderation, they oppose groups that, in one way or another, connect their persona with *takfir*. The Salafi networks that were approached during fieldwork maintain that *takfir* is a matter for scholars and Islamic states to decide, and is not for 'average' Muslims to be carried out. A far-reaching consequence of denunciation is that a Muslim can be sentenced to death or violence against the apostate person can be justified. In the networks researched here, however, the Salafists interviewed expressly stated that these punishments may only be imposed by Islamic judges in Islamic states, and not in the context of democratic states [32].

Self-discipline and self-perfection are stressed, and coercion in religion is not to be permitted [33]. Nevertheless, Salafists use the warning of God's wrath and his unknown punishments in this world and the hereafter to discipline one another. Coercion occurs only if the warning has sanctions attached to it or when it generates fear, and if this religious interpretation is believed. There is no legitimation of actual coercion through sanctions, violence or explicit pressure, but there can be a strong level of social control. This is expressed in practice through *da'wa* (the call to Islam)*, nasiha* ('friendly' advice) and the pressure to conform through persuasion, but should always be non-violent. The strongly held view is that participation and the observance of rules should be voluntary and self-chosen based on a pure intention. As a result, belief is experienced in a strong individual sense [34].

In concrete terms, this means that practices such as not praying, not wearing a headscarf and being homosexual are condemned according to Salafi ideology. Nonetheless, this intolerance may not lead to physical or verbal violence or coercion [35]. Moreover, conformism to religious dogma is considered to be a matter between each individual and God. This differs in some Islamic countries where Sharia is implemented (either in part or entirely), and where conformism to religion is enforced through formal means of coercion, such as the criminalisation of dissociation from Islam, adultery and homosexuality. In those contexts, freedom of religion as a democratic right and the autonomy of the individual are not respected. This is why a contextual approach to the Salafi movement is essential. The movement makes a clear distinction between the position of Islam in a European context and in the context of Islamic countries. Instruments of coercion, punishment and violence are not legitimised in a European context. This is where quietist and political Salafists differ from jihadist Salafists, who legitimise violence in some situations. Although coercion and violence are not permitted in quietist and political Salafist networks, its actual existence cannot be excluded despite the fact that it is explicitly condemned by Salafi leaders.

Types of Organisations: Formal Translocal Organisations and Disputed Leadership
The Salafi movement is also diverse at an organisational level since it is not run by from a single elite group or organisation. Although religious leaders and organisations sometimes collaborate informally, there is also internal competition and strife. The religious authority in the Salafi movement is diffuse, pluriform and subject to change [36]. The Internet is not only used by the movement as a means of religious disciplining but also as a platform where religious authority is challenged and questioned [37]. In a context of internal fragmentation, each Salafi religious leader tries to portray himself as a representative of Islam. Because *taqlid* (blindly following scholars or schools of law) is forbidden, their views are continuously checked by other Salafists for 'truth.' Many religious leaders are accused by outsiders of speaking with forked tongues when they distance themselves from violence, but such behaviour is difficult to hide. A religious leader cannot afford to act in this manner if he wants to maintain his credibility among his more critical followers. When religious leaders change their opinion on a socio-religious issue, some of their followers may not react positively [38].

The categorisation of the Salafi movement as a sect is problematic because doing so ignores both the diversity of the production and consumption of religious authority and its ideological diversity. The forms of organisation and participation and the status of the various religious leaders are ambiguous, constantly changing and in need of being renegotiated which means there is never uniform commitment or a degree of exclusivity and separation that could justify the analytical use of the concept of a 'sect.' There is no communal life (such as in the utopian societies that Kanter has described [39]) in which the members' daily activities all take place at one location and are all coordinated by a central power apparatus. Neither the environment nor the structure of the Salafi movement lends itself to complete isolation. Religious leaders, organisations and networks conduct themselves in what one could call a 'translocal' manner. Unlike in a community

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that manifests itself in one place, the commitment of participants is temporary and multiform, and physical isolation is hardly an issue. One can, however, argue that Salafists isolate themselves from society in an ideological way. Nevertheless, on the ideological level, there is disagreement on issues such as participation in society and contacts with 'disbelievers'. There is an inherent paradox hidden in *da'wa* (the call to Islam): on the one hand it entails reaching out to disbelievers and on the other distancing oneself from disbelief. In addition, all organisational levels manifest diversity in the ethnic and linguistic background, age and gender of the participants. There are competing organisations and networks, and this results in a constantly changing and diverse movement. For instance, the network around quietist Salafi Bouchta is controversial among the participants in the network around the As-Soennah mosque and Ahmed Salam, and vice versa. During fieldwork, a dramatic change in the organisational structure of the As-Soennah mosque occurred: a famous imam, Fawaz Jneid, was fired as a result of internal tensions. This was one sign indicating that the Salafi movement is constantly developing and changing at an organisational level [40].

According to security agencies, the Salafi movement is continuously professionalising [41]. Indeed, some of the informal organisations have now established education, welfare and broadcasting subdivisions to broaden their *da'wa* activities. Is this worrisome? The formation of organisational structures and the professionalisation of the Salafi movement have a paradoxical effect on the movement's threat to democracy. Organisations tend to become more transparent to the outside world, and board members and other officials can be called to account in cases of suspected misconduct (related to violence and coercion). Organisations are also better equipped than informal networks to enter into formal and informal forms of collaboration, and it is more difficult for them to isolate themselves. Concretely, the Salafi mosques and networks investigated were collaborating to varying degrees with their local (non-Salafi) environment. Such collaboration related to issues of health, education and security and took place with welfare organisations, religious organisations, politicians, policy-makers and the Dutch police. Although their disciplinary function will become more professional and extensive through better organisation, it will not necessarily lead to more unity among the Salafi networks. Informal networks can operate more easily outside the public eye and are more difficult to monitor. Potential abuses such as coercion and violence escape external control more easily in informal than in a more formal organisational structure with a centralized authority [42]. Consequently, the isolation of Salafi networks is not in the public interest because a lack of control and transparency might give anti-democratic powers free rein.

Political Views: Criticism of Violent and Sharia Groups

It is often taken for granted that Salafists reject the democratic rule of law and want to introduce Sharia law [43]. The rejection of democracy as a matter of principle is based on the Salafi conviction that Islam is the superior religion and on the Salafi interpretation of *tawhid*: Allah is the only legislator, and everything that deviates from his law is deemed inferior. A person who does not acknowledge this unity of Allah is guilty of *shirk* (idol worship) - the worst sin that a Muslim can commit. It is not immediately clear what these theological principles imply in practice. Although the principle of *tawhid* and the banning of *shirk* are central to the ideologies of all Salafi networks, there are considerable differences in the interpretation and the effects of the concept on contemporary political issues, such as the life of a Muslim in a Western democracy where Muslims are in a minority position, and on their political participation. In fact, the application of Salafi principles leads to endless discussions in Salafi circles [44].

In practice, fieldwork in the Netherlands showed that the rejection of democracy as a matter of principle does not automatically imply the rejection of political participation or disobedience to democratic authority. Nor did fieldwork indicate that the belief that Salafist ideology by definition leads to political radicalisation or is a root cause of violence or terrorism is justified [45]. There is considerable diversity in the degree and form of political involvement. In their daily practices Salafists respect Dutch political rights. They believe they have entered into an 'covenant' with the countries in which they live as minorities and in which they enjoy sufficient freedom to practise their faith (although this continues to come under increasing pressure). This is why they think they must respect the prevailing laws [46]. The laws must also be respected because otherwise *fitna* (chaos) would ensue. The motto is 'better a poor leader than no leader at all'.

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In the Netherlands, quietist and political Salafists form the majority of the Salafi movement; jihadis are a marginal phenomenon. Exact numbers are not available, but a national survey found that 8 per cent of Dutch Muslims are susceptible to Salafism [47]. Quietist and political Salafists appear to respect democratic legislation and the existing political rights in the Netherlands. They also reject violence and coercion to bring about the realisation of their ambitions and views, political and in other fields [48]. That said, their attitude towards obedience to democracy is conditional. The question remains how this pragmatism will develop in the future. Will it become a position held for reasons of principle?

Dutch quietist and political Salafists do not seek the implementation of Sharia law in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, nor do they seek the establishment of a worldwide caliphate like Hizb ut Tahrir. They think this is an unrealistic and undesirable endeavour, given their position as a minority in Europe. They give priority to the moral reform of the individual daily lives of Muslims. The Salafi movement in the Netherlands vigorously challenges and criticises groups (such as Hizb ut Tahrir, Sharia4Belgium/Holland) which aim for such an objective. They also criticize groups that organise 'street *da'wa'* and political demonstrations (groups like Straatdawah and Behind Bars). The above-mentioned groups sometimes employ violence (verbal or otherwise), which is wholeheartedly rejected by Dutch quietist and political Salafists. [49]. The Salafi movement calls for people to respect political rights in the Netherlands and to demand these rights when the rights of Muslims are violated. It also calls for its followers to respond in a non-violent manner to accusations, insults and acts of violence against Muslims. To accomplish this, they primarily make use of religious means: invocations, patience, rectitude, emigration and detachment, of which the last two are realised only with considerable difficulty. *Hijra* (emigration) is desired by many but achievable to only a few, because of a lack of financial resources and due to the belief that no Islamic country is totally organised according to the Salafists' high standards. Finally, the detachment from society is difficult to combine with their *da'wa* activities and their daily contact with non-Salafi relatives, colleagues, neighbours and so forth [50].

Jihad as a violent means to protect, defend and spread Islam is soundly rejected by quietist and political Salafi religious leaders in the context of the Netherlands and other Western, non-Islamic countries. These types of Salafist organisations commit themselves to combating the legitimisation of violence in various ways. They devote many video clips and flyers and much preaching, education and website content to the refutation of Al-Qaeda's actions and ideology. Nonetheless, during fieldwork it was possible to encounter a few believers in and around the Salafi networks who sympathize with jihadist ideas and legitimise violence. Despite communal efforts to steer youngsters away from extremism, these few young hotheads were found to approve, for instance, of the murder of Theo van Gogh [51].

In regard to defensive jihad in the context of Islamic countries, the networks visited assume a more ambiguous position. In some networks, the current situation in, for instance, Syria is designated as jihad, yet at the same time they call on followers not to go there. On their webpages and during their Friday sermons, political Salafists of the As-Soennah mosque (Fawaz Jneid and Suhayb Salam) call on youngsters to stay at home and not participate in jihad. There are other quietist Salafi networks that contend there is no jihad whatsoever going on in Syria [52]. According to the Dutch security services (AIVD), around 100 Islamic youngsters from the Netherlands are actually participating in the ongoing conflict in Syria. On this issue too, both quietist and political Salafi networks strongly disagree with the Sharia4 groups and Behind Bars. It is from the ranks of these groups that many young Muslims left the Netherlands to follow the path of jihad in Syria.

To summarise, quietist and political networks in the Salafi movement tend to respect democratic authority in Europe, do not want to institute Sharia law, react non-violently to critical statements about Islam and do not call on their followers to engage in jihad. The political detachment of some Salafists (who refuse to participate in the political system or to react politically to dissatisfaction) can result in societal detachment, but it is not primarily a security problem. Jihadists, on the other hand, violate democratic values by calling on people to commit violent acts in certain circumstances. For this reason, it is important to distinguish between the various Salafi strands in terms of security policy.

Participation: Opposition, Variability and Pluriformity

Participation in the Salafi movement is often equated with the pursuit of segregation, distancing and isolation [53]. Yet does participation in the Salafi movement really lead to societal isolation and a clearly defined identity? Does the Salafi movement distance itself

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from societal participation in Europe, and are, through them, Muslim enclaves in which democracy is not recognised coming into existence?

To answer such questions, one has to keep in mind that Salafi organisations attract a diverse audience whose members manifest differing levels of involvement. Participants also differ in background and motivation for participating in the activities that the Salafi organisations offer. As a result, heterogeneity exists in participation [54]. At the same time, Salafists invest in a uniform group identity and express this by stressing brotherhood and sisterhood through their clothing, language and religious practices. For instance, Salafists can distinguish themselves by wearing certain clothing: women wear the *khimar* (a veil that hangs down to just above the waist, covering the hair, neck and shoulders, but leaving the face clear) and the *niqab* (a veil for the face that leaves the area around the eyes clear and is worn with an accompanying headscarf) and men wear baggy, short-legged trousers. They frequently use Islamic terms and expressions and follow ritual practices like the *salat* (daily prayer) with precision. These group symbols are used in many ways and sometimes only temporarily: they are subject to debate and thus to change. For instance, there is no agreement on the obligation and desirability of wearing the *niqab* in the Netherlands. Only a few women choose this style of covering themselves and many of those who do, wear it only some of the time. The diversity in the use of group symbols makes the group boundaries unclear [55].

Even if the dividing lines between the various Salafi schools of thought are not always clearly demarcated, each Salafi network tries to present itself as the representative of the only true Islam in contrast to other Muslims who have 'gone astray'. In addition to ritual behaviour, clothing and language, this is also expressed in the labels they give themselves. Self-definition is a powerful means to construct symbolic boundaries (moral and otherwise) and to create and reinforce a feeling of community in the process [56]. Self-definitions determine the position that Salafists assign themselves in relation to society and other Muslims [57]. But distinctive self-definitions are controversial, multiform and subject to change in practice [58]. Some Salafists call themselves *selefies* (a practice engaged in by some quietists), other prefer more neutral labels like 'Muslim' or 'Muslim following the Quran and the Prophet and the first three generations'. They choose to use more neutral terms as an expression of personal modesty. In addition, these more neutral terms express the claim of being not a sect in Islam, but the only true Islam itself. Paradoxically, the term Salafist is highly controversial among Salafists and they rarely use it. As a result, group boundaries in terms of group labels are fluid and there is no clearly defined commitment or group. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between insiders and outsiders of the Salafi movement.

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In a movement that propagates purity and unambiguity, the daily and religious practices of Salafi believers are also less black-and-white than one might assume. This is not only because Salafists are surrounded by a pluralistic society, but also because their belief system is accompanied by all sorts of contradictions and is implemented and experienced in so many different ways – leading to even more ambiguity. As a result, the Salafi identity is not clear-cut or easy to recognise. In their practice of the ideal Salafi lifestyle, Salafists walk a tightrope between values and interests (for instance, 'being a good Muslim' and educating people about Islam versus being successful in their professional careers and avoiding conflicts, *fitna*), which leads to a considerable friction.

The construction of the perfect moral self, which is favoured by the Salafi movement, is surrounded by contradictions, variability and temporality, both ideally and in practice [59]. For instance, the call to Islam is at variance with the endeavour to attain purity because it implies contact with the 'impure other'. Many Islamic rules are difficult to observe, too. For example, it is difficult to keep the two sexes separate at school, at work, on public transport and so on. Finally, those who manifest their Salafi identity through their clothing and behaviour often encounter negative sentiments: family members, friends and colleagues can be very critical about it. Salafists have to make compromises every day. The purity, the unity and the moral framework propagated by the Salafi movement result in tensions in the daily lives of Muslims [60].

The above remarks lend substance to criticism of those who unjustly represent the religious moral frameworks as a coherent and clearly demarcated whole. Those who portray them like that have insufficiently examined the ambivalence, contradiction and ambiguity of the moral frameworks themselves and how they work in practice.

The impact of involvement in the Salafi movement on social relationships with friends and family and on male–female relationships is not straightforward. Involvement does not

always lead to exclusivity of social relationships and isolation, not even among those who strive for segregation. Contact with people who think differently is unavoidable. In their daily practice, Salafists attempt to find a balance between their religious life and society at large [61]. The level of involvement in the Salafi movement and the extent to which the Salafi lifestyle is practised can change over time. Salafists can and do modify their religious interpretation or practice, or even eschew the Salafi movement [62]. Muslims also form mixed groups, in which they combine Salafi ideas with those from Sufism or from the Maliki school of law [63]. Participation in the Salafi movement is not uniform or life-long, nor is it straightforward in nature.

Participation in the Salafi movement does not always go hand in hand with societal isolation and segregation, and only a minority aspire to distance themselves from the non-Salafi environment. It is true that there can be isolationist trends, about which the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) expressed concern in various publications [64]. However, a clearly defined counterculture [65] and Islamised spaces or anti-democratic Muslim enclaves [66] do not exist; intermingling, negotiation and compromise all take place.

Longitudinal research is required to investigate the changes Muslims undergo throughout the various phases of their lives and explore the future of children who grow up in Salafi families. There is currently no explicit exclusivity or isolation in the Dutch context. This is because forms of participation are frequently non-binding, diverse, contradictory and temporary. Due to the fact that diversity among participants exists, the boundaries of group identity are broken down, and there is inclusiveness of social relationships and societal participation. Nonetheless, the autonomy of children in Salafi families who do not go to or have not yet started school and women in informal marriages can be put under pressure when they are completely isolated from their surroundings. Although the Salafi movement does not call for the abolition of the autonomy of women and children, it does not stimulate such autonomy. Isolation sometimes does occur, but occasionally it is self-chosen. At the same time, women can join the Salafi movement in order to achieve autonomy from their parents, family members or partners, and to break with traditions, like forced marriages, that hinder them in their personal development. There is no direct connection between the Salafi movement and the violation of women's autonomy.

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Conclusion: the Salafi Movement is not by Definition a Threat to Democracy

In the Dutch context, quietist and political Salafists reject violence and coercion. In their religious, societal and political practices, they respect democratic freedoms. These conditions apply only to the majority of Salafists who are present in the Netherlands today - not to those Salafists who sympathise with jihadist ideas and consider the use of violence legitimate. There is no clear and strong occurrence of isolation, nor are there anti-democratic Muslim enclaves. However, even if isolation from Dutch society is not propagated or violence legitimised, the existence of disciplining practices, for example, forcing women to wear headscarves, cannot be excluded even though the practice is not legitimised by their ideology. Yet this particular problem is a societal one, and does not pose a security risk. The question whether it is fair to consider the entire Salafi movement as security threat, and a threat to the democratic system, must, at least with regard to the Netherlands at this moment in time, be answered negatively.

The Salafi movement in the Netherlands does not encompass a homogeneous, clearly delineated group that forms an unequivocal threat to the rule of law. When one studies the Salafi movement in its local contexts, its internal diversity becomes visible. The representation of all manifestations of political Islam as an early stage of, or initial step towards violent jihadism and terrorism, has found no corroboration in this case study; it does not reflect Dutch reality. The large majority of Dutch Salafis, while adhering to orthodox and fundamentalist opinions, eschew acts of violence. So far, the existence of anti-extremist forces in important parts of the Salafi movement has been largely ignored and the movement as a whole has been discredited to prematurely.

It is important that academics, journalists and politicians guard against the careless use of the term 'Salafist' as a uniform label. Both the practices and the ideology of the Salafi movement are variable, heterogeneous and contradictory. The Salafi movement is not a unitary entity with clearly demarcated group boundaries. It is inadvisable to judge the Salafi movement and enact policies with regard to it only on the basis of certain ideological Salafi positions. In reality, the practices, the internal social relationships and the relationships with the

outside world are decisive for the proper assessment of the movement. These relationships are currently variable, multiform and contradictory. There is internal disagreement on important issues like sharia and jihad, as well as regarding social and political participation in Dutch society. It is also important that the Salafi movement and its members are not excluded from Dutch society. Placing restraints on them (such as instituting a ban on burkas or headscarves) can facilitate isolation, even when such measures are intended to encourage participation in society [67].

Finally, the Salafi movement ought to be encouraged to participate in politics. Its spokesmen should be invited to join public debates and participate in political parties. They should also be allowed to stage public demonstrations. Political participation is beneficial in that it allows them to building civic competence while de-legitimising the use of violence as a political instrument. It is important that quietist and political networks are given a platform to explain their anti-jihadist position vis-à-vis those who sympathise with jihadist ideas. It ought to be the responsibility of the community and its imams, religious leaders, educators, as well as friends and families to discourage the legitimisation of violence whenever they come into contact with it.

▶ **Notes are available at source's URL.**

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Deterring Terrorism: a New Strategy
By Max Abrahms
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/344/html

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Traditional concepts of deterrence try to thwart unwanted behaviour by manipulating adversary incentives. Deterrence-by-punishment threatens to impose costs on the adversary for an undesirable course of action. Deterrence-by-denial seeks to deny him any benefits from it.[1] Clearly, both strategies are based on influencing the adversary by reducing the utility of his actions. Unfortunately, neither approach is likely to succeed since terrorists are generally motivated by such a wide variety of personal and strategic aims that they are liable to derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond.

Although traditional concepts of deterrence are unlikely to work against terrorists on any systematic basis, the tactic itself may be deterred with an alternative counterterrorism approach. Deterrence-by-delegitimisation focuses less on deterring adversaries themselves than their support constituencies.[2] This less well-known indirect form of deterrence offers superior counterterrorism promise because terrorist supporters are more likely to be motivated by a relatively straightforward incentive structure. Unlike the perpetrators themselves, their supporters are generally driven by one main goal—the desire to coerce government concessions. In recent years, a growing body of academic research has found that terrorism decreases rather than increases the odds of government compliance. In this fundamental sense, the tactic of terrorism is politically counterproductive. The policy community's primary contribution to deterring terrorism should be to broadcast this finding in a targeted public diplomacy campaign to terrorist supporters.

The argument of this article proceeds in three sections. In the first section, an explanation is offered why classic concepts of deterrence are doomed to fail against terrorists. The strategies of deterrence-by-punishment and deterrence-by-denial are based on the unrealistic premise that governments can deter terrorists by simply removing the utility of their violent behaviour. This assumption is faulty not because terrorists are categorically irrational actors, but because they do not employ a uniform, consistent metric of success. Indeed, many terrorists seem to regard their actions as fruitful regardless of how governments choose to respond. The second section argues that most terrorism is deterrable, however, even if its practitioners are not. This section details the burgeoning academic literature on terrorism's political ineffectiveness and explains how this finding can be exploited to deter terrorist supporters and, by extension, the tactic itself. The

conclusion issues an appeal to the policy community—work closer with the academic community on counterterrorism. Only by sharing our knowledge can we hope to deter the terrorism threat.

Why Terrorists Tend to Be Undeterrable
The conventional approaches to deterrence are actually two sides to the same coin. In deterrence-by-punishment, the threat of reprisal is intended to deter the adversary with unacceptable costs. In deterrence-by-denial, the point is to deter him by removing the potential value of his actions. As Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel noted: "Whereas cost imposition strategies threaten retaliation, benefit denial strategies threaten failure. If actors believe that they are unlikely to succeed or reap significant benefits from a certain course of action, they may be deterred from taking it."[3] When it comes to combating terrorism, however, this objective is intractable because its practitioners seem to derive value from their actions notwithstanding the nature of the government response.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter's pioneering study on terrorist motives. [4] In "Strategies of Terrorism," Kydd and Walter report that terrorists are motivated both to coerce government concessions and to provoke government retaliation. Left unsaid is that these government responses are essentially opposites. Terrorism succeeds as a coercive strategy when governments appease the perpetrators by accommodating them with concessions. Conversely, terrorism succeeds as a provocation strategy when governments dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. If Kydd and Walter are correct, then terrorism offers strategic utility to many perpetrators whether governments act conciliatory or not.

The empirical record is replete with evidence that terrorists are indeed motivated by such inconsistent strategic objectives. Members of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, for example, emphasize in public pronouncements that coercing government concessions is an important strategic objective. Al-Qaeda has historically called on the United States to withdraw militarily from the Muslim world and to sever relations with apostate regimes.[5] Al-Qaeda affiliated members have also emphasized these foreign policy goals in private. In October 2001, for instance, a trove of letters written by Osama bin Laden was seized by Scotland Yard. The objectives listed in the letters repeat the coercive goals of driving out U.S. forces from the Muslim world and ending U.S. interference in Muslim politics. [6] Surely, al-Qaeda would declare victory if Washington were to accede to such political demands.

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Yet al-Qaeda has an equally rich tradition of trying to elicit the opposite government response. Al Qaeda military leader, Sayf al Adl, said the main goal of 9/11 was not to coerce the U.S. from the Muslim world, but to provoke American military operations there. According to al Adl, President George W. Bush played into this strategy by pursuing the "anticipated response" in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim countries. In a May 2005 statement, he explained: "What we had wished for actually happened."[7] Similarly, bin Laden often said the purpose of 9/11 was "for us to provoke and bait this administration."[8] More recently, Ayman al-Zawahri praised operatives for "provoking" the United States into adopting costly counterterrorism responses at home and abroad.[9] These public pronouncements accord with al-Qaeda's private statements. In autumn 2001, for instance, a journalist visiting Afghanistan famously recovered Zawahiri's personal computer with hundreds of correspondences to bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and other 9/11 planners. These correspondences make clear that the al-Qaeda leadership was unworried about provoking a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, they hoped the U.S. would respond in that fashion and then get bogged down in a costly asymmetric conflict.[10]

To gain insight into how al-Qaeda evaluates strategic success, Abrahms and Lula conducted a content analysis of bin Laden's translated statements made in public and private between 1994 and 2004.[11] Collated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, this self-contained compilation of 98 interviews, correspondences, and fatwas is believed by counterterrorism officials to provide reliable insight into al-Qaeda's strategic mindset during that period.[12] The authors examined the asymmetric campaigns exalted by bin Laden Osama as political successes and then categorised them. According to the al-Qaeda leader, the most successful asymmetric campaigns included cases in which the target country was coerced into making accommodations or provoked into adopting the opposite response.

These competing goals of coercion and provocation are hardly confined to al-Qaeda. In fact, they are strategic objectives found across numerous terrorist groups.[13] So, too, are other strategic goals that are equally difficult to reconcile. A common terrorist strategy, for

example, is "spoiling" peace processes by ramping up violence during negotiations in order to halt them in their tracks. Whereas coercion is intended to induce politically conciliatory behaviour and provocation is intended to elicit the opposite political response, spoilers seek to destroy any peaceful political movement at all.[14] Scholars may be tempted to conclude that terrorists are thus irrational. The point, however, is that many terrorists are able to derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond due to the complexity of their incentive structures. Terrorists are often able to accomplish at least some of their core strategic aims when governments retreat, advance, or do nothing at all. Since almost any conceivable response is liable to generate strategic utility from the vantage of terrorists, they are decidedly poor candidates for deterrence.

In fact, the byzantine strategic goals of terrorists only partially account for their complex incentive structure. People participate in terrorism for an even wider range of personal goals than strategic ones. The personal benefits of participating in terrorism are hardly affected by the nature of government reactions. Research shows, for example, that terrorists are often motivated by the social benefits of participating in a tight-knit group independent of any political progress.[15] For this reason, terrorists routinely reject compromise proposals, eschew superior political tactics, and fight rival groups sharing their given ideology. Such terrorist behaviours may not be politically instrumental. Yet each generates utility for those members who are motivated by the social solidarity of participating in a terrorist group and therefore wish to perpetuate it.

Participating in terrorist groups also supplies members with countless personal benefits beyond social solidarity. For many terrorists, perpetrating the violence helps to give them purpose, end their boredom, facilitate travel to new destinations, gain respect, follow their religious convictions, terminate their miserable lives, or simply harm and frighten others. In the early 1990s, many policy-makers began to recognize that the conventional understanding of terrorist groups needed revision. Whereas past terrorists seemed motivated to achieve their given strategic objectives, the "new terrorists" are increasingly defined by their questionable attachment to them. Since the 1990s, the international terrorism threat has been driven by perpetrators aiming to kill the maximum number of civilians, perhaps as an end in itself. A 1995 National Intelligence Estimate observed that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was intended "to kill a lot of people, not to achieve a more traditional political goal."[16] Former CIA director James Woolsey similarly noted that "Today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it."[17] Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow expanded on this interpretation in a 1998 article in *Foreign Affairs*, writing that the new wave of "catastrophic terrorism" is not designed to affect policy, but to create destruction in itself.[18] This macabre incentive among international terrorists blossomed after the 9/11 attacks. When news first reached bin Laden and his lieutenants of the human consequences, they were reportedly elated while though the Bush administration was still debating how to respond.[19] For al-Qaeda leaders, the nature of the U.S. response was secondary if not wholly inconsequential because the bloodshed alone was already cause for jubilation.

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But just because terrorists rejoice from an operationally successful attack, this does not mean they can be deterred with a denial strategy. Denying terrorists from carrying out operationally successful attacks is a losing strategy for two main reasons. First, terrorists are manifestly motivated by numerous goals, some of which do not even require attacks at all.[20] Second, a consensus exists within the policy community that terrorists will always finds ways to mount operations, given sufficient resolve. As Stephen Flynn remarks, terrorism "will be perennially in the offing" because "it is an ongoing hazard, something we will never successfully eliminate."[21] This is true for several reasons. For terrorists, potential targets include anywhere people gather. As such, very little capability is required for carrying out an attack. In the rare cases where targets are effectively hardened, terrorists simply move on to softer targets. Governments may try to play cat and mouse, but are ultimately constrained in their responses particularly within democracies.[22] In sum, the ease of perpetrating attacks virtually guarantees some form of success though is hardly a requirement for it.

For the sake of prediction, scholars tend to model the behaviour of terrorists by attributing to them simple, straightforward incentive structures. In their efforts to achieve parsimony, however, these models are often too reductive. The evidence suggests that terrorists tend to harbour varied, complex, even inconsistent strategic and personal aims. Given the complexity of their objectives, terrorists seemingly derive utility from their actions regardless of how

governments respond. The inability of governments to reduce the utility of terrorism seemingly presents an insurmountable challenge for deterring its practitioners.

Deterring Terrorist Support

It would be easy to conclude that terrorism cannot be deterred because its practitioners are fundamentally undeterrable. In fact, counterterrorism circles are heavily populated by deterrence naysayers. Richard Betts, for example, contends that deterrence has "limited efficacy…for modern counterterrorism." Paul Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins likewise assert, "The concept of deterrence is both too limiting and too naïve to be applicable to the war on terrorism." And President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy concluded, "Deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy."[23] This pessimistic outlook is unwarranted. Terrorism may be deterrable even though most of its practitioners are not.

Unlike the strategies of deterrence-by-punishment and deterrence-by-denial, deterrence-by-delegitimisation does not seek to deter the perpetrators themselves. Rather, deterrence-by-delegitimisation aims to deter unwanted behaviour by discrediting the perpetrators in the eyes of their supporters. For counterterrorism purposes, this means our focus should be on deterring terrorist supporters by discrediting the perpetrators. This approach has a large, untapped strategic upside for three main reasons.

First, the ability of terrorists to generate violence depends critically on their level of support. There is indeed power in numbers for producing terrorism.[24] When support from the local population grows, so too does the terrorism threat since its perpetrators are then better equipped to elude authorities and acquire material resources essential for sustaining full-fledged terrorist campaigns.[25] Admittedly, even isolated terrorists are able to inflict some measure of pain because terrorism is the proverbial weapon of the weak. But shrinking the pool of supporters would go a long way towards curbing terrorism since it enfeebles its perpetrators.

Second, supporters of terrorism are potential candidates for deterrence due to the relative simplicity of their incentive structure, which facilitates the manipulation of costs and benefits undergirding the deterrence mechanism. In marked contrast to terrorists, their supporters tend to be motivated by one main goal—achievement of the terrorist group's political demands. International polls consistently show that when terrorism is seen as strategically advantageous, public support for the perpetrators increases. But when terrorism is viewed as strategically disadvantageous, public support decreases. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is an illustrative example, as local support for it dried up once its attacks were seen as politically costly. Similarly, Palestinian support for Hamas and other terrorist groups in Israel is positively related to perceptions of political effectiveness. When terrorism is viewed as an impediment to Israeli concessions, the Palestinian public invariably turns against the perpetrators, effectively isolating them.[26]

Third, terrorist supporters are deterrable because they systematically overestimate the political value of terrorism. In recent years, a growing body of empirical research has found that terrorism does not actually help the perpetrators to coerce major government concessions. Terrorism is not simply highly correlated with political failure; the tactic appears to have an independent, negative impact on the odds of government concessions. Terrorism can therefore be deterred by educating its supporters about the harmful effects to their political preferences. Below, is a summary of the existing research landscape on terrorism's political impact. Across several methodologies, the evidence indicates that terrorism is a losing political tactic that hampers perpetrators from obtaining their demands.

Terrorism is usually defined as non-state attacks against civilian targets for a putative political purpose.[27] This combination of target selection and objective is, however, in tension. For decades, specialists have noted that terrorism almost never results in strategic concessions. In the 1970s, Walter Laqueur published "The Futility of Terrorism" in which he asserted that perpetrators seldom manage to wring important government concessions.[28] In the 1980s, Bonnie Cordes, Bruce Hoffman, and Brian Jenkins likewise observed, "Terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains…[I]n that sense terrorism has failed. It is a fundamental failure."[29] Martha Crenshaw also pointed out, "Few [terrorist] organisations actually attain the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure."[30] In the 1990s, Thomas Schelling proclaimed, "Terrorism almost never appears to accomplish anything politically significant."[31] Sun-Ki

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Chai remarked that terrorism "has rarely provided political benefits" at the bargaining table.[32] Virginia Held went even further, claiming that the "net effect" of terrorism is politically counterproductive.[33] Since the September 11 attacks, a series of large-*n* studies has confirmed that only a handful of terrorist groups in modern history have accomplished their political platforms.

In 2006, Max Abrahms published in *International Security* an article entitled "Why Terrorism Does Not Work"; the first large-*n* study on terrorism's political effectiveness.[34] The effectiveness of terrorism can be measured in terms of its process goals or outcome goals. Process goals are intended to sustain the terrorist group by attracting media attention, scuttling organisation-threatening peace processes, or boosting membership and morale often by provoking government overreaction. The outcome goals of terrorists, by contrast, are their stated political ends, such as the realization of a Kurdish homeland, the removal of foreign bases from Greece, or the establishment of Islamism in India. An important difference between process goals and outcome goals is that unlike the former, the latter can only be achieved with the compliance or collapse of the target government. The study assessed whether terrorism helps militant groups to achieve their outcome goals, that is, their core strategic demands. To this end, Abrahms analysed the political plights of the twenty-eight Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs), as designated by the U.S. State Department. The analysis yields two main findings. First, the FTO success rate is quite low—under ten percent—compared to other non-state tactics. On average, the FTOs perpetrated terrorism for decades without any visible signs of political progress. Second, and even more importantly, the successful FTOs used terrorism only as a secondary tactic. FTOs are just like other militant groups that exhibit wide variation in their tactical choices. All of the political winners directed their violence against military targets, not civilian ones. By disaggregating the FTOs by target selection, Abrahms helped to reveal the full extent to which terrorism—defined as non-state attacks against civilian targets—has historically been a losing political tactic.

Subsequent studies have found even lower rates of terrorist success. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki examined the universe of known terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006. Of the 648 groups identified in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database, only 4 percent obtained their strategic demands.[35] More recently, Audrey Cronin reexamined the success rate of these groups, confirming that less than 5 percent prevailed.[36] Suicide terrorism is usually more lethal than the conventional type, but its practitioners fail at an even higher rate.[37]

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These low figures actually exceed the coercion rate, however, as terrorists may accomplish their demands for reasons other than civilian pain. In fact, all of the studies emphasize that terrorism does not encourage concessions. In his 2006 study, Abrahms concluded that "the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself."[38] Jones and Libicki contend that in the few cases in which terrorist groups have triumphed, "Terrorism had little or nothing to do with the outcome."[39] And Cronin observes that the victorious have achieved their demands "despite the use of violence against innocent civilians [rather] than because of it," and that "The tactic of terrorism might have even been counterproductive."[40] Hard case studies have inspected the limited historical examples of clear-cut terrorist victories, determining that these salient events were idiosyncratic, unrelated to the harming of civilians, or both.[41]

The tactic does not appear to be epiphenomenal to government intransigence or the result of selection bias. On the contrary, the latest wave of scholarship provides a raft of evidence that escalating violence against civilians impedes non-state challengers from attaining their demands. To demonstrate the political ineffectiveness of terrorism, Abrahms published in *Comparative Political Studies* a coercion study that scrutinised the political outcomes of 125 FTO campaigns. The study reveals substantial variation in the political success of Foreign Terrorist Organisations depending on their tactical choices. Evidently, FTOs are significantly more likely to coerce government compliance when their violence is directed against military targets instead of civilian ones—even after controlling for the capability of the perpetrators, the nature of their demands, and many other tactical confounds.[42] Virginia Fortna analysed the coercive effectiveness of terrorism within civil wars. After factoring out the relative capabilities of rebel groups, she found they are also more likely to coerce government compliance by refraining from terrorism.[43] Similarly, Anna Getmansky and Tolga Sinmazdemir found that the Israeli government in particular is significantly less likely to cede land to the Palestinians when they have perpetrated terrorism. The authors exploit variation in the operational outcome of terrorist attacks and find that "successful" ones actually prompt Israeli land seizures rather than territorial concessions.[44] Relatedly, Erica Chenoweth

and Maria Stephan found that protest groups suffer at the bargaining table when they employ violence against the population.[45] The same is true for militant groups that seize hostages. Militant groups are far more likely to successfully pressure government compliance when they refrain from harming the hostages, particularly civilian ones.[46] With few exceptions, coercion studies thus find that terrorism lowers the likelihood of government concessions.[47]

Terrorism rarely frightens citizens of target countries into supporting more dovish politicians. On the contrary, studies on public opinion demonstrate that terrorist attacks tend to raise popular support for right-wing leaders opposed to appeasement. Based on their dataset of Palestinian attacks from 1990 to 2003, Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor found that terrorism boosts national support for right-wing parties in Israel, such as the Likud.[48] In a related study, the authors demonstrate that Israeli localities struck by terrorism gravitate to right-bloc parties opposed to territorial concessions.[49] Eric Gould and Estaban Klor also explored geographic variation in terror attacks within Israel and found that the bloodiest ones are the most likely to induce this rightward electoral shift.[50] Anna Getmansky and Thomas Zeitzoff found that Israelis within range of rocket-fire from the Gaza Strip are significantly more likely to support right-wing candidates.[51] These trends appear to be the international norm, not Israeli specific. Christophe Chowanietz analysed variation in public opinion within France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States from 1990 to 2006.[52] In each target country, terrorist attacks have shifted the electorate to the political right in proportion to their lethality. Related observations have been registered after al-Qaeda and its affiliates killed civilians in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, the Philippines, Russia, Turkey, and the United States.[53] RAND observes in a précis of the literature: "Terrorist fatalities, with few exceptions, increase support for the bloc of parties associated with a more intransigent position. Scholars may interpret this as further evidence that terrorist attacks against civilians do not help terrorist organisations achieve their stated goals."[54] By bolstering hardliners, militant groups engaged in terrorist attacks are more likely to be crushed from the backlash they provoked.[55]

To understand why terrorism is a suboptimal instrument of coercion, it is useful to review how this violent tactic is supposed to work in the first place. In theory, terrorism operates as a political communication strategy that signals to the target country the costs of noncompliance; terrorism allegedly coerces government accommodation when the expected cost of the violence against civilians exceeds the expected cost of making the concession.[56] This bargaining logic lacks external validity, however; in fact, terrorism is a poor coercive tactic precisely because it is a flawed communication strategy.

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Content analyses of media stories strongly suggest that terrorism struggles to amplify terrorist demands. Michael Kelly and Thomas Mitchell have produced the most ambitious study on the media's coverage of terrorist demands. Their content analysis of terrorism articles in the *New York Times* and *Times* of London reveals that historically "less than 10 percent of the coverage in either newspaper dealt in even the most superficial way with the grievances of the terrorists"[57] Terrorists are unable to broadcast their demands even when the perpetrators emphasise them, are highly educated, and speak the majority language of the target country. As Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf illustrated in the case of the American Weather Underground, "The terrorists could bomb their names on to the front pages, but they could do next to nothing to make sure that the message intended by their bombings was also the message transmitted."[58] In her analysis of European-based terrorist groups, Bonnie Cordes et al. likewise find that "The violence of terrorism is rarely understood by the public."[59] Kelly and Mitchell go even further, noting the use of terrorism seems to "sap…its political content."[60] Anecdotal evidence thus abounds that terrorism is a losing political tactic because it is a poor communication strategy.

In a recent study published in *International Studies Quarterly*, Abrahms proposed and tested a new psychological theory to explain why terrorism underperforms politically. The Correspondence of Means and Ends bias is a newfound cognitive heuristic in international relations. It posits that citizens of target countries are apt to infer the extremeness of the perpetrators' political preferences directly from the extremeness of his tactics. That is, terrorists are seen as harbouring extreme, unappeasable ends because of their use of extreme means. Because of this human tendency to confound the extreme means of the perpetrator with his presumed ends, escalating to terrorism or other violent tactics can discredit him as a viable negotiating partner.[61]

To test the Correspondence of Means and Ends bias, Abrahms conducted an online experiment on a large, representative national sample of American adults. All subjects

were presented with a simple vignette of an unidentifiable group issuing a traditionally moderate preference through the American media—the release of its imprisoned leaders from U.S. custody in exchange for permanently demobilising. Subjects were randomly assigned, however, to two conditions that differed along a tactical dimension. In the control condition, the group surrounds a bunch of American civilians, takes them hostage, but does not physically harm anyone in the course of the confrontation. The same information was presented in the treatment condition, except the group escalates tactically by killing the civilians in its custody. To minimise framing issues, the survey instrument paid attention to the formal aspects of the instrument by avoiding any derivatives of the word terror or any other emotive labels to describe either the coercive acts or the actors themselves. The two conditions were thus duplicates, except in the painful treatment the moderate group adopts a more extreme method by killing the civilians instead of releasing them unharmed.

Subjects in both conditions were presented with a series of identical multiple choice and ordinal scale questions designed to assess both directly and indirectly the perceived extremeness of the group's preferences. Specifically, all subjects were asked the following set of questions: (1) to evaluate whether the group is motivated to achieve its demand of freeing the imprisoned leaders in U.S. custody or to harm Americans out of hatred towards them; (2) to rate the group's preferences from 1 to 7 along this continuum;[62] (3) to judge whether the group would in fact demobilise upon achieving its demand to free the imprisoned leaders; (4) to appraise whether the group would derive satisfaction from Americans physically harmed in an unrelated incident that would not contribute to winning back the imprisoned

Figure 1: Average Survey Responses for Painful Treatment and Painless Control (Vignette 1)

1. Group hates Americans and wants to harm them.

2. Group is most extreme on 7-point scale.

3. Group would not demobilize upon achieving demand.

4. Group would gain satisfaction from Americans harmed in unrelated incident.

5. Group would continue to do same actions upon discovering less extreme tactic to achieve its demand.

leaders in U.S. custody; and (5) to ascertain whether the group would continue to engage in the same actions against Americans even after discovering a less extreme method that promised to free the imprisoned leaders.

Following a standard convention in experimental research, Abrahms then applied a two-tailed difference of means test to determine whether the tactical manipulation alone yields significant variation in the perceived extremeness of the self-described moderate group's preferences. Answers to each of the five questions are statistically significant at the .01

level or better. Compared to subjects in the control condition in which no civilians were physically harmed, those exposed to the painful treatment were on average: (1) 27 percent more likely to believe the group is motivated not to free the imprisoned leaders in U.S. custody, but to harm Americans out of hatred towards them; (2); 20 percent more likely to rate the group's preferences as the most extreme on a standard 7-point ordinal scale;[63] (3) 23 percent more likely to believe the group would not demobilise upon achieving its demand to free the imprisoned leaders; (4) 33 percent more likely to believe the group would derive satisfaction from Americans physically harmed in an unrelated incident that would not contribute to winning back the imprisoned leaders; and (5) 22 percent more likely to believe the group would continue to engage in the same actions against Americans even after discovering a less extreme method to free its leaders from U.S. custody. The experiment therefore helps to resolve why governments dig in their political heels in the face of terrorism. When groups escalate to this extreme tactic, they are seen as harbouring equally extreme political preferences, undermining confidence in negotiating with them.

For experimentalists in psychology or behavioural science, the quality of a causal mechanism depends less on the scope of confirming cases than on the theoretical construct and its predictive power. As a robustness check, however, the study also tested the mechanism with another vignette, again varying only whether the moderate group escalates tactically by killing the hostages instead of releasing them unscathed. Subjects in both conditions were presented with the same set of questions to further assess whether the extremeness of tactics employed by non-state actors informs perceptions of their preferences independent of their actual demands. Across questions, those exposed to the painful treatment were again significantly (p<.01) more likely to conclude that the perpetrators are motivated to harm the population irrespective of whether the moderate demand were granted.

