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# Fugitive Greek extremist taunts government

Source: http://uk.news.yahoo.com/fugitive-greek-extremist-taunts-government-212106040.html#Uu 47yFG

A screen image taken from anti-establishment site Indymedia shows 56-year-old Christodoulos Xiros, talking on a video posted on January 20, 2014.

One of Greece's deadliest far-left extremists, who disappeared while on prison leave, on Monday taunted and threatened the country's government which he said had ruined the country with austerity measures.

"Your democracy is long dead, and the aberration that remains is so blatantly fascist that the hooks of the swastika protrude," Christodoulos Xiros wrote in an online tract accompanied by a brief video of himself.

"Nothing can save you.... When I return I will screw you," said Xiros, wearing a red tracksuit top and standing before images of Che Guevara, two heroes of Greece's revolutionary war against Turkey and a Greek civil war Communist guerrilla leader.

"I've decided to fire the guerrilla shotgun against those who stole our life and sold our dreams for profit," he said.

The 56-year-old was a leading hitman for November 17, a far-left outfit that carried out a series of assassinations of prominent Greek and foreign targets between 1975 and 2000.

The group was named after a student uprising against Greece's US-backed military junta in 1973.

Xiros' disappearance on January 7 while on a nine-day leave caused alarm in the United States, with the State Department calling for his swift capture.

A State Department spokeswoman said: "We're obviously deeply concerned that this convicted terrorist remains at large and is now allegedly issuing renewed calls for violence. We remain very closely engaged with the Greek officials.... on trying to find him and bring him back to prison."

In his tract, which was posted on anti-establishment site Indymedia, Xiros accused the government of bringing Greek society to the point of collapse, pointing to austerity cuts adopted over the past four years.

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| WANTED.jpgEDITOR’S COMMENT: On Jan 23 the Greek Minister of Citizens Protection (left in the photo) rewarded the four missing terrorists (included Xiros) with 4 mil euro. Let sum up the whole story: Xiros was convicted with six life sentences for his terrorist actions as execution member of “17 November” terrorist group. Before his “escape” he has been granted six leaves and he disappeared during the seventh one. During his leaves he was not under surveillance from police and/or intelligence authorities… During his imprisonment he was able to move freely within the high security (…) prison and meet members of other imprisoned terrorists (i.e. Nuclei of Fire). Head of prison guardes implied that his overall behavior was supported/covered by higher (…) authorities (not mentioned) outside prison. Now all fear of a terrorist attack and security measures applied resemble those taken during the 2004 Olympic Games (since Greece presides EU for the coming six months). What a superb scenario for a Holywood movie or an ancient Greek comedy… Please note that the 4 mil euros will be given to informers that are in order with national IRS while 23% tax will be enforced to the money delivered! No further polite comments! |

## Assad bolsters al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria with secret oil deals, prisoner release

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140121-assad-bolsters-alqaeda-affiliates-in-syria-with-secret-oil-deals-prisoner-release-western-intelligence



Fighters of al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant parade at Syrian town of Tel Abyad, left, and Syria's Preisdent Bashar al-Assad Photo: REUTERS/AFP

Western intelligence agencies say that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in a complex double game, has provided funds to and cooperated with al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations in Syria even as these organizations fight the Syrian military. **The regime has two goals in pursuing this policy.** The **first** is to persuade the West that the uprising is inspired and led by Islamist militants, including al-Qaeda and its affiliates, in order to weaken, and even stop, Western support for the rebels. The **second** is to allow the jihadists to gain the upper hand in the internal fighting among rebel groups. The regime believes that if the rebellion is seen to be led by Islamist fundamentalists rather than secular and moderate Syrians, more non-Alawite Syrians would side with the regime against the rebels, even if grudgingly.

**►Read more on this “chess” policy at source’s URL.**

# Pakistan guards die escorting Spain cyclist Javier Colorado

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25849649

Gunmen have shot dead at least six guards who were escorting a Spanish cyclist through Pakistan's volatile Balochistan province.

They were about 50km (31 miles) west of the provincial capital Quetta, in the district of Mastung, when they were ambushed.

Cyclist Javier Colorado was slightly hurt after falling off his bike.

A message on Facebook said he intended to continue his trip from Europe on into Asia and the rest of the world.

The attack happened close to the scene of a bus bombing on Tuesday that killed 28 Shia pilgrims.

This remote part of western Pakistan is plagued by kidnappings and drug traffickers as Balochistan ethnic nationalists wage an insurgency for more autonomy.

'Hello Pakistan'

Mr Colorado had arrived from Iran on Tuesday evening. He was urged by the authorities to spend the night at a local police station before being assigned a 12-man armed escort, in two vehicles, for his onward journey.

Soon after setting off, a group of armed men attacked the convoy, shooting dead at least six of the guards and wounding five others.

Several hours after the attack, a message attributed to Mr Colorado's family was posted on the Facebook page devoted to his trip, Colorado on the Road.

"First of all, we want to thank the Spanish consulate in Pakistan for all their help. We've received a call from the embassy and they have informed us that Javier is well and not hurt.

"Today he will fly to Lahore, on the border with India. His initial intent is to continue his trip."

In an earlier message, Mr Colorado posted "Goodbye Iran, hello Pakistan" and said he was in Pakistan, close to Quetta, having cycled more than 10,000km since his trip began on 1 October.

"My next stop is the capital of this country, Islamabad."

Police say they do not know why Mr Colorado was cycling through such a dangerous area.

Two Czech women abducted as they travelled through Balochistan from Iran last March are still missing.

The BBC's Ilyas Khan says the route has been traditionally used by Western tourists entering Pakistan from Iran, but it has become increasingly dangerous to do so.

It seems bizarre that the Pakistani authorities would allow a Western tourist to cycle through the region, particularly in light of the kidnapping of the two Czech women, he adds.

# Afghan boys playing volleyball shot dead

Source: http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/breaking-news/afghan-boys-playing-volleyball-shot-dead/ story-fni0xqll-1226809123025

**At least five boys have been shot dead after a group of militants attacked them on a volleyball court in eastern Afghanistan.**

"The young boys, who were school students, were playing volleyball in a village in Alingar district at 12.30pm ... a group of gunmen from the nearby village came and shot them," Sarhdai Zwak, a spokesman for the provincial governor of Laghman, said on Thursday.

"The shooters, who are surely members of the armed opposition, fled the area," Zwak said, implying the attack was carried out by Taliban militants.

"It is not clear yet why they shot dead the boys, but it is clear that the enemies of Afghans cannot tolerate our sports achievements. So, they restore cowardly attacks."

**Last week, four young footballers were killed in the southern province of Kandahar when a rocket, allegedly fired by Taliban militants, struck the football field.**

Read more on “cricket” – the **only** sport approved by the Taliban. A different approach of Afghanistan’s history!

# Al-Shabab: Guardians of Somali identity?

**By Abdullahi Boru Halakhe**

Source: http://www.mareeg.com/al-shabab-guardians-of-somali-identity/

British Channel 4 journalist Jamal Osman had an exclusive on al-Shabab that included a training and graduation ceremony. **The picture that emerged was that al-Shabab is a sophisticated group which, more than others, grasped the duality of the state; one of brutal efficiency in employing force and in the second order, the ability to undertake state’s benign “soft” function: collecting garbage and ensuring pharmacies stock unexpired drugs.**

In popular state formation theories what distinguishes or indeed makes a state a state, is its ability to project the use of force. By being the prominent purveyor of violence, the state increases the cost to anyone who wants to challenge it, and also provides an incentive for a group(s) to accept to be part of the state. Since its collapse, Somalia’s ability to function as a state and project the use of force has been outsourced to external actors. As a result – nature abhors a vacuum – al-Shabab or previously, warlords, filled in.

**The group’s overarching understanding that the centre of gravity- for its survival- rests with the citizens, and not the state or external actors, explains their durability.** As long as they can provide security – because they are the biggest source of violence anyway – and garbage is collected in areas that they control, it buys them legitimacy, albeit through fear.

While all external actors crave to be loved, al-Shabab thrives on fear. In understanding Somalis, one has to struggle with the paradox of being at once pastoral democrats – ready to negotiate some issues – and an unflinching republican, some relations like family are non-negotiable. Al-Shabab concentrated on the latter part. While Somalis can trenchantly disagree over their clan politics, however, when it comes to their sovereignty, both personal and collectively, they will never negotiate. They are unrepentant nationalists, and in the absence of a state, rhetorically and sometimes symbolically, al-Shabab acts as the vanguard and the only reliable guardian of Somali nationalism and identity.

This is further entrenched by the fact that the majority of the post-1991 governments have not been organically constituted – they have been externally midwifed, making al-Shabab a formidable custodian of the Somali identity.

**While al-Shabab has that luxury, monopoly really, the Somali government has to juggle many contradicting and often competing interests – the Turks who would want to show Somalia as the testing ground for international Islamic brotherhood through a humanitarian lens, the Europeans and the Americans who have a mortal fear of the radicalisation of Somali youth immigrants, and the African Union that wants to prove the dictum African solutions to Africa’s problem.**

Without any leverage, the Somali president/prime minister is left at the mercy of all these and many actors. All the while al-Shabab is capable of being run like a well-oiled machine. The **Western countries** have, by default, reduced their footprints and focus on counterterrorism. This is guided by rational calculations; limited footprint means limited domestic political consequences, inoculating themselves against accusation of invaders. But this singular focus on terrorism by the West is akin to attempting to address the symptoms rather than the cause of Somalia’s crisis – a classic Band-Aid solution.

**African countries** are enamoured by an African solution to Africa’s problems, but they suffer from naively thinking that since we are fellow Africans, Somalis will welcome us with flowers at the gates of Mogadishu. Just like any other modern intervention, the window between an intervention as liberation and invasion is small. In the case of the AMISOM, they need to grasp that reality urgently, otherwise, their genuine effort of winning over Afro-pessimists could be undone. In all, everyone is in Somalia for their own interests rather than the Somalis’, and that explains why al-Shabab succeeds where others fail.

**Another group that most external actors could learn from is the khat distributors in Somalia.** Since the collapse of the state in 1991, khat, also known as miraa – a mild stimulant popular in East Africa and grown in the Eastern part of Kenya – has been exported to Somalia during war and peace. It is distributed more efficiently than any food aid. This efficiency beats what any economist envisages when they speak about the virtues of the unseen hand of the market. This is despite al-Shabab banning khat as haraam – forbidden.

The group that has survived al-Shabab has an enduring lesson for all. Khat distribution networks and their resiliency is a case study on how to operate in a hostile environment. Maybe it is about time we undertake an unbiased study of al-Shabab and khat distributors on how to establish a state and an efficient distribution network of economic and public goods – the key prerequisites of a state.

***Abdullahi Boru Halakhe*** *is a security analyst on the Horn of Africa*

# Drug money from Aussies going to terrorists

Source: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/01/23/drug-money-aussies-going-terrorists-australian-crime-commission?goback=.gde\_4709642\_member\_5832100637113884676#!

**The Australian Crime Commission said more than Aus$580 million (US$512 million) of drugs and assets had been seized, including Aus$26 million in cash, in a year-long sting codenamed Eligo targeting the offshore laundering of funds generated by outlaw motorcycle gangs, people-smugglers and others.**

According to the ACC, the operation had disrupted **18 serious and organised crime groups and singled out 128 individuals of interest in more than 20 countries**, tapping information from agencies including the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

Eligo saw 105 people arrested on 190 separate charges and resulted in the closure of three major clandestine methamphetamine labs and Australia's largest-ever urban hydroponic cannabis hothouse in Sydney last November.

"The task force focused on high-threat money laundering activities and, as a result, revealed a range of different crime types which has led to these extraordinary outcomes," said Australia's Justice Minister Michael Keenan.

"Seizing more than $550 million worth of drugs and cash is a significant blow to the criminal economy," he added.

Legitimate international cash wiring services were a major focus of the operation, with the government's anti-laundering agency AUSTRAC saying they had been identified as at "high risk of being exploited by serious and organised crime groups".

According to a Fairfax media expose on the operation, criminals targeted foreign nationals and students in Australia awaiting remittances from overseas, hijacking the transaction by depositing dirty money to the payee and then taking the cash wired from offshore.

Fairfax said at least one of the exchange houses used in the Middle East and Asia delivered a cut from every dollar it laundered to Lebanon's powerful Shiite movement and Syria ally Hezbollah, which is banned as a terrorist organisation in Australia.

"It was just never-ending," said ACC acting chief Col Blanch. **"We were regularly finding bags of $500,000 and $400,000**."

**Organised crime is estimated to cost Australia Aus$10-15 billion per year** by the ACC, with drugs, money-laundering, fraud, firearms and high-tech cyber offences the major issues.

**Profits from transnational organised crime were estimated at US$870 billion in 2009 -- the latest available data -- according to the ACC's 2013 report into the sector. That represented about 1.5 percent of global GDP at the time**.

## Israel facing a growing al-Qaeda challenge

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140127-israel-facing-a-growing-alqaeda-challenge

What appears to be the first al Qaeda plot against targets inside Israel was thwarted last December when the Israeli security services arrested three Palestinians — two of them East Jerusalem residents with Israeli identification cards — who planned simultaneous attacks on the International Conference Center in Jerusalem and the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv.


The three men were arrested on 25 December, but a court-ordered gag order was lifted last Wednesday.

The three suspects are Iyad Abu Sa’ara, 24, of East Jerusalem’s Ras al-Khamis neighborhood, Roubeen al-Najma, 31, of Abu Tor in East Jerusalem and Alaa Ranem, 22,  of Al-Aqaba, a village near Jenin.

Abu Sa’ara, who appears to be the organizer of the cell, was planning on receiving some training from Jihadists in Syria, and was looking to buy a roundtrip airline ticket from Israel to Turkey.

Al Qaeda operatives re already working with Islamists and Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula, but their actions there are aimed against the military government in Cairo and in support of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Analysts say that the growing influence of al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq and Syria, the foothold the organization has gained in the Sinai, and the growing presence of Salafists in the West Bank, made it only a question of time before al Qaeda-inspired terrorist acts against Israeli targets would be hatched.

**Fox News reports that the terrorists planned to strike the Jerusalem target again once emergency services arrived. Israeli security agency Shin Bet said there were additional plans for bus attacks, shootings, and kidnappings in the pipeline.**

It is not clear how close the terror cell was to carrying out the plot, but Shin Bet sources told Fox News the men had been recruited online by Gaza-based operative Arib a-Shaham, who answers directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born successor to Usama Bin Laden.

Analysts note that the three key members of the plot had joined al Qaeda after becoming radicalized online, and that they chose to align themselves with al Qaeda rather than local militant anti-Israel Palestinian organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center reports that about twenty Arab Israelis and thirty Palestinians have been fighting for al Qaeda-linked militias in Syria.

Haaretz reports that there is growing evidence of al Qaeda and other Jihadists increasing their presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In November, three al Qaeda-inspired terrorists, whose car was loaded with explosives, were killed in a gun battle with members of Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Unit near Hebron. The increasing radicalization of some elements in the West Bank is also bad news for the it’s bad news for the Palestinian Authority.

The growing presence of al Qaeda may be the result of the anti-Hamas policies of the military government in Egypt. The government of General al-Sissi has been battling Islamists in the Sinai Peninsula, and has clamped down on smuggling operations from Sinai to the Gaza Strip. With its financial and commercial ties to Egypt more limited, and with smuggling operations no longer available, Hamas has turned to al Qaeda and Jihadists-supporter Qatar for help.

One result has been renewed rocket attacks from Gaza against Israeli towns in the south.

“Clearly Hamas has the capacity to enforce its will over all the groups,” Israel’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor told Fox News. “So many [rocket] shootings over such a short time could reflect in theory a loosening of Hamas control, or they could simply reflect a cynical game by Hamas, instrumentalizing these organizations in the same way [Yasser] Arafat did with Hamas in his time.”

A high-ranking Shin Bet official told Haaretz that in recent years, the global jihad movement has shown increased interest in perpetrating terror attacks against Israeli targets. This interest combines with the flow of Jihadist operatives to the region, mainly as part of the fight against Assad’s regime in Syria and the generals’ regime in Egypt. He said that the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip has taken a complex stance regarding these groups. Hamas is disturbed by activity against it, and in some cases it intervenes to prevent Gaza-based terror attacks against Israeli targets for fear of the trouble that such attacks would cause to it. Hundreds of members of global Jihad groups are active in the Gaza Strip.


A spokesman for the Palestinian security services in the West Bank told Haaretz that said there was “no indication” that al-Qaeda had a presence in the territory.

“Al-Qaida cannot operate here,” Adnan Damiri, said. “It needs broad logistical support and that cannot be here in this small area.”


Israel, he said, had arrested some naive “boys” and claimed they were al-Qaeda to halt American pressure to show more flexibility in peace talks. Israel has demanded that it retain a presence in parts of the Palestinian-claimed West Bank after any future peace deal due to security concerns.

**Greece: Terrorists believed to have netted some 10 mln euros from armed heists**

Source:http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/\_w\_articles\_wsite1\_1\_26/01/2014\_536812



**Guerrilla organizations in Greece have amassed an estimated 10 million euros over the years, chiefly through armed robberies that finance their activities,** according to police sources who say these reserves are more than adequate to supply members of the various groups with guns and explosives.

According to police, Nikos Maziotis, the convicted leader of Revolutionary Struggle who has been unaccounted for since the summer of 2012, is believed to have participated in at least five armed bank raids that netted more than 1.5 million euros for his organization. Revolutionary Struggle was thought to have been dismantled following several arrests and convictions of suspected members including Maziotis and his girlfriend Panagiota Roupa. But fears have resurged of Maziotis’s possible involvement in attacks claimed by new organizations over the past two years.

Greece’s deadliest terrorist group, November 17, which was disbanded in 2002, also financed its activities through bank robberies.

Police believe that members of the Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire also participated in armed raids on banks. Convicted members of that group met on a regular basis at Attica’s Korydallos Prison with N17’s Christodoulos Xeros who has been at large since absconding during a furlough earlier this month.

Supreme Court prosecutor Efterpi Koutzamani is to decide this week on the fate of two fellow prosecutors who sat on the judicial council that approved seven furloughs for Xeros who was was serving multiple life terms.

As fears mount of a possible high-level terrorist attack, authorities are expected to seek access to the bank accounts of individuals believed to have helped finance the activities of the country’s guerrilla groups.


Vassilis Paleocostas, the serial robber best known for two dramatic helicopter escapes from Korydallos Prison, is believed to have helped fund guerrilla organizations, Kathimerini understands.

A “must see” video…

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52FSbORUEp8#t=258

**Published on Jan 26, 2014**

Militants destroy Military helicopter in Egypt's Sinai killing 5 officers

اسقاط جماعة انصار بيت المقدس للمروحية المصرية في سيناء والتي استشهد فيها افراد طاقمها الخمس

The latest video released by the "pro-Morsi" group, called "Ansar Bait AlMaqdis", with footage of their surface to air missile attack that **brought down a helicopter killing 5 Egyptian officers in Sinai**.

