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Malaysia: Terror threat at new level

November 25 – **The terror threat in Malaysia has reached a new level – the link between foreign and local fighters via social media has led to greater funding for terrorism activities.**
And now the foreign militants are trying to influence local political parties through their members.
Tomorrow, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak is expected to table a White Paper in the Dewan Rakyat, which will detail the "real threat" that terrorist groups like Islamic State (IS) and others in the region present to Malaysia.
Home Minister Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid

Hamidi *(pic)* said the White Paper would touch on proposed measures to combat and prevent terrorism.
"The threat is real and we hope this (White Paper) will create more awareness on both sides of the political divide and Malaysians as a whole.
"If they (IS) can kill among Muslims, then they are able to kill non-Muslims (also).
"People must be alerted (to this) and precautions should be taken," he said in an exclusive interview at the Putra World Trade Centre yesterday.
Dr Ahmad Zahid said Najib would also be touching on the involvement of Malaysians in terror cells and the need to amend existing laws or introduce new ones to combat terrorism.
Saying the ministry had looked at these options, he added: "We will either strengthen the seven existing laws by amending the clauses or propose a new Anti-Terrorism Act as a preventive measure.
"If introduced, the new Act will complement Sosma (the Security Offences (Special

Measures) Act) and PCA (the Prevention of Crime Act)," he said.
Previously, the Government tabled White Papers on the Al-Ma'unah group and the Baling incident involving supporters of a religious group.
"This time around, the foreign threat is real and the threat from within is also real," stressed Dr Ahmad Zahid.
"What is worse now is that Malaysian fighters are connected to foreign fighters and this poses a whole new level of threat."
Dr Ahmad Zahid said national security was under threat because IS manipulated Islamic teaching to justify their goals to overthrow a democratic government by military force and declaring it was permissible to use force to establish an Islamic State as in accordance with their own interpretation of what constituted the Islamic State.
"This force includes killing Muslims and non-Muslims who refuse to be subjected to their version of the Islamic State."
Dr Ahmad Zahid, who is Umno vice-president, hoped the White Paper would be debated sincerely by Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat MPs.
"The important thing is for us to work together … It is about the security of the country," he said, adding that MPs should be united in the interest of national security.
He said Bukit Aman had identified some 100 Malaysians involved in extremist actions.
"However, we fear the number might increase if preventive measures are not taken.
"That is why we are also monitoring social media on two fronts – the recruitment of Malaysians and the terror cells

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getting more donations and funding."

Dr Ahmad Zahid was firm that Malaysia was not being used as a launching or training ground for terror cells because of the strict monitoring by the authorities here.

"Terror groups prefer neighbouring countries but we are working with Aseanapol and Interpol to prevent them from increasing their membership," he said.

So far, Bukit Aman has said 39 Malaysians were involved with militant groups in Syria and Iraq, especially IS.

"Five have returned to Malaysia. Three have been arrested and two others are still under investigation," he said.

Dr Ahmad Zahid added that threats against Malaysia were constantly evolving as local militants were working with those from southern Thailand, southern Philippines and other parts in the region.

"The militants are trying to not only get new recruits but also trying to strengthen their organisations.

"They are also trying to influence other organisations, including political parties, which we are monitoring, though we don't have hard evidence yet.

"We discovered that the militants were trying to influence political parties through their members and not the leadership," he said, adding that the Umno leadership has said it would not endorse any member who promoted IS.

The Islamic State (ISIS) and Imperialism: Terrorism is not a "Threat" to the West. It is a Weapon of the West.

By Sam Muhho

Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-islamic-state-isis-and-imperialism-terrorism-is-not-a-threat-to-the-west-it-is-a-weapon-of-the-west/5415927

Cooperation is an essential part of maintaining a healthy and progressive international order that serves the interests of multipolarity and the people as opposed to the powers of the financial elite and imperialism.

Cooperation is needed in a world increasingly affected by the machinations and whims of a ruling elite in the west that thrives on the use of destabilization and power projection to orient the world in their own interests while simultaneously calling for "cooperation". The Arab Spring has been a means of geopolitical reorientation for the west, the largest since the post-WWII period. Culminating in this destabilization has been the fracturing of Syria and the volatile nation of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines, creating a power vacuum which was deliberately stroked by the west to facilitate in the rise of ISIS. When the dynamic of western involvement in the rise of ISIS is taken into account, the duplicity and illegitimacy of continued western calls for "cooperation" against ISIS is increasingly being seen as farcical and the need for truth even more critical.

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ISIS: Imperialism is the Problem, Not Religion

To obfuscate the nature of the ISIS menace, pundits across the west frame the conflict in a particularly religious dimension and in the case of stations like Fox News, we are given the impression that the Arabs and Muslims are simply crazy people who have no regard for human life and are motivated by hate. This ignorant and untrue characterization seeks to pacify the short attention span of the majority of western intellect and keep them from peeling back the reality and understanding the geopolitics of western imperialism across the region and the regime change agenda being played which is responsible. Also missed in the discussion is the fact that ISIS is not simply menacing minorities but even Muslims (including Sunnis) who are just as much among the greatest victims of ISIS and western balkanization in the Middle East as are minority victims like Syrian Christians and the Yazidis.

Sectarian violence incurred by ISIS in both Syria and Iraq is not a fundamentally religious issue. Both Sunnis and Shiites are united against ISIS and extremism. The problem is the hegemonic and imperialist designs of the NATO governments who have on-record worked with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to use Islamic extremists throughout the Middle East as their "Swiss army knife of destabilization" in order to reorient the Middle East per their interests.

This comes at the expense of

their Iranian, Russian and Chinese competitors. Retired US Army General and former Supreme Allied Commander-Europe for NATO, Gen. Wesley Clark has spoken out multiple times in both 2007 and in a 2011 "DemocracyNow" interview on how after 9/11, the US was hijacked by a policy coup whose objective was to "destabilize the Middle East, turn it upside down, and bring it under our control." Among the nations he cited as listed for destabilization include "Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon."

Zbigniew Brzezinski has also labeled the region as important geostrategically in his book "The Grand Chessboard" in ensuring America's global "pre-eminence" and essentially dominance over the world order. To understand what drives western strategists, one must understand the " Heartland Theory" of geopolitics put forward by Halford John Mackinder in 1904 to the Royal Geographical Society who stated , "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland [Central Asia]; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island [Eurasia]; who rules the World-Island controls the world"(Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 194). US domination over Central Asia is central to its global power projection and the Middle East and Iran, along with Eastern Europe, are the windows into Central Asia. What Bush began under his radical Neo-Con administration, Obama has continued under a different political cover whose nature was clearly seen in examples such as the regime change in Libya against Gaddafi which served as the prequel to the destabilization of Syria.

The Redirection

What is happening now in Syria was predicted by Pulitzer-Prize winning investigative reporter Seymour Hersh in his 2007 New Yorker article "The Redirection" which documented how the US was working with the Saudis and the Hariri political faction in Lebanon to undermine Syria and Iran. Tony Cartalucci has extensively documented the thesis of that piece in various publications demonstrating its centrality to the geopolitics being played out today. Consider the following points from "The Redirection":

"To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia's government,

which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda."

One the coming reality of persecution to religious minorities, it was noted:

"Robert Baer, a former longtime C.I.A. agent in Lebanon, has been a severe critic of Hezbollah and has warned of its links to Iranian-sponsored terrorism. But now, he told me, "we've got Sunni Arabs preparing for cataclysmic conflict, and we will need somebody to protect the Christians in Lebanon. It used to be the French and the United States who would do it, and now it's going to be Nasrallah and the Shiites."

To dispel critics' notions that this is passive, uncontrollable, and indirect support, consider also:

"[Saudi Arabia's] Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that "they will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was 'We've created this movement, and we can control it.' It's not that we don't want the Salafis to throw bombs; it's who they throw them at— Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran."

Terrorism is not a "threat" to the West. It is a weapon of the West.

Saudi Arabia is the author of global Islamic radicalism and a close ally of the US, interlocked with the western ruling establishment. The largest US weapons sale in history was to Saudi Arabia in 2011. Saudi Arabia's connection to terrorism is universally acknowledged in academia because Saudi Arabia funds the "madrassas" that indoctrinated people into fundamentalist thinking and these people are in turn manipulated to serve the geopolitical agenda of the Saudis and Qataris and in turn their western allies. Geopolitical analyst Tony Cartalucci notes in his article, "US-Saudi Funded Terrorists Sowing Chaos in Pakistan" how these militant dupes benefit NATO objectives from Mali to

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Pakistan in undermining any rival geopolitical competitor like China by offsetting their strategic ambitions. For example, Baluchi terrorists in Pakistan harm China's investments in a deep-sea port at Gwadar; terrorists in Mali prevent Chinese attempts to make business in-roads into Africa and strengthen Qatari ties. Syria is no different. Destabilizing Syria prevents Chinese and Russian influence in the Middle East and preserves Israeli and American domination in the pivotal region by fracturing the Arabs and keeping a unified resistance from developing.

This is not merely conspiracy theory; veteran journalist Robert Dreyfuss has noted the long history of US and British covert cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic groups against secular nationalist and Arab leftist groups that sought to undermine British and other western interests in the Middle East. Said Ramadan, the Brotherhood's chief organizer in the 1950s was documented by both Dreyfuss and Wall Street Journal's Ian Johnson as having ties to western intelligence and being backed by the CIA. The Islamic right wing was an effective proxy against anti-imperialist and nationalist Arab leftism. Wikileaks reports from 2005 also showed that backing of Syrian opposition groups, including the Brotherhood, had begun under Bush.

Nothing has changed today. The US and Britain claim that they backed "moderate rebels" in Syria but this is an obfuscation to hide their support for terrorism. I don't believe there are any viable and effective moderates among the ranks of the driving forces among Syria's rebels. A chart by the Economist documenting who's who among the rebels on the ground notes that most of the fighting factions, with the exception of the Kurdish PYD and alleged exception of the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA) under the western-backed umbrella group, the "Supreme Military Council" are Islamist. As will be noted, even the supposedly non-Islamist FSA is stocked with and influenced by Islamists blanketed by the west as "moderates", the same moderates who supported the influx of foreign jihadis into Syria which led to the creation of ISIS.

The Syrian rebels' highest-level leader to receive direct support from the US, Free Syrian Army Col. Abdel Jabbour al-Okaidi from the ranks of the "moderates", has admitted that he has "good relations with ISIS/ISIL" and Jabhat

Al-Nusra and denied media "allegations" against them, openly stating his cooperation. He apologizes for and defends both terrorist groups and downplays what he calls "allegations" and "mistakes" committed by both which are in reality grave crimes against the Syrian people. He and his "moderates" have also worked with ISIS to capture the critical "Menagh Airbase" in Aleppo, Syria. One of the radical jihadis of ISIS, Abu Jandal, was even seen in a video next to al-Okaidi praising the men for their "victory"; moments before, the same Abu Jandal was being filmed wielding a sword and hysterically calling for genocide against the Alawites while praising ISIS leader "Al-Baghdadi." Another key "moderate" leader, Jamal Maarouf of the Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF), has admitted to the "Independent" that he regularly carries out joint operations with Al Qaeda and has no problem with them. One example of such cooperation between "moderates" and extremists was the attack on the Syrian Christian town of Sadad in November 2013.

As others have pointed out, Reuters has admitted that the "moderate" Free Syrian Army's (FSA) command is "Islamist dominated." The Associated Press says that "Many of the participating groups have strong Islamist agendas, and some have fought in ways that could scare away Western backers." The Wall Street Journal reports that Brig. Gen. Mithkal Albtaish, an FSA leader, says that the organization is "dominated by Islamist groups that are in close coordination with al Nusra [Syrian Al Qaeda]." Even the pro-establishment think-tank, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) , admitted in 2012 that the FSA's effectiveness depended on Al Qaeda and pro-establishment Neo-Con, Gary Gambill, even wrote an article demonstrating this titled "Two Cheers for Syrian Islamists", praising the Islamists in helping to undermine Iran geopolitically. Consider the CFR's Ed Husain's statement:

"The Syrian rebels would be immeasurably weaker today without al-Qaeda in their ranks. By and large, Free Syrian Army (FSA) battalions are tired, divided, chaotic, and ineffective. Feeling abandoned by the West, rebel forces are increasingly demoralized as they square off with the Assad regime's superior weaponry and professional army. Al-Qaeda fighters, however, may

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help improve morale. The influx of jihadis brings discipline, religious fervor, battle experience from Iraq, funding from Sunni sympathizers in the Gulf, and most importantly, deadly results. In short, the FSA needs al-Qaeda now."

To drive the point home, even Zbigniew Brzezinski has admitted, "*You know, we started helping the rebels, whatever they are, and they're certainly not fighting for democracy, given their sponsorship, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as far back as early spring of last year, 2012, without saying it publicly.*" He throws in the claim that the people who "we want to win" (i.e. the moderates) are the smallest and weakest faction in Syria. Apparently, this comes after the fact that the west has invested the summation of its resources into "moderates" to topple Assad. Either we have a case of "failed policy" or a successful destabilization campaign, Nicaragua-Contra style, which seems to be the mostly likely explanation given the facts and geopolitical motivations.

The Solution
All these points together are the problem, not religion. What we in the West must do is realize this and stop funding to Syrian rebels which are clearly counterproductive to regional stability and also stop perpetuating constant media spin. Bashar al Assad is not the issue from the geopolitical vantage point and the Syrian Arab Army commands the popular support in Syria, which is a nationalist and patriotic nation, against the Islamist ranks that have been propped up by the regional Arab powers and the West. Many of the accusations leveled against Assad as a pretext to forego cooperation and force a change on the ground in favor of US interests by means of military intervention have been found to be based on distortions, false allegations, or hearsay, especially the chemical weapons claims.

Before the US comes before the world to call for "cooperation" and "airstrikes", let them take responsibility for their actions and come clean on the truth from Libya to Syria. Russia, China and the non-aligned countries who are increasingly aware of the duplicity and imperialism of the west should collectively work to get their governments to pressure the west on this point and raise awareness through alternative media, awareness that will shatter the blinds of corporate media spin. Only then will we be able to genuinely guarantee a secure, multi-polar world order driven by unity in truth against the forces of money and power.

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Sam Muhho is a student of history at Florida State College at Jacksonville (FSCJ) and is an advocate of anti-imperialism and anti-globalism.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: It is very difficult to write 100% objective articles since we all are influenced by own beliefs and perceptions. What is (again) not clarified is the fact that current situation is not about a religious war but a conflict of cultures where both parts are driven by imperialism and globalism…

The sixth anniversary of 26/11 Mumbai attacks

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/11/the-sixth-anniversary-of-2611-mumbai.html

On the sixth anniversary of 26/11 attacks, India faces primarily two kinds of jihadist terror threats. One, as a society, it is witnessing the birth of self-radicalizing Muslim youth who are attracted to the jihadist call of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This radicalisation can be countered by India's vibrant democracy, pluralism and alert parents. On November 22, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval told a conference in New Delhi that 5-6 youth recently showed "inclination" to join the ISIS but their parents were first to contact the security agencies in preventing them from doing so. Doval's optimism must be encouraged.

Second, as a state, India faces a very old-and-new jihadist threat from Pakistan. In September, al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri announced the establishment of Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).

The nature of 26/11 and 9/11 attacks reveal interesting

characteristics. Both appear to have been planned by a single person or organization. On 9/11, the jihadists launched airborne invasions of US cities.

only difference being that ISI wants Pakistan to be the head of such an international caliphate. Evidence in the public domain demonstrates that the ISI and al Qaeda function in close

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On 26/11, they launched seaborne invasion of Mumbai. They used GPS technology to guide planes and boats to reach their targets. This pattern was demonstrated for a third time on September 6 when the AQIS attempted to take over Pakistani frigate PNS Zulfiqar in order to use it to attack US and Indian warships on the high seas.

The three attacks - 9/11, 26/11 and September 6 - indeed reveal a deep connection between al Qaeda and the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). On November 22, Home Minister Rajnath Singh, speaking a few hours before Ajit Doval, said in Delhi: "Terrorism in India is fully Pakistan-sponsored. Pakistan says non-state actors are involved. But is ISI non-state actor?"

Although led by Arab terrorists, Al-Qaeda is fundamentally a Pakistani organization; it was formed in Pakistan in 1988; it is from Pakistan that it spread to the Middle East. al Qaeda is practically a branch of the ISI, which views itself as the ideological guardian of the Islamic state of Pakistan: both Qaeda and the ISI share the same ideological objective - establishment of the Islamic Caliphate, with the

cooperation. The ISI protected Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and continues to protect Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, who is also the top-most Qaeda leader, given that all Taliban factions and Al-Qaeda affiliates have expressed an oath of allegiance to him as Emir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Ummah). Protecting bin Laden in Abbottabad was in tune with the ISI's established policy, as also demonstrated in its protection of jihadist groups' headquarters Muzaffarabad, Bahawalpur and Muridke.

While the Pakistan Army carries out the facade of military operations in the tribal region, the Haqqani Network militants are found in Rawalpindi, not in Waziristan. In 2011, US military's top officer Admiral Mike Mullen described the Haqqani Network as the ISI's "veritable arm."

In the late-1980s, as the US was winding up its mission Afghanistan and the Soviets were to about leave, the ISI planned its next jihad in Jammu and Kashmir that peaked through the 1990s. During the 2000s, it tried to take

its jihad to India's heartland by using the Indian Mujahideen.

In 2014, as the US is winding up its mission in Afghanistan, the ISI appears to be mounting its next jihadist mission. The establishment of AQIS means that al Qaeda is being used to advance the ISI's post-2014 strategy.

Through its early days to the 1980s, Pakistan sought to expand its sphere of Islamic influence through Afghanistan to Central Asia and got Pakistani citizens recruited in the Afghan government institutions in the 1990s when the Taliban were power. Now, it is looking eastward through India to Bangladesh and Myanmar to establish an imaginary caliphate. The AQIS is a Pakistani brainchild,

not a product of' Arab mind.

Former ISI chiefs continue to work for the secret agency in informal capacities. Lt. Gen. Zahirul Islam, who stepped down recently as ISI chief, is reportedly involved in the establishment of Bol television channel. Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha, another former ISI chief, was involved in directing the recent protests led by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri. Lt Gen. Hamid Gul, on whose watch al Qaeda was established in Peshawar in 1988, remains involved with the ISI. Many times, journalists who went to meet Gul were told that he had gone to the GHQ, the general headquarters of Pakistan Army.

The use of jihadists in the Kargil War and 26/11 was planned when General Pervez Musharraf

was in command, who would later elevate the first ISI chief to the post of army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani.

To Indians, the ISI's involvement in the 26/11 attacks is clear. To the world, the 9/11 attacks are blamed on al Qaeda, as it is considered undiplomatic to accuse nation-states of such involvement without police-like evidence.

Even if you look before the 9/11 attacks, an ISI connection is evident. It was relatively a short period from 1988 when al Qaeda was formed to 1993, when the CIA headquarters at Langley and World Trade Center (WTC) were first attacked. Qaeda wasn't at peak then, and the 1993 attacks could not have been carried out without some form of state support, especially since footprints led back to Islamabad.

An excessive focus on footmen involved in specific jihadist attacks helps the ISI to escape global attention for its role in 1993 attacks on WTC and Langley, or in 9/11 and 26/11 attacks. As India remembers the Mumbai attacks this Wednesday, the jihadist threats are multiplying.

The following recent developments appear to originate from a concerted strategy from the ISI. First, the AQIS was established to target India. Second, Punjabi Taliban chief Asmatullah Muawiya announced ceasefire against Pakistan, vowing to fight in Afghanistan. Third, Pakistani media reported that Muawiya joined hands with the Haqqani Network, which is part of the Afghan Taliban. Fourth, Pakistan's national security advisor Sartaj Aziz commented that terrorist groups that are not dangerous to Pakistan must not be targeted. Fifth, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif joined this ISI strategy when he announced that Pakistan will talk first with Kashmiri secessionists before any dialogue with India.

The year 2014 is effectively 1988 when al Qaeda was formed and ISI's control of Pakistan's foreign policy was total.

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The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Tufail Ahmad, an independent columnist, a former BBC Urdu Service journalist, and Director of the South Asia Studies Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute in Washington DC By Tufail Ahmad.

Britain's "New Anti-Terror Drive": Dirty Intelligence and the Repeal of Civil Liberties

By Binoy Kampmark

Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/britains-new-anti-terror-drive-dirty-intelligence-and-the-repeal-of-civil-liberties/5416342

You always know when the British Home Secretary comes clean about the number of "terror plots" that have been foiled that something ugly is waiting around the corner. The dossier of justification is just about to be thrown at civil liberties – we got the necessary runs on the board, the attitude seems to say: have you? Since April 2010, we are told that 753 people have been arrested on terrorism-related offences, with 212 charged and 148 successfully prosecuted.

"There have been attempts to conduct marauding 'Mumbai-style' gun attacks on our streets, blow up the London Stock Exchange, bring down airliners, assassinate a British ambassador and murder serving members of our armed forces."[1]

Papers make the announcement part of what seems like a charity experiment. "Speaking as part of a new anti-terror drive" sounds like a radio plea for subscriptions and donations. It is, however, serious fare. The Counter-Terrorism Bill which is entertaining members of Parliament this week is the most serious of all.

While there is no visible sense that Britain, or any other country in Europe, the United States, or Australasia, is in any greater danger than at any time since September 11, 2001, May would let you to believe otherwise. Since she is pondering the immeasurable – how "likely" is an attack to take place? – we are essentially dealing with the legislation of the worst sort: that which covers probabilities.

In support of her contentions, she utilises the tea-leaf reading habits of such bodies as the JTAC – the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre – which decided in the northern summer to raise the threat level for international terrorism from "substantial" to "severe". Turn the knob just the right way, and the policy will seemingly follow.

Some of the measures already chart the ground for hypocrisy. At the very least, it leaves huge potholes for it. Ransoms, for instance, will be banned seeing how beneficial such proceeds have been for the ISIS war machine, though we know that governments will fork out when they believe the stakes matter. Internet service providers (ISPs) are obliged to retain information linking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. They are also being put in a position where they will have to do more. Such errors of overstretch are typical to a mindset that sees threats of immeasurable harm that must be controlled by snipping the communications line.

Blame Facebook, for instance, if it doesn't make an effort to alert the security authorities about the prospect of a domestic attack between the chatterers. It does not matter whether such attitudes are those of a hot air disposition, the crazed wishes of people baying for blood against a regime or an order. The Lee Rigby report from the Intelligence and Security Committee, examining the circumstances that led to the killing of Drummer Lee Rigby, ticked the social media organisation off for not doing enough when it was revealed that one of the killers, Michael Adebolajo, had expressed one such view.[2] Such indignation is the equivalent of scolding phone companies for not doing the dirty work of intelligence services.

May sees a fruit salad of threats to the British realm. ISIS is one, but add to that Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and home grown fanciers of aspiring caliphate growers, and you have a minister keen to think the brandish the dangers as credible. Or so she suggests, mooting the point that the legislation "is not a knee-jerk response to a sudden perceived threat." The problem with this, as with anti-terror legislation, is that it tends anticipate the hypothetical with the actual.

Perhaps she also sees Prime Minister David Cameron, and many of her colleagues, as bits of fluff in the making of hard hitting policy. As noted in a *Spectator* profile of her, "She doesn't rate Cameron anymore.

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She did, but not many more."[3] When a person is attempting to brush up their leadership credentials, everything is free game. Such behaviour shows a synaptic blindness on handling the liberty of the subject by nibbling away at its provisions. While in Britain, outrage will still gather in stormy opposition to such proposals as the ID card, matters concerning data retention over a search history on the Internet will garner a murmur in comparison. More to the point, while the Coalition government is keenly promoting a heavy abridgment of those liberties, it was very happy to abolish the ID cards legislation as one of its first acts in 2010.

Forms of bureaucratic registration are merely aspects of a panacea, the whole solution to a markedly complex effort. But worse than panaceas, they tend to be placebos. Monitoring citizens like chickens in a pen doesn't guarantee a better citizen. But it certainly assures suspicion and detachment from the political process. Commentary from such observers of the jerky security state such as Philip Johnston can laud the fact that ID cards are not a part of British political life yet offer little by way of criticism of the proposed legislation. Pieties about the British belief in balancing and trade-offs are resorted to. "That is why, despite Labour's efforts 10 years ago, we can still walk down the street without being asked to produce our ID cards."[4]

Perception is everything, and punishing people for perceptions is tantamount to detaining people for witchcraft and blasphemy. Much of this suggests how little the road travelled on security matters has been. The realm of hypotheticals remains an all too potent temptation.

Notes

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-theresa-may-on-counter-terrorism
[2] https://sites.google.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report%28website%29.pdf?attredirects=1
[3] http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/11/theresa-may-a-big-beast-in-kitten-heels/
[4] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11250776/Can-Theresa-May-get-the-right-balance-between-liberty-and-security.html

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: "*Dirty intelligence and the repeal of civil liberties*" – one more time the favorit topic of

discussion! Dirty intelligence – as if there is such a thing like "clean" intelligence! And then "civil liberties"! And the big question: who is to worry about them? Us – the plain people who have nothing to hide or be afraid of or them – both the bad guys and people in high places often acting in the background of all the anomalies of this planet? If I do nothing against laws and constitutions why should I worry about how certain professionals are doing their jobs – that is to protect me, my family and my homeland? We do not live in an angels' world and we have to keep this in mind when opposing to measures related to public security and defense against terrorism and organized crime – two entities threatening our life and culture. And this is not a naïve approach on a very complicated problem. It is a consius opposition to all those that pathologically defend "liberties" of any kind! Recently in Greece we had a public shooting where an Albanian psychopath stormed a bar injuring with an AK-42 15 young people just been there. Authorities did not make his photo public because they had to wait for 48hrs in order to deliver the official charges (by law) in paper to his last known residency! During that time he was moving freely among us until he was arrested from Greek SWATs. People living in neighboring houses reported that if they had seen his photo they should have called police since they easily recognized him! The bottom line is this: Do Brits want their lion as it is in the picture accompanying the article or like the one shown in my comments. Simple as that!

The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats

By Andre LeSage

Despite its reputation for peace and stability in a troubled region, the East African country of Tanzania is experiencing a rising number of militant Islamist attacks that have targeted local Christian leaders and foreign tourists, as well as popular bars and restaurants. These attacks, which began

in 2012, rarely make the headlines of international media. However, they should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers to increase short-term engagement with Tanzanian officials and support for Tanzanian security agencies to preempt the emergence of a more significant threat to U.S. and international interests in East Africa.

Thus far, the attacks in Tanzania have been relatively unsophisticated. They have involved crude homemade explosives, handguns, and buckets of acid; they have been focused on poorly protected targets of opportunity; and they have not resulted in mass casualties. However, as events over the past few years in neighboring Kenya have demonstrated, today's seemingly minor and manageable threats can evolve quickly into something far more lethal and intractable. In Kenya, similarly unsophisticated attacks only a few years ago have grown quickly, resulting in the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, when 4 shooters killed 67 people and wounded 175 more; the discovery in March 2014 of a

massive car bomb in Mombasa that could have killed scores more; and the massacre of more than 60 villagers in Lamu County in June 2014. Events such as these have thrown Kenya into a cycle of violence pitting national security forces against clandestine militant cells.

This paper provides an overview of the current threat posed by Islamist militants in Tanzania by tracing their evolution in the Tanzanian political context, identifying the major Islamist movements active in the country today, and assessing the spillover of al Shabab– and al Qaeda–associated threats from Somalia and Kenya. The paper concludes with recommendations that the United States pay closer attention to the situation in Tanzania, build Tanzanian capabilities to address current threat streams, and work closely with the governments in both mainland Tanzania and the Zanzibar islands to counter further radicalization.

The Tanzanian Context

Globally, Tanzania is known for its rich cultural his - tory, political stability, and increasingly vibrant economy. Politically, the country earned respect from international observers as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and a key regional force in the struggle against South African apartheid. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first president who served from 1964 to 1985, promoted national unity of the country's 120 ethnic groups and emerged as one of Africa's leading statesmen. The economy is primarily based on agriculture, infrastructure remains poor, and corruption is a significant problem. However, foreign direct investment is booming in the mining and oil exploration sectors. In addition, tourism opportunities abound— including safaris in the Serengeti, climbing on Mount Kilimanjaro, and the luxury beach resorts of Zanzibar.

Officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania, the country was formed through the union of main - land Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands (Unguja and Pemba), which lie approximately 20 miles off the

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coast. Tanzania has a population of approximately 48 million, divided roughly evenly between Christians and Muslims at 35 to 45 percent each, with a large segment of traditional animists making up the difference. Tanzania is not dominated by a single ethnic group. The largest tribe—the Sukuma, located around Lake Victoria—constitutes less than 20 percent of the population. Other tribes, including the Nyamwezi, Haya, Gogo, Ha, and Masaai, individually comprise less than 10 percent of the population.

Muslims—primarily from the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam—are scattered across the country and interspersed with non-Muslims in all major Tanzanian cities. That said, the largest concentrations of Muslims can be found in Zanzibar—where Muslims make up 95 percent of the population of 750,000 people—and the mainland Tanzanian coastline. Islam arrived in Tanzania from Arabia, resulting in dynastic settlements along the coast by the 13th century, and then spread inland along pre-colonial trade routes. Zanzibar—including the more populous island of Unguja and the smaller, poorer island of Pemba—was critical to this process as it became the seat for an Omani sultanate by the mid- 1800s and a main base for the slave trade deep into the mainland. European colonization—the British on Zanzibar and the Germans on the mainland—did little to disrupt the spread of Islam. In fact, "the diffusion of Islam in East Africa generally followed the establishment of railroads, and was facilitated by the fact that the Germans initially employed Muslims as officials, police, soldiers and teachers."[i]

Control of mainland Tanganyika shifted from Germany to Britain during World War II. The territory then gained independence in December 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Zanzibar did not achieve in - dependence until December 1963. Its first government, a constitutional monarchy led by the Sultan of Zanzibar, was overthrown in an extremely violent coup by the Afro- Shirazi Party (ASP), which quickly merged Zanzibar with Tanganyika in 1964 to form the modern Tanzanian state. This was followed by the merger of the TANU and ASP parties to create Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or the Party of the Revolution).

Tanzania was established by Nyerere along the lines of state corporatism, which was originally considered a mid-point between capitalism and Marxism. In the corporatist state, all interest groups—trade unions, women's organizations, ethnic organizations, youth organizations, and even religious groups—are directly controlled by the government. The ideas behind state corporatism were that interest groups would still be represented, but a strong government able to guide economic and political development would be firmly in control.[ii]

Tanzania remained a single-party state under the CCM until multiparty elections were allowed in 1992, but the CCM's rule continued unbroken until today. Since the CCM remains deeply intertwined with state institutions and retains its organized system of party representation from the village level up to the national level, it has been difficult for Tanzanian opposition parties to challenge the party's dominance. However, in the run-up to national elections in 2015, cracks in CCM's control are beginning to show, and political competition is becoming fiercer and occasionally violent.

Although several political parties exist,[iii] the primary challenges to CCM rule come from two parties: Chama Cha Wananchi (CUF, or the Civic United Front) and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADE - MA, or the Party for Democracy and Progress). While the CCM is able to draw support from all parts of the country, the CUF emerged in Zanzibar—particularly the poorer and more religiously conservative island of Pemba—and Muslims remain its primary supporters. Although the CUF is working to build stronger support on the mainland, Zanzibar remains its base. After losing closely contested elections in Zanzibar to the CCM in 1995, 2000, and 2005, violent demonstrations occurred after CUF supporters decried vote-rigging by CCM politicians. In an attempt to avoid future conflict, a Government of National Unity was created for Zanzibar following a referendum in July 2010, effectively to share power between CCM and CUF leaders on the islands. As a result, following the 2010 elections, the CCM retained power in Zanzibar under President Ali Mohamed Shein, with long-time CUF leader Seif Sharif Hamad as his first vice president.[iv]

The other main opposition party, CHADEMA, is building its constituencies on the mainland among young people and other

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disenchanted voters, and it won 26 percent of the national vote in 2010. CHADEMA, as well as the CUF, is hoping for a much stronger showing in the 2015 elections. Several CCM leaders are positioning themselves to succeed the current president, Jakaya Kikwete, who has served his maxi - mum two terms in office. In addition, public frustration with CCM leaders is elevated following a series of high-profile (and high-value) corruption scandals and the sacking of four ministers in 2013 for human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian security forces involved in anti-poaching operations.[v] Efforts by the CCM to undermine its challengers have led to accusations of state-sponsored repression of opposition politicians, civic leaders, and journalists, the banning of opposition demonstrations, and a dangerous rise in political violence. The abduction and torture of party leaders have been reported, and a handrenade thrown into a CHADEMA rally in Arusha in 2013 killed four people.[vi] Despite the formation of the Government of National Unity before the 2010 elections, the question of Zanzibar also remains a critical issue. Following 2 years of work, a Constitutional Review Commission, chaired by Joseph Warioba, has recommended changing the structure of the republic to a federation or "three government system." According to this propos - al, Tanzania's new structure would include one overall national government and two state governments—one for the mainland and one for Zanzibar. The proposal, however, remains highly controversial. Failure to find a significant degree of national consensus on the issue could further divide Tanzanians on political, regional, and religious lines.

Notes
[i] Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, and Pasquale Vittori, "Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat in the War on Terror?" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 12 (December 2009), 1077.
[ii] Ibid., 1080.
[iii] These include the Civic United Front, Party for Democracy and Progress, Tanzania Labour Party, United Democratic Party, and National Convention for Construction and Reform.
[iv] For details on the Government of National Unity, see Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, "Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The 'Silent' Referendum and the Government of National Unity," Journal of Contemporary African Studies 30, no. 2 (April 2012), 195–218; and Archie Matheson, "Maridhiano: Zanzibar's Remarkable Reconciliation and Government of National Unity," Journal of Eastern African Studies 6, no. 4 (November 2012), 591–612.
[v] Hanno Brankamp, "CCM's Identity Crisis: Comebacks, Constitution and Corruption in Tanzania," Think Africa Press, February 21, 2014.
[vi] See Nicholas Kulish, "Violent Episodes Grow in Tanzania, an African Haven," The New York Times, June 30, 2013; and The Citizen, "Chaos Threat Looms Ahead of 2015 General Election," May 7, 2014.

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How Counterinsurgency Has Changed Across the 20th and Into the 21st Century

By Wayne Tyrrell
Source: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=185325

The straightforward approach to evaluating how counterinsurgency had evolved across the 20th and into the 21st centuries would commence by evaluating the successful approaches to some of the early insurgencies of the 1900's. Against this we could chart a course of lessons learned, then forgotten, and later relearned. We would recognise some enhancements and adaptations to suit the emerging insurgencies at various times. This would eventually lead us to the modern counterinsurgency publications, which have emerged in the wake of what were commonly accepted as disastrous attempts to quell insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. While this might prove to be a good history lesson, much of the enduring nature of successful counterinsurgency practice might be lost in the process.

Instead, this paper will focus on the modern doctrine crafted in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, its foundational basis and its adequacy to cope with a new form of globally networked and ideologically based insurgency. With scrutiny, it should become apparent that current practices have eclipsed modern doctrine and now reflect some revolutionary thinking in terms of defeating the global insurgency. This paper will suggest that modern counterinsurgency practice is fighting a new insurgency with new tactics based on old principles. In so doing we shall see how counterinsurgency has changed across the 20th and into the 21st centuries.

The Modern Doctrine

Frank Hoffman, a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Research at the National Defense University (NDU) in the US, believes that the new US field manual on Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) is a long step forward, reflecting our current understanding of this increasingly complex mode of conflict (2007: 84). This publication, issued in 2009, establishes doctrine for tactical counterinsurgency operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. Based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations, FM3-24 defines the operational environment of counterinsurgency and covers planning for tactical operations and working with 'Host Nation Security Forces' (Department of the Army 2009: viii).

Of course, the US is not alone in developing counterinsurgency doctrine; the British Army publication, issued later in the same year, bears remarkable resemblance in substance[i]. It is the more comprehensive US doctrine, which has been described as probably the most influential piece of doctrine in the last twenty years (Griffin 2014), that will serve as the principal basis for this paper's evaluation of modern counterinsurgency doctrine.

Modern Counterinsurgency Doctrine - New Concepts, or Old Lessons?

Hoffman (2007: 71) points to the inclusion of a number of 'classical school' examples of insurgency included in FM3-24, underpinning its foundational basis for counterinsurgency, particularly the writings of Robert Thompson and David Galula[ii]. He, like Jones and Smith (2010: 101), criticises the fact that many of the principles expressed in the manual are rooted in the 'classical' counterinsurgency. They assert that texts authored by Cold War theorists and practitioners, whose frame of reference was defined by wars of national liberation and the Maoist model of guerrilla warfare, are outdated and ill suited to modern insurgencies. According to this argument, today's insurgencies, most notably in Iraq and

Afghanistan, are not like those that came before, they are, variously and at once, less hierarchical, more globalised, and more focused on the media and information domain (Nagl & Burton 2010: 123). Accordingly, the reference point for evaluating whether modern counterinsurgency doctrine is a bald recitation must commence by assessing these classical schools.