This is the first controlled experiment on the mechanism of coercion. A concern inherent to this methodology is the sacrificing of external validity for precision. The results appear externally valid, however, in important ways. First, the vignettes in the experiment are not based on hypothetical scenarios. Each tracks closely with the most common international events from ITERATE, a leading dataset on non-state coercion. International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2005 (ITERATE 5) contains detailed information from over a thousand international hostage incidents between 1968 and 2005. By far, the two most common demands issued are for governments to cede money or prisoners, which occurred in 16 percent and 11 percent of the cases, respectively. The perpetrators demand prisoners in vignette 1 and money in vignette 2 in accordance with both the relative frequency of these moderate demands and the definition of terrorism itself as an extremism of means though not necessarily ends[.[64]

Second, case studies confirm that the publics of target countries are in fact prone to inferring the extremeness of challengers' preferences directly from their tactics, empowering anti-accommodation hardliners in the face of terrorism. Within Israel, for example, polls show that respondents who perceive the tactics of Palestinians as "mainly violent" are more likely to believe their intent is to "destroy Israel." Conversely, respondents who perceive the tactics of Palestinians as "mainly nonviolent" are more likely to believe their intent is merely to "liberate the occupied territories." The Russian public also infers the extremeness of Chechen preferences directly from their tactics, fortifying hardliners against terrorist appeasement. Before the terrorism commenced, Russians favoured granting an independent Chechen state. When terrorism erupted in the late 1990s, however, the Russian public concluded that the Chechens were apparently bent on harming it, shifting popular support away from concessions, while bolstering Vladimir Putin to instead bomb Grozny. Al-Qaeda's stated grievances about U.S.-Middle East policies fell on deaf ears for the same reason. Bin Laden and his associates stressed that the purpose of the September 11, 2001 attack was to coerce the United States into withdrawing from the Middle East. But most Americans thought the point was "to harm them" as an end in itself, a perception that fuelled George W. Bush's strong counterterrorism response in the Arab-Muslim world.[65]

Observational evidence therefore accords with the experimental results that terrorism is an inherently flawed political communication strategy. The Correspondence of Means and Ends bias can account for why terrorism impedes government compliance. Evidently, citizens of target countries do not perceive the means of terrorists as fully independent from their desired ends. Terrorists struggle to induce government compliance because they are seen as unappeasable extremists by dint of their immoderate tactical choices. When a non-state actor escalates violence directed against civilians, citizens of the target country infer that the perpetrator

harbours correspondingly extreme preferences, undermining the logic of concessions regardless of whether a bargaining space objectively exists.

Academic research on terrorism offers hope that the tactic is indeed deterrable with a delegitimisation strategy. The burgeoning literature on terrorism demonstrates that the tactic hinders perpetrators from achieving—even taking seriously—their political demands. Given their incentive structure, supporters of terrorism may be deterred if only they knew what academics already do: terrorists are uniquely ill-suited for bargaining due to their grisly tactical choices, which have a proven and understandable record of political futility.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that most terrorism is deterrable even if many of its practitioners are not. Classical conceptions of deterrence are based on dissuading the adversary from unwanted behaviour by disincentivising it. The problem with deterring terrorists, however, is their incentive structure is so complex they are likely to derive utility from their actions regardless of the government countermeasure. Terrorism may still be deterred, however, by dissuading terrorist supporters. Supporters are essential not for terrorists to wage an isolated attack, but for them to mount a campaign of sustained operations. Terrorism has power in numbers because with greater local support, terrorists are better positioned to elude authorities and obtain material resources, necessary factors for long-term survival. In direct contrast to terrorists, their supporters are deterrable due to the simplicity of their incentive structure. People generally support terrorists for a single reason—to achieve their political demands.

Fortunately, a growing body of research finds that terrorism is a losing tactic for perpetrators to attain their demands. Four main findings attest to terrorism's political ineffectiveness. First, terrorism is highly correlated with political failure. Historically, a surprisingly small percentage of perpetrators have managed to achieve their political platforms with terrorism. Second, the low political success rate of terrorism is inherent to the tactic itself. Coercion studies rather consistently find that nonstate actors are less likely to achieve their demands when they employ terrorism than other tactics such as guerrilla warfare, and that this correlation holds even after controlling for the capability of the perpetrators, strength of government opposition, and dozens of other potential confounds. Third, electorates do not become more dovish in the face of terrorism. On the contrary, they tend to gravitate towards more hawkish, right-wing leaders opposed to concessions. Finally, terrorism is suboptimal political behaviour because it is an inherently flawed communication strategy. Terrorism obfuscates rather than amplifies the demands of the perpetrators. Notwithstanding their actual nature, terrorists are suspected of harboring extreme political preferences by dint of their extreme tactics. This perception that terrorists are wedded to radical political views understandably dissuades target countries from trying to appease them.

Policy-makers frequently complain about the irrelevance of contemporary political science research. According to this widespread view, political scientists favour esoteric topics over intrinsically important ones and methodological rigour over clarity.[66] Such allegations may ring true for other areas of the field, but not for counterterrorism. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, academic research has answered numerous questions about terrorism, including its political effects. Initially, many political scientists assumed that groups turn to terrorism because of its effectiveness in achieving their demands. This viewpoint has undergone a sea change, however, once subjected to empirical scrutiny. A consensus is forming that terrorism tends to steel target countries from making concessions. The policy community can help to mitigate the terrorism threat by broadcasting this message to its supporters in a targeted public diplomacy campaign. Supporters of terrorism will be deterred once they know that their actions obstruct their preferences.

▶ **Notes are available at source's URL.**

Max Abrahms is a professor of public policy in the department of political science at Northeastern University. He is also a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has published extensively on the outcome of terrorism, its motives, and the implications for counterterrorism strategy.

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Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: a Troublesome Cooperation?

By Senia Febrica

Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/347/html

Abstract

The security of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is of great importance for the international seafaring community. As a result, lack of adequate cooperation in this area has raised some concerns over the

safety and security of navigation in the waterways. This article focuses on Indonesia and the Philippines role in securing the waters and the behaviour of these two countries when it comes to cooperation. It investigates why they have joined a number of cooperation arrangements while rejecting others. Most scholarly works point at sovereignty concern as the main reason underpinning their decision. Rather than focusing solely on sovereignty infringements, this article argues that Indonesia's and the Philippines' decisions towards cooperation initiatives are informed by the calculation of (both the sovereignty and implementation) costs and benefits, and the level of their control over the cooperation outcomes.

▶ **Read the full paper at source's URL.**

Senia Febrica is a researcher at the American Studies Center, Universitas Indonesia (UI). She is also affiliated with the Department of International Relations, UI. This article is based on her PhD research at the University of Glasgow (Politics). The Indonesian Ministry of Education, the Gilbert Murray Trust, the United Nations-Nippon Foundation of Japan, and the University of Glasgow have funded research for it. The author benefited greatly from the guidance provided by her PhD supervisors Professor Alasdair Young and Dr. Cian O'Driscoll. Her most profound debt is to Dr. Daniel Hammond, the editor, and anonymous reviewers for their comments on the early draft of this article.

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Eco-Terrorism? – Countering Dominant Narratives of Securitisation: a Critical, Quantitative History of the Earth Liberation Front (1996-2009)

By Michael Loadenthal

Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/345/html

Abstract

The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) has carried out acts of political violence and 'economic sabotage' characterized by a pattern of behaviour reflecting tactical and targeting selections, communications strategies, and geographic location. The movement's attacks typically focus on the destruction of property located in 'soft targets' associated with commercial and residential construction, the automotive industry, and a variety of local, national and multinational business interests. These sites are routinely targeted through a variety of means ranging from graffiti to

sabotage to arson. Geographically, the movement has focused its attacks in the United States and Mexico, and, to a limited extent, countries on the European, South American and Australian continents. The findings presented in this article were developed through a statistical analysis of the movement's attack history as presented through its above-ground support network. This is discussed in critical contrast to assertions about the movement's alleged terrorist behaviour found in most academic and government literature. This study seeks to present an incident-based historical analysis of the ELF that is not situated within a logic of securitisation. In doing so, it challenges traditional scholarship based on statistical findings.

▶ **Read the full paper at source's URL.**

Michael Loadenthal i*s a Doctoral Fellow at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University (Arlington, VA) and teaches 'Terrorism and Political Violence' at the Program on Justice & Peace at Georgetown University (Washington, DC).*

Fanatical British jihadists join the ISIS cause by posing as tourists

By Simon Wright and Vanessa Altin
Source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/fanatical-british-jihadists-join-isis-3741250

June 22 – **Fanatical British jihadists disguised as tourists enjoying a holiday in Turkey are slipping unnoticed across its border and joining the bloodthirsty ISIS killers in Iraq.**
Sunday Mirror investigators this week visited the sprawling Turkish city of Gaziantep which is just 30 miles from the Syrian border and a crucial meeting point for British terror recruits.

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Our Vanessa in one of the 60 gun shops in Gaziantep

Our team traced the route starting from cities like London, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester across Europe to Syria and Iraq.
Before leaving the UK, wannabe jihadists tap into a networks of fixers and set up fake Twitter and Instagram accounts. They then seek out recruiters who use coded street-slang online to identify themselves as ISIS affiliates.

They are assigned a handler who later meets them on the final leg and guides them to remote border crossings away from official check-points. The jihadists often book package holidays as a cheap and innocent-seeming means of arriving in Turkey.

Recently, five British Asian lads boarded a flight from Manchester to Antalya, after paying for a one-week stay at a five-star spa resort in Side. The group, believed to originate from Luton, arrived on an airport transfer in the evening and left the hotel early the next morning – never to be seen there again.

They failed to attend their welcome meeting and never took advantage of the spa. An inspection of their room by staff revealed two abandoned suitcases, complete with a discarded electric beard-trimmer.

A local taxi driver revealed the group had asked the fare from Antalya to Gaziantep – but instead settled on a lift to the bus station and an arduous 12-hour journey East across Turkey.

After arriving in the sprawling industrialised city of Gaziantep, which is littered with gun shops, they are met by their ISIS handlers.

Airport worker Vali, 35, said: "We welcome tourists but recently we have had more young British men arriving in small groups. Some enquired about car hire. When we asked for their return flight date they said they weren't going back." From Gaziantep, the jihadists are transferred to pick-up trucks and driven 30 miles to the Syrian border, near the bombed-out Turkish towns of Akcakale and Reyhanli, which have come under attack from ISIS in recent months.

Avoiding the main border crossings and refugee camps, they fan along narrow tracks away from the main highways. Barely an hour later, they have crossed into Syria without encountering a single border official.

A local police source said: "Large sections of the border between Turkey and Syria and Iraq are not policed and there are many points that you could slip across unnoticed."

By the following day, the UK jihadists have arrived at an ISIS training camp, been handed their first AK47 and are posting triumphant pictures of themselves on social media.

Bahadir Dincer, an jihad expert, said: "It is a journey more young British men are taking. If they want to join ISIS in Syria, it is easy."

Simon Wright is a senior reporter for the Sunday Mirror.

Iraqi Kurdistan's New Security Challenges

By Wladimir van Wilgenburg

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/hotissues/single-hot-issues/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42547 &tx_ttnews[backPid]=61&cHash=e156fbfc895a2c8bb9e7349445640551

The recent advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and collapse of a quarter the Iraqi Army has created both opportunities and threats for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). With Baghdad occupied by the crisis, the KRG has been able to consolidate control of disputed oil-rich areas. With the

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Iraqi government in desperate need of Kurdish support, the KRG has an opportunity to extract concessions on both territory and the distribution of oil revenue, and has become a priority for the United States. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited the region on June 24 in order to request Kurdish support for Baghdad.

While the crisis gives Kurdish leaders leverage over the national government, it has also created a 1,000 kilometer-long border between the KRG and territory controlled by the aggressive and violent ISIS. Kurdish leaders must worry about attacks from the militant group, as well as infiltration or attacks by sympathizers who have likely entered the region among 300,000 Sunni refugees.

On balance, Kurdish leaders believe that they will benefit. They remain optimistic about their territorial and political gains, and believe that the Kurdish security forces will be able to prevent ISIS attacks. Their efforts to navigate the situation will have a major impact on both the struggle in Iraq and the regional strategic situation.

Introduction

The withdrawal of most Iraqi Army units from the Sunni areas of Iraq in early June, solidified Kurdish control over the disputed areas that the Kurds historically consider part of Kurdistan. The Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, has tried to push the Kurds back from these provinces since August 2008, but now the Kurds are in full control after securing the deserted Iraqi Army positions.

The blitzkrieg assault led by ISIS has handed most of the oil-rich disputed territories to the Iraqi Kurds, which could serve as the basis of

an independent Kurdish state in the future. Furthermore, the KRG has secured most of the Iraqi-Syrian border areas where Kurds live and are now able to defend Kurdish minorities who were under attack in formerly Iraqi-controlled areas. These gains also increase security risks to the Kurds, however.

The United States and Iran have put pressure on the KRG to side with Baghdad against ISIS, but the Kurds would benefit more if they stayed neutral and did not become part of the sectarian conflict. Shiite parties have

already made threats against the KRG for allegedly supporting the Sunnis, while ISIS could target the Kurds in case they cooperate with Shiite-dominated government against the militant group (Rudaw, June 20).

The internal divisions among the Kurds might threaten the neutrality of the Kurds, but they speak with a united Kurdish voice to Baghdad over oil and security issues. This is because the two main Kurdish parties are allied with different countries: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is closer to Iran, while the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is closer to Turkey. Both parties operate their own security forces and this could lead to different approaches in the fight against ISIS (Basnews, June 18).

The KDP has hosted several Sunni leaders, including the governor of Mosul, and has heavily criticized Baghdad's policies. The PUK has been more critical of Turkey. Its territories mostly border Iran and they maintain good contacts with the Iranian security agencies. However, the current crisis might pressure the Kurdish parties to act as one and they have managed to form a national unity government that consists of all parties (Rudaw, June 19).

The PUK fights mostly in the disputed territories of Diyala and Kirkuk, while the KDP is fighting in the disputed areas of Mosul. There were heavier clashes in the PUK-controlled areas where the borders are less clear than in Mosul and there are larger Shiite populations in the areas of control. In Mosul, the population consists mostly of Sunni Arabs and Kurds, Christians and other minorities. Shi'a Turkmen are now fleeing the town of Tal Afar, after the Iraqi Army was expelled.

Kurds Set to Benefit
The KRG hope they can use Baghdad's weakness as a bargaining chip to push the central government to accept independent Kurdish oil exports to Turkey, pay the withheld budget to them and recognize the disputed territories as part of the KRG. The Kurds now demand 25 percent of Iraq's oil revenue having secured Kirkuk's oil fields (Reuters, June 16).

The position of Baghdad has weakened as it loses territory. They cannot control most of the Sunni areas without cooperating with the Kurds. Therefore, the United States realizes that the Kurds are necessary to keep Iraq together and to fight ISIS.

The Kurds have another advantage over Baghdad: Kirkuk's oil can now only be exported through Kurdistan, since the damaged Ceyhan pipeline passes through ISIS-controlled territory and therefore cannot be repaired. The Iraqi Kurds now hold the key to exports from Kirkuk to Turkey.

New Security Risks
Nevertheless, although Kurds have increased their chances of establishing their own state, they now have to deal with ISIS instead of Baghdad. They also suffer from a lack of fuel, resulting from the ISIS takeover of the Baiji refinery and increased fuel demands (PUKmedia, June 23). This can cause social disturbances and worsen economic conditions with the ongoing lack of a budget in the KRG.

The so-called trigger line – a curve stretching across Iraq from the Syrian to the Iranian border where the Kurdish fighters faced the Iraqi Army – has been replaced by a security line of 1,000 kilometers bordering ISIS militants between the Syrian border in Rabia and Naftxana, close to Iranian border. [1]

The Kurdistan Region now borders ISIS, and not Baghdad. "We now have 1,000 kilometers of border with terrorists. Of course that is a threat. We are not happy to be neighbors with terrorists," said Peshmerga spokesperson Jabbar Yawar. [2]

Although the security situation strengthens the Kurdish hand against Baghdad, the Kurds now face battle-hardened ISIS fighters instead of the disorganized Iraqi Army. Nevertheless, the Kurds remain confident that they can contain the ISIS threat, although ISIS could attempt to carry out bombings in the KRG or engage in battles with Kurds in the disputed areas. So far, ISIS remains the biggest threat for Baghdad and not the KRG.

Internal Security in the KRG
As a result of the threat, the KRG Interior Ministry as heightened security measures.
"The internal security is good anyway, the security forces are dedicated and have a lot of experience in what they are doing," says Harry Schute, a former U.S. general and security advisor to the KRG. [3] "The recent movement of ISIS and the long border we have with them now, caused our internal security forces to have a higher state of readiness and are more on alerts." [4]

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The number of checkpoints and security controls has also increased as the result of an influx of over 300,000 internally displaced Sunnis that fled the fighting (UNHCR, June 17). The KRG already welcomed more than 200,000 Syrian Kurdish refugees and thousands of refugees who fled the Iraqi government crackdown on Anbar governorate earlier this year (UNHCR, June 15).

Although the Kurdish government welcomed the Sunni refugees, they are aware that some of the displaced Sunnis could be sympathetic to Sunni insurgent groups and pose a security risk and could even be used as sleeper cells.

Some oil companies operating in Kurdistan are worried about the security conditions and have evacuated non-essential staff (Global Post, June 20). Foreign oil companies operating in disputed territories close to ISIS borders are also worried. So far, though, it seems the KRG has successfully fortified these positions since they were already under full Kurdish security control. It is unlikely that ISIS could threaten critical oil infrastructure in these territories.

"We are aware, before the problem began, that one critical infrastructure for Kurdistan is the oil and gas sector, therefore there is a lot of attention for that, and sometimes even more intensive than for other areas," Schute said. [5] Some Kurdish security officials even suggest that security has improved in the Kurdistan region. "The security will be better now because in the past any terrorist that entered in Kurdistan came from Mosul and Kirkuk and now we control these [parts of these] areas completely," Halgurd Hikmet, a spokesperson of the Peshmerga forces said. [6] The oil-rich and strategic city of Kirkuk is now under full Kurdish control and protected by security trenches. "We have [Peshmergas] along the river Zab. Here in this area we moved our forces further west, around 35 kilometers from the city. Around 25 kilometers from the [security] trench. That has given us a defensive line," says Kirkuk Governor Najmaldin Karim. [7]

Nevertheless, ISIS still carries out bomb attacks against Peshmerga forces in the border town of Rabia border town and Kirkuk city and will be able to continue to destabilize the disputed areas in the near future. On June 24, the Turkmen head of the Kirkuk provincial council was gunned down by unknown gunmen (PUKmedia.com, June 24).

Threat of Kurdish Jihadists
Another risk the KRG faces are homegrown jihadist fighters that have travelled to Syria. According to Mariwan Naqshbandi, spokesperson for the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs, around 200 Kurds have travelled to Syria. [8] In reality, this number might be higher and there is a high possibility that these Iraqi Kurdish jihadists could join ISIS in battle against the KRG in Iraq.

The close proximity to ISIS territory also makes it easier for Kurdish ISIS sympathisers to travel to ISIS controlled areas without travelling to Syria first. Therefore, the KRG might have to tighten intelligence control over Kurdish ISIS sympathisers who pose a threat to the KRG.

Conclusion
The Iraqi Kurds benefit from the current crisis in Iraq where ISIS has taken over many areas. The situation and the uncompromising mentality of the Iraqi government could lead the Kurds to break away from Iraq if they are able to get support from Turkey. Kurdish borders are now clearly demarcated and they are likely to benefit from controlling Kirkuk's oil resources. Nevertheless, the fact that the KRG now borders 1,000 kilometers of ISIS territory will also present serious security risks to the Kurdistan region. There have been several clashes between the ISIS and Kurds and in the future the ISIS could destabilize the KRG if they pose a threat to ISIS plans. Nevertheless, the Kurds are confident that they can maintain their security in the future.

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Notes
1. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along The Trigger Line," July 2009, www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/088-iraq-and-the-kurds-trouble-along-the-trigger-line.aspx.
2. Author's interview with Jabbar Yawar, June 18, 2014.
3. Security meeting, Middle East Research Institute, May 24, 2014, Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Author's interview with Halgurd Hikmet, June 15, 2014.

7. Author's interview with Najmaldin Karim, June 29, 2014.
8. Author's interview with Mariwan Naqshbandi, spokesperson for the ministry of endowment and religious affairs, June 22, 2014.

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Life After Terrorism-Induced Trauma (REVIEW)
Source: http://www.algemeiner.com/2014/05/29/life-after-terrorism-induced-trauma-review/

For Dr. Zieva Konvisser of Orchard Lake, Mich., an interest in Israeli survivors of terrorism began years ago she heard the stories of the few members of her family from Vilna, Lithuania, who had survived the Holocaust.

"I was impressed by their motivation to achieve extraordinary accomplishments following their traumatic experiences," said Konvisser, author of the recently published book "Living Beyond Terrorism: Israeli Stories of Hope and Healing."

"For example, my mother's cousin, a math professor, brought the Russian method of teaching mathematics to the United States," she said. "Izaak Wirszup, who lived through the Vilna Ghetto and the camps, survived believing he was spared to make a difference in the world. Out of his struggle, he observed 'how love, friendship and help can transform the most fragile souls into individuals stronger than steel.'"

A pivotal moment for Konvisser came when she attended the Turning Point '95 International Leadership Intensive held at Auschwitz-Birkenau on the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the extermination and labor camps. She noted how survivors shared their stories to establish meaning from their experiences and make a positive difference in the world.

"As a second-generation witness, I deeply sensed and identified with the horror and pain," she said. "At the same time, I felt the hopes of those who not only suffered such horrendous events but who thrived in spite of these events. I came away with an important question: How can we learn from our experiences to prevent genocide?"

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Terror survivors
After traveling to Israel with husband, Marc, in October 2002 during the height of the Second Intifada, Konvisser began researching the experiences of terror survivors in Israel.

"That trip helped me connect what I learned about Holocaust survivors to what was now happening in Israel and the Middle East conflict," she said. "Once again, I observed the strength of the human spirit to cope with tragedy and uncertainty and asked myself how we can move beyond the trauma of terrorism. I knew then I needed to listen more, record and compile the stories, and make them available for others."

Konvisser felt that if she were to share the survivors' stories she possibly might give more meaning to their experiences and make a positive difference in the world.

Between 2004 and 2010, she traveled to Israel eight times for extended stays to collect stories for her dissertation and book. Participants were obtained from personal recommendations and from newspaper ads. Sixty-three people were interviewed, resulting in 36 stories recounted by 48 people.

In 2006, she completed her dissertation, "Finding Meaning and Growth in the Aftermath of Suffering: Israeli Civilian Survivors of Suicide Bombings and Other Attacks." The findings were recently published in the peer-reviewed journal, "Traumatology," documenting the academic foundation for her research. Her book, "Living Beyond Terrorism," presents the voices of those who live with and beyond terrorism.

"I chose to do this difficult work in Israel because my heart and

passions are in Israel," she said. "This is where I am committed to making a difference. My love for the people in Israel lets me live like they do—in the present and not worrying about what might happen in the future."

Konvisser and her brother Eddie Dauber were raised in a Jewish and Zionist home in New Jersey, surrounded by their parents' love of Israel, Jewish education, charity, family, and friends.

"Growing up, Israel was always 'home' in our hearts," she said. "We took trips back and forth to visit family in Israel, and they visited us."

Those who know Konvisser are not surprised by the turns of her professional journey. Her undergraduate degree in chemistry and her master's degree in pharmaceutical chemistry prepared her for non-traditional roles as a woman. During her 25 years with Chrysler Mopar Parts Division, she held numerous supervisory, management and executive positions in planning, operations and marketing—often the first woman to do so.

Victim or survivor?

In one excerpt from her book, Konvisser tells the story of 54-year-old Shoshana "Shoshi" Gottlieb, a happily married woman, mother of four, and grandmother of five. A poised, beautiful woman with sparkling eyes and infectious laughter, she had her life change forever by a senseless and horrific terrorism attack. Seemingly effortlessly, she manages her family, household and job from a wheelchair in her spacious handicap-accessible apartment in Har Nof, a newer community on the westernmost tip of Jerusalem.

Her daughter Rinat best describes Shoshi: "Mom, when you are sitting by a table when we talk to you, it's just like you are everyone else. No one can see there is something wrong with you."

To which Shoshi quickly adds: "I told you that there is nothing wrong with me, even though I understood in the van the minute I saw my legs what was going on. The minute I went to rehabilitation, I started rehabilitating. I won't let anything take over my life. I haven't given up anything. Even walking I haven't given up …"

The long months of recovery and the years since the attack have allowed Shoshi time to reflect on the events in her life and to discover who she really is. She is healing. In the face of overwhelming disaster, this otherwise ordinary woman calls forth, from the depths of the human spirit, courage she never knew she possessed; she finds meaning from her deeds, experiences and attitudes, and turns tragedy into triumph. She has become a survivor.

Therapeutic research

While collecting the narratives for her book, Konvisser said, "My role was as a researcher. Even so, there was a therapeutic aspect to the interview process. Telling their stories to an empathic listener helped the participants increase their self-awareness and understanding of their experiences, and seemed to give them a more complete perspective on their lives."

All the people in her book struggled with indiscriminate acts of terror.

"While some survived with impairment, many were able to live next to their feelings of grief and pain, overcoming suffering and moving forward to hope and healing," she said.

"There is no one recipe—no right or wrong response—about how humans respond after struggling with horrific experiences," she said. "Yet there are common themes that evolved from these stories that can be cultivated to master any crisis."

A few of the major themes:

- Adjusting future expectations to fit a new reality and focusing on the important things in life
- Moving forward with strength gained from past experiences and prior adversity
- Grappling with fundamental existential questions through religion and spirituality
- Finding the silver lining and creatively giving back turns tragedy into action or activism.

"By focusing on terrorism's human rather than political dimension, the book fills out the historical narrative in a critical way," said Don Cohen of West Bloomfield, Mich., a former Jewish professional and journalist who worked with Konvisser to refine the ideas, stories, and style.

Cohen added, "The book's depth and humanity help us penetrate the life-changing impact on those who survived, and provide a necessary context for grappling with the personal and political possibilities and challenges ahead."

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
Agent Storm: My Life Inside al Qaeda and the CIA

By Morten Storm (Author), Paul Cruickshank (Author) and Tim Lister (Author)

Morten Storm was an unlikely Jihadi. A six-foot-one red-haired Dane, Storm spent his teens in and out of trouble. A book about the Prophet Mohammed prompted his conversion to Islam, and Storm sought purpose in a community of believers. He attended a militant madrasah in Yemen, named his son Osama, and became close friends with Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born terrorist cleric. But after a decade of Jihadi life, he not only repudiated extremism but, in a quest for atonement, became a double agent for the CIA and British and Danish intelligence.

Agent Storm takes readers inside the jihadist world like never before, showing the daily life of zealous men set on mass murder, from dodging drones with al-Qaeda leaders in the Arabian desert to training in extremist gyms in Britain and performing supply drops in Kenya. The book also provides a tantalizing look at his dangerous life undercover, as Storm traveled the world for

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missions targeting its most dangerous terrorists , and into the world's most powerful spy agencies: their tradecraft, rivalries, and late-night carousing, as well as their ruthless use of a beautiful blonde in an ambitious honey trap. *Agent Storm* is a captivating, utterly unique, real-life espionage tale.

▶ **Read a related article on Storm's real dual life at:**
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2664141/Double-agent-jihadi-To-extremist-brothers-Muslim-convert-hungering-commit-atrocities-Britain-In-truth-spy-MI5-In-new-book-blows-cover-terrifying-double-life.html

Hijacking for Product Theft is Business as Usual in Southeast Asia

Source: http://www.marinelink.com/news/hijacking-business371797.aspx

June 25 – Well-established local criminal syndicate diversifying its targets rather than undertaking new operations says Denmark-based security advisory and intelligence company Risk Intelligence.

The recent hijacking cases of coastal product tankers in Southeast Asia for the theft of their cargos represent a diversification of the threat rather than a new trend.

"It's a case of new diesel in old tankers," said the CEO of Risk Intelligence, Hans Tino Hansen. "This type of piracy for product theft evolved in Southeast Asia and we've been following these sorts of cases and some of the syndicates involved for a number of years."

Hijacking for product theft can be documented as far back as 1990s in Southeast Asia. **The most active syndicate has usually favored boarding the preselected targets in the same general location and always during the region's dry season between March and October**.

"We believe that the majority of these incidents can be traced to a particular (and well-established) group based in the immediate area," said Special Projects Manager and Southeast Asia analyst for Risk Intelligence, Karsten von Hoesslin. "They are diversifying in the product type they are stealing. If anything, this indicates their network is expanding within the illicit oil products market. But otherwise, with respect to modus operandi and patterns, it's business as usual."

Risk Intelligence's forecasts since 2011 have warned of an increase of reported hijackings for product theft in the South China Sea based on this seasonal pattern. **Both the Johor and Miri coasts have been particularly highlighted as high risk regions.**

"Despite the increase in activity and recent advisories, the vessels targeted are almost always pre-selected – suggesting an 'inside man' element to them – and solely targeting regionally managed and flagged tankers," said von Hoesslin.

Field surveys carried out by Risk Intelligence during the 2013 dry season revealed hijackings targeting both product tankers and tug and barges occurring approximately every fortnight in the South China and Java Seas by at least four well placed syndicates.

Will ISIS spur new strategic directions for S Arabia?
By Andrew McGregor
Source:http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42553&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=0ae7a0b37983781524192d68a5f62906#.U62XJUBpfgI

In some ways, the recent triumphs of the radical Sunni Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) inside Iraq have alarmed Riyadh as much as Tehran. While the Saudis are still willing to support less radical Islamist movements in Syria and Iraq as part of a proxy war against Shiite Iran, there are fears in Riyadh that ISIS extremists, many of whom were recruited in Saudi Arabia, may eventually turn their attention to the Kingdom itself, threatening its hereditary rulers

and the stability of the Gulf region. Iraq and Iran, meanwhile, accuse the Saudis of sponsoring terrorism and religious extremism throughout the Middle East.

Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki first accused Saudi Arabia of financing Iraqi terrorists in March. Echoing al-Maliki, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi cabinet issued a statement on June 17 in which they held the Saudis "responsible for supporting these [militant] groups financially and morally… [and for] crimes that may qualify as genocide: the spilling of Iraqi blood and the destruction of Iraqi state institutions and religious sites" (Arabianbusiness.com, June 17). Saudi Arabia reacted to the allegations by releasing a statement condemning ISIS as well as the Iraqi government:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wishes to see the defeat and destruction of all al-Qaeda networks and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operating in Iraq. Saudi Arabia does not provide either moral or financial support to ISIS or any terrorist networks. Any suggestion to the contrary, is a malicious falsehood. Despite the false allegations of the Iraqi Ministerial Cabinet, whose exclusionary policies have fomented this current crisis, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports the preservation of Iraq's sovereignty, its unity and territorial integrity (Arab News [Jeddah], June 19).

The Iranian press has clearly stated the Kingdom is the largest sponsor of terrorism in the region (*Javan* [Tehran], June 14). Tehran considers Riyadh to be in complete support of efforts to drive Iraq's Shi'a majority from the central government in Baghdad. After Iran's President Hassan Rouhani announced Iran's readiness to defend Shi'a holy sites in Iraq, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal, warned against foreign interference in Iraq. While also pledging fighters to defend the Shi'a shrines of Iraq, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah was less eager to accuse the Saudis of directly sponsoring the radical Salafist ISIS movement, saying only: "It is uncertain that Saudi Arabia had a role" (Ra'y al-Yawm, June 17).

Syria has also pointed to Saudi Arabian responsibility for arming and funding ISIS operations in that country at the behest of Israel and the United States and in cooperation with Qatar and Turkey. According to Syrian state media: "No Western country is unaware of the role Saudi Arabia is playing in supporting terrorism and funding and arming different fronts and battles, both inside and outside Iraq and Syria" (*al-Thawra* [Damascus], June 12).

Saudi Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykh denounced ISIS on May 27, condemning their recruitment of Saudi youth for the war in Syria (*al-Riyadh,* May 27). The Kingdom has also stepped up its terrorist prosecutions, diving into a backlog of hundreds of cases mainly related to the 2003-2006 Islamist insurgency. Sentences of up to 30 years in prison are being issued in cases where there once seemed little inclination to prosecute (Saudi Press Agency, June 10). Earlier this year, King Abdullah issued decrees prohibiting Saudi citizens from joining the jihad in Syria or providing financial support to extremists.

Saudi foreign minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal recently told an Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) gathering in Jeddah that Iraqi claims of Saudi support for terrorism were "baseless," but warned there were signs of an impending civil war in Iraq, a war whose implications for the region "cannot be fathomed" (Arabianbusiness.com, June 18; al-Arabiya, June 19). The Saudi government has blamed "the sectarian and exclusionary policies implemented in Iraq over the past years that threatened its stability and sovereignty" (*al-Akhbar* [Beirut], June 10). Officially, Saudi Arabia disavows sectarianism in Iraq and calls for a unified Iraqi nation with all citizens on an equal basis without distinction or discrimination (*al-Riyadh*, June 18).

Saudi authorities hold the Maliki government responsible for the present crisis and its sometimes bewildering implications, a stance summed up by former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal:

Baghdad has failed to stop the closing of ranks of extremists and Ba'thists from the era of Saddam Hussein… The situation in al-Anbar in Iraq has been boiling for some time. It seemed that the Iraqi government not only failed to do enough to calm this situation, but that it pushed things towards an explosion in some cases… One of the possible ironies is to see the Iranian Revolutionary Guard fighting alongside U.S. drones to kill Iraqis. This is something that makes a person lose his mind and makes one wonder: Where are we headed? (*al-Quds al-Arabi,* June 15; Arab News, June 14).

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When Prince Bandar bin Sultan was removed from his post in April and replaced by Prince Muhammad bin Nayef it was interpreted as a sign Riyadh was prepared to vary from the hardline approach to Iran taken by the ex-intelligence chief (Gulf News [Dubai], May 21). The change reflects the Saudi government's appreciation of the strategic situation it finds itself in as Washington shows greater reluctance to intervene directly in the affairs of the region. The lack of American consultation with the Kingdom during initial U.S.-Iranian discussions has convinced many in Riyadh that their nation must forge its own relationship with Iran to avoid a wave of conflict that could threaten the traditional Arab kingdoms of the Gulf region. The election of new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani has presented new possibilities in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, including a common approach to Turkey, whose Islamist government has supported the Muslim Brotherhood, now defined as a destabilizing threat in both Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, this remains conjecture at this point, as Riyadh follows a cautious approach to an Iranian rapprochement. While improved relations might prove beneficial, the Kingdom cannot afford to risk its self-adopted role as the guardian of Sunni Islam.

The rapprochement with Iran began tentatively earlier this year, with a series of secret meetings in Muscat and Kuwait followed by more official encounters between the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers (*National* [Abu Dhabi], May 19). Diplomacy between the two nations appears to have been spurred by American urgings and the Kingdom's realization that a reactive rather than pro-active foreign policy could leave the Saudis outside of a recalibrated power structure in the Middle East. There are fears in Riyadh that an ISIS offensive may result in Iranian troops joining the fight against Sunni extremists in Iraq, followed by the breakup of the country (*al-Quds al-Arabi*, June 15).

While Saudi Arabia appears to have backed off from its covert financial support of ISIS, private donations likely continue to flow from donors in the Kingdom and other Gulf states, though the recent looting of bank vaults and consolidation of oil-producing regions in Syria and Iraq mean that ISIS will be largely self-supporting from this point. Saudi anxieties over political change in the Middle East are reflected in the Kingdom's growing defense budget, which now makes the nation of under 30 million people one of the world's top six military spenders (Arabianbusiness.com, June 14).

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Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto's Dept. of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations in 2000 and is a former Research Associate of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In October 2007 he took over as managing editor of the Jamestown Foundation's Global Terrorism Analysis publications. He is the author of an archaeological history of Darfur published by Cambridge University in 2001 and publishes frequently on international security issues. His latest book is A Military History of Modern Egypt, published by Praeger Security International in 2006. Dr. McGregor provides commentary on military and security issues for newspapers (including the New York Times and Financial Times), as well as making frequent appearances on radio (BBC, CBC Radio, VOA, Radio Canada International) and television (CBC Newsworld, CTV Newsnet, and others).

What Did the White House Know? Did Obama Know that ISIS Planned to Invade Iraq?

By Mike Whitney
Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/what-did-the-white-house-know-did-obama-know-that-isis-planned-to-invade-iraq/5388417

"I think we have to understand first how we got here. We have been arming ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in Syria. ISIS, an al Qaeda offshoot, has been collaborating with the Syrian rebels whom the Obama administration has been arming in their efforts to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad." - Senator Rand Paul, Interview CNN

Today's head-scratcher: How could a two-mile long column of jihadi-filled white Toyota Land rovers barrel across the Syrian border into Iraq–sending plumes of dust up into the atmosphere –without US spy satellites detecting their whereabouts when those same satellites can read a damn license plate from outer space? And why has the media failed to inquire about this massive Intelligence failure?

Barack Obama is a big proponent of "inclusive democracy" which is why he wants Iraqi prime minister Nouri al Maliki to either include more Sunnis in the government or resign as PM. In an interview with CNN, Obama said, "We gave Iraq the chance to have an inclusive

motivations, come together, and compromise. If they can't there's not going to be a military solution to this problem … There's no amount of American firepower that's going to be able to hold the country together and I've made that very clear to Mr Maliki and all the other leadership inside of Iraq (that) they don't have a lot of time." (New York Times)

Anyone who thinks Obama gives a rip about sectarian problems in Iraq needs his head examined. That's the lamest excuse for a policy position since the Bush administration announced they were sending troops to Afghanistan to "liberate" women from having to wear headscarves. If Obama was serious about "inclusive democracy" as he calls it, then he'd withhold the $1.3 billion from his new dictator buddy, Generalissimo al Sisi of Egypt who toppled the democratically-elected government in Cairo, installed himself as top-dog in conspicuously rigged elections, and is now planning to execute 200-plus Egyptians for being members of a party that was legal just a few months ago. Do you think Obama is pestering al-Sisi to be "more inclusive"? No way. He doesn't care how many people are executed in Egypt, anymore than he cares whether al Maliki blocks Sunnis from a spot in the government.

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democracy, to work across sectarian lines to provide a better future for their children and unfortunately what we've seen is a breakdown of trust…There's no doubt that there has been a suspicion for quite some time now amongst Sunnis that they have no access to using the political process to deal with their grievances, and that is in part the reason why a better-armed and larger number of Iraqi security forces melted away when an extremist group, Isis, started rolling through the western portions of Iraq.

"Part of the task now is to see whether Iraqi leaders are prepared to rise above sectarian

What matters to Obama and his deep-state puppet-masters is regime change, that is, getting rid of a nuisance who hasn't followed Washington's directives. That's what this is all about. Obama and Co. want to give al Maliki the old heave-ho because he refused to let US troops stay in Iraq past the 2012 deadline and because he's too close to Tehran. Two strikes and you're out, at least that's how Washington plays the game.

So Maliki has got to go, and all the hoopla over sectarian issues is just pabulum for the News Hour. It means nothing. The real goal is

regime change. That, and the partitioning of Iraq. In fact, the de facto partitioning of Iraq has already taken place. The Sunnis have basically seized the part of the country where they plan to live.

The Kurds have nailed down their own territory, and the Shia will get Baghdad and the rest, including Basra. So, the division of Iraq has already a done deal, just as long as al Maliki doesn't gum up the works by deploying his army to retake the parts of the country that are now occupied by ISIS. But the Obama team probably won't allow that to happen, mainly because the bigshots in Washington like things the way they are now.

They want an Iraq that is broken into smaller chunks and ruled by tribal leaders and warlords. That's what this is all about, splitting up the country along the lines that were laid out in an Israeli plan authored by Oded Yinon 30 years ago. That plan has already been implemented which means Iraq, as we traditionally think of it, no longer exists. It's kaput. Obama and Co. made sure of that. They weren't satisfied with just killing a million Iraqis, polluting the environment, poisoning the water, destroying the schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, and leaving them to scrape by on meager rations, foul water and a tattered electrical grid. They had to come back and annihilate the state itself, erase the lines on the map, and remove any trace of a nation that was once a prosperous Middle East hub. Now the country is gone, vanished overnight. Poof. Now you see it, now you don't.

Of course, al Maliki could try to reverse the situation, but he's got his own problems to deal with. It's going to be hard enough for him just to hold onto power, let alone launch a sustained attack on a disparate band of cutthroats who are bent on wreaking havoc on oil wells, critical infrastructure, pipelines, reservoirs, etc as well as killing as many infidels as humanly possible. No matter how you cut it, al Maliki is going to have his hands full. Obama has already made it plain, that he's gunning for him and won't rest until he's gone. In fact, Secretary of State John Kerry is in the Middle East right now trying to drum up support for the "Dump Maliki" campaign. His first stopover was Cairo. Here's a wrap-up form the Sunday Times:

"Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Cairo on Sunday morning on the first leg of a trip that is intended to hasten the formation of a cross-sectarian government in Iraq. In his swing through Middle East capitals, Mr. Kerry plans to send two messages on Iraq. One is that Arab states should use their influence with Iraqi politicians and prod them to quickly form an inclusive government. Another is that they should crack down on funding to the Sunni militants in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The group is largely self-sustaining because of success in extortion and its plundering of banks in Mosul, Iraq. But some funding "has flowed into Iraq from its neighbors," said a senior official on Mr. Kerry's plane." (Kerry Arrives in Cairo on Trip to Push for New Iraqi Government, New York Times)

How's that for priorities? First we get rid of al Maliki, says Kerry, then we move on to less important matters, like that horde of jihadi desperados who are descending on Baghdad like a swarm of locusts. Doesn't that seem a little backasswards to you, dear reader?

And why isn't Obama worried about a jihadi attack on Baghdad? Think of it: If they did attack Baghdad and the capital fell into jihadi hands, then what? Well, then the Dems would take the blame, they'd get their butts whooped in the upcoming midterms, and Madame Hillary would have to take up needlepoint because her chances of winning the 2014 presidential balloting would drop to zero. So, the fallout would be quite grave. Still, Obama's not sweating it, in fact, he's not the least bit worried. Why?

Could it be that he knows something that we don't know? Could it be that US Intel agents have already made contact with these yahoos and gotten a commitment that they won't attack Baghdad if they are allowed to remain in the predominantly Sunni areas which they already occupy? Is that it? Did Obama offer the Baathists and Takfiris a quid pro quo which they graciously accepted?

It's very likely, mainly because it achieves Obama's strategic objective of establishing a de facto partition that will remain in effect unless al Maliki can whip up an army to retake lost ground which looks doubtful at this point.

But, here's the glitch; al Maliki is not a quitter, and he's not going anywhere. In fact he's digging in his heels. He's not going to be blackmailed by the likes of Obama. He's going to this fight tooth and nail. And he's going to have help too, because young Shia males are flocking to the recruiting offices to join the army and the militias. And

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then there's Russia; in a surprise announcement Russian president Vladimir Putin offered to assist al Maliki in the fight against the terrorists, a move that is bound to enrage Washington. Here's a clip from the Daily Star:

"Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday offered Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Moscow's total backing for the fight against jihadist fighters who have swept across the Middle East country.

"Putin confirmed Russia's complete support for the efforts of the Iraqi government to speedily liberate the territory of the republic from terrorists," the Kremlin said in a statement following a phone call between the two leaders…

Russia is one of the staunchest allies of Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad and has helped prop up his regime during three years of fighting against a hotchpotch of rebel groups, including the ISIL." (Putin offers Iraq's Maliki 'complete support' against jihadists, Daily Star)

That makes a third front in which Russia and the US will be on opposite sides. It's just like the good old days, right? Putin seems to be resigned to the idea that Moscow and Washington are going to be at loggerheads in the future. He's not only opposed to a "unitary world order", he's doing something about it, putting himself and his country's future at risk in order to stop the empire's relentless expansion and vicious wars of aggression.

Needless to say, proxy wars like this can lead to rapid escalation which is always a concern when both parties have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Now check this out from the Oil Price website:

"Here's why the threat goes beyond Iraq and Syria…Modern Syria is bordered by Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan and Israel to the south and Lebanon to the west.

'Greater Syria' incorporates most of the territories of each.

This is what 'Syria' means in the mind of Middle Easterners, says Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, and author of the respected blog SyriaComment.com

'If we can teach people that so many Arabs still think of Syria as Greater Syria, they will begin to understand the extent to which Sykes-Picot remains challenged in the region,' said Landis.

Sykes-Picot, of course refers to the secret agreement drawn up by two British and French

diplomats — Sir Mark Sykes and Francois George-Picot — at the end of Word War I dividing the spoils of the Ottoman Empires between Britain and France by drawing straight lines in the sand.

To this day, many Arabs refuse to accept that division and think of 'Syria' as 'Greater Syria.' Some go so far as to include the Arab countries of North Africa – which from the Nile to the Euphrates forms 'the Fertile Crescent,' the symbol of many Muslim countries from Tunisia to Turkey. And some even go as far as including the island of Cyprus, saying it represents the star next to the crescent.

Given that, anyone who thinks ISIS will stop with Iraq is delusional." (Insiders reveal real US aims in redrawing map of ME: Greater Syria, oil price)

Interesting, eh? So, if Mr. Landis is right, then the fracas in Iraq and Syria might just be the tip of the iceberg. It could be that Washington, Tel Aviv and Riyadh –who we think are the driving force behind this current wave of violence– have a much more ambitious plan in mind for the future. If this new method of effecting regime change succeeds, then the sky's the limit. Maybe they'll try the same stunt in other countries too, like Turkey, Tunisia, Cyprus, and all the way to North Africa. Why not? If the game plan is to Balkanize Arab countries wholesale and transform them into powerless fiefdoms overseen by US proconsuls and local warlords, why not go on a regime change spree?

By the way, according to the Telegraph, Obama and friends knew what ISIS was up to, and knew that the terrorist group was going to launch attacks on cities in the Sunni territories, just as they have. Get a load of this:

"Five months ago, a Kurdish intelligence "asset" walked into a base and said he had information to hand over. The capture by jihadists the month before of two Sunni cities in western Iraq was just the beginning, he said.

There would soon be a major onslaught on Sunni territories.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Isis), a renegade offshoot of al-Qaeda, was about to take its well-known cooperation with leftovers of the regime of Saddam Hussein, and his former deputy Izzat al-Douri, to a new level.

His handlers knew their source of old, and he had always proved reliable, officials told The

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Telegraph. So they listened carefully as he said a formal alliance was about to be signed that would lead to the takeover of Mosul, the biggest city north of Baghdad, home to two million people. …

'We had this information then, and we passed it on to your (British) government and the US government,' Rooz Bahjat, a senior lieutenant to Lahur Talabani, head of Kurdish intelligence, said. 'We used our official liaisons.'