They admit killing the state security officers Mabruk and AbuShakra. Those two were directly involved in "Muslim Brotherhood" cases.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: Perhaps one of the thousands of missing/stolen MANPADS from Libya. See how easy it is? One of my greatest concers for the coming Sochi Winter Olympics since it can operate outside the security rings established. But also in the rest of the world – against commercial aircrafts… |

# Suicide Bombings in 2013: Annual Report

**By Yotam Rosner, Einav Yogev, Yoram Schweitzer**

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/01/suicide-bombings-2013-annual-report/

Between the start of suicide bombings in the recent past, carried out by Hizbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s, and the beginning of the twenty-first century, some 200 suicide attacks took place around the world. **A dramatic increase in suicide terrorism around the world began in early 2000, and overall some 3,500 suicide attacks have taken place over the last three decades.** The reverberations of the September 11 attacks led to a significant increase in the role played by terrorist organizations identified with **al-Qaeda and global jihad in the planning and execution of suicide attacks. Since their establishment in the 1980s, these organizations have carried out more than 85 percent of the suicide bombings around the world, and in 2013, they perpetrated almost 95 percent**. Although suicide bombings account for fewer attacks compared with other methods used by terrorist organizations, they make more of an impact on the public due to the greater number of fatalities and their effect on morale.

**In 2013, eighteen countries suffered the lethal results of suicide terrorism. Some 291 suicide bombings were carried out, causing approximately 3,100 deaths. This figure represents a 25 percent increase in the number of attacks over the same period the previous year (230).**

Prominent statistics indicate a significant increase in attacks in Middle East countries, particularly Iraq; a large number of suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which for about a decade have suffered from a high level of attacks; a continued phenomenon in central Africa; and a trend toward declining involvement of women in suicide terror. In addition, **despite the common assumption that suicide bombings are usually carried out in occupied countries and primarily against the occupying power, only 32 percent of the attacks were perpetrated in countries where a foreign army is present.** Most of the attacks were carried out against the local population as part of an internal struggle, particularly in countries in which the regime lacks legitimacy.

The absence of political stability in much of the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring has led to a considerable increase in suicide bombings.

**In 2013, the Middle East saw 148 suicide attacks, which constituted some 50 percent of all attacks in the world.** The most prominent trend in the region is the increase in the number of attacks in Iraq. The 98 attacks there constituted one-third of all suicide bombings in the world, an increase of 280 percent over the previous year (35). Iraq, which began to suffer from suicide bombings only after the entry of Western forces in 2003, has thus far experienced some 1,500 attacks, most a result of religious and ethnic tensions. **Nearly one-half of the suicide bombings in Iraq (45 percent) were directed against the civilian population, primarily in restaurants, markets, and mosques, and at funerals and in funeral tents,** while the rest (48 percent) were aimed at security forces and police. A considerable portion of the attacks directed against the civilian population were carried out in areas in which there is a dominant Shiite presence, while bombings against military and governmental targets took place mainly in Sunni-dominated regions.

Additional factors beyond religious and ethnic tension account for the increase in the number of attacks in Iraq. The intelligence and operational vacuum that US forces left behind has weakened the security forces’ intelligence capabilities and ability to thwart attacks. In addition, the heightened presence of global jihadi elements because of the civil war in Syria has increased the supply of volunteers for suicide bombings in Iraq. Furthermore, corrupt behavior by the Shiite-majority government and the harsh discrimination against the Sunni minority have aroused much resentment against the government, and in turn, many are reluctant to assist Iraqi security forces to act against Sunni terrorist organizations. The organization behind most of the suicide bombings is the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which this year announced that it was expanding its activities from Iraq to Syria, and accordingly, changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

The internal fighting in Iraq is clearly associated with the civil war in Syria. This year, some 27 suicide bombings that killed some 400 people were carried out in Syria.1 The civil war in Syria, like the situation in neighboring Iraq, is marked by sectarian and ethnic tensions, with the focus on the Sunni-Shiite divide and the struggle between nationalist secular forces and Islamist foreign forces. Support by Iran and Hizbollah for the Assad regime has exacerbated the conflict. The groups that were mainly responsible for suicide terror in Syria this year are Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, both affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Suicide terrorism also spilled over into Lebanon, which for years was free of this phenomenon. In late 2013 Lebanon suffered three suicide bombings; the most noteworthy attack occurred at the Iranian embassy. The announcement claiming responsibility asserted that these attacks were intended to deter Hizbollah following its dispatch of hundreds of operatives to Syria, with the approval of its patron, Iran, to fight alongside Assad.

In Egypt too the prolonged governmental instability led to a rise in terrorist activity in the country, particularly after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi by the military. Increased activity by terrorist organizations occurred especially in the Sinai Peninsula (including four out of Egypt’s six suicide bombings). Conversely, in Yemen, which also suffers from prolonged governmental instability, ten suicide bombings took place this year, a decline of more than 50 percent over last year. In Libya and Tunisia, where there is serious governmental instability, there was one suicide attack.

Not only was there escalation in the Middle East in 2013; Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to figure prominently among countries that suffered heavily from suicide bombings. **Since the start of the twenty-first century, there were some 700 suicide bombings in Afghanistan and some 450 in Pakistan.** In 2013, 65 attacks were carried out in Afghanistan and 35 in Pakistan, figures similar to last year’s numbers. The violence in the two countries is affected, inter alia, by the expected withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan in 2014. In Afghanistan, the Taliban changed the focus of its attacks from civilian targets to local military and police targets (32 percent of the attacks), and governmental figures who are viewed as collaborators (27 percent). The organization has also continued to attack foreign forces in the country (35 percent). Terrorist organizations in Pakistan have perpetrated attacks on the civilian population (31 percent), along with security targets (34 percent) and governmental targets (25 percent).

The level of suicide terror in Africa has remained stable relative to the previous year, with 34 attacks in African countries, one more than in 2012. The most prominent terrorist organization in Somalia is the Shabab, which frequently operates against foreign government officials and army troops present in the country, and this year, carried out fourteen suicide attacks. In Mali, where French troops joined African Union forces this past year to help block the country’s takeover by global jihadist forces, there were fifteen suicide attacks, most of them carried out by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). In Nigeria, where the Boko Haram organization is dominant, there were three attacks, a significant decrease from the number of suicide bombings there (21) the previous year.

**In conclusion**, the increase in the number of suicide bombings in 2013 stemmed from a lack of stability in Middle East countries, and particularly from the escalation of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, with the latter turning from a local into a regional conflict. Given the increasing political instability in the Middle East, it appears that suicide terror can be expected to continue and even to escalate because it is an effective tool available to the warring parties. For Israel, this escalation, and especially the increase in suicide bombings, is a warning of sorts to increase security vigilance lest some involved in the conflicts along its borders attempt to export suicide terror to Israel. This might likewise encourage Palestinian opposition factions to attempt to reactivate this deadly method of operation against Israeli civilians and soldiers.

***Yotam Rosner*** *is an intern in the Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict Program at INSS,* ***Einav Yogev*** *is a project manager and research assistant at INSS, and Yoram Schweitzer is director of the Program on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict at INSS. The authors would like to thank Ariel Levin, an intern in the Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict Program, for the data collection that contributed to this paper.*

**A naive question by the Editor**

Source: Wikipedia

**Both super-powers base part of their intel network to sophisticated cyber-webs with immense capabilities and complexity – SORM and PRISM:**

**SORM** (Russian: Система Оперативно-Розыскных Мероприятий, literally *"System for Operative Investigative Activities"*) is a technical system for search and surveillance in the internet. A Russian law passed in 1995 allows the FSB to monitor telephone and internet communications. The FSB made secret arrangements for significant upgrades to Sorm equipment in Sochi prior to the 2014 Winter Olympics. The Russian Ministry of Communications also introduced new regulations for ISPs regarding Sorm in March 2013. All communication and Internet traffic by Sochi residents is now captured and filtered through deep packet inspection systems at all mobile networks.

**PRISM** is a clandestine mass electronic surveillance data mining program known to have been operated by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) since 2007. PRISM is a government code name for a data-collection effort known officially by the SIGAD US-984XN. The Prism program collects stored Internet communications based on demands made to Internet companies such as Google Inc. and Apple Inc. under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to turn over any data that match court-approved search terms. The NSA can use these Prism requests to target communications that were encrypted when they traveled across the Internet backbone, to focus on stored data that telecommunication filtering systems discarded earlier, and to get data that is easier to handle, among other things. PRISM began in 2007 in the wake of the passage of the Protect America Act under the Bush Administration. Its existence was leaked six years later by NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who warned that the extent of mass data collection was far greater than the public knew and included what he characterized as "dangerous" and "criminal" activities. The disclosures were published by *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post* on June 6, 2013. Subsequent documents have demonstrated a financial arrangement between NSA's Special Source Operations division (SSO) and PRISM partners in the millions of dollars. Documents indicate that PRISM is the number one source of raw intelligence used for NSA analytic reports", and it accounts for 91% of the NSA's Internet traffic acquired.


**What if terrorists adapt fast (as always) and go back to traditional “snail-mail”? How can these innovative systems comply with this operational shift? In most Western or Eastern countries post services have been greatly improved and even simple mails can be delivered within 24hrs. And a simple letter can contain many forms of passing information. I was watching in *CSI New York* (on TV) a case were a big box full with hundrends of barrcoded documents were scanned by a computer’s software and not only all documents appeared on screen without opening the box but also a cloud was formed through which certain conclusions were providing leading to identification of a given case of murder. Science fiction perhaps! But this specific series often provides future imaginary of the things to come. Do not forget that TV/movies producers are always ahead of technology and hardware. Just some naive thoughts of an asymmetric Editor…**

## 60 percent increase in terrorism in “arc of instability” across North Africa, Sahel

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140131-report-60-percent-increase-in-terrorism -in-arc-of-instability-across-north-africa-sahel

**A new study on North Africa and the Sahel reports that terrorist attacks in the region “increased an alarming 60 percent” in 2013, to the highest annual level over the past twelve years.** “An expanding array of al-Qaeda-affiliated and like-minded extremist groups” escalated their violent attacks across an “‘arc of instability’ from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.” These extremist groups include several al-Qaeda-affiliated and like-minded extremist formations and their associates, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansaru, Ansar Dine, Ansar Al-Sharia, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), al-Mourabitoun, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA), Al-Shabaab, and militant recruits from the Polisario-run refugee camps and other displaced persons.

The study, **Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2013**, reports that Libya, Algeria, Mali, and Tunisia suffered the highest rate of attacks in the region, which has seen terrorism rise more than 60 percent since the 9/11 attacks.

The study, authored by Yonah Alexander, director of the Inter-University Center on Terrorism Studies (IUCTS), is the IUCTS’s fifth annual report on terrorism in the Maghreb and Sahel region. It was released last Friday at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. at the 16th annual event on International Cooperation in Combatting Terrorism: Review of 2013 and Outlook for 2014, hosted by the IUCTS/Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

“The stakes are too high for America to disengage from the Maghreb and the Sahel,” Alexander underscored in the report, adding that “America’s vital interests in the region and those of our friends and allies are under assault by extremists and radicals who are doing us harm and want to inflict more damage.”

The report recommends that regional and global leaders take steps to stem the flow of arms and new jihadi recruits, promote regional cooperation and development, and prevent what the UN Security Council warned last year was becoming “a breeding ground for extremists and a launch pad for larger-scale terrorist attacks around the world.”

**The study recommended a range of “hard” and “soft power” solutions:**

* Apply “soft power” by accelerating national and regional economic development through reduced barriers to foreign and domestic trade and investment, increased assistance programs, support for critical infrastructure programs such as Power Africa and Trans-Africa Highway, and “triangular aid” projects in health, water, sanitation, power, and primary education.
* Increase intelligence-sharing, counter-terrorism technical assistance, and support for reforms that promote human rights, independent judiciaries, transparency, and rule of law, as well as work to resolve old conflicts which stand in the way of regional economic and security cooperation, such as the Western Sahara dispute.
* Improve regional security cooperation and control of national borders to reduce the flow of recruits and arms to criminal and terrorist groups.

Morocco has deep interest in the security situation in North Africa and the Sahel, and would be gratified to see that among the report’s recommendations is one specifically directed at the Polisario:

* Cooperate with international monitors to conduct a census in the Polisario-controlled camps near Tindouf, Algeria, which pose a threat to regional security as a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers. The current Polisario military units should be disbanded and the refugees who have lived in those camps should be given an opportunity to migrate elsewhere in the region.

Rachad Bouhlal, Morocco’s ambassador to the United States said at the forum that “The precarious situation in the region constitutes a real threat to peace, security, and stability.” He said Morocco is taking a comprehensive approach that includes security and economic development, as well as promoting religious moderation, to combat extremism. He noted King Mohammed VI’s agreement with the new Malian president to train 500 imams in Morocco’s moderate Islam and reported that 100 imams from Mali have already begun the program.

►**You can download full report at:** http://www.iucts.org/publications/reports/

# Al-Qaeda terrorist threat to Australia

Source: http://www.smh.com.au/national/alqaeda-terrorist-threat-to-australia-20140131-31sui.html

**Al-Qaeda-linked groups that are enticing dozens of Australians to join the bloody conflict in Syria have begun setting up camps to train foreign fighters to launch terrorist attacks when they return home.**

The alarming change in tactics, revealed by US intelligence chief James Clapper, comes as Australia's counter-terrorism ambassador Bill Fisher told Fairfax Media the threat of an attack on a bar, mall or another ''soft'' target frequented by Westerners had ''worsened'' in recent times.

Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been grappling with a surprising resurgence of al-Qaeda over the past year, as its affiliates capture major cities in western Iraq and assume control of the military resistance in Syria.

As many as 200 Australians are believed to have travelled to Syria to help rebels trying to topple dictator Bashar al-Assad. Of those, a ''few dozen'' are actively engaged in combat, although authorities don't have a precise handle on the numbers.

According to Mr Clapper, US intelligence has evidence of ''training complexes'' within Syria ''to train people to go back to their countries and conduct terrorist acts''.

Mr Clapper, who is US director of national intelligence, named Jabhat al-Nusra as one group with ''aspirations for attacks on the homeland''. He strongly suggested it wasn't the only one, but declined to provide any more detail on the camps.

About half of the Australians fighting in Syria are believed to be members of Jabhat al-Nusra. Others have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an even more militant Islamist group with strong ties to al-Qaeda.

**US and Australian intelligence agencies have long worried about the possibility of their citizens returning battle-hardened from Syria, with the combat skills and virulent anti-Western ideology that might enable them to launch a terrorist act.**

**Those worst fears now appear to be well founded.**

''This is a huge concern,'' said Mr Clapper, adding that he did not believe the danger of a terrorist attack was ''any less'' than what it was a decade ago.

The assessment of the level of threat was backed by Mr Fisher, a veteran diplomat who became Australia's counter-terrorism ambassador last year.

''The likelihood of an attack like 9/11 in the West has lessened but the capability of al-Qaeda and its affiliates to undertake lots of smaller but nonetheless deadly attacks is very real - hitting bars where Westerners congregate overseas, and other soft targets. In this respect, the threat is worse,'' he said. ''Any place where there is very low domestic security control is an obvious target.''

The attacks in Bali in 2002 claimed 202 lives, including 88 Australians. While counter-terrorism officials have made hundreds of arrests in the region, concerns remain that Australians and other Westerners could be targeted abroad, including at popular tourist destinations in south-east Asia.

While established terrorist networks have been disrupted, Greg Barton from the Global Centre for Terrorism Research said smaller self-starting terrorist cells are emerging, including in Indonesia, and are difficult to detect.

Intelligence agencies in Australia, he said, have also struggled to get a grip on who has travelled to Syria and what they are doing over there.

''The numbers [of Australians going to Syria] have caught everybody by surprise,'' he said, adding that they far exceeded the exodus of Islamists to other conflicts, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.


Mr Clapper said al-Qaeda's affiliates have developed counter-espionage techniques that have confounded Western agencies. ''They've gone to school [on] us, on how we try to track them,'' he said.

''The combination of … the geographic dispersal and the increasing challenges in collecting against them make al-Qaeda, in all of its forms, a very formidable threat.''

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| --- |
| EDITOR’S COMMENT: So what? Get tired sick with similar statements, warnings, conclusions and comments. Same in the UK, France, Germany, Belgium, the Balkans – just to name a few countries. Common logic dictates that all these “visiting fighters” one day (soon) will have to come home – all wars end sooner or later. How they will materialize their expertise and fighting knowledge? By going to universities to study the art of war or start charities organizations because they have faced death and contribute to atrocities? I do know that it is very difficult – if not impossible – to locate them upon return (although UK authorities did that) and put them aside or under surveillance. But there has to be a plan on how to handle them in the short run. Retired fighters need money to continue to live and their expertise is not valid for the modern markets of employment. So what they are going to do when return to their sleeping, naïve countries of origin? Silly question since we all know the answer that will – unfortunately – surprise us once more in the months to come (as always!).  And it is not only them! The next generations of jihadists are been prepared from the very innocent age of four as you can read in the footage below… |

A future jihadist?

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3wvZ46v3U0

The amazing videos of a four year old firing with a AK-47 somewhere in Syria. It is estimated that the little boy is of Albanian origin – in the video a directive in Albanian “keep it close” is heard along with the usual “Allah Akbar” heard in all jihadi videos. Albanian mercenaries are taking their families with them living into extremists’ camps in the conflicts areas.

Al-Qaida denies links to ISIL in Syria

Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/03/al-qaida-denies-links-isil-syria

Al-Qaida's general command has said it has no links with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), in an apparent attempt to assert authority over the Islamist militant groups involved in Syria's civil war.

The small but powerful ISIL has been caught up in battles with other Islamist insurgents often triggered by disputes over authority and territory, and has also clashed with secular rebels.

The internecine fighting - among the bloodiest in the three-year conflict - has undermined the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad and dismayed western powers pushing for peace talks.

Rebel-on-rebel violence in Syria has killed at least 1,800 this year alone.

ISIL follows al-Qaida's hard-line ideology and, until now, the two groups were widely believed to be linked.

However, the organisations that have clashed with ISIL include Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaida's official Syria wing, which is led by al-Qaida chief Ayman Zawahri.

In a message posted on jihadi websites on Monday, the al-Qaida general command said ISIL "is not a branch of the al-Qaida group … [al-Qaida] does not have an organizational relationship with it and is not the group responsible for their actions."

In April, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of ISIL, tried to engineer a merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, defying orders from Zawahri and causing a rift.

Charles Lister, visiting fellow at Brookings Doha Centre, said the statement "represents an attempt by al-Qaida to definitively reassert some level of authority over the jihad in Syria" following a month of fighting and ISIL disobedience.

"This represents a strong and forthright move and will undoubtedly serve to further consolidate Jabhat al-Nusra's role as al-Qaida's official presence in Syria."

# Report Cites Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing From Diamonds

Source:http://www.diamonds.net/%28X%281%29S%28f2ucsj45xsvt1brdzzvvud2q%29A%28c3XXIqvwzAEkAAAANjgxZmZkZDQtNzVlYy00MzRkLWE3YjUtYTM2NTM4OWQ4ZjExvBmLtVPTBLDte1NmJ8cLjnlWRnk1%29%29/News/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=45998&ArticleTitle=Report+Cites+Money+Laundering%2C+Terrorist+Financing+From+Diamonds


The FATF and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units collaborated on a typologies research project to identify the money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) vulnerabilities and risks of the “diamond pipeline,” which covers all sectors in the diamond trade: production, rough diamond sales, cutting and polishing, jewelry manufacturing and jewelry retailers.

Based on research conducted, analysis of case studies collected by the project team and after consultation with the private sector, the report concludes that the diamonds trade is subject to considerable vulnerabilities and risks. The closed and opaque nature of the diamonds markets and the high value of diamonds combined with a lack of expertise in this area on the part of the authorities have left this industry susceptible to abuse by criminals.