The 'Classical Schools' of Counterinsurgency and the Population-Centric Approach

In terms of assessing the evolution of counterinsurgency, can it be said that current doctrine resembles the approaches of the early authors cited in FM 3-24? During the 1960's a French military Officer, Galula, advocated a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency built from the bottom up (1964: 51 & 95-96), where he sets out the following strategy (1964: 59):

1. Concentrate sufficient forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents
2. Detach sufficient troops to oppose his return in the villages and towns where the population resides
3. Control the population in order to cut off its links with the insurgents
4. Destroy the insurgent political organization
5. Establish new provisional local authorities by election
6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the 'softs' and the 'incompetents', while giving full support to the active leaders
7. Assist the development of a national political infrastructure
8. Win over or suppress the remaining insurgent

==The strategy espoused by Galula flows from his four principles== (1964: 55-59), which are reiterated in FM 3-24 (2009: 3-9):

1. The support of the population is necessary for the counterinsurgent as it is the insurgent

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2. Support is gained through the active minority
3. Support from the population is conditional
4. Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential

These strategy and the four principles bear significant resemblance to the approach used in Afghanistan for a 2009 Operation Kalay, seeking to establish village stability based on the ink spot approach using the shape-clear-hold-build-enable mode (Verret 2013: 114). Together Galula's writings seems to reflect the 'hearts and minds' approach, which despite having such prominence in the counterinsurgency discourse during the last decade, actually has its genesis in the earlier insurgency in Malaya. Attributed to General Sir Gerald Templer[iii], during Britain's apparently successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya from 1948–1960[iv] (Dixon 2009: 353), this phrase is generally associated with a less coercive approach, which emphasises the importance of using 'minimum force' in a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency (Enterline 2013: 187).

Templer's strategy for counterinsurgency, latterly published by his subordinate Robert Thompson, is also referred to in FM 3-24 as part of the foundational basis for modern counterinsurgency doctrine (2009: 3-9). Here, Thompson is credited with the five principles for successful counterinsurgency:

1. The need for government to have a clear political aim
2. To function within the law
3. To establish an overall plan, whereby all political, socio-economic and military responses were coordinated
4. To give priority to the elimination of political subversion
5. To secure the government's base area before conducting a military campaign

Again, unsurprisingly, the five principles espoused by Templer and Thompson point to a political and population centric solution, with the military response being very much the subordinate aspect of counterinsurgency. These principles, however, were written *post factum*, and it is questionable if they capture the true approach in Malaya.

The Strong-arm Approach to Counterinsurgency

While the 'Hearts and Minds' approach seems seductive and appeals to a general sense of

reluctance to use excessive force, there is a suggestion that the campaign in Malaya was less 'carrot' and more 'stick'. Commentators like David French suggest that outright brutality was often a hallmark of British operations of the time, including Malaya (2012: 745). Dixon (2009: 368) believes that the Templer's use of the term 'hearts and minds' during the campaign in Malaya may serve to conceal the extent to which coercion and repression was used by the British, which included, *inter alia*, the forces resettlement of 500,000 ethnic Chinese, mass arrests and internment, and the death penalty for carrying arms and hanging prisoners as criminals. In light of this understanding of the approach to Maoist insurgency in Malaya, it could be said that that the approach involved a population-centric approach, which attempted to protect and win support from the general population, while retaining a willingness to use robust force against insurgents and their support base.

This willingness to adopt a very aggressive posture towards insurgents and their support base is also evident in earlier insurgencies of the 20th century, a period which opened with the insurgency of second Boer War. Facing imminent defeat, the Boers adopted guerrilla tactics rather than submit to British demands to cede their independence (Downes 2007: 428). What followed was a scorched-earth policy, burning down the farms of all those who supported the Boer cause, and forcing154,000 Boer civilians, mainly women and children, into concentration camps with appalling conditions (Gillespie A. 2011: 154). Most interestingly, this policy of isolating the support base was accompanied by the introduction of small formations, known in this conflict as 'flying columns' to pursue the insurgents with significant success (Downes 2006: 433).

The use of concentration camps prompted much public criticism in Britain and the practice did not follow the British Army when it met its next insurgency, this time in Ireland. Nonetheless, the use of robust force against the civilian population was also adopted in Ireland, as was the continued use of one-or-two platoon-strength foot columns to adopt tactics mirroring those of the enemy. These patrols, which could move undetected for several days at a time, proved militarily effective and resulted in something approaching the collapse for the

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insurgent 'flying columns'. While in strictly military terms the British forces were not defeated, the failure to effectively control large tracts of the Ireland brought the authorities to the negotiating table with the insurgents and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 ensued (Townshend 2008 :25-26).

With the outbreak of insurgency in Palestine in the late 1920's, Britain was poised to repeat its failure to grasp the essential requirement for a politically based, population-centric approach. The inability of the British to retain control of many major towns during the Arab Revolt was evident for long stretches, including, for about five days in October 1938, the Old City of Jerusalem (Hughes 2010: 6). By way of response, some British Forces resorted to what was referred to as 'exemplary force', which was effectively counter-terror, resulting in the High Commissioner lamenting what he described as "the Black and Tan tendencies" (Townshend 2008: 32&33). While the outcome of the insurgency in Palestine was not favourable to the British, the lessons were not lost on this occasion. Indeed, some of the individuals, including the Chief of Police, were transferred directly to Malaya, where the lessons of Palestine were put into practice, resulting in the relative success mentioned above.

Looking back to the modern doctrine, on a superficial level, therefore, the 'clear, hold, build' strategy espoused in the modern doctrine is merely an adaptation of the earlier writings of counterinsurgency, developed in the early and mid-20th century.

Modern Counterinsurgency Doctrine – Evolutionary, Revolutionary or Just Restatements?

The central criticism of the reliance on 'classical schools' of counterinsurgency asserts that the classical writers, such as Galula and Thompson, would be startled by the complexity of Afghanistan and Iraq and the distinctly broader global insurgency of the long war (Hoffman 2007: 71).

However, on a deeper reading of FM 3-24, it readily appears that there is greater appreciation and application to modern manifestations of counterinsurgency. This watershed is exemplified in its recognition of current operational environments, such as population explosion and increased urbanisation, technological developments and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (2009: 1-6 – 1-14). FM 3-24 also has regard for religious fundamentalism[v] and the demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations combined with climate change and natural disasters, which will compound already difficult conditions in developing countries.

It seems, therefore, that the modern doctrine bases it strategies on a 'classical' foundation, but recognises and adapts them for the modern environment of counterinsurgency. To fully understand the extent to which modern counterinsurgency doctrine has evolved since the Maoist period, it is necessary to evaluate the substantive adaptations of the classical theories to react to the modern counterinsurgency environment.

The modern battlespace is far more complex and frenetic in terms of the actors in the field. Disparate amalgams of insurgent forces, such as the opposition forces currently in Syria, the impact of foreign based diasporas and the presence of a spectrum of international agencies from the UN to humanitarian actors, all under the ever-present media scrutiny, provides for a level of operational complexity unknown to early counterinsurgency strategists. However, this complexity is not ignored in the modern doctrine, as Appendix B to FM 3-24, entitled 'Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools' provides a powerful threat evaluation tool for commanders and staffs to make decisions and develop plans and orders in the complex modern operational environment [vi].

One of the principal differences between earlier insurgencies and those being encountered today is the information dimension. Modern communications, easily accessed and adapted to enhance insurgent capabilities, are a significant force multiplier. Again, FM 3-24 provides for 'Information Engagement Operations', even suggesting they form Lines of Operation[vii] in conceptual planning for counterinsurgency [viii].

The impact of increased urbanisation, particularly in the developing world is not lost in modern counterinsurgency doctrine either. In the modern insurgency, distance is exchanged for density (Hoffman 2007: 76), and insurgents can operate within the hodgepodge of a metropolis with the support of criminal entities and external global actors, such as Al Qaida Core. Contrary to the

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views of Hoffman, the modern tactical approach in FM 3-24 devotes considerable attention to counterinsurgency offence and defence in the urban environment in chapters 5 and 6 [ix].

It appears, therefore, that many of the criticisms levied against FM 3-24, to the effect that it is overly reliant on classical doctrine and fails to have regard for the modern counterinsurgency environment are ill-founded. This said, good doctrine may express best practice, but is the doctrine reflected in the practice on the ground? Having navigated the course of counterinsurgency through its evolution to the publication of modern doctrine, it is necessary to look more closely at the operations currently being undertaken, to see where this evolution has led.

'Surge' or Shift? - The Current Approach to Counterinsurgency

Against the criticisms of the policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current approach seems to be shifting towards the suggestion that the defence community need a very different way of thinking about and understanding insurgency strategies and operation (Metz 2008: 110). The US approach to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has been characterised by the notion of a 'surge' in recent years. In a publication from late 2013, Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry (2013:1) assesses the US attempts of protecting the population of Afghanistan as having been a failure. Recognising this as the first principle of counterinsurgency, he asks whether the local population in Afghanistan are protected from criminal narcotraffickers, local police chiefs, or government officials. He also asks what should be done about tribes that turn to the Taliban for help in fighting more powerful tribes with patrons in the Kabul government and also the complex cases of ethnic violence with roots dating back a century or more. While it appears that the population-centric approach is firmly recognised in modern counterinsurgency, efforts to bring it to fruition have fallen short on the aspirations in this most recent conflct.

This failure by US forces to secure the population of Afghanistan brought about the realisation that such security is best achieved by indigenous people. This realisation has been the basis for the belated transfer of authority to the Afghan authorities and echoes the views of writers such as David Kilcullen,

who believes that, especially in traditional tribal societies, an emphasis on local partnerships and local security forces that protect communities and guard against extremist presence is essential (2009: 271).

Current approaches to counterinsurgency have also recognised and grasped the importance of the digital age. Many militaries are developing capabilities to pursue the counterinsurgency battle in cyberspace, such as the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYERCOM), which conducts information operations such as computer network exploitation (CNE), computer network attack (CNA) and Cyber IPB (CIPB). Such activities complement intelligence operations to capitalise on the existing use of the internet by insurgents, thus aligning the classical intelligence focussed counterinsurgency doctrine, recognised as far back as Ireland in the 1920's, with the manifestations of modern insurgencies (Pendall, Wilkes and Robinson 2013: 4).

Perhaps the most notable shift in modern counterinsurgency is the approach which strives towards a strategy of 'disaggregation'. This approach seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad. In his much cited article from 2007, David Kilcullen notes the relevance of traditional counterinsurgency techniques to modern insurgencies but asserts that the approaches in the 1960's cannot be applied to today's problems in a simplistic fashion because counterinsurgency, in its 'classical' form, is optimised to defeat insurgency in one country, not counter a global insurgency (2007: 606). He believes that dozens of local movements, grievances and issues have been aggregated into a global Jihad by the use of a series of 'nested interactions'. The policy of eliminating the individuals providing the links severs the network connections between the various conflicts, such as the killing of Abu Yahya al-Libi in 2012, has been the predominant focus in turning global Jihad into a series of disparate conflicts (Schmitt 2012).

Thus, we see advances beyond the approaches specified in modern doctrine. Now, the counterinsurgency fight has entered the information domain, the global insurgency is being disaggregated and a strong arm approach against insurgents is complimented by a population-centric approach aiming to

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empower national security forces to protect their own people.

Conclusion

Rather than focus historically on the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, this paper focussed on current doctrine, which has grown out of modern insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global fight against Al Qaeda. We recognised its formative basis in the 'classical school' counterinsurgency theorists and evaluated some of the criticisms of its overly retrospective outlook. In so doing, we identify some enduring principles of successful counterinsurgency practice extant since the early 1900's.

The world of war has changed greatly over the past century and, with these changes, insurgencies have evolved demonstrating greater breadth and complexity. This has required modern doctrine, crafted in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, to respond to a new form of globally networked and ideologically based insurgency. On review, it becomes apparent that the modern doctrine captured the changes to counterinsurgency across the 20th century and also recognised the emerging changes as it braced against its 21st century manifestation. By standing on a strong doctrinal foundation, current counterinsurgency strategy has adapted to incorporate revolutionary approaches in response to the ever evolving insurgency threat.

▶ **Bibliography and end notes are available at source's URL.**

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Is CAIR a Terror Group?

By Daniel Pipes
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4899/is-cair-a-terror-group

Can a Washington-based organization with ties to the Obama White House, the U.S. Congress, leading media outlets, and prestigious universities truly be an instigator of terrorism?

▶ **Read more at source's URL.**

Mr. Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum.

Here's why killing the head of Islamic State wouldn't yield results

By Arie W. Kruglanski
Source: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/11/27/heres-why-killing-the-head-of-islamic-state-wouldnt-yield-results/

Many believe that killing the leaders of terrorist organizations like Islamic State could change the course of events in Iraq and Syria. Like the cutting off of a snake's head, eliminating the chief of a terrorist organization is assumed to deal it a fatal or near fatal blow. The U.S. government, for instance, has often boasted about eliminating major al Qaeda leaders, and

viewed such assassinations as a clear mark of progress in the 'global war on terror.'

Yet there are reasons to question the premise that killing terrorist leaders is tantamount to progress. **Indeed, rather than cutting off the head of a snake, killing off terrorist leaders resembles the decapitating a hydra, the mythological monster reputed to replace severed heads with multiple new ones.**

Admittedly, in some cases assassinating or arresting a major terrorist leader may paralyze the organization for years to come. Such was the case with Abimail Guzman, the philosopher-leader of the Peruvian Shining Path organization, and with Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party, both of whom have been imprisoned for years. Fathi Shaqaqi, the founding chief of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was assassinated by Israeli security forces in 1995, which disrupted the organization for a number of years.

In all these cases, however, the disruption was temporary and sooner or later the groups in question recovered their resolve and resumed the fight.

Moreover, **major terrorist organizations have cleverly adapted to the loss of their chief honchos.** Eliminated leaders are typically replaced by others waiting in the wings. In addition to this, some organizations respond to assassinations by loosening their hierarchical structure and allowing local leaders greater freedom. This reduces their dependence on select few figures at the top and spreads their risk.

Palestinian organizations adopted this tactic in response to targeted killings of their leaders by the Israelis. So did al Qaeda, which dispersed power that was highly concentrated in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region to a world-wide network of affiliates carrying the al Qaeda banner.

In defense of this Western strategy, some would respond by saying that terrorist leaders are in short supply. They posit that sooner or later their numbers will be exhausted, thus causing severe degradation of the organizations' fighting capacity.

Available evidence does not unequivocally support this claim. If the group boasts a wide appeal, its supply pool of leadership talent may be large and able to replenish itself.

It is important to remember that the killing of Osama bin Laden, though of symbolic importance, didn't seem to offer the U.S. an appreciable strategic advantage in the fight against al Qaeda, nor did it appreciably alter the status of war against jihadist terrorism.

Occasionally, the 'replacement' leader might actually be more adept and dangerous than the chief whom he came to replace, so one needs to be careful what one wishes for.

Abu Musab al Zarqawi, founder of al Qaeda in Iraq was a formidable enemy, but not as formidable as his replacement, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. Baghdadi is the current leader of Islamic State and is widely proclaimed to be one of the biggest threats to world security.

Similarly, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the current leader of the Hezbollah is considerably more dangerous to Israel than Abbas al-Musawi, the former head of the group who was assassinated in 1992.

That said, there is no question that the pressure of killing campaigns significantly degrades the organizations' operational capability. Targeted leaders are forced to spend significant portions of their time looking over their shoulder and protecting themselves.

Their ability to communicate with subordinates is hampered, they are compelled to frequently change locations, and are often forced to remain invisible for long stretches of time. Not to be underestimated either is the psychological toll on leaders who are constantly on the run.

The Palestinian leaders' reactions to targeted killings attest to the campaign's impact. Time and time again, they have demanded that Israel end the policy. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's successor as head of Hamas, conceded that the killing campaign posed significant hardships for his organization.

All told then, targeted killings have their place and remain a useful tactical tool in the kit of counterterrorism strategists, if only for the constant pressure

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they bring to bear on terrorist organizations. However useful they are in the short run, however, they are unlikely to bring an end to terrorism. They are a vehicle, not a panacea, and the billions of dollars spent on their implementation might not be worth it after all.

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Islamic State Lacks Funds to Run the Territory They Control: Terror Experts

Source: http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/islamic-state-lacks-funds-to-run-the-territory-they-control-terror-experts-626890?curl=1417167675

Islamic State (IS) militants may ultimately lose the war in Iraq and Syria because they do not have enough money to run the territory under their control, despite holding assets worth more than $2 trillion,

Brisard, an expert on terrorist financing and a consultant on business intelligence.

"That means there will probably come a time when the population could turn against the Islamic State, which is not the case at the

Areas under IS control in Iraq and Syria

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international terrorism experts said.
The cost of running an entire administration - paying civil servants and the military, maintaining roads, schools, hospitals, electricity and water networks - is far beyond the reach of Islamic State, said Charles

present moment, especially ... in Iraq," Brisard said in an interview on Thursday.
Iraq's Sunni tribal leaders can decide the fate of IS, he added. In 2006 and 2007, they played a major role in fighting the group,

then called al Qaeda in Iraq, with U.S. backing. Since then, however, support for IS has grown, especially among Iraqi tribal leaders who resented being sidelined by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Shi'ite majority government.

The political situation in both Iraq and Syria led to the rise of IS and its capture of territory in both countries, "and may tomorrow decide its fate", according to the Thomson Reuters report "Islamic State: The Economy-Based Terrorist Funding".

The report was released earlier this month by Brisard and Damien Martinez, sales director for Thomson Reuters Risk in Western Europe and co-author of "Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaida".

IS is the world's richest terrorist organisation, with an income estimated at about $2.9 billion a year, much of it from oil, gas and farming projects it controls. It runs factories, oil refineries and even banks.

U.S.-led air strikes are targeting IS in Syria and Iraq, but the United States does not want to shut down economic activities in IS-contolled areas, Brisard said.

The United States is not targeting oil trucks, for example, because if the strikes kill the drivers, the local population may turn against the Americans, the report said.

IS receives about $30 million a month - 12 percent of its total income - from extortion, according to the report. Extortion includes tax on cash withdrawals from bank accounts, an $800 tax on each truck entering Iraq from Joradan and Syria, a tax on looting archaeological sites, and a protection tax for non-Muslims. Income from oil makes up 38 percent of IS's income, gas 17 percent, kidnap and ransom 4 percent, and donations 2 percent. The rest comes from gas, phosphate products, cement, wheat and barley, the report said.

PKK: banned in Germany, allies in Iraq

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/11/pkk-banned-in-germany-allies-in-iraq.html

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Germany finds itself in a complicated relationship with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). At home, police must investigate anyone who flies the flag, but in the Middle East they are the best hope of beating back the Islamic State.

Passers-by were confronted by a new addition to the statue commemorating the November Revolution of 1918 in Rostock, northern Germany, on Friday morning.

Someone had attached the flag of the outlawed PKK to the fist of the sailor statue. Firefighters were called immediately to remove it.

In Göttingen last week, police investigated Kurdish protesters for flying the flag of the PKK, whose symbols have appeared at Kurdish demonstrations across Germany.

The PKK, which is believed to have 13,000 supporters in Germany, has been banned in the country for many years in response to its armed struggle against Turkey.

In the early 90s the PKK attacked Turkish government buildings in Germany and in 1993 even stormed the Turkish Consulate in Munich.

As recently as 2012, Germany's parliament reaffirmed the ban on the PKK. The parliamentary state secretary for the interior

ministry said at the time the PKK was a "destructive" force which undermined "peaceful co-existence" between Kurds and Turks in Germany.

In northern Iraq, German weapons and training are being delivered into the hands of the PKK's one-time Kurdish rivals, the peshmerga, but their fighters have not been able to put up the same level of resistance as the PKK and the two groups are increasingly working together.

It means arms the German government provides to the peshmerga could end up with a group classified as a terrorist organization by the EU.

But with a fighting force of 15,000, the PKK is Germany's and the West's best hope of staving off Isis advances and German Kurds are joining the fight, putting domestic security forces in a difficult position.

The gardening general
Around 50 Kurds are believed to have travelled from Germany to Syria and Iraq to fight against Isis, Spiegel magazine reported on Monday.

One such fighter is Shescho Khalaf, 61. A gardener in his

home town of Bad Oeynhausen, North Rhine-Westphalia, he has become a general in Iraq.

Khalaf and his sons Abdul Karim and Haydar are leading the defence of Scherfedin, a city sacred to Kurdish Yazidi people on the Iraq-Syria border where thousands of civilians are surrounded by Isis forces.

"There are explosions and close-quarters fighting," Seleman Khalaf, another of Shescho's sons who has remained in Germany, told Bild last week. "They desperately need help."

Meanwhile, members of Kurdish biker gang Median Empire MC from Cologne have also travelled to Iraq.

This week they posted images of themselves with Kurdish Defence Minister Shex Jafar on Facebook, while members in Germany started a crowdfunding campaign to buy their comrades equipment.

While the Turkish government is allowing small numbers of Peshmerga fighters to travel through its territory to join the defence of Kobane, tensions remain high between the Ankara government and the Kurds.

Deputy PKK leader Cemil Bayik threatened a return to armed struggle earlier this month after Turkish security forces killed 31 people during protests in Kurdish areas of the country.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Surprised? Why? The interaction of real and virtual worlds is so common phenomenon in our days! Remember the (international) proverb "*the enemy of my enemy is my friend*"? Although it is often described as an Arabic proverb, there is no evidence of such an origin. The proverb in Arabic is 'عدو عدوي هو قي صديق ' ('Adu 'Aduyi Hooweh Ssadikki - My enemy's enemy is my friend). A similar Bedouin Arabic proverb is "أنا وأخي على ابن عمي، وأنا وابن عمي على الغريب" (Anna WaAkhi Al Ibn Ammi, WaAnna WaIbn Ammiya Alla Karib - Me and my brother against my cousin, and [but] me and my cousin against our family [the other tribe]).

The Chechens are NOT Fearless – Let's Get Over It!

By Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin, PhD

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November 29 – I promised Carol Taber and Nancy Kennon at Family Security Matters that I would write something about Ukraine after my lecture tour in Kiev and Lviv. I had been many times to the former Soviet Union as well As Central Europe.

I lectured to psychologists, psychoanalysts, social workers, military, police and other mental health professionals among others. I lectured on the Chechen brand of Jihad as an outcome of my third book on terrorism very favorably reviewed both by Professors Jonathan Matusitz and Adam Lankford.

The Ukrainian mental health community was particularly pleased to learn that the book *The Maternal Drama of the Chechen Jihadi* is a free download at www.freepsychotherapybooks.org

Special tribute to Jason Aronson, the well-known publisher of psychology books, should be given as he has taken it upon himself to make books accessible to people living throughout the world who normally would not have access to them. Clearly this Ukrainian community which is now inflicted with war is embracing his idea wholeheartedly.

Through my extensive research I have come to learn more about the Chechens and their psychological dynamics. I had come to Ukraine to learn more about the Chechens and what is going on right now. Clearly the Chechens are there on both sides of the war -- pro-Ukraine and pro-separatist Russian. I was told for

example that the intentions of pro-Ukrainian Chechen fighter Issa Munaev remain questionable. Ukraine is facing an unprecedented influx of Muslim refugees. The Muslim population (not necessarily only refugee) is over four hundred thousand. While Russia is apparently cracking down on Islam according to Raymond Ibrahim, I wondered myself what will ultimately happen with the Chechens? Or even Putin's puppet Kadyrov who would not be happy about the banning of texts such as Sahih Bukhari? The radicalization of Muslims in Ukraine has not been adequately factored into the mix of the current war and what could be the outcome.

One moment stands out in my mind about the Chechens in the Ukraine. While I do not have a crystal ball as to what might be in the future, I did have an intuitive moment. A psychotherapist approached me after my lecture in Kiev and said that another therapist who works with Chechen refugees told her that the Chechens are fearless. She wanted to know if I thought they were. I replied "No." This is exactly part of the "Chechen Brand" advertising the myth that they are without fear in order to terrorize us. In psychological terms this is known as projective identification. "If we are fearless and heartless, terror comes to us carte Blanche."

Chechens are a shame honor culture where shame has been ritualized and "normalized" as appropriate when it is not. They grow up in a shame honor culture practicing a shame honor religion cum political movement which blocks them from in getting in touch or having access to their own fears and terrors. The Chechen jihadis are human beings just like us *but* where did they psychologically go array? My entire lecture was based on exactly that point that the childrearing practices in Chechen culture do not support children getting in touch with their feelings let alone their own terrors. To feel, to desire, to express is tantamount to bringing shame and dishonor on to the family and the community.

These behaviors are not a far cry from psychotic patient's terrors who sits in a locked ward as if frozen /paralyzed and can only communicate through body language that expresses his bodily and emotional state of mind -- frozen! Like ice. He is emotionally freezing to death. As my colleague Dr. Joan Lachkar has put it so well the jihadis can't feel or acknowledge their terrors, instead -- "Now

you are the fearful ones!" This is what is meant by projective identification. We begin to feel the split off parts of them that they project into us.

This leads us to my main point in reference to the Chechen jihadi behavior as the volcanic iceberg mentality. Like icebergs in Iceland, where there rages a volcano below the iceberg, ready to blow. This reminds me of how jihadis are always described as "the nice guy living next door" with neighbors not being able to recognize his seething murderous volcanic rage lurking deep in his antisocial personality.

I told this therapist that she should think of the Chechens as if they were adolescents who go bungee jumping in order to prove that they have no fear of heights. They appear to jump fearlessly but the crowd watching them are the fearful ones. This is the projective identification for the audience and while for the Chechen jihadi it is a counter phobia because his own unacknowledged terrors remain, not understood. With the Chechens in their culture they must brainwash their children into thinking that they have no fears. The fathers are actually terrified of death. They are death obsessed.

I explained further to this Kiev therapist that we must do an X-ray, a Roentgen, of their unconsciously motivated violent behavior in order to strip the Chechens of this pseudo propaganda power with which they try to manipulate and hold sway over the masses.

The Chechen jihadis are nothing more than bullies and mama's boys but lethal.

Omar Al Shishani, the leader of Chechen jihadis is a serial killer who harbors a rage that exceeds murder itself. As we encounter the horrors of ISIS (which in English sounds like "ice") we should think of their violence in light of what researchers have noticed about serial killers and people on the autism spectrum. There is some overlap but serious differences. Serial killers are obsessed with people often women who resemble their mothers. In contrast people with autism tend to be obsessed with hard objects.

I have argued all along that terrorists have a *malignant* form of something *like* autism. My descriptive analytic X-Ray received support when I was interviewed for a documentary called *Body Language* (2012) by Doina Harap. Along with me, she interviewed neuroscientists and experts on autism.

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The Chechen jihadis express a malignant autistic hybrid of serial killing because they are hyper focused on infidels whom they treat as objects while at the same time having an obsession with violent weapons, similar to active shooters who commit mass murder. And as the title of my book further reflects their behavior, they like serial killers are mother obsessed. The violence is their maternal drama. Omar Al Shishani lost his Muslim mother and became violent like Zarqawi and others.

Chechens are hardly fearless. We need to get over this myth of the Chechen brand. We must also not fear to know their deepest terrors.

Dr. Nancy Kobrin, a Fellow at the American Center For Democracy and a psychoanalyst with a Ph.D. in romance and semitic languages, specializes in Aljamía and Old Spanish in Arabic script. She is an expert on the Minnesota Somali diaspora and a graduate of the Human Terrain System program at Leavenworth Kansas. Her new book is The Banality of Suicide Terrorism: The Naked Truth About the Psychology of Islamic Suicide Bombing.

The Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaida Really Wants

By Yassin Musharbash

Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-future-of-terrorism-what-al-qaida-really-wants-a-369448.html

If there is anyone who might possibly have an inkling as to what al-Qaida are up to, it is the Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein. He has not only spent time in prison with al-Zarqawi, but has also managed make contact with many of the network's leaders. Based on correspondence with these sources, he has now brought out a book detailing the organization's master plan.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is blamed for some of the worst terrorist attacks and hostage killings in Iraq.

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There must be something particularly trustworthy about the Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein. After all, he has managed to get some of the the most sought after terrorists t o open up to him. Maybe it helped that they spent time together in prison many years ago -- when Hussein was a political prisoner he successfully negotiated for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to be released from solitary confinement. Or is it because of the honest and direct way in which he puts his ideas onto paper? Whatever the reason, the result is that a film which Hussein made about al-Zarqawi has even been shown on al-Qaida affiliated Web sites. "That showed me that they at least felt understood," the journalist says.

Even for an Arab journalist it is no easy matter getting in touch with al-Qaida's inner circle. Nevertheless, Hussein, who is based in Amman, Jordan, has succeeded in turning his correspondence with the

terrorists into a remarkable book: "al-Zarqawi - al-Qaida's Second Generation."

If you meet Hussein, as you might when he is relaxing in Amman's Café Vienna, you see he is calm and laid-back, without any of the glamour of a secret service spy. But what this small, slim man has to report is nothing less than the world's most dangerous terrorist network's plan of action: al-Qaida's strategy for the next two decades. It is both frightening and absurd, a lunatic plan conceived by fanatics who live in their own world, but who continually manage to break into the real world with their brutal acts of violence.

Have you seen this man? If so, you could earn yourself 5 million dollars. Seif al-Adl is not only wanted by the FBI but is also one of Hussein's main sources in the book.

One of Hussein's most sensational sources for the book, according to what he told SPIEGEL Online, was

Seif al-Adl. The Egyptian terrorist, who is suspected of taking part in the attacks on the American Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, has a ransom of US$5 million on his head from the FBI. Secret services suspect that al-Adl is now in Iran.

To prove that he really has had contact to al-Adl, Hussein includes in the first two pages of the book a copy of a hand-written letter the wanted man sent to the author. In the original document, which is 15 pages long, al-Adl describes the disagreements between al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden during the Afghanistan war. "Statements from Seif al-Adl have also crept into the chapter on al-Qaida's strategy," explains Fouad Hussein.

An Islamic Caliphate in Seven Easy Steps

In the introduction, the Jordanian journalist writes, "I interviewed a whole range of al-Qaida members with different ideologies to get an idea of how the war between the terrorists and Washington would develop in the future." What he then describes between pages 202 and 213 is a scenario, proof both of the terrorists' blindness as well as their brutal single-mindedness. In seven phases the terror network hopes to establish an Islamic caliphate which the West will then be too weak to fight.

- **The First Phase** Known as "the awakening" -- this has already been carried out and was supposed to have lasted from 2000 to 2003, or more precisely from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. The aim of the attacks of 9/11 was to provoke the US into declaring war on the Islamic world and thereby "awakening" Muslims. "The first phase was judged by the strategists and masterminds behind al-Qaida as very successful," writes Hussein. "The battle field was opened up and the Americans and their allies became a closer and easier target." The terrorist network is also reported as being satisfied that its message can now be heard "everywhere."

- The Second Phase "Opening Eyes" is, according to Hussein's definition, the period we are now in and should last until 2006. Hussein says the terrorists hope to make the western conspiracy aware of the "Islamic community." Hussein believes this

is a phase in which al-Qaida wants an organization to develop into a movement. The network is banking on recruiting young men during this period. Iraq should become the center for all global operations, with an "army" set up there and bases established in other Arabic states.

- **The Third Phase This is described as "Arising and Standing Up"** and should last from 2007 to 2010. "There will be a focus on Syria," prophesies Hussein, based on what his sources told him. The fighting cadres are supposedly already prepared and some are in Iraq. Attacks on Turkey and -- even more explosive -- in Israel are predicted. Al-Qaida's masterminds hope that attacks on Israel will help the terrorist group become a recognized organization. The author also believes that countries neighboring Iraq, such as Jordan, are also in danger.

- **The Fourth Phase** Between 2010 and 2013, Hussein writes that al-Qaida will aim to bring about the collapse of the hated Arabic governments. The estimate is that "the creeping loss of the regimes' power will lead to a steady growth in strength within al-Qaida." At the same time attacks will be carried out against oil suppliers and the US economy will be targeted using cyber terrorism.

- **The Fifth Phase** This will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. The plan is that by this time, between 2013 and 2016, Western influence in the Islamic world will be so reduced and Israel weakened so much, that resistance will not be feared. Al-Qaida hopes that by then the Islamic state will be able to bring about a new world order.

- **The Sixth Phase** Hussein believes that from 2016 onwards there will a period of "total confrontation." As soon as the caliphate has been declared the "Islamic army" it will instigate the "fight between the believers and the non-believers" which has so often been predicted by Osama bin Laden.

- **The Seventh Phase** This final stage is described as

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"definitive victory." Hussein writes that in the terrorists' eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the "one-and-a-half billion Muslims," the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. This phase should be completed by 2020, although the war shouldn't last longer than two years.

A Serious Plan?

But just how serious is this scenario? "Al-Qaida makes no compromises," says the book's author Fouad Hussein. He obviously believes that this seven-point plan could well become the guiding principle for a whole range of al-Qaida fighters. Hussein is far from an hysterical alarmist -- in fact he is seen as a serious journalist and his Zarqawi book is better than most of the reports in Arabic on the subject. Only last year, the journalist made a film which was received with great interest and was shown on the German-French TV channel arte. In it he provided deep insights into al-Qaida's internet propaganda machine.

Nevertheless, there is no way the scenario he depicts can be seen as a plan which al-Qaida can follow step by step. The terrorist network just doesn't work like that anymore. The significance of the central leadership has diminished and its direct commands have lost a great deal of importance. The supposed master plan for the years 2000 to 2020 reads in parts more like a group of ideas cobbled together in retrospect, than something planned and presented in advance. And not to mention the terrorist agenda is simply unworkable: the idea that al-Qaida could set up a caliphate in the entire Islamic world is absurd. The 20-year plan is based mainly on religious ideas. It hardly has anything to do with reality -- especially phases four to seven.

But that doesn't mean that we should simply discount everything that Hussein has uncovered. A few of the steps in the agenda are plausible. The idea that Syria will become a focus for the Mujahedin is regarded by experts as highly likely. "Close ranks, concentrate on getting more recruits, set up cells," was the call to the "Mujahedin in Syria" which appeared on one Web site at the beginning of August. From the point of view of the jihadists, Israel and Turkey are also fairly logical targets for an escalation of the confrontation. "Al-Qaida views every fight as a victory, because for so long Muslims didn't have any weapons at all," says Hussein. He may not be far off. As for Jordan, al-Qaida leaders such as al-Zarqawi, have already made attacks on the country. They have also stated on numerous occasions that Jerusalem is the real target.

Equally, the idea that in the future al-Qaida could increasingly become a movement that attracts young frustrated men, is hardly a theory plucked out of thin air. The terror network puts a lot of effort into its propaganda -- assumedly in order to expand its support base.

Attacks on the West: a Means to an End

What is interesting is that major attacks against the West are not even mentioned by Fouad Hussein. Terrorism here cannot be ignored -- but it seems these attacks simply supplement the larger aim of setting up an Islamic caliphate. Attacks such as those in New York, Madrid and London would in this case not be ends in themselves, but rather means to a achieve a larger purpose -- steps in a process of increasing insecurity in the West.

Nowadays, it is harder than ever to truly understand al-Qaida: the organization has degenerated into branches and loosely connected cells, related groups are taken in, and people who hardly had anything to do with al-Qaida before, now carry out attacks in its name. It is hard to imagine orders which come right from the top because Osama bin Laden spends all his time struggling to survive. At the same time, the division between foot soldiers in the organization and sympathizers is becoming increasingly blurred. It is all too easy to fall prey to disinformation -- al-Qaida also excels in this area. Even Hussein's scenario should be judged skeptically.

His book should therefore be read for what it really is: an attempt to second guess how al-Qaida terrorists think, what they really want and how they propose to get there.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: This is a 2005 article – but still very interesting!

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

By Jonathan Masters, Deputy Editor, and **Zachary Laub**, Online Writer/Editor
Source: http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369

The militant Islamist group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in January 2009 through a union of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda. Jihadist antecedents in the region date to the early 1990s, when thousands of mujahedeen returned to Yemen after fighting the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. **Analysts rate the Yemen-based group as the most lethal Qaeda franchise, carrying out a domestic insurgency while maintaining its sights on striking Western targets.** As the ranks of so-called "al-Qaeda central" in Pakistan have thinned, the umbrella organization's core may shift to Yemen. In August 2013, indications of an AQAP-sponsored plot led to the closure of more than two dozen U.S. diplomatic facilities across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

Yemen, long a fractured and fragile country, is increasingly so since the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012. AQAP has exploited the instability, establishing a domestic insurgency based in the south. Meanwhile, the United States has expanded counterterrorism operations—particularly drone strikes—in the area. Experts question whether President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi's transitional government can pull back the impoverished country from the brink of failure.

A Legacy of Jihad

In the late 1980s, the Saleh regime fostered jihad in what was then North Yemen by repatriating thousands of Yemeni nationals who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. Saleh dispatched these mujahadeen to fight the Soviet-backed Marxist government of South Yemen in a successful bid for unification, and subsequently, to crush southern secessionists.

The returning Yemenis were joined by other Arab veterans of the Afghan war, foremost among them Osama bin Laden, who advocated a central role for Yemen in global jihad. A corps of jihadists who had trained under bin Laden in Afghanistan formed the militant group Islamic Jihad in Yemen (1990-1994), one of several AQAP predecessors. Other such groups include the Army of Aden Abyan (1994-1998) and al-Qaeda in Yemen, or AQY (1998-2003).

