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CBRNE NEWSLETTER TERRORISM

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TERROR NEWS

More Westerners join ISIS following the group's successes in Iraq

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140728-more-westerners-join-isis-following-the-group-s-successes-in-iraq>



Of the 10,000 foreign fighters who have already joined militant groups in Syria and Iraq, 3,000 hold European or other Western passports, making it easy for them to travel across most borders. U.S. officials report that as many as 100 foreign fighters hold U.S. passports, leading to worries that foreign fighters may return to the United States to launch an attack. "It's the largest number of Western fighters we have ever seen in a jihadist theater," said Seth G. Jones, a former U.S. counterterrorism official now with the Rand Corporation.

Another counterterrorism official familiar with the matter reports that Yemeni terrorists have developed a powerful cellphone bomb designed to avoid detection at airports, prompting the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to ask overseas airports to stiffen security measures, especially checking cellphones and other electronic devices.

In addition to concerns about terrorists relocating back to the United States to launch an attack, U.S. officials are worried that territories in Syria and Iraq held by militants belonging to the Sunni Muslim group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), could become sites for launching future attacks. "The concern is not what is happening today, but in four or five years," said the official, who spoke on

condition of anonymity to discuss classified assessments. "If they get their own state, take on new projects, turn from looking inward to outward ... we want to get in front of it."

Intelligence agencies have also intensified the screening of passenger manifests of flights in and out of Turkey, the main entry point to Syria. A counterterrorism task force of FBI agents and federal prosecutors is investigating dozens of Americans who they believe have or plan to travel to Syria to join militants. "We're spending a tremendous amount of time and effort trying to identify those who go [to Syria] so we can know who they are when they come back," FBI head James B. Comey told reporters.

Leader of the special task force, veteran prosecutor Stephen Ponticello, joined Attorney General Eric H. Holder in Europe earlier this month to urge allies to share intelligence on suspects, conduct more undercover investigations, and to enact stronger laws criminalizing support for terrorist groups. The Justice Department has even offered to help European allies draft laws making it easier to charge suspects with attempt to commit an act of terror. The expanding conflict has become "a cradle of violent extremism," Holder said in a speech in Norway. "But the world cannot simply sit back and let it become a training

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ground from which our nationals can return and launch attacks."

French and British citizens form the largest bloc of Western passport holders in Syria and authorities have begun to crack down. The *Los Angeles Times* reports that between January and March, at least forty people in Britain were arrested on charges relating to supporting militant groups in Syria, and the British Home Office has stripped at least twenty people of their citizenship for suspected terrorism support.

American officials have also made some arrests of would-be terrorists including Michael

Wolfe, a native of Houston, who told undercover FBI agents that he would use a \$5,000 federal income tax refund to relocate his wife and two children to Turkey, and then he would join the fighting in Syria. Wolfe was arrested in June by FBI agents at George Bush Intercontinental Airport as he prepared to board the first in a series of flights to Turkey. Wolfe pleaded guilty in June to one count of attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization. He faces up to fifteen years in prison and a \$250,000 fine.

OSCE explores ways to prevent extremism in the Balkans

Source:http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/07/28/feature-01

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Balkan countries are working to address political and socio-economic factors that lead to radicalisation and



recruitment of terrorists, officials said. The OSCE organised a seminar in Skopje that brought together 50 security experts, government and civil society representatives. The recent gathering was part of a series of seminars in the past two years organised by the OSCE's transnational threats department. In Skopje, participants discussed the broader context of the threat of violent extremism that leads to terrorism, and how public-private partnerships, community policing and regional police co-operation can prevent and combat terrorism.

Police co-operation is crucial to regional security given the threat posed by returning Islamic fighters from the Middle East, said Ralf

Breth, head of the OSCE mission to Macedonia.

"Radical groups work jointly and go to training camps in other countries to learn more. It usually ends in terrorist activities. The terrorism often comes back to the country where these people originate from. So our idea is to exchange information on the roots of the problem and create a strategy for how to attack this problem together," Breth said.

Experts also said the new approach should seek to counter the factors leading to radicalisation through providing training and practical tools for police, religious and community leaders as well as government and NGO personnel to design effective anti-radicalisation programmes.

There are two kinds of factors that radicalise returning Islamic fighters, according to Blagoja Markovski, president of the Balkan Security Forum in Skopje.

"First, these people are not ready to be integrated in normal life without proper re-socialisation; they need help from psychologists and psychiatrists. Second, if their number is big, they can organise terrorist activities at home with ease," Markovski told *SETimes*. Terrorism-related security risks, their specifics and complexity, highlight the need for a careful approach that includes early detection measures as well as preventative measures and effective institutional engagement

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for their suppression, said Gordana Jankuloska, Macedonia interior minister. "One of the first measures is exchange of information with other countries that face similar problems," Jankuloska told *SETimes*. Some countries, like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), have imposed harsh criminal penalties for participants in foreign conflicts in an attempt to prevent citizens to join these radical groups. But experts suggested that implementing specific economic measures may be a key to

preventing radicalisation of extremists and their carrying out of terrorist acts.

"It is hard to get a job and for many of these people, [extremism] is the only chance to secure means of existence. Very likely, the most adequate measure to prevent their leaving to foreign battlefields is to provide employment opportunities or include them in some kind of government social policy," Markovski said.



Mega-Terror Attack Predicted in American Shopping Malls

Source: <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Radio/News.aspx/5597#.U9dpv7HhtUo>

A7 Radio's "The Tamar Yonah Show" with Tamar Yonah

"The target will be shopping malls. The method will be with explosive devices meant to inflict suffering and death and to wound as many as possible."

Dr. Jim Garrow is a 2009 nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize. His work saving baby girls from gendercide in China came to international attention as did his rather elite network of schools across China. He worked in Intelligence in the US government, and says that according to his contacts, a huge mega-terror attack in America is to take place. He joins Tamar on her show and talks about his past, his present connections with intelligence sources, and his firm belief that in the future, a mega-terror attack will take place in American shopping malls across the continent.



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According to a send-out of his:

"Intelligence Rumblings:

I have avoided sharing certain information because I took an oath and will not break that oath. I am skating on the edge today because of information that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not share it. Islamists currently in the country, aided by those who have recently arrived via the southern sieve we call a border and those who boldly came on aircraft in a variety of disguises have a purpose in their criminality. Be warned, this is not for the faint of heart.

The target will be shopping malls. The method will be with explosive devices meant to inflict suffering and death and to wound as many as possible. This is terrorism in its lowest form. The purpose is to inflict fear in the hearts of Americans through this targeting of where we go to shop and relax.

The date will be a significant one for the Islamists. The event will happen simultaneously across America at hundreds of locations (note the number). The police, DHS, and security services throughout the nation should be warned and take appropriate action.

Why release this on Facebook? It turns out that the necessary agencies are reading my stuff. Why make phone calls when this gets the news out in a speedy fashion to all of them in an instant message.



Be warned, my sources on this are impeccable. I lay my 100% record of reliability on the line.- Dr. Jim Garrow
Jul 25, 2014"

Tamar Yonah is the daughter of a Holocaust survivor. Her father survived the Nazi brutalities and after liberation, made his way to the shores of the British Palestine Mandate, where again fighting for his survival, fought in Israel's war of Independence. This made a great impression on her life and she too has been fighting for Israel by serving in the Israeli army & air force, and afterwards by becoming an activist for Israel and the Jewish nation. She has been a vocal beacon of light since beginning a prolific career in radio. She hosts The Tamar Yonah Show - Israel's most popular English language radio talk show. She also writes a biting and sometimes humorous, award winning blog that discusses current events, religion and politics.



"Aggressive" Islamic effort to influence Birmingham, U.K. schools: Report

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140729-aggressive-islamic-effort-to-influence-birmingham-u-k-schools-report>

A report issued on 22 July by former U.K. antiterrorism chief suggests that some of the concerns raised in a letter which outlined Operation Trojan Horse – an attempt by Islamic extremists to take over British schools in Muslim neighborhoods – may be real, even if the letter itself was probably a hoax.

The storm caused by the letter and the subsequent investigation and report concern more that public schools in the City of Birmingham. At issue are the clash between British and Islamic values and norms, and, more broadly, the efforts in Britain and other West Europe countries to assimilate a growing Muslim minority.

The *New York Times* reports that according to the report by Peter Clarke, the former head of Scotland Yard's counterterrorism command, there was "coordinated, deliberate and sustained action to introduce an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos into a few schools in Birmingham."

Clarke said there was no evidence of actual radicalization, violence, or encouragement of terrorism. He told the BBC, however, that "there's clearly been a wish to introduce what has been described as a conservative religious agenda into those schools."

Clarke noted that Islamic hard-liners had gained influence on school boards, adding that "installing sympathetic head teachers or senior members of staff, appointing like-minded people to key positions, and seeking to remove head teachers who they do not feel to be sufficiently compliant with their agenda."

The report said that calls to Friday Prayer were broadcast over loudspeakers – such calls were stopped during school inspections — and evidence that female members of staff were not treated equally.

Nicky Morgan, Britain's new education secretary, told Parliament that the report's findings were "disturbing." She said that teachers who led the push for the unauthorized imposition of Islamic practices in schools would likely face disciplinary action and some of the teachers might be barred from the profession.

Leaders in the Muslim community and education officials in Birmingham, where 20 percent of city residents are Muslims, agree that over the past few years there has been an increase in the number of Muslim teachers in schools in majority-Muslim neighborhoods. The *Times* notes that they insist, however, that what the report suggests was meddling by extremists was mostly Muslims advocating to improve their children's educational performance.

Muslim leaders in Birmingham were especially critical of Michael Gove, the former education minister who initiated the investigation, of being the driving force behind months of scrutiny which, these leaders claim, have brought the reputation of some schools "to the point of destruction."

Some opposition lawmakers urged Morgan to repair what they described as the damage done by Gove. Liam Byrne, a Labor lawmaker, told the BBC that "We

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need ministers who drop the divisive rhetoric which Mr. Gove has used in the past. At times in east Birmingham we have felt like we are just a football in Michael Gove's culture wars." Morgan suggested, however, that fear of being accused of racism and anti-Islamic views had allowed a "small number of people with a shared ideology" to take over schools. These people had "a restricted and narrow interpretation of their faith," and had failed to promote fundamental British values and to challenge the extremist views of others, she said.

Morgan said that particularly shocking was evidence of a social media group, called the "Park View Brotherhood," used by some staff members of Park View school. Clarke's report notes that the group's online chats included explicit homophobia; offensive comments about British soldiers; a stated ambition to increase gender segregation in the school; and a constant undercurrent of anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-Israeli sentiment.

In Britain, there is no clear line between state and religion. In fact, public schools, while nondenominational, are required to offer opportunities for collective worship. Official guidelines say that such worship should be "wholly or mainly" Christian in character, but in schools in which the overwhelming majority of students are Muslims, head teachers may request special dispensation to hold Islamic assemblies instead.

Educational experts say the only solution to the problems revealed in Birmingham is to end all worship in state schools.

The requirement to encourage such worship has "led the community quite naturally to think that religion, apart from the agreed syllabus, had legitimate wider influence on the curriculum. It does not," Tim Brighouse, a former chief education officer of Birmingham

and schools commissioner for London, wrote in the *Guardian*.

"Legislation is now needed to replace the act of worship clause with the need to promote pluralism and respect for those with different faiths and none, while making sure that schools stand for those values that underpin a peaceful and civilized society."

The *Economist* notes that the problems in Birmingham may bring about a retreat for the U.K. government's bold education reforms.

Since 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition has freed about 2,500 schools from local-authority control — including some of the schools at the center of Islamic influence storm in Birmingham. All these schools remain under the control of the Department for Education and must submit to inspections by the U.K. Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED), the British schools watchdog, the head teachers of these schools have considerable power to shape the curriculum.

In addition to these "academies," parents have been encouraged to set up "free schools."

The *Economist* notes that the education reforms have ruffled feathers, and posed a difficult question: How can the desire to give schools more autonomy be squared with the desire to enforce liberal values? The magazine concludes:

One sobering lesson from Birmingham is that academic results are often a poor guide to the health of a school. Park View School [the school at the center of the Trojan Horse investigation] was rated "outstanding" by OFSTED in January 2012 — a glaring misjudgment. Nor was parent power much use. Some Muslim families seem to have been happy with the social conservatism of the school.

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"Independent" Kurds need Baghdad more than they'd like

By Tristan Dunning

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140729-independent-kurds-need-baghdad-more-than-they-d-like>


Iraqi Kurds are in a unique position to declare independence in defiance of a seemingly powerless central government in Baghdad following the rapid disintegration of Iraq in the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and As-Sham (ISIS) onslaught. But is independence as

simple as that, a fait accompli resulting from a series of unpredictable events?

Intense nationalists under normal circumstances — the kind of nationalism that only a people with existential angst can express

— this sentiment has been ratcheted up exponentially since Kurdish armed forces or Peshmerga ("those who march unto death") seized Kirkuk on 12 June. Many Kurds in the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) believe their hour of independence is finally at hand. They are likely to vote overwhelmingly to declare independence in the referendum their president, Massoud Barzani,

everything might work in practice after independence. And what might be the consequences? This is especially the case given the parlous nature of governance in the KRG before the present crisis in Iraq, let alone the problems that might follow independence. First, any attempt at secession will inevitably lead to conflict with Baghdad, possibly of the armed variety. It is difficult to recall any



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has proposed.

The 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which created artificial states in the Middle East to serve French and British imperial interests, is unravelling at startling speed in Iraq and Syria. The long-oppressed Kurdish population, divided between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria, cannot but welcome this. They, along with the stateless Palestinians, were the ultimate losers of the post-World War One carve-up of the Ottoman Empire.

No-one can deny that the Kurds of Iraq suffered horribly under Saddam Hussein. The Anfal campaign in the late 1980s, in particular, is reputed to have killed over 100,000 Kurds, destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages, and created millions of refugees.

Can a Kurdish state support itself?

Amid the euphoria of seemingly inevitable independence, however, there seems to be surprisingly little public discussion about how

peaceful secession in recent memory, even for emergent sovereign states that had legal referendums and UN endorsement. The examples of East Timor and South Sudan are not cheery prospects to countenance.

Baghdad may be at the nadir of its power, but the central government could yet reassert itself and be none too pleased about the KRG's opportunism. This is a strong possibility given the resources available to Baghdad and international aid forthcoming from actors with a vested interest in a unified Iraq.

While the Kurds will not face the formidable army of Ba'athist-era Iraq, the Iraqi army has historically had little trouble repeatedly crushing Kurdish insurrections. Let us not forget that the KRG was established on the back of NATO, not Kurdish, arms in 1991 and protected by a no-fly zone until the toppling of Saddam in 2003.

At the very least, Baghdad will look to reclaim Kirkuk and its

oilfields. Again, think of the conflict between North and South Sudan over the oilfields straddling their new border.

Another distinct possibility is that, with time, the Arabs and Turkomen living in Kirkuk province will rebel against Kurdish rule. A recent show of force by Shi'a militia marching through the streets of Kirkuk could merely be the beginning.

Second, the KRG is not financially viable in its present state. It is almost totally dependent on the 17 percent of Iraqi revenue guaranteed to it under the constitution.

The KRG has faced a financial crisis since January when it decided to export a comparatively meagre amount of oil to Turkey against Baghdad's will. Baghdad demands that all oil exports be managed by the central government, lest the north become financially independent and thus liable to declare full independence. In retaliation, Baghdad has repeatedly withheld the Kurdish budget. Most KRG government employees have not been paid for months and are living on the brink.

This leaves the KRG in a catch-22 situation whereby it is unclear how a newly founded Kurdish state would fill the monetary void.

It is true that large deposits of natural wealth lie under the soil of the Kurdish north, especially the oil wells around Kirkuk. These will, however, take years to develop and the Kurds lack the means to refine the crude oil into a consumable product.

The KRG has had a petroleum crisis since Islamist militants took Iraq's main oil refinery at Baajji. The KRG can only provide 60 percent of the region's needs. Every petrol station in the KRG that still has petrol has hundreds of cars lining up outside. People camp out overnight or leave their cars in line and return at opening to acquire some of the coveted fuel.

It is telling that the Turkish government — that is to say, the country that the KRG is supposed to be exporting oil to and the reason for the budget impasse with Baghdad — has offered to export petroleum to the KRG, albeit at a grossly inflated price.

A new nation would need reliable allies

Third, any emergent Kurdish state would be almost totally dependent on Turkish goodwill

due to opposition from Baghdad, Tehran, and Damascus. Turkey's Erdogan government predominantly sees the current situation as an exceptional business opportunity. Given Turkey's fractious relationship with its own Kurdish minority, goodwill could be withdrawn at any time — especially should current negotiations with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) fall apart.

This would leave the KRG surrounded by hostile neighbors. More to the point, almost no one will buy Kurdish oil at present for fear of legal challenges from Baghdad. Thus, not only does the KRG lack the means to develop its resources, but it also lacks a stable export route.

It is similarly telling that the KRG has refused to recognize the self-declared Kurdish autonomous enclaves in Syria at the Turkish government's behest.


Fourth, it is difficult to see what kind of international support the KRG would be able to muster for this endeavor despite the justice of their cause. The U.S. government, for instance, is bound by treaty to guarantee a unified Iraq. Washington also still lists the two main KRG parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, as terrorist organizations so it is in a legal strait-jacket.

The KRG's neighbors, moreover, would not recognize the new state, leaving it landlocked, isolated and impotently sitting atop its proverbial golden egg.

Finally, all of this ignores the threat of ISIS, which controls almost all of the territory on the KRG's southern border. While relatively little conflict has occurred between ISIS and the KRG thus far, it is entirely possible that the Islamist movement will turn its guns north. Flush from its capture of heavy weaponry in Iraq, ISIS is already bombarding the Kurdish enclaves of Syria, so there is little reason to expect otherwise in Iraq.

Unpalatable as it may sound to Iraqi Kurds, the KRG needs Baghdad far more than it is prepared to admit. By all means, the KRG should seek to leverage a better deal out of Baghdad — the peshmerga are vital to the fight against ISIS. In terms of full independence, though, the costs seem to outweigh the benefits at present.

Tristan Dunning is Honorary Research Fellow in the School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics at the University of Queensland.



TOURISM SECURITY
Strategies for Effectively Managing Travel Risk and Safety
Peter E. Tarlow

B H

Learn how to avoid risk and ensure safe travel from a leading tourism safety and security expert.

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Tourism Security

Strategies for Effectively Managing Travel Risk and Safety

By Peter Tarlow

In the post-9/11 world the field of tourism security has become an important part of both security management and tourism. Private security professionals and police departments in tourism cities, as well as hotels, major attractions, and theme parks, have all come to realize that tourism security and safety issues (often called tourism surety) are essential for industry survival and success. In *Tourism Security*, leading expert Peter Tarlow guides the reader through a study of tourism security themes and best practices.

Topics include the relationship between tourism security and the economy, hotel and motel security, risk and crisis management, public places, transportation, and legal issues. This book also includes case studies of four major tourist destinations. With each destination, an interview with a police or security representative is included—providing unique, in-depth insight to security concerns.

Tourism Security is an invaluable resource for private security professionals, police departments that serve tourist destinations, and tourism professionals who work in hotels, at attractions, casinos, at events and in convention centers.

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www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com

Swedish expert slams Norway terror alert

Source: <http://www.thelocal.se/20140728/sweden-slams-norways-terror-alert-tactics>

Sweden has started scratching its head about Norway's methods of handling a recent threat. "It created unnecessary anxiety in Norway," Magnus Ranstorp, terrorist expert at the Swedish National Defence College, told The Local.

Norway has been on high-powered, ultra-defensive tip-toe for the past few days, since its intelligence service (PST) said last Thursday that it suspected an "imminent" terror attack.

"Was it necessary? There are some critical questions we don't know the answer to," Ranstorp mused. "How close was the threat, was it an inevitable trajectory, and how much of it could they control? And we don't know any of that because the story keeps on changing."

Ranstorp said that both Sweden and Denmark have gone public about terror threats before, but generally only the threat is under control and the suspect has been clearly identified.

"That's apparently not the case here."

The threat was described as "credible" but "unspecific", but the PST admitted that it did not know who was behind the threat, nor where or how any attack might be carried out.

Since then airspace has been blocked, football tournaments disrupted, and museums closed in preparation for the attack. Nuclear plants were shut down and border control checks increased.

Ranstorp said that the PST deserved praise for its openness - but not its timing.

"In order to maintain faith and credibility, they need to be as transparent as possible," Ranstorp said. "But it should be done restrictively, and not without good grounds. The Golden Rule is that the more they go public, the less they know."

Following the initial report on Thursday, Norwegian TV reported on Saturday that there was good cause to suspect the attack would take place on Monday. On Sunday agencies backed off, saying that indeed it may not be Monday - but that they still suspect an attack. The situation was unchanged on Monday.

"The 22nd of July was a sort of complete intelligence failure, and they took the safe road. It's understandable,"

Ranstorp told The Local.

"But we can be a bit critical of their level of response. There didn't seem to be any clarity. One day they raised the level, the next they say it's coming, the next they drop it again."

Ranstorp said the nation could not continue indefinitely with such measures, as the drama has already hit hard on the Norwegian economy through lost tourism profits and overwhelming security costs - not to mention the potential impact on society.

"One of the big problems when you go out strong like this is that you not only create public anxiety, but it can also create terrorism in society," Ranstorp told The Local.

"You have to make sure that if there is a general sort of threat like this that people stand together, with community leaders, to mitigate the long term effect."

Former Danish Security (PET) director Hans-Jørgen Bonnichsen has also criticized Norway's behaviour, calling the Norwegian police's reactions a "victory for the terrorists" in newspaper Berlingske.

Ranstorp disagreed - but did say an assessment would be needed to determine whether such measures had been appropriate.

"There needs to be an assessment, or Norway will be like a yo-yo with security, going up and down, up and down, and over time it will become meaningless. So you really have to reserve this extreme level of security for very severe situations."

On Monday evening the PST announced that they would be lowering the threat level on Tuesday another step - but that the nation is still armed and prepared for an attack.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Norwegians are polite and peaceful people. Would love to stay away from all the problems happening globally – if possible! In that respect: better over-reacting than been over-sorrow!



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Pilots Arriving in Israel Blinded by Lasers

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2014/07/pilots-arriving-israel-blinded-lasers/>

Pilots arriving at Ben Gurion Airport have reported powerful laser beams aimed at their cockpits. The source of the beams was identified as the “triangle” area of central Israel, home to many Israel-Arabs. Ever since the new airport runway was opened, flights head north and then arrive towards the runway from the north-east. Pilots have reported several incidents of powerful laser beams aimed at their planes. While similar reports have been received in the past, this time there's a significant rise in their frequency.

Experts say that a powerful laser beam blinds the pilot for a few moments, endangering the plane during critical segments of the landing process.



Catching those responsible is next to impossible, since law enforcement agents have to be very close to the laser beam's source in order to identify the culprit.

Aviation security sources told iHLS that if the situation continues a special police unit will have to try and locate those aiming the lasers.

Knowledgeable sources said that the beams were only aimed at

planes belonging to Israeli companies. Even without looking at a plane's markings, those responsible for the laser beams can consult flight schedules and choose their targets accordingly.

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Libya Militia Map: A Visual Breakdown Of Who Controls What

By Erin Banco and Hanna Sender

Source: <http://www.ibtimes.com/libya-militia-map-visual-breakdown-who-controls-what-1630392>

July 16 – Over the past two months, militias in Libya have been vying for power in the major cities. Existing rival militias have become even more fractionalized and loyalties have both been strengthened and frayed.

The situation on the ground is changed completely from even six months ago and is confusing not only for the militias themselves, but for everyone trying to understand exactly what is going on in Libya.

An infographic based on our research, as well as think-tank data, explains how the loyalties among the militias in Libya are currently split geographically. We explain below the militias' history and current status, as well as the affiliation to Abdoulgassim Khalifa Hifter, a former general in deposed dictator Moammar Gadhafi's armed forces who has been launching attacks against the current Libyan government and has played a prominent part in propelling the country into a new state of chaos.

*This map does not include militias from southern Libya


1. **Libyan National Army:** The so-called Libyan National Army came into the picture in February 2014, but started its offensive in May. Renegade General Hifter controls this group, which claims 6,000 soldiers. It operates in the east of the country, mostly in Benghazi. Hifter recruited and trained thousands of young Libyans from this area to fight government forces.

Military forces in eastern Libya, including some who still have connections to the Libyan army, pledged loyalty to Hifter in May.

Hifter, along with 300 other men, was captured at the Battle of Maatan al-Sarra on Sept. 5, 1987, by Chadian military forces, during the war Gadhafi waged in his southern neighbor. Following the capture, the dictator refused to admit that there were Libyans being held captive in Chad. Many of those captives formed an anti-Gadhafi insurgent group while in captivity,

and named Hifter as their leader. It was during his captivity in Chad that Hifter's loyalty changed and he began a long fight to oust Gadhafi and take power.

2. **Libya Shield:** The Libyan Shield is a group of militias based in Benghazi. It reports to the Defense Ministry and is affiliated with the government. The group was attacked by Hifter during his offensive in May. It has four brigades across the country.



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This map is interactive

3. **Al-Zintan Revolutionaries' Military Council:** The Al-Zintan Revolutionaries' Military Council formed in 2011. The group brings together 23 militias in Zintan and the Nafusa Mountains in western Libya. It played a role in the recent clashes at the Tripoli airport. The Zintan militias are some of the strongest in the country. The group controls Tripoli's airport after taking it over during the fall of the capital in 2011. Rival militias tried to take over the airport this week, but failed.

4. **Al-Qaqa Brigade:** This group was formed by Libyans in the western part of the country who trained in the Zintan area during the revolution. It used to align with the National Congress and is known to have bases in Zintan and Tripoli. This group has officially announced its support of Hifter.

5. **Al-Sawiq Brigade:** The Al-Sawiq Brigade has strong connections to Al-Qaqa and has also pledged allegiance to Hifter. The two groups said in a statement back in February that they wanted the Libyan parliament to step down.

6. **Misrata Brigades:** This is an umbrella group that formed in 2011. It was seen as a revolutionary militia and is Zintan's main rival militia. It seized weapons from Gadhafi's forces during the revolution. It was accused of war crimes by the U.N.'s International Commission of Inquiry on Libya.

7. **17 February Martyrs Brigade:** Based in Benghazi, this Islamist militia is thought to have about 12 battalions. It fought against Gadhafi during the 2011 revolution and has a membership in the low thousands. It was linked to the events in the 2012 Benghazi attack that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens.

8. **Ansar al-Sharia Brigade:** Linked to al Qaeda and currently in control of Camp 27, also known as Camp Younis, which was used by the U.S. for a counterterrorism training mission. The group is Islamist in nature and supports Shariah law. It also is thought to have played a part in the 2012 Benghazi attack. The group operates in Benghazi and Darnah.

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Hanna Sender is Infographics Editor at IBTimes. She plays with datasets, making maps, infographics and interactives. Before joining IBT in April, Hanna worked as the Infographics Designer at Vocativ. She graduated from Parsons The New School for Design and Eugene Lang College. Her other loves include Brooklyn, podcasts, iced americanos and bourbon.

The evidence that shows Iron Dome is not working

By Theodore A. Postol

Source: <http://thebulletin.org/evidence-shows-iron-dome-not-working7318>

Editor's note: Images referenced in this article can be viewed in the slide show above; captions appear when a cursor is placed over the images. The images can also be seen in a separate slide show found [here](#), or by clicking on the red button to the right of the story's third paragraph.


In the early weeks of July, the conflict between Palestinians in Gaza and Israel flared up again, resulting in a new round of large-scale rocket attacks, launched by Hamas, operating from

protective measures that include deployment of the Iron Dome rocket-defense system and a civil defense effort that includes an efficient system for early warning and sheltering of citizens. As of this writing, only one Israeli had died from Hamas fire, apparently from a mortar round (although that number increased with the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip begun late last week). During the November 2012 conflict, a detailed review of a large number of photographs of Iron Dome interceptor contrails revealed that the rocket-defense system's success rate was very low—as low as 5 percent or, perhaps,

Gaza, against Israeli population centers. The last such large-scale rocket attacks occurred in November 2012.


Initially, the Israeli military responded to the rocket attacks with air strikes in Gaza, and with

even less. A variety of media outlets have attributed the low casualty number to the supposed effectiveness of the Iron Dome system, quoting Israeli officials as



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saying it has destroyed 90 percent of the Hamas rockets it targeted. But close study of photographic and video imagery of Iron Dome engagements with Hamas rockets—both in the current conflict and in the 2012 hostilities—shows that the low casualties in Israel from artillery rocket attacks can be ascribed to



Israeli civil defense efforts, rather than the performance of the Iron Dome missile defense system.

The collection of data for Iron Dome's performance in July 2014 is still in progress. The data we have collected so far, however, indicates the performance of Iron Dome has not markedly improved.

Historical data on civil defense measures—including those taken to protect citizens from V-1 and V-2 rocket bombings of London during World War II—suggest that Israel's low casualty rate from Hamas rockets is largely attributable to the country's well-developed early-warning and quick-sheltering system for citizens under imminent rocket attack. That is to say, Iron Dome appears to have had no measurable effect on improving the chances of Israelis escaping injury or death from Hamas artillery rocket attacks in Israel.

What performance characteristics make a rocket defense effective?

To successfully intercept an artillery rocket of the type Hamas has been firing, an Iron Dome interceptor must destroy the warhead on the front end of the rocket. If the Iron Dome interceptor instead hits the back end of the target rocket, it will merely damage the expended rocket motor tube, basically an empty pipe, and have essentially no effect on

the outcome of the engagement. The pieces of the rocket will still fall in the defended area; the warhead will almost certainly go on to the ground and explode.

Destroying an artillery rocket warhead is a considerably more demanding mission than damaging other parts of the targeted rocket—or, in the analogous situation of aircraft defense, successfully damaging an airplane, causing the failure of its mission.

Analysis of photographs of contrails left by Iron Dome interceptor missiles can show whether or not an attempted rocket intercept could have been successful. Such analysis focuses on two connected facts: To have a realistic chance of destroying an artillery rocket's warhead, an Iron Dome interceptor must approach the rocket

from the front—in fact, almost directly head-on. And for all practical purposes, an Iron Dome interceptor has no chance of destroying the warhead if the interceptor engages the rocket from the side or from the back.

Photographs of Iron Dome contrails indicate that most of the system's interceptors have either been chasing Hamas rockets from behind or engaging those rockets from the side. In both such cases, geometry and the speed of the interceptors and rockets make it extremely unlikely the interceptor will destroy the rocket's warhead.

How an Iron Dome interceptor works

To understand why the Iron Dome interceptor must approach the artillery rocket from the front to be effective, it is necessary to understand the basics of how an Iron Dome interceptor is meant to function.


Figure 1 illustrates a theoretical front-on engagement by an Iron Dome interceptor against a Grad artillery rocket, a weapon initially produced by the Soviet Union in the 1960s, subsequently manufactured by many other countries, and now readily available to Hamas. The blue dashed line emanating from the forward section of the Iron Dome interceptor depicts the line-of-sight of its "laser fuse," which

creates a beam of light that reflects off the front-end of a targeted artillery rocket. Via its control system, the interceptor can then determine when the target rocket is in the process of passing the interceptor. The warhead in the Iron Dome interceptor is placed well behind the fuse assembly, a distance of roughly 3 feet from the laser-fuse aperture. This arrangement gives the fuse enough time to determine where the front of the target-rocket is, to estimate how long it will take for the front of the artillery rocket to pass parallel to the artillery rocket's warhead, and to detonate the Iron Dome warhead at the moment when it is in position to cause the rocket's warhead also to explode.

The timing of this sequence of events is critical to performance. The Iron Dome interceptor must account not only for the location of the target-rocket's warhead, but also for the high crossing speed of the Iron Dome interceptor and the artillery rocket; for any off-parallel orientation of the Iron Dome interceptor relative to the artillery rocket; for the distance between the interceptor and rocket when the interceptor's explosive warhead goes off; and for the speed of the shrapnel fragments shooting from the warhead.

Figure 2 shows how the fragments from the Iron Dome warhead would move, under the assumption that the crossing speed of the Iron Dome interceptor and artillery rocket—that is, their speed relative to one another—is about 1,200 meters per second. The explosive in the Iron Dome warhead projects fragments at about 2,100 meters per second, perpendicular to the direction the interceptor is traveling. According to standard physics calculations (suggested by the red and yellow vector diagram at the lower right of the figure), the net direction of the cloud of fragments, as experienced by a theoretical observer sitting on the artillery rocket, is shown by the pale blue arrow passing through both the Iron Dome warhead and the artillery rocket's warhead.

Figure 3 provides a slightly more vivid and detailed view of the outcome, if an Iron Dome interceptor works as intended. There is, however, only a limited range of possible outcomes that provide a high likelihood of success. Beyond that range, the possibility of



success diminishes drastically.

The many ways that Iron Dome can miss

Because of the uncertainties in the exact crossing speed and geometry of two high-speed missiles, even a perfectly operating Iron Dome fuse may fail to place lethal fragments onto an artillery rocket's warhead. In addition, unless the distance between the Iron Dome warhead and the warhead of an artillery rocket is small (roughly a meter or so), there will be a greatly diminished chance that a fragment from the Iron Dome warhead will hit, penetrate, and cause the detonation of the artillery-rocket warhead.

So a front-on engagement does not guarantee that an Iron Dome interceptor will destroy the warhead on the artillery rocket. A front-on engagement geometry merely indicates that an Iron Dome interceptor has a greater-than-zero chance of destroying the target-artillery rocket warhead.

The consequences of a failure in fuse timing—in what was almost certainly an engagement between an Iron Dome interceptor and the artillery rocket—are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 4A.

The photo in Figure 4A shows the magnified front-end of the rocket; holes can be seen in the expended and empty rocket

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motor casing immediately behind the warhead. In this case, it is nearly certain that the artillery rocket was engaged by an Iron Dome interceptor properly approaching the artillery rocket, front-on. Unfortunately, it seems the timing commands from the fuse resulted in fragments from the exploding Iron Dome warhead hitting the artillery rocket after the warhead had passed. The relatively low density of holes in the artillery rocket's after-body suggests that the encounter also had a relatively high miss distance—possibly several meters. And as can be seen in Figure 4, there is significant damage in the area where the rocket fell—damage almost certainly caused by the detonation of the rocket's small warhead when it hit the ground. This photograph illustrates that even when the Iron Dome interceptor is in a proper front-on trajectory, it can still fail to destroy the warhead of a target-



artillery rocket.

Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 are detailed diagrams that indicate how an Iron Dome interceptor would perform if it engaged an artillery rocket from directions other than head-on. They show why the kill rate for an Iron Dome interceptor will be very low when the interceptor does not attack its target almost directly head on.

As Figure 5 shows, even a moderately skewed approach to the targeted rocket will result in a drastically reduced chance that fragments from an Iron Dome warhead could be sprayed onto the rocket's warhead. Such small but crucial off-frontal errors could result from faults in the master guidance and control system of the Iron Dome interceptor.

Figures 6, 7, and 8 show interceptor engagements that approach the targeted

artillery rocket from the side or from the back. Careful inspection of the geometry of the fuse sensing beam and the spray pattern of the fragments from an Iron Dome warhead reveals two very serious problems with these kinds of engagements: First, even if the fuse detects the artillery rocket in these angles of approach, it has no way of determining where the warhead is on the rocket. Second, even if the fuse detonates the Iron Dome warhead, by chance, at a time when fragments might be sprayed in the direction of the rocket warhead, in almost all circumstances the result will be a very low density of fragments arriving at the artillery rocket warhead location. Given the small number of fragments that can be dispersed by the Iron Dome warhead, this translates into a very high chance that no fragment will hit the warhead.

Making a successful interception even more problematic, the projected target area of the rocket warhead is very small, viewed from the front or back, rather than from the side. Also, when an Iron Dome interceptor approaches from these side and rear angles, fragments from its warhead are very likely to hit the metal surfaces of a target rocket at low grazing angles, with fragments tending to bounce off the shell of the rocket body or warhead casing. In sum, then, for engagement geometries that are not front-on, the probability that an Iron Dome interceptor will destroy the warhead of an engaged target-artillery rocket will be, for all practical purposes, nearly zero.


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Understanding Iron Dome contrails

If artillery rockets are fired at their maximum range, they can be expected to fall at angles of 60 to 65 degrees relative to horizontal in their descent to a target; they will fall at angles well above 65 degrees when fired at less than maximum range.

The very steep descent of artillery rockets is important to keep in mind when attempting to visualize what is happening when viewing the photographs that show only the smoke contrails of Iron Dome interceptors attempting to engage artillery rockets. When Iron Dome interceptors explode in the sky, but have contrails showing they have crossed the expected rocket trajectory in a side-on geometry or chased the artillery rocket from behind, it can be said, with a high degree of certainty, that no intercept could

have occurred—assuming of course, an artillery rocket was even being engaged. Figures 9, 10, and 11 are photographs taken during the artillery rocket attacks in November 2012. They show contrails in the sky that indicate Iron Dome interceptors were



attempting to engage target-artillery rockets from behind or from the side. The geometries of the engagement are easily established; the artillery rockets are falling at high elevation angles relative to the ground, and the contrails show Iron Dome interceptors clearly approaching from above or sidelong to any reasonable estimate of a rocket's descent path. The photographs in Figures 12 and 13 show intercept attempts in July 2014 that are nearly side-on, and hence, have essentially a zero chance of destroying target rockets, if they are present.

Observations colleagues and I made in November 2012 found no more than 20 percent of Iron Dome contrails indicating an engagement geometry that was front-on to the targeted rocket. At that time we estimated the probability of destroying a SCUD warhead in a front-on engagement might be between 30 and 60 percent, meaning that if all other engagements effectively resulted in a zero probability of interception, then the overall intercept rate would be between 6 and 12 percent. Given that less than 20 percent of the engagements we were able to get data on were actually front-on, our best estimate was that the intercept performance of Iron Dome was likely 5 percent or less.