The diamonds trade has existed for centuries.  It has developed a unique culture and trade practices, which have their own characteristics and variations across countries and continents. However, **the international diamond trade has changed in the last few decades:**

* De Beers no longer holds the same all inclusive diamonds monopoly.
* A number of smaller diamond dealers have entered the market.
* Distribution channels have become more diverse.
* New trade centers have emerged with billions of dollars' worth of diamonds, and financial transactions go in and out of newly founded bourses and their ancillary financial institutions.
* Cutting and polishing has shifted (except for the most valuable stones) from Belgium, Israel and the U.S. mainly to India and China, with smaller cutting centers emerging.
* Cash transactions are still prevalent but the usage of cash is diminishing.
* The Internet, as in all other facets of life, is rapidly taking its place as a diamonds trading platform.

These significant changes in the "diamonds pipeline" structure and processes raised the question of whether the risks and vulnerabilities remain the same and whether current anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and national regulations are sufficient to mitigate the different ML/TF risks and vulnerabilities identified in the research.

The case studies included in the report demonstrate the creative methods that criminals have used to exploit diamonds trade for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. This report aims to help build awareness with the regulatory, enforcement and customs authorities as well as reporting entities about risks and vulnerabilities of the diamonds trade, and how to mitigate them.

**Some of the risks and vulnerabilities of the diamonds trade, identified in this report are:**

* Global nature of trade - The trade in diamonds is transnational and complex, thus convenient for ML/TF transactions that are, in most cases, of international and multi-jurisdictional nature.
* Use of diamonds as currency -  diamonds are difficult to trace and can provide anonymity in transactions.
* Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) - the specific characteristics of diamonds as a commodity and the significant proportion of transactions related to international trade make the diamonds trade vulnerable to the different laundering techniques of TBML in general and over/under valuation in particular.    
  High amounts - the trade in diamonds can reach tens of millions to billions of  dollars. This has bearing on the potential to launder large amounts of money through the diamond trade and also on the level of risks of the diamonds trade.
* Level of awareness - law enforcement and AML / CFT authorities, including financial intelligence units (FIUs), have limited awareness of potential ML/TF schemes through the trade in diamonds.

►**Read the full report at:** http://www.egmontgroup.org/news-and-events/news/2014/1/31/fatf-and-egmont-group-announcement-ml-and-tf-through

# How Do We Know If Security Measures Work Against Terrorists?

**By Brian Michael Jenkins**

Source: http://www.livescience.com/42888-how-do-we-know-if-security-measures-work-against-terrorists.html

The United States spends $200 billion a year on homeland security. This includes physical barriers, guards, closed-circuit TV, explosives detection, body scanners, security software and other technology and services intended to keep the nation safe from terrorists and other non-military adversaries. Does it work? And how do we measure the results?

At a glance, those seem to be easy questions. The country has invested heavily in homeland security and is safer now. In terms of terrorist activity in the United States, the years since the September 11 attacks have been the most tranquil since the 1960s, when terrorism in its contemporary form first emerged as a threat.

People tend not to recall that during the 1970s, the United States experienced an average of 50-60 terrorist bombings a year. In the 12 years since the September 11 attacks, terrorists inspired by al Qaeda's ideology—the ones we worry most about—have been able to pull off just four attacks in the United States, two by lone gunmen, a failed bombing in New York's Times Square, and the 2013 bombing in Boston. In all, 18 people were killed.

If, however, we ask whether the visible security measures that have become so prevalent in the landscape prevented more terrorist attacks, what security measures are most effective against terrorists, or whether the difference can be measured in substantially reduced risk, then hard proof is much harder to come by. The field of medicine is based upon evidence-based practice grounded in empirical evidence obtained from sound, scientific research and analysis. Can we apply the same approach to security?

In the broadest sense, we know that security works. Criminals exploit the absence of security. Increasing security drives them away. Rising bank robberies in certain areas prompt increased security measures, such as anti-jump barriers that prevent robbers from jumping over the counter, resulting in a decline in robbery attempts where these are in place. This is proof that security works.

Shoplifting, a common crime, can be demonstrably reduced by signs warning that shoplifters will be prosecuted, pointing out the presence of security cameras, and by attaching radio identification tags to items in the store. Because shoplifting is a high-volume crime and inventories are now computerized, it is easy to track changes in inventory shrinkage as security measures are implemented.

But crime is an imperfect analog. Terrorist attacks differ from ordinary crimes in important ways.

**Despite an increase in the volume of terrorism worldwide, terrorist attacks remain statistically rare events. Unlike bank robbers, who go where the money is, terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time. Statisticians treat terrorist attacks as random events.**

Terrorists can avoid security by attacking soft targets, such as public places that are difficult to protect. That terrorists have moved toward softer targets can be interpreted as an indirect indicator that security works. However, it also may reflect the terrorists' growing determination to kill in quantity, which can be done most easily in crowded public places. Not all terrorist perpetrators worry about being caught in the act, or even about escaping. Even the terrorists' operational failures cause fear, which is the objective of terrorism.

The psychological effects of terrorism make it hard to apply an economic cost-benefit analysis. While terrorism ranks low as a source of risk, the people regard it as a major danger—public tolerance for terrorism is near zero.

Many criticize security as being "just for show." However, illusion is an important component of security. The objective is to convince would-be attackers that they will fail.  We tend to focus on detection and prevention. Judging by the evidence, the most important effect of security is deterrence. There are very few instances where terrorists are caught trying to smuggle weapons or bombs on board airliners. If deterrence is working, that means fewer attempts, but it is difficult to count things that don't occur.

Teams that test security measures by trying to get past those measures could add artificial events to the universe of terrorist attacks. However, those teams test only detection, not deterrence.

While quantifiable preventions of terrorist attacks by physical security measures are rare, we do have indirect indicators of their effects. Aviation security, the most ambitious security effort, offers several examples. Airline security measures have increased over the last four decades since 100 percent passenger screening was imposed in response to the increase in hijackings during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Each decade since then has seen fewer attempts to hijack or sabotage commercial airliners, although it appears that terrorists remain obsessed with attacking aviation targets. This is not simply because the security measures chased away the less-determined non-terrorist adversaries, although that contributed to the overall decline.  Even terrorist attempts declined.

This is not to say that security was the only reason for the decline. The destruction of certain terrorist groups and international pressure on states supporting them also contributed.

The evolution of terrorist attempts to sabotage airliners also shows that, whatever we may think of aviation security, terrorists attempting to smuggle bombs aboard airliners take security seriously. They attempt to build smaller, more concealable devices with undetectable ingredients that operatives will be able to smuggle through security checkpoints. Sometimes they have been successful in doing so. For example, we have the cases of the 2001 shoe bomber and the 2009 underwear bomber. But the devices malfunctioned, and it is not clear that the tiny quantities of explosives, even if detonated, would have brought down either airplane. In other words, the security measures did not prevent the attempts, but they persuaded the terrorists to trade reliability for concealment—an achievement nonetheless.

Seizing hostages at embassies and consulates was a popular terrorist tactic in the 1970s, but it declined by the end of the decade. Increased security at diplomatic posts was part of the explanation — embassies became virtual fortresses. Other contributing forces included declining willingness of nations to make concessions to terrorists holding hostages, along with the increased willingness to end such episodes with force, thereby increasing the terrorists' risk of death or capture.

Examination of recent terrorist plots on ground-based transportation showed that, in a number of cases, the plotters were aware of security measures, but they continued to plan their attacks. Still, most of these plots were interrupted in the early stages, long before they became operational, so we cannot say for sure how security might have influenced terrorists' plans. Interrupted plots underscore the importance of intelligence as a countermeasure.

Where there is a continuing terrorist campaign, long-term effects are discernible. For example, the 25-year bombing campaign by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against London Transport also shows the effects of security. IRA bombers, who initially targeted rail and subway stations in the heart of London, were gradually pushed to the outskirts, and from busy stations to remote track facilities.

An active IRA cell in London was a precious commodity to be protected. The terrorists avoided capture. That is not the case with suicide attackers for whom even survival is irrelevant. **Research shows that suicidal attackers attain higher levels of lethality—more deaths per attack—than non-suicide attacks. And security against suicidal attackers is more difficult. But this may itself be seen as an achievement of security because it pushes terrorist operatives to a much higher degree of commitment, thereby complicating recruitment.** Very few of the terrorist plotters in the United States have been willing to carry out suicide attacks.

Databases that provide valuable details about attacks, such as the one developed by the Mineta Transportation Institute, where I now work, may yield further clues about security effectiveness. Meanwhile, they also provide insightful information that allows security planners to focus their efforts on the attack and concealment methods that cause the greatest number of casualties.

What we can see is that the effects of security measures ought not to be measured solely in terms of prevention. Different types of countermeasures produce different effects, from deterrence to making it more difficult to carry out an attack, and from making it easier for security to intervene during an attempted attack to providing visible security that reassures an apprehensive public. Each of these efforts would need to be scored differently.

The bottom line is that we can identify which security measures apply to which results, but finding hard numbers to measure their effectiveness remains an analytical challenge.

**Brian Michael Jenkins** is the director of the National Transportation Safety and Security Center at the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI), established by Congress in 1991 as a research institute based at San Jose State University in California. A leading authority on terrorism and sophisticated crime, Jenkins has directed MTI's continuing research on protecting surface transportation against terrorist attacks. In 1996, President Clinton appointed Jenkins to be a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. He served as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism and has served on the U.S. Comptroller General's Advisory Board.

# Super Bowl Security Breach Comes After Game, in an Interrupted News Conference

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/sports/football/lines-that-seemed-to-be-worth-the-wait. html?\_r=1

**Tens of millions of dollars were spent securing the Super Bowl and the events beforehand, but perhaps the most bizarre security breach happened after the game, when Malcolm Smith, the game’s most valuable player, was speaking with reporters.**

**He finished saying that he never thought he would win the award when a man leapt on the platform and grabbed the microphone.**

“Investigate 9-11; 9-11 was perpetrated by people in our own government,” he said.

Smith looked to the side for help, and Harvey Greene, a Miami Dolphins spokesman who was running the news conference, jumped forward and pushed the man, dressed in a red-and-black flannel shirt, off the stage.

The entire incident lasted about four seconds.

Smith remained calm. “Is everyone all right?” he asked the handful of reporters nearby.

“Let’s check his press pass,” he added with a smile.

Stephen Jones, a spokesman for the New Jersey State Police, identified the man as Matthew Mills, 30, of Brooklyn and said he was being charged with criminal trespass.

N.F.L. officials said they were looking into the matter.

Earlier Sunday, fans made their way to the game in the midst of armored vehicles, Hummers, metal detectors, police helicopters and bomb-sniffing dogs.

“It would be very hard for someone to get something through security,” said Randy Owen, 46, of Manhattan, who spent more than three hours with his 9-year-old son, Timothy, making the trek to MetLife Stadium, often reminding him not to take out his game ticket just yet.

After they made their way through the crowds at Pennsylvania Station and the rail station in Secaucus, N.J., and then through the long lines outside the security screening tents at the stadium’s gates, Owen said, “It was quite a journey.” But he certainly was not complaining about the layers of screening.

**The Super Bowl has long been considered a terrorist target, and those concerns were elevated this year with the event being held in the New York region. This Super Bowl was also the first since the Boston Marathon bombings in April, and it came amid considerable attention on potential threats in Russia for the Winter Games in Sochi.**

With the Super Bowl approaching, the New York police commissioner, William J. Bratton, told reporters Wednesday that there were no known threats. But local, state and federal law enforcement agencies were on high alert.

At kickoff, the N.F.L. spokesman Brian McCarthy said he was not aware of any significant security issues.

The police presence was highly visible in public areas Sunday and the week leading to it, from Midtown Manhattan, where the police lined the fan zone known as Super Bowl Boulevard, through a round of security screening in Secaucus to MetLife Stadium. There, rows of law enforcement vans lined the parking lot, and dogs checked cars, vans and buses as they entered.

As they waited elbow to elbow in lines at Secaucus, some fans shouted, “T.S.A.,” referring to the Transportation Security Administration — a jab at airport security lines. Others pointed the finger at Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey, yelling, “Blame Christie!”

But fans generally seemed pleased to see the protection.

“It’s definitely been concerning,” said Taylor Swallow of Denver, who attended the game with his wife, Kajsa. “We’ve been hearing about what can happen — mass shootings, bombings.”

The Swallows said they noticed plenty of police cars with lights on as they took a car from their hotel in Midtown to New Jersey for the game.

“It changes the nature of the game when you have to be aware and vigilant,” Taylor Swallow said.

MetLife Stadium is not even 10 miles from Manhattan, but the area around it has a much lower building density, making the stadium resemble a fortress — and much easier to protect. To enter the stadium, fans lined up outside security screening tents, where they went through metal detectors.

**Fans were not allowed to bring much with them: A clutch and a small, clear plastic bag were permitted, but the authorities discouraged fans from bringing much of anything.** In fact, the N.F.L. left cold-weather gear on each seat.

Before Giants and Jets games at MetLife Stadium during the season, fans pack the parking lot with grills, setting up tables and playing games. But on Sunday, tailgating in the parking lot was highly discouraged, with open flames being banned.

Still, some fans, particularly local ones, arrived early and set up for a downsize tailgating experience in the backs of their vans and sport utility vehicles — typically with some chips and beer but no barbecue.

“It’s a lot more serious than a regular game,” Serhiy Levchuk, 25, of Lyndhurst, N.J., said of the police presence.

Levchuk and his friends arrived early and sat in folding chairs outside their van, having paid $350 for a parking pass. They said the police had come around about three times, first telling them to put away their chairs **but then relaxing their requests as the afternoon went on.**


They could not help but talk about what the experience was usually like at Giants games. “You have a whole bunch of people together, a grill, three tables,” Levchuk said.

But his friend, Xavier Cordova, a Broncos fan from Jersey City, interrupted the reminiscing with a dose of reality, saying, “It is the Super Bowl, you know.”

# Break the link between terrorism funding and poaching

### By Johan Bergenas and Monica Medina

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/break-the-link-between-terrorism-funding-and-poaching/2014/01/31/6c03780e-83b5-11e3-bbe5-6a2a3141e3a9\_story.html

There is a new threat in the terrorist hotbed of Africa, and the U.S. military can do much more to combat it. Poaching of endangered elephants and rhinos has become a conservation crisis, and profits from wildlife crimes are filling the coffers of terrorist organizations. The twin crises should be cause for alarm for military leaders, not just conservation groups. They need to start working together before it is too late.

In the past two years, about 60,000 elephants and more than 1,600 rhinos have been slaughtered by poachers, according to reports from the Wildlife Conservation Society, the International Union for Conservation of Nature and others. About a thousand park rangers have died in the past decade defending the animals.

**Illegal wildlife trade generates an estimated $19 billion a year — more than the illicit trafficking of small arms, diamonds, gold or oil. A July Congressional Research Service report found that a rhino horn is worth more than $50,000 per kilogram on the black market — more than gold or platinum.** Sadly, poaching elephants and rhinos in Africa is easy money for terrorists, and they are cashing in.

**One Elephant Action League undercover investigation in Kenya concluded that illegal ivory funds as much as 40 percent of the operations of al-Shabab, the group behind the November attack at a Nairobi shopping mall where 60 people were killed.** The former director of the Kenyan Wildlife Service and the U.N. secretary general have drawn similar links between crime against wildlife and al-Shabab, al-Qaeda and the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army.

Last May, President Obama called for a new strategy to fight al-Qaeda and its affiliates. To be effective, these counterterrorism plans must engage not only African defense leaders but also conservation and development leaders. U.S. military plans for Africa should include ending elephant and rhino poaching to cut off a key source of funds for al-Qaeda and other terrorists.

A high-level summit on wildlife crimes, organized by the British government, Prince Charles and Prince William, is scheduled to take place this month in London. It is the perfect place to call for a new partnership between the defense and conservation communities.

As Obama’s national security team plans its next steps, it can follow Hillary Clinton’s lead. Before stepping down as secretary of state, Clinton commissioned an intelligence review of the impact of wildlife trafficking on national security. Completed last summer, the review prompted Obama to sign an executive order creating an interagency task force to develop an anti-poaching strategy. Due out this year, the strategy should include a greater military role in responding to this growing challenge.

Last year Congress gave the Pentagon permission to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army’s poaching and human-trafficking activities. That authority should be expanded to cover all terrorist groups, including al-Shabab.

Even without specific direction from Congress, the Defense Department and intelligence agencies should work with conservation groups to combat poaching, using new and inexpensive technologies to detect and deter terrorist activities and traffickers. Drones, satellite imagery, tracking devices and other high-tech tools could transform the fight to save elephants and rhinos, cheaply and effectively starving terrorists of the easy money they gain from wildlife crimes. Already, some African countries are asking for such tools.

Top U.S. defense officials should routinely discuss wildlife trafficking in meetings with African military leaders. The U.S. military’s post-Afghanistan plans must explicitly include poaching in Africa and illegal trafficking of wildlife as new “fronts” in the war on terror. Using technology to detect and deter poachers is a much less expensive way to fight terrorists than deploying Special Operations forces — and less dangerous to U.S. troops.

Finally, private-sector security and technology companies should be encouraged to work with African governments to deploy sensors, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites and other sophisticated data-gathering and detection systems. These types of defense technologies are needed to bolster borders, ports, roads, energy facilities and other economic infrastructure in Africa. Over the next few decades, the market for this infrastructure and societal security capacity is estimated to be at least $60 trillion, according to reports by McKinsey and others. By working now to protect African economic infrastructure, which includes endangered elephants and rhinos, technology companies could reap huge financial and public relations rewards.

Security technology, military capacity and market incentives are all waiting to be deployed to defeat terrorists and save wildlife in Africa — a huge potential win-win. Here’s hoping that Prince Charles and Prince William use this month’s summit to publicly call on military and industry leaders to join the fight to conserve rhinos and elephants.

**Johan Bergenas** is deputy director of the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit and nonpartisan think tank that studies peace and security challenges around the world.

**Monica Medina** is a former special assistant to U.S. defense secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel.

# Al-Qaeda: Defender of Christians?

**By Raymond Ibrahim**

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3737/al-qaeda-christians

Muslim persecution of Christians is the "Achilles Heel" of the global Islamic movement's image—the surest way of exposing its supremacist and intolerant elements and one of the main reasons the major media and establishment rarely report or address it.

The logic (fully explained here) can be summarized as follows: Islamic and jihadi attacks targeting the West or Israel pose no problem to the image of Islam. No matter how violent or brutal, no matter how many Islamic slogans are shrieked—"Allah commands the subjugation of infidels!"—Muslim violence against the West and Israel will always be dismissed as desperate acts of disempowered, oppressed, and frustrated Muslims—the "underdogs," which the West tends to romanticize.

And so they will always get a free pass, without further reflection.

But if jihadis get a free pass when their violence is directed against those stronger than them, how does one rationalize away their violence when it is directed against those weaker than them—in this case, the millions of Christians being persecuted today by Muslims across 41 nations?

This is the dilemma that none other than Ayman al-Zawahiri, chief of al-Qaeda, understands.