'We knew exactly what strategy they were going to use, we knew the military planners. It fell on deaf ears.' (How US and Britain were warned of Isis advance in Iraq but 'turned a deaf ear, Telegraph)

"Deaf ears"?
I'm not buying it. I think the intelligence went straight to the top, where Obama and his neocon colleagues came up with the plan that is unfolding as we speak. They figured, if they just look the other way and let these homicidal madhatters seize a few cities and raise a little Hell, they'd be able to kill two birds with one stone, that is, get rid of al Mailiki and partition the country at the same time. But, it's not going to work out like Obama expects, mainly because this is just about the dumbest plan ever conjured up. I would give it an 80 percent chance blowing up in Obama's face in less than a month's time. This turkey has failure written all over it.

As for the sectarian issue, well, Iraq was never a sectarian society until the war. The problems arose due to a deliberate policy to pit one sect against the other in order to change the narrative of what was really going on the ground. And what was really going on was a

very successful Guillaume war was being waged by opponents of the US occupation who were launching in excess of 100 attacks per day on US soldiers. To change the storyline–which was causing all kinds of problems at home where support for the war was rapidly eroding–US counterinsurgency masterminds concocted a goofy plan to blow up the Golden Dome Mosque, blame it on the Sunnis, and then unleash the most savage, genocidal counterinsurgency operation of all-time. The western media were instructed to characterize developments in Iraq as part of a bloody civil war between Shia and Sunnis. But it was all a lie. The bloodletting was inevitable result of US policy which the Guardian effectively chronicled in a shocking, but indispensable hour-long video which can be seen here. James Steele: America's mystery man in Iraq - video

The US made every effort to fuel sectarian animosities to divert attention from the attacks on US soldiers. And due to a savage and deceptive counterinsurgency plan that employed death squads, torture, assassinations, and massive ethnic cleansing, they succeeded in confusing Iraqis as to who was really behind the daily atrocities, the human rights violations and the mountain of carnage.

You'd have to be a fool to blame al-Maliki for any of this. As brutal as he may be, he's not responsible for the divisions in Iraqi society. That's all Washington's doing. Just as Washington is entirely responsible for the current condition of the country and for the million or so people who were killed in the war.

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Mike Whitney lives in Washington State. He is a contributor to Hopeless: Barack Obama and the Politics of Illusion (AK Press).

Sadly, There's Nothing the U.S. Can Do to Save Iraq
By Gary C. Gambill
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4738/us-cant-save-iraq

Since the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) earlier this month, an idea that almost no one in his right mind was publicly advocating a few short weeks ago is steadily gaining currency among American politicians and pundits — that the United States should, in some capacity or another, go to war

in Iraq. A few words of advice to those who are jumping on the bandwagon:

First, understand that the United States didn't start this fire and can't put it out. The sectarian conflict now raging between Muslims in the heart of the Arab

world was primed to erupt by decades of brutal minoritarian rule in both Syria (Alawites over majority Sunnis) and Iraq (Sunnis over majority Shiites), and by over a millennium of religious antagonism before that. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq overturned an applecart that was bound to falter during the 2011 Arab Spring revolts anyway. The Bush and Obama administrations both could have done more to ensure that the quasi-democratic system they left behind was capable of weathering the storm, but their errors are academic now. Like the Syrians, the Iraqis will have to fight it out.

Second, don't believe the hype about ISIS taking Baghdad. The group has managed to gain control of most areas where Iraq's 15-20% Sunni Arab minority predominates because locals acquiesced in its advance and garrisoned soldiers had little stomach for fighting in such a hostile environment. While the confessionally mixed Iraqi capital may be plagued by jihadist terrorism in the months ahead, the number of combatants Iraq's Shiite majority can throw into the city's defence dwarfs the number that ISIS can field, even if large numbers of Iraqi Sunnis unite under its banner and a steady stream of foreign jihadis continues to join its ranks. Do the math. Baghdad won't fall.

Third, recognize that the Iranians will be delighted if the U.S. Air Force starts pounding ISIS, a problem they created by encouraging the excesses of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and propping up the embattled regime of President Bashar Al-Assad in Syria (ISIS, as its name suggests, is a two-headed monster).

Prospective American intervention will be less about defending Baghdad than about helping Iranian-backed government forces and Shiite militias seize back the Sunni heartland of northwest Iraq. It's going to be a long, bloody campaign, certain to involve massive civilian casualties. The Iranians would love for the Obama administration to share the costs and take some of the heat for the horrific measures that will be necessary to cleanse Iraq of ISIS.

Fourth, consider also that U.S. intervention could be a blessing for Al-Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan, who have always been more interested in killing Westerners than Shiites or Alawites (one reason why they have been eclipsed in the Syria-Iraq theatre). Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri would have preferred that the many hundreds of European Muslims now fighting in Syria and Iraq had stayed home and plotted attacks in their countries of origin. A U.S.-led air campaign against ISIS would weaken Al-Qaeda's main competitor for the loyalties of Sunni jihadists in the region, while giving Zawahiri exactly the narrative twist he needs to refocus Sunni angst on the West.

Is that thumb still up? Don't get me wrong. I understand the temptation to jump in and kill terrorists when the opportunity presents itself. With Iran and various rival Sunni states financing and equipping opposing Islamists to do their dirty work (you don't bring a knife to a gunfight), the Syria-Iraq theatre is an extraordinarily target-rich environment. But as long as they're busy killing each other, the United States should leave bad enough alone.

Gary C. Gambill is a Shilman-Ginsburg fellow at the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum.

Lebanon releases photo of suspect in hotel suicide blast

Source: https://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-releases-photo-suspect-hotel-suicide-blast

June 26 – Lebanese security forces on Thursday released a photo of a Swedish man suspected of providing explosives to the suicide attackers behind Wednesday's Beirut hotel blast.

General Security said that Al-Monzer Khaldoun al-Hassan, born in 1990, had supplied the two Saudi nationals involved in Thursday's attack at the Duroy Hotel with suicide belts and other explosives, according to a statement carried by the National News Agency.

One of the suicide attackers detonated the explosives inside their hotel room after security forces launched a surprise raid. Only the suicide bomber was killed in the blast that injured 11 people, including his accomplice, now in police custody.

The statement said Hassan was born in the town of Bezbina in Lebanon's northern Akkar district to a mother from the Syrian city of Aleppo. It said he holds Swedish nationality.

The report added that he drives two cars: An old beige Nissan, and a 2005 silver Mercedes.

LBCI had earlier reported that the second culprit who survived yesterday's attack told his police interrogators that they were plotting to attack a restaurant in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

The report identified the restaurant as al-Saha Restaurant near the Rasoul Azam Mosque in Dahiyeh.

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Greece – Jailed terrorist presented his book
Source: Greek press

June 28 – At the auditorium of Athens Law School the book "I was born in November 17" of the jailed notorious Demetrios Koufodinas, chief executionist of the "17 November" terrorist group was presented.

Koufodinas addressed the event via telephone conference from Korydallos Prisons.

Content of his book was analysed by Horhe Sabalsa (former member of Tupamaros), Maouro Ferrari (former member of Red Brigades), Aggeliki Sotiropoulou and the editor of the book Nikos Giannopoulos.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Some times too much democracy is bad for our health…

AQAM: Fatal Attacks and Violent Plots in the United States
Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ECDB_ViolencePerpetratedbySupportersofAQAM_Res
earchHighlight_June2014.pdf?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=77c246161f-
START_Newsletter_June2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-77c246161f-14081393

This research highlight provides an overview of violent incidents and plots committed or attempted by supporters of al-Qa'ida and affiliated movements (AQAM) who targeted the United States between 1990 and 2013. Data are drawn from the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which includes information on the 35 homicide events* and 196 violent plots perpetrated by AQAM-related supporters during this time period.

*The "Beltway Snipers" were responsible for 15 homicide events, and throughout this highlight, findings that do not include these 15 attacks will be indicated in parentheses.


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
Homicide event – an attack by one or more offenders that results in the death of at least one victim. Each event involves a spatially unique target; for example, the 9/11 attacks consisted of four homicide events.

PERPETRATORS	TARGETS	WEAPONS	REGIONS
• 34% (60%) of fatal incidents were committed by lone actors who were often fueled by ideology, personal grievances and mental illness. • 44 (42) unique offenders were responsible for all AQAM-related homicide events.	• 71% (50%) of homicide events targeted the general public, 14% (25%) law enforcement, 9% (15%) the military, and 6% (10%) social minorities. • Mass casualty events were rare—69% (45%) of fatal AQAM-related attacks targeted and killed one victim.	• 75% (45%)of homicide events were perpetrated with firearms. • The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings were the only fatal attacks committed using explosives.	• AQAM-related homicides were scattered from coast to coast. • Due in large part to 9 attacks conducted by the "Beltway Snipers," the D.C. metro area experienced 11 homicide events. New York, 5, and California , 4, also experienced relatively high numbers of events.

<u>**Violent plot**</u> – a violent incident that is set into motion and stopped before it reaches completion. An offender or group of offenders who plans to attack several different targets would be responsible for

several unique plots.
▶ **Read the full START Report at:**
https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ECDB_ViolencePer
petratedbySupportersofAQAM_June2014.pdf?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=77c246
161f-START_Newsletter_June2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-77c246161f-
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
The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): Relationships 2004-2014

Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_EvolutionofISILRelationships_FactSheet_June2014.pdf
?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=77c246161f-
START_Newsletter_June2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-77c246161f-14081393

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Significant Relationships

Source: Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Data

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NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIPS THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY POSITIVE

1) The group currently known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was originally founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi's first connection with al-Qa'ida began in 2000 when he sought out Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and requested assistance in creating al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, a network focused on overthrowing the Jordanian government.1 Zarqawi initially avoided the post 9/11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led surge in Afghanistan by relocating to Iran and then, in 2002, to Iraq.2 At the request of al-Qa'ida leaders, Zarqawi began facilitating the move of militants into Iraq to combat coalition forces. However, Zarqawi did not formally swear allegiance to and join under the umbrella of al-Qa'ida until 2004.3 This strengthened relationship was reflected in Zarqawi's network changing their name to Tanzim Qa-idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly referred to as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI).4 The association persisted as AQI continued to develop, forming the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) in 2006 and, after Zarqawi's death later that year, changing their name to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the command of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi in October.5 ISI's relationship with al-Qa'ida was characterized by ideological schisms, with al-Qa'ida leaders voicing concern that the organization's indiscriminate and brutal tactics were isolating them from public support in Iraq.6 The relationship continued to deteriorate in 2013 when Abu Umar al-Baghdadi attempted to claim al-Nusrah Front under his command—a claim that was rejected by al-Nusrah Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani who instead pledged allegiance directly to Al-Qa'ida.7,8 Al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri attempted to mediate, supporting Jawlani as the

official Syrian branch of al-Qa'ida.9 In defiance, ISIL increased operations in Syria including targeting members of al-Nusrah Front. As a result, Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced ISIL on February 2, 2014, officially ending al-Qa'ida's affiliation with the group.10

2) Al-Nusrah Front was originally founded when Abu Umar al-Baghdadi sent Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani along with militants to Syria to set up a front.11 In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the expansion of ISI to Syria, officially rebranding the organization as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIL).12 Al-Nusrah Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani was not consulted before the announcement and denounced al-Baghdadi's claims, confirming instead his allegiance directly to al-Qa'ida's leadership.13 Subsequently, the groups clashed in Syria, with each targeting militants from the opposing organization and solidifying their break.

3) On February 16, 2012, the United States Department of Treasury designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) as a supporter of terrorism for provided funding and arms to ISIL (then al-Qa'ida in Iraq)—however their report does not provide specific evidence or dates.14 Iran has collaborated with al-Qa'ida based on their common opposition to the United States' involvement in the region. In 2001 when Zarqawi fled coalition forces in Afghanistan, the MOIS allowed him and others safe haven in Iran.15 However, subsequent to ISIL's 2014 advancement in Iraq, the Iranian government has voiced their support of military action against the group.16

GROUPS THAT AQI/ISI/ISIL HAS TARGETED HISTORICALLY

4) Since 2003 the organization has been working to overthrow the Iraqi government, expel United States forces and establish a government under their interpretation of Islamic law.17 They have continued to clash with the government and the military has led campaigns against the group.

5) In 2003 the organization began targeting United States-led forces in Iraq. They have also criticized the influence of Western actors, such as the U.S., but choose to focus on the "near enemy" rather than threaten the U.S. homeland.18

6) The 1920s Revolutionary Brigades was originally formed to combat the United States-led coalition forces in Iraq. However, according to the Long War Journal, in 2007 they began coordinating with U.S. forces in order to expel ISIL militants from the region and have focused their efforts on mitigating the influence of ISIL.19

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7) ISIL began campaigns against the Assad regime in Syria in 2011, gaining notoriety for their highly brutal tactics including decapitations and enforcement of Sharia wherever they gained territory.20 As ISIL's relationship with other rebel groups continued to fracture, they increasingly changed the focus of their attacks to other Islamic coalitions striving to overthrow the Syrian regime.21

8) Since gaining a foothold in Syria, ISIL has clashed with other rebel groups in the region, including assassinating commanders of the Free Syrian Army.22

9) Since 2014, ISIL has been publically denounced by and exchanged fire with several active groups in Syria, including the umbrella Islamic Front (IF), the Jaish al-Mujahedin (JM), and Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SFR).23,24

10) In 2011 Hezbollah sent troops to Syria on behalf of the Assad regime and has clashed with rebel forces there, including ISIL.25 The groups are ideologically opposed and have targeted each other in Syria and in Lebanon.

11) In early 2014, ISIL declared Lebanon as a target due to Hezbollah's involvement in Syria.26 Violence has spilled across the Lebanese-Syrian border as ISIL and al-Nusrah have both perpetrated suicide attack against Hezbollah.27

GROUPS THAT CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ISIL*

12) According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as of the beginning of 2014, Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdisi and Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia) have both continued to offer verbal support for the ISIL and their actions.28

*current reports from Iraq indicate that ISIL does have some degree of support from local Sunni communities and groups who oppose the current regime led by Nouri al-Maliki.

▶ **References are available at source's URL.**

Where have all Pakistan's militants gone?

By M Ilyas Khan)BBC News, Islamabad)
Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/07/where-have-all-pakistan-militants-gone.html

After years of reluctance, Pakistan's infantry and special services troops have finally moved into "militant central" - Miranshah in North Waziristan.

The town has served as the joint command-and-control centre of powerful local groups and their foreign allies in the tribal region, believed to be the last major militant sanctuary in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

Troops moved in from a nearby garrison early on Monday following two weeks of aerial bombardment to soften militant targets ahead of the ground offensive. Officials had ordered the evacuation of nearly half a million people from the area to deprive the militants of "human shields".

So what have we discovered on day one of the ground offensive?

In the absence of the media, the only source of information is the military. It has reported the killing of some "militants" in a shootout, the discovery of some tunnels and a few factories that manufactured improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

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But there is no word, for example, about the top- or mid-ranking leadership of the main groups that were entrenched in the area, such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Haqqani network, the many foreigners, or the three native Waziristan-based militant groups.

Recent evidence suggests that most of these groups have already left the regions around Miranshah

and the other main town in North Waziristan, Mir Ali.

The main market in Miranshah is seen shuttered during a curfew in mid-June

The most prominent among these are the Uzbek fighters allied to the TTP who claimed the 7 June assault on Karachi airport, and are believed by many to be one of the two major targets of the current operation, along with the TTP.

They are mostly believed to have slipped into Afghanistan's Khost province after Pakistani troops left a section of the border unmanned for a couple of weeks prior to the operation.

Others who might have pulled off a similar disappearing act are the Haqqani network's leaders. They have traditionally had sanctuaries in Khost as well as in Pakistan's Kurram tribal district and, despite official denials, are known to have enjoyed freedom of movement through security checkpoints in the region.

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Waziristan's native Taliban and their Afghan allies still roam the vast Waziristan hinterland south and west of Miranshah. They are armed and mobile.

But their leaders - Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Bahawal Khan (alias Salahuddin Ayubi, who heads the group once led by Mullah Nazir), and Khan Said Sajna of the Mehsud faction (which has split from the TTP leadership) - have voiced no opposition to the Pakistani assault.

The Pakistani authorities, too, have not hinted that they might want to control all of this land, although they did carry out some air raids in the area possibly to hit some remnants of the TTP.

There are also no boots on the ground in the Wana region of neighbouring South Waziristan, which is part of the extended Waziristan sanctuary.

So, the overall picture is one of a military ground assault which is taking place at a time when most of the apparent "adversaries" have disappeared from the scene.

Many of them are reported to have crossed into Afghanistan and may play a potentially destabilising role there once all Nato combat troops leave by the end of the year.

For many analysts this was not entirely unexpected.

Pakistan has long been accused by its critics of trying to control Afghanistan so as to prevent its arch-rival India from using that country to open up a "second front" against Pakistan.

Pakistan has been widely accused of using militant groups as proxies to control Afghanistan and destabilise India.

But since many Islamist militants now consider Pakistan itself to be a legitimate target, analysts say Pakistan may not want the Taliban to be ascendant in post-Nato Afghanistan.

They say for Pakistan, the current operation is more about pushing the militants into Afghanistan or scattering them across the countryside instead of outright eliminating them.

They believe Pakistan may still need some of these groups as leverage in Afghanistan to check Indian influence.

So Pakistan's main objective at the moment appears to be to secure its border against a possible reverse flow of hostile groups from post-Nato Afghanistan.

But it is also trying to keep its options open - what it plans to do about those left on its soil remains to be seen.

What Is The Islamic Caliphate?

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/07/explainer-what-is-islamic-caliphate.html

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Militant Islamist fighters wave flags as they take part in a military parade in Syria's northern Raqqa province on June 30 to celebrate the announcement of a new Islamic Caliphate by ISIL.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) has formally declared the establishment of a new "caliphate," or Islamic state, in territory it has seized in Iraq and Syria.

Accordingly, ISIL has dropped Iraq and Levant from its name, referring to itself simply as "Islamic State," and proclaimed its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi its "caliph." The Islamic State has called on the world's entire Muslim population, the "Ummah," to swear loyalty to him, including rival militant groups.

Islamists have long dreamed of recreating the caliphate that ruled over the Middle East, much of North Africa, and beyond in various forms over the course of Islam's 1,400-year history.

What Is A Caliphate?

In Arabic, caliphate means "government under a caliph." The caliphate was the Islamic state established after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, in the seventh century.

The word caliph comes from Arabic, meaning "successor" to Muhammad. A caliph was the Islamic state's supreme religious and political leader. He was considered the spiritual leader of the entire Muslim population in the world. The caliph was often referred to as the Amir al-Mu'minin, or "Commander of the Believers."

The Beginning And The End?

The Rashidun caliphate (632-661) was the first, and was founded after the death of Muhammad. "Rashidun," under Sunni Islam, refers to the first four caliphs of the Rashidun caliphate -- Abubakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali. Rashidun, in Arabic, means "righteously guided."

After the first four caliphs, the caliphate was claimed by various dynasties such as the Ummayads (661-750) and the Abbasids (750-

1258). The caliphate languished after the Mongol Invasion until the Ottomans claimed it (1453-1924). The caliphate was abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first president of Turkey, in 1924.

There have been efforts made to revive the caliphate, but they have collapsed because of political infighting among Muslim leaders.

Was The Title Caliph Disputed?

Dr. Carool Kersten, a senior lecturer in Islam at King's College London, says the caliphate was the desired political model for the political organization of the Sunnis, but not the Shi'a.

Shi'a believed the successor of the Prophet Muhammad should come from his family. Shi'a believe Ali, who was a cousin, and son-in-law of the prophet, was the only legitimate successor to Muhammad.

But under Sunni traditions, the leadership was elected, meaning Ali was the fourth caliph after Abubakr, Umar, and Uthman.

"[Followers] didn't call Ali a caliph, they called him an Imam. And after that the Shi'ites recognized a succession of Imams," not caliphs, says Kersten.

Even under Sunnis, there were competing claims to the caliphate for much of its history. There were counter claims from rival dynasties in Spain and Egypt.

What Is The Significance Of ISIL's Declaration?

Many observers agree that ISIL's declaration of a caliphate is an attempt to add legitimacy and credibility to its position following its huge territorial gains in Iraq.

Kersten says ISIL will challenge the current borders of the Middle East by offering a "genuine, authentic, and alternative Islamic political [system]."

"By proclaiming a caliphate they want to strengthen and emphasize that they wish to exercise political control over that territory that is different from the nation-state model based on which the international system functions at present," says Kersten.

Kersten adds that the timing of the declaration, a day after the holy month of Ramadan began, is not coincidental. "It's a very powerful point of time because Muslims express a heightened sense of religiosity at that time of the year."

Few in the Middle East are expected to accept the caliphate of ISIL, however.

The extremist group's claim to the caliphate could also have an impact on the international jihadist movement, especially on the future of Al-Qaeda, which disowned the group after falling out with ISIL's leadership in Syria.

Al-Qaeda has long carried the mantle of the international jihadist cause. But ISIL has accomplished in Syria and Iraq what Al-Qaeda never has -- carved out and taken control of a large swath of territory in the Middle East.

ISIL's proclamation also poses a direct challenge to the Arab Gulf states, particularly for Saudi Arabia, says Kersten.

"Saudi Arabia, although it has supported organizations such as ISIL, will certainly not take kindly to this because the king of Saudi Arabia has given himself the title, 'Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques [located in Mecca and Medina],' which is almost like an alternative title to a caliph."

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India Enhances Maritime Security

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja
Indian Council of World Affairs
Courtesy of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) Magazine
Source: http://strategicri.com/newsAndPress/india-enhances-maritime-security

India shares maritime boundaries with seven countries. Nearly 100,000 vessels pass through the Indian Ocean each year. Strengthening India's maritime security means facing challenges, but the country's economic security is at stake.

India has a coastline of 7,515 kilometers, an Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.01 million square kilometers and shares maritime boundaries with seven countries – Bangladesh, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and Sri Lanka. Most of the

maritime boundaries have been delineated except in South Asia, i.e. with Pakistan in the Sir Creek area in Gujarat, and the India-Bangladesh boundary dispute is under arbitration before the Permanent Court of

Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, Netherlands.

Economic Lifelines
India, Maldives and Sri Lanka are strategically located astride the sea lane – Hormuz Strait in the Arabian Sea to the Straits of Malacca in the Bay of Bengal – which serves as the lifeline of the Asia Pacific economies, particularly of China, Japan and South Korea. This sea lane witnesses heavy merchant vessel traffic which includes super tankers, bulk cargo, chemical tankers, container vessels and other types of shipping that sail very close to their shores, bringing additional responsibilities to ensure safety of shipping and security of the sea areas. It is estimated that nearly 100,000 vessels transit through the Indian Ocean annually.

India, Maldives and Sri Lanka have established a number of politico-strategic and operational mechanisms to address a variety of sea based Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats and challenges such as piracy, terrorism, drug smuggling, gun running, human trafficking etc. After the terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008, India carried out a major restructuring of the coastal security architecture, set up additional surveillance and reconnaissance stations, special training of naval and coast guard personnel and expanded the number of stakeholders to include fishermen as 'eyes and ears' of the maritime security forces to make coastal security more robust.

Trilateral Security
In 2011, the first National Security Advisor (NSA) level trilateral meeting was held in Male, Maldives and measures to enhance maritime security cooperation were discussed. The second NSA level trilateral talks were held in July 2013, which resulted in a joint understanding on issues relating to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), Merchant Ship Information System (MSIS) and Automatic Identification System (AIS). It was also agreed to enhance cooperation in the domain of

Search and Rescue (SAR) coordination including personnel training, increase the frequency and content of naval exercises called 'Dosti', exchange real-time information and intelligence and also study legal issues related to piracy. Issues relating to the expansion of the trilateral initiative to include other smaller Indian Ocean littoral countries were also discussed.

Consequently, at the third meeting held in March 2014 in New Delhi, delegations from Mauritius and Seychelles were invited as observer nations. The participants expressed satisfaction over the activities undertaken by the partners and discussed new areas for joint activities to enhance maritime cooperation such as sharing of hydrographic knowledge, Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) training, visits by cadets of partner countries on-board Indian Sail Training Ships, exchanges between think tanks and joint participation in adventure activities. These pioneering initiatives are laudable and noteworthy.

Sri Lanka and Maldives
India has also taken initiatives to build capacities of smaller navies through the supply of surveillance platforms such as ships and aircraft, helicopters, training of personnel to ensure technological enrichment and operational experience. India supplied an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) equipped with a helicopter to Sri Lanka in 2000 and has trained its naval personnel.

Likewise, Maldives has received extensive naval support from India. India gifted two naval Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv to enhance the capacity of the Maldivian Coast Guard. One of these is deployed in the southern Maldivian Island of Addu and the second, which operates from the northern Hannimadhoo Island, is more advanced and is fitted with a weather radar. It will also be used for medical evacuation duty. Significantly, these helicopters are currently operated and maintained by

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Indian crew and the Maldivian personnel are being simultaneously trained to operate these platforms. In February 2014, India gifted a naval landing craft to the Maldives and also announced financial support for the construction of a new building for the Ministry of Defence.

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is a former Indian Navy officer and the author of Confidence Building from the Sea: An Indian Initiative. His second book, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions - China, India and Southeast Asia, is under print.

Islamist Rebel Leader Renounces Female Suicide Terrorism

Source: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/islamist-rebel-leader-renounces-female-suicide-terrorism/502726.html

In an unexpected departure from one of the most dreaded terrorist strategies, a leader of the North Caucasus Islamist rebels has called on his followers to put an end to female suicide bombings that have claimed hundreds of civilian lives, including in Moscow.

"We categorically ban our sisters from doing this," Aliaskhab Kebekov, known under the alias of Ali Abu Muhammad, emir of the Caucasus Emirate group, said in a lengthy interview with the rebel website Kavkaz Center posted on YouTube on Saturday.

"We monitor how jihad is practiced in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Mali, and there was not a single case [of a female suicide bombing] there. Women there are not allowed to do this," he said. "My order to brothers is not to use sisters for this."

Female suicide bombings have become a trademark war tactic of the North Caucasus Islamist insurgents, with sensationalist media quickly dubbing the female attackers "black widows."

Since June 2000, when the first such bombing happened in Chechnya, women have been involved in 24 more terrorist attacks, both alone and as part of groups. According to The Moscow Times' count, these attacks have claimed a total of 847 lives, averaging 61 deaths a year.

Eight of those attacks took place in Moscow, including the 2002 Dubrovka theater hostage-taking in which 19 female suicide bombers from Chechnya took part, and more recently, the 2010 twin metro bombings by two women from Dagestan.

There has been a visible shift in the origin of these attacks over the years. In the vast majority of cases from 2000 to September 2004, when two female suicide bombers took part in the attack on a packed school in the town of Beslan, they hailed from Chechnya, which has fought two separatist wars with Moscow. Following a lull in attacks after Beslan, from 2010 to the latest female suicide bombing of a bus in Volgograd in October 2013, most of the bombers came from the neighboring Russian Muslim-populated province of Dagestan where Islamist radicals have been waging a low-intensity deadly campaign against local security and law enforcement officials for nearly two decades.

Kebekov, 42, also a native of Dagestan, assumed his role as rebel leader in March after his notorious predecessors, the ethnic Chechens Shamil Basayev and Doku Umarov, were killed by Russian security forces. His group, the Caucasus Emirate, has been designated a terrorist organization by both Russia and the United States.

"Only in Dagestan is this [female suicide bombings] practiced," he said in the hour-long video interview.

Female suicide attacks have been used occasionally by Palestinian terrorists, Tamil Tigers rebels in Sri Lanka and by the Kurdish Workers' Party. But while those groups resorted to using women after security services became suspicious of men, the North Caucasus rebels starting using female attackers for bombings before it ever used men.

Kebekov cited practical reasons as the rationale behind ending the practice of female suicide bombings.

"It does not have any effect on infidels," he said. "It will be better if these women stay alive and raise their children in the spirit of jihad."

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He added that there are dozens of women willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of jihad in the North Caucasus.

Contrary to Kebekov's arguments, female suicide bombings have been effective, as demonstrated by the death toll above and the factors of shock and fear that have helped terrorists to get their messages across. Two deadly suicide bombings in Volgograd late last year — one of which was blamed on a female terrorist — led to an international discussion over whether the Russian government would be able to provide adequate security for February's Sochi Olympic Games.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's Message as Caliph
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4744/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-message-as-caliph

"[F]ear Allah as he should be feared and do not die except as Muslims.... Go forth, O mujahidin in the path of Allah. Terrify the enemies of Allah and seek death .... for the dunyā [worldly life] will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever."

Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi, Caliph, "The Islamic State" [aka ISIS]

Marking the beginning of Ramadan, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of "the Islamic State" (formerly ISIS: the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and declared Caliph Ibrahim, released a new audio message addressed to the Muslim world.

The new speech is most notable for being forthright about Baghdadi's message on the global nature of the Islamic State's struggle. Baghdadi touched on issues regarding the persecution of Muslims in Burma and the Philippines as well as the French restrictions on the wearing of the veil, and he responded to accusations that the Islamic State engages in *'irhab* [terrorism].

Ominously, Baghdadi concluded his speech with aspirations for the Islamic State's conquest of "Rome" and the whole world. Such emphasis on the transnational nature of the Islamic State's project corroborates Baghdadi's projection of himself as the caliph and sole representative of Islamic rule on earth to whom all Muslims must pledge allegiance.

While these explicit proclamations, however, may come across as new in the Islamic State's messaging, the reality is that emphasis on worldwide ambitions has actually been a part of the group's propaganda since at least last summer when it was still known as ISIS. This distinguished ISIS early on from its al-Qa'ida competitor Jabhat al-Nusra, which prefers a more gradualist approach of "hearts and minds" as advocated by jihadist thinker Abu Mus'ab al-Suri. This approach aims to have locals first become accustomed to the norms of Shari'a law, with ambitions for a global Caliphate not expressed openly except in unofficial videos primarily put out by members of Jabhat al-Nusra's foreign contingent.

Only more recently, in response to the dispute with ISIS, has Jabhat al-Nusra in any of its official media outlets explicitly affirmed the Caliphate ambition, specifically in Shari'a official Sheikh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir's interview featured this year by al-Basira media (an outlet set up by Jabhat al-Nusra to counter ISIS).

In contrast, in a video released by ISIS' media wing al-Furqan Media in August 2013, an elderly native Syrian fighter for ISIS, who had participated in the ISIS-led takeover of Mannagh airbase in Aleppo province, affirmed that jihad is *farḍ ul-ayn* [an obligation on every individual Muslim] and that it is necessary for an "Islamic state" to be established "over the entire world," beginning with victory in *Bilad ash-Sham* [Syria]. Also within the realm of official media, one of ISIS' early slogans was "the promised project of the Caliphate," featured on a billboard ISIS erected in the northern Aleppo town of Azaz, bordering Turkey, after seizing control of it from a rival group -- Northern Storm -- in September.

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Elsewhere, one could observe long-standing ISIS billboards in Syria carrying statements like "Together we cultivate the tree of the Caliphate" and "a Caliphate pleasing to the Lord is better than democracy pleasing to the West." Besides these explicit affirmations, Baghdadi was projecting himself as a *de facto* caliph, taking the names of "al-Qurayshi" (indicating descent from Muhammad's tribe) and "al-Husseyni" (to indicate lineage from Muhammad's family), enhancing legitimacy to claims of being a caliph.

The reference to Rome in Baghdadi's latest message might seem odd at first sight too, but that has also been part of Baghdadi's de facto caliph image for months, as was apparent in his imposition of the *dhimmi* [second-class, "tolerated" non-Muslim residents] pact on Christians in Raqqa in March. *Dhimmi* status, in traditional theology as expounded in the *Umdat al-Salik* manual, is to be imposed by a caliph. ISIS' official Raqqa province news feed expressed hope that "tomorrow" (not literally, but at some point in the future) the *dhimmi* pact would be imposed in Rome.

While no one expects the vast majority of Muslims worldwide to migrate to Baghdadi's state, or caliphate, in Iraq and Syria to build up from there to take over the whole world, the question does arise of what implications there are for Baghdadi's project and how it plays out on the ground. The first implication is that these most explicit affirmations yet send a clear message to the other insurgent groups in Iraq in particular that there is no room for power-sharing, significantly increasing the prospect of wider fighting with groups like the Ba'athist Naqshbandi Army and the Islamic Army of Iraq, both of which have previously fought with ISIS' predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

Optimists, however, who are hoping that the infighting might roll back the Islamic State are likely mistaken: the insurgency is significantly different from the days of the Iraq War, precisely because the insurgency is much more dominated by the Islamic State, which has vastly superior financial and arms resources spanning borders.

The second implication is that, internationally, existing trends will most likely be strengthened: those already sympathetic to ISIS will be the ones most likely to heed Baghdadi's call, including jihadists in Gaza, Sinai, Libya and most notably Tunisia. In contrast, the ever pro-Nusra Maldivian fighters and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the latter of which has its own affiliated armed contingents in Syria, are predictably in opposition. At the same time, the Islamic State's project, in actually existing on the ground with a network of contiguous strongholds and the workings of an actual state, can have wider ideological appeal, in contrast to an al-Qa'ida in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area that lacks the showings of real strength.

If the "Islamic State" ultimately goes into decline, it looks as if it will happen only in years, not months.

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Turkey: Between Iraq and some hard choices
By Norman Bailey
Source: http://acdemocracy.org/turkey-between-iraq-and-some-hard-choices/?utm_source=+Turkey%3A+Between+Iraq+and+some+hard+choices&utm_campaign=Turkey%3A+Between+Iraq+and+dsome+hard+choices&utm_medium=email

Recent events in the Middle East have placed Turkey in a most uncomfortable situation, with hard choices and few options.

After supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an ultra-violent jihadist group which split with its al-Qaida sponsor after its leader was killed in Iraq and moved operations to Syria to fight the Assad regime, Turkey is now faced with dealing with an ISIL at least temporarily triumphant in northern and western Iraq as the result of a lightning offensive earlier in June which saw US-trained Iraqi forces melt away before its advance.

ISIL, whose leader Abu Bakr al-Bagjdadi has just announced the formation of a new Muslim Caliphate with himself as the "Caliph Abdullah", is in turn faced not only with resurgent Shiite Iraqi forces staging a counter-offensive with the help of Iran, Russia and the United States, but also flanked in the north by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and the Kurdish area of northeastern Syria; both regions now practically independent.

Traditionally, cooperating with Kurds anywhere would be absolutely unthinkable for Turkey, which has been fighting a local Kurdish insurgency for decades. Erdogan has tried to square that circle by offering a deal to the jailed leader of the Turkish Kurds, Abdlullah Ocalan, under which Ocalan would suspend all separatist activities in the Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey in return for being released and Turkish recognition of wide-ranging Kurdish autonomy.

In the meantime, Turkey has signed a deal with the KRG to permit the export of Iraqi-Kurdish oil in a pipeline which ends at the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The initial shipment was made and ended up being sold to Israel. The Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are so far the only force that has been able to confront ISIL, and the KRG took advantage of the ISIL advance to occupy Kirkuk and its oil production facilities, further increasing Kurdish control of Iraqi oil reserves.

Turkish-Iranian relations are also highly fragile, given Iran's support for Assad in Syria against a backdrop of centuries of Turkish-Iranian hostilities, as the two state leaders of Sunni and Sh'ia Islam battled each other. Despite Turkish fears of a nuclear-armed Iran, the two countries have signed an agreement providing for about $30 billion in trade and investment expansion.

Erdogan has chosen this moment to enter into frontal conflict with the Alevi sect of Sunni Islam (related to the Alawaite sect of Sh'ia Islam in Syria), which constitutes about 20% of the Turkish population, including many Kurds. Thus he has added millions of Alevis to the two million or so followers of the Sunni spiritual leader Fethullah Gulen to his enemies.

Israeli foreign and security policies are greatly influenced by what happens in the two non-Arab giants of the region, Iran and Turkey. Right now, Iran is an implacable enemy, so that rapprochement with Turkey would seem to be indicated and is apparently a possibility, as negotiations over reparations for the "Mavi Marmara" incident progress, and Turkish-Israeli commercial relations continue strong. The multiple Turkish dilemmas, however, could erupt at any time into a repeat of last year's widespread unrest, the ultimate effects of which are unpredictable. Winston Churchill's dictum should always be the guide of the policymaker: "Countries have no permanent friends, only permanent interests".

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Terror fear in city malls

Source:http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32591:-terror-fear-in-city-malls&catid=78:topstories&Itemid=116

US embassy warns of terror attack on Entebbe as Kampala fears for its malls and crowded places

Recent reports warning of a terror attack on Ugandan soil have sent top security officials into overdrive, planning how to keep the country safe, The Observer has established.

According to a source close to Uganda's intelligence community, authorities have been particularly alarmed to find that most of Kampala's shopping malls – let alone those in other towns – do not have adequate measures to avert terrorist attacks. Our source went as far as saying that only one shopping centre, the recently-opened Acacia mall, can be said to have a hard-to-breach security system.

The Observer understands that in the last two months, a multi-agency security team, headed by police chief Kale Kayihura, has been assessing intelligence reports on possible terror threats and whether the country can ably foil an attack. The team, which reports to President Museveni, is largely drawn from security organisations (Police, ISO, ESO, CMI and UPDF).

It is working closely with security personnel at the American and British missions in Uganda. Our source says the US and UK have been useful sources of vital intelligence information, given their advanced security setup and resources. Indeed, the US embassy yesterday issued a statement warning its citizens here of a potential terrorist attack on Entebbe airport between 9pm and 11pm last night.

"Individuals planning travel through the airport this evening [July 3] may want to review their plans in light of this information. Review your personal security plans; remain aware of your surroundings, including local events; and monitor local news stations for updates.

Maintain a high level of vigilance and take appropriate steps to enhance your personal security," said the statement posted on the embassy's website.

In addition, the security officials are assessing information that terrorists, possibly linked to al-Shabab, could strike on July 13, the day of the final match of the World Cup, like they did in July 2010.

"It is a general technique used by terrorists. They like targeting anniversaries. You remember how they tried to bomb London again in 2006 on the eve of the first anniversary of the London bombings of 2005," the source said.

A spate of terror attacks in neighbouring Kenya in recent months has kept Uganda alive to the danger of terrorism in the region. Uganda, like Kenya, remains a target given the presence of its peace-keeping troops in Somalia, against the wishes of the militant al-Shabab which still controls parts of the country.

So far both countries are working closely to fight back. Uganda's former head of the counter-terrorism unit, John Ndungutse, is now based in Nairobi as a liaison officer between Uganda and Kenya.

Urban counter-terrorism force

One of the most visible security measures rolled out recently is the deployment of an urban counter-terrorism force (officially referred to as the field force), at strategic places in the city. The force, which recently underwent a one-year specialist training in intelligence gathering and self-defence techniques, is manning the major roundabouts, power installations and key buildings like Parliament.

Besides the uniformed officers, security has increased the presence of plain clothed personnel in crowded places. Their work is to gather intelligence, look at potential problem areas and monitor the security situation.

They have been trained to blend in with the crowd and only those with a trained eye can pick them out. Some have been placed at the major shopping malls and downtown.

Malls vulnerable

Security officials are greatly concerned about the lax security at most shopping malls. Our source told us that malls remain a major target of terrorists because they are frequented by the affluent, diplomats and foreign tourists. An assessment of security at major shopping malls found many loopholes.

For instance, the security cameras at most malls are concentrated at the entry or exit points, ignoring some areas like the backyard, which can provide safe cover to would-be terrorists.

Secondly, the source said, many of the handheld metal detectors used to frisk people at most malls are defective. Some could not detect metallic objects like pistols or pocket knives. Another big concern was the fact that private guards could not reliably use the under-vehicle scanner. It was discovered that many of the guards, could not identify a foreign object from a car part even with the aid of this scanner.

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Acacia Mall is believed to be the only mall with hard-to-breach security system. Photo: Samson Baranga

A guard at one of the malls, our source said, confessed that he just uses the scanner as part of a daily routine but was clueless about what he is looking out for. Ideally, our source said, private guards are supposed to be trained to be able to identify suspicious objects, using a scanner, that might not be part of the underside of the car.

It was also discovered that many security guards at the malls simply wave through cars that belong to tenants, government officials and diplomats. Other guards, the security team discovered, were found to be in the habit of asking for water or money from regular customers, something that compromises their judgment towards certain people.

It thus becomes easy for potential terrorists to befriend these guards and thus make their mission easy, the security team observed, according to our source. These and other concerns were recently tabled before the top management of the major shopping malls, our source said. In the meeting, whose details our source is privy to, security asked all malls to install walk-through metal detectors whose accuracy rate is high.

Some malls were told to install more surveillance cameras to further secure their places. In addition, they were told to frisk (thoroughly check) all people who enter. However, the source said, some mall owners

expressed reservations that strict security measures will scare away customers, thereby affecting their business.

Yet the biggest headache for security, our source said, remains on how to secure crowded places like the airport, the two taxi parks, markets and education institutions, among others. With the city virtually unsurveilled (no CCTV cameras), it has become increasingly difficult to monitor activities of its inhabitants.

The idea has been to use a combination of uniformed and plain-clothes personnel to monitor the situation. In addition, police bomb squads have been stationed at the taxi parks and the airport to avert any danger.

Coordination

Police spokesman Fred Enanga confirmed that strict measures had been instituted to foil any terror attack. He said they had held meetings with owners of shopping malls, schools, churches and entertainment places to find ways of securing their places better and to equip them with security skills.

Enanga said they were also following up on reports that remnants of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) could be trying to regroup or to work with al-Shabab to wreak havoc.

Countrywide, he added, they had reactivated their crime prevention units and recruited informants to

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inform them of any suspicious movements. The informants are supposed to work hand-in-hand with crime intelligence officers in their areas to gather as much intelligence as possible.

"As far as security is concerned, we have been vigilant due to a well-coordinated security plan. We have set up measures which are applicable under all circumstances," Enanga said.

Hacked Facebook Correspondence Indicates a Burgeoning Trade in Organs of Ukrainian Soldiers

Source: http://slavyangrad.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/hacked-facebook-correspondence-indicates-a-burgeoning-trade-in-organs-of-ukrainian-soldiers/

Translated by Gleb Bazov

July 06 – Translated below is the Facebook correspondence published by Kiber Berkut between Yuliya Tymoshenko's lawyer (and lover), Sergey Vlasenko, a German surgeon, Olga Wieber, and the commander of Battalion Donbass, Semyon Semyonchenko. According to Kiber Berkut, the correspondence was obtained via a hack of Vlasenko's Facebook account by Kiber Berkut on July 4, 2014. The original posting by Kiber Berkut can be found here.

1. The complete correspondence archive can be found here: Dropme Files and Rghost.
2. According to Kiber Berkut, the following Facebook accounts are involved: Sergey Vlasenko, Olga Wieber and Semyon Semyonchenko.


Correspondence
Sergey Vlasenko – SV (Yuliya Tymoshenko's Lawyer)
Olga Wieber – OW (German Surgeon)
Semyon Semenchenko – SS (Commander of Battalion Donbass)
Note: cor – heart; nep(hrone) – kidney; hep(ar) – liver; pan(creas) – pancreas; pul(mon) – lung.

Sergey Vlasenko and Olga Wieber

February 22, 2014

Информационное Агентство Молот Правды Антимайдан
July 4, 2014 at 10:18 pm   Close

22 лютого
Сергій Власенко
22.02.2014 20:44
Сергій Власенко

Добрый вечер, Ольга. Вопрос,который мы обсуждали в Вальдкирхе, скоро должен решиться, с моей стороны обстановка в порядке. А как твои клиенты?
Olga Wieber
22.02.2014 20:48
Olga Wieber

Привет! Это хорошо, что ж, как раз кстати)

Заказчики есть! очень интересуются,когда уже? Но добавить они отказались, как я и говорила, если повезет позже
Сергій Власенко
22.02.2014 20:50
Сергій Власенко

Уже не жиды, а туда же... Но судя по плану наверху, новые поставки будут с марта с первых чисел.
Olga Wieber
22.02.2014 20:51
Olga Wieber

Для большинства подойдет. Есть тут один, надрывается, чтоб ему через 5 дней привезли
Сергій Власенко
22.02.2014 20:51
Сергій Власенко

Будет ждать, по одному возить им что ли???
Olga Wieber
22.02.2014 20:57
Olga Wieber

Ладно, лучше напомни, кого для выемки пришлешь?
Сергій Власенко
22.02.2014 20:58
Сергій Власенко

На местных рассчитывать не приходится, крайние несговорчивые «моралисты», чтоб их!!!

Таак что будем твоих работников брать, может даже израильских пригоню...
Olga Wieber
22.02.2014 20:59
Olga Wieber

22.02.2014 20:44 – SV: "Good evening, Olga. The question we discussed in Waldkirch should soon be resolved; on my side the situation is in order. How are your clients?"

22.02.2014 20:48 – OW: "Hello! This is good, and right in time! There are plenty of customers! They are really interested to find out when's the time? But they refused to add anymore, just like I told you; later, if we are lucky ..."

22.02.2014 20:50 – SV: "They aren't Jews, but behave the same ... But, judging from the plan on the top, new deliveries will start in the first days of March."

22.02.2014 20:51 – OW: "It will suit most of them. There is one here, keeps pushing for a delivery in five days."

22.02.2014 20:51 – SV: "We'll have to wait – we can't be moving them one by one, can we???"

22.02.2014 20:57 – OW: "Fine, better remind me, who will you send for the removal?"

22.02.2014 20:58 – SV: "We can't count on the locals; these "moralists" are very hard to convince, damn them!!! So, we'll have to use your employees; perhaps I'll get the Israelis to come..."