In October 2000, a skiff piloted by two members of AQY detonated several hundred pounds of explosives into the hull of the USS *Cole*, which was moored in the port of Aden. Seventeen U.S. servicemen were killed. Two years later, another suicide bombing orchestrated by AQY, on the French oil tanker M/V *Limburg*, killed one crew member and further highlighted the threat to Western interests in the region. Several militants involved in the *Limburg* plot would eventually hold top leadership positions in AQAP.

Following the *Cole* bombing and the al-Qaeda-led attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration pressed the Saleh government to begin aggressive counterterrorism operations against AQY. Many analysts believe Saleh may have stoked the jihadist threat—perhaps facilitating prison escapes of convicted terrorists—to ensure Western backing for his embattled regime, which viewed northern insurgents and southern secessionists as a greater threat than al-Qaeda.

Washington dispatched Special Forces and intelligence personnel to Yemen to aid the counterterrorism campaign. A U.S. drone strike in 2002, the first such operation in the region, killed AQY's leader, Abu Ali al-Harithi. By the end of 2003, AQY faced a precipitous membership decline.

Resiliency

In February 2006, twenty-three convicted terrorists escaped from a high-security prison in the capital of Sana'a, a turning point for al-Qaeda in the region. Many of the escapees worked to "resurrect al-Qaeda from the ashes" and launch a fresh campaign of attacks. Among them was Nasser al-Wuhayshi, who today leads AQAP.

In late 2008, a crackdown by the Saudi government led remnants of the local al-Qaeda franchise there to flee across the border and unite with the resurgent jihad in Yemen. The two branches merged in 2009.

The U.S. State Department estimates the organization has "close to a thousand members." This represents dramatic growth from some two-to-three-hundred

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members in 2009, Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen notes, even as so-called al-Qaeda central, based in Pakistan, has declined.

AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the region since 2006. These have included the failed August 2009 assassination attempt on Saudi prince Mohammed bin Nayef; an attack on the U.S. embassy in Sana'a in 2008; attacks on Italian and British embassies; suicide bombings targeting Belgian tourists in January 2008 and Korean tourists in March 2009; bombings of oil pipelines and production facilities; and the bombing of a Japanese oil tanker in April 2008. In May 2012, a suicide bomber killed more than ninety Yemeni soldiers rehearsing for a military parade in the capital of Sana'a, the largest attack since Hadi assumed power in early 2012.

AQAP has also attempted, unsuccessfully, to strike the U.S. homeland: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to bomb a Detroit-bound jet on Christmas Day, 2009, but failed due to a technical malfunction; two attempts to down Chicago-bound cargo planes with bombs disguised as printer cartridges were intercepted in October 2010 based on Saudi intelligence; and a May 2012 attempted bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner was foiled by a double agent.*

More than half of the 166 prisoners held in the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay are Yemenis, and President Barack Obama's long-standing pledge to shut down the facility is contingent on repatriating them. But some U.S. lawmakers have objected, raising concern about the prisoners' return to the battlefield through detention and reintegration programs.

An Effective Propaganda

The primary goals of AQAP are consistent with the principles of militant jihad, which aims to purge Muslim countries of Western influence and replace secular "apostate" governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes observant of sharia law. Associated AQAP objectives include overthrowing the regime in Sana'a; assassinating Western nationals and their allies, including members of the Saudi royal family; striking at related interests in the region, such as embassies and energy concerns; and attacking the U.S. homeland.

The group has also mastered recruitment through propaganda and media campaigns. A bimonthly AQAP magazine in Arabic, *Sada al-Malahim* ("The Echo of Battles"), is tailored to a Yemeni audience and offers theological

support and praise for jihadists. The U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki and Pakistani-American Samir Khan were central figures in AQAP's production of propaganda aimed at Western audiences. Though they were killed in an October 2011 U.S. drone strike, their English-language propaganda magazine *Inspire* continues to be published. U.S. Major Nidal Hasan exchanged emails with Awlaki prior to his shooting rampage at the U.S. Army's Fort Hood in 2009.

Analysts say that AQAP's messaging attracts recruits by "minimiz[ing] global jihad while emphasizing national struggle," focusing on jihad as an answer to local grievances while remaining focused on what jihadists call the "far enemy"—the United States, particularly for its unholy alliance with Saudi Arabia.

Leadership and Funding

AQAP is hierarchical, compartmentalized, and decentralized, analysts say, which allows it to withstand attacks and arrests.

Wuhayshi, AQAP's leader, served as bin Laden's aide-de-camp in Afghanistan for some four years. He was reportedly appointed "general manager" of al-Qaeda by Ayman al-Zwahiri, bin Laden's successor, in July 2013. In this capacity, *Long War Journal*'s Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio report, he is "positioned to coordinate the activities of al-Qaeda's robust affiliates in the heart of the Middle East and Africa," and "make sure that the regional affiliates continue to devote some of their assets to targeting the West."

Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, the organization's chief bomb maker, made explosives for the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing, demonstrating the technical capacity to avoid typical airport detection and strike at the United States.

Financing for the al-Qaeda network, according to U.S. officials, comes from sources such as bank robberies, kidnappings, drug proceeds, and phony charities. A December 2009 classified memo from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated donors in Saudi Arabia were "the most significant source" of funding to Sunni terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.

Yemen's Troubled Landscape

Yemen faces ongoing political and economic challenges that will shape the threat posed by AQAP

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in the coming years. One of the poorest Arab countries, Yemen had a poverty rate of 54.5 percent in 2012, the World Bank estimates. Rapid population growth has heightened pressure on natural resources—especially water—and public services. Unemployment is rampant.

As the Arab Spring protests spread to Yemen in 2011, Saleh moved troops deployed throughout the country to Sana'a in a last-minute bid for survival. Amid the ensuing security vacuum in the south, Islamist militias

says that if the dialogue fails, civil war may ensue—creating further instability for AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia to exploit.

U.S. Policy in Yemen
In the wake of the failed 2009 Christmas Day plot, the Obama administration ordered a major review of U.S. policy toward Yemen that led to a three-fold strategy: combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance in the long term, and organizing international support for stabilization efforts.

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Known drone and air strikes in Yemen targeting al-Qaeda and other militants. Size of circle relative to average estimate of those killed (Courtesy New America Foundation).

seized territory in the southern province of Abyan. Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist insurgent group that analysts say is either a rebranding of AQAP or a nationalist-Islamist insurgency more loosely affiliated with AQAP, declared Abyan an Islamic emirate. The "Taliban-like insurgent movement" has restored social services, repaired infrastructure, and established sharia courts.

The transitional government of President Hadi is weak outside Sana'a and faces an entrenched opposition, including members of the former regime, as well as an insurgency in the north and secession movement in the south. The Hadi administration faces a delicate balancing act as it fulfills the requirements of the Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored (and U.S.-backed) transition plan. These include restructuring the military, redrafting the constitution, and holding parliamentary and presidential elections. The National Dialogue, mandated by the GCC to hammer out a power-sharing agreement between Sana'a and the province, is set to present a list of grievances, reforms, and recommendations for a new constitutional system in the fall of 2013. Hadi

In January 2010, the Obama administration designated AQAP a foreign terrorist organization, and amended the order to include Ansar al-Sharia after a May 2012 suicide bombing killed ninety-six in Sana'a. The United Nations has maintained sanctions on AQAP's leadership since 2010.

The United States collaborated with Yemen on counterterrorism since the *Cole* bombing and 9/11 attacks, but the Saleh regime's violent crackdown on protestors in 2011 strained the relationship. Events culminated in May 2011 with the U.S. backing of the GCC transition initiative that removed Saleh from power. In May 2012, the Obama administration issued an executive order threatening sanctions on individuals who disrupted the political transition under President Hadi. Hadi maintains strong relations with the United States, analysts say, because his domestic base is not particularly strong.

The U.S. campaign of targeted killings expanded with the construction of secret bases in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. As intercepted communications in the summer of 2013 led the United States to believe AQAP was spearheading an al-Qaeda plot, the United States closed over two dozen diplomatic facilities, accompanying the precautionary measure with a significant escalation of the drone campaign. The United States expanded its target list to include lower-level militants (as opposed to operational leaders), carrying out nine strikes.

In all, the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) have carried out seventy-nine drone strikes in Yemen under the Obama administration (the Bush administration carried out one, in 2002). Conservative estimates

suggest 386 enemy and 84 civilian casualties, while the New America Foundation, compiling local and international news reports, puts the total killed between 630 and 876 as of August 13, 2013.

Despite tactical successes, including the killing of Awlaki, Khan, and possibly Said al-Shihri, who, after his release from Guantanamo Bay, rose to AQAP's number-two position, critics challenge the strategic wisdom of drone strikes. Some analysts argue that they engender anti-Americanism, alienate populations from the Yemeni government, and make aggrieved kinsmen of victims sympathetic to AQAP, perversely swelling AQAP's ranks. Signature strikes, in which targets are chosen based on behavioral profiles, remain particularly contentious.

Maori Muslim backs Islamic State

Source: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10690655/Maori-Muslim-backs-Islamic-State

Aotearoa Maori Muslim Association head Te Amorangi Kireka-Whaanga was named one of the world's 500 most influential Muslims in 2010.

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An influential Maori Muslim leader is openly supporting the Islamic State militant group and believes Kiwi fighters should not be stopped from joining.

An image from Te Amorangi Kireka-Whaanga's Facebook page.

Te Amorangi Kireka-Whaanga is the head of the Aotearoa Maori Muslim Association and in 2010 was named one of the world's 500 most influential Muslims by a group in Jordan, one of only two New Zealanders to make the list.

The Sunday Star-Times began investigating him after discovering his Facebook pages were festooned with Islamic State imagery. He has 905 friends on Facebook, many of

them Muslim converts from around New Zealand. His pages have been repeatedly taken down in recent weeks by Facebook administrators.

Islamic State has been taking over towns and cities in Syria and Iraq, conducting massacres and beheadings of hostages, as it tries to establish an Islamic caliphate. Its followers in the West have been conducting "lone wolf" terrorist attacks in recent weeks.

At home in Hastings yesterday, Kireka-Whaanga told the Star-Times Muslims were being killed all over the world, the United Nations "doesn't care" and he understood Islamic State' actions.

"If you practise your religion then of course you'll be 100 per cent behind Islamic State," he said, adding that he was not a violent person. His comments come as tension rises between Muslim New Zealanders and others in the community following statements by Prime Minister John Key about the domestic terror threat.

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Muslim leaders and senior police met in Auckland on Friday to discuss the issues.

Federation of Islamic Associations (FIANZ) president Anwar Ghani said they expressed concerns about the amount of harassment they were getting, including women wearing veils being abused, while police asked that community leaders keep an eye out for changing behaviour among potential radicals.

Kireka-Whaanga said John Key was right to be worried because Islamic State was going to "bring down Western civilisation". He said his family wanted to move to Syria but he expected his passport would be cancelled. He claimed to have one "brother" in Syria at the moment.

"If I want to go to Syria that should be my right and my choice. It's like the Jews going to fight for Israel to kill the Palestinians. They don't stop that."

On Wednesday Key will make a speech outlining the Government's plans to combat foreign fighters.

Security Intelligence Service director Rebecca Kitteridge said Islamic State propaganda material telling followers "every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader and kill him" brought the threat closer to home than people thought. "There is a range of people who we are concerned about here," she said. She refused to discuss individuals. Kireka-Whaanga, 40, who has Mongrel Mob connections, said he used Facebook to "propagate the faith. I am pushing the religion. I like going into chatrooms and talk about Islam."

He said Islamic State supporters among local Muslims were in the minority but this would change "once we start talking to each other".

He said he had been regularly visited by police and intelligence agents since 9/11.

"If I say a word out of line [on Facebook] the police can show up. They get worried I'm going to go and blow up people. Once they understand I'm not like that they're OK."

FIANZ says Kireka-Whaanga's views are misguided and not shared by most Muslims.

The Star-Times revealed 10 years ago that Kireka-Whaanga was visiting prisons as part of a project to convert inmates to Islam. The visits were banned after the article.

Proportion of Māori Ethnic Population by Region
2006 Census

10.0% or less
10.1–25.0%
25.1% & over

A senior Corrections source said there were new concerns that a small number of Maori Muslim inmates were becoming radicalised and might pose a threat on their release.

Bevan Hanlon of the Corrections Association said the issue of Muslim radicals in prisons was brought up with staff on a recent nationwide tour but no-one raised it as a concern.

What makes a terrorist stop being a terrorist?

By John Horgan

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141201-what-makes-a-terrorist-stop-being-a-terrorist

The journey into and out of terrorism is as personal as it is complex. De-radicalization programs still represent some of the most creative approaches to counter-terrorism. They can be powerful forces in thinning the ranks of lower-level members. But if we do not have a sincere discussion of why or how they work, their future will be in jeopardy. With rumors of hundreds of disillusioned ex-ISIS members exploring a potential return home, we are already way behind. We need clear thinking to underpin these programs and their evaluation. In the absence of transparency and clearer expectations, it will only take one-high profile failure (would any program survive if one of its graduates detonated a suicide bomb closer to home?) for the potential of these programs to be lost forever.

"Feet first." That's how one terrorist leader told recruits was the only way out. It makes sense. Allowing members to just walk away wouldn't be good for the group's image.

And yet — at the same time as Islamic State parades its European jihadists in shocking beheading videos and continues to recruit aggressively around the world — terrorists do disengage all the time. Some quietly disappear. Others go public, telling their stories on TV or in autobiographies. They embrace their new identity as an "ex-" or "former" to warn others of the dangers of involvement.

We have also come to know formers through the rise of so-called de-radicalization programs. For the past decade, I've examined how and why terrorists walk away, and I've also closely examined programs aimed at helping ease that transition.

De-radicalization: how it works

One of the newest efforts was launched earlier this year by social workers and psychologists in Denmark. Their objective? To successfully reintegrate Danish jihadists who left a few short years ago to take up arms against the Syrian regime. Now they want to come home.

The Danes join similar ongoing efforts around the world. It's hard to say how many de-radicalization programs exist. At least fifteen are publicly known, from Saudi Arabia to Singapore, but there are likely twice as many. Some are the brainchildren of individuals trying to make a difference in managing a group of terrorist prisoners. Others are wide-ranging, well-funded (typically by governments) initiatives that offer invited tours to journalists and academics. You can even meet and chat with "model" participants. In one of my first visits to a de-radicalization facility, back in March 2008, I was invited to sit and have dinner with several al Qaeda members undergoing rehabilitation, whom, I was assured, were there voluntarily.

On the surface, such efforts are promising. After all, who wouldn't support an approach to counter-terrorism that isn't just cost-effective (it's far cheaper than indefinite detention) but doesn't rely on torture or just throwing away the key forever? Some programs openly claim tremendous success. The decade-old program in Saudi Arabia, for example, boasts a guaranteed low rate of recidivism — about 10-20 percent.

But we still don't really know if this or any similar program actually does what is claimed. Or, more accurately, we don't know if the risk of re-engagement in terrorism is reduced as a result of several months' participation in the program (and if so, how) or because of something else.

Reducing the risk of re-engaging in terrorism

Though data is sparse, we do know that people who leave terrorism behind statistically have a low chance of re-engagement.

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The question is: why? And if so many candidates for de-radicalization programs are already deeply disillusioned, is a program that focuses on changing how they think really responsible for making them "safe"?

All programs share one goal - reducing the risk of re-engagement. Where they differ is in how to achieve it.

Sometimes they help provide concrete opportunities — vocational training, jobs — with which to build a new life. Yet, only last September, British Prime Minister David Cameron advocated forced participation in de-radicalization schemes to help ensure adherence to "British values" for returning jihadists. Others, including psychologists, argue that we should focus on achieving "attitude change". That is what we need to do, many say, so that we can be sure they'll never go back.

It sounds plausible, but so far there's no convincing evidence to support this argument.

Ask most psychologists and they will tell you that attitudes and behavior match up poorly even in the best of circumstances. The fact is that there's paltry evidence to suggest that people stay out of terrorism because they have been taught to "think different" about the legitimacy of their views.

Parroting ideological or religious doctrine (acquired as a result of participating in a program) may occur among people who don't go back into terrorism, but getting formers to do that doesn't make the rest of us any the wiser as to *why* they don't re-engage.

Surprisingly, a number of the programs I've seen first hand don't pay attention to people's experiences as members of their terrorist groups. How can we effectively assess risk of re-engagement if we don't understand the meaning of involvement for that individual?

Get them a job

The Danish program appears to focus on reintegration - providing eligible returning jihadists with help finding a house, a job and an education. That may be far more pragmatic than 'de-radicalization' per se.

Longer established programs such as Pakistan's Sabaoon (or "the first ray of light from the dawn") initiative don't prioritize changing the way people think. Having an actual job, they argue - and a place to go to every day - may be a better protective

mechanism to avoid re-engagement than any internal brain re-wiring.

In effective programs, the main priority is figuring out what meaningful reintegration means. As security analyst and director of Hostage UK Rachel Briggs recently recommended, nuance is essential. Reintegration needs and challenges will differ from person to person and from community to community. Is a community, for example, likely to welcome back a former? What is the influence of the security situation prevailing in a particular region?

I've seen cases where an individual terrorist remained in voluntary detention because his family was waiting outside to ferry him right back into the arms of the militants. Sometimes you really can be truly de-radicalized, but not necessarily at low risk for re-engagement.

Some of the more ambitious programs - including those in Pakistan and Singapore that manage detained or imprisoned former terrorists - recognize that it's not just what takes place in prison that's important. What really matters more is what happens once the person steps outside. The acquired "values" that now sit inside someone's head are far less important than strengthening the social bonds that will either keep someone in their community or, if severed, pull them back into violent extremism.

The most effective de-radicalization programs serve as a kind of halfway house for former extremists. They help prisoners to prepare for the challenges of reinserting themselves into everyday life. Just like for ordinary criminals, prisoners are coached on post-release monitoring and learn that they are probably always at some risk of re-engagement. A major goal of such programs is often to heighten individual mindfulness of those risks as a form of longer-term protection against re-engagement.

The journey into and out of terrorism is as personal as it is complex. De-radicalization programs still represent some of the most creative approaches to counter-terrorism. They can be powerful forces in thinning the ranks of lower-level members. But if we don't have a sincere discussion of why or how they work, their future will be in jeopardy.

With rumors of hundreds of disillusioned ex-ISIS members exploring a potential return home, we are already way behind. We

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need clear thinking to underpin these programs and their evaluation. In the absence of transparency and clearer expectations, it will only take one-high profile failure (would any program survive if one of its graduates detonated a suicide bomb closer to home?) for the potential of these programs to be lost forever.

John Horgan is Professor of Security Studies at the School of Criminology and Justice Studies and Director of the Center for Terrorism & Security Studies at University of Massachusetts Lowell.

A Jordanian Spins Comic Book Tales to Counter Terrorist Ideologies

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/world/middleeast/a-jordanian-spins-comic-book-tales-to-counter-terrorist-ideologies.html

Mr. Bakhit, 36, is a Jordanian comic book

author and entrepreneur who creates Middle Eastern stories that are an alternative to terrorist ideologies. His field research has included surveys of children in poor neighborhoods in and around the Jordanian capital of Amman and in Syrian refugee camps. All this, he says, has given him an insight into what fuels terrorism, and a specialist's appreciation for the propaganda strategies of the Islamic State, and how they have improved upon those pioneered by Al Qaeda. Where Osama bin Laden once lectured in didactic videos, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has young jihadists speaking to potential recruits in their native tongues, whether English, French or Arabic, and connecting on an emotional level.

They "preach terrorism as a heroic journey," Mr. Bakhit said in an interview. "The biggest threat in the Middle East is terrorism disguised as heroism."

He says he believes that the terrorist narrative is essentially "copying Joseph Campbell's work," referring to the American mythologist. In Mr. Campbell's view, a heroic journey is central to mythmaking. A hero has to be called to action, perhaps hesitate, then leave home and be tested. Among other things, Mr. Campbell's work inspired the filmmaker George Lucas to create "Star Wars."

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Mr. Bakhit has studied Mr. Campbell as part of his fellowship at TED, a nonprofit organization known for sponsoring conferences on ideas. He expanded on this idea, and his story, during a recent speech at the Oslo Freedom Forum, a gathering of dissidents and activists, and in a series of interviews.

"The greatest heroic journey in our culture is the journey of the Prophet Muhammad, who left his village to go meditate in a cave in the middle of the desert," he said. "He was meditating, and there the archangel came down and gave him the message of Islam. He came out of that cave transformed with a new vision of Islam and united all Arabs around that vision."

"What's interesting is that Bin Laden emulated that journey to the letter," he continued. "Bin Laden left his life of wealth and aristocracy in Saudi Arabia, went

to the caves in Afghanistan and emerged from these caves a new leader, with a new vision to cleanse the shame of the Muslim nation through violence. Similarly, this is the same message, the heroic message, that they push to all the terrorists in Western Europe who go join ISIS. And this has such a huge appeal for a lot of these youth, unfortunately."

In the Islamic State vision, you win whether you live or die. "You get killed, you're reunited with the prophet and Allah," Mr. Bakhit said. "If you don't, you're still on your journey."

Mr. Bakhit says he believes that comic books and video games can provide an antidote, coupled with the right storytelling, and he started a company in 2006 called Aranim

Media Factory — Aranim being a fusion of the words "Arab" and "anime" — to produce them. But his path has not been easy.

IN many ways, Mr. Bakhit is playing out his own Campbellesque journey. Barrel-chested, with a cleanshaven head and a goatee, he certainly looks the part of an action hero. Like many people, he saw his life change on Sept. 11, when he was studying at the University of Minnesota. On the day of the attacks, before he even knew about them, he received a call from his father, Marouf al-Bakhit, a Jordanian politician who went on to serve two times as prime minister.

"He says, 'Suleiman, if anybody asks you your name, tell them you're José and you're from Mexico,'" he said. "I should have listened to him. Sometime afterwards, I got attacked by a group of men for no other reason than being an Arab."

He decided to visit schools in the area to build community relations and explain to American children that most Muslims are not terrorists. When he was asked by a young boy if the Arab world had its own Superman and Batman, he realized the answer was no. He describes the moment as an epiphany. He taught himself how to draw and began creating stories and characters. Eventually, he moved back to Jordan and started his company.

Early on, he conducted focus groups with Jordanian children from different economic classes.

"I went there and asked the kids, 'Who are your heroes?'" he said. "'We don't have any heroes, but we hear a lot about Bin Laden, about Zarqawi,'" he said they told him, referring to the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led the group that evolved into the Islamic State. "I'm like, 'What do you hear about them?' The children replied, 'That they defend us against the West because the West is out there to kill us.' And this is the terrorist narrative and Propaganda 101."

Some of the art by Mr. Bakhit, who taught himself to draw as he prepared to make comic books with Middle Eastern stories. Credit Warrick Page for The New York Times

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At first, the Jordanian government embraced his company, even though he says his father was less than enthusiastic. "He was initially disappointed, and wanted me to become an engineer," he said. "Later on, he started to change his mind and see the value in it."

MORE than a million copies of his comic books were distributed in schools in Jordan, he said, and his company received a grant from the King Abdullah II Fund for Development. His early comics were about Jordanian war heroes. Then he began to expand his company's range, creating stories like the one about an all-women military unit, and he hired web developers to create games for Facebook. One of his most popular characters, Element Zero, was a kind of Arab version of Jack Bauer, the fictional counterterrorism agent in the television series "24."

He says he has not been offered American government support and would not take it.

"If I get any funding from the U.S., it's going to be perceived as

propaganda, C.I.A., and doomed to failure," Mr. Bakhit said. "We as the Arab world, we need to take responsibility for this problem. We have to develop the solutions from the ground up."

Problems developed along the way. An assault by extremists has left a long scar above and below his left eye. And his relationship with the government became strained.

After he developed a post-apocalyptic "Mad Max"-style comic called "Saladin 2100," set almost a century in the future, the government was concerned that it did not show the ruling Hashemite dynasty was still in power. The comic was a collaboration with Tony Lee, the prolific British comic book author.

"It was deemed 'too dangerous' because I did not answer the question who is going to be the leader 100 years from now," Mr. Bakhit said. "Now you know why I don't have any hair."

Eventually, he shut his company as the government's pressure increased. Many of his comics, including one about a world ruled by teenagers after adults disappear, were left unpublished.

Mr. Bakhit weathers his struggles with good humor. Expanding on his baldness, he said, "I have a lot of hair, just really bad distribution." Of the attack that left him with a scar: "My dating life improved exponentially."

He says the government is softening its stance, and he is in the process of restarting his business with a new name, Hero Factor. But he says he is considering domiciling it in the British Virgin Islands. A spokesman for the Jordanian government did not respond to requests for comment.

"For every terrorist we kill, there's a hundred more being born," Mr. Bakhit said. The narratives pushed by the likes of the Islamic State are "light years ahead of what we have, and no one is fighting it at that level."

"It is at its core a war of mythologies," he added, one that can be fought "for a fraction of the cost of a drone strike."

Al Qaeda plot to blow up 5 passenger planes in Christmas 'spectacular'

Source: http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/541725/REVEALED-Al-Qaeda-plot-to-blow-up-5-European-passenger-jets-in-Christmas-spectacular

The threat has been taken so seriously it came close to leading to an outright ban on all hand

luggage, a senior insider has revealed.

Mobile phones and electronic devices could still be banned from plane cabins, with the threat of a 9/11-style coordinated attack on London and other major cities feared imminent.

The warning comes as Whitehall officials admit that a terror strike on the UK is now "almost inevitable" particularly with British jihadis returning from fighting alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

An airport security source told the Sunday Express: "We've been told that five planes are being targeted in a high profile hit before Christmas. They've been waiting for the big one. "We have many scares but this one nearly got hand baggage pulled from all airlines. The threat is still alive and real."

The plot, which has been known about for the past two months, is thought to involve Islamists smuggling bombs on to planes bound for major European destinations before Christmas.

The well-placed security insider said talks had been held about how to deal with it, with suggestions made to ban hand luggage.

The source said: "High level negotiations are continuing at Governmental level but at the moment there has been little done to respond.

"There is paralysis because of the difficulty of banning hand luggage

which is one of the strongest weapons we have against the new threats.

"All electronics may be banned from hand luggage and placed in the hold, that has been considered, and there has been behaviour analysis training at airports but while it's

effective, it's difficult to roll out quickly and is not a sufficient safety net.

"The threat is aimed at Europe. The U.S has improved their security over the summer but we have not.

"Everyone is expecting something catastrophic very soon"
Inside source

Threats of bombs hidden in toothpaste tubes caused huge disruption to travellers to the Sochi Winter Olympics and stringent security checks at UK airports will cause huge queues during what is the busiest time of the year for

airlines.

Security experts also warn that future terror attacks could be carried out by sleepers - western converts as likely to have blond hair and blue eyes as dark skin and beards.

The latest threat is understood to have been uncovered by American intelligence officers who fear that despite success in taking out key Al Qaeda bomb-makers, the genie is out of the bottle and sleeper cells are currently preparing for a doomsday scenario.

David Drugeon, a 24-year-old Frenchman and one of Al Qaeda's most trusted bomb-makers was killed by a cruise missile strike earlier this month to the west of the Alepo, Syria.

Drugeon, who was part of an Al Qaeda off-shoot called the the Khorasan group, and was said to be targeting US and UK airlines with non-metallic explosive devices, which could be concealed in mobile phones, computers and printer cartridges.

Although now dead his work remains a huge threat as his skill set is likely to have been spread among a number of terror apprentices, including an unidentified Saudi-born bombmaker.

Last night leading terrorism expert Dr Sally Leivesley said the banning of hand luggage and hand held electronic devices is unlikely to be accepted by the airlines despite the risks.

She explained: "Efforts to ban all electronic devices including computers from business class passengers which reaps huge revenue for the airlines is nearly unsustainable in their business model.

"However, I would contend that even a mobile phone in the hold is capable of being used as a trigger for a bomb or used as a bomb in its own right.

"The most likely scenario is a plane heading towards a major European capital.

"There is likely to have been dry runs already with terrorists testing airport security."

Dr. Leivesley, a former Home Office risk adviser, said that terrorists are now more likely to be "white, blond and blue eyed" who are radicalized in as little as five weeks.

She also claimed that female terrorists were becoming a significant risk, adding: "Crime profiling shows that white, middle class women, who are better than averagely educated, are susceptible to the terrorist narrative.

"They see themselves at the forefront of attempts to change the world and are represent a very dangerous tool for the terrorists.

"These sleepers will have been from ordinary and not very

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religious families and not only is the threat from them here but also when they return battle hardened from Syria and Iraq."

In a speech earlier this week, Home Secretary Theresa May warned that numerous Islamic militants were looking to attack the UK.

She said: "Now the threat is more diverse in terms of the number of groups out there who will be looking to carry out attacks in the West.

"It's also more diverse in that not everybody's affiliated to a particular group - some are self-starting groups and you do have individuals,

perhaps the "lone wolves" or the volatile individuals.

'We have to look across the board at all sorts of threats that are out there."

Scotland Yard would not comment on the claims.

A spokeswoman for the Department for Transport, which looks after air security, said she could not comment on the specific allegations.

But she added: "We keep airport security under constant review."

Egypt thwarts terrorist attack on Israeli gas platforms in the Mediterranean Sea

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141202-egypt-thwarts-terrorist-attack-on-israeli-gas-platforms-in-the-mediterranean-sea

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Knox class frigate Damietta of the Egyptian Navy during exercises with the Greek Navy

Egypt said it had thwarted an attempt by Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated terrorists on 12 November to attack Israeli energy platforms in the Mediterranean Sea. Israel's Channel 2 TV reported that **the terrorists commandeered an Egyptian navy missile boat for the planned attack** (photo). Other Egyptian navy vessels gave chase and stopped the commandeered missile boat, killing eight aboard in a heavy exchange of fire. An Egyptian military spokesman said on 12 November that the seizure of one of its navy vessels in a "terrorist" attack left five Egyptian servicemen injured and eight others missing at

sea. The Egyptian navy destroyed four boats used by the assailants, and captured thirty-two of the Islamist militants.

The mid-November Egyptian statements about the planned attack did not mention the terrorists' intended targets.

Times of Israel quotes Israeli TV reports from yesterday (Monday) which added new details to the Egyptian account of 12 November. Monday's Israel's Channel 2 TV report said that ISIS-affiliated Sunni extremists "staged an accident" on board of the missile boat and were able to install a member of

their own group in temporary charge of the Egyptian vessel. **They set out for sea from the port of Damietta, planning to attack Israeli boats and gas installations in the Mediterranean.**

Egyptian naval commanders, monitoring routine radio communications with the commandeered missile boat, realized something was not right and sent out other navy vessels to give chase. "They managed to neutralize" the terrorists, the TV report said.

The report did not identify the sources of the story, but did note the close cooperation between the Egyptian and Israeli navies and intelligence services — "closer than in the days of Mubarak," the reporter emphasized.

Back on 12 November, Egypt's official MENA news agency reported that a naval vessel was set on fire in a heavy exchange of fire with assailants about seventy kilometers off Egypt's coast. The MENA report also said that the Egyptian air force took part in the attack on the commandeered vessel.

The al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis terror group, which operates in the Sinai Peninsula, earlier in November announced its loyalty to ISIS.

The Islamist group has launched several deadly attacks against Egyptian forces since the military overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood' Mohammed Morsi last year.

Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World

Source: i-hls.com/2013/11/ict-study-lone-wolf-terrorism-in-the-western-world/

This study analyzed current trends and developments in lone wolf terrorism. Starting with a literature review, this paper analyzed the dataset to add information to the previous research, and analyzed case studies to examine previously researched trends in-depth.

Analysis of the dataset revealed a number of developments. The United States has the highest level of lone wolf terrorism. The total number of incidents in the United States – and in the Western world in general – is increasing. Second most-targeted countries are the United Kingdom and Germany. Over the past three decades, these three countries remained the most targeted; however, the number of countries targeted by Islamic lone wolves has increased. In the 1990's, only the United States was targeted; from 2010 to 2013, the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Spain have also been attacked.

The United States have improved their ability to stop lone wolf attacks before they are implemented – dispelling the common notion that lone wolves are impossible to prevent. Even though they are unaffiliated and thus harder to trace, their attacks are preventable. It is most difficult to prevent when the attacker has no contact whatsoever with other extremists – Pantucci's loners were seen to be the most successful at carrying out terrorist attacks.

The increased level of military personnel targeted has increased in the last three decades – possibly due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Islamic terrorists no longer need to blame the West in general; concrete wars can be used to condone violence. This is just an idea, not a research finding, so research would be needed to link the increase in guerilla warfare to the American occupations.

Analysis of the five case studies revealed consistency with previous research themes. Previous research discusses the prevalence of psychopathology and social ineptitude in lone wolf terrorists. The case studies likewise show instances of psychopathology and social ineptitude. This additionally fits with the data analysis from the dataset: loners were seen to be the most prevalent – and successful – type of lone wolf terrorist. Since the case studies were chosen due to their high fatality or injury rate, they represented successful cases. In this way, since loners are most likely to be successful, it is unsurprising that the case studies showed high prevalence of social ineptitude.

Another congruency with previous research was the influence of the Internet. In many of the case studies, the Internet influenced their radicalization. Some specifically were radicalized by Al-Awlaki's YouTube sermons. The Boston Bombers' success was additionally credited to the Internet, where they found their

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bomb-making recipe that injured 264 people.

Lastly, the case studies supported the previously researched trend that lone wolves are motivated by a combination of personal grievances and broader goals. Almost all of the perpetuators analyzed had immense personal grievances: divorce, custody issues regarding children, job loss, mental illness, harassment, and more. In all the cases, the perpetuators were not religiously devout all their lives – in most of the cases, radical Islam was used as a comfort after the suffering of personal grievances. Radical Islam was an attractive narrative for these people: it removed the blame from the individual, and externalized their personal problems and blamed Western society. Additionally, it condoned violence, and these people with personal frustrations used that to blame and to vent all of their problems out onto the world that had wronged them.

This study represented an overview of current trends and developments, linked to previous research themes. Future research is needed to look in-depth into each trend, and link the data to Islamic radicalization and, most importantly, prevention techniques.

Typology proposed by Pantucci, who characterizes four types of lone terrorists:

1. **Loners:** while they may utilize the ideological cover of an Islamist ideology to provide an explanation for their actions, they do not appear to have any actual connection or contact with extremists – beyond what they are able to access through passive consumption on the Internet or from society at large.
2. **Lone wolves:** they carry out their actions alone and without any physical outside instigation, but they do in fact emonstrate some level of contact with operational extremists. They are troubled individuals who seek solace in the extremist ideology – an ideology that while for the most part remains self-taught, also appears to be reinforced through online contacts with extremists.
3. **Lone wolf packs:** a group of individuals who self-radicalize using the Al Qaeda narrative.
4. **Lone attackers:** these are individuals who operate alone, but demonstrate clear command and control links with actual Al Qaeda core or affiliated groups. These attackers are not truly lone wolf terrorists, and this fourth type was included by Pantucci for comparison purposes.

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▶ **You can read the report at:** http://images.i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Lone-Wolf-Sarah-Teich-2013.pdf

Understanding Islamic Terrorism as Religious Sacrifice

By Prof. Louis René Beres

Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/16080#.VH2Q08mAOW4

Somewhat like war, Islamic terrorism is founded upon assorted fantasies of *redemption through sacrifice*. Today, the universal Jihadist rallying cry, "We love death," animates much of what is presented publicly as "liberation" or "self-determination,"[1] and is common to a broad variety of terrorist groups. This variegated collection includes both Sunni and Shia elements.

The rallying cry, always shrill, and always shouted in chorus, exhibits no core differences between ISIS in Iraq or Syria, and Hamas/Fatah in Gaza.

Oddly, this critical observation has been lost upon the administration in Washington. For some as yet undisclosed reason, the president decided to bomb the former, but (effectively) support the latter.

Despite readily discoverable commonalities of Islamist terror, in the particular evolution of Palestinian terror, there exists an almost unique historical narrative. Originally, before an explicitly sacred *love of death* took its uncompromising hold throughout the Islamic Middle East, the fraternity of Palestinian terrorist groups had brought together several extraordinarily disparate bedfellows.

Then, the principal desired end of insurrection and war, Israel's "liquidation" (the first term used most frequently in the Arab aggressor's lexicon) had amply justified all manner of eager participants.

Then, virtually every Arab enemy of Israel was more-or-less welcome to join in the expectedly

conclusive battle against "Zionists."

Then, even Marxists, and similarly flagrant "unbelievers," were welcomed under the same operational tent.

No more.

Today, the fight has changed from what had once been a preeminently secular and tactical one, to one that draws insistently upon generally unhidden commitments to *religious sacrifice*. These viscerally primal commitments are discernibly relentless, persistent, and conspicuous.

Speaking on official PA (Palestinian Authority) TV, on November 7, 2014, a senior Fatah official literally blessed all Islamic killers of Israelis, stating: "Jerusalem needs *blood* in order to *purify itself* of Jews."