A few days ago, the Associated Press reported that:

*It was a rare call by Ayman al-Zawahri in defense of Christians, who largely supported the popularly backed coup against Mohammed Morsi and were subsequently targeted by a wave of violence.*

*In an audio message posted on militant websites, al-Zawahri said it was not in the interest of Muslims to be engaged with the Christians because "we have to be busy confronting the Americanized coup of (Gen. Abdel-Fattah) el-Sissi and establish an Islamic government instead."*

*El-Sissi is Egypt's defense minister who overthrew Morsi after millions of Egyptians protested to demand he step down. The head of the Coptic church supported the coup along with other groups.*

*"We must not seek war with the Christians and thus give the West an excuse to blame Muslims, as has happened before," al-Zawahiri said.*

Although Maamoun Youssef, the AP reporter who wrote this story, portrays it as "*a rare call* by Ayman al-Zawahri *in defense* of Christians," and although the report is titled "Al-Qaida leader *opposes* fighting Christians," in fact, Zawahiri's communique has nothing to do with "defending Christians" or "opposing" the overall jihad on them.

Indeed, Zawahiri himself played an important role in inciting mass violence against Coptic Christians following the anti-Islamist June 2013 Revolution—leading to the destruction of some 80 churches, some with al-Qaeda flags planted atop them.

Moreover, Zawahiri's like-minded brother and Salafi front-man, Muhammad, allegedly called ousted president Morsi while he was still in office, insisting that the latter take measures to force Christians to pay jizya and live in abject humiliation, according to Koran 9:29.

Instead, Zawahiri's rationale for this communique "in defense of Christians" is that, in his own words, "We must not seek war with the Christians and thus give the West an excuse to blame Muslims."

Zawahiri knows that Islamic jihadis waging terrorist attacks on Egypt's military and state targets will be portrayed in the West as oppressed and frustrated "freedom fighters" doing whatever is necessary to overthrow "tyrannical" powers.

But such "heroic" depictions disappear once these same jihadis persecute the unarmed Christian minorities in their midst *simply for being Christian*.

Zawahiri understands that, not only are such attacks strategically ineffective—kill all the Copts you want, it won't bring Morsi back—but they unequivocally expose the true face of the "freedom fighters," one that can only be seen as inherently fascistic and intolerant.

And the fear that Zawahiri and others have is that some people in the West might actually begin to connect the dots and conclude that, if jihadis persecute Christian minorities simply because they are non-Muslim "infidels," perhaps that is also the true reason they are at war with Israel, the West, and non-Muslims everywhere.

Perhaps the jihad is less about political and territorial "grievances" and more about religious intolerance and Islamic supremacism—as unprovoked attacks on disenfranchised non-Muslim minorities clearly indicate; as al-Qaeda's once clandestine writings to fellow Muslims indicate.

Hence, the true reason why the astute Zawahiri is trying to call off the jihad on Christians.

For now, anyway.

***Raymond Ibrahim****, author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam's New War on Christians (Regnery, April, 2013) is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.*

# Terrorism in the S. American Tri-Border Area: A Review

**By Ms. A. F. Trevisi, Research Assistant, ICT**

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/01/terrorism-in-the-s-american-tri-border-area-a-review/

Terrorism in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) has become a salient, highly-publicized issue. The region is frequently called a counterfeit capital, crime hub, and breeding ground for terrorists. Analyzing terrorist activities, operatives, and groups established in the triple frontier requires an introductory description of its particular background.

**Part 1** outlines the geographical features of the frontier area where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet, as well as the specificities of the three main urban centers: Foz do Iguaçu, Ciudad del Este and Puerto Iguazú. It also expounds the socioeconomic elements that characterize the region, including its different ethnic minorities, religious groups, and economic activities. It includes a section on the area’s black-market economy and the role played by the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este. These general characteristics make the TBA a potential safe haven and breeding ground for terrorists.

Subsequently, **Part 2** attempts to evaluate the main components of the regional terrorist threat – the groups and their activities. Even though the existence of terrorist cells is frequently debated, there is a general consensus among security forces that terrorists operate in the TBA. Most of the available texts focus on the presence of Hezbollah and al Qaeda, despite the identification of Hamas, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad, al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, Jihad Media Battalion, and Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group operatives in the region. These organizations engage in varied fundraising, recruiting, training and violent activities in the triple frontier. Their capability was alarmingly demonstrated with the TBA-linked bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.

In **Part 3**, this report attempts to explain how the operational capabilities of the terrorist organizations are improved by the extension of their regional network and their collaboration with criminal organizations. These factors intensify the threat posed by terrorists operating in South America. Finally, the last part analyzes the efforts that have been undertaken to combat crime and terrorism in the TBA. National, regional and international actors have collaborated in the development of a regional security network. Nevertheless, the fight against terror remains incomplete and riddled with limitations. In order to eradicate terrorism from the triple frontier and the South American continent, the TBA nations will need to implement a more comprehensive counterterrorist strategy.

►**Read full report at:** http://i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Assessing-the-Terrorist-Threat-in-the-Tri-Border-Area.pdf

# Detection Points in the Terrorist Attack Cycle

**By Scott Stewart**


**Source:** **http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/detection-points-terrorist-attack-cycle**

Last week's Security Weekly discussed the fact that terrorism is a tactic used by many different classes of actors and that, while the perpetrators and tactics of terrorism may change in response to shifts in larger geopolitical cycles, these changes will never result in the end of terrorism. Since that analysis was written, there have been jihadist-related attacks in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Yemen and Pakistan, an assassination attempt against the president of Abkhazia, and a failed timed-incendiary attack against the Athens subway. (The latter incident, which militant anarchists claimed, reinforces that jihadists are not the only ones who practice terrorism.)

But while terrorism is a continuing concern, it can be understood, and measures can be taken to thwart terrorist plots and mitigate the effects of attacks. Perhaps the most important and fundamental point to understand about terrorism is that attacks do not appear out of nowhere. Individuals planning a terrorist attack follow a discernible cycle -- and that cycle and the behaviors associated with it can be observed if they are being looked for. We refer to these points where terrorism-related behavior can be most readily observed as vulnerabilities in the terrorist attack cycle.

### The Attack Cycle

Many different actors can commit terrorist attacks, including sophisticated transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda; regional militant groups like India's Maoist Naxalites; small, independent cells like the anarchists in Greece; and lone wolves like Oslo attacker Anders Breivik. There can be great variance in attack motives and in the time and process required to radicalize these different actors to the point that they decide to conduct a terrorist attack. But once any of these actors decides to launch an attack, there is remarkable similarity in the planning process.

First, there is the process of selecting or identifying a target. Often an actor will come up with a list of potential targets and then select one to focus on. In some cases, the actor has preselected a method of attack, such as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, and wants to find a target that would be vulnerable to that specific type of attack. In other cases, the actor will pick a target and then devise a method of attack based on that target's characteristics and vulnerabilities. Simply put, the execution of these steps can be somewhat fluid; some degree of planning or preparation can come before target selection, and sometimes target selection will be altered during the planning process. The time required to execute these steps can also vary considerably. Some attacks can be planned and executed within hours or days, while more complex plans, such as those used in the 9/11 or Mumbai attacks, may take months or even years to complete.

Frequently, those planning an attack will conduct detailed surveillance of potential targets to determine what security measures are in place around the target and to gauge whether they have the ability to successfully attack it. If the target is too difficult to attack -- commonly known as a hard target -- the attack planners will typically move on to their next target, which may prove easier to attack. (When they do continue with attacks against targets whose security measures exceed the attackers' capabilities, those attacks fail.) We refer to this stage as preoperational surveillance, which means surveillance that is conducted before the operation is fully planned.

After the target has been selected, a second round of surveillance is conducted. This round will be far more detailed and is intended to provide all the details necessary for planning the attack. For example, if the attack is being planned against a static facility, this round of surveillance will generally try to obtain a detailed description of the target's physical security features and security force procedures. It will also focus on establishing a baseline understanding of the activity that can be expected around the facility at the time of day the attack is anticipated.

If the target of the attack is an individual, the individual's residence, office and other places the individual frequents will be surveilled. Additionally, the surveillance team will look for patterns and routines that the target follows between these known locations. The team will often analyze the target's usual routes looking for choke points, or places the target must pass to get from one point to another. If the surveillance team identifies a choke point that the target passes through predictably, it will then try to determine whether that point will allow the attackers to deploy in secret, permit them to spot and control the target, and provide them with good escape routes. If it does, this point will frequently be chosen as the attack site.

In the case of large organizations, different groups or individuals may conduct different phases of the surveillance. Many organizations use specialized operatives for surveillance, though the operational planner will often attempt to get eyes on the target to help with the planning process. For instance, it is known from court testimony in the Mumbai case that David Headley made five extended trips to Mumbai as those attacks were being planned. The repeated trips were required because the operational commanders in Pakistan considered India a hostile environment and the operational planners could not go there to conduct the surveillance themselves. As a result, Headley was sent to observe and report on specific things as planning for the attacks progressed.

During the planning phase, the personnel to be used in the attacks are identified and trained in any special skills they may require for the mission, including languages, marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, small-boat handling or land navigation. To protect operational security, the operatives may not be briefed in any great detail about the target of their operation until they are very close to being deployed.

Many times the planning phase will end with a dry run, as the preparation did for the 9/11 attacks, when some of the hijackers took their assigned flights in August 2001. While conducting a dry run, the attackers will generally be unarmed to ensure they do not needlessly bring law enforcement attention to themselves.

Sometimes an attacker will have acquired weapons for the attack before the planning phase. Other times the concept of the operation will be constrained by the weapons and money available. But quite frequently, the weapons for the attack will be acquired during the planning phase, after the target has been selected and the means of attack have been established.

Once planning, training and weapons acquisition are complete, the attack team can be deployed. The attack team frequently will again conduct surveillance of the target, especially if the target is mobile and the attack team is deployed and waiting at a predetermined attack site.

If it was properly planned, an attack is very likely to succeed once it has moved to the operational phase. Sometimes attacks do fail because of mistakes or bad luck, but by and large there is no way to stop an attack once it has been set in motion.

At the attack's conclusion, the attackers will seek to escape the scene. The exception is suicide attacks or when, like Breivik, the attacker intends to be captured as part of the media exploitation phase, the final step in the cycle.

Regardless of whether the attack is a suicide attack against a church in Nigeria or a timed-incendiary attack against a subway in Athens, the same attack cycle is followed. With an eye toward averting future attacks, a thoughtful observer can use the attack cycle model to understand how an attack was planned and executed.

### Vulnerabilities

While plots are occasionally thwarted at the last second, for the most part law enforcement and security personnel must detect and interdict the plot before it gets to the attack phase to have any chance of stopping it. Once the bullets fly or the explosive device is detonated, there is little security forces can do but initiate their immediate action drills in an effort to reduce the body count. This means that an emphasis must be placed on identifying attackers earlier in the process, well before they are in a position to strike.

Unless security forces have a source inside the group that is planning the attack or manage to intercept the group's communications, the only way to identify attack planners is by noting their actions. This is especially true of a lone wolf attack, where no external communication occurs. The earliest point in the attack cycle that the attackers can be identified by their actions is during the preoperational surveillance required for target identification.

There is a widely held conception that terrorist surveillance is generally sophisticated and almost invisible, but when viewed in hindsight, it is frequently discovered that individuals who conduct terrorist surveillance tend to be quite sloppy and even amateurish in their surveillance tradecraft. We will discuss what bad surveillance looks like, and how to recognize it, in more detail next week, but for now it is sufficient to say that poor surveillance tradecraft is a significant vulnerability in the terrorist attack cycle.

As noted above, additional surveillance is often conducted at later stages of the attack cycle, such as in the planning stage and even sometimes in the attack stage, as the attackers track the target from a known location to the attack site. Each instance of surveillance provides an additional opportunity for the assailants to be identified and the attack to be prevented.

During the planning phase and as the operatives prepare to deploy, communication between and movement of group members often increases. Additionally, group members may engage in outside training that can attract attention, such as playing paintball, visiting the firing range or, as was the case with the 9/11 pilots, attending flight schools. This increase in activity, which also might include money transfers, leaves signs that could tip off the authorities.

Another significant vulnerability during the attack cycle is weapons acquisition. This vulnerability is especially pronounced when dealing with inexperienced grassroots operatives, who tend to aspire to conduct spectacular attacks that are far beyond their capabilities. For example, they may decide they want to conduct a bombing attack even though they do not know how to make improvised explosive devices. It is also not uncommon for such individuals to try to acquire Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, automatic firearms or hand grenades. When confronted by this gap between their capability and their aspirations, grassroots operatives will often reach out to someone for help with their attack instead of settling on an attack that is within their ability. Increasingly, the people such would-be attackers are encountering when they reach out are police or domestic security agency informants.

As far back as 2010, jihadist leaders such as Nasir al-Wahayshi of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recognized this problem and began to encourage grassroots jihadists to focus on conducting simple attacks against soft targets. Nevertheless, grassroots jihadists are consistently drawn toward spectacular attacks, as seen in the Feb. 17 arrest near the U.S. Capitol of a Moroccan man who thought his handler, who was in fact an FBI informant, had equipped him for a suicide attack. Unlike most jihadists, other types of grassroots militants, such as anarchists, are far more comfortable conducting simple attacks with readily available items.


Personality traits and psychological profiles aside, anyone desiring to plan a terrorist attack must follow the attack planning cycle, which at certain stages will necessarily open them up to detection.

## Al Shabaab: The World’s Jihadi Darwinists


Source:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1209&goback=.gde\_1528217\_member\_5837691300933042176

In December, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace invited me as a panelist for their conference “The al Shabaab Threat After Westgate”.  I had the great fortune of meeting and speaking with Stig Hansen and Bronwyn Bruton – both top notch Somalia experts that far outpace my skills.

For those interested in al Shabaab, I recommend Stig Hansen’s book *al-Shabaab in Somalia* which is the book to read to understand the evolution of al-Shabaab.  I have a couple small things I disagree with in terms of the book’s notion of how al Qaeda integrates with al Shabaab, but overall, its a fantastic read on Shabaab. Stig displays his knowledge well in the audio recording of this session.

As for me, I discussed the terrorist threat of al Shabaab and how it integrates with al Qaeda, with special emphasis on my pal Omar Hammami, who is now taking a dirt nap courtesy of the terror group he joined and killed on behalf of – al Shabaab.

My discussion rests on a few points:

* **al Shabaab in 2014 – Probably as good as it gets**.  I would like to see al Shabaab completely defeated; removed from Somalia’s hinterlands and prevented from disrupting Somalia’s government.  But I’m not naive.  I don’t see any reason why al Shabaab won’t be able to stay alive for the foreseeable future.  As Jeffrey Herbst explains in his book States and Power in Africa, African states have historically had limited ability to project power beyond the capital.  There is no reason to believe the current Somalia government is any different.  Shabaab is not what it was two years ago, but either Shabaab or some jihadi evolution of Shabaab is likely to endure for the next decade similar to how AIAI and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) existed in the past two decades.  So, after two years of fracturing and Somali government rebuilding, I don’t expect to see any significant and enduring progress in securing south central Somalia.
* **Shabaab exists because it can provide security allowing economic stability** - While we talk about the ideology in our terrorism and counterterrorism studies, the reason Shabaab flourishes in Somalia is because they provide security and allow for some semblance of economic stability.  This ecomonic-security dynamic is why the ICU came to being and what al Qaeda learned during the early 1990s.
* **Shabaab is Jihadi Darwinism** – While many in the West focus on ideological analysis (and I too believe it serves an important role), Shabaab more than any extremist group acts out of self-interest more than ideological convention.  Shabaab will make jihadi ideology fit its own agenda.  Whatever Shabaab needs the ideology to be to survive, that is what the ideology will be. Thus, jihadi darwinists.

## “Our Goal is Jerusalem” – Militant Islamists in Southeast Europe

Source: http://acdemocracy.org/our-goal-is-jerusalem-militant-islamists-in-southeast-europe/#pretty Photo

Over the past several years, the Balkans has emerged as a new battleground for militant Islamism.**[i]** In June 2010, Islamist extremists bombed a police station in the central Bosnian town of Bugojno, killing one police officer and wounding six others. In February 2011, a Kosovo radical killed two US servicemen at Frankfurt Airport. In October 2011, a Sandzak Wahhabi attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo. In April 2012, suspected Islamist extremists murdered five FYROM citizens outside Skopje. In July 2012, Hezbollah operatives bombed a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria. In March 2013, a Hezbollah operative was discovered monitoring Israeli citizens in Cyprus. [ii] In the first six months of 2012 alone, some 200 Iranian “businessmen” entered Bosnia, including an individual Israeli intelligence has tracked in Georgia, India, and Thailand—all countries in which terrorist attacks have targeted Israeli officials over the past two years.[iii]

As concerns grow that European and even American jihad volunteers in Syria could pose new security threats if and when they return to their home countries,[iv] large numbers of individuals from the Balkans have joined the Syrian jihad. According to one estimate, Bosnia has provided more Syrian jihad volunteers than any other country in Europe per capita,[v] with several hundred citizens of Bosnia & Herzegovina now reported to be fighting in Syria,[vi] along with a large number of Bosnian émigrés.[vii] It has also been reported that Bosnia and Romania are sources of weapons for the Syrian jihad, as the arrest of a Swedish imam-turned arms-procurer, Haythan Rahmeh, revealed.[viii] In addition, reports suggest up to 140 ethnic Albanians are now fighting alongside Islamist groups in Syria,[ix] as well as and some thirty individuals from the Sandzak.[x] Priština media have reported that some 30 individuals from Kosovo went to Syria in January 2014 alone, and that six Albanians have already died in the fighting there.[xi] In an interesting example of comparative rates of radicalization, one observer has noted that more individuals from the Balkans have joined the Syrian jihad than from Central Asia or the Caucasus.[xii] An indication of the degree to which the threat of violent Balkan extremists joining the Syrian jihad has become, and the danger they pose to their native states and societies upon their eventual return, is the January 2014 dispatch of a large, multiagency US government delegation (including individuals from the FBI, the NSA, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice) on a fact-finding mission to the region.[xiii]

The Balkan blowback from the Syrian jihad is already being felt. In November 2013, six suspected terrorists (two of whom are believed to have fought in Syria) were arrested in Kosovo on suspicion of plotting terrorist attacks using cell-phone activated explosive devices. The group was also believed to have been involved in an attack on two American Mormon missionaries in Priština on November 3rd.[xiv] Subsequently, a group called “Xhemati i Xhehadit” warned police of “painful attacks” if their comrades were not released. The warning noted that “without doubt, we have people who love death more than you life in this world.”[xv] The continuing threat from militant Islamist groups in the region was further on evidence in Bosnia, when at the beginning of the month the largest illegal arms cache discovered in postwar Bosnia was found near the central Bosnian town of Tešanj, in the heart of territory where foreign mujahedin and their local Bosnian allies operate. The weapons, which arrived in the area about 1999, included over five hundred 84mm grenades for rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Local authorities believed the weapons could have been used for terrorist attacks or provided for use on other jihad fronts.[xvi]

These have not been unexpected attacks and developments. Already in May 2007, a leading American observer of Islam in the Balkans had noted that “a visitor to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia encountered unmistakable evidence that extremist intruders are opening a Balkan front in the global jihad,”[xvii] and in January 2010 Israeli officials warned that the Balkan region “is global jihad’s next destination for creating an infrastructure and recruiting activists.”[xviii]

Bosnian jihad veteran Sulaiman abu-Ghaith with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, October 2001

