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CBRNE NEWSLETTER TERRORISM

E-Journal for CBRNE-CT First Responders



TERROR NEWS

Humanity defeated ...
Does it matter
who released them?



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Suez Canal Authority says attack attempted on container ship


Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/31/us-egypt-protests-suez-idUSBRE97U0FG20130831>

A "terrorist" staged an unsuccessful attack on a container ship passing through the Suez Canal on Saturday, in an attempt to disrupt the flow of ships through the waterway, the head of the Suez Canal



© Peter Thomas
MarineTraffic.com

Authority Mohab Memish said.



The Suez Canal is a key global shipping line which is secured by the armed forces. "One of the terrorist elements has carried out a failed attempt to affect the movement of ships in the Suez Canal by targeting one of the passing ships, Cosco Asia," Memish said in a statement about the Panama-flagged ship.



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"The attempt failed completely and there was no damage to the ship or the containers it carried. The situation was dealt with strictly by the armed forces," he said, adding that the traffic of ships is moving normally.

The statement did not specify what kind of attack it was but shipping sources told Reuters they heard the sound of two explosions as the ship passed through the waterway.

See a related video at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buS4mfEX3w0>


New Analytic Tool Could Predict Leadership Changes in Terrorist, Criminal Networks

Source: http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/new-analytic-tool-could-predict-leadership-changes-in-terrorist-criminal-networks/9c9d1dcd58fd9acd99567bac129bb829a.html?goback=._gde_2311273_member_268770778#

A University of Maryland (UMD) research team has developed an analytics tool they call STONE (Shaping Terrorist Organizational Network Efficacy) that could allow "US intelligence analysts ... to help predict who might rise to the top of a terrorist or criminal network, and whether the redefined

imprisonment, change of allegiance or death -- can create a vacuum in which subordinates jockey for position or splinter into factions," but "Rather than wait to see how these scenarios play out, STONE could help "to minimize the impact of these organizations."

"The STONE software represents the first



organization has an increased ability to carry out its activities," according to an announcement by the researchers.

The UMD team said it used open-source data to hypothetically test their software platform on four known terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and that STONE was able to predict with 80 percent accuracy what individual would rise to take on a leadership role when a terrorist leader was removed.

The team explained that "The loss of a terrorist or criminal network's leader -- whether through

computational effort to understand who will replace a terrorist leader and how the terrorist network will adapt to these changes," team leader, V.S. Subrahmanian, a professor of computer science leading the STONE team, told *Homeland Security Today*.

"Analyzing the evolution of terror networks is fundamentally a multidisciplinary problem," and "We need to understand both the intrinsic capabilities of possible replacements for a removed leader, as well as their influence within the network, as well as how well connected they are to



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others in the network,” said Subrahmanian, who also is director of UMD’s Center for Digital International Government, and co-director of the Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics.

“All of these factors play a role in identifying who will replace a leader,” so, “We used a novel mix of social network analysis methods and probabilistic data mining methods to arrive at these predictions,” Subrahmanian explained. And “Because the data is huge,” he said, “this poses a challenge to human analysts – computational tools such as STONE help analysts leverage computational methods to better inform their predictions and recommendations.”


“An analyst may use STONE to supplement their own knowledge of how a network will reshape itself when organizational changes occur,” Aaron Mannes, a public policy researcher who complemented the computer scientists on the team, told *Homeland Security Today*.

The data used is open source and included information such as how long a person was actively involved with an organization, the specific role they had, and the roles of others

dealing with, which can ultimately decrease the efficacy of these organizations.”

“The STONE software allows an analyst to visualize a terror network and identify properties and information about the status of nodes in the network,” Francesca Spezzano, a computer science researcher working on this effort, told *Homeland Security Today*. “For instance, in the accompanying screenshot of STONE showing part of the Lashkar-e-Taiba network, you will see nodes in different shapes – nodes represented as stars represent dead terrorists, those shown as circles have been captured, those shown as rectangles are alive and operational.”

“Lashkar-e-Taiba is the terrorist group that carried out the Mumbai attacks in Nov 2008. The size of a node denotes the rank of the node in the terrorist group’s organizational hierarchy,” said Spezzano. “For instance, node 1 in this figure is Hafez Saeed, the current leader of LeT. You can see that his rank is 10 (i.e. he is the undisputed leader), his level of hostility to the west is ranked 4, and that his ability (on his own) for carrying out terror acts is 3. Using STONE, the analyst can also learn



they were directly associated with.

Government analysts and decision-makers with access to a “more complete” picture of these organizations can input their own data into STONE, increasing the tool’s accuracy, Subrahmanian said. “This is a not a computing tool that tells [analysts] what to do. It is something that can help them better understand the situation or situations they are

what happens when we ‘remove’ a node from the network (e.g. if a special operation was mounted by the US to capture him). To do this, he clicks on “REMOVE” in the LeT1.png file.

“Along with the predicted replacements, STONE assigns a probability that a given individual will replace the removed individual,” Spezzano said.



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The image at right "shows the top 5 candidates to replace LeT leader Hafez Saeed showing a dead heat between Hafez Abdul Salaam and Abdur Rehman Makki, with probabilities 0.122 and 0.129, respectively."

Subrahmanian also said STONE could potentially be used to evaluate leadership

changes in criminal networks, such as narco-cartels and transnational criminal organizations. However, he said, he and his colleagues have not yet tested STONE for this application.

What Martin Luther King taught me about extremism

By Imran Awan

Source: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/what-martin-luther-king-taught-me-about-extremism-8788384.html>

As the United States celebrates the 50th anniversary of the 'March for Jobs and Freedom' and the civil rights rally where Martin Luther King Jr made his famous "I have a dream" speech, an issue which often gets ignored is the use of the word 'extremist' to describe Dr King.

quick to use the term extremism to signify communities under suspicion.

In his Letter from the Birmingham Jail, King wrote:

"But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an extremist, as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a



At the time, the Alabama clergymen were quick to brand him an extremist because they were worried that his civil rights campaign and fight for racial equality would cause more tensions between black and white people in the US.

Dr King's response to the claims that he was an extremist was to write his seminal *Letter from the Birmingham Jail*. What followed was a profound statement from Dr King and one that should never be forgotten by those who are

measure of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an extremist for love... Was not Amos an extremist for justice... Was not Martin Luther an extremist... So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice?"



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Those words have had a powerful impact on me, as Dr King eloquently and passionately helped me have a better understanding of the term extremism. It should also be read by those people who are quick to use lazy assumptions that link extremism with Islam and Muslims. My research into extremism has shown that many Muslim communities agree with the view of Dr King and believe that there is both good extremism and bad extremism. As the term continues to interchange, so too does our understanding of extremism.

Dr King was once considered an outsider and a troublemaker. The Alabama clergymen fought against him because they felt his mission of change was too 'extreme' for their liking. Dr King thus joined a number of people such as Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Malcolm X who were also considered to be extremists - and

indeed in some cases terrorists. What they all have in common is that they are now accepted as being pioneers for change, and individuals who have made an important contribution towards social activism and social community cohesion.

On this special occasion, let's try to have a better understanding of what Dr King meant when he talked about extremism, and let us use that to frame how British policy deals with extremists. If Dr King was alive today, he probably would also be an extremist under British Law. Too often those who use the term do so with a narrow lens, and forget that a more nuanced approach is required. One that understands, as Dr King did, that we all are extremists - it just depends whether we take the path of extreme love or extreme hate.

Imran Awan is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Birmingham City University. He is co-editor of the book 'Policing Cyber Hate, Cyber Threats and Cyber Terrorism (Ashgate 2012).

Egypt's Sinai emerges as new theater for jihad

By **Maggie Michael** (Associated Press)

Source: http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24004696/egypts-sinai-emerges-new-theater-jihad

An Egyptian doctor once close to Osama bin Laden is bringing together multiple al-Qaida-inspired militant groups in Egypt's Sinai to fight the country's military, as the lawless peninsula emerges as a new theater for jihad, according to Egyptian intelligence and security officials.

There have been other signs of a dangerous shift in the longtime turmoil in the peninsula bordering Israel and the Gaza Strip since the military's July 3 ouster of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi, the officials say. With the shifts, Sinai's instability is becoming more regionalized and threatens to turn into an outright insurgency.

Sinai has seen an influx of foreign fighters over the past two months, including several hundred Yemenis. Several militant groups that long operated in the area to establish an Islamic Caliphate and attack their traditional enemy Israel have joined others in declaring formally that their objective now is to battle Egypt's military.

Also, Sinai has become the focus of attention among major regional jihadi groups. A leader of al-Qaida's Iraqi branch, Abu Mohammed al-Adhni, last weekend called on Egyptians to

fight the military, as did al-Qaida's top leader, Ayman al-Zawahri. The militant considered the most dangerous man in the Sahara—one-eyed terror leader Moktar Belmoktar, a former member of al-Qaida's North Africa branch—joined forces with a Mali-based jihadi group last month and vowed attacks in Egypt.

Topping the most wanted list in Sinai is Ramzi Mawafi, a doctor who joined al-Qaida in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Mawafi, 61, escaped from an Egyptian prison in 2011 in a massive jailbreak that also sprung free Morsi and more than a dozen Muslim Brotherhood members during the chaos of the uprising against autocrat Hosni Mubarak.

Mawafi is now believed to be in Sinai coordinating among militant groups and helping arrange money and weapons, security officials told The Associated Press. The four officials were from military intelligence, the military and the security forces and spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the press.

Sinai's disparate militant groups are now "on the same page, in full cooperation in the face of the same



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threat," Gen. Sherif Ismail, a recently retired security adviser to the governor of Northern Sinai, told the AP. He said the groups are inspired by al-Qaida, but not necessarily linked to the mother group.

Morsi's fall opened the way for an escalation by Sinai's jihadis. Most militants had seen Morsi as too willing to compromise in bringing rule by Islamic Shariah law in Egypt. But his removal by the military, backed by liberals, was seen as an attack on Islam. More importantly, it ended the policy Morsi pursued during his year in office of negotiating with Sinai armed groups, restraining security operations against them in return for a halt in attacks on the military.



Now, the military has stepped up operations. On Tuesday, helicopter gunships struck suspected militant hideouts in several villages near the borders with Israel and Gaza, killing at least eight and wounding 15, the state news agency MENA announced.

Since Morsi's ouster, more than 70 police and soldiers have been killed by militants in a cycle of attack and counterattack that has seen jihadis turn to more brutal tactics. In the worst single attack, gunmen pulled police recruits from buses, lay them on the ground and shot 25 of them to death on Aug. 19. Days later, a group of militants was killed before carrying out

a suicide car bombing in a significant escalation.

Over the same period, security forces have killed 87 militants, including 32 foreigners, and arrested 250 others, including 80 foreigners, according to the army spokesman's office.

Hit-and-run attacks take place nearly daily in northern Sinai, targeting security forces in the provincial capital of el-Arish and towns dotting the coast and the borders with Gaza and Israel.

Two militants—a Yemeni and a Palestinian—who were recently arrested in Sinai provided information about Mawafi's role while under questioning, the security officials said.

Recently, Nabeel Naeem, a founder of the Islamic Jihad militant group who has known Mawafi since

Afghanistan—said on an Egyptian TV station that Mawafi "is leading the militants in Sinai."

Mawafi specialized in bomb-making during his years in Afghanistan, the officials said. He also supervised clinics that treated wounded Islamic fighters, earning him the nickname "bin Laden's doctor"—though Naeem

said he never treated the late al-Qaida leader himself.

Recently, Nabeel Naeem, a founder of the Islamic Jihad militant group who has known Mawafi since

In this image taken from video, Egyptian Army personnel supervise the destruction of tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip at the border, near the town of Rafah, northern Sinai, Egypt, Tuesday Sept. 3, 2013. Tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza have been used to smuggle everything from weapons, to cigarettes and fuel but now the Egyptian military appears determined to close the tunnels once and for all. (AP Photo/AP Television)

An Egyptian court in June last year accused Mawafi, along with Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood members of conspiring with Hamas and Hezbollah to orchestrate the 2011 break from Wadi Natroun prison. The court described Mawafi as "the secretary general of al-Qaida in Sinai."

The number of jihadi groups operating in Sinai's rugged, mountainous deserts has mushroomed over recent years, believed to have thousands of fighters.


Some are mainly Egyptian, such as Ansar Jerusalem—thought to include



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Egyptians from outside Sinai—and the Shura Council of Mujahedeen of Environs of Jerusalem—which is mostly Sinai locals—and the Salafi Jihadi group. Among Sinai's population, there has been a growing movement of "Takfiris," who reject as heretical anyone who does not adhere to their strict interpretation of Islam. While not all Takfiris are involved in armed action, their ideology makes them an easy pool for armed groups to draw from.

Other groups are based in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, such as the Islam Army and Jaljalat, which are believed to send fighters into Sinai.



Some groups were oriented toward fighting Israel, occasionally firing rockets across the border. Others attacked Egyptian security forces, usually in retaliation for arrests or out of the deep-seeded resentment of the police among Sinai's population. In the aftermath of Mubarak's fall in 2011, a group attacked police stations and drove security forces out of the border towns, declaring the area an Islamic Caliphate. Many of them were later tried and sentenced to death.

Now multiple groups are overtly calling for "jihad" against Egypt's military.

Several hundred Yemeni fighters came in after Morsi's ouster in response to religious edicts by clerics back home urging them to fight jihad in

Egypt, according to a Yemeni security official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the press. Al-Qaida in Yemen, known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, is considered the most active branch of the terror network.

The Egyptian officials say fighters have also come from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Syria.

The military intelligence official said commanders of jihadi groups are joining ranks with prominent Sinai-based militants who belong to major tribes to ensure protection and facilitate weapons smuggling. One of the most influential tribes, the Swarkas, has split between anti- and pro-government families.

An Egyptian military official in el-Arish said jihadis run at least nine main training camps in Sinai, hidden in villages controlled by allied tribes or in mountainous regions.

Ismail el-Iskandarani, a researcher at the Egyptian Center for Social and Economic rights who writes extensively about Sinai, says it's hard to pin down the number of militants or camps because local jihadis hide in homes among their own families after carrying out hit-and-run attacks.

"Even their relatives might not know they are involved in Islamic militancy," he said.

He said there is also no single leader, with small cells of differing ideologies. The situation is further complicated by the overlap of militants and criminal networks involved in smuggling, sometimes with the involvement of corrupt police officials. "Different security agencies are meddling in making it hard to tell who is doing what," he said.

Now international terror groups are adding their calls for jihad in the wake of the coup.

In an Aug. 3 statement, al-Zawahri mocked Morsi's participation in the democratic process, calling democracy "an idol made of date paste" created by secularists. The al-Qaida leader called upon "the soldiers of the Quran to wage the war for the Quran."

From North Africa, the militant leader Belmoktar and a Mali jihadi group announced last month that they aim to form a jihadi front from the River Nile to North Africa's Atlantic coast.

So far, Egypt's military has not launched a major offensive against armed groups in Sinai. El-Iskandarani believes the generals are wary of a sparking a wider confrontation with disgruntled Bedouin tribes. Also, Sinai jihadis



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have powerful new arsenals of heavy anti-aircraft guns, rockets and other weapons smuggled from Libya.

"The price will be very heavy," el-Iskandarani said.





Source: <http://www.dsalert.org/cpo-role-in-homeland-security>



NYPD Designates Certain Mosques as Terrorist Enterprises

Source: <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/nypd-designates-certain-mosques-terrorist-enterprises>

The New York Police Department has labeled certain mosques as terrorist organizations, allowing police to keep an eye on worshipers and imams who might be involved in terrorist activity.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NYPD has opened at least a dozen "terrorism enterprise investigations" (TEIs) as part of an initiative to help police infiltrate and investigate secret terrorist cells.

Information about the TEIs was revealed by Associated Press after the news organization recently saw a number of documents on the subject. The TEIs are also part of a new book, "Enemies within: inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden's Final Plot Against America," by AP reporters Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, as well as interviews with current and former NYPD, FBI and CIA officials.

Before the NYPD could target mosques for surveillance, the procedure had to be approved by a federal judge who established guidelines on how police can conduct surveillance on citizens.

David Cohen, a former CIA executive who became the NYPD deputy commissioner for intelligence in 2002, told the judge deciding the case that mosques could be used "to shield the



work of terrorists from law enforcement scrutiny by taking advantage of restrictions of the investigation of First Amendment activity."

The recent revelations of the NYPD's investigation have outraged some, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) who says that mosque programs are unconstitutional.

Yet, as the Clarion Project reported, the ACLU has a history of fiercely fighting against essential U.S. counter-terrorism programs and actions, possible due to the background of one top ACLU official, Jameel Jaffer.

(Interestingly, the ACLU chose not to protect the right of freedom of expression when the White House tried to pressure YouTube to take down the film *Innocence of Muslims*, a provocative presentation of Mohammed's life, which provoked worldwide riots.)

NYPD police commissioner Raymond Kelly and Mayor Michael Bloomberg have denied that TEI is unconstitutional and insist they are following leads.

"Undercover officers and confidential informants do not enter a mosque unless they are following up on a lead. We have a responsibility to protect New Yorkers from violent crime or another terrorist attack, and we uphold the law in doing so," Kelly said.

Why movies can't handle terrorism

By Andrew O'Hehir

Source: https://www.salon.com/2013/08/28/why_movies_cant_handle_the_security_state/

British director John Crowley's "Closed Circuit" should and could have been a crackerjack thriller about the collision between the national-security state, terrorism and the erosion of rights and liberties. Its timing was perfect, if presumably accidental, given the drumbeat of news over the past few months. It has a script by Steven Knight, who wrote "Eastern Promises" for David Cronenberg and "Dirty Pretty Things" for Stephen Frears. It starts with a nifty premise – a gruesome terrorist attack in central London whose aftermath threatens to expose unsavory state secrets – and features

an agreeable cast headed by Rebecca Hall and Eric Bana as squabbling ex-lovers trying to defend an accused terrorist mastermind they suspect may be a fall guy.

Now, I suspect something specific befell "Closed Circuit" during the production process that caused it to end up as a late-August throwaway. The storytelling is unaccountably herky-jerky, the film seems oddly truncated (at 96 minutes) given its plot density, and expository information is tacked onto the ending in an audio-only scene that vaguely



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suggests a more upbeat conclusion. There's also the problem that Jim Broadbent, playing a villainous British attorney general trying to squelch the facts, is a far more compelling



figure than the namby-pamby, kissy-face pair of Bana and Hall. (I kept finding myself agreeing with him: Evidence, shmevidence! Who cares about the truth? Let's grow up and move on.) It's tempting to speculate that Crowley – who made his reputation with the 2007 “Boy A,” a landmark of contemporary British realism – made a quite different version of this movie at some point, or at least meant to.

But there's a larger issue represented by “Closed Circuit,” one also found in Mira Nair's “The Reluctant Fundamentalist,” a similarly unsatisfying 2013 mishmash of allegedly terrific ingredients. Movies about the era of terrorism and the expansion of the surveillance-security state have mostly been muddled and mediocre, if not downright bad. Sure, there have been exceptions, but in the dozen years since 9/11, not a lot of them. Television, for various reasons, has produced much more urgent and watchable responses: Showtime's “Homeland,” of course, along with “Prisoners of War,” the gripping Israeli series that inspired it. Let's also just admit that Fox's “24,” as politically noxious and dramatically ludicrous as it often (or mostly) was, felt like a live cultural nerve and a near-mandatory viewing experience.

Without relaunching the debate around the morality or politics of Kathryn Bigelow's “Zero

Dark Thirty,” I'll submit that it's a marvelously crafted film that seeks grand drama within recent history. Stephen Gaghan's 2005 “Syriana,” in which George Clooney won an Oscar, stuck out precisely because it's a work of considerable ambiguity and complexity in a field largely devoid of those qualities. Paul Greengrass' “United 93,” with its pseudo-documentary tick-tock account of a historical event, almost doesn't count; it spins a gripping yarn but makes no attempt to grapple with its moral aftermath. There are a handful of interesting indie films that tackle the topic, like Zal Batmanglij's “The East” – which almost prefigures the Snowden/NSA scandal – and British satirist Chris Morris' ruthless “Four Lions.” But those had small audiences and little cultural impact.

One could argue that Greengrass reckoned with the consequences of 9/11 more directly in “The Bourne Supremacy” and “The Bourne Ultimatum” than he did in “United 93.” Those are just two of the numerous action-adventure movies of the last decade to use terrorism and



security-state paranoia as both canvas and subject matter. From the “Iron Man” series to the last three James Bond films to “Mission: Impossible – Ghost Protocol,” our twinned fears of nihilistic murderers and an intrusive, all-seeing state apparatus find their fullest expression in cinema that is pure fantasy and wish-fulfillment, with little or no connection to history. Besides, people actually wanted to watch those movies, which you can't say about the labored twists and turns of “The Reluctant Fundamentalist” or Michael Winterbottom's “A Mighty Heart,” which somehow managed to turn the tragic and dramatic real-life tale of Daniel and Mariane Pearl into a



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soapy melodrama for Angelina Jolie. One aspect of this is pretty simple: It takes cinema a long time to digest history. Filmmakers kept wrestling with the legacy of World War II and the Holocaust well into the 1990s, and the well may not be tapped out yet.



The United States pulled out of Vietnam in 1973, but serious cinematic consideration of that conflict began with “Apocalypse Now” in 1979 and even more with Oliver Stone’s “Platoon” in 1986. David O. Russell’s “Three Kings,” set during the first Gulf War of 1991, came out amid the legendary indie-film extravaganza of 1999. By those standards, United 93” (released in 2006) was an early effort to contend with a painful history, and “Zero Dark Thirty” was a work of journalism-as-drama reminiscent of Emile Zola.

But it’s also true that the culture *around* cinema has shifted enormously, and that nobody’s waiting around for filmmakers to start making 9/11 or Osama bin Laden movies sometime around 2015. Among the many reasons that television has stolen the central cultural position once accorded to movies are the fact that TV series can react more rapidly to news events, are less expensive to make, tell different kinds of stories and operate in different vectors of space and time. The constricted screen-space and limited

budget lend themselves to claustrophobic narrative, and televisual storytelling thrives on long, novelistic arcs, fueled by slow-burning character relationships, cliffhangers, plot twists and multiple shifts of perspective. Most mainstream movies, on the other hand, remain

married to the familiar three-act structure, in which the third act usually resolves to a straightforward collision between opposing forces, in which all complications and contradictions must be erased.

That’s exactly where “Closed Circuit,” which begins so promisingly as a study of the many-layered British security state (which remains conveniently free of a constitution to violate) falls apart. Rebecca Hall’s character

is a “special advocate” appointed to review evidence so secret that it may not be shared with the defense team for a Turkish immigrant accused of a truck bombing at a central London produce market. But once she and

Bana’s character (the defense lawyer) understand that the whole attack

was a particularly egregious example of war-on-terror blowback, and that the security services are cracking down on anyone who stands in the way of a thorough whitewash, the whole picture devolves into


chase-and-hide paranoia, which isn’t especially interesting even when it’s justified. If

“Closed Circuit” were the first episode of a new BBC series, with


Bana and Hall as a push-pull screwball duo facing a contemporary London of ubiquitous security cameras and cocky young secret policemen (one of those is Riz Ahmed, not playing the scary Arab militant for once), I’d be mildly encouraged. As it stands, it’s a meh, a near-miss, a watch-on-Amazon-if-you’re bored, a fragment of genuine commentary soon gone with the wind.







12 years...



Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview

By Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/279/html>

How do terrorists move money? This article examines six of the most widely used methods: cash couriers, informal transfer systems (e.g. hawala), money service businesses, formal banking, false trade invoicing, and high value commodities. When terrorists move money, they choose methods that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and speed. This article analyzes the methods according to these issues. It draws on multiple cases and examples, including the most recent cases of Hezbollah's and al Shabaab's use of money service businesses, and many others.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. federal agents received a tip-off from a confidential informant that a Yemeni sheik was raising money in Brooklyn for al-Qaeda. The sheik had allegedly boasted in recorded conversations that he had raised as much as US \$20 million for Osama bin Laden. Some of the money was raised in cash donations, but cash is bulky and difficult to move. Depositing the cash in a formal bank and wire transferring it to Yemen would have raised red flags. So the sheik arranged to have the bulk cash shipped in cargo. When the agents arrested two men at Kennedy Airport in October 2001, they found US \$140,000 of cash hidden in cardboard boxes along with honey jars.[1] It wasn't the first time the honey trade had been used to disguise the movement of money. In the months leading up to 9/11, the same Yemeni honey trading businesses imported over-invoiced honey to disguise money flowing to the United States.[2]

How terrorists move money, and how this can be disrupted, is often overlooked. Instead, scholars and policy-makers focus on either the sources of terrorist financing or the things terrorists spend money on, like weapons and the attacks themselves.[3] Yet the movement of money is a critical intermediary step. Terrorist groups often raise money in places different from where they are located and different from where attacks might take place. For terrorist groups to be effective, they must be able to move money from its origins to the operational areas where it is needed. These transfers of money represent potential weak points which the state can target to more effectively disrupt the terrorist organization and its operations.

Given the range of possible methods for terrorists to move funds, why do terrorist groups choose a particular method or combination of methods from the possible options? The following section will explore what the broad attributes might be for the movement of money. The subsequent section will describe the primary methods used to transfer money and will include how each method has advantages and disadvantages according to the attributes laid out in the earlier section. The final section will discuss how better countermeasures can be developed to better address the movement of terrorist finances.

Attributes

When terrorists move money, what kinds of issues might they be thinking of? Based on some evidence, as well as assumptions and inferred behavior, terrorists seem to choose methods of moving funds that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and speed.[4]

Volume: The ability to move more money with each transaction makes it easier for terrorist groups to fund an operation. However, not all methods are capable of moving an equal volume of funds. Methods like formal banking, hawalas, and money transfer businesses can theoretically transfer an infinite amount of money in a single transaction. In contrast, moving bulk cash is limited by the size and weight of the cash being transferred, with US \$1 million in US \$100 bills weighing over 20 pounds; and in US \$20 bill denominations, more than 100 pounds. Such a load would also take up a lot of space. Despite what is often portrayed in the movies, a typical briefcase can fit just over US \$250,000 in used US \$100 bills, or a mere US \$50,000 in US \$20 bills.

Risk: For terrorist groups, there are several types of risks they might face depending on the method of fund transfer. Among the most obvious risks is that the transfer itself will be



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detected by authorities. For example, a transfer between two banks is much more likely to be monitored, recorded, and discovered, than a transfer of cash that crosses the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. A related element of risk comes from the varying degrees of anonymity associated with each method of moving funds. Some methods, like formal banking, require institutions to follow “know your customer” (KYC) practices, while others, like hawalas or cash, allow for more anonymity.

Another risk for terrorists is the reliability of different methods. There is a high degree of certainty that transfers made between banks and between hawalas, for example, will be made accurately and completely. Cash transfers, on the other hand, may be less reliable because of the opportunities for theft along the way. And because of their bulk, they may be more vulnerable to seizure by law enforcement.

Convenience: Depending on their physical location, some methods for moving funds may be more or less convenient for a terrorist group. For example, using cash or hawalas to move money into or out of tribal areas in Iraq or Afghanistan is much more convenient than using formal banks. Likewise, al-Qaeda’s alleged trade in West African conflict diamonds was more convenient than using cash or gold to move funds.[5] West Africa is geographically distant from South Asia, but diamonds are easy to hide, and therefore much more convenient than cash. Gold is less convenient because of its weight and bulk, but given the importance of gold for dowries in both South Asia and the Middle East, and the number of large gold souks throughout the region, large shipments of gold in the form of high-end jewelry will not attract much notice. The convenience of a particular method will clearly depend on geographic/topographic features (like an uncontrolled border) as well as demographic (cultural, ethnic, linguistic) factors.

Simplicity: Everything being equal, terrorists would prefer methods that require the fewest number of steps, the lowest level of technology, and the least amount of skill. Given these parameters, terrorists are less likely to engage in elaborate money laundering schemes that involve numerous actors and that require dozens of complicated steps to obscure the trail of money. Using a scheme like the black market peso exchange, for example, would be much more complicated than a series of wire transfers through multiple bank accounts.[6]

Costs: Put simply, moving money requires the payment of fees. Western Union and MoneyGram charge users a transaction fee that can range anywhere from 1-10% depending on the amount being transferred and other transaction variables. Likewise, hawalas charge between 0.5-2.5% on each transaction. Even moving cash across borders may require side payments to border guards or customs officials.

Speed: Terrorists want to move money as quickly as possible to their final destination in order to fund their operational needs. Hawalas, for example, allow for transfers to occur relatively quickly, while formal banking may require deposits to sit for a day before they clear. Bulk cash smuggling can vary depending on how far the cash needs to move, and how many borders it needs to cross. A false trade invoicing scheme probably requires the longest amount of time to complete.[7]

Methods

This section highlights the most used methods as well as some methods that are not used, but have been raised as potential future methods. For each method, we offer a description of the method, some examples of how terrorists have used the method, and how we might think about each method according to the attributes described above. The methods are presented from most simple to most complex.


Cash Couriers: Using couriers to move physical cash is the “simplest and oldest way of moving value.”[8] When criminals move cash across international borders, they typically conceal it in vehicles, packages, luggage, or anything else that can hold large physical volumes of cash.[9] Oftentimes, where borders are uncontrolled or where the state’s resources are strained, criminals do not even conceal the cash.[10]



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AQ relied on couriers to move money in the 1990s and before the 9/11 attack. According to the 9/11 Commission Monograph, al-Qaeda used money changers to transfer US \$1 million from the UAE to Pakistan and then used couriers to transfer the funds as cash into Afghanistan. For the 9/11 attack itself, “Khalid Sheik Mohammed delivered...US \$120,000 [in cash to] Abdul Aziz Ali in Dubai...[who] then used the cash to wire funds to the hijackers in the United States.”[11] Khalid Sheik Mohammed also gave thirteen of the hijackers US \$10,000 each as they left Pakistan. These hijackers brought cash and traveler’s checks with them as they entered the U.S. and deposited the funds at banks such as Bank of America, SunTrust, and other smaller banks. Others, like Ramzi Binalshibh and Mustafa al Hawsawi also used cash to fund the attack. Zacarious Moussaoui brought in the most cash, US \$35,000, which he declared with Customs as he entered the country. (See Figure 1 for some of the cash transactions before the 9/11 attack.)

Figure 1: Cash Transfers before 9/11 Attacks



Cash couriers are used by other groups as well. For example, foreign fighters traveling to Iraq to join AQI often brought cash with them. According to the captured records from Sinjar (on the Syrian border in northwestern Iraq), of the 590 records of foreign fighters, 149 brought cash to AQI after entering Iraq. In general, almost all the different nationalities had close to the same rate of fighters contributing money (about 20-30%), but the Saudi fighters contributed the largest amount in an absolute sense. They also comprised 22 of the 23 fighters who brought in more than US \$1,000.[12] Overall, these cash transfers were estimated to make up over 70% of AQI's budget, highlighting the importance of this mechanism for both raising and moving funds into the organization.[13]

Likewise, Jemaah Islamiyah has used cash couriers in the past as their primary method of moving funds. Before the Bali bombings in 2002, JI used two Indonesian laborers working in Malaysia to transfer over US \$15,000 between terrorist members. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the al-Qaeda deputy and mastermind of 9/11, used a Pakistani courier to deliver US \$50,000 to a JI leader in 2003 after the Bali attack.[14] JI also used cash transfers and couriers to move about US \$8,500 to the bombers of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in 2001.[15]

Security is an important consideration when using cash couriers. Terrorist networks will presumably use only trusted personnel to move the money. Another consideration is speed.



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Transferring funds with couriers is much slower than electronic means. It also requires some complex planning and coordination if couriers need to arrange the transfers.