Two days later, on November 9, 2014, PA television honored these same killers again, now expressing their latest sentiments as follows: "Greetings and honor to our heroic *Martyrs....*We stand submissive and humbled by what you gave and *sacrificed*."

Further, on November 14, 2014, representatives of the PA Ministry of Religious Affairs, seemingly summing up, wrote synthetically in *Al-Hayat Al-Jadida: "*Jerusalem needs *sacrifices* and *blood*."

Who are these heroic "martyrs?" Plainly, they are the 'courageous' Palestinians who drive cars into groups of women and children waiting at Israel's train or bus stations, who attack elderly Jews praying in the synagogues, and who randomly stab assorted civilians walking quietly on the streets on Jerusalem.

Seeing requires distance. The deepest roots of Jihadist terror originate from those cultures that embrace certain religious views of "sacrifice." In these mostly Arab cultures, the key purpose of sacrifice extends far beyond any presumed expectations of civic necessity (expectations, for example, reported by Plutarch, in his accounts of ancient Sparta). [2] More precisely, this rationale goes to the very heart of individual human fear, that is, to the palpable and ubiquitous dread of one's own death.

The promised reward for those who would sacrifice everything for jihad is salvation. In essence, these martyrs choose to "die" for their cause, not in order to expire, but rather, not to become "really" dead. This is because the pain and suffering of an ordinary death, they reason, is merely a passing distraction, a tolerably temporary inconvenience, one to be endured in the fully *rational*(social scientists would say,

"cost-effective") pursuit of a true immortality, in paradise.

Says *Sura* 2:154: "Do not think that those who are killed in the way of Allah are dead, for indeed they are alive, even though you are not aware."[3]

In the Arab Middle East, where theological doctrine divides carefully into the *dar al-Islam* (world of Islam) and the *dar al-harb* (world of war), acts of terror against unbelievers have long been taken as an exemplary expression of *sacredness*. Here, individual sacrifice derives, in large part, from a fervidly hoped-for conquest of personal death. By adopting such atavistic practice, the *Jihadist* terrorist expects to realize an otherwise unattainable *immortality*, not to mention other substantially seductive and corollary benefits.

For *Hamas,* which would ultimately dominate power in any ne w state of Palestine,[4] there are certain obligatory aspects of sacrificial terror that must never be overlooked. These aspects, underscoring the two-sided nature of terror/sacrifice - that is, the sacrifice of "The Jew," and the reciprocal sacrifice of "The Martyr" - is explicitly codified, within the *Charter of Hamas,* as a "religious" problem."

Earlier, Yasser Arafat's appointed clergy, preaching on the Temple Mount, had reaffirmed a core Islamic precept: "Palestinians spearhead Allah's war against the *Jews*. The dead shall not rise, until the Palestinians shall kill all the *Jews*...."

Most worth noting, in this very consequential reaffirmation, is Arafat's identification of the enemy in purely religious (not narrowly geopolitical) terms.

Always, from Arafat to Abbas, the true Jihadist's enemy is "The Jew," not *merely* "The Israeli."

Sometimes, when Jihadists settle upon using the specific tactic of suicide bombing - that is, when the older Palestinian leaders give orders, from Qatar, for young Palestinians to make sacrifices on behalf of all others - they leave nothing about their surrogates' promised immortality to chance. Because dying in the act of killing "infidels," "apostates," and "unbelievers" is sworn to buy freedom from the unbearable penalty of non-being,[5] these selected terrorists aim to conquer their dreaded mortality by killing

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themselves. Here, existential fears are converted into a twisted form of "heroism."

Of course, Israel and its myriad terrorist enemies display very different orientations to "peace." This stark asymmetry is not beside the point. Rather, it puts the Jewish State at a notable disadvantage.

To be sure, Israelis don't not share the Palestinians' commitment to immortality through homicidal forms of "suicide." Fundamentally unlike their Jihadist enemies, Israelis do not make celebratory plans to murder certain *other* human beings in order not to die themselves. Yet, it is still the Israelis, not the Palestinians, who are being urged by the "civilized world" to accept their own national disappearance.

Jurisprudentially, Israel is being pushed toward complicity in its own literal genocide.

Credo quia absurdum. "I believe because it is absurd." Under pertinent international law, war and genocide are not mutually exclusive. The planned Islamic war against Israel is conceived as a distinctly "final solution" for "The Jews."

The undisguised expectations of Palestinian terrorists regarding Israel's physical disappearance - expectations codified both verbally and cartographically, and on all official Palestinian maps - meet the specified criteria of the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*.[6]

For the United States, a state party to this authoritative treaty, it is worth noting that America has its own unambiguous legal obligation to support Israel against "Palestine." To wit, by virtue of Article 6 of the *U.S. Constitution* (the "Supremacy Clause"), all treaties entered into by the United States become the "supreme law of the land."

For Hamas, Islamic suicide represents not only the temporary "death" of heroic Muslims, but also the required disintegration of a religiously-despised Jewish state. For Israel, on the other hand, there is something innately wrong with this view, something "crazy," something that only an authentically "mad" adversary could possibly choose as its preferred strategy of confrontation. Nonetheless, as this particular Islamic view is the authentic source of Palestinian policies toward the Jewish State, Israel must fashion its security postures accordingly.

For Hamas and other Palestinians, suicide against Jews represents the highest form of political engagement, a divinely mandated road to salvation that rewards doubly, because the enemy infidel is forced to cooperate in its own uncompensated dying. For Israel, which has yet to fully understand that an asymmetrical sort of suicide is being sought through the creation of a Palestinian state, America's steadily undaunted commitment to a "Two-State Solution" may continue (erroneously) to appear more-or-less "realistic."

Israel faces an expanding threat of unconventional war and unconventional terrorism.[7] Faced with opponents who are not only willing to die, but who actually and ecstatically seek their own "deaths," Jerusalem must quickly understand the critical limits of ordinary warfare, national homeland defense, and strategic deterrence.

For Israel, the root "Middle East Peace Process" problem is *Jihadist* death fear, and the consequent religious compulsion to sacrifice certain despised *others*. This compulsion, in turn, stems from a firm doctrinal belief that *killing unbelievers*, and *being killed by unbelievers*, is the best available path to immortality. In short, an Islamist terrorist unwillingness to accept personal death leads to the killing of certain *others* in order to escape this death.[8]

For Jihadists, killing *Jews* offers the optimal immunization against personal death. Always.

Resembling more explicitly sacrificial elements of *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad*, the military wing of *Fatah* is now oriented toward much more than a purely nationalistic "armed struggle." It is openly dedicated to religious sacrifice, to a commitment that promises followers not just military victory over "Zionist occupiers," but, also an *immunity from death*.

What could be better? For the Palestinian terrorist, violence and the sacred remain closely intertwined. Israel, therefore, must think in terms of *desacrilizing* this relentless adversary, and somehow convincing him that ritual murders of Jews will not lead to paradise and sexual pleasures, but to untold "terrors of the grave."

Can such a desacrilization ever be accomplished through ordinary politics, including the U.S.-brokered "peace process?" To be persuasive, it would have to originate among certain influential Islamic clerics themselves. How could this improbable origination ever be made to work?

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Overall, Jerusalem must inquire, what is the correct "peace" strategy for Israel? As Palestinian statehood is already being endorsed and validated in the U.N., and among certain individual European states, Mr. Netanyahu will quickly need to acknowledge the fallacy of ever accepting a Palestinian state because it has allegedly agreed to "demilitarization."[9]

Every state, he will soon need to recognize, maintains an "inherent" and irreducible right of self-defense. This right would not be summarily withdrawn from "Palestine," even if it should make public its long-term program for aggression[10] against Israel. This is the case, moreover, whatever its leaders might have conceded in any pre-independence negotiations.[11]

President Obama's "Road Map" coaxes Israel along a determinably lethal excursion to unending war and terror. By ignoring the core roots of Palestinian terrorism, this twisting cartography can offer Israel only a contrived "Two-State Solution." Should Prime Minister Netanyahu agree to follow Washington's simplistic views, he will have misunderstood the deepest, and simultaneously most ineradicable, origins of Palestinian terrorism.

For Hamas, Fatah, and other Jihadist fighters, the terror-based struggle against Israel has never been about land compromises or halting "settlements." Always, it has been about *God* and about *immortality*. In this regard, we should be reminded that there is no greater political power on earth than power over death.

Never!

For Jihadists, the ethos of redemption through sacrifice remains an immutably core pillar of both individual and collective Islamic existence. It follows that Israel's and possibly even our own survival will ultimately be contingent upon understanding this grotesque ethos, and, reciprocally, on calculating just how it might be most effectively countered.

Nietzsche, writing in that part of *Zarathustra* that deals with "The New Idol," calls the state "the coldest of all cold monsters." More precisely, he continues, the state signifies "the will to death. Verily, it beckons to the preachers of death....Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous...."

At the time, Nietzsche had already understood that, at least in principle, it was the state that seemed most directly able to salve the ubiquitous "hunger for immortality."[12] Hegel, after all, had previously said (but then, in a markedly positive voice): "The State represents the march of God in the world."[13]

What could be more vital to understand? From an analytic standpoint, neither Nietzsche nor Hegel was mistaken, but their particular understandings were also limited and partial. Today, we can see, plainly, that there are other available objects of veneration that can relieve the apparently timeless human horror of death, most obviously certain Jihadist religious persuasions, and their various organizational incarnations. In an emergent "Palestine," these organizations are principal Jihadist terror groups, especially Hamas and Fatah.

Just as the state recurrently requires *blood sacrifice* as a tangible means to personal redemption, including even literal salvation, Jihadists require the same. They, too, wish to be recognized as dedicated "soldiers" of sacrifice. Once this derivative wish is more fully acknowledged, necessary measures to curtail the destructive power of pertinent terror groups could become substantially more promising.

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▶ **Sources are available at source's URL.**

Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), and publishes widely on world politics, terrorism, and international law. Born in Zurich, Switzerland, on August 31, 1945, he is the author of some of the earliest major books on nuclear war and nuclear terrorism, including Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat (1979) ; Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (1980); Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (1983); and Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (1986). Professor Beres' most recent writings can be found in The Atlantic; U.S. News & World Report; The New English Review; Israel National News; The Jerusalem Post; The Washington Times; and Oxford University Press. His recently published and more specifically academic articles have been featured in The Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); International Journal

Brainwashing and radicalization don't explain why young people join violent causes

By Jason Hart

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141203-brainwashing-and-radicalization-don-t-explain-why-young-people-join-violent-causes

Why do young people from Western societies join ISIS? Terms such as "brainwashing" and "radicalization" are typically and casually invoked to explain the phenomenon. Suggestions of brainwashing or radicalization imply that the object of such efforts has been profoundly diverted from their usual, reasonable way of thinking. The instigators of this mental trickery are implicitly credited with considerable psychological skill, while the target is simultaneously assumed to have some mental insufficiency or vulnerability. The young are commonly deemed to be easy prey for those seeking to enlist them for a "radical" cause. The problem is, it's just not that simple. Arguing that a 15 or 16-year-old is able to make a reasoned choice about engagement in hostilities risks exposing that young person to the full force of the law – but using loose, inadequate concepts such as brainwashing and radicalization to explain young people's engagement in political violence carries its own risks. It severely limits our ability to understand why young people are mobilized in support of a group such as Islamic State, and hinders intelligent debate about the wider changes needed to prevent them doing so. Moreover our efforts to reintegrate them once they come back are likely to prove desperately inadequate.

On the morning of 24 September 2014, 15-year-old Yusra Hussien left for school near her home in Easton, Bristol. She then disappeared. News reports surfaced a few days later that Yusra and a 17-year-old friend from London had reached Istanbul, fueling speculation that the two young women were heading for Syria to join Islamic State.

Terms such as "brainwashing" and "radicalization" were repeatedly and casually invoked to explain Yusra and her friend's actions. Understandable enough; how else to explain the uncharacteristic folly of a model student who was described by her teachers as "calm and collected"?

The problem is, it's just not that simple.

Weasel words

Suggestions of brainwashing or radicalization imply that the object of such efforts has been profoundly diverted from their usual, reasonable way of thinking. The instigators of this mental trickery are implicitly credited with considerable psychological skill, while the target is simultaneously assumed to have some mental insufficiency or vulnerability.

This may be a lack of agency, an inadequate understanding of the issues at stake, or just "weakness of mind."

The young are commonly deemed to be easy prey for those seeking to enlist them for a "radical" cause. Indeed, children and young people's engagement in oppositional politics has often been explained away by reference to their supposed psychological immaturity.

Outside of state-sanctioned exceptions (such as allowing 16 and 17-year-olds to vote in the Scottish referendum), political engagement by minors is liable to be dismissed as the product of mental or physical coercion, the incapacity associated with immaturity, or a combination of both.

The response from police, educators and political figures to protests by school students at the planned invasion of Iraq in 2003 illustrates the assumption of immaturity. Rallies held in various cities

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around the U.K. and in Parliament Square were uniformly depicted as the acts of "truants" who lacked "the experience to really understand the full ramifications of what they are talking about." But the same truants' reflections ten years on suggest these rallies were profoundly meaningful events for them, offering a real expansion of their political outlook and experience.

Similar, equally lazy assumptions still inform much of the debate around child soldiers, which has been raging since the late 1990s.

The push to end the recruitment of under-18s for military action has spawned academic studies, human rights reports, advocacy campaigns and measures adopted by the United Nations, including an Optional Protocol added to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that raised the minimum age of involvement in combat from 15 to 18. And yet, these initiatives have rarely paid serious attention to the reasons why the young might engage in military action. The underlying assumption, as usual, is that this is generally the result of some kind of coercion.

While horrific cases of kidnapping and intimidation undeniably continue to occur, detailed investigation of specific settings and even accounts from former underage soldiers reveal a more complex reality. Around the world, young people join military groups or engage in less organized political violence with diverse motives; they act out of self-defense, a sense of justice and revenge, or support for "community" — construed at local, national or transnational level.

Double standards

This unwillingness to seriously consider why children might engage in armed hostilities is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is also liable to come into play more particularly when the minors concerned fight for causes we deem objectionable.

A century ago, the estimated 250,000 boys who volunteered to fight for the British Army were hailed by newspaper editors and political leaders as heroes and patriots, not dupes or truants. The role of black South African schoolchildren in the struggle against Apartheid was scarcely pathologized or belittled.

The fact is that in a great many societies, teenagers under the age of 18 are still considered capable of reasoned choice about enlistment and involvement in political violence. But elsewhere, the assumption of incapacity offers former combatants deemed "children" a shield from the punishment meted out to their "adult" comrades and seniors.

Arguing instead that a 15 or 16-year-old is able to make a reasoned choice about engagement in hostilities risks exposing that young person to the full force of the law. On the other hand, using loose, inadequate concepts such as brainwashing and radicalization to explain young people's engagement in political violence carries its own risks. It severely limits our ability to understand why young people are mobilized in support of a group such as Islamic State, and hinders intelligent debate about the wider changes needed to prevent them doing so. Moreover our efforts to reintegrate them once they come back are likely to prove desperately inadequate.

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— Read more in Jason Hart, "The Politics of 'Child Soldiers'," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Fall-Winter 2006); Matthew Francis, "If you could really 'brainwash' young Muslims, ISIS would have a lot more British recruits," *The Conversation* (30 June 2014); and Yvan Guichaoua, *Understanding Collective Political Violence* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

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Maritime guns for hire adapt to changes in sea piracy

Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/us-piracy-shipping-guards-idUSKCN0JH2HC20141203

Cash-strapped maritime security firms are being forced to use fewer costly elite guards and to diversify into other businesses such as cyber security, as a steep decline in Somali pirate attacks and hotter competition erode fast-thinning margins.

Hundreds of security firms sprang up over the past seven years to offer protection to shipping companies, with scores of merchant vessels being boarded and sailors taken

hostage in pirate raids off the coast of conflict-torn Somalia.

However, **attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean have dropped from a peak of 237 in 2011 to just 10 in the first nine months of this year,** the lowest since the

piracy scourge began in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.

The fall has been helped by using armed guards, deploying naval forces and defending ships with barbed wire or fire hoses.

The cost of using guards has also halved as the sector has become more competitive, which though good for ship owners is bad for security firms.

"Day rates for embarked teams are continuously being squeezed to rock bottom," said retired rear admiral Vasilis Politis, managing director of Greek armed guard company Marine Security International.

The price for a security team to protect a ship has slumped from an average of $40,000 per voyage to around $18,000-$20,000, said Gerry Northwood, who previously commanded the British Royal Navy's Counter Piracy Task Group which detained 13 Somalis after an attack on a tanker in 2012.

A typical team comprises three or four guards, working round the clock and armed with semi-automatic weapons to maximize fire power and rifles for accuracy and range.

Faced with a tougher operating environment, some firms have switched from using former

U.S. and British marines and special forces to cheaper alternatives including guards from India, the Philippines and Estonia, said Ian May, Asia manager for Protection Vessels International.

Declining revenue has encouraged industry consolidation. Ambrey Risk, one of the biggest firms, bought the maritime security division of rival Drum Cussac this month, while Gulf of Aden Group Transits shut in July.

Peter Cook, chief executive of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), said its membership had fallen from a high of 180 companies in November 2012 to 140, and he anticipated further falls.

New business

Companies are trying to expand into new areas including cyber security for ships and the offshore industry, port security and training coast guards.

Some are also offering protection in areas where piracy has increased such as West Africa, with 23 attacks recorded up to September this year, and Asia, where almost 100 attacks were reported in the waters off Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.

However, restrictions on privately contracted armed guards in West Africa and the low level of violence normally used in attacks in Southeast Asia mean firms cannot necessarily replicate their Indian Ocean operations, said Mark Thomas, Asia Pacific

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business development manager at Dryad Maritime in Singapore.

Despite the drop in attacks, the Gulf of Aden still remains vital for the security business, with a fifth of global trade passing through it and at least 40 per cent of ships transiting the area had armed guards in July, according to SAMI.

Former British naval captain Northwood, who is chief operating officer at Maritime Asset Security and Training, said there were still probably two or three cases of Somali pirate boats probing the defenses of ships a month.

For now, naval patrols are set to continue. The European Union expects to extend its anti-piracy operations for another year and NATO is extending its to the end of 2016.

"If companies stop using armed guards and the naval presence disappears then we would not have to wait for too long for another wave of successful attacks," said Madis Madalik, chief operating officer of Estonian-based ESC Global Security.

Create jobs not jails to fight maritime crime, says Somaliland's counter-piracy chief

Source: http://www.defenceiq.com/naval-and-maritime-defence/articles/create-jobs-not-jails-to-fight-maritime-crime-says/?utm_source=1-6361871014&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=14+12+05 +DFIQ+NL&utm_term=DFIQ&utm_content=DFIQ&mac=OGIQ1-36N4O1G&disc=

If there's one thing that the Somaliland government wants us – the international community – to know about maritime crime and the country's future economic stability, it's this:

"Whether it's on our waters or on the waters of our neighbours in Somalia, as long as there are young Somali-speaking men in the Horn of Africa who have got access to arms and do not have any means of earning a living, the waters of the Horn of Africa will not be safe."

Mohamed Osman Ahmed is the Executive Director of Somaliland's Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office and is leading efforts in the country to eliminate maritime crime through coastal development programmes, local governance, and job creation.

Speaking exclusively to *Defence IQ*, Ahmed said that while piracy off the coast of Somaliland has fallen dramatically since 2012, there are other maritime threats that must now be addressed in a similar way. The root cause of all maritime crime is the same, so Ahmed believes all efforts must be targeted towards confronting the issues at source.

"One of the approaches that can solve the piracy problem is to create job opportunities for people in Somaliland and our neighbours in Somalia," he said.

The fisheries industry in the country collapsed during the war in the 90s but now Somaliland is working to restore this vital trade through new infrastructure and capacity building with assistance from its international partners.

"Somaliland is trying to rehabilitate the fishery sector," said Ahmed.

"There is an enormous effort from the private sector but we would like the training, the equipment, the knowhow and the financial

resources to completely rehabilitate our fishery sector and we need international assistance to achieve this.

"The Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy needs more support and we need to train marine biologists.

"We need cooling stations along the coast of Somaliland so fishermen can cool and freeze the fish they catch at sea too.

"The entire fisheries sector needs investment and that's where we should concentrate our efforts."

While piracy has declined in recent years, tackling the sharp rise of illegal fishing, human trafficking and arms smuggling in the Horn of Africa has demanded a more focused approach. Establishing new authorities, which are backed up by robust and clear legislation, is one of the key elements to Somaliland's strategy to help deter maritime crime with Ahmed confirming that the creation of a Maritime Law Enforcement Agency is in currently underway and in the draft stage.

"It has been translated from Somali with the assistance of EUCAP Nestor, which has also helped draft the legislation.

"We expect the Maritime Law Enforcement Agency to be in place by early 2015 to help

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protect our waters against piracy and illegal fishing.

"Also, there's an EU and UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime] joint action plan in which we're training maritime law enforcement officers for the Coast Guard. The joint action plan sets out that by the end of 2016 Somaliland should have a Maritime Law Enforcement Agency or Coast Guard that will be able to police our waters and conduct search and rescue operations. In fact it will fight all kinds of maritime crime whether it's piracy, illegal fishing, arms smuggling or human trafficking or any other related maritime crime."

While the rule of law is a vital element in the wider interests of governance, Ahmed is clear that community engagement and capacity building will be far more effective against the rise of maritime crime in the long-term than deterrence.

"Law enforcement alone cannot stop maritime crime happening in our region," he said. "We need to complement it with coastal development programmes and job creation within the region."

The Djibouti Code of Conduct was signed in 2009 to address the threat of piracy that was crippling the economy and free movement of vessels off the East African coast. The agreement encouraged the exchange of maritime information and intelligence between the signatory nations in a bid to boost collaboration and undermine the pirates. Together with international support and an influx of military task forces operating in the

Gulf of Aden, the Djibouti Code of Conduct has been successful in quelling the tide of a piracy epidemic.

But times have changed.

As Mohamed Osman Ahmed highlighted, illegal fishing, human trafficking and arms smuggling – where "illegal fishing is [now] the main threat to the stability of Somaliland and the region" – are responsible for draining resources today in the same way that piracy did a few years ago. Ahmed wants to see a new agreement with a wider scope that accounts for all contemporary maritime threats, not just piracy.

"I think the Djibouti Code of Conduct needs to be revisited and reviewed to include cooperation on all maritime crime."

Capacity building, job creation and good governance are vital, but doing so in collaboration with neighbouring countries and international partners is the critical point.

"We need to understand that maritime crime is transnational crime," said Ahmed.

"It needs the cooperation of all the countries in the region including Somalia, which on our side would be Puntland, Somaliland, Djibouti, Yemen, Oman and those in the Western Indian Ocean.

"There should be some sort of platform on which to share information in order to deter and stop maritime crime happening in the region.

"No single government and no single country can solve all of these issues, it has to be done within the framework of regional cooperation. It needs the cooperation of the region."

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Jihadist rehab Denmark style

Source: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/894885.shtml

==How do you turn around a young man who is determined to destroy the West?== In the Danish city of Aarhus, you take him to a cafe or a public library and talk about football.

This is the "softly-softly" approach of Mads, a mentor in an innovative program to de-radicalize young Muslim men who might otherwise turn to violence.

"The guy I'm working with now really wanted to go to Syria," said Mads, who is in his early 30s but asked not to be identified any further for fear of compromising his work.

"My aim is not to disconnect the religion, because I think it's fine that he's religious. But it's about obtaining a balance," he added.

Belying its reputation as a harmonious, wealthy country, Denmark has the second largest number of foreign fighters in Syria relative to its size among Western nations, behind only Belgium, according to an estimate by The Economist magazine.

The young men Mads works with grew up in places like the sprawling Gellerupparken, a dreary housing estate where four out of five are from immigrant homes.

With its graffiti, crumbling concrete and broken glass it is a far cry from Denmark's wealthy image - and only a short walk from Grimhojvej mosque.

This picture taken on November 14, 2014 shows Oussama el-Saadi, chairman of the mosque at Grimhojvej, outside the Aarhus, Denmark jihadist rehab. Photo: AFP

It has gained notoriety for refusing to denounce the ultra-radical Islamic State (IS), and is supportive of the approach of "do not make them feel that they have done something wrong. Give them an opportunity to come back and tell what they have experienced," according to Oussama el-Saadi, the chairman of the mosque.

This may help explain why in a city like Aarhus, with just 324,000 residents, as many as 30 people have gone to fight in Syria.

100 Danish combatants

About 100 Danes have taken part in Syria's bloody civil war, according to estimates by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. At least 16 have been killed, and roughly 50 have returned home.

Faced with this challenge, Denmark is offering rehabilitation programs to would-be fighters - and most controversially of all, even helps those returning from Syria.

A young man who came back from Syria was "shaken" and had seen things "that weren't quite normal for a regular young Danish guy," Mads said. The two started out by talking about football.

But the real objective was to prevent him from returning to Syria, and to motivate him to finish his education.

"Those were our primary targets, and they succeeded," Mads said, with a hint of pride.

It is part of a two-pronged approach - slapping travel bans on radicalized youths and jailing them if they break them, but also investing in preventive measures.

Aarhus was the first Danish city to launch an anti-radicalization scheme in 2007. Anyone can be referred to the scheme by family, friends or police, social workers and youth club leaders.

After a risk assessment, the person is offered counseling, a mentorship program and help with getting an education or a job, and finding housing.

"The one I have now I helped with writing applications for part-time work, and we went out and delivered them together," said Mads. They have also tried to bond by going to the library together.

Dispiriting slog

The mentors meet their charges once or twice a week on average, and it can be a dispiriting slog.

After meeting regularly since March, the boy Mads currently works with threatened to leave for Syria a few weeks ago.

This may reflect the difficulty of competing with organized religion and its lure of camaraderie, a sense of meaning - and ultimately salvation.

And that's not the only challenge the Aarhus program is facing. It regularly takes flak from politicians who believe the battle against extremism is best fought in the courts.

After it emerged that its staff cited real or perceived discrimination as a factor in becoming radicalized, some lawmakers reacted strongly.

Martin Geertsen of the main opposition Liberal Party said he wants to avoid a situation where society "feels sorry" for people who should really be punished.

In Belgium, Europe's largest exporter of foreign fighters to Syria per capita, a court has ordered that 46 suspected members of an Islamist group believed to be involved in sending young fighters to the country to stand trial.

Denmark, in contrast, has yet to charge anyone because while fighters who go to Syria may have

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violated anti-terrorism laws, securing evidence in the war-torn country is difficult, experts say.

Toke Agerschou, who heads the crime prevention effort by the city's schools, social services and police, said he was a pragmatist who was open to trying any de-radicalization method that worked, including confiscating passports.

"You have to take your punishment in a society governed by law," he said, but added that prison largely had "the opposite effect."

Since the Aarhus project began it has received around 130 enquiries about radicalization.

Most were offered advise. In 15 cases people were offered, and accepted, a mentorship program, out of which eight have been completed successfully - one "with limited success" - while seven are ongoing.

"You can liken it to a divorce," said Agerschou. "It's rarely something that goes away immediately; it might take months and years."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Yeah! Sure!!! Try also X-box or Playmobil! - mainly because brain genetic engineering will take some time to be available in a rehabilitation center next to you!

ISIS's latest killing machine: The 10-foot sniper rifle that can fire bullets three times the size of a normal gun

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2859301/ISIS-s-latest-killing-machine-10-foot-sniper-rifle-fire-bullets-three-times-size-normal-gun.html

It's so big that it has to be supported on two tripods and fires ammunition that's three times the size of standard rifle ammo.

An Isis terrorist has been photographed aiming a 10-foot long sniper rifle out of a flat window in Kobane. The fearsome weapon fires 23mm calibre bullets, far larger than the standard size.

Fearsome: An Isis terrorist has been photographed aiming a 10-foot long sniper rifle out of a flat window in Kobane

Gigantic: This picture shows a row of 23mm bullets - the same size as those fired by the 10-foot rifle

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Huge casings from the bullets can be seen on the floor next to the gunman.

What sort of effect this gun would have remains open to debate, however, according to firearms expert David Dyson.

He told MailOnline: 'The problem with identifying the effect of this gun is firstly that we don't know for sure what the calibre is, although there wouldn't be a lot of point in building something like this if it wasn't of a significant calibre. Secondly, and probably of more importance, we don't know how well it is made: is the barrel accurately machined and rifled?

'The effect will also depend on the type of ammunition used. These rounds exist [23mm] fitted with high explosive incendiary or armour piercing incendiary projectiles.They will be effective against personnel and vehicles including lightly armoured ones.'

The picture emerged after a show of force from al Qaeda's Nusra Front, a rival group. They toured in a convoy around villages they said they had captured from Syrian rebels.

Dozens of pick-up trucks bristling with anti-aircraft guns and men armed with heavy machine guns drove through settlements in the southern countryside of Idlib.

France ordered to compensate Somali pirates

Source: http://www.dw.de/france-ordered-to-compensate-somali-pirates/a-18110804

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) told France on Thursday that delays in bringing apprehended Somali pirates before a judge were unacceptable. The eight pirates were arrested after attacking two French ships on separate occasions in 2008 off the Somali coast.

The ECHR said French authorities were wrong to keep the pirates in custody for an additional 48 hours after arriving on French soil, instead of "promptly" presenting them before a judge.

The arrests took place more than "6,000 kilometers" (3,730 miles) from French territory," the ECHR said, acknowledging that there were "completely exceptional circumstances" to justify a long detention without seeing a judge. Not including the

48 hours in France, one group was held for nearly five days at sea, the other for almost a

each pirate for "moral damages," plus between 3,000-6,000 euros in legal costs.

© picture-alliance/dpa

week.

But the ECHR said the groups should have been presented "without delay" to a judge when they arrived on French territory.

The Strasbourg-based court said the delay constituted a "violation of their rights to freedom and security," in a ruling published in French.

France was made to pay between 2,000 euros and 5,000 euros ($2,480-$6,200) to

In late 2012, the Malaysia-based International Maritime Bureau reported pirate attacks to be the decline, with the fall in incidents off Somalia particularly striking. The deployment of naval forces, such as NATO's Operation Ocean Shield and the EU Naval Shipping Force, are seen as major factors, as are initiatives by shipping operators such as hiring private security teams.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: A good solution would be to have a legal cell in all warships conducting high-risk operations off Somalia. This could save time and money while it would be a good opportunity for those behind desks to see what is happening in real life. This is the most polite comment I can write given my highest respect to law and people implementing law. I just have an inherent distaste for bureaucracy and human brain arteriosclerosis.

Why Colombia's War Against the FARC Isn't Over Yet

By Danielle Renwick and Stephanie Hanson
Source: http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/12/why-colombias-war-against-farc-isnt-over-yet/100193/

Civil conflict in Colombia, **one of the United States' closest allies in Latin America, has left as many as 220,000 dead and 5.7 million displaced over the last half century.** Territorial disputes among the military, left-wing guerrillas, and right-wing paramilitaries have wracked much of the country's rural areas even as Colombia's economy has surged (in 2014, its economy was poised to grow 5 percent) and overall violence has fallen. Renewed talks between the government and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) may end the hemisphere's longest-running armed conflict.

History and Ideology
The FARC and ELN were founded in 1960s in the wake of more than a decade of political

violence in Colombia, known as *La Violencia* (1948–58). Excluded from a power-sharing agreement

that ended the fighting, communist guerillas took up arms against the government. FARC was composed of communist militants and peasant self-defense groups, and the ELN's ranks were dominated by students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing intellectuals hoping to replicate Fidel Castro's communist revolution in

Cuba. Right-wing paramilitary groups formed in the late 1960s after the Colombian Congress passed legislation that allowed citizens to form local self-defense organizations. The largest paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, was on the U.S. State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations until July 2014 (the group formally disbanded in 2006, but splinter groups remain).

Although some say the ELN is more ideological than the FARC, the two groups have similar programs. Both oppose U.S. influence in Colombia, the privatization of natural resources, and rightist violence, and claim to represent the rural poor against Colombia's wealthy. The FARC is primarily a rural organization while the ELN's supporters tend to be in urban areas. In some parts of the country they cooperate; in others they have clashed directly. Both are designated by the State Department as foreign terrorist organizations.

"The FARC is the critical group," says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, speaking of both groups' bilateral negotiations with the government. "If there's an agreement with the FARC, that would be a major advance. If there's an agreement with the ELN and not the FARC, then there's still a real problem."

The Crackdown

Both groups have been in decline since Alvaro Uribe came to office in 2002 in the wake of failed peace talks led by his predecessor, Andres Pastrana. Having campaigned on taking an aggressive stance against the guerrillas, Uribe cracked down on the FARC and ELN, and Colombian society saw dramatic drops in violence. These moves boosted the Uribe administration's popularity but human rights groups have accused the police of corruption and the government of collusion with right-wing paramilitaries.

The FARC had just more than seven thousand members in 2013, down from sixteen thousand in 2001, the Colombian government says. The group operated in as much as one-third of the country in the early 2000s, mostly in the jungles of the south and east, but by 2014 its ranks were diminished. **The ELN, which operates mainly in northeastern Colombia, is estimated to have about 1,400 members,** far fewer than it had in the late 1990s. The ELN has been weakened by advances by paramilitaries, competition with the FARC, and more aggressive government security forces.

Financing Operations

The FARC and ELN historically generated much of their revenue from the international drug trade and ransoms from kidnappings. Estimates of **the income the FARC derives from the sale of narcotics vary widely. InSight Crime, an online publication that specializes in organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, put a conservative estimate at $200 million in 2012, while Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon said the figure could be as high as $3.5 billion.** The U.S. government alleges the group accounts for 60 percent of Colombian cocaine exported to the United States, and the U.S. Treasury has frozen the assets of several FARC members it asserts are significant narcotics traffickers.The FARC also profits from rural extortion and, more recently, from illegal gold mining. The ELN's primary income source is also drug trafficking, a shift from

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the ransom and extortion payments that accounted for much of its funding in the 1980s and 1990s.

Kidnappings and Acts of Terror
The FARC and ELN both have histories of using terrorism and kidnapping for leverage and income. In one of its most notable

kidnappings, the FARC abducted presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in 2002. The group held her and three American military contractors until 2008, when Colombian forces rescued them and twelve other hostages. Other notable incidents include the assassination of a former culture minister in 2001 and the hijacking of a domestic commercial flight in 2002. Colombia's National Center for Historical Memory estimates that guerrilla groups kidnapped twenty-five thousand people between 1970 and 2010.
In 2012, in preparations for peace talks with the Colombian government, the FARC renounced kidnapping. The group continues to attack infrastructure projects, targeting the country's economy. A 2014 Human Rights Watch report alleges that in southwestern Colombia, the FARC perpetrates violence against civilians with impunity.

Plan Colombia and Rebels' Foreign Ties
Guerrilla and paramilitary involvement in the international drug trade has meant that outside governments—particularly the United States, the largest market for Colombian cocaine—have an interest in promoting peace and dismantling the country's trafficking networks. **Between 2000 and 2011, the United**

States provided more than $8 billion is mostly military assistance through Plan Colombia. In addition to their security alliance, the United States and Colombia have close economic ties: the United States is Colombia's largest trading partner, with a bilateral free trade agreement that entered into force in 2012.

Support from the United States has helped Colombia thwart the FARC, but these ties have led to tensions between Colombia and its neighbors—particularly the leftist governments of neighborhing Venezuela and Ecuador.
During Uribe's crackdown, both the FARC and ELN sought refuge in rural areas bordering Venezuela and Ecuador. Both rebel groups frequently cross into neighboring territory to avoid Colombian military sweeps. In 2008 one of the FARC's senior leaders, Raul Reyes, was killed during Colombian airstrikes on a jungle encampment on the Ecuadorian side of the border.
Following Reyes's death in 2008, the Colombian military claimed to have found documents that indicated Venezuela and Ecuador were providing material support to the FARC. According to these documents, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez gave the group $300 million. Venezuela denied the allegations and said the funds were to secure the release of hostages.
In 2009 the *New York Times* reported continued contact between the rebel group and high-ranking officials in the Venezuelan military and intelligence services. Tensions peaked in November 2009 when Chavez mobilized troops at the border, accusing Colombia of conspiring with the United States to attack Venezuela. When Santos took office in 2010, both he and Chavez agreed to "turn a new page" in the countries' relationship.
Despite such tensions, Chavez facilitated communication between the Colombian government and the FARC, particularly between 2007 and his death in 2013. He helped secure the release of two

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hostages in 2008 and was involved in talks with the FARC that laid the groundwork for negotiations with the Colombian government.

Prospects for Peace
The Colombian government has held inintermittent peace talks with the FARC and ELN since the 1980s. The groups have been sufficiently weakened that they are now willing to negotiate with the government. The current talks began between the FARC rebels and the Santos administration began in secret in 2010 and were made public in 2012 in Havana. The governments of Cuba, Norway,Venezuela, and Chile are acting as hosts, mediators, and observers to the talks. **The negotiations have a five-point agenda:**

- land reform,
- political participation,
- drug trafficking,
- victims' rights and reparations, and
- disarmament of the rebels and implementation of the peace deal.