Daytime visual photographs of Iron Dome debris clouds can show, in many cases, the evidence of a successful intercept, i.e., the destruction of the targeted artillery rocket warhead. Since the Israeli government has been claiming a very high intercept rate—near

90 percent—it should be expected that visual evidence of hits would be common. But we have found only one example of photographic evidence in which it is clear that such a head-on success occurred.

Figure 14 shows photographic evidence of the destruction of a rocket warhead by an Iron Dome interceptor. In this photograph, the Iron Dome missile is clearly on a trajectory that engages the falling artillery rocket head-on. The large white arrows at the top and bottom of the photograph show the relative directions of the rising Iron Dome interceptor and the falling artillery rocket. An inspection of the debris cloud

shows that it is asymmetrical—indicating that two explosions have occurred nearly simultaneously.

This debris cloud formation is essentially the result of fragments from the Iron Dome warhead hitting the warhead of the artillery rocket and detonating it. The explosive process that led to this observable debris cloud took less than one half of a millisecond, or essentially instantaneously from the perspective of an observer or with regard to the frame rate of a standard video camera, which would take a picture roughly every 30 to 40 milliseconds.


This photograph is the only successful engagement I have found during very extensive searches of voluminous photographic and video evidence of Iron Dome interceptor activity.

It could be argued that the details that can be seen in this photograph are sufficiently subtle that they might not be observable in all engagements. This argument is probably correct. All the same, it seems extremely unlikely that the Iron Dome system would be intercepting 90 percent of the artillery rockets it engaged, but result in only one photo among hundreds as evidence of a successful intercept.

It is absolutely clear: There is no evidence in the public record to show that Iron Dome is performing at an intercept rate of nearly 90 percent.

If Iron Dome doesn't work well, why are Israeli casualties from rocket attacks so low?

Israel has a vast system of shelters, arranged so citizens can easily find protection within tens of seconds or less of warning. The Israeli rocket attack warning system is sophisticated; Figure 15 shows warning times published by the Israelis for artillery rockets of varying ranges. Figure 16 shows the screen of a mobile phone warning system that issues an audible alert of an impending artillery rocket



impact. This particular phone application is called "red alert."

The app's message indicates the general area where an artillery rocket impact is expected; depending on the location of individuals receiving the warning message, they know whether or not to take shelter.

During the World War II bombing of London by Germany's V-1 and V-2 rockets, seconds of early warning resulted in reductions in casualties and deaths by a factor of two or more, even when the people under attack did nothing more than take expedient measures like falling to the ground before a rocket impact. In the World War II bombings in London, the warheads were much larger than those used by Hamas, carrying about 2,000 pounds of explosives; in the Gulf War of 1991, SCUD warheads were also much larger, about 500

pounds each. In the case of the recent artillery rocket attacks against Israel, the overwhelming number of artillery rocket warheads are in the 10- to 20-pound range. These small warhead sizes make early warning and protective sheltering even more effective, because the smaller warheads are very unlikely to penetrate or destroy a shelter.

These two factors—the small size of the warheads, and the warning and sheltering system—go far toward explaining why there has been only one Israeli death from rocket and mortar attacks. The one Israeli death attributable to the current conflict as of the writing of this article occurred on July 15; a man was hit by shrapnel from an exploding mortar shell near the Israeli border with Gaza, and his death was clearly the result of two unfortunate circumstances: The man was not in a shelter, and he had no warning of the arriving mortar shell.


Another example of the hazards of not taking shelter occurred in November 2012. Three people were out on a terrace; one of them was hoping to observe the Iron Dome system intercepting incoming artillery rockets. An artillery rocket hit the terrace, killing all three people. Had

these people followed the simple procedure of taking shelter, they would be alive today.

A need for Israeli transparency

I do not know precisely why Iron Dome interceptors are not engaging most artillery rockets using the proper front-on geometry. It is clear that the Iron Dome radar tracking and guidance system is not working as it should work; it is initially sending Iron Dome missiles to intercept points that then result in interceptors not being able to achieve the right engagement geometries when they start the process of homing on targeted artillery rockets. Photographs from November 2012 show such problems, and pictures from July of this year indicate that Iron Dome interceptors are still behaving

erratically, resulting in continued low intercept rates.



If Iron Dome is in fact working at the high levels of performance being claimed, there is systematic data that the Israeli government could present to document the success.

The Israeli government publishes insurance claim data that occur during different time periods. This data would very clearly show a reduction in ground damage in the areas defended by Iron Dome. This could not be otherwise, given the large number of successful intercepts being claimed by the Israelis and the significant reduction in damage that would occur from destroying artillery rocket warheads that would otherwise explode on the ground, or in or near buildings.

A physicist, Postol is professor of science, technology, and national security policy at MIT. His expertise is in ballistic missile defense technologies and ballistic missiles more generally. Prior to coming to MIT, he worked as an analyst at the Office of Technology Assessment and as a science and policy adviser to the chief of naval operations. In 2001, he received the Norbert Wiener Prize from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for uncovering numerous false claims about missile defenses.

The Islamic State Is the Newest Petrostate

Source:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/28/baghdadis_hillbillies_isis_iraq_syria_oil_terrorism_islamic_state

The homicidal maniacs of the Islamic State, like many shady and not-so-shady groups before it, are apparently getting into the oil business. And it seems to suit them as they

This is not to say that there would still not be significant insurance claims in areas successfully defended by Iron Dome.

A successful intercept can at the very best destroy the explosive warhead carried by the artillery rocket. It cannot destroy the pieces of debris from the artillery rocket itself. This debris will fall whether or not an artillery rocket has been intercepted.

Nonetheless, the major contributor to significant damage is the exploding warhead on the artillery rocket. The Israelis have not provided any evidence of a reduction in ground damage that

would surely have to accompany the amazing success rates that they have claimed for Iron Dome.

In the absence of Israeli data backing claims of Iron Dome efficiency, and based on the unambiguous evidence I have reviewed, a conclusion seems clear: The Israeli government is not telling the truth about Iron Dome to its own population, or to the United States, which has provided the Israeli government with the bulk of the funding needed to design and build the much-heralded but apparently ineffective rocket-defense system.

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reportedly are making millions of dollars per day off of it.

The militants who have conquered broad swaths of Iraq

and Syria are turning to good old-fashioned crime -- oil smuggling, in this case -- to underwrite its main line of work. The money it can earn from illicit oil sales further bolsters the group's status as one of the richest self-funded terrorist outfits in the world, dependent not on foreign governments for financial support but on the money its reaped from kidnappings and bank robberies. The group has also managed to steal expensive weaponry that the United States had left for the Iraqi military, freeing it from the need to spend its own money to buy such armaments.

But even the millions of dollars a day that the Islamic State seems to be raking in by trucking stolen oil across porous borders is not enough to meet the hefty obligations created by the group's own headlong expansion.

Taking over big chunks of territory, as in eastern Syria and in northern Iraq, could also leave it forced to take on the sorts of expensive obligations -- such as paying salaries, collecting the trash, and keeping the lights on -- usually reserved for governments.

As with much of what the Islamic State purportedly does, the group's actual role in trading illicit Syrian and Iraqi oil is hard to pin down. The Islamic State seemingly controls the majority of Syria's oil fields, especially in the country's east; human rights observers say 60 percent of Syrian oil fields are in the hands of militants or tribes. The Islamic State also seems to have control of several small oil fields in Iraq as well, though reports differ on whether most of those wells are capped or whether the Islamists are producing and shipping serious volumes of stolen Iraqi oil across the border.

In all, energy experts estimate that illicit production in Iraq and Syria -- largely by the Islamic State -- is north of 80,000 barrels a day. That's a tiny amount compared with stable oil-producing countries' output, but it is a lot of potentially valuable oil in the hands of a group that even al Qaeda considers beyond the pale.

If that oil fetched global market prices, it would be worth a small fortune: **\$8 million a day**. But as the Sunni militant group's new neighbors in Iraqi Kurdistan have discovered, it's not easy to get top dollar for what many consider black-market oil. The Islamic State allegedly sells much of its production to middlemen in Syria, who then bring it to refineries in Turkey, Iran, or Kurdistan.

That oil is essentially fenced and likely fetches only about \$10 to \$22 a barrel, said Valérie Marcel, an oil expert at Chatham House in London. Crude trades just above \$100 a barrel in New York and London.

In Iraq, the Islamic State apparently cut out middlemen and uses its own fleet of tankers, which means it can reap between \$50 and \$60 a barrel, Marcel said. Other reports put the terrorist group's Iraqi oil proceeds as low as

\$25 a barrel.

"They're taking a massive discount, and they're only achieving a small fraction of the value" of the oil, the Washington Institute's Knights said. **Altogether, the group's oil smuggling could be generating on the order of \$1 million to \$2 million a day. Other analysts say the Islamic State's oil income could be as much as \$3 million a day.**

The United Nations is taking notice. On Monday, July 28, it warned countries against buying oil from militants in Iraq or Syria, saying that such purchases would violate U.N. sanctions on the terrorist group.

With the Islamic State at the helm, that oil boom certainly won't last forever. The old oil fields in Syria and Iraq need lots of care, such as injections to keep the pressure up and output reliable; the lack of trained technicians and the frequent turnover have been a nightmare for proper reservoir management and will ultimately lower future output at those fields, Marcel said.

Still, all else being equal, that kind of control over oil fields, oil revenues, and petroleum products would be a financial shot in the arm for any terrorist outfit. Control of oil products, from gas canisters needed for cooking to fuel needed for transport, gives the group additional local leverage. And the revenue bolsters the Islamic



State's ability to recruit and pay fighters and to buy weapons.

However, that money is also desperately needed to cover the salaries of public workers in places the militants now occupy. Providing basic public services to show that they can do more than conquer and crucify, but can govern to a limited extent, also costs money. Serving as an unelected proxy for ousted or absent governments has long been a way for Islamist groups, from Hezbollah to Hamas, to broaden popular support.

"They need to keep their war machine going, but they also need to govern, and that's costing them money," said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a terrorism expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He estimates that most of the oil revenue is quickly spent pacifying restless tribal leaders, bribing coalition partners, and paying to keep functional the basic sinews of daily life.

"If they don't make happen the things that people are used to see happening, their rule is going to look really, really bad," he said.

Oil money is just one slice of an illicit pie funding the group. In Syria and Iraq, protection rackets, extortion, local taxes, and other forms of smuggling all pour millions of dollars into the Islamic State's coffers. Brett McGurk, the State Department's point man on Iraq, told Congress last week that even before the militants captured Mosul, Iraq's second-biggest city, the group was raking in \$12 million a month from illicit activities there.

And in the pantheon of terrorist groups, none of which has conquered the world, top-line illicit revenues of a few hundred million dollars a year are not unusual. The U.S. government estimates that more than a score of the groups on its list of designated foreign terrorist organizations are deeply involved in transnational criminal activities.

The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, raked in between \$100 million and \$200 million annually from the drug trade and smuggling timber and minerals. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb took home dozens of millions of dollars a year from ransom kidnappings; over a decade, the group possibly netted as much as \$200 million. Hezbollah took a page from *The Sopranos* and made a fortune off stolen or counterfeit cigarettes. Al-Shabab fueled its fight with proceeds from human trafficking, while cocaine money kept Colombia's FARC in the field for decades.

More importantly, the Islamic State's access to some oil revenues pales in comparison with its obligations and points to the group's longer-term vulnerabilities.

Part of its illicit empire, such as extortion and shakedowns in towns across northern Iraq, is crumbling after Baghdad froze public salaries for those areas. That's a double blow to the group: No local incomes to extort, and now the Islamic State has to pay the payroll tab itself. At the same time, the group's barbarity, lack of outreach to even like-minded Salafi groups, and territorial overreach may have sown the seeds of its own downfall.

"They're overplaying their hand everywhere they have a hand, and that's going to come back and hurt them," Gartenstein-Ross said.

Moreover, control of a few small oil fields that translates into heavily discounted smuggling revenues won't be enough to give the Islamic State staying power.

"They can bring power, fear, and intimidation, and they can even bring unsophisticated social services," Knights said. "What they can't do is bring the resources of the Iraqi state," a \$120 billion national budget underwritten by the nearly 3 million barrels of oil shipped daily out of southern Iraqi oil terminals.

"Without that oil from Basra, then ISIS are just Palestinians," Knights added.

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British Airways to continue flying over Iraq

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28619934>



British Airways flights will continue to fly over Iraq despite concerns over the threat of Islamic militants on the ground, its chief executive has said.

Willie Walsh told the Financial Times: "We fly over Iraq because we consider it safe. If we thought Iraq was unsafe we would not fly over Iraq."

Qantas has become the latest airline to say it will divert planes to avoid flying through Iraqi airspace.



BA said it would be reviewing its decision on a daily basis.



carry out their own risk assessments about flying over warzones because they had different operations and aircraft.

There is fresh focus on the routes taken by airlines following the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine last month.

British Airways has been avoiding the airspace over eastern Ukraine for several months.

Analysis: Theo Leggett, Business reporter, BBC News

The loss of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 has focused attention on the decisions made by carriers when it comes to flying over conflict zones.

Safety is always a top priority. No reputable airline would knowingly put the lives of its passengers in danger.

That said, diverting aircraft around a particular country can take longer and use more fuel, depending on the route taken and the weather conditions. Ultimately, that costs money.

Unless regulators step in, it is up to the airlines themselves to analyse the risks and decide whether a diversion is justified, based on their own information and the advice they receive. Sometimes, they come to different decisions. However, after MH17 there will be a greater emphasis on caution than ever before.

Sovereign rights

On Thursday, **America's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) told US airlines to fly above 30,000ft (9.1km) over Iraq.**

It had previously told them to fly above 20,000ft (6.1km).

Australian airline Qantas said in a statement on Saturday it had "closely monitored the issue of flight paths over conflict zones, particularly in light of the MH17 tragedy, with safety our first priority".

It said it had "no new information that alters our safety assessment of flying over Iraq,

The airline said flights from the UK to destinations including Dubai and Doha would normally cross Iraqi airspace.

Fresh focus

"Our flight plans vary depending on a number of factors but our highest and first priority is always the safety of our crew and customers," BA said in a statement.

Mr Walsh told the FT some customers would find it "confusing" that airlines had taken different positions on Iraq.

But he said airlines should be able to

especially given the altitudes we maintain over this region".

"However, given the various restrictions imposed by different governments in the past 24 hours, including by the United States' FAA, Qantas has temporarily rerouted its flights within the Middle East to avoid Iraqi airspace.

"The flight path adjustment applies to services between Dubai and London and is not expected to significantly increase flight times on this route."

On Friday, German airline Lufthansa suspended flights over the country.

Others, including Emirates Air Line, Virgin Atlantic and Air France, began diverting flights earlier this week.

Virgin confirmed in a statement it was "not currently flying" over Iraq, adding "safety and security is our top priority".

Militants with the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (Isis) group have captured large areas of northern and western Iraq, including the country's second-largest city, Mosul.

This week, independent aviation consultant John Strickland told BBC Two's Newsnight there was "a cobweb approach to the management of safe airspace".

Governments had "sovereign rights to close airspace above their territories", he added.

"Governments, whether its their own airspace or not, can give advisory guidance to airlines about what to do.

"We have industry bodies, we have airlines with their own

intelligence - particularly those larger global airlines who have local staff in a whole host of places around the world.

"But it isn't a hard and fast rule."

'Vital questions'


Jim McAuslan, general secretary of the British Airline Pilots Association (Balpa), meanwhile, told Newsnight: "Our concern is that, in the balance of the equation, some airlines might be

raises vital questions about the safety of aircraft over conflict zones.

"The incident shows that there are gaps in the overall management of airspace."

The Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 airliner came down on 17 July while flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

Rebels in Ukraine deny accusations from the West that they shot the plane down with a missile.



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making decisions based on some financial or commercial consideration - rather than purely flight safety - simply to save six minutes on a flight and six minutes extra fuel burn."

Last week, Balpa warned that safety assessments for risky air routes were "not good enough", saying there must be "a uniform level of safety, not one decided in secret".

It called for "global leadership" from the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in flight operations in or over areas of hostility.

On Tuesday, at a meeting of world aviation chiefs in Montreal, Canada, Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (Canso) director general Jeff Poole said: "The downing of flight MH17

Dangerous skies

UK Embassy closed

On Wednesday, meanwhile, British Airways suspended flights to and from Tripoli up to and including 5 August due to the security situation in Libya.

The country has been gripped by instability since the uprising in 2011.

More than 200 people have been killed in Tripoli and Benghazi in the past two weeks.

Britain is to temporarily close its embassy in the Libyan capital and the UK Foreign Office has urged Britons to leave the country immediately.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Read the article before this one. Then read the obvious reasoning behind continuation of flights over Iraq (money). Let us hope that by the date for uploading the new issue of the Newsletter, British Airways should have reconsider its decision but NOT because "something" hit one of its carriers...





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CNN: Doomsday Disneyland



Disaster Preparedness
 Technical Rescue
 Tactical Training
 4 Lane D.O.T. Highway
 Explosives Testing
 Two City Blocks
 Multiple Level Flood Scenarios
 Dual Rail Mass Transit Subway
 Firearm Shooting Ranges
 Onsite & Offsite Lodging

830

Acre Training Facility

102000

SQ FT Secure Office/Academic

75

Acres Realistic Multistory

7000

Participant Training Capacity

Air Algerie AH5017, Air France 447, Malaysian MH370 and

www.guardiancenters.com



MH17: Vanishing Aircraft, “Numerology”, and the Global Elite

By Jason Kissner

Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/air-algerie-ah5017-air-france-447-malaysian-mh370-and-mh17-vanishing-aircraft-numerology-and-the-global-elite/5394526>

Vanishing Aircraft

We have been told by much of Western MSM that Air Algerie flight 5017 (hereinafter AH 5017) and its 117 passengers (according to the airline) lost contact with the ground and subsequently crashed in Mali on 7/24 due to heavy weather.

A simple, tidy story that; and for all one knows the MSM soporific might even be true. And yet, true to the times, meaningful questions remain.

Via CNN on 7/24 we have:

“1:17 a.m. local time, Air Algerie Flight 5017 left Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso bound for Algiers. It was supposed to be a four-hour overnight flight but about 50 minutes of takeoff, it disappeared from radar over Mali close to a zone of ongoing conflict between Islamist rebels and the government.”

The Guardian chimed in on 7/29 with:

Radar recordings show the plane’s last contact at 1.47am local time. A witness reported seeing a ball of flame in the crash area at about 1.50am, suggesting the tragedy happened in minutes.

One witness said it was “as if a bomb had fallen” on the desert, and that the plane had hit the ground at a steep angle and at full speed, ruling out any attempt at an emergency landing.

Police investigators and gendarmes at the scene say the plane was “pulverised” and they have found no bodies. Even finding traces of the victims – who included one Briton and 54 French people, including entire families – is proving a challenge, with stifling heat alternating with torrential rain in a remote area.

The Guardian’s reportage that the plane was pulverized echoed Le Monde’s 7/26 assertion that the wreckage was indicative of disintegration.

Matters are so compromised with respect to the status of bodily evidence that France now thinks it could take from three to five months for forensic processes to produce the first identifications.

And then we have the facts that it took hours for airline and government officials to make AH 5017’s disappearance public, there were 51 French passengers, and France, declaring victory, had very recently terminated Operation Serval (a counterterrorism adventure in Mali).

Finally, we have the pending performance on a France/Russia deal whereby Russia is to receive delivery of two Mistral warships. Maybe certain elitist elements would rather see France breach the contract?

Might the demise of AH 5017 be attributable to an act of terror, and might there be additional links to the vanishing aircraft of MH 17, MH 370, and veryconceivably even Air France 447? Newsweek on AH 5017:

“General Gilbert Diendere, head of Burkina Faso’s crisis cell, said radar data showed that the plane appeared to try to fly around the bad weather before reverting to its initial course, which took it back into the eye of the storm.

“Perhaps the pilot thought that he had completely avoided it and wanted to return to the original route,” Diendere said, according to the website of French radio RFI. “The accident took place while the plane performed this maneuver.”

Diendere said the last contact with the plane at its altitude of 10,000 meters was at 0147 GMT and the crash was reported by witnesses to have taken place at 0150.

“That means that (plane) fell from an altitude of 10,000 meters to zero in about three minutes, which is a steep fall given the size of the plane,” he added.”

10,000 meters is just about 33,000 feet, so, if the preceding sentence is true, AH 5017 lost altitude at an average of 11,000

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feet per minute before being ostensibly destroyed.

The same thing happened to Air France 447. A quick refresher on that flight from the Huffington Post:

"On the evening of May 31, 2009 [it was in the early hours of 6/1/2009 that the flight went missing], 216 passengers and 12 crew members boarded an Air France Airbus 330 at Antonio Carlos Jobim International Airport in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The flight, Air France 447, departed at 7.29 p.m. local time for a scheduled 11-hour trip to Paris. It never arrived. At 7 o'clock the next morning, when the aircraft failed to appear on the radar screens of air traffic controllers in Europe, Air France began to worry and contacted civil aviation authorities. By 11 a.m., they concluded that AF447 had gone missing somewhere over the vast emptiness of the South Atlantic.

How, in the age of satellite navigation and instantaneous global communication, could a state-of-the art airliner simply vanish? It was a mystery that lasted for two years."

Air France 447, like MH 370, MH 17, and AH 5017 also "vanished without a word from the crew." Perhaps, then, the official report regarding Air France 447, which explained the affair in terms of heavy weather, a high altitude stall, and pilot error also happens to more or less describe what occurred with AH 5017?

Then again, it was reported regarding Air France 447 that:

"Two pilots of an Air Comet flight from Lima to Lisbon saw a bright flash of light in the area where Flight 447 went down, the Madrid-based airline told CNN. The pilots have turned in their report to authorities.

"Suddenly, we saw in the distance a strong and intense flash of white light, which followed a descending and vertical trajectory and which broke up in six seconds," the captain wrote in the report.

The flash of light contributes to the theory that an explosion is what brought down Flight 447, which was carrying 228 people from Rio de Janeiro to Paris."

To be sure, these reports have gone down the memory hole.

Intrepid readers will have little difficulty locating other disturbing claims about Flight 447, but to be honest it's difficult to decisively separate mere rumors from plausible alternative accounts.

Be that as it may, what follows may amount to nothing more than a mirage of coincidences (some of them possibly forced)—but it might also suggest something quite significant.

"Numerology"

An earlier contribution to Global Research on the subject of MH 17 stated:

Next, here are a few other curious tidbits. The flight 17 crash shares an anniversary with the demise of TWA 800, which AT's own Jack Cashill has compellingly argued was, in fact, brought down by a missile on July 17, 1996 and subsequently covered up by the US government. And, the maiden flight of flight 17 occurred in 1997 on the date of, you guessed it, July 17.

[Moreover Russia's last ruling monarch of the Romanov family Tsar Nicholas II, together with his wife Tsarina Alexandra and their five children Olga, Tatiana, Maria, Anastasia, and Alexei were executed on 17 July 1918. Subliminal message to Putin? No doubt it's another "coincidence"]

So "17s" are everywhere. To be sure, though, each of the items in the last paragraph is easily ranged under the heading "coincidence."

With respect to AH 5017, we obviously encounter "17" again in the number of the flight. And, we have the fact that the flight left at 1:17 AM. Plus, some early reports indicated 117 passengers. In a related vein, as previous quotes show, "7s" and "11s" seem to reverberate around facts

pertaining to Air France 447 and AH 5017. And, MH 370 was lost on 3/7/2014 at 17:20 UTC.

Of course, many other numerical facts connected with the three flights have nothing to do with 7s, 11s, or 17s.

It is unquestionably easy to get carried away with this sort of thing; one very serious problem is that in the absence of a consistently applied, rationally based rule for combining digits and assigning times, **it is easy to mold phenomena so as to reach conspiratorial conclusions when nothing obtains other than coincidence (and perhaps not even that).**

In short, we do not want to consume witches' brews or magicians' potions; instead, **we should ask whether there might be scientifically sensible reasons as to why intelligence enterprises and their associates might want to play numerological games.**

Rare events and events that are meaningfully singular in their description (such as the vanishing of MH 370) are next to impossible to predict statistically, especially if one is attempting to predict the precise time, date, and place of occurrence (almost by definition there's not enough data to support valid statistical analyses). It is just such "black swan" events, though, that often exert the greatest, and most reverberating, impacts on global dynamics. Because such events are difficult to predict even with a great deal of information in hand, they are difficult to prevent—even with a tremendous amount of information.

With these thoughts in mind, consider that when singular, rare events such as plane vanishings that receive intensive coverage take place, the threshold geopolitical question is really whether the occurrence was accidental or in some way planned. It is here that "numerological" factors may come into play. It may be that the numerical properties of events can function as ways of indicating human agency, even though such agency will, of necessity, be invisible to algorithms and associated databases. If human consciousness, on the basis of ironically non-quantifiable meaning, considers an event to be too significant to perfunctorily ascribe to an accident, it will react accordingly even if the "data" and surface authorities (such as certain visible bureaucrats and news anchors with far

more proximate connections to the public) say otherwise.

If these ruminations are accurate, it may be that the degree of brazenness of "numerological" ties functions as a measure of the danger we confront. Surface authority, in spite of its nearly universal mathematical illiteracy, has been successfully conditioned to believe that the only measures of scientific significance are those that can be quantified. Therefore, it is blind to many potential indications of agency that could indicate covert conflict.

However, had a flight numbered 7077 crashed on 7/7/2014 after having disappeared from radar at 7:07 PM, even surface authorities might have been forced to acknowledge design—even if they were told in so many terms by deep authority that "*Big Data*" could not back it up. Since even the dimwits of surface authority would be talking design, the risk of overt hot war would rise substantially. It is for reasons such as these that the rather glaring 17s surrounding MH 17 are unsettling.

The Global Elite

Now consider these utterly bizarre remarks made by none other than IMF chief Christine Lagarde at a 1/15/2014 National Press Club speech:

"Now, I'm going to test your numerology skills by asking you to think about the magic seven, okay? Most of you will know that seven is quite a number in all sorts of themes, religions. And I'm sure that you can compress numbers as well. So if we think about 2014, all right, I'm just giving you 2014, you drop the zero, 14, two times 7. Okay, that's just by way of example, and we're going to carry on. (Laughter) So 2014 will be a milestone and hopefully a magic year in many respects. It will mark the hundredth anniversary of the First World War back in 1914. It will note the 70th anniversary, drop the zero, seven—of the Breton Woods conference that actually gave birth to the IMF. And it will be the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 25th, okay. It will also mark the

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seventh anniversary of the financial market jitters that quickly turned into the greatest global economic calamity since the Great Depression. The crisis still lingers. Yet, optimism is in the air. We've left the deep freeze behind us and the horizon looks just a bit brighter. So my hope and my wish for 2014 is that after those seven miserable years, weak and fragile, we have seven strong years. I don't know whether the G7 will have anything to do with it, or whether it will be the G20. I certainly hope

that the IMF will have something to do with it."

Can anyone recall the last time a global elitist of the stature of Lagarde made such bombastic reference to numerological notions during a speech, whether "jokingly" or not? That someone like her would even speak in such terms is decidedly odd—conceivably even unprecedented—irrespective of the particulars.

Aside from the very audacity of even mentioning numerology, the key 1/15/2014 language may very well be the G7/G20 wording; Lagarde states the alternative pretty starkly in terms of either/or but not both—and the G20 does not include Russia.

Dr. Jason Kissner is Associate Professor of Criminology at California State University. Dr. Kissner's research on gangs and self-control has appeared in academic journals. His current empirical research interests include active shootings.



Tour the 'doomsday Disneyland'

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/30/us/guardian-center-disaster-response-training/index.html?iref=allsearch>

Guardian Centers may be a place to practice how to respond to a disaster, but that doesn't mean real danger is nonexistent.

When we headed over to see its mock subway station, complete with eight cars donated from Washington's Metro system, we were told we had a limited window to view it. The reason -- they were going to be pumping actual toxic gas into the building to simulate a chemical attack.

As smoke rose from chunks of concrete representing an obliterated

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building, Chris Schaff put it this way: "As soon as you come in here, the pretend goes away."



He's a fire and rescue battalion chief with Fairfax County, Virginia, and his words carry a lot of weight. His elite team of urban search and rescue operatives has been deployed to numerous disasters, including Hurricane Sandy, the 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the 2010 Haiti quake.

[Disaster training at Guardian Centers](#)

Luis Fernandez, a two-decades-plus veteran of disaster response, agreed the Perry, Georgia, facility passes muster.



"The temperature extremes, the building extremes, the noises, the environment, are incredibly lifelike," said Fernandez, Miami-Dade Fire Rescue chief of staff and a spokesman for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.



From the aforementioned subway station, to a mock bridge with crushed cars, to a devastated structure made to look like the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, Guardian Centers' 830-acre site is designed to allow a variety of responders to do a variety of drills in one location. This kind of "doomsday Disneyland" owes its vision to Geoff Burkart, a telecommunications executive who was in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. During Katrina, he saw "what was being done there, and what was not being done."

From there the idea was born, and a former Cold War missile plant became the location.



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The subway station is especially convincing, fashioned from an elongated building originally designed to be an assembly line for the weapons.

Open for less than two years, the Centers facility has changed the game for disaster response training.



Clients can tell Burkart's team what their specific needs are. If it's a group from the Pacific Northwest, they can request the ground be saturated to simulate the region's heavy rainfall.

Many agencies have "script writers" that work with Guardian Centers on specifications, from smoke to rebar. "We're primarily just a tool, and we want to be the best tool," Burkart said.

He doesn't want to slight government

training facilities but points out the advantages to being privately run.

"We can adapt and provide everything the client needs almost on demand," he said.



And by being able to provide a number of different training types in one place, Burkart says, he's saving the taxpayers money.



Still, the process to create such scenarios takes time. A recent weeklong earthquake response drill for FEMA and the U.S. Agency for International Development took months to plan, according to spokespeople.



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And things must always be changed up. A pair of dog handlers from a New Mexico search and rescue team pointed out that the animals are smart enough to remember where the holes in the rubble are. As for Burkart, he hopes his vision will extend well beyond the rolling hills of central Georgia. "If we can make this entire campus successful, we would like to put one of these in (each of) the four corners of the United States," he said.

► Visit Guardian Centers at: <http://guardiancenters.com>



Could a Brain Scan Protect U.S. Troops from Insider Attacks?

By Patrick Tucker

Source: <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/07/could-brain-scan-protect-us-troops-insider-attacks/88801/?oref=d-river>




A Pentagon report, revealed by The New York Times over the weekend, showed that the American troops working alongside Iraqi forces were at risk of harm from Sunni extremists who had infiltrated the Iraqi Army (and, perhaps, from the pro-Iranian Shiite militias that effectively are the Army.) On Monday, Rear Adm. John Kirby told reporters that “it would be imprudent, irresponsible not to think about the insider threat.” The threat is real in Afghanistan as well where insider threats, so-called “green-on-blue” attacks, have killed several U.S. troops in recent years.

So, if you’re a U.S. soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan today, how do you determine whether or not the Iraqi or Afghan soldier next to you is going to give up your location to the enemy at the first chance? One solution, developed by a former Army counterintelligence agent, is scanning the brains of Iraqi troops for signs of potential betrayal.

Veritas Scientific, based in Virginia, markets a truth detection system called HandShake for soldiers to diagnose the trustworthiness of people they may have to work with. The technology was developed by Derrell Small, who served as a U.S. Army counterintelligence agent in 2003 and 2004.

Here's a brief introduction from the Veritas website:

Here's how the HandShake system works: A U.S. soldier would take, say, an Iraqi officer and outfit the subject with a special helmet that can pick up both electromagnetic signals (EEG) and perform functional near-infrared imaging (fNIRs) which images blood flow changes in the brain. The soldier would put the subject through a battery of tests including image recognition. Most of the pictures in the tests would be benign, but a few would contain scenes that a potential



insider threat would remember, possibly including faces, locations or even bomb parts. The key is to select these images very, very carefully to cut down on the potential false positives.

For instance, as company founder Eric Elbot explained to *The Futurist* magazine’s Keturah Hetrick, just being familiar with IED parts does not explicitly signal terrorist inclination, “But if I flash you a picture of a diagram that shows you how to build an IED, that would be a pretty strong indicator that you might be a foe... You wouldn’t be studying how to make an IED if you were a friend.”

When you recognize a picture that’s of emotional significance to you, your brain experiences a 200 to 500 microsecond hiccup, during which the electromagnetic activity drops, measurable via EEG. The reaction, referred to as the P300 response, happens too fast for the test subject to control, so the subject can't game the system.

The fNIR readings back up the EEG numbers. Together, they speak to not only whether or not a subject is a traitor but how *likely* an individual is to act on potentially criminal or treasonous impulses. The system then runs all the data through what Veritas calls a Friend or Foe Algorithm. The output: the ability to pinpoint an insider's threat potential with 80 to 90 percent accuracy, according to the company.

“It would take an immediate \$1.2 million for a one to two month full-court press operation here to convert [the system] to the complex Iraq game dynamics. It would take another \$800,000 expenses and \$800,000 hard and software to deploy to Iraq, run tests and set up an operation at scale,” company founder Eric Elbot told *Defense* One in an email. “That operation depending on the scale, could run full-time at \$500,000 a month per site.” He added “These are guestimates.”

“The US is engaged in a dangerous multi-fronted, contradiction-loaded, counter-

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intuitive game [in Iraq]. Our technology if it were fully tested would be up to this sort of advanced challenge. I can assure you that we would do the best to work under these time and battlefield conditions and that we can make a major difference in managing complex inputs and outcomes," said Elbot.

The connection between the brain and criminality has been presumed — though not well understood — for more than 7,000 years, ever since humankind's first experiments in treating anti-social behavior with brain surgery. Fossils show that the ancient people in what is France today treated violent mental disorders through crude medical procedures aimed at cutting evil out of the brain, as did the Mayans and later the Greeks. Some of the most innovative research in diagnosing criminality today involves scanning the brains of incarcerated populations in New Mexico. More and more research suggests that a lot of dangerous behavior can be detected using techniques like EEG and fNIR.

We may be entering the golden age of imaging, but that doesn't mean neuro-scans are always accurate in determining potential criminality or insider threats.

*Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He's also the author of *The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move?* (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for *The Futurist*, where he served for nine years. Tucker's writing on emerging technology also has appeared in *Slate*, *The Sun*, *MIT Technology Review*, *Wilson Quarterly*, *The American Legion Magazine*, *BBC News Magazine* and *Utne Reader* among other publications.*

European Duplicity Funds Terrorism

By Larry M. Elkin

Source: <http://www.palisadeshudson.com/2014/08/european-duplicity-funds-terrorism/>

Kidnapping a European brings profit; kidnapping an American brings a drone. If you were in the kidnapping business, which would you choose? While our military and intelligence forces hunt terrorists, Europeans are some of their best customers, providing the cash flow that helps keep them in business.

The New York Times reported last week that al-Qaida and its affiliates have received at least \$125 million in kidnapping revenue since 2008, much of it from European governments. These ransom payments are often designated as "humanitarian aid" and delivered through third parties, even as foreign ministers in many European countries have denied (which is to say, lied about the fact) that they have paid any sort of ransom. The Times found, however, that

"There's great variability between individuals" under brain screening, Adam Lamparello, assistant professor of law at Indiana Tech Law School, told *Defense One*, "But there is more reliability within the individual itself. Age, mental disorders, gender will affect the reliability" of brain scanning techniques he said. Indeed, some research has shown that age, stress, alcohol and nicotine use as well as loud noises can influence P300 response.

"Measures of perceptions don't exactly measure truth. And that's why the law has an evidentiary problem with this," Lamparello said. He admits that while brain analysis isn't a perfect indicator of potential insider danger, "it is suggestive."

The best way to cut down on the variability in the results of different brain scans, according to Lamparello, is do more tests on a single subject. In the field, that could mean bringing Iraqi forces into a controlled environment and subjecting them to tests fairly routinely. Unfortunately, that's not a luxury available to the relatively small number of U.S. military operating in Iraq right now. And it may not help build the trust needed to work with the Afghan security forces in the future.

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kidnappers today net up to \$10 million per hostage. Evidence suggests that three main al-Qaida affiliates are coordinating their efforts, too.

I have written before about the importance of denying kidnappers ransoms. Not only does paying ransoms encourage further abductions, it can lead to tragically violent outcomes. The results, both of paying ransoms



and refusing to do so, could not be clearer. The United Nations Security Council has even issued a resolution calling on member states to


"prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments" and to discourage private sector organizations from paying as well.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has dropped sharply since peaking in 2011.

The International Maritime Bureau reported only 15 incidents in 2013, and overall piracy is down 40 percent from its height. Increased naval patrols and other countermeasures, including the capture and trial in Western countries of pirates, deserve a lot of the credit. But crucially, leaders of the G8 group of developed countries also agreed in June 2013 to stamp out ransom payments for hostages. Governments and shipping companies began defending their crews with force if needed, and pirates have been killed, captured, tried and imprisoned, rather than merely rewarded.

Yet despite the success on the seas off Somalia, the counter-kidnapping effort on land had clearly faltered by late last year, amid numerous indications that European countries other than Britain were still paying off kidnappers affiliated with terrorist groups. (The U.K. maintains a strict policy of not making substantive concessions to kidnappers, which has been in place since the 1970s.)

The United States and Britain continue to lead resistance to paying ransoms. Had other European countries held the line, this might have been an effective way to curtail kidnapping



as a

major revenue source for terrorist groups. As it is, however, the practice of paying ransoms while denying that they are doing so has ensured that European countries face ever increasing abductions of their citizen, with ever higher price tags for their return. Citizens from countries that will not pay have become collateral damage. Edwin Dyer, a Briton seized along with a German woman and a Swiss couple, was executed; the other three hostages were freed after an 8 million euro ransom arrived for the kidnappers.