22.02.2014 20:59 – OW: "My employees will only add to the costs! I will visit you on Tuesday, as promised, and we'll decide them, there will still be time."

22.02.2014 21:03 – SV: "Understood; call

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me then."
22.02.2014 21:03 – OW: "Till we meet."

March 3, 2014
03.03.2014 17:08 – OW: "It all came in, not bad! Your gratitude will be on its way tomorrow."
03.03.2014 17:25 – SV: "Good. Understood."
03.03.2014 17:38 – OW: "Tomorrow be on the line for new information."

March 4, 2014
04.03.2014 22:14 – OW: "Her is what we need: 5 cor, 12 nep, 3 hep, 3 pan, 1 pul."
04.03.2014 22:17 – SV: "Got it. We can even do more, do you even follow the news? Think, find someone – we will increase the batches!!!"
04.03.2014 22:17 – OW: "I can't promise now, but have a meeting soon – it may get decided."

March 12, 2014

12.03.2014 16:58 – OW: "And here I am. Our second batch went well; the clients are happy, and we have new once. So, then, here is your list, in the same order: 8 cor, 25 nep, 6 hep, 4 pan, 3 pul."

12.03.2014 17:00 – SV: "Got it all; we have enough freedom of action here."

12.03.2014 17:00 – OW: "Did you say you'll be coming here?"

12.03.2014 17:01 – SV: "Yes, I was going to, why?"

12.03.2014 17:01 – OW: "We have something to discuss about our conditions; get the ticket and fly here."

12.03.2014 17:01 – SV: "Not sooner than the day after tomorrow. What other conditions do you have???"

12.03.2014 17:02 – OW: "New information; come here and find out."

12.03.2014 17:03 – SV: "I think the next day after our plane I'll fly out, will you meet me? You owe me a tour …"

12.03.2014 17:07 – OW: "Let's see when I finish work. If you will be coming after ours, I might not make it. We'll get in touch later."

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March 23, 2014

23.03.2014 21:15 – OW: "Hello, I have a new one: 10 cor, 31 nep, 8 hep, 8 pan, 3 pul."

23.03.2014 21:15 – SV: "Ok."

23.03.2014 21:37 – OW: "When's your flight?"

23.03.2014 21:39 – SV: "I will write to you. Is everything going smoothly?"

23.03.2014 21:39 – OW: "All good. It'd be preferable if you sent it over the next couple of days."

23.03.2014 21:40 – SV: "Olga, please understand that you can't plan it; they act quickly, depending on the situation. As soon as I find any more material, I'll let you know."

25.03.2014 10:36 – SV: "We are in luck, darling. Specialists are working; give it a few days, and it's yours."

25.03.2014 10:42 – OW: "Ok, waiting."

April 3, 2014

03.04.2014 12:03 – SV: "Good morning, have anything to tell me?"

03.04.2014 12:04 – OW: "Hey, keep looking for a place, the numbers will come in the evening."

03.04.2014 23:18 – OW: "So: 10 cor, 40 nep, 11 hep, 9 pan, 2 pul."

03.04.2014 23:20 – SV: "People are working. Let's leave it to tomorrow."

April 15, 2014

15.04.2014 21:24 – OW: "15 cor, 40 nep – for now the same amount, later they are promising more, 19 hep, 10 pan, 5 pul. Received?"

15.04.2014 21:25 – SV: "Yes, passing it on."

15.04.2014 21:25 – OW: "Judging by the news, the events will help our business. What do you think, will they turn course?"

15.04.2014 21:31 – SV: "Not anticipating it, we'll have a lot to work with! Our "Western partners" with their policies are setting good conditions and, importantly – quantity!"

15.04.2014 21:36 – OW: "Well, alright, then I will keep on signing up interested parties."

May 3, 2014

03.05.2014 21:18 – SV: "Did you get the last batch alright? We sent it with some delay, how did it fare?"

03.05.2014 21:32 – OW: "A few of the items were wasted, Seryozha! You know the permissible time! One of the customers was left dissatisfied, but is willing to wait for the next ones; don't delay."

03.05.2014 21:45 – SV: "When will you confirm the numbers?"

03.05.2014 21:46 – OW: "Tomorrow."

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May 4, 2014

04.05.2014 19:12 – OW: "17 cor, 50 nep 15 hep, 30 pan, 5 pul. Here are your Western partners. They have a lot of diabetes patients, so the demand is there."

May 10, 2014

10.05.2014 22:04 – OW: "The orders are growing; do you have enough people? Confirm receipt: 15 cor, 63 nep, 35 hep, 20 pan, 5pul."

10.05.2014 22:07 – SV: "Got it. For now we manage with the same resources; only thing they work more intensively (no one refuses a large income) …"

May 22, 2014

22.05.2014 21:43 – OW: "Did you get the numbers?"

22.05.2014 21:43 – SV: "Yes, and passed them on already."

22.05.2014 21:45 – OW: "Seryozha, I gave you another order, but in the last batch there was a lot of substandard merchandize!!! You are letting me down with this."

22.05.2014 21:49 – SV: "Olya, you haven't been here and haven't see HOW it all happens; and the conditions are getting more and more difficult."

22.05.2014 21:51 – OW: "You were able to find the right quantity, that's good of course, but the quality suffers. My people get access to the material too late!!! Clients are waiting here."

22.05.2014 21:56 – SV: "They'll wait, don't worry, who else could they go to? Where else could they find it??? And meahwhile, here there is shooting, shells are exploding, how can

I get your people here? Be they my specialists or yours – it is very difficult to ensure their safety, please understand. We are forced move the materials ourselves!"

22.05.2014 22:03 – OW: "Maybe we should go back to the way things were? At least there is access to the with heavy and terminal patients, and the conditions aren't much worse?"

22.05.2014 22:05 – SV: "On my side, there can be no talk of this, and you were told the same by Nalivaichenko in your last conversation! Too much risk of a leak and too many questions from local staff; I don't want anything to do with this anymore!"

22.05.2014 22:10 – OW: "Then do it as you did in Alexandrovka!!! Don't undermine me! Look for more material, so there is better choice."

22.05.2014 22:13 – SV: "There is enough material; it's difficult to transport it. Even though Senya (not Yatsenuk, my own) promised to help."

22.05.2014 22:14 – OW: "The next order will be ready by July; you'll get in touch with me through the new channel; bye."

22.05.2014 22:14 – SV: "Bye, good luck to us."

June 8, 2014

08.06.2014 12:42 – OW: "Hi. I could not call you yet; at least I got you here … A new order: 13 cor, 55 nep, 30 hep, 15 pan, 3 pul."

08.06.2014 12:43 – SV: "Sure, once we get the Israeli one done, we'll send it right away."

08.06.2014 12:43 – OW: "Waiting."

June 15, 2014

15.06.2014 21:16 – SV: "Olya, you haven't gotten in touch in a long time! What's happening?"

15.06.2014 21:18 – OW: "Everything is fine, except prices are dropping. But we continue working."

15.06.2014 21:20 – SV: "Did you get the first "advance" portion of the goods?"

15.06.2014 21:21 – OW: "It arrived already. They liked this scheme here; they are ready to pay for speed. I am still confirming the second portion."

15.06.2014 21:25 – SV: "Just make sure you hurry; there is a big one coming up – we shouldn't loose the chance!"

15.06.2014 21:26 – OW: "Ok, the meeting is in the evening; I will report immediately."

June 16, 2014

16.06.2014 00:38 – OW: "I took care of everything; in addition to what you sent, we need AGAIN: 8 cor, 28 nep, 13hep, 6 pan, 2 pul."

16.06.2014 00:41 – SV: "Understood. Good thing you clarified in time – no desire to load up on extras!"

16.06.2014 00:42 – OW: "If there will be an overlimit – no trouble, I think I will the use for it …"

16.06.2014 00:47 – SV: "Alright, we'll see how many we get. I'm gone, too much to do."

Sergey Vlasenko and Semyon Semyonchenko
March 18, 2014

18.03.2014 20:19 – SS: "Sergey Vladimirovich, good evening! Everything is ready on my end, people are at their posts. I already informed Yarosh."

18.03.2014 20:23 – SV: "Good, Semyon. Did you set everything up for our German comrades and for the Jews?"

18.03.2014 20:24 – SS: "Yes, they are working under good protection."

18.03.2014 20:48 – SS: "What did you decide about your request?"

18.03.2014 20:55 – SV: "I'll send your body kits tomorrow, the first order that you made. There is a shortage of 5th level for now, but there may be a batch coming in the near future."

18.03.2014 20:58 – SS: "Thank you, we are waiting, and the guys are already risking a lot! Be so kind, let them not at the top, our work order. We need another 7 cars with flashing lights (white) specifically to provide transportation for your topic, but there must be 5th level on board."

18.03.2014 20:59 – SV: "Are you talking about the armour?"

18.03.2014 20:59 – SS: "Yes, it is very important now in our conditions!"

18.03.2014 21:01 – SV: "When is your next raid? When do you need the cars?"

18.03.2014 21:02 – SS: "Better earlier, the latest for Friday."

18.03.2014 21:04 – SV: "Alright, I'll find out; call me tomorrow evening."

May 26, 2014
26.05.2014 17:25 – SV: "Semyon, are you available?"
26.05.2014 17:26 – SS: "Yes, listening."
26.05.2014 17:29 – SV: "We got problems with the last batch!!! A lot of bad quality material, our customers are dissatisfied! We need to do everything on time! Speed it up, because if you don't make it in 14 hours from the time of extraction – we only get 30% of the price! And that means you don't get your equipment, do you understand?"
26.05.2014 17:33 – SS: "I know, Sergey Vladimirovich. We are trying, we have many losses; just in the last go we lost more than 20 guys!"
26.05.2014 17:34 – SV: "Then take others! Don't you have enough people?"
26.05.2014 17:35 – SS: "There aren't many left, and I can't put just anyone on this job."
26.05.2014 17:40 – SV: "Keep working. The next extraction must be made by instruction, do it right! Otherwise, you don't just undermine me!"

June 27, 2014
27.06.2014 21:54 – SS: "Sergey Vladimirovich, I was able to get in touch with Bes [**Note**: Russian for demon. The Bes referenced here likely is a Ukrainian commander stationed at Karachun Mount, also nicknamed Bes, not the Militia's Bezler], we discussed your question."
27.06.2014 21:55 – SV: "Ok, how did he react?"
27.06.2014 21:57 – SS: "Just like we anticipated, at first adamantly against, but I was able to get him interested! … He'll give me his final answer once he visits the location."

June 28, 2014
28.06.2014 01:13 – SS: "He responded. Took care of problems; giving us green light, so we can work."
28.06.2014 01:20 – SV: "Alright, but keep on your toes with this Bes, so he does not turn around …"
28.06.2014 01:22 – SS: "Don't worry, we'll find something to convince him with!"

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UK –The photo that could have stopped the 7/7 bombings: How a crucial clue was ruined by MI5

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1384179/7-7-inquest-verdict-Emergency-services-mistakes-52-victims-died.html

It is the photograph that could have stopped the July 7 bombers.
A surveillance picture from 2004 shows two of the terrorists – Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer.
But, in order to disguise where the picture was taken, the good quality image was cut in two and heavily cropped by an MI5 officer before being sent to the U.S. and shown to an Al Qaeda supergrass.

Caught on camera: Tanweer, left, and ringleader, Khan are clearly visible in this surveillance photo
In fact, the turncoat wasn't even shown the poor crop of Khan – only the blurred picture of Tanweer, whom he did not know.

Yesterday the July 7 coroner criticised MI5's decision to crop the surveillance photograph so badly that Tanweer was unrecognisable and the image of Khan was discarded entirely.
Lady Justice Hallett said the resulting images were 'dreadful', adding: 'I fully expect the Security Service to review their procedures to ensure that good quality images are shown and that whatever went wrong on this occasion does not happen again.'

She also said that MI5 held all the clues they needed to identify the July 7 ringleader months before the terror attacks.

The Security Service repeatedly watched Khan meet a known terror mastermind and was given his name and even his mobile phone number.

But officers dismissed him and his deputy Tanweer as 'small-time fraudsters' and ruled they were not important enough to be put under surveillance.

MI5 has insisted there was no evidence the two men were involved in planning terror attacks in Britain, and therefore were not priority targets.

Lady Justice Hallett questioned that decision and made two formal recommendations for improvements to MI5's techniques and procedures.

She said: 'They were plainly more than minor criminals.

'They had a number of highly suspicious meetings with a known attack planner, at a time when his plans were coming to fruition.'

She continued: 'It may have been technically possible to link all the strands and produce an extremist who … had undergone military training and was an associate of attack planners and a possible facilitator of terrorism in 2004.'

Despite her criticisms, Lady Hallett stopped short of saying MI5 could have prevented the bombings.

But she added: 'I am concerned about the fact that the Security Service's other commitments prevented a more intense investigation of a possible terrorist.'

She also recommended that MI5 should keep better records about its assessments of 'targets'.

The inquest heard that Khan and Tanweer were spotted meeting the leader of a 2004 fertiliser bomb plot – the occasion on which they were dismissed as 'small-time fraudsters'.

A tip-off that Khan had attended mujahedeen training in Pakistan and Afghanistan was treated with similar complacency, with officers calling him a 'jihadi tourist'.

The coroner said she was concerned that 'flawed' decision-making was not properly supervised, with 'possibly dire consequences', and called on MI5's director general Jonathan Evans to examine the problem.

Her ruling that the Security Service could not have prevented the attacks was greeted with dismay by survivors.

Retired teacher Tim Coulson, 56, from Henley, Oxfordshire, was caught in the Edgware Road explosion and cradled one dying victim in his arms.

He said: 'I still believe it was preventable. Two of the bombers were known to the Security Services years beforehand and, as close as 2004, were on their radar.

'If they had, based on evidence that was in their possession at the time, made the decision to remove [Khan] from the public and bring him in for questioning, it would never have happened.'

An ISIS caliphate is bad news for Iraq, Syria and everywhere else

By Mathieu Guidère

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140707-an-isis-caliphate-is-bad-news-for-iraq-syria-and-everywhere-else?page=0,0

After the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, the global jihadist movement seemed to have become fragmented and considerably weakened. This happened for various reasons. First, the coincidence of the al-Qaeda leader's death with the start of the Arab Spring suggested to many in the region that they could change their regimes without the help of al-Qaeda.

At the same time, the absence of a charismatic and innovative leader to replace Bin Laden weakened the organization and highlighted its association to the "old jihad". The internal personal rivalry among the "emirs" of the different branches of al-Qaeda, each trying to appear as the true flag-bearer of jihad after Bin Laden, made cohesion hard to manage.

In 2011, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was the first branch that tried to establish an "Islamic state" in Africa's Sahel region. Documents found in Timbuktu, Mali, clearly show the details of this project and its progress both on a doctrinal level and on the military field.

Through its various lieutenants in northern Mali, for several months between March 2012 and January 2013, AQIM established a kind of Islamic state with "governors" and "judges" applying Sharia law. If it weren't for the French military intervention in northern Mali, this "Islamic State" would still exist today and would probably extend across the Mali border and into part of the territories of neighboring countries, starting from the south of Libya and Algeria and including western Niger at least.

Then it was the turn of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who tried the same experiment in Yemen, controlling — almost at the same time — large areas of the south. In particular, the coastal city of Zinjibar was directly administered by leaders of the organization for several months in 2012.

This jihadist project was defeated by a coalition of tribal forces backed by the Saudi intelligence services and supported by massive U.S. drone strikes. Many leaders and key figures of AQAP were killed, hundreds of fighters of the organization died in the fighting against the Yemeni army, but the risk of a "jihadist sanctuary" in Yemen still exists.

In both the Sahel region (with AQIM) and in Yemen (with AQAP), the jihadists took as their model the Taliban experience of the "Islamic Emirate" regime that dominated Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. Most leaders of al-Qaeda knew this experience in detail and wanted to reproduce this "state model" on the territories that fell under their control between 2011 and 2013.

State within a state

With the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), the situation is quite different. First, the group — although it came from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and was established after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — was built as a virtual state. It had "ministers" and "secretaries" and was explicitly called: "Islamic State in Iraq." It was not until 2013 and the stalemate in the Syrian conflict, that the "Islamic State in Iraq" became the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham" (ISIS).

The territorial unification implied in the change of name was not purely symbolic, since fighters of ISIS were present on both sides of the Iraqi border and already controlled territories in both Iraq and Syria. Gradually, they have sought to ensure territorial continuity between Iraqi Sunni and Syrian Sunni populations.

The political justification for such a military commitment on both sides of the border was not accidental either, since ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared his intention to "erase" the consequences of the 1916 Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement that established the current borders of Iraq and Syria.

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Pledging allegiance

The declaration of the "Caliphate" by al-Baghdadi now provides that legal framework that was lacking for the unification of territories on both sides of the borders. It is also an ideological justification for the forced union of jihadist fighters that was previously rejected in 2013 by the main jihadist group in Syria, the al-Nusra Front. The Syrian leader of al-Nusra Front, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, after having rejected any union with ISIS, immediately pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi as the "new Caliph."

The leader of AQIM, Abu Mussab Abdul Wadud, has also congratulated al-Baghdadi and ensured him of his support. Abdul Wadud previously supported Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia by sending him fighters from North Africa. This message from AQIM is a typical pattern of the old process of recognition of the caliph called the "bay'ah" (allegiance).

This practical reactivation of the concept of the "caliphate" by al-Baghdadi is particularly worrying as it creates a new unifying idea for disparate jihadist groups around a common strategic project. Since Bin Laden's death, these groups were fragmented, but they might now be able to connect and share an ideology — and, probably, funding given the wealth of the "new caliph." The "Caliphate Utopia" may reveal to be also a much more efficient tool for jihadist recruitment, especially among young Westerners.

This change might point to the marginalization of the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, who has not been able to impose himself after Bin Laden's death. But at the same time it indicates the end of the fragmentation and the beginning of the reunification of jihadi groups around the world within an even more dangerous organization. The global war against terror may finally start.

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White House Plans for Counter Piracy and Maritime Security
Source: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/node/1339

June 20 the White House released the United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan. This plan implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea. The United States continues to strengthen regional governance and rule of law to maintain the safety and security of mariners, preserve freedom of the seas, and promote free flow of commerce through lawful economic activity.
The plan provides strategic guidance for counter-piracy efforts, focusing on preventing attacks, responding to acts of maritime crime, and enhancing maritime security and governance.
The plan also provides specific frameworks for the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea regions, providing guidance on how the United States will respond to regional threats with varying geographic, political, and legal environments.
 The plan supersedes the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (2008.)

▶ **Read the Action Plan at:**
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/united_states_counter_piracy_and_maritime_security_action_plan_2014.pdf

European Union Council Approves Maritime Security Strategy
Source: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/node/1338

July 07 – The European Union Council recently endorsed a framework for effectively and comprehensively addressing the EU's maritime security challenges. The objective is to secure the EU's maritime interests against risks and threats such as cross-border and organized crime, threats to freedom of navigation, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or environmental risks.
According to the announcement the strategy recommends action be stepped up in five areas:
-- using all instruments at the EU's disposal, including political dialogue, development aid to support to capacity building
-- developing a common information sharing environment for maritime awareness and surveillance
-- developing capability by pooling and sharing initiatives and dual-use technologies
-- bolstering risk management through protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response
-- strengthening maritime security research and training

▶ **Read the approval EU document at:**
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/143352.pdf

Gruesome Attacks in Kenyan Villages Heighten Fears of a Nation on Edge
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/world/africa/deadly-attacks-in-kenya.html?ref=world&_r=0

Villagers in Hindi gathered by the body of a man who was killed in attacks on the Kenyan coast on Saturday night. Many victims' hands had been tied and their throats slit, residents said. Credit Athman Sheikhuna/Reuters

More than 20 people were killed in two attacks on Kenya's coast on Saturday night — with residents saying that many of the victims had their hands bound and their throats slit — in the latest in a string of gruesome assaults with ethnic undercurrents.
The violence has deeply unnerved this country at a time of increasing insecurity and rising political tensions. Nonetheless, Kenya's leading opposition politician, Raila Odinga, vowed

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on Sunday to press ahead with a large demonstration in downtown Nairobi, the capital, on Monday.

The Kenyan government fears that opposition supporters may try to occupy a public park, setting up what could be a bloody showdown with the police. Government officials said that such a sit-in would be illegal and that they would not allow the center of Nairobi to be turned into a Kenyan version of Tahrir Square, the plaza in Egypt's capital, Cairo, that became the foremost symbol of the Arab Spring uprisings.

Many Kenyans are worried about the Monday rally, given the heightened insecurity and strained mood. Some families have already begun to flee ethnically mixed areas in Nairobi and surrounding towns after leaflets mysteriously surfaced warning members of certain ethnic groups to leave.

In Kenya, it is hard to draw a line between politics and ethnicity. Most people back politicians from their own ethnic group, and political tensions often stir up ethnic ones. Many analysts say that Kenya has not been this ethnically polarized since a disastrous election in 2007 set off riots and clashes that killed more than 1,000 people.

"Government, opposition must step back from the brink," read the lead editorial in the Sunday Nation, one of Kenya's biggest newspapers.

Over the past few weeks, Kenya's opposition leaders have held a number of boisterous rallies across the country, all of them peaceful. But the government is taking no chances about Monday's event, timed to commemorate the anniversary of Kenya's multiparty democracy movement that began in 1990. Thousands of police officers will be deployed throughout Nairobi with orders to keep roads open and trade flowing. Even so, many businesses have advised employees and customers to stay away from downtown, fearing that riots could break out.

At the same time, Kenya's security forces seem overwhelmed by the spate of killings along the coast that the government has called politically motivated.

According to the police inspector general, two villages, Hindi and Gamba, were attacked around the same time at about 11 p.m. Saturday, with dozens of armed intruders killing civilians, blasting their way into a jail and burning down houses and a church. Residents said that, as with other recent attacks, most of the victims were Kikuyus — the same ethnic group as Kenya's president, Uhuru Kenyatta — and that many had been slaughtered with knives, their hands tied behind their backs.

Police officers said they found a blackboard placed in a road near the killings that said "Raila Tosha," which means "Raila's enough," and "Kick Christians out of coast," suggesting a domestic source for the violence rather than a foreign one. Those implications, whether true or not, are bound to push the political temperature even higher.

Many Kenyans and security experts alike are confused about who is behind the attacks, which began last month with a full-fledged raid on what had been a sleepy coastal town.

At first, many believed the culprits were Shabab militants from Somalia, who have taken responsibility for the killings, including the attacks on Saturday night. In a radio address, the Shabab boasted that the same group of militants had attacked both villages and "disabled the enemy of God." The Shabab promise to keep wreaking havoc in Kenya as long as the country has troops in Somalia. (Kenya sent troops into Somalia in 2011 in an effort to stabilize the country.)

But now it is not so clear who the killers are. The coastal areas hit recently are a hive of local grievances over land, ethnicity and economic opportunity. The Kenyan government is in the midst of building a huge, multibillion-dollar port in the same area, and many business interests are now jostling for a piece of the pie.

Last month, President Kenyatta attributed the attacks to "local political networks," and the governor of the surrounding county was promptly arrested on suspicion of murder. Many people who know the governor insist that he is innocent. Some analysts, though, have

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speculated about whether local groups disgruntled with Mr. Kenyatta's government might be cooperating with the Shabab to mount attacks against Kikuyus.

The most obvious victim is Kenya's tourism industry, a pillar of the economy. Western governments, including the United States and Britain, have issued travel advisories, scaring away tourists. The Kenyan coast is usually packed in the summer with kite surfers, fishermen and sunburned European children digging holes in the sand. But now countless hotels have closed or nearly shut down, laying off legions of cooks, maids, waiters, drivers and many others who support their families with tourism jobs.

"It's so terribly, depressingly empty," a hotel manager said Sunday night. "It's made me rethink all my plans. You just don't know now. It may be time to buy some land in Europe."

Street crime also seems to be getting worse. On Sunday, just hours after the raids on the villages, a Western tourist was killed in a botched robbery while she was visiting an old fort in Mombasa.

Kenyan news media reported that the tourist was Russian, and that armed men shot her and stole her camera.

Border crisis could provide cover to ISIS operatives, say experts

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/07/07/isis-could-take-advantage-weakened-us-border-for-terrorist-attack/

The border crisis could be the perfect opportunity for Islamic terrorists looking to sneak sleeper cells into the U.S., say experts.

Patrols on the Mexican border have been stretched to the breaking point in recent weeks by a tidal wave of immigrants from Central America. Among the estimated 60,000 people who have streamed across is a small percentage of what agents term "Special Interest Aliens," or SIAs. Terrorism experts say

airport security is effective at keeping dangerous jihadists out, but the border breakdown could be America's Achilles heel - providing an entry point for groups like ISIS.

"It's impossible to say that ISIS will soon be active on our border, but some groups will be," said retired Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters, a security and defense analyst and Fox News contributor. "The one thing that all of the squabbling jihadi groups in the Middle East and North Africa have in common is that they want to strike the U.S., both for what they view as vengeance and because, in terrorist circles, striking the U.S. is how you confirm that you're a major player."

"If you pay the cartels enough, they will sneak you across or assist in getting anything you want across the border."
Shawn Moran, vice president and spokesperson for the Border Patrol Council

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It's long been known that a percentage, albeit small, of illegals caught sneaking across from Mexico hail from terror-sponsoring states. And some of the Islamic terror groups have ties to Latin American drug cartels and gangs, including MS-13. The combination of terrorists' desire to infiltrate the border and gangs' know-how could prove dangerous to American security, say experts.

"It's obviously a concern," Shawn Moran, vice president and spokesperson for the Border Patrol Council, told FoxNews.com. "If you pay the cartels enough, they will sneak you across or assist in getting anything you want across the border.

"It's definitely a nightmare scenario if they use the borders, north or south, to cross and conduct a terrorist attack," Moran added.

Texas Gov. Rick Perry said the record wave of illegal immigrants includes record numbers of SIAs.

"We have record high numbers of other than Mexicans being apprehended at the border," Perry told Fox News.

"These are people that are coming from states like Syria that have substantial connections

back to terrorist regimes and terrorist operations. So we're seeing record, historic high numbers of these individuals being apprehended."

Some policy experts say that, while it's possible for groups like ISIS to cross at the border, it may not be necessary for them to achieve their deadly means.

"Big picture, we need to look at how terrorist attacks have evolved since 9/11," Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical analysis for Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm, told FoxNews.com. "The old model was to sneak operatives in, but it has really changed in recent years. It's emanating from the grassroots. People who already reside in a targeted country are recruited or those who can enter a country legally with proper documentation."

And ISIS, despite its bluster, is probably not yet capable of launching an attack on American soil, Stewart said.

"They really haven't shown a capacity to import their attacks," he said. "They haven't worked towards conditioning operatives for terrorist attacks. It's a very different than the training for the insurgency."

James Phillips, a senior research fellow for the Heritage Foundation, said the U.S. can never completely protect itself from terrorist infiltration.

"The real danger is Europeans that have already been recruited who could fly into the country legally," he said. "I wouldn't rule out the Canadian border, either. Many operatives from other terrorist groups have entered the U.S. from the north."

Understanding, and predicting, Boko Haram tactics

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140708-understanding-and-predicting-boko-haram-tactics

A recently published analysis by IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center offers insights on how to predict future attacks by Islamist militant group Boko Haram. The group, whose name translates to "Western education is sin" in its Hausa language, has been launching attacks primarily in northern Nigeria since 2004. The group's 15 April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from a school in Chibok, Borno State is unlike earlier attacks targeting Nigeria's civilian population in public markets and transportation hubs.

HIS notes that following a May 2013 state of emergency declaration in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, Boko Haram's core operational region, there has been a shift in the group's operation patterns.

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group's operation patterns.
First, Boko Haram has increased the attacks directed at ordinary civilians, and its attacks are becoming more lethal. Between January 2010 and March 2013, roughly 2.9 people were killed per attack, while between April 2013 and May 2014, Boko Haram attacks led to 17.7 fatalities per attack. So far in 2014, roughly 27.9 civilians have been killed per attack.

Number of attacks and civilian fatalities attributed to Boko Haram in Nigeria Jan 2013 - May 2014. Credit: IHS Jane's

Second, Boko Haram's area of operations has contracted during the past eighteen months, with majority of attacks between 2013 and early 2014 carried out in Borno State, where the group originated. The group has managed to stage some attacks in central Nigeria, including an April attack in the capital,

Abuja, and a May attack in Jos. Attacks outside of Boko Haram's area of operations tend to be bombings, suggesting that the group's ability to mount assaults, ambushes, and other guerrilla operations is limited to its northeast strong hold.

IHSreports that attacks on secular schools did not occur until 2012, eight years after the group's first attack, and are largely a response to the population's cooperation with the government's counterterror efforts, and specifically to the participation of local youths in government-backed anti-Boko Haram vigilante groups. Attacks on students resulted in mass killings at dormitories and male students were generally the targets. A 29 September 2013 attack in the College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe resulted in at least ninety deaths when militants attacked four male dormitories while sparing the single female dormitory on campus. The Chibok abduction, directed at female students, led analysts to believe that additional factors might have motivated the operation.

The May 2013 state of emergency in Borno State pushed Boko Haram into remote bush camps, including those in the Sambisa Forest. The abduction of girls in Chibok could have been motivated by the need to find orderlies and wives to make it easier for the fighters to sustain life in the forest. Similar motives have led to mass abductions of girls by other militant groups like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. Should this be the motivation, analysts believe that Boko Haram foresees its immediate future as a rural guerrilla movement, and that Boko Haram camps are sufficient and secure enough to accommodate both fighters and non- fighters such as the abducted girls.

The new caliphate and India

India cannot, and should not, enter the ideological fight in West Asia

As far as anachronisms go, West Asia has nailed it. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a militant group that controls a large chunk of territory in Iraq and Syria, has declared itself a caliphate. The term is odd. Not since the end of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century has the expression been used to describe a real world political formation.

The ISIS is now giving the tottering Nouri al Maliki government in Baghdad a run for its money. It is also giving a headache to political leaders from Ankara to Tehran to New Delhi. The world should sit up and take ISIS for what it is, a violent group with an army and a large piece of real estate under its control. It is also potentially an exporter of a dangerous commodity, terrorism.

A freak storm?

A caliphate is a political system so radically out of place in the modern world that its longevity is doubtful. Its backers don't think so and never have. The Taliban's rule in Afghanistan from 1996-2001 was modelled as a caliphate. It collapsed when it began posing a threat to the

world. But even the citizens of Afghanistan, a conservative and economically backward country, came to dislike the Taliban regime. Any political party (and for the purpose of ruling, the ISIS and the Taliban are like political parties) can stay in power only if it makes and delivers a credible set of promises to citizens. One large part of these promises, if not the biggest one, is economic well-being. The ISIS and the Taliban are an incongruity in this respect. Riding on the back of military power, these groups have little competence in the mundane tasks of governance—ensuring supplies of essential goods, running electricity installations, keeping commerce lubricated— and none in long-term projects such as economic growth that are essential for the survival of nation-states in the world.

If the ISIS does end up creating a secure caliphate, it will be a territory governed by laws and ideas very different from what citizens in almost all countries are accustomed to. There will be no anarchy or petty crime, but there will be no freedom and economic security either. ISIS will sow the seeds of its own destruction unless it radically changes its outlook like the Hezbollah did in Lebanon when they acquired power there. There are no signs of that.

The trouble for the world will be in this interim period when the ISIS

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will want to expand further in light of its ideology that does not believe in modern borders and inspires violence everywhere. That is what India should prepare for.

 Indian fears
The reasons for fearing the ISIS and the Taliban are reversed in the Arab world and India. In Arab countries, groups like the ISIS pose a formidable ideological challenge. The existing political options in that world—democratic (Iraq), authoritarian (in most countries there) and monarchical—have all proved incapable of meeting the aspirations of people who live in these countries. India has no such fears. It is a democratic country that sees a regular churn of governments elected by its citizens. Indian fears have to do with the disruption of its economic and social life from terrorism. The Taliban and the ISIS—both wanting to create an otherworldly paradise in this world—encourage disruption. A look at the map of the world—from Azaz on the Syrian-Turkish border all the way to South Punjab in Pakistan—tells this story vividly. Iran is the only geographic buffer that prevents the spread, if not linking, of two extremely radical Muslim groupings—the Taliban and the ISIS—with each other. This should not be dismissed as a geographic flight of fancy.
 Iran, one could say, is as strong a state as one can get in the Middle East. But it is also a state which can potentially come under pressure

from two sides of its border—the one it shares with Iraq and the one with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both ISIS and the Taliban have violent sectarian goals. Unlike conventional wars that are easy to wage, an ideological and quasi-military fight with irregulars inspired by religious dreams is a very different matter. In Iran's case, the further complication is the tacit backing that many Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia for one) are providing to ISIS. The danger to India is not from these groups besieging its borders (now that would be a flight of fancy!) but from a potential upsurge in terrorist violence. The Taliban respond to Pakistan's whistle while the ISIS has openly said that India is a legitimate target for jihad. It is not the military strength of these groups that India should worry about, but the rise in terrorist violence inspired by their ideas. India cannot, and should not, enter the ideological fight.
That is something for the Arab and Afghan peoples to resolve. What India should do is to bolster its intelligence gathering capabilities specifically about these groups. It should focus not only on domestic intelligence collection but also in other countries. This should be coupled with a specialized counter terrorism apparatus that neutralizes threats based on a combination of threat profiling and actual intelligence. India should be prepared for a disruptive onslaught, always. Global Roaming runs every Tuesday to take stock of international events and trends from a political and economic perspective.

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Israel: Remaking the Mideast Again?
Source: http://acdemocracy.org/Israel-remaking-the-mideast-again/?utm_source=Israel%3A+Remaking+the+Mideast+Again%3F&utm_campaign=Israel%3A+Remaking+the+Mideast+Again%3F&utm_medium=email

Events are drawing Israel into a major war with neighboring Arab terrorist organizations to result in another total reordering of Mideast relationships.
Comparison of the current scene with the eve of the Six Day War in 1967 is almost unavoidable. Then, too, a reluctant Israel waged a preemptive action because of what it saw as an existential threat from an alliance of Arab neighbors.
As great as the possibility for another complete regional re-dispositioning is, the outcome of events is even more unpredictable than it was in 1967. Today's situation is vastly different:

First, Egypt, the largest and traditionally the leading Arab state, will not be the tripwire which brought on Israel's preemptive strike then. This time Cairo could well be a benevolent neutral if not an ally in any new encounter between Israel and its principle enemy, the radical Arab Islamists. Cairo's military junta is waging a ruthless campaign against the jihadists, voted into power but which it dislodged with considerable popular support.
Second, the prospect of a intervention by the Soviet Union is missing — and a clash of the,

then, two superpowers — which hung over the earlier events. Russian President Vladimir Putin's nuclear arsenal notwithstanding, his ability to influence events in the region with conventional military forces and aid is marginal. In part, that is because his imbroglio in Ukraine – having produced early victories – is now turning into a Russian disaster.

Third, the ambivalent position of the Obama Administration despite all its public protestations of loyalty to a U.S. ally, is a sharp contrast to President Lyndon Johnson's profound pro-Israel sympathies at a time when the U.S. Left had not made a bogus Palestinian

crusade a central issue.

And, fourth, there is a new aggressive and potentially nuclear-armed Iran, dedicated to the destruction of Israel, mobilizing long suppressed Shia minorities throughout the region in a Muslim sectarian conflict. Tehran's mullahs have been able to bridge the historic Arab-Persian divide to bolster Arab Shia and even non-Shia allies.

Instead of the pan-Arab ideology so successfully evangelized by the charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser — however dented by the earlier Egyptian defeat in 1956 — the cement of any anti-Israel alliance today is radical Islam. Rather than the artificial national entities mapped out by the World War I victors, Jerusalem today faces on all sides fanatical regional guerrilla organizations evolved into threatening major organized terrorist entities.

In the south, Hamas, a child of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood so favored by the Obama Administration as a "moderate" political force,

has crossed over the sectarian line in the past to accept Iranian aid. Despite what is a tacit combined Israeli and Egyptian embargo, it has accumulated a growing and increasingly sophisticated arsenal. In the north, the Hezbollah with its roots in southern Lebanon, is now bloodied with its significant participation with Iran in salvaging the Assad regime in Syria. Both these organization now could inflict far more pain on Israel's civilian population than the artillery, mortar and rocket attacks of '67.

On the east, the always fragile Jordan, beset with enormous destabilizing refugee flows from both Syria and Iraq and the growing seduction of its own majority Palestinians by the radical Islamists, now faces the ultra-fanatical Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant on its once secure border with Iraq. ISIL's claim to restoration of a trans-national caliphate, a Muslim empire headed by a religious figure invoking 7th century codes of justice, may not be sustainable. But its announcement in the half of Iraq it tentatively controls with like-minded allies is a powerful rallying cry for traditional Muslim jihad, holy war against all "non-believers". That appeal to ruthless and bloody fanaticism, always just below the surface in traditional Islam with its validation in Koranic text, is cutting through yesterday's regional allegiances.

Washington has not caught up. Obama's tentative choice to meet the new threat in the area incrementally — dribbling advisers to a crippled Baghdad government — is not likely to stem the tide of success against the jihadists' bandwagon. There is already evidence that the new ultra-radical Muslims have adherents in both the Israeli-Occupied West Bank and under relatively more moderate Hamas's nose in Gaza. Washington indecision confirms the belief throughout the umma (the Muslim world) that the U.S. is no longer the major factor in the region's power struggles. They see an American retreat providing the opportunity for dedicated minorities to determine events.

Thus, Israel faces the same dilemma as in 1967, that is, whether to wait for the always powerful fissiparous tendencies of Arab and Muslim societies to tear

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themselves apart or to move before a new and aggressive enemy tyranny consolidates. In that earlier conflict, by happenstance as much as design, Israel established itself as the region's military "superpower". That, in turn, produced (however recalcitrant and imperfect) peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Their defection from the anti-Israel front formalized the division of the Arabs despite their profession of unity which had been one of the sources of the Israeli victory.

Today the Arabs are no less divided. And, in fact, the Syrian civil war has not only set Muslim fanatics against a pretended secular –if dictatorial — regime, but because of Damascus's Alawite (an offshoot of Shia) leadership and the Iranian Shia mullahs' support, it has set off a new regional test between the majority Sunni regimes and long-oppressed Shia Arab minorities.

Their tactics, claiming as many Muslims as non-Islamic lives — from suicide bombings to kidnappings — strike deep at the vulnerability of Israel's Western-style civil society And whether targets are a relatively new light-rail system in Jerusalem or vacationers on a foreign beach, Israel's growing prosperity and sophistication as a leading world industrial society make it all that more susceptible.

Ironically, Israeli leadership today — while as contentious and disputations as ever — is probably freed from two of the principal concerns on the eve of the Six Day War in deciding strategy. Regard for the UN — even then under the hapless leadership of Secretary General U Thant — is less a consideration. UN peacekeeping in the region, as elsewhere, has come and gone with little if any effect. One suspects, too, that despite frequent public obeisance to the Obama Administration for the U.S.'s invaluable source of military hardware,

no one in Jerusalem is blind to its pro-Muslim sympathies and its incompetence.

Obama's insistence on prioritizing Jewish settlements in the traditional sites of the ancient Hebrew kingdoms, the basis of Israel's legitimacy, was a guarantee of failure of Israel-Arab negotiations. (No one seems to ask if there is to be a two-state solution with a 1.8 million Israeli Arab minority, are Jews to be excluded from the proposed Palestinian state?) In continuing to insist on direct negotiations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has had to concede the growing power of the Islamists by a coalition government with Hamas, Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry appear totally at sea in the Arab desert.

Yet Jerusalem has other deepening concerns. The kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers and a subsequent kidnapping and brutal murder of an Arab teenager — perhaps by Israeli vigilantes in retribution — are dramatizing the deterioration of the domestic scene. The civil strife in predominantly Arab northern Israel is further evidence. The fact that Hamas cannot or will not control escalating missile strikes against southern Israel and the new ISIL threat to Jordan are forcing the Israelis into consideration of more dramatic action to preserve their stature. While future action might become a full-fledged invasion, or even reoccupation, of Gaza, it is likely, as in 1967, to coincide with developments on the other "fronts".

Assuming the Israeli military superiority, including the tacit endorsement of Cairo and the Gulf states to action against the jihadists, a new perspective would unroll in the Mideast. But given the incredible complex of cross-currents (as in 196&) the outcome is totally unpredictable.

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Abandoned Al Qaeda notebook found in Yemen features blueprint for creating Islamic state

Source:http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/abandoned-al-qaeda-notebook-features-blueprint-creating-islamic-state-article-1.1858534

At first glance, the neat handwriting in blue ink could be from a school notebook.

Prise apart the pages - stuck together by sand and water - and it becomes clear that the book belonged to a militant from Al Qaeda. Discarded in shrubbery in the mountains of southern Yemen, it covers everything from the

principles of a raid - "Surprise, firepower, a sacrificial spirit, quick performance" - to the ultimate goal: "Establishing an Islamic state that rules by Islamic Sharia law."

The notebook, with the name Abu al-Dahdah al-Taazi in red

calligraphy on the first page, is one relic of what a local Yemeni governor called a leadership camp for Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). The camp, now abandoned, was visited by Reuters reporters in May. Locals in the nearby town of al-Mahfad described how they had tolerated hundreds of militants for three years. Then in April, after the militants posted online a video boasting of their presence, U.S. drones and the Yemeni army attacked encampments in the region. The villagers say it was then that they asked the fighters to leave.

The story of the camp shows how deeply embedded Al Qaeda fighters had become in the country's remote, destitute south.

"We didn't realize they were that many until the night they all left. That last night when they withdrew, we saw all these people, with families, more than 60, 70 cars," said tribal leader Sheik Nasser al-Shamee in al-Mahfad.

The 'emir' of AQAP's al-Mahfad cell was a local man called Ali bin Lakraa', say Yemeni officials.

that the campaign had to be conducted "in the right way to be sustainable."

So far, the raids like the one near al-Mahfad have broken up the camps. But fighters seem to have simply moved into other parts of the country.

In the days following the fighters' departure from al-Mahfad, AQAP gunmen raided local banks in Hadramawt province, some 300 miles (480 km) away, suggesting they can travel almost unchecked. At least 27 people were killed in that attack, one of several assaults around the country, including one on the presidential palace, in the past two months.

"Using the army against Al Qaeda has very limited utility and Al Qaeda can adapt. It's like going after a fly with a sledgehammer, it's not effective," said Abulghani al-Iryani, a prominent Yemeni political scientist. AQAP has taken second place to the Al Qaeda offshoot known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), he said, but will continue to be a serious international threat.

"Their significance is that they were given enough time to penetrate local communities and become well-established."

The Saudi and Yemeni branches of Al Qaeda merged in early 2009 to form Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Funding itself partly through kidnappings - the group received almost $20 million in ransom payments between 2011 and 2013, Britain said last year - AQAP has masterminded at least two failed plots on U.S.

He later died of wounds inflicted during the strikes, according to one official, who described the cell as AQAP's most active, responsible for multiple operations against military and oil and gas facilities.

Last month the Yemeni army said 500 militants and 40 soldiers have been killed since it launched the offensive against the group in April.

Jane Marriott, Britain's ambassador to Yemen, said the Yemeni government should be applauded for going after AQAP; but warned

targets. President Obama has said it is the group most actively plotting attacks against the U.S. Last week U.S. national security sources said AQAP was part of a plot to develop explosives that could avoid detection in airports.

The story of Al-Mahfad shows how the group is able to live alongside local communities. Home to around 10,000 people, the town is more than 400 miles from the capital, Sana'a and a grueling five-hour drive from the southern port city of Aden through stark

mountains, acacia trees and volcanic rock.

A mass stone grave on the road to al-Mahfad stands as a memorial to a 2009 U.S. drone strike, which killed dozens and boosted tribal sympathy for Al Qaeda in the area. Black Al Qaeda flags are spray-painted on a few primitive buildings and rock formations along the road.

In 2011, after protests unseated veteran Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda fighters captured swathes of territory in southern Yemen and established Islamic emirates. The army mounted a campaign to push them out, but didn't come near al-Mahfad. Much of the country is beyond government control. Nearly half Yemen's 25 million people face hunger. The country also suffers from water and fuel shortages, daily power cuts and endemic corruption.

In al-Mahfad, locals rely on goat herding and bee-keeping. Unemployed youth sit, AK-47s resting on their shoulders, under shady stalls, chewing qat, a popular mild stimulant in Yemen and Somalia.

"Because al-Mahfad is so far and there was a lack of state's presence in providing services, some of the sons of the area were exploited by Al Qaeda who told them we can do this and that for you. The place was destitute and totally isolated," said Jamal al-Aqel, the governor of Abyan province, which houses al-Mahfad.

Fighters, distinctive with long hair and beards, would come to the town to restock on essential goods and recruit boys. Townspeople said the fighters were mostly Saudi and Yemeni but that only Yemenis with family in al-Mahfad ventured into the town.

Tribal leader Shamee said the fighters did not cause any trouble and mostly kept to themselves.

"Al Qaeda has been very clever in how it's made itself part of the fabric in parts of the country," said British ambassador Marriott.

The camp sat a few kilometers up a mountain in the Wadi al-Khayyala enclave. On a recent visit, a sheet of paper with Al Qaeda's black flag logo fluttered in the bushes. Scattered around were soy packets for a popular instant noodle brand, tuna cans, chocolate wrappers, and an empty tube of toothpaste. There were discarded clothes, medicine boxes, indigestion treatments, and syringes.