The two sides have been able to reach draft agreements on the first three points, but victims' rights and the group's disarmament have proven more complicated. "They are now involved in one of the trickiest issues, focusing on the rights of victims, which necessarily touches onto questions of transitional justice and how much impunity or prosecution [to pursue], which is one of the most emotionally difficult and visceral issues for the public," says Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Both sides have acknowledged commiting human rights violations and have agreed that victims have a right to "truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees that violations will not be repeated ". However negotiators are struggling to define who should be considered victims (6.7 million people have registered as victims of parties to the conflict) and agree on how to bring perpetrators to justice.

The purpose of the talks is "not to humiliate the FARC but to persuade the guerrillas to swap their guns for votes."
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos

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One of the central principles of the negotiations is that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"; there will be no partial application of the accords. Santos has also refused to implement a cease-fire during the talks, saying that doing so would create an incentive for the insurgent group to prolong the process. If an agreement is reached, Santos has said, he will put the terms before a popular referendum.

Santos's reelection was widely seen as a vote in favor of continuing the talks. But rebel attacks on Colombia's oil infrastructure in July 2014 and the capture of army General Ruben Dario Alzate in November threatened to jeopardize progress. Public confidence in the talks dropped slightly following the infrastructure attack, and Santos suspended negotiations following Alzate's abduction. However, when FARC announced plans to

release the general, Santos said he would resume negotiations.

Santos, who modeled elements of the

negotiations on the UK–Irish Republican Army peace negotiations in the 1990s, told the Guardian that the purpose of the talks is "not to humiliate the FARC but to persuade the guerrillas to swap their guns for votes."

Some observers have cited the example of the M-19 movement, a Colombian guerilla organization that in the late 1980s became a nonviolent political party. (It later disbanded, and its members joined other left-leaning political parties.)

A truce could bring about major changes in Colombia; rural development and reintegration programs for both victims and rebels are expected to be part of any settlement. Santos has called for a "Marshall Plan" for Colombia,

appealing for international support to finance rural redevelopment, whose costs lawmakers estimate could run at least $45 million over the next ten years. Even if a peace referendum is passed, rebuilding Colombia's countryside may produce challenges of its own. Says Arnson, "I would not underestimate the difficulties in implementation—in terms of violence and in terms of implementing all the terms that have been subscribed to."

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The Koran and Eternal War

By Raymond Ibrahim
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4905/the-koran-and-eternal-war

News recently emerged that Russia was banning key Islamic scriptures—including Sahih Bukhari—on the charge that they

promote "exclusivity [supremacism] of one of the world's religions," namely Islam; or, in the words of a senior assistant to the prosecutor of Tatarstan Ruslan Galliev, "a militant Islam" which "arouses ethnic, religious enmity."

If Sahih Bukhari, a nine-volume hadith collection compiled in the 9th century and seen by Sunni Muslims as second in importance only to the Koran itself is being banned for inciting hostility, where does that leave the Koran?

After all, if Sahih Bukhari contains pro-terrorism statements attributed to the prophet of Islam and calls to kill Muslims who leave Islam, the Koran, Islam's number one holy book itself is

full of intolerance and calls for violence against non-believers. A tiny sampling of proclamations from Allah follows:

- "I will cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers, so strike [them] upon the necks [behead them] and strike from them every fingertip'" (8:12).
- "Fight those among the People of the Book [Christians and Jews] who do not believe in Allah nor the Last Day, who do not forbid what Allah and His Messenger have forbidden, and who do not embrace the religion of truth [Islam], until they pay the jizya with willing submissiveness and feel themselves utterly subdued" (9:29).
- "Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them—seize them, besiege them, and make ready to ambush them!" (9:5).
- "Fighting has been enjoined upon you [Muslims] while it is hateful to you" (2:216).

That Islam's core texts incite violence and intolerance has many ramifications, for those willing to go down this path of logic.

For example, as I argued more fully here, although Muslims around the world, especially in the guise of the 57-member state Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), continue to push for the enforcement of

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"religious defamation" laws in the international arena, one great irony is lost, especially on Muslims: if such laws would ban movies and cartoons that defame Islam, they would also, by logical extension, need to ban the religion of Islam itself—the only religion whose core texts actively defame other religions.

Consider what the word "defamation" means: "to blacken another's reputation" and "false or unjustified injury of the good reputation of another, as by slander or libel," are typical dictionary definitions.

What, then, do we do with Islam's core religious texts—not just Sahih Bukhari but the Koran itself, which slanders, denigrates and blackens the reputation of other religions?

Consider Christianity alone: Koran 5:73 declares that "Infidels are they who say God [or "Allah"] is one of three," a reference to the Christian Trinity; Koran 5:72 says "Infidels are they who say God is the Christ, [Jesus] son of Mary"; and Koran 9:30 complains that "the Christians say the Christ is the son of God … may Allah's curse be upon them!"

Surely such verses defame the Christian religion and its central tenets—not to mention create hostility towards its practitioners. In short, the argument that some Islamic books should be banned on grounds that they incite segregation and violence is applicable to the Koran itself, which unequivocally defames and creates hostility for unbelievers, that is, non-Muslims.

Is the Koran Different?

That said, in the "real world" (as it currently stands), the very idea of banning the Koran—believed by over a billion people to be the unalterable word of God—must seem inconceivable.

For starters, whenever Muslims are pressed about the violent verses in the Koran, they often take refuge in the argument that other scriptures of other religions are also replete with calls to violence and intolerance—so why single out the Koran?

To prove this, Muslim apologists almost always point to the Hebrew Scriptures, more widely known as the "Old Testament." And in fact, the Old Testament is replete with violence and intolerance—all prompted by the Judeo-Christian God.

The difference between the violent passages in the Koran and those in the Old Testament (as more comprehensively explained here) is this: the Old Testament is clearly describing historic episodes whereas the Koran, while also developed within a historical context, uses generic, open-ended language that transcends time and space, inciting believers to attack and slay nonbelievers today no less than yesterday. Thus in the Old Testament God commands the Hebrews to fight and kill "Hittites," "Amorites," "Canaanites," "Perizzites," "Hivites," and "Jebusites"—all specific peoples rooted to a specific time and place; all specific peoples that have not existed for millennia. At no time did God give an open-ended command for the Hebrews, and by extension their Jewish descendants, to fight and kill all "unbelievers."

To be sure, Muslims argue that the verses of the Koran also deal with temporal, historical opponents, including the polytheists of Mecca, and to a lesser extent, the Byzantine and Sassanian empires.

The problem, however, is that rarely if ever does the Koran specify who its antagonists are the way the Old Testament does. Instead, Muslims were (and are) commanded to fight the "People of the Book," which Islamic exegesis interprets as people with scriptures, namely, Christians and Jews—"*until* they pay the jizya with willing submissiveness and feel themselves utterly subdued" (9:29) and to "slay the idolaters *wherever* you find them" (9:5).

The two Arabic conjunctions "until" (*hata*) and "wherever" (*haythu*) demonstrate the perpetual and ubiquitous nature of these commandments: There are still "People of the Book" who have yet to "feel themselves utterly subdued" (especially all throughout the Americas, Europe, and Israel) and "idolaters" to be slain "wherever" one looks (especially Asia and sub-Saharan Africa).

In fact, the salient feature of almost all of the violent commandments in Islamic scriptures is their open-ended and generic nature: "Fight *them* until there is no more chaos and [all] religion belongs to Allah" (Koran 8:39).

This fact will ensure that as long as the Koran proliferates and is read as God's literal word, its readers will continue to exist in a dichotomized world, themselves versus the rest.

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Was al-Qaeda a winner or loser from the Arab uprisings?

By James L. Gelvin

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141205-was-alqaeda-a-winner-or-loser-from-the-arab-uprisings

At first glance it appears that the Arab uprisings have strengthened al-Qaeda and similar groups that fly the black banner. With the possible exception of Tunisia, the rest of the "Arab Spring" countries have either experienced unprecedented repression (Egypt, Bahrain) or chaos (Libya, Yemen, Syria). Thus, many in the Arab world have come to believe that the removal of local autocrats hardly guarantees good governance – an argument al-Qaedists have been making for years.

The uprisings weakened the control of some Arab governments over their territories. This provided al-Qaeda affiliates with sanctuaries from which they might harass their enemies. From Tunisia to the Sinai to Syria and Iraq, affiliates, wannabes, and copycat groups proliferated, wreaked havoc on fragile transitional governments, and sometimes took the lead in ongoing struggles. One even established a caliphate of its own carved out of Syria and Iraq. Finally, uprisings in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain seem to confirm al-Qaeda's core belief that victory against oppression could be won only through violence.

Nevertheless, the proliferation of affiliates masks a phenomenon that would have been deeply troubling to the original al-Qaeda cohort. From its inception, al-Qaeda was not big on organization. Bin Laden himself once remarked there was no such thing as al-Qaeda. The term, he claimed, merely referred to what a bunch of guys hanging out in the Afghan badlands waging jihad called their headquarters, their base (al-Qaeda in Arabic). This was the term which Westerners latched on to and endowed with substance. More important than organization was ideology — the common bond that held al-Qaeda affiliates together and united them.

Al-Qaeda's ideology can be broken down into two parts: First, al-Qaedists believe that the Islamic world is at war with a transnational Crusader-Zionist conspiracy which includes states hostile to the Islamic world. Among them are the United States and the rest of the West, Israel, Russia, and even India and China. It is this "far enemy," and not the local despots (the "near enemy") who do its bidding that should be the target of jihad. For al-Qaeda, local despots are merely the henchmen of the "far enemy" and have no power except that which the latter has endowed them with. Thus, **once the "far enemy" is dealt a critical blow, the power of the "near enemy" would crumble.**

There's a marked difference between al-Qaeda and ISIS/IS

Al-Qaeda also opposes the division of the Islamic world into individual nation states which, they claim, is a trick perpetrated by the Crusader-Zionist conspiracy to keep the Islamic world weak and divided. For al-Qaeda, state boundaries are to be ignored, if not eliminated. That is why al-Qaeda affiliates are not named after states but rather after regions: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (North Africa); al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (actually, fi bilad ar-rafidin — in the land of the two rivers — usually mistranslated as al-Qaeda in Iraq). al-Qaeda has never made clear what will happen after the nation state is eliminated from the Islamic world except for scattered and vague references to a restored caliphate whose definition shifts from al-Qaeda spokesman to al-Qaeda spokesman. Nevertheless, these two points are the foundation for the al-Qaeda philosophy.

But now al-Qaeda's ideological cohesion has dissipated. Local groups modeling themselves on al-Qaeda and calling themselves "Ansar al-Sharias" have emerged in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2010-11 in various countries. Emulating al-Qaeda's tactics but picking and choosing from its philosophy, they have taken on local coloration, have forsaken global jihad in favor of fighting their own weak post-"Arab Spring" governments (the "near enemy"), and name themselves after the states in

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which they operate — Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, etc. In other words, they ignore the two central tenets of al-Qaeda's ideology.

Nowhere is the rift between al-Qaeda and its offshoots more evident than in Syria. Not only did ISIS/IS defy al-Qaeda central by refusing to leave the struggle in Syria to a rival group, Jabhat al-Nusra, as Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda central ordered it to, its leader put himself above al-Zawahiri by declaring himself caliph; that is, the supreme leader of the Muslim world. ISIS/IS also promotes the doctrine of takfir — the practice of declaring self-professed Muslims apostates, thus authorizing "true Muslims" to kill them. Hence, the sectarian bloodbaths unleashed by ISIS/IS, which al-Qaeda central finds counterproductive and has roundly condemned.

And even Jabhat al-Nusra, an official al-Qaeda affiliate, abandoned central elements of al-Qaeda's belief system by asserting its struggle is in Syria alone and its aim is to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It has set aside the Islamic punishments and restrictions on personal behavior and religious practice that made ISIS/IS unpopular in the territories it "liberates," and has even fought pitched turf wars with ISIS/IS.

What, then, is al-Qaeda's current state? If one looks at al-Qaeda not as an entity but as a tendency within a broader jihadi movement, it might be argued that the groups that operate as al-Qaeda affiliates, wannabes, and copycats have profited from the Arab uprisings in terms of expanding their operations and digging in, although in the process many have jettisoned many of the central tenets of the original cohort. This might be evolution, but it is just as likely to mark the deterioration or even the dissolution of the al-Qaeda wing of the jihadi movement.

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Death of an American 'Infidel' in Abu Dhabi

By Phyllis Chesler
Source: http://www.meforum.org/4906/an-american-infidel-in-abu-dhabi

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On December 1st, a figure in a black burqa, armed with an eight-inch knife, entered the upscale Boutik shopping mall located in Reem Island, the neighborhood where most of Abu

Dhabi's 40,000 expatriates live.

The black burqa'ed figure waited for more than an hour in a woman's toilet—then stabbed the first white blonde infidel American woman who came in to use the facilities six times until she was dead. Then, with the possible help of two

other women, the mysterious black burqa'ed figure either smoothly and calmly walked away, or did so in a frenzied fashion (there are conflicting eye witness reports about this). In any event, the killer entered an elevator and disappeared.

The victim's name was Ibolya Ryan (photo). She was a Hungarian-born and Romanian-raised kindergarten teacher and the divorced mother of two 11 year-old twin boys, Adam and Aiden. Her former husband lives in Colorado. Ryan had described herself in an online profile for a teacher-recruiting company as "Romanian born" and someone who has worked "in four countries over the last 15 years." Ryan wanted to "experience the Arab world…their culture and daily life."

Tragically, she has done just that. At a time of fierce Islamic fundamentalist jihad, Ibolya, a civilian, may have been targeted by jihadists. In the wake of an anonymous posting

on a jihadist site that encouraged attacks on American teachers in the Middle East, the U.S. embassy in Abu Dhabi, UAE posted an October 29 security warning for U.S. citizens, especially "teachers at international schools." This included the following:

Avoid crowds or large gatherings when traveling in public; Identify safe areas (for example police stations, hospitals) in your area and how to get to them quickly; Tell co-workers or neighbors where you are going and when you intend to return; Minimize your profile while in public; Always carry a cellphone…; Be prepared to postpone or cancel activities for personal safety concerns.

In other words: Live vigilantly, live fearfully, live indoors as much as possible and have as little contact with strangers, especially with Arab Muslim strangers, as possible.

This is no way to live. But that is the point of such terrorist intimidation-- namely, to make life unlivable, unbearable, so that the infidel will either convert to jihadist Islamism or leave Muslim lands.

On the other hand, the UAE is a strong ally of the United States. Every state in the United States exports to the UAE and more than 1000 American firms have an on-the-ground presence. Strategic American and UAE alliances exist in terms of oil, medical, and military equipment and personnel—but most important, perhaps, is the fact that the UAE "was the first country to support the United States at the advent of Desert Storm; the only Arab country to participate with the US in five coalition actions over the last 20 years: Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Bosnia-Kosovo, and the First Gulf War."

More importantly, the UAE supports and enforces UN sanctions to contain Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities and, since mid-September of this year, "the UAE has flown dozens of missions against ISIL targets."

The murder of Ibolya Ryan might also have been a targeted message to the governments of both the UAE and the United States, one that hoped to destroy their relationship in terms of the ongoing joint fight against the most barbaric forms of Islamic fundamentalism.

Jihadists wish to intimidate Americans abroad in Muslim countries so that they move back to America. But jihadists also wish to punish any individual Muslim or Muslim country for daring to work with infidels against Islamic fundamentalists. How this intimidation is handled, both by individuals and by governments, is bound to affect the course of the war between civilization and barbarism.

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New Routes of Terrorism

Source: http://www.newdelhitimes.com/new-routes-of-terrorism123/

Pakistan has been indulging in the nefarious games of cross border terrorism against India from its inception by exploiting the sensitivities of India's religious and cultural communities. There are a number of training camps in POK in which terrorists are trained and sent inside Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Direct accessibility and the porous nature of the borders allow insurgent groups tactical flexibility. Pakistani sponsored terrorist networks are on the constant lookout for new routes for sneaking into India. The master minds of terrorism on a daily basis try and create new routes of smuggling their men and weapons to India. Along with the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir as the favoured points for terrorists to infiltrate into India, porous areas along the international borders with Bangladesh and Nepal have also emerged as a hub for terror activities.

Indian intelligence inputs confirm that Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has been using Nepalese territory to carry out anti-India activities since the 1990s.Wikileaks documents have also revealed that the ISI has created a number of terrorist fronts in Nepal and has also pushed in men and explosives through the border to carry out terror attacks in India. The India-Nepal border is also a frequent entry point for smuggling of weapons such as AK-47 rifles, Chinese pistols and M-16 rifles. Similarly, the increasing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh has resulted in the large- scale influx of the foot- soldiers of jihad terrorism and pan- Islamic

fundamentalism on Indian soil, destabilizing the country and threatening national security. In addition to the Bangladesh and Nepal borders, terrorists are finding new avenues on

the porous Indo-Myanmar border. India shares a 1,640 km-long porous border with Myanmar which is notorious for movement of terrorists and smuggling of small arms and narcotics. Innumerable incidents involving cross-border movement of militants operating from Myanmar have been reported. The continuous smuggling of small arms across the Indo-Myanmar borders is a major concern for India's security establishment.

Moreover, in a development that has serious security implications for India, Taliban has successfully recruited Rohingya Muslims, Bangladeshis, and Indonesian nationals and are training them in an undisclosed camp in Myanmar. It is no secret that Pakistan and Taliban are in collusion with each other and as such Pakistan will make every effort to use the extremist in Myanmar to sow terror into India. The recent arrest of Khalid Mohammed, who is a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)-trained Myanmar citizen, also a member of a militant outfit Rohingya Solidarity Organization, bears evidence to the facts that Pakistani terrorism has established active contacts with militant networks along the Indo –Myanmar border. Khalid was a member of the militant group

Rohingya Solidarity Organisization (RSO), which receives support from terror outfits such as Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh and Pakistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami in Afghanistan, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in Jammu and Kashmir, and Angkatan Belia Islam sa-Malaysia (ABIM) – the Islamic Youth Organization of Malaysia.

Militant outfits like Lashkar-e - Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), are further working to extend their footprint along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border by exploiting the sectarian violence targeted against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar's Rakhine state. There have been confirmed reports that Pakistan had been trying to set up training camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border for Rohingya extremists, in consultation with Pakistan-based LeT commander Ustad Abdul Hamid.

The team of New Delhi Times (NDT) also conducted its own research into this issue. NDT conducted a special interview with a former strategic commander of JEM. The former JEM man revealed a possible scenario that Pakistan would contemplate to spread terror into Indian territories through the porous Myanmar border. It would happen so that terrorists could easily procure weapons – including nuclear one's – from Pakistan. Then, they would steal a frigate ship, go to India – Myanmar border, and then enter India by road. The former commander also told that although these roads to India have several checkpoints, they are also manned at regular intervals by the members of the Jamat- e –Islami members, who in turn secure a safe passage for their terrorist brethren.

There have been several instances when terrorists have entered into India not from Kashmir but from the Bangladesh border, major steps has been taken by both India and Bangladesh to protect these borders, secret joint operations have been carried out between paramilitary forces from India and Bangladesh to arrest terrorists trying to cross into India from Bangladesh.

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ISIS – Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization

By The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/12/isis-portrait-jihadi-terrorist-organization-part-1/

This study examines the nature of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), an Islamic Salafist-jihadi terrorist organization founded a decade ago as a branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. It established itself during the fighting against the United States in the Sunni regions of western Iraq and spread to eastern and northern Syria during the Syrian civil war. In the summer of 2014 ISIS scored dramatic achievements, among them the occupation of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and the declaration of the "Islamic Caliphate," headed by a charismatic Iraqi terrorist operative nicknamed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

ISIS began as a branch of Al-Qaeda, founded in Iraq in 2004 after the American invasion and headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. It filled the security and governmental vacuum created by the disintegration of the Iraqi army and Saddam Hussein's regime, accompanied by the increasing alienation of the Sunni Muslims from the central, Shi'ite-affiliated government in Baghdad sponsored by the United States. The branch of Al-Qaeda gradually established itself in Iraq during the fighting against the United States and its allies, adopted the name the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), and became a central force among the anti-American insurgents.

Towards the end of the American presence in Iraq the ISI was weakened (as were other insurgents), the result of America's military successes combined with its wise policy of fostering the Sunni tribes in western Iraq (ISIS' principal domain). However, the Americans did not continue the policy, and later policies carried out by Shi'ite Adnan al-Maliki and the American withdrawal from Iraq all contributed to strengthening the ISI. That gave it a convenient starting point for its operations when the Americans eventually withdrew from Iraq.

The civil war that broke out in March 2011 made Syria fertile ground for the spread of the ISI to Syria. In January 2012 the Al-Nusra Front ("support front") was founded as the Syrian branch of the ISI. However, the two disagreed early on and the Al-Nusra Front split off from the Islamic State in Iraq, which then changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq

and Greater Syria (ISIS). Al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced its support for the Al-Nusra Front and its dissociation from the ISI. After the split ISIS gained military successes, leading it to declare the Islamic State (or the "Caliphate State"), while the rival Al-Nusra Front has weakened.

ISIS is an Islamic Salafist-jihadi organization. Salafism is an extremist Sunni political-religious movement within Islam that seeks to restore the golden era of the dawn of Islam(the time of the prophet Muhammad and the early Caliphs who followed him). That is to be done, according to Salafist jihadist ideology, by jihad (a holy war) against both internal and external enemies. Jihad, according to Salafist jihadism, is the personal duty of every Muslim. Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations (of which ISIS is one) sprang from Salafist jihadism.

According to the ISIS concept, Islam's golden era will be restored through the establishment of a supranational Islamic Caliphate modeled after the regimes of the first Caliphs after the death of Muhammad. It will be ruled by Islamic religious law (the sharia), according to its most extreme interpretation. The Caliphate will arise on the ruins of the nation states established in the Middle East after the First World War. Some of them, including Syria and Iraq, where ISIS operates, are in the process of disintegrating in the wake of the upheaval in the Middle East, creating favorable conditions for the vision of an Islamic Caliphate.

The territory of the Caliphate State, whose establishment was declared by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, lies in eastern Syria and western Iraq. ISIS seeks to expand the Caliphate throughout Syria and Iraq and finally take control of them. After that, the states belonging to "greater Syria" will be annexed, that is, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and after them other countries in the Middle East and beyond. According to the ISIS vision as it appears on its maps, the future Islamic Caliphate will include vast stretches of North Africa, Asia and the Caucasus, and parts of Europe that were once under Muslim rule, such as Spain and the Balkans.

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The main characteristics of ISIS and its military campaign

1) Military capabilities: ISIS has an estimated 25,000 operatives in Syria and Iraq, and their number is growing. In ITIC assessment, as many as 12,000 are operatives from Syria and Iraq, and more than 13,000 are foreign fighters. Most of the foreign fighters come from the Arab-Muslim world. An estimated 3,000 come from Western countries (about half from France and Britain). They usually arrive in Syria via Turkey, are given short military training by ISIS and engage in fighting. For the most part they return to their countries of origin. During their stay in Syria they gain military capabilities and receive Salafist-jihadi indoctrination, and pose a security threat to their countries of origin and to a certain extent to Israel (as illustrated by the attack on the Jewish museum in Brussels, which was carried out by a French national who fought in the ranks of ISIS).

2) Possession of weapons: ISIS has a large arsenal of weapons, most of them plundered from the Syrian and Iraqi armies. They include light arms, various types of rockets and mortars, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. In addition ISIS possesses heavy arms and the advanced technologies usually found only in regular national armies: artillery, tanks and armored vehicles, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and drones. It has used mustard gas a number of times in Syria and Iraq and may have other types of chemical weapons, such as chlorine gas. Chemical weapons were used to attack the Kurdish militias in Ayn al-Arab (Qobanê) in northern Syria and against the Iraqi security forces. ISIS also has at least one Scud missile (technically flawed, in ITIC assessment) and a number of planes (operating from an ISIS-controlled airport).

3) Areas of control: Today ISIS controls an estimated third of the territory of Iraq and between a quarter and a third of Syria, from the outskirts of Baghdad to the outskirts of Aleppo. The vast area, according to various estimates, is home to between five and six million people. Several important cities are in the ISIS-controlled region, among them Mosul (the second largest city in Iraq), Fallujah (symbol of the struggle against the United States) and Al-Raqqah (the ISIS "capital city" in northern Syria). It is noteworthy that a relatively small number of ISIS operatives control a broad swath of territory, which is one of ISIS' weak points. To overcome it, ISIS relies on local supporters and allies, and is making an effort to enlist operatives from Syria, Iraq and abroad.

4) Establishment of alternative administration networks: In the areas under its control ISIS instituted alternative administrations to replace those of Syria and Iraq which collapsed. They include educational, judicial, policing and law enforcement networks. ISIS uses them to provide vital services and at the same time to enforce its Salafist-jihadi ideology on the local population. To that end it uses

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brutal measures against its opponents and the minorities living under its control (including mass executions). Nevertheless, so far the local populations seem to have come to terms with ISIS control and sometimes even support it. They do so especially in view of its ability to provide basic services, restore daily life to the status quo ante, and fill the administrative void that was created.

5) High financial capabilities: In Syria and Iraq ISIS took control of the state infrastructure, including most of the oil fields in eastern Syria and several oil fields in Iraq. The export of petroleum products is the main source of ISIS' income and its profits are estimated at several million dollars a day. However, profits fell in the wake of the aerial attacks carried out by the United States and its allies on its oil infrastructure. Other sources of ISIS income are various types of criminal activity (extortion, collecting ransom for abductees, trading in antiquities), collecting donations and imposing local taxes. Thus it is an exceptional example of a terrorist organization which managed to acquire semi-national financial capabilities to fund its military infrastructure and allow it to establish an alternative governmental system.

In June 2014 ISIS began a military campaign in Iraq whose objective, in ITIC assessment, was to take over most of the territory of northern and western Iraq to launch an attack on Baghdad. At the same time it waged campaigns for the control of various districts in eastern and northern Syria and to weaken its rivals and enemies (the Syrian regime, the Al-Nusra Front, the Kurdish militias and the other rebel organizations). Its military achievements so far have enabled it to create a supranational territorial continuum of the vast area under its control, where it is actively working to establish the rule of its self-declared Islamic Caliphate.

To date ISIS' military campaign in Iraq has had three stages:

1) Dramatic success (June – August 2014): ISIS captured the oil city of Mosul from the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army, in whose establishment and training the United States invested enormous resources for years, collapsed and fled. An ISIS force also captured the Mosul Dam with its hydroelectric plant (north of the city on the Tigris), driving out the Kurdish Peshmerga force defending it. (An ISIS force also tried to capture the Haditha Dam on the Euphrates, the second largest dam in the

country, but was met with resistance from the Iraqi army stationed there.) ISIS also took control of the city of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's birthplace and a former stronghold of the Iraqi Ba'ath party.

2) Containment and halt (second half of August – September 2014): During the second half of August and September 2014 (when the United States began its pinpointed aerial attacks) ISIS' advance was halted. The Kurdish Peshmerga forces, the Iraqi army and the Shi'ite militias retook the Mosul Dam. The Iraqi army drove ISIS forces from the large Haditha Dam and the oil city of Baiji (an important logistic passage besieged by ISIS). ISIS enemies saved the lives of minority groups considered "infidels" by ISIS and targeted for harassment, attack and slaughter: Yazidi refugees were rescued from Mt. Sinjar (in northern Iraq) and the siege of the predominantly Shi'ite-Turkmen town of Amerli (south of Kirkuk) was lifted.

3) Establishment of control over the Al-Anbar province, possibly a step in a campaign against Baghdad (end of September – mid-November 2014): ISIS forces cleared pockets of resistance in the Al-Anbar province (Iraq's largest Sunni district) and advanced towards the capital city of Baghdad. At the same time, ISIS carried out a series of suicide bombing attacks in Baghdad, mainly in Shi'ite neighborhoods. The news agencies reported ISIS forces located several dozen miles from the city and fighting in the city of Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad. However, the Iraqi army, the Shi'ite militias and the Kurdish forces had several military achievements, the most prominent of which was relieving the siege of Baiji.

So far ISIS has not yet taken full control of the Sunni Al-Anbar province. In ITIC assessment, in the future ISIS is planning to take over Baghdad, but apparently the campaign will be far more difficult than the easy conquest of Mosul, because its operatives are liable to encounter fierce resistance from the Shi'ite militias and the Iraqi army, which will have Iranian support and aerial cover from the American-led coalition. It is also likely that ISIS' rivals will cooperate against it. In can be expected that ISIS will attempt to overcome resistance by besieging Baghdad and disrupting life in the city (by firing rockets and mortar shells, and detonating IEDs and

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car bombs). During October and to mid-November 2014 hundreds of civilians were killed in Baghdad, most of them Shi'ite, in suicide bombings and car bomb attacks, for at least some of which ISIS was responsible.

While launching military campaigns, ISIS has firmly established its grip on extensive areas of eastern and northern Syria. It has expelled its rivals and enemies (among them other rebel organizations, the Al-Nusra Front and the Syrian army), and attempted to gain control of new key areas (as of this writing the campaign for the Kurdish region of Qobanê near the Turkish border has not yet ended). It established its control over Al-Raqqah, turning it into its "capital city" in Syria, and solidified its control over the local population. Its accomplishments are funded by the enormous sums of money pouring in from its control of the country's infrastructure, especially the sale of petroleum products from the fields in eastern Syria (although its profits have decreased since the Americans and their allies began aerial attacks).

The Significance and Main Implications of ISIS' Achievements in Syria and Iraq:

The foothold gained by ISIS in Syria and Iraq has far-reaching local, regional and international significance and implications:

1) Iraq: ISIS conquests in the summer of 2014 accelerated the disintegration of Iraq into religious and ethnic components. It can be said that Iraq no longer functions as a nation state. Three entities arose: a Sunni district controlled by ISIS in western and northern Iraq; an autonomous Kurdish region in the north and a Shi'ite region in the center and south affiliated with the Shi'ite regime in Baghdad. The borders between them are blurred and unstable, and ISIS, which is gaining strength, can be expected to continue its efforts to enlarge the areas under its control at the expense of the other entities, which are currently on the defensive.

2) Syria: In Syria as well ISIS' increase in strength contributed to deepening the country's de facto division. ISIS secured its control over the northern and eastern parts of the country and weakened its various rivals (the Syrian regime, the Al-Nusra Front and the other rebel organizations). However, ISIS has not been able to break the Syrian regime's hold on Damascus and other core areas in the north and west, or of the rebel organizations on the southern part of the country (including most of

the area of the Golan Heights along the border with Israel). The strengthening of ISIS and the American-led campaign against it increased the existing complexity of the Syrian civil war and made the situation more volatile, making it more difficult to resolve the Syrian crisis in the foreseeable future.

3) The establishment of the global jihad in the Middle East: ISIS' successes in Syria and Iraq turned them into a new focus for the global jihad, inheriting the place of Afghanistan and Pakistan. As opposed to the era of Osama bin Laden, today there are two principal hostile, rival jihadi organizations: one, ISIS, affiliated with the global jihad but at odds with the Al-Qaeda leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri; and the other, the Al-Nusra Front, a branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria. Between the two are global jihad networks within the Middle East and beyond. Some of the jihadi networks in the Middle East, mainly the Egyptian-based Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, have already taken a stand and sworn allegiance to ISIS, which is gaining power against the Al-Qaeda leadership. In addition, in the future ISIS' potential for subversion and terrorism is liable to destabilize countries in the Middle East and to export jihadi terrorism to Israel and the West.

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4) Regional Middle East significance: The foothold gained by ISIS and the global jihad in Syria and Iraq reflects and may aggravate the regional upheaval in the Middle East: the flashpoints include the tensions, schisms and hostility among the various ethnic, religious and tribal groups, especially between the Sunnis and Shi'ites; the political weakness of the nation states created and forced upon the region by the French and British after the First World War; the loss by the key states in the Middle East of their ability to govern; and the establishment of alternative ideologies and governance in the places where nation states collapsed. The establishment of the Salafist-jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq are manifestations of the power of radical Islamic ideology to attract followers and present itself as a magical solution for the ongoing distress and basic ills that have plagued the nation states since their inception.

Thus, additional instability and volatility were injected into the already unstable situation in the Middle East by the establishment of ISIS and the global jihad organizations' power base in Syria and Iraq. They are

liable not only to accelerate the disintegration of Syria and Iraq but to filter into the entire region. In the foreseeable future ISIS can be expected to continue its military occupation of Syria and Iraq, establish its control and oppose the campaign the United States is waging against it. However, in the long run, as it establishes itself more firmly in Syria and Iraq, its influence may gradually spread to other Arab states; its growing cooperation with the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is proof thereof. Veterans of the fighting in Syria who return to their countries of origin in the Middle East are liable to become "carriers" of terrorism and subversion, whether at ISIS instigation or on their own initiative, thereby contributing to political instability in their own countries (as has already happened in Darnah in eastern Libya, taken over by a jihadi network which expressed its support for ISIS).

Chilling images show new ISIS terrorist school in Syria where children soldiers known as 'Caliphate Cubs' are trained to kill

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2865509/Chilling-images-new-ISIS-terrorist-school-Syria-children-soldiers-known-Caliphate-Cubs-trained-kill.html

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Chilling new images have emerged from inside Islamic State-run terrorist training schools in Syria, showing child soldiers being trained to kill using assault rifles.

Dubbed 'Caliphate Cubs', the children appear little more than 10 years old and are dressed in full combat gear as they struggle to hold weapons while standing in front of ISIS' infamous black flag.

The photographs were released by official Islamic State media over the weekend and apparently show a recently-opened school close to Damascus - the Assad regime-held capital of Syria where other preteen training camps are known have been operating in recent months.

The photographs taken near the Syrian capital Damascus and released by Islamic State terrorists show young children wearing masks and camouflaged military fatigues as they are trained to use AK47 assault rifles and carry out military drills.

The high quality photographs were released on ISIS' favoured anonymous file sharing website JustPaste.it over the weekend, and appear to be still images taken from an as-yet unreleased edition of the terror group's many

professionally shot propaganda videos.

In one photograph a large group of masked and armed child soldiers crowd around a minibus decorated with the ISIS flag, holding their guns aloft and striking poses bearing a striking resemblance to the terror group's executioner in chief - the British militant known as Jihadi John.

In much the same way as the Nazi Germany preyed on its impressionable young citizens with the creation of the Hitler Youth, ISIS has long groomed children to take part in jihad.

The practice was the subject of the second episode of VICE's groundbreaking 'Islamic State' documentary series, in which very young boys were seen being asked whether they

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Another image shows a fair-skinned boy being handed a massive AK47 assault rifle by a grey-bearded ISIS general as he stands in formation alongside other young child soldiers.

Other shots from the propaganda release show the children performing fitness tests and military drills designed to train them for the harsh realities of the frontline.

In a clear display of ISIS' callous attitude towards the use of child soldiers, one photograph from the terror group's latest media release shows two bearded adult militants laughing and leaning against a lorry while a group of young boys are forced to carry out military exercises in front of them.

Other shots show the heavily armed boys carrying their weapons inside what appears to be a mosque, where there appear to be taking instructions on how to use an AK47 from another masked militant, who stands in front of what looks like a minbar - a type of pulpit used by Islamic preachers.

want to be a suicide bomber or a jihadist, and were forced to repeat calls for the murder of Western 'infidels'.

In the VICE footage, ISIS' PR man Abu Moussa - who has since been killed - describes how every male child is forced to attend Sharia camps to be taught the militants' radical interpretation of Islam.

After the age of 16 the boys are sent to a military camp, where they are given intensive training in the art of warfare and prepared for possible future as either front-line militia or suicide bombers.

The images emerged as just weeks after ISIS released a video entitled 'The Blood of Jihad 2' - the second installment of a video series revealing life inside the group's training camps.

The video is believed to have been filmed in the ISIS-held province of Nineveh in, Iraq.

The highly choreographed video opens with

dramatic slow motion shots of of young boys firing AK47s as they advance in a line. All the boys are seen wearing matching military camouflage fatigues and chequered headscarves.

The first part of the film, which appears to be shot in soft focus and is set to music, then shows the boys undertaking training in martial arts.

One of the boys can be seen holding the black flag of Islamic State whilst another of the boys, wearing a headband with a slogan in Arabic, leads the martial arts drill.

In October another set of images emerged purporting to show young Syrian children being trained at a military camp run by ISIS in the group's de facto capital Raqqa.

The photographs showed children barely older than five being taught basic combat and survival skills, learning how to use enormous assault rifles, and being given lessons in extremist ideology.

The disturbing images of the school, said to be named Al-Sharea, were shared online by Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently - a small activist collective which secretly documents the shocking violence and oppression the terror group has brought to their home city.

According to the activist group, the Al-Sharea school is specifically run to provide militant training to young males under the age of 16.

Its objective is understood to be to wildly distort the views of young Raqqa residents, creating an entire generation for whom the idea of Islamic extremism and acts of terrorism are second nature.

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Security Intelligence Service on terrorism: Finland abreast of developments

Source:http://yle.fi/uutiset/security_intelligence_service_on_terrorism_finland_abreast_of_developments/7676854

The British counter-extremism think tank Quilliam Foundation sees Finland and the rest of the Nordic region as one of Europe's problem areas for Islamic radicalisation. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service does not subscribe to this evaluation, but it does admit that there are problems.