Indeed, almost every major terrorist  action against the US and other western countries and interests over the past two decades has had Balkan ties or connections—including the 9/11 attacks, the August 1998 US African embassy bombings, the December 1999 Millenium Bomb Plot targeting Los Angeles’ LAX Airport, the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, the November 2003 Istanbul bombings, the March 2004 Madrid Train bombings, the 7/7 London Underground bombing, the May 2007 Fort Dix bomb plot, the July 2009 Raleigh Group conspiracy, and the January 2010 conspiracy to attack the New York subway system. The late Richard Holbrooke made clear the dangerous extent to which militant Islamism has infiltrated southeastern Europe when he noted that had it not been for the Dayton Peace Accords, “al-Qaeda would probably have planned the Sept. 11 attacks from Bosnia, not Afghanistan.”[xix]



Bosnian jihad veteran Khaled al-Harbi, November 2001

Making these attacks possible is the sophisticated infrastructure Balkan Islamist militants have created over the past two decades. The infrastructure consists of four main components: 1) local allies in political, security, and religious establishments; 2) safe havens consisting of radical-controlled mosques and remote villages which provide militant Islamists places to recruit, organize, train and hide; 3) NGO’s and financial institutions providing terrorists with cover identities and the ability to clandestinely transfer operational funds; and 4) various electronic and print media promoting their extremist ideology. Such complex, multi-faceted organization allows militant Islamist groups to sustain the occasional crackdown or arrest without substantial damage to their networks or infrastructure as a whole.[xx]

**Local Allies**

The origins of militant Islamism’s rise in the Balkans can be traced to the life and work of Bosnia’s late Islamist president, Alija Izetbegović. In the late 1930s/early 1940s, Izetbegović and a conspiratorial group of like-minded Islamist extremists formed an organization called the *Mladi Muslimani* (“Young Muslims”) whose goal, in Izetbegović’s own words, was the creation of a “great Muslim state.” [xxi] Towards this goal, the *Mladi Muslimani*established an underground journal with the telling title *Mudžahid* (“Holy Warrior”) and swore an oath asking Allah to grant them perseverance in their “path of jihad” and their “uncompromisingly struggle against everything non-Islamic.”[xxii] Several decades later, Izetbegović continued to promote this view; in his seminal work, the *Islamska Deklaracija* (“Islamic Declaration”) Izetbegović would argue that “There is no peace or co-existence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political institutions . . . the Islamic movement can and may move to take power once it is morally and numerically strong enough, not only to destroy the existing non-Islamic government, but to build a new Islamic government.[xxiii]



Jihad in Europe: Izetbegović’s “Seventh Muslim Brigade,” Zenica, 1996

Given the existence of such local Balkan allies and sympathizers, it proved easy for Al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups to extend their reach throughout Europe. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Bosnia, according to one study, became “[a] new refuge, close to both the heart of Europe and the Middle East . . . an excellent tactical base for espionage, fundraising, and terrorist activities . . . a major center for terrorist recruitment and fundraising. . . a place where recruits could train, coalesce into cells, and seek shelter from prosecution by foreign law enforcement.”[xxiv] The former NATO commander in Bosnia, US Army Major General Virgil Packett, has claimed that “Bosnia has moved from being a sanctuary for terrorism to a gateway for terrorism.”[xxv] Other analyses further support this view, suggesting that the existence of an extensive network of individuals sympathetic to militant Islamism makes Bosnia a command and control center for various groups of regional militants.[xxvi] Estimates of the number of non-indigenous *mujahedin* who moved to Bosnia in the 1990s range from several hundred to six thousand.[xxvii]

Increasing the threat and capacity of militant Islamists in the Balkans is the support and cooperation they receive from local authorities sympathetic to their cause. In February 1996, NATO forces raided an Iranian-operated terrorist training camp in Bosnia where they found plans to NATO installations, booby-trapped children’s toys, and essays on how to assassinate political opponents and critical journalists. The camp’s director was the personal intelligence advisor to Bosnia’s late Islamist president, Alija Izetbegović.[xxviii] His son, Bakir Izetbegović (currently a member of the Bosnian state presidency) has admitted to personally being in touch with leading mujahedin figures in Bosnia such as Imad al-Husin, a.k.a Abu Hamza, and offering “to help in any way.”[xxix]

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| Bardos6Like father, like son? Alija Izetbogic with Abu el Malli (second from left), aka “the little Osama bin Laden” | Bardos7Bakir Izetbegovic with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,  Cairo, 7 February 2013 |

Local allies also provide international jihadists with new identities allowing them to travel and conduct operations around the world. A secret report prepared for the Clinton Administration in late 2000 “shocked everyone” when the scale in which the Izetbegović regime had provided travel documents to  international extremists was revealed.[xxx] By one count the Izetbegović regime distributed some 12,000 Bosnian passports to international jihadis.[xxxi] Osama Bin Laden himself was the owner of a Bosnian passport,[xxxii] and Western reporters even saw him Izetbegović’s office during the war.[xxxiii] When Italian police discovered a plot to kill Pope John Paul II in Bologna in 1997, all fourteen men arrested were travelling on passports issued by Izetbegović’s foreign ministry.[xxxiv] (In April earlier in the year, another attempt to assassinate the Pope had been made in Sarajevo.)[xxxv] In the 1990s, Al Qaeda operative Safet Abid Catovic was given cover as a diplomat at Bosnia’s Mission to the UN in New York.[xxxvi] In 1998, just days before the bombing of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, the mastermind of the attacks, visited Bosnia on a “business trip” on a visa issued to him by the Bosnian consulate in Ankara.[xxxvii] In September 1999, Turkish police arrested Mahrez Auduni (at the time considered one of bin-Laden’s top aides) traveling on a Bosnian passport (Number 0801888).[xxxviii] As of January 2014, the chairman of the security committee in Izetbegović’s Islamist party is a man on the US government’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and who is otherwise widely considered to be the leading Iranian agent in Bosnia.[xxxix]

**Balkan Bases**

In remote, isolated villages around the Balkans militant Islamists have developed a network of extra-territorial, sharia-run enclaves that serve as recruiting stations for local converts and safe havens for jihadis from around the world. In Islamist-run villages such as the central Bosnian town of Bočinja Donja, extremists live “separate lives untroubled by local police, tax-collectors or any other authorities. Outsiders never set foot in the small community.”[xl] Bulgaria’s former chief mufti, Nedim Gendzhev, claims that extremists are trying to create a “fundamentalist triangle” formed by Bosnia, FYROM and Bulgaria’s Western Rhodope mountains.[xli]

The above-mentioned central Bosnian village of Bočinja Donja, inhabited by some 600 people, has been associated with numerous international terrorists, including Karim Said Atmani, the document forger for the Millenium Bomb plot; Khalil Deek, arrested in December 1999 for his involvement in a plot to blow up Jordanian tourist sites; and Omar Saeed Sheikh, involved in the murder/beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.[xlii] Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al Zawahiri, is known to have visited the village in 1997[xliii] and spent much of the 1990s in nearby Bulgaria.

Another Bosnian village, Gornja Maoča, is the headquarters of Bosnia’s main Wahhabi leader, Nusret Imamović. In 2005, Italian investigators discovered a Gornja Maoča-based plot to attack the funeral of Pope John Paul II and assassinate the assembled world leaders.[xliv] A former member of the Wahhabi movement from Gornja Maoča gave a detailed description of life in the village to a journalist, reporting that residents claims to personally know the editor of *Inspire* (Al Qaeda’s online publication), and that members of the community who know Arabic regularly inform members about news and information from Al Qaeda websites. The village is frequently used as a way station for extremists joining jihads in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Yemen. The Gornja Maoča community prefers to send unattached young men to jihad so that it does not have to assume financial responsibility for their families. The Wahhabis are also known to cache weapons in local forests surrounding the village.[xlv] In October 2011, the Sandžak Wahhabi Mevlid Jašarević left the village with two other residents on the day he attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo.[xlvi] Another Wahhabi outpost in Bosnia is Bužim (near Bihać) in northwestern Bosnia, home to a prominent anti-American Wahhabi preacher, Bilal Bosnić, known for his YouTube spots supporting suicide bombings, glorifying the Taliban, and various anti-Semitic rants.

Bosnian jihad veteran Omar Ahmed Saeed Sheik, participant in the murder/beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl

In these remote Islamist-controlled areas, under the guise of “youth camps,” former mujahedin take young people into the local hills and forests where they are given military training. The camps are intentionally non-permanent to make it more difficult for security officials to track them, but are effective in fostering the relationships needed for creating extremist networks.[xlvii] In March 2007, Serbian police raided one such camp in the mountainous Sandžak region straddling the border between Serbia and Montenegro, arresting a number of individuals and seizing weapons, explosives, and food stocks.[xlviii] The group was allegedly planning to attack western embassies in Belgrade. Similarly, in July 2013, a raid near the village of Kalošević, close to the the central Bosnian town of Tešanj, uncovered the largest stash of undeclared weaponry and explosives found since the end of the Bosnian war, including over 500 rocket propelled grenades. Local inhabitants of the village claimed the arms and ammunition were hidden there on the order of a high-ranking member of Izetbegović’s party Bosnian media cite as one of the main local liaisons with Al Qaeda operatives in the country.[xlix]

Throughout the western and southern Balkans, extremist-led mosques also provide valuable bases for militant Islamists. A focal point for Wahhabi extremists in Bosnia is the Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center in Sarajevo, “the epicenter of the spreading of radical ideas” in Bosnia,[l] which for a number of years functioned autonomously under the direct supervision of the Saudi embassy in Bosnia. The White Mosque in Sarajevo is the headquarters of Sulejman Bugari, a Kosovo Albanian-born imam whom some reports have described as a go-between and point-of-contact for Albanian and Bosnian extremists.[li]] In Kosovo, the Makowitz mosque on the outskirts of Priština and the Mitrovica mosque are reportedly recruiting militants to fight alongside Islamist groups in Syria.[lii]] In FYROM, Wahhabi extremists have been trying to take control of Skopje’s Jahys Pasha, Sultan Murat, Hudaverdi and Kjosekadi mosques.[liii]]

**NGOs and Financial Institutions**

Militant Islamists support their efforts in southeastern Europe through a network of “NGO’s,” “charities” and “humanitarian aid” organizations, funded by known Al Qaeda financial donors. The CIA has estimated that one third of the Bosnian NGO’s operating worldwide have terrorist connections or employ people with terrorist links,[liv] and various NGO’s with known ties to Al Qaeda funneled several hundreds of millions of dollars to Izetbegović’s war effort.[lv] Izetbegović himself was on the Iranian payroll, receiving on just one occasion in $500,000 (US) in cash from Iranian agents.[lvi]

al Qaeda’s donors’ list, “The Golden Chain,” discovered in Sarajevo in March 2002

In one example of how this was done, U.S.-based “charities” with close ties to Osama Bin Laden, such as Care International, Inc., received checks with memo lines such as “Bosnia mujahedin,” “for jihad only,” and “Chechen Muslim fighters.”[lvii] Of the estimated $800 million the Saudis alone gave to Bosnia after Dayton, some $100 million is untraceable, lost in a maze of Al Qaeda front organizations funding terror activities worldwide.[lviii] In the aftermath of 9/11, a raid on the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia netted “maps of Washington, material for making false State Department identity cards and anti-American manuals designed for children.”[lix] (the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit brought by 9/11 victims and families in U.S. federal court.) Also found in Sarajevo in March 2002 was Al Qaeda’s donor’s list, the so-called “Golden Chain.” Bin Laden’s organization apparently felt so comfortable in Bosnia at this time that some seventy Al Qaeda members reportedly planned to flee there from Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11.[lx] Among the Al Qaeda-linked organizations working in the Balkans have been the Benevolence International Foundation (which had offices and personnel in Chicago), the “Taibah Foundation,” the “Global Relief Foundation,” which operated in Bosnia and Kosovo, and al Haramain, which was active in Albania.[lxi] The Turkish-based IHH (the “Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief,” or *Insani Yardim Vakfi*in Turkish) which was involved in the *Mavi Marmara* incident off the Israeli coast in May 2010, began its activities in Bosnia in the 1990s. In June 2010, Turkish authorities began an investigation of the group’s founder, Bűlent Yildirim, for funding Al Qaeda.[lxii]

The lack of transparency in many Middle-Eastern-based banking institutions makes it extremely difficult to track the flow of monies to militant groups in the region.[lxiii] Monies donated for legitimate charitable purposes often get siphoned off and used to support weapons purchases or to provide support for families of imprisoned or killed jihadis. Members of the Al Qaeda cell in Albania, for instance, working under the cover of various Middle-East based charities, were required to contribute 26 percent of their salaries to support the global jihad; one such individual claimed that he diverted $800 per month (from funds intended for Albanian orphans) for such purposes. Monies provided from such sources have also financed political asylum applications in western countries, helping militants establish terrorist cells in Europe and the US.[lxiv] By 2010, the Albanian government had seized and confiscated some $7.5 million (USD) in assets from two individuals and thirteen foundations believed implicated in terrorist finance.[lxv]

The archetype for the way in which Islamist extremist organizations in the Balkans function was the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), run by Elfatih Hassanein, a Sudanese national with known ties to Bin Laden. By some accounts, TWRA alone collected $400 million (US) for Izetbegović’s war effort.[lxvi] TWRA, among other things, has been revealed to have provided some of the operational funding for the first group of World Trade Center bombers in 1993. [lxvii] Most of Izetbegović’s inner circle was involved in the organization.[lxviii] Islamist NGO’s and humanitarian groups also finance sending school-age children to study in countries such as Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria where they are indoctrinated in extreme forms of Islam.[lxix]

**Militant Media and Propaganda**

Militant Islamists in the Balkans have developed an extensive array of print periodicals, websites, and YouTube spots spreading religious intolerance, glorifications of violence, and anti-American, anti-Semitic, anti-democratic messages. Websites such as the “Way of the Believer” (*putvjernika.com*), Way of Islam” (*stazomislama.com*), *Ensarije Serijata* (“Partisans of Sharia” http://www.geocities.ws/ensarije\_ seriata/index-2.html), and “News of the Community“ (*vijestiummeta.com*), and the Sandžak Wahhabi website *kelimetul-haqq.org* promote jihad, suicide bombings, and the killing of non-Muslims.[lxx] These websites also relay news from other jihadi fronts, sermons by extremist preachers from the Middle-East, and messages from Al Qaeda leaders; for instance, the *Put vjernika* website recently carried “A New Order from Zawahiri: Focus on Attacks on American Interests.”[lxxi] According to Fahrudin Kladicanin, the co-author of a recent study on Balkan extremists’ use of the internet and social media, “The number of those who are ‘liking,’ making comments and sharing the content of these pages, especially when it comes to religious leaders, extreme Islamists and Wahhabists, is rising on a daily basis.” The Facebook profiles of almost all such extremist leaders have over 5,000 “friends” and even more “likes.”[lxxii] The Facebook page *Krenaria Islame* (Albanian for “Islamic Pride”), which posts pictures and stories of Albanians fighting in Syria, has 2,500 followers. According to the Tirana-based security expert Arjan Dyrmishi, “If all the followers of this page were identified as terrorists, they would make a small army and pose a major problem. Such a large number of followers would a pose a concern, even if these people were to be identified only as supporters of political Islam.”[lxxiii]

The US State Department has reported that the Bosnia-based “Active Islamic Youth” (Bosnian acronym AIO) spreads extremist views and has links with radical groups in Western Europe and the US.[lxxiv] Former members of the AIO publish a weekly called *SAFF* in both print and an online electronic version which the State Department has described as anti-American and tending towards extremism. Middle Eastern funders have established some 25 *madrasas* (Islamic religious schools) in Bosnia through which some 2000 students have already passed.[lxxv] In Kosovo, a radical preacher, Zahir Naik, has established a 12-hour daily Albanian-language, hardline-Wahhabi TV channel ironically called “Peace TV” which “which insults, in aggressive terms, spiritual Sufis, Shia Muslims, non-fundamentalist Sunnis, Jews, Christians, and Hindus, among others.” In his sermons Naik has praised Osama bin Laden and supported terrorism.[lxxvi] Similarly, in Bulgaria, dozens of new mosques and Wahhabi “teaching centers” funded by Middle Eastern donors were opened over the past twenty years. In 2003, the Bulgarian government shut down a number of Wahhabi outposts because of their ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremist groups. [lxxvii] Bulgarian security analysts have estimated that some 3000 youths have passed through these Wahhabi-funded educational centers over the past twenty years.[lxxviii]

Together with the large number of locally-born Islamic clerics who have studied in the Middle-East (including individuals such as Nedžad Balkan, Bilal Bosnić, Mustafa Cerić, Nusret Imamović), the combination of this large cadre of the indigenous population being educated in Middle-Eastern funded institutions in the Balkans themselves carries with it the potential danger of transforming what has usually been considered a “moderate Balkan Islam” into something more radical. As Esad Hećimović, a leading expert on the jihadi movement in Bosnia has noted, “There is now a new generation of Islamic preachers in Bosnia who were educated after the war at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and other countries . . . Thus, it is no longer possible to distinguish between ‘imported’ and ‘local’ versions of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina anymore.”[lxxix]

**Conclusion**

Relatively small numbers of people in southeastern Europe subscribe to the extremist movements and ideologies represented by militant Islamism. A survey conducted in Bosnia in 2007 found that **three percent of the population adhered to Wahhabism (perhaps some 50-60,000 people), out of an estimated Muslim population of approximately two million, and another ten percent identified with it**.[lxxx] Current and former Bosnian Wahhabis, however, claim that the movement has many secret adherents. The above-mentioned Ikanović, for instance, has said that some forty percent of those adhering to the Wahhabi movement do not have the outward appearance of being Wahhabis.[lxxxi] Other former Bosnian Wahhabis have claimed that Wahhabi sympathizers have “infiltrated schools, universities, and the media.”[lxxxii] In 2010, **a Bosnian security official estimated that there are 3000 potential terrorists in Bosnia**,[lxxxiii] and **a former Al Qaeda operative in Bosnia, the Bahraini-born Ali Hamad, has claimed there are some 800 individuals of local origin making up a “white Al Qaeda”:** i.e., people who can pass through security checks avoiding racial profiling.[lxxxiv] In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, NATO officials suggested there was a “hardcore group” of some thirty individuals in Bosnia with direct links to international terrorism.[lxxxv] In Kosovo, security experts suggest about 50,000 people adhere to the more conservative, Middle-Eastern forms of Islam,[lxxxvi] and one specialist on Balkan Islam has claimed that, “Exponents of Saudi-financed Wahhabism and of the Muslim Brotherhood have penetrated the highest levels of the official Kosovo Islamic apparatus.”[lxxxvii] **In FYROM, the mufti of Skopje, Ibrahim Šabani, has estimated that there are some 500-600 Wahhabis in the country**, possibly more,[lxxxviii] while **other security specialists believe up to 3000 Wahhabis are active in FYROM, mainly concentrated in areas around Skopje, Tetovo, Struga, and Kumanovo**.[lxxxix] **In the Sandžak**, the International Crisis Group has estimated there are some **300 Wahhabis who control several mosques in the region**,[xc] and some local analysts have claimed that the leader of the Islamic Community in Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, has close ties to the movement and receives funds from Wahhabi sources in Rome and Vienna.[xci]

Despite these relatively small numbers, however, the danger militant Islamists in the Balkans pose to US and Western interests, or to the creation of the tolerant, multiethnic, western-oriented democracies we desire in the region, is clear. The recent upsurge in extremist activity in southeastern Europe provides significant evidence to show that militant Islamism’s Balkan front requires increased attention. Remarkably, western officials prefer to deny that any problem exists; for instance, the current High Representative in Bosnia, Valentin Inzko, claims that the Wahhabis in Bosnia are not a threat to Europe.[xcii] Militant Balkan Islamists, for their part, are not hiding their long-term intentions. As a Bosnian jihadi fighting in Syria recently noted, “I left Bosnia with the intention only to return with weapons in my hand. I am a part of the revolution and this is the morning of Islam . . . [by allowing us to leave Bosnia] your intelligence agencies made a mistake thinking that they would be rid of us, however, the problem for them will be the return of individuals trained for war.”[xciii]

Moreover, **it is a grave mistake to believe that it is only of tangential importance or interest that so many individuals who were involved in various terrorist actions around the world have travelled through the Balkans, because during their time spent in the region they developed numerous connections with like-minded extremists, sowing the seeds for new generations of extremists that threaten Balkan stability, and indeed US and western security interests around the globe.** To again quote Esad Hećimović “Radical Islamic groups are waiting for a resurrection of the violent conflict . . . It is still conceivable that Islamic leaders and groups are waiting for a new jihad.”[xciv] **With the possible return of hundreds of Balkan extremists from the Syrian jihad, the same could become true for other parts of the Balkans as well.**

►**Note:** All references are available at source’s URL

# Italy Under Constant Security Threat

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/02/italy-constant-security-threat/



**Italy’s defense minister is warning that criminal groups with potential links to terrorism are profiting from running migrant vessels across the Mediterranean to European shores and is calling on the US to keep focused on resurgent Islamic terrorism in the region.**

Mario Mauro told a small group of reporters that Italy is using drones and submarines to counter the profitable trafficking of migrants from North Africa, which was potentially bankrolling terrorism.