For kidnappers who hope to make money, the clear answer is to try to avoid wasting time and resources on hostages whose governments won't pay for them. **Only three Americans are known to have been kidnapped by al-Qaeda or its affiliates in the past five years.** When American hostages are taken, our government is more likely to send a drone than a ransom payment, which probably has something to do with that figure.

It makes no sense for us to fight terrorists who are funded by ransoms paid by our NATO allies. If French or Italians or Germans don't see this, then maybe it is time to reconsider the way we extend the military and nuclear umbrellas that kept European citizens safe and free through the Cold War. If these countries really cannot cooperate on putting kidnappers, murderers and terrorists out of business,

maybe we will ultimately have no choice but to leave them to their own devices.

In the meantime, terrorists may harm the occasional American or Briton they grab by mistake, but they will presumably try not to grab them in the first place if they can avoid it.

Snatching an American can bring a drone strike down on your head. Snatching an Italian, German or French citizen is likely only to bring euros.

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Larry M. Elkin, CPA, CFP®, has provided personal financial and tax counseling to a sophisticated client base since 1986. After six years with Arthur Andersen, where he was a senior manager for personal financial planning and family wealth planning, he founded his own firm in Hastings on Hudson, N.Y., in 1992. That firm grew steadily and became the Palisades Hudson organization, which moved to Scarsdale, N.Y., in 2002. The firm expanded to Fort Lauderdale, Fla., in 2005, to Atlanta, Ga., in 2008, and to Portland, Ore., in 2012. Larry received his B.A. in journalism from the University of Montana in 1978, and his M.B.A. in accounting from New York University in 1986. Larry was a reporter and editor for The Associated Press from 1978 to 1986. He covered government, business and legal affairs for the wire service, with assignments in Helena, Mont.; Albany, N.Y.; Washington, D.C.; and in New York City's federal courts in Brooklyn and Manhattan. In 1997 Larry established the organization's investment advisory business, which currently manages more than \$1 billion. As president of Palisades



Hudson, Larry maintains individual professional relationships with many of the firm's clients, who reside in more than 30 states, from Maine to California, as well as in several foreign countries. He is the author of Financial Self-Defense for Unmarried Couples (Currency Doubleday, 1995), which was the first comprehensive financial planning guide for unmarried couples. He also is the editor and publisher of Sentinel, a quarterly newsletter on personal financial planning, and the lead author of the firm's daily online opinion column, Current Commentary. Larry served as president of the Estate Planning Council of New York City, Inc. in 2005-2006. In 2009 the Council presented Larry with its first-ever Lifetime Achievement Award, praising his service to the organization and "his tireless efforts in promoting our industry by word and by personal example as a consummate estate planning professional." He is regularly interviewed by national and regional publications, and has made nearly 100 radio and television appearances.

'Innovative terrorists' a growing concern for TSA officials

Source: <http://www.wtop.com/215/3675091/Innovative-terrorists-a-growing-concern-for-TSA-officials>

In late 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab spent weeks leading up to his planned demolition of U.S.-bound Northwest Airlines flight 53 getting familiar with a cutting-edge bomb.

Though his "underwear bomb" fizzled due to faulty construction and alert passengers and crew, a terrorism innovation pipeline had opened for business.

Operating in the shadowy margins of Yemen, Abdulmutallab was trained, equipped and dispatched by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to detonate the bomb on Christmas Day over Detroit.

Abdulmutallab had been in possession of the device well before he tried to use it, the Transportation Security Administration recently revealed.

In fact, Abdulmutallab had the device for "over two weeks" before getting on the flight, TSA Administrator John Pistole told attendees at the Aspen Security Summit.

With ample time to practice, Abdulmutallab managed to get it past security and onto the plane.

The evolution of explosive devices and extremist operatives continues to worry TSA officials. Terrorists take their time perfecting deadly devices, shrouded by large swaths of space uncovered by the TSA.

And the quick spread of terrorist know-how -- facilitated by social media platforms -- has put deadly ideas in the hands of far-flung jihadist sympathizers.

A significant challenge

North Africa is an area of great anxiety for counter-terrorism officials all over the world.

"Libya is another worrying development," says European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator

Gilles de Kerchove. "We know that Libya is a transit hub for the Tunisians and the Moroccans that want to go and fight in Syria.

"It's also a safe haven for fighters from Northern Mali pushed out by the French operation there. They've tried to hide and regroup in southern Libya."

Not only is Libya the center of terrorist plotting and planning in the region, but shutting down the activity even after it's been identified is nearly impossible, de Kerchove says.

Libyan national security operations never recovered from the bloody ouster of late dictator Muamar Ghadafi.

"It's very difficult to find anyone with whom we can talk and rebuild the security sector," de Kerchove says.

Abundant weapons stocks left over from the Ghadafi regime, and the flow of young innovative terrorist operatives into what counter-terrorism officials call "ungoverned space," has left the door open for new attacks on the U.S. aviation sector.

"Our most significant challenge," Pistole says, "is to make sure we are best equipped in terms of technology, personnel and training to detect and prevent somebody like that from getting on a flight either here in the U.S. and with our international counterparts in one of the hundreds of airports flying to the U.S."

On July 6, Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a statement confirming he "directed TSA to implement enhanced security measures at certain overseas airports with direct flights to the United States."

The message specifically identified new concerns about electronic devices, saying: "During the security examination,

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officers may also ask that owners power up some devices, including cellphones. Powerless devices will not be permitted onboard the aircraft. The traveler may also undergo additional screening."

Unorthodox terrorist methods receive a great deal of attention from the U.S. intelligence community, due in part to lessons learned from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula's chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri. He was responsible for Abdulmutallab's underwear bomb, as well as the printer cartridge bombs in 2010.

Recent intelligence activity suggests unusual terrorist tactics will remain a concern for years to come, according to U.S. officials.

"I see a continuing threat," Pistole warns. "It's a persistent threat that has not gone away, even with substantial effort to mitigate the threat overseas."

The most troubling part?

"We have seen terrorists who are coming up with innovative designs, construction and

concealment of particularly non-metallic improvised explosive devices that may be able to get through some airports particularly overseas," Pistole says.

Learning from the past

A new report from the Bipartisan Policy Center, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Ten Years Later," corroborated the concern about Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

According to the report, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has advanced bomb making capabilities and has already attempted several attacks on U.S. aviation targets.

"While the various al-Qaeda spinoffs are primarily focused on regional conflicts, they hate the United States and will not forgo opportunities to strike at the U.S. homeland."

Thousands of foreign fighters have flooded in and out of war-torn Syria in the last three years. U.S. intelligence and security officials are concerned that when they leave, they do so with renewed jihadist energy and possibly new plans to attack the U.S.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Despite the fact that we usually consider terrorists as stupid, brainless, fanatics, history proves that this is not the case – for a very simple reason: they are always a step ahead of us! Perhaps we can discriminate planners from executioners. The latter can fit with our perception. But those who plan the attacks, choose the "right" suicide bombers, innovate in IEDs or design unexpected outcomes cannot and should not be ignored or put aside. They are comparable to our best strategists and master asymmetry well before we start to realize its importance and learn from it. It is good that people in high places start realizing this since this might be the missing element for an effective management of the terrorism plague.

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North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?

By Andrea Berger

Source: <http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/>

August 05 – North Korea's arms exports to US-designated terrorist organizations in the Middle East have made headlines twice recently. On July 23, 2014, a US district court ruled that "North Korea and Iran are liable for damages because they provided material support and assistance" to Hezbollah, which enabled the latter's rocket attacks during the 2006 war with Israel. Only a few days later, the *Daily Telegraph* claimed that Hamas, "looking for ways to replenish its stocks...because of large numbers it has fired at Israel in recent weeks," is negotiating a new arms deal with North Korea.

These two developments highlight the historical, and possibly continuing, arms relationship between North Korea and non-state actors in the Middle East. A general consensus among analysts is that today, North Korea's dominant motivation for arms sales is the possible financial gain—a driver which may well apply to North Korea's provision of weaponry to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Yet the picture appears to be more complex than mere economics. As Balazs Szalontai at Kookmin University has also noted, Pyongyang's relationships with non-state groups have historically tended to form part of their relationship with a state friend, in this case, Iran and Syria.^[1] North Korea's desire to show they are "in the same trench" with friendly governments by helping their clients, may complement economic motivations for the sale. By extension, such assistance therefore



also contributes to North Korea's foreign policy goals by undermining the strength of its enemies. North Korea's relationship with armed groups in the Middle East has likely primarily involved three formats: training, infrastructure support and the provision of weapons. Palestinian militants, including one of the founding members of Fatah, received training in North Korea as early as the 1960s. Hezbollah also allegedly benefitted from such training in the 1980s and 1990s. Pyongyang has also reportedly supported Hamas and Hezbollah in building tunnels and underground facilities, a speciality of the North Koreans, whose networks under the DMZ are renowned. As noted in the Memorandum Opinion in the recent case of *Chaim Kaplan et al v. Hezbollah*, "prior to July 12, 2006, North Korea provided Hezbollah with...assistance in building a massive network of underground military installations, tunnels, bunkers, depots and storage facilities in southern Lebanon."

Yet it is the idea of North Korean-manufactured weapons in the arms of Hamas and Hezbollah militants in particular that has captured international media attention this week. Are continuing ties plausible? Assuming the *Telegraph*'s report about Hamas restocking with North Korean help is accurate, what could they be interested in buying from North Korea? And, is Iran involved in this curious long-distance relationship?

Contemporary open-source information is thin, making it difficult to independently substantiate claims of current activity. However, a closer look at previous arms interdictions, what appear to be the procurement priorities of Hamas and Hezbollah, and North Korean manufacturing capabilities, can shed a small ray of light on the possible trajectory of these relationships and the role of Iran.

The Arms Bazaar

The 2008-2009 period offers a relatively substantial degree of (admittedly dated) information on North Korea's relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah. During that time, there appear to have been four confirmed seizures of North Korean cargo en route to Iran or Syria, where Hamas or Hezbollah could have been the end-users. Information on the weapons seized in those cargoes is useful in figuring out the present shopping list of the two groups.

In 2008, two containers filled with "rocket fuses" bound for Bandar Abbas in Iran were seized by an unspecified United Nations Member State. The UN Panel of Experts (PoE) alleged that these were similar to fuses that were found in two other cargoes detained the following year. Since one of those later cargoes of rocket fuses was identified as for 122mm Katyusha rockets, one can reasonably conclude that fuses from 2008 were for the same system.

In March 2009, Israel intercepted the *MV Francop* and discovered 500 tons of weapons on its way from Iran to Syria. Weapons on board included: 120mm, 80 mm, and 60mm Iranian mortars; 107mm Iranian rockets; Chinese ammunition for AK-47s; hand grenades, Spanish 106mm anti-tank shells; Soviet and North Korean-made 122mm Katyusha rockets; and North Korean fuses for the Kayushas. (More on this incident below.) In July 2009, the UAE detained the *ANL Australia* en route from the DPRK to Bandar Abbas. Ten containers of military-related goods, including another 2,030 fuses for 122mm Katyusha rockets were found on board. According to the UAE's subsequent report, weapons in the ship's containers included detonators, rocket launchers, munitions, and explosives including ammunition for rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons. Then, in December that same year, Thai authorities grounded an IL-76 cargo plane flying from the DPRK. According to the UN PoE, "the inspection revealed that the cargo consisted of some 35 tons of conventional arms and munitions, including 240-mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and man-portable air defence systems, valued at over US\$ 16 million." Though the Panel doesn't mention the systems specifically, a cursory glance at photos of the cargo suggests the rocket-propelled grenades were RPG-7s, and the man-portable air defence systems were the North Korean version of the Russian-designed "Igla-1." While Israel said the loot was bound for Hamas and Hezbollah, the White House was a bit more conservative in its analysis, and merely said Hamas.

A few other incidents that did not appear to have North Korean cargo are worth considering since they substantiate the probable importance to Hamas and Hezbollah of the items captured in these cases.

The **Karine A** was alleged to be carrying weapons to Gaza in 2002. When it was stopped and searched, the vessel was found to contain 50 tons of weapons including: 122mm and 107mm rockets; 80mm and 100mm mortar shells; a variety of anti-tank missiles including Russian-made AT-3 Sagger; anti-tank mines; AK-47s; sniper rifles; and ammunition. Aboard the German-owned *Victoria* in 2011, the Israeli Defence Forces found: C-704 anti-



ship missiles and associated launchers; 120mm and 60mm mortar shells; radar systems; and a large quantity of ammunition suitable for AK-47s. These, the IDF said, were Gaza-bound and Iranian-made. Though this is not an exhaustive list of cargo detentions, and does not consider sources of information on Hamas and Hezbollah's procurement other than interdictions, both groups appear to prioritize:

- Small arms: namely AK-47s and ammunition
- Mortar bombs: 120mm, 80mm, and 60mm
- Anti-tank weapons: rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7s), anti-tank missiles, and anti-tank mines
- Surface-to-surface missiles: 240mm (Hezbollah), 120mm, 107mm and associated launchers
- Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)

Urgent Operational Requirements

Suggestions that Hamas and Hezbollah may need to restock their weapons stockpiles seem plausible since both are engaged in military action. The first four categories of weapons in the above list may be particularly desirable in the types of campaigns the two groups are currently fighting, and a large number of those types of munitions will have been expended in recent exchanges. Hamas, for instance, has apparently already fired more than 3,200 rockets into Israel during the current conflict. MANPADS, on the other hand, are unlikely to have been used to the same extent in either theatre and Hamas acquired a substantial quantity from looted Libyan stores in 2011.

Not only is the demand apparent, but also is the supply. North Korea is adept at producing some of the arms that Hamas and Hezbollah most need. It has domestic production lines (and if they follow the old Soviet model, stockpiles as well) for 240mm and 120mm multiple rocket launchers and their associated rockets and fuses, AK-47s and ammunition, RPG-7s and a variety of warheads for them, and Igla-copy MANPADS. Others have also noticed Pyongyang's ability to produce "an indigenous variant" of the 1970s Soviet 9K111 Fagot guided anti-tank missile, which they seem to have delivered to Hamas militants.

Previous customers of North Korean weapons have spoken of Pyongyang's ability to undercut other suppliers in terms of price, though reliable and comparable specifics are hard to come by. In theory, Pyongyang is therefore an economical source of potentially critically-required systems and parts for militant groups in the Middle East. Interdictions show that, in the not-too-distant past, they have also been in practice.

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Tehran in the Middle? The MV Francop Case

In all of the seizures of North Korean cargo allegedly bound for Palestinian militants or for Hezbollah, Iran has been, at minimum, a critical logistical node and enabling force. Its logistical network and supply routes, including the port at Bandar Abbas, are essential for getting goods from the manufacturer to the end-user. The sharing of proliferation networks between North Korea, Iran and Syria has been relatively well documented, and there is little reason to doubt that this dynamic will persist. The recent voyage of the arms-laden *Klos C* from Iran to Sudan (and possibly intended for Hamas thereafter) shows that even the delicate diplomatic discussions between Iran and the P5+1 has not deterred such proliferation-sensitive shipments.

The 2009 **MV Francop** case highlights the fact that, for some transactions involving North Korean arms, Iran may play a greater role than merely as a through-route. When the IDF pulled over the *MV Francop* it did open-source analysts everywhere a favour by posting 250 photos of the cargo on Flickr. Close examination of these photos support—and indeed strengthen—the conclusion of the UN Panel of Experts that some of the cargo was "highly likely to have been produced" in the DPRK, but may have been transferred to Iran before UN sanctions were in place.



Traditional North Korean mislabelling techniques visible on crates containing 122mm rockets aboard the MV Francop. Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

A number of crates carrying 122mm rockets and fuses featured the standard North Korean tactic of mislabelling items. Though this is not in itself proof of their origin, a side shot of the crates seems to show North Korean manufacturers stamps (see, for reference a photo of a North Korean-made Kalashnikov with a comparable stamp).



Crates for 122mm rockets bearing what appears to be a North Korean manufacturer's stamp. Crates for 122mm rockets bearing what appears to be a North Korean manufacturer's stamp. Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

Yet despite their apparent North Korean origin, the 122mm rockets and fuses appear to be decades old. Assuming that the North Korean arms manufacturing industry—established by Kim Il Sung in the 1940s—

employs a serial numbering system similar to that used by the Soviet Union (factory number – year produced – batch number), the rockets aboard the MV *Francop* were likely produced in 1988.



Labelling on North Korean rockets and fuses suggests they were manufactured in 1988. Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

Labelling on North Korean rockets and fuses suggests they were manufactured in 1988. Labelling on North Korean rockets and fuses suggests they were manufactured in 1988. Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.



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It is of course possible that North Korea shipped these rockets, which could have been surplus or stockpiled, to Iran recently, and Tehran merely helped to collate the goods for onward shipment to Hezbollah. This seems unlikely, however, given the other items in the cargo.



Labelling on weapons originating in Spain and the former Soviet Union also suggests they were produced around the time of the Iran-Iraq war. Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

122mm rockets seem to also have been manufactured in the mid- and late-1980s. At the time, Iran was at war with Iraq, creating an urgent demand for these sorts of weapons. Their presence points towards what may be a more likely explanation for the array of cargo aboard the MV *Francop*, namely, that they are post-war surplus weapons from the Iranian arsenal that were determined to be of military utility to Hezbollah, and that Iran decided to either gift or sell them, possibly at a discount. It added a sprinkling of newer mortar bombs and 107mm rockets to this array of aged weapons, and sent the whole 500 ton shipment towards Latakia, Syria.

If this explanation is correct, it leads to a few conclusions. First, Hezbollah will accept what is available or affordable, even if it is decades old. In that context, a contemporary arms relationship with North Korea—able to undercut other suppliers in price—makes sense. Secondly, Iran may have a greater role than merely as a logistical link in the chain: it may actively direct procurement for its non-state militant friends in the region. Supporting this notion, the Secretary of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council was recently quoted on state

television as saying that "Palestinian resistance missiles are the blessing of Iran's transfer of technology." Finally, Iran may actively endorse the supply of North Korean-made products when Tehran cannot fill a particular order itself. North Korean 122mm rockets and fuses were shipped by or through Iran several times, complementing the Soviet/Russian- and Syrian-produced variants that are likely also in Hamas and Hezbollah arsenals.

None of these postulations can be proven as fact, but as new details arise and other arms shipments bound for Hamas or Hezbollah are seized, they should be kept in mind. If the *Telegraph*'s sources prove correct and a restocking campaign with North Korean assistance is underway, we may not have to wait very long for more information.

[1] Personal conversation with the author, April 2014.

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New Threat: The Rise of Hezbollah in Europe

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2014/08/new-threat-rise-hezbollah-europe/>

This month, it was revealed that Hezbollah agents operating in Europe made procurements for "parts and technologies" in Bulgaria which would allow them to operate surveillance drones in the country.

As Defense One reports, under the Stars Group Holding company, the owners, subsidiaries, and "certain managers and individuals" functioned as Hezbollah procurement group which sought to purchase technological equipment from around the world and utilize it in Europe.

The organization was recently blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury.

Following this and further incidents – such as a plot to target Israeli tourists in the country six months ago, and an infamous airport bus bombing in Burgas two years ago – U.S. intelligence members and lawmakers are growing increasingly worried.

Last Tuesday, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a bill that would potentially allow the United States to impose harsh sanctions on the organization, including

the punishment of banks that worked with them.



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These attacks and efforts on the part of Iran-partnered Hezbollah over the past two years mark a historical change in terms of their European operations and planning — a rise in activity following a lower profile after their more renowned activities of the 1980s.

In response to this, the EU also banned Hezbollah's military wing last summer, which allowed for the seizure of much of its finances in Europe.

According to Homeland Security News Wire this has led to successful incidents such as the

seizure of 770,000 euros in the possession of two Lebanese airline passengers, and the German raid of a fundraising front organization known as the "Orphan Children Project Lebanon."

However, these measures fail to counteract the activities of the group in certain meaningful ways. The surveillance drone incident is the

first catch that truly has affected their operations.

Treasury Undersecretary David Cohen said that the latest incident reinforced that "it is critical that countries throughout the world work together to combat this dangerous organization and sever it from sources of revenue and support."

Chinese city bans anyone with Islamic clothing or a 'big beard' from boarding buses after terror attacks across the country

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2717560/Chinese-city-bans-Islamic-clothing-big-beard-boarding-buses-terror-attacks-country.html>

A city in China's restive western region of Xinjiang has banned people with head scarves, veils and long beards from boarding buses, as the government battles unrest with a policy that critics said discriminates against Muslims.

Xinjiang, home to the Muslim Uighur people who speak a Turkic language, has been beset for years by violence that the government blames on Islamist militants or separatists.

Authorities will prohibit five types of passengers - those who wear veils, head scarves, a loose-fitting garment called a jilbab, clothing with the crescent moon and star, and those with long beards - from boarding buses in the northwestern city of Karamay, state media said.



© Getty Images

Uyghur men leave the Id Kah Mosque following the Eid prayers on July 29 in old Kashgar, Xinjiang Province. Hundreds have died in unrest in Xinjiang in the past 18 months

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The crescent moon and star symbol of Islam features on many national flags, besides being used by groups China says want to set up an independent state called East Turkestan.

The rules were intended to help strengthen security through August 20 during an athletics event and would be enforced by security teams, the ruling Communist Party-run Karamay Daily said on Monday.

'Those who do not comply, especially those five types of passengers, will be reported to the police,' the paper said.

In July, authorities in Xinjiang's capital Urumqi banned bus passengers from carrying items ranging from cigarette lighters to yogurt and water, in a bid to prevent violent attacks.





Crackdown: Chinese authorities have introduced rules banning people dressed in an Islamic style from boarding buses amid violent unrest linked to extremist Muslims. Pictured are Chinese soldiers securing an area outside a mosque in Kashgar, Xinjiang province, after an Imam was killed by assailants in late July

Exiled Uighur groups and human rights activists say the government's repressive policies in Xinjiang, including controls on Islam, have provoked unrest, a claim Beijing denies.

'Officials in Karamay city are endorsing an openly racist and discriminatory policy aimed at ordinary Uighur people,' Alim Seytoff, the president of the Washington-based Uyghur American Association, said in an emailed statement.

While many Uighur women dress in much the same casual style as those elsewhere in China, some have begun to wear the full veil, a garment more common in Pakistan or Afghanistan than in Xinjiang. Police have offered money for tips on everything from 'violent terrorism training' to individuals who grow long beards.

Hundreds have died in unrest in Xinjiang in the past 18 months, but tight security makes it almost impossible for journalists to make independent assessments of the violence.

About 100 people were killed when knife-wielding attackers staged assaults in two towns in the region's south in late July, state media said, including 59 'terrorists' shot dead by police. A suicide bombing killed 39 people at a market in Urumqi in May.

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The Hezbollah wild card in the conflict in Gaza

By Andrew McGregor

Source:[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=42726&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=26&cHash=db8aa0ad032fe8847a5311a0e591b198#.U-X9kWPhsxA](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42726&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=db8aa0ad032fe8847a5311a0e591b198#.U-X9kWPhsxA)

The ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza have benefitted from the knowledge that Israel's northern border with Lebanon is not being threatened by the Shi'a Hezbollah movement of Lebanon, the senior partner in the anti-Israel "Resistance" movement. With Hezbollah occupied with its own military operations in Syria and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (and possibly now in Iraq), the frontier has remained largely quiet throughout Israel's

"Operation Protective Edge" in Gaza, with the Lebanese Army and UN peacekeepers working to prevent rockets from being fired into Israel from southern Lebanon. In late July, Hamas' political bureau deputy chief, Musa Abu Marzuk, appealed to Hezbollah to intervene in the Gaza conflict: "We hope the Lebanese front will open and together we will fight against this formation [Israel]... There's

no arguing that Lebanese resistance could mean a lot" (RIA Novosti, July 30).

Hezbollah was once able to present itself as the defender of Lebanon and the champion of the anti-Israeli Resistance, but circumstances prevent Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and the rest of the Hezbollah leadership from resuming these roles. Lebanon is now experiencing severe economic problems while hosting over a million refugees from the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah fighters are deeply engaged in the Syrian conflict and have assumed an important role in preventing Sunni jihadists from Syria from operating in the hills surrounding the Bekaa Valley in northeastern Lebanon (al-Arabiya, July 26; for Hezbollah attempts to reposition itself as an anti-terrorism force, see Terrorism Monitor, April 18). Other factors working against Hezbollah support for Hamas include local suspicion and resentment arising from Hezbollah's Syrian intervention and the current strained relations between the two groups. There are also perceptions within Lebanon that Hezbollah has a controlling influence over the Lebanese military and security forces. These forces are currently overstretched and awaiting the supply of \$1 billion worth of new French weapons in a deal financed by the Saudis (*Daily Star [Beirut]*, August 5).

Nasrallah's first public remarks on the current Gaza conflict were not made until July 25, when the Hezbollah leader warned Israel against going to the level of "suicide and collapse" by continuing its campaign in Gaza, while assuring "our brothers in Gaza" that "we will do everything we can to support you" (AP, July 25). Nasrallah elaborated on his remarks in an interview a few days later:

We in Hezbollah will be unstinting in all forms of support, assistance and aid that we are able to provide. We feel we are true partners with this resistance, a partnership of jihad, brotherhood, hope, pain, sacrifice and fate because their victory is our victory and their defeat is our defeat... As far as the situation on the battlefield goes, we are winning. Yes, the correlation of forces is beyond comparison, but we have men who are capable of stopping and vanquishing the aggressor (RIA Novosti, July 30).

Nasrallah had earlier made calls to both Hamas chief Khalid Mesha'al and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Abdullah Shalah to express his support for their struggle against

Israel (*Daily Star [Beirut]*, July 22). Despite an increasing political distance between the Sunni Hamas movement and the Shi'a Hezbollah movement due to growing sectarian tensions throughout the Middle East (particularly in Syria) and Hamas' ties to the now-deposed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, there are claims that the military arms of the two movements continue to cooperate (Al-Monitor, July 24).

The northeastern Lebanese border town of Arsal has been the scene of bitter fighting in recent days as Lebanese troops of the mechanized 5th and 6th Brigades and the light 8th Brigade move into the region to combat an estimated 4,000 Sunni gunmen of the Nusra Front, most of whom arrived from Syria (al-Manar [Beirut], August 4). Also operating in the Qalamoun region are Islamic State forces under the command of local amir Abu Hassan al-Filastini (al-Akhbar [Beirut], August 4). Hezbollah is working alongside Lebanese Army troops around Arsal while also working with the Syrian Army to destroy Islamist forces (particularly the Nusra Front) operating in Syria's Qalamoun region. Hezbollah is reported to be aided in the region by a group of advisors from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps who arrived there in mid-July (*Daily Star [Beirut]*, July 22).

The anti-jihadist operations are intended in part to pre-empt a planned Islamist offensive (Laylat al-Qadr – "Night of Power") against Lebanese border villages intended to abduct hundreds of Lebanese citizens to give the jihadists a bargaining chip in obtaining the release of dozens of their comrades from Lebanon's Roumieh Prison. Other residents of the region were to be slaughtered in order to provoke a sectarian conflict within Lebanon (*Daily Star [Beirut]*, July 22; July 26; July 27). The planned operation came after an earlier scheme to enable a jailbreak by blasting the Roumieh Prison gates open with a car bomb was foiled by Lebanese intelligence (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 5). Lebanon's Sunni Prime Minister, Tammam Salam, has ruled out any kind of political deal with the Sunni gunmen on the frontier (Reuters, August 4).

Fighting in the area began following the arrest of Imad Juma'a (a.k.a. Abu Ahmad Juma'a), leader of the Sunni militant Fajr al-Islam Brigade (allied to the Islamist Nusra Front). Juma'a recently declared his allegiance to the Iraqi-Syrian Islamic State and



its leader, the self-declared "Caliph," Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (*al-Akhbar* [Beirut], August 4). Hezbollah has cut the jihadists' supply lines in the region between Qalamoun and Arsal while the Syrian Air Force conducts airstrikes against concentrations of gunmen in the mountains in anticipation of a major joint Hezbollah-Syrian Army-Lebanese Army operation to flush out the gunmen and eliminate their presence in the border region. While likely to be militarily effective, the prospect of Hezbollah operating closely with the officially secular Lebanese Army has alarmed many Sunni leaders within Lebanon. In addition, Arsal is predominantly Sunni and generally in sympathy with the

Syrian jihadists, leading to the possibility of a joint operation as described sparking a sectarian confrontation within Lebanon (*Daily Star* [Beirut], July 31).

With most of its best fighting cohorts operating in Syria or northern Lebanon, Hezbollah is reluctant to renew hostilities with Israel at this time. A war on two fronts would not be sustainable and Hezbollah is well aware that the Israeli Defense Forces have been using their repeated ground offensives into Gaza to develop the new methods and tactics necessary to avoid a repetition of their failure to overcome Hezbollah forces in 2006.

The Islamic State's Strategic and Tactical Plan for Iraq

By Murad Batal al-Shishani

Source:[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=42728&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=26&cHash=5f5c821fd26340124e1456aaa3b9d7d#.U-X9tmPhsxA](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42728&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=5f5c821fd26340124e1456aaa3b9d7d#.U-X9tmPhsxA)

Since the announcement of the Islamic State, Iraq's Sunni jihadist movement has been obsessed with controlling geographical space in order to declare an Islamic caliphate, a move that, in addition to its symbolic importance,



would help raise recruits and secure the movement's logistics. The group was shocked by the armed opposition of the Sunni Awakening Councils in 2007 and started planning for the post-U.S. occupation era in Iraq in 2010, when Iraq's jihadist movement published an important booklet with direct relevance to the strategy and tactics used by the Islamic State today: *Khoutah Istratigya li Ta'aziz al-Moqif al-Siyasi al-Dawlat al-Islamyiah fi al-Iraq* (A Strategic Plan to Improve the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq).

The booklet was published in a time when the Iraqi jihadists were in difficulty, appearing only months before Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's successor as leader of al-

Qaeda in Iraq) and the movement's defense minister, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, were killed in April 2010. The contents of *Khoutah Istratigya* outlined a strategic plan to "improve the position of Islamic state; therefore it will be more powerful politically and militarily... so the Islamic [State] project will be ready to take over all Iraq after the enemy troops withdraw." [1]

The Islamic State is a linear descendant of al-Zarqawi's Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers – more commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq), formed in 2004 to fight the American invasion of Iraq.

The group, which is a splinter of al-Qaeda as a result of differences over practices and ideology (especially in Syria), has built its legitimacy around a number of concepts and ideas such as *al-shawkat* (power, intensity) and *al-taghloub* (overcoming), components of the belief that if a group has the power, it will have the legitimacy to rule.

Since 2005, the movement has engaged in a sectarian war considered by the Sunni jihadists as being as important as fighting the invading *kafir* (infidel) forces, most specifically the Americans (*al-Hayat*, July 3). The war has been justified by presenting Iraq's majority Shi'a population as a "fifth column" for the Americans or the Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad. After 2007, the jihadists began to present themselves as

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an alternative to the existing Sunni leadership in Iraq. Their attempt to announce an Islamic State proved premature, with the Sunnis of Anbar governorate forming the anti-jihadist *Majalis al-Sahwat* (Awakening Councils), whose subsequent military campaign forced a jihadist retreat.

Iraq's jihadists noted in the 2010 booklet that the state they are aiming to create should not bind itself with international commitments: "Creating an Islamic state which has no commitments towards the international community is not a fantasy, dream or illusion as some might imagine or fancy, rather it's a clear-cut issue built on an obvious strategy." [2] In order to establish an Islamic state that controls Iraq, the jihadists set out a clear five-point agenda served by their tactics and strategies:

Unification: This agenda urges jihadists to unify their efforts in Iraq and prove that the Islamic state is a reality. Efforts by the jihadists to run day-to-day management of the cities of Fallujah and Mosul after the Islamists took control may be considered as part of attaining this goal. [3]

Balanced Military Planning: This agenda is divided into three tactics:

1. "Nine Bullets against Apostates and One against Crusaders," referring to a campaign to "increase the rate of fear amongst Iraqis who join the army and security forces";
2. "Cleansing," in which the movement aims to occupy places where the Iraqi army and security forces are located and keep them busy trying to retake these places. [4] To achieve this goal, jihadists in Iraq resort to a tactic involves holding hostages, killing dozens of them and then engaging in an open clash with security forces. This kind of attack has been dubbed "Mumbai-style" after the storming of the historic Taj Hotel in Mumbai by the Kashmiri jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2008. Although the preferred jihadist tactic in Iraq is suicide bombings, mostly due to the damage they cause, their lower cost, the ability of the perpetrators to bypass security checks and the increased media coverage they attract. [5] Although they are not cheap compared to suicide bombings, Mumbai-style attacks achieve other goals in addition to media coverage. Most importantly, they undermine confidence in the security services in the targeted country, according to the assessment of the jihadists themselves. In October 2010,

jihadists used a Mumbai-style attack on Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad, killing more than 50 worshippers (National Iraqi News Agency, November 1, 2010). The group used the same tactic five months later at the provincial council building in Tikrit, where another 56 people were killed (al-Shorfa, May 30, 2011);

3. Targeting influential military and political leaders by assassination. [6]

Formation of jihadist "Awakening Councils": Jihadists admit that the formation of Awakening councils in Anbar was a "clever idea," therefore, they have urged local Sunnis to form groups to protect their areas from the army and security forces, take control of day-to-day security in those areas and implement Shari'a. According to the jihadists, the aim is to integrate locals into the project to establish Shari'a and avoid the alienation of local people. All these groups are to be overseen by a jihadist religious *amir*. [7] Progress towards these goals was seen in the increasing numbers of Iraqis joining the jihadists as well as the alliance created with some local tribes in Fallujah in January. [8]

Political Symbolism: The jihadists believe that advancing a political and religious leader is an essential step in establishing an Islamic state. [9] At the time of the booklet's publication, jihadists thought it would be difficult to find such a symbol, but when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) several months later, it was clear he was assuming this symbolic role by combining the necessary political and religious credentials. This symbolic role was displayed when al-Baghdadi delivered the Friday sermon at Mosul's Great Mosque of al-Nuri (built 1172-1173), which was traditionally used by the early Muslim Caliphs.

Assuring Non-Muslims: This refers to a just ruling by the Islamic State to assure non-Muslims that the jihadists are able and willing to protect them and their interests, a stance the jihadists view as important in light of ongoing efforts to misrepresent jihadists in the media. [10] However, after the jihadists took the city of Mosul in June, hundreds of Christian families fled after the jihadists demanded they convert, submit to their rule and pay a religious levy (*jizyah*) or face death by the sword. The Islamic State does not see this as a contradiction since their concept

of justice involves implementing Shari'a as the group understands it.

Since it started to operate in Syria in 2013, the ISIS/Islamic State organization has been obsessed with controlling geographical space to support its plans to establish a caliphate. To achieve aims such as securing the border between Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has actually engaged in more fighting with Kurdish militants, the Free Syrian Army rebels and even other jihadists than with the troops of the

Assad regime. The announcement of a caliphate has benefited the Islamic State in terms of attracting fighters from all over the world. European citizens are reported to have carried out suicide attacks and even jihadists in Jordan who once opposed ISIS have now changed their position in support of the caliphate (*al-Ghad* [Amman], July 23). [11] These developments reflect the ideological foundations presented in the plan presented in 2010.

► Notes are available at source's URL.

Murad Batal al-Shishani is an Islamic groups and terrorism issues analyst based in London. He is a specialist on Islamic Movements in the Middle East and in the North Caucasus.

ISIS, the Caliphate, is Evil Incarnate

Source: <http://aclj.org/radical-islam/isis-caliphate-is-evil-incarnate>



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Each day we see new evidence of the unthinkable atrocities and barbarism unleashed by ISIS, the radical Islamic terrorist group oppressing much of Iraq and Syria.

Recently, ACLJ Chief Counsel Jay Sekulow and Senior Counsel Skip Ash compiled a report detailing the history, extent, and gravity of the danger posed by this ruthless jihadist terror group.

While born as an offshoot of al Qaeda, even these terrorists quickly distanced themselves from ISIS for its brutality and indiscriminate slaughter.

As the report explains:

ISIS has emerged as the most ruthless of the Sunni Jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria. ISIS is so extreme that other well-known, radical Islamist and Jihadist groups have not only distanced themselves from ISIS but have also publicly condemned ISIS's actions. ISIS jihadists commit violence against fellow Muslims in violation of Islamic law; they routinely commit war crimes and engage in torture in violation of international law; and they also issue threats to Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities. What makes ISIS especially dangerous is

that, not only are ISIS leaders and fighters ruthless, but they also have obtained sufficient material assets to support a standing military force and they possess the will to use weapons of mass destruction to carry out their fanatical aims.

As the report notes, ISIS is indiscriminate in its heinous barbarism:

Individuals suspected of violating Sharia law or opposing ISIS, including children as young as 8 years old, are abducted and transported to prisons, where they are flogged, tortured, and summarily executed. . . .

Reports from former detainees describe various modes of torture common in ISIS prisons: beating detainees with “generator belts, thick pieces of cable, sticks or other implements” and forcing detainees to remain in “contorted stress position[s] . . . for long periods, inducing severe pain and possible long-term muscular or other damage.”

One detainee reports being “tortured with electric shocks and beaten with a cable while suspended with only one foot touching the floor.” Other detainees claimed that ISIS utilizes solitary confinement and electric shocks. Still other reports indicate that ISIS members flog early-teenage prisoners anywhere from 30 to 94 lashes at a time.

Execution style shootings, hangings, decapitation, grotesque public displays of brutality, and mass graves are just some of the utterly depraved uses of violence they unleash on the civilian populations.