"It is accurate to the extent that per capita a lot of fighters have gone to Syria. But, it is not a reason for major concern," Security Intelligence Service Senior Inspector Tuomas Portaankorva told Yle on Monday.

Earlier during the day, Yle reported that Quilliam Foundation Managing Director Haras Rafiq said he believes that recruitment to radical Islamic groups must be combated by challenging the extremist views in online social media and forums.

According to the Security Intelligence Service, Finland is abreast of developments. For example, online postings are monitored and action is also taken when indicated. It is also known that there have been returnees to Finland from the fighting in Syria.

Plans in place
The UK has rolled out new anti-terrorism laws that can exclude people returning if they go abroad to fight with extremist groups. Finland is currently planning an entry ban for

individuals who are outside the country and may have connections with terrorism. Police access to information is also to be eased.

"At the moment, for example, the possibilities for the police to search a suspect's computer are insufficient. This may require a change in legislation," says Interior Minister Päivi Räsänen.

Officials also want a freer hand to monitor the online activities of recruiters. Direct action has also been taken to re-integrate Finns returning from war zones in Syria.

"So-called anchor programmes have been developed in Finland. If an individual is suspected of having connections to terrorism or is returning from a war zone, we make contact. Psychiatrists and social workers are involved and we go through the individual's situation. This has been tried out in Helsinki," explains Interior Minister Räsänen.

No names in the papers

The British media has published the names and photographs of people who are known to have gone to Iraq or Syria to take part in the fighting. The Finnish press does not.

"I take no stand on whether it's a good idea or not. It just doesn't fit in with the way that Finnish officials operate," says Portaankorva.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: No comment cause they live in another planet! I will do that after landing!

Crime data research sheds new light on British Muslim communities

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141208-crime-data-research-sheds-new-light-on-british-muslim-communities

December 08 – Muslim communities may not be as victimized by violent crime, or as dissatisfied with the police as is widely suggested and believed, according to new research by a Cambridge academic.

An examination of statistics taken from the Crime Survey of England and Wales between 2006 and 2010 reveals a surprising counter-narrative to commonly held perceptions of British Muslim communities and their relationships to crime victimization and the criminal justice system.

A University of Cambridge release reports that analysis of crime data generated by nearly 5,000 Muslims reveals few differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in relation to a range of violent personal crime including assaults, wounding, and threats — the types of crime that scholarly literature, media reports, and anecdotal evidence all suggest have disproportionately affected Muslim communities.

Likewise, statistical analysis reveals few statistically significant differences between Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, and Sikh respondents in respect of many personal crime types included within the Crime Survey. Research carried out by Julian Hargreaves from

Cambridge's Center of Islamic Studies, and published by the *British Journal of Criminology*, also shows surprisingly high levels of positive attitudes towards the police. Among Muslims surveyed by the Crime Survey of England and Wales, 61.2 percent of respondents rated their local police as either good or excellent compared to 53 percent of non-Muslims.

Despite widespread condemnation of police counter-terrorism measures such as stop and search, data from the Crime Survey reveal that a sizeable majority of Muslim respondents not only reported positive attitudes towards a range of subjects such as police fairness, reliability and relevance to the community but are in many cases more likely to do so than non-Muslim respondents.

"Such findings, derived from a large nationally-representative dataset, clearly challenge the dominant narrative within the criminological literature which describes all or most Muslim people as being at greater risk of violent crime, as well as having a deep-rooted sense of police dissatisfaction," said Hargreaves.

"Much of the discourse in this area is highly politicized and rhetorical in character, rarely rooted in statistical evidence and seldom substantiated by empirical findings. The findings suggest a

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growing need to move beyond misleading and potentially damaging generalizations which seek to cast British Muslim communities only as the victims of violent crime and police discrimination."

Research undertaken by Hargreaves also examined the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and household crime such as burglary and car theft. Here, the analysis revealed a strong relationship between household crime victimization and the socio-economic disadvantage suffered by many British Muslim communities — topics rarely, if ever, discussed by criminologists and journalists.

The research incorporated data from a Multiple Deprivation Index, a ten-tier classification system designed to map socio-economic deprivation in the United Kingdom. While there were no discernible differences between Muslim and Christian households in each tier (or decile) there were marked differences in the numbers of Muslim and Christian households contained within areas of disadvantage. Two thirds of Muslim households (66.2 percent) were distributed among deciles containing the most deprivation and the highest levels of reported household crime.

While Hargreaves' work provides a fascinating counter-balance to traditional victimization narratives concerning Muslim communities, he is at pains to point out the need to use large-scale and anecdotal evidence together in order to complete as broad a view as possible of Muslim life in twenty-first-century Britain.

"Research in this field is dominated by descriptions of British Muslim communities which appear to eschew the use of large, nationally-representative data samples, placing emphasis instead on interviews and focus groups and on describing the nature of anti-Muslim hostility rather than quantifying the scope and extent of any problems.

"Descriptions of the lived experiences of Muslim victims of crime have undoubtedly provided an invaluable contribution but it is clear that the Crime Survey offers crime statistics at odds with commonly-propagated views — and a greater range of attitudes towards the police than might be assumed from an uncritical reading of the literature.

"Current debates around British Muslim communities, crime and the police — and especially those around the scale of current problems — unfortunately rest on rather inconclusive statistical evidence. Much more research is needed to complete the criminological picture in this area, including large-scale data concerning damage to property such mosques and small businesses. The is also a need for research to focus more often on 'everyday' hate crime, such as verbal abuse from strangers, which often goes unreported to both the police and the Crime Survey."

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— *Read more in Julian Hargreaves, "Half a Story? Missing Perspectives in the Criminological Accounts of British Muslim Communities, Crime and the Criminal Justice System,"* British Journal of Criminology *(30 November 2014)*

Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe

**By Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard**
Cambridge University Press, NY, 2015
Source: http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/12/06/review-eurojihad-patterns-of-islamist-radicalization-and-terrorism-in-europe/

The obvious objective of this book is "to identify patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe," wherein radicalization is the "rejection of the key dimensions of modern democratic culture at the center of the European value system." From those stated objectives, *Eurojihad* effectively covers a variety of subtopics in concise and well notated academic format.

The *Introduction* provides a strong précis of what is to be discussed. Following that is a basic technical demographic analysis of *Europe's Muslim Population.* From there, it begins to provide an analysis of the who, why, how manner of information: a discussion of Salafism and radical Islamic development and belief systems within Europe; the

formation of the networks; the patterns of radicalization for recruitments; and the evolvement of these systems.

EUROJIHAD

Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe

ANGEL RABASA
CHERYL BENARD

The work ends with a discussion of the European reaction to these elements, mainly from the British and German perspectives. The closing section on *Key Judgments* provides a brief summary and an extension of possible thought to how the U.S. could apply this information to confronting their own terrorist threats.

As proposed on the back cover notes, this text could serve as "an immediately essential text" and a "text of reference on jihadism in Europe." For anyone unfamiliar with the demographics and recruitment methodologies of European terrorism this text does provide a concise, clearly written overview of the topic.

The authors have for the most part stayed well within the parameters of their chosen thesis and have not ventured in the broader context of the global terrorist enterprise. However, the few times a comment is ventured that touches on, or more daringly steps into, the realm of the broader context, it does leave room for questioning.

Questions
My first question rose regarding the definition of radicalization as presented above. Could it be that those who are radicalized—and as explained by the authors, they tend to be reasonably well educated—also recognize the double standards, hypocrisy, and contradictions within that system?

Ideology is recognized by the authors as being "the center of gravity of jihadists and radical Islamist movements," followed by a clear basic explanation of Islamist ideological points. However, that is followed by a discussion of that touches on the "theaters of global jihad." The ideas expressed: recognizing the Sykes-Picot secret deal of 1916; the "foreign support for…apostate regimes;" and the "insurgency" in Iraq and "invading Afghanistan and Iraq;" presents the realm of action sounding more like defensive insurgency military actions against foreign forces rather than a purely religious enterprise. The latter idea is the manner in which it is presented in western media and generally in western academia, but the authors here step around discussing the issue any further and re-focus on Europe.

Another touch on the outside rises in the section in the *Origins of Radical Islamist Networks in Europe*, where a brief mention of recruits being sent off for training "well before" 1996 in Afghanistan, where "training was provided by international elements." Left at that, it is fine for the given discourse, but if one were to venture into the "international elements", a different spin would have to enter the discussion. The generally recognized *Radicalization Patterns* involved mainly young men who were not "marginalized individuals" but were educated, "driven by social and personal grievances and issues of identity." That is not entirely new information, but it does present the idea that being educated, more aware of societies "values", its contradictions, double standards, and inequalities could lead toward the route of radicalization.

In the same discussion of UK terrorism, it is mentioned that a terror cell was "infiltrated with the assistance of a foreign security service," raising the obvious question, which one? The CIA? The NSA? Mossad? It also raises the specter of the ineptitude of some of the terror attempts such as the "shoe bomber" and the "underwear bomber"—or it demonstrates how those with already radical ideas are prompted on their journeys by said infiltrators, an easy way to score a victory against terrorism, an avenue of thought well supported in non-mainstream media.

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Global Dimensions

The book does not truly discuss *The Global Dimensions of Europe-Based Islamist Terrorism*, but tries to limit itself to the links between various regions. The authors lean dangerously close to trouble with their brief discussion of ISIS and Syria, recognizing that—at least from the terrorists perspective— "Syria was more complex than they expected and that it was not simply a fight against Assad," but "there were many players in the conflict and they were ordered to fight against other Muslims." The authors recognize, "For European governments—the French and the British in particular—that support the opposition to the Assad regime, it is difficult to reconcile their political goals in Syria with preventing a jihadist blowback."

In order to fully examine that comment within "global dimensions" would take the reader all the way back to the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Ottoman Empire, and then on through all the wars and imperial efforts up to and including the present arena of international concerns: oil, US dollar hegemony, Israel/Palestine, U.S. efforts at destabilizing governments in the region (Libya, Iraq, Egypt) while supporting others that are clearly monarchic, authoritarian, and non-democratic, and containment of Russia and China being the main "dimensions" not discussed.

Instead they move on to Pakistan, Central Asia, Yemen, and East Africa, where many of the same dimensions are also not discussed but are effectively constrained behind the discussion of the actual links.

What to Do

In the *New European Approach*, the authors discuss what Britain and Germany have done in order to counter the terrorist threat. In broad terms, Britain appears to be trying intervention as the preferred method rather than criminalizing the precipitate behaviors; Germany is much more direct in countering such behaviors. For both, what it allows is more surveillance, data sharing, privacy intrusions, detention without charges, and perhaps more concerning than these already active features, the "special and harsher legal procedures" within separate courts.

That may all be well and good for countering a state enemy, but it also leads into the area of a police controlled society with extra judicial authority. While uncertain of that status in Europe, in Canada and the U.S., it has led to expressions of terrorism including environmentalists, anti-corporate protesters (usually one and the same thing but not necessarily in our financially bewildered world), anti-racists and others who are protesting against government iniquities.

Finally

The conclusion for the authors is that terrorism is "stable and probably more difficult to eradicate than the violence rooted in Middle East politics that affected Europe in the 1990s" implying that after 9/11 terrorist actions broadened well beyond the direct concerns of the Israel-Palestine situation.

As for the lessons for the U.S., "The European experience may be instructive in confronting this danger." Okay, like what…? Like the U.S. "could explore the European model of a special counter-terrorist legal regime as an alternative to federal courts, military commissions, or indefinite detentions of suspected foreign terrorists."

Whoa….what? Are you indicating the PATRIOT Act and the NDAA (2013) are not enough? Or that the Posse Comitatus act truly limits the use of military force within the U.S.? That an extrajudicial legal regime alternative is required? Are not more surveillance, data sharing, privacy intrusions, military commissions, detention without charges as already used by the U.S. sufficient?

The ultimate final conclusion is that "there may be experiences in the European's adaptation of their legal frameworks to deal with terrorist threats that may be of value to the United States as Americans adapt their legal system to the realities of global terrorism." Ah yes, the realities of global terrorism—good thing they are beyond the scope of this book.

And really, as indicated above, the book is generally well written and the authors do keep to the stated thesis for their work. So take it for what it is—a concise, well written text of the European experience with terrorism, without expectations of a broader discussion.

So take it for what it is—a concise, well written text of the European experience with terrorism, without expectations of a broader discussion.

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## Jihadi attacks - the data behind November's 5,000 deaths

Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/jihadi-attacks-killed-more-than-5000-people-in-november-the-vast-majority-of-them-muslims

More than 5,000 people, mostly civilians and overwhelmingly Muslims, were killed in jihadi attacks in November, according to a study documenting the toll of Islamist violence worldwide.

About 60% of these deaths were caused by the militant groups Islamic State and Boko Haram, suggesting a transformation in the nature of jihadi groups from terrorists to "more conventional forces that are fighting to gain or hold territory against state armies", the report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and the BBC, said.

Deadliest groups

Drawing on local media sources, non-government organisations and the BBC's monitoring services, the study found that extremist groups adhering to the austere Salafist ideology carried out 664 attacks that killed 5,042 people in November.

Deaths / Attacks		Deaths / Attacks	
Islamic State	2.206	Islamic State	306
Boko Haram	801	Boko Haram	30
Taliban	720	Taliban	150
Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula	410	Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula	36
Al Shabab	266	Al Shabab	41
Jabhat al Nusra	257	Jabhat al Nusra	34
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan	146	Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan	32
Jamaat ul-Ahrar	60	Jamaat ul-Ahrar	1

Iraq suffered 1,770 deaths, but the deadliest attacks were carried out in Nigeria, where just 27 incidents took 786 lives. The "battle zone" between Syria and Iraq where Islamic State has dug in saw the largest number of fatalities, and the death toll in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan also stretched into the hundreds.

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Jihadi killings by country

| Deaths / Attacks		Deaths / Attacks	
Iraq	1.770	Iraq	233
Nigeria	786	Nigeria	27
Afghanistan	782	Afghanistan	152
Syria	693	Syria	110
Yemen	410	Yemen	37
Somalia	216	Somalia	37
Pakistan	212	Pakistan	35
Philippines	50	Philippines	9
Kenya	50	Kenya	4
Libya	39	Libya	12
Cameroon	15	Cameroon	3
India	13	India	2
Egypt	5	Egypt	2
Niger	1	Niger	1

Excluding the jihadis themselves and victims of unknown origin, the authors found just over half of those killed in November's attacks were civilians. "Given context and location, the vast majority of jihadist victims is Muslim," the report said.

Victim status

Most deaths were caused by bombings but the figure is dwarfed by the combined number of fatalities from shootings, ambushes and executions.

Victim status

Civilian 2.093
Military 1.723
Unknown (61)
Official
Police
84
147

Fatalities by form of attack

Al-Qaida, which was thought to be in "terminal decline" following the killing of Osama Bin Laden, killed 410 people.

The figures showed jihadism was a "movement in the middle of a transformation", the authors said, with the deadliest groups now embracing strategies to hold and govern territory against the armies of weak or failing states.

Fatalities by form of attack

Bombings	1.653
Shooting	1.574
Ambush	666
Execution	426
Shelling	204
Stabbing	49

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The Currency of the Islamic State: The Political and Symbolic Significance of an Economic Move

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/12/currency-islamic-state-political-symbolic-significance-economic-move/

On November 13, 2014 the Treasury of the Islamic State organization (IS) announced its intention to

mint a first series of coins to be used in the territory under its control. For the leaders of IS, this move has both symbolic and economic meaning. Not only does the minting of coins reflect the group's ambition to signal to its domestic public and its audience abroad that it is a sovereign state, not an organization, and to give this message iconographic expression. It also constitutes another stage in realizing the radical revolutionary vision of IS, which includes establishing an Islamic religious monetary regime, free from dependence on the international financial

system. The IS monetary initiative combines wishful thinking with reality and is unlikely to be an economic threat to the West. Nevertheless, by issuing an independent currency, it is taking a symbolic step that could improve its prestige in the eyes of Muslim target audiences, strengthen the sense of governance it projects at home and abroad, and consolidate its hold on the territory under its control.

On November 13, 2014 the Treasury of the Islamic State organization (IS) announced its intention to mint a first series of coins to be used in the territory under its control. This is a direct order from the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The first issue includes seven coins of differing values, with the respective metals and weights chosen in accordance with Islamic religious law: the dinar (4.25 grams of gold), the dirham (2.975 grams of silver), and the fils (0.496 grams of copper).

For the leaders of IS, this move has both symbolic and economic meaning. Not only does the minting of coins reflect the group's ambition to signal to its domestic public and its audience abroad that it is a sovereign state, not an organization, and to give this message iconographic expression. It also constitutes another stage in realizing the radical revolutionary vision of IS, which includes establishing an Islamic religious monetary regime, free from dependence on the international financial system, and taking the lead in a global wave of repudiation of the US dollar.

Political and Symbolic Significance

IS is a political entity that is not recognized by sovereign countries and is struggling to establish its authority among those who are supposed to see themselves as its subjects. An independent currency will support its claim to sovereignty, while continued use of the currencies of states it aspires to dissolve weakens this claim. Furthermore, the symbols on the coins provide an additional layer for IS propaganda. They are intended to assist in inculcating among target audiences at home and abroad messages relating to IS identity, aspirations, borders, and guiding policy ethos.

These symbols are divided into two main groups, and reflect the tension between the ambitious global objectives of IS and its inevitable need for cooperation on the part of the local population.

Symbols Expressing the Long Term Strategic Vision

The five-dinar gold coin showing the five continents and the copper ten-fils coin showing the Muslim crescent reflect the extreme messages that are the basis of IS ideology. The first image, as explained in official publications, symbolizes the promise that according to tradition God gave to the Prophet Muhammad, namely, that his nation would rule over territory from the eastern to the western ends of the earth. The Muslim crescent, which represents the Hijri calendar and is displayed on the flags of Muslim countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, is a Muslim symbol that speaks to the hearts of the global target audience that IS purports to represent.

A spear and shield appear on the silver one-dirham coin, while the ten-dirham coin shows the al-Aqsa mosque. According to official publications, the weapons symbolize jihad for God, that is, the violent struggle through which IS will realize its territorial ambitions. The choice of the mosque in Jerusalem that is the third holiest site in Islam shows that it is a future target for conquest by IS. This choice bespeaks the vitality of the ethos of the struggle to liberate Jerusalem as a source of national religious legitimacy. It also implies that the propaganda appeal of the struggle to liberate al-Aqsa exceeds even that of the struggle to liberate Mecca and Medina, sites that according to Islamic dogma are holier.

Symbols with an Iraqi-Syrian Local Character

The three other coins have symbols with a particularistic hue, which on the face of it contradicts the global message of IS. They were designed with the current borders in mind and inspired by characteristically Iraqi and Syrian symbols in order to market the new regime's revolutionary doctrine to the public in Iraq and Syria through a recognizable and accepted symbolic prism. For example, the twenty-fils copper coin has an engraving with three palm trees. This tree is considered the national symbol of Iraq and has appeared over the years on many of its coins. The five-dirham silver coin shows a while lighthouse in Damascus, through which, according to a prophetic tradition glorifying the Islamic mission of Syria, at the end of days, Issa ibn Mariam (Jesus) will return to earth in order to defeat the dajjal (the false messiah). A one-dinar gold coin bears an illustration of wheat stalks, a traditional symbol of economic growth, which was also used by the regimes in Iraq and Syria.

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Economic Significance

IS has also explained its minting of coins as an economic step with strategic pretensions. Its spokesmen have noted three main advantages of the move.

Conversion of Forbidden Coins into Permitted Coins

In accordance with the Salafist doctrine of IS, for the first time since the end of the Ottoman caliphate, the issuing of Islamic coins will create a monetary system that is in keeping with the dictates of Islamic law, which rejects the use of bills, money changing, bond trading, and usury. According to IS ideology, the modern global economy relies on "worthless" paper currency and is responsible for periods of inflation, depression, and crisis. On the other hand, the use of gold, silver, and copper coins, which have an intrinsic value, will provide the IS economy with stability, immunity, and credibility and give the citizens confidence that their money will not lose its value because of a possible drop in exchange rates.

Repudiation of Economic Dependence on the West

According to the official announcement by IS, the new currency will enable it to break away from the "tyrannical financial system imposed on the Muslims, which has been a factor in enslaving and impoverishing them, in wasting the resources of the Islamic ummah, and in making it easy prey for the Jews and Crusaders." Minting of the coins has been described as a step to escape the economic hegemony imposed by the United States and the "despicable band of Jews" in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who "control the global financial markets." According to this conspiracy theory, the United States currently enjoys a monopoly over production of oil, "with which God graced the Muslim ummah." It is imposing use of the dollar as the sole currency for determining the oil rate in order to steal the Muslims' money and resources and to finance its economy at their expense. Pure metal coins will liberate the Islamic caliphate from subordination to the dollar economy because it will not need recognition from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund and will be difficult to impose sanctions on it.

Renewing Islam's Glorious Days

IS believes that issuing its own coins will hasten the collapse of the US economy and lead to the decline of the United States as a global power and the rise of the Islamic caliphate. It feels that the move will encourage other oppressed countries to follow in its footsteps, i.e., to liberate their currencies from the humiliating Western hegemony and achieve financial independence. IS leaders believe that this chain reaction will cause the rapid collapse of "the economy of colored bills" and the creation of "a true economy of production," which will change the existing hierarchy among the countries of the world and grant the Muslims superiority over the infidels.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The IS monetary initiative combines wishful thinking with reality and is unlikely to be an economic threat to the West. Nevertheless, by issuing an independent currency, it is taking a symbolic step that could improve its prestige in the eyes of Muslim target audiences, strengthen the sense of governance it projects at home and abroad, and consolidate its hold on the territory under its control. The plan indicates that for IS, conquering the old countries and destroying their institutions and frameworks is not enough, and that it will dedicate a portion of its resources to long term processes of state building and the establishment of new symbols and mechanisms of government. Various reports show that IS has purchased gold, silver, and copper with the idea of implementing the minting project.

IS has internalized that its political revolutionary enterprise, which began in the mosques and has continued in the battlefield, must also focus on mobilizing the loyalty of residents of the conquered territories, inter alia, through their purses. Those fighting against its ambition to realize its vision must internalize this, and the international community would do well to intensify economic pressure on IS. To this end, it should first and foremost continue attacks against the oil trade, which provides IS with liquid capital for its activities, including acquisition of the metals needed for minting coins. At the same time, the international community must begin to formulate a plan to reconstruct Iraq and Syria with the goals of ensuring a positive economic outlook for their impoverished

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populations and preventing them from being   led astray by radical Islam.

Homeland Security Chief: No carry-on bag ban... yet

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/12/homeland-security-chief-carry-bag-ban-yet/

Speaking on CNN, Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said the ban is not being considered "at this time." The comments come following a National Public Radio (NPR) report that counter-terrorism officials are considering banning carry-on bags in airports out of concerns they will be used by terrorists to transmit bombs.

The NPR report cited concerns that Islamic terrorist could be planning to attack airlines in Europe before the Christmas holiday. Johnson advised all travelers to be vigilant.

"I think people should continue to travel and have a happy and safe holiday but we continue to be vigilant and continue to evaluate whether more is necessary, based on the latest threat streams," Johnson said.

Concerns have increased in recent weeks that al-Qaida operatives may be planning a high-profile attack on five commercial flights around Christmastime. U.S. officials confirmed to NPR they are aware of the reports but would not confirm its authenticity. The plot is thought to involve the smuggling of bombs onto planes using the carry-on luggage.

Officials are also reportedly considering banning electronic devices from the passenger cabin.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: The problem with carry-on bags is not that great at airports where a security checks is always carried on before departure – although they pose a threat for the check-in and arrivals areas. The problem is bigger in other critical infrastructure settings. Recently I was staying in a hotel in Brussels just opposite the entrance of the EU HQ building. Every morning many employees were entering the building on foot carrying bags of this type – just showing their ID or something (although not always). At the hotel there was no inspection of the arriving baggage as well. Yes! Of course this is not necessary as it is in New Delhi, Mumbai or Qatar because Belgium is FAR AWAY from hot spots… but…

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Two terrorists set free into U.S. by Homeland Security Department

Source: http://i-hls.com/2014/12/two-terrorists-set-free-u-s-homeland-security-department/

December 10 – U.S Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson acknowledged ==that his department had to release two men who admitted they were part of a terrorist group from Turkey, after a judge ordered them to be let out – a decision he said he disagreed with.==

Earlier this year, Mr. Johnson had told Congress that four men who were caught crossing the southern border and who claimed to be part of a Marxist terrorist group would be deported.

Nevertheless, according to the *Washington Times*, the secretary told the Homeland Security Committee that two of them remain in U.S. custody, and two others were released into the U.S. and then **fled to Canada, where they are seeking asylum.**

Mr. Johnson said he would have preferred the two men be kept in custody but didn't have a choice after the judge ruled.

"I'm not sure of their exact whereabouts," Mr. Johnson said.

The Washington Times reported earlier this year on the apparent existence of a smuggling network that shepherded the four men from Istanbul through Paris to Mexico City, where they were stashed for several days before being driven to the U.S. border. They crossed illegally in early September.

Finances of jihad: How extremist groups raise money

By Tom Keatinge (Finance and security analyst)
Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30393832

Twelve months ago, the group now known as Islamic State (IS) was little recognised on the international stage beyond those inspired to travel and join the group as fighters or those in the security and academic worlds monitoring

Financing jihadism
Annual income and sources

Islamic State: sale of oil, tolls and 'taxes' **$2bn**

Afghan Taliban: donors, sale of drugs **$400m**

Al-Shabab: sale of charcoal and 'taxes' **up to $100m**

Boko Haram: kidnap for ransom, fundraising **$10m**

Al Nusra Front: donations, kidnap for ransom **$ unknown**

developments in Syria and Iraq.
Even at its emergence, it was dismissed as just another of the multitude taking advantage of the chaos created in Syria by the wide-ranging conflict with President Bashar al-Assad.
In January 2014, US President Barack Obama downplayed the capabilities and threats posed by those flying the al-Qaeda flag in Falluja and elsewhere across Iraq and Syria.
But within a few months, IS controlled a vast and valuable swathe of territory across northern Syria and Iraq.
Former US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel described IS as being as "sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen". "They're beyond just a terrorist group… they are tremendously well funded," he said.

New realities

More than with any other militant group perhaps, the focus of the international community's attention is on the finances of IS -

the revenue it earns from oil, taxation, extortion and looting.
The US-led coalition has directed a considerable portion of its air strike effort against the oil refineries and smuggling routes believed to be the mainstay of the group's financial survival in the belief that disrupting funding sources will ultimately precipitate its demise.
The importance of financing in conflict is as old as conflict itself. The Roman orator Marcus Tullius Cicero observed that "the sinews of war [are] a limitless supply of money."
More recently, during the Cold War, states sponsored political violence by funding and supporting proxies.
However, the end of the Cold War, and the use of UN Security Council resolutions against countries such as Libya and Sudan, saw a dramatic decline in state-sponsored terrorism.
Whilst organisations such as Hezbollah continue to operate with state backing, post-Cold War terrorist organisations have mostly been unable to rely on state sponsorship, thus needing to source their own financing.
Skilful financial management is at the heart of the success of any terrorist or insurgent organisation - it represents their lifeblood but is also one of their most significant vulnerabilities.

Donors

Securing and maintaining reliable funding is the key to moving from fringe radical group to recognised terrorist organisation -
from a hand-to-mouth existence to
a more planned and organised
model.

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Successful groups are often defined as much by their skills as financial managers as they are by their military expertise and ability to recruit fighters.

In general, terrorist groups can draw on financing from two primary sources

- Internally, funds are generated by taxation of people, businesses and transport routes; proceeds from kidnap and ransom; and profits from trade
- External funding is provided by donors sympathetic to the cause, be they wealthy supporters (often from Gulf state countries, sometimes referred to as the "Golden Chain") or members of the diaspora community

Donations are also sometimes transferred between like-minded terrorist groups. For example, the Nigerian group Boko Haram reportedly received $250,000 from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012.

In a letter from 2005, al-Qaeda's former deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called upon al-Qaeda in Iraq to transfer $100,000 (£63,700) because many of its own funding lines had been cut.

Whilst donations can provide a source of initial "seed-funding", they are vulnerable to disruption by the authorities and the supply is unreliable.

To establish financial independence, terrorist groups need to move from primarily external funding to internal, self-generated funding that is more difficult for the international community to disrupt.

Drugs
Al-Shabab in Somalia is a good case in point. Whilst the group receives some limited funding from external sources, it has developed a highly effective charcoal export business which generates up to $80m a year, according to the UN.

Al-Shabab has also mastered another funding tool - business, personal and transport tax. Like IS, al-Shabab controls territory and population, operating a form of quasi-government in the areas under its control - raising taxes and offering some services, particularly security and justice, in return.

IS promises services and food supplies to Muslims in areas it controls.

The control of territory also allows lucrative businesses, such as the growing of opium poppies in Afghanistan, to flourish.

Over $7bn has been spent on fighting the drugs trade in the country yet despite 13 years of a Nato-led effort, poppy cultivation is at an all-time high, with the Taliban exploiting

Afghanistan's position as the supplier of over 90% of global opium output to earn up to $150m a year.

But not all groups control territory containing populations ripe for taxation and extortion.

Based in the vast, sparsely inhabited regions across the Sahara and Sahel, AQIM raises its funding from two main sources

- Abduction of foreign tourists and workers for ransom in a trade which is believed to have earned the group close to $100m over five years
- Control over smuggling routes for drugs which are flown in from Latin America along "Highway 10" - referring to the 10th parallel - as the most direct route across the Atlantic en route to Europe

The Haqqani Network, based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, also relies on smuggling as a key source of finance.

With its roots in the opposition to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it controls long-established smuggling routes that benefit from the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan to support the funds it raises from its extensive criminal activity.

Hostage trade
Kidnap for ransom is increasingly used by terrorist groups.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is based in Yemen, is estimated to have earned $20m this way between 2011 and 2013.

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Serge Lazarevic (centre) spent three years in captivity in Mali before being freed while Philippe Verdon (right) was killed in captivity

The UN underlines the profitability of this trade, revealing recently that terrorist groups are estimated to have earned $120m in ransom payments from 2004-2012.

IS alone is believed to have raised up to $45m in just the past year.

So if terrorist groups are to establish themselves, survive and thrive, they need to develop reliable sources of financing based on the territory, population and resources where they operate.

That Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) recognised the critical importance of finance is clear from declassified documents captured in Iraq following the 2003 invasion in which the group identified poor money management and irregular income as critical contributors to the group's failure.

Funding is clearly the lifeblood of a terrorist organisation. It is also its Achilles' heel.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the international community has sought to disrupt terrorist groups by targeting their finances.

The first step in US President George W Bush's so-called "war on terror" was to launch "a strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network".

Yet, as we are witnessing across northern Syria and Iraq, starving extremists of financing is no easy task once they evolve from external reliance to internal self-sufficiency.

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Why Somali pirates got damages from Strasbourg

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/12/why-somali-pirates-got-damages-from.html

Ali Samatar and others v. France, 4 December 2014, ECtHR, Fifth Section, read judgment

There is a good deal of froth about this case in the media, with little of it looking at what our pirates got their damages for. I also suspect that some of the hostility comes from elements who may not wish to trouble themselves with a judgment only in French. So let's have a quick look at what the case was actually about.

The surrounding facts are terrifying but France's liability to pay damages occurred for mundane reasons, as we shall see.

On 4 April 2008, a large (88m – see pic) French cruising yacht, Le Ponant, was hijacked by twelve Somali pirates armed with AK47s and rocket launchers. 30 crew were taken hostage. After clearing it with the Somali government, France sent the military in. On 11 April, the hostages were ransomed for $2,150,000, whilst Le Ponant was moored in the port of Garaad. An SUV speeding out of Garaad was then apprehended by 5 or 6 helicopters, and 6 men (the applicants) were arrested. Of these 6, 4 were to be convicted of piracy, and 2 (Al Samatar and Said) were acquitted by the French Courts. All were to receive damages of €2,000 each from Strasbourg. So when I say "Somali pirates," you will of course understand that I mean either pirates or pirate suspects – a fair suspicion, I suppose, in that all 6 were in the fast moving SUV.

Their claims were for breach of Article 5(3) of the ECHR, and in particular the duty on the state to bring detainees before a judge "promptly" – and Article 5(5) confers an express right of compensation for breach of the Article.

As we have seen, the "pirates" were arrested on 11 April. They were held initially on a French navy vessel, and then flown to France by military aircraft. They landed on 16 April. They appeared before a French court in Paris, early in the morning of 18 April.

There was no argument about jurisdiction per *Al Skeini* and all that (see, e.g. here); France accepted that Article 1 of the Convention was satisfied immediately upon arrest due to its exercise of military control agreed to by Somalia.

But Strasbourg rejected any claims for unlawful detention between arrest and the pirates' arrival in France. It looked at the various cases concerning detention out of the jurisdiction (a motley crew of drug dealers arrested on the high seas and taken thousands of kilometres by ship- see *Medvedyev* or *Rigopoulos)* and decided that the delay between arrest and arrival on French soil *could* be justified.

By contrast, the Court went on to conclude that the period between arrival and first appearance in court (48 hours according to [55] of the judgment) was culpable, and damages were awarded for this. After all, it was not as if France did not have warning of their imminent arrival.

The Court recognises that its rules are strict on this. The reason will be obvious, to minimise the time of detention if it cannot be justified by a court, and detect "*tout mauvais traitement*" during that original period of detention. Or as the Grand Chamber put it in the *Medvedyev* case

> *there must be protection, through judicial control, of an individual arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. Such control serves to provide effective safeguards against the risk of ill-treatment, which is at its greatest in this early stage of detention, and*

> *against the abuse of powers bestowed on law enforcement officers or other authorities for what should be narrowly restricted purposes and exercisable strictly in accordance with prescribed procedures.*

Judicial control must be prompt, automatic (i.e. not dependent upon some application by the suspect) and must be by a judge or equivalent.

Conclusion

When you see what the case was actually about, wherein lies the fuss? Because it does not take a great deal of thought to realise that the right not to be unlawfully detained is not just conferred on those who later turn out to be not guilty. By definition, you are at a stage when a court has not pronounced on guilt, one way or another. I suppose in theory you could make the recovery of damages dependant upon whether the individuals were ultimately convicted or not, but then you would have to do something to amend the right to compensation currently conferred by Article 5(5). And it would be a bit odd on our facts to give the acquitted 2 suspects money, and withhold it from the 4 guilty men. Looking at it the other way round, the prospect that thoroughly undeserving individuals might collect modest sums of money from the state because the state did not get them up before a court quick enough might be precisely the spur needed to ensure that authorities act fast.

Once you see that the "pirates" get their money, not for anything done to them in Somalia, but for a failing arising out of France's exercise of jurisdiction over them when they were in France, then perhaps any residual doubts people may have about the case may disappear.

That said, don't suppose any of this will be picked up in the political debates about the case.

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ISIS reportedly trying to sell the body of beheaded journalist James Foley

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/11/isis-reportedly-trying-to-sell-body-beheaded-journalist-james-foley/?intcmp=latestnews

Intermediaries with ties to the Islamic State reportedly are looking to sell the remains of American journalist James Foley to his family for $1 million.
Foley was beheaded by ISIS in August. His death was the first in a series of executions of Western hostages carried out by the terror group.

Three sources in contact with ISIS and its associates told BuzzFeed News that it wants to sell Foley's body back to his family, and would deliver it across the Syria-Turkey border along with a DNA sample to authenticate his identity. The sources were granted anonymity over safety concerns.

One of the sources, a former Syrian rebel fighter, said he had been approached by an ISIS leader and was asked to find a channel to either the American government or Foley's family.

"They ask for $1 million, and they will send DNA to Turkey, but they want the money first," he said. "They will not give the DNA without the money."

The source said his motivation to broker out a deal would be to help Foley's grieving family find closure.

Teaching torture

By Daniel Byman

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/teaching-torture/2014/12/12/ca788af4-8149-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html

December 12 – **Intelligence officers detain a man who built a bomb that will soon explode: If he refuses to talk, should you torture him?** **An alleged terrorist is walking the streets of Karachi: Is it okay to grab him**

and jail him in a Middle Eastern country where he is likely to face torture? **Or should you simply send down a Hellfire missile, sidestepping the torture debate but not the moral one?**

These are some of the questions I've asked my students in my master's-level class on "Terrorism and Counterterrorism," which I've taught at Georgetown University for more than a decade. The class examines controversial U.S. programs over the years, as well as the dilemmas faced by other democracies, whether Israel, where the high court allowed tough interrogations while trying to limit abuse in its longtime fight against terrorism, or France, whose use of torture helped devastate insurgents in Algeria in the

mid-20th century — but also discredited the French government and eventually led to the French withdrawal from the colony.

My students are not wide-eyed undergrads. Some are junior military officers back from hard fighting, who in 15 years will be among our nation's top military officials. Others have been or will be intelligence analysts or homeland security officials charged with stopping terrorists or patrolling cyberspace. A few have even interrogated alleged terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan and here in the United States. Nor are they all Americans — some come from countries that face more immediate and daily threats of terrorism.