Informal Transfer Systems: There are several types of informal financial networks, such as Hawala/Hundi in South Asia, Fei ch'ien in China, Phoe Khan in Thailand, and Door-to-Door in the Philippines.[16] These networks often have traditional roots and ethnic ties, and operate in places where the formal banking sector is less established or where large ethnic diasporas live. They are estimated to be part of a US \$500 billion global remittance system.[17] Although most countries have legalized hawala (thinking that the networks will be easier to police if they operate openly), many hawaladars (hawala dealers) continue to operate illegally because of prohibitively high licensing and registration fees. Hawala networks were especially scrutinized after 9/11 due to evidence that al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) used them.

Hawala networks in the Middle East and South Asia operate in the following manner: a worker in Dubai wants to send US \$1,000 back to his wife in Pakistan. He finds a hawaladar and gives him the funds. The hawaladar contacts a fellow hawaladar (often an extended family member running a linked operation) in Pakistan. The hawaladar in Dubai gives both the worker in Dubai and the hawaladar in Pakistan a transaction code. The worker's wife goes to the hawaladar in Pakistan and gives him the code. If the codes match, the hawaladar in Pakistan gives his wife the rupee equivalent of US \$1,000 minus a small fee. (Note that no funds have actually crossed borders.)

To settle the accounts, the simplest method is for the hawaladars to wait for a similar value of transactions to move in the other direction. As this rarely occurs, the hawaladars will periodically (weekly, or monthly) balance their books by using money service businesses, smuggling high value commodities, or false trade invoicing transactions to transfer funds.

Although most customers use hawala for legitimate purposes, several terrorist groups have used hawalas to move money. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda "moved much of its money by hawala." [18] They used "about a dozen trusted hawaladars" (as well as some unwitting hawaladars) in Pakistan, Dubai, and elsewhere in the Middle East.[19] While AQ used hawalas prior to 9/11, they did not use them specifically for the 9/11 plot.[20]

Besides al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba used hawala networks to move funds before their 2000 Red Fort attack in Delhi. Likewise, Dawood Ibrahim transferred funds via hawala networks before the 1993 Mumbai attack.[21] In Iraq, terrorist groups have used hawala: two Iraqi Kurds were arrested for using hawalas to move part of nearly US \$150,000 to finance Ansar al-Sunna/Ansar al Islam.[22] Based on an author's interview with a U.S. Special Forces colonel, we also know of coalition operations undertaken against hawaladars that were knowingly moving funds for Iraqi insurgent groups. Jemaah Islamiyah also used hawaladars to transfer about US \$2,500 before a 2001 attack.[23]

A more recent example is the case of the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. In February 2010 Mr. Shahzad's handlers in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban)[24] arranged for US \$4,900 to be sent via an unregistered hawala network operated by two brothers, one of whom, Aftab Ali Khan, was an illegal Pakistani immigrant living in Brookline, Massachusetts. On February 24 or 25th Mr. Ali Khan met Mr. Shahzad just outside of his Massachusetts apartment to hand over US \$4,900 in cash.[25] There was no suggestion in any subsequent investigations that Mr. Ali Khan knew what the money would be used for. He was merely completing an anonymous business transaction.

In April Mr. Shahzad received an additional tranche of funds from the Pakistani Taliban. Perhaps because of the inconvenient distance between Boston and New York, another hawala network was used. This new network, operated by Mohammad Younis on Long Island and his brother in Pakistan, was also unregistered.[26] On April 10th, just three weeks before the bombings, Mr. Younis spoke to Mr. Shahzad by phone and arranged a meeting in a parking lot in Ronkonkoma, New York to hand over US \$7,000 sent by Mr. Shahzad's Pakistani Taliban handlers.[27]






Figure 2: Finances for Faisal Shahzad

Hawala and other informal transfer systems are fast, with transactions happening usually within hours, perhaps up to a day or slightly more for transactions to the more remote regions.[28] They are also relatively anonymous. Hawaladars keep records, but these may often be done in their own shorthand, and their bookkeeping methods vary.[29] They may even be more reliable than other methods, like money service businesses, which serve similar communities.[30] They are also relatively inexpensive compared to other methods, charging just 1-2% for transfer fees and often offering a more competitive exchange rate –this is the primary reason why people use them. They are also convenient, operating in areas underserved by traditional banking. In Afghanistan, for example, Thompson notes that hawaladars operate in even the most remote areas of the country.[31] In the United States, informal transfer systems are required to register with FinCEN. In Afghanistan, there has been a similar effort to regulate the hawala network but both Afghanistan’s geography and the weakness of its institutions have prevented much progress.[32]

Money Service Businesses: The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) defines money service businesses (MSBs) as “currency dealers or exchangers; check cashers; issuers [or redeemers] of traveler’s checks, money orders, or stored value cards; and money transmitters.”[33] In the United States alone there are over 33,000 registered MSB’s.[34] Money service businesses are generally subject to the same regulations and laws as banks, and are subject to regulatory audits. However, unlike banks, MSBs do not follow similarly rigorous “know your customer” (KYC) procedures. Banks will only conduct transactions with people holding accounts at that bank, and those account holders must provide a significant amount of personal information when they open the account. MSBs, on the other hand, do not require that customers have existing accounts. Customers only need to present a valid form of ID. Most MSBs, and particularly the more established money transmitters such as Western Union, transfer funds quickly (within minutes to most locations), are minimally expensive for transfers larger than US \$1,000, and offer low risks of detection, especially if the MSB is unregistered.


In February 2013, a federal jury in San Diego convicted four Somali immigrants of conspiring to fund al Shabaab, a militant terrorist group in Somalia.[35] While all four men were involved in raising funds, one of them, Issa Doreh, worked at the Shidaal Express, a registered MSB



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from which he sent funds directly to one of al-Shabaab's leaders, Aden Hashi Ayrow, who was in regular telephone contact with one of the other defendants. Months of wiretapped telephone conversations led to additional arrests in two related cases in St. Louis, Missouri and Minneapolis, Minnesota. Again, the goal was to raise funds for al-Shabaab and wire transfer those funds through registered MSB's, getting lost in the traffic of numerous legitimate remittances sent by the sizeable Somali immigrant communities in those cities. (See Figure 3)

Figure 3: Operation Green Arrow




Before al-Qaeda officially existed, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef, and Wali Khan Amin Shah used a large MSB in the UAE, Al Ansari Exchange Establishment (AAEE), to move funds for the Operation Bojinka plot in 1995.[36] Al-Qaeda also made extensive use of MSBs in their financing of the 9/11 attacks. An AQ financier, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali deposited almost US \$120,000 at two MSBs in Dubai: the Wall Street Exchange Center and the UA Exchange Center. The money was transferred to the hijackers' U.S. bank accounts through the MSBs' correspondent accounts at the Royal Bank of Canada and Citibank, respectively. Even though the MSBs in Dubai required identification, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali used aliases. His transactions also appeared unremarkable among the millions of MSB transactions flowing out of that jurisdiction. A second financier, Binalshib, transferred about US \$8,500 via two Traveler's Express/MoneyGram transactions and two Western Union transactions.[37] (See Figure 4)



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Figure 4: Money Service Business Transfers before 9/11 Attacks


Perhaps the terrorism financing case study that highlights the role of MSB's most glaringly is the complex Hezbollah financing case that entrapped and eventually undid Lebanese Canadian Bank in



2011. While the Lebanese Canadian Bank case has many layers (and more will be said about the case in the next section), one critical component of the money laundering operation allegedly run by Hezbollah involved the placement of cash into money service businesses located in Beirut. These MSB's had accounts with Lebanese Canadian Bank. The scheme originated in the Western Hemisphere with drug proceeds from Ayman Joumaa's drug trafficking network. Although Joumaa, himself, was not a member of Hezbollah, he had loose connections with the organization, and found in them a willing partner in crime.

Joumaa's drug proceeds were laundered through a complicated scheme involving the purchase of used cars from Lebanese-owned dealerships in the United States.[38] The used cars were shipped to Africa where they were sold for cash. Additional drug cash was co-mingled with the proceeds of the car sales, and this cash was sent to at least two money service businesses in Beirut, including Elissa Exchange and the Hassan Ayash Exchange (See Figure 5). Both of these MSB's were allegedly complicit in the scheme, and allegedly earned commissions on their laundering services, which went straight into the coffers of Hezbollah. When the scandal was laid bare, both MSB's were shut down, and Joumaa's drug trafficking network was forced to find another channel through which to launder their funds.


Figure 5: Hezbollah Financing Scheme Pre-2011



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According to a recent Treasury sanctions designation in April 2013, it did not take long for Joumaa to find a new channel for laundering his funds. Elissa Exchange and Hassan Ayash Exchange were soon replaced by two other Beirut-based, Hezbollah-linked money services businesses: Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and the Hawali Exchange Co.[39] The designation by Treasury alleged that between March 2011 and October 2012 Rmeiti Exchange collected bulk cash, issued cashier's checks and facilitated cross border wire transfers for a variety of criminals, including "Hezbollah affiliates." (See Figure 6) Hawali Exchange was charged with similar, albeit more complex, transactions. Such designations essentially bring a financial institution's operations to a halt, as it becomes almost impossible to conduct U.S. dollar transactions. The designation decision set a new precedent, for it was the first time Treasury had used Section 311 of the Patriot Act against a money service business. Previous designations had been limited to formal banks.

Figure 6: Hezbollah Financing Scheme Post-2011



Up until this case and the successful efforts on the part of the U.S. Treasury Department to take down four well-known Lebanese money services businesses, MSB's had been considered an advantageous method for moving terrorist funds. They allow for the relatively inexpensive and speedy transmission of funds, their omnipresence is convenient, and even though their cash reporting threshold is low, it is still possible in theory to move a large volume of funds at any given time. But the risks have changed in recent years. Previously, MSB's flew under the radar and faced a lower risk of external audits or careful scrutiny by financial regulators. Renewed attention on their activities has put them in the spotlight, and many MSB's in North America are now finding it difficult to establish accounts with formal banks, who do not wish to take on the additional risks.

Formal Banking. The formal banking sector includes depository financial institutions (DFIs) – banks, saving and loans, and credit unions – which are the sole entities permitted “to engage in the business of receiving deposits and providing access to those deposits” through a payment system of checks, electronic networks, credit and debit cards, and bank-to-bank transfers.[40] The formal banking sector is heavily regulated in the West, and increasingly so in most emerging market countries. In the U.S. laws like the Bank Secrecy Act (and its most recent amendments in Title III of the USAPATRIOT Act) require banks to maintain records, know their customers, report transactions over US \$10,000 and report suspicious transactions of any amount. However, banks are still vulnerable to abuse by terrorists and other criminals.

Banks can be a vehicle for criminal financing in a variety of ways. The most convenient arrangement for a terrorist would be a bank that asks no questions, such as the former al-



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Madina Bank in Lebanon. Alternatively, the bank could have a crooked employee, who facilitates the laundering and movement of funds under the nose of unwitting supervisors, as happened with Lebanese Canadian Bank. And if a bank is not careful, it could also be used for criminal activity by way of correspondent accounts or payable-through-accounts of correspondent banks, as was the case with HSBC. And finally, there may be instances where a bank does all it is required to do with respect to customer due diligence, but the transactions still fail to set off any red flags, as happened with the 9/11 hijacker accounts.

Al-Madina Bank, and its subsidiary, United Credit Bank (UCB), represent a notorious case of deceitful corruption. When their crimes were uncovered in 2003, their unorthodox transactions caused the bank's collapse and the loss of depositors' funds. Purchased by two Lebanese-Saudi brothers in 1984, the bank soon fell under the *de facto* control of a woman named Rana Qoleilat, who started out as a mere executive assistant, but was soon given power of attorney to conduct transactions on behalf of the two owners. According to prosecutors' allegations, Ms. Qoleilat knowingly facilitated the laundering of funds by Saddam Hussein's sanctioned regime, conflict diamond dealers, Russian mafia groups, and an arms dealer for Hezbollah.[41] She is also alleged to have embezzled funds from the bank to enrich powerful Syrian generals and politicians during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. However, because the bank was run like a Ponzi scheme, the entire operation eventually collapsed. Most depositors eventually recovered their funds, but the owners lost an estimated US \$1.5 billion.[42]

The Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), mentioned earlier, was implicated in Hezbollah financing at a number of levels. The bank held accounts for money service businesses that were allegedly laundering and earning commissions for Hezbollah, but the bank was also held liable for allowing a handful of crooked senior bank managers to structure cash deposits right under the unwatchful eye of compliance staff.[43] These crooked employees received funds from Hezbollah couriers, who would bring the bulk cash directly from the airport, and deposit the funds at a nearby LCB branch.

Even when a bank carefully scrutinizes its employees, it can still be used for terrorism financing by way of contaminated correspondent accounts. Correspondent accounts are accounts set up to allow off-shore banks to conduct transactions in a key currency such as the U.S. dollar. For example, any foreign bank that wishes to conduct dollar transactions must first set up a correspondent account with a U.S. bank to process those dollar transactions. Correspondent accounts are an unavoidable tool for conducting international transactions. The problem arises because the U.S.-based bank cannot guarantee that the foreign correspondent bank is carefully screening its own customers and its customers' activities. That is why correspondent relationships take time to establish. Most large international banks will not set up a correspondent relationship with an overseas bank without first conducting an on-site visit and evaluation of the other bank's risk compliance regime. Unfortunately, such due diligence and care was not undertaken by HSBC-US when it continued to maintain a correspondent account relationship with al-Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia, after several allegations of connections to terrorism financing. The first allegations arose in 2005 when two individuals were indicted for using al-Rajhi bank to send money to violent extremists in Chechnya. Additional concerns arose in 2007 when the contents of a 2003 CIA report were leaked. The report found that "senior al-Rajhi family members have long supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank." [44] In spite of all of these red flags, HSBC-US continued to conduct correspondent account transactions with al-Rajhi Bank until they were investigated for many additional compliance failures.

In the execution of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda used the formal banking sector as their primary method of moving and storing funds. All told, they deposited around US \$300,000 in U.S. banks, and spent all but US \$36,000 of that before the attacks. About US \$130,000 of the funds the hijackers used came through bank-to-bank transfers (including through MSB correspondent accounts at banks) and the rest was deposited as cash. Once these funds arrived in the United States they were deposited in accounts at Union Bank of California and Sun Trust Bank in Florida, among others. All the hijackers opened accounts at these U.S. banks with their real identities. They accessed their funds with ATM and debit cards. An additional US \$47,600 was deposited in overseas banks: US \$9,600 in Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia, US \$8,000 in a Citibank branch office in the UAE, and US \$30,000 in a Standard Chartered Bank branch in the UAE. Two of the hijackers accessed these overseas accounts with ATM and Visa cards.[45] What is remarkable is that most of these transactions, because of their relatively small size and the lack of suspicion about the would-be hijackers, would not have set off any red flags even today.



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Formal banking has several advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups. In general, banks are largely regulated and therefore pose higher risks for terrorists of detection by investigators. Al-Qaeda, however, overcame some of these drawbacks by utilizing bank branches in the UAE and Pakistan, which at the time lacked much regulatory oversight, and by allowing mostly low-level (unknown to law enforcement) operatives to use banks for the 9/11 plot.[46] They are safe and convenient, but can be expensive (based on fees and exchange rates), and can be slow if the banks hold the money for a period of time before authorizing transfers.[47]

False Trade Invoicing. One of the most difficult laundering methods to detect is false trade invoicing, which is why it is estimated to be the one of the most heavily utilized methods by both organized crime and terrorist groups for moving funds internationally.[48] False trade invoicing disguises the transmission of value from one jurisdiction to another. This can be done through over-invoicing or under-invoicing.[49] If a U.S.-based terrorist purchases some American honey, and then exports that honey to Yemen, he could overprice the shipment by US \$100,000 without attracting much attention. When the Yemeni importer pays for the overpriced honey, some of that money will go towards paying off the U.S. honey producer. The additional US \$100,000 goes right into the pocket of the fellow terrorist in the U.S., who arranged for the shipment. According to one government source, this is believed to have happened in the months leading up to 9/11.[50]

When investigators followed leads connected to the 9/11 hijackers they ran into a number of suspicious transactions related to the Middle East honey trade. Thanks to a tip-off from a confidential informant, agents rushed to Kennedy Airport to find two suspects stashing US \$140,000 in cash inside a honey shipment bound for the Middle East.[51] Learning of the suspicious honey transactions, Professor John Zdanowicz at Florida International University took it upon himself to run through all of the Commerce Department data on honey imports and exports between the U.S. and al-Qaeda watch list countries in the months leading up to 9/11. What he found raised a number of eyebrows, particularly for honey exported to Yemen. Although Yemen is known for its honey trade, importing 600 metric tons per year and exporting its own special brand of honey from the ancient Sidr tree,[52] these transactions were nevertheless highly unusual, suggesting the surreptitious movement of funds from Yemen to the U.S. The investigation ultimately led to the listing of the Yemen-based Al Nur Honey Center, Al Nur Honey Press Shop and the Al-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce on OFAC's list of designated terrorism-related entities.[53]

Of all of the methods of moving terrorist funds, false trade invoicing offers many advantages for criminal organizations. While it is not simple and can be quite time consuming, it is incredibly convenient if the group already has front companies to conduct the transactions. Traditionally, the risk of detection has been quite low, but with the continued establishment of Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) around the world, this risk is rising. In addition to assisting with port security, Trade Transparency Units attempt to scour big data, searching for unusually priced transactions.[54] While this method is unlikely to catch falsely-invoiced shipments in real time, the paper trail related to the discovered transactions can be a starting point for money laundering and terrorism financing investigations.

High-value commodities. Valuable commodities like gold and diamonds offer yet another convenient method for transmitting value across borders. Gold is an especially reliable form of transportable payment during times of strife, or when fiat currencies are heavily devalued or not easily convertible. Gold can also be smelted into any shape and disguised for easy transport. Its weight, quality and price can be easily determined, and it is nearly impossible to trace its origin.[55] In addition to these advantages, gold is extremely important in Middle Eastern and South Asian cultures. Bridal dowries are often presented in the form of high quality gold jewelry. The region is also home to the world's largest gold souks (markets), so the transport of gold by travelers is not likely to raise eyebrows. For these reasons, it should come as no surprise that gold has been offered as a reward incentive by both al Qaeda and the Taliban for would-be jihadists.[56] Other groups such as the militant right-wing Posse Comitatus in the U.S., and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, have been known to store and trade gold.[57]

Diamonds and their use by terrorists groups are more controversial, with researchers divided over the reliability and weight of the evidence. There is little doubt that Hezbollah has a hand in the diamond business, especially give the large Lebanese diaspora involved in the African diamond trade.[58] What is more controversial is the extent to which al Qaeda and its affiliates have used diamonds to store or move value. The first allegations arose not long after 9/11



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when Douglas Farah, a *Washington Post* reporter at the time, declared a connection,[59] but there were many doubters. A brief FBI investigation soon after 9/11 turned up nothing, but more evidence began to surface in the following years, especially with the capture and questioning of Ahmed Ghailani in Pakistan in 2004. Ghailani, a senior al-Qaeda operative, confessed to buying conflict diamonds and spent a great deal of time traveling in and out of West African conflict zones between 1999 and 2002.[60] There were also a lot of questions raised about Aafia Siddiqui, an MIT-trained Pakistani microbiologist and al-Qaeda sympathizer, who was captured by U.S. forces and now sits in a Texas prison, sentenced to 86 years for trying to kill Americans. She is alleged to have traveled to Liberia to purchase conflict diamonds prior to 9/11.[61] Why would al-Qaeda resort to the diamond trade? After the 1998 East African embassy bombings the Clinton Administration froze more than US \$220 million of assets belonging to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The organization needed to convert its remaining assets into something transportable, which could not easily be traced or seized.[62]

Gold and diamonds clearly offer many obvious advantages for a terrorist. Diamonds are especially easy to transport and hide, and both are easy to convert into cash. But obtaining diamonds and gold from the source (such as African mines) is neither simple nor convenient. They need to be transported by hand, and that always carries the risk of seizure or theft. Where valuable commodities continue to play a major role is in settling hawala accounts, for both criminal and law abiding hawaladars.[63]

Other methods. The methods described above are the most common way terrorists move money. However, it is worth mentioning that there are other methods that criminals use, but, so far, have not been used extensively by terrorists groups. One relatively new, and widely discussed, method is the use of stored value cards (SVCs).[64] “Closed” cards are tied to a particular business, while “open” cards, like prepaid debit cards, can be used anywhere. These cards, especially the open ones, “provide a compact, easily transportable, and potentially anonymous way” to move funds.[65] While drug dealers and money launderers have used SVCs, terrorists have not been known to use them in any meaningful way.[66] Likewise, casinos are often mentioned as a venue for criminal money laundering, but we have found no evidence that terrorists utilize them for moving funds. As another example, digital currencies, like Bitcoin, are increasingly being used by criminals, especially drug dealers, but we have seen little evidence that terrorists are using them.[67] A 2008 report lists several examples of criminals using new payment methods (NPMs), like digital currencies, stored-value cards, and mobile payments, but lists just a single example of terrorists selling phone cards to raise funds.[68]

Conclusion

To sum up, terrorist groups utilize multiple methods for moving funds, demonstrating how they are flexible and adaptive; when one method becomes riskier or costlier, they move to other methods. Terrorists also take advantage of legal and regulatory differences between states, finding the seams where they can work. This makes stopping terrorist financial flows a challenging problem.

To counter the movement of terrorist funds, there are reporting requirements for banks and non-bank financial institutions, as well as a loosely coordinated international regime consisting of organizations like the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units which share financial intelligence, and FATF-style regional bodies that evaluate member states’ compliance regimes. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the full regime here, as others have done so more than adequately.[69] This regime has had a mixed record of success, despite insufficient international coordination, deficient capacity, and inadequate implementation in many countries. For example, al-Qaeda especially, but also Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Hamas, and the Abu Sayyaf Group have been unable to maintain their levels of violence because of financial difficulties.[70] Additionally, financial data has been a key component in prosecuting terrorism cases, with FBI special agents often making use of SAR filings. This is because financial transactions leave “footprints” for law enforcement agencies to intercept and follow. And even when investigations do not begin with suspicious financial transactions, financial records can provide key evidence in piecing together the details of a case, as it did with the would-be Heathrow liquid explosive bombers in 2006.[71]

Despite these successes, there are also failures and challenges. For example, as the 9/11 Commission noted, the regulatory regime in place before 9/11 did not fail, rather it was “never designed to detect or disrupt the transactions of the type that financed 9/11.”[72] The point here is that there is no way to create a perfect regulatory and enforcement regime that can stop all criminal transactions. Nor would we want such a heavy regime, because then it would



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also impose costs on the vast majority of legal, legitimate transactions that occur within the financial system.

To return to the attributes described earlier, there is little countries can or should do to affect many of them, because so many methods are used for legitimate purposes. We do not want to decrease the potential volume of funds that can be transferred with any method (with the exception of cash transactions); nor do we want to make methods costlier, slower, more complex, or less convenient.

Instead, the focus should be on making the risks of detection higher. Specifically, this means enhancing regulatory compliance at the ground level and improving international collaboration, cooperation, and capacity building, as well as prioritizing enforcement with non-compliant countries.[73] Making the transfer of funds riskier can be especially effective against the many terrorist groups who place a high value on the internal control of their operatives, even at the risk of operational security. For many groups, like al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq and North Africa, they obsessively demand that their members keep detailed records of their financial transactions. Their choice of “control” over “security” provides an important vulnerability that states can exploit.[74]

Notes are available at source URL

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The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply

By Joel Hernández

Source:<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/281/html><http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/281/html>

This case study analyzes the diversification of both terrorist groups and drug traffickers and the convergence between the two types of organizations in recent decades. As financial markets have become globalized, so have opportunities for illicit groups to transact with each other. The article builds on the collapse of Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2011 after its designation by the U.S. Treasury Department as a money-laundering financial institution tied to global drug trafficking and to Hezbollah. It follows the trajectory of two Hezbollah-associated drug kingpins: Ayman Joumaa, who facilitated trade between Hezbollah and the Zetas, and Maroun Saade, who was apprehended attempting to connect Hezbollah to the Taliban. In its analysis of the histories, motivations, and relationships among these three groups, the article reflects on relationships currently in existence between terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations, and on the implications of the possible directions these relationships might take in the future.



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2011 was an eventful year for Michele Leonhart, Preet Bharara, and Neil MacBride. Working through the Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Court system, they took on Hezbollah and its errant banker, and dismantled a US \$329 million money-laundering scheme run out of the ninth-largest bank in Lebanon, and underwriting a global drug trafficking network by means of which Hezbollah transacted with Los Zetas and attempted to transact with the Taliban as well. The legal record that Leonhart, Bharara, and MacBride left behind reveals, in intriguing detail, a few strands of the intricate transactional webs that link together terrorists, drug traffickers, and money launderers, across continents and oceans. What follows is their story and its context.

The Puppeteers: Ayman Joumaa and Maroun Saade

DEA Investigator Michele Leonhart was ready to go public. Her five year-investigation of a suspicious Lebanese-Colombian hotel owner named Ayman Joumaa had uncovered a network that “coordinated the transportation, distribution, and sale of multi-ton shipments of cocaine from South America... operating in Lebanon, West Africa, Panama, and Colombia.”[1] Acting on her findings, on January 26, 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control labeled Joumaa as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker, along with nine individuals and nineteen entities affiliated with him. About two weeks later, on February 10, the Treasury Department tightened the screws on Joumaa by exposing his clients—revealing links between Joumaa’s network and Hezbollah as well as Los Zetas—as well as his banker—designating Lebanese Canadian Bank and its subsidiaries as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern.”[2]

A few days later, on Valentine’s Day, Leonhart and U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara announced the unsealing of charges against Mr. Maroun Saade and six associates—including an alleged associate of Hezbollah—with “conspiracy to engage in narco-terrorism... conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists—namely, the Taliban... and conspiracy to acquire and transfer anti-aircraft missiles.”[3]

On December 13, 2011, following up on the DEA and Treasury Department’s work, U.S. Attorney Neil MacBride formally charged Joumaa with drug trafficking and money laundering.[4] Two days later, to close off the year, Bharara filed a civil complaint against Lebanese Canadian Bank and its affiliates, shedding further light on their money-laundering activities.

The stories of Mr. Saade, Mr. Joumaa, and the erstwhile Lebanese Canadian Bank, present a fascinating view into a global web of illicit activity linking geographically distant and ideologically distinct terrorist groups. This network explains both the extraordinary resilience of Hezbollah and the Taliban, and the meteoric rise of the Zetas. It also provides a convincing explanation why military operations against any of these groups have succeeded only at the tactical level, while failing to strategically defeat them. The Taliban speak disingenuously when they snicker that “you have all the watches, but we have all the time”[5] at their adversary: they enjoy, in fact, much more than a mere chronological advantage over the ISAF. Hezbollah, the Taliban, the Zetas, and a host of other transnational criminal groups play interlocking roles in a global network of mutually supporting commercial exchanges, by means of which they fund and replenish each other’s treasuries and armories.

This paper will begin with a historical and ideological background of the two terrorist groups and the drug-trafficking organization cited in its introduction. It will then bore into each group’s relationship with drug trafficking, analyzing the practical and ideological foundations for their use of this particular mechanism, and reflect on the relationship between global terrorism and drug trafficking. It will then return to the developing legal actions against Ayman Joumaa, Maroun Saade, and Lebanese Canadian Bank, and close with a brief discussion on to the practice of countering international crime by means of juridical and fiduciary interdiction.

The Chameleon: Hezbollah

Most grievously remembered for the bombing of the American and French Barracks at Beirut International Airport in 1983, which killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers, Hezbollah has shown a remarkable degree of adaptability in its three decades and counting of simultaneous terrorist, political, and charitable activity. As a traditional terrorist group, Hezbollah is nimble and boasts an impressive tactical reach, having staged attacks as far away from its home base as India and Argentina. Among the first modern terrorist organizations to systematically employ suicide bombing,[6] Hezbollah has deployed cells to strike at Israeli—as well as



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Jewish non-Israeli—targets worldwide, and is also strongly suspected of having carried out the brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. [7] Buenos Aires stands out in its suffering at the hands of Hezbollah, having endured attacks against the Israeli Embassy to Argentina that killed 29 people in 1992,[8] and against the Asociación Mutua Israelita Argentina that killed 85 people in 1994.[9] In 2012 alone, active Hezbollah cells surfaced in Thailand, Georgia, India, and Bulgaria, although all but the last cell failed to execute their attack plans.[10]

Hezbollah also operates as a paramilitary force along Lebanon's southern border with Israel. While it keeps a close secret of its force levels, it is believed to currently field between 5,000 and 7,000 part-time soldiers, although recruitment rates have grown significantly since the 2006 war with Israel. Hezbollah is currently believed to be capable of fielding 25,000 soldiers in case of a national emergency.[11] Hezbollah is also believed to possess an arsenal of as many as 50,000 rockets of varying range, allowing them to strike as far south as Eilat;[12] Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned in 2010 that Hezbollah's missile arsenal dwarfs that of most states, and that Hezbollah may also possess chemical and biological weapons.[13] Acting in concert with Iran, Hezbollah may have even developed some capability in aerial drone surveillance, and claims to have thus penetrated Israeli air space at least twice in recent years.[14] Hezbollah clashed with Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon continually prior to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, and fought a month-long engagement with the IDF in the summer of 2006. Although Hezbollah simply does not have the capability to defeat the IDF on the field, the moral victory it claimed following its 2006 defeat outsized its material losses; Hezbollah is believed in any case to have replenished its arsenal well beyond its stockpile as of 2006.[15] Lest any doubt remain as to Hezbollah's recuperation from that conflict, the game-changing effect of its 2013 intervention on behalf of the Assad regime in the ongoing Syrian civil war speaks volumes about its capacity in conventional military action.[16]

An influential player in Lebanese politics, Hezbollah currently claims only a small minority of Parliamentary seats, but nonetheless holds two Cabinet Ministries, and controls, through political alliances, eighteen out of thirty Cabinet seats.[17] Hezbollah's entry into mainstream politics is the product of adaptation. In its first manifesto, the Open Letter of 1985, Hezbollah clamored that it was simply "intolerable for Muslims to participate in... a regime which is not predicated upon the prescriptions (ahkam) of religion and upon the basis of the Law (the Shari'a) as laid down by Muhammad,"[18] and called for the "establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled on Iran's Islamic Republic." [19] In the next half-decade, however, it would come to accept the state apparatus as established by the Taif Agreement, and agree to partake in national elections beginning in 1992, at which time it would secure a foothold in the Lebanese Parliament that it has retained since then. Its 2009 electoral program would go as far as to call for a "state that is committed to applying the rule of law on all constituents within a framework of respect for public freedoms, and impartial application of citizens' rights and duties, irrespective of religious sect, home region, or the citizen's views." [20]

Hezbollah also operates as a welfare-state-within-a-state in Lebanon, providing "monthly support and supplemental nutritional, educational, housing and health assistance for the poor... there are also Hizballah-affiliated schools, clinics and low-cost hospitals." [21] The soft power that Hezbollah thus projects finds expression in the words of former Lebanese President Émile Lahoud, a member of Lebanon's Christian community,

"..for us Lebanese, and I can tell you a majority of Lebanese, Hezbollah is a national resistance movement. If it wasn't for them we couldn't have liberated our land. And because of that, we have a big esteem for the Hezbollah." [22]

Hezbollah's influence thus rests on the twin pillars of its image as a liberator and salvation army, and on the coercive power it can project, via intimidation as well as outright violence, when moral suasion falls short. Yet welfare is expensive—as are armaments. The portrait of Hezbollah is thus incomplete, without a look at its funding streams—one which will have to wait, another few pages, while we introduce the Taliban and the Zetas.