“European governments and public opinion see this as a problem of illegal immigration — this is not my vision,” Mauro said during a trip to Washington to see US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. “My thinking is that the situation is linked to the problem of international security and the security of the Mediterranean,” he said.

The traditional flow of migrants from Africa to Italy, usually on ramshackle boats that head for the Italian island of Lampedusa, has stepped up in recent years, initially boosted by an outpouring of migrants from Tunisia, and more recently from Syria. Migrants also make the arduous desert crossing from Sub-Saharan Africa through Libya, where they have often been jailed and tortured before being allowed to board boats.

After hundreds of migrants drowned last year when their boats sank, the Italian Navy mounted regular patrols to pull people off unseaworthy, overcrowded vessels.

Mauro said the normal flow of boats from Libya is being augmented by sailings from Egypt organized by “criminal multinational organizations,” which had handled 25,000 paying passengers in the past year, the majority fleeing the war in Syria.

According to Defense News traffickers are using mother ships, he said, which would tow smaller and less seaworthy vessels to within about 200 kilometers of the Italian coast, at which point about 1,000 passengers would be loaded onto the smaller vessels and released.

In Libya, he added, it is hard to tell the difference between criminal and terrorist groups involved in trafficking.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: If this is the case in Italy imagine the situation in Greece – the main entry gate for illegal immigrants from all Asian and African countries or battle zones. But the biggest problem is the attitude of “ruling” northern EU countries: they only shout about human rights and living conditions of illegal immigrants from the safety of their geographical position protected by the legislation that fit their own needs and peace of mind… |

# 'First British suicide bomber in Syria' believed to have struck Aleppo prison

Source: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/first-british-suicide-bomber-in-syria-believed -to-have-struck-aleppo-prison-9115530.html

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| A picture of the suicide bomb driven by British citizen Abu Suleiman al-Britani into Aleppo prisonView image on Twitter | A photo showing a blast allegedly set off by a British suicide bomber at a prison in the Syrian city of AleppoA photo showing a blast allegedly set off by a British suicide bomber at a prison in the Syrian city of Aleppo |

A British man is thought to be the first suicide bomber from the UK to die in Syria, following a raid on a prison in the city of Aleppo. The man, believed to be of Pakistani origin and only known by his pseudonym Abu Suleiman al-Britani, was believed to have had links with the with the Jabhat al-Nusra arm of al-Qa'ida.

**Mr Britani would be the eighth Briton to die fighting in the three-year-long civil war, if reports by are confirmed.**

A photo posted on Twitter by a senior professor at Kings College London, Shiraz Maher, allegedly shows the lorry driven by Mr Britani, with the black Jabhat al-Nusr flag draped over the top (left photo).

Mr Maher also tweeted claims that a foreign fighter had contacted him to confirm the bomber was Mr Britani. Another image posted by a man claiming to be a fighter, was reportedly taken shortly after the blast and shows clouds of smoke rising from the prison (right photo).

Around 4,000 prisoners were left in their cells before the strike, despite the building having been under siege by rebels for almost a year, and more recently becoming a military base for the Syrian army, The Telegraph reported.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, up to 300 prisoners were released in the Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham-led operation.

The alleged attack comes after Cecilia Malmström, the EU’s Domestic Affairs Chief, warned in January that 1,200 citizens from the bloc are believed to be fighting in the war-torn country.

She claimed that the fighters were putting European governments at risk of more terror attacks at home unless they tackle growing the growing threat of extremism.

Four British fighters who had joined Syrian rebels also died in November last year, but were not involved in suicide attacks as Mr Britani is alleged to have been.

## Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking: Congressional Hearings

# Jeffrey Thomas (Homeland Security Research Analyst – via LinkedIn Institute of Terrorism Research and Response Group)

Source: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-terrorist-groups-latin-america-changing-landscape

The House Foreign Affairs Committee held two hearings last week on the terrorist-drug trafficking nexus. ***Below are the main points that I took away from the hearings.***

**HEARING: Counternarcotics Operations in Afghanistan**

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

Feb 5, 2014

**Afghanistan and the Opium Trade:**

As outlined by William Brownfield (State Department) and James Carpa (DEA), Afghanistan produces more than 80 percent of the world’s illicit opium. In 2013, Afghan opium production increased markedly, reaching its highest level yet. The primary markets for Afghan opium are Europe, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and coastal Africa.

**The Taliban and Narcotics Trafficking:**

James Carpa (DEA) identified the Taliban’s opium-related activities: taxing poppy farmers, running processing labs, moving narcotics, taxing narcotics transported through Taliban-controlled territory, and providing security to poppy fields, labs, and opium bazaars. The UN estimates that narcotics-related activities provide $155 million annually to the Taliban. Ted Deutch (Ranking Member) said these funds account for almost half of the Taliban’s budget.

**ISSUE TO WATCH:** U.S Assistance

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Subcommittee Chair) stated that the U.S. has provided more than $7.5 billion in counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan. The FY2014 budget calls for an across-the-board cut of 50% in the Obama administration’s request for assistance to Afghanistan, including counternarcotics operations.  
  
  
**HEARING: Terrorist Groups in Latin America**

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

Feb 4, 2014

**The FARC and Drug Trafficking:**

According to Celina B. Realuyo (Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies), the FARC began providing security for the Cali, Medelline, and the Norte de Valle drug cartels in the 1990s. The defeat of these cartels by Columbian forces (with U.S. assistance) left a vacuum in the drug trafficking economy, which the FARC quickly filled. Columbia’s counter-insurgency campaign over the past decade (also backed by the U.S.) severely reduced the FARC’s capacity, but the organization still earns up to $600 million annually from cocaine trafficking.

**The Shining Path and Drug Trafficking:**

The Shining Path almost disappeared after the capture of its leader in 1992, but Celina B. Realuyo pointed out that the group has recently engineered a small-scale revival by entering Peru’s drug trade. Ted Poe (Subcommittee Chairman) stated that about 500 remaining Shining Path militants operate out of the Apurimac-Ene-Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM), the source of more than half of Peru’s cocaine production. Michael Shifter (Inter-American Dialogue) asserted that, while Shining Path militants in VRAEM still espouse a Maoist doctrine, their ideological underpinnings have all but disappeared as the group has turned increasingly to money-generating criminal activities.

**Hezbollah Enters the Latin American Drug Trade:**


Celine Realuyo explained that, beginning with a base of operation in Paraguay (in the largely lawless tri-border area connecting Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Hezbollah established illicit money laundering, counterfeiting, piracy, and drug trafficking enterprises. Douglas Farah (Center for Strategic and International Studies) said Hezbollah then developed ties with the FARC, trading arms for cocaine to traffic abroad.

**ISSUE TO WATCH:** The future of U.S. assistance

Ted Poe (Subcommittee Chairman) raised concerns about continued U.S. assistance to Latin American countries for combating drug trafficking. He praised the cooperative efforts over the past decade, but questioned the need for continued funding and asked (more than once) when countries receiving U.S. aid should be expected to graduate to self-sufficiency.

Greece – A phantom attack against Mercedes-Benz offices?

Source: Greek press



In their 20 pages declaration “Popular Fighters Group” accept responsibility for the attacks against the residence of German Ambassador in Greece and the offices of ruling party “New Democracy” in Sygrou Avenue in Athens. In the text there was reference to a “rocket attack” against German auto manufacturer Mercedes-Benz Hellas S.A. in a suburb of Athens. This attack was not made public until the declaration was released. Two explosions were heard by people living in the area and when the issue went public a 25cm crater has been located in an empty space (arrow within red circle) behind M-B premises while parts of the “rocket” have been collected from police and Army EODs from nearby living citizens.

No Consistent Increase, Decrease in Terrorist Attacks During Olympics

Source: http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/no-consistent-increase-decrease-in-terrorist-attacks-during-olympics-study-finds/974b339aff1c0a95685a7fd16fc0dc5e.html



A new study said that “analysis indicates that there is no consistent increase or decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks during the Olympics, suggesting that efforts to reinforce security are generally effective at mitigating any potential threats that may exist.”

The “Background Report” by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), said it analyzed terrorist attacks that have taken place during the Olympic Games in the host country, attacks indirectly related to the Olympic Games and attacks targeting other major sporting events” and found “that the heightened profile of international sporting events might increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack while the heightened security and surveillance might decrease the likelihood of an attack.”

START, which is supported in part by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland, evaluated general patterns of terrorism in Olympic host countries at the time of the games, compared to the same time period the previous year.

“To better understand general patterns of terrorism in Olympic host countries,” START relied on its Global Terrorism Database (GTD) “to compare the number of terrorist attacks and casualties that happened in the host country during the Olympic Games with the number of terrorist attacks and casualties for the same time period previous year.”

START said “Because preparation for the games and international attention begins long before the official start of the games, the time periods we evaluate begin six months before opening ceremonies and end on the day of closing ceremonies. We do not assume that all attacks taking place during the ‘Olympic’ time period are explicitly linked to the Olympics, however one could hypothesize that the same mechanisms that may increase or decrease the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the host city during the Olympics also impact patterns of terrorism at other locations in the country, among all types of perpetrators, and in advance of the games themselves.”

Overall, START’s study found, the locations of Olympic Games “are quite safe with respect to terrorism. In five Olympic venues there were no terrorist attacks reported in the GTD during the Olympics, six months prior to the Olympics, or during the same time period the previous year. These locations include Japan 1972, Canada 1976, Soviet Union 1980, Yugoslavia 1984 and Australia 2000. Additionally, in South Korea and Canada in 1988, Japan in 1998, Greece in 2004 and Canada 2010, there were no fatal attacks recorded during any of the time periods we examined.”

The location with the greatest number of attacks during the actual Olympic Games is China 2008, with seven assaults. The location with the greatest number of fatalities during the Olympic Games is West Germany in 1972 with 16. The most injuries took place in the United States in 1996 with 110. The Olympic host country that experienced the most attacks during both the Olympic period and the comparison period was Spain 1992.

“Although the numbers of attacks in these locations are generally low,” START said, “four locations experienced terrorist attacks during the Olympic period, but not during the comparison period the year before (Austria 1976, South Korea 1988, Italy 2006 and China 2008). Two others -- Canada in 1988 and Canada in 2010 -- experienced attacks during the comparison period the prior year but not during the Olympic period.”

Continuing, START said that “of the 16 countries that experienced any attacks during the time periods we analyzed, nine had a higher number of attacks during the Olympic period than the comparison period. Of these nine cases, six took place in 1992 or earlier. Seven venues had a lower number of attacks during the Olympic period. All seven cases in which there were fewer attacks at the time of the Olympics than the year prior took place since 1988.”

However, START noted, “these findings are generally consistent with temporal patterns in terrorism worldwide, which increase from the 1970s through the early 1990s, decrease in the mid-1990s and early 2000s and increase in the mid-2000s.”

“Due to the fact that fatal attacks in Olympic locations are rare and fatality statistics are sensitive to atypical events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 2001 attacks on September 11 in the United States,” START concluded, “no clear pattern emerges regarding the relative lethality of attacks that take place in the context of the Olympics. In four locations the total number of fatalities during the Olympic period was lower than the comparison period the previous year. In six locations, the total number of fatalities during the Olympic period was higher than the comparison period.”

# Global Terrorism & Insurgency Attacks Rapidly Increase in Five Years

Source: http://www.heraldonline.com/2014/02/13/5675694/global-terrorism-insurgency-attacks.html

The number of attacks by non-state armed groups around the world has rapidly increased in just five years, according to the *IHS Jane’s 2013 Global Terrorism & Insurgency Attack Index* from IHS Inc. (NYSE: IHS), a leading global source of critical information and insight.

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| * Global: Significant rises in global militant and non-militant fatalities * Arab Spring countries see attacks spike * Syria: Attacks almost double between 2012 and 2013 * Iraq: Suicide attacks quadruple and Al-Qaeda in Iraq re-enters the top five most active non-state armed groups in the world * Sub-Saharan Africa: Terrorism fatalities rise |

“In 2009, a worldwide total of 7,217 attacks were recorded from open sources. In 2013, that number increased by more than 150% to 18,524,” said Matthew Henman, manager of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre(JTIC), which carried out the study.

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**Global Trends**

“The epicenter of 2013 activity was in the Middle East, with significant pockets of violence radiating out to neighboring regions in Africa and South Asia. We have also seen a dramatic rise in the number of militant and non-militant casualties. In 2012, 13,872 militants and 10,562 non-militants deaths were recorded from open sources. In 2013, non-militants fatalities almost doubled to 17,554 and militant fatalities numbered 21,490. These are some of the largest rises we have recorded in the past several years,” Henman said.

**Arab Spring countries see attack spike**

“In 2013, JTIC recorded a spike in activity by non-state armed groups in Tunisia and Egypt. Attacks in Tunisia grew from 21 in 2012 to 72 in 2013. In Egypt, the number of attacks recorded jumped from 63 in 2012 to 431 in 2013. In Libya, there were 237 attacks recorded in 2013 and 81 in 2012. While the increases in Egypt and Tunisia were both somewhat attributable to the emergence of Islamist militant groups, violent protests following the deposing of President Muhammad Morsi in Egypt accounted for the majority of sub-state violence recorded by JTIC,” Henman said.

**Syria’s attack count almost doubles between 2012 and 2013**

Henman added that “due to a plurality of factors, the anti-government insurgency in Syria intensified notably in 2013. Between 2012 and 2013, the number of attacks recorded by JTIC almost doubled. In 2012, we recorded 2,670 attacks. In 2013, that number jumped to 4,694.”

**Suicide attacks quadruple in Iraq; Al-Qaeda in Iraq re-enters the Top 5**

“A key indication of the intensifying level of violence in Iraq was that the number of suicide attacks in the country quadrupled from 2012 to 2013, with the 2013 total almost triple that recorded in neighboring Syria and almost double that recorded in Afghanistan,” Henman continued.

“In 2013, 207 attacks were claimed by or attributed to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This is a 160% increase from the 79 recorded in open sources in 2012,” he said. “Despite this increase, it does not fully reflect AQI’s predominant role in driving the 52% increase in the recorded number of attacks in Iraq and the 148% increase in non-militant fatalities. In 2012 there were 2,297 attacks in Iraq. At the end of 2013, that figure stands at 3,499.”

**Sub-Saharan Africa’s rising terrorism risks**

Henman concluded that “while the number of recorded attacks has only slightly increased in sub-Saharan Africa, we are seeing more lethal attacks claiming a higher number of fatalities. In 2012, JTIC recorded 1,370 attacks in sub-Saharan Africa with 3,434 fatalities. In 2013, JTIC recorded 1,391 attacks with 3,903 fatalities. When we look at Nigeria specifically, attacks decreased from 305 in 2012 to 137 in 2013, but fatalities rose from 1,351 in 2012 to 1,447 in 2013. This was partly due to an intensification of violence by militant Islamist group Boko Haram, but also a consequence of several high-profile instances of inter-communal violence across the country.”

**Top 10 most active non-state armed groups in 2013**

1. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (Thailand)

2. Taliban

3. Islami Chhatra Shibir (Bangladesh)

4. Communist Party of India – Maoist

5. Al-Qaeda in Iraq

6. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab)

7. FARC (Colombia)

8. New People’s Army (Philippines)

9. Jabhat al-Nusra (Syria)

10. Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist

**About *IHS Jane’s 2013 Global Terrorism & Insurgency Attack Index***

The IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre uses open source data to build its global database of terrorist and insurgent events, archived to 1997. The *IHS Jane’s Global Terrorism & Insurgency Attack Index* is an annual report for clients highlighting key data and global trends from this database, which is updated on a daily basis. The database enables users to search by location, target, group (active and dormant), tactics and casualty numbers in order to quickly obtain actionable intelligence and/or data.

JTIC defines an attack as any incident in which a sub-state actor (either an individual or organisation) commits an illegal act of politically or ideologically motivated violence against persons or property, with the aim of coercing others to adopt or comply with its objectives or to submit to their authority that results in death, damage, or disruption.

# Far right terrorist Anders Breivik threatens hunger strike for better video games, end of “torture”


Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/02/far-right-terrorist-anders-breivik.html

Norwegian mass killer Anders Breivik has threatened to start a hunger strike over his living conditions in jail, it has emerged.

Breivik, who killed 77 people in 2011, compared prison to “torture” and bemoaned, among other things, **the lack of an up-to-date video games console in his cell.**

His comments were made in a four-page hand-written letter to penitentiary officials, which contains a dozen requests, including making his jail time compliant with **European regulations.** They also tackle issues of fundamental rights, such as a daily walk and communication.

Breivik requests the Playstation 2 he has access to is replaced by a more recent Playstation 3. “Other inmates have access to video games for adults while I can only play the less interesting children video games. One example is ‘Rayman Revolution,’ a game designed for 3-year-olds,” the 35-year-old wrote.

Breivik, in solitary confinement since 2011 for security reasons, claims he has behaved “in an exemplary fashion” and deserves an improved “activities offer” compared to other inmates.

Breivik also requests the doubling of his weekly allowance of 300 Norwegian crowns (36 euros), to help pay for postage stamps. All the mail he sends and receives is thoroughly searched and filtered by prison staff, which, he laments, slows his exchanges considerably.

He also requests the end to the “almost” daily body searches, access to a PC rather than “worthless typewriter, technology that dates back to 1873,” and more contact with the outside world.

### “Through hell”

“You have put me through hell (…) and I won’t be able to survive it much longer. You are killing me,” Breivik writes to the prison authorities, brandishing the threat of a hunger strike.

“If I die, all the far right radicals and extremists in the European world will know exactly which individuals tortured me to death (…)This could have consequences for some individuals on the short term but also when Norway will have a new fascist regime in 13 to 40 years,” warns the killer, who considers himself a “political prisoner.”

In his letter, Breivik writes that a hunger strike seems like “one of the few and rare alternatives.”