The report on CIA interrogations released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Tuesday is important not just because it forces us to grapple with right and wrong today, but because it can be used as a teaching tool for future military and government leaders, who will no doubt be influenced by its findings and the debates it sparks.

When I came to Georgetown University in 2003 and began teaching about terrorism, the shadow of 9/11 hung over all discussions. Everyone (myself included) thought there would be another mass-casualty attack on the United States. Acceptance of

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torture was not quite universal — I remember being impressed by the courage of one young student who insisted that torture was wrong, even if it saved many lives — but it was close. Yet, as successive classes came and went and no major attack occurred on U.S. soil, and as reports of mistakes and abuses trickled out, skepticism grew steadily. Now few of my students see torture as necessary, even in extreme circumstances. I wonder if another attack would change this yet again.

What is water-boarding?

Water-boarding is a harsh interrogation method that simulates drowning and near death; origins traced to the Spanish Inquisition.

Subject strapped down

Cloth* held tightly over subject's face; water poured onto cloth, over face

*CIA uses Cellophane

Breathing becomes difficult; gag reflex stimulated; subject feels close to drowning, death

Subject begs for interrogation to stop

Source: The Nation, ABC News, McClatchy Washington Bureau
Graphic: Lee Hulteng, Judy Treible

© 2006 MCT

The class discussions have grown more sophisticated. For many years students tried to have it both ways. They wanted the option of coming down hard, but only on confirmed terrorists. When we discussed how intelligence might be flawed or incomplete (the Senate report's finding that 26 of the 119 detainees in secret prisons did not meet the standard for detention is not a particularly high error rate, given how the program worked), they were caught between their belief that America must be tough when needed and their reluctance to hurt innocents. Other students wanted torture to be illegal — but wanted officials to break the law when they felt it was necessary, with the sin upon their heads. When I explained that this would inevitably lead to either over-caution or unnecessary abuse, they, too, were flummoxed.

Students' own experiences have often advanced the discussion far more than the assigned readings or my lectures. A former Army interrogator described his frustration trying to sort out responsibility for a set of IED attacks in Iraq and how, years later, he still didn't know the truth. A civilian student had been waterboarded as part of a training exercise. A quiet and poised man, he exuded authority when he declared that yes, waterboarding was torture and should never be used.

As with the Senate report, the students' focus is often on practicality, not morality. They are more interested in whether something works rather than whether it's right. Even when I push students to declare whether they think torture is "wrong," those who do tend to argue that it produces false information, not that it contradicts fundamental American values and human decency. Though I don't relish the prospect of discussing "rectal feeding" in future classes, learning about specifics helps: It's one thing to talk about torture in the abstract, it's another to wallow in the details of its inhumanity.

Students are much more comfortable with renditions — the extrajudicial transfers of alleged terrorists, usually to a third country — than with torture. Many of the recipient countries have poor human rights records, and the risk of torture there is high. Students have thought that the benefit of getting an alleged terrorist off the street is worth the risk of torture or mistaken identity. What is immoral for the United States to do is fine for an ally to do on our behalf. U.S. hands can still be clean, at least in public.

Nor do targeted killings of non-Americans elicit much concern. Students tend to believe that being in a war zone changes the rules for evidence and due process dramatically, but that once a suspect is in U.S. custody, his rights again kick in. Part of the problem with the war on terrorism, of course, is that jihadists are active in many countries, from Pakistan and Syria to Somalia and Yemen, and their ranks include groups that did not exist on Sept. 11, 2001. So allowing killings "only" in a recognized war zone or "only" against al-Qaeda does not neatly fit today's reality.

Students with military backgrounds tend to be the most concerned about human rights. Part of it may be their military training, which stresses the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

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Part of it also may be enlightened self-interest: The rules that protect terrorists from torture someday might protect them or their comrades should they fall into enemy hands. But part of it, I think, is a maturity and awareness, gained from painful experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, that programs that seem logical in

GOOD CHOLESTEROL COP, BAD CHOLESTEROL COP

Washington come off as muddled, contradictory and treacherous for those in the field who must carry them out — the same people who are held responsible when things go poorly.

My students hail from a generation shaped by 9/11 and two — now three — wars in the Muslim world, and they want to contribute to this fight, or to avoid future messes. I hope they recognize, when interpreting legal authorities, designing programs and carrying out the

wishes of their political masters, that what seems like a watershed event might fade to the background and that the winds might blow in another direction.

I fear that America has not learned this. We oscillate between demanding that our government "do something" about a hard problem and expressing outrage when officials go too far — or when the public changes its mind. I hope my students learn to be cautious about public opinion, especially when it appears permissive. When they assume leadership roles in political and military life, they must build detention, interrogation and counterterrorism policies and programs that will endure, regardless of the philosophy of who is in the White House, regardless of the week's polls.

In 2003, when I began teaching, this would have meant keeping in mind that the lone student objecting to particular interrogation methods may soon come to represent the majority opinion; in 2014, it might mean keeping open controversial programs, such as indefinite detentions in Guantanamo. But constantly shifting between liberal and conservative extremes will be a recipe for failure.

It is gratifying to watch my students wrestle with the dilemmas of counterterrorism policies in a free society. They don't come up with all the answers, but by at least posing the right questions, they'll be ready to make tough decisions when it matters most.

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Daniel Byman is a professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University and the research director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

British soldiers told not to shout at, insult terror suspects, report claims

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/14/british-soldiers-told-not-to-shout-at-insult-terror-suspects-report-claims/

British soldiers have been told not to shout in terror suspects' ears, use "insulting words", or bang their fists on tables or walls during interrogations, according to a published report.

Britain's Sunday Telegraph obtained court papers outlining regulations for military intelligence officers, and current and former commanders have warned that the guidelines are so strict as to make interrogation pointless.

"The effect of the ambulance-chasing lawyers and the play-it-safe judges is that we have got to the point where we have lost our operational capability to do tactical questioning. That in itself brings risks to the lives of the people we deploy," Tim Collins, a retired British Army colonel who now runs a private security company, told the Telegraph. "These insurgents are not nice people.

These are criminals. They behead people; they keep sex slaves. They are not normal people." There is also concern, in the wake of this

the technique after a challenge by lawyers for Haidar Ali Hussein, an Iraqi civilian arrested in 2004 who alleged that he had been subjected "to substantial periods of shouting" while detained and claimed damages from the Ministry of Defence over alleged mistreatment.

Despite the ruling in favor of "Challenge Direct", the Telegraph reported that the three Court of Appeal judges identified several breaches while viewing videotaped interrogations of prisoners in Afghanistan. Among them were a questioner who "held the hand of the captured person ... a breach of the prohibition on physical contact" and another interrogator who suddenly moved forward from a crouching position so that his face was right in front of the captured person's." The judges described this maneuver as "physically intimidating."

week's release of a report by the Senate Intelligence Committee documenting alleged torture of terror suspects by the CIA following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, that soldiers will risk exposure to disciplinary action and legal claims.

"While these insurgents are chopping people's heads off and raping women, the idea they can take us to court because somebody shouted at them is ridiculous," Sir Alan West, former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism told the paper.

The Telegraph reported that the new interrogation rules, known as the "Challenge Direct" interrogation technique,

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The Challenge Direct technique was implemented amid public outcry over the 2003 death of Baha Mousa, an Iraqi who was fatally beaten while in British military custody. A 2011 inquiry report found that Mousa had suffered lengthy and repeated beatings by British soldiers.

The Menace of Maritime Piracy and Somali Pirates – Is There a Solution?

Source: http://www.marineinsight.com/marine/marine-news/headline/the-evolution-from-ship-piracy/

Maritime piracy must have been in existence ever since the first ship set its sails on the high seas. Talk about sea pirates to your friends or relatives and the first thing that would come to their minds are the images of Capt. Jack sparrow and Barbossa from the movie Pirates of the Caribbean.

For landlubbers it's hard to imagine that today a sea pirate looks no different from any of us. The only difference is that he is better trained, more fearless and perhaps a part of an organized crime or terrorist network. That is what our seafarers have to deal with in today's

world at sea and live in constant fear of getting jacked or looted or even killed by the sea pirates when sailing on highly dangerous waters infested with such criminals.

In olden days, merchant ships were well armed and prepared with gallant sailors who carried guns and swords to protect themselves and their precious cargo. In comparison to older ships, today's maritime fleet is completely unarmed and banks on non-lethal anti-piracy weapons and armed guards to deter the sea pirates or rely on naval vessels or coast

guard. Training ashore and on board deals strictly with methods to protect us from piracy but not to fight pirates. No seafarer in his right mind would want to fight pirates armed or otherwise.

Since specialized shore based training is already provided to seaman today for tackling maritime piracy issues, I would focus here more on the growing trends of piracy at sea worldwide and how it is affecting the seamen.

Earlier before socio economic and political issues redefined the whole meaning of maritime piracy, Piracy from Malacca strait to the West Coast of Africa and even India was confined more with looting of ship's property and crew's personal items. With changing political dynamics from year 2005 onwards, Somalia grabbed the world center stage in ship hijackings and the entire Arabian sea and the Gulf of Aden became virtually a "No Man's Land" for seafarers. The plight of captured seamen, their captivity for several months has only increased the presence of Naval Vessels in the area, but still there seems to be no lasting solution to this problem.

Hijacking of unarmed ships and kidnapping of seafarers near Nigeria and Somalia have become the most lucrative business for political rebels, organized criminals and agencies involved in the negotiation of ransom payments. Also, South China Sea/Singapore strait have been reporting considerable number of hijackings of small ships in the past few years.

Is there a Solution to Curb Maritime Piracy?

If we check the history of piracy around USA, rarely one will read about cases of ship hijacking. The US coast guard is extremely alert and professional and the coast is well guarded. Can other countries with piracy activities along their coasts boast such firewall against pirates?

No doubt the coast guard of these countries are alert and their navies are excellent, but the lack of enforcing legislation on lines of USCG 96 hours (NOA) has made coastlines of countries such as India prone to alien vessels.

Many of these countries (e.g. India) do not have Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and ships report to port authorities only when within VHF range. Comparatively, if the US coast guard does not receive the mandatory 96 hrs.' notice of arrival a ship cannot dock to any of its port and this system ensures each and every approaching vessel is tracked and monitored. A shipmaster before arriving US port must declare all particulars of his crew, cargo, past history of ports called by the ship etc. This is a great method to keep illegal activities away from the country.

Ship owners have started installing armed guards, created citadels and barbed wires on board for protection from piracy attacks, but these measures are focused mainly for ships transiting Gulf of Aden or pirated sensitive areas in the Arabian Sea and Indian ocean. The recent shooting case of Indian fisherman off Kerala coast by Italian armed guards has given good excuse to some ship-owners to remove armed guards quoting this incident and leaving their seafarers totally at the mercy of patrolling Naval vessels.

Several measures taken by NATO's *Operation ocean shield* , the EU's *NAVFOR operation Atlanta* and the *Combined Task force151* which have been helpful to deter the pirates from attacking ships off Somalia up to a certain extent, but not completely. The political situation in Somalia is too complex for any foreign government to interfere and to provide a lasting solution. Considering the easy money that the ransom brings to the pirates, the problem of somali pirates will not end very soon.

With piracy spreading its influence to many terrorist groups who eye easy money with the kidnapping and seajacking of ships, seafarers are one left at the receiving end

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and more vulnerable to such piracy attacks.

BMP4
Best Management Practices for
Protection against Somalia Based Piracy

Produced and supported by:

What Seafarers Should Do To Tackle Maritime Piracy?
Seafarers should demand armed guards in all hostile waters where even a minutest risk exists for militants to settle scores with theirs or any foreign Govt. or to wage war on a foreign nation. For those who do not track IMB piracy reports, the following sea areas are prominent piracy prone areas as declared by IMB PRC and seafarers should be vigilant when passing through them.

1. Bangladesh
2. India
3. Indonesia
4. Singapore strait
5. Malacca strait
6. South china sea
7. Lagos
8. Cotonou(Benin)
9. Lome (Togo)
10. Abidjan(Ivory coast)
11. Gulf of Aden/Red sea
12. Somalia

Seafarers should also read *the Best Management Practices – For Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (Version 4 – August 2011)*
I was recently watching the famous TV-series Homeland where FBI shoots a terrorist after tracking him right down to the last few meters using their advanced satellite imaging system. Considering there are such advanced technologies available (I suppose there are) that can be used to keep pirate ships under surveillance, tracked or even destroyed, it is hard to believe why are they still not being used for such purpose. A naïve seafarer will never understand the political moves of affected business houses who perhaps never want this piracy to end. No one knows what is the real reason behind these activities and what are the probable solutions. Until now the shipping industry is just defending itself from maritime piracy. We wonder when will the responsible people find real solutions to end this and for long seafarers will have to risk their lives at sea?

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As Somali Pirate Attacks Decline, Maritime Security Firms Diversify Into Other Businesses

Source: http://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/maritime-security-firms-somalia/

Cash-strapped maritime security firms are being forced to use fewer costly elite guards and to diversify into other businesses such as cyber security, as a steep decline in Somali pirate attacks and hotter competition erode fast-thinning margins.
Hundreds of security firms sprang up over the past seven years to offer protection to shipping companies, with scores of merchant vessels being boarded and sailors taken hostage in pirate raids off the coast of conflict-torn Somalia.

However, attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean have dropped from a peak of 237 in 2011 to just 10 in the first nine months of this year, the lowest since the piracy scourge began in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
The fall has been helped by using armed guards, deploying naval forces and defending ships with barbed wire or fire hoses.

The cost of using guards has also halved as the sector has become more competitive, which though good for ship owners is bad for security firms.

"Day rates for embarked teams are continuously being squeezed to rock bottom," said retired rear admiral Vasilis Politis, managing director of Greek armed guard company Marine Security International.

The price for a security team to protect a ship has slumped from an average of $40,000 per voyage to around $18,000-$20,000, said Gerry Northwood, who previously commanded the British Royal Navy's Counter Piracy Task Group which detained 13 Somalis after an attack on a tanker in 2012.

A typical team comprises three or four guards, working round the clock and armed with semi-automatic weapons to maximise fire power and rifles for accuracy and range.

Faced with a tougher operating environment, some firms have switched from using former U.S. and British marines and special forces to cheaper alternatives including guards from India, the Philippines and Estonia, said Ian May, Asia manager for Protection Vessels International.

Declining revenue has encouraged industry consolidation. Ambrey Risk, one of the biggest firms, bought the maritime security division of rival Drum Cussac this month, while Gulf of Aden Group Transits shut in July.

Peter Cook, chief executive of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), said its membership had fallen from a high of 180 companies in November 2012 to 140, and he anticipated further falls.

New business

Companies are trying to expand into new areas including cyber security for ships and the offshore industry, port security and training coast guards.

Some are also offering protection in areas where piracy has increased such as West Africa, with 23 attacks recorded up to September this year, and Asia, where almost 100 attacks were reported in the waters off Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.

However, restrictions on privately contracted armed guards in West Africa and the low level of violence normally used in attacks in Southeast Asia mean firms cannot necessarily replicate their Indian Ocean operations, said Mark Thomas, Asia Pacific business development manager at Dryad Maritime in Singapore.

Despite the drop in attacks, the Gulf of Aden still remains vital for the security business, with a fifth of global trade passing through it and at least 40 per cent of ships transiting the area had armed guards in July, according to SAMI.

Former British naval captain Northwood, who is chief operating officer at Maritime Asset Security and Training, said there were still probably two or three cases of Somali pirate boats probing the defences of ships a month.

For now, naval patrols are set to continue. The European Union expects to extend its anti-piracy operations for another year and NATO is extending its to the end of 2016.

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"If companies stop using armed guards and the naval presence disappears then we would not have to wait for too long for another wave of successful attacks," said Madis Madalik, chief operating officer of Estonian-based ESC Global Security.

What Drives Maritime Piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Source: http://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/what-drives-maritime-piracy-in-sub-saharan-africa/

Southeast Asia once dominated the landscape of maritime piracy. From 1999 to 2004 Indonesia experienced nearly 100 pirate attacks per year. But just as piracy was receding in and around the Malacca Straits, attacks in the Gulfs of Guinea and Aden were on the rise. Indeed, piracy and especially hijackings exploded in the Greater Gulf of Aden after 2008 (see Map of Africa with incidents geo-coded). In a recent report for the Office of Naval Research in the United States, Brandon Prins examines trends in maritime piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Using newly collected and geo-coded data from the Maritime Piracy Event and Location Data Project (MPELD) Brandon Prins documents both the drivers of piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa and compares piracy to other forms of political violence witnessed in this region. He notes that given the tremendous social and political conflict occurring in many piracy prone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, counter-piracy efforts at sea will likely fail.

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Piracy Incidents, 2005-2013
Table 1 below provides a short temporal window of piracy attacks in nine Sub-Saharan African countries. Clearly East Africa, specifically Somalia and Tanzania, and West Africa, including Nigeria in particular but other countries in the Gulf of Guinea as well, account for the vast majority of piracy observed. Table 1 also shows the dramatic decrease in piracy off Somalia beginning in 2013 and the sizable increase in the Gulf of Guinea that began in 2012. Incidents ascribed to Togo may of course be Nigerian pirates attacking transport ships as they steam towards the oil fields and platforms located in the Niger Delta. So far in 2014 there are twelve reported piracy incidents in Nigerian waters (but another

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
GG of Aden	11	43	20	46	105	158	107	152	58	13
Nigeria	27	16	12	40	39	28	18	11	25	29
Ivory Coast	4	3	1	0	3	2	4	1	5	4
Guinea	5	1	4	3	0	5	6	5	3	1
Ghana	5	3	3	2	7	3	0	3	3	1
Togo	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	4	14	5
Cameroon	3	2	1	0	3	3	5	0	1	1
DRC	0	0	2	4	1	2	3	3	1	0
Tanzania	2	7	9	11	14	6	18	8	2	1

17 in the Greater Gulf of Guinea), which is slightly below the number of incidents reported in 2012 and 2013 for the same first eight months of the year. Interestingly, and perhaps worryingly, the number of incidents reported off of Somalia and Yemen in 2014 now stands at 9 (through September 17, 2014) with another 3 occurring in the Red Sea. This remains considerably fewer than the incidents observed in 2012 off Somalia (and Yemen) but is more than the total number of incidents from all of 2013. So piracy may be increasing once again off Somalia.

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Sub-Saharan African Maritime Piracy Counts by Year
Many of the drivers of maritime piracy are strong in Sub-Saharan African countries. Extant research shows state fragility, economic deprivation, population, and geographic opportunity all related to the incidence of piracy in territorial waters. Similar to the growth of armed insurgencies, political and economic conditions help facilitate corruption and criminality, both of which enable piracy. Indeed, countries that suffer from piracy experience much higher levels of political fragility.

	SFI Score 2005-08	SFI Score 2009-13	GDP PC 2005-08	GDP PC 2009-13	Population 2005-08 Millions	Population 2009-13 Millions	Ports	Choke Distance kms	Coastline kms
Somalia	22.75	24	481	562	88	97.8	5	1,235	3,025
Nigeria	19.5	17	861	1,013	145	162	25	4,894	853
Ivory Coast	15.5	16.25	937	942	17.8	19.2	7	4,453	515
Guinea	18.5	19	308	304	9.9	11	4	3,734	320
Ghana	13.75	12.5	533	650	22.2	24.5	4	4,689	539
Togo	13.75	13	385	399	5.7	6.4	2	4,775	56
Cameroon	17	16.25	922	941	18.9	20.9	9	5,265	402
DRC	22.75	23	139	155	56.4	63.1	3	5,571	37
Tanzania	11.25	10.5	398	459	40.6	45.7	8	1,871	1,424

Table 2: Country-level Information

The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) measures political weakness using an ordinal scale ranging from one to twenty-five, with higher values signifying increasingly fragile states (see Table 2).
The average fragility score for the nine Sub-Saharan countries examined in this report (averaged across the 2009-2013 time period) is 16.8, which is 2.5 times higher than countries without piracy. The average fragility score for countries without piracy during the

2009-2013 time period is 6.6. Somalia, with an average score of 24, represents the closest thing to a failed state in the international system. The political improvement Somalia witnessed from 2011 to 2012 (and likely into 2013 although the data for 2013 are not yet available) appears to have helped counter-piracy efforts in the Greater Gulf of Aden. Given that trade in the greater Gulf of Aden is valued at nearly one trillion US dollars a year, it is clear why would-be pirates gravitate toward these waters. Further, Somalia despite having only five deep-sea ports, sits only five kilometers from where the Red Sea empties into the Gulf of Aden, and approximately twenty thousand ships transit through the Greater Gulf of Aden each year. These vessels represent in many cases easy targets for would-be pirates.

Economic deprivation within countries also helps to facilitate piracy and illegal markets more generally. Unemployed youth (especially males) provide the foot soldiers both for insurgencies and pirate gangs. The average per capita gross domestic product for our nine Sub-Saharan African countries (averaged across the 2009-2013 time period) is only about $600 US dollars. The average value for countries without piracy is nearly 28 times higher, at $17,753. As Table 2 demonstrates, some of the most piracy-prone countries remain some of the poorest places on Earth. Somalia had an average per capita GDP in 2009-2013 of only $562. Nigeria was slightly higher at $1,013. Such entrenched and deep poverty poses significant challenges for any counter-piracy efforts. Convincing individual fishers or farmers to forego the opportunity of a lucrative payoff (typically several thousand US dollars) remains difficult when there are few employment alternatives. And, monies from pirate operations tend to depress job growth in the legal economy. Prices rise with cash from piracy leading to the appreciation in the value of the local currency, which tends to decrease primary commodity exports (Oliver, Jabloski, and Hastings 2013). Efforts to increase wages and job growth in piracy-prone countries must be part of an effective counter-piracy strategy.

Many of the same drivers of maritime piracy also associate with other forms of violent conflict on land. The Armed Conflict Location and Event dataset (ACLED) as well as the Social Conflict in Africa database (SCAD) both record instances of political and typically violent conflict occurring on the ground in Africa. The Global Terrorism database (GTD) collects information on transnational and domestic terror attacks occurring in all countries around the world. As Figure 2 clearly shows, piracy represents only a small fraction of this violent political conflict, but even these relatively small numbers have costly consequences on international trade.

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Figure 2: Comparing Piracy, Conflict, and Terrorism Events in 9 Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2004-2013

The *Oceans Beyond Piracy* Project estimated the costs of Somali piracy in 2012 alone to be around $6 billion dollars. Of course, the illicit gains from piracy also drive trade in narcotics, weapons, and human slavery. Combatting these proscribed activities reduces the public coffers of already poor countries and consequently prevents investments in other areas that might spur development, reduce poverty, and improve public health (all of

which would likely help drive piracy lower). Counter- trafficking programs seemingly cost billions of US dollars each year since the modest counter-piracy military operations in the Greater Gulf of Aden cost over 1 billion US dollars in 2012 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013).

Although pirate attacks dropped dramatically off the coast of Somalia in 2013, they increased significantly in the Gulf of Guinea. Counter-piracy naval operations and improved security onboard ships likely contributed to the decline in the greater Gulf of Aden. Some strengthening in Somali governing institutions also likely had an effect even as armed conflict continued to create difficulties for the new regime. In the Gulf of Guinea, a deteriorating security environment and continued fragility in many West African governments provided space for pirate groups to operate. In Nigeria, for example, the number of conflict events on land increased by over 200% from 2011 to 2013 and the number of terrorist attacks jumped by nearly 250% from 2011 to 2012. Political violence was also on the rise in Togo, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and the DRC. Although West African leaders met during the summer of 2013 to plan an assault on piracy and pirate groups, insufficient resources and too few naval patrol craft will likely hamper their efforts. Permitting foreign-armed guards on merchant vessels transiting Nigerian waters may be a next step in countering this maritime threat. Clearly, though, conditions on land must improve before the piracy threat will disappear. Weak states, joblessness, and abundant targets currently ensure that piracy will continue.

Australia commandos end Sydney cafe siege

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-30485355

December 15 – Two people have died, along with an Islamist gunman, after commandos stormed a cafe held under siege for 16 hours in Sydney, police say.
The gunman, identified as an Iranian refugee, had taken dozens of hostages.
Paramedics were seen carrying away several injured people.

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The centre of the city was put in lockdown when the gunman seized the hostages early on Monday, forcing some of them to hold up a black Islamic banner at the window of the Lindt cafe.
The cafe is located in Martin Place, a busy shopping area in Sydney's financial district.
Several people appear to have been injured

Prime Minister Tony Abbott said it was "profoundly shocking" that people were being "held hostage by an armed person claiming political motivation".

Dramatic scenes
The Australian police said the victims were a 34-year-old man and a woman, aged 38.
Another man, who was 50, also died. He is believed to be the gunman.
We do not know yet what triggered the assault, the BBC's Phil Mercer reports from Sydney.
However, reports in the local media suggest the commandos from the Royal Australian Regiment entered the building after the gunman started firing shots.
Shortly after 02:00 local time Tuesday (15:00 GMT Monday), several hostages fled from the building.

Minutes later, the commandos with assault rifles and wearing helmets and body armour could be seen piling into the cafe, tossing stun grenades ahead of them, and apparently opening fire.

Hostages ran to safety with their hands in the air. A man and a woman were seen being carried to safety by emergency services. Medics were seen treating a person lying on the ground.

The dramatic scenes of the rescue operation were broadcast live on television.

New South Wales police announced the end of the siege at 02:44 local time (15:44 GMT) in a tweet, promising details later.

Sixteen-hour siege

09:45 Monday local time (22:45 GMT Sunday): Police are called out to the Lindt Chocolat Cafe in Sydney's Martin Place, a busy plaza in the heart of the city. Suggestions an armed robbery is under way are soon discounted

10:09: Australian TV stations broadcast footage of hostages holding a black Islamic banner up to the window. The gunman can also be seen, wearing a bandana

12:30: As police flood the area, Prime Minister Tony Abbott goes on national TV to promise a thorough police response to the "deeply concerning incident"

16:00-17:00: Three men, then two women, sprint to safety from the cafe's fire exit

18:30: Police confirm negotiations are under way with the gunman

02:20 Tuesday (15:20 GMT Monday): Several more hostages escape and commandos storm the cafe

02:48: Police officially confirm end of siege. Reports suggest gunman and one other person dead, several people injured

'Isolated figure'

As many as 40 customers and staff were taken hostage. Five managed to escape through a fire exit on Monday afternoon.

Monis is well known to the Australian police

Suspected gunman Man Haron Monis received political asylum in Australia in 1996 and was on bail facing a number of charges.

On a website, now suspended, he describes himself as a Shia Muslim who converted to Sunni Islam.

The self-styled cleric was described by his former lawyer as an isolated figure.

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One of his demands was to have a flag of Islamic State, the Sunni militant group which recently seized territory in Syria and Iraq, to be delivered to the cafe.

Martin Place is home to the state premier's office and the headquarters of major banks.

At the nearby Sydney Opera House, evening performances were cancelled as shops and offices in the area shut early due to the security situation.

"It's sad to think this is my home and that it could happen anywhere," onlooker Rebecca Courtney told AFP news agency.

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Mr Torry Johnson, 34 (manager of Chocolat Café) was shot dead after he tried to wrestle the gun from Islamic extremist Man Haron Monis inside the Lindt cafe in Martin Place just after 2am on Tuesday morning.

Ms Katrina Dawson, a 38-year-old whose three children are all under 10, died in hospital. She was a barrister at Eight Selborne Chambers in Sydney's Phillip Street, opposite the site of the siege.

In September, Australia - which has sent fighter jets to join the US-led coalition conducting air strikes against Islamic State in Iraq - carried out a big anti-terror raid.

One man was charged with plotting to behead a member of the public in Martin Place.
In October, the Australian parliament approved new anti-terrorism laws, including a provision designed to stop Australians fighting in overseas conflicts.

Sandy Hook Parents Sue Bushmaster: You Sold 'Weapon of Choice' for Mass Murderers

Source: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/15/sandy-hook-parents-sue-bushmaster-you-sold-weapon-of-choice-for-mass-murderers.html

A lawsuit filed Monday (Dec 15, 2014) by 10 Sandy Hook victims' families claims Adam Lanza would not have been able to kill 26 people in five minutes without his "weapon of choice," a Bushmaster AR-15.

"The number of lives lost in those 264 seconds was made possible" by the rifle that was "engineered to deliver maximum carnage with extreme efficiency," according to the lawsuit against AR-15 manufacturer Bushmaster.

The lawsuit was filed Monday morning in Connecticut superior court against

Bushmaster, several other manufacturers, and Riverview Gun Sales, where Lanza's rifle was purchased.

These defendants know that "as a result of selling AR-15s to the civilian market, individuals unfit to operate these weapons gain access to them... Despite that knowledge, defendants continue to sell the XM15-E52 rifle to the civilian market."

In making the case against any civilian sales of AR-15s, the plaintiffs say—among other things—"there is not a single state that requires a mental-health examination of a potential purchaser of an AR-15" or to "answer questions about other individuals with whom they intend to share access."

The reference is unmistakably to Nancy Lanza, who purchased the AR-15 that her son would use to massacre 20 first-grade students and six adults before taking his own life.

Under the title "The Road to Sandy Hook," the lawsuit painstakingly details the use of the AR-

15 in other mass shootings, including those at schools. Yet Bushmaster continued to market the AR-15 as a weapon that would make others "bow down" and kept selling high-capacity magazines with it.

After recounting the individual lives taken by Lanza and his Bushmaster AR-15, the lawsuit says the defendants "knew, or should have

known" that the sale of the AR-15 "posed an unreasonable and egregious risk of physical injury to others." In addition, it should've known it would've been used in a mass shooting to inflict maximum casualties.

The families created estates in their childrens' names (with parents as administrators) so they could sue on behalf of the victims. Bushmaster and the other defendants' conduct, the plaintiffs say, was a "substantial factor resulting in the following injuries and losses." They are listed for the dead as "terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life's activities; destruction of earning capacity, and death."

The plaintiffs claim damages in excess of $15,000 and seek further relief for monetary damages, puntitive damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive relief.

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▶ **Read the lawsuit document at source's URL.**

EDITOR'S COMMENT: There is nothing that can replace the life of a child! If lawsuit is to claim compensation then it is wrong – except for expenses paid for hospitalization of the injured. If lawsuit aims to apply pressure or even change existing situation regarding gun trade then it is understandable. But why only Bushmaster, other manufacturers, and Riverview Gun Sales? Were they selling guns without state permission? Why not the Governor, the Senate and other legistative bodies – even the President himself – that authorized Bushmaster and distribution chain to sell this type of weapons. Any type of weapons to be used by not trained individuals of all ages? Why not the company providing the ammunition for the AR-15? A gun without bullets is nothing! We can only imagine the pain of the families loosing their children. But if you want to change our word you have to do it right starting from the head of the fish not the tail!

Majority of Americans Believe Torture Can Prevent Terrorism Sometimes

Source: http://time.com/3633497/american-torture-poll/

December 15 – **More than half of Americans (57 percent) believe that interrogation tactics such as waterboarding — techniques widely considered to be torture — are successful in preventing terrorist attacks at least some of the time.**

Roughly a quarter (23 percent) believe that many of the techniques in the CIA's interrogation program, publicized in a Senate Intelligence Committee report last week, produce reliable counterterrorism information often, *CBS News* reports. The poll of 1,003 adults was conducted by phone on behalf of CBS News by SSRS of Media, PA.

Close to half (49 percent) of Americans believe interrogation techniques such as waterboarding are sometimes justified, while 36 percent believe they are never justified. The percentage of those who believe the techniques are justified has slightly risen, compared to three years ago.

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Americans consider these interrogation techniques to be torture:
- **73 percent believe threatening to sexually abuse a prisoner's mother is torture**
- **70 percent believe forcing a detainee to stay awake for 180 hours is torture**
- **69 percent believe waterboarding is torture**
- **57 percent believe forcing detainees to take ice-water baths is torture**

A little more than half (52 percent) of Americans believe publicizing the program tactics will negatively impact U.S. national security, while a third believe it will have no effect.

Romania's Directorate for Organized Crime and Terrorism indicts over 30,000

Source: http://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-directorate-for-organized-crime-and-terrorism-indicts-over-30000/137726/

The Directorate for Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) has summed up its 10-year activity: 30,831 people indicted, precautionary measures amounting to over EUR 1.16 billion, the seizure of 8.5 tons of drugs and 64,564 resolved files.

"DIICOT was a generous project that finally confirmed that we could collaborate with 50 countries, making joint investigation teams, that we could solve cases that can be taught at any seminar where you learn how to fight organized crime and terrorism," said DIICOT interim chief prosecutor, Giorgiana Hossu, cited by local Mediafax.

Hossu took over this position after former DIICOT head Alina Bica was arrested in November by the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) in the restitution file for an overpriced piece of land.

NATO Brunssum jihadi target
(Tranlated from Dutch)
Source: http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/23455847/__NAVO_jihadi-doelwit__.html

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The NATO headquarters in Brunssum (hosting 1,500 people; 900 from 26 different NATO countries), is possible target of Muslim terrorists. The warning for the jihadist threat already applies from September according to sources within the NATO base.

Mayor Luc Winants Brunssum confirms the threat. "That threat is certainly there now. I'm about to be informed by the police during a briefing. We look very seriously at the threat together with the people of the base and the investigative services. Of course, I am shocked. "

The Ministry of Security and Justice says that protective measures already been taken in September when the Netherlands was participating in the coalition against Islamic State (IS). According to the spokesperson there is no concrete evidence of additional threat; it's a precaution, as the advice to soldiers and customs officers not to wear uniforms in public transport and leisure time.

There is a mosque nearby and many Muslims are passing by infront of the base and the barracks and this make people and families living/woring there both worry and suspicious.

Analyzing how emotions ripple following terrorist events
Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141216-analyzing-how-emotions-ripple-following-terrorist-events

The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing motivated mass expressions of fear, solidarity, and sympathy toward Bostonians on social media networks around the world. In a recently released study, researchers at the University of Pittsburgh and Cornell University analyzed emotional reactions on Twitter in the hours and weeks following the attack.

The study is the first large-scale analysis of fear and social-support reactions from geographically distant communities following a terrorist attack. A University of Pittsburgh release reports that the findings show the extent to which communities outside of Boston expressed their

emotions by using hashtags such as #PrayForBoston and how those reactions correlated with geographic proximity, social-network connections, and direct ties to Boston.

The full results of the study, which have been published online in the journal *EPJ Data Science*, may provide insight to governmental agencies exploring how best to handle public fear following a disruptive event.

"When a community in one geographic location is attacked, it is important for government officials to be able to predict where public fears will be heightened most as a result of that attack. The findings of our study will potentially assist officials in predicting the exact manner and extent in which citizens in their own regions will react to tragic occurrences in another region of the country," said Yu-Ru Lin,

the study's principal researcher and an assistant professor in Pitt's School of Information Sciences. "By swiftly recognizing the heightened presence of fear as a result of occurrences elsewhere, officials within a city can respond appropriately with various measures to calm the public and reassure them that all measures are being taken to ensure public safety and well-being."

The study is unique in that previous studies of emotional responses to terror attacks have only focused on those in directly affected areas. For the Pitt-led study, researchers analyzed more than 180 million geocoded tweets from individuals in ninety-five cities around the world. Researchers focused their analysis on the 60 most-populated metropolitan areas in the United States as well as the thirty-five highest-populated cities outside of the United States.

To study expressions of fear, Lin's team utilized content-analysis programs to search for a predetermined set of keywords — including "fearful," "fatal," and "terror" — within tweets directly related to the bombing. The study also utilized Twitter hashtags to identify tweets reflecting expressions of solidarity and sympathy. Researchers found that citizens in some cities were more likely to express specific emotions based on geography and shared experiences.

The hashtag #PrayForBoston — a variant of the #PrayFor{X} hashtags that have been used in recent years following various tragic events — was used to identify expressions of sympathy.

Citizens in the city of London were modest in their expressions of fear and solidarity but were more forthcoming in their use of the #PrayForBoston hashtag. Lin and her team theorized that the greater show of sympathy from Londoners was due to the citizens of London having endured their own terrorist attacks in the recent past and therefore relating to the sense of tragedy that Boston's citizens were enduring.

The **hashtag #BostonStrong** — a variant of the #{X}strong hashtags made popular by Lance Armstrong's Livestrong motto and the U.S. Army's "Army Strong" media campaign — was used to measure expressions of solidarity. Expressions of solidarity were used most by citizens in U.S. cities that possess close geographic proximity and have similar cultural identities as Boston. For instance, citizens in Chicago and Washington, D.C., were more likely to express emotions of solidarity due to their relative closeness in distance and personal ties with Boston.

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"Our findings suggest that the immediate emotional reactions on social media are indicators of deeper feelings of connection to suffering in other communities that linger," said Drew Margolin, Lin's collaborator and an assistant professor of communication in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Cornell University. "In the future, this may have implications for anticipating how communities will respond to shocking events beyond terrorist attacks, such as school shootings, natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy, or incidents like those that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri."

According to the study's overall findings, the extent to

which communities outside of the Boston metropolitan area expressed emotional reactions to the attack directly correlated with individuals' geographic proximities, social network connections to Boston residents, and relationships to the city of Boston. Furthermore, reactions of fear were the most likely of sentiments to be expressed by individuals with direct ties to Boston or to Bostonians. The extent to which individuals had ties to the Boston area was the best predictor of fear and solidarity expression as well as a strong predictor of an expression of sympathy.