ISIS's targeted brutality and persecution of Christians has been well documented. ISIS has issued a broad edict in Iraq that Christians must convert to Islam, pay an Islamic tax for unbelief, or die. After setting a July 19, 2014 deadline for Christians to make this choice, ISIS has gone on a brutally violent rampage, hunting down Christians and other religious minorities and slaughtering them.

The analysis shows how ISIS has repeatedly and specifically threatened Christians, fellow Muslims, Israel, the U.S., and even American doctors who are ministering to the sick and needy around the world. As the report succinctly states, “ISIS readily threatens everyone it sees as opposing its version of Islam. What makes ISIS especially dangerous is its possession of both the means and will to use such means to carry out its threats.”

ISIS has captured advanced weaponry, including American tanks, and now has access to radiological material (i.e. to make dirty bombs) and possibly even chemical weapons.

Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of pure evil is unthinkable.

As the report concludes:

Tragic human rights violations committed by ISIS against people of various religions are plentiful and well-documented. Additionally, ISIS has demonstrated its military effectiveness by conquering vast swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq with speed and decisiveness. The ISIS threat is compounded by the group’s preparation and planning. Significant holdings of cash, other material assets, and weapons demonstrate ISIS’s potential longevity and lethality. ISIS’s recent actions in Syria and Iraq have culminated in a tangible threat to human rights, regional stability, and global peace—a threat that we disregard at our peril.

President Obama’s decision to drop a payload of justice on the pure evil that is ISIS is a first step, but we are naive if we think a few missile strikes will silence this brand of terror.

► Read the full ACLJ report at: <http://media.aclj.org/pdf/ISIS%20Paper.pdf>

Experts warn of terrorism blowback from Iraq air strikes

Source: <http://yalibnan.com/2014/08/11/experts-warn-terrorism-blowback-iraq-air-strikes/>

The American air strikes against a militant group in Iraq could motivate the fighters to retaliate with terrorist attacks against U.S. civilians, experts warn.

President Barack Obama’s air strikes against militants from the group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) “could increase the likelihood

that ISIS or somebody inspired by ISIS, would strike against the homeland,” says Seth Jones, a terrorism expert with Rand Corp. ISIS has long threatened America openly. In June the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, warned Americans that “soon enough,



you will be in direct confrontation [with us].” Last week a spokesman for the group vowed that “we will raise the flag of Allah in the White House.”

Despite that bombastic rhetoric, ISIS has thus far been consumed with its fights in Iraq and Syria, and with capturing territory to form an Islamic caliphate. But counterterrorism officials worry that the fanatical group could now place a higher priority on attacking Americans. Jihadists in online forums and on Twitter are already calling for terrorist attacks in response to Obama’s intervention in Iraq.

The prospect of blowback was on the mind of senior officials even before Obama approved air strikes last week.

“That’s one of the downsides of U.S. involvement,” former deputy CIA director Michael Morell told CBS News in June. “The more we visibly get involved in helping the [Iraqi] government fight these guys, the more we become a target.”

A U.S. intelligence official would not say whether the threat level has escalated, saying the U.S. continues to monitor the known ISIS threat. “ISIS has previously stated its willingness to strike targets outside of the region and the [intelligence community] is working in close coordination with our allies to track these threats,” says Brian Hale, spokesman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

In July, Brett McGurk, the top State Department official for Iraq, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the 30 to 50 suicide bombers per month deployed in Syria and Iraq by ISIS “are increasingly Western passport holders,” and that “it is a matter of time before these suicide bombers are directed elsewhere.”

Several experts agreed that attacking ISIS will make the group more eager to strike back against America, but said the threat is hard to calculate — and no reason to avoid taking on the group.

“U.S. strikes against ISIS may well raise that group’s interest in carrying out terrorist attacks against U.S. targets,” says Daniel Benjamin, a former top State Department counterterrorism

official now at Dartmouth College. “But the significance of that shouldn’t be overstated.”

Benjamin questions whether the ISIS threat has increased significantly, given its previously known desire to kill Americans.

Regardless, he adds: “We can’t let our policies be held hostage by this concern.”

Obama’s strikes this month mark the first direct U.S. attacks on ISIS in its current form. But the U.S. military did battle with the group’s prior incarnation, al-Qaeda in Iraq, during the U.S. occupation of that country in the mid-2000s. AQI never found a way to hit Americans beyond the Iraq battlefield.

But since splitting with al-Qaeda, broadening its ambition and declaring itself ISIS — and, more recently, the Islamic State — the group has attracted Westerners whose passports could grant them easy entry to Europe and the U.S.

“What is concerning, and which makes this situation different,” warns Jones of Rand Corp., is that large complement of Western fighters, which AQI did not possess. “The connections to this battlefield from the West are stronger than they were a decade ago.”

Jones says there’s precedent for the U.S. drawing the attention of a regionally focused terrorist group by targeting its ranks. The attempted 2010 Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was trained and directed to strike the U.S. by the Pakistani Taliban, which sought revenge for American drone strikes against the group’s leadership.

At least one expert on Sunni radical groups doubts that Obama’s strikes make Americans any less safe, however.

“I don’t think this changes [ISIS’s] calculus,” says Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “They are likely planning attacks whether the U.S. conducts targeted air strikes or not. We shouldn’t have reactionary policy when it comes to [ISIS] anyway — why would we let them continue to grow just because they aren’t attacking us now?”

“In my opinion,” Zelin says, “we should destroy them as soon as possible.”



United Kingdom Counter Terror Network Goes Live With New Intelligence Management System



Source: <http://www.issinc.com/united-kingdom-counter-terror-network-goes-live-new-intelligence-management-system/>

ISS Global announced today that the United Kingdom's National Counter Terrorism Network has now begun using its Dfuze intelligence management tool.

The Network's six Counter Terrorism Units around the UK formally 'went live' with the tool this week, enabling them to instantaneously share critical intelligence information across the national network for the first time.

The screenshot shows the Dfuze v3.1.0 application interface. On the left, there's a sidebar with a search bar and a tree view of 'Groups [86]' containing various organizations like SIPAH-E-SAHABA PAKISTAN (SSP), JASHE-E-MOHAMMAD (JEM), LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ), AL-BADR, PAK PAKISTAN, AL-BADR, LASHKAR-E-TABA (LET), MOHAJIR QAMI MOVEMENT-HAQIQI (MQM), BLACK DECEMBER, PAK PAKISTAN, HARKAT UL-ANSAR, BLACK DECEMBER, AL-MADINA, AL-FUQRA, PAK PAKISTAN, AL-ZULFIKAR, AL-FUQRA, ISLAMI INQILABI MAHAZ, MUTTAHIDA QAMI MOVEMENT (MQM) (which is highlighted in orange), HARKAT UL-MUJAHIDIN (HUM), HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN (HM), AL-ZULFIKAR, AFG AFGHANISTAN, ALL PAKISTAN MOHAJIR STUDENTS ORG, JAMATUL ULEMA-E-ISLAM-E PAKISTAN, TURKISTAN PARTY (PAKISTAN), AL-MAQINA, INDIA, TALIBAN, AL-UMAR MUJAHIDEEN, PAK PAKISTAN, JAMAT UL-MUJAHEDIN (JUM), AL-ARIFEEN, MUSLIM UNITED ARMY, NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTO, AL-ARIFEEN, PAK PAKISTAN, 313, PAK PAKISTAN, and S13. The main panel displays a detailed group profile for 'MUTTAHIDA QAMI MOVEMENT (MQM)' under the 'UNCLASSIFIED' category. The profile includes fields for Unique Reference (DFZTGRP73), Group Name (MUTTAHIDA QAMI MOVEMENT (MQM)), Sub Category (NATIONALIST/SEPARATIST), Strength (APPROXIMATELY 3,000 MEMBERS), Area (PAKISTAN), Library Item (Yes), Disable Transmission (No), Compliance Checked (Yes), and Forward locking (CLEAR). It also lists Goals, Remarks (MOTHERTONGUE NAME: MUTTAHIDA QUOMI MAHAZ), Financial Sources (MQM-A CLAIMS THAT THE MQM-H IS FUNDED BY CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES AND RECEIVES ASSISTANCE FROM PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS. MQM-H DOES GET SOME OF ITS FUNDING VIA PROTECTION RACKETS), Aliases (MOHAJIR QUAMI MOVEMENT, UNITED NATIONAL FRONT), and Founding Philosophy. To the right, there's a sidebar with links to Main Incidents (5), Groups (1), and Persons Involved (1), each with a list of items. The top navigation bar includes Application, Databases, What's New, prosPECT, Advanced Search, Image Viewer, Support, Help, and Log Out.

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The Dfuze system is designed to allow counter terror personnel to upload to a national database photos, videos and other key content directly from terrorism and bomb scenes from mobile devices, and make that content immediately accessible and searchable across the entire UK Counter Terrorism Network.


"The Dfuze system will significantly improve the sharing and dissemination of critical information within minutes of investigators arriving on the scenes of terrorist attacks," said Neil Fretwell, operations director, ISS Global. "This is enormously important in trying to prevent synchronized attacks in other regions. The faster the information is shared and processed across the network, the better chance law enforcement and public safety personnel can prevent additional casualties."

The Dfuze® Intelligence Management System allows customers in **more than 40 countries** to securely store and maintain all data related to virtually any incident including: IED, EOD, criminal gang, terrorist or firearm incidents and/or operations. The system provides a centralized view of all significant data on record, enabling rapid search and retrieval. With its built-in analytical tools and secure data sharing, Dfuze provides an effective and powerful solution for data entry, data linking, data searching and data retrieval – end to end intelligence management.

The Maternal Drama of the Chechen Jihadi

By Norman Simms

Source: http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/the-maternal-drama-of-the-chechen-jihadi?f=must_reads



Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin, *The Maternal Drama of the Chechen Jihadi*. Chevy Chase, MD: International Psychotherapy Institute E-Books, 2014. pp. 188.

While specifically written for a professional readership of psychologists, psychohistorians and specialists in anti-terrorism, prevention and control, Nancy Kobrin's book may also interest the general public concerned with the spread and deepening of fanatical forms of terrorism, the scourge of our still very new twenty-first century. The main focus of this study is the Chechen type of figure, specifically as the two Tsaranaev brothers, the Boston Marathon bombers of April 2013, in the context of their family history, and generically as a murderous form of cultural dysfunction already spreading from the Caucasian homeland and its diasporic communities in North America into other hot spots of fanatical Islamicist opposition to Judeo-Christian civilization.

There are, to be sure, tell-tale signs of the imminent emergence of such a terrorist personality in terms of geopolitical situations and economic tensions, but because not each individual or every family caught up in those

external binds becomes a mass murderer and suicide bomber, Kobrin returns to a theme she has been developing in the last few decades: the incomplete bonding between mother and child (almost always but not necessarily a son), the ensuing "maternal drama" creating in many instances what she calls the "volcanic mentality." Cold as ice and seemingly self-possessed, even charming, on the outside, such a mentality seethes within with boiling rage and, when the conditions are ripe, explodes in acts of horrendous violence. "The volcanic iceberg mentality," the author explains, "is a psychotic adaptation, a result of children having been treated as objects when they were infants." From generation to generation in certain cultures, such as that obtaining in Chechnya for the past several hundred years at least, mothers are abused (e.g., wife beating and honour killing) in a shame-honour society, their weakness and pain inflicted on females is seen and experienced by sons who at once love them and despise them for being unable to protect themselves, and then seek a revenge that is too terrible to confront consciously. Rage replaces love, and yet so long as the cauldron of pain and humiliation boils up inside the darkest recesses of the mind, the child appears normal, if somewhat numb and distant, all concerned in the drama—the abusing fathers, the victimized mothers, the humiliated children, denying their own hurts and feelings of helplessness to escape the syndrome.

Kobrin says the whole phenomenon becomes an intergenerational game of Catch-22. But to understand it properly the researcher must study a "psychological X-ray" of the persons, relationships and actions of those involved. "The Chechen jihadi offers a unique window of this kind of concrete delusional thinking, acting out, and unacceptable antisocial behaviors targeting women, children and infants." Thus rather than addressing ideologies and political forces the specialists seeking to discover the terrorist before he or she acts out the murderous rage needs to examine the drama in terms of a particular kind of family dynamics, where in the rest of the world

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becomes the theatricalized stage of mass suicide-murder. The central motif of Kobrin's book, then, is that terrorists do not feel their cauldron of rage when it erupts into the world, "they become it." So unthinkable and unimaginable to most people, not least law enforcement officers and security agents, as well as supposedly dispassionate mental health professionals, that "We are sucked into the psychotic world of the terrorist and remain in denial because it is just too terrifying to think that the problem lies buried in early childhood development, embedded in the family." Yet this is exactly the picture, the psychological X-ray that is revealed, by psychohistory: "the underlying unconscious dynamic of hostage taking and how the cultural practice informs terrorist behaviour."

At the same time, Kobrin, an expert in Arabic and Islamic studies, provides a background to the nature of the shame-honour culture that shapes Chechnya and its migrant offshoots elsewhere, and which is now increasingly providing a volatile form to other similar societies in the Middle East and among displaced communities where transported family dynamics of violent devaluation of the

female and humiliation of the objectified child continues the syndrome. As well as political correctness inhibiting interventions in those families presenting all the signs of imminent volcanic eruptions in our midst, fear of their own darkest pains lead western officials from dealing with the issues. "By and large," Kobrin writes, "counterterrorist experts are themselves terrified of dealing with the mother and early childhood development." And yet in adjacent fields of study, it is now patently clear and accepted that "[t]he most critical years for brain development and attachment are from birth to age three." Failures to pass normally through the phases of infant-mother attachment and detachment establish patterns of response-or rather, non-response-that drive all subsequent ontological growth of the personality and social ties. "Instead of internalizing the food, mirroring mother," Kobrin says, summing up the last several decades of neurodevelopmental research, "the baby incorporates the mother's terror and annihilation anxiety within the context of this unconscious structure, precipitating the psychological birth of a terrorist."

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Norman Simms is the author of Alfred Dreyfus: Man, Milieu, Mentality and Midrash (Academic Studies Press, 2011). The second volume in the series, Alfred Dreyfus: In the Context of His Times: Alfred Dreyfus as Lover, Intellectual, Poet and Jew (also by Academic Studies Press) was published in July 2013; and the third Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus in the Phantasmagoria (Cambridge Scholars Publisher, UK) in September 2013.



the other "Why when shooting down the passenger Boeing777 except the machine gun of Su-25 had to be used and missile air-to-air?"

In other conversations there is reference to "dismembering" of Ukraine wounded soldiers for selling their organs!

Read the dialogue below:

28.06.2014 20:35

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

Набери меня, я тебе не дозваниваюсь, ты вне зоны. Что там решилось?

The answer to the big questions?

Source: Greek press

E-mail snooping of two Ukrainian officials from the hacker group "KiberBerkut" confirms that the Malaysian Boeing 777 was shot down by Ukrainian Su-25 fighter. In the debate between the two one is asking

Call me, I can't reach you, always out of coverage zone. What was the final decision?

И кстати, что с ранеными? Вас разместили?

By the way, what is going on with wounded? Everything OK? [Referring to the wounded Ukrainian soldiers chosen for disassembly for organs to be sold on the black market]

28.06.2014 20:39

Юрий Береза

Раненых разместили, все нормально. Только главврачу пришлось немножко мозги прочистить) провели полигон беседу, так сказать, применили меры!))

The wounded were placed, everything is fine. Only the head physician give us hard time, had to do little "brain washing", so to speak, "applied measures")

[Apparently one of the doctors refused to participate in organ removal operations. Please note two smily faces at the end of the sentence]

28.06.2014 20:40

Юрий Береза

Сегодня все не смогу – надо ребят отправить. Завтра утром. Подойдет?

Wouldn't be able to do everything today – need to send boys out. Tomorrow morning? If it's OK with you.

28.06.2014 20:40

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

Да, нормально. А насчет врача не слышал еще!

Sure, acceptable. I haven't heard about doctor yet!

28.06.2014 20:41

Юрий Береза

Да теперь все ок.

Everything is fine now [Doctor was killed]

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28.06.2014 20:41

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

Я не сомневаюсь

I never doubted you.

17.07.2014 21:22

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

Ладно, фиг с ним. Что? И как?

Screw it. What and How [it went]?

17.07.2014 21:23

Юрий Береза

землей – прямым – воздухом

Ground [SAM] – direct [referring to cannon] – air [air to air missile]

17.07.2014 21:24

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

А воздухом какого хера???

Why air in the fracking world? [Air to air missile]

17.07.2014 21:26

Юрий Береза

Передали, что не смог долго удерживаться там, типа высоко. Сделал один прямым. Не проканало. Тогда пришлось воздухом.



[Pilot] reported that he could not keep plane so high for a long time. Made one straight [cannon salvo]. Didn't work. Then had to use air to air [missile].

17.07.2014 21:27

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

А почему сначала харьковских подняли?

Why Kharkov was involved? [Air defense military command center]

17.07.2014 21:30

Юрій Береза

Они сказали, что сначала команда пришла из Киева на харьковский пульт, а когда он начал разворачиваться, тогда уже остальных подключили.

They said that the first orders came from Kiev to Kharkov control [Air defense military command center], only when they went on defcon others began to follow.

17.07.2014 21:32

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

ясно, ну расскажешь еще потом подробнее. Ты без задержек?

Got it, well later on you'll provide me all details [in personal conversation] Any delays?

17.07.2014 21:34

Юрій Береза

Да, скоро на месте буду. Только закончил с журналистами.

Absolutely, soon well be there. Just finished with journalists.

01.01.2014 22:32

Svyatoslav Oliynyk

З Новим Роком, Анатолій Степанович! Бажаю вам, бажаю всій країні, бажаю всім нам, щоб в Новому Році ця скотина в короні як найшивидше була скинута зі свого трону волею усього народу! Бажаю в новому році здобути нову, сильну та прекрасну країну! Ще раз з Новим Роком! Слава Україні!

Happy New Year, Anatoly Stepanovich! I wish you, the whole country, and all of us in upcoming New Year that beast [ex. president Yanukovich] will be deposed as soon as possible. I wish for a new, strong and beautiful country! Once again, Happy New Year! Glory to Ukraine!

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03.01.2014 19:20

Анатолій Гриценко

З Новим Роком, Слава! Тобі також всього найкращого у наступному році!

Happy New Year, Slava! Same to you, all the best wishes!

03.01.2014 19:21

Анатолій Гриценко

Я приєднуюсь до твоїх побажань, і також бажаю всій країні, щоб вони здійснились якнайшивидше! Героям Слава!!!

Same to you!

19.07.2014 09:15

Анатолій Гриценко

Слава! Якого черта?! Що ви суки накоїли? Як можна було викласти це відео за добу до проведення операції????!! Ти розумієш, що «рашисти» його вже передали на експертизу, та запросили з Ютуба дату першого завантаження???

Slava!

What the hell ?! What are you bitches done? How anyone could upload this video a day before the operation ??? [MH-17 provocation] !!! You know perfectly well that russians employed experts, and requested from youtube date of the first upload ??



The Middle East Is Deep In Denial Over Where ISIS Came From

Source: <http://www.businessinsider.com/hussein-ibish-middle-east-denial-over-isis-2014-8>



One of the most alarming features of Arab responses to the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq is a persistent pattern of neurotic denial in the form of conspiracy theories and other escapist fantasies.

But running away from the truth will only complicate the ability of Arab states and societies to comprehend where the IS (or ISIS) came from, how it has unexpectedly managed to surge into so much power so quickly, and how it can be effectively countered.

One of the most persistent and widespread delusions is that the IS did not, in fact, emerge from Sunni Muslim communities in Iraq and Syria over the course of the wars there in the past decade.

Instead, it is increasingly asserted, the IS is a creature of, and was established by, intelligence services such as the CIA or the Israeli Mossad. An extraordinarily large number of Arabs, Muslims and others appear to have taken refuge in these conspiracy theories. Call it Baghdadi Denial Syndrome.

The most outlandish version circulating online holds that IS leader and "caliph" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is, in fact, a Jewish actor named Elliot Shimon, or some such plausibly-Jewish name. Shimon, it's laughably alleged, was trained for a year by the Mossad in various skills, including theology and rhetoric.

Even some who don't embrace this detailed self-parody are still clinging to the notion that Baghdadi and the IS are, somehow, foreign impositions on the Sunni Muslim social and political landscape of Syria and Iraq. An astounding number and range of Arabs, in my own experience in recent weeks, embrace some version of a conspiracy theory holding that the IS and Baghdadi are not what they seem and are, in fact, the creations of Western or Israeli intelligence services.

In a way, this thinking reflects a positive impulse.

There is a desire to reject Baghdadi and the IS, and an unwillingness to accept the fact that

such vicious malefactors could actually have been organically produced by elements of Syrian and Iraqi society under extreme pressures.

Like Arab and Muslim 9/11 conspiracy theories, it begins with a disavowal — "that can't have had anything to do with any of us" — that, rather than producing serious introspection, gives way to denial through conspiracy theory and a terror of the truth.

And, indeed, the truth is terrifying.

For the reality is that Baghdadi and the IS are not the products of the CIA or the Mossad or anything like that. They have arisen, and gained power, in the heart of the Sunni Arab world. Accordingly, they cannot but be recognized as reflecting a profound crisis in the culture and hierarchies of moral and religious values that have taken root in parts of those societies.

Of course it's true that Baghdadi and the IS would not have arisen without the ill-conceived and disastrous American invasion and occupation of Iraq a decade ago. And they would not have swept to power but for the concerted policies of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Assad relies on the IS for defeating the Syrian opposition by making the IS appear more horrifying than himself, and has touted their role in the opposition at every stage. In Iraq, Maliki's outrageously sectarian and abusive policies created the space for the IS to operate successfully within Sunni communities — a space that probably wouldn't have existed had it not been for the course the Iraqi Prime Minister plotted.

And yet, while one cannot hold the entirety of Iraqi or Syrian Sunnis responsible for the IS and its depredations, one cannot exculpate these communities entirely either. Without significant public support the IS would not have been able to seize and control the amount of territory it has acquired in recent months.

If its message did not resonate, the group would not have grown so quickly. At the very least, Sunni tribes and other Sunni militias have stood aside while the IS has seized victory after victory in Iraq.

Whatever they thought they were accomplishing by either

supporting or not opposing the IS, they must bear some responsibility for its outrageous conduct.

Christians have been forced out of newly-acquired IS territories, apparently without any pushback from their Sunni Muslim neighbors. In some cases, there appears to be popular collaboration in this cleansing. The murderous assault on the Yazidi minority has also gone apparently unopposed on the ground.

Is it expecting too much to wonder why people are not standing up to these savages when they have the guns and many others don't? Perhaps.

But there don't appear to be any real signs that these communities are stricken, or even upset, by IS abuses against their neighbors.

As long as there is a way of blaming others — whether it's the CIA and/or the Mossad via conspiracy theories, or implicating the United States, Iran, Assad or Maliki by emphasizing the context of the IS rise, rather than the rise itself — the true meaning and impact of the Islamic State will be denied.

In fact, there is no way to look at the fact of the surge of these extremists without seriously questioning the cultural and moral health of the Arab Sunni Muslim communities in which they are operating and which they claim to represent. It cannot but be a manifestation of the most profound crisis.

And this spiritual and moral crisis cannot be analyzed until it is accepted as fact, and cannot be addressed until it is analyzed. So as long as many Sunni Arabs hide behind conspiracy theories or point the finger elsewhere, the real meaning of the horrifying IS phenomenon will remain unexamined, and a serious response aimed at correcting the social and cultural distortions that have produced it will be unattainable.

And, in turn, that will ensure that the pushback against the IS and similar fanatics is, at best, delayed or ineffective. The Islamic State itself should be delighted.


Nothing could be better calculated to facilitate a continuation of their string of successes than Baghdadi Denial Syndrome.

Hussein Ibish is a columnist at NOW and The National (UAE). He is also a senior fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine.

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'The dawn of a new era has begun': ISIS supporters hand out leaflets in London's Oxford Street encouraging people to move to newly proclaimed Islamic State

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2723703/The-dawn-new-era-begun-ISIS-supporters-hand-leaflets-Oxford-Street-encouraging-people-newly-proclaimed-Islamic-State.html#i-4b6a8e78bb8ed428>



ISIS supporters have been handing out leaflets to Oxford Street shoppers encouraging them to leave Britain for its new Islamic state.



The radicals stood in front of posters declaring 'the dawn of a new era has begun' in reference to the caliphate and their literature praised the 'sacrifices'

made in the Middle East.

Scotland Yard has said today it is investigating whether the men were breaking terror laws.



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Rules: The literature sets out how people should live their lives and encourages them to leave Britain for the caliphate



One Muslim woman who confronted the men, believed to be from Luton and linked to hate preachers Anjem Choudary and Omar Bakri, said she was racially abused.

Asmaa Al-kufaishi, tweeted: 'This group are promoting ISIS on Oxford Street. Racially abused us when we spoke out. They don't know Islam. 'Promoting death of innocent people, telling me to die because of my faith and race and insulting me is not Islamic behaviour.'

[A few days before – car demonstration in a London's tunnel](#)

Pictures of the men and their leaflets have spread across social media. The literature describes the 'glad tidings' that 'Muslims with the help of Allah have announced the re-establishment of the Khilafah (sic) and appointed an imam as a Khaleef (sic).'

It also sets out seven rules for supporters, including to

'obey' the leaders of ISIS, Sharia law, 'migrate' from the UK to the caliphate and 'expose lies' about the extremist group.



House in East London – When "Guardian" reporters approach the house they were threatened by those living in it that they will break their cameras.

Today, ISIS, which now styles itself simply Islamic State (IS), has become a powerful military force that now has control of an area larger than Great Britain.

Its extremists - which include hundreds of Britons - have carried out such acts of such extreme brutality that Al Qaeda has severed all links with them.

Three British militants call for others to join the fight in Iraq
The leafleting yesterday has led to calls for police action.

A Met spokesman said: 'The MPS has been made aware, via social media, of leaflets which reports state were being distributed in the Oxford Street area. We are assessing the content of the leaflets to establish whether any criminal offences have been committed'.

Ghaffar Hussain, managing director of the anti-extremism foundation Quilliam, said it is a 'clear breach of the law'.

'This is a very disturbing development but one that should not come as a surprise since we are aware that around 500 British nationals have joined up with ISIS already.'

'We need to have a zero tolerance policy towards ISIS supporters and recruiters in the UK.'



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EDITOR'S COMMENT: So far it was known that the British Lion was sleeping. It is evident now that it not only sleeping but also snoring... The critical question is if it is able to wake up from the sound of explosions!

Other sleepes around the globe...



Germany



Silvio K. threatens to attack targets in Germany



Kosovo – 40 suspects arrested for fighting with ISIL



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
Istanbul – ISIL T-shirts for sale



United States of America



New Jersey, USA



Denmark

58

Abdul-Malek @truthsMaster

SUPPORT FROM ROME!!

#حملة_المليار_مسلم_لنصرة_الدولة_الإسلامية
#AllEyesOnISIS >

[View translation](#)

Reply Retweet Favorite More

RETWEETS 3 FAVORITES 3

3.22 AM - 20 Jun 2014

Rome, Italy



Australia – Ocean supports ISIL



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Greece; Athens – 23 September 2012




ISIL 5-years Plan

ISIS Is Paying Attention To What Experts Are Saying About Them

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2014/08/isis-is-paying-attention-to-what.html>

The recent inaugural issue of Dabiq, ISIS's English-language propaganda magazine, included a typical assortment of jihadist imagery: black flags fluttering over stolen armored vehicles, graphic photos of dead enemies, and pages reveling in the group's assault on northern and western Iraq.

It also demonstrated that one of the world's most brutal terrorist groups isn't indifferent to what the western expert community has to say about them. On page 32, there's a picture of Douglas Ollivant, a



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THE ISLAMIC STATE
IN THE WORDS OF
THE ENEMY

Douglas A. Ollivant, former Director for Iraq at the US National Security Council, and Brian Fishman former Director of Research for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point – two American crusaders – wrote an article titled "The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" a short time before the Islamic State's liberation of Mosul as well as other important cities and towns in Iraq. Here are excerpts from the article.

“

"Out of the crucible of the Syrian civil war and the discontent in Iraq's Sunni regions, something new is emerging. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is no longer a state in name only. It is a physical, if extra-legal, reality on the ground. Unacknowledged by the world community, ISIS has carved a de facto state in the borderlands of Syria and Iraq. Stretching in a long ellipse roughly from al-Raqqah in Syria to Fallujah in Iraq (with many other non-contiguous "islands" of control in both Iraq and Syria), this former Al Qaeda affiliate holds territory, provides limited services, dispenses a form of justice (loosely defined), most definitely has an army and flies

former National Security Council official and Army officer and one of the planners of the "surge" strategy in Iraq, under the heading "The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy."

Next to the photo is a stylish block-quote of an article that Ollivant wrote with Brian Fishman of the New America Foundation this past May for War on the Rocks, in which he argues that ISIS is "no longer a state in name only" and in fact possesses most of the characteristics of a formal political entity (photo).

"Out of the crucible of the Syrian civil war and the discontent in Iraq's

Sunni regions, something new is emerging," Ollivant wrote in a section quoted in Dabiq. For ISIS, the propaganda message is clear: when decontextualized, Ollivant's analysis seems to validate ISIS's entire mission. What horrifies much of the world about ISIS — its brutality, narrow ideology, outsized ambition, and proven battlefield acumen — thus turns into a potential recruiting point.

As Ollivant explained to Business Insider, even descriptive analysis of the group's rise and nature can be easily warped into propaganda.

"Perversely, there's a level at which they're able to flip the fact that we take them seriously and show their followers that major American analysts actually do take them seriously," Ollivant said. Still, he admitted it was "kind of flattering" to see his work in a piece of ISIS propaganda. "Somebody's reading what we write," he joked.

The fact that ISIS cares what experts have to say about them — and that they're even paying attention in the first place — is another sign of how the organization differs from other jihadist groups.

"They obviously have a good intelligence organization," Ollivant says of ISIS. "They're looking at what's being said about them and what people are thinking."

Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS's forerunner organization, didn't produce propaganda with Dabiq's sophistication or professional-level quality. AQI was also notoriously uninterested in the effect its brutal tactics were having on the people they were effectively ruling over — Osama Bin Laden even believed that AQI's violence and heedlessness were damaging the global Al Qaeda brand.

ISIS is an incredibly violent organization, but it's invested a lot of effort in shaping its public image and in getting a sense of how the rest of the world views it.

This hasn't done anything to moderate ISIS. But it's allowed them to expand the scope of their messaging, and win over a small but vocal cadre of English-speaking supporters.

Ollivant isn't worried about being on the radar of one of the world's ascendant and truly innovative terrorist groups.

"I live in Washington, DC," he told Business Insider. "If ISIS ever comes to DC, I doubt I'm in their top ten."

Fighting terror and crime using intelligence visualization

Source:<http://i-hls.com/2014/08/fighting-terror-crime-using-intelligence-visualization/>

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Intelligence agencies generate massive amounts of information.

How can experts avoid getting flooded by the endless stream of data, and instead use it to their advantage? Intelligence agencies monitor and record all pieces of information – how is the gathered intelligence crafted into a useful tool that can be used by intelligence officers?

Espionage and counter-terrorism organizations all over the world connect their data mining and collection systems to every civilian communications infrastructure, including cellular,

landline and internet service providers, effectively acquiring the ability to intercept any phone call, location of cellular phones, SMS message contents, e-mails or surfing data.

The total amount of information is immense and constantly growing. All the information that's collected using signal intelligence systems, or SIGINT, in addition to large amounts of additional civilian information held by intelligence organizations, such as population registries, border crossings, banking transactions and more, is entered into massive databases that must support quick retrieval of large amounts of data.



Whether it's an emergency that requires immediate response or a methodical infiltration of a criminal organization, the amount of data collected during every incident is massive. For example, using various technological systems the daily routine of a lone terrorist or terrorist cells can be figured out, making them substantially easier to stop.


The daily routine of an individual can be deduced by analyzing his electronic habits, his phone calls, the e-mail he uses and the name and nature of the websites he visits. Electronic intelligence systems can intercept massive amounts of information, much more than any human being is capable of processing. That information has to be presented in a way that is clear and immediately understandable.

In order to present the large amounts of intercepted data regarding groups or individuals in a way that makes sense, and to help intelligence officers understand the information and use it effectively, the data

has to be presented in a graphical, visual way, rather than textual.

One of the most important means of deducing a suspect's routine and establishing his connection to an event is carried out using a "connections map".

(photo – left) The sum total of the suspect's communications with his various social circles (friends, co-workers, family, bosses, etc.) – incoming and outgoing cellular phone calls, text messages, calls using landlines, VOIP chats – are presented visually, with every line representing his entire communication history with a specific target. The width and direction of the line can teach us, among other things, how "strong" is his connection with a specific person, the direction




of their relationship (does the suspect receive reports or orders from that individual, or is it the other way around), and the timing and location of their communications.

In this way maps of connections between individuals or groups can be drawn, illustrating, for example, paths taken by orders and guidelines for carrying out terror attacks, quickly reaching the individual terrorist, the one who actually carries the bomb.

Another interesting – and just as important – way to display intelligence data aimed at assisting counter-terrorism or crime fighting efforts, is through GIS-based maps (photo).

Using layers, which can be enabled or disabled in order to hide or display important information to decision makers or forces in the field, a terrorist's movement route can be



represented, sometimes at extremely high resolutions capable of showing specific houses and vehicles. This can be done in real time and used to direct tactical units on their way to arrest or neutralize the terrorist. The layers can include topographic information, road images, demographic, intelligence and municipal information, and more.

New evidence of Erdogan's secret meeting with al-Qadi emerges

Source: http://www.todayszaman.com/national_new-evidence-of-erdogans-secret-meeting-with-al-qadi-emerges_355836.html



August 15, 2014, Friday/ 15:46:56/ TODAY'S ZAMAN / ANKARA

A number of new snapshots from a video surveillance camera were leaked on Friday in a Turkish daily, documenting secret meetings attended by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Yasin al-Qadi -- a Saudi businessman who is on the US Treasury Department's "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" (SDGT) list -- and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan.

The photos, published by the Karşı daily, were reportedly leaked from a corruption investigation which had been stifled since Dec. 25, 2013 by the Erdogan government. The meetings featured in the photos are alleged to have taken place on April 14, 2012, when, according to a Cabinet decision, al-Qadi was forbidden from entering Turkey. This was also before the UN had removed his name from its list of supporters of the terrorist al-Qaeda network. Karşı reports that the meeting took place in the Haliç Congress Center in Istanbul.

The new pictures depict al-Qadi entering the parking lot of the Congress center at 11:59 a.m. on April 14. After parking his car, al-Qadi enters the building. About two minutes later, Erdogan and Fidan, the chief of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), entered the parking lot with their protection teams.

The security cameras inside the Congress Center recorded al-Qadi entering a meeting room in the building at 12:01 p.m., followed by Erdogan at 12:03 p.m. Fidan did not participate in the 51-minute-long meeting. According to security tapes, al-Qadi leaves the room at 12:54 p.m.

After al-Qadi left the room, Fidan was seen entering the room at 2:56 p.m. The meeting between Erdoğan and Fidan lasted about 10 minutes. Fidan leaves the room at 3:06 p.m. Al-Qadi was the first one to leave the building, followed by Fidan and later by Erdoğan.

Karşı did not report on the content of the meetings and it is not known whether the investigation file contains any information as to what the three men talked about.

In an earlier article, the daily extensively reported on the network al-Qadi established in Turkey and its unhindered access to key leaders in Erdoğan's government.

According to the investigation files, the daily reported, al-Qadi's representative Usama Qutb called Erdoğan's executive assistant Hasan Doğan on April 2. Qutb, the nephew of Sayyid Qutb, a founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, told Doğan that his "elder brother" wants to discuss something with the prime minister. Doğan returned the call a day later and the meeting was arranged.

Al-Qadi arrived in İstanbul on April 14 and headed directly to the Haliç Congress Center. The probe details allegedly demonstrate that al-Qadi was picked up by Erdoğan's guards at the airport and was escorted into Turkish territory without even going through passport control.

According to the daily, this wasn't the only meeting between Erdoğan and al-Qadi. There have been 13 alleged meetings, some of which were also attended by businessman Mustafa Latif Topbaş, whose name is also included in investigation files concerning the Urla villas scandal, and Bilal Erdoğan, the prime minister's son.

Erdoğan received al-Qadi in Ankara on June 25, 2012, for a meeting at which Fidan and Qutb were also present. After six days, on July 1, the prime minister had another meeting with al-Qadi in Topbaş's

house in İstanbul, who also attended the meeting. On July 12, 2012, Erdoğan met with al-Qadi at the same place, accompanied by Bilal Erdoğan.

[Another secret meeting – June 2013...](#)



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Topbaş hosted Erdoğan and al-Qadi one more time, on Sept. 22, this time with Muaz Kadioğlu, al-Qadi's son. Exactly a week later, Erdoğan and al-Qadi gathered in Ankara with Fidan and Khaled Meshaal, the long-exiled Hamas leader.

On Oct. 11, 2012, six days after his name was removed from

the UN blacklist, al-Qadi was invited to Erdoğan's office in Dolmabahçe Palace in İstanbul. Three days after this they were together again, this time with Topbaş.

On Oct. 22, Erdoğan and al-Qadi met yet again in İstanbul, along with Erdoğan's adviser Sefer Turan, who was appointed as an envoy to improve relations with Egypt.

The prime minister met with al-Qadi on March 18, March 30 and May 11, 2013 in İstanbul. Their last meeting, according to the information Karşı obtained from the leaked investigation files, took place in Erdoğan's official residence in İstanbul on Oct. 9. In this meeting, the two were accompanied by Fidan, Qutb, Bilal Erdoğan and Abdülkerim Çay, the general manager of the construction company Bosphorus 360. The investigation files allege that Çay was involved in a plot to rig the acquisition of the valuable Etiler Police Academy land in İstanbul

EDITOR'S COMMENT: And we – the naïve populace – believe that one day extraterrestrial jihadists decided to take over the land of their ancestors...How stupid they think we are???