The Purist: The Taliban

Formed in 1994 in Quetta, Pakistan, after a fratricidal the internal war that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its withdrawal roughly a decade later, the Taliban are a movement of Afghan and Pakistani Deobandi Muslim, ethnic Pashtuns—although the record reflects that "all Taliban are Pashtuns, but all Pashtuns are not Taliban." [23] Operationally split



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between an Afghan and a Pakistani wing, the Taliban operate from both sides of the Durand Line. The Afghan Taliban have been fighting for the best part of nearly two decades to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Afghanistan, dominated by the Pashtun tribe and governed by sharia law, while the Pakistani Taliban fight ferociously to protect their autonomy within Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Afghan Pashtuns dominated Afghan politics from the formation of the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1747 until the Soviet invasion of 1979.[24] Secular government based on the Soviet model was universally rejected in Afghanistan, and the country broke down into an orgy of violence. The heavily mechanized Soviet occupation troops killed as many as 1 million Afghans during the course of their ten-year occupation,[25] roughly 7% of the nation's population. By the time of the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan had been reduced to "a state of virtual disintegration... divided into warlord fiefdoms... [where] all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed." [26]

By 1994, Afghanistan was a wasteland begging for a savior. Enter the Taliban: presenting themselves as a pure, uncorrupt alternative to Afghan warlords, and bolstered by crucial support from the Pakistani government, the Taliban fought their way across the Durand line and took Kandahar in November of 1994.[27] From there they swept west and north to capture Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif in 1995, and north to capture Kabul in 1996, visiting unspeakable atrocity unto conquered populations and imposing strict *sharia* along their way.[28] Although the Taliban never secured total control of Afghanistan, they ruled roughly 85% of national territory until 2001, when the post-9/11 U.S. invasion relegated the Taliban from the major cities into rural areas and into the tribal areas of Pakistan.[29] After ousting the Taliban, NATO labored to install a plural government in Kabul, led by Pashtun Hamid Karzai but also inclusive of its Tajik and Uzbek allies of the Northern Alliance—a coup in the eyes of tribal Pashtuns.[30] The collapse of the Taliban wrought abject disaster unto Pashtun communities of Northern Afghanistan, visited upon them in the form of "a wave of attacks on Pashtun communities... [resulting] in mass displacement and communal impoverishment... [including] summary executions, rape, denial of access to agricultural land, and widespread looting of livestock and movable property." [31]

At the present moment, the Taliban form a fearsome insurgent threat to ISAF forces, as well as the Afghan and Pakistani governments. The Taliban had an estimated 36,000 active fighters as of March 2010, supplied mainly with light, general-purpose machine guns and grenade launchers.[32] The Afghan Taliban pose a serious threat to the stability of Afghanistan once the ISAF withdrawal is complete. They are active throughout the tribal areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, from which they can easily reach ISAF forces in Afghanistan or stage attacks on the Afghan government. The Pakistani Taliban are no less threatening, and are continually involved "against the wishes of Mullah Omar... in attacks against Pakistani military and security forces inside Pakistan." [33]

The Taliban's goals are somewhat more difficult to assess than their capabilities. Both as a response to persecution, and as a function of their tribal (rather than institutional) political structure, the Taliban's political goals tend toward inscrutability. Taliban pronouncements have oscillated between unambiguous declarations of the movement's intention to recover the control it once enjoyed over Afghanistan,[34] to conciliatory messages such as Mullah Omar's August 28, 2011 *Eid-al-Fitr* message, which called for an Afghanistan where "all ethnicities will have participation in the regime and portfolios will be dispensed on the basis of merits... the policy of the Islamic Emirate is not aimed at monopolizing power." [35] Reputed voices—notably that of eminent Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid—surmise that the Taliban have learned from their demise in 2001 that they are simply not capable of administering the whole of Afghanistan, and are ready to cut a power-sharing deal with the government in Kabul,[36] which might at once satisfy some of the human rights and governance concerns of the international community, and the confessional prerogatives of the Taliban, in a post-ISAF, modern form of *cuius regio, eius religio*.

The prospects for a negotiated power-sharing agreement, however, appear murkier than either Omar's pronouncements or Rashid's speculation. In mid-2012, Taliban representatives dismissed Afghan President Karzai as a puppet and chafed at the "ever-changing position" of American negotiators,[37] while the utter failure of the U.S.-brokered attempt to host talks between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan in Qatar in the summer of 2013 reveals in no uncertain terms the former group's contempt for Karzai's government and for the idea of interlocution with it.[38]



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The Psychopath: Los Zetas

Although Los Zetas are decidedly not a global terrorist organization in the same sense as Hezbollah and the Taliban, they enter this study by virtue of their association with a terrorist group. Los Zetas came into being in 1997, cherry-picked out of the GAFES—Mexico's elite special operations corps, assembled with the explicit purpose of fighting against Mexican cartels—by Osiel Cárdenas, a rising force within the Gulf Cartel seeking the best bodyguard contingent Mexico could produce.[39] As Cárdenas consolidated his leadership within the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas expanded from a personal guard to a full-force mercenary army. The capture of Cárdenas in 2003, however, dealt his organization a heavy blow. The Gulf Cartel was able to mitigate this loss with the firepower it gained from its alliance with Los Zetas—but only for as long as Los Zetas consented to their subordinate role. Smelling blood in Gulf's decline, Los Zetas opted for schism with their benefactors in a 2007 internal vote.[40] A cold peace held until early 2009, when the Gulf Cartel's attempt seize the border city of Reynosa from Los Zetas prompted them to turn their firepower—which had served the Gulf Cartel so well in friendship—against their former ally in war.[41]

In the two years following this rupture, Los Zetas arguably became the most powerful drug cartel in Mexico—at very least posing a worthy challenge to the Sinaloa Cartel for primacy in Mexico's criminal underworld.[42] As if tasked with personifying Mexico's Faustian descent into generalized violence, Los Zetas made sadism their trademark. A comprehensive list of Zeta atrocities might stretch into infinity; anecdotes can serve as guide to Los Zetas' use of psychopathic violence as a tactic: the beating to death with a two-by-four of a female police officer in Nuevo Laredo, in front of her stunned colleagues, as a warning against crossing the Zetas;[43] the 2010 San Fernando Massacre, when Zeta elements intercepted a northbound bus near the village on San Fernando, abducted the seventy-five migrants on board to an isolated farmhouse, executing them methodically;[44] or its reprise in 2011, when Zeta members abducted hundreds of travelers from multiple buses to pit them against each other, in gladiator-style fights to the death, and dumped their bodies in mass graves.[45]

The meteoric rise of los Zetas required that they expand their capacity. Expand they did, effectively becoming “the first major crime syndicate to broadly diversify their activities,”[46] enriching their portfolio with the addition of kidnapping and extortion; smuggling of humans and contraband; theft of petroleum, vehicles, and human organs; and money laundering.[47] In parallel to their brazen public operations within Mexico, Los Zetas also developed vast underground drug-and-arms trafficking and money-laundering networks within the United States, as far away from the border with Mexico as in Chicago, where authorities arrested twenty people, including five alleged members of a Zeta cell, and seized about US \$12 million in cash and 250 kilograms of cocaine in November of 2011.[48] In March 2013, the ominously-named Tremor Enterprises, an Oklahoma-based corporate breeder and trainer of quarter horses, was revealed to operate as the front for a multi-million dollar scheme laundering dirty Zeta money through the U.S. horse-racing circuit and stallion breeding industry.[49]

If at their peak, Los Zetas controlled nearly the entirety of Mexico's eastern seaboard,[50] as this article goes to press the Zetas may well be facing terminal decline. Zeta capo Heriberto Lazcano Lazacano, the grand strategist atop an otherwise decentralized operation, died in October of 2012 in a shootout with Mexican Marines, depriving the Zetas of his both his organizational skills and his vision.[51] His successor, Miguel Treviño Morales, lives to commit atrocity rather than to command it; under his leadership of Los Zetas retained power by virtue of intimidation, but ceased growing.[52] In any event, Morales was captured by Mexican marines in July of 2013, and while the consequences of his apprehension have yet to play themselves out, the likeliest outcome forecast by Mexican drug war analysts is one of fragmentation and descent.[53] As per security expert Alejandro Hope, of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness, Treviño's demise could represent “the last nail in the coffin of the Zetas as a cohesive organization at the national level.”[54]

Operating in the spaces between Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Mexico, were Ayman Joumaa's and Maroun Saade's networks, acting as proverbial quartermasters for Hezbollah, and Los Zetas, moving their drugs, money, and weapons across the globe in a systematic and highly organized manner, and attempting, although failing, to link up with the Taliban as well. As their respective histories demonstrate, these three organizations are vastly different from each other and operate in distinct—and geographically isolated—theaters. Nonetheless, the international network that each of these organizations has tapped into, by the hands of Ayman Joumaa and Maroun Saade, points at the existence of a problem much larger than either terrorism or drug



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trafficking on their own: the existence of global illicit exchange markets, and the convergence between transnational drug trafficking and international terrorism that these exchanges have underwritten.

The Convergence

In spite of the significant geographical distance separating Hezbollah and the Taliban, and the distinct environments in which they operate, logistical imperative has guided each group away from theological injunction, and toward the embrace of drug trafficking to complement or replace flagging alternative revenue streams. In this process, Hezbollah and the Taliban created sophisticated international distribution networks, expanding their operations far beyond the maintenance of political control and the pursuit of their ideological objectives within their home countries.

By all means, drug cultivation was, and remains, endemic to both Hezbollah's and the Taliban's home regions. Marijuana cultivation was rampant in the Bekaa valley in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when the Lebanese civil war had disrupted most economic activity in the state, and when the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon opened a funnel for the trafficking of Lebanese hashish into Israel. Explains Matthew Levitt:

Following the establishment of Hezbollah in the early-1980s-recruiting heavily from key Bekaa Valley tribes and families - it benefited from a religious edict, or fatwa, issued in the mid-1980s providing religious justification for the otherwise impure and illicit activity of drug trafficking. Presumed to have been issued by Iranian religious leaders, the fatwa reportedly read: "We are making drugs for Satan—America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, we will kill them with drugs." According to an FBI report declassified in November 2008, "Hezbollah's spiritual leader... has stated that narcotics trafficking is morally acceptable if the drugs are sold to Western infidels as part of the war against the enemies of Islam." [55]

Fatwa and sales to infidels notwithstanding, the recourse to drug trafficking remains the product of necessity for Hezbollah's cash-hungry operations. Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah unequivocally condemns drugs as a scourge, one which he fought to the length of cooperating with Rafiq Hariri's government—for at least as long as Hezbollah allowed Hariri to live.[56] Yet Nasrallah's discomfort with the drug scourge has not impeded his organization from using it to its immense benefit. Operation Titan, carried out by U.S. and Colombian authorities in 2008, exposed and "dismantled a cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering organization that allegedly helped fund Hezbollah operations... laundering hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds a year and paying 12 percent of those profits to Hezbollah." [57] Among those arrested in the sting figured Chekry Harb, a Lebanese kingpin living in Colombia and believed by Colombian officials to keep close telephone contact with Hezbollah officials and to frequently travel to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt.[58]

In April 2013, the Treasury Department again accused Hezbollah of international drug trafficking and blacklisted Kasseimi Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co., two Lebanese money-exchange houses which had effectively taken over the money-laundering operation previously carried out by Lebanese Canadian Bank.[59] At an April 23 press conference announcing the designations, Treasury Department Under Secretary of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen unambiguously charged that "Hezbollah is both a full-fledged terrorist organization... and an enterprise that increasingly turns to crime to finance itself." [60] DEA special agent Derek Maltz, at the same press conference, accused Hezbollah of operating like a drug cartel, adding that

Drugs and terrorism coexist across the globe in a marriage of mutual convenience. As state-sponsored terrorism has declined, these dangerous organizations have looked far and wide for resources and revenue to recruit, to corrupt, to train, and to strengthen their regime. Many drug-trafficking groups have stepped up to fill that revenue void.[61]

As did Hezbollah, the Taliban faced an awkward task in "managing the apparent disconnect between their Islamic ideology and the illicit drug trade." [62] But popular favor was on their side. After all, the Taliban had risen to power "because an exhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviours and peacemakers... they disarmed the population, enforced law and order, imposed strict Sharia law and opened the roads to traffic which resulted in an immediate drop in food prices. These measures were all extremely welcome to the long-suffering population." [63] This Pax Talibana allowed the resumption of poppy cultivation; under Taliban rule a small plot producing just 45 grams of opium per year could earn its owner over a thousand dollars—a fortune in rural Afghanistan.[64] To reconcile Deobandi faith and drug production,



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The Taliban have provided an Islamic sanction for farmers... to grow even more opium, even though the Koran forbids Muslims from producing or imbibing intoxicants. Abdul Rashid, the head of the Taliban's anti-drugs control force in Kandahar, spelt out the nature of his unique job. He is authorized to impose a strict ban on the growing of hashish, 'because it is consumed by Afghans and Muslims'. But, Rashid tells me without a hint of sarcasm, 'Opium is permissible [sic] because it is consumed by kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans.[65]

The expedient is remarkably similar to that used by Hezbollah, banning (read: wishing away) the consumption, but not the production and trade, of opium and heroin.[66] The abysmal state of Afghan finances at the time of the Taliban ascension to power—not to mention the economic calamity wrought by Talibanization—only magnified the relative value of poppy cultivation and intensified the romance between the Taliban and heroin production: the poppy harvest doubled from 2,248 to 4,565 metric tons between 1996 and 1999. At this point, international pressure against Afghan drug production (as well as the Taliban regime's dismal human rights record) prompted Mullah Omar to command a one-third reduction in the poppy harvest that would reduce the harvest to 3,276 metric tons in 2000.[67] In spite of this reduction, the harvest still fetched an estimated total value of US \$900 million, dwarfing Afghanistan's \$130 million in legal exports, and generating more than one third of Afghanistan's \$2.5 billion GDP, for that same year.[68]

Mullah Omar turned the screws in June 2000, prohibiting opium production in all Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Production plummeted to 185 metric tons in 2001,[69] choking off rural income and inviting starvation to Afghan tables.[70] Neither did the Taliban stop puppeteering heroin production after their fall from power; quite the contrary, they continued to “successfully [manipulate] international prices for heroin to their advantage, ordering farmers to grow, or not grow poppies depending on requirements, and stockpiling thousands of tons of opium to hedge the market and insulate themselves from coalition intervention efforts.”[71] The poppy harvest rebounded after the fall of the Taliban—as of 2010, Afghanistan was exporting 900 tons of opium and 375 tons of heroin per year, and had built up a two-year inventory of surplus product [72] awaiting export.

Los Zetas, for their part, came at this convergence from the opposite direction. Born of the drug trade, Los Zetas faced no moral qualms engaging in trafficking. They suffered a stiff challenge, however, early in their institutional life, when President Calderón deployed military force against Mexican drug cartels, to which Los Zetas responded by adopting certain attributes of terrorist groups. Los Zetas, who simply “never looked at themselves as a drug trafficking organization,”[73] were distinctly well-disposed for the challenge of morphing from an assassination force into a “military group whose primary goal is to control territory.”[74] Following their schism with the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas consolidated their control of the state of Tamaulipas, and expanded beyond it into at least sixteen Mexican States.[75] While their presence grew most concentrated along Mexico's eastern coastline and along the Texas-Mexico border, the Zetas also made efforts at securing intersecting corridors, from north to south and from east to west along the whole of Mexico—identified as the “Zeta Cross” by investigative journalist Samuel Logan.[76] The growth of Los Zetas saw them expand not only onto physical, but also psychological territory: Los Zetas took up the perverse meme of filming the execution of its victims and disseminating the footage to families, when seeking ransom, or broadcasting them more openly to inspire fear and respect.

The convergence here described between drug trafficking and terrorism certainly follows a valid internal logic. Terror organizations generally do “not require massive sums of money for their operations, but must finance training, infrastructure needs, equipping their members, bribing local officials, recruiting, and logistics.”[77] Yet what funds they need they certainly can, and have, raised by means of drug trafficking; the Al-Qaeda-related terrorist cell that carried out the 2004 attack at Atocha Station in Madrid raised a substantial amount of its operating funds through the sale of hashish.[78] As explains former DEA Chief of Operations Michael Braun,

There are many similarities between a terrorist organization and a global drug cartel. Both oppose nation-state sovereignty, function best in ungoverned spaces, depend on mutual shadow facilitators, have no regard for human rights, rely on the hallmarks of organized crime such as corruption, intimidation, and violence, and are highly sophisticated organizations that operate with the latest technology. Most analysts believe that FTOs copied their decentralized structure of cells and nodes from drug cartels. Both FTOs and drug cartels often rely on the same money launderers and have a capacity to regenerate themselves when dealt a blow, often reemerging in a new or unrecognizable form. The main difference is motivation; drug cartels are motivated entirely



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by profit, whereas terrorist organizations have political or ideological motivations.[79]

Motivation thus emerges as the key wedge between sometimes remarkably similar drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. This wedge merits a close look, as it conditions the strategic environment in which each of these groups operates, and the imperatives they must respect in order to thrive.

The political, geographic, and martial environments in which Hezbollah, the Taliban, and Los Zetas operate have placed distinct requirements on each group's evolution and trajectories. Hezbollah, in its aspiration to moral legitimacy as the vanguard of a millenarian struggle against the state of Israel, has proven willing to leave titular control of Lebanon's political administration, in exchange for which it has obtained a national platform to project its political objectives.[80] While Hezbollah's strategic theater does not extend beyond Lebanon and its neighboring states, its tactical landscape is effectively global.

The Taliban, for their part, aspire to the exercise of a unique theological mandate in Afghanistan—one that fails to translate in any obvious manner into clear political objectives.[81] Unlike Hezbollah, however, the Taliban's capacity for military projection is limited, and their political objectives are at best regional, confining both their strategic and tactical theaters exclusively within Central Asia. They may inveigh against the West, but the Taliban simply lack the capacity to strike against the West in a major way—other than by attacking Western personnel or assets in their home region. Upon completion of the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, Western nations will thus have withdrawn not only outside the limits of the Taliban's tactical grasp, but also beyond their strategic horizon—so that, notwithstanding the risk of international terrorist groups being provided sanctuary in a re-Talibanized Afghanistan, the West could well just rely on its absence to serve as a bulwark against future Taliban attack. While both Hezbollah and the Taliban depend on drug trafficking for at least part of their revenue, their primary objectives remain broader and far more exalted than any single funding mechanism.

For their part, Los Zetas seek neither Hezbollah's international legitimacy, nor the Taliban's theological supremacy. At the peak of their power, Los Zetas' strategic imperatives were twofold: to retain their capacity to move illicit products across Mexico, and to preserve their markets for drugs and arms within the United States (staving off recent incursions by rivals, notably by the Sinaloa Cartel,[82] has recently become an additional, and increasingly important, objective). In keeping with these interests, Los Zetas' operational expansion south and west of their home base in Tamaulipas was axonal rather than expansive, concentrated on securing corridors rather than entire regions.[83] To the north, moreover, their expansion was clandestine; overt acts of violence by Los Zetas north in the United States have been so few as to appear negligible in comparison to the scourge they have visited upon Mexico. Coming from a group as sadistically violent as Los Zetas, this restraint reflects sound strategic thinking—their admittedly perverse entrepreneurialism simply does not allow the deployment of systematic violence within the United States. While Hezbollah and the Taliban harbour deep-seated animosity towards the West, Los Zetas actually benefit considerably from their enterprise in the United States—easily obtaining weapons and reaping astronomic proceeds from drug sales.

To be certain, Los Zetas' motivations for holding their fire against the United States are far from noble, offering no reason from complacency from the part of U.S. authorities. Los Zetas, by every measure, are a violent and dangerous organization whose savagery has destroyed countless lives in Mexico. The amount of firepower at their disposal, the scope of their territorial control, and their use of generalized violence as a tool of psychological war elevate Los Zetas far above the category of a simple organized crime syndicate. Los Zetas, furthermore, have formed ad hoc, transactional relationships with associates of Hezbollah.

It would be an error, however, to confuse this commercial relationship with a strategic alliance. Although the possibility of such an alliance developing would be plausible, there is no conclusive evidence of it having been consummated. The utter failure of a 2011 Iranian plot to have Zeta operatives murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States [84] attests to Los Zetas' unwillingness to buck their own interests when it comes to their presence in the United States. Although illicit markets have certainly become a point of contact for otherwise vastly different criminal groups—one where political terrorism, theocratic ultra-nationalism, and narco-insurgency fund and equip each other—commerce and imitation do not make amalgamation.

Strategic alliance or not, however, the links such as these exist between the Zetas and foreign terrorism, however embryonic, warrant careful consideration. In spite of the vast geographic



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and ideological chasms that separate Hezbollah and Los Zetas, these groups have deftly identified a mutual interest—as well as lucrative gains to be made—in crossing in order to conduct trade with each other. The attempts of Hezbollah associates to extend this network to the Taliban reflect the seriousness of the threat. The scope, volume, and sophistication of these transactions merit profound study; a study into which the downfall of Lebanese Canadian Bank - to which we now return - opens a fascinating view.

See you in Court

The world into which Leonhart, Bharara, and MacBride peered with their shakedown of Mr. Saade, Mr. Jourmaa, and Lebanese Canadian Bank, is a world in which the erstwhile bank's US \$329 million worth of laundered proceeds amounts to pocket change. Although US \$329 million worth of pocket change can still finance hefty arms purchases, the object of interest is not so much the specific amount of money as the network through which it circulated. Among his many money-laundering schemes, Hezbollah associate Ayman Jourmaa controlled a web of some 30 Lebanese-owned export firms, shipping used cars from the United States to West Africa and combining the revenue from this trade with the of Colombian cocaine sold in the United States—with Los Zetas serving as faithful mules between 2005 and 2007.[85] Another of Jourmaa's schemes involved "perhaps the richest land deal in Lebanon's history, the US \$240 million purchase... of more than 740 pristine acres overlooking the Mediterranean." [86]

Hezbollah is uniquely positioned to initiate these kinds of cross-continental drug-and-weapons trafficking schemes for a number of reasons. Its home base provides a propitious environment for international commerce, licit and illicit, as Lebanon sits at the "crossroads for all manner of trade, [owing] much to the flourishing of a worldwide diaspora... through criminal elements in these émigré communities, Hezbollah has gained a deepening foothold in the cocaine business." [87] The depth and sophistication of the Lebanese banking system, quantitatively and qualitatively a positive outlier within the Middle East and North Africa region, and among emerging markets, [88] allows Hezbollah access to a capital base large enough to provide lines of credit to enable large-scale drug and weapons purchases, while also allowing Hezbollah-allied bankers to conceal dirty money behind the appearance of legitimate transactions and clean bank accounts.

Furthermore, as a legitimate political force within Lebanon, Hezbollah enjoys diplomatic advantages usually unavailable to terrorist groups. Why take the risk of crossing borders illegally or falsifying passports when the Government of Lebanon can just as easily provide a legitimate one? Hezbollah members in Europe are able to take advantage of intra-European mobility to direct and plan operations against Israeli people and assets in Europe—as well as European links to the Israeli government to penetrate its enemy. So long as Hezbollah retains its dual identity as a terrorist group and political movement, it will retain the diplomatic cover that makes its ongoing global operations possible. [89]

Los Zetas began transacting with Hezbollah in 2005, by the hand of Ayman Jourmaa. As per Preet Bharara's allegations in the complaint against Lebanese Canadian Bank, Jourmaa coordinated the shipment from Colombia to Mexico of no less than 85 metric tons of cocaine sold to Los Zetas between 2005 and 2007. [90] Los Zetas moved approximately US \$850 million through Jourmaa's money-laundering network in that same time period. [91] Jourmaa's dealings with Los Zetas saw them collude across the whole of Central America, "[coordinating] the shipment of multi-thousand kilogram quantities of cocaine from Colombia to Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico... whose ultimate destination... was the United States." [92] Although the 85 million tons of cocaine and US \$850 million they circulated through Ayman Jourmaa's network are no small amounts, neither did they ever comprise a majority of Los Zetas' total operations or revenues. The total yearly income of Mexican and Colombian drug cartels is estimated between US \$18 and \$39 billion; [93] Los Zetas themselves raise only 50% of their operating budget from cocaine trafficking—complementing it with income from "extortion (10-15 percent), methamphetamines and heroin (5-10 percent), immigrant smuggling (5 percent), contraband, (5 percent), and miscellaneous activities (10-15 percent)." [94]

Although Maroun Saade did not succeed at engaging the Taliban in commerce with Hezbollah, the intent behind his failure warrants consideration. James Motto, investigator for the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York, provided a rich description of Mr. Saade's weapons-for-heroin bartering network in his deposition for Saade's indictment. In November and December 2010, a DEA operative masquerading as a Taliban associate held a



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series of meetings with Saade and his associates in West Africa and the Ukraine to negotiate the exchange of a multi-ton shipment of Afghan heroin for a cache of weapons including, but not limited to, pistols, automatic rifles, Stinger and Javelin missiles, and night-vision equipment, to be used against American forces in Afghanistan. Motto further stated for the record that Mr. Saade, and at least one of his associates, had links to Hezbollah and counted on the Lebanese group to supply the weapons to be transacted. [95] Although Saade's misstep in trying to conduct illicit business with undercover agents would ultimately make a farce of his efforts, the record of his deeds raises the ominous possibility that a similar transaction, had it been carried out with veritable Taliban associates, could have led to a successful exchange. The success of Hezbollah's commerce with Los Zetas makes it patently clear that, given the opportunity, it could have likely pulled off such an exchange.

Even though the Taliban did not, in this instance, transact with Hezbollah, they nonetheless rely on numerous other channels to distribute Afghan heroin worldwide. Mired in their respective conflicts against Israel and the United States, Hezbollah and the Taliban have pulled off a brilliant feat in turning their enemies into major sources of funding. So long as there is a market for hashish in Israel, and for heroin in the United States, money will continue accruing to Hezbollah and the Taliban, and fund the planning attacks against American and Israeli citizens and military personnel.

As per Los Zetas, what ultimately spelled their decline was a combination of their excessively decentralized operating structure [96] and popular revulsion against their sadistic violence,[97] handicaps which no amount of Hezbollah-assisted fundraising could have mitigated. The cautionary tale to be gleaned from the record of Zeta cooperation with Ayman Joumaa's network need not decline along with Los Zetas' fortunes, however. Whereas fears of a strategic alliance between Hezbollah and the decentralized Zetas turned out to be a dud, the much more centralized and hierarchical Sinaloa Federation [98] could well see value, that Los Zetas failed to recognize, in consummating a formal, trans-continental alliance with Hezbollah, or with other terrorist groups.

Conclusion

Neither Hezbollah, the Taliban, nor Los Zetas will be defeated on the battlefield. The millenarian goals of the first two groups, and the operational latitude of the latter (and of other Mexican drug cartels) in Mexico's rule-of-impunity governance, are simply immune to military action. The inherent danger posed by any of these groups should thus not be seen as a factor of their ultimately immutable motivations, but rather of their capabilities. If the commercial networks linking these groups together form the foundation of these capabilities, then the interdiction of these exchanges offers a unique, non-military opportunity to degrade the capacity of both terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations.

Although the collapse of Lebanese Canadian Bank offers a promising illustration of the potential impact of juridical action in the fight against global terrorism, one must also acknowledge the fact that the loss of L.C.B. fell short of presenting Hezbollah with a Lehman Brothers moment. There were doubtless dozens of candidates ready to take the place of the shuttered bank—among them, Kasseimi Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co., introduced in the opening pages of this article as recent targets of follow-up action from the Treasury Department, and in any event, the US \$102 million settlement that Bharara secured as settlement in his suit against Lebanese Canadian Bank is unlikely to deliver a knockout punch to financial infrastructure of international drug-and-arms trafficking.[99] By the same token, there was likely no shortage of kingpins ready to take over Maroun Saade's operations upon his arrest, and there will likely be just as many ready to perpetuate Ayman Joumaa's operations if he is apprehended as well.

Rommel's adage, whereby "battles are decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired,"[100] remains valid today, although in circumstances that have evolved far beyond those surrounding its first iteration seven decades ago. This evolution finds its illustration in the staggering volume of material and monetary exchange described in this article, and in the lead role handed to investigators and prosecutors in containing these groups by means of fiduciary interdiction. Just as illicit trade between terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations has become systematized, so must interdiction efforts be elevated and sustained at the same scope and level.

Joel Hernández is a Spanish-American graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.



PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Literature on the Financing of Terrorism

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot>

The Art of Searching: How to Find Terrorism Literature in the Digital Age

By Judith Tinnes

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/283/html>


Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage by Islamist terrorists and insurgents. While working for several research support organisations, she has gained expertise in information retrieval, librarianship and electronic publishing. Currently she works in the Research & Development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID)

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Capsule Reviews of 13 Books

By Joshua Sinai


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The following are capsule reviews of important books recently published on terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics.



Dominique Avon and Anais-Trissa Khatchadourian [translated by Jane Marie Todd], **Hezbollah: A History of the "Party of God"** (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 256 pages, \$24.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-674-06651-9.

An examination of the Lebanese Hezbollah from its origins in 1982 until 2009. Although the book's overview of Hezbollah is only 110 pages in length, what makes it especially valuable are the additional 100 pages that provide a selection of the organization's primary ideological documents (including its charter), as well as the appendices, such as a lexicon of Hezbollah's theological principles and portraits of Hezbollah and Lebanese leaders. The authors are French academic experts on Hezbollah.



Nasser al-Bahri, with Georges Malbrunot, **Guarding Bin Laden: My Life in al-Qaeda** (London, England: Thin Man Press, 2013), 238 pages, \$14.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-9562473-6-0.


Originally published in French, this fascinating 2010 memoir by Osama bin Laden's former chief bodyguard provides an insider's account of life in al Qaeda prior to 9/11. Nasser al-Bahri had served with bin Laden from 1996 to 2001, when he succeeded in escaping from Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban regime, eventually making his way to Yemen, where he was arrested. Al-Bahri, born in Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents, was radicalized by extremist jihadists in his teens. He then proceeded to join jihadist militants in Bosnia and Somalia, eventually making his way to al

Qaida's Afghanistan headquarters in Tamak Farm. There he was spotted by bin Laden and was rapidly promoted to head his personal security unit. Of particular interest are the author's descriptions of various assassination attempts against bin Laden, al Qaida's inventory of armaments, the security measures instituted to protect bin Laden, portraits of the



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
organization's leaders and their families, as well as the group's links with the Taliban and Pakistani security services. The author concludes that "The Jihad movement will never agree to negotiate with the West unless all its legitimate claims are met. The Clash of Civilizations has many days ahead of it."



William C. Banks, editor, *New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 320 pages, \$29.50 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-231-15235-8.

As explained by the editor, the contributors to this volume attempt to examine "from an interdisciplinary legal and policy perspective the challenges posed to humanitarian law as weaker, non-state combatants use forbidden tactics to offset their military disadvantage, and as irregular warfare becomes a common means for weaker parties to achieve political goals that they could not accomplish through established channels." Such an examination is warranted today, the editor writes, because the changing patterns of asymmetric conflict are forcing legal practitioners to reexamine the traditional laws of war, particularly the Hague Rules, the customary laws of war, and the post-1949 law of armed conflict, which are no longer relevant in accounting for the way non-state groups, whether terrorist or guerrilla forces,

are waging their protracted insurgent campaigns. This volume is a highly important contribution to the study of the interplay between international and military law and the response measures by democratic governments to terrorist insurgencies.




Benedetta Berti, *Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), \$49.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4214-0974-0.

An important and innovative comparative and theoretical examination of how disparate insurgent organizations such as the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) decide to transform themselves from terrorists into political organizations, using the electoral process by their "political wings" to attempt to become legitimate political actors in their societies. The author argues that the classic theory of the democratization process, which views violence and elections at opposite ends of the political spectrum, is inadequate to explain the negotiation and disarmament process that is necessary for peaceful resolution of protracted terrorist conflicts. To remedy this theoretical shortfall, the author develops an alternative model that explains the reasons terrorist groups create political wings to compete in elections, and how this

organizational choice affects their subsequent decisions about their armed struggle. One might argue that while such an electoral option was wholeheartedly embraced by the IRA, it was never genuinely adopted by Hamas and Hizballah – nevertheless, the author's conceptual framework and case studies are an important contribution to understanding the types of measures that governments need to adopt in order to engage with their terrorist adversaries who may have finally entered the phase in which they are ready to transform themselves into legitimate political actors, which is the precondition necessary to peacefully resolve their conflicts and bring about their political integration into society.