— Read more in Yu-Ru Lin and Drew Margolin, "The ripple of fear, sympathy and solidarity during the Boston bombings," EPJ Data Science 3, no. 1 (2014)
▶ http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/pdf/s13688-014-0031-z.pdf

Taliban assault on Pakistani school ends, 130 dead, mostly children

Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/16/us-pakistan-school-idUSKBN0JU0JO20141216

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December 16 – **At least 130 people, most of them children, were killed on Tuesday after Taliban gunmen broke into a school in the Pakistani city of Peshawar and opened fire, witnesses said, in the bloodiest massacre the country has seen for years.**
More than eight hours after militants entered the school compound, the military declared the operation to flush them out over, and said that all nine insurgents had been killed.
The attack at a **military-run high school** attended by at least 500 students, many of them children of army personnel, struck at the heart of Pakistan's military establishment, an assault certain to enrage the country's powerful army.

The Taliban, waging war against Pakistan in order to topple the government and set up an Islamic state, immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.
"We selected the army's school for the attack because the government is targeting our families and females," said Taliban spokesman Muhammad Umar Khorasani. "We want them to feel the pain."
As night fell on Peshawar, a teeming, volatile city near the Afghan border, security forces finally wrapped up an operation that lasted more than eight hours and involved sometimes intense gun battles.

The Taliban said the gunmen had been equipped with suicide vests. Three explosions were heard inside the high school at the height of the massacre, raising fears of more casualties.

Outside, as helicopters rumbled overhead, police struggled to hold back distraught parents who were trying to break past a security cordon and get into the school.

Officials said 122 people were wounded. A local hospital said the dead and injured were

But despite the crackdown this year, the military has long been accused of being too lenient toward Islamist militants who critics say are used to carry out the army's bidding in places like Kashmir and Afghanistan.

So far the Taliban have targeted mainly security forces, military bases and airports, but attacks on civilian targets with no logistical significance are relatively rare.

In September, 2013, however, dozens of people, including many children, were killed in

Shahzaib Hussain ART

Black Day for the Whole World

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aged from 10 to 20 years old.

According to early witness accounts, a group of militants burst into the school as students attended classes and lectures, shooting indiscriminately at both pupils and teachers.

The gunmen, who several students said communicated with each other in a foreign language, managed to slip past the school's tight security because they were wearing Pakistani military uniforms, local media reported.

Pakistanis, used to almost daily militant attacks, were shocked by the scale of the massacre and the loss of so many young lives. It recalled the 2004 siege of a school in Russia's Beslan by Chechen militants which ended in the death of more than 330 people, half of them children.

Spiral of violence

The Pakistani Taliban have vowed to step up attacks in response to a major army operation against the insurgents in the tribal areas.

an attack on a church, also in Peshawar in Pakistan's northwest.

The assault on a school where officers' children studied could push the armed forces into a more drastic response, analysts said.

In Peshawar, with the rescue operation still under way, hospitals overflowed with hundreds of wounded children, teenagers and adults.

"Classes 8-10 were in a special seminar on first aid in the main hall when students heard gunshots and then countless men burst in and opened fire," said Shahrukh Khan, in his mid-teens, who was shot in both legs.

"Teachers and the principal were also there. The men who burst in were speaking and shouting in an incomprehensible language. Sounded like Arabic or Farsi."

Another student told Pakistan's Dunya Television: "The attackers had long beards, wore shalwar kameez (traditional baggy clothes) and spoke Arabic."

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif condemned the attack.

"I can't stay back in Islamabad. This is a national tragedy unleashed by savages. These were my kids," he said in a statement.

"This is my loss. This is the nation's loss. I am leaving for Peshawar now and I will supervise this operation myself."

In India, Pakistan's long-term rival, Prime Minister Narendra Modi echoed Sharif's sentiments.

"It is a senseless act of unspeakable brutality that has claimed lives of the most innocent of human beings - young children in their school." Pakistani teenager Malala Yousafzai, joint winner of this year's Nobel peace prize for her education campaign work, said she was devastated by the news.

"I am heartbroken by this senseless and cold-blooded act of terror in Peshawar that is unfolding before us," Malala, who now lives in central England, said in a statement.

INTERVIEW-"We must negotiate with Islamic State" - senior mediator

Source: http://www.trust.org/item/20141215093959-qsdq3/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=AlertNet+Expresso+15+Dec+2014&utm_content=AlertNet+Expresso+15+Dec+2014+CID_e4f0918ba34d48d8d7bf0802441cd073&utm_source=Campaign%20Monitor&utm_term=INTERVIEW-We%20must%20negotiate%20with%20Islamic%20State%20-%20senior%20mediator

December 15 – **When Padraig O'Malley says we must talk to Islamic State, he's speaking from experience.**

A seasoned mediator, O'Malley brought together warring parties in Iraq at the height of the sectarian conflict in 2007 and 2008, resulting in an agreement that formed the basis for political reconciliation in Iraq and helped curb the violence.

He did this with the aid of negotiators from South Africa, and from Northern Ireland, where he helped pave the way for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that ended 30 years of sectarian conflict.

In 1997, believing that people who had overcome deadlocks were best placed to advise others, he took Northern Irish negotiators to learn lessons from South Africa. When the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the main players thanked President Nelson Mandela and the South African negotiators.

"A way in time must be found to talk to Islamic State. You simply will not wipe it out. It'll just re-emerge in a different form," he said in a telephone interview from Boston, Massachusetts, where he is a professor.

"I don't think we in the West, or maybe anybody, fully understands the phenomenon of Islamic State, and the degree of its sophistication in attracting young people from all over the world."

O'Malley, who is John Joseph Moakley Distinguished Professor of Peace and Reconciliation at the John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies, University of Massachusetts Boston, is originally from Dublin and has four decades of experience as a mediator.

He quoted a recent opinion poll carried out in six Arab countries by the Qatar-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, which found that Palestinians were the strongest supporters of IS.

This is striking because IS is focused on establishing a caliphate and has no particular eye on destroying Israel - and the finding could open a Pandora's box, O'Malley said.

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"Is this because they (the Palestinians) have reached such a level of hopelessness regarding their own future that they will turn to anything? That IS can offer them something that will give meaning to their lives?"

How do you negotiate with Islamic State?
Contact with IS would have to begin with intermediaries close to the group - wealthy individuals in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab countries "who shovel money" to the fighters.

 Persuading any armed group to talk to its enemies takes a long time. It begins with developing relationships in the community, building trust with people in the lower levels of all the warring parties, and gradually working your way up. "It's very personal," O'Malley said.
"Part of our problem in the West is that we think these things can be resolved quickly.
"Well that's fine, except that people in other parts of the world don't think that way, or we don't have a sufficient appreciation of the depth of the divisions among them," he said.
The Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East, for example, runs very deep, he said.
The divide is one reason for Islamic State's rise, supported by Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq who feel disenfranchised by the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.
"This divide is ugly, it goes way back in history, so there is no such thing as closing this with a few gestures or conferences, or huggings ... It's not the way human beings work."
He predicts that Iraq will not exist in its current form in 10 years' time. The Kurds, emboldened by their successes against Islamic State, will in the near future declare their independence from Iraq, he said.

Return to Iraq
The 2008 Helsinki Agreement that O'Malley helped broker was signed by political parties across the Sunni-Shia divide. It stipulates an end to corruption and to sectarianism in public office, among other things, but it was never implemented. The government has been dominated by Shia politicians, and Sunnis have felt increasingly marginalised.
"Like most things in Iraq at that point, while everybody shook hands, nothing ever happened with that agreement," he said.
O'Malley said he plans to return to Iraq when the recently appointed Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is "more secure in his position", and to suggest that al-Abadi reconvene a meeting of all the signatories to the agreement - who include the current president, prime minister, members of the cabinet and leaders of all parties in the Iraq parliament.
"What I would be emphasising is something that is very important to Arabs - their honour ... Will you honour your signature or will you not?"

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Sick societies
Everyone coming out of conflict suffers from post-traumatic stress, which gives rise to a host of problems, ranging from domestic abuse to addictions and drinking, to a large segment of the population being dysfunctional, O'Malley said.
"On their own they cannot resolve their problems, because they're sick, they're actually sick. And no one is treating them," he said.
"You have to ask how many people in Iraq were killed as a result of the American intervention there in 2003 ... how many were displaced, how many were lost?"
"This country never thinks about them, never thinks of the effects that might have had on surviving members of those families."
O'Malley describes being stuck in traffic in Baghdad two years ago, because bombs had gone off that day.
The Iraqis in the car didn't complain about the bombs, what they complained about for two hours was being stuck in traffic, he said.

"They had so internalised bombings and death that ... it's no longer a significant cause for any kind of shock," he said.

In O'Malley's experience, one divided society is in the best position to help another. Which is why he asked South African negotiators to help those in Northern Ireland, and both groups to help the Iraqis.

And now he brings together divided cities - including Baghdad, Belfast, Jerusalem, Kirkuk, Mitrovica and Sarajevo - each year to listen to each other's experiences, in the Forum for Cities in Transition.

"Our small contribution is for them to recognise their sickness and to help each other."

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Join the discussion…

3scoreand10 · 2 days ago
negotiate with people that cut your heads off and kill women & children you must be off your trolly mate

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Public support for torture declines as people learn the explicit details of torture techniques

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141217-public-support-for-torture-declines-as-people-learn-the-explicit-details-of-torture-techniques

December 17 – Does the American public condone torture when the goal is to prevent terrorist attacks? **News headlines reporting the results of a Pew Research Center poll released on 9 December indicate more than half of Americans do.** That finding, however, is not necessarily valid, says Richard Eichenberg, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University, who argues that the poll is flawed because it is based on a faulty premise.

Pew reported on its poll about using torture to fight terrorism on the same day that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released an executive summary of its report on the Central Intelligence Agency's detention and brutal interrogation program implemented after the 9/11 attacks.

The Senate findings, writes committee chair Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., "are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and rightfully so."

The Pew poll, conducted in August 2011, is one of those cases where paying careful attention to the wording of survey questions is important for really understanding public opinion about an issue, Eichenberg says. The Pew survey found that 53 percent of Americans

believed torture could often or sometimes be justified, while 42 percent said it could only rarely be justified or is never warranted at all.

A Tufts University release reports that according to Eichenberg, the reason for these results may lie in the Pew poll's slanted question: "Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified or never be justified?"

"First, the poll is based on a false premise, in that it says to the survey respondent that torture is used to get important information, while we now know from the [Senate's report on the CIA program] that most of what you get is false information," Eichenberg says.

"Second, the Pew poll offers just four responses, three of which endorse torture, at least in part. So basically you are stacking the cards in favor of torture by three to one."

While this may seem like methodology details in which only students of polling would be interested, Eichenberg argues that such distinctions are important because poll respondents can only respond to a question as it is

posed. "If the question is flawed, then the answer is going to be flawed," he says.

A more accurate picture of the nation's attitude can be found in responses to polls conducted by Pew, Gallup, and other news organizations and analyzed in a 2010 report. These surveys explained in graphic detail what interrogation techniques were being judged, Eichenberg says. The results were summarized in a journal article by researchers at Reed College in Oregon, led by Paul Gronke, a political science professor.

"By and large, 70 to 80 percent of the people reject the techniques that are described in this month's Senate committee report, yet these findings are not getting into the public conversations," says Eichenberg. He points to the Reed researchers' compilation of survey numbers that show that 80 percent of Americans polled between 2004 and 2009 opposed electric shock, waterboarding, sexual humiliation and punching or kicking as interrogation techniques.

So while response to more general questions on the use of torture may continue to produce mixed reactions, Eichenberg says public support for torture will decline as more people become aware of the explicit details of torture techniques contained in the Senate report.

"The graphic details evoke disgust, and the more salient these details are in the press, the more the polls will reflect that disgust — even when the poll question might be fairly general," he says.

A change in sentiment, he says, could lead to public pressure on the U.S. government to adhere to its obligations under the United Nations Convention against Torture agreement that President Ronald Reagan signed in 1988 and the U.S. Senate ratified in 1994. The agreement, in part, calls for the investigation and prosecution of crimes that clearly fall under the definition of torture as cruel and inhumane treatment.

"Whether our government will live up to its obligations under the law of the land is still an open question," Eichenberg says.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: An interesting addition to the questionnaire mentioned above would be to ask those opposing taff interrogation methodologies: "How do you propose to collect information from suspects involved in terrorist plots or actions?" It is easy to say "NO" but same people will accuse their security agencies when such an incident happens to their city, state, nation! I am sure that those involved in security issues to advocate a gentle method approved by the people for the people.

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Somali pirates are "not defeated but dormant," says Puntland's Minister for Maritime Transport

Source: http://www.defenceiq.com/naval-and-maritime-defence/articles/somali-pirates-are-not-defeated-but-dormant-says-p/?utm_source=1-6361871014&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=14+12+18+DFIQ+NL&utm_term=DFIQ_NL&utm_content=DFIQ_NL&mac=1-6954880556&disc=

Map of Puntland State of Somalia

December 15 – Hon. Abdalla Jama Saleh is the Minister of Maritime Transport, Ports and Counter Piracy for Puntland. He is charged with leading the country's counter piracy efforts by working with the international community to fight piracy inland and along the coast of Puntland. He spoke to Defence IQ about the decline of piracy off the Somali coast and how that has given rise to new maritime challenges in the Gulf of Aden…

Defence IQ: **Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has fallen dramatically in the last few years – what are the main reasons for this? What have been the key lessons learned during this period?**

Hon. Adballa Jama: The success against piracy is down to cooperation between at us and the international community. We fought with the pirates inland at their hideouts and points of gathering. We used force on certain occasions; we used religious guidance by preachers stating that piracy is forbidden and any income directly or indirectly is illegitimate and absolutely forbidden. We successfully reached the point that they could not buy properties or marry with the piracy money. Besides that anybody caught by the international armada was given a long prison term. The international navy presence in the area was a major factor too.

What else can be done to continue to reduce the threat of piracy in the region?

To totally eradicate piracy we must support and develop the livelihood of the coastal inhabitants and provide them wit fishing gear, market accessibility for their products, train them with better fishing techniques and help them educate their children and give them access to basic medical facilities. In many areas they don't have potable water and lack all basic infrastructure. A lot of areas are landlocked and can only be reached by boat.

Another important point is to build up the Somali Coast guard along the coastline to have stations with boats, communications, and radars to identify and intercept any illegal activity and at the same time have a database for all sea ferries. It will be the duty of this force to guard and help the fisherman and all sea travelers in their area of control. For instance, in Puntland we need at least eight stations to take complete control of our seas which stretches from Garad to Laskorey.

Have you seen a rise in other types of crime that has spawned out of the piracy threat? How is Puntland tackling these new challenges?

Definitely yes. Illegal fishing in its highest level as well as drugs, arms smuggling, human trafficking and terrorists going back between East Africa and Arabian Peninsula.

Some of the pirates changed tact when they realised the consequences of piracy and instead resorted to all the above activities in association with international gangs and drug kingpins. NATO ships are reporting illegal fishing at its highest level but said they don't have any mandate to interfere. They said they see it happening but can't do anything without a UN mandate. Puntland cannot control its waters because we lack speed boats and surveillance aircrafts. We cannot save lives in disastrous situation in and around our shores.

How important is cooperation between regional governments and militaries to combat maritime threats? Is Puntland State of Somalia working with neighbours to tackle these issues?

The cooperation between us and neighbours is not good for some political issues and there is lack of cooperation among the regional states and neighboring countries as well. But with the international community we've full cooperation and communication at all time.

The Djibouti Code of Conduct was established as a framework to combat piracy in the region – how effective do you think the agreement has been? Does the agreement now need to be built upon to widen the scope of maritime security cooperation and if so, what are the key aspects it should consider in the future?

What we need is practical team work not beautiful communiqué and statements without follow up and commitment. As Puntlanders with our very limited resources, we're committed to abide to what has been agreed upon. The ctf 508 of NATO is the most active ship in our seas and we provide them all the cooperation they ask for. Besides that we have constant communication at all times. EucapNestor has been very helpful in training our port police and so far trained 50 police cadets for 6 weeks in two groups.

The fact is that Somalia's present government can't and will not be able to control this country's long coastline for years to come so the alternative is to support the regional states in taking command and responsibility of their waters.

What will the future maritime security roadmap look like for the next 10 years – what is the key to success? Will Puntland acquire more assets to combat maritime crime?

It all depends on what happens in Somalia during the coming years. If Somalia becomes a country of

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law then there will be a peace and stability in the region's seas but with Somalia like this the safety of the surrounding seas and oceans will never be safe. The pirates are not defeated but dormant and if things remain like this I'll not be surprised to see them arise in a more complex and lethal way. With Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in the area the world should be on a constant alert in this volatile region.

Why do you feel the AFSEC conference is important for Puntland at this time? What are you hoping to achieve at the event?

Our participation in the AFSEC conference will help us find out the achievements made since the last conference and what needs to be done in the future. We will present our viewpoint, our difficulties in piracy, illegal drugs, arms smuggling and human trafficking including terror suspects.

To overcome the difficulty of piracy, drugs, illegal trafficking, arms smuggling and terror movements at sea, states like Puntland and Somaliland need to get speed boats, radars, adequate equipment and proper training for coast guards. They definitely need financial support, logistics, supervision and constant evaluation in order to know that everything is working according to plan.

Colombia Farc rebels declare indefinite unilateral truce

Source: International Crisis Group, Colombia Ministry of Defense

GENE THORP/THE WASHINGTON POST

Colombia's Farc rebels have declared a unilateral ceasefire for an indefinite period, starting from Saturday.

The leftist rebels said the truce should become a formal armistice and would only end if they were attacked.

The announcement was made in Cuba, where the Farc has been holding peace talks with the Colombian government.

President Juan Manuel Santos has so far refused to suspend military action, saying the rebels would use a bilateral truce to rearm and regroup.

The peace talks in Cuba - which began in 2012 - are aimed at ending five decades of conflict that has killed an estimated 220,000 people.

'Renewed pressure'

"We have resolved to declare a unilateral ceasefire and end hostilities for an indefinite period of time, which should be transformed into an armistice," the Farc said in a statement.

Colombia's largest rebel group had previously called for a bilateral truce - but these moves have been rejected by the government in Bogota.

The peace talks were almost derailed in September after the Farc captured Gen Ruben Dario Alzate, prompting President Santos to suspend the negotiations.

The rebels released the general unharmed in November in an effort to revive the talks.

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But following Wednesday's announcement by the Farc, President Santos may come under renewed pressure now to match the rebel offer, BBC regional analyst Leonardo Rocha says.

'Terror has no religion': MP urges ban on phrase 'Islamic terrorist' in mass media

Source: http://rt.com/politics/215131-russian-islamic-terrorist-ban/

Aftermath of a terrorist attack in Kizlyar, Dagestan on 31.03.2010 / RIA Novosti / Said Tsarnaev

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A Russian lawmaker proposes a ban on expressions such as 'Islamic terrorist' and 'Islamist militant' in the mass media, claiming they give people the wrong impression about Islam and put ordinary believers at risk.

Shamsail Saraliyev (United Russia) stepped up with this initiative at this week's session of the State Duma Committee for Information Policy, Izvestia daily reported on Wednesday. According to the newspaper, other Russian MPs supported the idea.

Saraliyev is from Chechnya and before taking a parliamentary seat he was the minister of external relations, ethnic policy and information in the predominantly-Muslim internal Russian republic. Presently he is a member of the State Duma committee for Foreign Policy.

The MP said in an interview with Izvestia that lately the mass media are freely and frequently using expressions like 'Islamic terrorists', 'Islamists', 'Jihadists', 'Shahid belt', 'Terrorist Islamic State' and many others of this kind.

"*These expressions push people towards the conclusion that Muslim religion and terrorism are the same thing. Common people*

automatically begin to associate Muslims with bandits, murderers and terrorists," Saraliyev said.

At the same time, the majority of Muslims prefer to distance themselves from radical groups, preferring to call them 'Kharijites' – Arabic for 'dissenters' or 'insurgents', the lawmaker noted.

One typical example of such people are the supporters of the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL), he said.

"*They call themselves the Islamic State, but they have absolutely nothing to do with Islam! For them Islam is just a cloak with which they cover their evil deeds!*"

Saraliyev reiterated the thesis that traditional Islam is a kindness and creation that promotes peaceful coexistence between all peoples. The reports about Muslim religion calling for aggression and extremism is a either a mistake or a baseless lie, he added.

"*Just as we don't call fascists 'Christians', we should stop using the term Muslims when we describe radical militant groups*

who claim to be followers of Islam."

In 2012, Saraliyev was among the sponsors of the bill that called for a ban on the mass media mentioning the ethnicity of criminals or suspects in news reports. Though not yet passed into law, the bill prompted several media outlets to adopt this rule on a voluntary basis. Saraliyev called such self-regulation an example of how the ban on drawing a connection between Islam and terrorism could work in the future.

There are about 20 million Muslims among Russia's 140-million-strong population. Islam is considered one of four 'traditional religions' in the country, along with Orthodox Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism.

To Catch a Terrorist

By The Editors of Bloomberg
Source: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-16/sydneys-siege-and-how-to-catch-a-terrorist

When terrorism experts warn about the threat posed by a "lone wolf," people picture a confused young Muslim glued to his computer, growing more bloodthirsty with each beheading video he watches. Yet the man responsible for this week's hostage crisis in downtown Sydney -- Man Haron Monis, a 50-year-old Iranian and self-declared "spiritual healer" -- doesn't uphold the stereotype. If they want to prevent future attacks, authorities shouldn't, either.

The reality is that budding terrorists fit no single profile. Intelligence officials have come to downplay the idea that would-be jihadists evolve along a continuum from personal grievance to radicalization -- online or at a mosque -- to violence. Nor is there evidence that greater religiosity raises a potential extremist's risk profile; indeed, the opposite may be true.

This raises questions about the strategies police have traditionally used to try to prevent terrorist attacks -- infiltrating local Muslim communities and mosques to listen for extremist chatter, for instance. Censoring Islamist websites and taking down YouTube videos may actually do more harm than good; new online forums inevitably spring up, and in the meantime, authorities lose a potentially rich source of leads.

How can police recognize potential terrorists? Research has found that many of them exhibit a combination of specific traits. **As many as 40 percent, according to a study by Ramon Spaaij and Mark Hamm, show signs of mental-health problems**, as the unstable Monis did. And like Monis, many have had run-ins with the police or have amassed criminal records. (Monis was out on bail on charges going back more than a decade, including involvement in his ex-wife's murder and sexual harassment.)

Especially in recent years, many suspects have been highly active on social media before their attacks, continuing a tradition of terrorist broadcasting that goes back at least to the Unabomber's manifesto in 1995. In many cases, they have attempted contact with organized terrorist groups, even if they haven't formally joined. And at some point, obviously, all have procured weapons, bomb-making materials or both.

None of these red flags by itself offers slam-dunk confirmation of an imminent threat, and intelligence officials can't keep an eye on everyone. To bolster defenses, local police and other authorities must be trained to be alert to the full range of warning signs. They also need trust and open channels of communication within their communities -- which can easily dry up if Muslims feel they're being unfairly targeted or monitored. And authorities need to share information better with one another, so they can flesh out suspects before attacks occur. Monis was already known to Australian federal police, but he appears not to have been included on any terrorist watch list.

Worldwide, more sophisticated efforts could be made to counter jihadist narratives, whether from

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al-Qaeda, Islamic State or other groups. Many analysts question whether such narratives alone can inspire violent attacks. But as Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott correctly noted, "sick individuals exist in every society." Islamic State's glossy online vision of a rising caliphate offers some of those people a chance to feel part of something larger than themselves.

How Australia's open, multicultural society responds to this week's attack can contribute to that global effort. **While there are fears of a backlash against local Muslims, there are also powerful signs of solidarity among Australians of all faiths.** To those who would paint the West as intent on suppressing Muslims, it's hard to imagine a more enlightened reply.

Why The Balkans Are Becoming The Transit Point For Foreign ISIS Militants

Source: http://www.ibtimes.com/why-balkans-are-becoming-transit-point-foreign-isis-militants-1761464

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A protester holds an Islamic flag outside a government building during clashes with police in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, April 21, 2010. Reuters/Damir Sagolj

The Balkans is becoming a transit point for foreigners wanting to fight with the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. Over the past several months, authorities in Bosnia, Kosovo and Bulgaria have arrested foreigners allegedly working for ISIS. In the latest attempt to crack down on ISIS militants, Bulgarian police detained three foreigners wanted in Spain on terrorism charges. The foreigners were on their way to take part in the conflict in Syria and to fight with ISIS.

Bulgaria's state security agency said Tuesday that the three suspects were detained at a border crossing with Turkey. Two of them were

Moroccan and one was Brazilian. Interpol had issued warrants for the three suspects.

Islamist foreigners wanting to reach Iraq and Syria to fight with ISIS are flocking from places like Morocco to Europe and then on to the Balkans, before heading to Turkey to pass through the border to the battleground. Moroccan authorities said that more than 2,000 nationals, many of whom passed through the Balkans, are now fighting in Syria and Iraq with ISIS. Spain's ambassador to Iraq, Jose Maria Ferre de la Peña, said in November that about 100 citizens of Spain were fighting with ISIS.

Bulgaria's arrest of the fighters Tuesday is just one example of how Balkan states are cracking down on Islamist fighters headed for Iraq and Syria. This year Bosnia passed a law that puts convicted Islamists and recruiters in prison for up to 10 years. Other Balkan nations such as Kosovo and Serbia have also strengthened their anti-terrorism laws.

Bosnia has arrested people thought to be fighting with ISIS almost every month since June when the Sunni militant group took over Iraq's second biggest city, Mosul. In one of the most recent crackdowns, Bosnian police arrested 11 people on suspicion of fighting alongside ISIS militants, or recruiting and raising money for the group. More than 100 police took part in the operation, which spanned over five towns. In September, 16 others were arrested in Bosnia on similar charges. Bosnian authorities said earlier this year that up to 1,000 people from the country were thought to be fighting with ISIS.

As of June, according to a report published by the Combating Terrorism Center, a research institution at West Point, somewhere between 200 and 600 fighters from Balkan nations have traveled to Syria since 2012.

In September, the U.S. State Department designated two Balkan fighters as terrorists, imposing economic sanctions on them and any Americans who associated with them. One of the fighters was a Kosovar Albanian affiliated with ISIS and one was a Bosnian who fought with Jabhat al-Nusra, al Qaeda's offshoot in Syria.

Several Balkan states officially declared their support for the U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq and Syria to fight ISIS. Balkan states in NATO and the European Union, such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the coalition, as did Bosnia, Kosovo, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia.

Counter-Terrorism: The Radicalization of Turkey

Source: https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20141218.aspx

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December 18, 2014: At the end of 2014 Israel revealed that in September it had broken up a Hamas terrorism group in the West Bank. More than 30 arrests were made and interrogations revealed details of the attack plans. Targets in Jerusalem (a sports stadium and the light rail system) and elsewhere in Israel were to be hit. Firearms and bomb making materials were seized during the raids along with documents showing **how a Hamas headquarters in Turkey was coordinating Hamas terror operations in the West Bank and Israel.** This alarmed the Israelis.

When Israel asked NATO to look into this matter NATO, which Turkey is a member of, is at war with Islamic terrorists and denied any such Hamas activity. Yet it's no secret that Hamas is active in Turkey, under the guise of being an "Islamic charity." Turkey has been known to look the other way if Islamic groups set up shop in Turkey and behave while they are there. Over a decade of pro-Islamic government has made all sorts of Islamic conservatives feel welcome in Turkey. That has made Turkey vulnerable, as it's often difficult to tell if some Islamic conservatives are radicalized Moslem or just Turks who take their Islam seriously.

This situation might change if more Turkish Islamic terrorists show up inside Turkey. The current Turkish rulers are trying to make Islam more a part of a government that has been deliberately secular for nearly a century. Meanwhile Turkey's economy has been booming for the last decade, ever since an Islamic party took control in 2002 by promising to finally do something about the corruption that had long crippled the government and the economy. Economic growth usually leads to fewer Islamic terrorists. But the moderate Islamic politicians running the country have also sought better relations with Islamic states, especially neighboring Iran and Arab countries. That meant an end to the close economic and diplomatic relations with Israel.

All this is a return to the past that many Turks are not comfortable with. Until 1924, the Sultan of the Turks was the Caliph (technically, the leader of all Moslems). But in the 1920s, Turkey turned itself into a secular state. Although Turkey became a major economic power in the Middle East, with one of the best educated populations in the region, it was still hobbled by corruption and mismanagement. The current Islamic politicians

promised to attack the corruption (which they have) and return religion to a central place in Turkish culture (a work in progress). This has upset a lot of secular Turks. But it's fashionable to hate Israel these days, over Israeli efforts to cope with Palestinian terrorism. Yet despite the anti-corruption speeches, and actions, of the Islamic politicians Turks are noticing that the Islamic politicians are beginning to act like the corrupt and incompetent aristocrats that brought down the empire in the 1920s,

Turks also fear the possibility that young Turkish Islamic conservatives, radicalized in Syria and returning home with murderous intent might be one of several recent trends that are sending Turks back to secularism. For over three decades most of the terrorist violence in Turkey came from secular Kurdish nationalists, but that is declining as the government makes peace with the nationalist movements. There was always some terrorist activity from Turkish nationalists, Armenian nationalists and Islamic or Arab terrorists. But the fighting in neighboring Syria since 2011 has radicalized many Turkish Arabs and Shia Moslems and now there is fear that ethnic Turkish Sunnis are also becoming radicalized. **The number of Turkish Sunni radicals are still small, but they have been growing since 2011 and it's unclear what a lot of these newly radicalized Turks will do once the war in Syria is over.** Because of all this Israeli accusations that Hamas Islamic terrorists are operating inside Turkey, and the Turkish government is denying it, is nearly as worrying to many Turks as it is to most Israelis.

Terror adviser: Lone wolf attacks are changing

Source: http://thehill.com/policy/defense/227517-terror-advisor-nature-of-lone-wolf-attacks-is-changing

President Obama's homeland security adviser, Lisa Monaco, said Wednesday night that **the nature of lone wolf attacks like the one that took place in Australia on Monday have changed significantly in recent years.**

She said that the ways in which individuals are becoming radicalized have changed with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL), and that the government was still figuring out how to counter their media operation.

"Now, with the evolution, the proliferation, and frankly the prowess that a group like ISIL is making of the social media platform — that has altered the lone wolf, or the homegrown violent extremist, or the lone actor threat that we face in ways that I think we're just beginning to understand," she said.

In the past, she said, individuals would turn radical after viewing videos or reading al Qaeda's english-language magazine. Now, radicalization is a less passive process.

She was speaking at an event hosted by Atlantic Media along with Fran Townsend, who held the adviser role during the Bush administration.

Her comments came days after a gunman took a Sydney cafe hostage. He was killed, along with two hostages, in a police raid.

Former Deputy Director of the CIA Michael Morell said on Monday that the U.S. should expect lone wolf attacks within the next year.

Monaco also responded to the recent cyberattack against Sony Pictures Entertainment, likely over the release of the movie "The Interview." On Wednesday, during the panel, the movie was pulled from theaters by the studio.

"I personally think we need to learn the lessons that we have gained from a decade-plus of counterterrorism improvement," she said — noting that she was hoping that the counterterrorism community would become more culturally adept at handling cyber threats. Monaco and Townsend talked about the intense nature of the job, including having to wake up the president. They both said that the adviser is constantly barraged with information about events and possible threats.

"Do you ever wake up in the morning and things feel good?" the moderator asked at one point. Monaco's response was immediate.

"No."

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The Year Terrorists Lost Religion

By Noah Feldman

Source: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-18/the-year-terrorists-lost-religion

The horrific massacre of 132 boys this week at their school in Peshawar, Pakistan, embodies a new trend in Islamist terrorism that has emerged over this year. Past jihadi terrorists, up to and including Osama bin Laden, claimed that their violence was justified as self-defense under their interpretation of the Islamic laws of war. In 2014, however, we've seen radical Islamists ignoring those laws altogether. From Islamic State to Boko Haram to the Pakistani Taliban, the killers seem unconcerned to justify their actions in terms of Shariah -- and this development demands careful attention to understand where the jihadis are going.

Before you say that you don't care what rationale terrorists give for their actions, recall that understanding terrorism is a necessary prerequisite to combating it. The vast majority of terrorist acts are not committed by literal madmen who don't know right from wrong. To the contrary, most terrorists think that their actions fit into a moral schema and that they are thoroughly justified by some combination of politics and theology. To understand the terrorists' arguments is not to justify or forgive them. It's simply the first step toward making terrorism a thing of the past.

In that spirit, consider that the overwhelming majority of jihadi terrorism has been justified over the past two decades as an exercise of the right to self-defense inherent in the classical Islamic idea of defensive jihad. Unlike offensive jihad to spread the realm of Islam, defensive jihad is not optional but obligatory. According to most classical Islamic authorities, it also doesn't require the direction of an Islamically legitimate leader. And it applies to the individual, not just to the state.

Consequently, jihadi terrorists have claimed to be engaged in defensive jihad, even when an outside observer would consider the claim doubtful. Bin Laden claimed, implausibly, that Saudi Arabia was being occupied by the U.S., so al-Qaeda's embassy bombings in East Africa and the Sept. 11 attacks were acts of self-defense. Once the U.S. was actually occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, resistance against it could be described much more convincingly as a defensive jihad to protect Muslims against the unbelieving occupier.

Even in a defensive jihad, there are laws of war laid down by the classical sources. Women and children are not to be killed. Innocent Muslim men, too, are out of bounds, unless (according to some sources) they are being used as human shields by the enemy.

Of course, al-Qaeda and its affiliates killed women and children as well as some Muslims on Sept. 11, and in Iraq and Afghanistan as well. But the theorists of radical jihadism bent over backward to justify these

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deviations from the classical laws of war.

One rationale was that the classical sources allowed some collateral damage: For example, the use of a catapult that would shoot flaming stones to defeat a siege. Another argument insisted that necessity trumped the classical laws: Because there was no other way for Muslims to defend themselves, weapons of mass destruction were permissible. A third

Front, from which Islamic State broke off in the first place.

Islamic State is justifying its violence on the theory of state expansion. This rationale is not based in self-defense, but in a kind of raison d'état: The violence is justified because Islamic State is trying to achieve sovereign control. Indeed, sovereignty is at the core of its mission, and explains some of its stranger

strand, running parallel to some Western thinking about the laws of war, argued that the use of such weapons was proportional to the kind of indiscriminate violence wrought by American air bombardment. Bin Laden himself even offered a fourth claim, namely that all Americans were responsible for American violence because the U.S. is a democracy.

The point is not to explore whether these arguments were correct interpretations of Shariah. Rather, it's important to notice that the terrorists of 2014 make no such efforts. Boko Haram calls itself a jihadi organization, but it has killed numerous Muslim men. It claims that its best known outrage, the kidnapping of more than 200 young women, is permitted under Islamic law because slaves may be taken, but this is not a doctrine of jihad.

Islamic State goes further. It has used beheadings to enforce its expansion -- and many of those killed have been Sunni Muslims. What's more, there's no non-Muslim occupying force in Iraq for Islamic State to be fighting a jihad against. True, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad can be described as an infidel, and so struggle against his regime might count as a defensive jihad. But much of Islamic State's efforts are focused on other Sunni Muslim groups, including the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra

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undertakings such as the issuance of currency and the declaration of a caliphate. These objectives are strikingly different from defensive jihad. Recall that even bin Laden never declared himself caliph, probably because he didn't govern any territory.

Now in Peshawar, the Pakistani Taliban have followed suit, killing Sunni Muslim boys who couldn't under any theory be described as part of any occupying force. Pakistan is constitutionally an Islamic state, so the Taliban aren't engaged in a defensive jihad. They're trying to gain control of Pashtun-dominated territory -- and perhaps someday of the state itself.

The common thread is the use of terrorism not simply to defend, but to control. The hint of anti-imperialism that attached to al-Qaeda violence and to the modern theory of defensive jihad is starting to look quaint.

The response to the new terrorism must take account of this new, disturbing trend. Put bluntly, the new terrorists can't be allowed to govern. Their successes in the eyes of their followers will be measured not by resistance to the West, but by the creation of semi-functional states. If it's sovereignty they seek, then

sovereignty must be denied to them -- or they   will grow.

Noah Feldman, a Bloomberg View columnist, is a professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard University and the author of six books, most recently "Cool War: The Future of Global Competition." Feldman has a bachelor's degree from Harvard, a law degree from Yale University and a doctorate in Islamic thought from the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He clerked for Justice David Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court. As an adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, he contributed to the creation of the country's new constitution. His other books include "Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem -- and What We Should Do About It" and "After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy." He lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and is a senior fellow of the Society of Fellows at Harvard.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Perhaps the best article's title in 2014! If we do not seriously consider the observed shift on terrorism then in 2015 more horrible incidents will happen…

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What is the lesson learned in 2014?
"The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wise people so full of doubt"
Bertrand Russell

CBRNE-Terrorism
Newsletter
WMD

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