Western intervention over Isis won't prevent the break-up of Iraq

By Paddy Ashdown

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/14/western-intervention-isis-iraq-muslim>

Three years ago, when the world obsessed about President Assad, some of us warned that Syria was only one frontline in a wider sectarian war between Sunni and Shia; that the spread of militant jihadism among the Sunni community, funded by Saudi Arabia and

Qatar, was a preparation for this. And that before long this movement, like the 30 years' religious war of 17th-century Europe, would threaten to engulf the entire Muslim world.

This is the true context in which the Isis terror in the Middle East must be seen. It is why we need to understand that, though the world watches Iraq today, just as it did Syria yesterday, the actual war being fought is a regional one, with potential to spread across Islam worldwide. It is not an accident that

many Isis fighters are foreigners – many of them not even Arabs. Or that they use the most modern global communications to evangelise their medieval horrors.



Illustration by Satoshi Kambayashi

Of course, seeing the humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq – for which the UN has just declared its highest state of emergency – something must be done. But then we said the same

about the slaughter in the now forgotten suburbs of Damascus. What we need now is not just a plan for a tragedy, but a strategy for a widening war.

What is happening in the Middle East, like it or not, is the wholesale rewriting of the Sykes-Picot borders of 1916, in favour of an Arab world whose shapes will be arbitrated more by religious dividing lines than



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the old imperial conveniences of 100 years ago.

For as long as western policymakers deny, even tacitly, that this is the most likely outcome of present events, so they will fail to find solutions to the Middle Eastern conundrums that confront us. And so we come to the case of the beleaguered Kurds, and the Yazidis on Mount Sinjar. And so, we drop humanitarian aid.

But then what? We did the same in Srebrenica in 1995. It worked well enough for a few days. But in the absence of a credible western policy in Bosnia, it only gave space for mass murder later. **So what credible policies are available to us in Iraq?**

There are three. The **first** is an all-out, long-term western military engagement to defeat Isis and save Baghdad. This is favoured by some who have not yet learned the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a few superannuated generals seeking more spending on defence. It is by far the least practical and most unwise option open to us. Western populations would not support it, and we no longer have the military means to do it.

The **second** is to help the Iraqi state to defeat Isis itself. This seems to be current western policy. But I fear it amounts to little more than elevating desperate hope over reasonable expectation. It was the collapse of the Iraqi army that gave Isis the advanced American weapons they now use to drive back the Kurds. And it has been the subsequent absence of any effective government in Baghdad that has allowed the jihadists to continue widening their advance on all fronts.

The Potemkin reconstruction of the Iraqi government in the last few days is unlikely to alter a fundamental truth: the Iraqi state is not, and is unlikely to become, an effective instrument for a western-backed attempt to tackle the Isis insurrection. Unless of course Iran too gets directly involved. But that would inevitably lead to the creation of a de facto greater Iran extending into Iraq, and to a further widening of the sectarian faultlines. This may not be avoidable – but should we be encouraging it?

The **third** option is to help the Kurds by all means possible – assistance to house the Yazidis, equipment, military training, advice, protective air strikes – anything short of current operational boots on the ground. The aim would be to make Iraqi Kurdistan the northern bulwark against the Isis advance. The government seems at last to be tiptoeing in this direction – but why so half-hearted? It's a strange scruple that flies in other people's weapons but denies access to our own. Is there a difference?

But there are downsides here too – big ones. Whether intentionally or not, we will end up acting as handmaiden to Kurdish ambitions for full independence – and in so doing, effectively assist in the dismemberment of Iraq. **Part of the deal with the Kurds would have to be an end to interference in Turkey,** which has its own problems with Kurdish secessionism. We would also be tacitly accepting the end of the Sykes-Picot borders in the Middle East.

So this will only work if it is not just a short-term plan, but part of an integrated long-term strategy: a new rapprochement with Iran to act as a counter-balance to those who promote Sunni jihadism; deeper engagement with Turkey; **greater pressure on those Gulf states that fund jihad** (is the government's reluctance here because of Tory friends among the Gulf states?); and a **new determination to deal with illegal Israeli settlements, as a prelude to a lasting peace in Palestine.**

None of this will be easy, of course. But better, surely, to face up to the realities of the post-Sykes-Picot Middle East and influence it where we can, than lose the moment standing impotently by, hoping that yesterday will come back again

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Paddy Ashdown was high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2002 until January 2007. He is UNICEF UK president.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Quite objective approach of the problem and its future management. But also a good opportunity to highlight the (constant) UK's support to Turkey – most probably author haven't read the article on Erdogan's 13 meetings with a wanted ISIS terrorist and to choose con-Israel site regarding the settlements (as if this is the main problem in the long regional dispute). And of course the inherent belief that the overall IS problem will be confined within Muslim world technically/intentionally forgetting the progressing Muslimization of his own country. Perhaps this is part of the big powers' way of doing things and if they do not work out well a simple "sorry" is what victims are taking back.

Muslims demand breakaway Islamic nation in Norway or another 9/11 threatened

August 19, 2012

Source: <http://www.examiner.com/article/muslims-demand-breakaway-islamic-nation-norway-or-another-9-11-threatened>

"We do not wish to live together with dirty beasts like you..."

The Norwegian news portal VG Nett is reporting that a Muslim terrorist group, *Ansar al-Sunna'*, is threatening that if a section of the nation's capitol isn't transformed into a sharia-compliant Muslim nation, an attack rivaling 9/11 will be launched upon the Scandinavian nation.



VG Nett has stated that the Norwegian Police Security Service (*Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste - PST*) is already familiar with many members of this particular terror group.



As translated by Michael Laudahn,

"If norwegian soldiers can take planes to Afghanistan, then Osama and Mohammed can also take planes to Norway, inshaAllah.

Now, the government must wake up and assume responsibility, before this war spreads to Norway. Before the counterpart reacts. Before moslems take the step necessary.

Do not confuse the moslems' silence with weakness. Do not profit from the moslems' patience. Do not force us to do something that can be avoided. This is not a threat, only the words of truth. The words of justice.

A warning that the consequences can be fatal. A warning about a 9/11 on norwegian ground, or larger attacks than the one carried out on 22 july. This is for your own good and in your own best interest.'

We do not want to be a part of norwegian society. And we do not consider it necessary either to move away from Norway, because we were born and grew up here. And Allah's earth belongs to everybody.

But let Grønland become ours. Bar this city quarter and let us control it the way we wish to do it. This is the best for both parts.

We do not wish to live together with dirty beasts like you."

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Dag Sunde · Software Architect at Doorway AS

This is sooo sad!

Almost ALL the responses to this article is on par with the treath in the article, so most of you are their equal.

This article describe a treath that is almost funny, as seen with Norwegian eyes. We are a small nation with approx. 5 million people, and this threath is put forth by a group of angry adolescent boys that counts maybe 20-30 people. The largest group of immigrants in Norway are from Sweden (not a particularly scary group), the second largest is Polish construction workers.

Most of the Imams and Muslim leaders in Norway preaches integration an peace on a daily basis.

Norway is like this Because we do not base our daily desicions on an "eye for an eye" philosophy, but thru communication.

We are (in your eyes) so God Damn Left Wing that we have free health care for everyone, free education up to university level for everyone, almost no pollution problems, no need to follow your kids to school because its safe here, one of the worlds lowest crime rates, an Unarmed police force! All that, and no need for insurances, except for your private house and cars.

In addition, the way the Norwegian society works, its more in accordance with what the Quran puts forth than ANY muslim state in the world. And Norways muslims KNOW this! So such a small group of angry boys will be put down by their own.

Thank you for your attention! :-)

Form an exasperated Norwegian.

Reply · Like · 25 · August 14 at 5:35am

EDITOR'S COMMENT:

This is a 2012 article. What is the real threat to Norway is the attitude of its citizens as described in one of the comments – see below. I was not aware that Norwegians apart their love for nature, also love surprises!

Islamic State 'Slowly Spreading Terror Influence to China'

By Aaron Akinyemi

Source: <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-crisis-islamic-state-slowly-spreading-terror-influence-china-1461384>

August 16 – **Jihadist group Islamic State (previously known as Isis) is spreading its influence to China, through the country's embattled Muslim Uighur minority, according to reports.**



him to several
China's role in
country's

Abdul Maulana Aziz, the radical spiritual leader of Pakistan's pro-Taliban Las Masjid, or Red Mosque, has declared his support for Isis, Counter Punch reported. Uighur students accused by the Chinese government of terrorism have reportedly forged close links with the mosque, and its followers have been accused of targeting Chinese sex workers as part of a purification campaign.

During the Pakistani government's siege of the Red Mosque in 2007, radical Islamists retaliated against Chinese in other parts of the country. The attacks prompted concern from the Chinese government, which demanded that the-then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf intervene.

Musharraf subsequently sent troops personally loyal to the mosque, resulting in a bloody conflict that led to deaths.

the siege stoked Aziz's resentment against the communist government and observers fear that in retaliation, the Islamist extremist could facilitate the training and infiltration of radical Uighurs into China's disputed Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

The Pakistani Taliban is also reportedly willing to nurture links with Uighur and Uzbek fighters, posing further risk to the spread of Islamic terrorism in China.

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Islamic State Leader Calls for 'Revenge' on China

Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi gave a speech in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul last month, in which he said Muslims' rights were being "forcibly seized in China" and several other countries.

"Your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue and are anticipating your brigades," Al-Baghdadi told followers.

"It is enough for you to just look at the scenes that have reached you from Central Africa and from Burma. What is hidden from us is far worse. So by Allah, we will take revenge! By Allah, we will take revenge!"

China, which has been battling its own separatist insurgency waged by Uighurs in Xinjiang for decades, has become increasingly alarmed by the prospect of foreign Islamist groups infiltrating the region.

Chinese special envoy Wu Sike recently met with the-then Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to guarantee support for its anti-terror measures.

"Solving the conflicts in Iraq and Syria will benefit China and the entire world," he said.

Professor Xiao Xian, of the Institute of International Studies at Yunnan University, told *The Global Times*: "Wu's speech shows that China is paying close attention to the Middle East situation and is fully aware of the grim influence the recent upsurge of violence in Syria and Iraq has cast on global terrorism activities, including terror attacks in Xinjiang."

Last month, the Islamic State released a map outlining the territories it plans to conquer within the next five years. The scope of its intended caliphate spans from Morocco and Spain to Sri Lanka and the border of China.

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CNN International and The World Bank's Affiliated Network for Social Accountability-Africa, among others. He has worked as a radio producer for the BBC World Service and as a television producer on BBC 2's long-running flagship news and current affairs programme Newsnight.

Islamic State: "We Will Take Spain Back"

By Soeren Kern

Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4616/islamic-state-spain>

Calls to reconquer al-Andalus are becoming more frequent and more strident.

"Clearly Spain forms part of the strategic objectives of global jihad. We are not the only ones but we are in their sights." — Spanish Interior Minister Jorge Fernández Díaz.

Radical Muslims in Spain have launched a social media campaign aimed at generating

such as, "We are all the Islamic State" and "Long Live the Islamic State."

One poster includes an image of the medieval Islamic Aljafería Palace in the Spanish city of Zaragoza and the black flag associated with the IS. Another uses an image of the famous La Concha beach in the Basque city of San Sebastián. Yet another includes an image of



abubasir alkhalidiye

@abubasirkhalid



[Follow](#)

@alwahsh1983 Support from Andalus means when we come to #spain won't be hard to take it back

[Reply](#) [Retweet](#) [Favorite](#) [More](#)



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support for the jihadist group Islamic State [IS]. The campaign involves posters that include images of famous Spanish landmarks and monuments emblazoned with Arabic slogans

the statue of Jesus Christ on Monte Urgull in San Sebastián, with the Arabic words "Al-Andalus



Country" instead of "Basque Country." Al-Andalus is the Arabic name given to those parts of Spain, Portugal and France that were occupied by Muslim conquerors (also known as the Moors) from 711 to 1492. As the Basque Country is surrounded by mountains, however, the Moors never succeeded in

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ



occupying

it. The poster

campaign comes

after IS jihadis

produced a [video](#) in which they vow to liberate al-Andalus from non-Muslims and make it part of their new Islamic Caliphate.

The video shows a jihadist speaking in Spanish with a heavy North African accent. He says:

"I say to the entire world as a warning: We are living under the Islamic flag, the Islamic caliphate. We will die for it until we liberate those occupied lands, from Jakarta to Andalusia. And I declare: Spain is the land of our forefathers and we are going to take it back with the power of Allah."

Radical Muslims (and many moderate Muslims) believe that all territories Muslims lost during the Christian Reconquista of Spain still belong to the realm of Islam. They claim that Islamic law gives them the right to return there and re-establish Muslim rule.

In recent years, the return of "occupied" Al-Andalus to the fold of Islam has become an obsession for Muslims of all stripes, and calls to reconquer al-Andalus have become more frequent and more strident.

Commenting on the latest video, Spain's Secretary of State for Security, Francisco Martínez, said Spanish police were remaining "vigilant" in the face of a "grave" jihadist threat. Meanwhile, Moroccan authorities have warned Spanish police that some of the more than 3,000 Moroccan jihadis fighting in Syria and Iraq are beginning to return home, and that many of them are likely to attempt to infiltrate

the Spanish mainland via the North African Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

The Moroccan Interior Minister, Mohamed Hassad, recently identified 1,221 Moroccan citizens who have joined jihadists groups in Syria and Iraq, as well as another 2,000 ethnic Moroccans who are citizens of other countries, including Spain.

Spanish and Moroccan counter-terrorism forces have stepped-up efforts to break up jihadist cells that have been proliferating in both countries.

On August 14, nine members of a recruitment cell for the IS were arrested in northern Morocco, not far from the North African Spanish exclave of Ceuta.

The arrests were made in the Moroccan cities of Fez, Tétouan and Fnideq, in what the Spanish Interior Ministry said was a joint intelligence operation between Moroccan and Spanish counter-terrorism police.

All the detainees are Moroccan citizens, several of whom made repeated trips to Ceuta to recruit jihadis and raise financial support for the IS.

"The jihadis recruited by the cell received instruction in weapons handling, assembly and placement of explosive devices and car theft, in order to participate in suicide terrorist attacks or to fight in conflict zones," a statement by the Spanish Interior Ministry reported.

Some of those recruited by the cell are believed to have participated in beheadings in Syria and Iraq. Police say they are also examining computers and data storage devices to determine if there were plans to carry out a terror attack on Moroccan soil.

On August 4, a 19-year-old Spanish woman and a 14-year-old Spanish girl were arrested in Melilla just days before they were due to join the jihad in Syria. They are first Spanish females to be prevented from becoming jihadis.

"Both were trying to cross the border to Morocco with the aim of contacting the network that would move them immediately to a conflict zone between Syria and Iraq," the Spanish Interior Ministry said in a statement.

The 19-year-old was released after surrendering her passport. The 14-year-old—who police say appeared "completely convinced" that she was doing the right thing by becoming a jihadist—is currently being held in a juvenile detention

center where she has no access to the Internet. The girl's parents said she had recently become radicalized after spending time perusing jihadist websites.

In June, Spanish police in Madrid arrested ten individuals (eight Moroccans, one Argentine and one Bulgarian) on allegations that they were members of an international network that recruited jihadists for the IS.

The ringleader was a 47-year-old Moroccan national named Lahcen Ikassrien, who was arrested in Afghanistan in 2001, and released after three-and-a-half years in Guantánamo. In



July 2005, the U.S. government handed him over to Spain, where he faced charges of cooperating with al-Qaeda. In October 2006, the Spanish High Court acquitted him on the grounds that no firm evidence existed of his ties to the terrorist group.

Ikassrien, who lives in Madrid, was part of a cell led by Abu Dahdah, a Syrian-born Spaniard sentenced to a 27-year prison term in Spain for his part in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and for being one of the founders of al-Qaeda in Spain. In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court reduced the Abu Dahdah's penalty to 12 years because it said that his participation in the 9/11 conspiracy was not proven. He was released in May 2013.

In May, Spanish police broke up a cell in Melilla that allegedly recruited 26 jihadists (24 Moroccans and 2 Spaniards) for al-Qaeda groups fighting in Libya and Mali. All six

members of the cell are Spanish citizens. One of them, Benissa Laghmouchi Baghdadi, is the first Spanish jihadist known to have returned from the fighting in Mali. Police say the cell used social media platforms such as "Sharia4Spain" to recruit jihadists.

In March, police in Spain and Morocco arrested seven suspected jihadists who belonged to cell operating in the southern Spanish city of Málaga. Four of the suspects were arrested in Spain and the other three in Morocco. Spanish officials said the cell was one of the largest of its kind in Europe and responsible for recruiting

more jihadists than any other network discovered in Spain so far.

The suspected ringleader of the cell is a wheelchair-bound Spanish convert to Islam named Mustafa Maya Amaya. Maya, 51, was born in Brussels after his Spanish parents moved to Belgium in the 1960s to look for work there. After converting to Islam, he changed his given name from Rafael to Mustafa.

Police say Maya—who maintained close ties to jihadist cells in Belgium, France, Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Syria—is suspected of recruiting dozens of volunteer jihadists on the Internet and, after a careful selection process, sending them to join terrorist organizations in the Middle East and North Africa.

The sting operation was conducted on March 14, just three days after Spain marked the 10th anniversary of the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people and wounded nearly 2,000. Since then, more than 470 suspected Islamic extremists have been arrested in Spain, according to Spanish Interior Minister Jorge Fernández Díaz.

"Clearly Spain forms part of the strategic objectives of global jihad," Fernández Díaz said on the eve of the anniversary. "We are not the only ones but we are in their sights."

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Can the U.S. out-tweet the terrorists?

Source: <http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/sunday-commentary/20140815-out-tweeting-the-terrorists.ece>

The skirmish began like so many others: with a tweet. On June 26, a Twitter user with the handle @AboudouAbdallah, who identifies himself as living in Morocco and supporting the terrorist group Islamic State, tweeted the following remark: "I just want to remind you ... never forget what happens to your 'soldiers' in #Fallujah #Iraq #CalamityWillBefallUS." Attached to the tweet was a photo of the burned body of a Blackwater contractor hanging from a bridge. Abdallah has 535 followers, and the message accrued only two retweets and three favorites, but someone from the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, a division of the State Department, picked up on it.



Michael Hogue/Staff Artist

The center then posted the following reply from @ThinkAgain_DOS, its English language-Twitter account: "@AboudouAbdallah I want to remind you what happens to terrorists who target us #CalamityWillBefallUS." Attached to this tweet was a low-resolution photo of Osama bin Laden in his loungewear, watching television in his Abbottabad compound. Stamped on the photo, in text that for some reason alternates between black and purple,

was a warning: "Would you throw away your life for those who hide far away?"

Not much about the State Department's tweet made sense. Why use such a poor quality photo? Why did it repeat Abdallah's hashtag, which was a threat toward the United States? And what gives with the black-and-purple font, which looks better suited for a placard scrawled by a high school kid running for class president?

But it was too late to debate aesthetics. The battle was on. A user with the handle @alisalehi1292 chimed in with a simple message: "Sh. Osama=2 USSR=0 USA=0," the putative score in the war between superpowers and the late bin Laden. @alisalehi1292 added that the mujahedeen will go to heaven, "while your rapists and torturers live a cursed life [PTSD] and then are thrown in hell." Responding earnestly, @ThinkAgain_DOS asked, "why do u wish to reward those who murder innocents?" and linked to an article showing that al-Qaeda's attacks in Iraq have mostly killed civilians. Again, the State Department staffer invoked the #CalamityWillBefallUS hashtag.

The American effort appeared to amuse some of the Islamist tweeps who were engaged in the battle. "Your boss is going to fire you soon if these tweets don't improve," joked someone named Abu Ottoman.

This exchange wasn't accidental or uncommon. It's part of a State Department program to change how the United States deals with extremist communications online. For years, the government vacillated over how to respond to al-Qaeda's online broadcasts, from its martyrdom videos to Inspire, the terrorist group's slick English-language digital magazine. Fighting back was considered beneath the office — we don't negotiate with terrorists and all that.

Under the George W. Bush administration, the government also believed it was fighting such a vast, communist-like ideological threat that there were simply too many jihadis to try to dissuade them one by one on social media. The better approach, the previous administration thought, was to campaign broadly

for freedom. "For the longest time, there was total resistance in the State Department to badmouthing al-Qaeda — as a job that the State Department should be engaged in — and that the real solution should be to sell America, to tell America's story," says Will McCants, who helped set up the CSCC when he served as a senior adviser for countering violent extremism at the State Department.

That has changed under Bush's successor, Barack Obama, who took a much narrower view of terrorism, confining his focus to al-Qaeda and seeking to make it less a war than a law-enforcement and intelligence problem. Under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the State Department began to pursue a policy of what she called "21st-century statecraft," a broad designation that included anything from using social media to speak directly to people in the developing world to helping foreign dissidents set up secure communications networks.

Now, the government is trying to go on offense, challenging terrorist propaganda all across the new digital battleground and seeking to wean would-be terrorists from the cause, recruit by recruit, using the hashtag #ThinkAgainTurnAway. The CSCC wants to "contest the space" that, in the words of State Department senior official Alberto Fernandez, who oversees the program, "had previously been conceded to the enemy."

In practice, this means that the center, with its \$5 million budget, verbally jousts with jihadists on social media all day long. Not a bad idea, according to experts like McCants. The problem is that it appears to be losing — at least when it comes to showing the quick thinking and verbal dexterity that so characterizes the big winners in the social-media universe. In an arena in which people are largely inured to the frequent intrusions of advertising, the center is conducting itself like it's the only propaganda operation in town.

The way the program works is fairly simple: The State Department's analysts follow online chatter about the latest ISIL victory or news of a recent al-Shabaab massacre in Kenya, and then they try to insert themselves into the conversation. The idea is less to sway committed terrorists than to persuade fence-sitters not to join up or provide material support.

But State's messages usually arrive with all the grace of someone's dad showing up at a

college party. The posts tend to be blunt, adversarial and plagued by poor Photoshop work. Typically, "Think Again Turn Away," as the CSCC's English-language Twitter account calls itself, delivers hectoring messages written in the schoolmarmish tone of Reagan-era "Just Say No" commercials — only this time it is terrorism, not drugs, they're trying to scare everyone away from.

And because the government's tweeting is so flat and self-serious, few people — even those most sympathetic to its messaging — are motivated to share the CSCC's posts. As anyone bidding for attention on social media knows, that's a serious problem.

Islamic State supporters, by contrast, can be playful and droll, though sometimes the humor is exceedingly macabre and only appeals to a certain sensibility. Many of the photos being circulated — such as one of a dead Shiite man floating in a body of water, alongside a joke about him being taught to scuba dive — are horrific, but they also make for popular jihadist memes. (That particular picture was retweeted nine times and favorited 15.)

The plain fact is that, for now, groups like the Islamic State are far more sophisticated than the State Department in their messaging.

The rise of social media has transformed how jihadist propaganda is disseminated, news is spread and recruits are gathered. Extremist groups have proved themselves to be rather adept at utilizing new forms of digital communication. Knowing that Western intelligence agencies are likely watching, the Islamic State and its sympathizers have taken to hopscotching among various social networks, using each for different tasks: Twitter and YouTube for propagandizing and making initial contacts; Ask.fm for establishing a closer rapport; and private messaging apps like Kik and Surespot for disseminating instructions about how to find an Islamic State-associated imam, or where to cross the porous Turkey-Syria border.

At the same time, open-source intelligence — the gathering of intelligence from public forums — has become an essential tool for analyzing the opinions of large populations, tracking terrorist activities and seeing how radicalization plays out online. Yet despite this glut of new information sources, there had been reluctance about using the



State Department as a bully pulpit until fairly recently.

In the past, the American government preferred to respond to jihadist activity online with covert means — monitoring chatrooms, shutting down password-protected forums or making them difficult to access. Sometimes intelligence analysts would let members of a jihadist forum know that they were watching. “It’s like inserting an informant into a prison to sow distrust,” says William Braniff, the executive director of START, a terrorism research center at the University of Maryland. “People no longer trust their cellmate.”

But those efforts also had the effect of making forums “much less vibrant places,” Braniff says. Jihadists began to retreat from communicating in spaces where they once felt they could speak freely, and intelligence gathering suffered.

With the enthusiastic support of Hillary Clinton, the Obama administration started up the CSCC effort in 2011. Over the next year, using images, videos and text and communicating in Urdu, Somali, Punjabi and Arabic, the center’s 50-member team began posting on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and other social networks, always identifying themselves as part of the U.S. government. There would be nothing covert about this effort. In a December 2013 speech, Fernandez said that this collective output had amounted to “18,000 engagements” to date.

More recently, with ISIL and other al-Qaeda splinter groups popping up in different places, and attracting new adherents from Western Europe and other English-speaking populations, the U.S. government has had to step up its English-language efforts. Last month, the State Department awarded a contract worth about \$575,000 to JTG Inc., a small, privately held company based in Vienna, Va., to expand its English-language offerings. The contract calls for a campaign manager as well as writer-analysts designers, and multimedia specialists — six employees in total who will work out of Foggy Bottom. It’s the second CSCC-related contract for JTG, whose previous work includes a \$4.7 million deal to produce curricula for the Defense Language Institute. (Both the State Department and JTG declined to comment for this story.)

Although the State Department program operates in a technological milieu defined by precise metrics, data analysis and finely honed

targeting procedures, it’s difficult to say exactly what its effect has been — whether any Islamic State sympathizers have been turned away. As of last week, the @ThinkAgain_DOS Twitter account had more than 3,500 followers, but the State Department hasn’t released any information indicating that the program has been a success and instead has relied on the argument that terrorists have had the run of the Internet, so something should be done about it. That sets up a thorny challenge. As Rep. Brad Sherman put it to Ambassador Fernandez in a congressional hearing, “Are you so sure that you’re going to be able to out-debate them?”

Defenders of the program, not least CSCC’s first director, Richard LeBaron, sound more than a little defensive when the question comes up. “So you do nothing? So you don’t try? You don’t experiment? You don’t spend a small amount of money?” said LeBaron, who is now retired from the State Department. “This organization probably costs less than one drone every year. Probably considerably less.

... And to tell me that that is a waste of money is just utter [expletive]. That’s a good use of money. That’s an ideal use of money — experiment and learn, so that you don’t have to use the drones.”

In the end, I decided to ask some of the people the CSCC was targeting what they thought. As extremist sympathizers who seemingly hadn’t yet joined the fight, these were precisely the audience that “Think Again” would hope to convert. Maybe they had some suggestions.

One of them was Abu Ottoman, the tweep who told the writer behind @ThinkAgain_DOS that he’d be fired if he didn’t improve his tweeting. Abu Ottoman seems to love battling “Think Again Turn Away” on Twitter, repeatedly mocking the State team’s efforts. (“John Kerry must very disappointed,” he taunted the CSCC in another message.) He’s also expert at needling CSCC staffers about their use of Muslim terminology.

After @ThinkAgain_DOS referenced the Quran in one tweet, Abu Ottoman responded, “Who knew that the US State Dep had so many Quranic scholars. And making takfir?#TheManyTheologiansOfWashington” — the joke being that anonymous State Department employees have taken it upon themselves to say that members of the Islamic State, by killing fellow Muslims, are betraying the faith.



If Abu Ottoman weren't extolling jihad and railing against Jews much of the time, I'd say that he's actually quite funny. Over a series of direct messages on Twitter, I asked him what he thought of the State Department's public outreach. (Abu Ottoman declined to share much about his background, but he writes English with the facility of a native speaker.)

"If somebody thinks again or turns away, it won't be from their ham-fisted trolling," says Abu Ottoman. "The most potentially effective part of that account is it can possibly make some brothers slightly nervous when the U.S. State Department singles them out and calls them 'terrorists' just for sharing an opinion. It's like the evil eye of focusing on you. Haha. They're trying to scare people into silence."

Abu Khalid, who identifies as an Islamic State supporter living in the West, says, "They will

Of course, many people, not least of them the staffers behind "Think Again Turn Away," would reply that these are merely twisted semantics. Most Muslims do consider Shiites to be fellow Muslims. And whatever name you call it, a ruined shrine still represents the wrecked hulk of something that once held dear religious and cultural value. ISIL's claim that it's not killing Muslims only remains true when seen through the blinkered prism of strict Salafist ideology. It's not that the "Think Again Turn Away" people have the wrong message; clearly they have a point to make. The issue is how they're delivering it. The Islamic State, which also has an English-language magazine called **Dabiq**, is already far ahead of Western governments in how it engages with its followers and enemies alike.

The terrorist group has popularized its own

app, available on the web and for Android phones, called **The Dawn of Glad Tidings**. (photo) Islamic State supporters can connect to the app, which asks for authorization to post to users' Twitter accounts. These users are still free to post on their own, but



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never change anybody — rather they are only enraging people who support groups" such as the Islamic State.

When I pointed out that, compared with the CSCC and its clunky graphic design, the Islamic State — also known as ISIL and ISIS — is considered quite skilled at social media, Abu Khalid tried to explain why.

"ISIS social media actually show the good they've done whether it is food distributions or developing state institutions," he says. He also pointed out some inconsistencies in the CSCC's language and arguments. In one instance, he noted, the State Department tweeted a photo of a bombed-out Shia shrine, but referred to it as a mosque. "Think Again Turn Away" excoriates the Islamic State for "killing Muslims," Abu Khalid says, but "in fact, we don't and many Sunnis don't view Shias as Muslims."

the app allows the Islamic State to send out coordinated tweets across hundreds or even thousands of supporters' accounts. That lets them spread messages quickly and widely — including announcements of recent victories — and try to get their own hashtags trending. Perhaps most important, it allows supporters to feel as if they are more closely tied to the organization.

The CSCC hasn't seemed able to find a way into the perspective of the youthful fundamentalist who still has one foot in Western digital culture. As a consequence, the two sides can appear to be talking past one another, as they sometimes use the same language for vastly different ends.

When @MuhamjurSumalee, the handle of a jihadist who goes by the name Abu Usamah, tweets a photo with the caption, "Extremist

ISIS soldier Abu Usamah radicalizing innocent Syrian children," he's doing so out of admiration and pride. He's also being knowing and sarcastic in a way the CSCC would never be.

Still, there may be hope for the program if State can get its tone and messaging right. When the Islamic State decided to declare itself a "caliphate" ruled by a little-known militant, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the new leader's followers found themselves fending off critiques that, during his dramatic public debut in a Mosul mosque, he was wearing an expensive watch — a sign, perhaps, of corruption or immodesty. "Is #ISIS warlord Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wearing a Rolex or an 'Islamic watch?'" CNN tweeted, linking to a lengthy article devoted to the question.

The whole thing was rather silly and petty, especially given the surrounding bloodshed. But this brief tour through the outrage cycle reflects a common feature of digitally mediated

politics, where every gesture is recorded and analyzed and hypocrisy is among the greatest sins.

In the case of the State Department team, this might have been a good time to get a bit sarcastic about the new caliph's material habits: Suddenly, Baghdadi's supplicants weren't talking about a mythical man. Abu Ottoman, for instance, tweeted a defense that, if it weren't absurd to be debating a mass murderer's choice of timepiece, would almost seem sweet and pitiful: "A good watch is an essential navigational instrument as well as many other things. Astronauts wear expensive Swiss watches even."

These are the kinds of cleavages that the State Department might leverage — both the petty political skirmishes and the larger debates over doctrine, authority and massacres of fellow Muslims. But if they are to succeed, they'll have to move beyond the "Just Say No to Terrorism" approach to social media.

Jacob Silverman's book, "Terms of Service: Social Media, Surveillance, and the Price of Constant Connection," will be published next year.

Aussie government to cut off unemployment, welfare benefits to terror supporters

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/seeworld20140818-aussie-government-to-cut-off-unemployment-welfare-benefits-to-terror-supporters>



The Australian government has proposed new legislation which would see the unemployment benefits and other welfare payments of Australian terror supporters cut off. Prime Minister Tony Abbott said the legislation would allow the Department of Human Services to cancel benefits to those assessed as a serious threat to national security. Under current arrangements, welfare payments could only be suspended or cancelled for Australian who did not meet social security eligibility rules, which include failing to fulfil participation, residence or portability qualifications. The government has already cut benefits to those abroad, but not extremists in Australia who continue to meet eligibility requirements.

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Helping the PKK fight ISIS would violate U.S. law

Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2014/0815/Are-the-US-France-and-UK-lining-up-to-support-the-terrorist-PKK-in-Iraq>

Fighters from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) have been in the middle of the battle in Iraq against ISIS militants, who now hold significant chunks of territory in northern Iraq and in Syria. The PKK is a separatist group that has long fought the Turkish government in an effort to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. **For the United States to aid the PKK would be problematic: the Department of State designated the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, making it illegal for the United States to offer any assistance to the group.**

It's
Not a
Joke

Here's how the State Department explains the ramifications of designating a group a "terrorist" organization:


"It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as " any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes "the term 'training' means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term 'expert advice or assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."

Presumably the US government can do things that a US "person" cannot. And most people would agree that if the US has an important interest in stemming the advance of IS in Iraq, ignoring the niceties of the FTO designation is the right thing to do.

U.S. Forces Take Ship From Somali Pirates

A September 2010 operation

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/africa/10pirates.html?_r=0



In a predawn raid with helicopters hovering nearby, 24 American Marines scaled aboard a hijacked ship in the Gulf of Aden on Thursday, arrested the nine pirates on board and freed the ship — all without firing a shot, the American military said. American officials said the rescue appeared to be the first time the American military had boarded a ship commandeered

by Somali pirates, who have been hijacking vessel after vessel off Somalia's coast and wreaking havoc on some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

The Americans, however, are active in the area. Last year, Navy Seal snipers killed three pirates who were holding an American cargo ship captain in a lifeboat, after he had offered himself as a hostage in exchange for the safety of his crew.

Despite the intense international naval presence in the region, the pirates are on track to have another banner year, with more than 30 ships hijacked so far in 2010 and tens of millions of dollars in ransoms.

But not this time.

According to American officials, around 5 a.m. on Thursday, **two teams of 12 Marines each motored up in inflatable boats to the hijacked ship, a 436-foot-long German-**

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owned cargo vessel called the Magellan Star. A band of Somali pirates had seized the ship and its crew of 11 in the Gulf of Aden, between Yemen and Somalia, on Wednesday morning. It was carrying steel chains.



Cmdr. Amy Derrick-Frost, a spokeswoman for the Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, said the Marines had been able to stay in constant contact with the crew on board, receiving specific information about the number of pirates and their locations on the ship, as well as the locations of crew members. That lent military planners a big advantage when organizing the raid, Commander Derrick-Frost said.



the show."

After the operation, Rear Adm. Sinan Ertugrul of the Turkish Navy said: "This regional problem, truly, has global impact, and we are completely committed to bringing the disruptive acts of piracy to an end."

The Marines clambered up portable ladders — much as pirates have been doing — and swiftly took over the ship, American officials said. Two helicopters hovered overhead, throwing down cones of light. A Turkish frigate, part of an American-led anti-piracy task force, was nearby. All nine pirates surrendered without a shot, American officials said. The Magellan Star's crew was safe, too.



Lt. John Fage, an American Navy spokesman, also credited extensive coordination among several players.

"There was an amazing amount of teamwork between the Navy and the Marines and several ships in the task force," Lieutenant Fage said, "including the Turkish frigate, which was running

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We have full support of the international community and will continue to do everything possible to bring security to the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin."

It is not clear what will happen to the captured pirates. They are in custody aboard one of the ships in the task force, and the officers on the scene are awaiting orders from higher levels. While hundreds of Somali pirates have recently been sent to jail in Kenya, the Seychelles or Somalia, and a few have even been taken to Europe and the United States,



many more have been set free by Western navies in a controversial "catch and release" approach because of the complications of prosecuting suspects arrested on the high seas.

Terrorism Tunnels

Source: http://acdemocracy.org/terrorism-and-tunnels/?utm_source=Terror+Tunnels&utm_campaign=TerrorTunnels&utm_medium=email

The main purpose of the expensive tunnel network Hamas dug from Gaza was to terrorize Israel. The tunnels they constructed under the Egyptian border have been used for mostly criminal enterprises, such as arms, people, goods and sometimes drug smuggling, much like the tunnels running under the



Mexico-U.S. border, of which 170 have been discovered since 1990.


How many more tunnels are there? How many people smuggled their way into the U.S. through those tunnels? How many of them came in search of a better life? How many criminals came trough to build or join deadly criminal gangs operating throughout the country? And how many al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and other jihadists came through to agitate, recruit, raise funds and wait for an opportunity, or order, to terrorize America?

Considering Iran's, Hezbollah's and other jihadists' growing presence in Central and South America, and their collaboration with

criminal gangs, it would be foolhardy to dismiss their opportunities and readiness to use of the Mexican tunnels.

Though our Northern neighbor, Canada, bares very little resemblance to corrupt lawless and Mexico, jihadist activity is unabated. ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah supporters who have long standing orders of deportation against them, remain in the country free to pursue their agenda to recruit, incite, raise money and even travel to Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, to join the terrorist group of their choice: al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, Hizballah, or others. Some died. Some returned. How many of those simply walked over or drove to the U.S.? But we have no idea how many of the foreign fighters who were trained and ordered to go to the U.S. come through the Mexican tunnels.

Israel Homeland Security has this to say about the tunnels threat: **The Underground Threat is not an Exclusively Israeli Problem***



A lot of attention has been paid in the past weeks to Israel's struggle against the terror tunnels employed by Hamas in Gaza. Nevertheless, Israel isn't the only country in the world whose security is threatened by the ancient warfare method.