Also left behind were stores of Saudi-manufactured dates and Saudi riyals, testament to the strong ties between the

Yemen branch of Al Qaeda and the country's northern neighbor, said Aqel. AQAP's mastermind bomb maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, is a Saudi; his brother died in a failed suicide attack on now Saudi Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef in 2009.

Locals were unhappy about the foreign presence. It was one thing to have local fighters, "but for people to come from other areas and turn al-Mahfad into a launch pad for terrorist attacks is an unacceptable situation," said Aqel.

Somalis, who are only a short boat ride away across the Gulf of Aden, even appeared on the coast road asking for "al-Mahfad," he added.

"We found all kinds of (explosive) devices. We destroyed about 10 tonnes of explosives and more than 180 mines and 150 explosive devices."

Aqel said the camps also had a complex irrigation system and air conditioned rooms.

In late March, the fighters sent out a video of a large Al Qaeda gathering, which showed hundreds of militants singing and celebrating unperturbed, apparently in the camp outside al-Mahfad. The video was "very provocative", said Aqel.

By April U.S. drone strikes hit targets in both Abyan and the nearby province of Shabwa, another AQAP stronghold. The Yemeni army followed with its offensive. Skirmishes on the Aden-Mahfad route killed at least nine soldiers, Aqel said.

Locals panicked. Town elders told military officials that they would ask the fighters to leave to avoid a battle.

"We told them, 'You're trapped and we're trapped with you. There's an operation in Mahfad and an operation in Abyan and you're in the middle and we civilians are stuck in the middle too and we can't bear it anymore. We're trapped from above and below,'" said Shamee.

Local Al Qaeda fighters were allowed to quit the group and return home. There was one condition: They must "present a commitment to the sheik" that they would no longer fight with Al Qaeda, said Aqel.

Many southerners in Yemen feel neglected by the government, but are also repelled by the extreme Al Qaeda ideology. Abdellatif al-Sayed, from Jaar, about 150 miles from the fighters' camp, said he had initially supported AQAP when they seized control of his region in 2011 because "the state

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was oppressing us and there was unemployment. We didn't know anything about them."

But the group's methods horrified him. "Their intentions were to fight the army in the name of Al Qaeda, not as a popular revolt," said Sayed, who said he wore dark sunglasses to hide an eye injury suffered in an assassination attack by Al Qaeda.

"We never expected that we would one day slaughter a soldier or see a man hanged. Before being Muslims, we're Arab and we have customs and traditions. They killed prisoners, they killed women. They had no mercy."

The abandoned notebook features notes on weapons maintenance, topography, and elaborate diagrams for creating different ambushes.

It also identifies the three stages of guerrilla warfare needed to create an Islamic state - a similar blueprint to the one ISIL seems to be following in Iraq and Syria.

The first is the "exhaustion phase", categorized by hit-and-run attacks, especially on supply routes. "The aim is to disperse the enemy, not kill its men," say the notes. The enemy may come forward with "secret negotiations for some mujahideen," before urging "No military truce... No negotiations."

In the "equilibrium phase", the mujahideen should focus on creating semi-official forces that can impose security and "launch political campaigns...to clarify the features of the struggle."

The mujahideen should also "send diplomatic messages either through political language, or the language of blood," to warn people whose governments support the "enemy" that they are a "legitimate target."

"If negotiations are necessary then so be it, but only on the condition that we look for conditions for the enemy's surrender because that will destroy their morale.

"It should be noted that the enemy will try to offer the mujahideen a chance to participate in power. This is completely and utterly rejected."

The endgame is the "categorical phase" in which "all negotiations should stop and the enemy will be warned with necessity of surrendering." Sharia courts would be set up to try all those "apostates of religion."

On the notebook's last pages, a few verses of poetry are repeated, evoking a paradise in which virgins are available to those seen by God as deserving: "Oh brother, why be sad ... the price is heaven and the heavenly virgins. Oh brother, come here ... the price is heaven and the heavenly virgins."

The people of al-Mahfad are happy they avoided a battle. Aqel said he was working on bringing telephone lines back to the town. Yemeni soldiers have set up an army base at the foot of the mountain where the camp once stood.

But security precautions are casual. One recent afternoon, in 35 degree Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit) heat, soldiers relaxed under makeshift tents, pink plastic bags on their laps from which they lifted a few leaves of qat.

Reporters in a private car were allowed to approach the first checkpoint. A soldier flagged down the vehicle and asked for the occupants' identification, apparently worried that the car could be a militant suicide mission. He borrowed a reporter's pen and wrote down names on his hand and then waved the reporters through.

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Indian among 11 ship crew members freed by Somali pirates

Source:http://indianexpress.com/article/world/europe/indian-among-11-ship-crew-members-freed-by-somali-pirates/

An Indian national was among 11 crew members of a ship freed after being held hostage for nearly four years by Somali pirates, with a top United Nations official calling for the release of all remaining captives. The UN envoy for Somalia, Nicholas Kay, welcomed the release over the weekend of the 11 crew members of the ship MV Albedo which was hijacked by Somali pirates in November 2010.

According to the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the 11 survivors of the MV Albedo crew were released to officials from the UN Office for Drugs and Crime(UNODC) inside Somalia and are now safely back in Kenya. The crew members include seven men from Bangladesh, one Indian, one Iranian, and two from Sri Lanka.

They will be repatriated to their home countries over the coming days. The MV Albedo had been held by armed Somali pirates since November 2010 but the ship sank close to the

Somali coast last year due to mechanical failure and bad weather. The surviving crew had been held on shore by pirates since that time.

"For over three years the crew members and their families have suffered unimaginable

distress. The crew underwent the trauma of piracy, their ship sinking and then being held ashore in very difficult conditions", Kay said.

"While we have seen a significant reduction in piracy off the coast of Somalia in recent years, I remain deeply concerned that 38 other crew members are still being held hostage by Somali pirates", Kay said, calling on "those who continue to detain these crew members to release them without further delay." UNODC's Counter Piracy Programme, now in its fourth year of operation, supports the criminal justice professionals of States in the Indian Oceans region that are dealing with Somali piracy. It has developed an extensive police and Coast Guard contingent, as well a division that deals with hostage release and repatriation.

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'It was do or die': Somali pirates' hostages tell of dramatic escape

Source: http://www.thenational.ae/uae/it-was-do-or-die-somali-pirates-hostages-tell-of-dramatic-escape

June 10 – A group of sailors have described their dramatic midnight escape after four years

held hostage and tortured by a gang of Somali pirates.

Barefoot, starving and terrified, the 11 men ran through the darkness for more than 10

kilometres, ducking behind low bushes to avoid recapture before they eventually reached safety.

On Saturday night the men had broken a window in the cramped room in which they were being held, and fled. It was their last slim shot at freedom, as their captors had theatened to start torturing them again on Tuesday.

"It was a do or die situation because they knew if they got caught … they would be shot," said Fathima Farhana, daughter of one of the crew, Mohammed Bisthamy.

"My father is very weak and didn't have energy but they ran until they were safe. They didn't have slippers or proper clothes when they jumped through the window.

They knew it was their last chance because the pirates had told them they would start to torture them again on June 10.

"The men could not bear more pain so had to escape somehow. We thank Allah for their release; he gave them strength to survive."

Mr Bisthamy, 60, described being beaten with wooden and metal rods. "There was torture all the time, there was too much torture. We were always worried. But now we feel good and safe."

The 11 men were among the crew of the MV Albedo, the Malaysian-flagged cargo ship hijacked on November 26, 2010, after leaving Jebel Ali port in Dubai.

The 23 crew comprised seven Pakistanis, seven Bangladeshis, six Sri Lankans, two Indians and an Iranian.

The Pakistani crew were freed two years ago after their families raised part of a US$2.85 million (Dh4m) ransom demanded by the pirates. One Indian sailor was shot by pirates early in the hijacking.

The gang held the 11 remaining crew on shore after the vessel sank in July last year and four Sri Lankans were reported missing.

The men's escape at the weekend was assisted by a split in the pirates' ranks. One group wanted to continue torturing the men in the hope of a substantial payment from their families. Another group secretly accepted a smaller ransom payment organised by a charity group, the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian

Response Programme, and helped with the escape.

Peter Swift, the charity's chairman, said the final settlement was small and had been raised from donor contributions to a fund to release the men.

"We stressed to the pirates that the families have no money, the owner has effectively disappeared and abandoned the ship, which was not insured.

"It's not easy to persuade people who want a lot of money that there aren't millions, so it took a lot of patience."

The 11 men fled to the protection of a convoy in Galmudug, a semi-autonomous region in central Somalia, and were flown to Kenya by officials from the hostage relief programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Their freedom also ended the ordeal of a Pakistan family in Dubai.

"When my dad and others were released, it felt incomplete because our goal was always to get the entire crew out," said Nareman Jawaid, a Dubai resident and daughter of Jawaid Khan, the ship's Pakistani captain who was released in August 2012. The pirates had refused to free the entire crew with the money raised by the Pakistani families.

"This is such huge relief that they will be back with their families. Still, it is a tragedy for the families of the four who may have drowned and one Indian sailor shot."

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France proposes anti-terrorist travel bans

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28231947

The French government has proposed six-month travel bans to stop citizens travelling to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside Islamist militants.

A new offence of creating an "individual terrorist enterprise", designed to counter the threat of "lone wolves", would also be established.

Government officials say that two or three young Muslims leave France every day to join Islamist groups abroad.

There are fears they will eventually pose a threat to France itself.

A French citizen arrested for the killing of four people at the Brussels Jewish Museum in May, Mehdi Nemmouche, had returned from Syria, after being radicalised in prison.

Another French-born jihadist, Mohamed Merah, killed seven people in Toulouse in 2012 before being shot by police. His victims were three paratroopers as well as three children and a teacher at a Jewish school.

EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gille de Kerchove announced on Tuesday that interior ministers from nine countries had adopted an action plan to identify people travelling to Syria and stop them falling into terrorism on their return.

The countries that signed up to the plan are Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands

- The UK has threatened to cancel passports of jihadists

- UK courts have tried a number of people for the offence of preparing to carry out terrorist acts
- The Netherlands has refused passports to at least 10 citizens suspected of planning to travel to Syria for jihad
- Seven Dutch militants were reported killed in Syria on Wednesday
- Germany believes it has some 300 nationals fighting in Syria

Freedom of Schengen

The French bill would allow the authorities to impose six-month travel bans on people suspected of planning to make the trip to the danger zone.

Young Muslims planning to join militant groups like Isis (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) travel on low-cost tourist flights to Turkey, then are met by contacts who take them across the Syrian border.

Under the new bill, Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve would be able to impose a renewable six-month travel ban on individuals who have been identified by the intelligence services.

These people would have their passports confiscated and in theory be unable to travel - though, in fact, because of the border-free Schengen zone, they will still be able to move about inside the EU, right up to the Greek border with Turkey, the BBC's Hugh Schofield reports from Paris.

The "individual terrorist enterprise" clause is meant to counter the threat of solitary Islamists, acting outside organised structures and planning personal acts of terrorism on French soil.

Details of the EU action plan were confidential, Mr Kerchove said after interior ministers met in the Italian city of Milan. The plan is due to be discussed further in October.

5 reasons the new Afghan civilian casualty report is awful

Source: http://washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/07/09/5-reasons-the-new-afghan-civilian-casualty-report-is-awful/

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Smoke and flames rise from fuel trucks after an overnight attack by the Taliban on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan, on July 5. Civilian casualties in Afghanistan are on the rise this year as troops with the U.S.-led coalition withdraw. Photo by REUTERS/Mohammad Ismail

The U.S. military has less than five months before its formal combat role in Afghanistan comes to a close. That means many things, including the Taliban testing Afghan troops in a series of bloody battles across the countryside. But it also means this: Civilian casualties are up exponentially, and there is no signs of it letting up.

That's according to a new report released today by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. The report has received some media attention this morning, but considering the focus of this blog, it seemed prudent to drill down into what is occurring. Here are five key findings in the report, which covered the first six months of 2014:

This chart is in the United Nations' new civilian casualty report for Afghanistan.

**Civilian Deaths and Injuries
January to June 2009 - 2014**

1. Civilians are dying in firefights at an unprecedented level.

Death and injuries caused by mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire has jumped dramatically since 2013, especially in areas with concentrated civilian populations, the report says. In the first six months of 2014, the U.N. counted 1,901 civilian casualties due to ground combat, including 474 deaths and 1,427 injuries. That is up 89 percent since 2013.

2. Women and children are getting hit more frequently.
Some 295 children were killed and and 776 were injured in the first six months of 2014. That's up 34 percent from 2013, to 1,071 casualties. The number of adult female civilian casualties also jumped 24 percent to 440, including 148 killed and 292 injured. The biggest factor contributing to the numbers in both cases was attacks, as opposed to improvised explosive devices. Ground engagements killed 112 children and injured 408, an increase of 111 percent over 2013 in total child casualties. Ground combat killed 64 women and injured 192 in the first half of 2014, a combined 256 adult female civilian casualties. That's up 61 percent over 2013.

3. Civilian casualties caused by IEDs have risen their highest number since the U.S. surge.
The increase in ground engagement casualties overshadows another negative: The number of civilians killed or wounded by IEDs has jumped to 1,463 in the first half of 2014,

up 7 percent from 2013. That marks the single largest number of civilian casualties due to IEDs in a six-month period since 2009, before President Obama called for tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to flow into the country. The number of pressure-plate IEDs — which do not discriminate between military targets and 5-year-old kids — also appears to have surged in 2014. Some 161 civilians were killed and 147 were wounded by them so far this year, a combined 308 casualties. That marks a 33 percent increase over 2013.

This chart in the new United Nations civilian casualty report for Afghanistan shows the number of deaths and injuries due to ground combat is on the rise in numerous parts of the country in 2014.

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: All Ground Engagements by region January to June 2009 - 2014

	Central	Central Highlands	Eastern	North Eastern	Northern	South Eastern	Southern	Western
2009	45	0	154	12	25	120	145	6
2010	90	8	254	52	45	162	236	46
2011	149	0	288	20	22	194	361	28
2012	188	0	188	19	80	151	42	21
2013	122	4	310	42	69	139	246	72
2014	209	5	414	158	210	343	410	152

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4. The number of civilian casualties in ground engagements is especially up in areas where the U.S. surged military forces.
When the U.S. military surge began in late 2009, most of those troops were sent to southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Others were sent to eastern Afghanistan. As the U.S.-led military coalition pulls its forces back, however, the number of civilians killed or injured in those areas in ground engagements is on the rise. For example, there were 246 civilian casualties from January 2013 to June 2014 in southern Afghanistan. That number jumped all the way to 410 over the same six-month time period this year.

5. Afghan troops are killing more civilians while in firefights.
The Taliban and other insurgent forces have long been responsible for the bulk of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. But the number of incidents in which Afghan national security forces kill or wound civilians is on the rise, the report says. That's troubling considering they are still locked in a counterinsurgency fight with the Taliban in which civilian casualties can turn the people against them.
In the first half of 2014, there were 274 civilian casualties (74 deaths and 200 injuries) caused by Afghan troops while in firefights, a 99 percent increase over the same period in 2013. Of those, the Afghan National Army was responsible for 33 deaths and 81 injuries, the Afghan National Police was responsible for one death and 15 injuries, the Afghan

Local Police was responsible for 10 deaths and four injuries, and a variety of operations involving multiple kinds of troops accounted for the rest.

International troops, including the U.S., were found to be responsible for three civilian deaths and no injuries in the same time frame, the U.N. report says.

The war on terror didn't defeat al-Qaeda. But ISIS could
By Terrence McCoy
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/30/the-war-on-terror-didnt-defeat-al-qaeda-but-isis-could/

One of the great ironies of the current battle for Iraq is that for all the billions spent on the war on terror, all the bullets fired, all the lives lost, what may ultimately defeat al-Qaeda isn't the United States or another Western power — but a group from within the jihadist movement. It didn't take drones. Or the surge. It took a charismatic, emergent leader known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who recently threw off the yoke of al-Qaeda's command and decided he and his militant pals would do their own thing.

They would become the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which on Sunday declared the restoration of the 7th-century Islamic caliphate. Baghdadi, anointed caliph, would rule over its vast tracts of captured territory in northern Iraq and Syria, the message said. And all Muslims worldwide must now pledge allegiance to him.

For a group long on guns and cash and defined by acts of audacity and ambition, Sunday's declaration was perhaps its boldest move yet. It has announced something no other modern jihadist movement has done before — though some have wanted to — and showed its intention to destroy al-Qaeda. "This is a threat to the legitimacy of al-Qaeda as the representative of global jihad, and it lays down the threat big time," Charles Lister of Qatar's Brookings Doha Center, told The Washington Post's Liz Sly. "Put simply, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has declared war on al-Qaeda."

The ideological and recruiting power of al-Qaeda remains grounded in the mythology of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But that power weakens the older those attacks become, analysts say. Today's young foreign recruits, for whom jihadist groups compete and who are essential to the continuance of any insurgency, aren't bound by that lineage. "Al-Qaeda's greatest achievement was the 9/11 attacks, but that was 13 years ago," wrote Haverford associate professor Barak Mendelsohn in Foreign Affairs. "Many of today's jihadis were young children at the time" and don't have much loyalty to the aging movement.

As such, analysts warn against underestimating Sunday's declaration. "ISIS now see themselves as the legitimate leaders of the movement, and they expect everyone to fall in line," Peter Neumann, who studies radicalization at King's College London, explained to the Guardian. "For ideological jihadists, the caliphate is the ultimate aim, and ISIS — in their eyes — have come closer to realizing that vision than anyone else.... This could be the end of al-Qaeda.... This could mark the end of Bin Laden's vision and his legacy."

That end, if it comes to pass — and there are reasons it may not – has roots deep in the past.

The jihadist leaders of Iraq and those of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda have long had differences, according to a study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It begins with the divergent socioeconomic backgrounds between bin Laden and the murderous, Jordan-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led Iraq's al-Qaeda before he died in a U.S. airstrike in 2006. Bin Laden was educated, urbane and upper middle-class. Zarqawi, meanwhile, had a criminal past and was poorer and less-educated.

"During the Iraq war, Zarqawi's brash personality and belief that authority is derived from those on battlefield front lines rather than behind the scenes would create even more tensions," wrote Aaron Zelin in the report. "Zarqawi became a household name for his brutal personal beheadings and fast-paced suicide bombing.... As a result, many foreign fighters wanted to join."

This challenged bin Laden, who wanted to "own" the Iraqi jihad. But then, when it seemed as though they'd split, Zarqawi relented and pledged fealty to bin Laden in 2004.

ISIS leader Baghdadi, who assumed control of al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2010, appears to be an amalgamation of those two jihadist leaders. He's reportedly a well-educated man but is also a battlefield tactician who's willing to order such shocking acts of brutality that foreign

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fighters, including thousands from the West, have flooded his ranks. Baghdadi, who chafed under al-Qaeda leadership, wouldn't be as conciliatory as Zarqawi.

In the winter of this year, after Baghdadi publicly said he "choose the rule of God" over the rule of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, the insurgencies split. "In addition to killing one another on the battlefield … it is likely that social media, especially Twitter, has amplified mutual hatred," according to the Washington Institute.

But more than social media, what has hurt al-Qaeda has been ISIS's recent territorial gains. Those successes have attracted fresh recruits and, analysts say, made al-Qaeda under Zawahiri appear weak,

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, the Long War Journal | The Washington Post

diffident and indecisive. "Al-Qaeda has maintained a slim but diminishing lead over ISIS among key key influencers in the movement," wrote expert J.M. Berger, who runs the Web site IntelWire.

He said it also appeared to hurt al-Qaeda's fundraising. Sunday's "proclamation will likely generate new streams of fundraising and fighter recruitment" to ISIS, he wrote.

The power of an insurgency is in its currency. And today, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said, al-Qaeda is a declining power. "It is too early to know, but if current trends hold, ISIS has opened up a lead on al-Qaeda, which has a steep hill to climb just to stave off its own relative decline."

Terrence McCoy is a foreign affairs writer at the Washington Post. He served in the U.S. Peace Corps in Cambodia and studied international politics at Columbia University.

Items confiscated at US airports show enough weapons to start your own army

By Chris Bradley

Source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/weird-news/items-confiscated-airports-show-enough-3063970

US Transport Police have released shocking photographs of the lethal weapons airline passengers tried to board with in the past year.

The haul of concealed contraband ranges from samurai swords, to pistols, bullets, grenades, inert land mines and live explosives.

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Suspicious black powder, flare guns, 562 stun guns and a live "sting ball" riot control grenade were also stopped from being loaded onto aircraft.

Officers from the Transport Security Administration, part of the Department of Homeland Security, screened 638,705,790 passengers across the US.

Around FIVE GUNS per day were fund during checks at 205 airports and firearms were the most confiscated item, with 1,813 being seized.

In about 80 per cent of cases the guns were loaded, the TSA said.

One of the more bizarre items to be found was a bazooka from World War II in a carry on bag at Chicago O'Hare airport and a mace.

The wood and metal club was a popular weapon in Europe during the Middle Ages for being used in battle and later in South America.

Weapons were often found concealed in inconspicuous packages, like lipsticks and cigarette packets.

But one of the most obvious items confiscated was a suicide vest belonging to an explosives instructor that had been deactivated.

A couple at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood airport in Florida caused delays to flights when TSA officers discovered in a bag filled with clay pots.

The TSA screened more than 1,000,000 passengers than they did last year.

Earlier this year, TSA officer Gerardo I. Hernandez, 39, was killed in the line of duty at LAX airport in Los Angeles by gunman Paul Ciancia.

A spokesperson from the TSA said: "This year's tragic incident reminds us that being on the frontline also comes with a great risk.

"We wanted to share with you examples of the continued vigilance of TSA officers in protecting our nation's transportation systems, including some of the most unusual items TSA caught at the checkpoints this year. "

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Islamist plot to blow up Eiffel Tower, Louvre and nuclear power plant foiled, say French police

Source:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10956636/Islamist-plot-to-blow-up-

Eiffel-Tower-Louvre-and-nuclear-power-plant-foiled-say-French-police.html

France foiled an Islamist terrorist plot to target the Eiffel Tower, the Louvre and even a nuclear power plant, it emerged on Wednesday, as the country unveiled new, tougher anti-terror rules.

French police stumbled on the plans after decrypting coded messages between a 29-year-old Algerian butcher living in the Vaucluse, southern France, known only as Ali M, and one of the highest-ranking members in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM.

According to Le Parisien newspaper, in April last year, the married father of two who went by the pseudonym Abu Jaji was asked by his AQIM contact, whose web alias was Redouane18, to make "suggestions concerning how to conduct jihad in the place you are currently".

Ali M suggested targeting nuclear power plants, "planes at the moment of take-off", and a string of French landmarks, including the Eiffel Tower and the Louvre museum in Paris.

Failing that, he suggested launching terror attacks on "the modest and poor French population" in markets or nightclubs, as well as police patrols.

In an apparent reference to the famed Avignon theatre festival, he also singled out "cultural events that take place in the south of France in which thousands of Christians gather for a month".

"The main walkways become black with people and a simple grenade can injure dozens of people, not to mention a booby trapped device," he said.

His contact then asked him to travel with a fellow would-be terrorist to Algeria to "benefit from a military training and training in combat techniques".

After that, he would return to France, stake out targets and "await your instructions".

"I am fully ready and prepared," he replied.

Although the plans were still at the discussion stage, French police arrested the Algerian in June last year, a month before he was due to fly to Tunisia and then onto Algeria for training.

The man's lawyer said he had been brainwashed. "The arrest was a relief for him," Daphné Pugliesi told Le Parisien.

The revelations came as Bernard Cazeneuve, France's interior minister, unveiled tougher anti-terror rules, including proposals to ban a suspect from leaving the country if it is thought he intends to fight Jihad abroad, such as in Iraq or Syria.

Last month French police arrested Mehdi Nemmouche, a French jihadist who fought in Syria, and allegedly killed four people at the Brussels Jewish Museum in May after travelling back to Europe.

The new legislation, to be presented to parliament "in the coming days", will also make it easier to target "lone wolves" and create new powers to force internet providers to block Islamist hate propaganda.

It will also allow investigators to use pseudonyms to go undercover in pro-jihadist sites.

Marc Trevidic, one of France's highest-profile anti-terror judges, said the case of Ali M was far from being isolated. "There are doubtless others on our soil programmed to harm French interests," he told Le Parisien.

Some 800 French nationals or residents are thought to have left to fight in Syria since the start of the civil war.

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Fragile States

Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014

▶ **Explore the iInteractive map at source's URL.**

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Terrorists looking at drone attacks

Source: http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2014/07/09/nypd-terrorists-looking-at-drone-attacks/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NationalTerrorAlertResourceCenter+%28National+Terror+Alert+Response+Center%29

Police say operators flew a drone too close to an NYPD helicopter that was on patrol at the George Washington Bridge and forced the chopper to change its course to avoid a collision early Monday morning. As a result, the two men were arrested.

Daniel Rose is an aviation lawyer. He points out that a bird brought down the jet in the Miracle on the Hudson incident. So a drone could do that or worse.

"To have a piece of metal, essentially, that high up in the sky coming in contact with a plane, a plane's engine, a plane's flight control system, a helicopter, can do a myriad of different types of damages including bringing the plane down," Rose says.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: How can one intercept a model airplane directed against a commercial airplane during landing or takeoff phase?

And there are quite many of them out there… and are freely sold … and are not expensive…

Perhaps airports' authorities' to consider this and take some actions … or train their security hawks to catch them or drop them!

Are Schools Focusing Too Much on the Active Shooter Scenario?

By Jim McKay
Source: http://www.emergencymgmt.com/training/Are-Schools-Focusing-Too-Much-Active-Shooter.html

School shootings have captured the attention of the American public and certainly school

administrators, who feel compelled to do something to prevent or mitigate the effects of a similar incident taking place on their grounds. Solutions — in the form of cameras, metal detectors, buzzers, bulletproof white boards and the like — are coming out of the woodwork and are being foisted upon administrators. There is a lot of training available too, such as the *Run, Hide, Fight* video that demonstrates what to do in the event of an active shooter, including taking down an armed gunman.

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But there are problems with these approaches and educators are missing key elements of managing these scenarios by relying on some of the technology fixes and the active shooter training, some experts say.

The **Run, Hide, Fight training** is an alternative to waiting for law enforcement to arrive, which is ineffective since most violent acts are usually over in minutes, before law enforcement arrives. The objective of the training videos is to condition students and administrators, anyone faced with the potentially deadly situation of an active shooter, to recognize the best avenues for avoiding bloodshed. Running is the first option. If you can get away from danger, do it, the video

teaches. If not, find a place to hide quietly. And last, if in close quarters with a gunman, with no place to hide and no avenue for escape, become offensive by throwing objects at him to distract him or even resort to physical combat.

Proponents, and there are many school campuses taking part in such training, say this is better than becoming a sitting duck.

But there are those who say the training is flawed, asks too much of school administrators and students, and misses key components like threat assessments, all-hazards training and collaboration.

Are Schools Less Safe?

"We're very concerned that a lot of schools are less safe today than they were before Sandy Hook," said Michael Dorn, a former law enforcement officer and now executive director of Safe Havens International, a nonprofit campus safety organization.

One of the reasons, Dorn said, is the heavy emphasis on the active shooter scenario, which

ignores other threats, and that some of the training is not evidence-based and not proven to work, such as the *Run, Hide, Fight* video, created by the city of Houston with U.S. Department of Homeland Security funds.

That thinking is in line with that of Curt Lavarello, executive director of the School Safety Advocacy Council, as well. He knows of no instances where a classroom has been trained to disarm a gunman and has actually done so successfully. He was speaking of the "fight" component of some of the trainings being offered to school districts, which instruct teachers and even elementary school students how to disarm a gunman.

Asking teachers or students to have the wherewithal to attack an armed gunman and hold him down "gets way, way off base," Lavarello said. "We're doing something that is not only inherently dangerous but it's untested."

Dorn likened the "Fight" part of the video to close quarters combat taught in the military. "When you're training people to disarm somebody, it's the highest level of close quarters combat. It's harder to teach that than to teach them to shoot somebody or stab them with a bayonet." And yet it's being done with a 10-minute video or two-hour class, he said.

Dorn's organization conducts assessments for schools to see how prepared or unprepared they are, putting them in a scenario and observing the reaction. Often the reaction is counter to what is safe and effective, and oftentimes those who've watched the *Run, Hide, Fight* video perform worse than those with no training at all.

"The video is very frightening to educators," Dorn said. "They freak out and do the most bizarre things. We ask them why they did what they did and they say, 'I saw the video and that's what the video told me to do.'"

One elderly man got so panicked during a drill that he jumped through a plate-glass window. And that's just one case. Dorn said one state has had nearly a quarter of a million dollars in emergency medical bills in the last 18 months just from training. In addition, he said about one-fourth of all participants in the assessment drills will attack the gunman, whether the gunman is suicidal, down the hall, waving the gun or not.

There have been real shooting scenarios where citizens unsuccessfully tried to stop a gunman and Dorn acknowledged that it has gone both ways, where citizens were successful. For instance at Thurston High School in Oregon, students disarmed a gunman after he opened fire. But, as in the case of a Wisconsin high school principal, people have been killed by becoming aggressive with an individual brandishing a gun. At the assessments, people are going out of their way to attack the gunman.

As for having guns for protection in the classroom, Lavarello said it's asking for trouble. For one thing, police arriving on a scene would have the daunting task of identifying a "good shooter" versus a "bad shooter." He said that from his 25 years as a law enforcement officer (18 in schools) he understands that in a high-stress situation like an active shooter scenario, even a trained shooter will hit the target about 30 percent of the time.

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"The school teacher who may qualify at the pistol range once a year is not going to hit the target in a high-stress situation like an active shooter," Lavarello said. "And in a school, the backdrop of missing rounds is other kids."

Physical security, in the form of police officers or security officers has increased since Sandy Hook, and that's a good thing and advocated by most security professionals. These can be multi-hazard professionals, trained in all-hazards response and, perhaps, shared with the local law enforcement office.

Other Violent Acts

In *Run, Hide, Fight,* students and teachers are taught to run if it's safe and hide if it's not, but they don't remember that part correctly or misidentify the situation in simulation. Assessments reveal that when given scenarios where there is someone with a gun walking 75 yards away, they do unthinkable things like leaving second-graders exposed.

There are more common types of violence on campus that are being overshadowed by the active shooter hype, such as suicides and other incidents: "The guy who pulls out a buck knife on a teacher or the guy who's emotionally unstable and comes in and starts beating up the secretary with the wooden nameplate on her desk," Dorn said. He cited a study that listed 63 homicides in the last 15 years with twice as many suicides. Kids are shooting themselves in front of classes or in the principal's office, and those instances are twice as common in terms of the number of deaths and five times as common as shootings.

Proponents of the fight and countermeasures say those are meant to be last resorts; when everything else is off the table and the subjects are in close quarters with a gunman. And it's an alternative to the "lockdown" procedure, which produces easy targets.

But teaching students to hide under a desk or lie down on the floor is counterproductive when it comes to survival, they say, and recent shootings such as Sandy Hook prove that. At Sandy Hook 39 rounds were fired into a room of about 17 square feet where kids were hunkered down. "That was somebody's strategy," said Lt. Joe Hendry with the Kent State University Police Department. "That's not a great idea for this circumstance."

Same thing at Virginia Tech and the movie theater in Colorado, where a number of people were shot lying on the ground. "Those are not

survival tactics," Hendry said. He's a proponent of the counter aspect and teaches students to become harder targets, to distract the shooter with noise and movement. Janice Evans, chief policy officer and director of communications for Houston Mayor Annise Parker's office, where the *Run, Hide, Fight* video was produced, stated that the "fight" portion of the video is not transferable to a school situation. "However, the 'run' and 'hide' segments can be applied to schools." She said the video has been viewed by nearly 3 million people on YouTube and her office continues to get requests for it from corporations and public agencies around the country.

Brad Spicer, CEO of SafePlans, agrees that passive targets are easy victims. "It's not that we think that young kids can pick up a book and take out a bad guy. We're saying don't just tell kids to hide under a table and hope the bad guy doesn't come in," he said. He said bullets aren't magic and don't automatically find their targets, so being active, making the shooter make decisions and presenting him with challenges can save lives.

Marianne Derbyshire Alvarez is the vice president at the ALICE Training Institute. ALICE — Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate — is a training strategy for schools, including K-12 schools, businesses and hospitals to improve the odds of survival among students and employees during a "violent intruder event."

Alvarez called ALICE a toolbox that provides options other than the traditional actions of lockdown and wait. ALICE is based on the principle that every circumstance is different and there is no one-size-fits-all method for survival, she said. And the order of response is based on the situation, meaning whether it's Lockdown, Evacuate or Counter (distract the shooter) the best choice depends on the circumstance.

But can children or even adult employees stay calm and focus on the right solution when shots are being fired? "That's where training comes in," Alvarez said. "Just like police are trained over and over, we actually visualize what we may go through so that if we are faced with it, then we just do it."

ALICE emphasizes that "Counter" is a last resort to be used only when all other options are no longer viable. And unlike the *Run, Hide, Fight* video, where fighting

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is an option, the countermeasure in ALICE is a diversion aimed at distracting the shooter and allowing time for individuals to escape. "Say you're the shooter and you're approaching some people and they all start throwing books at you or a cup of coffee," Alvarez said. "Isn't it going to be more difficult for you to hit that target with things flying at your face?" ALICE Training is a method of mitigating the circumstance of an active shooter incident once that happens. It's not meant to replace assessments of facilities and the mental health of students and employees. Alvarez said she's a "big believer" in threat assessment teams for schools or any agency and having different groups meet once a month to discuss individuals who might need to be watched or investigated.

All-Hazards Approach

The emphasis on an active shooter scenario detracts from other important trainings like tornado drills, CPR and shelter in place, Dorn and Lavarello said. And school districts, deluged with quick fixes from vendors, are investing in things they don't necessarily need.

"We do a lot of school safety assessments and I get the million-dollar question: 'What do I need? Do I need cameras? Metal detectors? Retina scanning?'" Lavarello said. "We tell them to take a step back and truly look at what the needs are."

The way to do that is through an assessment, which can be done by a professional or even a principal from another school. But oftentimes the most important security measure lacking on campus is supervision.

Lavarello said he recently did an assessment for a school district in a city that was ready to shell out nearly $5 million on walkthrough metal detectors. He was on several of the district's campuses for hours at a time before anyone approached him to ask who he was and what he was doing there. At one point there were nearly 40 buses unloading children, he said, and not one administrator or adult was around other than the bus drivers to inquire as to who he was.

"Here the district was ready to make this huge purchase and yet they weren't even doing the simple things."

Dorn agreed, saying supervision is almost always implicated when a student is killed on or near campus. More emphasis on student supervision will reduce the number of deaths

from tornado, school traffic fatalities, suicide, and reduce bullying, child abduction and sexual molestation, he said. "And it's cheaper than teaching people how to pack a gun."

Part of that is just being available, greeting students as they arrive at school, communicating with them and developing a rapport. Cameras are great but they are mostly used as evidence and schools usually don't review video at the end of the day.

Amy Klinger, director of programs at the Educator's School Safety Network, acknowledged that it's fine to purchase buzzers, locks, cameras, metal detectors, etc., but it's also important to realize that they are but a first line of defense and that there must be a second line. She said if someone wants to get onto school grounds, they will, so there'd better be a second line of defense, and that should be trained, alert personnel. Like Dorn and Lavarello, Klinger does intruder assessments and finds the same things: Nobody engages the visitor. "That's a huge vulnerability for schools," she said. "Maybe they're there to steal iPhones or snatch a kid or shoot up a school — you don't know."

Dorn said de-escalation training is a no-brainer because it works. Evidenced-based anti-bullying programs work as does training on pattern matching recognition — learning how to spot a desperate individual can help administrators become more able to detect danger and act accordingly to de-escalate it. Assessment training should not just be about who the next shooter might be but who has the potential to be violent to one's self or to others in any way. It could be merely a student who appears to be engaging in risk-taking behavior all the way up to a person who projects the ability to be violent.

Klinger said that in more than 75 percent of school shootings, three or more adults were concerned about the individual prior to the shooting, and threat assessments and appropriate training are ways to connect the dots. "But it also is predicting kids at risk for suicide, self-mutilation, substance abuse or running away. So it's exactly what we need to be doing because it's an all-hazards approach to preventing these events."

Schools, businesses and the public have — for the most part — waited for law enforcement to arrive on the scene during situations like an active shooter.

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But prior collaboration with law enforcement, and fire and EMS is an important part of mitigating events.

"School districts and colleges should reach out to local first responders and develop a

relationship and an understanding of how things work in each realm," Lavarello said. They should go hand in hand to make kids learn to their maximum capacity."

Jim McKay is the editor of Emergency Management. *He lives in Orangevale, Calif., with his wife, Christie, daughter, Ellie, and son, Ronan. He relaxes by fly fishing on the Truckee River for big, wild trout.*

Best Practices for Campus Safety and Security

Source: http://www.centerdigitaled.com/paper/Best-Practices-for-Campus-Safety-and-Security.html?promo_code=Newsletter_ContentSubstitution_TextLink_Govtech

Up-to-date technologies are vital for maintaining a high level of campus security and emergency response capability. But do educators and public safety officials have confidence in the security-related technology on their campuses?

CDE set to find out with two surveys: one with educator respondents from K-12 and college campuses and one with public safety official respondents.

Find out the results – and get guidance on deployment and planning of security preparation and emergency response – in this white paper.

The individualisation of radical Islam in Britain

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/07/the-individualisation-of-radical-islam.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+terrorismwatch%2FJTvK+%28Terrorism+Watch%29

An alleged Islamist plot, dubbed "Trojan Horse", seeking to bring hardline practices into Birmingham's schools, has stoked fears that Islamic fundamentalists in Britain are cultivating a new generation of radicals. The prime minister, David Cameron, responded by calling on schools to promote purportedly "British values": freedom, tolerance, personal and social responsibility, and the rule of law.

The episode has fuelled Islamophobia, with Myriam Francois-Cerrah alleging that the discourse on British values "smacks of neo-imperialism and casts British Muslims as subordinate to white, secular liberal Britons". It has also ignited a cultural battle against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the UK. To reverse this trend, however, it is important to understand the reshaping of Islam in Britain and how this has led some young British Muslims to wage jihad in Syria and Iraq.

Multiculturalism

Muslims have been arriving on Britain's shores for decades. The majority were subjects in the Indian subcontinent of the British raj—a

governance system, based on communalism, which drew Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims into open conflict. When British rule

ended, Muslims began to migrate *en masse* to the UK, where the segregated experience of the Muslim community under the raj was replicated. The creation of a multicultural polity allowed Britain to appear tolerant by showering Muslims with rights while segregating them from the rest of British society, rather than pursuing integration.

Multiculturalism thus created a semi-secluded Muslim community.

The UK media have engendered the notion that the supposed values of a British-Muslim, religion-based culture are incompatible with what is deemed to be western society. There is a confusion, however, between Islam as a religion and "Muslim culture". A religion is usually embedded in one or more cultures, but cannot be reduced to a single culture; this is why Islamic fundamentalists seek to define a 'pure' religion untouched by culture.

The role of Islam in shaping contemporary societies has been overemphasised: the faith itself is becoming westernised or even globalised. And the perceived opposition between British and Islamic values is biased, because British values are perceived as being consensual among all Britons bar the Muslim community. Cameron has failed to realise that the UK holds no monopoly over these universal values, to which all human beings—including British Muslims—can and should adhere.

We must now consider Islam a western religion, due to the second- and third-generation Muslim population which has taken root in the west. The fading of mental borders is not just a consequence of immigration but is linked with a more general deterritorialisation: Islam is less and less ascribed to a specific place. This deterritorialisation has led to a quest for definition by the individual believer— what it means to be a Muslim living as part of a minority in the UK.

That journey may lead towards liberalism but it can also end in fundamentalist rejection of British society. In both cases, however, the process is individual, not collective. 'Re-Islamisation' never occurs through the social pressure of the family or community but as the result of an individual quest, which often leads to an encounter with a radical preacher at a local mosque or websites propagating militant Islamist ideology.

The fluidity of Islam and the absence of a hierarchy of authority within it have made the religion very easy for fundamentalists to manipulate. They target individual British Muslims rather than communities for the simple reason that they have no political or social project, only the implementation of sharia. Islamic fundamentalism has a strong appeal among disenfranchised, second-generation Muslims as it addresses individuals who have doubts about their faith and identity. It offers a way for believers to break from the bonds of family and religious institutions, and encourages a personal return to the "true" tenets of Islam.

For hundreds of British Muslims, their individual journey has taken them to Syria and Iraq as combatants of the jihad. There are now fears of a blowback from the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars, with fighters returning to the UK even more radicalised. Britain experienced a similar phenomenon after the Soviet war in Afghanistan, when London became a centre of radicalisation due to the number of "Afghan veterans" who settled there.

Breaking the monopoly

To combat the radical narrative, Britain must realise that the battle isn't with religion, but with the ideas that are driving people to extremism. The war of ideas is a delicate phenomenon: many who get involved in extremism do so out of a desire to "do right", whilst others struggle to distinguish between credible and non-credible sources of religious scholarship.

To navigate Muslims away from the path of fundamentalism, the Muslim community must break the monopoly of older, foreign-born imams over UK mosques—the growing generation gap has disconnected and alienated many young British mosque-goers. A change of guard is needed, with young liberal imams given the opportunity to gain popularity and influence, not just within mosques but also on the internet. With a stronger presence and a louder voice, these new liberal leaders will act as a visible source of guidance for disaffected British Muslims.

The radical narrative will not simply disappear, however. The socio-cultural issues which are making people receptive to radical ideas when presented to them must be addressed. Britain must assuage the mistrust in the Muslim community stemming from concerns about foreign policy, domestic "counter-terrorism" measures and the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the media.

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Cameron's "British values" approach will ultimately fail to curb radicalisation, as it simply casts undue suspicion on the Muslim community. But if relationships are built with members of that community, rather than demonising it, many young British Muslims will begin to reinvent their faith within a British rather than a fundamentalist context.

The Caliphate in South Asia: A Profile of Hizb-ut Tahrir in Pakistan

By Farhan Zahid

Unlike other radical Islamist organizations in Pakistan, the Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT – Party of Freedom) takes a covert approach to disseminating its Islamist ideology and

agendas. The organization is so secretive that most Pakistanis are not even aware of its existence. HT defines its target audience as senior military officers, civil bureaucrats and professionals, including doctors, engineers, accountants, managers in multi-national corporations and other categories of highly-educated youth.

Founded in Palestine in 1953 by Taqi al-Din Nabhani, a jurist and Islamist cleric who was a former member of Muslim Brotherhood, the HT adheres to the Salafi brand of Islam with the goal of restoring the Islamic Caliphate. The organization could not manage to hold ground in the Middle East and instead took root in Central Asia and the UK, where it became popular amongst British youth of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins.

According to HT defectors, the organization aims to re-establish the Caliphate (abolished in 1924) in one of the Muslim-majority countries, to be followed by the imposition of Shari'a and the unification of all Muslim-majority countries by virtue of conquest, thus reclaiming lost lands and glory. The final stage would be the declaration of war on the Western world. [1] The ideology and strategic plan of HT resemble al-Qaeda but the *modus operandi* of the two entities is different. HT believes neither in democracy nor in revolutionary take-over.

Pakistan is considered a special case by HT. The organization's plan for Pakistan is as follows:

- Recruitment of high-ranking military and civil officers
- Indoctrination of the youth of premier universities (both private and public) with HT ideologies
- The overthrow of the government in a bloodless military coup
- Imposition of Islamic Shari'a and the end of the *kufr* (infidel) system of democracy
- Declaring Pakistan the new Islamic Caliphate
- Spreading the borders of the Caliphate by means of offensive and aggressive jihad
- Reclaiming the lost lands, that is from Spain to Russia and China
- Invading and conquering the "infidel lands." [2]

A nuclear-armed yet poverty-ridden country, with a low literacy rate and history of military coups, Pakistan's situation has led HT to prioritize its efforts in that country.

Bringing military officers into its fold is an important part of HT's strategy. The movement's preference for a military coup as a means of taking power is based on the following factors:

- Pakistan is a nuclear-armed nation with a fast-growing nuclear arsenal

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- Pakistan has a history of military coups (four so far)
- The influence of the armed forces in Pakistan is second to none
- Bureaucracies, both military and civil, are pivotal in controlling and managing the affairs of the country; therefore both have to be cajoled.

HT presented its mission statement for Pakistan in a 2011 monograph, *Return of the Khilafah: A Vision of Pakistan under the Khilafah and how an Islamic Constitution will give rise to Policies of Revival*. [3] The 64-page document outlines the problems of Pakistan, including issues related to revenue collection, electricity generation, inflation, military doctrine, education, ethnic violence in Karachi and a separatist insurgency in Balochistan. *Return of the Khilafah* provides guiding principles for the caliph in the realm of foreign policy, calling for an end to all types of relations with India, the United States and the Western world before framing a policy based upon military brinkmanship. Diplomatic relations with neutral non-Muslim countries would only be established in order to propagate the message of Islam by capitalizing on the prevailing liberal and secular environment in those countries.

The overall focus of HT constitution remains military-centric. Several articles of the constitution emphasize the need for a strong "Islamic Army" capable of spreading the boundaries of the Caliphate from Pakistan into India and Central Asia. The caliph would be the supreme commander of the armed forces.

The military regime of General Pervez Musharraf banned the organization not because it was involved in terrorist or sabotage activities, but rather because it was trying to influence senior military officers (*The News* [Islamabad], February 28, 2013). Unlike the United Kingdom, where HT operates openly, in Pakistan the movement consists of a network of secretive cells, making an understanding of its hierarchy difficult.