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Charles T. Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 288 pages, \$32.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-58901-894-5.

In this important study, the author examines the factors leading, in some cases, to the failure of peace accords that attempt to resolve their societies' protracted civil wars, thereby plunging them once again into armed conflict, while in other cases peace accords survive and succeed in sustaining themselves for the long-term. Fifteen cases of civil wars in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, and Latin America are examined. The author finds that some explanations for the outbreaks of civil war – such as poverty, conflict over natural resources, and weak states – are less causative than the crucial factor of political exclusion, while the inclusion of former adversaries in post-conflict governance plays a decisive role in


sustaining peace accords for the long-term. Thus, those involved in post-conflict reconstruction must remain fully engaged in supporting the newly-elected governments, to ensure that they include former combatants in power-sharing and governance.



Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 280 pages, \$59.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4452-6.

A highly authoritative and up-to-date study about the protracted civil war in Sri Lanka, which was terminated with the military defeat by government forces of the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2009. The author discusses the evolution of the military measures that ultimately won the intractable insurgency - a conflict which for many years was viewed as unwinnable by the Sinhalese government's forces - although its military victory came at the cost of human rights violations (and the Tamil insurgents engaged in such violations as well). Also discussed are lessons learned about terrorist tactics by the Tamil Tigers that have

been emulated by terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, as well as al Qaida-affiliated groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The author also discusses whether the Sri Lankan government's counterinsurgency tactics are worthy of being implemented by other governments facing their own protracted terrorist insurgencies.




David Jacobson, *Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 272 pages, \$24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-4214-0754-8.

Although much of this conceptually innovative study focuses on the impact on the self-identity of women in patriarchal Muslim societies around the world, the author also provides a valuable discussion of the connection between tribal patriarchy and radicalization into Islamic extremism through an innovative tool he has developed, which he terms the tribal patriarchy index. To analyze this process of radicalization, he draws on empirical data about Islamists who have been convicted under terrorism laws in Britain and France because, he writes, "they provide us a lens into two very different responses to patriarchy and to religion." He concludes that one of the factors driving such men (and particularly

immigrants) in Britain and France to embrace extremism is that they "generally are disproportionately (compared with women) stuck at the bottom rungs of the social ladder. Combined with the dynamics of patriarchy, discrimination, and religious politics, this state of affairs has an alienating effect on poorer second- and third-generation Muslim men."




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
Martin A. Miller, *The Foundations of Modern Terrorism: State, Society and the Dynamics of Political Violence* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 306 pages, \$28.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-107-62108-4.

An interesting, well-written and highly provocative survey of the history, evolution and trajectory of modern terrorism, from its beginning in early modern Europe up to the contemporary period. Of special interest is the author's unique interpretation of terrorism (which is not generally accepted in the terrorism studies discipline), which attempts to "integrate" the "violence of governments and insurgencies into a single narrative format as a way to understand terrorism in its broadest historical representation." To validate this approach, the author selects significant historical cases, such as 19th century Russian revolutionary and tsarist terrorisms, government and anti-government terrorism in 19th century and early 20th century Europe, terrorism in the United States, Communist and fascist authoritarian terrorism, ideological terrorism during the Cold War, and terrorism in the contemporary period. With the traditional notion of state legitimacy being contested by insurgent and government forces, the author finds that the use of terrorist tactics has become part of a violent contest for control of state power between those in government and the competing terrorist insurgents. Although one may disagree with the author's contention that terrorism has since evolved into a competition between insurgents and state security forces that employ similar violent behaviors and tactics, this book is nevertheless a highly useful, intellectually sophisticated and thought-provoking "alternative" history of terrorism and counterterrorism.



Donatella della Porta, *Clandestine Political Violence* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 344 pages, \$36.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-521-14616-6.

In this highly insightful, empirically-based theoretical and comparative study, the author (a political sociologist and one of Italy's foremost experts on terrorism) argues that "clandestine political violence" (another term for terrorism) falls into four general types: left-wing (in Italy and Germany), right-wing (in Italy), ethno-nationalist (in Spain), and religious fundamentalist (for instance, in Muslim societies). A common conceptual framework is employed to analyze the causal mechanisms that operate at the beginnings of such underground movements, during their persistence, and at their demise, as well as within the context of the interactions between them and the state. Also examined are the ways in which the different violent actors "cognitively construct the reality they act upon," as well as their internal dynamics. Empirical evidence is used to illustrate the crucial cyclical phases that characterize these cases of "clandestine political violence."




Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, editors, *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 248 pages, \$29.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-58901-908-9.

The contributors to this insightful volume employ a multidisciplinary approach from the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to examine effective strategy and policy options (including the costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative option) to terminate the involvement by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan's protracted civil war. Some of the findings reached by the contributors are that, following the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, a strong, legitimate central government in Kabul is unlikely to emerge; that fewer



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
remaining coalition forces (used in creative ways) might achieve better results on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Pakistan, should be encouraged to become more actively involved in the conflict's "endgame." Such an approach, they believe, while not ensuring "complete peace" in Afghanistan, will likely create a self-sustaining security system that will be able to restore order in the wake of violent outbreaks.



Michael W.S. Ryan, *Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 368 pages, \$37.50 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-231-16384-2.

In this groundbreaking and highly informed study, the author examines the writings of jihadist theoreticians, such as Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Salam Faraj, and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, in order to "decode" al Qaida's strategy against its adversaries, with particular focus on its warfare against America. The author finds that such jihadist ideas have more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam, with leading al Qaida strategists such as Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri influenced not only by Salafist ideologues, but also the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and even General Giap, the mastermind of the Viet Cong successful insurgency. The author applies this theoretical framework to analyze al Qaida's insurgencies in places such as Yemen. He concludes that al

Qaida's "political-military strategy" is a "revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad." Once the political, military, socio-economic, cultural, ideological, psychological, and international dimensions of al Qaida's revolutionary strategy are properly understood, the author concludes, they will contribute to substantially upgrading the countermeasures employed by America against al Qaida and its affiliates.




Gershon Shafir, Everard Meade, and William J. Aceves, editors, *Lessons and Legacies of the War on Terror: From Moral Panic to Permanent War* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 200 pages, \$135.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-63841-8.

The contributors to this conceptually interesting and provocative volume utilize the framework of what they term a political "moral panic" to examine the lessons and legacies of the United States-led "Global War on Terror." One of their general findings is that terrorists (in the form of 9/11's catastrophic attacks) have "prevailed" by forcing the United States to change its "way of life," with transportation, trade, communications and other daily activities disrupted, even when "the pace and intensity of terror attacks have abated." Also of concern to the contributors is that what were expected to be "temporary security measures and sacrifices of liberty" adopted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 type terrorist events soon became "more or less permanent." To examine how

such constraints on civil liberties ensued, the contributors examine the social, cultural, and political drivers underlying the "war on terror" in which "perceived" threats to individuals and institutions have affected the targeted countries' "social norms and values, civilization, and even morality itself." To validate this thesis, a wide range of case studies are examined, including the United States involvement in Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq. The concluding chapter argues that "we all lost the 'war on terror,' because real external security threats were reconstructed by a political moral panic into a dysfunctional miasma of national insecurity," and that "deconstructing the politics of fear" is required to "unpack moral panic, and reconstruct a rational assessment of threat, normative commitment to the rule of law, and global social imaginary."





Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 360 pages, \$29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-691-14940-0.

In this important and authoritative study, the author (a veteran academic expert on Islamist movements) examines the evolution and current status of the Muslim Brotherhood, which achieved “a level of influence nearly unimaginable before the Arab Spring.” The book was written prior to the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in early July 2013, so some of its conclusions need to be revised when its new edition is published, but, nevertheless, the author’s analysis paves the way for understanding how it became the “resounding victor” in Egypt’s 2011-2012 parliamentary and presidential elections. Drawing on more than one hundred in-depth interviews as well as Arabic language sources, the author traces the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from its founding in 1928 to the fall of

Mubarak and the elections of 2011-2012. She also compares the Brotherhood’s political trajectory with those of its counterpart Islamist groups in Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, including highlighting their internal divisions. Interestingly – and presciently (in light of the ouster of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from power) – the author finds that Muslim Brotherhood parties in the Middle East are not proceeding along a linear path toward greater moderation, but that their trajectory is marked by tensions and contradictions, in which “hybrid agendas” embrace “themes of freedom and democracy [that] coexist uneasily with illiberal concepts of Shari’a carried over from the past.” Understanding such political and doctrinal nuances provides a glimpse into these organizations’ predicaments as they attempt – whether successfully or not – to find the appropriate balance that will enable them to sustain themselves in the Middle East’s currently uncertain turmoil and upheaval.

Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘*Perspectives on Terrorism*’.

Women Terrorists Today Follow Men’s Ideologies: Interview with Mia Bloom

Source: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=168648>

The leader of Hezbollah recently reiterated that women can be suicide bombers but not elected leaders. Mia Bloom is not surprised by this statement. In today’s interview, she explains why women make great ‘shells for bombs’ but are not part of the leadership of terrorist organizations.

There are more women now involved in terrorism, but none are in any kind of leadership role, said Mia Bloom, Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell, in this interview with the *Global Observatory*. “While the women may be used, in essence, as the shells for bombs, they’re not making the decisions, they’re not writing the ideologies, and they’re not performing a leadership role that they did in previous generations when women held positions of power and influence,” she said.

“It is interesting that, two days ago, the head of Hezbollah, [Hasan] Nasrallah, came out with a statement that women can participate as suicide bombers but they can’t run for election.”

Women become terrorists for many reasons: respect, relationships, rape, and also to change their reputations in cultures where women are marginalized, judged, and punished harshly. “What we’re seeing in certain conflicts is that when women become suicide bombers, they become more famous than they could’ve ever been in their lives. Young girls are looking towards them as a source of emulation and want to follow in their footsteps. So, having positive role models would be very important in terms of the next generation.”

Ms. Bloom said children are coerced into terrorism without full knowledge of what they are doing, and are drawn in for lack of other options. “If you have environments where there is rampant hopelessness, a lack of education and no resources, the terrorist groups are offering something that may seem very positive to a child: food, shelter, protection for their family. If



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there are other opportunities, it's likely the children will choose the other opportunities, but in an environment in which there is nothing except the terrorist organization, it makes it especially difficult."

"One of the reasons that I talk about this is to show that the terrorist groups, especially transnational groups, really do not care about the civilians in the conflict. They are using the civilians for their own purposes," she said. "This is very different from ethno-nationalist conflicts, where the groups represent a minority population. Transnational groups are basically using the local population as cannon fodder, and if we can make that known, that will lessen their attractiveness to the locals and maybe inoculate the locals to have terrorist groups operate from within their midst."

"It's important that we demobilize and demystify what involvement in terrorism actually entails," she said. "I think the problem is, in many instances, both children and youth look at involvement in terrorism as something that's exciting, something positive, and if they actually knew what an involvement really entailed, they'd probably be less enthusiastic."

The interview was conducted by Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, a Visiting Fellow at the International Peace Institute.



Transcript:

Andrea Ó Súilleabháin: I'm here today with Mia Bloom, Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell. Mia's research focuses on women in terrorism, rape in war, the exploitation of children in conflict, and suicide terrorism. She has written two influential books, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* and *Bombshell: Women and Terrorism*. Mia, thank you for speaking with me today in the *Global Observatory*.

As your research shows, women carrying out acts of terrorism is not a new phenomenon—they have done so for decades. But their role is increasing, and more women are drawn to terrorism than ever before. Why is this?

Mia Bloom: Well, you're right, women have been involved in terrorism since the 1960s and 70s, especially in the secular groups in Europe, many of which were left-wing groups. And they provided both ideological leadership as well as leadership to the groups; so for instance, in Germany the Baader Meinhof group was in part led by Ulrike Meinhof.

What we have now is larger numbers of women who are involved, but not in any kind of leadership role. Instead, we see women on the front lines that are largely used because it's expedient, because they can get through security checkpoints, because they are not expected, but they are not necessarily making decisions about operations. One example I made in my book, *Bombshell*, is how in the 2002 Dubrovka Theater siege, there were several Chechen black widows wearing suicide belts, but they were not in control of the mechanism that detonated those suicide belts. So, while the women may be used, in essence, as the shells for bombs, they're not making the decisions, they're not writing the ideologies, and they're not performing a leadership role that they did in previous generations when women held positions of power and influence.



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AOS: You've researched and interviewed women in terrorism in dozens of countries, from women in the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland to female Tigers in Sri Lanka and female suicide bombers in Iraq. Are there common motivators and mobilizers across regions, religions, and cultures that push women to getting involved in terrorism?

MB: One of the things that I found looking at very different kinds of cases of women's involvement is that there wasn't one single thing that motivated all women, but there were several things that linked women across the Middle East, Europe, South Asia. The best predictor of a woman's involvement in any kind of terrorist organization is the involvement of a male family member. This is done not only because women might experience some sort of family or social pressure to get involved, but it's also an excellent vetting mechanism for the organization to ensure that the person who's being recruited isn't going to be an informant or work for the government or provide information and spy on them.

One of the things that I started to see in Northern Ireland and Chechnya and in other cases was that terrorism was part of the family business. If one member of the family got involved, the sisters and the cousins and the female members of the family would also get involved. Of course, this varied in terms of the levels of coercion. So, in some cases, the women would be married off to well-known Jihadis, knowing full well they probably wouldn't survive more than two years in the marriage. In other cases, the women motivated themselves to participate but not necessarily as suicide bombers; so women's involvement varied significantly.

Another theme that linked women's involvement was sexual violence perpetrated against the women; victimization was one way in which women were mobilized into terrorism as a kind of "take back the night." At checkpoints in Sri Lanka if the Sinhalese army sexually abused Tamil women, the Tamil Tigers made it clear that those women were welcome to join the LTTE, and their reputations would be completely absolved. We also see this in places like Iraq where Samira Ahmed Jassim oversaw the rape of eighty women and of whom thirty-two were already successful suicide bombers by the time she was captured.

We see sexual violence against women as a motivator, but also as a way of mobilizing men by making the claim that if the men do not go to the region on jihad to help their sisters in Islam, women will be raped and they didn't step up.

One of the things that I said in the book is that there are a few things: respect, relationship, rape, as well as women wanting to rehabilitate their reputations. And this is in a few other instances where their reputations might've been placed into question. The first five Palestinian suicide bombers, extensively written about by Barbara Victor, were trying to basically reinvent themselves by becoming suicide bombers: one woman had been accused of having a sexual relationship outside of marriage; in one instance, a woman's father had been accused of being a collaborator; in another case, a woman was incapable of having a child, and her husband left her, so this was a source of great shame in the community. By becoming a member of a terrorist organization and then becoming a Shahida or a martyr, the women completely reinvent themselves and no one thinks of them in a negative way; now they're only seen in the positive.

The same thing in Northern Ireland—women were able to gain a lot of respect by becoming members of the provisional IRA, to a point. One of the things that I wrote about in the book that most people don't realize is that while Bobby Sands and nine other of his colleagues went on hunger strikes in Northern Ireland, women also went on hunger strikes.

AOS: To follow up on that idea of women in terrorism as redeeming their reputation and establishing themselves as important in the community, do you think that empowering women in positive leadership roles—such as political and peace processes or conflict mediation—could also counter participation in terrorism, by modeling an alternative path for a strong identity and social change?

MB: Having women in leadership positions is definitely a way of incentivizing and motivating young women to follow suit, and one of the things that we're seeing in certain conflicts is that when women become suicide bombers, they become more famous than they could've ever been in their lives. Young girls are looking towards them as a source of emulation and want to follow in their footsteps. So, having positive role models would be very important in terms of the next generation. I don't know if having women in positions of leadership where this is not the norm is necessarily going to be helpful in certain cultures in which this will be seen as Western involvement through women.



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It's important that if women have these positions of leadership then there's no footprint of Western countries, especially the United States. That it becomes part of civil society, a bottom-up approach, where women's involvement isn't seen as a negative or that they're puppets of the West. It is interesting that two days ago the head of Hezbollah, [Hasan] Nasrallah, came out with a statement that women can participate as suicide bombers but they can't run for election. So here you have an instance where women's participation is permitted in one capacity but is not a political role.

AOS: As more women engage in violence, there are also children fighting, in Somalia, Syria, Mali, and many other current conflicts, not only as soldiers but as child terrorists and even suicide bombers. Based on your current research, how and why is this happening?

MB: A lot of the groups turn to women when it becomes very difficult for men to infiltrate a target. As targets are hardened and it becomes increasingly difficult for men to cross borders or checkpoints, a lot of the groups become very flexible and start to look towards women as a wonderful source of recruitment.

The same thing has been true of children. Where it becomes more difficult in the conflict either to recruit men or to get men through hardened targets, children become a natural operative. We have started a study to look at the effect of having to face children who are militarized or armed: what effect does that have on soldiers? Does it increase the levels of PTSD? The preliminary study has shown that it becomes much more difficult over the long-term. If American or British or NATO soldiers are facing children, of course there's the hesitance to shoot because these are children, but at the same time, there isn't an existing standard operating procedure for how you engage children. So it's really a murky area, it's on a case-by-case basis.

It's been very difficult to fight children's involvement in any kind of violent extremist organizations. I'm hesitant to use terms common in the media, like "child terrorist" or "baby bomber" or "baby Jihadi," in part because many of these children don't completely understand what they're getting involved in, and they really can't make the kinds of choices to become members of a terrorist organization that adults can make. So, we have to understand the roles of the community; whether there are cultures of martyrdom that are either gently or not so gently pushing the children in that direction; whether the terrorist organizations have youth movements in order to funnel children into the terrorist groups; or whether there are cultures of martyrdom that actually promote involvement in terrorism or in jihadi operations.

All of these will have an influence on children to participate. And it's one of the things that is very worrying because we're seeing increasing numbers of children, we're seeing children in Somalia being used in al-Shabaab recruitment videos, we see children increasingly in militant groups; and then also television programming and books and media directed at children in order to get them involved at an early age. And as we see this, we need to figure out ways to combat it.

AOS: To end on a positive note, how can women and children be demotivated and demobilized? Have you encountered effective strategies and programs in the field for prevention and rehabilitation?

MB: Perhaps one of the most effective programs I've encountered is in the Swat Valley in Pakistan, an organization called Sabaoon, which is translated as "the first rays of dawn's light." It's a rehabilitation facility for children who have been caught by the military and the police involved in terrorism. In most cases, over 56% of the time, the children were coerced or kidnapped by the terrorist group or handed over by the families—also under duress—to the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban. And it's important that this organization has training that provides the children with education and skill sets. It also provides the children with religious studies to undermine the existing stereotypes and falsehoods that the children have been taught by the terrorist group about the Islamic faith.

That is one of the better ones. I think what makes it so excellent is that it's a multipronged approach. The program is run by psychiatrists and psychologists and social workers. It's funded by the [Pakistani] military, and the military has a presence there, but it's really run by people who are interested in the children. But it also has a lot of aftercare—follow-up visits, visits with the families and the communities to help with reintegration—that makes it unique.

In terms of being hopeful, I think it's important to demotivate the children by providing them other opportunities and other pathways. If you have environments where there is rampant hopelessness, a lack of education and no resources, the terrorist groups are offering



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something that may seem very positive to a child: food, shelter, protection for their family. If there are other opportunities, it's likely the children will choose the other opportunities, but in an environment in which there is nothing except the terrorist organization, it makes it especially difficult.

It's important that we demobilize and demystify what involvement in terrorism actually entails. I think the problem is, in many instances, both children and youth look at involvement in terrorism as something that's exciting, something positive, and if they actually knew what an involvement really entailed, they'd probably be less enthusiastic.

One of the reasons that I talk about this is to show that the terrorist groups, especially transnational groups, really do not care about the civilians in the conflict. They are using the civilians for their own purposes. This is very different from ethno-nationalist conflicts, where the groups represent a minority population. Transnational groups are basically using the local population as cannon fodder, and if we can make that known, that will lessen their attractiveness to the locals and maybe inoculate the locals to have terrorist groups operate from within their midst.

AOS: Mia Bloom, thank you sharing your interesting work with us in the *Global Observatory* today.

Jihadis challenge the role of the Arab armies

By Andrew McGregor

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_011_Issue17_03.pdf



With one Arab army locked in battle against rebels (including Sunni Islamists) in Syria and another apparently set on cleansing the Egyptian political scene of its Islamist presence, a prominent jihadist scholar has questioned the role of Arab militaries in the modern Middle East. In an article entitled "Is There Any Legitimacy Left for the Arab Armies?," Shaykh Abu Abdulillah Ahmad al-Jijeli calls on Arabs to look closely at the fighting doctrines, methods, education and loyalties of their military elites rather than accept the claims of these militaries that they are guardians of the nation or defenders of the interests of the *umma* (Islamic community). Al-Jijeli suggests that the leaders of the Arab armies form a corrupt, Westernized elite that exists free of oversight or accountability.

Shaykh al-Jijeli identifies the following as the main problems with modern Arab militaries:

- Arab militaries have a common allegiance to the "secular trend" and are hostile to Islam.
- Blind obedience to military commanders comes before obeying the law of Allah. Orders must be executed without reference to the Koran or Sunna.
- The movement and freedom of Arab armies is inhibited by bilateral and multilateral

alliances that tie these armies into a global military and security system.

- Rather than following the law, these armies live above it without accountability, making presidents and policies in accordance with their own corrupt principles and the interests of their supporters in Russia, Europe or America.
- Under the pretexts of counterterrorism and international legitimacy, the Arab armies allow themselves to be moved about according to the will of the Western "crusader armies."
- The military leaderships ignore mandatory retirement ages in order to perpetuate themselves in power for as long as possible. The shaykh cites as an example Algerian army chief General Ahmed Gaid Salah, who is "near the end of his ninth decade."

The shaykh concludes that Arab Muslims have the right "by every standard" to question the legitimacy of these armies following their "horrible crimes." According to al-Jijeli, the Algerian, Syrian and Egyptian peoples could have avoided their current misfortunes and the crimes of their corrupt militaries if they had owned arms individually, "the only guarantee



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to remain alive, in a world that only understands the sounds of bullets and only respects the heavy boots.”

Al-Jijeli's critique was followed a few days later by a statement delivered by Abu Muhammad al-Adhani, a spokesman for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in which al-Adhani called on Salafists to join the battle against the Egyptian military.

In Sunni Islam, the military traditionally undertakes the functions of defense and jihad on behalf of the community, rendering it basically unassailable by the community it represents. Al-Adhani challenged this basic interpretation by identifying the Arab armies as the defenders of apostate and tyrannical rulers rather than the Islamic community:

The infidelity of the armies protecting the tyrants' regimes, most prominent of which are the Egyptian Army, the Libyan Army and the Tunisian army, before the revolution and after it. As for the Syrian Army, its infidelity is apparent even to the elderly... The Egyptian Army... is seeking until death to prevent the implementation of the Law of Allah... The Egyptian army and those [other] armies falsely claim that they are protecting and defending Muslims and that they watch for their safety and comfort. These armies were only present to protect the tyrants, to defend them and secure their thrones in the palace. The Egyptian Army... is one that protects the

interest-charging banks and brothels. It also protects the Jews, the Copts and the Christians who fight against Allah and his messenger... It is a wild army that has burnt mosques and Qurans, finished off the wounded and burnt the bodies of the dead. How can any sane person say, 'it is not allowed to fight against this army' even if he or she considered the army as Muslim?

The ISIS spokesman also criticized the Muslim Brotherhood ("a secular party disguised as Islamists") and the Salafist al-Nur Party (which has decided to support the army's takeover) for being too peaceful at a time when violence is called for (al-Tahrir TV [Cairo], September 1). [2] Al-Nur leader Younis Makhoun says the party has been forced to distance itself somewhat from the military's "roadmap" for Egypt due to security abuses, but at the same time rejected jihadist calls to fight the military: "There are conspiracies to attack the Egyptian army... Those who carry them out are traitors" (Daily News Egypt, August 28).

As the Egyptian military tries to separate itself from the discredited Mubarak regime, a new decree that ends the practice of Egyptian troops pledging direct loyalty to the Egyptian president is designed to create distance between the military leadership and Egypt's political leadership (Daily News Egypt, September 2).

Notes

1. Shaykh Abu Abdullah Ahmad al-Jijeli, "Is There Any Legitimacy Left for the Arab Armies?" al-Andulus Media, August 26, 2013.
2. See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JLuiocsV8JE&feature=share>.

Flexible vehicle-arrest system stops cars involved in crime, terrorism

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130909-flexible-vehicle-arrest-system-stops-cars-involved-in-crime-terrorism>

Researchers in China have developed a mathematical model that could help engineers design a flexible vehicle-arrest system for stopping cars involved in criminal activity or terrorism, such as suspect car bombers attempting break through a check point, without wrecking the car or killing the occupants.

An Inderscience Publishers release reports that Pak Kin Wong and colleagues in the Department of Electromechanical Engineering at the University of Macau, in Taipa, Macao, writing in a forthcoming issue of the *International Journal of Vehicle Design*, explain how common vehicle-arrest systems used by law enforcement, the military, and in anti-terrorism activities, usually cause serious damage to the vehicle and maim or kill the occupants. A more positive system for bringing a car chase to a halt or stopping a car-bomber in their tracks is needed if perpetrators, witnesses and evidence are to be protected.



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A flexible system would increase the stopping distance of a vehicle involved in criminal or terrorist



activity and allow its kinetic energy to be dissipated without the complete destruction of the vehicle as otherwise occurs with solid, immovable barriers and equipment currently used. The team's mathematical model of vehicle arrest with different flexible materials and designs bears up to theoretical and experimental scrutiny and offers engineers a new set of variables to embed in their design program in the development of new, effect vehicle arrest systems. Moreover, the system could allow the design of an

“intelligent” vehicle-arrest system for roadblocks and checkpoints that could respond differently depending on vehicle speed and type and allow for greater control in bringing a vehicle to a stop.

— Read more in Pak Kin Wong et al., “Modeling and testing of arresting process in flexible vehicle arresting systems” in *International Journal Vehicle Design* 64 (forthcoming, 2013): 1-25

Myths about Myths

By Phil Wood

Source: <http://buckssecurity.wordpress.com/2013/09/12/myths-about-myths/#respond>

Interesting to watch the video and read the ideas in Gary LaFree's 'The Five Myths of Global Terrorism:

Here <http://start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=556>

and summarised here: <http://forumblog.org/2013/07/top-five-myths-about-terrorism/>

Interesting because it assumes that we assume that global terrorism has properties in line with those put forward:

First, the tremendous impact of 9/11 encourages us to think about terrorism as being mostly about dissatisfied individuals from one country attacking innocent civilians from another country. Based on the data in the GTD we found that more than 90% of the 17,000 attacks carried out by 52 foreign terrorist groups were actually domestic attacks. **My comment: 9/11 was not a typical terrorist attack, in fact it was unusual in many ways. I think that most people who study terrorism let go of the idea that dissatisfied individuals from foreign lands were at the core of terrorism many years ago - especially in the places that have suffered from sustained terrorism such as Europe. Our terrorists have been mainly indigenous since terrorism has existed.**

Second, because of the seemingly irrational nature of the 9/11 al-Qa'ida attack, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that a large number of terrorist attacks involve fairly rational political disputes over territory. Although there are major differences in terms of their specific orientation, this explains in large part all of the top ten most active terrorist groups of the modern era, including Shining Path, ETA, the FMLN, the IRA, FARC, Hamas and the LTTE. **My comment: Conflated argument - there is a rational reason behind what drives AQ and its modern affiliates - for them. It is also rational in that we knew AQ existed and that they had already 'irrationally' been attacking US interests elsewhere (Africa) previously. Terrorists are not**



crazed fanatics and most have a rationalised and considered political and ideological approach to life (as most of us do) they are just more extreme. There is to me, little to link the motivation of the attacker with the way he chooses to carry out the attack. And 9/11 was an awful, unforecast event (I am not going to use that 'Black Swan' term) - but there was significant and detailed rationality behind its planning and the exact and planned effect that it would have.

Third, because of the devastation caused by attacks such as 9/11, it is easy to suppose that most terrorist attacks are incredibly lethal. However, from the GTD we find that more than half of all terrorist attacks since 1970 involved no fatalities. **My comment: If an attack is lethal, it is successful. Also, if we look closely at START's definition of terrorism - many events may not fit what some consider to be terrorist attacks. And if even less than half of real terrorist attacks are successful - the fact that they are is something to be concerned about; there is no myth there. This is statistical analysis to fit the 'myth'**

Fourth, images of 9/11 and Hollywood movies no doubt encourage us to think that most terrorist strikes depend on sophisticated weaponry. But contrary to this view of terrorism that we commonly get from Hollywood, the vast majority of terrorist attacks rely on unsophisticated, readily accessible weapons. According to the GTD, 80% of all attacks rely on explosives and widely available firearms. **My comment: I am trying to think of one incident or attack where the weaponry has been sophisticated. Clever and innovative, yes. Sophisticated, no. There is no myth here at all.**

And finally, the advance planning, originality and destructiveness of 9/11 contributed to the notion that terrorist groups are infallible. We could call this the myth of the "super-terrorist". My colleagues and I at the START Center have been involved in several research projects using GTD data which suggests otherwise. For example, in a recent study we used the GTD to examine the targeting strategies of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) – a very active group based in Turkey. The increasing reliance on random, brutal violence such as the attack by ASALA on Orly Airport created a polarized and hostile

climate among the supporters of ASALA and seriously undermined its legitimacy. **My comment: I am not sure whose notion this is. Terrorist groups are sometimes organised, sometimes not. Some they win and some they lose, and they often are either defeated or implode of their own accord - again there is no myth here - there are no 'super-terrorists'; some are simply better at planning, organising and implementing whilst retaining their cohesion and ideological focus. In terms of successful attacks and longevity, that is the differentiator.**

LaFree: 'So, if rare events like 9/11 are black swan events, why not simply ignore them and go back to business as usual? A major reason why ignoring terrorism is a risky idea is directly related to the fact that it is bursty: when it starts to happen it happens a lot and rapidly.

If we look at worldwide terrorism over the past four decades, we find not one single kind of terrorist threat, but rather successive waves of attacks by groups with very different ideologies and goals. The common pattern is that a group or set of groups gets organized, stages increasing numbers of attacks and then decline. In fact, this bursty nature of terrorism might eventually help us become more effective in responding to terrorist threats.' **My comment: Jargon such as 'bursty' means nothing and despite the attempt to make it catch on (like the successful 'Black Swan' as a euphemism for 'something we didn't know about before it happened'; I really hope it doesn't. Terrorism isn't 'bursty'.**

There was a time when terrorist groups (yes back here in Europe) looked at each other, linked up and there was sustained activity particularly in the 70s-early 90s - but it wasn't exactly coincidental. Social scientists and political scholars have published widely on the confluence and spike in terrorism then and the reasons for it. The shift in terrorism from that to the way things are now is not 'bursty' - the causes and methods are different, as are the constraints on planning and implementation that influence where and when they happen. I can confidently predict that the next burst will come when the outcomes and survivors from the current conflicts take pause and reflect on the potential opportunities for armed attacks



against the larger targets. There is a huge amount of battle-innoculation and combat skills building going on at the moment and that will no doubt be reapplied elsewhere.

Those who are growing up and watching these conflicts daily will look at the perceived inequalities and injustices and at who is on whose side - then they will choose their own. No burstiness there, just a sense of injustice, and ideology and

motivation to frame it and an availability of the means to get to a target.


It is very easy and simple to debunk myths when you set them up in the first place. I don't think that any of those postulated here have much credibility and I sincerely believe that there is a great deal of merit in looking beyond 9/11 as the embodiment and exemplar of terrorism. It is in fact, a terrible anomaly.

Phil Wood is Head of Department, Security and Resilience at Buckinghamshire New University

Q&A: Indonesia's Terrorism Expert on the Country's Homegrown Jihadis

Source: <http://world.time.com/2013/08/26/qa-indonesias-terrorism-expert-on-the-countrys-homegrown-jihadis/>

Indonesia has endured terrorist attacks targeting churches, embassies, nightclubs and luxury hotels for over a decade. While much focus has been on the link between Indonesian terrorist groups and al-Qaeda, terrorism expert and author Solahudin argues that the jihadist movement actually has local origins, dating back to the early years of the country's independence.