“The hunger strike will not stop until [Norwegian Justice Minister Anders] Anundsen and [Norwegian Penitentiary affairs director] Marianne Vollan stop treating me worse than an animal,” he adds, before saying he will “soon” announce the beginning of his hunger strike.

In previous letters, Breivik, claiming he was a “human rights activist,” had already complained about his living conditions and had attacked the media for not publicising his “torment.” In January 2013, his lawyers announced Breivik had filed a complaint for “aggravated torture”.

On July 22, 2011, Breivik first killed 8 people with a bomb near the government headquarters in Oslo, then killed a further 69, mostly teenagers, after opening fire on a Young Labour activists meeting on the island of Utøya.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: Start with the title: Why far right terrorist and not just “Terrorist”? Does it really matter his orientation? I do not think so. Then he threatens with “hunger strike”! Who cares about it? Or perhaps Norgwgians DOES care about it? It would be unthinkable to these noble people living in this remote beautiful part of the world that a human might die into their prisons. Their “luxurious” prisons… Same people who punished him with just 8 years per soul taken in the 2011 bloodshed. And now we have his unbelievable request for video games to makehis boring prison time more compatible to European regulations! Not to mention that he insults “animals” but putting himself in the same order with them. Throw him in a deep hole and throw the key in the lake surrounding the island of Utoeys. This might bring some peace in the souls lost; their families and those physically survived but have to live with his memory for the rest of their lives. Too much civilization is bad for our health and sanity! |

# Europe's Fight Against Piracy: From the Barbary Coast to Operation Atalanta

**By Joris Larik**

Source: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=176514

European cooperation in the fight against piracy is anything but new. Between 12 and 21 July 1784, a joint fleet consisting of Spanish, Portuguese, Neapolitan, and Maltese ships bombarded the city of Algiers, a stronghold of the Barbary pirates. On 27 August 1816, an Anglo‐Dutch fleet bombarded Algiers again, this time with the aim of stopping the practice of enslaving Europeans. Two centuries later, during the night of 14 to 15 May 2012, forces of the EU naval mission Atalanta attacked a pirate base on the Somali coast. However, for the European Union, Operation Atalanta (also known as EUNAVOR Somalia) is the first aero‐naval operation conducted in the framework of its ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ (CSDP). The mission, which is part of the wider international efforts to fight Somali piracy, has been going on for four and a half years. The present paper examines the performance of this mission and puts it the wider historical context of the European integration process as well as Europe’s role in contemporary international relations.

To this end, the paper first introduces the operation, delves into how it was conceived and assesses its performance to date. Subsequently, it argues that Operation Atalanta represents an important benchmark for the credibility of the European Union as a global actor and thus constitutes rather a logical continuation of the European integration process. It shows that Europe and its nations have come a long way since the fight against the Barbary pirates of the past.

**December 2008: The EU goes naval**

The European Union was not the first actor to address piracy off the coast of Somalia with military means. Piracy attacks in this region had already been reported for a decade before Atalanta was launched in December 2008. Given the persistent lack of an effective government in Somalia, piracy found a fertile breeding ground there. The country has been a so-called ‘failed state’ for more than two decades. As pirate attacks surged between 2007 and 2008, at first individual countries including Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, as well as NATO, sent warships to escort ships of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) through this area. Moreover, US‐led coalition forces (the Combined Maritime Forces) had already been – albeit initially incidentally – involved in counter-piracy.

In mid-2008, the United Nations Security Council seized the matter and adopted a series of resolutions calling on the international community to fight piracy, both on the high seas off the Somali coast as well as in the territorial waters of Somalia, in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). Responding to the call of the Security Council, the EU assumed a leading position in a relatively short period of time. Given that naval assets from various EU Member States were already present in the area, EU engagement started in September 2008 with a small mission consisting of a cell charged with coordinating these different national deployments called Operation EU NAVCO. This coordination mission was followed up two months later by the launching of a genuine EU naval mission, operation Atalanta. Its mandate has been extended several times, and is projected to last until the end of 2014.

The objectives of the operation, as stipulated in Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, are, firstly, ‘the protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia’, and furthermore ‘the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast’. In March 2012, the mandate of Atalanta was expanded to cover Somali coastal territories also, thus allowing for attacks on land against pirate bases (Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP).

By creating a mission of its own, the European Union has consistently provided one of the largest counter‐piracy contingents in the past four years. Even though numbers fluctuate due to the constant rotation of vessels, overall operation Atalanta comprises usually of about four to seven warships and a small number of maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the EU, a number of warships from other countries are present in the area for the specific purpose of counter-­‐piracy. These operate either on a national basis, or take part in the US‐led Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force 151 or NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield.

A number of reasons are likely to have motivated the Union to take this step. From an economic point of view, the operation was clearly in the Union’s interest. As the world’s foremost trading power, the EU and its Member States are dependent on safe maritime shipping lanes. This applies in particular here, as the Gulf of Aden is a so- called ‘choke-point’ through which vast quantities of goods are traded between Europe and Asia, as well as oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. Apart from economic considerations, by upholding UN Security Council Resolutions, the EU was able to become more visible as a responsible international actor. The combination of these factors allowed for the convergence of interests among critical Member States, including above all France, which is seen as the main instigator of the operation, but also Germany and the United Kingdom.

**Four and a half years of fighting pirates off the Somali coast**

How has Atalanta performed during the past years? On the upside, it has contributed to reducing the number of successful pirate attacks, to the authority of the United Nations Security Council, international law and human rights, as well as to fostering multilateral cooperation. On the downside, it has failed to thwart piracy altogether, while a permanent and sustainable solution to the underlying causes of piracy is still lacking. From an EU perspective in particular, Atalanta has not been mandated to protect EU citizens, even though Europeans have repeatedly been taken hostage by Somali pirates. Furthermore, the Union continues to serve as only one of several frameworks through which the Member States can operate, which puts in question the idea of the EU as a ‘cohesive force’ on the international stage.

Atalanta has indeed been successful in protecting ships of the World Food Programme as well as in reducing the rate of successful pirate attacks, especially in the Gulf of Aden. This is not least due to the ‘Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor’, which the EU helped to establish. It allows merchant ships to organize themselves into convoys and receive military escorts through the Gulf of Aden. However, an unintended consequence of the success of Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden is that pirates have relocated their activities to the east coast of Somalia and have started to operate in the Indian Ocean. In view of this vast body of water (the area of operation for Atalanta covers now two million square nautical miles, i.e. twice the size of the Mediterranean) and the limited number of assets available, effective control is difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, as of late, piracy has been abating in the region. According to figures of the International Maritime Bureau, in comparison with the 219 attacks (including attempts) attributed to Somali pirates in 2010 (in the Red Sea, the Somali coast, the Gulf of Aden, Oman and the Indian Ocean) in 2010, the number rose to 237 in 2011, but dropped to 75 in 2012. In the first quarter of 2013, only five incidents attributed to Somali pirates were reported.\* In view of these numbers, the measures of the international community seem to be bearing fruit.

However, the root causes of piracy in Somalia remain to be addressed. After all, it is the failed‐state problematic ashore that created an environment for piracy to prosper. The European Union tries to tackle this through its so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ and with the help of a specially designated EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa. In addition to Operation Atalanta, it has taken a range of other measures to help improve the situation on the ground. Together with its Member States, the EU remains the largest donor of humanitarian and development aid to Somalia. It is politically and financially supporting the Somali Transitional Federal Government as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia. Furthermore, in April 2010, it launched a small mission EU Training Mission Somalia, based in Uganda, aimed at training Somali security forces for the TFG. In July 2012, the Council of the EU also agreed on Operation Nestor to strengthen the maritime security capabilities of several countries around the Horn of Africa, including Somalia.

The effectiveness of this approach has been criticized as insufficient in view of the apparent lack of substantial improvement on the ground in Somalia. One might characterise this criticism as unfair to the extent that it would expect the EU to single‐handedly ‘fix’ Somalia. This is a complex and massive problem which has persisted for more than two decades, a durable solution to which arguably requires more capabilities – political, financial and military – than even an extremely committed European Union could muster. Given past experiences with a more robust engagement in Somalia, above all the failed US-led UN mission UNISOM II, which ended in the withdrawal of American forces in 1994, as well as the continuing weakness of the TFG, it is illusory for the EU to spearhead a new effort to bring back an effective government to Somalia in the short‐term.

Concerning the respect for international law and human rights, the mandate of Atalanta underlines that the operation is ‘in support of’ the relevant Security Council resolutions, and is to be conducted ‘in a manner consistent with’ the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. More specifically touching upon human rights, the mandate addresses the treatment of captured piracy suspects, stating that their transfer and subsequent prosecution must be carried out ‘in a manner consistent with relevant international law, notably international law on human rights’. In this vein, the EU concluded transfer agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles in 2009, which are aimed at ensuring that the human rights of the transferees are protected. This stands in stark contrast to certain actions by other deployments. A notorious incident from May 2010 involved the Russian navy, which, after forcefully liberating the tanker Moscow University from a pirate hijacking, put the captured pirates in an inflatable boat and set them afloat, which most likely resulted in their death.

In addition, Atalanta is an example of what the EU calls ‘effective multilateralism’, as it has promoted and facilitated cooperation and coordination among major powers and organizations active in the region. It set up the ‘Maritime Security Centre—Horn of Africa’, where ships in the area can register and receive information regarding pirate attacks and elaborated ‘Best Management Practices’ to avert pirate attacks in cooperation with the shipping industry. Furthermore, the EU has actively participated in the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and helped to establish the ‘Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor’. Crucially, it has co-chaired the ‘Shared Awareness and Deconfliction’ mechanism (SHADE), which coordinates military anti-piracy deployments in the region.

Given the presence of various navies including those of the major global players, the region has become a testing ground for multilateral cooperation in the twenty-first century, which involves the USA, Russia, India and China. There is a clear geopolitical dimension underlying the counter-piracy operation in this area. In this regard, the EU, with its contributions and achievements in multilateral cooperation, has shown initiative and leadership. What is more, it also stood up to the other powers, for instance by insisting on remaining co-chair of SHADE.

Nevertheless, it is still difficult to see the EU as a single ‘power’ in its own right in the case of Atalanta. After all, the EU remains only one of many options for its Member States to act internationally. While Atalanta can be lauded as decisive action on the part of the EU, exhibiting leadership and innovation, it has also highlighted the freedom of the Member States to conduct their own foreign policies despite the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union. In many ways, the EU appears to be a forum or framework to be used by the Member States, in addition to others or the option to ‘go it alone’. Thus, the convergence of interests of the EU Member States on Atalanta has not kept a number of them (including Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain the UK and even France) from contributing in parallel to other missions in the framework of NATO and/or the Combined Maritime Forces, for anti‐piracy or other purposes such as counter‐terrorism in the region. Sometimes the same warship has been simply rotated through these different formats, such as the British Navy’s HMS Northumberland, which was part of the NATO operation in late 2007, and then joined Atalanta a year later. Moreover, while Norway as a non-EU NATO member has contributed to Atalanta, EU member Denmark, which has opted out of the CSDP, has taken over the rotating command of Combined Task Force 151 in early January 2012. In addition, EU ships sometimes switched to operating under their national flag for conducting missions outside of the mandate of Atalanta, for instance to escort their own ships or to rescue their own nationals.

Concerning the latter point, it is noteworthy that the mandate of Atalanta does not extend to the protection and rescue of EU citizens from pirates. The Treaty on European Union, as reformed by the Lisbon Treaty, now contains the explicit foreign policy objective for the Union to ‘contribute to the protection of its citizens’ (Article 3(5) TEU). The concept of Union citizenship, as established in EU law, has gained considerable importance within the internal legal sphere of the Union. In the external domain, by contrast, Member States have a difficult time even agreeing on common rules for providing consular and diplomatic protection to EU citizens. Against this backdrop, it may not surprise that operation Atalanta is, according to its mandate, prioritizing WFP ships, and lending protection to everyone else on a case‐by‐case basis, while EU citizens are mentioned nowhere.

However, EU citizens are threatened by pirate attacks, as evidenced by numerous hijackings involving Europeans victims. Furthermore, this is obviously a concern for individual Member States, as they have engaged actively in operations to rescue their own citizens. France in particular has not hesitated to use deadly force against pirates to liberate hostages on hijacked yachts. In other cases, EU Member States have rescued each other’s citizens, such as the Dutch Frigate Tromp, which in April 2010 freed a multinational crew from the hijacked MV Taipan that had German nationals on board. Against this backdrop, it would seem logical for the Member States of the EU to pool their resources in order to protect their citizens, also understood as EU citizens, together.

**Naval Power Europe?**

Beyond the appraisal of the performance of Atalanta per se, the operation feeds into a wider debate on the trajectory of European integration and the role of the European Union on the international stage. The EU was traditionally portrayed in the scholarship as a distinctly ‘civilian’ power, either by design or by default. The launching of a Security and Defence policy of the EU in the 1990s and its operationalization in the 2000s has put this traditional conception into question. ‘Militarising’ the process of European integration, according to critical voices, would vitiate the Union’s distinctiveness and in the worst case even its normative clout. For more enthusiastic observers, it meant rather that the EU would ‘normalize’ by acquiring the full range of tools of a global power, including notably military means to pursue its interests. These means, however, can also be used to further ethical and humanitarian ends.

As Atalanta shows, the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union continues to advance and mature. The EU now engages in military operations on land, at sea and in the air. Given the importance of the Gulf of Aden for trade flows and energy security, the economic motivations for launching the operation are rather evident. Beyond economics interests, the EU decidedly put the emphasis on acting within the common United Nations framework, in accordance with international law, and with a priority of protecting vessels of the World Food Programme. It took the lead in shaping cooperation mechanisms involving all major powers. Regarding the treatment of captured pirates, the Union has been insistent that their human rights be respected. Moreover, it has made efforts to improve the situation on the ground in Somalia. In view of all this, Operation Atalanta, together with the other measures adopted by the EU in this crisis, has advanced not only the Union’s interest but also values of a global appeal.

All the same, the idea of a nascent ‘naval power Europe’ should not be equated with the emergence of a singular Europe puissance, at sea or elsewhere. The operation was born out of favourable circumstances, and represented a more manageable challenge compared to other international crises. It involves minimal action and exposure on land, and in terms of technology and firepower, modern European navies are far superior to the improvised skiffs of Somali pirates. Thus, under these particular circumstances, the EU was an opportune framework through which the Member States could act. Given the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP, this does not bind them to do so in other situations. As the European Union’s rather absent role in the Libyan civil war in 2011 showed, willing and able Member States might opt for other frameworks such as NATO, or continue to act on a national basis. As we have seen, even in the fight against Somali piracy, several Member States choose to contribute in parallel to operations other than that of the EU.

**Conclusion**

In sum, it can be observed that Operation Atalanta represents an overall success for the European Union. It has expanded the Common Security and Defence Policy into the maritime domain and it has shown that the Member States are capable of acting on fairly shortnotice. Most importantly, it has demonstrated that the EU can be a leader with initiative and perseverance.

Thus, coming back to the start of the paper, what has changed when we contemplate anti-piracy operations undertaken jointly by European nations today compared to the past? In the broader historical picture, joint European operations were rather the exception. Instead, true to the dictum ‘no peace beyond the line’, condoning, encouraging and partaking in acts of piracy against rival powers through ‘privateers’ and ‘letters of marque’ was the rule. Furthermore, Algiers was bombarded as an act of collective punishment and with of the broader intention of coercing the Barbary States into peace treaties dictated by the Europeans. Today, not only do European states cooperate in an organised manner to fight piracy, understood as an established affront against international law, the EU itself has moved to the vanguard of international efforts to restore peace and an effective self-government in Somalia. In view of this remarkable development, Europe has indeed come a long way from the Barbary Coast to the shores of Somalia.

\* These numbers are taken from the annual and quarterly reports of the ICC International Maritime Bureau, which can be requested, free of charge, via: http://www.icc‐ ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/request-piracy-report

***Joris Larik*** *is a senior researcher at The Hague Institute for Global Justice. Previously, he was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre within the project "The Internationalisation of European Law and Europeanisation of International Law" and academic coordinator of the "The EU in Global Governance"-MOOC. His research focuses on the law of external relations of the European Union, comparative & multilevel constitutional law and comparative regional integration.*

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| https://encrypted-tbn2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSoqNx63cuO1yRrjtuCVZu-wfkSaBh3rR1nJVTXHMNW9FsN3awIEDITOR’S COMMENT: A very nice academic politically correct paper (as usual). BUT… There is a big difference when we speak or write about Europe without defining the term. Is it “Europe” as a geographic term or as “European Union”? I strongly doubt the latter given the fact that so far is not a “union” but a consortium of “interests” and “chess political games”. A “union” should have common defense strategy, maritime strategy or illegal mass immigration strategy – just to mention a few key points. A small fleet off shore Somalia is like trying to manage a wildfire with a bucket of water. Might be a good political movement to show that “Europe is here defending global rights” but a small fleet in such a huge sea sounds like a joke. They might claim that piracy is declining. Do the results justify the cost of similar missions? Especially when everyone recognizes that the problem lays in the Somali mainland and not at sea. There both Europe and NATO do nothing to solve the problem. A problem that now moved to other parts of suffering Africa with a dynamic that might result in similar problems for maritime trade. Without proper rules of engagement; without surgical attacks against pirates’ safe heavens on shore; without unified collaboration with Somali government and neighboring countries; without caring for the populations caught in between conflicts, terrorism, drought and adverse living environments, do they expect to solve the problem and restore peace and international law with a bounch of warships in the area? I do not think so… Simply because “Europe” remains a “geographic” term! |

## Turkey remains on terror financing "gray list"

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/seworld20140217-turkey-remains-on-terror-financing-gray-list

Turkey, a NATO member, has remained on the gray list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international body which sets the global standards for combating terrorist financing (CFT). FATF left Turkey on the list due to insufficient laws and capabilities to counter terrorism financing in Turkey. On Friday the FATF issued a statement saying that even though there have been improvements in Turkey for countering terrorism financing, identifying and freezing terrorist assets are still a problem. The worst countries according to the FATF criteria are Iran and North Korea, which are on the organization’s black list. The other countries on the gray list are Algeria, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen. Kenya and Tanzania have recently been removed from the gray list due to their progress in substantially addressing their action plan agreed with the FATF.

# Airliner hijacking exposes Swiss Air Force to ridicule

Source: http://www.janes360.com/article/34073/airliner-hijacking-exposes-swiss-air-force-to-ridicule

**The hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 767 airliner on 17 February has seen the Swiss Air Force subject to widespread ridicule as it was unable to respond due to the incident occurring 'outside of office hours',** international media has reported.

With Swiss Boeing F/A-18 Hornet and Northrop F-5 Tiger II fighters being unavailable due to the timing of the incident at 4am on Monday morning, Italian Eurofighter Typhoon and French Mirage 2000 jets, which had earlier intercepted the airliner as it passed through their respective airspaces were forced to remain on station as the Ethopian Airlines co-pilot diverted his aircraft to Geneva Airport.

"Switzerland [could not] intervene because its air bases are closed at night and on the weekend … It's a question of budget and staffing," Swiss Air Force spokesperson Laurent Savary was quoted as telling the AFP.

While Switzerland does have agreements with neighbouring countries to provide quick reaction alert duties during these down times, the hijacking brings into focus the lack of resources available to the country's air force at a time when it is looking to procure 22 new Gripen E fighters from Saab.