The foundations of HT Pakistan were laid in 1999 by Imtiaz Malik, Taimur Butt, Imran Yousafzai, Shahzad Shaikh, Muhammad Irfan, Naveed Butt and Maajid Nawaz. All were Western-educated and had U.S. or UK citizenship. [4] Naveed Butt is currently the HT spokesman for Pakistan. A business graduate of the University of Illinois, Butt works for mobile phone company Motorola in Lahore. Butt came to light in January 2011 when he

issued a videotaped "open letter" to officers of the Pakistan Army. [5] In the provocative letter, Butt explicitly asked Pakistani military officers to rebel against the state: "Oh officers of Pakistan's armed forces! You are leading the largest and the most capable Muslim armed forces in the world… you must move now to uproot Pakistan's traitor rulers." Butt was later picked up by military intelligence.

HT's focus from the beginning has been on recruiting senior military officers and highly educated youth for the purpose of taking over the reins of state in a *coup d'état*. It is estimated that in the last ten years, HT has attempted three times to penetrate the Pakistan Army (*Dawn* [Karachi], October 2012). In 2003, HT recruited 13 officers of Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG), an elite Special Forces unit. All were subsequently court-martialed. In 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Shahid Bashir was court-martialed on the same charges. Bashir was recruited along with Brigadier Ali Khan, whose identity Bashir managed to protect until Khan's arrest by military police in 2012.

Before his arrest, Khan was successful in recruiting and radicalizing fellow officers and had been able to establish a cell of HT-inspired officers in the army. With his arrest, a complete network of HT-tied officers was broken. Others found involved in the network were Major Sohail Akbar, Major Jawad Baseer, Major Inayar Aziz and Major Iftikhar. All were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 18 months to five years (*Dawn* [Karachi], October 29, 2012).

As part of its media campaign, HT Pakistan has been instrumental in organizing workshops and seminars for youth at public and private universities. Several tactics have been adopted to influence the target audience, including:

- Free distribution of books such as Taqi al-Din Nabhani's *The Concept*, which provides HT's Islamic Constitution for the Islamic State
- Disseminating the concept of Caliphate through two-page pamphlets, usually distributed outside mosques after Friday prayers
- Free distribution of booklets, CDs and open letters about the evils of democracy
- Letters and video messages to military chiefs with calls to

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intervene on behalf of the Muslim world [6]

- Social media activities, including the creation of a Facebook open forum attracting more than 1,500 members. The forum is laden with news feeds, videos, articles and HT publications.

Hizb-ut Tahrir and al-Qaeda espouse the same brand of Islam. By creed, both organizations are Salafist. The differences are of tactics, *modi operandi* and, most importantly, the profiles of its members. The people who tend to join HT usually have similar ideological

leanings towards radical Islamism, but because of their educational background and urban sensibilities, they remain reluctant to become involved in active violence. HT's constitution remains silent about the activities of radical Islamists and al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan, almost as if they did not exist. HT members in Pakistan do have pent-up violent tendencies, but being aware of the consequences, their focus remains on seizing the reins of power in a military coup, an activity not very unusual in a Pakistani context.

▶ **Notes can be read at source's URL.**

Farhan Zahid did his PhD in Counter Terrorism (Topic: Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist violent Non-State Actors in Pakistan and their relationship with Islamist Parties) at Vrije University Brussels, Belgium.

Enter ISIS: Why the Iraqi crisis is a growing threat to both global security and energy

Source: http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/white-papers/enter-isis-why-the-iraqi-crisis-is-a-growing-threa/?&shownewswindow=1&mac=DFIQ_Other_SMO_2011&utm_source=DefenceIQ&utm_medium=SMO&utm_campaign=DF_LI_ANN&utm_content=smo&utm_term=smo

THE JOINT CHIEFS
Special Dispatch

ENTER ISIS

WHY THE IRAQI CRISIS IS A
GROWING THREAT TO BOTH
GLOBAL SECURITY & ENERGY

July 2013

Nine months after ISIS declared independence, The Islamic State (IS) as it is now known, established itself as a caliphate under the rule of military commander Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with its capital at the Abbasid city of Ar-Raqqah.

This special feature - a joint publication between Defence IQ and Oil and Gas IQ - explores the impact of the militant group on global security as well as how the insurgency can affect oil prices in the region.

At 140.3 billion barrels, Iraq has the world's fifth largest stock of proven oil reserves and is the second largest producer in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), outputting 3.3 million barrels per day. At about 4% of global supply, the news that Iraq's oil-rich second city, Mosul, was seized by ISIS militants three weeks ago, sent the price of Brent crude to a three-year high of $113.

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Should ISIS manage to roll unimpeded through the Fertile Crescent and reach Iraq's oil hub, do not discount the ensuing chaos pushing oil beyond the $200 dollar mark.

How I was tortured in a Kampala safe house, terror suspect says

Source: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/lifestyle/article/2000127821/how-i-was-tortured-in-a-kampala-safe-house-terror-suspect-says

The National Intelligence Service reportedly raised doubts over the religious convictions of suspects, describing them as Muslims who "preach water while drinking wine". A report seen by The Standard places the late Harun Fazul at the top of the list of terror suspects. Omar Awadh Omar, aka Abu Sahal, comes in

second place. Fazul was linked to a man identified as Bilal El Berjawi and another one listed with only one name, Badrudin, who was described as the head of Al-Qaeda Intelligence in Nairobi. Besides Fazul and Omar were 12 other names, with Jabir and

Mohamed Ali listed as key missing persons. Those on the list are Hussein Hassan Agade aka Gogo; La Tanga aka Prof aka Muhadir (formerly Alex Lishama Agade); Issa Ahmed Luyima aka Abu Zargawi; Sheikh Idriss Magondu aka Doctor (formerly Christopher Magondu); Hijjar Nyamadondo Selemani; Salim Hassan Ali aka Salim King; and Abubakar Batemyeto aka Nsimbi. Others are Hamid Mohamed Suleiman aka Abu Zeinab of Nairobi Cell; Yahya Suleiman Mbuthia aka Yasul; Habib Suleiman Njoroge aka Bibu aka Bibs aka Abu Aiman aka Mzee aka Mzwanda, and lastly Musa Hussein Adbi aka Musa Dheere. Somali forces shot dead Musa Dheere, an explosives expert who used an artificial leg, together with Fazul (who was on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) list of wanted terrorists) at a roadblock in Mogadishu in June 2011. Seven out of those listed in the intelligence report are currently in Uganda's Luzira Maximum Prison facing terrorism and murder charges in Ugandan courts. The document described Omar as a "Nairobi-based second-hand motor vehicle dealer (who) has emerged as the undisputed leader of the Al-Qaeda cell in the region, filling in the void created by the death of fugitive Harun Fazul." The operationally-savvy Omar, the document states, was said to be close to slain preacher Sheikh Aboud Rogo. He is "alleged to have provided accommodation for Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab elements and facilitated travel of foreign recruits to Somalia," the report states.

Omar was accused of co-ordinating the treatment of fighters injured in Somalia, co-ordinating finances and communication links, recruiting and indoctrinating members and supporting planned terrorist attacks. He is further alleged to have provided accommodation for Al-Shabaab suspects Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, Issa Osman Issa and Danish Mohamed Muhudin Gelle aka Jibril. Issa is alleged to have been a key player in the 2002 Kikambala (Mombasa) attack before Omar facilitated his travel to Sudan in 2007. Jibril was arrested in Denmark after a foiled attempt to attack a cartoonist who drew caricatures of Prophet Mohammed that sparked international condemnation by Muslims. Omar is said to have facilitated the travel of foreign recruits to Somalia, namely British nationals Bilal El-Berjawi and Mohammed Sakr, and three Moroccans, Nadane Si Mohamed, Brighit Mohamed and El

Adlani Moulay Abdel Halim, who were arrested in El-Wak before entering Somalia. He also facilitated travel for two Tunisians, Hamza Mohamed Hersi and Ben Mansour Mohamed, and Sudanese Idriss Ibrahim Ali who were arrested in Nairobi's Eastleigh. Omar allegedly co-ordinated the travel and treatment of Ahmed Abdulahi Hassan aka Anas, who was injured while fighting near the presidential palace in Mogadishu in 2009. A Nairobi FBI source said Omar often referred to his Kikuyu errand boys as "my niggers". However, the report fails to provide tangible evidence against most of the suspects who are termed "suspects of the Kikambala bomb attacks", only stating that they are close associates of Omar. The intel brief states that Hamid Mohamed Suleiman "undertakes logistics and runs errands for Omar, including movement of foreign recruits to the Somalia border. Yahya Suleiman Mbuthia and Idriss Magondu run "logistics", while brothers Habib Suleiman Njoroge and Hussein Agade were trained in Somalia and were involved in transporting suicide vests to Kampala. I travelled to Kireka, a city suburb and the place where Omar says he was first taken while in Uganda, where he was briefly detained in safe houses. He claims Uganda's various security and intelligence agencies keep safe houses for undercover operations. "Omar, look around. This is a military barracks. If you move, even to scratch yourself, we won't think twice about shooting you." These are the first words Omar recalls an officer telling him in Kireka. The suspects claim they were moved from one safe house and detention centre to another.

"You can be put in a van and then moved around," a security agent told us. Uganda's methods to extract the "truth" from suspects are told in fear. In some safe houses, suspects are said to be threatened with snakes while others are said to have died from snake bites and other methods of torture. During the interrogations, Omar says he was taken in shackles to face a team of Caucasian interrogators wearing civilian clothes. In court documents, he described the third interrogator as one who seemed "to have considerable knowledge about Kenya and spoke Kiswahili". "I asked the interrogators who they were and in reply one of the white interrogators told me they were from the FBI," Omar claims – even though the man appeared

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to have an English accent. During the questioning, according to court documents, there was also a very muscular white man and a Kenyan officer, whom Omar recognized. No lawyer was present. The quizzing started with Omar being called a terrorist and a bastard. When he complained that the handcuffs were tight, the interrogators tightened them more, causing him extreme pain. "I was forced to sit on a small hard stool which had wheels like a secretary's chair but it had no back so the interrogators pulled me back and forth," he says. "One interrogator would grasp the back of my neck very tightly if he was not satisfied with my answers and drag me around on the stool while clutching my neck," he recalls. The questions he was asked included who he knew in the UK. Omar claims an FBI agent said to him, "It's unfortunate that you are not part of

the group involved in the Kampala bombings, but you are from a more dangerous group," before punching him in the back. The coming days involved more interrogation by a man who sounded like an American but who introduced himself as Ibrahim. "I think you've never tasted a bullet, have you?" A Ugandan officer called Nixon asked Omar when he declined to co-operate with Ibrahim. He then grabbed his head and stuck the gun in his mouth saying, "I expect you to co-operate fully with this man (Ibrahim)." Omar says he was probed about 15 times in 21 days when he was in Kireka. For the first two years, the suspects were moved to various safe houses and detention centers and finally taken to Luzira. During this time, the harsh questioning did not stop and their trial never commenced.

Why Does Hamas Want War?
By Daniel Pipes
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4749/why-does-hamas-want-war

Politicians start wars optimistic about their prospects of gaining from combat, Geoffrey

Blainey notes in his masterly study, *The Causes of War*; otherwise, they would avoid fighting.

Why, then, did Hamas just provoke a war with Israel? Out of nowhere, on June 11 it began launching rockets, shattering a calm in place since November 2012. The mystery of this outburst prompted David Horovitz, editor of the *Times of Israel*, to find that the current fighting has "no remotely credible reason" even to be taking place. And why did the Israeli leadership respond minimally, trying to avoid combat? This although both sides know that Israel's

forces vastly out-match Hamas' in every domain – intelligence gathering, command and control, technology, firepower, domination of air space.

What explains this role reversal? Are Islamists so fanatical that they don't mind losing? Are Zionists too worried about loss of life to fight?

Actually, Hamas leaders are quite rational. Periodically (2006, 2008, 2012), they decide to make war on Israel knowing full well that they will lose on the military battlefield but optimistic about winning in the political arena. Israeli leaders, conversely, assume they will win militarily but fear political defeat – bad press, United Nations resolutions, and so on.

The focus on politics represents a historic shift; the first 25 years of Israel's existence saw repeated challenges to its existence (especially in 1948-49, 1967, and 1973) and no one knew how those wars would turn out. I remember the first day of the 1967 Six-Day War, when the Egyptians proclaimed splendid triumphs while complete Israeli press silence suggested catastrophe. It came as a shock to learn that Israel had scored the greatest victory in the

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annals of warfare. The point is, outcomes were unpredictably decided on the battlefield.

No longer: The battlefield outcome of Arab-Israeli wars in last 40 years have been predictable; everyone knows Israeli forces will prevail. It's more like cops and robbers than warfare. Ironically, this lopsidedness turns attention from winning and losing to morality and politics. Israel's enemies provoke it to kill civilians, whose deaths bring them multiple benefits.

The four conflicts since 2006 have restored Hamas' tarnished reputation for "resistance," built solidarity on the home front, stirred dissent among both Arabs and Jews in Israel, galvanized Palestinians and other Muslims to become suicide bombers, embarrassed non-Islamist Arab leaders, secured new United Nations resolutions bashing Israel, inspired Europeans to impose harsher sanctions on Israel, opened the international Left's spigot of vitriol against the Jewish state, and won additional aid from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The holy grail of political warfare is to win the sympathy of the global Left by presenting oneself as underdog and victim. (From a historic point of view, it bears pointing out, this is very strange: Traditionally, combatants tried to scare the enemy by presenting themselves as fearsome and unstoppable.)

The tactics of this new warfare include presenting a convincingly emotional narrative, citing endorsements of famous personalities, appealing to the conscience, and drawing

simple but powerful political cartoons (Israeli supporters tend to excel at this, both in the past and now). Palestinians get even more creative, developing the twin fraudulent techniques of "fauxtography" for still pictures and "Pallywood" for videos. Israelis used to be complacent about the need for what they call *hasbara*, or getting the message out, but recent years find them more focused on this.

Hilltops, cities, and strategic roadways matter supremely in the Syria and Iraqi civil wars, but morality, proportionality, and justice dominate Arab-Israeli wars. As I wrote during the 2006 Israel-Hamas confrontation, "Solidarity, morale, loyalty, and understanding are the new steel, rubber, oil, and ammunition." Or in 2012: "Opeds have replaced bullets, social media have replaced tanks." More broadly, this is part of the profound change in modern warfare when Western and non-Western forces fight, as in the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Clausewitzian terms, public opinion is the new center of gravity.

All this said, how fares Hamas? Not well. Its battlefield losses since July 8 appear higher than expected and worldwide condemnations of Israel have yet to pour in. Even the Arabic media are relatively quiet. If this pattern holds, Hamas might conclude that raining rockets on Israeli homes is not such a good idea. Indeed, to dissuade it from initiating another assault in a few years, it needs to lose both the military and the political wars, and lose them very badly.

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Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum.

Boko Haram Sinks its Narco Terror Fangs into India

Source: http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/Boko-Haram-Sinks-its-Narco-Terror-Fangs-into-India/2014/07/13/article2327584.ece

Boko Haram is the latest dreaded outfit to slither into India. Riding on the back of the Nigerian drug syndicate, Dawood Ibrahim's proximity with Al-Qaeda and his tentacles in India, the Nigerian outfit which recently triggered worldwide panic by abducting 276 schoolgirls, has penetrated the African drug-cartel operating in India, top Intelligence sources told The Sunday Standard.

The outfit dominates at least seven states of North-Eastern Nigeria and is said to have brutally killed 12,000 innocent people in the last 10 years to establish a global Islamic caliphate. Founded in 2002, the terrorist outfit is using its well-oiled network in Africa and West Asia for drug trafficking to finance it activities. Sources said the Nigerians in India have been under their scanner for drug pushing, but, now they are keeping an eye on the Nigerian

militant outfit exploiting drug syndicates with inputs suggesting that some militants have already joined the network and are involved in narco-terrorism.

"They came on our radar after intelligence input from a friendly country indicated that Dawood Ibrahim's younger brother Anees Ibrahim made several trips to Lagos last year and subsequently met an Al-Qaeda commander close to Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau. D-gang's proximity with the two outfits indicates that militants are now riding on Dawood's well-oiled network in India, Africa and South America to raise terror funds though drug trafficking," sources added.

Dawood, according to a 2010 intelligence report, is procuring drugs from Al Qaeda and in return pumping in huge sums in training and procurement of weapons for hardened terrorists in Taliban controlled camps in Waziristan. Besides Lashkar-e-Taiyaba, Dawood is also financing Al Qaeda's Indian version Al-Qaeda al-Hind (AQAH) to carry out terror activities.

Although a senior official refused to divulge the details on Boko Haram's alleged infiltration arguing "it is too hot at the moment", he indicated that the outfit must have smuggled some of its own cadres in India using D-gang's well-established transit network in Africa and the Gulf. He said in the last three years, intelligence agencies trailed Nigerian cartels operating in Goa and Delhi. Around 900 modules were netted by the security agencies, but majority of them remain elusive. Last year, Goa government had initiated a crackdown on a Nigerian gang. Out of 51 arrested Nigerians, only one person had valid visa and passport. Rest were smuggled in using illegal routes.

"As per the latest intelligence input, around 2100 Nigerians are still missing. We have the information that they entered India using valid documents, but disappeared later. They remain untraceable. There is also an input that around 1,200 Nigerians sneaked in using illegal routes and could be involved in nefarious activities," the official said.

Intelligence suggests that Boko Haram and Al Qaeda control the cocaine route in Central Africa. They facilitate smuggling to various destinations in Asia and Europe with the help of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) and other criminal networks. Intelligence agencies suspect that Goa and Delhi's cocaine racket allegedly controlled by Nigerians is

being protected and supported by D-gang as part of the tacit understanding with the Al Qaeda and the Nigerian outfit.

The agencies fear that Boko Haram, which literally means 'western education is sin' may intensify narco-terrorism to fuel the terror matrix. The outfit known for its brutal method to neutralise non-believers is said to have also raised a fidayeen (suicide) unit to carry out mayhem. Last month, a female suicide bomber of Boko Haram blew herself up near a gas station in Appa district killing several innocent people.

"Such foreign outfits have limited means to strike in unknown territories on their own but definitely they pose a serious threat due to safe haven provided by forces inimical to the country's interest. The crackdown on Nigerian drug cartel is necessary. India had earlier avoided it due to complex diplomatic issues," Intelligence sources said.

Beast unleashed

The Islamist terrorist outfit shot to global limelight after it recently abducted 276 school girls from Chibok to sell them in sexual slavery market in Chad and Cameroon. The outfit was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf to establish a pure Islamic state that would be ruled by Sharia, cleansing non-believers from the face of earth.

Yusuf allegedly received weapons and money from Al Qaeda commander Osama Bin Laden to wage Jihad against western forces and westernized education. The outfit soon took to cocaine smuggling and kidnapping to generate money for its terror activities. The entire central Africa's cocaine route which supplies to Asia and Europe is controlled by the Boko Haram, making it one of the largest Islamist terror outfits with absolute control of the cocaine racket.

The outfit is known for systematically targeting schools in Borno and Yobe states of Nigeria and said to have eliminated over 170 school teachers for defying Sharia. After Boko Haram chief Yusuf was killed in sectarian violence in 2009, his deputy Abubakar Shekau took control and is said to have orchestrated deadly attacks against Nigerian army and Christians in Northern Nigeria. Nicknamed "beast", Shekau, 43, confessed to have enjoyed killing of innocents as he enjoys killing chickens.

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A New 'Caliphate' In Middle East: Is There An Abu Sayyaf-ISIS Link? – Analysis

By Joseph Franco

An audio recording of a purported Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) member pledging support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) was uploaded to YouTube on 24 June 2014. The pledge was made in Arabic and played over jihadist-inspired graphics. The objective of the clip remains unclear.

The month of June also saw major incidents involving the ASG. A top ASG leader, Khair Mundos, who had a US$500,000 bounty on his head, was captured by the police in Manila. Further arrests followed of ASG operatives associated with Mundos involved in plots to kidnap local businessmen in Zamboanga City, a Christian enclave in Mindanao. Thrusting the ASG further into the limelight was a fierce skirmish that resulted in several deaths, including of a junior officer.

The non-ideological heritage of the ASG

Some pundits claim that recent events indicated new links between the ASG and ISIS. Particularly after ISIS declared itself the new "caliphate", henceforth the Islamic State (IS); security stakeholders in Southeast Asia (SEA) especially in countries where militant Islamist groups operate were expectedly concerned. This stems from the popular narrative of how terrorist organisations in the Philippines maintain alliances with groups outside SEA.

While Al Qaeda elements provided seed funding in the early years of the ASG, radicalization based on ideology does not factor heavily for the new ASG recruit. The demise of ASG founder Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, arguably the only ideologue in its history, stunted the group's ideological development. No other ASG faction leader has produced something to complement or rival Janjalani's one written tract, the Jumaah Abu Sayyaf. The few dozen pages of the Jumaah pale in comparison to the voluminous body of literature produced by other extremist Islamist groups such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah.

In the milieu of Mindanao, recruits join the ranks of ASG factions for more practical motivations – to earn ransom money. The ASG, specifically its Sulu-based faction, gained international notoriety when it kidnapped 21 Western tourists in Sipadan Island in 2000. During the protracted captivity of the victims, the average individual, even entire clans, swelled the ranks of the ASG, expecting to benefit from the potential windfall. Once the estimated US$20 million ransom was paid out, another cycle of financially motivated but transitory involvement in the ASG occurred.

For such opportunistic individuals, joining the ASG is a way to monetise their possession of illicit firearms. Mindanao is a region beset with small arms proliferation, where firearm possession is part of a wider gun culture. Decades of conflict allowed the flourishing of an arms black market from captured or diverted government stockpiles. In Sulu alone, international NGOs peg the number of illicit firearms at 100,000. Mindanao's illicit arms surplus had in fact been a major source for Islamist and Christian militias operating in Indonesia's Sulawesi and Ambon. The relationship between small arms smugglers on both sides of Philippine-Indonesia border had been largely transactional, across sectarian lines.

The recent ASG kidnappings in Eastern Malaysia between late 2013 and early 2014, viewed with this more practical perspective, reveals the group's weakness as an ideological movement. ASG had not even attempted to posture the kidnappings as political acts; their profit-making preoccupation overshadowing their ideological moorings.

An Offline ASG in an Online world

The local roots of ASG's continuity go hand-in-hand with its lack of online presence, further disputing assertions of its link to extra-regional groups like ISIS. To date, the ASG has remained an offline organisation. A 2014 Australian study of "neojihadism" in the Philippines followed the activities of three Facebook pages, claiming them as evidence of the online presence of Islamist groups in the Philippines. However, the study itself admits that the pages are mostly passive

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repositories of links to other jihadist websites.

A simple digital ethnography reveals that the audience of all the pages combined amounted to only 15,000 Facebook "likes" – including fake and duplicate accounts – originating from only a single urban centre in Mindanao. The number is dismal considering the Philippines' stature as the "Social Media Capital of the World" with nearly a third of its 100 million-strong population active on Facebook. Moreover, the pages were arguably run by "jihobbyists" — an Internet subculture of young men interested in Islamist content but having neither capabilities nor intent to engage in violence.

The tepid presence of Philippine-based militants is in stark contrast to the more active online jihadists found in the Western context where notorious online "disseminators" propagate global jihadist ideology despite not being officially part of groups like ISIS such as Australian Musa Cerantonio. Curiously, Cerantonio is currently reported to be seeking

refuge in "the mountains of Sulu". The claim remains unconfirmed. Even if it were true, the appeal of the likes of Cerantonio owes much to their take on armed jihad as an individualistic duty, which does not align with the more communitarian social structures of Mindanao. Neither would theological arguments gain traction in communities involved with the ASG because of the primacy of financial motivations.

The importance of context
The ASG remains a localised movement. Its subscription to the jihadist narrative is passive and superficial. It has yet to make its mark in the online world and would unlikely do so in the near future. Thus, state responses should always be aware of and be cautious of quickly ascribing ideological motivations to what essentially are socio-economic issues. The Philippines's social and economic milieu creates distinct dynamics that may be wholly different even from close neighbours like Indonesia or Malaysia.

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Suicide Bombers' Training Den in North Waziristan Unearthed

Source: http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/suicide-bombers-training-den-in-north-waziristan-unearthed-557427

A key facility run by Afghanistan militant group Haqqani network for training the suicide bombers has been unearthed in Pakistan's troubled North Waziristan tribal region, a media report said today.

The Haqqani network militants have been involved in several lethal attacks inside Afghanistan, including deadly strikes on Indian mission in the war torn-country.

The training school was housed in one of the many non-descript buildings at the dead-end of a small street inside Serai Darpakhel in North Waziristan, the Dawn reported.

It was hard to find the iron door of the building and for the unsuspecting outsiders, there was nothing unusual about this

place, except that it was known to all those who lived nearby. "It was a facility to indoctrinate and train suicide bombers," Dawn said.

There is a courtyard with big columns, mats spread out, bed-rolling piled up in one corner and stairs leading to the upper portion painted

AP PHOTO

in light cream and brown colours.

Plastered on one of the walls is a white banner inscribed with Islamic slogans and beneath it 'the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'.

This was one of the five suicide bombing facilities, owned and operated by the Haqqani Network in Serai Darpakhel, frequented by would-be bombers in their teens and twenties.

Most of the visitors were Afghans and Mehsuds but boys from Mohmand and Orakzai tribal region also would turn up for training and attacks.

It was rare that the religious indoctrinators, mentors or those running the centres were

seen outside the iron gate of the building that shielded the dead-end house from the public.

No one living in Serai Darpakhel knew who they were, except that it was a centre for suicide bombers. Those enrolled at the centre were not allowed to step out till the completion of a mandatory two-month training. The centre also would get an undertaking from all "esteshahadi friend" or would-be bombers on a printed form.

"It had a printed colour picture of the would-be bomber, his name, assumed name, father's name, age, address, education, personal contact number, family contact number, family occupation, names of friends and acquaintances, father's past and present political affiliation, the number of members in the family and their monthly income and experience, if any, in militant activities," said Dawn.

And the seven rules the 'esteshahadi friend' were required to live by were pretty stringent too. The use of cell phones were neither allowed nor considered necessary. For two months, neither would the enroller be allowed to go outside nor was he allowed to go out without permission, it read.

He was not allowed to make friends other than his 'fidayi brothers', teachers and mentors. He was supposed to hand-over his personal belongings to the centre in-charge and get things he might need.

The facility implemented a strict regimen of praying, spiritual and religious indoctrination and cooking, locals say.

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Nigeria arrests Boko Haram 'butcher' in restive northeast

Source: http://www.interaksyon.com/article/91280/nigeria-arrests-boko-haram-butcher-in-restive-northeast

Nigerian police on Tuesday said they had arrested a senior Boko Haram Islamist commander known as "Chief Butcher" during a raid on an insurgent camp in the restive northeast.

Mohammed Zakari, 30, was arrested on Saturday "following the massive onslaught by security forces on the activities of the insurgent group", at Balmo Forest in Bauchi state, a statement said.

Zakari was implicated in "the recent slaughter of seven people, including women and children," it added.
According to police, Balmo Forest is one of several bases scattered across the bushlands of the northeast used by the extremist group blamed for killing more than 10,000 people during a five-year insurgency.
Bauchi has been attacked repeatedly through the conflict.
Zakari was not widely known as a prominent Islamist leader, but the group's command structure is seen as fractured, including autonomous cells operating across the north headed by individuals who may not report to the group's recognised leaders.
Boko Haram, which wants to create an Islamic state in the north, is nominally headed by Abubakar Shekau, declared a global terrorist by the United States and sanctioned by the UN Security Council.

A Dictionary for Defining Terrorism
By Michael Widlanski
Source: http://www.algemeiner.com/2014/07/15/a-dictionary-for-defining-terrorism/

Westerners often flail away at dangerous enemies or situations because they cannot describe or name them accurately, especially Arab-Islamic terror groups.
Here are some words to remove from usage or to save for very special occasions.

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Militants: This is a term frequently used by CNN, Reuters, the Associated Press, The New York *Times,* and other media, even Fox News. It is a nice way to avoid using "terrorist" for someone who has just blown himself up in a shopping mall or bus or whose organization has unleashed indiscriminate rocket attacks against cities. Reuters, for example, has a policy against using the word "terrorist" because it believes it is opinionated or judgmental. Soon, Reuters will replace "bank robbery" with "large withdrawal." CNN often uses the term "militants," as in: "Israel launched an offensive against militants in Gaza, killing scores of militants who responded by shooting primitive rockets at Israel." This is also a classic example of getting who, what, when, where, why, and how all wrong in one sentence.
Militants, like "gunmen" or "fighters," is a term used to avoid calling murderers and terrorists by their rightful name. "Militants" should be saved for college students who sit-in at the dean's office, whining about not having the Pass-Fail option, or for Detroit labor unions demanding their full pension plans and golf courses as part of a bankruptcy plan. "Gunmen" should be saved for movies, and "fighters" for boxers.

Arab Spring: This is a euphemism coined by superficial journalists and Western leaders to cover up for wishful thinking masquerading as cold analysis. From Fareed Zakaria of CNN and *Time* to Barack Obama of the White House, prominent pundits/politicians claim to see a huge democracy movement in a region drowning in autocracy. In fact, they are witnessing struggles between rival ideologies, religious sects and tribes in the Arab-Islamic sphere, from Tunisia to the Gulf. The heart of democracy is regular elections and possible change, along with minority rights.

Man-made disasters, workplace violence, lone gunmen: These are politically correct and factually inaccurate metaphors used by the Obama Administration to describe the Fort Hood terror attack, the abortive mid-plane bombing attempt over Detroit, and the abortive Times Square bombing, among others.

Political Protest: This is what President Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Susan Rice call the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, the taking of the U.S. Consulate in Libya and the murder-sodomy rape of a U.S. ambassador. It is too bad for President Jimmy Carter that he could not get CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite to describe the Iranian takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran as "political protest."

Abu-Mazen: This is the *kunya* or nickname of PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas, frequently used by Israeli reporters and Western diplomats who should know better. The term "Abu-Mazen" means "father of Mazen," and is an endearing name or honorific used by Arabs to honor the father after the birth of the first son. It is somewhat similar to the Russian patronymic name as when late Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was called Nikita Sergeivich: Nikita the son of Sergei.

Arab women also are often known by a *kunya*, as the famous Egyptian singer Um-Kulthum: mother of Kulthum. Sometimes an Arabic nickname describes the quality of a person or his or her prowess or an organizational nickname or nomme de guerre. The PLO military commander, Khalil al-Wazir was known as "Abu-Jihad" — "father of holy war" because of his job and also because his son's name was Jihad. His wife, Intissar al-Wazir was known as Um-Jihad: Mother of Holy War. Israeli commandos liquidated Abu-Jihad but did not touch the mother or anyone else in the family.

In the case of Mahmoud Abbas, his son Mazen died a long time ago, and his term as leader of the Palestinian National Authority also expired a long time ago. So saying "Palestinian leader Abu-Mazen" is bad for many reasons. It is also like calling Joseph Stalin "Uncle Joe." Israeli reporters and politicians, as well as their Western counterparts, should send the term to the *Never-to-be-Recycled* bin.

Islam, Religion of Peace: There is much linguistic and theological distortion here. It is true that the word Islam in Arabic is related to the word *Salaam*, both words from the root S-L-M, like the Hebrew word *Shalom*, which comes from the root SH-L-M. However, in Arabic grammar, Islam is actually the fourth verbal form that means to "give oneself" or "to submit" to God's will. So much for the linguistics.

As for the theology, Islam is a religion that has gone through several phases, but Islam's formative phase was led by Muhammad, Islam's prophet and general, who forced non-Muslims to convert or die. Yes, Jews often did better under Islam than under medieval Christendom, but not always. Muhammad changed his conduct towards Jews during his life. At first he courted them, but later, Muhammad slaughtered three Jewish tribes in Arabia. True, Islam officially regards Jews and Christians as *ahl al-kitab* "people of the book," but many Islamic leaders have forcibly converted Jews and Christians over the centuries. Anyone who looks at Islamic groups in Sudan, Iran, Nigeria, and even Egypt, sees the harsh face of Islam to non-Muslims. Even when Islamic regimes tolerate Jews and Christians, they also give them a clear second-class status as dhimmi (subject peoples) who often pay a special tax in an Islamic state. Most of the Islamic terrorist groups today use the formative stage of Islam as the inspiration for their movements. They recall Muhammad's phrase: *sabil allah fi-al-seyf* – the path of Allah is by the sword.

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Intifada: This is a word used by Arabs to describe violent and often terroristic battles with Israel. In Arabic, Intifada means "shaking off," like the shaking off of dust or water by an animal. Some Western reporters and PLO chief Yasser Arafat wanted to call any violence against Israel "Intifada" so as to give it a certain cachet and not call it violence or terror. Western media types often said Intifada meant "uprising," but they were wrong. Many Arab commentators and left-wing Israeli pundits tried to suggest that Intifada meant strong spontaneous protest with some rock-throwing but something less than full-scale violence (compare this view to Obama-Clinton use of "political protest").Thousands of Arabs died in the 1987-89 Intifada, more killed by other Arabs, with guns and knives, than by Israelis.

Yasser Arafat tried to attach the name *Intifadat al-Aqsa* (The Al-Aqsa Intifada) to his planned war against Israel, launched after Ariel Sharon putatively "defiled" the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Of course, Sharon never went anywhere near the mosque, and if he had, he would have taken off his shoes, out of respect for the Muslim tradition. Today, Arabs talk of a "third Intifada" or "an electronic intifada," but they are all really expressing a hope for a violent war of attrition or terror campaign against Jews.

Dr. Michael Widlanski is the author of Battle for Our Minds: Western Elites and the Terror Threat*, published by Threshold/ Simon and Schuster. He teaches at Bar-Ilan University , was strategic affairs advisor in Israel 's Ministry of Public Security, and was the Schusterman visiting professor at University of California, Irvine for 2013-14.*

## Terrorism in Latin America: Infographic
By Michael Jensen
Source: http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/terrorism-in-latin-america-infographic/

Editor's note: We've partnered with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) to publish a series of infographics based on data from their Global Terrorism Database and related START projects. Each week we'll release a new set of graphics that depict trends in global terrorism activity. Sign up for the War on the Rocks newsletter to make sure you don't miss any of them!
These graphics were designed by Michael Jensen, William Kammerer, and Brian Wingenroth.

The first graphic shows the most active regions in terms of total number of terrorist attacks since 1970. In the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America was the epicenter of global terrorism. In the first of those two decades, the region experienced more terrorist attacks (17,293) than all other regions combined

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(13,643), and nearly four times as many as the next most active region—Western Europe (4,729).
Terrorist violence in Latin America during this period was driven by the campaigns of a number of secular Marxist/Maoist organizations, most notably the Shining Path in Peru, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Violence dramatically subsided in the mid-1990s, after a number of governments waged successful—and often quite violent—counter-terrorism campaigns. (On a side note, the graphic also shows the tendency of global terrorism to migrate over time. As we see in the chart, global terrorism has migrated from Western Europe in the 1970s, to Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and to the Middle East and South Asia where it currently resides.)
The second graphic is a snapshot of terrorism in Latin America in 2013. Currently, terrorist violence is largely confined to Colombia, where both the FARC and the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) are still quite active. However, while levels of violence

in other countries are small in comparison to Colombia, some still face challenges from armed organizations, namely Peru (remnants of the Shining Path) and Paraguay (Paraguayan People's Army,


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or EPP).

The third graphic shows the six most active countries in Latin America by decade. The region experienced a particularly disproportionate share of terrorist violence in the 1908s. During that decade, 142 countries around the world experienced some level of terrorist activity . However, the six most

active countries in Latin America—Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru—witnessed more attacks (16,004) than the other 136 combined (15,164).

The graphic also illustrates the massive scale of terrorist violence in El Salvador and Peru during the time period. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the two countries, combined, experienced more than 10,000 attacks that caused more than 24,000 fatalities. While violence levels have diminished dramatically in those countries, the threat posed by violent groups in Colombia remains persistent. In fact, the 2010s data includes only four years' worth of activity. If trends continue, Colombia will once again experience more than 1,000 attacks in the decade, making it one of the most active countries in the world.

Twenty Most Active Groups in Latin America, 1970-2013

Source: Global Terrorism Database

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The final graphic (above) displays the 20 most active terrorist groups in Latin America from 1970-2013. As the chart shows, the Shining Path and the FMLN were especially violent organizations at the height of their activity. In fact, the Shining Path still ranks as the world's most violent organization over this period, outpacing the Taliban and the various al-Qa`ida affiliates, even though the group has not been particularly active since the mid-1990s and the lifespans of these groups are generally comparable. The graph also illustrates a common feature of terrorist groups' lifespans: their short duration. Although there are outliers, most organizations do not survive much longer than a decade.

This last graphic also illustrates the notable counter-terrorism successes that the region has experienced. Counter-terrorism in Peru is often cited as the hallmark example of the potential utility of a leadership decapitation strategy. After Peruvian forces captured the Shining Path's leader, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992, the group experienced a sudden and swift decline in activity.

Notes: This graphic is based on preliminary data that is subject to change. 2013 GTD data is not yet available for public download or distribution. It will be released via the GTD website later this summer. Beginning with 2012 data collection, START made several important changes to the GTD collection methodology, improving the efficiency and comprehensiveness of the process. In general, comparisons of aggregate statistics over time and between locations should be interpreted with caution due to these methodological improvements, as well as the considerable variation in the availability of source materials.

Michael Jensen is the data collection manager for the Global Terrorism Database at START.

Boko Haram: A New Type of Terror?

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/07/boko-haram-new-type-terror/

A recently published analysis by IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, offers insights on how to predict future attacks by Islamist militant group Boko Haram. The group, whose name translates to "Western education is sin" in its Hausa language, has been launching attacks primarily in northern Nigeria since 2004. The group's 15 April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from a school in Chibok, Borno State is unlike earlier attacks targeting Nigeria's civilian population in public markets and transportation hubs.

IHS notes that following a May 2013 state of emergency declaration in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, Boko Haram's core operational region, there has been a shift in the group's operation patterns.

First, Boko Haram has increased the attacks directed at ordinary civilians, and its attacks are becoming more lethal. Between January 2010 and March 2013, roughly 2.9 people were killed per attack, while between April 2013 and May 2014, Boko Haram attacks led to 17.7 fatalities per attack. So far in 2014, roughly 27.9 civilians have been killed per attack.

Second, Boko Haram's area of operations has contracted during the past eighteen months, with majority of attacks between 2013 and early 2014 carried out in Borno State, where the group originated. The group has managed to stage some attacks in central Nigeria, including an April attack in the capital, Abuja, and a May attack in Jos. Attacks outside of Boko Haram's area of operations tend to be bombings, suggesting that the group's ability to mount assaults, ambushes, and other guerrilla operations is limited to its northeast strong hold.

IHS reports that attacks on secular schools did not occur until 2012; eight years after the group's first attack, and are largely a response to the population's cooperation with the government's counter-terror efforts, and specifically to the participation of local youths in government-backed anti-Boko Haram vigilante groups. Attacks on students resulted in mass killings at dormitories and male students were generally the targets. A 29 September 2013 attack in the College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe resulted in at least ninety deaths when militants attacked four male dormitories while sparing the single female dormitory on campus. The Chibok abduction, directed at female students, led analysts to believe **that additional factors might have motivated the operation.**

The May 2013 state of emergency in Borno State pushed Boko Haram into remote bush camps, including those in the Sambisa Forest. **The abduction of girls in Chibok could have been motivated by the need to find orderlies and wives to make it easier for the fighters to sustain life in the forest.** Similar motives have led to mass abductions of girls by other militant groups like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. Should this be the motivation, analysts believe that Boko Haram foresees its immediate future as a rural guerrilla movement, and that Boko Haram camps are sufficient and secure enough to accommodate both fighters and non- fighters such as the abducted girls.

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Don't Put Terrorists on Trial
By Daniel Pipes
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4751/dont-put-terrorists-on-trial

The Obama administration has brought an accused Libyan terrorist named Ahmed Abu Khattala to Washington for trial. His saga reveals how the government views the Islamist threat, and it's discouraging. Fortunately, a much better alternative exists.

Abu Khattala stands accused of taking part in the murder of an ambassador and three other Americans in Benghazi in September 2012. After an achingly slow investigation, during which time the suspect lived in the open and defiantly gave media interviews, the American military seized him on June 15. After being transported by sea and air to Washington, D.C., Abu Khattala was jailed, provided with a defense attorney, Michelle Peterson, indicted, arraigned, and, after listening to an Arabic translation of the proceedings, pleaded not guilty to a single charge of conspiracy and requested a halal diet. He potentially faces life in prison.

An artist's rendering of Abu Khattala at his June 28 hearing at the federal U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C.

This scenario presents two problems. First, Abu Khattala enjoys the full panoply of protections

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offered by the U.S. legal system (he actually was read his *Miranda* rights, meaning his right to stay silent and to consult with a lawyer), making conviction uncertain. As the *New York Times* explains, proving the charges against him will be "particularly challenging" because of the circumstances of the attacks, which took place in the midst of a civil war and in a country brimming with hostility to the United States, where concerns about security meant that U.S. law investigators had to wait for weeks to go to the crime scenes to collect evidence, and the prosecution depends on testimony from Libyan witnesses brought over to the United States who may well falter under cross-examination.

Secondly, what good does a conviction bring? If all goes well, a minor operative will be taken out of commission, leaving the ideological sources, the funding apparatus, the command and control structure, and the terrorist network untouched. A years-long, cumbersome, expensive, and draining effort will prove a point, not damage the enemy. If Abu Khattala is convicted, administration officials can crow but Americans will be only marginally safer.

This futility recalls the 1990s, when terrorist attacks were routinely treated as criminal incidents and handled in courts of law, rather than as warfare to be dealt with using military force. In response, I complained in 1998 that the U.S. government saw terrorist violence "not as the ideological war it is, but as a sequence of discrete criminal incidents," a mistaken approach that turns the U.S. military "into a sort of global police force and requires it to have an unrealistically high level of certainty before it can go into action," requiring it to collect evidence of the sort that can stand up in a U.S. court of justice.

George W. Bush discarded the criminal paradigm when he dramatically declared a "war against terrorism" in the evening of 9/11. While that is a clumsy phrase (how can one make war on a tactic?), what became known as the Bush Doctrine had the great benefit of declaring war – as opposed to a police action – on those attacking Americans. But now, 13 years later and in part because of the success of this war, the Obama administration has reverted to the pre-9/11 approach of apprehending criminals.

Instead of this, the U.S. response to terrorist attacks on Americans citizens should be immediate and lethal. As I wrote 16 years ago, "anyone who harms Americans should

know that retribution will be certain and nasty. … When reasonable evidence points to Middle Eastern terrorists having harmed Americans, U.S. military force should be deployed. If the perpetrator is not precisely known, then punish those who are known to harbor terrorists. Go after governments and organizations that support terrorism, not just individuals."

Skip the fine-grain analysis of who carried out the attack. Security depends not on complex court procedures, but on a record of U.S. deterrence established by "years of terrible retribution against anyone who so much as harms a single American citizen." Enemies must expect to face the full fury of the United States when they harm its citizens, thereby dissuading them from committing such attacks in future.

American taxpayers turn over $3 trillion a year to the federal government and in return expect to be protected from foreign threats. This holds doubly for citizens who venture abroad on behalf of their country, such as the four embassy personnel killed in Benghazi.

Crimes require rules of evidence, *Miranda* rights, lawyers, judges and juries. Warfare requires full-throated retaliation by the American military.

Mr. Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Perhaps this is the case with pirates off shore Somalia captured in action. In 2011 total cost of prosecutions was $16,4 million; in 2012 procecutions and imprisonment costed $14,89 million. So what? When you are starving to death, imprisonment might be a safer alternative…

GREECE – Terror fugitive arrested in Athens shootout

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2694229/Terror-fugitive-arrested-Athens-shootout.html

July 16 – Greek police arrested one of the country's most wanted men — a fugitive convicted of terrorism — during a shootout Wednesday in Athens' central tourist district that left four people wounded, authorities said.

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It was not immediately clear how the lunchtime shootout began in the crowded Monastiraki district, near the city's main Syntagma Square and historic Plaka district.

Police said the wounded included Nikos Maziotis, who has been on the run along with his wife Panagiota Roupa since 2012 following their release from jail after serving the maximum 18 months in pre-trial detention. Maziotis was being treated in a central Athens hospital under heavy police guard.

Maziotis and Roupa were convicted in absentia last year and sentenced to 25 years for participation in Revolutionary Struggle, a group active between 2003 and 2009 and best known for firing a rocket-

propelled grenade into the U.S. Embassy and bombing the Athens Stock Exchange. Neither of those attacks caused injuries.

Photographs obtained by The Associated Press showed the suspect lying in a pool of blood on a sidewalk, before he was taken in a police-escorted ambulance to a nearby state hospital.

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In January, authorities announced a 1 million-euro ($1.3 million) reward for information leading to each of the couple's arrest.

Police said the others wounded were a police officer and two bystanders, both foreign tourists. Witnesses at the scene told the AP that an Australian tourist was lightly wounded in the leg (bottom photo).

"The whole thing lasted about half an hour. We saw a lot of police running through the streets and later we heard the shots," souvenir store employee Makis Tourounias said.

"There wasn't much panic. Store owners and police were telling people to come indoors. But not everyone realized what was going on."

Islamic State (ISIS): The Islamic Caliphate, An Invisible Shura and A New Slate for Jihadist

Source: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/islamic-state-isis-islamic-caliphate-invisible-shura-and-new-slate-jihadist

Maps of pledges of support by groups and individuals

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
▶ **Read more at source's URL.**

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Will Afghanistan be the new Iraq?