In the wake of the 2002 Bali bombing, the former journalist and press activist spent years doing research — interviewing jihadists, reading court documents and scouring religious sources — for a groundbreaking book. The English translation, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*, was published this month. Solahudin, who like many Indonesians goes by one name, talks with TIME from Jakarta.

Why do you say that Indonesia's jihadism was homegrown and not imported?

The ideology of Darul Islam [or DI, an Islamist group that launched an armed revolt in 1949 to set up an Islamic state] didn't originate from overseas. It came from the political genius of its leader [Sekarmaji Marijan] Kartosuwiryo. From 1947 to '49, he and his supporters fought in the independence war against the Dutch. Kartosuwiryo wanted an Islamist state because he saw Indonesia as an infidel nation. He was captured and executed in 1962. [The revolt was crushed and DI went underground.]

From 1985 to the early '90s, DI sent people to Afghanistan to undergo military training. When they met the international jihadists there, they realized they shared the same beliefs. DI members easily embraced al-Qaeda ideology. When these Afghanistan alumni returned, they brought home Salafist jihadist ideology and Wahhabi religious practice. It created a stir among the DI members at home because they were essentially traditionalist Muslims in the Indonesian sense — they also believed in mysticism. Kartosuwiryo was an *abangan* [a Javanese Muslim who practices a syncretic version of Islam that integrates pre-Islamic traditions], and he couldn't even read Arabic. The Afghanistan returnees, who thought the local practice was heretical, split from DI



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and in 1993 set up Jemaah Islamiyah [or JI, the group responsible for the Bali bombing of 2002 and implicated in the Bali bombing of 2005]. JI carried out terrorist acts in the first decade of this century, but it's not too active now. In contrast, out of the 77 cases uncovered between 2010 and 2013, 50 involved members or ex-members of DI.

How has Indonesia fared in combating terrorism?

It's has done a great job. Since 2010 alone, Densus 88 [the government's antiterrorism squad] has arrested more than 300 people and killed nearly 70. The problem, however, is the deradicalization program, run by the National Counterterrorism Agency. Their strategy relies on using religious figures who aren't respected by the terrorists. Clerics from the traditionalist school, whose Islam is seen as imperfect, are invited to talk. Or they organize a show or a soccer match for the prisoners, activities that are irrelevant for deradicalizing terrorists.

The most effective way is to organize a meeting between convicted terrorists and victims. Let them see how their acts affect the victims' lives and their families'. One example: last year, [jailed JI member] Umar Patek met a man who was badly injured in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. It was an emotional encounter. The terrorist was so shocked that he couldn't say much, apart from telling the victim, "Please tell others how sorry I am. If they can't forgive me, I can't go to heaven."

Indonesian terrorists nowadays mostly target the security forces, especially the police, instead of foreign embassies and entities. What caused the shift?

Since 2010, almost all victims of terrorism have been police officers, who are blamed for the arrests and killings of jihadists; there were fatwas justifying the attacks on police. It's a shift in ideology, mixed with revenge. But it doesn't mean the so-called distant enemy won't be targeted anymore. Last year, there were plans to attack the American embassy and the offices of [U.S. mining giant] Freeport because of the YouTube video *Innocence of Muslims*. In May, the police intercepted a plan to bomb the Myanmar [Burmese] embassy, which was linked to the Rohingya issue. As long as there is an international issue deemed to be harming the Islamic community, jihadists will target foreigners.

Also, terrorist attacks are now carried by many smaller, amateurish groups. They are not funded by al-Qaeda, but through robberies or cybertheft.

Should Indonesia be worried about a spillover of Burma's Buddhist-Muslim tensions?

We should be worried. Last April, [jihadis] planned an arson attack on the Glodok market [in Jakarta's Chinatown] because they said the ethnic Chinese were Buddhists. There was also a list of Buddhist temples that could be targeted going around on the Internet, and this month, the Ekayana Buddhist temple [in Jakarta] was bombed. Another conflict we should be worried about is the Syrian conflict. Some groups have sent people for "humanitarian assistance" there. There is also jihadi propaganda, quoting sayings of the Prophet that Armageddon will happen in Syria. If the trend continues, I am afraid the Shi'ite minorities in Indonesia could be a target.

Are you optimistic that Indonesia's terrorist movement can be eradicated?

They will always be there. They can weather all sorts of changes. They will be there as long as there are people who dream of imposing Shari'a and people who can be easily recruited. Terrorism relies on these three ingredients: a disappointed people, a justifying ideology and an organization. The challenge is how to prevent it from getting big.

Who created the terrorists?

By Nabil Al-Bukiri

Source: <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1712/opinion/2899/Who-created-the-terrorists.htm>

The fallout from the coup in Egypt includes a number of answers to questions regarding political and security issues since the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was a historic turning point in the

strategies adopted by the U.S. and the capitalist West.

America, for one, had to find a replacement enemy "other" instead of the Soviet Union. In his book "The



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Rise and fall of the Great Powers," Paul Kennedy says that no empire can maintain its political stability and remain a superpower unless it directs its energies towards an enemy, real or imagined. Without the external bogey to focus on, such energies are dissipated internally leading to cracks in the façade of unity, followed by the fall of the empire.

Kennedy's theory is consistent with the roots of Western thought. The German philosopher Hegel believed that without the prospect of war and the sacrifices it requires people become absorbed in themselves and society deteriorates under the rush to fulfill their selfish desires, resulting in the collapse of society.

Philosophical theories aside, America was also aware that as a result of the Warsaw Pact's demise, Europe could have gone its own way. Posing a threat to U.S. national security, this could have seen America unable to persuade European countries to join it in its wars, even NATO could have been hard to manipulate.

In the decade or so between the fall of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the events of September 11, 2001, an image of the new enemy was being prepared by Western decision-makers, who enlisted the help of writers and intellectuals. The purpose was to restore the tactical and strategic position of the U.S. Army as the strongest in the world.

Samuel Huntington's book, "The Clash of Civilizations," and Francis Fukuyama's "End of History," represent the most important theoretical literature on what became known as the "Green Menace," a new enemy for the West to focus on, replacing the communist "Red Menace" of Eastern Europe.

Huntington noted that the upcoming struggle between nations would be a cultural struggle between the Islamic East and the Christian West. According to Fukuyama, liberal capitalism as a governing system in the West will be the last example of human intellectual creativity and that through capitalist values the West will prevail and impose them on the entire world.

Coinciding with the announcement of these theories, the Western media was spreading its carefully selected terminology associated with what it called radical or fundamentalist Islam. These and other terms were welcomed warmly by security agencies and state media in the Arab world before being repeated maliciously and somewhat foolishly. Such Arab regimes were overjoyed that their interests met with the

West's in creating a bogey out of terrorism and extremism.

Thus was the West able to create a new avenue for international conflict under the guise of a "war on terrorism" in which anything and everything concerning Islam was a target.

Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, a vicious civil war afflicted the country in the absence of a unified national project and vision among the disparate groups who had been victorious against the invaders. This internecine conflict amongst the Afghans has become an object lesson in what can happen to one-time comrades in arms who are left without clear leadership.

There was a difference of opinion among the jihad leaders in Afghanistan, with a number suggesting that the Arab fighters should return to their countries to contribute to the political developments taking place there. This was an idea backed by the doyen of the Arab fighters, Abdullah Azzam. The intention was to give support to peaceful change through democratic means.

The first test for this point of view was the Algerian Islamist Party's victory in the municipal elections, followed by the parliamentary elections in 1992. As soon as it was clear that the Islamists would win, the election was cancelled by the army. A bitter armed conflict followed. The architect of the victory, though, did not live to see this happen; Azzam was assassinated in 1989.

Osama Bin Laden was among the first to agree with Azzam and went back to Saudi Arabia and his life in business. He'd majored in Business Administration at King Abdul Aziz University and was following in his father's footsteps.

It is claimed now that Bin Laden was engaged in the type of political affairs prohibited by the Saudi government. In any case, events took a turn for the worst with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the deployment of American troops on Saudi soil ready to invade and liberate the small, oil-rich state. This complicated the political situation in Saudi Arabia, with many people condemning the decision to allow American troops into the land of Makkah and Madinah.

Bin Laden, like other Islamists opposed to the Saudi policy at the time, was put under house arrest before being allowed to return to Afghanistan to put his affairs there in order, he then went into self-imposed exile in Sudan in early 1991.



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He invested heavily in Sudanese construction and agricultural companies. This coincided with his announcement of the establishment of the "Advice and Reform Committee" based in London, through which he would oppose the Saudi regime that expelled him from his country due to his political views.

Neither the Saudis nor the Americans liked this, so they put great pressure on Khartoum, which was willing to hand over Bin Laden to either side; both refused. Back in Afghanistan he formed the "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders" with Ayman Al-Zawahiri in 1998.

The membership increased as the Arab "Mujahideen" fighters followed Bin Laden to Afghanistan having found only prison cells and oppression waiting for them in their home countries. The same agencies which had recruited them to go and fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan now demonized and persecuted them.

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the American mainland were preceded by attacks against U.S. targets such as the American embassies in Dar Al-Salaam and Nairobi. The USS Cole was also targeted off the coast of Yemen in 2000. However, 9/11 remains the biggest and most damaging attack against the United States in living memory. It was this which prompted George W Bush's "war on terrorism", leading to US invasions of Afghanistan just weeks after 9/11 and Iraq in 2003. Both countries and their regimes were accused of harboring terrorists and supporting terrorism.

It is often forgotten that "Al-Qaeda" was a name given by the Americans to a list provided by the Arab fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan to keep track of those killed and those who survived. It has since become the generic term for any and all "Islamic terrorists."

The author is a Yemeni journalist. This article is a translation of the Arabic text which appeared on Al-Jazeera net on Sept. 12.

A look at shootings at military posts

Source: <http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/news/national/a-look-at-shootings-at-other-military-posts>

A former Navy man opened fire Monday, Sept 16 2013 at the Washington Navy Yard, leaving at least 13 people dead, including the gunman. It was the deadliest shooting rampage at a U.S.-based military installation since Maj. Nidal

With the outbreak of the peaceful demonstrations in 2011 against decades of repression, marginalization and despotism in the Arab world the Arab Spring was born. As regimes were overthrown in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, the common factor was the clearly peaceful intentions and nature of the demonstrators. This changed the minds of those who felt that only armed solutions were possible, although the situation in Libya and now Syria has further altered perceptions considerably. Nevertheless, the Islamists won free and fair elections but the democratic experiment faced a major setback with the coup against Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. It is now feared that the gains of the Arab Spring will be lost, not least because the coup leaders were given a clear green light to proceed by the supposedly democratic West.

This poses several questions regarding the extent of the West's involvement in what is happening, not only in Egypt but also in Syria. The new terrorism is backed by the West in its efforts to overturn any possibility of Islamists coming to power in the Arab World. Once again, the Arab despots are behind the West, cheque-books in hand.

The Islamists who have gained most from the Arab Spring have been proven to be the most effective democrats in the region. Hence, a great deal of effort has been expended on dragging them into violence and demonising them as "terrorists". It is clear that the West wants to eliminate democracy and Islamists in one go. They forget, however, who created Islamic "terrorists" and terrorism in the first place to do the West's dirty work against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These things are all linked and now form part of one long chain of events with no foreseeable end in sight.

Hasan killed 13 people and wounded more than 30 others in 2009 at Fort Hood in Texas.

Here is a look at other shootings at military installations in recent years:



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- Thirteen people shot dead, including gunman, at Washington DC Navy Yard
- At least three people wounded
- Shooter, named as Aaron Alexis from Fort Worth, Texas, was armed with AR-15
- Gunman, a former Navy reservist, was killed after opening fire on police
- Seattle police arrested Alexis in 2004 for shooting out the tyres of another man's vehicle



July 21, 2013: Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D. Tech. Sgt. Matthew Hullman dies following a shooting incident.

March 21, 2013: Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va. Corp. Jacob Wooley, 23, of Guntown, Miss., is killed by Sgt. Eusebio Lopez, 25, of Pacifica, Calif., military officials said. Lopez also shoots Lance Cpl. Sara Castromata, 19, of Oakley, Calif., to death before he kills himself. June 4, 2012: Offutt Air Force Base south of Omaha, Neb. Zachari Johnson, 21, of Lincoln, dies at an Omaha hospital after being shot by an Air Force security contractor. Authorities say Johnson was shot when he crashed a car through a base entrance. Air Force officials have said the guard followed procedure when he shot Johnson.

Sept. 18, 2011: Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz. Lance Corporal Daryl Adams, 22,

an avionics technician is shot and wounded in Yuma. The shooting is accidental and the suspect is also a local Marine.

May 19, 2010: MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla. The FBI says military veteran Ronald J. Bullock, 61, of Hanson, Mass. is fatally shot by one of its agents at MacDill Air Force Base. The FBI says Bullock was involved in an altercation at the campground that led to a pursuit by base police. When the FBI agent confronted him, Bullock pulled a knife and the agent shot him.

Feb. 22, 2010: Luke Air Force Base, Glendale, Ariz. Gabriel Aguilera, 19, is charged with first-degree murder, aggravated assault and unlawful flight from law enforcement. Aguilera drove a stolen car into Luke Air Force Base, which resulted in the



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fatal shooting of his 16-year-old passenger.

Dec. 11, 2009: Near Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. Airman 1st Class Corey Hernandez, 21, fatally shoots Senior Airman Michael Garvia, 23, of San Benito, Texas in a game of "trust." Hernandez is later sentenced to five years of confinement and given a dishonorable discharge.

Nov. 5, 2009: Fort Hood Army Base, Fort Hood, Texas. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Nadal Hasan, 39, was convicted in August 2013 for killing 13 people and wounding more than 30.

Oct. 13, 2005: Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Pvt. Nicholas D. Mikel, 21, is accused of firing shots into a group of soldiers; no one is injured. Mikel is later sentenced to 25 years in jail.

Nigerian Terrorism – Why Africa Is the next Big Battleground against Islamic Extremism

Source: <http://guardianlv.com/2013/09/nigerian-terrorism-why-africa-is-the-next-big-battleground-against-islamic-extremism/>

Last night's (sept 28) attack on Nigerian students in an agricultural college in the middle of the night is only the latest violence committed by Islamic extremists in the region. With bodies still being recovered, the death toll

the Westgate shopping center. In it, he explains the terrorist group's reasons behind the attack. He thanked the shooters for their actions and said that the violence was a reprisal against Kenya for sending troops into



has risen to over 50 in this newest terrorist attack in Africa. The group responsible, Boko Haram, is a militant group allied with al-Qadea, and has become more active with violent reprisals in the region since the beginning of this year. The spider web of terrorist groups with ties to al-Qadea is growing in Africa, and this is where intelligence organizations believe the next big battleground against Islamic extremists will take place.

Many of the recent terrorist attacks, including the recent mall shooting by al-Shabab, stem from a brand of Islamic extremism established on a global scale by al-Qadea. The increasing violence is often done as a reprisal against the local populations for working with Western powers. Al-Shabab leader, Mukhtaar Abdirahman Abu Zubeyr, sent a message to Kenyans after he perpetrated the carnage at

Somalia.

Al-Shabab grew out of the Somalian civil war, becoming a full-blown Islamist insurgency in the region by taking control of major bases of operations from the Somali government back in 2008. Both Ethiopia and Kenya sent troops to help rid the region of the hardline Islamist groups who were implementing strict interpretations of shari'a law on the populace of their controlled areas, such as publicly flogging women for wearing "deceptive bras" and whipping men for shaving their beards. Kenya contributed troops to the African Union mission that ousted al-Shabab from the region in 2012. Ethiopia also participated in the mission and should have their guard up for reprisal attacks from al-Shabab in the near future.



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Boko Haram has been ordered to step up the violence in their area as well. Back in January this year, a splinter group taking orders directly from al-Qaeda called *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis- Sudan* (JAMBS), was called on to increase attacks in the region because Nigeria deployed troops into northern Mali with the mission to flush out al-Qaeda Islamist extremist groups controlling the region. Last night's attack on defenseless Nigerian students by Boko Haram is another in a long line of violence being committed by terrorist sects in Nigeria. These Islamic extremists' acts are establishing the grounds for a big upcoming battle against terrorism in Africa.

Behind all of this is the terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. In June, 2012, General Carter Ham, the USAFRICOM commander, addressed a meeting of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies naming al-Shabab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda in the land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali area, respectively, as the three major groups posing a growing threat in Africa. *"What really concerns me are the indications that the three organizations are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts, in other words, to*

establish a cooperative effort amongst the three most violent organizations. And I think that's a problem for America and for African security in general."

Why are these hardline Islamist extremist flourishing in Africa? For one, they survive best in areas where government forces are weaker and don't have a lot of control. These groups can take over regions where villages and settlements are more secluded and scattered, where their victims have little to no police force or local government troops to protect them. By setting up in these remote areas, the terrorists can force their own brand of law and order on the local populations where little existed before, and they can hide better from any military opposition that comes their way.

Given the U.S. establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, an organization responsible for U.S. military operations in Africa, the Western world is well aware of the upcoming battleground in Africa against Islamic extremism and terrorism. The only question remaining is, how effective Western and African governments' responses will be against these emergent threats?

Violent hate crimes, lone-wolf terrorism share characteristics

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr/2013/10/02-violent-hate-crimes-lonewolf-terrorism-share-characteristics>

Understanding the patterns of violent hate crimes may help law enforcement officers better understand lone-actor terrorism. When compared to group-based terrorism incidents, violent hate crimes are more predictive of when and where lone-actor terrorist attacks occurred, according to new research from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

A START release reports that in the United States between 1992 and 2010, locations where the 101 lone-actor terrorism incidents occurred shared more demographic similarities with the locations of the 46,000 violent hate crimes than with the locations of 424 group-based terrorist attacks over the time period.

Similar to group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes, lone-actor terrorism is more likely to occur in counties with larger populations, lower levels of home ownership, and higher percentages of non-Hispanic whites.

"We think this is likely for two reasons: one, home owners may exert more control and surveillance over their immediate neighborhood, and two, there are likely fewer suitable targets — businesses, abortion clinics, government buildings, in residential areas with high home ownership rates," said Victor Asal, lead author and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Albany, SUNY.

Unlike group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes, lone-actor terrorism is not more likely to occur in counties with higher percentages of residents living in urban environments, higher percentages of male residents between 15 and 24 years of age, or higher unemployment rates. The researchers also found that lone-actor terrorists tend to attack in less populated states, leading them to conclude that lone-actor terrorists may be a more serious threat outside the major



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population centers than in larger cities.

“Though our research cannot predict the time or place of future attacks, we hope that knowledge of these trends and risk factors can be useful from an intelligence perspective and can inform strategies for prevention,” Asal said. The release notes that Asal and his fellow researchers — Kathleen Deloughery, University at Albany, SUNY, and Ryan King, the Ohio State University — examined the timing, locations, methods, targets, and geographic distributions of lone-actor terrorist attacks, group-based terrorist attacks, and violent hate crimes that occurred between 1992 and 2010. They then used data from the U.S.

Census Bureau and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assess whether the counties in which lone-actor terrorism occurred shared common demographic characteristics with those that experienced group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes.

The study was funded through START by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate's Resilient Systems Division. It is part of a series of studies in support of the Prevent/Deter program. The goal of this program is to sponsor research that will aid the intelligence and law enforcement communities in assessing potential terrorist threats and support policymakers in developing prevention efforts.

— Read more in *Understanding Lone-actor Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis with Violent Hate Crimes and Group-based Terrorism (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], September 2013)*


A guide to terrorist, security actors in East Africa

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131008-a-guide-to-terrorist-security-actors-in-east-africa>

The continuing violence in East Africa is often attributed to Somalia's instability, triggered by the collapse of the government more than twenty years ago, and the descent of the country into a war among war lords, tribes, and religious factions.

areas of Somalia controlled by Islamists to enforce Sharia law. The United States supported an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 to root out the Islamists and destroy the ICU. When the Ethiopian military retreated, the remnants of the ICU formed al Shabab as an umbrella organization for Islamic militants in the Horn of Africa.

Al Shabab, which always had a strong Somali national message in addition to its Islamic ideology, enjoyed financial support from members of the Somali diaspora abroad, allowing the organization to gain control parts of Somalia, including most of southern and central Somalia and parts of Mogadishu and Kismayo,



USNews offers a useful guide to the main groups and organizations which operate in the region which extends from Eritrea in the north to Tanzania in the south.

Al Shabab

Al-Shabab, which translates to “The Youth,” was formed out of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of Islamic courts operating in

from 2007 to 2011.

In 2011, the African Union (AU) created the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and launched a broad campaign against al Shabab strongholds.

The AMISON campaign chased al Shaba out of most of the areas it had controlled. The organization went through a period of internal squabbles



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and infighting, and leaders and members who were not deemed radical enough were expelled or killed, and radical Moktar ali Zubeyr emerged as the new leader.

"It became much smaller but much more radical," J. Peter Pham, the director of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center and frequent adviser to Congress and the White House, told *USNews*.

This was also the period when al Shabab sought closer relationship with al Qaeda, and increased its recruitment efforts among Somalis who lived abroad, including the United States.

Al- Qaeda in East Africa

Al Qaeda in East Africa refers to Islamic militancy in East Africa excluding al Shabab. The group has been a financial supporter of al Shabab, and many of its founding leaders have trained with other al Qaeda-affiliated groups. One of the group's missions is to establish an Islamic state independent of Western influence. The reason for the group's existence is the unease with which Osama bin Laden regarded al Shabab. Bin Laden was living in Sudan until 1996, and became familiar with Somali Islamists. He was never convinced about the depth of their commitment to the Islamic cause, and regarded them more as Somali nationalists who were employing the universal language of Islam to pursue parochial Somali interests. While he was heading al Qaeda, therefore, he preferred to support the competing Al Qaeda in East Africa (the relationship between al Shabab and Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's successor, are much better).

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON)

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) consists of thousands of Ugandan, Burundian, Kenyan soldiers, with a few hundred soldiers each from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Djibouti. The force of about 17,000

soldiers was created to protect the central Somali government from attacks by al Shabaab and to destroy the infrastructure used by extremist groups in the country. AMISON's commander Maj. Gen. Fred Mugisha has reiterated that AMISON's mission is to clear Somalia of al Shabaab, not to occupy the country. "We need the support of all peace loving Somalis to help us restore peace and stability to the city (Mogadishu). We urge the civilian population to support their government and isolate and reject criminals. That way we can start to provide effective security together," he said.

The Forces of the Federal Republic of Somalia

The Forces of the Federal Republic of Somalia is the official name of the Somali military. This is not a national military in any meaningful sense of the term. Rather, over the past three years, some warlords and clan leaders appointed themselves as members of the Somali parliament, and each made a "contribution" to the state by ordering some members of his clan or militia to join the Forces. These newly minted "soldiers," however, are loyal to the clan leader or warlord who sent them to join the military, not to their immediate commanders or the country's nominal government.

U.S. forces

In addition to the occasional commando raid, like the Saturday Special Forces raid in Somalia, American forces in the Horn of Africa are limited to an air base in Djibouti, support troops for AMISOM, and ship-borne Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) which patrol the region's seas. Col. Francis Donovan, former commander of the Marine's 24th MEU. Told *USNews* that, "The ultimate goal of bringing up security forces in other countries is so they can fight so we don't have to."

Canadian ship seizes heroin linked to terrorist groups

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/seworld20131007-canadian-ship-seizes-heroin-linked-to-terrorist-groups>

A Canadian Navy commander on board a warship that seized more than 180 kilograms of heroin said that the drug shipment came from suppliers in the Middle East and was linked to terrorist groups. HMCS Toronto Cmdr. Matthew Bowen said the drugs were destined for recipients in Africa, and would have funded the activities of "extremist elements." He added



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that the drugs likely have ties to terrorist organizations with connections to Afghanistan. The massive drug bust took place about 800 kilometers east of the Horn of Africa. Crew members of the HMCS Toronto boarded the suspected smuggling ship and seized 154 bags of heroin.

Economic warfare by forest fire

Source: <http://wildfiretoday.com/2012/09/08/economic-warfare-by-wildfires/>

“America, I think, is under attack by terrorists waging economic warfare by fire.”

In this important and compelling video William Scott talks about how terrorists could, and perhaps already are waging economic war inside the United State by starting wildfires which can cost the government and residents billions of dollars.



He also refers to the al Qaeda magazine article which encouraged Western Muslims to wage war within the United States by engaging in lone wolf attacks, including setting forest fires.

Economic terrorism was one of the desired effects of the 9/11 attacks, to force the United States to spend billions of dollars beefing up our security infrastructure. The terrorists succeeded in meeting that objective.

Mr. Scott worked on the 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel that studied and made recommendations about the air tanker fleet

after the mid-air wing failures of two air tankers that year. He also is a former editor of Aviation Week, former official of the National Security Agency, and the author of *Space Wars*.

In the video, Mr. Scott does not just complain and rant like some politicians, he actually has some constructive suggestions, including:

- Using NASA and military assets, 24/7, to patrol fire-prone forests, using “fire combat air patrols” to quickly detect new fires and to track suspects leaving the scene;
- Stop narrowly thinking of fires as a land management issue, and begin treating them as a national security issue;
- “Finally it’s time. We have to develop and field a robust large air tanker fleet of firefighting aircraft. The Forest Service has made a good start, but it still suffers from a culture and attitude of what firefighters call ‘cheapism’, the idea that we can fight wildland fire on the cheap. And that’s no longer acceptable.”

► [View video at source URL](#)

Al-Shabaab suicide bomber attacks restaurant in Somalia

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/19/al-shabaab-suicide-bomber-restaurant-somalia>

At least 13 people have been killed and another 10 wounded in a suicide bomb attack in Somalia.

The al-Shabaab group claimed responsibility for the explosion, which happened at a restaurant near a military base in the city of Beledweyne, around 210 miles north of Mogadishu. The city is under the control of the central government and African Union peacekeepers from Djibouti are stationed there.

"Our main target was Ethiopian and Djibouti troops who invaded our country. They were sitting there," al-Shabaab's military operation spokesman, Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, said.

He put the death toll from the attack at 25.

"A man with an explosives jacket entered unexpectedly in the tea shop where soldiers and civilians sat ... and blew himself up," local elder Ahmed Nur said from the scene of the blast.



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"I could see the bodies of several soldiers being carried, but I could not make out whether they were dead or injured." Al-Shabaab frequently attacks political targets as well as restaurants and other recreational spaces popular with foreigners and government soldiers.



The al-Qaida linked militants also claimed responsibility for an attack last month on a shopping centre in Nairobi in which at least 72 people were killed.

Ethiopian troops have been fighting Islamist militants in neighbouring Somalia for much of the past decade.

The country waged an ill-fated war between 2006 and 2009, and sent troops across the border again in 2011 to combat al-Shabaab militants, who were also battling Kenyan troops

and an African Union military mission.



'London 2012 was like a concentration camp': Russian chief blasts deployment of missiles and snipers as he vows to make security 'invisible' at the Winter Olympics

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2442523/Sochi-Winter-Olympics-wont-concentration-camp-like-London-says-Russian-chief.html>

A Russian security chief overseeing the Sochi Winter Olympics says he will not allow the event to become a 'concentration camp' like London's summer Games.

Alexei Lavrishchev, a spokesman for state security organisation the FSB, attacked the organisers of the 2012 Olympics for imposing for what he claimed were draconian safety measures.



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In the biggest peacetime security operation the UK had ever seen, surface-to-air missiles, snipers and even warships were deployed across the English capital last year over heightened fears of a terrorist attack.

But Mr Lavrishchev insisted that security at the Sochi Games would be 'invisible'.



He told **The Daily Telegraph**: 'The city of Sochi will not be like a concentration camp.

'For comparison, take the most recent Olympics in London. There were anti-aircraft missiles and snipers on the rooftops?

'The streets and public areas were crammed with surveillance cameras, even, excuse me, in toilet

cubicles. We won't do that either.'

However, he said entry to the area would be strictly controlled and anyone attending the event would be



subjected to rigorous checks.

Security will still be tight: A general view of the Bolshoy Ice Dome (left) and Adler Arena Skating Centre in the Olympic Park to be used for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics

The Black Sea resort, due to host the Games in February, is close to Russia's Caucasus republics where there has been a persistent Islamist insurgency since the two Chechen wars in the 1990s and 2000s.

Earlier this year, the leader of the so-called Caucasus Emirate, Doku Umarov, called for the Games to be targeted.



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His group has previously claimed responsibility for suicide bombings on the Moscow metro in 2010 and at Domodedovo airport in 2011.



Critics have also urged a boycott of the Sochi Olympics in protest against a law banning gay 'propaganda' among minors.

The law is part of a broader attempt by Putin to win over Russians in the mostly conservative country following protests against his rule among urban and often middle class voters over his return to the Kremlin last May.

The Growing Terror Threat From Radical Women Converts

Source: <http://www.investigativeproject.org/4190/the-growing-terror-threat-from-radical-women>

In a photograph, the girl looks back with casual curiosity, her face scrubbed, her hair pulled a bit untidily behind her ears, her collar crisp, her tie askew, a charming and timeless portrait of the young Catholic schoolgirl in her teens.

Barely more than a decade later, she is called the world's most dangerous woman, the Muslim terrorist known as the "white widow," thought to have helped mastermind last month's terrorist attacks in Nairobi in which 72 people, including several children, were massacred in a popular shopping mall. Some reports placed her at the scene, commanding others as they gunned down dozens off non-Muslims over a three-day period.



If the allegations are true, then Irish-born Samantha Lewthwaite, whose husband Germaine Lindsay was among the suicide bombers responsible for the July 7,

2005 terrorist attacks in London,

is by no means alone among violent women converts to Islam.

Last May, Michigan-born Muslim convert Nicole Lynn Mansfield became the first American to die fighting with the Syrian rebels opposing the Bashar al-Assad regime.

And in 2005, Belgian convert Muriel Degauque blew herself up in a suicide bombing outside of

Baghdad. Other examples include Jamie Paulin-Ramirez and Colleen La Rose, better known as Jihad Jane – American converts convicted in 2010



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in connection with a plot to murder Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks for "insulting Islam" in his drawings of the prophet Mohammed as a dog; and Canadian Amanda Korody, charged with her partner John Stewart Nuttall, with "conspiracy, facilitating a terrorist activity and making an explosive device" in a failed attack on the British Columbia legislature on Canada Day last July.

This is just a sampling.

It should be said up front that while the vast majority of converts to Islam are women (in the UK, officials say women comprise about 75 percent of the 5,000 people who become Muslim every year), radicalization among them is rare, and violent attacks – or plots to commit them – rarer still. But the numbers are growing, reports the Christian Science Monitor, and becoming an increasingly worrisome phenomenon.

The attraction of Islam to Western women is not new. Experts have repeatedly noted common patterns among female converts, most of whom convert because of a relationship to a Muslim man, as was the case, say, with Katherine Tsarnaev, widow of Boston Marathon bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Others seem to find respite in the trappings of Islam. According to Dutch psychiatrist Carla Rus, who frequently works with Muslim women and converts, they are attracted less by the religion itself than by the costume, claiming that "covering up" under an abaya or niqab allows them to escape from a sexualized Western culture in which, they say, women are too often perceived as sex objects. (That the entire purpose of these coverings in Islamic culture is based on the premise that women are nothing but sex objects is a nuance that, evidently, escapes them.) They find, too, comfort in the notion of clear rules for women, a definitive set of guidelines by which to organize their lives in a post-feminist West where women's roles remain, in many instances and circles, ambiguous.

"The Bible can be vague about the roles of men and women," a woman called "Saskia" told a reporter for London's *Standpoint* magazine in 2010, "and I wanted certainty. Islam gave me that."