[A tunnel discovered in Nogales, Arizona in 2014, Department of Homeland Security](#)

Throughout the continents, tunnels undermine governments and law enforcement agencies. Some are used for smuggling of contraband, for human

trafficking and illegal immigration. Others have more belligerent purposes and may be used by terror organizations. Tunnels may also vary in size and structure. Tunnels dug by Hamas for example are often found 20 meters underground and some are 2.4 km long. It is estimated that the terror organization invested millions in structuring the tunnels,

covering each with hundreds of tons of concrete and equipping them with electricity and supplies. U.S and Mexico are also concerned about tunnels on their border which enable human trafficking and

smuggling of drugs and weapons, keeping busy the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Border Patrol. Around 170 tunnels have been discovered since 1990, varying in size and complexity – from 148 to 800 meters. Some are equipped with lighting and ventilation, and are held up by wood and concrete. U.S. security forces are in search of efficient techniques for finding and destroying tunnels. One such technique is using a wireless, camera equipped robot, remotely navigated by a technician, which allows fast and safe examination of the tunnel. Some of the methods also include setting off explosives inside holes dug near the tunnels causing them to collapse in a controlled manner.

It seems tunnel warfare is becoming a global concern as it is also common in other parts of the world



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such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, where rebels use them in combating Assad's military forces.



According to the market research company Meidata, it seems the old fashioned, simple warfare technique challenges modern technology so defense companies, security authorities and research centers continue to look for solutions. For example, U.S. Department of Homeland Security is collaborating with Lockheed Martin in developing systems for discovering tunneling activity. Raytheon is also working closely with the American army and utilizes technological solutions along the Mexico border. It has supported the Egyptian army

as well and provided it with a radar for its battle against Hamas smuggling tunnels.

Research institutes in the fields of geo-physics and energy are also putting forth efforts in this field.

Hamas Issues ‘Terrorism 101 Handbook’

By Adam Kredo

Source: <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/hamas-issues-terrorism-101-handbook/>

Hamas has been disseminating to its followers in the Gaza Strip a detailed terrorism training

It is just another example of how Hamas utilizes unconventional warfare techniques and



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manual that teaches would-be bombers how to make explosives and conceal them in household items such as televisions, according to documents seized by the Israeli military during recent raids.

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers discovered the handbook on the ground in the Gaza Strip as they conducted raids of homes and other facilities used by Hamas to plan its terror activities.

Hamas’ terrorism manuals instruct readers on how to build homemade explosive devices and how to set them to explode in unlikely places.

Hamas has even strapped explosives to donkeys and attempted to send them after Israeli soldiers.

The terror group’s goal is to encourage the citizens of Gaza to plant explosives in unlikely places in the hopes that Israeli military personnel set them off during routine raids in Gaza.

civilian cover to carry out attacks on Israelis. Hamas has already been caught using women and children as human shields and firing their rockets from hospitals and United Nations-owned schools.

The detailed manual, excerpts of which were published by the IDF this week, explicitly



instructs readers to camouflage their explosives, with one diagram demonstrating “how to fill a

television-shaped bomb with shrapnel," according to the IDF.

Soldiers in Gaza have reported seeing the techniques described in the handbook implemented in various homes. **In one instance, an Israeli soldier entered a civilian home located next door to a school only to find eight mines connected together by cable and spread throughout the home.**

Mines have also been discovered hidden in the shape of a chicken coop in other homes. Other diagrams in the handbook appear to detail methods to embed explosives in wall mounts,

Shawat 2A

- الوزن الكلي 11.5 كيلو جرام.
- المادة المتفجرة 2.2 كيلو جرام من TNT بودرة.
- تستخدم أرضية وجانية للدببات وناقلات الجندي.
- ويكون الأثر تدميري.
- تستخدم جانبي للدببات ويكون الأثر إعطب شديد.
- المادة لونها أسود داكن ويكتب عليها شواط 2 فقط.

مسافة بين العبوة والهدف	٦٠ سم
الاختراق في الحديد	٢٥-٣٠ سم

Shawat 2C

- الوزن الكلي 12 كيلو جرام.
- المادة المتفجرة 2.7 كيلو جرام من TNT مصبوغ.
- تستخدم أرضية وجانية للدببات وناقلات الجندي.
- ويكون الأثر تدميري.
- تستخدم جانبي للدببات.
- المادة لونها أسود داكن ويكتب عليها شواط 2C فقط.

ملاحظة:- يتم تحويل شواط 2A إلى شواط 2C بواسطة عملية تفريغ شواط 2A من TNT بودرة وإعادة تعبيتها به TNT مصبوغ لتصبح فعالة ضد الدبابات.

مسافة بين العبوة والهدف	٦٠ سم
الاختراق في الحديد	٤٠ سم

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4

such as those used to hang televisions. As hostilities continue and Israel moves to disarm Hamas and destroy its intricate system of underground tunnels, the IDF is reporting that its Givati Brigade located explosives "that are very similar to those detailed in the manual."

"Such explosives," the IDF said, "have been found in Palestinian homes in Gaza, endangering not only the residents of the house but also neighbors within range of a potential explosion."

Hamas terrorists last week sent a fleet of donkeys strapped with explosives toward a contingent of IDF forces. **In other instances, horses have been used.**

Hamas leaders also have been releasing social media tips to its followers and others in the

Gaza Strip about how to lie about civilian casualties.

The Hamas Interior Ministry—which notoriously ordered civilians to ignore Israel's warnings and remain home during strikes—is now directing supporters on social media to always refer to the dead as "innocent civilians" and refrain from posting pictures that show Hamas fighters launching rockets from populated civilian centers.

An instructional video published by Hamas' Information Department of the Ministry of the Interior and National Security teaches viewers

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Shawat 1

- الوزن الكلي للعبوة 20 كيلو جرام.
- المادة المتفجرة تزن 3.5 كيلو جرام من الردة.
- الكتاب المستخدم من الحديد.
- تستخدم عبوة أرضية وجانية للدببات وناقلات الجندي.
- الاختراق:

بعد عن الهدف	١٠ م	٥ م	٦٠ سم
الاختراق في الحديد	٦ سم	١٢ سم	٤٠ سم

ملاحظة: تختلف في الباطون ثلاث أضعاف اختراقها في الحديد

يجب أن تحافظ على مسافة Stand off

المصورة تغير انتقال الموجة الانفجارية في اتجاه واحد

للجمي عبوة شواط إن قطع الاختراق كبير فالله الوجهية البطلة منهارة

how to create sympathy for Hamas in the media, according to a translation of the video published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).

"Anyone killed or martyred is to be called a civilian from Gaza or Palestine, before we talk about his status in jihad or his military rank," the video states, according to MEMRI. "Don't forget to always add 'innocent civilian' or 'innocent citizen' in your description of those killed in Israeli attacks on Gaza."

Social media users also should "begin [your reports of] news of resistance actions with the phrase, 'In response to the cruel Israeli attack,' and conclude with the phrase, 'This many people have been martyred since Israel

launched its aggression against Gaza," according to the video.
“Be sure to always perpetuate the principle of

differently than they would to an Arab audience.
Regarding “the narrative of life vs. the narrative

العبوة الرعدية

- تعتبر عبوة موجهة ضد الأفراد والسيارات الغير مصنفة ، حيث تكون شظاياها مركزاً إلى الأمام وعلى مسافات بعيدة.
- شكلها اسطواني يقطن 32 سم و ارتفاعها 10 سم.
- تحتوي على 9 كيلو من TNT صب.
- لها صحن به شظايا قطرها 6 ملم.
- ليبيها قذرة على لقاح في حديد سماكة 2 ملم على مسافة 70 متراً وعدها القاتل 100 متراً على مساحة عرضها 15 متراً.

الوجه الانفجاري، تهطلق أمام العبوة الرعدية، بمحركه للأمام

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العبوة التلفزيونية 2

- وزن المادة داخل العبوة: 2700 جرام TNT صب.
- على بعد 10 متراً تطلي الشظايا 20 متراً عرض.
- ارتفاع الشظايا عن الأرض 60 - 40 سم .
- الأهداف التي تستهدف بها مثلاً - سيارة غير مصنفة.
- العبوة مصنوعة من البلاستيك المتكسر.
- هذه العبوة قاتلة لائق لا إذا كانت بعيدة مسافة 40 متراً أو أقل من ذلك.

المطر المفتوح للسمعة
المطر السادس للسمعة

الصورة
الكتف زنة

الصورة
الكتف زنة

الصورة
الكتف زنة

الصورة
الكتف زنة

الصورة
الكتف زنة

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‘the role of the occupation is attack, and we in Palestine are fulfilling [the role of] the reaction,’ according to the video.

Hamas urges its backers to not tell people that

of blood: [When speaking] to an Arab friend, start with the number of martyrs. [But when speaking] to a Western friend, start with the number of wounded and dead,” the video

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الاختراق في الحديد 20-25 سم

شواط 2C

- الوزن الكلي 12 كيلو جرام.
- المادة المفخخة 2.7 كيلو جرام من TNT مصوب.
- تستخدم أرضية وجانبي للمدببات ونقالات الجندي.

خراق في الحديد

خطة: تخترق في الباطون ثلاث أضعاف إخراقتها في الحديد

6 سم
12 سم
40 سم

rockets are being fired at Israel from densely populated areas, a technique Hamas uses to maximize civilian casualties.

“Avoid publishing pictures of rockets fired into Israel from [Gaza] city centers. This [would] provide a pretext for attacking residential areas in the Gaza Strip,” the video states. “Do not publish or share photos or video clips showing rocket launching sites or the movement of resistance [forces] in Gaza.”

Palestinian activists who are speaking to Western audiences are encouraged to speak

states. “Be sure to humanize the Palestinian suffering. Try to paint a picture of the suffering of the civilians in Gaza and the West Bank during the occupation’s operations and its bombings of cities and villages.”

The PR techniques appear to be working. Many U.S. and Western media outlets have worked in recent weeks to interview Hamas officials and accuse Israel of committing war crimes, something that Hamas routinely does.

Adam Kredo is senior writer for the Washington Free Beacon. Formerly an award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo's work has been featured in outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others.

CIA used Anwar al-Awlaki's desire for a third wife to track and kill him

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140819-cia-used-anwar-alawlaki-s-desire-for-a-third-wife-to-track-and-kill-him>

August 19 – Today, young Europeans who regularly visit Yemen and Syria are often suspected of aiding terrorism, forcing security officials in Europe to track their whereabouts. In September 2009, Morten Storm, a young Danish national-turned-Islamic jihadist flew to Yemen at the request of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born jihadi preacher who was one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. During the visit, Awlaki told Storm, "the Americans want me dead." "They are putting pressure on the (Yemeni) government all the time." He discussed spending eighteen months in prison between 2006 and 2007 for kidnapping charges. "I was in solitary confinement for the first nine months," Awlaki said. "The only contact I had with humanity was my guards, and the cell was 3 meters long. It



was underground. There were times when I thought the isolation and claustrophobia would drive me insane."

Now that he was out of prison, Awlaki wanted Storm to help send Western Muslims to Yemen to learn how to launch attacks in their home countries. Storm agreed to help Awlaki, but failed to inform him that he — Storm — was now working as a double agent for Western intelligence agencies.

According to the *New York Post*, Storm first met Awlaki in 2005 in Yemen. At the time, the troubled Danish national sought to find refuge in jihadist rhetoric. By 2006, PET, Danish intelligence agency, noticed



Storm's frequent travels between Europe and the Middle East, and upon discovering his involvement with terror



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networks, convinced Storm to act as a double agent. **For \$1,800 a month, Storm provided information on his militant associates.**

Soon the CIA, MI5, MI6, began training Storm and using him to get closer to Awlaki.

In 2008 Awlaki confided in Storm that he was searching for a third wife because of his dissatisfaction with his current two

wives. Storm used the opportunity to recruit Irene, also known as Aminah, a 32-year-old blond Croatian, who had converted to Islam and appeared to like Awlaki from a picture Storm showed her.

Storm informed his intelligence handlers of the opportunity to use Aminah to get to Awlaki. In his just-published book, *Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and the CIA*, Storm writes that his handlers were beginning to get worried that he was getting in too deep for an untrained civilian, and eventually ended their work with him. Before ending the working relationship, however, the **CIA offered Storm \$4,000 a month with a \$250,000 bonus if he helped arrange the marriage of Aminah and Awlaki.**

In his book, Storm noted that the CIA was interested in killing Awlaki for several reasons, including his link to the 2009 Fort Hood massacre.




After weeks of communicating with Aminah, Awlaki arranged for her to travel to Yemen. "Lust had gotten the better of him," Storm wrote. By 2010, Aminah had obtained a Yemeni visa, per Awlaki's instructions. "The embassy apparently thought there was nothing out of the ordinary in a Croatian blonde going to Yemen to learn Arabic," he added. In June 2010, Aminah married Awlaki and the CIA paid Storm his bonus, but cut off ties with him, hoping that Aminah would unknowingly lead the agency to Awlaki through her **bugged suitcases**.

By April 2011, the CIA had lost all leads on Awlaki and soon offered Storm \$5 million if he led them back to Awlaki. Back then, Awlaki was linked to an attempt to smuggle bomb-laden laser printers on FedEx and UPS planes.

On his last trip to Yemen to visit Awlaki, from 27 July to 17 August 2011, Storm delivered designer dresses, expensive chocolates, lingerie, a fridge, and Dolce & Gabbana perfumes, all items requested by Awlaki and Aminah, as they were difficult to find in Yemen. Storm delivered the items to Awlaki through a courier, and included in the package **a bugged USB storage device which contained information on ricin – information Awlaki wanted so his organization could use the material in terror attacks in the United States.** Now the CIA was able to track Awlaki after months of poor intelligence.

On 30 September 2011, two Predator drones operating in Yemen fired Hellfire missiles at Awlaki's convoy. Aminah survived the attack but Awlaki was killed. **Storm says the CIA never paid him his \$5 million reward for leading them to Awlaki. The CIA claims it had tracked Awlaki through the courier.**



Islamic State Militant Who 'Beheaded Journalist James Foley' Spoke With A 'British [London] Accent'

Source:http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/08/19/islamic-state-militant-who-beheaded-james-foley-spoke-with-a-british-accent_n_5693434.html

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Beyond terrorism: ISIS and other enemies of humanity

Source: <http://nypost.com/2014/08/20/beyond-terrorism-isis-and-other-enemies-of-humanity/>

After a long slumber spent in denial, the UN Security Council has decided to do “something” about the forces of neo-Islam now on the rampage in more than a dozen countries across the globe.

Yet the “something” consists of freezing a few bank accounts and making it hard for a few individuals to obtain visas to Western countries — in other words, gestures like those made fashionable by the Obama administration.

It is a quite simplistic “answer” to the far more complex and deadly threat to the peace and security of more than 40 nations posed by the groups in question.

For over a decade the United Nations has been grappling with how to define terrorism, stuck thanks to that worn cliché, **“One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”** (The truth, of course, is that one man’s terrorist is every man’s terrorist.)

In any case, with these neo-Islamist groups — the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (a.k.a. Daesh), the Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shabab in Somalia, the Islamic Victory Front in the Levant — we have moved far beyond terrorism in any of its classical definitions. We need a new term for these monsters.

Before the true extent of their atrocities became widely known, politically correct discourse referred to these as “militants.”

Early in his presidency, Barack Obama labeled the precursors of these groups as “extremists.”

In Western Europe, those who still chase the mirage of multiculturalism suggested an even gentler term: “Islamic fighters.”

So, is “Caliph Ibrahim” of the Islamic State an extremist, a militant, a terrorist or an Islamic fighter? None of the above.

All those labels imply behavior that makes some sort of sense in terms of human reality and normal ideologies. Yet the Islamic State and its kindred have broken out of the entire conceivable range of political activity, even its extreme forms.

A “militant” spends much of his time promoting an idea or a political program within acceptable rules of behavior.

The neo-Islamists, by contrast, recognize no rules apart from those they themselves set;

they have no desire to win an argument through hard canvassing.

They don’t even seek to impose a point of view; they seek naked and brutal domination.

A “terrorist,” meanwhile, tries to instill fear in an adversary from whom he demands specific concessions.

Yet the Islamic State et al. use mass murder to such ends. They don’t want to persuade or cajole anyone to do anything in particular; they want everything.

“Islamic fighter” is equally inapt. An Islamic fighter is a Muslim who fights a hostile infidel who is trying to prevent Muslims from practicing their faith. That was not the situation in Mosul.

No one was preventing the city’s Muslim majority from practicing their faith, let alone forcing them to convert to another religion. Yet the Islamic State came, conquered and began to slaughter.

The Islamic State kills people because it can. And in both Syria and Iraq it has killed more Muslims than members of any other religious community.

How, then, can we define a phenomenon that has made even al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Khomeinist gangs appear “moderate” in comparison?

The international community faced a similar question in the 18th century when pirates acted as a law unto themselves, ignoring the most basic norms of human interaction.

The issue was discussed in long negotiations that led to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty of Rastadt (1714) and developed a new judicial concept: the crime against humanity.

Those who committed that crime would qualify as “enemies of mankind” — in Latin, hostis generis humanis.

Individuals and groups convicted of such a crime were no longer covered by penal codes or even the laws of war. They’d set themselves outside humanity by behaving like wild beasts.

In the 18th century, Britain used the concept to hunt down pirates across the globe, notably in the Caribbean. President Thomas Jefferson invoked the same principle to justify sending an expedition to wipe out pirates in Algiers. (Hence

"To the shores of Tripoli" in the "Marines' Hymn.")

After World War II, the Allies used the same concept to put Nazi chiefs on trial in Nuremberg.

Over the past 10 years, the United Nations has referred to the same concept in trials of the Khmer Rouge mass-killers in Cambodia — without, however, moving to make it part of international law.

Neo-Islamist groups represent a cocktail of nihilism and crimes against humanity. Like the pirates of yesteryear, they've attracted criminals from many different nationalities.

The European Union estimates that 2,000 of Daesh's 10,000 fighters are citizens of EU

states. There are also Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pakistanis and Russians from Dagestan.

Having embarked on genocide, the neo-Islamists do not represent an Iraqi or Syrian or Nigerian problem, but a problem for humanity as a whole.

They are not enemies of any particular religion, sect or government but enemies of mankind.

They deserve to be treated as such (as do the various governments and semi-governmental "charities" that help them).

To deal with these enemies of mankind, we need much more than frozen bank accounts and visa restrictions.



What goes on in the mind of a militant extremist?

By Lazar Stankov

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140820-what-goes-on-in-the-mind-of-a-militant-extremist>

So far, the ongoing discussions about radicalization of extremists both at home and abroad have tended to emphasize its sociological aspects. It has focused on concepts such as the religion and social environments of individuals.

However, psychological accounts of extremist activity are infrequent, and it is often forgotten that only a few of those who hold strong ideological, political and religious views get involved in violent acts. Personal dispositions, feelings and beliefs may play a decisive role in explaining why people become radicalized.

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Nastiness, grudge and excuse

Both conceptual analyses and empirical psychological studies that I have undertaken in the past have shown there are three main ingredients of militant extremist mindset.

The **first of these ingredients** is nastiness, as captured by strong endorsement of statements approving of violent acts, such as "killing is justified when it is an act of revenge," or "we should respond to terror with terror."

The **second** is grudge, which can take two forms. One is a direct reference to the "West," shown in statements such as "terrorism in the form of unfair torture and execution without trial is carried out daily by many Western countries" and "the West is degraded by its lack of dignified values, its AIDS epidemic, and its alcohol and drug addiction."

Grudge's other manifestation is a more generalized belief in the vile world: "evil has

been re-incarnated in the cult of markets and the rule of multinational companies."

The **final ingredient** is excuse. Although there are several forms of excuse, a common feature is justifications in people's own minds of the nasty and violent things they tend to condone. In some cases it is with reference to God: "only one's own God is the true God." In other cases it is the trust in divine power: "at a critical moment, a divine power will step in to help our people."

These three components were identified within the general populations in several countries, including the United States, Serbia and China. These aspects of militant extremist mindset are generic in nature and are not focused on Islamic terrorism.

One does not need to become a terrorist if they endorse moderately all three ingredients of a militant extremist mindset. Even a strong

endorsement of one or even two of the three components is unlikely to prompt a person to spring into action. However, high endorsement of all three components may lead a person to act. And if a group has high ratings on all three components, chances are that at least some members of the group may become potential recruits for a radical cause.

Although the measure may be useful for identifying groups prone to terrorism, no justification can be made to use the militant extremist mindset for profiling purposes.

What can be changed?

Grudge should be more open to change than either nastiness or excuse. Nastiness is a social attitude akin to dogmatism and authoritarianism that are known to be hard to modify.

Grudge is only partly a psychological internal state of the person and the other part — that is, the outside threat that causes unhappiness or fear — may be open to intervention. Education and media can play a crucial role.

Policy response

Governments can continue with campaigns to educate people of the benefits of immigration, equal opportunity for all citizens and the acceptance of diversity as well as the need for vigorous action to secure immigrants' equal rights and promotion of the democratic process.

Countering "protest counter-culture" can be achieved by directly engaging in discussions with counter-culture groups, monitoring their development and, eventually as a last resort, using police methods if the situation gets too heated. These efforts, perhaps, should be increased.

Lazar Stankov is Professor, Institute for Positive Psychology and Education at Australian Catholic University.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: What goes on in the mind of a militant extremist? Why do we presume that they do have a mind?

Monitoring the level and changes in extremists' mindset

In a recent interview, retiring ASIO [Australian Security Intelligence Organization] chief David Irvine said that a small number of people who have very distorted views that propel them towards violence leading to mass casualties are a real concern.

Irvine added that the number of threats that ASIO is looking at, in terms of the numbers of people, has grown substantially with the Syrian conflict. Translated into the language of militant extremist mindset, this means that "grudge" among the people who already have an "excuse" has increased. Any policy response needs to account for the "nasty" ones within the protest counter-culture groups.

Prudent governments should monitor the extent and the strength of the militant extremist mindset in its population and especially among the young, including older adolescents and students. If this had been done in the past, the warning signs would have been detectable ahead of the realization that 150 Australians are engaged in terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq.

Psychological research into radicalization may complement political science and religious studies in countering terrorism in Western society. Monitoring the strength of militant extremist mindset endorsements in different communities within the Australian population could be helpful.

Finally, it may be useful to establish regular polling practices that would gauge the extent of radicalization over time and in reaction to terrorist-related political acts at home and globally.

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"Counterterrorism Bookshelf": 47 Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects

By Joshua Sinai

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/371/html>

This column consists of two parts: capsule reviews of six books published by various publishers, and, continuing the series begun in previous columns, highlighting books by



publishers with significant publishing programs in terrorism & counterterrorism studies, providing this time capsule reviews (with the authors listed in alphabetical order) of 41 books published by Routledge. Please note that while most of these books were recently published, several published over the past few years deserving attention were also included.

General Reviews

Yael S. Aronoff, *The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard Liners Opt for Peace*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 248 pp., US \$ 29.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 9781107669802.

In this highly interesting and innovative account of the political psychology of six Israeli Prime Ministers, the author draws on the academic literature on the psychology of political conversion to examine how such political leaders approached, whether through conciliation or intransigence, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Based on the book's six case studies of Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, and Shimon Peres, the author finds that those who rejected full-blown peace processes tended to be "those leaders who are emotionally attached to and focus on a violent conflict-ridden past...because they are less able to forge a new image of a past opponent as a partner," while "risk tolerant leaders" are more likely to make peace. (p. xvi). A highly useful conceptual framework in the form of a matrix is provided to examine the ideology and cognitive style of such political leaders regarding their propensity to engage in potential peace processes. This is broken down into factors such as their adherence to a particular ideology, cognitive flexibility, risk propensity, emotional intelligence, and whether their advisers expressed diverse views. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on counterterrorism with its focus on the challenges involved in resolving terrorism-related conflicts. The author is a professor in Israel studies and international relations at Michigan State University.

Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (Eds.). *Crime Wars and Narco Terrorism in the Americas: A Small Wars Journal – El Centro Anthology*. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse LLC, 2014. 544 pp., US \$ 31.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1491739556.

The contributors to this important anthology examine the magnitude of threats presented by the evolution of narco-trafficking criminality, and corruption at all levels of the Mexican state into a full-scale narco-terrorist insurgency that threatens the security of the Mexican state, and has seen its violence spill over into its United States neighbor. The volume's chapters cover topics such as a framework for analyzing criminal national security threats, a review of Mexico's counter drug policy and related security measures, the possible benefits of creating a paramilitary force in Mexico to counter such threats, the spillover of Mexican criminal violence into America's border states, armed tactics employed by the drug cartels, the involvement of the Anonymous hacktivist group in targeting the Los Zetas drug cartel, an assessment of the American defense department's military measures against such transnational organized crime, the relevance of Colombia's counter-drug and counterinsurgency campaigns to the Mexican area of operations, and future trends in Latin American narco-criminality and terrorist warfare. The anthology's chapters were originally published in the *Small Wars Journal*. Dr. Bunker is adjunct faculty, Division of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University and a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro, and Dr. Sullivan is a career police officer in Los Angeles and a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro.

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Frank Foley, *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 352 pages, US \$ 99.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781107029699.

A highly detailed and authoritative account of the similarities and differences in the way the liberal democracies of Britain and France conduct counterterrorist policies and operations against their respective adversaries. The book's chapters cover topics such as the nature of the Islamist-based terrorist threats facing France and Britain, the history and evolution of their counterterrorist organizations, how both countries coordinate intelligence, police and prosecution in their counterterrorism responses, how they manage the judicial frameworks for prosecuting suspected terrorists, and how both countries tackle Islamist terrorism and



its supporting communities. One of the author's conclusions, based on his analysis of the British and French cases, is that "if [liberal democratic] norms and institutions play a crucial role in shaping counterterrorist policy, then states in certain circumstances are constrained from making an overly repressive response to terrorism." (p. 327) The author is a research fellow at the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies in Madrid and a Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King's College London.

Jeff M. Moore, *The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency*. Charleston, SC: A Muir Analytics Book, 2014. 476 pp., US \$ 18.00 [Paperback] ISBN: 978-149395701.

This is a highly comprehensive and insightful account of Thailand's counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign's strategies, operations, and tactics from 1965 to the current period. Beginning with a valuable theoretical discussion of the differences between terrorism and guerrilla insurgencies, the author proceeds to discuss the components of effective counterinsurgency, which he terms the "COIN Pantheon" because not only does it involve "force applications based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, counterpolitical warfare, political remedies for the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities." (p."xiv) Based on these crucial criteria, the author finds that the Thai way of COIN is generally effective in several areas, such as in the security, political and economic realms, with the government military forces often "achieving the upper hand." (p. 372) In other areas, however, the author writes that the Thai way of COIN "is also, unfortunately, self-hindering due to turf battles, rivalries, corruption, and egos." (p. 372) The author is director of Muir Analytics, LLC, which advises clients in reducing exposure to risks in conflict areas.

Andrew Silke, *Terrorism: All That Matters*. London, UK: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd/New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2014. 160 pp., US \$ 14.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1444163315.

This is a concise, highly engaging and authoritative introductory overview of terrorism in all its dimensions, starting with a history of terrorism, how to define terrorism, terrorists' motivations, strategies and tactics, the root causes of terrorism, the nature of terrorists' mindsets, how individuals become radicalized into terrorism, the characteristics of suicide terrorism, the components of effective counterterrorism, and future trends in terrorism. Although intended as a 'quick read,' this well-written book nevertheless is filled with numerous insights. It discusses the 1st century Sicarii as well as 19th century Russian anarchists to illustrate the history and evolution of terrorism. In assessing the effectiveness of terrorist warfare, the author points out that five key areas determine a group's capability: quality of leadership, quantity of members, quality of members, availability of weapons, and their financial base. (p. 38) Effectiveness in counterterrorism, in the author's formulation, involves deterring terrorists and their supporters through penalties and punishments, increasing the ability of the security forces to identify and thwart terrorists, reducing the vulnerability of potential targets, tackling the underlying grievances and root causes that give rise to terrorism, and increasing the public's resilience in the face of terrorist attacks. (p. 102) The author is a Professor at the University of East London, where he also serves as the program director for terrorism studies.

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V.S. Subrahmanian, Aaron Mannes, Animesh Roul, and R.K. Raghavan, *Indian Mujahideen: Computational Analysis and Public Policy*. New York, NY: Springer, 2014. US \$ 109.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-3-319-02817-0.

This is a highly innovative application by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists, law enforcement experts, and scientists of computational techniques to examine the targeting techniques and attack patterns of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) terrorist group. The book begins with an examination of the history and evolution of IM's terrorist campaign against the Indian state, the nature of its organization and membership, areas of operation, and links to other South Asian Islamist groups. It then transitions to a discussion of the conceptual framework's "syntax and semantics of Temporal Probabilistic (TP) behavioral rules" that technologically compute the IM's attack and targeting behaviors. (p. 49) This chapter will be of particular interest to the computational academic community – and, as per the authors guidance, those readers who are not familiar with such computational algorithmic techniques "may skip this chapter without any loss of relevant material." (p. 49) The succeeding chapters provide valuable and rich data about the IM's

tactics, such as bombings, simultaneous and timed attacks, and targeting patterns, such as attacking public sites, as well as the total deaths caused by such attacks. Especially innovative is the chapter on computing policy response options, which are based on the overall conceptual framework's "methodology and algorithm that are used to automatically generate policy options" in the form of a "mathematical definition of a policy against IM" that has a "high probability of significantly reducing" most types of its attacks. (p. 107) The book's final chapter presents a recommendation to establish an Indian "National Counter-Terrorism Center," because, among other reasons, a major operational problem in India's counterterrorism campaign is its "lack of a coordinated authority or even a central database of all arrested individuals, suspects, or ongoing operations." (p. 133) The appendices describe the study's overall methodology and use of various classes of variables as sources for data collection, as well as a chronological listing of IM's terrorist attacks. V.S. Subrahmanian is a professor of computer science at the University of Maryland, College Park, where he also serves as Director of the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics (LCCD), where Dr. Mannes serves as a research associate. Animesh Roul, and R.K. Raghavan are prominent India-based researchers on terrorism.

Routledge Publications

Javier Argomaniz, *The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, Polity and Policies After 9/11*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 208 pages, US\$150.00 [Hardback], US\$39.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-72406-7.

An insightful and comprehensive assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union's response to terrorism, explaining how its numerous institutions conduct counterterrorism in the post-9/11 era, including its attempts to coordinate its member-states' policies, legislations and threats-related intelligence information sharing. The author's research is based on a qualitative methodology that draws on numerous interviews, policy documents and secondary literature.

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Claude Berube and Patrick Cullen, (Eds.) *Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 272 pp., US \$ 140.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 39.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-72424-1.

The contributors to this edited volume, which is one of the first to comprehensively discuss the issue of maritime private security, examine its historical origins and evolution as a private sector contribution to countering piracy, terrorism, and other security-related maritime threats around the world, where governments require the private sector to support and augment their own countermeasures in these spheres.

Tore Bjorgo (Ed.), *Terror From the Extreme Right*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1995. 332 pp., [Re-issued] US \$ 57.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7146-4196-6.

When this edited volume was published in 1995, it represented one of the first times that the subject of far right-wing terrorism in democratic societies was discussed in a systematic manner, making it a classic in the field of terrorism studies at the time. It is still highly pertinent to the current era. The volume's contributors discuss subjects such as the role of "split delegitimization" among extremist right-wing groups, and right-wing violence in North America, Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, South Africa, and Japan. The volume's papers were originally presented at a workshop supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin in August, 1994.

Anna Cento Bull and Philip Cooke, *Ending Terrorism in Italy*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 348 pp., US \$ 130.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-60288-4.

An innovative and up-to-date examination of the processes that brought about the end of more than four decades of left-wing and right-wing terrorism in Italy. The book's chapters cover topics such as the roles of Italian legal institutions, anti-terrorist legislation, and prison reform, as well as conflict resolution measures such as conciliation and reconciliation, in ending terrorism. Other chapters discuss the perspectives of former terrorists and victims on these issues. The concluding chapter places the case of Italy in comparative perspective.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 488 pp. US \$ 225.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 54.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-66472-1.

The contributors to this comprehensive handbook examine significant components in security studies including theoretical approaches to studying security issues (such as realism, liberalism, critical security studies, post-structuralism, and feminism), contemporary security challenges (such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, state failure, energy security, public health breakdowns), and regional security challenges (such as China's regional ambitions, conflicts in the Korean peninsula, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Western Balkans), as well as future security challenges (in the form of alliances, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, peace operations, humanitarian intervention, global governance, and crisis management).

Ryan Clarke, *Crime – Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-State Actors*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 232 pages, US \$ 150.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 39.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-72403-6.

A detailed and well-researched examination of the links between criminality and terrorism in South Asia, focusing on the activities of terrorist actors that operate in Indian-held Kashmir (particularly Indian and Pakistani proxies) and Pakistan (particularly Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Taliban, and al Qaida). The concluding chapter discusses the challenges facing Pakistan's ineffectual management of the terrorist and criminal groups that operate on its country and the spillover effects into the neighboring countries.

Richard Clutterbuck, *Terrorism in an Unstable World*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1994 [Re-issued in 2006]. 235 pages, US\$180.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0415103404.

Considered a classic when it was first published in the mid-1990s, this is a well-written and comprehensive examination of the nature of the terrorist threat during the immediate post-Cold War period by a military man turned academic. The volume's chapters cover topics such as the nature of conflict in the post-Communist world, technological developments in terrorist weaponry and targeting, the role of intelligence in counterterrorism, the nexus between terrorism and criminality, including narco-terrorism, the nature of rural and urban guerrilla warfare, airport and aviation security, and the roles of civil liberties and the rule of law in counterterrorism.

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Gillian Duncan, Orla Lynch, Gilbert Ramsey and Alison M.S. Watson, (Eds.). *State Terrorism and Human Rights: International Responses Since the End of the Cold War*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 200 pp., US \$ 155.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 42.95 [Paperback], ISBN: ISBN: 978-0415629072.

The contributors to this important volume examine the use of terrorism by certain states since the end of the Cold War. The volume's chapters present an historical overview of state terrorism, including current trends, obstacles to international responses against the use of state terror, as well as case studies that focus on Saddam Hussein's use of terror against the Kurds, Indonesia's use of terror against the East Timor separatists, genocidal terror in Rwanda, and the components of an effective international response to state terror. The concluding chapter discusses the contribution of Paul Wilkinson's notion of state terror to understanding the use of such coercive methods in the current period.

Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira and Bruno Oliveira Martins, (Eds.), *The European Union's Fight Against Terrorism: The CFSP and Beyond*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 160 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-84241-9.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the European Union's (EU) management of counterterrorism in all its dimensions in the post-9/11 era. The chapters cover topics such as the external dimension of the EU's counterterrorism policies, the United States' influence in the construction of the EU's counterterrorism policies and programs, the challenges to the EU's counterterrorism policies presented by the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, the EU as a 'global counterterrorism actor,' and future trends in the EU's counterterrorism campaign. This volume was originally published as a special issue of the *European Security* journal.

Joshua Alexander Geltzer, *US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and al-Qaeda: Signalling and the Terrorist World-View*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 228 pp., US\$150.00 [Hardcover], US\$49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415664523.

A conceptually interesting examination of the ineffectiveness of the communicative components of the Bush administration's counter-terrorist policies towards al Qaida. The author's conceptual framework on communicators and audiences is applied to examine America's counter-terrorist communications vis-à-vis al Qaida's own world-view. The concluding chapters assess whether the right lessons were learned and provide the author's recommendations for improving the communications components in US counterterrorism against groups such as al Qaida.

Joseph Heller, *The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1995/2006. 392 pp., US\$210.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-7146-4558-2.

This is a reissue of the author's masterful 1995 account of the Stern Gang (also known as the Stern Group or Lehi), the right-wing Jewish terrorist group that operated during Israel's formative pre-state period. The volume's chapters discuss the group's revisionist ideology, its split from the larger Irgun terrorist group, its organizational formation, its terrorist activities, including political assassinations, and its political activities following independence in the nascent Jewish State.

Brian Hesse (Ed.), *Somalia: State Collapse, Terrorism and Piracy*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 128 pp., US \$ 140.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415828932

The contributors to this edited volume examine significant challenges facing Somalia in terms of the fragile nature of its government and the twin threats to its stability presented by terrorism and piracy. Also discussed are proposals how the international community can help stabilize the situation in Somalia, the influence of Kenyan Somalis in Somalia, as well as several areas where Somalia has achieved a certain degree of success, such as in communications and banking. The volume was originally published as a special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*.

Clive Jones and Ami Pedahzur, (Eds.), *Between Terrorism and Civil War: The Al-Aqsa Intifada*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005. 176 pp., US \$ 170.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415434539.

The contributors to this volume examine significant aspects of the al Aqsa intifada (uprising) by the Palestinians against continued Israeli rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which began around September 2000. The chapters provide conceptual frameworks on the linkage between terrorism and civil war, the causes of Jewish settler vigilante terrorism against the Palestinians, the attitude among Palestinians towards political reform, the role of the peacekeeping force in Hebron in attempting to prevent conflict escalation, attitudes towards the intifada by Jordan and Egypt, the role of Hezbollah as a 'shadow actor' in the intifada, and an assessment of the intifada's political and military effectiveness. The volume was originally published as a special issue of the journal *Civil Wars*.

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Naim Kapucu, *The Network Governance in Response to Acts of Terrorism: Comparative Analysis*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 281 pp., US \$ 140 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9780415500111.

A highly interesting comparative analysis of the use of what the author terms "network governance" to effectively and comprehensively respond to and recover from catastrophic terrorist incidents. The author uses the cases of major terrorist incidents in New York, Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and Mumbai to illustrate how a networked response system could have vastly improved the responses by the authorities in mass-casualty emergency situations.

George Klay Kieh and Kelechi Kalu, (Eds.)editors, *West Africa and the U.S. War on Terror*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 224 pages, US\$130.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0415539425.