A national referendum into that procurement is due to go ahead on 18 May, and the air force's embarrassment at its seeming inability to carry out its core mission to safeguard the national airspace could hardly have come at a worse time. With the government looking to convince the Swiss people of the need to spend CHF3.1 billion (USD3.5 billion) on new fighter aircraft, many in Switzerland and beyond will be questioning whether that money might be better spent in properly funding the assets it already has.

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| http://static2.bornrichimages.com/wp-content/uploads/s3/1/2011/12/20/13243760656.jpgEDITOR’S COMMENT: At first I thought: “They are joking!” But they were not… On the other hand this might be a new proposal for European Air Defense. Taking shifts between countries! Oh! Greek Air Force pilots would love that instead of spending their lives inside their planes in high readiness status during “peace” time! Democracy is good. Populace involvement in serious state decisions is good. But there is a limit for everything. Otherwise democracy becomes a joke. I only hope Swiss pilots to park their planes next to their homes to be ready to take off with the first light on working days… |

# A Candid Discussion with Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin on Suicide Terrorism

**By Reza Akhlaghi**

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Throughout the Middle East, many Muslims and non-Muslims have fallen victim to suicide bombings. In fact, more Muslims have been killed in suicide bombings in the region than Jews and Christians. This extreme form of violence has been the subject of many studies. Researchers have been baffled as to why someone, mostly at a young age, decides to take the lives of others and end his/her own life in the process. Questions have revolved around such topics as religious teachings, ideology, nationalism, and hatred of the “other”. In a unique and novel approach to the issue of suicide terrorism, Dr. Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin (photo) takes an entirely different look at this topic and informs her audience of aspects of suicide terrorism that can offer new directions for policy makers and for the field of counter-terrorism around the world. Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin is an Israeli psychoanalyst and counter terrorism expert and a fellow at the American Center for Democracy. She is the author, most recently of, **Penetrating The Terrorist Psyche**, in which she delves into the dark world of Islamic suicide terrorism using psychoanalytical methods that include early childhood development stages. The following discussion with Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin was conducted by Arian Moradzadeh. Mr. Moradzadeh is an independent researcher in psychoanalysis and translator of essential works in the field of  psychoanalysis from German language.

**How would you assess the state of psychoanalysis today within psychological disciplines?**

It is a very good question how the confluence of psychoanalysis continues to evolve and engage with other disciplines, yet within the field of psychology, psychoanalysis has generally been marginalized. Paradoxically, psychology as an academic discipline could never have developed without its psychoanalytic roots. Since I am deeply involved in counterterrorism, I have found that psychoanalysis provides us with invaluable tools for they are the only tools that can decode the unconscious rage and promote a better understanding of terrorism. Nevertheless there has been great resistance to integrating the studies of psychoanalysis, which allows us to delve into the psyche of the terrorist for the field of counter terrorism.

I understand how frightening this special knowledge is that counter terrorist experts themselves are ironically quite terrified, which accounts for their denial. It does take an analytic mind to contemplate and to see the linkage that exists from early childhood. The inclination toward violence is in place developmentally by age three. If it goes undetected, the rage festers below the radar until it bursts out during adolescence or later to the shock of everyone.  This is similar to the personality development of the serial killer to cite only one example. During this early time frame the terrorists are not developing empathy, usually something that occurs between the mother and the baby in their relational bond.

The personality is essentially “set in cement” by age three. This also takes into account genetic predisposition along with the neuroscience of the brain, which also plays a major role in violent aggressive behavior. Thus by the time the child goes off to school, the proclivity for aggressive behavior and violence is already there.

My goal is to engage counter terrorist experts, policy makers and the general public with these tools to help understand the intricate interplay between early childhood development, the devalued hated object of the female and its ramifications for violence contributing to suicide bombing. In no way is this meant to blame and devalue the female further because she is the lynchpin for remedying the problem.

**What are the mechanisms of a suicide terrorist’s action as an unconscious form of patricide?**

Fortunately Sigmund Freud did not live at a time when there were suicide bombers. If he did, he would probably view these aggressive sadistic/masochistic acts in classic psychoanalytic terms as an extreme Oedipal conflict. In today’s world this would turn many non-psychoanalytic scholars off. It is difficult for many to understand the assumption that the devalued status of the female helps to spawn suicide attacks. It is an unconscious paranoid act of violence, which is the outcome, in part, due to the early bonding relationship between mother and infant. The trauma of her being the target of abuse and ongoing hatred and never having the opportunity to heal from being the shock absorber of such hatred within a dysfunctional family set within a shame honor culture and religion causes significant problems.

Instead of developing normal maternal feelings for her baby, she experiences the needs of her baby unconsciously as attacking and persecutory. I came to the conclusion that it wasn’t so much patricide as it was matricide. In 2010 my theory was confirmed by a documentary maker who had read my work and had also spoken with neuroscientists who felt that it was very difficult for a mother to bond with her baby in shame honor cultures that advocates wife beating, female genital mutilation and honor killing.

This is NOT to blame the female, but it is hard to access the empathy necessary to develop a healthy loving bond with her infant free of unconscious recycled hatred. One has to look to the nonverbal language of the terrorists and read their violent behavior in conjunction with their dysfunctional family dynamics. Unlike many followers of Freud who stressed the mother, Freud stressed the importance of the father and how he plays a role in helping the son to overcome Oedipal rivals not through aggression. In Islam the father does play a role, basically absent or ineffective mainly because he never had a role model of a father who effectively set limits in a non-violent manner. The learned model of behavior is to act out violence rather than to put feelings into words and resolve conflict.

Some may say that it is not possible to import psychoanalytic thinking to a non-Western culture but Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, a leading Tunisian sociologist, in his book, *Sexuality in Islam,* demonstrates that Muslim culture harbors the Judar complex which is based on the negation of the female. There are also many psychoanalysts who are Muslim. The field is very diverse. I arrived at this conclusion myself by looking at the terrorist communication in the suicide attack.

Terrorists do not have a sense of autonomy and independence because in Arab Muslim culture, and all other shame honor cultures, you are not permitted to separate from the mother. Shame plays a significantly traumatizing role since children are shamed into behaving which causes rage. Children are not listened to and they are treated like objects. When they grow up, they treat others as objects. My work also explains why there is radicalization and the problem of western converts because in the West we, too, have pockets of shame-honor families. We are more alike than different as human beings.


Allow me to add one more note as some people say, well what about the Tamil Tigers and the large number of female suicide bombers they produced. They are not Muslim. Yet they too came from a shame honor culture, where the female is also devalued. Nevertheless, the majority of terrorist attacks take place in the Muslim Middle East. Islam is the fastest growing religion/political movement in the world and its ideologies have a higher rate of frequency of violence in comparison to other religions.

Since aggression breeds aggression, it has to be immediately curtailed when it occurs. Limits have to be set. If not, it spreads through imitative behavior. Jihadi violence has a peculiar kind of sadomasochistic tone to it, which is an unspoken attraction for those who are seeking justification for committing their acts of violence.

**What role does the individual’s “social unconscious” play in your book?**

The role of the social has extreme importance for we are dealing with a shame/honor culture. In these cultures it is the group self that has more importance than the individual self. A “We” culture as opposed to the West which is a “Me” culture. Individuality is felt to be a threat to the group. In conjunction with this we must introduce the role of language, verbal and nonverbal, because it structures our unconscious and by extension reality. Even their child rearing practices are imbued with group thinking rather than focusing on the individual needs necessary for healthy child development. The attraction to jihad becomes a more pervasive force than life itself.

A vast number of kids coming from shame honor western families are attracted to jihad.  Jihadis love explosives and fire. It reminds me of my interview of a little boy on a locked psychiatric ward when I was in training. I sat down to interview him at a children’s table and immediately felt his foot on top of mine—the sign of dominance. He had been hospitalized for setting fires. I realized that his nonverbal communication was a projection literally on to me of his terrors about being interviewed by me and the issue of trust. Trust was not something found in his early childhood experience. He had no sense of basic trust.

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This anecdote shows that we must “listen” carefully to understand the terrorizing behavior that targets us as its potential victims. There are a lot of articles and books published on the suicide bombers with titles like “talking” to terrorists. Yes, talking is important but even more critical is listening to them and using your own body and training as a kind of unconscious psychological tuning fork, because the split in their psyche runs so deep and their projections so forceful and overwhelming. This ‘listening” is a tool uniquely developed by psychoanalysis referred to as the third ear.

Empathy and shame/honor cultures do not go together. Lacking is the necessary empathy for basic trust. If it is not there, it keeps one forever terrified. A parent has to be there to help the child with his/her emotional experiences in life, which can be confusing and enraging.

Child rearing practices are culturally informed and shape the social unconscious of the child. How a culture and religion sanction aggression will be transmitted to the child. It is learned behavior in the home before the child reaches school. While schools play an important role in incitement to violence as in the case of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories, to name a few, where teaching hatred of the “other” has been institutionalized. School is still relatively late in the development of personality. The mother plays THE critical role because she educates the child in utero through age three before s/he goes off to school.

The Cypriot Turkish psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan has written that the need to hate and the need to have an enemy is in place by age three. Furthermore the Egyptian sociologist Halim Barakat has noted that the family is a microcosm of society, stating that if you have a dysfunctional family, which is not egalitarian, you will have a dysfunctional society. Why is this so? I state that its citizens do not develop the requisite “psychological” infrastructure for a democracy. To wit the Arab spring failed.

**What, in your opinion, is the most appropriate method of transference to educate government authorities on the psychoanalytical aspects of suicide terrorism?**

In order to understand how transference methods can impact change in people’s attitudes, we must first take into account the nature of group psychology. According to Wilfred Bion the well-known psychoanalyst and expert on group behavior (and by the way he served as a British tank commander during WWI wherein close quarters one would learn quite a bit about group dynamics), he noted that the individual thinker is a rare species.

He discusses two types of groups: the work group and the basic assumption group. The work group is basically the task-oriented group, those who are goal-oriented, those who do not allow primitive defenses to get in the way of thinking. They are the “reality-based” group. The second set of groups is the ones dominated by primitive defenses such as denial, splitting, projection and projective identification.

This includes fusion, following the herd mentality, the group “thinkers” rather than the individual thinker. Yes, even government officials get duped into the latter, whereby conformity takes precedence over introspection and self-analysis. To effect change, government officials need this kind of introspection to inquire more in-depth and to ask themselves if they truly understand how the brain of a child is made in a society, which hates the female and in turn, the “other”.

To do so requires this kind of introspection to question and explore their own rote-like responses, to question their own basic assumptions in order to explore their feelings and defenses that keep them from seeing clearly what the reality is. We all have our own “internal” terrorist, which means that we are all terrified to some degree to acknowledge this aspect of the unconscious terrorist communication.

Realistically speaking, this does not mean we must now put all governmental officials on the couch, but we do have to provide some methods for them to learn how to handle their own aggression and rage, and deal with their own internal terrorist. Even in the West we have a long way to go with regard to the treatment of the female, sexual harassment, violence against women and minorities, etc. These are intersecting problems.

In my first book *The Banality of Suicide Terrorism*, I conclude by stating the importance of focusing on the little Muslim girl to help and guide her in ways to disengage her from her devalued status. To allow her the freedom and the honor that one day she will become the mother. She has the burden of teaching her child not to hate, while at the same time she has also been highly traumatized by her religion and culture.

My colleague Dr. Joan Lachkar has advocated programming and dialoguing that focus on bonding with culture through music, the arts and food, (sensory perception) – aspects of nonviolent cultures in order to familiarize people, bridging the gap between people, seeking nonviolent ways of engaging. In Saudi Arabia they came to realize that engaging the imprisoned terrorists in art therapy was a way to begin to encounter their highly dissociated violent minds. Nevertheless the rate of recidivism will be high because the problem is so early developmentally; the intervention comes too late.

Yet for as long as Saudi Arabia remains a closed society, hatred will persist because it allows for hatred of the female and the “other”, including the anti-Semitism found in Islam. The same goes for Iran, where the situation is even more complicated because Shia Islam has violent rituals and they feel themselves to be the victims in the larger picture of the ummah, the Muslim global community. The key is education, introspection and understanding about group formation.

**How would you analyze the psychological mechanism a charismatic leader has, as a unique source of power, with his suicide terrorist followers?**

Most psychoanalysts and other experts like Irving Schaffer, who wrote a very interesting book called *Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Society* have focused again on the need for the father. While there is no doubt a father hunger exists for the terrorists who think they are unconsciously seeking out and hooking into a charismatic paternal figure. However, through my work I discovered that the violence they commit speaks to the deep split in their psyches concerning their bonding relationship with their mothers.

The father is a *symptom* of the underlying problem of the devalued female as he was once a little boy who had value only as a narcissistic object of alleged honor for his devalued mother in the shame honor group. I point to the intense bonding that takes place between the mother and the infant as the seed for seeking out a charismatic leader in order to fuse with him because the personality lacks a sense of identity. It is a heliotropic process and they hook into the charismatic leader as a source of support, “now I have found an identity” through a strong leader.

Yet the strong leader has a maternal dimension. We know this when we look to murder-suicide configurations, be they domestic violence or rampage shooters who then commit suicide, that these lethal actions are a way of bonding to the mother thereby seeking a rebirth fantasy in death. In fact, in another shame honor culture, Japanese, the Kamikaze pilots were told not to fear death because when they were within meters of their target the face of the mother would reappear. It is part of this charismatic pathological maternal bonding.

The mother is the first person we bond with in life and hence the power source. The experience sets the template for all other relationships. Irwin Yahlom, a psychoanalyst, wrote that mother is so ingrained in the interstices of our mind, we are not even aware of it. Buried beneath the alleged “paternal” nefarious charismatic leader, lies our first charismatic experience with our mother. Osama bin Laden’s mother was devalued and abused by his father. He grew up in a huge Saudi family with over fifty siblings. Bin Laden reenacted and recycled this dysfunction by creating a “family” called Al Qaeda in which he could act out his rage by having been raised by an abused mother and an absent father. He just managed to get a way with committing his violence, which exceeded murder itself under the banner of jihad, turning the familial violence into political violence.

**What role does gender segregation play in a terrorist’s psyche?**

Separate is not equal. In radical Islam there is strict gender apartheid. This separation is a revealing sign. It is a nonverbal communication about the psychological splitting which occurs early on in the traumatic bonding with the mother. They split off all their bad feelings. They purge themselves by projecting their self-hatred outward to keep themselves “pure.” Hence all their talk about purity. They have a weak sense of their maleness so they must create the separation as a means of controlling the terrifying female. It tells us how they feel about the female body.

Terrorists do not understand how they could be born from such a devalued body, the site of shame. In the “we” group of a shame honor culture, the female body is contaminated and contaminating, which means that they must keep apart from it, i.e. her. They must also control and manipulate her. The mother is heroically portrayed as larger than life because it is an overcompensation (defense) against inadequate. They are in conflict. Terrorists conduct in bullying.

It is hard for the female because this unconscious message is blasted at her day in and day out through all sorts of subtle and not so subtle manipulative ways. She internalizes male rage of the female as self-hatred. She has been treated as an object early on and in turn. This is the model she has for her children. It remains very hard for her to break out of it. She must find avenues to get rid of her rage and that is why, you have female jihadis like the Black Widows (Chechen) who “out French the French” in their revenge suicide bombings. Suicide terrorism becomes an easy way to purge themselves of their own rage through eliminating death while at the same time finding an identity in a society in which they are faceless.

Gender apartheid plays out the paranoia, which occurs first in the home. It supports the psychological splitting and the deep split in the terrorist psyche. They can remain dissociated from their own terrors and just hate and kill rather than choosing to have psychological awareness. However, the mother is the key to decoding the terrorist behavior. Like a palimpsest lying beneath an oil painting the terrorists paint the unconscious conflict of their minds, their maternal drama, on “the canvas” of a suicide attack site.

They are so preoccupied by the fact that they have not separated from their mothers that their behavior is at near conscious level like children in play therapy. Unfortunately, for us, it is not play and very lethal, spreading like wild fire. The mother is always there. Take for example, the Al Qaeda e-zine Inspire’s article “How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom.” It is a clear misuse of the kitchen and unconscious rage meant for their mothers, yet again experts and the public remain duped. We gloss over the unconscious meaning because it is too terrifying that it could be that simple.

**In your book you write about hate-oriented trauma and its social consequences. Can you elaborate on it?**

Hate-oriented trauma paralyzes an individual and in a very specific way. The hatred is so pervasive and ongoing that the targeted object of hatred becomes numb to it – dissociated from it. One can be high functioning and yet behind the scenes at home, be chronically abused and in denial. Often even therapists miss what is going on in the home because of our own unacknowledged terrors and wind up colluding with the terrorist.

My colleague Dr. Joan Lachkar has written extensively about this and I have added a dimension to this problem in tracing out the institutionalization of unacknowledged unconscious hatred which can be found in different disciplines like the field of psychoanalysis, the practice of psychotherapy and the discipline of counter terrorism. These should be thought of as mirror image denial of the terrorist acts.

Being dissociated from the swirling unconscious rage and violence of terrorism courses through all sectors of society. It does not allow us to see what is really going on. In counter terrorism they like to keep political violence partitioned off from all other kinds of violence. This, in my opinion, causes blind spots.  The deep waters of denial and dissociation help contribute to an illusion that there is progress. We saw this in Afghanistan and also Iraq. The belief was that things were getting better. This fallacy demonstrates that it was poorly understood the degree to which the developmental problem exists in terrorism and in these violent societies. For as long as the female remains the permissible object of hatred, the violence will not be diminished.

This deeply affects men in all shame honor cultures, societies and families because their mothers were the devalued object of hatred and the cycle goes on. The little boy cannot possibly have a good feeling about his self if he sees his mother being beaten. She is an extension of him. As a child he was dependent upon her. This causes great rage in him. He must find an avenue to deal with that rage. In tightly controlled gender apartheid societies, he can not get his needs met for warmth and affection in a balanced, healthy way. He rages and projects outwards from domestic violence, to crime, to radicalization, to jihad.

Rare is the individual who desires to have psychological understanding of him/her self. It remains difficult because of the shame these children have experienced early on. Being hated is interpreted as being impotent, helpless, defective and shamed. Shame is a powerful emotion that has been underestimated in terrorism.

To conclude, from all my work over these years, I observe that shaming happens very fast. It is disconcerting and crippling. The projections are forceful. When someone envies the genuine strength of another, they become attacking, destructive and violent. They cannot tolerate the fact that the other, the hated objected, has been able to become resourceful, strong, vigorous and independent. Hence the terrorists must repudiate and destroy. In order to solve the problem of political terrorism we must begin to recognize the unconscious psychodynamics of the terrorist’s terrors, his project of them and the meaning of the object of hatred. We must also acknowledge our own “internal terrorist” which each of us harbors due to our own terrors growing up.

To do so, is to genuinely begin to deal with the problem of political terrorism. Education is key concerning this matter. Treatment of the female who becomes the mother remains the lynchpin for solving this pervasive, global problem. We must muster the courage to explore this aspect of early childhood development and its relation to the psyche of the terrorist. Finally I wish to thank the Foreign Policy Association for being so forward thinking in opening up such a discussion within these pages concerning the political violence of terrorism. It is a much needed step in the right direction.

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| EDITOR’S COMMENT: As I have already commented last year, Nancy’s book is a **deposit of soul** and one that has to be read by all involved in the field of counter-terrorism. |



►ANSWER TO QUIZ: United Kingdom!

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