By Jean MacKenzie

Source: http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140715/will-afghanistan-be-the-new-iraq

July 15 – It's now been more than a month since Islamic State extremists swept through northern Iraq, gaining large swaths of territory, a huge chunk of cash, and the dangerous mystique of an unstoppable force.

The United States has watched the spectacle with horror as a country that claimed 4,500 American lives and more than $2 trillion all but collapsed.

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, a bitterly contested presidential election had precipitated a major political crisis. Until Secretary of State John Kerry rushed in to save the day over the weekend, the specter of civil war loomed in the background.

This, said President Barack Obama in May, "is how wars end in the 21st century."

But these "ends" look an awful lot like beginnings.

Now that Obama has made clear that all troops will leave Afghanistan by the time he leaves office — at the end of 2016 — the pundits are busy predicting the consequences. It's too soon, they say; it's too rash. Abandoning Afghanistan will bring disaster in its wake, they say. Look what's happening with the Islamic State in Iraq.

One question keeps surfacing: Will Afghanistan go the way of Iraq?

The pessimists — and those who want to put the blame for the mess squarely on Obama — have no doubt that it will.

"Before Sept. 11, our enemies controlled one nation. Now they will control two — one Islamic caliphate in Iraq controlled by ISIS, and another in Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban and core Al Qaeda," Marc Thiessen, political commentator and former speechwriter for Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, wrote in The Washington Post.

ISIS and ISIL are acronyms for the Islamic State extremists fighting in Iraq and Syria. Al Qaeda disavowed ties to them in February.

There are certainly grounds for concern about Afghanistan's future. But the danger of "core Al Qaeda" forming a caliphate, a la the Islamic State, is not one of them.

To paraphrase Russian writer Leo Tolstoy, "All happy countries are alike, while each unhappy country is unhappy in its own way."

While Iraq's crisis has all the elements to push it front and center — radical Islamists bent on taking over large swaths of territory, mass executions, the threat of regional involvement, and dark hints of retribution against the West — the conflict in Afghanistan is all too depressingly familiar.

Election fraud is hardly a headline-grabber, and the back-and-forth with the Taliban has been going on for so long that it barely registers in the public consciousness.

"It's been the same conversations going on for years," said Alex Strick van Linschoten, co-author of several books on Afghanistan and the Taliban. "The West has given up on Afghanistan."

Even when something significant does happen it receives scant attention. The Taliban recently took large chunks of northern Helmand, a key southern province and the center of Afghanistan's thriving poppy industry.

Still, the word out of Washington, and even from US forces in the field, is relentlessly upbeat.

"Everything I see, sir, is good news," said Army Gen. John F. Campbell, whom the president nominated this month to be the new commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. He was speaking to a skeptical Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearings Thursday. "I'm looking forward to getting over there, and I think we're on a positive path right now."

Officials can try all they like to paint a rosy picture, but they cannot change the reality on the ground, says Frank Ledwidge, a former British military intelligence officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and who's authored two books on his government's engagement in both countries.

"The US is lying about the capabilities of the security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan," he said. "The truth is that the ANA [Afghan National Army] is not capable of holding on without NATO assistance. This is a defeat of such a nature that it cannot be spun; it can only be hidden."

But even if the Afghan security forces are as bad as Ledwidge says they are, does it matter?

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"In Afghanistan there is not the same problem with spillover; there are fewer repercussions for US national security," said Shadi Hamid, fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of "Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East."

"This cannot be said of Iraq and Syria, which undermine stability on a regional level," he added.

The Taliban, despite Thiessen's dire warnings, is not Al Qaeda.

Taliban leader Mullah Omar did provide refuge for Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, but Omar and his movement lived to regret that act of hospitality. News reports from 2001 make clear that the Talban was searching for a face-saving way of handing over Osama, but the George W. Bush administration was having none of it.

"We know he's guilty. Turn him over," was the response to Taliban pleas for evidence.

This lack of flexibility got the US bogged down in a seemingly endless war with a fairly murky mission.

In 2009, a newly inaugurated President Obama addressed the issue in a policy speech.

"I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future," he said.

By 2010 CIA Director Leon Panetta estimated that there were no more than 50 to 100 Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan — at a time when the US had close to 100,000 troops on the ground.

"That's what you call asymmetric warfare," laughed Ledwidge.

Four years later, the likely new NATO commander, General "Good news" Campbell, is still pursuing the same strategic objective.

"The US presence in Afghanistan aims to defeat Al Qaeda and its affiliates," he wrote in response to advance questions from the Senate.

But the Taliban has never really been an Al Qaeda affiliate, Strick van Linschoten argues. In his book "An Enemy We Created," written with co-author Felix Kuehn, he posits that "the issue of international terrorism from within Afghanistan's borders may not necessarily be as big a potential problem as is currently believed."

This is because the Taliban and Al Qaeda have never really seen eye to eye. The Afghan Taliban has a much narrower focus,

van Linschoten says, and is not bent on global jihad.

"The Taliban just want their Islamic Emirate of the 1990s back," says Anand Gopal, journalist and author of a new book on the war in Afghanistan, "No Good Men Among the Living," which largely supports van Linschoten's thesis. Core Al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan, Gopal argues. "If you want to join Al Qaeda there is Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia," he said. "Why go to Afghanistan?"

There are many surface similarities between Afghanistan and Iraq. Both countries have been put back together after US-led invasions toppled their retrograde regimes, replacing them with administrations more to the West's liking. This has not worked out uniformly well.

In Iraq, the Shia government has vented decades' worth of anger and frustration on the Sunnis, who had traditionally led the country.

The US-mandated process of de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army, now seen as among the biggest mistakes of the war, created large pools of disaffected armed men who provided fertile ground for extremist Islamic State recruitment.

In Afghanistan, the US-installed government of President Hamid Karzai has unleashed such a flood of corruption that it has largely lost the people's trust.

The billions in assistance money is routinely pillaged, ending up in Dubai or other financial capitals, and the judiciary is so compromised that many people prefer to take their chances with tribal or even Taliban courts.

The US has been unable to do much about it, despite years of anti-corruption projects that have been deemed largely ineffectual even by the US' own watchdog on Afghanistan.

Some observers wonder whether the results have been worth the cost.

If van Linschoten and Gopal are correct, the insurgency in Afghanistan is largely a product of American missteps. Heavy-handed counter-terrorism operations, often directed at the wrong targets, or involving civilians, have contributed to radicalizing some segments of the population.

"If the Taliban are now a little bit like Al Qaeda it's because we have made them that way," van Linschoten said.

In Iraq the irony is even starker.

The US began its "shock and awe" campaign in 2003 to keep Saddam Hussein's mythical

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weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of equally spurious Al Qaeda-linked terrorists.

Last week, the press reported that the Islamic State group had seized nuclear materials from university science facilities near Mosul. United Nations and US officials say the grade and quantity of the materials taken is not sufficient to build a bomb.

Still, it is cause for concern.

"Such materials can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction," Iraq's ambassador to the UN, Mohamed Ali Alhakim, wrote in a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

"Ten years ago we invaded Iraq to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists," said Paul Fishstein, independent consultant and the former head of Kabul's Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit. "In the process we so destabilized the country that we may have actually brought about the very thing we were trying to combat."

Jean MacKenzie spent seven years in Afghanistan, where she worked as a journalist trainer at the Institute of War & Peace Reporting and served as senior correspondent for GlobalPost.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: I just love silly questions!!! (but this article is good!)

Proven approach to stop sectarian violence in Iraq
By David Leffler
Source: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/210118-proven-approach-to-stop-sectarian-violence-in-iraq

Editor's note: "The Hill is a top US political website, read by the White House and more lawmakers than any other site -- vital for policy, politics and election campaigns."

With regard to growing sectarian violence in Iraq, President Barack Obama recently said, "I don't rule out anything," and "my national security team is looking at all the options."

If Obama is sincere, then he should consider Invincible Defense Technology (IDT), a scientifically-validated approach to effectively, efficiently, and quickly end the turmoil. If he has the political will to suggest that the Iraqi military deploy this approach, and they agree, it will no longer be necessary to base defense plans on guesses.

This IDT approach to reducing stress and violence is already part of the training of America's future commanders at Norwich University, and has been field-tested by foreign militaries. It is validated by 23 peer-reviewed studies carried out in both developed and developing nations. They include the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Independent scientists and scholars endorse it, based on 25 years of research.

IDT uniquely neutralizes the power base of insurgent groups, which is the stress, frustration and civil unrest prevailing in the general population. By eliminating the root cause of insurgency, violent outbreaks are pre-empted and prevented. IDT is effective because it gets to the heart of the matter. Insurgency often thrives in nations in which decades or even centuries of under-employment, poverty, and hunger have created a huge societal weight of stress, frustration and unhappiness. This leads to civil unrest, social violence, and a downward spiral of economic degradation.

A specially trained military unit called a Prevention Wing of the Military uses IDT to reduce stress in the national collective consciousness. As the stress and frustration ease, the population is more capable of finding orderly and constructive solutions to their problems.

Entrepreneurship and individual creativity increase. With increased intelligence, people's aspirations are raised and a more productive and balanced society emerges. Such a society abhors violence as a means for change or as an expression of discontent. And so the ground for terrorism is eliminated.

What is more fascinating is that this change takes place within a few days or weeks after IDT is introduced. The changes are measurable from such statistics as crime rates, accidents, hospital admissions, infant mortality, etc.

The IDT soldier's daily routine includes the practice of the Transcendental Meditation program and its advanced TM-Sidhi program. As a societal coherence-creating military

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unit, they practice these programs twice a day, seven days a week, preferably in a secure location near the targeted population. Their presence and deep-field influence operation need not be disclosed to achieve the effect of violence reduction and conflict resolution.

Such coherence-creating groups have achieved positive benefits to society, shown statistically, in even just 48 hours. Modern statistical methods used in this research preclude chance or coincidence.

The IDT approach has been used during wartime, resulting in reduction of fighting and in number of deaths and casualties, and in progress toward resolving the conflict peacefully.

A New Role for the Military: Preventing Enemies from Arising—

Reviving an Ancient Approach to Peace

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Societies applying IDT perform extremely well in a very short time. This is what decreased the intensity of war in Lebanon in 1984 in a dramatic way in 48 hours, to name only one of the successful experiments.

Read full paper at:
http://www.davidleffler.com/preventing-enemies.html

In 1992, the Mozambique military carefully analyzed the IDT research and decided to try it. As predicted, violence disappeared by 1993 and Mozambique become more self-sufficient. The economic growth reached 19 percent. Once the poorest world country in 1992, by 2000, it had moved up to be the world's fastest-growing economy.

In summary, IDT works by deploying human resources, and utilizing the human brain mechanics, the most powerful natural resource possessed by every nation on earth. The positive transformational effects of IDT have been statistically proven numerous times to decrease and prevent violence and terrorism, and boost the economy. This defense technology supersedes all other known defense technologies (which are based on electronic, chemical, and/or nuclear forces). The military that deploys this powerful human-resource-based technology disallows negative trends and prevents enemies from arising, and as a result, it has no enemies. No enemies means no terrorism and no insurgency.

If Obama requests that Iraq establish Prevention Wings of the Military, it will ease high tensions and prevent further unrest. Extensive scientific research objectively says, "Yes, the approach works." Why not use it for Iraq? Why not use it for the United States, too? Time is running out. The best time to act is now before the situation worsens.

David Leffler, executive director at the Center for Advanced Military Science, is the author of "A New Role for the Military: Preventing Enemies from Arising - Reviving an Ancient Approach to Peace."

▶ **Read his publications at:** http://www.invinciblemilitary.org/articles/dr-david-leffler-publications.html

Preventing Future *Boko Haram* Attacks

By Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Kulwant Singh and Dr. David Leffler
Source: http://www.invinciblemilitary.org/preventing-future-boko-haram-attacks.html

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tV, *Global Village Extra*, Olosho, *African Herald Express*, *Eagle Reporters*, *Ionigeria*, Stephanieoba Blogspot, Extract News, *Daily Review*, Gurus Fans, *Nigeria World*, *Recent Gist*, *Nigeria Newspapers Online*, *TMG APP*, *Nigeria News*, *STFELOBENblog*, *Editorial Nigeria*, *Ikpenistephenblog*, Nigeria Daily Newspapers, *In Depth Africa*, *Guruzwap*, *The Will Nigeria*, *Yohaig*, *Daily Newswatch*, *Ultimate News*, *Retro Gidi*, *The Nation*, Naija Standard Newspaper, Real News**,** *Naija Shine* **CAMEROON:** *The Standard Tribune*, **ERITREA**: *Harnnet.org* (The Official Eritrean People's Democratic Party Website) **SOMALIA:** *Mareeg* **GHANA:** *Spy Ghana* **INDIA:** *Scoop News*, *Indian Muslim Observer* **IRELAND**: *The Street Journal* **LIBERIA:** *The Liberian Dialogue* **AFRICA:** *Africa Metros* **WORLDSERVICE**: *News + Rescue, Coker Confidential, Joints Area* **UNITED STATES**: (Washington, D.C.) *Africa News Cicle*, *OpEdNews* **ISRAEL**: *MEPeace* (Middle East Peace), **UNITED KINGDOM**: (London) *The News Chronicle,* *MiracMedia*

Featured in: *News Uganda, *Africa Press Review*, *Bloglovin*, *Gaafo*, *Revolutionary Wellbeing*, *Inagist*, *Africa News Hub*, Nigeria Headlines, Mathsvillage, *Nigeria Tell*, *Nigeria Sun*, *Uguma Monjok's Blog*, NewsRIB, *Nigeria News Stand*, Kaaf BulkNews, *Lynkly* (Libya) *News247*, *Nigeria Bulletin*, *News Kenya*, *African Headline Nigeria*, *Toovia*, *Nice World News*, *In A Gist* Naijo *2*, *3*, *4*, *Bepa Zimbabwe*, *OCCUWORLD Global Occupied News* and *Sierra Leone Times*.

Violence and conflict have plagued mankind throughout history, and the terrorist attacks by *Boko Haram* are just a current manifestation. How can Nigeria protect itself from future attacks? Ideally, the best way to guard against emerging terrorist threats would be to have no enemies. No enemies = no terrorism! An unfamiliar but effective human resource-based approach called Invincible Defence Technology would help the military of Nigeria to begin creating a lasting peace by preventing such enemies from arising, both internally and externally.

Invincible Defence Technology (IDT) is a scientifically validated solution to conflict and violence. There are over 50 published studies confirming its effectiveness. This recently revived method of preventive defense promises to end terrorism and conflict. Its adoption in Nigeria can set an example of peace-based defense for the rest of the world - something all military leaders would value.

Militaries have tried to quell violence and conflict through a dynamic approach, i.e., with weaponry and military personnel. But, interestingly, even with advanced weapons, they cannot eliminate problems like terrorism. New terrorist threats constantly emerge, and the number of terrorist cadres and cells continues to grow. Even with more fully equipped police and paramilitary forces, militaries cannot eradicate them. More alarming, defense experts predict that terrorists will soon start using portable, easily concealed weapons of mass destruction to launch their attacks around the world. Imagine the dire ramifications for Nigeria if a dangerous terrorist group like *Boko Haram* could obtain such devastating weaponry.

War, conflict, violence and terrorism are human problems. They require a human solution
So the question remains: Can war and terrorism be prevented with the military methods used in the past? Again and again, history shows that the answer is "no." War, conflict, violence and terrorism are human problems. Therefore, they require a human solution. Their underlying cause is accumulated stress in society's collective consciousness. If the collective consciousness is full of tension and fear, then disorder is more likely to erupt into some specific act of violence than if the prevailing mood is one of contentment. Social injustice and unfavorable economic conditions thrive in and contribute to chaotic environments. Unresolved religious, territorial, political, and cultural differences further add to the unrest.

A dissatisfied and frustrated population contributes to its own instability
Thus, a dissatisfied and frustrated population contributes to its own instability. The buildup of this sort of tension is dangerous to any nation's sovereignty, producing an unstable government that is prone to war. However, if the collective social stress driving these problems is prevented, negative manifestations would cease. Thus, zero collective stress ultimately means no war and no terrorism.

Invincible Defense Technology is rooted in the ancient Vedic knowledge of India, which describes the best approach to prevention as *Heyam duhkham anagatam* (*Yoga-Sutra*

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2.16): "Avert the danger before it arises." Similarly, *Yoga-Sutra* 2.35 affirms *Tat sannidhau vairatyagah*: "In the vicinity of Yogic influence - unifying influence, integrating influence, coherent and harmonious influence - conflicting tendencies do not arise." These ancient principles were effectively applied in past, and they have already been successfully applied in today's world, with commendable results.

According to Vedic tradition, conflict results from ignorance - ignorance of how to prevent the buildup of collective stress through the harmonizing influence of coherence. For example, the *Ramayana* states that "...ignorance will have no access within eight miles from [the Yogi's hermitage]." The *Ramayana* describes the ancient city of Ayodhya, whose name means "Invincible." Certainly, Ayodhya relied on the conventional defense technologies of its time. For instance, "It was enclosed by strong fortifications and a deep moat, which no enemy, by any expedient whatsoever, could penetrate." Also, "Ayodhya abounded in warriors undefeated in battle, fearless and skilled in the use of arms, resembling lions guarding their mountain caves." However, the descriptions of the enlightened, stress-free life of the inhabitants of Ayodhya indicate that its first line of defense was the city's freedom from collective stress. According to the *Ramayana*, this low stress level, based on life in harmony with Natural Law, made Ayodhya worthy of its name.

In today's modern cities, however, social stress gets generated by countless violations of natural laws (i.e., crimes are committed every day). People's weakness results in an inability to find positive and life-supporting ways to fulfill their desires. Crime contributes to a growing cloud of negativity for a city and for a nation. When the stress from crime, frustration, unhappiness and lack of national fulfillment grows beyond a certain limit it spontaneously erupts into terrorism and war. Therefore, ignorance, or lack of understanding of how to act in accord Natural Law, is responsible for suffering in human affairs.

Military personnel in USA, Latin America, Asia, and Africa practice group Transcendental Meditation to increase their performance and resilience better helping them protect their nations

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Implementing Ideal National Defense

Maharishi Mahesh Yogi revived the practical components of this silent approach for national defense. They are all-known around the world as the Transcendental Meditation® and TM-Sidhi® program. These programs are evidenced-based solutions, with a substantial amount of published, peer-reviewed research that has accumulated since 1970. Because they are human resource-based technologies, they are easy to implement and practice. It is important to note that they do not involve religious belief or practices. Members of many faiths worldwide have practiced these meditation techniques. Extensive scientific research documents the ability of the TM and TM-Sidhi program to dissolve stress on the individual and collective levels.

Could the ideal of Ayodhya's preventive defense again be accomplished by militaries today? Yes! It is already starting to happen now. Military-related leaders in the USA, Latin America, and Africa, are applying TM because peer-reviewed scientific papers have confirmed that regular practice produces many other wide-ranging, measurable benefits. These include increased intelligence, creativity; reduced stress and improved health; and more fulfilling and harmonious interpersonal relationships. Most importantly to warriors, TM increases resilience, mental clarity and physical strength as well enhancing mind-body coordination (See *Defence and Security Alert*, Vol. 4, Issue No. 8, pages 34-39). Also, from a practical standpoint, the TM program is easy to do and has no religious philosophy attached. For nearly sixty years it has been taught to millions of people (including schoolchildren and their teachers) around the world from every race, cultural background, religion, ethnicity and educational background.

Are soldiers willing participants in such an unusual endeavor? Again, yes! A study was conducted by Ecuadorian army psychologists to assess the value of the IDT preventive defense program after its soldiers had been practicing it for one month. The results? Over 96% of the soldiers thought it was a very practical activity. Why are these warriors convinced? As the study showed, 92% felt their performance in activity had improved and they were better able to deal with stress; 96% declared their relationships with others had improved; and 95% said their practice of IDT was completely satisfying.

The operative part of IDT requires having a Prevention Wing of the military. This wing is comprised of a small portion of the armed forces of a country. The rest of the military carries on with their usual duties. The Prevention Wing of the military creates societal coherence by practicing the TM and TM-Sidhi program in large groups morning and evening. Their collective practice produces positive benefits for both themselves and their adversaries. Peaceful overtures increase from all sides.

Similar coherence-creating groups have been deployed in many war zones and conflict-prone areas with great success. Extensive scientific research indicates that when the square root of 1% of the population practices the advanced TM-Sidhi program in a group, a "field effect" is created. Scientists call this field effect the "Maharishi Effect." Many carefully controlled studies have documented and validated positive social trends such as reduced conflict and lowered crime rate resulting from the Maharishi Effect. These studies have been scrutinized and published in respected peer-reviewed journals such as *Social Indicators Research*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Mind and Behavior* and *Journal of Crime and Justice*.

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This coherence-creating effect has also been documented on a global scale in a study published in the *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation.* When large assemblies of practitioners of the TM-Sidhi program exceeded the Maharishi Effect threshold for the world (about 7,000 at that time) during the years 1983–1985, international conflict decreased 32%, terrorist casualties decreased 72%, and violence was reduced in other nations without intrusion by other governments.

IDT is a force multiplier because it creates coherence for the entire military and the whole country, thus making everyone's jobs easier. While the majority of the military continues with the dynamic approach (weaponry, equipment, training), the minority implements the silent approach of Invincible Defense Technology. Defense of the nation is perfect, thus invincible, when both these approaches are combined.

The military of Nigeria cannot solve the problem of terrorism by standard military means alone. It also needs a silent approach that will help people focus more on peaceful means of settling differences. Nigeria needs to deploy Prevention Wings of the Military immediately to prevent terrorism, and achieve true invincibility and permanent peace. The authors urge Nigerian leaders to immediately adopt this evidence-based approach.

Major General (Ret.) Kulwant Singh, U.Y.S.M., Ph.D., leads an international group of generals and defense experts that advocates Invincible Defense Technology. He was awarded the Uttam Yudh Sewa Medal, *the second highest decoration for senior officers during operations in Sri Lanka as part of IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force).*

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
Malaysia Airlines jet crashes in Ukraine; official says 295 people 'shot down'

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/europe/ukraine-malaysia-airlines-crash/index.html

July 17 – A Malaysia Airlines passenger jet crashed in eastern Ukraine on Thursday,

to Malaysia. He said he invites Dutch experts to participate in the investigation of the crash,

prompting a Ukrainian official to say that the flight carrying 295 people had been shot down. **The Boeing 777 was "shot down" by "terrorists" operating a Buk surface-to-air missile system,** according to a Facebook post from Anton Gerashchenko, adviser to the

Ukrainian Interior Ministry.

The plane went down near the town on Torez in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine, according to the post, as it flew at about 10,000 meters (32,000 feet).

"We do not exclude that the plane was shot down and confirm that the Ukraine Armed Forces did not fire at any targets in the sky," Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said, according to his website.

He also said he has expressed condolences to Netherlands Prime Minister Mark Rutte about Flight 17, which was headed from Amsterdam

emphasizing that he does not call it an "incident" or a "catastrophe," but a "terrorist action."

Details of the incident are quickly pouring in during the same week that Ukrainian officials said a Russian fighter shot down a Ukrainian military transport plane while the aircraft was in Ukrainian airspace.

Malaysia Airlines has confirmed that it lost contact with Flight 17 and that the jet's last known position was over Ukrainian airspace, the airline said on Twitter.

Reacting to the breaking story, CNN's Richard Quest, an aviation expert, said that it would be "extremely unusual" for an airliner at 32,000 feet to be shot down. From the ground, one could simply look up and tell whether a plane was a commercial aircraft.

"It looks like a commercial aircraft, it squawks a commercial aircraft. So something is absolutely appalling that's gone on here," he said.

FlightRadar24 showed the plane disappearing near Kremenchuk, Ukraine.

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak tweeted that an investigation will be launched immediately. "I am shocked by reports that an MH plane crashed," he posted.

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And Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk ordered that a government commission investigate the crash, a statement

from his office said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin "expressed deep condolences" to Malaysia's Prime Minister over the crash, a post Thursday on the Kremlin's website said. He "asked to pass the most sincere word of condolences and support to families and relatives of (the crash) victims," the post said.

Near the end of a phone call Thursday morning

with President Obama, Putin noted to the President the early reports of a downed passenger jet near the Russia-Ukraine border, White House press secretary Josh Earnest said.

Obama has directed his staff to be in touch with senior Ukrainian officials, Earnest said.

Later Thursday, Obama said the crash "looks like it may be a terrible tragedy" and he said efforts were underway to determine if any

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Americans were aboard.

The route the Malaysian plane was on, between Kuala Lumpur and the Netherlands, is a common one, CNN aviation safety consultant Mary Schiavo said Thursday. She said that the plane was flying over a troubled area and that close communication with air traffic controllers would be a key necessity.

In hostile or disputed areas, "any alteration from your course, and you can have a problem," she said.

Russia-Ukraine dispute

Tensions have been high between Ukraine and Russia since street protests forced former pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych from power in February. Russia subsequently annexed Ukraine's southeastern Crimea region, and a pro-Russian separatist rebellion has been raging in Ukraine's eastern Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Ukrainian forces have been struggling to quell the separatist unrest. Ukraine's government has accused Russia of allowing weapons and military equipment, including tanks, to cross the border illegally into the hands of pro-Russian separatists.

The Pentagon said Wednesday that Russia now has 12,000 troops on the border with Ukraine, as well as some heavy weapons. The troop numbers had fallen to about 1,000 previously from a high of an estimated 40,000 forces earlier this year.

The **Buk missile system** (Russian: "Бук"; *beech*) is a family of self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile systems developed by the Soviet Union and its successor state, the Russian Federation, and designed to engage cruise missiles, smart bombs, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The Buk missile system is the successor to the NIIP/Vympel 2K12 Kub (NATO reporting name SA-6 "Gainful").The first version of Buk adopted into service carried the GRAU designation 9K37 and was identified in the west with the NATO reporting name "Gadfly" as well as the US Department of Defense designation SA-11. Since its initial introduction into service the Buk missile system has been continually upgraded and refined. With the integration of a new missile the Buk-M1-2 and Buk-M2 systems also received a new NATO reporting name Grizzly and a new DoD designation SA-17. The latest incarnation "Buk-M3" is scheduled for production. A naval version of the system, designed by MNIIRE Altair (currently part of GSKB Almaz-Antey) for the Russian Navy, according to Jane's Missiles & Rockets, received the GRAU designation 3S90M1 and will be identified with the NATO reporting name Gollum and a DoD designation SA-N-7C. The naval system is scheduled for delivery in 2014.

1988 – Iran Air Flight 655
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Air_Flight_655

Iran Air Flight 655 was an Iran Air civilian passenger flight from Tehran to Dubai that was


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shot down by the United States Navy guided missile cruiser USS *Vincennes* on 3 July 1988. The attack took place in Iranian airspace, over

Iran's territorial waters in the Persian Gulf, and on the flight's usual flight path. The aircraft, an

Airbus A300 B2-203, was destroyed by SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles fired from the *Vincennes.*

All 290 on board, including 66 children and 16 crew, died. This attack ranks tenth among the deadliest disasters in aviation history, the incident retains the highest death toll of any aviation incident in the Persian Gulf and the highest death toll of any incident involving an Airbus aircraft anywhere in the world. The *Vincennes* had entered Iranian territorial waters after one of its helicopters drew warning fire from Iranian speedboats operating within Iranian territorial limits.

According to the Iranian government, *Vincennes* negligently shot down the civilian aircraft: the airliner was making IFF squawks in Mode III (not Mode II used by Iranian military planes), a signal that identified it as a civilian craft, and operators of Vincennes mistook for Mode II.

According to the United States Government, the crew incorrectly identified the Iranian Airbus A300 as an attacking F-14 Tomcat

fighter (a plane made in the United States and operated at that time by only two forces worldwide, the United States Navy and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force).

The event generated a great deal of controversy and criticism of the United States. Some analysts have blamed U.S. military commanders and the captain of *Vincennes* for reckless and aggressive behavior in a tense and dangerous environment.

In 1996, the United States and Iran reached "an agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims"

relating to the incident at the International Court of Justice. As part of the settlement, the United States agreed to pay US$61.8 million, an average of $213,103.45 per passenger, in compensation to the families of the Iranian victims. However, the United States has never admitted responsibility, nor apologized to Iran.

To this day, Iran Air still uses flight number IR655 on the Tehran–Dubai route as a memorial to the victims, contrary to the informal convention amongst many other airlines that discontinue flight numbers associated with tragedies.

1983 – Korean Air Lines Flight 007
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Lines_Flight_007

Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was a scheduled Korean Air Lines flight from New York City to Seoul via Anchorage. On September 1, 1983, the airliner serving the flight was shot down by

a Soviet Su-15 interceptor near Moneron Island, west of Sakhalin Island, in the Sea of Japan. The interceptor's pilot was Major Gennadi Osipovich. **All 269 passengers and crew aboard were killed**, including Lawrence McDonald, representative from Georgia in the United States House of Representatives. The aircraft was en route from Anchorage to Seoul

when it flew through prohibited Soviet airspace around the time of a U.S. reconnaissance mission.

The Soviet Union initially denied knowledge of the incident, but later admitted the shootdown, claiming that the aircraft was on a spy mission. The Politburo said it was a deliberate provocation by the United States to test the Soviet Union's military preparedness, or even to provoke a war. The White House accused the Soviet Union of obstructing search and rescue operations. The Soviet military suppressed evidence sought by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) investigation, notably the flight data recorders, which were eventually released eight years later after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The incident was one of the tensest moments of the Cold War and resulted in an escalation of anti-Soviet sentiment, particularly in the United States. The opposing points of view on the incident were never fully resolved. Consequently, several groups continue to dispute official reports and offer alternative theories of the event. The subsequent release of KAL 007 flight transcripts and flight recorders by the Russian Federation has clarified some details.

As a result of the incident, the United States altered tracking procedures for aircraft departing Alaska. The interface of the

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autopilot used on airliners was redesigned to **Administration to allow worldwide access**

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make it more ergonomic. **In addition, the event was one of the most important single events that prompted the Reagan** **to the United States military's GNSS system, which was classified at the time. Today this system is widely known as GPS.**

'We can show this rat is dead': Chechnya releases picture 'proving' Russia's Bin Laden - and Putin's most wanted terror warlord Doku Umarov - has been killed

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2698220/Chechen-leader-releases-picture-proving-Russias-wanted-terrorist-Doku-Umarov-dead.html

July 19 – A chilling photo that allegedly proves Russia's most wanted terrorist is dead was released today by the head of the Chechen Republic.

Pro-Vladimir Putin leader Ramzan Kadyrov uploaded the image of what is claimed to be Doku Umarov's body to the social-networking site Instagram.

Alongside the photo, he wrote: 'For those who would like to believe that this rat is still alive, we can show him after his death.'

Known as Russia's Osama bin Laden, Umarov is Putin's most wanted enemy - sought for crimes of terrorism, kidnapping, homicide and treason.

The bearded warlord is responsible for a string of deadly attacks on Russia, including a train bombing between Moscow and Saint Petersburg which left 26 dead in 2009 and an attack on a Siberian dam which killed 75.

He has also been linked to the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings, in which 40 died, and the hit on one of the city's main airports, Domodedovo, in 2011, in which 36 people perished.

In April, Russian sources indicated Umarov had died without giving clear evidence.

his death'. Right, Umarov has been linked to a string of deadly attacks on Russia

It is not clear why Mr Kadyrov decided to release the photo of his 'dead body' today - particularly as Russia is under the spotlight for allegedly supporting terrorists in Ukraine in downing the Malaysian

Boeing 777.

The Chechen strongman did not provide any details as to how, where or when Umarov died.

But he said: 'I have said earlier that Doku Umarov had been killed in a special mission. But various law enforcement authorities and the media hurried to doubt the information.

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'They claimed they did not see the dead body. We at that time had undisputable proofs he had been killed. Later on, the fact of his death was confirmed officially.

'Now, to those who would prefer to believe that rat is still alive, we can demonstrate it after death.'

On April 8, FSB spy chief Aleksandr Bortnikov told a meeting of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee in Moscow that Umarov's activities had been 'stopped'.

Umarov had been seen as a threat to the Sochi Winter Olympics - but he is likely to have been killed earlier than this.

Styling himself the 'Emir of the Caucasus Emirate', his aim was to expel non-Muslims from Chechnya, impose Sharia law and wage jihad far beyond the republic's present borders.

A trademark of his attacks was his deployment of 'black widow' women suicide bombers, ready to cause mass murder in vengeance for the death of their insurgent spouses.

The U.S. had placed a $5million (£2.9million) bounty on his head.

Umarov, who is thought to have died aged 49, has been reported slain on at least six occasions.

In December last year, Kadyrov alleged he has been 'dead a long time'.

Al-Shabab and the origins of East Africa's recent violence

By Daniel Solomon

Source: http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/al-shabab-kenya-violenceeastafricacorruptionanti terrorism.html

On June 16, a group of unidentified gunmen attacked a World Cup screening in Kenya's coastal city of Mpeketoni. A few weeks later, in Arusha, Tanzania's tourism hub, in separate

strikes over four days, attackers threw hand grenades at a popular restaurant and targeted a local community leader. Authorities arrested two Tanzanian nationals in connection with the incident, but some suspect the attackers are linked to the Somali militant group Al-Shabab. Last week Al-Shabab attacked Somalia's presidential palace in Mogadishu, proving its resilience against an ongoing regional offensive. These and other attacks across East Africa have killed hundreds during the past month.

The new wave of violence against multinational forces in Somalia suggests the group's apparent resurgence. But the increasingly regional pattern of the violence has much to do with local corruption and the regional stakeholders' lack of response to local grievances.

The renewal of violence was unsurprising. Following Kenya's swift invasion of Somalia in 2011, Al-Shabab warned, "We shall come into Kenya if you do not go back." Two years later, after the attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall shocked Kenya's political consciousness, the group threatened to "strike Kenyans where it hurts the most." Nearly three years after Kenya's first airstrikes in southern Somalia, Al-Shabab appears to have made good on those threats.

The regional response to Al-Shabab has also escalated in kind. In July 2012, Kenya joined an existing African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) contingent of troops from Burundi, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Djibouti. In January, following years of independent operations against Al-Shabab, Ethiopian units formally joined the expanded African force, swelling its troop count to 22,000. Other regional partners such as Tanzania have also joined AMISOM in an auxiliary role while avoiding direct combat responsibilities.

In March, after a 14-month lull in operations in southern Somalia, AMISOM launched a new offensive in several Al-Shabab-occupied cities. Al-Shabab has so far proved resilient; as AMISOM's operation deepens, accounts of mass violence attributed to the insurgent group have also increased in number.

Reports of covert local networks linked to Al-Shabab have emerged throughout the region. For example, an affiliate known as Al-Hijra has established cells in major urban centers in Kenya. Meanwhile, regional security officials have done very little to illuminate the implicit link between the spike in violence and Al-Shabab's ever-expanding capabilities. After the

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massacre at Mpeketoni, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed "local political networks," downplaying Al-Shabab's alleged role in the attack.

East African leaders must acknowledge the role of local grievances in engendering violent response, and seek more robust opportunities for redress.

Kenyatta's motivations might be disingenuous, but local politics and corruption provide a significant basis for the surge in violence in Kenya and across East Africa. For example, the circumstances that preceded Al-Shabab's raid on the Westgate Mall have as much to do with the institutional rot of Kenya's security forces as with the nature of the group itself. Dispatches from Westgate's aftermath suggest that for every instance of tactical planning by Al-Shabab forces, there were willing counterparts in Kenya's corrupt security officials. Allegedly, Kenyan police officers even leased assault rifles to the insurgents. Similarly, smuggling routes from southern Somalia across the porous border with Kenya were intentionally left undersupervised. Despite evidences of corrosive corruption, international counterterrorism partners such as the United States look on as police abuses proliferate. It is against the backdrop of these permissive security institutions that Al-Shabab's operations are expanding across East Africa.

Unable to stem new mass violence, these institutions are adopting a different violence of their own. In March, a spate of attacks in Mombasa and Nairobi gave way to Operation Usalama Watch — Swahili for "peace watch" — a mass roundup and subsequent deportation of ethnic Somali and other civilians by security forces. Few, if any, of those targeted boast affiliations with, much less

memberships in, Al-Shabab or other groups that may have been responsible for the spike in violence across Kenya. According to Human Rights Watch, the raids are often more a commercial enterprise than a law enforcement operation. A recent Kenyan police report accused corrupt officials of demanding bribes and arresting those who could not afford the fix.

It is difficult to untangle the chain of political discontent that precedes recent violence across the region. Local grievances, such as land tenure disputes, often accompany the decay of political and economic institutions. For example, Kenya's Lamu County, one of the sites of recent attacks, has been the locus of large protests against alleged land grabbing by Kenyan port developers. These issues alone may not prompt new violence by local groups. But if mass abuses continue unmitigated, East African governments could soon find unexpected pockets of their society a fertile recruiting ground for Al-Shabab's terror network.

As violence spirals out of control across the region, governments will likely adopt an increasingly heavy-handed strategy against Al-Shabab and its alleged affiliates. However, selective targeting of minority civilians, as witnessed in Kenya, will not root out the threat. In fact, it will likely make matters worse. Regional leaders must acknowledge the role of local grievances in engendering violent response, and seek more robust opportunities for redress. Land ownership issues, in particular, have proved a powerful trigger for violence, particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia. As the multinational campaign against Al-Shabab falters, the resolution of these local grievances may prove to be a more fruitful path to peace.

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Daniel Solomon is a writer based in Washington, D.C.

Ethiopia in Somalia: What Next for Al-Shabab?
By Omar Mahmood
Source: http://www.fairobserver.com/region/africa/ethiopia-somalia-what-next-al-shabab-11475/

After the September 2013 siege at Westgate Shopping Complex in Nairobi — a brazen operation that saw four terrorists kill at least 67 civilians — international attention refocused on the threat of al-Shabab, an Islamist militant organization in Somalia. Less than three weeks later, US forces raided a compound in the

group's stronghold of Barawe. They targeted a Kenyan national described as an al-Shabab "facilitator and operational planner."

In the following months, additional operations focusing on the organization's leaders unfolded, with suspected drone strikes in

the vicinity of Barawe in October 2013 and January 2014 eliminating top commanders. However, the most significant move aimed at degrading al-Shabab's destructive capabilities came when the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping force, announced the integration of 4,000 Ethiopian soldiers under its command on January 22. Through this measure, AMISOM fulfilled a post-Westgate United Nations resolution to increase overall troop levels in Somalia.

While Ethiopian forces had been present on Somali soil since late 2011, the additional manpower spurred the resumption of AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) incursions into al-Shabab territory. Since March, the combined forces captured at least nine towns, including key areas such as Rabdhure, Qoryoley and Ceel Buur — al-Shabab's first major losses since September 2013.

Ethiopian Forces in Somalia

While the reduction of al-Shabab territories is welcome news for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and its allies in their battle to eliminate the terrorist organization, the inclusion of Ethiopian troops is problematic. Ethiopian-Somali relations have manifested violently a number of times over the past half-century, and Ethiopia traditionally evokes a negative and visceral reaction from the Somali public. More recently, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in late 2006 in order to remove the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had provided a modicum of stability to the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces committed a number of alleged abuses until their withdrawal in January 2009.

Al-Shabab, meaning "The Youth" in Arabic, began as a largely autonomous and hard-line youth wing of the ICU, and emerged at the forefront of the anti-Ethiopian occupation around 2006-07 — though other ICU elements either fragmented or escaped. The group effectively exploited the Ethiopian invasion. Al-Shabab rallied many to its cause by presenting the movement as the defender of Somali sovereignty and the Muslim community against an arch-rival and a historically Christian nation. Support flowed in, including contributions from the diaspora. While some held religious motivations, many participated less due to an ideological affinity toward al-Shabab's

worldview and more under the banner of fighting against a hated enemy. As long as Ethiopia was in the country committing perceived abuses, al-Shabab recruiters had a relatively easy task.

Following Ethiopia's withdrawal, AMISOM forces took over and the Somali government began a slow and uneven process of extending

its authority beyond a few city blocks in Mogadishu. A major boon to this project came in October 2011 when Kenyan forces invaded southern Somalia, ostensibly to institute a buffer zone containing the strategic port of Kismayo.

Ethiopia followed suit along its border, making for a three-way assault on al-Shabab territories; though both nations pursed interests independent of AMISOM. While significant advances did occur, al-Shabab was far from eliminated, and retained the ability to conduct large-scale attacks in Mogadishu or plan massive operations such as the siege at Westgate.

Al-Shabab Counters

In this sense, while AMISOM and SNA advances against al-Shabab had slowed prior to Westgate, the

redeploying of Ethiopian troops as a means to address this was a controversial choice, and appeared to provide conditions for the Somali group to recapture a level of public support enjoyed years earlier. To this point, al-Shabab began a messaging campaign highlighting the role of Ethiopia in AMISOM, in an attempt to capitalize on longstanding Somali enmity and delegitimize the peacekeeping mission and, by association, the SFG.

In his first speech since the Westgate attacks, al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane focused heavily on Ethiopia in early March, declaring that the country sought to divide Somali lands, eliminate sharia law, and rectify its landlocked status by obtaining access to the Somali coast. He also referenced the "historical rivalry" between Somalia and Ethiopia — dating back centuries, but amplified by bouts of heavy fighting in the post-colonial era — and called for jihad in response.

Other top al-Shabab leaders issued similar refrains. Spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage stated, "We want to remind them [the Somali population] how they [Ethiopia] killed our men, raped our women, desecrated our Holy Quran, and looted our riches, they are here yet again to commit the same crimes," while urging Somalis to eradicate this "arch enemy from their land." Hassan Ya'qub Ali, al-Shabab governor of the central Galgadud region, focused on the religious aspect, proclaiming that Ethiopia "brought the weapons in the country so they kill the Muslims."

Al-Shabab also utilized anti-Ethiopian rhetoric to secure local support, by organizing demonstrations in various locations under its control. In addition, since February, the organization has publicized a number of clan-based meetings, including members of Wa'else, Murusade and Marehaan.

Following agreements to resist an Ethiopian occupation for the second time in a decade, many of these clans backed up their words with financial donations and fresh recruits.

A New Environment

These statements and actions represent a movement trying to capitalize on some of the same dynamics that aided the rise of al-Shabab, namely the presence of Ethiopian troops on Somali soil. However, the environments of 2007 and 2014 are very different. Some clans have voiced their

support, but a nationwide uprising against the "Ethiopian invaders" under the banner of al-Shabab has yet to materialize. At the same time, the movement has been unable to resist encroaching government-allied forces. For example, despite an anti-Ethiopia rally in Buloburde in February, AMISOM took control of the town a few weeks later.

Earlier, the level of discontent vis-à-vis Ethiopia largely outweighed the ideology preached by al-Shabab, which was a nascent organization that had yet to impose its governance throughout the Somali countryside. However, in the years since, al-Shabab has unveiled its plan for Somalia's future, replete with harsh punishments and bans on facets of local culture, including public executions for suspected informants and restrictions on music at local celebrations. While the organization's rule provides specific benefits, chiefly in the realm of justice and security, this came at the price of forced adherence to a foreign and conservative ideology.

Today, the inclusion of Ethiopian troops undoubtedly garners an extra degree of popularity for al-Shabab. However, the level demonstrated thus far is unlikely to make a significant difference in the movement's fortunes, especially in the wake of sustained AMISOM and SNA pressure. In this sense, the costs of living under its rule may now outweigh the costs of allowing Ethiopia to participate in the making of a new future. This is the most telling sign of the current state of al-Shabab, and perhaps the most promising for Somalia.

This is not to say al-Shabab stands on the verge of extinction — in fact, far from it. The inability of the fledging SFG to provide adequate and united governance in newly captured towns is a key factor that will keep al-Shabab pertinent in the foreseeable future, as it will likely only become more overstretched as AMISOM offensives continue. In addition, al-Shabab has demonstrated regional capabilities amid a host of emerging likeminded organizations, charting a course as a significant terrorist operator in the Horn of Africa for years to come.

Nonetheless, the relatively low-key public outcry over the presence of Ethiopian troops, in comparison to previous iterations, is as telling a situation as any that the high-water mark for al-Shabab's popularity in Somalia has passed. If there is an issue

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the organization should be more concerned about than the loss of territorial control, it is this inability to recapture public support in the wake of advances by a traditional enemy.

Omar Mahmood is an Africa Security Analyst who focuses on the Horn of Africa and Nigeria. He holds a Master's in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School at Tufts University, and previously served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Burkina Faso.

Asymmetric warfare evolves in tragic directions
By Ed Fitch
Source:http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Opinion+Asymmetric+warfare+evolves+tragic+directions/10029388/story.html

Among the greatest challenges facing modern military commanders is the imperative to "think like a terrorist." As that was my last job in uniform, I know first-hand this is a task as distasteful as it is essential.

Prior to to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, I headed the Games Red Team, which was assigned the role of adversary to the Canadian Armed Forces security plan. We devised a fictional terrorist cell and attack plan to test Canada's defence of the Games and, in so doing, expose any flaws. Viewing security through the lens of the perpetrator was a sobering assignment that, perhaps more than any other experience in my 43 years in the CAF, taught me the burden of decision-making faced by Western militaries in our time.

Counter-terrorism has reached a level of complexity, speed, and moral dilemmas the likes of which were unimaginable a century ago. Post-9/11, Western forces operate in highly complex environments, with plain-clothed terrorists embedding themselves among and exploiting their civilian populations. Non-state actors, be it al-Qaida, Taliban, or ISIS — the latest ugly jihadist incarnation — enjoy tremendous home-field advantage. Extremist movements rather than a legitimate state, these groups aim to inflict maximum damage on Western forces while using high civilian casualties to wage a public relations war.