The contributors to this important edited volume assess the effectiveness of the United States' counterterrorism assistance to West African states. The volume's chapters cover topics such as a general overview of U.S. counterterrorism, Sub-Saharan Africa as an additional front in U.S. counterterrorism, how West Africa perceives U.S. counterterrorism, the implications of the crisis in Nigeria's Niger Delta region, the Mauritanian military and U.S.



counterterrorism, West Africa regional security and U.S. counterterrorism, and the consequences of U.S. counterterrorism for West Africa.

Peter Lehr, (Eds.), *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism*. New York, NY: Routledge/Lloyd's Marine Intelligence Unit, 2007. 272 pp., US \$ 165.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 54.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415953207.

The contributors to this highly authoritative edited volume examine the full magnitude of the threats to global security and commerce presented by maritime piracy within the broader context of international terrorism. The chapters discuss issues such as the major 'hot spots' of piracy in Somalia, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Straits of Malacca-South China Sea, and the militant groups that engage in maritime piracy, as well as international legal and naval responses to the threats of piracy. The concluding chapter assesses future trends in the evolving threat of maritime terrorism.

James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*. [Third edition]. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 392 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 44.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415539456.

This well-organized and well-written textbook provides a comprehensive overview of terrorism in all its dimensions. The chapters cover topics such as the history and evolution of terrorism, defining and classifying terrorism, terrorists' strategies, tactics, weapons, and targets, the roles of state sponsors and other supporters of terrorism, religious, ethnic, nationalistic, left- and right-wing bases of terrorism, prominent terrorist groups, countries with multiple crises of terrorism, the components of counterterrorism, and future trends in terrorist warfare.

Claire Macken, *Counter-Terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive Detention and International Human Rights Law*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 232 pp., US \$ 150.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415859219.

A highly authoritative and balanced examination of the relationship between preventive detention of suspected terrorists and international human rights law within the broader context of counterterrorism. The volume's chapters cover topics such as defining preventive detention, examples of the use of preventive detention in the United Kingdom in general and Northern Ireland in particular, the right to personal liberty in international human rights law as a legal framework for the consideration of state preventive detention laws (including in a state of emergency), and legitimate and illegitimate purposes of preventive detention. The concluding chapters present a model law for the detention of suspected terrorists within a criminal law framework, including a discussion of instances in which preventive detention can be used for legitimate purposes.

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Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, (Eds.). *Counter-Terrorism and Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice After 9/11*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 243 pp., US \$ 150.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 44.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415631396.

The contributors to this edited volume examine what they term the 'culture of control' that has been instituted in several democratic countries as part of their counterterrorism campaigns. The chapters cover topics such as the roles of pre-emptive policing and the use of intelligence in counterterrorism, the creation of a 'culture of suspicion' in community surveillance, the use of extraordinary measures in legal proceedings, and how the media may be used as information 'proxies' for government authorities. Australia and the United States are employed as case studies to illustrate the contributors' arguments. The concluding chapter discusses best practices in protecting human rights during periods of emergency for counterterrorism campaigns.

George Michael, *Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 304 pp., US \$ 180.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 54.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-62844-0.

In this paperback edition of the originally published 2003 book, the author examines the state of far right-wing extremism at the time, including the effectiveness of the U.S. government's response to this threat. Far right-wing extremist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, the militias, American Renaissance and White Aryan Resistance are profiled. This



book's assessments are still pertinent in light of the resurgence of far right-wing extremist groups in the current era.

David Miller, Jessie Blackbourn, Rani Dhanda and Helen Dexter (Eds.), *Critical Terrorism Studies Since 11 September 2001*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 156 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0415838528.

The contributors to this edited volume are critical of what they term the 'orthodox' terrorism studies approach, which they claim uses 'shoddy' research and lacks academic independence because it is sometimes closely identified with government counterterrorism agencies. To remedy these perceived shortfalls, the volume's chapters cover topics such as an assessment of their own findings since 9/11, the roles of drones in counterterrorism, the reliance on 'false positives' in the UK's preemptive counterterrorism measures, an assessment of the UK's attempts to reach out to 'suspect communities' (e.g., the British Irish and Muslim communities), and a concluding discussion of whether the category of 'terrorism' improves or impedes our intellectual understanding of a certain type of violence (p. 121).

Andrew Mumford and Bruno C. Reis, (Eds.), *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 176 pp., US \$ 150.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-83690-6.

The contributors to this edited volume assess the contributions of 'warrior-scholars' who had developed significant theories that shaped the doctrine and practice of counter-insurgency (as well as counter-terrorism) over the years. These 'warrior-scholars' include Charles E. Callwell, David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Moshe Dayan, Frank Kitson, David Kilcullen, and David Petraeus.

Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, *The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works, and Why It Fails*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. 140 pp., US \$ 158.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415545266.

An insightful account of how terrorism, even in its nihilistic variety, is a strategy by a weaker group as a violent means to achieve its objectives. Thus, in the authors' view, even relatively small-scale attacks that are able to inflict a psychological impact on their targeted audiences can be considered to be successful from the terrorists' idiosyncratic perspective. The authors note, however, that true success for a terrorist group involves 'gaining legitimacy' for their cause by "exploit[ing] the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message in order to seek to broaden support, often through the media and political front organizations." (p. 95) The authors conclude that effective counterterrorism, as a result, requires identifying their terrorist adversary's motivations, intentions and modus operandi in order to respond to them with specific and tailored countermeasures, including effectively incorporating civil liberties into such campaigns.

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Colin Murray Parkes, (Ed.), *Responses to Terrorism: Can Psychological Approaches Break the Cycle of Violence?* New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 280 pages, US\$170.00 [Hardcover], US\$53.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415706247.

The contributors to this highly interesting edited volume draw on the discipline of psychology to explain the origins of extremism and terrorism, the nature of governments' responses to terrorist attacks, and how to break the cycle of terrorism through effective utilization of conflict resolution approaches. The chapters cover topics such as the psychology of extremism, group identity and the roots of terrorism, the roots of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Rwanda, and the roles of schools, universities, the media, leaders, and others in helping to break the cycle of terrorist violence. The concluding chapter synthesizes the findings and offers recommendations for new thinking on these issues.

Suvendrini Perera and Antonio Traverso, (Eds.). *Living Through Terror: (Post) Trauma, (Post) Conflict and the South*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 176 pp., US \$ 140.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0415614474.

The contributors to this edited volume examine how the phenomenon of terrorism impacts the daily lives of its affected populations, many of whom become internally displaced refugees. What makes this volume special is its focus on the impact of terrorist conflicts on the populations outside the West, in particular the Philippines, South Africa, East Timor



and Aceh (Indonesia), and Fiji, although it also covers some Western theatres of terror such as Italy.

Mark Phythian (Ed.) *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 184 pp., US \$ 135.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0415811750.

The contributors to this innovative volume in intelligence studies examine the history and evolution of the intelligence cycle, including alternative ways of conceptualizing the intelligence process. The volume's chapters cover topics such as the move from the intelligence cycle to Internet-based intelligence, and using the intelligence cycle in the corporate world and in intelligence-led policing. The concluding chapter discusses applying intelligence theory to broaden the focus of the intelligence cycle, for instance in being able to use intelligence methods not only to identify and thwart impending terrorist plots but to "help focus work to prevent radicalization and enhance community cohesion." (p. 143)

Kacper Rekawek, *Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics: A Comparative Study of the Official and the Provisional IRA*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 208 pp., US \$ 150.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 48.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-13-882544-4.

A highly interesting account of the history of the two primary Irish republican terrorist groups, and the impact of certain developments in their histories on how their differing political beliefs and armed militancy evolved over the years.

David C. Rapoport, (Ed.). *Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science – Volume I: The First or Anarchist Wave; Volume II: The Second or Anti-Colonial Wave; Volume III: The Third or New Left Wave; Volume IV: The Fourth or Religious Wave*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. 2,376 pp., US \$ 1,530.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9780415316507.

This is one of the most comprehensive and indispensable collections of academic scholarship, bringing together seminal analyses published on the history of modern terrorism. The collection's 85 chapters are organized around the editor's widely adopted notion of the 'four historical waves of modern terrorism' (which is discussed in Chapter 64 in Volume IV), with the four volumes corresponding to each of the successive four waves. As explained by the editor, "A number of recurring themes are examined, such as the rise and fall of organizations, changes in purposes and tactics, counter-terrorism, civil liberties, international contexts and geographies" (Vol. I, p. xxvii). With so many new developments occurring since the collection's 2006 publication in terrorism, counterterrorism and the academic literature on these issues, it is hoped that a fifth volume will eventually be published that will cover the fifth historical wave of terrorism. The compiler is the founder and principal editor of *Terrorism and Political Violence*, the most highly regarded journal in the field of terrorism studies. The only drawback to this series of four volumes is its astronomical price which places it beyond the budget of students who would profit most of it.

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Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke, (Eds.), *Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 272 pages, US\$150.00 [Hardcover], US\$49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415532426.

The contributors to this edited volume comprehensively examine all the significant issues that need to be addressed in securing an Olympic event from potential terrorist attacks. The volume's chapters discuss the history of terrorist threats against Olympic games, beginning with the 1972 Munich Olympics, the types of terrorist threats that need to be considered by security planners, al Qaeda's possible intentions to attack an Olympic event, and understanding terrorist target selection, as well as the response measures that need to be considered, such as securing the transport system, implementing an effective surveillance security system, the role of the private security industry in securing such sites, the challenge of inter-agency coordination in managing all aspects of security, and future trends in terrorist threats against the Olympic games. The volume was written with an eye on the Olympic summer games in London in 2012, where security was both costly and effective.

Peter Romaniuk, *Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 240 pp., US \$ 140.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 35.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415776479.

An account of the effectiveness of multilateral responses to terrorism by international organizations such as the United Nations, and the conditions that facilitate or hinder individual states to cooperate in defeating the terrorist threat. With the introductory chapter laying the groundwork by defining and analyzing the nature of multilateral counter-terrorism, the book's chapters discuss issues such as historical precedents for such cooperation, which began with the League of Nations' cooperation in countering anarchist terrorism, and its evolution in the form of the United Nations from 1945 to 2001, and then following 9/11 to the present day. The concluding chapters discuss future trends in multilateral counter-terrorism, including possibly moving beyond the UN.

Ben Sheppard, *The Psychology of Strategic Terrorism: Public and Government Responses to Attack*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. 262 pp., US \$ 155.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415578103.

A highly original, conceptually innovative examination of the psychological impact of terrorism on its intended victims, particularly a targeted society's civilian population. Also discussed are how such targeted publics respond to the terrorist attacks and the measures governments need to adopt to build up their populations' resilience to terrorism. The chapters present an overview of the various disciplines utilized in the study of international relations, psychiatry and psychology. They also analyze case studies of Israel and the Scud missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War, Aum Shinrikyo's March 1995 Tokyo sarin attack, al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks, the September 2001 anthrax attacks, and Israel and the Second Palestinian Intifada. The final chapter discusses the study's key assumptions, evidence from two further cases, the contribution of the study's findings to key fields, and policy recommendations.

Asaf Siniver (Ed.), *International Terrorism Post-9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 256 pp., US \$ 150.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415622189.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the effectiveness of counterterrorism campaigns by governments around the world in the post-9/11 era. The chapters cover topics such as responses to radicalization into violent extremism and terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, and the counterterrorism campaigns by America, Australia, India, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom, as well as various Southeast Asian governments.

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G. Davidson Smith, *Combating Terrorism*. [Routledge Revivals] New York, NY: Routledge, 1990/2011. 324 pp. US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 42.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0415615310.

First published in 1990 when it became a classic in the field of counterterrorism studies, it remains an indispensable analysis on how to understand the terrorist threat and the components that constitute effective counterterrorism. The volume's chapters discuss the nature of the terrorist threat in terms of its motivations, aims and strategies, and the components of counterterrorism in terms of the philosophical foundations for the use of force, counterterrorism's direct (active) and indirect (passive) measures, the resources and capabilities that need to be assembled to counter terrorism, and the factors required for effective decision-making and crisis-management. Numerous case studies are provided, such as a comparative survey of counterterrorism campaigns by the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Andrew T.H. Tan (Ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 288 pp., US \$ 305.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 67.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-85743-579-5.

First published in 2006, this comprehensive handbook consists of essays written by academic experts in the field on various aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism, an A-Z glossary of major terrorist groups and incidents, maps of terrorist conflict zones, statistics on different types of terrorist incidents (by region, target and tactic), and a select bibliography. Although now dated, the handbook remains indispensable as a reference resource with its essays on the history of modern terrorism, the evolution of terrorist weapons and tactics, ethnic-based terrorism, left- and right-wing terrorism, religion and terrorism, state terrorism, and counterterrorism.

Edgar B. Tembo, *US-UK Counter-Terrorism After 9/11: A Qualitative Approach*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 176 pp. US \$ 135.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-64378-8.

A conceptually innovative comparative examination of the effectiveness of counterterrorism campaigns by the United Kingdom and the United States in the post-9/11 era. The volume's chapters focus on three policy instruments in their counterterrorism campaigns: the use of intelligence, law enforcement and military measures.

Mattia Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya and American Intervention in the Middle East*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 214 pp., US \$ 130.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-68501-6.

A highly interesting account of the formative origins of United States' counterterrorism during the Reagan administration in the 1980s. The volume's chapters discuss significant milestones in the development of U.S. counterterrorism, beginning with the 1979 Iranian revolution's mobilization of Lebanese Shi'ite elements, which eventually led to the U.S. involvement in the Lebanese civil war, the formation of the influential Bush Task Force on Combating Terrorism, and America's pre-emptive strikes to counter the Libyan regime's engagement in terrorism. The concluding chapter assesses the legacies of some of those counterterrorism policies with current American campaigns.

Harmonie Toros, *Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 256 pp., US \$ 135.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-68392-0.

Drawing on the author's extensive field research, this is an important conceptual and empirical account of the crucial role of negotiating with terrorists as a way of transforming terrorist violence into more constructive non-violent ways to achieve their objectives. The case studies of talking to terrorists in Northern Ireland and in Mindanao are employed to demonstrate the author's thesis.

Stephen Vertigans, *The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and Processes*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 226 pp., US \$ 165.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 52.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-57266-8.

This book is an innovative application of sociological research to examine terrorism in all its manifestations. The volume's chapters discuss how the sociological approach contributes to the study of the origins of terrorism, the violent 'dispositions' that create terrorists, the roles of groups in mobilizing individuals into terrorism, the processes of group dynamics that sustain terrorist groups, the rationale behind terrorist attacks and targeting, and how terrorism ends either through defeat or disengagement by a group's members from terrorism. Numerous case studies examine these issues.

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Martin I. Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter-Insurgency, Politics and Internal Security*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. 206 pp., US \$ 158.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-54518-1.

Although published in 2008, the recent escalation of the domestic terrorist threat in China's Xinjiang region makes this book's comprehensive, authoritative and detailed analysis highly relevant to the current era. The volume's chapters discuss the nature of the Islamist insurgency in Xinjiang, the components of China's counterterrorism campaign, including its waging of the 'war of ideas' to reshape society in Xinjiang, and an assessment of the strategic and tactical effectiveness of China's overall response measures.

Leonard Weinberg, *Democracy and Terrorism: Friend or Foe?* New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 136 pp., US \$ 152.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 39.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-77034-7.

A highly insightful and original account by a veteran academic analyst about the relationship between democratic governments and the origins and management of politically-motivated terrorism that threatens them. The volume's chapters discuss the history of terrorism against democratic states beginning in the 19th century, as well as during the 'third wave' from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the use of terrorism in the Arab Spring, which began in 2011, and the relationship between terrorist violence and democratic governments' rule of law, which is posed as a question of "If democracies are vulnerable to terrorist violence, what changes, if any, do they have to make in order to cope with this danger?" (p. 79) The author's conclusion is pessimistic: "terrorism in the first-wave democracies may approach something like the 'cost of doing

business,' while terrorism in the more recent democracies may be symptomatic of serious problems that place the democratic order itself in jeopardy" (p. 103).

David J. Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader*. [Fourth Edition] New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 368 pp., US \$ 140.00 [Hardcover], US\$45.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-68732-4.

This is a comprehensive and authoritative introductory overview of terrorism and counterterrorism, drawing its material from a variety of sources. This updated and revised edition is divided into three parts: characteristics of terrorism (e.g., defining terrorism, motivation for terrorism and terrorist conflicts around the world), significant terrorist conflict zones (e.g., jihadi insurgents, the United Kingdom, Israel, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Spain, Algeria, Germany, and Italy), and the components of counterterrorism (e.g., ethical and legal issues, campaigns and strategies).

Mark P. Worrell, *Terror: Social, Political, and Economic Perspectives*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 78 pp., US \$ 10.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-415-52032-4.

Part of the publisher's new series of concise "thinking frames" on significant current issues, this monograph discusses the sociological basis of terrorism, the nature of counterterrorism, what the author terms 'the business of security' (i.e., the ever-growing 'counterterrorist-industrial complex') and the 'terror of empire and the empire of terror.' Although one may not agree with some of the author's assumptions, the critical issues that are raised are worth considering.

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Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape

By Tricia Bacon

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/357/html>

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As for the answer to your question, why did we join Al Qaeda? We say, why shouldn't we join Al Qaeda? God ordered us to be united, to be allied, to cooperate and fight against the idolaters in straight lines.... We are a jihadi ancestral community.

—Abelmalek Droukdal, leader of al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), on his group's 2006 alliance with al-Qaida

By 2005, the predominant Algerian Sunni terrorist group, the GSPC, was a shadow of its former self. After two amnesties and more than a decade of conflict, its decimated ranks were pursuing a cause that no longer resonated with the war-weary Algerian public. Once an existential threat to the state, the jihadist insurgency operated largely as a law and order problem relegated to the outskirts of the country. Newly radicalized Algerian militants gravitated to the insurgency against the United States in Iraq, rather than join the discredited cause at home.^[1] Surrendering members reported that the group's fighters struggled to survive on rations and lived in desolate conditions.^[2]

Then, on the five-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida appointed the GSPC as its affiliate in North Africa. Shortly thereafter, the newly minted al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) unleashed a violent campaign that shattered the Algerian Government's claims that the insurgency was on the verge of defeat. AQIM adopted al-Qaida's modus operandi of suicide operations, which increased the lethality and reach of its attacks. It struck high profile targets, like the United Nations building in the heart of the Algerian capital, a locale considered secure against the group's traditional bombings and ambushes.^[3] AQIM expanded its safe haven and smuggling activities in the Sahel region, and members outside its traditional Algerian base joined the group.^[4] Significant credit for AQIM's rejuvenation went to its alliance with al-Qaida.^[5]

AQIM's post-alliance transformation reflects the fact that allying with another terrorist organization creates opportunities for groups to bolster their operational effectiveness, range, and efficiency as well as enhance their legitimacy and stature; sometimes it even allows them to re-invent their image.^[6] Like the increased destruction produced by AQIM's adoption of the tactic of suicide operations following its alliance with al-Qaida, terrorist groups with



allies conduct more deadly attacks, resulting in a higher average number of fatalities and injuries to both victims and attackers alike.[7] In addition, alliances increase terrorist groups' longevity and make them more resilient. For example, terrorist organizations with allies are 50 percent less likely to disband or collapse following leadership decapitation than those without them.[8]

Terrorist alliances clearly pose a threat; however, they remain rare.[9] For example, the apex of cooperation—a joint operation involving allied groups—occurred in less than one percent of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2007.[10] The paucity of alliances reflect the hurdles that terrorist groups face when attempting to forge credible commitments.[11] All entities allying in an anarchic environment face obstacles, but terrorist groups' secretive and illicit nature exacerbates them and thereby makes alliances more difficult. Terrorist groups also face additional barriers because of their strong in-group identification and insular qualities.[12] As a result, terrorist organizations struggle to form alliances.

These obstacles shed some light on why terrorist alliances occur infrequently, but fail to explain the puzzling distribution of terrorist alliances. Terrorist alliances tend to form in closely-knit clusters or cliques of cooperating organizations with a small number of groups acting as focal points.[13] Such alliance hubs are, in essence, an anomaly among anomalies. Hubs exhibit an unusual propensity to overcome the collaboration hurdles that stymie most groups. In addition, their activity accounts for a disproportionate number of these dangerous relationships. But why are alliance hubs so effective at forming these partnerships? Why do other groups seek hubs as partners?

Counterterrorism officials and terrorist groups themselves, i.e. the GSPC's justification of its relationship with al-Qaida, often attribute alliance behavior to shared ideologies and common enemies.[14] Alliances are indeed strongly correlated with both.[15] However, the rarity of terrorist group alliances is inconsistent with these ideational or instrumental motives. If ideological solidarity or common enemies stimulated alliances, they should occur more frequently, and alliances should form where none exist. In addition, neither explanation can account for the timing or duration of terrorist alliances. For instance, the GSPC shared an ideology as well as enemies with al-Qaida for years before "God ordered" them to unite.

Given the danger posed by alliance hubs, governments need to better understand what causes them. Overall, the dearth of well-developed theories that explain international terrorist alliance behavior, particularly compared to intra-conflict or inter-state alliances, has stunted efforts to disrupt and prevent these dangerous relationships. Not surprisingly, governments have had little success against international terrorist alliances, even though disrupting them has been a priority for over a decade. Government action has not severed any of the alliances involving the premiere contemporary alliance hub, al-Qaida, even though as early as 2003, the U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy asserted: "[t]he interconnected nature of terrorist organizations necessitates that we pursue them across the geographic spectrum to ensure that all linkages between the strong and the weak organizations are broken, leaving each of them isolated, exposed, and vulnerable to defeat." [16] For example, the public break between al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) earlier this year was caused by internal disagreements about the scope of ISIS's mission and its tensions with another al-Qaida ally, al-Nusrah Front. Though the ISIS-al-Qaida alliance was plagued with problems from the outset, governments proved unable to exploit these fissures.[17] If governments understand alliance hubs' appeal and their vulnerability, they can better identify when alliances may occur and more effectively intervene.

This article provides an excerpt of the findings in my dissertation "Strange Bedfellows or Brothers-in-Arms: Why Terrorist Groups Ally," forthcoming with the University of Pennsylvania Press. In it, I propose a theory of international terrorist alliance formation and sustainment based on a combination of organizational theory and constructivism. Using qualitative methods, including within-case comparisons, cross-case comparisons, and process tracing of nine international terrorist dyads between 1968 to 2011 and two hubs' alliance behavior, I argue that organizational learning and adaptation needs motivate alliance searches, while identity, particularly ideology, constrains partner selection and helps partnering groups to build trust. Furthermore, I find that alliance sustainment hinges on organizational need fit between partners, the nature of the organizational needs driving the alliance, as well as partners' ability to forge a shared identity.

This article focuses more narrowly on my dissertation's findings on alliance hubs, specifically why these organizations attract numerous partners. It begins by discussing the obstacles and benefits to terrorist alliances. It then defines international terrorist alliances and situates them within the alliance literature. Next, it delves into what constitutes an

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alliance hub—groups that demonstrate anomalous success in attracting partners and forging alliances, thereby increasing the terrorist threat. It proceeds by discussing how existing theories offer little insight into their behavior before proposing an alternative explanation for why terrorist alliances cluster around hubs. In the interest of space, this article selectively draws on the dissertation's alliance hub case studies to illustrate its arguments, rather than providing the full case studies. Instead of being a product of common ideology or shared threats, alliance hubs acquire their positions because of their willingness and ability to fulfill others' organizational adaptation and learning needs as well as by possessing identity traits that make them acceptable partners to numerous other groups. The article concludes by discussing follow-on research on alliance hubs and the implications that flow from these findings.

Defining International Terrorist Alliances

International relations scholar Ole Holsti contended that “[a]lliances are apparently a universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time and place.”[18] As fundamentally political actors, this applies to terrorist groups. However, beyond agreement on its political dimension, terrorism is a notoriously difficult concept to define, and debates persist about the appropriate use of the term.[19] At a minimum, an act of terrorism generally contains three components: 1) political aims and motives; 2) violence or threats of violence; and 3) intended psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target.[20] Terrorist organizations include entities that consistently employ such violence with some defined membership, chain of command, command and control mechanisms, and in-group identity.

Alliances consist of relationships of security cooperation between terrorist groups that involve mutual expectations of coordination or consultation in the future.[21] Such relationships are distinct from the more prevalent forms of low-level collaboration between individuals who do not represent organizations or ad hoc organizational cooperation without shared expectations for future cooperation. While these other forms of cooperation pose fewer hurdles and thus may be more common, alliances offer opportunities for deeper and more sustained exchanges, and therefore, can pose a greater threat.

International alliances refer to partnerships between terrorist groups that emerge from political markets that cross state and/or conflict boundaries. After the internationalization of terrorism, terrorist groups increasingly forged alliances with one another within the anarchic international system.[22] While international terrorist alliances have received less scholarly attention than intra-conflict or inter-state alliances, they have produced some of the most prolific terrorist attacks and defined the terrorist threat for the past decade. Beyond al-Qaida's abundant alliances, notorious examples include the Japanese Red Army's attack on Lod Airport in Tel Aviv in 1972, as well as the coordinated kidnapping and hijacking in 1977 by the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Significantly, the PFLP, JRA, and RAF were not rivals within a shared conflict, so they did not compete in the same primary political and resource market. Well-known examples of intra-conflict relations include the perpetual jockeying between Afghan *mujahidin* factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the constantly shifting alliances among militant Palestinian factions. International terrorist alliances differ from intra-conflict relations among violent non-state actors in important respects that necessitate separate theorizing and empirical work about the causes of their alliance behavior. A shared political market creates a competitive dynamic, particularly as groups proliferate over time due to group fractionalization. Competitor terrorist organizations thus constantly maneuver for primacy, and this affects their behavior, including alliances, in a variety of ways.[23] For example, competition influences the tempo and scale of violence as well as the tactics that competitor groups employ, such as suicide attacks.[24] In competitive situations, groups increase the pace or broaden the scope of their attacks, as Kydd and Walter claim that, “outbidding should occur when multiple groups are competing for the allegiance of a similar demographic base of support.”[25]

Rival groups operating within a shared conflict seek to acquire their share of resources, power, and position at the expense of one another, thus engaging in cooperation selectively, carefully, and briefly. While not all conflicts involving multiple terrorist groups reach the threshold of a civil war, Fontini Christia's work on alliance behavior within multiple party civil wars parallels what occurs in many conflicts with multiple terrorist groups. Alliances within a conflict fluctuate based on groups' assessments of relative power position vis-à-vis one another.[26] Unless one group is powerful enough to win outright or has a monopoly in the conflict, the within-

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conflict alliance terrain constantly shifts in response to changes in power, including defections, betrayals, group fracturing, and losses on the battlefield, detentions or targeted killings. Alliances thus tend to be tactical and temporary, governed by a desire to acquire the maximum resources as part of the smallest-winning coalition, as long as the risk of exploitation by stronger parties in that coalition is manageable.[27] In other words, power considerations trump all others. Power calculi not only subsume identity considerations, group leaders and elites actively manipulate identity narratives to suit their instrumental needs.[28]

In contrast, my research focuses on relations among dyads of terrorist organizations that operate in different primary conflicts and political markets, where relative power considerations do not readily apply.[29] While some scholarship distinguishes between domestic and international terrorist attacks, much of the work on terrorist alliances does not differentiate between these two types of alliances.[30] However, objectives such as creating alliances to establish the smallest-winning coalitions or determining relative power position do not transfer to non-competitive, international relationships.[31] Because they do not compete in the same political market, non-competitors can share assets, even members, funds, and safe haven, without the same concerns that doing so will negatively affect their position relative to one another. They need not worry that resources or skills shared today will be used against them tomorrow. Rather than vying for the same resources in a zero-sum environment, resources among non-rivals can have a positive-sum value. As a result, theories must account for these differences in order to understand international terrorist alliances and alliance hubs in particular.

Impediments and Benefits of Alliances

Even though terrorist groups can accrue benefits through alliances, they struggle to forge credible commitments, an essential ingredient for alliances. By design, most terrorist organizations are insular, secretive, and lack the requisite transparency to assure their partners that they intend to honor future promises and obligations.[32] With uncertain and often short lifespans, few have the requisite shadow of the future to make attempting cooperation worth the risk.[33] To compound these problems, terrorist groups often lack reputations as trustworthy partners.[34] Terrorist groups cannot overcome mutual distrust by creating institutions to bind themselves to agreements, as states do. Nor can they enter into contracts enforceable by an outside institution, like a firm. Thus, both sides have incentives to use cooperation opportunistically to improve their own security and then defect before reciprocating. Meanwhile, adversaries seek to exploit these fears to undermine cooperative relationships and weaken partnering organizations.[35]

At least four other major hurdles compound these problems. First, terrorist groups can be particularly leery of the security-autonomy tradeoff, in which an organization exchanges some independence for the improved security offered by the alliance partner. For groups with strong in-group identities, relinquishing autonomy can provoke internal dissension and thereby create instability within the partnering groups.[36] Second, partnering with another terrorist organization sometimes generates additional counterterrorism pressure as adversary governments respond to the threat posed by the alliance.[37] Third, groups risk discrediting themselves in the eyes of their real or perceived constituents, which can range from the international community to local support bases, with their ally choices or if their allies engage in behavior unacceptable to key audiences.[38] Lastly, and of the greatest concern to terrorist organizations, alliances increase the possibility of betrayals or leaks as they expand the circle of people with knowledge of groups' activities and members.

The obstacles to alliances discussed raise the question: what could groups acquire through an alliance that would warrant undertaking such risks? In a RAND study on terrorist interactions, Kim Cragin et al. explained that "interactions allow terrorist groups to elevate the threat that they pose to state governments by sharing 'best practices' and therefore multiplying their own efforts with the knowledge and know-how from other militant groups."[39] Alliances offer avenues for groups to acquire new capability, expand their capacity or conduct activities more efficiently.[40] Groups can train one another in new skills and teach one another improved techniques. An ally may improve its partner's ability to acquire resources and materiel, like weapons or documents. For instance, the West German Red Army Faction approached Fatah in 1970 primarily to access weapons that were not readily available in West Germany.[41] Allies can offer facilitation or logistical assistance to allow their partners access to previously denied areas or more secure routes where they currently transit.



Allied groups can also help one another to withstand counterterrorism pressure and regroup after losses. Groups that control territory or have unfettered access to a sanctuary can extend safe haven to their partners—a particularly coveted resource during rebuilding phases. Without its allies in Pakistan, it is unlikely that al-Qaida could have survived the United States' invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent fall of the Taliban. Under some circumstances, alliances offer intangible benefits, such as improved credibility, legitimacy, and prestige, which can translate into assets like recruits or funds. Groups can project themselves as part of a broader movement by allying with another terrorist organization, a particularly valuable asset when the resonance of the original cause begins to wane. In sum, by allying with another organization, groups can access assets that may otherwise be unavailable. Under some conditions, the potential benefits warrant the risks. For some groups, the resources and skills acquired through an alliance can be the difference between survival and extinction or between victory and defeat.

Alliance Hubs

Rather than being evenly distributed among dyads, terrorist alliances often form closely-knit clusters with a group or groups operating at the center of each cluster.[42] In that respect, terrorist groups' alliances bear similarities to businesses and military innovation patterns. Strategic blocks refer to firms that "are tied to each other more densely" than most businesses and rooted at the center of networks.[43] Similarly, critical nodes operate at the center of military innovation networks.[44] Likewise, alliance hubs act as focal points for terrorist partnerships around which other groups and relationships orbit.

This phenomenon—alliance hubs—has previously been observed among terrorist organizations, though it has not been explicitly identified and studied as such. Following the internationalization of terrorism in 1968 and accompanying proliferation of terrorist ties across national boundaries, some speculated that this collaboration was a state-driven phenomenon, a conspiracy hatched by the Soviet Union and the allied Communist bloc to coordinate terrorist groups' efforts against the West.[45] While the Soviet Union sponsored some terrorist groups—including one of the most influential alliance hubs in the 1970s, the PFLP's Special Operations Group, discussed below—it did not manage relationships among them.[46]

Instead, alliance hubs, particularly the PFLP and Fatah, operated at the epic center of the enhanced cooperation. In his quantitative examination of terrorist relationships in 1979, scholar Kent Layne Oots concluded that some groups acted as "major powers" providing aid and resources to others, primarily those of "similar ideological orientation." [47] Similarly, in his trenchant examination of al-Qaida, journalist Jason Burke likened the group's alliance behavior to a great power. He argued that al-Qaida acted similarly to the United States or Soviet Union during the Cold War in terms of its alliance behavior within the Sunni Islamic militant milieu.[48] Alliance hubs act as focal point organizations around which numerous alliances orbit and to which other terrorist groups are drawn. They demonstrate an exceptional ability to work closely with numerous partners and to maintain those relationships.

Alliance hubs can operate on a regional level or an international level. Regional-level hubs ally with fellow terrorist groups that are concentrated in a geographically contiguous area or in a grouping of countries with some overarching shared historical, cultural or linguistic qualities. For example, Hezbollah has acted as a regional alliance hub in the Middle East, more specifically in the Levant. A regional-level alliance hub often has the advantage of proximity, a common language or overarching shared ethnic identity. A regional hub may have relationships outside of the region, but it serves as a focal point of a regionally-based cluster. An international-level hub's relationships are not limited to any particular region; instead, they are transnational, drawing in groups from various states and regions. Fewer bases for a common identity exist, as do linguistic and cultural barriers as well as informational and access hurdles. International hubs are, not surprisingly, quite rare and extremely influential, when they do occur.

Alliance hubs' existence poses a puzzle in light of the obstacles to cooperative relationships. Alliances are the exceptions. Generally, terrorist groups struggle to form international alliances due to structural, organizational, and ideological hurdles, not to mention the geographic distance. Yet some organizations forge a disproportionate number of alliances. Hubs are, in essence, an anomaly of an anomaly; their alliance success defies expectations about the rarity of such partnerships and obstacles to them. Alliance hubs are by definition



deviant cases in that they show a surprising propensity to form alliances.[49] Their existence raises a host of questions, central among them: why do they attract other terrorist organizations as partners?

One component of my dissertation involved delving into this question by conducting comparative case studies involving two alliance hubs: al-Qaida and the PFLP. Much of the scholarship on al-Qaida's experience as an alliance hub focuses on its unique characteristics in ways that do not shed light on the broader phenomenon.[50] Moreover, this overlooks the fact that al-Qaida is not the first alliance hub, nor will it be the last. Given the rarity of alliance hubs, the threat they pose, and the need to move beyond correlations to determine the causal pathways, my dissertation employed a qualitative methodological approach to this puzzle. Quantitative research demonstrates, for example, a strong correlation between alliances and both common ideologies and shared enemies, but does not illuminate the causal process by which these variables produce alliances or alliance hubs.[51]

Hubs with international reach, as opposed to regional hubs, are simultaneously the rarest and the most difficult to explain theoretically, given the obstacles to cooperation and the propensity for relationships to form between proximate groups.[52] Therefore, I employed a cross case comparison coupled with within case process tracing in order to engage in both theory building and testing.[53] As mentioned earlier, in order to forge a broader theory of international terrorist alliance formation and alliance sustainment, my dissertation also examined nine terrorist dyads involving alliance hubs, selected based on their variation on the independent variables discussed below. This article focuses on a sub-component of the dissertation: determining the how and why of alliance hubs.

I conducted comparative case studies of two international alliance hubs—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and al-Qaida—selected based on their variation on three independent variables discussed below: threat, ideology, and organizational structure. The two groups' alliance hub tenures did not overlap and they operated under different international systems, as the PFLP was a hub from 1969 to 1979 during the Cold War bi-polar system, while al-Qaida's time as an alliance hub began in the early-1990s and occurred under the unipolar, United States-dominated system. While both defined their enemies expansively, they faced different threats, as al-Qaida insisted that the United States was its primary threat, while Israel posed the greatest threat to the PFLP. In addition, they hailed from different ideologies. The PFLP was a Marxist, leftist organization with a clear ethno-nationalist streak, while al-Qaida adhered to a Sunni jihadist ideology and sought to transcend nationalism.

Lastly, in contrast to the conventional explanations that point to ideology and enemies, this article proposes an organizational theory-based explanation for alliance hubs. Therefore, I selected hubs with organizational variation, including size and structure, as a proxy for the organizational needs theory discussed below. Al-Qaida[54] operated solely as a terrorist group with a few hundred members, while the PFLP's complex organizational structure included a political party and non-terrorist functions as well as thousands of followers.[55] Thus, the two selected hubs exhibited variation on each of the independent variables discussed in the next section, which offered an opportunity to test which theories elucidate how they developed into alliance hubs.

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Theoretical Frameworks and Findings

To date, much of the work on international terrorist alliances assumes the groups' motives for allying. The existing literature and prevailing wisdom frequently assert that common enemies or shared ideologies motivate relationships, yet remain silent on the many instances when these factors exist, but do not produce an alliance. For example, in a monograph examining technology transfers between terrorist organizations, "Sharing the Dragon's Teeth," Cragin et al. justified their selection of three dyads of international terrorist cooperation: 1) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other Sunni Islamist groups in Southeast Asia; 2) Hezbollah and Palestinian militant organizations; and 3) the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) as follows:

JI shares an ideological worldview and overarching objective with other Islamist militant groups in Southeast Asia. We therefore expected that JI's rationale for engaging in technology exchanges would be ideologically driven. Hezbollah and most Palestinian militants, however, derive from different, albeit Islamic, ideologies. With regard to Hezbollah's rationale, we therefore estimated that it would be driven more by its enmity toward Israel than by religious ideology. Finally, we expected that PIRA and FARC would represent the most disparate ideological worldviews, exchanging technologies exclusively for profit.[56]



Their goal was to select relationships that stemmed from different motives to test their theory on technology transfers. In so doing, they assumed the relationship motives post hoc based on shared characteristics. This example is not intended as a criticism of these authors or their work, which was not focused on explaining alliances, but to illustrate the tendency even for scholars to assign the reasons for these relationships, rather than to explore them.