But the journey from hijabi to terrorist is another matter, more complex and less easily explained. Research I have reviewed shows that, in many cases, the women are pressured by their partners, as may have been the case

initially with Samantha Lewthwaite (whose husband was also a convert). Muslim husbands and even the Muslim community at large may question their suitability and devotion: it is not unusual for a female convert to be told that she is "not a proper Muslim wife." Consequently, whether out of a need to please or to prove her mettle, for some women the response is simply to travel deeper into the orthodoxy. They may raise funds for jihad, or assist in recruiting male jihadists – or, as is the case with some of the female members of the Dutch radical Hofstadgroep network, join in the sitting-room gatherings of their radical husbands and lovers, absorbing the discussions – and the beliefs. Such activities can even influence women born into Islam; but for converts – especially those who either are eager to prove themselves, are too naïve and uninformed to know better, or both – they pose a particular danger.

It is, in fact, especially that lack of knowledge, according to many experts, that can lead down the path to radicalization, as much among women as men. Jolande Wthuis, a Dutch researcher who has written prolifically on the subject, points out that for many of the radicalized women, the desire to know more about the Quran and its teaching leads them to the Internet, where they land in Salafist online communities eager to embrace them into their world. For a jihadist recruiter, after all, nothing provides a better foil than a Muslim woman who does not look as if she's Muslim – someone, say, like the blonde and blue-eyed Jihad Jane.

Those recruits are also among the most effective, according to French Islam expert Olivier Roy, who in 2006 told the *Washington Post*, "For al Qaeda, converts are not just tools to get past security. It's a way for them to become a global movement."

But if the growing number of radicalized female converts to Islam is disturbing, at least as troubling is the absence of any real effort to combat it, both from within the Muslim community and from without. This seems especially true in the United States, where it would appear that the threat is becoming particularly acute. Nicole Mansfield's father, in fact, claims he contacted the FBI about his daughter long before she left for Syria; and while they followed her for a time, nothing ever came of it. "She'd go make U-turns," Gregory Mansfield



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told the *Detroit Free Press*, "They'd make U-turns. She'd pull into a parking lot, they'd pull into a parking lot."

Eventually, Nicole Mansfield contacted the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), who – rather than investigating the situation – ordered the FBI to back off. Now, says Nicole's

father, CAIR has told him and other family members to avoid the FBI completely.

Meantime, the 33-year-old Nicole, like the 38-year-old Degauque before her, is dead, leaving an 18-year-old daughter behind, alone. And Samantha Lewthwaite is still at large, awaiting, plotting, her chance to kill again.


Growing Hezbollah Presence in Southwest U.S.

By Ryan Mauro

Source: <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/hezbollah-tattoos-increasing-found-us-prison-inmates>

Terrorism expert Matthew Levitt writes that an increasing number of U.S. prison inmates have tattoos that are pro-Hezbollah or are in Farsi, the language spoken in Iran. The claim is made in Levitt's new book, *Hezbollah: The Global*

weapons from Iraq for Hezbollah. Yousef alone knew of a Hezbollah stockpile in Mexico that included 100 M-16 assault rifles, 100 AR-15 rifles, 2500 hand grenades, C4 explosives and anti-tank weapons.



Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God.

"Law enforcement officials across the Southwest are reporting a rise in imprisoned gang members with Farsi tattoos" and some express loyalty to Hezbollah.

His book includes an eye-opening quote from another official: "You could almost pick your city and you would probably have a [Hezbollah] presence."

Hezbollah's business relationship with Mexican drug cartels is seen as a driving force behind the phenomenon.

In 2009, Michael Braun, former Chief of Operations for the Drug Enforcement Agency, said that Hezbollah uses "the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels."

In April 2010, an individual named Jamal Yousef was apprehended in New York City. During interrogation, he admitted to stealing

An actual member of Hezbollah was captured in Tijuana in July 2010. His arrest was the smoking gun proof that Hezbollah is investing in building a network in Mexico.

An unnamed senior Mexican military officer confirmed to then-Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC) that Hezbollah was giving explosives training to members of Mexican drug cartels. She wrote a letter to the

Department of Homeland Security warning it "might lead to Israel-like car bombings of Mexican/USA border personnel or National Guard units in the border regions."

Very shortly thereafter, a drug cartel detonated a car bomb for the first time and killed 4 people in Ciudad Juarez. It was described as having "Hezbollah-like sophistication" and a Tucson Police Department reported later said there is a "strong suspicion" that Hezbollah had traded its expertise.

Hezbollah's presence goes further south than Mexico. The Venezuelan government has been accused of colluding with Hezbollah and Iran for years. It's long been understood that Hezbollah operates in the tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil.

The *Wall Street Journal* says that Hezbollah is "forging ideologically promiscuous ties with Colombia's



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right-wing paramilitary groups and communist guerillas and digging tunnels for drug cartels on the Mexican-American border—the same kinds of tunnel networks it has spent years perfecting along the geographically similar Lebanese-Israeli border.”

Roger Noriega, former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, could not be clearer in his urgent warnings:

“If our government and responsible partners in Latin America fail to act, I believe there will be an attack on U.S. personnel, installations or interests in the Americas as soon as Hezbollah operatives believe that they are capable of such an operation without implicating their Iranian sponsors in the crime.”

Noriega said that in 2011. That was two years ago. The threat has only grown since then.

Ryan Mauro is the ClarionProject.org’s National Security Analyst, a fellow with the Clarion Project and is frequently interviewed on top-tier TV stations as an expert on counterterrorism and Islamic extremism.

Brazil’s Largest Drug Cartel Promises ‘World Cup Of Terror’

Source: <http://www.sportsgrid.com/soccer/brazils-largest-drug-cartel-promises-world-cup-of-terror/>

A powerful Brazilian drug cartel has threatened to disrupt the 2014 World Cup with terror-style attacks if imprisoned gang leaders are transferred to a tougher prison as planned. The **PCC gang** (First Command of the Capital) mainly operates out of São Paulo jails, since so many of its leaders are now on ice. But their reach is worldwide, according to reports, and they have promised to stage attacks in



São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro during the World Cup and the upcoming Brazil elections. There will be 13 World Cup matches played in those two cities — six of them in São Paulo.

The threats come just a week after daily paper O Estado de São Paulo revealed the details of an in-depth report by state prosecutors into the gang’s activities, including a plot to kill São Paulo Governor Geraldo Alckmin.

The PCC’s recent plans were

discovered when phone calls were intercepted by police intelligence. The gang has vowed to attack both on the streets and in the jails.

This is just the latest threat in the country that has seen plenty of unrest this year as it prepares to play host to both the World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. What has happened lately, you ask? Right now there are protesters out in force due to a teachers’ strike, and things have turned violent. But larger protests have rocked major cities since June, with thousands taking to the streets, mostly in Rio, to protest rising taxes and government spending on the sports infrastructure rather than social concerns. During the ConCup Final between Spain and Brazil in July, police actually ran out of tear gas. Some players also reported being affected on the field by tear gas that was wafting into the stadiums.

FIFA responded by saying that any World Cup matches that got tear-gassy would be suspended. With tens of thousands potentially planning trips for the World Cup and Olympics, that has to look really good in the online brochure.

The Brazilian government continues to insist that everything is under control, but so far there has been enough stuff on fire to be seen from space, and hardly anyone is confident all hell will not break loose. We’re rooting for Brazil of course. But right now we’d say tourists should not so much be thinking beer keg as powder keg.



As Sochi Olympic venues are built, so are Kremlin's surveillance networks

By Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan and Shaun Walker

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/06/sochi-olympic-venues-kremlin-surveillance>



Activists protest against Russia's anti-gay laws. The Kremlin's surveillance network in Sochi will focus on dissent as well as terror threats. Photograph: Lefteris Pitarakis/AP

When Russia was awarded the Sochi Olympics back in 2007, there were celebrations as the country secured its first major sporting event since 1991. Vladimir Putin himself travelled to Guatemala, addressed the International Olympic Committee in English and basked in the limelight. The Sochi Olympics became his personal pet project.

With the city situated close to the various insurgencies of the North Caucasus, it soon became apparent that security concerns would be paramount. But it was not only the terrorist threat that had to be considered.

Russia's leadership is notoriously paranoid about perceived foreign meddling, and the conventional package of security measures that comes as standard with any major modern event in any country was augmented by a heightened interest in clandestine surveillance.

So as the oligarch-funded construction firms started building the venues and infrastructure for the Olympics, the FSB began making plans for a more shadowy kind of network, to address the vulnerabilities of the event.

The main role in providing security for the Olympics was handed over to the FSB in 2010, and in May of that year, Oleg Syromolotov, one of the bureau's deputy directors, was appointed as chairman of the interdepartmental operations staff to provide security at the Games. Intriguingly, Syromolotov has never been involved in counterterrorism.

Instead, he is the long-standing chief of the FSB's counterintelligence department. He has spent his entire career at the KGB and then the FSB, hunting down foreign spies. His training and experience is in identifying foreign threats.

At a conference in September 2010, a presentation ordered by the FSB was given on security in Sochi. The presentation, which we have obtained, was mostly about cyber threats, but it also said that Sorm, Russia's main system for intercepting communications, should be significantly updated in Sochi. It also specified this should be done in secret.

Sorm's tactical and technical foundations were developed by a KGB research institute in the mid-1980s, and have been updated ever since.

Now, the Sorm-1 system captures telephone and mobile phone communications, Sorm-2 intercepts internet traffic, and Sorm-3 collects



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information from all forms of communication, providing long-term storage of all information and data on subscribers, including actual recordings and locations.

Since 2010, according to procurement and tender documents collated from the communications watchdog, Roskomnadzor, Russian authorities have been busy making sure that Sorm equipment is properly installed in the Sochi region; and several local ISPs were fined when it was discovered they had failed to install Omega, the Sorm device recommended by the FSB.

One record from Roskomnadzor shows that last November, the ISP Sochi-Online was warned officially for "failing to introduce the required technical equipment to ensure the functioning of Sorm".

Mobile networks in Sochi have also been significantly updated. In June, Rostelecom, Russia's national telecom operator, launched a 4G LTE network around Sochi, pledging the fastest Wi-Fi networks in Olympic history, free of charge. But simultaneously, according to documents seen by our investigation, Rostelecom is installing DPI ("deep packet inspection") systems on all its mobile networks, a technology which allows the FSB not only to monitor all traffic, but to filter it.

Visitors determined to take their laptops and smartphones to Sochi may be under the impression their communications are safe, thanks to the sophisticated encryption provided

by most web giants such as Google and Facebook. They are likely to be wrong.

In March, Russia's communications ministry introduced new Sorm regulations for ISPs. The regulations are the first document in which major servers based in the west, such as Gmail and Yahoo are mentioned as services that should be able to be intercepted. The decree is not yet signed, but the intention is clear.

Conventional security measures will also be high at Sochi, with more than 40,000 police on duty, more than 5,000 surveillance cameras installed across the city and drones hovering overhead. Sochi will be the first time that surveillance drones have been used at an Olympics, with both the FSB and the interior ministry acquiring drones and planning to use them, according to information in the FSB's in-house magazine.

The FSB has also purchased two sonar systems to detect submarines and protect the Olympics from a sea-launched terror attack.

All protests have been banned during the runup to the Olympics, and the city will be in lockdown with only accredited vehicles allowed to enter.

Last week an FSB official, Alexei Lavrishchev, denied that Sochi would look like a "concentration camp", saying that compared with London, the security would be "invisible". He is not wrong. Snooping on communications will not be visible. But that doesn't mean it won't be there.

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan run the web portal agentura.ru and conducted this investigation in collaboration with CitizenLab and Privacy International

Sochi facts

- The estimated cost of the Olympics is £32bn, making it by some way the most expensive games ever. The London Olympics cost less than £9bn, while even the highest estimates put the last Winter Games, in Vancouver in 2010, at no more than \$6bn.
- An estimated £4.9bn was allegedly spent on just one road that links the airport with the mountain cluster at Krasnaya Polyana. A Russian magazine noted that for the same price, the road could be paved with a thick layer of foie gras or caviar.
- Much of the construction is being funded by Russia's oligarchs, as part of the informal contract that in return for keeping their wealth, they must help out with major state projects. Privately, some of the leading investors have complained about spiralling costs.
- During a tour of the construction sites in February, Vladimir Putin asked some meek aides who was responsible for a ski jump project going over budget. He fired the offending official, who has since fled the country, on the spot.
- All protests, rallies and demonstrations have been banned in Sochi for a 10-week period before and during the Games.
- Approximately 40,000 police will be on duty during the Games, and many have been learning foreign languages in order to be able to help out visitors.



Jihad or Terrorism?

By Raymond Ibrahim

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/3644/jihad-or-terrorism>

A recent Arabic article appearing in Egypt's *Al Ahram* newspaper titled "Is Terrorism Jihad?" written by Islamic law expert Dr. Abdul Fatah Idris offers important lessons—from the fact that jihad *does* involve subjugating non-Muslims to why the Western mentality is still incapable of acknowledging it.

Idris, professor and chairman of Al Azhar University's Department of Comparative Jurisprudence at the Faculty of Sharia Law, is a well-reputed legal scholar. He begins his article by quoting from various international bodies that correctly define terrorism as violence or threats of violence as a means of coercion.

Idris also mentions how "the Islamic Research Academy, in its report issued on November 4th, 2001, defines terrorism as terrorizing *innocent* people and the destruction of their properties and their essential elements of living and attacking their finances and their persons and their liberties and their human dignity *without right* and spreading corruption throughout the land."

It is interesting to note that, although he quotes from several international bodies, it is only the "Islamic Research Academy" that includes words like "innocent" and "without right," both of which clearly leave much wiggle room to exonerate terrorist acts committed against those perceived as not being "innocent" or who it *is* a right to terrorize, which according to many Muslims, includes the West.

At any rate, in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood's recent terrorist attacks throughout Egypt—including the destruction of over 80 Christian churches—Idris agrees that, It is therefore correct to define what happened recently [in Egypt] as terrorism and it cannot be called, as some have done [e.g., Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, et al.], a jihad or *ribat* in the path of Allah, for the difference between them is vast. Terrorism is a crime; both according to Sharia and the law, and all international conventions consider it a crime and call on all people to fight against it through all means.

Up until this point, Idris defines and agrees with the international definition of terrorism, and

portrays the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (whom he never names) as terrorism.

So far so good!

However, Idris immediately makes a complete reversal in his follow-up sentences:

But jihad in the path of Allah, *to make his word supreme, spread his religion*, defend the honor of the Islamic nation [umma], and respond to the aggression against Muslims all around the earth—this is jihad: *when a Muslim fights an infidel without treaty to make the word of Allah Most High supreme, forcing him to fight or invading his land, this is a permissible matter according to the consensus of the jurists.*

Indeed, it is an obligation for all Muslims. Now if the deeds of the jihad—including fighting the infidels and breaking their spine through all possible means—are permissible according to Sharia, then it is impossible to define those acts as terrorism, which Sharia-based evidence has made illegitimate. A large gap exists between them [jihad and terrorism]. And there is no connection between what is obligatory [jihad] and what is forbidden [terrorism].

At this point, the befuddled Western reader may be at a loss to understand how, exactly, jihad—"according to the consensus of the jurists," no less—is different from the aforementioned definitions of terrorism.

What's needed here is for the non-Muslim to try to transcend his epistemology and think, for a moment, like an observant Muslim, especially in the context of two points:

1. According to Islamic doctrine, jihad, as Idris asserts, *is* an obligation for Muslims (offensive being communal, defensive being individual). As this expert of Islamic jurisprudence states: "But jihad in the path of Allah, *to make his word supreme, spread his religion...* this is jihad: *when a Muslim fights an infidel without treaty [e.g. dhimma pact] to make the word of Allah Most High supreme, forcing him to fight or invading his land...*"
2. In Islamic thinking, even offensive jihad—including "breaking [the infidels'] spine through all possible means"—is seen as something of an altruistic affair, for the good of the world.



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More to the point, the ends justify the means.

Taking these two points together—(1) Allah commands Muslims to wage jihad and (2) it is good for all concerned, a means to a glorious end, i.e., "making Allah's word supreme"—how can Muslims classify jihad as "terrorism," even when, from a non-Muslim perspective, it seems identical to the international definitions of terrorism that Idris himself delineated and agreed with?

In short, jihad is not terrorism simply because Allah says so—even if the two, back in the real world, are identical. In the words of Idris: "Now if the deeds of the jihad—including fighting the infidels and breaking their spine through all possible means—are permissible according to Sharia, *then it is impossible to define those acts as terrorism*."

Three final thoughts:

1. Next time you wonder why "moderate" Muslims rarely if ever condemn the terrorism habitually committed in the name of their religion, you'd do well to remember Idris' article and rationale.

2. Regarding the supposedly "controversial" question of what jihad *really* is, who do you think is more authoritative—a Sharia law instructor at the Islamic world's most prestigious university, writing in Arabic to fellow Muslims, or, say, a Karen Armstrong writing best-selling fluff pieces about a benign and "misunderstood" Islam to a naïve Western public?
3. Why was Idris' article left unreported? Imagine the international outrage that would spark if a Christian theologian wrote in the *New York Times*—which is what *Al Ahram* is equivalent to in Egypt—that "it is an obligation" for Christians to wage "holy war" on non-Christian infidels and "fight or invade his [non-Christian] land" to "make Jesus' word supreme"?

And so we come back full circle to the lamentable fact that, while Islam's commands are black and white, so easily ascertained and visible to all, the West still cannot accept reality—thanks in great part to its own endless array of liars, fools, and traitors.

Raymond Ibrahim, author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam's New War on Christians (Regnery, April, 2013) is a Middle East and Islam specialist, and a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Could the Kenya attack happen here? It did

Source: <http://nypost.com/2013/10/12/could-the-kenya-mall-attack-ever-happen-here-it-already-did/>

After Islamic gunmen attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, the collective reaction

CNN was typical: "Can it happen here? Yes, say security experts, but it hasn't."

News flash: it did.

On the evening of Feb. 12, 2007, a young Muslim man walked into the Trolley Square mall in Salt Lake City with a pistol-grip, 12-gauge shotgun and a 38-caliber revolver and opened fire on shoppers, killing five and wounding four others, including a pregnant woman.

Police say he "sought to kill as many people as possible." He had a backpack full of ammunition, enough firepower to massacre dozens of innocent people. But fortunately, an off-duty cop returned fire and

eventually, with the help of other police, put an end to the terrorist's life and grand plans.



from the US media was to speculate whether such terror could happen here, as if a jihadist assault on a mall inside America had never before been tried.



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Twice as many people were killed at the Utah mall than the Boston Marathon. Yet the attack garnered few national headlines.

Local media wrote it off as the act of a madman, parroting the quick conclusion of law enforcement.

Officially, the FBI declared the mass shooting was not an act of terrorism.

"We were unable to pin down any particular motive," said Tim Fuhman, then-special agent in charge of the bureau's field office in Salt Lake City. "Unfortunately, his motivations went to the grave with him."

But the FBI ignored much of the shooter's



background.

A Salt Lake City police officer inside the Trolley Square Mall Feb., 12, 2007, the night of the shooting. Photo: AP

The shooter was Sulejmen Talovic, an 18-year-old Bosnian immigrant named after Suleiman the Magnificent, the 16th-century jihadist-turned-sultan.

As early as 2004, police were called to Talovic's school after it was discovered that he was looking at Tek-9 semiautomatic firearms on the Internet and boasting that his "grandfather was in the jihad."

It was a reference to the 1990s holy war between Bosnian Muslims and Christian Serbs in which his grandfather was reportedly killed.

Apparently, Talovic had prepared for his own martyrdom. He told a friend before the attack

that "tomorrow is going to be the happiest day of my life, but it will happen only once."

"One interpretation of this statement is that Talovic was happy that he was going to be a shahid — that he would be committing jihad and go to paradise," according to a July 2, 2007, electronic communication from the Salt Lake City field office to the counterterrorism division of the FBI.

Before leaving for the mall, which was located just a few minutes from the mosque he attended, he showered and put on a necklace featuring a miniature Koran, a gift from his father.

Prior to his death, some witnesses overheard Talovic shouting "Allahu Akbar!" — or "Allah is greatest!" — a ritual cry of suicide terrorists.

Talovic was "described as religious," according to the FBI communiqué, marked "Secret." "He had attend the mosque regularly for Friday prayers."

That mosque was the Al-Noor Mosque, led by a Somali national. Some investigators suspect Talovic was radicalized there.

These details are buried in the more than 745 pages of investigative reports generated in the case by the FBI, the same agency that officially claims it found no evidence Talovic's religion was a factor.

"Clearly, he had some religious beliefs," Fuhman said, "but just because someone has religious beliefs doesn't mean anything is a



terrorist act."

No, but it strains credulity that Talovic wasn't animated by his faith. There



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was an abundance of clues he was motivated at least in part by jihadist impulses.

Yet the Islamic element was so efficiently scrubbed from the Trolley Square terrorist attack that Salt Lake charities and local Mormons helped raise funds for Talovic's family to prepare and ship their son's bullet-ridden body to Bosnia for an Islamic burial.

The willful blindness (to borrow a phrase from former World Trade Center bombing prosecutor Andy McCarthy) to this Islamic factor does not engender confidence that law enforcement can effectively glean and analyze intelligence from the Muslim and immigrant communities to disrupt copycat attacks on malls and other domestic soft targets.

Predictive intelligence analysis is what's needed. Yet in the aftermath of the Nairobi carnage wrought by al Qaeda's Somalia branch, Homeland Security has merely contacted shopping malls to encourage them to beef up security against "mass shooters."

The Mall of America, the biggest shopping mall in the country, may be a prime target for jihadists. It's less than 20 minutes from Minneapolis, which boasts a large Somali community where al Qaeda has recruited heavily.

Yet the same year Talovic went on his mall rampage, a Somali national with ties to al Qaeda was arrested for plotting to bomb a mall in Columbus, Ohio. Nuradin M. Abdi trained overseas for a military-style assault. He and a small al Qaeda cell planned to bring "death and destruction to Columbus."

It's plain that jihadists already have targeted America's easy-to-enter malls for attack, and are likely plotting an assault even more brutal than Nairobi, which terror experts believe was a "dry run" for a more spectacular event here at home. Question is, what are our willfully blind authorities really doing to stop them?

Nairobi attack puts spotlight on mall safety

Source: <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nairobi-attack-puts-spotlight-mall-safety>

Some malls around the world have been scrambling to add security guards to look for suspicious people following a deadly attack on a shopping center in Nairobi over the weekend. But for other malls, it's been business as usual. The mixed reactions by malls across the globe isn't unusual in an industry whose security

The disparity offers a glimpse of why any moves following the Nairobi incident to increase mall security in countries that have less strict procedures aren't likely to last: The industry continues to struggle with how to keep shoppers safe without scaring them away.

"No one wants, when you go shopping, to be strip searched, to be interviewed in a room by a security guard," said Simon Bennett, director, Civil Safety and Security Unit at the University of Leicester in England. "That might be acceptable in aviation, but it is not in commercial retail."

Security concerns come after 12 to 15 militants from the Somali Islamic extremist group al-Shabab, wielding grenades, took control of the upscale Westgate mall in Nairobi. Terrorists held Kenya security forces for four days, killing at least 67 civilians



efforts vary from unarmed guards in most shopping centers in the U.S. to metal detectors and bag searches in places like Israel to main entrances that resemble airport security lines in India.

and government troops and injuring 175 others.

The Kenyan government said Tuesday that the attackers were defeated, with several suspects killed



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or arrested. On Wednesday, FBI agents began fingerprint, DNA and ballistic analysis to help figure out the identities and nationalities of the victims and al-Shabab gunmen.

In the aftermath of the attack, security was tight at the Junction Mall in Nairobi. Two of three entry gates were locked shut. Cars were searched more carefully than usual, with guards looking in glove compartments. Two armed soldiers were stationed inside the mall and mall security guards who search patrons with metal detector wands at entry points said the soldiers had been deployed after the Westgate attack.

In the U.S., the International Council of Shopping Centers, a trade group of shopping centers representing about one third of retail space globally, said the U.S. government's Department of Homeland Security is reaching out to corporate security at all malls.

At the same time, the group said some of the malls in the U.S. and South Africa are beefing up private security personnel, while others are bringing in more off duty police officers. Mall of America, the biggest U.S. mall, added extra uniformed security officers and stepped up other measures, but officials at the Bloomington, Minn.-based mall declined to elaborate. "We will ... remain vigilant as we always do in similar situations," said Dan Jasper, a mall spokesman.

In general, U.S. malls focus on reacting to a shooting more than preventing one. Malls depend on private security personnel, most of whom don't carry guns, though they do work with local police. And while they're trained to look for suspicious behavior and report that to authorities, they're discouraged from intervening.

"Shoppers at this point perhaps don't have an appetite for extraordinary measures," said Kenneth Hamilton, executive vice president of IPC International, the largest provider of shopping center security of malls in the U.S.

Indeed, heightened security hasn't been welcomed in U.S. malls. The International Council of Shopping Centers spent \$2 million to develop a terrorism training program after the Sept. 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. But surveys conducted by the group following the attacks show that people don't want to be subjected to metal detectors and bag searches at malls.

Jeff Wohl, 45, of Atlanta, said Tuesday that while he's horrified by the Nairobi attack, he

doesn't want to go through bag checks at malls. "Any public gathering ... can become a target," he said. "But you have to live your life."

U.S. malls have made changes to their security strategies following attacks. A shooting on Dec. 5, 2007 at the Westroads Mall in Omaha, Neb., for instance, was an impetus for malls to change how they deal with shooters themselves. After a 19-year-old man shot and killed eight people and injured five others before taking his own life, malls began working with Homeland Security on a plan to have the first responders from the police department enter the building to stop the shooter and free those who are trapped rather than wait for backup.

Many mall operators now also have evacuation drills once or twice a year that focus on lockdown situations. A growing number of malls also use cameras that scan license plates in parking lots. And many malls use technology that enables them to share three-dimensional virtual blue prints of their layout with law enforcement.

The reaction to attacks can be more muted in other parts of the world. In China and Hong Kong, malls are operating normally following the Nairobi attack, typically monitored by closed-circuit cameras and with unarmed private security guards stationed throughout.

"We review our security system and conduct emergency drills regularly to ensure that we are ready to respond to any breach of security swiftly and effectively," said Elizabeth Kok, Retail Portfolio Director at Swire Properties Ltd., which operates three upscale malls in Hong Kong.

At the busy PPR shopping mall in downtown Shanghai, a security guard who gave only his surname, Zhang, said he saw no need for any heightened security. "I can say that the possibility of the same kind of thing happening here is almost zero," he said. "Everyone knows that China prohibits guns, and Shanghai is such a safe city."

In Australia, a similar sentiment was expressed. Tobias Feakin, senior analyst for national security at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said malls in Australia would likely make a point of ensuring their security staff will operate on a heightened level of awareness in light of the attacks.

But given the relatively low risk of terrorism in Australia, it's unlikely they'll make major security changes.




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Meanwhile, Michael Green, chief executive of the British Council of Shopping Centers, a mall trade group, said that they work closely with police forces like Scotland Yard and would

respond to warnings with appropriate measures. But they don't want to make malls like prisons.

"We have to make them welcoming," he said.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Measures for shopping malls, military bases, embassies abroad, school shootings etc – **AFTER** a major incident happens somewhere in the world! What about pre-emptive measures???



Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent

Source: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf#

As of August 2013, AQI has regrouped, regained capabilities, and expanded into areas from which it was expelled during the surge. AQI in 2013 is an extremely vigorous, resilient, and capable organization that can operate from Basra to coastal Syria. This paper traces AQI's revival in Iraq since July 2012—when the organization launched a year-long operation they named the “Breaking the Walls” campaign—its ramifications, how Syria is part of the plan and why its reemergence is a threat to U.S. interests and national security.



BACKGROUND REPORT

Al-Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya

On Saturday, Sept. 21, gunmen attacked Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. After a four-day standoff, Kenyan officials indicated that the site of the attack was secured by armed forces on Tuesday evening, Sept. 24. Media sources report that Somali militant organization al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the attack, and that the attack has resulted in hundreds of casualties, including more than 60 deaths as of Sept. 25. START has developed this background report highlighting attacks attributed to al-Shabaab, terrorism in Kenya, and extended attacks involving hostages in barricade situations.

Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabKenya_Sept2013.pdf?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=66342c84ad-Boston+Marathon+Background+Report&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-66342c84ad-14081393

How Peru could become America's next drug war debacle

Source: http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/nationworld/report/101513_peru_drugs/how-peru-could-become-americas-next-drug-war-debacle/

For decades, locals in this isolated Andean valley have cultivated copious quantities of coca, the small bush at the heart of Washington's “war on drugs.” Untroubled by the level of narco-violence that's roiled Mexico and Colombia, and beyond the

reach of the Peruvian government, many poor farmers here have come to depend on coca as their only source of cash.

No wonder that, according to United Nations data, more coca now grows in the Valley of the Apurimac and Ene



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Rivers (VRAE by its Spanish initials) than any other region on the planet.

But that's about to change — and many here are predicting strife.

Peru's president, Ollanta Humala, has vowed to finally tame and control the VRAE. A key



part of that strategy will be forced coca eradication — sending in heavily armed police to uproot the plants by hand.

His anti-drug czar, Carmen Masias, is keeping mum about the precise dates, but the move is widely expected within the next 12 months.

Already, the government is preparing to expropriate more than 1,100 acres of farmland on the valley floor to build a new military airbase, and weathering attacks from the feared Shining Path rebels to pave the road into the VRAE.

Driven by a particularly savage interpretation of China's Maoist revolution, the Shining Path launched a civil war in the 1980s and early '90s that cost 70,000 lives.

Since then, the insurgents have been cornered into the far reaches of the VRAE, from where they still launch occasional attacks, killing more than 100 police and soldiers in and around the valley since 2008.

"There will be serious conflict," says Fredy Linares, 48, from the village of Otari. He stands to lose the family farm, which his father cleared from virgin forest three decades ago.

"There will be another guerrilla group. Not like Shining Path but a new one. No one is going to put up with having their crops destroyed. Of course, people are going to rise up."

Linares does not speak of violence lightly.

In the early 1990s, at the height of the bloody internal conflict, he was forced to flee the

VRAE for several years after speaking out against the Shining Path.

The group had long been terrorizing the valley but the final straw for Linares came after it murdered two of his neighbors — one of them for refusing to cut down a mango tree partially blocking a dirt track used by the rebels.

Yet Linares' sense of grievance now is heightened by the fact that he and the other farmers who will lose some of the VRAE's best land to make way for the airbase do not even grow coca.

But for others, it's all about hanging on to that controversial crop that never fails to put food on the table.

"We don't know what we will do if they destroy our coca," Glicerio Rojas, a 49-year-old farmer from the village of Los Angeles, says, as he contemplates the possibility of losing the harvest that every three

months keeps him, his wife and their six children afloat. "What am I supposed to feed them? We are just farmers. We don't make [cocaine] paste or cocaine."

No one disputes that coca has left most of the region's farmers trapped in a vicious circle of poverty and dependence on the drug traffickers.

Masias regularly reiterates the point, while also insisting the government has to convince the farmers that "the costs of illegality are tremendous."

"Eradication on its own does not work," she told GlobalPost. "Neither does development on its own. There has to be eradication and development."

Some of the resources for that policy will be coming from Washington. The Humala administration is a close ally of the United States and has been keen to be seen as cooperating in the so-called war on drugs.

In emails, the US Embassy in Lima said it was this year handing Peru \$68 million for counternarcotics operations and \$32 million for alternative development, including support for testing new crops and increasing their yields. Combined that is almost double the 2012 total of \$55 million.

But after decades of being abandoned, as locals see it, by one government after another in the faraway capital Lima, few in this



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troubled, spectacular valley are holding their breath for meaningful official help.

Meanwhile, residents view the increasingly present police and army with a blend of fear and contempt.

Many locals believe they were the ones — rather than the security forces—who stopped a rampant Shining Path in its tracks back in the 1990s.

Unable to take any more bullying and murder from the rebels, villagers here and across the Peruvian Andes and Amazon organized into armed vigilante groups known as “self-defense committees.”

The perception of ineptitude by law enforcement and the military has only been heightened by recent disastrous operations.