The current battle between Israel and various terror groups in Gaza, foremost among them Hamas, reflects an extreme version of this new phase of asymmetric warfare. After having been hit by hundreds of missiles from Gaza since mid-June, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge on July 8. Israeli leaders did so in the full knowledge they are working within the narrowest of margins of error, both in Gaza and on the Israeli home front.

Israel's strategic weakness has always been its small geography (n total, Israel is about two-thirds the size of Vancouver Island). Hamas has starkly exposed that vulnerability through its unprecedented barrages of long-range missiles. Those weapons, many of which are provided by Iran, now threaten the majority of Israelis — more than five million civilians.

Israel's Iron Dome system shoots down 90 per cent of those destined for population centres, keeping Israeli casualties to a minimum. The psychological impact, however, can be likened to that experienced by Londoners in 1940, a 21st century blitz, albeit with iPhone apps to alert Israelis of incoming missiles. Were it not for the Iron Dome, the country would be wracked with destruction. Indeed, the Iron Dome has saved lives on both sides by giving Israel's military command the ability to carry out a paced, targeted campaign in Gaza, rather than a rushed ground invasion.

In addition to targeting Hamas missile launch pads and depots, the Israel Defense Forces has focused on destroying the homes of terrorist commanders in Gaza. More than homes, the residences of Hamas leaders are first their command centres and weapons storage sites. Nonetheless, Israel takes great pains to provide civilians with advance warning through text messages, phone calls, warning leaflets, and sound bombs. While this enables Hamas operatives to flee targeted sites minutes before air strikes, it likewise allows Israel to destroy terrorist infrastructure with minimal collateral damage.

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This is not to diminish the loss of civilian life in Gaza; every non-combatant killed in war is a tragedy. But many of those who have died in Gaza were called by Hamas to congregate on the rooftops of buildings that Israel has warned will be targeted. A United Nations report released recently, in regard to civilian casualties in Gaza, stated: "In most cases, prior to the attacks, residents have been warned to leave, either via phone calls by the Israel military or by the firing of warning missiles."

Former U.S. General George Patton is reported to have said: "The object of war is not to die for your country, but to make the other (expletive) die for his." Disturbingly, Hamas has turned this axiom on its head by using its people as human shields. As stated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, "We use missiles to protect civilians; Hamas use civilians to protect their missiles."

Israel has been very clear its objective is to secure a long-term halt to missile fire from Gaza. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether Hamas will agree to a years-long de-escalation. One thing is certain. **The tactics used by Hamas are sure to be replicated by Islamist terror movements elsewhere.** In the wake of rising jihadist movements in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, Western militaries should not only do more to "think like a terrorist" as I once did. We would be wise to study Israel's tactics and ensure our forces are ready for a new evolution in asymmetric warfare.

Major-General Ed Fitch (retired) served in the Canadian Armed Forces from 1966-2009.

Muslim Double Standards Abound

By Tarek Fatah

Source: http://www.meforum.org/4756/muslim-double-standards-abound

If there is a God, he has some explaining to do.

On the one hand he tells us Muslims in the Qur'an that we are "the best of peoples, evolved for mankind", but then showers us with leaders who bring out the worst in the human soul.

Middle East Forum

If the murderous spree some of my fellow Muslims have embraced is not enough, their hypocrisy of playing the victim card makes the rest of the world cringe in anger, if not outrage.

As I write, Muslims around the world have taken to the streets and social media to protest Israel's Operation Protective Edge, that has resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 Palestinians.

Undoubtedly the death of 200 Arabs, many of them civilian women and children, is tragic and worthy of condemnation.

However, just next door to Israel almost 200,000 Arabs have been killed by fellow Arabs in Syria, but that tragedy has triggered no public demonstrations of anger in Islamic capitals, let alone in Toronto.

Let us examine two military operations by two countries against what they describe as Islamic terrorists belonging to radical jihadi movements.

While Israel's Operation Protective Edge is making the lead story around the world, few are aware of Pakistan's Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of Prophet Muhammad's Sword) underway against the Taliban inside Pakistan.

Israel's military operations have killed about 200 and displaced about 17,000 Palestinians from their homes in Gaza.

Pakistan's military operations, on the other hand, have killed over 400 and made over 900,000 Pashtun Pakistanis homeless and destitute in their own country.

While the 17,000 Palestinians are finding shelter in United Nations Relief and Works Agency structures, nearly one million Pakistanis are facing a catastrophe that has triggered neither media coverage, nor international aid or protest.

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On Monday, a day after an Israeli missile killed 18 family members of the Hamas police chief in Gaza, Iraqi men in Baghdad slaughtered 28 Iraqi women.

There was plenty of fury over the dead family, almost none for the women, for they were alleged to be residents of a brothel, as if that mattered.

Allah's "best of peoples, evolved for mankind", clearly live by a double standard, the one that triggers mammoth support for Palestinians but absolutely none for Pashtuns.

Here's why. It is not the race or religion of the victim that counts, but the identity of their tormentor.

As long as it's an Arab army annihilating fellow Arabs or a Muslim military murdering fellow Muslims, too many Muslims simply shrug away our responsibility and say, "leave it to Allah" as the Qur'an supposedly commands.

However, if the Muslim falls victim to the "kuffar" — meaning the Jew, Christian or Hindu — then many of our clerics take to the pulpit and deliver fiery, end-of-times lectures, using the tragedy as a reason to ignite hatred against the other, in most cases "The Jew".

I wonder if God has heard this mosque sermon by a prominent Pakistani cleric.

"And a time is about to come when Allah would bestow such a success on Islam that there would not be a single Jew left on the face of the earth. … And when the last Jew will be killed from this world, then peace would be established in the world …"

It would appear the depth of hatred many of God's "best of people" disseminate, needs his attention.

That is, if he is listening at all.

Tarek S. Fatah is a founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, a columnist at Toronto Sun, host of a Sunday afternoon talk show on Toronto's NewsTalk1010 AM Radio, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of two award-winning books: Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State and The Jew is Not My Enemy: Unveiling the Myths that Fuel Muslim Anti-Semitism.

James Appleyard terrorism analyst at Bath-based Maplecroft: Mapping out the safety of the world at any moment

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Source: http://www.westerndailypress.co.uk/Mapping-safety-world-moment/story-21751284-detail/story.html

Bath-based Maplecroft: Mapping out the safety of the world at any moment

James Appleyard is a terrorism analyst at Bath-based global risk analytics and mapping company Maplecroft looks at the international situation

With insecurity escalating globally in recent months, fingertip intelligence on risks from terrorism, piracy and civil unrest is an increasingly critical bridge to successful strategic planning of multinational companies, finance organisations, governments and NGOs.

The Maplecroft Terrorism and Security Dashboard (MTSD), which was released yesterday, solves this knowledge gap by

significant increases in the risk of terrorist attacks. Globally, the MTSD recorded 18,668 fatalities in the 12 months prior to July 1st, up 29.3 per cent from an annual average of 14,433 for the previous five years.

Over the same period the MTSD recorded 9,471 attacks at an average of 26 a day, down from a five year average of 10,468, revealing that terrorist methods have become increasingly deadly and sophisticated over the

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
offering near real-time monitoring of dynamic terrorism and security risks to operations, assets, investments, personnel and supply chains via an intuitive, subnational mapping and data platform.

The MTSD is the conduit through which our team of security experts and country risk specialists log, analyse and plot all reported incidents of terrorism, piracy, political violence and human rights abuses by security forces down to 100m across 198 countries. This provides frontline organisations with up-to-date global intelligence on security related incidents that can impact strategic decisions relating to market entry, security measures for in-country operations and supply chain continuity.

Over the last 12 months, our research has shown that global fatalities from acts of terrorism have risen 30 per cent compared to the previous five year average, with China, Egypt, Kenya and Libya seeing the most

last year.

The MTSD classifies 12 countries as 'extreme risk' many of which are blighted by high levels of instability and weak governance. These include: Iraq (most at risk), Afghanistan (second), Pakistan (third), Somalia (fourth), Yemen (sixth), Syria (seventh), Lebanon (ninth) and Libya (tenth).

However, of particular concern for the businesses Maplecroft consults, the important growth economies of Nigeria (fifth), the Philippines (eighth), Colombia (11th) and Kenya (12th) also feature in the category.

Iraq, rated as the highest risk country in the MTSD, recorded more than three times as many acts of terrorism as Pakistan (which had the second highest number of incidents) – with 3,158 acts of terrorism, resulting in 5,929 fatalities, an increase of 2,188 deaths on the previous year. The

deteriorating security situation in Iraq underscores the government's inability to combat the militant group Islamic State – formerly known as ISIS, which now controls vital oil and gas infrastructure, while threatening other key assets across northern Iraq.

An intensifying campaign of violence by Islamic militant group Boko Haram has seen Nigeria (fifth) record by far the highest number of fatalities per attack, reflecting the intensity of the violence there.

The country has been host to 146 reported attacks in the period July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014, resulting in 3,477 killed – an average of 24 people killed per attack, compared to two deaths per attack in Iraq.

The increased capacity of Boko Haram – as illustrated by attacks on the key centres of Abuja and Lagos in June 2014 – is likely to lead to a further loss of investor confidence in Nigeria's ability to respond to security risks in the country.

Faced with rising security costs and decreasing safety for their personnel, multinational companies can, and do, reconsider their country-level commitments.

As Maplecroft's CEO Professor Alyson Warhurst states: "The nature of terrorism means events are impossible to predict."

Terror threat against Norway imminent, intelligence service warns

Source: http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140724/terror-threat-against-norway-imminent-intelligence-service-warns

Norway's intelligence service said Thursday it has received information about an imminent "concrete threat" against Norway from people with links to Islamic fighters in Syria.

Benedicte Bjoernland, the head of Norwegian security service PST, said the agency has

received "reliable information" from a foreign partner about some kind of attack "within days." She declined to identify the source.

"It was unspecific about what the target might be," Bjoernland said, adding PST has no information about how or when such an attack would take place.

According to PST's assessment last month, about 50 people have traveled to Syria from Norway as foreign fighters, half of whom have now returned to Norway.

The domestic intelligence agency could not exclude that people involved with the threat already were in Norway.

Bjoernland told a news conference authorities hoped a terror act could be averted by going public with the information.

National Police chief Vidar Refvik said law enforcement would be more visible at border crossings, airports and train stations but reiterated the threat was vague about a target.

The greatest terror threat in Norway comes from Islamic extremists in and around Oslo, PST said in an April assessment.

It was unclear whether Thursday's case was linked to the May arrest of three Norwegian citizens with alleged links to an al-Qaida splinter group on preliminary charges of supporting or participating in a terror organization.

Earlier this month, the United States put Norwegian citizen Anders Cameroon Ostensvig Dale on a terrorism blacklist.

One of the gunmen in the 2013 shopping mall assault in Nairobi, Kenya, was a Norwegian citizen.

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Norway is still recovering from the 2011 attack by far-right fanatic Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 69 people in a shooting spree at a political youth camp, and eight others in a bombing of government headquarters.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Again another case of post-emptive measures. Let us hope that security authorities in this isolated European heaven would have more detailed plan than police officers patrolling. Muticulturarism is good – we all share the same planet! Same applies for the international attitude that "it will not happen to us!" And they have already paid the price once…

UK definition of terrorism 'could catch political journalists and bloggers'

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/07/uk-definition-of-terrorism-catch.html

The current British definition of terrorism is so broadly drawn that it could even catch political journalists and bloggers who publish material that the authorities consider dangerous to public safety, said the official counter-terrorism watchdog.

David Anderson QC, the official reviewer of counter-terrorism laws, said Britain had some of the most extensive anti-terrorism laws in the western world, which gave police and prosecutors the powers they needed to tackle al-Qaida-inspired terrorists, rightwing extremists and dissident Northern Irish groups.

"But if these exceptional powers are to command public consent, it is important they need to be confined to their proper purpose, and recent years have seen a degree of 'creep' in parliament that could be reversed without diminishing their impact"

In his annual report to be published on Tuesday, Anderson is expected to give three examples of how the terror laws were too widely drawn.

They included "actions aimed at influencing governments", hate crime and what he called the "penumbra of terrorism".

On the first, Anderson said Britain's laws treated politically motivated publication of material thought to endanger life or to create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public as a terrorist act if it was done for the purpose of influencing the government.

He said in other European and Commonwealth countries the bar was set much higher and there must also be an "intention to coerce or intimidate".

The watchdog said: "This means political journalists and bloggers are subject to the full range of anti-terrorism powers if they threaten to publish, prepare to publish something that

the authorities think may be dangerous to life, public health or public safety."

He warned that they could be branded as terrorists even if they had no intention to spread fear or intimidate, and those who employed or supported them would also qualify as terrorists.

The definition was so broad it would even catch a campaigner who voiced religious objections to a vaccination campaign on the grounds that they were a danger to public health.

On hate crimes, Anderson said the law made a terrorist out of a pupil who threatened to shoot their teacher on a fascist website, or of the racist who throws a pipe bond at their neighbour's walls. Both were obvious criminals, but if they only intended to harm their immediate victims, no purpose would be served by branding them as terrorists, Anderson said.

The laws were so widely drawn that they now included preparatory and ancillary offences including "terrorism-related activity", which were only used when a crime had been committed and so were unnecessary.

These definitions were so "overbroad" that they could catch a family member "who supports someone who encourages someone else to prepare an act of terrorism and could easily be limited by the home secretary", the watchdog said.

Anderson said Britain quite rightly had very tough counter-terror laws that the public accepted so long as they were used only when necessary.

"But they can currently be applied to journalists and bloggers, to criminals who have no concern other than their immediate victim, and to those who are connected with terrorism only at several removes," he said.

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"This is not a criticism of ministers, prosecutors or police – who as a rule exercise either their remarkably broad discretions with care and restraint. But it is time parliament reviewed the definition of terrorism to avoid the potential for abuse and to cement public support for special powers that are unfortunately likely to be needed for the foreseeable future."

Are Aboriginal inmates the next Muslim extremists?

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/07/are-aboriginal-inmates-next-muslim.html

Australia's spy agency has been enlisted to help crack down on radicalisation in jails after revelations Aboriginal prisoners are converting to Islam and risk becoming extremists.

Sheikhs and imams are being brought into

prisons to deliver de-radicalisation messages during Friday prayers, but two prominent Sydney sheikhs have told a high-level forum that chaplaincy services are grossly under-funded and prison converts are misinterpreting the religion.

A small but high-risk group of radicals are causing concern to Corrective Services NSW and it is believed recruitment to Islam is active, particularly among Aboriginal inmates.

Sheikh Omar Hammouche, who has worked with inmates and prison chaplains, says faith is a powerful tool in the reformation of prisoners but the lack of Muslim chaplaincy services in NSW means prison converts are misinterpreting Islam.

There are just two Muslim chaplains spread across 10 of the state's prisons.

Sheikh Omar told a Corrective Services-sponsored forum at Sydney University's Law School last month that Islam was primarily taught face-to-face and knowledge needed to be properly explained.

He cited the case of one of British soldier Lee Rigby's killers, who wildly misinterpreted a line from the Koran - "kill the unbelievers wherever you see them" – to justify the stabbing on a London street.

"There isn't enough capacity to address the needs and the requirements of the Muslim inmates," Sheikh Omar said. "When there are insufficient chaplaincy services appointed, we find that people then rely on other means to get their Islamic education ... Yes, you may be able to police the information they have, the books they receive but you can't police the understanding they take from that or the application."

About 9 per cent of inmates in NSW are Muslim, even though only 3 per cent of the general population identifies as Islamic.

Sheikh Omar said many had a poor understanding of Islam. "Dare I say, if they knew their religion ... they wouldn't be in prison in the first place so they need that face-to-face instruction."

Some imams and sheikhs struggled to communicate effectively with inmates. Senior management began consulting with the Muslim community in western Sydney a year ago and sharing information and contacts with intelligence authorities.

Sheikh Shady Alsuleiman, secretary of the Australian National Imams Council, told the forum many prison imams were avoiding hot topics such as jihad, Syria and Iraq for fear of being labelled jihadi supporters.

"These are topics our youth want to hear," he said. "If I'm not going to address it in the proper form, then they will go listen to someone else."

Australian National University researcher Clarke Jones, who is writing a book on prison radicalisation, said extremist

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conversions were rare because terrorism inmates tended to be at the bottom of the prison pecking order in Australia.

He cited the recent case of Sydney man Khaled Sharrouf, who posted images of himself fighting in Iraq and standing over slaughtered bodies, as an unusual case of an inmate committing acts of jihad upon release.

Sharrouf served four years for his role in the Pendennis terror plot and recently said on Twitter he received weekly lessons from al-Qaeda leader Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi via the jail phone, a claim that had not been verified.

"The problem is a lot of these de-radicalisation programs are very generic ... and tend to be a one-size-fits-all model," Dr Clarke said.

Asmi Wood, senior research fellow at the National Centre for Indigenous Studies, was aware of Aboriginal conversions in prison and said elders were concerned that converts would join foreign jihad but he had seen no evidence of it.

Rod Moore, chaplaincy co-ordinator for Corrective Services NSW, told the conference NSW had "a long way to go" to increase chaplaincy services but the program led the way globally.

From Theory to Action: The Rationale behind the Re-establishment of the Caliphate

By Michael W. S. Ryan

Source:http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42670&tx_ttnews[backPid]= 26&cHash=07530c4a6bfa83c0de33bdb148b6c242#.U9Mr8bHhtUo

According to most public analysis, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or its latest

iteration as the Islamic State (IS), is a serious regional threat but not yet a direct threat to the United States on the order of 9/11. [1] Reforms instituted after 9/11 have protected the American public for the most part, but the system struggles with a threat that is serious but not imminent. In the case of ISIS, it might well be that the United States is within the Islamic State's lengthy planning cycle for attack

– and the blow could fall first on the world petroleum market through subversion of regional partners such as Saudi Arabia.

Relationship to al-Qaeda

Before determining what kind of threat the IS poses to the United States, one must first define what it is and what strategy it is likely following. Despite the well-known rift with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, ISIS under any of its previous names has never been more than a nominal member of al-Qaeda, occupying a space somewhere between a fellow traveler and an affiliate. On October 17, 2004, after months of negotiation, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance (*bay'ah*) to Bin Laden. However, al-Qaeda leaders could try to persuade but could never give direct orders to al-Zarqawi or his successors. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or "Caliph Ibrahim" as he now styles himself, claims never to have sworn allegiance to al-Zawahiri after Bin Laden's death. Thus, IS does not consider itself a splinter of al-Qaeda. Instead, the Islamic State is a rival to al-Qaeda's leadership within the larger "jihadist movement." In its area of operations, ISIS has been more successful than al-Qaeda, while the Islamic State is the fulfillment of al-Zawahiri's constantly foiled dream as expressed in his 2001 book, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*.

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The jihadist movement must build its plan on the basis of controlling a portion of land in the heart of the Islamic world in which to establish a defensible Islamic state from which it will launch its battle to restore the Rightly Guided Caliphate according to the program of prophethood (*manhaj al-nubuwah*). Just as armies cannot achieve victory except through the occupation of a portion of land, likewise the jihadist Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infidel alliance without possessing a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Without the establishment of a caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world, everything we have reviewed, the means and the plans of assembling and mobilizing the *ummah*, will be left hanging in the air without a concrete result or demonstrable benefit... [2]

Controlling a portion of land proved elusive in the face of an American campaign using weapons for which al-Qaeda has no defense. The closest al-Qaeda has come to its goal has been through its most dangerous affiliate, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Al-Suri's Analysis of the Failure of the 1982 Insurrection in Syria

To appreciate ISIS's approach to its operations in Syria and Iraq, it is useful to review the record of the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood insurrection in Syria that ended in utter failure. Syrian jihad ideologue Abu Mus'ab al-Suri established his reputation in jihadist circles by writing a strategic history of this insurrection against Hafiz al-Assad. Al-Suri participated as part of the self-styled "Fighting Vanguard" and was in a position to provide his observations on the reasons for the failure (for which he accepted a share of responsibility). He published these observations separately in short articles that formed the basis for jihadist training in Afghanistan and elsewhere. [3] These lessons are certainly known to the leaders of the major jihadist groups in Syria and have been influential in Iraq since al-Zarqawi launched his "jihad." [4] Al-Suri identified 17 general "bitter lessons" of the failed insurgency and one hopeful lesson – the possibility of mobilizing a Sunni Muslim population for "Islamic jihadist revolution."

The overarching reason for the Brothers' failure, according to al-Suri, was the lack of a comprehensive strategy before the insurrection was launched. ISIS has been following a clear

plan based on the same strategic outline that inspires AQAP. This plan, given in broad strokes by Abu Bakr Naji and in keeping with Maoist dictates, urges local commanders to compose detailed plans based on the salient economic, geographic and social aspects of the area targeted for insurrection. [5] ISIS has both an overarching plan and different detailed approaches in Syria and Iraq – harsh in its relations with other groups in Syria and more accommodating in Iraq. It is worth noting that Naji advised his readers/students (who often came from urban settings) to study books on the sociology of tribal groups that could end up becoming allies. Tribal groups have become a major factor in both Syria and Iraq.

Al-Suri urges jihadists to avoid weaknesses such as failing to explain the ideology and objectives of the revolution; low political and revolutionary awareness and weak religious indoctrination within the population and recruits. Clearly, ISIS has made its ideology, objectives and required indoctrination trademarks of its operations in response to al-Suri's guidance.

A key weakness noted by al-Suri, the practice of having jihadists spread in numerous competing organizations, is one of ISIS's intractable problems. Its attacks on fellow jihadist groups in Syria form major propaganda material for competing jihadists and other rivals. ISIS's call for other groups to offer allegiance to the newly proclaimed caliph is aimed at this problem but is far from being able to solve it. In Iraq, an important number of its allies do not share the movement's ideology. Over time, this weakness, if not ameliorated, could become an existential liability for the Islamic State.

Another ISIS liability often cited in the Western press, its relatively small fighting force, could be considered a strength. Al-Suri points out that when the first bullets began to fly in Syria in 1982, the Muslim Brothers accepted a large number of recruits whose lack of preparation or dedication to a central ideology weakened the group's effectiveness. Al-Suri characterized this as a dependence on "quantity rather than quality" in recruiting. ISIS has chosen to keep its ranks small and highly flexible while depending on allied groups from local areas to provide additional manpower to ease the consolidation of captured territory

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and increase its capability to conduct further terrorist attacks.

Other causes of the failure of the 1982 Syrian insurrection addressed by ISIS include the inability to communicate ideas internally and externally; dependence on outside support rather than self-sufficiency; dealing with neighboring regimes as though they were reliable supporters; maintaining a leadership in exile away from the theater of operations; allowing the leadership to operate openly rather than clandestinely and failing to learn lessons from earlier jihadist insurrections. The point is not that ISIS has excelled in these areas; but their actions demonstrate that they thought through these issues and applied corrective actions in many cases. For example, they make use of outside sources, but they are mostly self-sufficient for resources.

In his eighth "bitter lesson," al-Suri criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood for allowing its fighters to become mired in a war of attrition with the powerful central regime on its terms rather than using proven terrorist and guerrilla tactics. ISIS's leaders appear to have decided that they would take the criticism of other jihadists when they minimized operations against Bashar al-Assad's forces inside Syria and devoted themselves to setting up a rudimentary state straddling the border with Iraq instead. Their pragmatic willingness to sell Assad oil from captured fields and to attack other jihadist groups has prompted conspiracy theories that ISIS is a product of the Assad regime and is working closely with it. The reality is simpler: ISIS wanted a state of its own over any other objective.

ISIS has demonstrated various levels of success in addressing the remaining "bitter lessons." Unlike the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS has successfully regionalized its operations. One may well criticize ISIS's handling of populations under its control, but it has a deliberate system of governance, which has enjoyed mixed success. It has applied its harsh interpretation of Islamic law in conquered areas, but it has also promoted vaccination campaigns and even a consumer protection service. It has also shown the ability to step back from its harshest practices on occasion. [6]

Al-Suri noted that the Brotherhood had not been able to use religious scholars to mobilize the people. Although the most influential Salafi-Jihadist scholars such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qutada al-Filastini continue to support al-Qaeda, ISIS has been able to engage the allegiance of lesser figures such as Abu Humam al-Athari. As early as July 21, 2013, al-Athari wrote an essay not only arguing for al-Baghdadi's role as the Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), but also asserting that he is the most qualified to sit "in the caliph's seat." [7] The cleric provided a genealogy tracing al-Baghdadi's lineage to the Prophet Muhammad and asserting that the leader is a member of the noble Quraysh tribe, as well other attributes associated with the ideal Muslim leader that neither al-Zawahiri nor Bin Laden could claim. One may judge how powerful al-Athari's arguments were by the fierce refutations issued by ISIS opponents. In this way, al-Baghdadi engaged at least part of the religious community to lay the groundwork for his self-declaration as caliph almost a year later. Successfully inspiring al-Athari and other religious figures in Syria, Iraq and beyond addresses another shortcoming cited by al-Suri, the failure to transform preachers into active jihadists.

One of the most important of the "bitter lessons" cited by al-Suri was the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize Sunni Muslim Arab tribes and Kurds. There is little doubt that a great measure of ISIS's success in both Syria and in Iraq is due to its alliances with tribes. [8] Without tribal allies, the relatively small ISIS force would struggle to gain territory and find it impossible to hold it. At the same time, the tribes will always have their own agenda, which will diverge from ISIS's goals, especially if ISIS stops winning. The Kurds have resisted efforts by ISIS to co-opt them and will fight the jihadists when necessary. The best the Islamic State can hope to gain from the Kurds in current conditions is a stalemate. Taking on the patriotic Kurds in their own homeland would be a dangerous gamble.

The Strategy: Next Steps

We should expect IS to continue to foil predictions. However, if they are following Abu Bakr Naji's strategy for establishing an emirate, we should be able to see the broad strokes of the Islamic State's strategic thinking. [9] Naji's strategy has been adopted by AQAP's leader, Nasir Abd al-Karim al-Wuhayshi, and extolled by another influential ISIS supporter, Abu Sa'ad al-Amili. To

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paraphrase the AQAP leader's advice to other Muslims about judging al-Qaeda, we should look at Naji's book, *Idarah al-Tawahhush* (Administration of Savagery), and look at what ISIS is doing before deciding whether this jihadist group is following a rational plan or simply running boldly on a tightrope over a deep canyon.

Naji's plan would have ISIS conquering areas after the mujahideen have driven out central government forces by using terrorist tactics and mobilizing the population to their side by polarizing society using money and sectarian politics. They would place these areas under the control of a primitive government one step above a state of nature, which would be accepted by people desperate for security. The mujahideen would introduce more government services over time and expand these areas while defending them from government counterattacks by arming the local population where possible and continuing mujahideen guerrilla operations to compel government forces to defend fixed locations, such as the capital, major religious shrines and economic targets. They would expand each area they control and merge them with others under their

control or controlled by ex-military or tribal groups. They would offer the tribes booty taken during their insurgency to gain their allegiance. As a real state begins to appear viable, the mujahideen leaders would send out a worldwide call for administrative experts, managers, judges and others who might help govern a complex state. We know from abundant reporting and IS's first magazine *Dabiq* that ISIS and now IS have already engaged in all these practices and more in Naji's playbook. This does not mean ISIS is following Naji as a recipe, but it does mean that more attention needs to be paid to Naji's work as experts devise a strategy to defeat ISIS without the use of U.S. military ground forces. More importantly, if the Islamic State is following Naji we should expect them to focus on undermining Saudi Arabia's ruling family and developing a plan to disrupt the flow of energy to the world's economies from the Arabian Peninsula. We should also expect the Islamic State to eventually inspire attacks inside Europe and the United States, with AQAP apparently ready to help in both endeavors if the opportunity arises.

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▶ **Notes are available at source's URL.**

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Timeline: Canada's brushes with terror

Source: http://www.vancouversun.com/touch/story.html?id=10057001

1982

A group dubbed both Direct Action and the Squamish Five detonated a bomb at a missile manufacturing plant in Toronto. Ten people were injured in the attack, which was part of a larger series of bombings protesting capitalist society. Targets included a BC Hydro substation, as well as mining firms and video stores specializing in pornography.

1985

An Air India flight originating in Toronto, with a B.C.-made suitcase bomb on board, exploded over the Atlantic, killing all 329 people on board. Two Canadians were tried for the bombing, but were acquitted. Inderjit Singh Reyat pleaded guilty to manslaughter. He was convicted of perjury in 2010.

1999
Ahmed Ressam and Abdelmajid Dahoumane moved from Quebec to Vancouver and holed up in an East Van hotel where they built a bomb Ressam planned to use to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. Travelling on his own, Ressam was caught trying to cross the border in Port Angeles, Wash. when a ferry attendant discerned he was acting strangely. He remains in a U.S. jail.

2004
Rudwan Khalil Abubaker of Vancouver and Kamal Elbahja of Maple Ridge disappeared during a trip to Azerbaijan after coming into contact with a radical Muslim cleric at a Metro mosque. Abubaker was killed by Russian troops in Chechnya.

2006
Police fanned out throughout Toronto and arrested a large group of young men. The group ultimately become known as the Toronto 18, and were accused of plots to bomb targets such as the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS headquarters and a military base. There was also an allegation Prime Minister Stephen Harper was a target for beheading. Eleven were ultimately convicted of terrorist offences.

2008
Momin Khawaja, the first person charged under Canada's post 9/11 anti-terror law, was convicted. The former software developer from Ottawa had been accused of training at a remote camp in Pakistan, providing cash to a group of British extremists and offences related to building a remote-control detonator. He was found guilty and sentenced to life behind bars without parole eligibility for 10 years.

2010
Police in Ontario made three high-profile arrests in what they described as a bid to foil a plot stretching from Canada to Iran and Afghanistan. Police arrested Misbahuddin Ahmed of Ottawa, alleged co-conspirator Khurram Syed Sher of London, Ont. and a third alleged co-conspirator whose name is protected by a publication ban. Ahmed was found guilty this month of two terrorism-related offences.

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2011
Tahawwur Rana was convicted in Chicago of providing support for the Pakistani group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Canadian citizen, who ran a Toronto-based travel business, was also found guilty of supporting a plot to attack a Danish newspaper that printed cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, though that plot was never carried out. He was ultimately cleared of involvement in a deadly three-day rampage the Indian city of Mumbai and is serving a 14-year prison sentence.

2013
A group of militants, including two Canadians, stormed a gas plant in Algeria. After a four-day siege, 37 hostages and all 29 militants were found dead in the plant. Ali Medlej and Xris Katsiroubas of London, Ont. were among the attackers killed in the siege. Aaron Yoon, one of their former schoolmates who did not accompany them to Algeria, is being held in a Mauritanian prison and accused of having links to al-Qaida in northern Africa. Yoon has denied being involved in terrorist activities.

2013
Police arrested two men and charged them with plotting to attack a Via Rail passenger train travelling between New York and Toronto. Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser face many charges, including conspiracy to murder for the benefit of a terrorist group, participating in a terrorist group and conspiring to interfere with transportation facilities for the benefit of a terrorist group.

2013
RCMP arrested two people and charged them with conspiring to blow up the B.C. legislature on Canada Day. John Nuttall and Amanda Korody are charged with knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity, making or possessing an explosive device, and conspiracy to place an explosive device with the intent to cause death or injury. Police said the plot was fuelled by al-Qaida-related ideology. The charges have not been proven in court.

2014
Mohamed Hassan Hersi, 28, was convicted in Brampton, Ont. of attempting to participate in the activities of a terrorist group and counselling a person to participate in terrorist activity.

Terror Group Tied to Turkish Gov't Recruits Hamas Human Shields

By Ryan Mauro
Source: http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/terror-group-tied-turkish-govt-recruits-hamas-human-shields

Children and women acting as human shields for Hamas fighters seen in the middle of the group (Photo: CNN video screenshot)

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A terror-linked charity closely linked to the Turkish government is organizing human shields in the Gaza Strip and pledging to "erect the flag of Islam everywhere." Prime Minister Erdogan is a top backer of Hamas and allows this charity, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), to operate.

IHH's website has a photo of the sign-up event in front of the Israeli embassy. The website refers to the Hamas terrorists targeted by Israel as "resistance fighters." CNN Turkey reports that IHH has signed up at least 73 volunteers to act as human shields in Gaza, with 38 being women.

Another page on the website talks about an IHH press conference where its president, Bulent Yildirim, openly talked about its organizing of human shields. Its press release was endorsed by the Association of Muslim Scholars, a body led by the spiritual leader of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

"We, as IHH started the human shield project," Yildirim said.

He said that it is negotiating safe passage with the Syrian government and if the Assad regime refuses, they will arrive by boat. He also called on Muslim countries to "provide weaponry support for self-protection."

Shockingly, Yildirim said the objective of sending the human shields is to spark a war between Israel and Turkey and the broader Muslim world. He explained:

"[W]e will tell Turkey that they will have to protect us. When we are passing by sea, if Israel fires at the Turkish ships protecting us, they will come face to face with the Israel and Turkey alliance. We are looking at how this war will end up. We are ready."

The long-term goal of IHH is to create a caliphate, as Yildirim stated matter-of-factly:

"Israel has done what we could not do. Israel has laid the foundation of an Islamic Union by attacking Gaza. I believe that soon, all Muslim countries will unite to become members of the establishment of the Islamic Union," Yildirim said.

IHH is also organizing protests in Turkey. At one event, which registered people to be human shields, Yildirim said, "Witness the enthusiasm of people gathered here to go to Gaza. We Muslims may show up in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem one day unannounced and we will erect the flag of Islam everywhere."

IHH is headquartered in Istanbul but operates in 135 countries, including the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. It is best known for its role in the 2010 *Mavi Marmara* incident, when IHH sent a ship to break the Israeli weapons blockade on Gaza.

According to the UN, the blockade was legal. It was set up to prevent Hamas from importing weapons through the sea. Yildirim said at the IHH press conference that the *Mavi Marmara* will soon sail to Gaza again.

IHH members on the *Mavi Marmara* were armed. When Israeli soldiers boarded the vessel, nine IHH members were killed attacking the Israelis. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan used the opportunity to confront Israel and elevate his stature among Islamists. IHH

government not to. At least 21 people on IHH's board of directors at the time were involved with Erdogan's AK party. One IHH official was the chairman of the parliament's foreign affairs committee.

According to its website, the Turkish parliament bestowed IHH with an "Award of Honor" in 2007. In 2009, Yildirim spoke at a Hamas event and declared, "All the peoples of the Islamic world would want a leader like Recep Tayyip Erdogan."

IHH is reacting to the latest fighting between Israel and Hamas with extremist incitement, just as Erdogan is. Erdogan says Israel has "surpassed Hitler in barbarism" and has launched a campaign of "systematic genocide." IHH falsely claims that Israel is firing missiles randomly into Gaza "without considering women and children."

IHH's links to Hamas would only encourage Erdogan to embrace the group. In 2010, Erdogan declared that Hamas is not a terrorist group. His government supports Hamas politically and financially and even harbors Hamas leaders. Erdogan is also an unshakeable friend of the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent organization of Hamas.

Germany, the Netherlands and Israel have all banned IHH as a terrorist organization. The U.S. has not, even though 87 Senators have

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requested it, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) and prominent leaders of both political parties.

The U.S. government has indirectly admitted that IHH is linked to terrorism. In 2008, the Treasury Department sanctioned the Union of Good, a network of charities, because it was "created by Hamas leadership to transfer funds to the organization." IHH is a member of the Union of Good.

In 2009, a senior Treasury Department official

Deputy Director Huseyin Oruc said he was warmly embraced by the Deputy Prime Minister after the incident and "we have good coordination with Mr. Erdogan."

Up to 10 MPs from Erdogan's AK political party planned to board the ship but were told by the

addressed IHH's terrorist ties with Turkish officials. A leaked State Department document records that the official mentioned how IHH is "providing material assistance to Hamas."

In 2010, the State Department said it could not prove links between IHH and Al Qaeda but is "greatly concern[ed]" about IHH's meetings with Hamas leaders. The State Department earlier said it was considering labeling IHH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It never happened.

The links of IHH to Hamas, labeled by the U.S. as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, are irrefutable. The two lavish praise upon each other. IHH sponsored a funeral for a Hamas leader named Mohammad Said Heyam. IHH's campaign coordinator in Europe, Muhammad Sawalha, used to be a senior Hamas leader before moving to the United Kingdom.

French counterterrorism magistrate Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere has documented links between IHH and Al Qaeda as well. For example, he has referred to phone calls between IHH and an Al Qaeda safe house in 1996. Turkish police raids on IHH in 1997 found strong evidence of its involvement in violent *jihad*.

The Danish Institute for International Studies quotes from his report:

It appears that the detained members of IHH were going to fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya ... The essential goal of this Association was to illegally arm its membership for overthrowing democratic, secular, and constitutional order present in Turkey and replacing it with an Islamic state founded on the Shariah.

Under the cover of this organization known under the name of IHH, [IHH leaders] acted to recruit veteran soldiers in anticipation of the coming holy war. In particular, some men were sent into war zones in Muslim countries in order to acquire combat experience. On the spot, the formation of a military unit was assured. In addition, towards the purpose of obtaining political support from these countries, financial aid was transferred [from IHH], as well as caches of firearms, knives, and pre-fabricated explosives.

In 2001, federal prosecutors called upon the magistrate as an expert witness in the trial of Al Qaeda terrorist Ahmed Ressam. He was involved in the "Millennium Bomb Plot" to attack the Los Angeles International Airport.

Bruguiere testified that IHH had an "important role" in the Al Qaeda plot. He referred to phone calls from the terror cell's apartment to IHH in Istanbul.

In 2011, two IHH members were arrested in Somalia after meeting with Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda's affiliate there. They traveled to an area known to be under the control of the terrorist group; IHH says they were delivering humanitarian aid to refugees.

The Erdogan government clashed with its own law enforcement earlier this year when it took action against IHH and Al Qaeda. In early January, Turkish police stopped an IHH truck that was suspected of transferring weapons to Syria. The officers involved were retaliated against and moved to new jobs. The public prosecutor filed a complaint against the government for obstructing justice.

About two weeks later, Turkish police raided six IHH offices as part of a terrorism investigation and arrested 23 people for allegedly having links to Al Qaeda. It was reported that two were senior Al Qaeda operatives. The lead police officer was immediately fired and the raids were condemned by the Deputy Prime Minister. The eight involved prosecutors had their bodyguards reassigned and a second police chief was fired.

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IHH operates in Turkey without any interference from Erdogan as it supports Hamas and recruits human shields. Yet, the U.S. hasn't followed Germany, the Netherlands and Israel in listing IHH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Erdogan's government would erupt in anger if the U.S. treated IHH like the terrorist entity it undoubtedly is, but that is the action required to counter the organization's terrorist activities. At the same time, the U.S. needs to initiate a reevaluation of Ankara's membership in NATO member since this is just the latest in a string of actions taken by the Turkish government in support of extremists and terrorism.

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7 Ways That You (Yes, You) Could End Up On A Terrorist Watch List

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/25/terrorist-watch-list_n_5617599.html

Earlier this week, The Intercept published a 166-page document outlining the government's guidelines for placing people on an expansive network of terror watch lists, including the no-fly list. In their report, Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux highlighted the extremely vague and loosely defined criteria developed by 19 federal agencies, supposedly to fight terrorism.

Using these criteria, government officials have secretly characterized an unknown number of individuals as threats or potential threats to national security. **In 2013 alone, 468,749 watch-list nominations were submitted to the National Counterterrorism Center. It rejected only 1 percent of the recommendations.**

Critics say the system is bloated and imprecise, needlessly sweeping up thousands of people while simultaneously failing to catch legitimate threats, like Boston Marathon bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev.

While some individuals are surely placed on these watch lists for valid reasons, the murky language of the guidelines suggests that innocent people can get caught up in this web, too, and be subjected to the same possible restrictions on travel and other forms of monitoring. **Here are several ways you could find yourself on a terror watch list, even if you aren't a terrorist:**

1. You could raise "reasonable suspicion" that you're involved in terrorism. "Irrefutable evidence or concrete facts" are not required.

This guidance addresses how to place people in the broader Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), of which the no-fly list and the selectee lists -- which cover those selected for enhanced screenings before boarding flights -- are both subsections.

In determining whether a suspicion about you is "reasonable," a "nominator" must "rely upon articulable intelligence or information which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts," can link you to possible terrorism. As Scahill and Devereaux noted, words like "reasonable," "articulable" and "rational" are not expressly defined. While the document outlines the need for an "objective factual basis," the next section clarifies that "irrefutable evidence or concrete facts are not necessary" to make a final determination as to whether a suspicion is "reasonable." So how could intelligence officials be led to put you on the watch list?

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2. You could post something on Facebook or Twitter that raises "reasonable suspicion."

According to the document, "postings on social media sites ... should not be discounted merely because

TED ALJIBE via Getty Images

of the manner in which it was received." Instead, those investigating the individual should "evaluate the credibility of the source" and, if they judge the content to pose a "reasonable suspicion" of a link to terrorism, nominate the person to the watch list, even if that source is "uncorroborated." If this sounds disturbing, don't worry: There's a sentence that explicitly prohibits listing an individual "for engaging solely in constitutionally protected activities." So as long as your free speech isn't accompanied by any other "suspicious" behavior, you should be fine, maybe.

3. Or somebody else could just think you're a potential terror threat.

The guidelines also consider the use of "walk-in" or "write-in" information about potential candidates for the watch list. Nominators are encouraged not to dismiss such tips and, after evaluating "the credibility of the source," could opt to nominate you to the watch list.

4. You could be a little terrorist-ish, at least according to someone.

The document explains that you could be put on a suspected-terrorist watch list if you are determined to be a "representative" of a terrorist group, even if you have "neither membership in nor association with the organization." Individuals accused of being involved with a terrorist organization, but who later are acquitted in a court of law or saw

their charges dropped, are still potential nominees for watch-listing, so long as "reasonable suspicion" is established.

5. Or you could just know someone terrorist-y, maybe.
Scahill and Devereaux reported that the immediate family of a suspected terrorist -- including spouse, children, parents and siblings -- may be added to the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), a broad terror database that feeds into the TSDB, "without any suspicion that they themselves are engaged in terrorist activity." According to the document, "associates or affiliates" of known or suspected terrorists, or just those somehow "linked to" them, can also be nominated to the TSDB watchlist, so long as the relationship is defined and constitutes a "reasonable suspicion" of a connection to terrorist activity. The document states that "individuals who merely 'may be' members, associates or affiliates of a terrorist organization" may not be put into the latter database, unless that suspicion can be backed by "derogatory information."
But there's also a more nebulous connection that could prompt your placement in the TIDE database. The document specifically provides for nominating "individuals with a possible nexus to terrorism ... but for whom additional derogatory information is needed to meet the reasonable suspicion standard."

6. And if you're in a "category" of people determined to be a threat, your threat status could be "upgraded" at the snap of a finger.
The watch-list guidelines explain a process by which the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism can move an entire "category of individuals" to an elevated threat status. It's unclear exactly how these categories are defined, but according to the document, there must be "current and credible intelligence information" suggesting that the group is a particular threat to conduct a terrorist act. Such determinations can be implemented and remain in place for up to 72 hours before a committee convenes to decide whether the watch-list upgrade should be extended.

7. Finally, you could just be unlucky.
The process of adding people to the terror watch lists is as imperfect as the intelligence officials tasked

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with doing so. There have been reports of "false positives," or instances in which an innocent passenger has been subject to treatment under a no-fly or selectee list because his or her name was similar to that of another individual. In one highly publicized incident in 2005, a 4-year-old boy was nearly barred from boarding a plane to visit his grandmother.
The watch-list guidance was supposedly revised in part to prevent incidents like these, but with more than 1.5 million people added to the lists in the last five years, mistakes are always inevitable. Just ask Rahinah Ibrahim, a Stanford University student who ended up on a no-fly list in 2004 after an FBI agent accidentally checked the wrong box on a form.
But then if you were to be mistakenly added to a list, you probably wouldn't know -- unless it stopped you from flying. The government has been extremely secretive about the names on the various watch lists. If you were to learn that you were wrongly placed on a watch list, good luck getting off it. As Scahill and Devereaux reported, you can file a complaint with the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, which begins a review "that is not subject to oversight by any court or entity outside the counterterrorism community."
And if you were to get your name removed from the watch list, the intelligence agencies aren't even obligated to inform you of your updated status. Helpful.
The secretive nature of the terror watch lists has come under court scrutiny recently. A federal judge ruled in June that the government must develop a new process under which individuals can challenge their inclusion on the no-fly list. The judge found the current process "wholly ineffective."

Profile of terrorist groups
Source: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1207.1497.pdf

HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS FOR THE ACTIVITY PROFILE OF TERRORIST GROUPS[1]

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The main focus of this work is on developing models for the activity profile of a terrorist group, detecting sudden spurts and downfalls in this profile, and, in general, tracking it over a period of time. Toward this goal, a d-state hidden Markov model (HMM) that captures the latent states underlying the dynamics of the group and thus its activity profile is developed. The simplest setting of $d = 2$ corresponds to the case where the dynamics are coarsely quantized as *Active* and *Inactive*, respectively. A state estimation strategy that exploits the underlying HMM structure is then developed for spurt detection and tracking. This strategy is shown to track even nonpersistent changes that last only for a short duration at the cost of learning the underlying model. Case studies with real terrorism data from open-source databases are provided to illustrate the performance of the proposed methodology.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Although this is a "difficult" text due to the mathematics included, it provides some good ideas on taking advantage of a group's profile and activity to predict future actions.

Air Algerie plane crashed in Mali – no (116) survivors...
Just an accident due to bad weather?

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