Moreover, the processes by which these frequently cited variables produce and sustain alliances are rarely articulated. What constitutes shared ideologies or enemies is frequently applied in an elastic way, fitted to explain the presence or absence of a partnership on a case-by-case basis with little consistency or predictive accuracy. It remains unclear how common enemies and threats should be weighed or what level of ideological compatibility is necessary for organizations to ally. It is even less clear how these variables would produce an alliance hub. Therefore, after exploring the inadequacy of these theories, this article offers an alternative framework for understanding alliance hubs, rooted in organizational theory and coupled with constructivism.

Responding to Threat

Like intra-conflict alliances, the robust inter-state alliance literature offers little insight into understanding international terrorist alliance behavior. Much of the dominant realist paradigm's emphasis on relative power does not apply to international terrorist alliance dynamics, for the reasons discussed above. However, the main existing work that proposes a theory of international terrorist alliances draws on a variation of neo-realism: balance of threat theory. Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory proposes that states ally to balance in response to threat, defined as offensive power, aggregate power, geographic proximity, and perceived aggressive intentions.^[57] Ely Karmon built on Walt's theory and proposed that terrorist groups in the international arena unite when they feel threatened and share a perception of the nature of a threat from the international system.^[58]

Terrorist groups, including alliance hubs, sometimes invoke this rationale to explain their alliance behavior, and quantitative research demonstrates that groups with a shared target have a higher probability of working together.^[59] The idea that the "Crusader-Zionist" threat required unity underlain bin Laden's numerous exhortations to Sunni terrorist groups to ally with al-Qaida.^[60] The GSPC's declaration of its alliance with al-Qaida also alluded to the need to ally with a hub to balance against a shared threat.

The destruction of war, the difficulty of the present situation, and the unified coalition of our enemies against us make it necessary for us to confront this coalition with our own coalition, their alliance with our alliance, face their unified forces against our unified forces... The United States of America will only be defeated by a United States of Islam... [I]t became clear to us that our brothers in Al-Qaida organization under the lead of Mujahid Shaykh Usama Bin Laden—may Allah protect him—are the best ones in this era to unify the scattered Muslims against their enemies and to lead them in their present war.^[61]

By extension, this theoretical framework would posit that alliance hubs emerge to form a counter-balancing coalition in response to threat. From a balancing perspective, this makes intuitive sense. Terrorist groups operate at a power disadvantage vis-à-vis their enemies and thus seek partners to help balance against the threat. Groups feeling similarly threatened by the distribution of power in the international system should then flock to hubs.

In the case of al-Qaida, this theory predicts that the threat from the United States' hegemony encouraged its emergence as an alliance hub and attracted terrorist groups that shared its perception of the threat from the United States.^[62] However, an examination of al-Qaida's alliance hub experience as well as that of the PFLP quickly reveals deficiencies in this theory. Following the United States' deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia in 1991, the nascent al-Qaida shifted its attention from Communist forces and identified the United States as its greatest threat. This corresponded with the Soviet Union's downfall and the emergence of a unipolar international system with the United States as the sole super power. As al-Qaida burgeoned as an organization and an alliance hub simultaneously, it propagated the view that the United States was the primary threat to prospective allies.

However, few fellow Sunni terrorist organizations shared this perception when al-Qaida developed into an alliance hub, as most focused on nationalist causes and the threat posed by their respective governments.^[63] Like al-Qaida, they opposed the United States and the world order under its hegemony, but the United States was not the primary threat,



or in some cases, a direct threat at all. For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Egyptian Islamic Group saw Cairo as their greatest threat.[64] Likewise, the Algeria Armed Islamic Group faced a clear threat from Algiers, a conflict in which the United States played a minimal role and thus posed no threat.[65] Yet all three groups allied with al-Qaida in the early 1990s, helping to elevate it into an alliance hub.[66] Therefore, al-Qaida developed into an alliance hub during a period in which most of its allies did not share its threat perception.[67]

Moreover, it cooperated only temporarily with groups that shared its perception of the threat from the United States during the early 1990s, to include Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed and Hezbollah, but did not forge full alliances with these actors.[68] Threat cannot explain this failure to ally or the short duration of their cooperation. More importantly, if threat motivated al-Qaida to become an alliance hub and attracted partners, its coalition would have included these groups, which shared its threat perception. Instead, its alliance network predominantly included fellow Sunni jihadist groups with differing threat perceptions.

In addition, 9/11 and the United States' response to it precipitated a convergence of threat against terrorist organizations to a degree previously unseen. Al-Qaida essentially created a situation whereby the United States posed the threat to terrorist groups, particularly to Sunni terrorist organizations, that al-Qaida long claimed that it did. Yet al-Qaida's alliance position did not commensurately change following this significant threat escalation. For example, immediately following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan—a clear shared threat for all resident groups—both the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and Jund al-Sham declined to ally with al-Qaida. A few years later, Jund al-Sham agreed to ally with al-Qaida and became al-Qaida in Iraq, now known as ISIS and a faction of LIFG merged with al-Qaida.[69] But in the face of a clear shared threat to both groups in Afghanistan, they opted to flee rather than ally with al-Qaida, contrary to what threat-based theories would predict. Post-9/11, al-Qaida added a different type of alliance—the affiliates—but this did not flow from a change in threat. As will be explained below, this reflected the shift in the assets al-Qaida could provide its partners.

Threat's limited explanatory power becomes even more apparent when examining the PFLP case. Israel posed the greatest threat to the PFLP throughout its time as an alliance hub, yet none of the PFLP's international allies faced any direct threat from Israel. Many opposed Israel on ideological grounds, but did not actually experience a threat from it, let alone view it as their greatest threat. Only the PFLP's competitors shared this threat and, as discussed earlier, different dynamics governed their alliance behavior. While the PFLP and its international allies shared a perception that the "imperialist" international system was an underlying cause of their respective threats, numerous organizations that did not ally with the PFLP also held this view. Thus, threat provides minimal insight into the PFLP's ability to develop into or operate as an international alliance hub.

One problem with the threat-based theory is terrorist groups constantly view themselves as threatened by implacable foes. Yet alliance hubs remain rare, as do alliances. In other words, theories of shared threat over predicts the frequency of alliance hubs and international terrorist alliances in general. Similarly, as discussed, both alliance hubs opposed the international system and viewed it as threatening. But this did not differentiate them from most groups operating during their respective eras. Many terrorist groups focus on parochial threats, but they also often see the international system as partially culpable for their grievances. Moreover, the international system configuration does not frequently change and thus the threats posed by it to terrorist groups fail to explain the timing or duration of alliance hubs, including the termination of the PFLP's alliance hub position in 1979, or their relationships.

Ideology: Causing Alliances or Shaping Alliance Behavior?

In addition to threat, shared ideology is also frequently invoked in explanations of terrorist group alliance behavior, with good reason. Quantitative research established that organizations with a shared ideology tend to ally, regardless of ideological orientation.[70] In addition, terrorist groups frequently attribute their alliance behavior to their ideological convictions. To return to the GSPC example, when asked why the GSPC decided to ally with al-Qaida, the GSPC's leader responded that: "[w]e rely on legitimacy (from religion) before anything else as a base of our decisions.[71]

Ideology serves as a lens through which groups view and interpret their environment and is what separates terrorist groups from profit-motivated criminals and other illicit non-state actors.[72] Terrorism expert Daniel Byman described the role of ideology as explaining



"the world's conditions and offering a blueprint for action. Ideology helps individuals formulate, consider and respond to political problems."^[73] In her analysis of left-wing terrorism in Italy, Donatella della Porta similarly found that "[i]deologies operate as facilitating factors, resources or constraints in the formation of actors and in their definition of strategies."^[74] However, the way in which ideology would theoretically function to produce alliances, let alone alliance hubs, remains unclear. No comprehensive theory exists that clearly specifies how ideological solidarity or compatibility causes terrorist alliances, despite the widespread perception that ideology influences terrorist group alliance behavior.

Like the contention that shared threats produce alliance hubs, the inchoate idea that common ideologies produces alliances or hubs faces a number of shortcomings. First, it suggests that alliance hubs should occur far more frequently than they do, as groups often share ideologies, while alliance hubs and alliance writ large remain rare. Like threat, ideological solidarity predicts that alliance hubs should form where they do not exist. Neither can account for the variation in cooperation among different dyads that share comparable levels of common threats or ideological solidarity. Threats and ideology do not often shift significantly during most groups' lifespan, so they cannot readily explain alliances or hubs' timing or duration. Overall, existing theories and conventional wisdom struggle to explain alliances and alliance hubs.

Ideology functions as an integral feature of terrorist groups' identities and thereby shapes alliance behavior. As constructivist scholar Michael Barnett argued, "a 'natural' security partner cannot be derived from material forces alone, for the degree of naturalness is highly dependent on familiarity and identity."^[75] Instead of functioning in the primary causal role that terrorist groups like the GSPC attribute to it, ideology operates as part of identity criteria that guide partner selection and contribute to alliance hubs' appeal as partners. For terrorist organizations in particular, identity ensures organizational loyalty and cohesion. Identity refers to "the understanding of oneself in relationship to others."^[76] Collective identity consists of both an internal and an external component; it binds terrorist groups together and situates them with respect to others. Collective identity provides a "set of norms and narratives that sustain "we-ness" through time."^[77] It functions as the glue binding terrorist groups together.^[78]

Identity affinity guides partner preferences and delineates the boundaries of acceptable alliance partners.^[79] Affinity refers to a sense of mutual identification among groups based on shared identity traits. Groups use identity affinity to evaluate the worthiness and desirability of prospective partners. Identity conditions thinking such that a group seeking an alliance will limit its search to other organizations with which it shares identity traits, primarily ideology, but potentially other identity characteristics, such as enemy narrative or ethnic affinity as well. Groups weigh affinity, either consciously or unconsciously, when they are deciding whether to enter into an alliance. In essence, in order to enter into a partnership, prospective allies must satisfy an identity threshold.

This identity threshold facilitated both alliance hubs' positions because they possessed salient identity features in their respective eras, and thus numerous other groups viewed them as acceptable partners. In particular, they adhered to ideologies that defined the terrorist landscape during their time. During the PFLP's tenure as an alliance hub, fellow militant leftist organizations were active in every hemisphere, identified as the third wave of modern terrorism by David Rapoport.^[80] For its part, al-Qaida emerged from the broader Islamist revival and the militant Sunni offshoots of that movement, particularly following the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s. Thus, they had numerous ideological brethren, accepted many as partners, and conversely, these groups tended to view them as suitable allies.

While terrorist groups' identities consist of more than just their ideologies, al-Qaida and the PFLP both used ideology as their primary criteria to determine identity affinity. This is consistent with terrorist groups' use of their ideology to reduce the information required to act and to simplify the environment.^[81] Ideology serves as an integral component of terrorist groups' identity features in that it provides both the historical narrative and vision that binds terrorist organizations together.^[82] An ideological platform helps to readily divide the world into dichotomous categories of "us" versus "them." These binary categories reinforce in-group solidarity and identities.^[83] They also inform friend-enemy distinctions, including determinations of who is a potential ally and who is an unacceptable partner.^[84] However, ideology alone was not sufficient to produce an alliance, as both hubs also failed to ally with groups with which they shared ideologies, including some of their closest ideological brethren.



Each terrorist group defines its identity parameters for alliances, including the degree of ideological compatibility necessary to meet the identity threshold. Ideologies do not come neatly pre-packaged to fit all circumstances. Instead, groups act as the interpreter and filter of their ideologies and adapt them to their conditions.^[85] The resulting identity affinity parameters depend on groups' ideological disposition, their ideological flexibility or rigidity, and the overall ideological landscape.

Both alliance hubs defined their identity parameters broadly enough to include numerous potential partners—a perk of their adherence to an ideology with resonance in their environment—but narrowly enough to maintain a cohesive in-group identity among its allies. Al-Qaida defined ideological affinity as fellow Sunni jihadist groups.^[86] Thus, its affinity criteria expanded beyond its narrower Salafist sect to include Deobandi groups, but excluded non-Sunni Muslim groups, such as Shia, Sufis or Barelvi organizations or Sunni entities that eschewed violence in favor of political participation. For example, al-Qaida's cooperation with Hezbollah early in its organizational life proved short-lived in part because it strained its identity affinity parameters.^[87] Some contend that Marxist actors struggle to form alliances.^[88] Yet the PFLP—a group admittedly more “tinged with red” than doctrinaire in its adherence to Marxism—defined its identity parameters expansively to include most fellow leftist groups and successfully forged numerous allies.^[89] It also had an ethno-nationalist streak that provided a basis for affinity with other groups seeking “self-determination,” though its leftist affinity proved far stronger.^[90] Al-Qaida and the PFLP also propagated expansive enemy narratives. All terrorist groups construct narratives that identify their enemies and the victims. Groups’ enemy and victim narratives explain why the enemy is the enemy and the plight of the victims they purport to represent. A terrorist group can describe its enemy in different terms at various times in order for its narrative to remain relevant with the perceived disposition of its constituencies.^[91] Significant overlap in groups’ narratives creates a sense of identity affinity between groups. When a common enemy/victim construction exists, a corresponding sense of “them” as opposed to “us” can also be present. This can complement ideological affinity or operate alone. In the hub case studies, narrative affinity buttressed ideological affinity. Al-Qaida’s opposition to the United States, Israel, their allies, as well as so-called “apostate” regimes provided numerous avenues for narrative affinity with fellow Sunni jihadist groups. Likewise, the PFLP held the “imperial system” responsible for Israel’s perpetuation and the Palestinians’ plight, thus its narrative included opposition to any states considered part of the United States-led imperialist bloc.^[92] The international orientation of their narratives added to a sense of identity affinity with many of their ideological brethren. Thus, the materiel interests derived from having a common enemy do not stimulate hubs; instead, hubs have expansive enemy or victimization narratives that overlap with others’ narrative and thereby make them acceptable partners to them.

Lastly, identity affinity serves as a cue that it is safe to attempt to build trust. In intra-conflict relations, identity affinity narratives have limited staying power and groups often have histories of interactions that make trust untenable. However, in the international environments where information is more limited, identity affinity signals trustworthiness. Alliances do not work without trust, and yet it is exceptionally difficult for terrorist groups to develop it. Identity affinity acts as an early indicator to prospective partners operating in the international realm that it is safe to try to build trust, especially when personal ties have not yet formed or reputations are not well established. Trust is essential for alliances to form and sustain; alliance hubs must be seen as trustworthy by their partners and vice versa. Their identity characteristics help to cultivate trust. Identity affinity cannot substitute for trust, yet without it, prospective allies are less apt to seize opportunities to build trust.

Organizational Needs

Identity affinity helps to explain alliance hubs’ appeal; it does not explain why hubs become alliance magnets. While pursuing political aims, terrorist groups, like other organizations, seek their own survival and organizational well-being, which they see as integral to achieving their goals. To survive and thrive, they must possess the organizational knowledge, skills, and assets appropriate in their operating environment. When organizational learning needs and adaptation requirements arise that cannot be addressed through self reform, groups’ alliance searches will lead them to alliance hubs, in particular hubs that meet their identity affinity parameters. In short, alliance hubs emerge as desirable partners because they are both well positioned and willing to fill other groups’ organizational learning and adaptation needs.



Terrorist groups negotiate a constant organizational tension: a bias towards action and a need to secure their survival.[93] When violence becomes necessary for internal satisfaction, a group's activities can become less connected to their political aims and more about affirming the organization's viability to satisfy existing members and draw in new ones.[94] Essentially, the means by which the group seeks to achieve political change, i.e. terrorism, and the perpetuation of the group become ends onto themselves, irrespective of their actual efficacy in achieving broader strategic aims.[95] As a result, over time, the need to preserve the group gradually determines many decisions.[96] This helps to explain why some groups persist even after many of their goals have ostensibly been accomplished or when their demands are no longer relevant to the environment.[97]

The perpetuation of the group depends in part on the adequacy of its knowledge base. Terrorist groups' knowledge base is the product of their organizational learning and adaptation processes. Organizational learning refers to groups' acquisition of new knowledge and skills to apply to future actions and decisions.[98] Relatedly, organizational adaption involves groups adjusting their existing knowledge, understandings, and processes to changed circumstances.[99] This knowledge base includes everything from their philosophical understanding of the problems that gave rise to their existence to the tactical requirements for day-to-day operations.[100]

Terrorist groups must continually question, verify, and re-define how their knowledge base interacts with their environments. Organizations misaligned with their environments experience instability, decline, and even death.[101] Conversely, groups appropriately aligned with their environment function more competitively, effectively, and innovatively.[102] Therefore, terrorist organizations must constantly learn, anticipate, and adapt in order to endure and prosper. Discrepancies between a group's knowledge, skills or resource base and its environment generate organizational learning and adaptation needs.

When organizational learning or adaptation needs become acute or significant, groups have a choice whether to: 1) continue without addressing the shortfall; 2) undertake self-reform; or 3) seek an alliance. The first option will lead to decline, potentially even an organization's demise, if the deficiencies become substantial enough. Most groups should prefer self-reform, given the risks involved in an alliance, but this may not be possible or successful, depending on the need, their existing knowledge base, and the environment. If a group both recognizes and chooses to address the need, but remains unable or unwilling to undertake self-reform, it may look for an ally. Therefore, groups seek alliances with hubs when hubs can provide access to the knowledge, resources or assets others need to remain competitive in the prevailing and the anticipated conditions.[103] In other words, hubs acquire their position by addressing other groups' organizational learning needs and adaption requirements.

Indeed, al-Qaida and the PFLP both possessed extensive resources and knowledge bases that they used to address other groups' organizational learning and adaptation needs. In the PFLP case, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the PFLP's alliance hub activities were concentrated in its international terrorist wing, the PFLP-SOG. For much of al-Qaida's tenure and all of the PFLP-SOG's time as a hub, they offered valuable assets to other terrorist groups, including training, safe haven, logistical assistance, and operational guidance, not to mention money and materiel. How did they acquire this ability? Part of it stemmed from the freedom afforded by their permissive state sponsors. These sponsors did not act as third-party arbiters or enforcers, but they offered both hubs sanctuary as well as extensive latitude within that haven, which was critical because al-Qaida and the PFLP-SOG both operated in exile. The PFLP-SOG ran training facilities from its haven in South Yemen and to a lesser extent in Lebanon, as did al-Qaida in its sanctuaries in Sudan and Afghanistan. Thus, in the wake of losses, such as when the Red Army in Japan sought training and revolutionary experience and the RAF needed training in hostage-taking operations, they sought an alliance with the PFLP-SOG.[104] Both hubs also extended their safe haven to allied groups when their partners needed breathing room. In addition, both groups enjoyed substantial treasures, al-Qaida's derived in large part from Usama bin Laden's wealth and the PFLP-SOG's from its blackmail, hijacking and hostage-taking operations.[105] They each had transnational reach with supporters in numerous countries, which they used to help partners with facilitation or logistics needs. Both hubs possessed operational sophistication and thus could provide guidance to partners on how to conduct attacks. Overall, both hubs could fulfill an array of tangible organizational learning and adaptation needs for other groups.

In addition, allying with the PFLP-SOG and al-Qaida also conferred cachet upon their partners, an intangible asset coveted by groups struggling to maintain relevance or support. As part of the Palestinian cause—revered in the late 1960s and 1970s as a



premier revolutionary liberation struggle—working with the PFLP-SOG bestowed prestige on partners.[106] Al-Qaida's transnational agenda offered fellow Sunni terrorist groups with declining resonance another cause to pursue in order to survive, a particularly valuable asset in the late 1990s following the defeat of many nationalist jihadist groups.[107] This intangible benefit expanded the pool of groups that could fulfill their organizational needs through allying with these hubs.

The two hubs' operational capability also improved their alliance appeal. The PFLP-SOG's high profile and innovative hijacking attacks, which ushered in the international era of terrorism, advertised a sophisticated operational capability that attracted allies.[108] Shortly after al-Qaida's name became synonymous with the largest terrorist attack in history, it lost many of the assets that made it an alliance hub, such as training facilities and haven. Thus, it no longer attracted partners that sought to fulfill those needs. Instead, groups seeking to associate with al-Qaida's image, cause, and capability, such as the GSPC, gravitated to al-Qaida and adopted its moniker.

But why would groups use their assets to fulfill other groups' needs? Hubs expend resources that they could use internally. Even sharing intangible assets imposes costs on hubs and can damage their reputations.[109] The two hubs shared an international orientation to their ideologies, narratives, and opposition to the international order, albeit based in different ideologies. More importantly, their alliance posture largely derived from perpetual organizational needs that stemmed from that disposition. Al-Qaida's motives evolved over time. Al-Qaida's well-known organizational desire to be the vanguard of an international Sunni jihadist movement in part motivated its early alliance receptivity, as it used alliances to bring groups under its rubric and guide their activities. The gap between its resources, its political and organizational goals, and its environment created a perpetual organizational deficiency that motivated its hub activities.[110] In the changed environment post-9/11, al-Qaida used alliances as a way to signal its continued viability in the face of constant losses and, in a reversal of fortunes, also needed allies to find haven and protection.

For the PFLP-SOG, allies played an integral role in the small, covert unit's ability to execute transnational attacks, its sole mission. Unable to strike in Israel, the group viewed international attacks as the only way to punish those it viewed as responsible for the Palestinians' plight. As it grew more difficult for its Arab operatives to conduct operations, allied operatives helped the hub evade enhanced security measures.[111] In addition, its allies' visible role in its attacks signaled that the Palestinian cause had international support that extended beyond the Arab world and garnered extensive media attention.[112] In the wake of the French withdrawal from Algeria, Palestinian militant groups became convinced that such international attention was essential to victory.[113] Moreover, the PFLP-SOG's motive was not selfless; it charged trainees to come to its camps and when it assisted with operational plans involving hostages and demands, it required a cut of the ransom money.[114] In other words, allies fulfilled the perpetual organizational needs of a small unit executing a transnational campaign from exile.

In sum, hubs acquire their positions by possessing knowledge, skills, and assets in demand to address others' organizational needs in the prevailing conditions and a willingness to share these with those groups that met its ideological affinity criteria because of their own perpetual organizational needs. When groups seek an ally to fulfill their organizational needs, this search tends to lead to hubs with shared identity traits. Over time, hubs become magnets for partners with shared identity qualities when organizational needs arise. Hubs choose to adopt this position because they possess ongoing organizational needs that require alliances as well and adhere to ideologies or narrative that prescribe or at least support working with their identity brethren.

Follow On Research and Implications

On July 10 2014, a Pakistani terrorist group calling itself Tehreek-e-Khilafat declared fidelity to ISIS's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.[115] The gesture by the shadowy and relatively unknown Pakistani group raises the question: will ISIS emerge as an alliance hub in its own right, particularly as al-Qaida's alliance hub position weakens? Al-Qaida's remaining asset, its name, has continued to lose its cachet, and even al-Qaida leaders have contemplated a name change.[116] In the absence of an international alliance hub, alliances within the Sunni jihadist movement may devolve into alliances linked through regional alliance hubs. Groups like the GSPC/AQIM have the ability and willingness to provide mobile training and haven at that level, as it has reportedly done for Boko Haram and other local jihadist elements.[117] Or another



international alliance hub may emerge, such as ISIS, if it is willing and acquires sufficient operating space or status to address other groups' organizational needs.

Subsequent research supports these findings on alliance hubs. Two brief examples help to illustrate. First, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)—a group with sufficient organizational capability to become an alliance hub—has opted not to adopt this role because it lacks the requisite organizational needs that motivated the PFLP-SOG and al-Qaida's willingness. The Pakistani Sunni terrorist group operates numerous training facilities from its extensive haven in Pakistan, where it enjoys the long-standing tutelage of the Pakistani Army. While it has trained foreigners in its camps and has a smattering of allies, it has not adopted an alliance hub position because its organizational knowledge base remains well aligned with its environment; thus, it lacks ongoing organizational needs for allies to address. It primarily conducts operations in India and Afghanistan, though it has sought plausible deniability to these attacks in recent years.[118] For example, one of its allies, Indian Mujahidin, fills an important organizational adaptation need: access to India for operations and a veneer or deniability.[119] So it does not eschew alliances altogether, but its organizational needs remain insufficient for it to invest its resources in becoming a hub. In other words, LT has the capability, but not the desire to become a hub. Should this change, LT may have the potential to function as a regional or potentially even international alliance hub.

Second, the West German leftist group, the RAF endeavored to become an alliance hub in the 1980s. It appealed to numerous fellow European leftist groups, including the French Direct Action (AD), the Belgium Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), and the Italian Red Brigades, in an effort to become a regional hub. The RAF's efforts produced brief alliances with these groups, first AD and CCC and later, the Red Brigades. But all proved unstable and short-lived.[120] Soon thereafter, its "Euro-terrorist" coalition collapsed. The RAF's alliance hub efforts relied on ideological affinity to court partners, but its prospective allies faced periods of weakness and declining relevancy. They needed an alliance hub that could help them adapt because in the changing environment, leftist groups were quickly becoming "hopeless anachronisms."[121] But the RAF did not possess the requisite assets that could realign these groups with the changing environment. In other words, the RAF had the desire; however, it lacked the resources to fulfill the pressing organizational needs of its partners. As a result, its alliance hub effort soon faded out.

Although international terrorist alliances pose a clear threat, to date no country has developed or executed a clear and effective policy to disrupt them. While no silver bullet will eradicate alliance hubs, this research highlights the reality that terrorist groups seek them as partners because of organizational weakness, often when they cannot undertake self-reform. Hubs increase the threat because they help fellow terrorist groups to fill organizational needs that, left unaddressed, would cause their decline and possibly even demise.

Therefore, counterterrorism policies should focus on degrading the assets that attract groups and disrupting their service provision capacity. Al-Qaida and the PFLP-SOG depended on unfettered safe havens to offer their partners resources like training, consultation, and sanctuary as well as to provide a venue to build trust. Targeting safe havens in particular will help prevent the emergence of alliance hubs and reduce the efficacy of existing ones. The hubs' quasi-state characteristics, including their havens, depended on supportive governments, and this offers yet another reason to sanction and punish state sponsors, particularly those that support alliance hubs. Even after al-Qaida lost its state sponsors and sanctuaries, the foundation Sudan and Afghanistan provided helped al-Qaida to sustain its position for years. In addition, both al-Qaida and the PFLP-SOG benefitted from reputations as operationally sophisticated organizations, which increased their appeal as partners. To counter this, governments should emphasize hubs' operational failures and mistakes, especially when they contribute to their partners' shortcomings and missteps. Their hub positions also depended on their robust treasuries, so measures to degrade their finances will help erode their ability to assist other groups. More specifically, disrupting financial transactions when hubs have committed to fulfilling partners organizational needs at critical junctures will harm relationships and damage hubs' reputations overall.

Counterterrorism efforts should also target figures within alliance hubs who manage, facilitate, and encourage alliances. In particular, leadership decapitation may damage alliance hubs' position and functioning. While they had vastly different leadership styles and skills, from an early point, Haddad and bin Laden saw alliances as a way to address their organizations' needs, were inclined to use their resources to assist other groups, and were involved in all aspects of their groups' alliances. They embedded alliances into their



organizations' problem-solving processes and cultures from the outset. In the PFLP-SOG case, the loss of Haddad spelled the end of the group's time as an alliance hub. While bin Laden's death did not have as decisive of an impact on al-Qaida's ability to act as an alliance hub, it further degraded al-Qaida's weakened alliance position. Moreover, replacement leaders may not be as effective or as receptive to alliances as their predecessors—this has been the case with Ayman al-Zawahiri. In addition to the central role that leaders played in hubs' development and sustainment, both groups depended on key figures to act as liaisons for partner groups. Targeting those individuals disrupts alliance interactions and can erode trust and affinity between hubs and their partners.

Admittedly, many of these recommendations are already part of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Therefore, more effective alliance disruption efforts do not necessarily require new initiatives. Rather they require more focused and enhanced measures against hubs as well as well-timed interventions. Keeping in mind the dynamic nature of an alliance, governments can corrode alliances by putting pressure on the partnering groups' identity affinity and hubs' appeal. Coordinated and consistent messaging on real or potential points of identity fissures may pressure alliance cohesion and force hubs to limit their parameters in order to maintain a cohesive in-group identity within the alliance cluster. Pointing to relationships, cooperation or actions inconsistent with hubs' professed identity will help erode their appeal. When governments label groups as compatible or emphasize traits that other groups share with hubs, they inadvertently help foster a sense of affinity and reinforce hubs' positions. Instead, governments should emphasize ideological differences, conflicts in groups' narratives, and cultural differences that differentiate a hub from its partners. In particular, highlighting actions that constitute violations of their shared identities can help weaken alliances.

In addition, government interventions that foster the impression that cooperation failed due to the hub's inability or unwillingness to fulfill other groups' needs will damage the hub's desirability and stunt individual relationships. Alliance hubs' relationships tend to be particularly vulnerable during the early, trust-building phase. Therefore, early interventions that cause cooperation failures will signal to the prospective allies that the hub cannot fulfill needs. Propaganda efforts that cast doubt on a hub's ability to address organizational needs—such as training that did not prepare a partner for an operation or contributed to an operational failure—will also diminish their appeal.

In general, counterterrorism efforts to prevent and disrupt alliances should capitalize on the obstacles groups already face when they attempt to ally. Governments can focus on undertaking measures that both increase the costs of alliances and stoke the concerns that hinder them. Rather than emphasizing groups' commonalities, messaging in forums where the groups acquire information should highlight allying groups' differences and the risks that alliances pose. For example, given terrorist organizations' difficulties forging credible commitments, governments should highlight instances when hubs fail to honor promises or attempt to use cooperation opportunistically. In addition, because alliances sometimes sow internal divisions, governments can take advantage of this by emphasizing the ways alliances cause partnering groups to deviate from their primary goals and lose their autonomy. Opportunities also exist to damage ties by pointing out when groups' actions alienate their partners' constituents. Counterterrorism policies that treat alliances as static or prematurely label a relationship as an alliance inadvertently reduce the costs incurred by the partnering groups, as concerns about an increase in counterterrorism pressure can help deter alliances. Conversely, once an alliance occurs, affected governments should work together to increase the pressure on both groups, including through measures such as sanctions. More than any other obstacle, stoking fears about infiltration and betrayal has the potential to damage alliance hubs' appeal and disrupt specific alliances. In other words, each of the obstacles that alliances face offer exploitation opportunities for governments.

These findings are significant because the conventional (albeit underdeveloped) wisdom that ideology and enemies precipitate terrorist alliances suggests that government intervention will be ineffective. Governments cannot often change terrorist groups' ideology or enemies. Moreover, the notion that shared threats cause alliance hubs infers that governments' cooperation against terrorist groups will cause them to unite in response, creating a disincentive to build counterterrorism coalitions. However, understanding that an organization's willingness and ability to fulfill others' needs makes them an attractive partner offers unexplored avenues to prevent and disrupt these dangerous relationships. It also can help governments to identify when alliances are more apt to occur, specifically when groups experience and identify acute or significant organizational needs that they cannot address on their own. Therefore, the United States



can devise a better strategy to prevent hubs' emergence and diminish their effectiveness when they do occur. This strategy should focus on the role of organizational needs and identity in alliance behavior as well as exploiting the obstacles that hinder all alliance efforts.

► Notes are available at source's URL.

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Terrorist Networks' Productivity and Durability: A Comparative Multi-level Analysis

By Arie Perlinger

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/359>

Terrorist networks, similar to the more traditional terrorist organizations, employ violence in order to promote political and social changes. By utilizing a unique dataset of 18 terrorist networks the current study contributes to the growing body of literature on terrorist networks by examining the factors that determine network productivity and durability. The findings illustrate how effective networks generally

Table I – Terrorist Networks versus Terrorist Organizations

Type	Hierarchy	Size	Communication	Boundaries
<i>Network</i>	Inherently leaderless. While some members have more "social power" than others, there are no formal mechanisms which institutionalize the status gaps between members, nor are there formal routines and protocols that manifest the division of power within the network.	Size is limited by the non-hierarchical structure, few individuals to several dozen.	Informal, not regulated or influenced by the functional role of the actors, their formal power or other organizational features. Based on social relations that are a product of primordial and previous social ties.	Elusive borders. Entrances and exits are in general less costly and dynamic.
<i>Organization</i>	Hierarchal structure, identifiable leadership. Division of power is relatively stable.	The formal and hierachal structure allows expansion of the group from few dozens to several hundred and more.	Communication tends to correspond with organizational lines of authority and regulated according to the organizational protocols.	Tend to establish clear identifiable boundaries via different mechanisms, including formal and standardized training and recruiting procedures.

operate within supportive and homogeneous communities, tolerant of the violent struggle. The findings also suggest that while funding and operational knowledge/training are not strong predictors of operational success, they seem to be potential preconditions for the

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formation of the networks, and for a network to shift from the ideological radicalization stage into the operational/behavioral stage. Finally, when looking at the structural characteristics that differentiate successful from less successful networks, it seems that the most important elements are the ability of the successful networks to effectively balance between cohesiveness and flexibility while preserving their dynamic nature.

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UAE – Sheikh Khalifa approves anti-terrorism law



Source: <http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-khalifa-approves-anti-terrorism-law>

A comprehensive and updated anti-terrorism law that includes harsh punishments for acts related to extremism has been approved by the UAE President, Sheikh Khalifa.

The law passed through the FNC, who made amendments in a private session last month, then went to Sheikh Khalifa for final approval.

The federal law consists of about 70 articles and covers areas not included in the 2004 law, such as human trafficking and establishing guidance centres to rehabilitate those exposed to extremism back into society.

Article 41 says: "If a person is found to be terrorism prone, they are referred to one of the guidance centres based on a court ruling and a request by public prosecution."

The law defines terrorists as people committing any act considered illegal that would lead to results of terror, whether directly or indirectly.

Those results include provoking terror among a group of people, killing or causing harm to people or property, and opposing the state or any other state or international organisation.

In addition to weapons including firearms, missiles and explosives, **the law adds non-typical weapons as a tool for terrorism**.

They include any device designed to kill others or harm lives through the spread of poisonous chemicals, an infectious creature or radiation.

Those who produce, prepare, import, export, possess or transport non-typical weapons for terrorist purposes would be issued a life sentence.

Those who steal or acquire by force, fraud, threat or blackmail any of these weapons would be punished by death or a life sentence. The law issues capital or life punishments to many acts, such as impersonating a public figure and wrongfully claiming to be on assignment for a public service.

The same applies to those who start, run or manage a secret organisation.

A death sentence could also be issued to anyone found guilty of attacking or endangering the life of the President, Vice President, or any of the Rulers and their families.

Article 13 had its penalty upgraded by the FNC to death or a life sentence for anyone who holds hostage a female, a juvenile or mentally disabled person.

Ali Al Abbadi, a lawyer who has handled a number of terrorism-related cases at the State Security Court, said the law should have clear definitions of all aspects to do with such crimes.

"Acts of terrorism are expanding and have crossed continents, so the legislature always see it fit to update the laws accordingly," Mr Al Abbadi said.

"The law should define clearly what is a terrorism crime and the related legislations should be clear to lift off ignorance and misunderstandings."

He gave the **example of new terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, who disguise**

their operations with religious claims and promote conflict between sects.

While the UAE is stable and secure country, other countries who oppressed their people gave a fertile ground for the growth of such

groups, who tempted people to follow them, Mr Al Abbadi said.

Other penalties issued in the law include five years in prison at least to anyone caught with mock explosives or bombs in public.



Al Qaeda's Balkan Ties: The Bosnian Connections – An ACD Exclusive

By Gordon Bardos

Source: http://acdemocracy.org/al-qaedas-balkan-ties-the-bosnian-connections-to-the-world-trade-center-attacks-an-acd-exclusive/?utm_source=Al+Qaeda%27s+Balkan+Ties&utm_campaign=Al+Qaeda%27s+Balkan+Ties&utm_medium=email

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Bulgaria may extend Turkish border fence to bar Syrian, Iraqi refugees

Source: <http://www.worldbulletin.net/headlines/142854/bulgaria-may-extend-turkish-border-fence-to-bar-syrian-iraqi-refugees>

Bulgaria may extend the fence at its border with Turkey to stop more refugees from Syria and Iraq entering illegally, a top interior ministry official said on Wednesday, while the foreign minister warned of "terrorism imports" to the EU member state.

The Balkan country is considering adding 130 km (80 miles) of barbed-wire fencing to an existing 33-km fence along the 240-km southeastern border which, the interior ministry's

Chief Secretary Svetoslav Lazarov, said would



save 2 million levs (\$1.36 million) a month on policing the area.

"It would be a prohibitively facility," Lazarov told reporters. "Our country has enough border points and those who want to come as a refugee can go through them."

More than 10,000 refugees, mainly Syrians, entered Bulgaria illegally last year from Turkey and, in an attempt to limit the influx, authorities deployed over 1,000 police officers.

Bulgarian authorities said the Black Sea state could face an even greater influx in the coming months due to intensified fighting in Iraq in recent weeks.

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"The situation is alarming and we can expect more refugees given what is happening in Iraq," said Vasil Varbanov, vice president of state agency for refugees. "The number of asylum seekers increased from 320 in April to

The U.N. refugee agency UNHCR has repeatedly appealed to Bulgaria to have an "open door policy" and has expressed concerns about refugees being turned away at the Turkish border.



911 in July...", without specifying if they had entered illegally.

Interim Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov also warned of the risk, noting that the critical situation in Iraq was the result of the West's indecision over Syria in the past three years. "There is a risk of terrorism imports," he said. "The passiveness of the Western community in Syria and, more seriously, fear of intervention led to the current situation. So, there are no excuses," Mitov said.

[Greece –Turkey border fence](#)

In April, Human Rights Watch said in a 76-page report that the Black Sea state violated the rights of asylum seekers by forcing them back across its border into Turkey, sometimes violently, and failed to provide basic humanitarian assistance.

Sofia denied any wrongdoing and said the allegations were "blatant lies which can be easily verified".

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