In one episode near the VRAE in 2012, the body of a 9-year-old girl was found hidden in a ditch, after apparently being inadvertently killed by security forces as they chased suspected Shining Path members.

Several months earlier, the father of a policeman murdered in a rebel ambush spent several days in the jungle, retrieving his son's body, after it was abandoned by his fellow officers.

The US appears well aware of the challenges in bringing its Peruvian partners up to speed.

The State Department's counternarcotics goals for Peru include combating “corruption, especially within the Peruvian National Police force,” and building “institutional capability to investigate and prosecute” drug kingpins, the US government says.

Both the police and Peru's Defense Ministry failed to respond to GlobalPost's requests for interviews with commanding officers in the VRAE.

“As Peruvians we support the armed forces and the US to fight the narco-terrorists, but we have never given permission for this war to happen on our land,” says Kecizate Atahualpa Capac, an indigenous Ashaninka activist from Otari, worried about the impending conflict.

But for others here, the challenge remains just keeping a roof over their heads and food on the table.

And without government support to develop alternative crops or increase yields from coffee and cacao, coca has proven the only reliable way of doing that in the VRAE.

Asked if he would grow other crops if they could match coca's returns, Rojas, the farmer, responds: “Of course! We would eradicate ourselves. We wouldn't need the army or police to do it. It would be magnificent.”

Africa - The New Wahabi Terrorist Training Ground

Source: <http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=471085>

Last year, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb did something no other modern terrorist group has: conquered a broad swath of a sovereign country—Mali. Since then, despite French intervention, northern Mali has become a jihadist front, with Islamist militants flowing in from around the world. While America remains focused on threats from the Middle East and South Asia, the new face of terror is likely to be African.

Gao, the largest city in northern Mali, is a place



of extremes. It's a sprawl of one- and two-story mud-brick houses that lack power lines and

running water, but it's also home to the garish, McMansion-style estates of Cocainebougou, or “Cocaine Town,” a deserted neighborhood that once belonged to Arab drug lords who controlled the region's smuggling routes for hashish and cocaine but fled, fearing reprisals from local citizens who blamed them for the Wahabi invasion. The city has few high schools and no universities, but many of Mali's leading guitarists and percussionists learned their craft in Gao's decades-old youth orchestras; it is a proudly secular city that also houses the Tomb of Askia, one of the oldest mosques in Africa,



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built in the 15th century to honor a regional ruler. Gao was for centuries best known as the capital of the ancient Songhai Empire, which once controlled a region larger than present-day Mali. In the summer of last year, an al-Qaeda affiliate known as AQIM, for “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” took over Gao and made it the capital of the rump state the group created after forcing the Malian army out of the north. Months earlier, the Tuareg, a separatist minority long bent on independence, had laid the groundwork for AQIM and its Wahabi allies when they captured the city. When I visited northern Mali in March of this year, a black-metal billboard the extremists had erected on the main road leading into the city was still welcoming visitors to the “Islamic City of Gao.”

French air and ground forces reconquered the north this past January, bringing the region back under the nominal control of Mali’s fragile central government. Camouflage pickup trucks full of Malian soldiers now rumble down Gao’s otherwise empty streets, and a handful of small bars and restaurants have reopened. Castel and other Malian beers, strictly forbidden under the Islamists, are freely available, though they’re usually served warm because of the city’s frequent power outages. I walked through the main bazaar one afternoon with Baba Douglass, an affable, rotund man who works as a top adviser to Gao’s mayor, Sadou Diallo. Teenagers hawked Nokia cellphones and women in brightly colored blue dresses and head scarves peddled warm bread and cake, calling out prices as we passed. Douglass pointed to a pair of canary-yellow bulldozers looming over a fenced-off expanse of dirt and stone. “That’s where the new central market building is going,” he told me. “If things stay quiet, it will be open by the end of the year.”

That’s a big if. Mali’s central government now runs Gao, but many locals believe that the jihadists who controlled the city last year have melted away into the surrounding countryside, where they are waiting out the French. France launched its military campaign on January 11 with a series of air strikes on insurgent targets. Thousands of French ground troops poured into the country later that month and began pushing north. At the peak of the campaign, more than 4,000 French soldiers were in Mali, but the French military has announced plans to withdraw about 3,000 of them by the end of the year. Paris will pull out the remaining troops

next year, leaving behind an unspecified number of special forces and trainers to mentor the Malian security forces, and will also support a new United Nations peacekeeping force of 12,600 troops drawn from other African countries. But many ordinary Malians still fear that their country’s armed forces won’t be able to fill the void.

After saying goodbye to Douglass, I made my way through the remains of a walled compound that once housed the mayor’s offices. About a dozen militants had snuck in days before and lobbed grenades at a convoy of passing Malian military vehicles, kicking off a fierce gun battle that raged for more than seven hours. French forces relieved the overmatched Malian soldiers and eventually killed all the attackers, but the fighting left the compound in ruins, two of its yellow walls reduced to piles of scorched concrete and rebar. The ground was littered with spent cartridges, scraps of clothing, and razor-sharp shrapnel. The compound’s custodian, Hasan Haidara, led me into a garage and pointed to a splotch on the floor that looked like brown paint. “Blood from one of the jihadis,” he told me. Haidara, who’d been trapped in the compound during the attack, said several of the fighters were Arabs. “They were not from Mali,” he said emphatically. “They were not from here.”

I heard a similar refrain from an array of Malian and American security officials. Gao’s central jail is housed in a defunct two-story health clinic a short drive from the mayor’s compound. When I visited, the warden, Captain Ballo Banfa, told me that many of his prisoners had come from Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, and other neighboring African countries. Captain Ibrahim Sanogo, an intelligence officer at a nearby Malian military base, told me that he’d listened in on radio conversations between rebels speaking English, Fulani, and Hausa, three of the primary languages of neighboring Nigeria, and personally interrogated captured fighters from Burkina Faso and Chad. France captured two of its own citizens allegedly fighting alongside the Islamists in northern Mali and is holding them on terrorism charges. U.S. officials say foreign fighters from across Africa have been flowing into Mali to earn their jihadist bona fides and gain tactical experience battling a well-armed Western military. “Northern Mali has become a jihad front,” said a U.S. official familiar with the region, who



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spoke on condition of anonymity. “People think of northern Mali like they thought of Chechnya in the late ’90s—as someplace where you can go and do your part to restore the caliphate.”

The foreign militants battling Malian and French troops across northern Mali are part of a little-noticed but hugely important shift. American policy makers have long treated the Middle East and South Asia as the main battlegrounds of the war on terror, but those regions are quickly being joined by Africa, which is now home to some of the largest and most active Wahabi militias in the world. The Islamist extremist group Boko Haram used a massive car bomb to demolish a UN compound in Nigeria in 2011, leaving at least 23 people dead, and has killed hundreds of other Nigerian citizens and security personnel over the past two years as it has fought to impose Sharia law in the oil-rich state. The Somali militia known as al-Shabaab has carried out suicide bombings throughout the beleaguered capital of Mogadishu and in neighboring countries like Uganda. And the latest of the series was in Kenya’s Shopping Mall where at least 85 People were Killed by the terrorist of the Al Shabab .Radicalized Africans have been involved in terror plots in the continental United States, taking advantage of the fact that they typically attract less scrutiny than Arabs or Pakistanis. The militant who tried to down a packed Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, for instance, was a Nigerian named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

The Islamist groups fighting in Mali pose a particularly dangerous threat. AQIM has already accomplished something no other al-Qaeda franchise has ever been able to pull off: conquering and governing a broad swath of a sovereign country, then using it as a base to plot sophisticated attacks outside its borders. Libyan fighters trained by AQIM took part in last September’s attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, according to another U.S. official familiar with the region, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, at the time the top al-Qaeda commander in northern Mali, also helped the al-Qaeda affiliate in Algeria organize the conquest of a sprawling natural-gas facility there earlier this year; at least 37 hostages, including three Americans, were

killed when Algerian special forces retook the compound. In late May, Islamist fighters loyal to Belmokhtar attacked a French-owned uranium mine in northern Niger and a nearby army outpost, killing nearly two dozen Nigerian soldiers. Belmokhtar, who is still at large, and AQIM have publicly promised to carry out attacks in France in retaliation for the country’s intervention in northern Mali.

That is far from an empty threat. Mary Beth Leonard, the American ambassador to Mali, told me during a March interview in her tidy embassy office, on a small, tree-lined street in the capital city of Bamako, that the U.S. believes a Malian terror attack in Europe is a real possibility. Leonard noted that a significant number of Malians live within France’s borders, which means Malian radicals loyal to Belmokhtar or other Islamist commanders could potentially evade scrutiny amid the flow of Africans traveling between the two countries. “The most proximate fear is that the threat could reach the European homeland,” Leonard told me. Citizens of any European Union country can travel to other EU nations without a visa, and Leonard worries that Malian jihadists with French passports could spread across the continent to strike European targets, as well as American embassies, schools, and military bases.

American officials also fear that Mali’s 10 months as a de facto Wahabi state allowed Belmokhtar and other local militants to operate rudimentary training camps where radicals from across Africa could train alongside one another and share tactics for building stronger bombs and mounting more-effective ambushes and attacks. A U.S. official who closely monitors Mali told me that Boko Haram had sent new recruits from Nigeria into Mali to improve their battlefield skills. Many of those hardened fighters have since returned, bolstering Boko Haram’s ranks as it intensifies its fight against the regime of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan in an effort to establish Sharia law. Amanda Dory, the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa, told me that Islamists from countries like Tunisia and Algeria have also started returning home from Mali, taking their new experience fighting Western militaries with them.

Fears about Africa’s emergence as a terror haven are unlikely to subside anytime soon. Africa’s Islamists are



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able to take advantage of the fact that many of the continent's countries have porous borders; weak and corrupt central governments; undertrained and underequipped militaries; flourishing drug trades that provide a steady source of income; and vast, lawless spaces that are so large—and so far away from the eyes of the World and where the Saudi and US sponsored terrorist can be Nurtured , and then can be used as a Private Mercenaries around the World. Those are precisely the reasons (along with a trove of Libyan weapons) Islamists were able to conquer northern Mali and use it as a base for planning the strikes on the uranium mine in Niger and the natural-gas plant in Algeria. The reasons given by the Analyst for all these Terrorist training camps is that the Chinese have already put a strong foot hold in the African region and now the US and the European who could not compete with the Chinese Economic Invasion in the African Continent , so the future where The Economic growth is expected and the whole of Africa which is already rich in resources , and was previously Invaded by the different European Countries , and now are still under their Influence , although Majority of the African Nations which are already Independent states , but due to their Weak Governments and Corrupt Practices they are easily available for any type of Crime , as Now to check the Chinese Economic Growth & Influence in the African Continent . The CIA has Planned another 9/11 to give a reason for the US forces to Officially Invade Africa as they did in Libya , where they with the help of their already trained terrorist of Al Qaeda , under different Groups will facilitate them in conquering and letting them check the Chinese Economic Invasion and to get hold of the Mineral rich African Treasures. These are the reasons American officials worry that a successful terror attack in the U.S. or Europe planned in Africa and carried out by African extremists is only a matter of time. The new face of militant Islam, in other words, is likely to be an African one. Mali's fall is a story of a decade of American Involvement as the CIA created Al Qaeda , which was led by the Listed Agent of CIA , Osama Bin Laden also started his journey from the African Continent

President Obama nodded to those dangers in May in a major speech on the future of the war on terror. "What we've seen is the emergence of various al-Qaeda affiliates," he said. "From

Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse." Still, Obama cautioned that he wanted U.S. troops to focus on helping other countries battle the militants operating inside their borders, not to take unilateral action against the extremists. That approach would be in keeping with Washington's recent policy toward the region. Successive presidential administrations failed to take stronger action against the militants who eventually conquered northern Mali, for three main reasons: bitter bureaucratic infighting between the Pentagon and the State Department; a mistaken belief that Washington's putative Malian allies were committed to cracking down on their country's militants; and a fundamental misreading of how much ordinary Malians had come to despise Amadou Toumani Touré.

Touré, a former army officer, took power in 1991 after helping oust the country's then-president, Moussa Traoré, and won international acclaim for leading a successful effort to draft a new constitution and clear the way for nationwide elections. Touré, who is universally known as ATT, transferred control of the country to Mali's first freely elected leader in 1992 and resumed his military career. He put himself forward as a presidential candidate in 2002, after retiring from the army, and was elected by a wide margin. He handily won reelection in 2007 and later promised to step down at the end of his second term, as mandated by the constitution he had helped write. The U.S., which saw Touré as a rare African leader with a genuine commitment to democracy, showered Mali with \$728 million in aid, beginning in 2008 and continuing until its rules for providing aid prevented it from doing so.

That was on March 22, 2012, when ATT was ousted in a military coup, just weeks before his second and final term was slated to end. The Touré government had become wildly unpopular because of its blatant corruption, with the president's relatives and political allies building massive mansions in Bamako while buying property in Dubai and other foreign cities, according to Malian press reports and a senior Malian lawmaker. Malian officials say that Touré also turned a blind eye to the country's burgeoning drug trade, apparently concluding—mistakenly—that allowing the north to reap tens of millions in drug proceeds each year



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could prevent another uprising by members of the country's independence-minded Tuareg minority. "The politicians who were close to ATT didn't even try to hide all the money they were stealing," Siaka Traoré, the deputy head

of the Malian parliament's defense committee, told me. "A colleague of mine built a house in the north that was so big, even Barack Obama couldn't afford a house like it."

Charity cash 'going to Syrian terror groups'

By Christopher Hope

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10357537/Charity-cash-going-to-Syrian-terror-groups.html>



Syrian refugee children walk in the Bab al-Salam refugee camp in Syria's northern city of Azaz Photo: GETTY IMAGES

People giving money to help millions of refugees from the civil war in Syria are inadvertently supporting terrorism, the charity watchdog has warned.

Some of their cash was "undoubtedly" going to extremist groups, said William Shawcross, the chairman of the Charity Commission.

Conditions on the ground in the midst of conflict made it difficult or impossible for charities to know where aid ended up, he said.

The Disasters Emergency Committee, which represents 14 of Britain's biggest charities, has raised £20million since the launch of its Syria Crisis Appeal in March. Its members include the British Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children.

But it said it was unable to guarantee that no cash was falling into the hands of terrorists.

The Charity Commission is so concerned that it has issued guidance to fund-raising bodies.

"A lot of money is raised that goes to Syria, some of it undoubtedly goes to extremist groups ... It is very hard for all organisations to determine that," Mr Shawcross said.

The commission said it was up to charity trustees to ensure that donors' generosity, intended to benefit those in need, was not diverted to terrorists.

"There is a risk that funds raised in the name of 'charity' generally or under the name of a specific charity are misused to support terrorist activities, with or without the charity's knowledge," the commission said.

It warned that "individuals supporting terrorist activity might also claim to work for a charity and trade on its name and legitimacy to gain access to a region or community".

Peter Clarke, a former head of anti-terrorism at the Metropolitan Police who sits on the board of the commission, said that donations could fall into the wrong hands once



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the money arrived in Syria or surrounding countries.

“Once you get into these very difficult, dangerous areas it is hugely difficult for charities to track the final destination of their funds,” he told The Telegraph.

“It is one of these ‘fog of war’ issues where stuff can be diverted.”

He said it was also possible for terrorists to set up fake charities in donor countries to attract funds.

“It is perfectly feasible for charities to be established as a sort of cover. We have not seen clear evidence of that yet,” Mr Clarke said.

“You can think of a host of different ways in which people giving money with the best possible intentions could find that it has been misappropriated.”

He added: “We know there is some abuse of charities by extremist terrorist organisations but the likelihood is the full extent of this will never be known.

“What we have got to do is try to stop as much of it as we possibly can.”

Three Conservative MPs, who sit on a Commons committee that monitors the work of charities, said they were concerned.

“Such is the seriousness of these claims by the Charity Commission that intelligence officials must urgently review this area and the tactics that terrorist organisations are using to finance their activities,” said Priti Patel.

Robert Halfon said: “It is shocking to find that some charitable aid is being diverted to terrorists in Syria.

“No charity should give out money, unless it can be really sure that money really goes to help those most in need, rather than arming extremists.”

Charlie Elphicke added: “There still needs to be greater scrutiny at home by the Charity

Commission on charities who have links to radical, extremist and even terrorist groups.”

A spokesman for the Charity Commission stressed that it had no estimates for how much donors’ money might be going to extremists.

She said: “Charities providing humanitarian aid are themselves aware of the risk that their funds may be diverted and that their staff and local partners will be working in areas where militant groups and in some cases those who support terrorist activities operate. Their work is not easy.”

A spokesman for the Disasters Emergency Committee said: “It is never possible to entirely eliminate such risks if you wish to help those in greatest need but DEC members take all reasonable steps to avoid, uncover and minimise such losses.

“The DEC and its member agencies do not fund or provide support to political organisations or armed groups.

“In places like Syria member agencies will have specific policies and procedures in place, based on decades of operational experience and in compliance with UK legal requirements, to ensure they prevent resources reaching these groups.

“Member agencies’ reporting to the DEC includes information about any losses or fraud involving DEC funds and we have not received such information regarding any DEC Syria Crisis Appeal funds.”

The committee said that £9.6million had been spent by the charities so far and that £10.4million was “given directly to our member agencies”.

In the first three months after the launch of the appeal 129,000 people received aid funded by the DEC and eight out of 10 of those were inside Syria.

Christopher Hope joined The Daily Telegraph in October 2003. He is now its Senior Political Correspondent, writing for the newspaper. He is also the 2013 Chairman of the Parliamentary Press Gallery.

Is elephant ivory helping to fund al-Shabab?

Source: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11136376

Al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group that killed dozens of people last month in a bloody four-day siege of the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, is deriving funds for its terror

campaigns from elephant poaching in Kenya and elsewhere, activists and conservationists claim.



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The Elephant Action League, which has dubbed ivory the white gold of jihad, said that elephant poaching and the trafficking of ivory is fuelling conflict in Africa by helping groups such as al-Shabaab to mount ever more deadly attacks.



The illicit ivory trade funds up to 40 per cent of the cost of al-Shabaab's army of 5000 people, according to Andrea Crosta, a director of the league and co-author of a 2011 report into the links between poaching and terror groups.

The spotlight on al-Shabaab's funding is more intense than ever after the most deadly terror attack on Kenyan soil since the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi that killed more than 200 people.

The Westgate siege has propelled the affiliate of al-Qaeda to international attention. The group has warned that the slaughter, in which at least 67 people died, is just the premiere of Act One and continues to demand that Kenya pull its troops out of Somalia.

The poaching of elephants for their tusks has driven the animal in some countries - such as Sierra Leone and Senegal - to the point of extinction. More than 30,000 elephants were slaughtered in Africa last year alone, 382 of them in Kenya.

Armed with AK-47 machine guns, and with bows and arrows that are sometimes poisoned, poachers slip unnoticed past the few rangers who patrol the reserves and monitor the elephants.

Often, they target the calves first in the knowledge that the older elephants will bunch up to try to protect them. Then they kill the others. It takes several bullets to bring down such sizeable mammals, and the elephants usually die after immense suffering. The poachers hack off most of the elephant's head to get at the tusks.

Not since the slaughter of the 1980s, which prompted the introduction of an international ban on the commercial trade of ivory, has the situation been so desperate, say conservationists. In less than 30 years, Kenya's elephant population has plunged from 167,000 to only 35,000. Armed gangs act with impunity, and officials are paid off all along the way. In the event that poachers are caught and brought to justice, they escape with trivial fines or short custodial sentences.

In relative terms, the rewards for everyone involved are huge. The poachers, who run the biggest risks, earn US\$50-US\$100 (\$60-\$120) a kg, and the price increases as the ivory moves up the chain. By the time it reaches its final market, which in most cases is China, it can fetch around US\$3000 a kg.

Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently unveiled a US\$80 million plan by conservation groups and African governments to fight poaching, targeting the measures from the poachers to a reduction in demand for ivory.

2 dead, 2 wounded in Nevada middle school shooting, authorities say

Source: http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/21/21064166-2-dead-2-wounded-in-nevada-middle-school-shooting-authorities-say?lite

Two people were killed and two wounded Monday in a shooting at a Nevada middle school, authorities said. A hospital said that it

was treating two boys in critical condition with apparent gunshot wounds.



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A student told the Reno Gazette-Journal newspaper that the shooter was a student, wearing a Sparks Middle School uniform, and shot a teacher after a teacher told him to put



the gun down.

“The teacher fell and everybody ran away,” said the student who spoke to the newspaper, Kyle Nucum. “We ran across the field to get somewhere safe, and while we were running we heard about four or five more gunshots.”

Police said that the suspect had been “neutralized.” It was not clear whether the shooter was one of the two dead.

The two boys were being treated at Renown Regional Hospital, said Angela Rambo, a spokeswoman.

Police urged parents to stay away from the school. They told the parents to go to a nearby school to pick up their children. KRNv, the NBC affiliate in Reno, reported that the school had been cleared, citing officials on the scene.

A police dispatcher told The Associated Press that the call came in at 7:16 a.m.

Gov. Brian Sandoval said that he was receiving



Sparks Middle School shooting on Oct. 21, that

regular updates and was “deeply saddened” to learn of the shooting.



In 2006, a boy using his father’s .38-caliber pistol opened fire at another Reno-area middle school and wounded a boy and girl, both 14, the newspaper said. A gym teacher was honored later for ending the episode by telling the boy to drop the gun and bear-hugging him.

James Scott Newman, 14 at the time of that shooting,

left two people dead and two in critical condition in Sparks, Nev.

pleaded guilty to battery with a deadly weapon and got house arrest.



Norway issues global alert for Syria-bound teenage sisters

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/21/norway-global-alert-syria-bound-teenage-sisters>

Police and security officials in Norway have issued an international alert for two teenage sisters who disappeared from their home near Oslo and are believed to have travelled to Syria to assist Islamist forces.

The pair, aged 16 and 19, disappeared late last week, leaving a message for their family saying Muslims in Syria were being "attacked from all directions" and they must do something.

Norwegian police say they were last spotted near Turkey's border with Syria.

The family of the teenagers, who have not been identified by officials, say they had no idea of the plan. At the time they are thought to have begun the journey their parents believed the younger sister was at school and the elder sister was with a boyfriend.

Officials say they do not know if the pair hope to assist with humanitarian efforts or actively join in the fighting. "There are a number of possible theories about why they might have gone, but we don't have a specific one at the moment," Nina Karstensen Bjørlo from the Asker and Bærum police district told the Guardian.

"We have talked to the family every day, and they have given us a lot of information, but we don't want to repeat any of it publicly."

Norwegian officials, who said last week that up to 40 Norwegian nationals were believed to be fighting in Syria, are not identifying the girls, from a family of Somali origin who moved to Norway in 2000. According to the Verdens Gang newspaper, which talked to relatives, the family was not particularly religious but the elder sister appeared to have been radicalised by outsiders and had rows with her mother over wanting to wear the niqab.

The paper reported that the mother first became worried last Thursday afternoon when the sisters failed to return home as planned. Later that evening the family received a text message from the daughters saying they should check an email account. The message said they had decided to help Syria's Muslim population "the only way we really can, by being with them in their sufferings and joys". They added: "It is no longer enough to sit at

home and send money. With this in mind we have decided to travel to Syria and help any way we can."

The Norwegian police issued an alert and have informed Interpol. Karstensen Bjørlo said detectives knew how the teenagers had travelled but did not want to reveal details.

"We believe they are trying to get from Turkey into Syria. They have been seen near the border with Syria."

A spokesman at Norway's ministry of foreign affairs said the government was trying to find the sisters: "We've received a request from the family of the two girls. The family is concerned that they're trying to make their way to Syria and we are assisting the family in their effort to contact the girls, to get hold of them."

According to Verdens Gang, the family live in a small town in Askershus county near Oslo, which it did not name. The teenagers' brother told the paper that the family did not know if they had received help to travel, and believed they may have saved up the money to travel. The sisters have not been in contact with the family since Thursday night. Their father has gone to Turkey to look for them.

A relatively large number of foreign nationals are believed to have gone to Syria to fight. Norway's security agency, the PST, said last week it estimated that 30-40 people had left the country for Syria.

A security expert who works in the region and asked not to be named said it was possible the sisters had been helped by increasingly organised Islamist networks bringing foreigners to assist militants in Syria, with many having been raised in the west. "There is an active recruitment effort under way that is financing and bringing people from all over the world to Syria," he said.

Last week, reports identified one of the attackers who killed at least 67 people at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi as a 23-year-old Norwegian citizen of Somali origin. Slightly more than 2% of Norway's 5 million-strong population comes from Muslim backgrounds, the largest number with origins in Pakistan.





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Explosion strikes luxury hotel in Burma

Source: <http://www.counterintelligence.com/news/explosion-strikes-luxury-hotel-in-burma>

A small bomb struck one of the most prestigious hotels in Burma's main city Rangoon just before midnight on Monday (Oct 21st), injuring a 43-year-old American woman. The blast was one of a string of unexplained



explosions to hit the country in recent days.

An explosion that struck one of the most prestigious hotels in Myanmar's main city was caused by a small, homemade time bomb, police said Tuesday.

Officer Myint Htwe said three suspects have been detained in relation to the blast, which went off just before midnight Monday at the Traders Hotel in the heart of Yangon, wounding a 43-year-old American woman as it ripped apart her 9th floor room.

Her husband and two young children were unharmed.

It was one in a series of unexplained explosions to hit the country in recent days, resulting in several injuries, the most recent occurring in Mandalay region before dawn Tuesday.

Small bombings occurred frequently when Myanmar was under 50 years of brutal military rule, most often blamed on armed exiled groups or ethnic rebels. But they have become rare since the nominally civilian government of President Thein Sein, a former army general, took office two years ago and started implementing a series of major political and economic reforms.

His spokesman, Ye Htut, told Radio Free Asia the incidents may be aimed at smearing the country's image.

"I think that the explosions may have been timed to coincide with Myanmar becoming the chair of ASEAN," he told RFA Myanmar's service, referring to the regional grouping.

Myanmar is also preparing to host the Southeast Asian Games, the region's largest sports event, after a 44-year hiatus, he noted.

"Someone or some organization" wants to "make the international community misunderstand the situation of stability and peace in Myanmar," he said.

The explosion at the 22-story Trader's Hotel, located in the heart of the country's commercial capital, blew out a window in the guest's 9th floor room, shooting shards of thick glass more than 30 meters (yards) into the street, but there were no other visible signs of damage to the exterior of the building.

The device apparently went off in her bathroom, scattering towels, toiletries and a red purse across the entrance way floor. A chair was overturned and part of the wooden



wardrobe lifted off its hinges and lying on the ground.

The American woman was slightly injured – witnesses saw blood on her arm and below her waist as she was escorted through the lobby by her husband – and taken to a Yangon hospital.



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“Our consular officers in Rangoon (Yangon) have visited the U.S. citizen and are providing appropriate consular assistance,” said Sarah Hutchison, the U.S. Embassy press officer, refusing further comment due to privacy considerations.

A dozen police and heavily armed soldiers with a sniffer dog entered the glitzy hotel soon after the explosion. Later, many of them crowded into the destroyed room, blocked off with yellow security tape, to inspect the damage.

Others carrying assault rifles and wearing bullet proof vests strolled through the main lobby.

Traders' general manager Phillip Couvaras said in a statement that the hotel, part of the Shangri-La group, was working with authorities to investigate what happened.

But “because this is an active police investigation we cannot comment further at this time,” he said. “The safety of our guests and staff are our highest priority and we are obviously monitoring the situation.”

The country has undergone rapid change since 2011, but many activists and rights groups have complained that country is still far from free, and dissent is frequently stifled despite reforms that have liberalized the economy and the political sphere.

Censorship has been eased and hundreds of political prisoners released.

Thein Sein's government has also struggled both to end a civil war with ethnic Kachin rebels in the north, and curb a rising wave of anti-Muslim violence that has killed hundreds of minority Muslims and displaced nearly 150,000 more in the predominantly Buddhist country since last year.

Unidentified assailants have planted several homemade bombs in and around Yangon in recent days, reportedly killing two people and injuring three others.

The first bomb reportedly went off Friday at a guesthouse in Taungoo, a town 200 kilometers (125 miles) from Yangon, according to the independent media outlet, the Democratic Voice of Burma. It said two people were killed, but those casualties could not immediately be confirmed.

On Sunday, two other homemade bombs went off in Yangon.

The explosions Tuesday occurred at 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. in Sagain, in Mandalay region. No further details were available.

Police called on the public to be vigilant and report any suspicious packages found at bus or train stations, or at the seaport.



New smartphone app alerts you if satellites are watching!

Source: <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/new-smartphone-app-alerts-you-if-satellites-are-watching/1185345/>

A new smartphone app that tells you when and what imaging spacecraft might be watching you has been developed in the US.

The app, SpyMeSat, provides notifications when spy satellites and unclassified imaging satellites are zooming above your head and may be taking your picture.

All of the imaging satellites in SpyMeSat are in low-Earth orbit at an altitude of about 805 kilometres, SPACE.com reported.

Enabled SpyMeSat satellites include such zoom-lens notables as GeoEye, the French space agency's SPOT-5, India's CartoSat-2A, DigitalGlobe's WorldView satellites and Canada's RADARSAT-2.

"I actually got the idea for the app from talking to friends outside the aerospace industry who were always very interested in space and satellites and imaging from space. This app answers those questions in a fun and interactive way," said Alex Herz, president of Orbit Logic in Greenbelt, Maryland which developed the app.

The app uses available public information about



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
commercial and international imaging satellites. It also uses orbit data from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

SpyMeSat does not include all imaging spacecraft. No classified imaging satellites, from any nation, have their orbit information published, so these satellites do not show up in the app.

Al Qaeda-linked groups among world's most active terrorist groups

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131023-al-qaedalinked-groups-among-worlds-most-active-terrorist-groups>

Only one of the 5,000 terrorist attacks in 2011 is attributed to al Qaeda Central, but more than half of the top 20 most active perpetrator groups in 2011 are linked to al Qaeda, according to new data released



laste week in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland.

A START release reports that the GDT, the most comprehensive, unclassified database of terrorist incidents, now contains information on more than 104,000 domestic and international terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2011. These attacks resulted in more than 225,000 deaths and more than 299,000 injuries. These attacks are defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.

The top five most active perpetrator groups of terrorist attacks in 2011 were:

- Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)
- Taliban



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- al-Shabaab
- Boko Haram
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

While only one of the attacks in 2011 was attributed to al Qaeda Central — the August kidnapping of Maryland native Warren Weinstein in Pakistan — eleven of the top 20 most active groups are linked to al Qaeda. Those groups alone carried out more than 780 attacks which resulted in more than 3,000 deaths and wounded more than 4,600.

Al Qaeda-linked groups were responsible for four of the top five most lethal attacks in 2011.

- al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) — Yemen: 28 March, 110 killed, 45 injured
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — Pakistan: 13 May, 80 killed, 140 injured
- al-Shabaab — Somalia: 4 October, 70 killed, 42 injured
- al-Qaeda in Iraq — Iraq: 29 March, 65 killed, 95 injured

“Total attacks in the GTD in 2011 continued an upward trajectory that began a decade ago, paced by the ongoing historic shift in attacks away from al Qaeda Central and toward its growing number of affiliates,” said Gary LaFree, START director and professor of criminology and criminal justice at the

Countries Where al Qaeda Has Operated



Albania
Algeria
Afghanistan
Azerbaijan
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bosnia
Egypt
Eritrea
France
Germany
India

Iran
Ireland
Italy
Jordan
Kenya
Kosovo
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mauritania
Netherlands
Pakistan
Philippines
Qatar
Russia

Saudi Arabia
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Yemen

University of Maryland.

The other most lethal terrorist attack in 2011 was committed 22 July by Anders Breivik in Norway. He killed sixty-nine people and injured at least sixty others when he opened fire on a youth camp hosted by Norway’s ruling Labor Party. Additionally, earlier that day, he detonated explosives in an attack that killed eight people and injured at least fifteen others. Breivik confessed to the attacks and in August 2012, was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison.

Terrorist attacks in just five countries accounted for 70 percent of the terrorist attacks worldwide in 2011:

- Iraq (25.78 percent)
- Pakistan (19.96 percent)
- India (12.67 percent)
- Afghanistan (8.35 percent)
- Russia (3.71 percent)



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The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2011 (ten) accounted for less than 0.2 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2011. U.S. cases of note:

- U.S. Transportation Secretary Beverly Swaim-Staley and Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley received packages 6 January, each with a note stating "Report suspicious activity! Total Bull! You have created a self fulfilling prophecy." The packages contained a small battery and an electric match that ignited when opened. No explosive material was found. Investigators indicated the notes were in opposition to highway signs urging motorists to report suspicious activity. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.
- On 7 January an envelope addressed to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano ignited at a postal sorting facility. The envelope was not opened and therefore did not cause any casualties or property damage. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- During a Martin Luther King Jr. parade on 17 January in Spokane, Washington, authorities found and safely disposed of a backpack containing a bomb. There were no casualties or property damage. In March 2011, Kevin Harpham, who has ties to white supremacist groups, was arrested in connection with the attack. He confessed to planting the bomb and was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison in December 2011.
- On 26 September, animal rights activists drilled a hole into the storage space of Rocky Mountain Fur and Fireworks in Caldwell, Idaho. They pumped several gallons of fuel into and set fire to the retail building. There were no injuries, but the fire caused \$100,000 in damage. A group calling themselves the "Arson Unit" sent a message to the North American Animal Liberation Press Office in Los Angeles, California, and the *BiteBack Magazine* Web site claiming responsibility for the arson. The "Arson Unit" is believed to be a branch of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).

The START Consortium says that with the release of the 2011 data, it also released four decades of geocoded GTD data for eight regions of the world. The geocoding allows researchers to chart the city-level progression of attacks across global regions and specific terrorist groups and movements, including: the spread of leftist violence in Europe in the 1970s; the diffusion of terrorism in Central American conflicts during the 1980s; the prevalence of ecoterrorism in the United States during the 1990s; and the contagion of terrorism in the Caucasus region during the 2000s. Geocoding for the remaining regions of the world is ongoing.

"The advent of satellite technology and geographic information systems is revolutionizing the study of crime, political violence and terrorism," LaFree said. "By releasing geocoded GTD data for the first time, we are making a down payment on what we hope will eventually be a fully geocoded Global Terrorism Database."

The GTD team notes it has also improved the quality of data from previous years, adding more than 1,500 new cases, removing cases that did not qualify for inclusion and clarifying and supplementing data with new information in hundreds of other cases. For example, the Haqqani Network is now recognized as an entity separate from the Taliban; they have been linked to thirty-nine attacks since 2006.

Many of the new clarifications and improvements are based on tips from GTD users. START makes the GTD available through an online interface in an effort to increase understanding of terrorist violence so that it can be more readily studied and defeated. START encourages users to submit appropriate updates, corrections or additions to the cases. Government officials and interested researchers may download the full dataset directly through the GTD Contact Form.

Top 20 most active groups in 2011

- Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)
- Taliban*
- al-Shabaab*
- Boko Haram*
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)*
- al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)*
- New People's Army (NPA)
- Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
- Baloch Republican Army (BRA)



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- al-Qaida in Iraq*
 - Garo National Liberation Army
 - al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)*
 - Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)
 - Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)*
 - Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)*
 - People's Liberation Front of India
 - Haqqani Network*
 - Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
 - Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*
- * = an al Qaeda-linked group

Top five most lethal terrorist attacks in 2011

- al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) — Yemen: 28 March, 110 killed, 45 injured. Perpetrators detonated explosives at an ammunition factory a day after Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants looted weapons from it. The attack killed 110 and injured 45. Though no group claimed responsibility, AQAP is suspected.
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — Pakistan: 13 May, 80 killed, 140 injured. Two suicide bombers killed 80 people and injured 140 people at a training center for the Frontier Constabulary when they detonated explosives hidden in their vests. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that “This was the first revenge for Osama’s martyrdom. Wait for bigger attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”
- al-Shabaab — Somalia: 4 October, 70 killed, 42 injured. A Somali national, Bashar Abdulahi Nur, detonated a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device targeting the compound that houses several Somali government ministries. The militant group al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.
- Anders Breivik — Norway: 22 July, 69 killed, 60 injured. The fourth most lethal terrorist attack in 2011 was committed 22 July by Anders Breivik in Norway. He killed 69 people and injured at least 60 others when he opened fire on a youth camp hosted by Norway’s ruling Labor Party. Additionally, earlier that day, he had detonated 2,100 pounds of explosives in a rental van he had parked in Oslo between the Norwegian prime minister’s office building and Norway’s Oil and Energy Department building. That attack killed eight people and injured at least 15 others. Breivik confessed to the attacks and in August 2012 he was sentenced to 21 years in prison.
- al-Qaeda in Iraq — Iraq: 29 March, 65 killed, 95 injured. Ten suspected al-Qaida in Iraq suicide bombers stormed the Salah ad Din council building wearing police uniforms. After firing upon government personnel in the council building and executing three government staff members, they detonated explosive belts. At least 65 people were killed in the suicide bombing, 95 others wounded. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but al-Qaeda in Iraq is suspected.

Mexican Cartels Help Hezbollah Infiltrate U.S.

Source: http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2013/10/mexican-cartels-help-hezbollah-infiltrate-u-s/?goback=gd_e_4962526_member_5797767156619825152#

In a shocking revelation made by a veteran U.S. counterterrorism expert, Hezbollah has infiltrated the Southwest United States by joining forces with Mexican drug cartels that have long operated in the region.

Judicial Watch has for years reported on the chilling connection between Islamic extremists and Mexican drug cartels. In fact, as far back as 2007 JW wrote about an astounding Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) report that lays out how Islamic terrorists and Mexican drug gangs

have teamed up to successfully penetrate the U.S. as well as finance terror networks in the Middle East

In Hezbollah’s case, a growing “business relationship” with cartels has allowed the Shia Islamic militant group to have a growing presence in the U.S., says Matthew Levitt, an esteemed terrorism expert with an impressive resume. Levitt is a former counterterrorism intelligence analyst at the Federal Bureau of Investigation



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(FBI) and State Department counterterrorism adviser. He also served as the No. 2 intelligence official at the U.S. Treasury where

traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels.”

A year later a man (Jamal Yousef) arrested in

AREAS OF CARTEL INFLUENCE IN MEXICO



he operated the agency's terrorism and financial intelligence branch.

Levitt offers details of this mind-boggling collaboration between two powerful criminal enterprises in a new book titled: "Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God." A nonprofit dedicated to exposing the dangers of Islamic extremism, the Clarion Project, profiled the book in a recent article titled "Growing Hezbollah Presence in Southwest U.S."

Hezbollah's business relationship with Mexican drug cartels is a driving force behind this phenomenon, according to the analysis that quotes alarming excerpts from the book. For instance in 2009, a former Chief of Operations for the DEA said that Hezbollah uses "the same criminal weapons smugglers, document

New York admitted stealing weapons from Iraq for Hezbollah and told authorities of a Hezbollah stockpile in Mexico that included 100 M-16 assault rifles, 100 AR-15 rifles, 2500 hand grenades, C4 explosives and anti-tank weapons. That same year a Hezbollah terrorist was captured in Tijuana and a senior Mexican military officer confirmed the group was conducting explosives training for members of Mexican drug cartels.

In the U.S., law enforcement officials across the nation's Southwest region report a rise in imprisoned gang members with Farsi tattoos that experts say express loyalty to Hezbollah, the book analysis reveals. One U.S. law enforcement official is quoted as saying this: "You could almost pick your city and you would probably have a [Hezbollah] presence."



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This is not surprising considering that for years a number of reports have exposed the connection between Mexico and Middle Eastern terrorists. In 2010 a veteran federal agent in the U.S. immigration system exposed a government cover-up of Middle Eastern terrorists entering the country through Mexico. The 30-year agent confirmed that thousands of SIAs (Special Interest Aliens) from terrorist nations like Yemen, Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan—classified as OTM (Other Than Mexican)—were captured along the southern border.

In 2011 a frightening exposé broadcast by the world's largest Spanish news network documented how Middle Eastern terrorists have infiltrated Latin American countries—especially Mexico—to plan an attack against the United States. The documentary uses undercover videos taken during a seven-month investigation that prove diplomats from Iran, Venezuela and Cuba planned a cybernetic attack against the White House, FBI, Pentagon and U.S. nuclear plants.

Mexico's Zetas Are Not Finished Yet

By Scott Stewart and Tristan Reed (Stratfor Global Intelligence)

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-zetas-are-not-finished-yet?utm_source=freelist&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20131024&utm_term=Sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=ad1c4f6bb3704acea24876a47cc22dc0

During the question-and-answer portion of our quarterly Mexico Security Monitor webinar, we were asked a question pertaining to the current status of Los Zetas. The question was something to the effect of: "Some Mexican media outlets and analysts claim that Los Zetas have been dismantled as an organization and are now little more than a 'ragtag operation.' Why do you disagree with that assessment?"

This question apparently came in response to our quarterly cartel report, in which we wrote that despite the leadership losses suffered by Los Zetas, including the arrest of their leader, Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales, there were no signs that other leaders were challenging the current leader and Miguel's brother, Omar Trevino Morales. We also wrote that we believed Los Zetas have maintained their operational capabilities in terms of drug smuggling and other criminal activity, and that they have retained the ability to defend their operations and to continue conducting offensive operations deep in the their rivals' territory.

Because of the interest Los Zetas generate among our readers and clients, we thought it would be worthwhile to explain why we believe Los Zetas have not yet been dismantled.

Violence Brings Attention

When they first emerged on the scene in the early 1990s as the enforcement arm of the Gulf cartel, Los Zetas brought a new dynamic to the

violence in Mexico. As deserters from Mexico's Special Air Mobile Forces Group, they introduced military tactics and weapons into the fight.

Although other cartels quickly followed suit and stood up their own enforcer groups comprised of former soldiers armed with military ordnance, like the Sinaloa Federation's Los Pelones, Los Zetas continued to generate much media and law enforcement attention. This was due not only to their background as special operations forces, but also to their penchant for gratuitous and overwhelming violence. Unlike other enforcer groups, which tended to operate in more confined geographic areas, the Gulf cartel deployed Los Zetas across Mexico and even into Central America. The group has also publicly taunted the government, such as via the audacious signs Los Zetas hung in Nuevo Laredo in 2008 offering better-paying jobs to the Mexican soldiers deployed to the city to counter them.

Los Zetas' violent nature was clearly on display after they split from the Gulf cartel in early 2010 and became an independent cartel organization. The group's involvement in high-profile incidents, such as the September 2010 killing of U.S. citizen David Hartley on Falcon Lake and the February 2011 attack on two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents that left one of the agents dead, also helped bring Los Zetas to the attention of the American government and public. This resulted in U.S.



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pressure on the Mexican government to act against Los Zetas. High-profile incidents such as the August 2010 San Fernando massacre, other large body dumps, attacks on media outlets and the killings of journalists also served to make Los Zetas public enemy No. 1 in Mexico's media and in the eyes of the Mexican government.

Both the Calderon and Pena Nieto administrations have specifically listed the

Zacatecas, Coahuila and San Luis Potosi states, split with the group and rejoined the Gulf cartel, which was in the middle of a heated fight against its former enforcer group for control of Mexico's northeast.

During 2012, we also saw repeated reports in the media that a war had erupted between Lazcano Lazcano and Trevino Morales, but no evidence of such a split ever emerged. In retrospect, we learned that the transfer of



group as a priority target. All this attention has impacted the organization. In addition to the arrests of several plaza bosses, the group also lost longtime leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano, who was killed by the Mexican military in October 2012, and his replacement, Miguel Trevino Morales, who was arrested in July 2013.

Los Zetas grew quickly after emerging as an independent cartel, rising to become the second-largest criminal organization in Mexico. But this rapid growth did not come without organizational challenges. In mid-2012, Ivan "El Taliban" Velazquez Caballero, a high-ranking Los Zetas leader operating in

leadership between Lazcano Lazcano and Trevino Morales had occurred in an orderly manner several months prior to Lazcano Lazcano's death.

Misinformation and Disinformation

Over a year later we do not know if the inaccurate rumors of the Lazcano Lazcano and Trevino Morales split were an incorrect understanding of the Velazquez Caballero defection (misinformation), or if they were a deliberate information operation conducted by the Mexican government or a rival cartel attempting to sow division among the



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ranks of Los Zetas (disinformation).

This situation highlights one of the big problems confronting those who track and analyze clandestine human networks such as terrorist groups or transnational criminal organizations like Los Zetas. In addition to disinformation and misinformation, there is simply much we do not and cannot know unless we have a source of information inside the organization. Even technical intelligence coverage of such organizations sometimes provides only a limited understanding of the exact structure of an organization and the members' intentions and motives.

It is also important to recognize that even in cases where inside information is available, rumors, disinformation and misinformation often run rampant inside organizations -- particularly organizations composed of brutal, paranoid criminals. In retrospect, it appears that it took some time for Trevino Morales to become aware that Velazquez Caballero's organization had declared war on him because of the disinformation spread by that group. Thus, even if one had been able to ask Trevino Morales himself in March 2012 who was causing the violence in Nuevo Laredo, he would not have known.

But beyond disinformation, rumors, false presumptions and a lack of knowledge or awareness are common within all human networks, from corporate offices and military units to jihadist groups and criminal cartels. Analysts and collectors tend to want to accept everything a source provides as accurate if the source has good placement and access. They seldom want to recognize that despite good placement and access, the source may be biased, completely uninformed, sincerely misinformed or may have bought into a false, conspiratorial hallway rumor.

This means that analysts and investigators can usually only infer what is going on internally within a group, and in many cases the information used to draw those inferences is misleading -- sometimes intentionally so. This applies not only to open-source press reporting and messages purportedly from the groups themselves, but also to the human and signals intelligence used by analysts and investigators with access to classified information. In fact, sometimes classified information can be detrimental to sound analysis when inaccurate classified reporting is given precedence over accurate open-source reporting simply

because it is from a highly classified source, thus skewing the analytical process. For this reason, sensitive intelligence should never outweigh common sense and observation. Indeed, analysts should not hold any item of intelligence, whether from a contact or open-source media, above another -- they must all be carefully evaluated.

While analysts may not know for certain what is happening inside an organized crime group, or what the dynamic is between groups like the Trevino Morales and Velazquez Caballero families, taking a holistic approach and correctly using available intelligence can allow them to form hypotheses. Those hypotheses must then be refuted or confirmed based on whether they conform to observable behavior of the groups and their members. In the case of Mexican cartels, internal shifts such as leadership losses, new strategies or tactics, new campaigns, new alliances, new rivalries and new operations are often manifested into quantifiable and irrefutable occurrences. These observable occurrences can include things such as shifts in drug routes, upticks in overall violent crime such as homicides and robberies, arrests of individuals with credible reported affiliations in new places, and so on. Hypotheses can be validated or invalidated based upon such observable indicators.

In the case of Los Zetas, observable events have repeatedly contradicted the reports that began in 2010 describing the downfall of Los Zetas. If the capabilities of Los Zetas had really begun to decline in 2010, we would not have seen them expand so rapidly in 2011, both in Mexico and internationally. Observing Los Zetas conducting body dumps in Culiacan and Guadalajara during 2011 and 2012 contradicted the idea that El Chapo and the Mexican government had crippled Los Zetas.

Current Hypotheses Regarding Los Zetas

With that in mind then, let's consider some of the hypotheses we are currently working off of regarding Los Zetas.

First, while we mentioned above that Los Zetas historically have been flashy and violent, we believe there has been a noticeable difference in the group's behavior after Miguel Trevino Morales assumed control. Since then, the group appears to have adopted a lower profile, with far fewer high-profile acts of violence and public displays of bodies and narcomantas.



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This is not to say that the group is any less violent, but with no indicators suggesting the group has weakened, it appears they have made a conscious decision to attempt to lower their press and public profile in hopes of reducing government pressure on them. Of course, it is also possible that some observers could interpret this lower profile as weakness, but such an assumption is not supported by what we can observe happening in Los Zetas' home base.

We operate under the assumption that a quiet plaza is a productive plaza. In other words, the less violence there is in a high-volume drug-trafficking corridor, the better that is for the business of the organized crime group that controls it. A lack of violence in a plaza is also a sign that it is under the uncontested control of a particular organization. Historically, we have seen large fights for the control of lucrative plazas such as Tijuana and Juarez, and when the Sinaloa Federation believed the Gulf cartel was weakened following the arrest of then-Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in 2003, it attempted to take control of Nuevo Laredo and a major war erupted between the two cartels in 2004.

In the case of Los Zetas, we have hypothesized that if the organization had indeed been weakened, the other cartels would be aware of the weakness and would make a push to grab the lucrative Nuevo Laredo plaza as Sinaloa did in 2004. Nuevo Laredo is the busiest cargo crossing from the United States to Mexico, and that heavy flow of traffic permits a large flow of contraband cargo to be hidden alongside legitimate goods. But since the death of Lazcano Lazcano and the capture of Trevino Morales, we have not seen a war break out for control of the city. Therefore, based on the lack

of observable violence in Nuevo Laredo, we can conclude that Los Zetas remain in control of that plaza and that contraband continues to flow through it. It is also worth noting that Los Zetas' rivals, including their biggest competitor, the Sinaloa Federation, have been hit hard by attrition. In fact, the organization that was sent to Nuevo Laredo to wrest it from Gulf cartel control in 2004, the Beltran Leyva Organization, has split away from Sinaloa and some of its remnants are currently fighting with Los Zetas against Sinaloa.

If Los Zetas were significantly weakened, we also assume we would see another organization attempt to take control of Monterrey, a major transportation hub in northeastern Mexico. The same transportation infrastructure that makes it a major industrial center also makes it a major hub for illicit trade. If a rival cartel could seize control of Monterrey, it could impact the flow of Los Zetas contraband through Nuevo Laredo. There has recently been a minor spike of violence in Monterrey, but we have not seen a dramatic escalation of violence that would indicate a significant new struggle for control there. The current level of violence in Monterrey is much lower than it was in 2010 and 2011, when Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel battled for control of the city following the split between the two organizations.

Like all criminal enterprises, law enforcement efforts, infighting, power struggles and plain old greed will eventually weaken, if not destroy, Los Zetas. But that has not yet happened, and Los Zetas remain a powerful organization engaged in a diverse range of criminal activities across a large portion of Mexico -- and the globe.

Unexpected pleasures: a new airport security-check experience

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131024-unexpected-pleasures-a-new-airport-securitycheck-experience>

For passengers traveling through Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) International Airport's Terminal E, the E18 security checkpoint will be an

introduction to a new level of style and comfort, compliments of SpringHill Suites by Marriott.



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The three-month pilot program, called “The Next Level Experience,” is a partnership between the hotel brand, SecurityPoint Media,



DFW, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to transform airport checkpoints into welcoming and comfortable experiences. “Airports want to deliver a positive experience for passengers from the moment they step out of their car all the way to the boarding door, and screening checkpoints are a major part of that passenger experience,” said Ken Buchanan, executive vice president of revenue management at DFW Airport. “We want to lead the way in making passenger screening a positive encounter, while maintaining the highest levels of security,” he added.

The *Financial* reports that the checkpoint is part of DFW’s Terminal Renewal and Improvement Program to renovate and redefine the Airport experience in its four original terminals.

The program aims to enhance the security checkpoint experience with stylish decor, soothing wall art, vibrant lighting, and relaxing ambient music in a setting that spans the entire checkpoint area. Lounge seating at the entrance and a furnished area for customers to

gather their belongings after the screening process represent a comprehensive approach to comfort enhancement during the checkpoint process.

“Spring-Hill Suites delivers stylish spaces that allow guests to relax and refresh, and the idea was to extend that same hospitality to the Airport security area, where so many travelers’ journeys begin,” said Craig Fowler, Marriott International’s Senior Director of Brand Marketing, Select Service Brands. “We hope travelers will

enjoy the unexpected and pleasant surprises they’ll experience in what can often be a stressful environment,” he added.

Travelers often experience long waiting and processing times at security checkpoints. The upgrade to a more comfortable atmosphere is expected to make the process more enjoyable, not necessarily quicker. “This enhanced checkpoint gives our passengers a next level experience when it comes to security screening,” said James Crites, executive vice president of operations at DFW. “Wait times are automatically calculated and displayed on monitors and audio messages replace the need for TSA officers to shout instructions and security messages are available to guide travelers throughout the screening process,” he added.

The *Financial* notes that DFW will review passenger interaction with the new program and decide on whether to expand the concept to other terminals. Plans to introduce the concept to other airports have yet to be announced by Marriott International, INC.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: What’s the point for this other than a good advertisement of the hotel industry supporting it? Too bad I did not know about it during my recent adventure in the US and spend 11 hours trying to make my sleep comfortable with the aid of two arm chairs and a little table in an almost empty airport! (see “Editor’s Corner” – connecting airport towards Athens).



TSA tells airports to guard exit lanes

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131024-tsa-tells-airports-to-guard-exit-lanes>

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has notified the nation's airports that it will stop guarding the exit doors between arriving flights and baggage claim. Many airports are unsatisfied with the TSA mandate that airports should start taking over the new staffing positions at the beginning of 2014 with

passengers, opposes the mandate as it would create additional staffing cost. "ACI-NA strongly objects to TSA's attempt to abdicate its responsibility to provide staff to monitor exit lanes by imposing a costly unfunded mandate on U.S. airports," the group said in a statement. USA Today quotes Patrick Hogan, spokesman



complete takeover by end of March 2014. Transferring the responsibility for guarding exit doors to the airports will save the TSA \$88.1 million a year and "will allow the administration to focus on its most critical responsibilities such as the screening of passengers and baggage," TSA said in a statement. "Exit-lane monitoring is not a screening function, but rather an issue of access control" similar to perimeter fencing and gates for vehicles.

USA Today reports that Exit lanes at airports were generally left unmonitored before the TSA was created in the aftermath of 9/11; today the TSA monitors about 350 exit lanes at one-third of the country's airports, according to the TSA. The remaining airports monitor their own exit lanes.

Airports Council International-North America, which represents airports serving 95 percent of the nation's domestic airline

for the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, to say that additional staff to monitor exit lanes will cost the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport about \$1 million per year, a cost likely to be passed to airlines and passengers. "We do not believe that parceling out national security functions is a fair or responsible way to address TSA budgetary concerns," Hogan said. "Shifting costs to local airports creates an unfunded mandate and decentralizes transportation security efforts, neither of which is in the best interest of the U.S. transportation system."

The Seattle-Tacoma International Airport proactively has installed automatic exit doors in its B Concourse, after experimenting with electronic doors and sensors during the summer. The \$6.4 million initiative combines cameras, sensors, and alarms to monitor passengers as they



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exit through two sets of automatic glass doors and then a metal gate. Alarms sound and doors lock when a passenger tries to enter in the wrong direction. The Port of Seattle Commission, estimating to save \$1.8 million per year from staffing cost, has agreed to expand the initiative to A and C concourses in


February 2014 with a completion date set for end of October 2014. “This new technology supports our number one priority: keeping passengers safe and secure,” said Tom Albro, president of the Port of Seattle Commission. “Sea-Tac Airport continues to innovate, reduce costs and improve the travel experience.”

More than 500 million people could face increasing water scarcity

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131024-more-than-500-million-people-could-face-increasing-water-scarcity>

Both freshwater availability for many millions of people and the stability of ecosystems such as the Siberian tundra or Indian grasslands are

area,” says Dieter Gerten, lead-author of one of the studies. A PIK release reports that scientists say that different mean global



put at risk by climate change. Even if global warming is limited to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, 500 million people could be subject to increased water scarcity — while this number would grow by a further 50 percent if greenhouse-gas emissions are not cut soon. At 5 degrees global warming almost all ice-free land might be affected by ecosystem change. This is shown by complementary studies now published by scientists of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK).

“We managed to quantify a number of crucial impacts of climate change on the global land

warming scenarios would likely have the following effects:

- 2 degrees, the target set by the international community, is projected to expose an additional 8 percent of humankind to new or increased water scarcity
- 3.5 degrees — likely to occur if national emissions reductions remain at currently pledged levels — would affect 11 percent of the world population



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- 5 degrees could raise this even further to 13 percent

"If population growth continues, by the end of our century under a business-as-usual scenario these figures would equate to well over one



billion lives touched," Gerten points out. "And this is on top of the more than one billion people already living in water-scarce regions today." Parts of Asia and North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East are particularly vulnerable.

Changes for the green cover of the planet

For the green cover of our planet, even greater changes are in store. "The area at risk of ecosystem transformation is expected to double between global warming of about 3 and 4 degrees," says Lila Warszawski, lead author of another study that systematically compared different impact models — and the associated uncertainties — in order to gain a fuller picture of the possible consequences of climate change for natural ecosystems. This is part of the international Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP).

A warming of 5 degrees, likely to happen in the next century if climate change goes on unabated, would put nearly all terrestrial natural ecosystems at risk of severe change. "So despite the uncertainties, the findings clearly demonstrate that there is a large difference in the risk of global ecosystem change under a scenario of no climate change

mitigation compared to one of ambitious mitigation," says Sebastian Ostberg, lead author of the third study.

The regions at risk under unabated global warming include the grasslands of Eastern India, shrublands of the Tibetan Plateau, the forests of Northern Canada, the savannas of Ethiopia and Somalia, and the Amazonian rainforest. Many of these are regions of rich and unique biodiversity.

The combined changes to both water availability and ecosystems turn out to be nonlinear. "Our findings support the assertion that we are fundamentally destabilizing our natural systems — we are leaving the world as we know it," says Wolfgang Lucht, one of the authors and co-chair of PIK's Research Domain of Earth System Analysis.

"This is not about ducks and daisies, but the very basis of life"

The studies use a novel methodological approach, introducing new measures of risk based on changes of vegetation structure and flows and stores of carbon and water. To this end, biosphere simulation models were used to compare hundreds of climate change scenarios and highlight which regions may first face critical impacts of climate change.

"The increase in water scarcity that we found will impact on the livelihoods of a huge number of people, with the global poor being the most vulnerable," says Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, one of the co-authors and director of PIK. This might get buffered to some extent through adaptation measures such as expanding of irrigated cropland. Such an expansion, however, would further increase the pressure on Earth's ecosystems and water resources. "Now this is not a question of ducks and daisies, but of our unique natural heritage, the very basis of life.

Therefore, greenhouse-gas emissions have to be reduced substantially, and soon."

— Read more in D. Gerten et al., "Asynchronous exposure to global warming: freshwater resources and terrestrial ecosystems," *Environmental Research Letters* 8, no. 3 (12 September 2013); S. Ostberg et al., "Critical impacts of global warming on land ecosystems," *Earth System Dynamics*, 4 (2013): 541-65; and L. Warszawski et al., "A multi-model analysis of risk of ecosystem shifts under climate change," *Environmental Research Letters* (forthcoming)



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Pirates seize two Americans off Nigeria's coast

Source: http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/24/21114805-pirates-seize-two-americans-off-nigerias-coast?lite

Two Americans were kidnapped by pirates after their ship was attacked off Nigeria's coast, U.S. officials said Thursday.




The U.S.-flagged oil supply vessel C-Retriever was targeted in the Gulf of Guinea early

kidnappers, as of late Thursday had no "hard information" on the whereabouts of the them or the two American sailors taken hostage, a Nigerian Navy spokesman told NBC News.

The spokesman attributed the abductions to "criminals in the delta," emphasizing they were common criminals and pirates, not militants. Creeks and swamps leading to the Nigerian coast were being searched for the hostages.

The seized vessel is owned by Louisiana-based Edison

Chouest Offshore, according to Reuters. The company was not immediately available for



Wednesday, Reuters reported.

Maritime news website gCaptain reported that the ship's captain and its chief engineer had been abducted.

The constant flow of massive cargo ships in the Gulf of Guinea has become a fertile hunting ground for pirates. NBC's Jim Miklaszewski reports.

U.S. officials said the working assumption was that the pair had been kidnapped for ransom.

Nigerian military officials, who deployed army and navy units in the hunt to find the

comment.

Sources told NBC News that there were no U.S. warships in the region and no immediate plans for a hostage rescue attempt. However, there is a contingent of U.S. Marines aboard a Dutch warship in the area as part of a military exchange program.


"We're obviously closely monitoring reports that two U.S. citizens have been kidnapped from a U.S. flagged vessel," State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said at a



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press briefing on Thursday. “It’s a motor vessel, the C-Retrieve, in the Gulf of Guinea. We are seeking additional information about the incident, so that we may contribute to safely resolving the situation.”

“Wherever the opportunity for these thugs or pirates are, they will take advantage of it, and Nigeria is teeming right now,” Phillips added. Phillips said the pirates were following a familiar pattern.



“Obviously our concern at this point is for the safe return of the two U.S. citizens,” Harf said. “We do believe that this was an act of piracy. Again, we are continuing to seek additional information and for privacy reasons can’t provide any additional information about the two U.S. citizens.”

In April 2009, U.S. Navy SEAL snipers killed three Somali pirates as they rescued American cargo ship Capt. Richard Phillips, who had offered himself as a hostage to save his crew. The high-seas hijacking has been turned into a film starring Tom Hanks. “Captain Phillips” earned more than \$52 million during its first two weeks in cinemas.

In an interview with NBC’s Brian Williams on Thursday, Phillips said the waters off Nigeria were “worse than even Somalia.”

“This is the m.o. for the Nigerians. And they usually take a captain or a chief engineer and they’ll bring ‘em ashore and hide ‘em, so no rescue attempt can be made,” he said. “You have to understand, it is dangerous out in the Gulf of Guinea, but it’s also dangerous on the land in Nigeria with everything going on there.” Rory Lamrock, an analyst specializing in maritime security with U.K.-based risk-management firm AKE, said there had been “an increase in the severity of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea” over the past two years. In August, Nigeria’s navy killed 12 pirates as they tried to flee from a fuel tanker they had hijacked.

Earlier this month, the International Maritime Bureau reported that pirate attacks off Nigeria’s coast had jumped by a third this year – with 29



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attacks on vessels recorded in the first nine months of 2013, up from 21 in the same period last year.

"Pirates, often heavily armed and violent, are targeting vessels and their crews along the [Nigerian] coast, rivers, anchorages, ports and surrounding waters," the IMB said. "In many cases, they ransack the vessels and steal the cargo."

The IMB said in the first nine months of 2013 the Gulf of Guinea accounted for all crew kidnappings worldwide, 32 of them off Nigeria, and two off Togo. In such incidents, sailors are taken ashore and usually held for ransom.

In a separate report, Denmark-based security firm Risk Intelligence earlier this month estimated 117,000 tons of oil products worth around \$100 million had been stolen by pirate gangs in the Gulf of Guinea since 2010.

"Attacks by pirates off the coast of Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea have increased substantially in recent years," according to a June 2013 travel warning from the State Department. "Armed gangs have boarded both commercial and private vessels to rob travelers. The Nigerian Navy has limited capacity to respond to criminal acts at sea."

Alistair Galloway, owner of private security provider Endeavour Maritime, said the discovery of new oil reserves in West African countries including Cameroon and Liberia was driving up shipping traffic in the area.

"This oil boom is attracting a far richer shipping environment and therefore more higher-value targets and that is the biggest threat to the region's maritime security," he said.

Galloway cited differences between West African pirates and their better-known Somalia-based counterparts.

Captain Phillips real-life, pirate drama is the subject of a new movie starring Tom Hanks. NBC's Janet Shamlian reports.

"In Somalia, piracy was really out-of-work fisherman looking to improve their lives, but piracy in West Africa is really part of a bigger criminal system, networks embedded in the nations," he said. "The networks are in place and it's been easy for them to attack."

Johan Potgieter, senior researcher at South Africa's Institute for Security Studies (ISS), said that pirates tended to feel "disenfranchised."

He added: "They feel that if the government won't share its wealth equally, they will take it for themselves by other means."

IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map 2013

Source: <http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map>

