

**CBRNF – A new addition (F=Financial)?**

# **CBRNE Newsletter Terrorism**

Volume 48, 2013

**Chem News**

*The Few  
and  
The Brave!*

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## **Regional Realities Extinguish Probability: Will Hezbollah Launch a Chemical Weapons Attack on Israel?**

By Patrick Blannin

Source:[http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CTTA-July12.pdf?utm\\_source=CyberDiplomacy+vs.+CyberSecurity&utm\\_campaign=ACD%2FEWI+BLOG&utm\\_medium=email](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CTTA-July12.pdf?utm_source=CyberDiplomacy+vs.+CyberSecurity&utm_campaign=ACD%2FEWI+BLOG&utm_medium=email)

The deteriorating situation in Syria has been a matter of international concern, not the least for Israel. This is due to the possibility of chemical weapons falling into the hands of entities such as Hezbollah which are hostile to the Jewish state. While the presence of chemical weapons (CW) in Lebanon is still uncertain, defence sources claim that Syria has already moved CW capable Scud missiles to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon and erected advanced surface-to-air missiles in the Lebanese mountains. Evidence Supporting the Chemical Weapons Threat Scenario While the presence of CW in Lebanon is still uncertain, Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Siyasa (2009), along with Israeli government and intelligence agencies have previously reported that Hezbollah was keeping CW in arms stockpiles in southern Lebanon. In one instance, three out of the eight Hezbollah operatives who were killed in the blast died

after coming in contact with the chemicals. However, Lebanese Army personnel as well as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces were denied access to the blast site in order to cover up any evidence. Israeli defence sources claim that Syria has already moved Scud missiles to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon and erected advanced surface-to-air missiles in the Lebanese mountains. Any scenario in which Hezbollah or any other non-state actor had CW capability, the balance of deterrence between Israel and its regional adversaries would shift dramatically.


According to Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, Israeli Deputy military chief, Syria has the largest CW stocks in the world with missiles and rockets that can reach any point in Israel. He added that if Syria had the chance, it would "treat us the same



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way it treats its own people.” It is in this context that on 12 June 2012 the Netanyahu government announced that it was going to


“the transference of chemical weaponry to Lebanon would be tantamount to a declaration of war by the Lebanese government” and “that



A map demonstrating key Syrian chemical weapons production and storage facilities and its proximity to Israel. Photo Credit: Nuclear Threat Initiative

mass distribute gas masks to protect its population against biological and chemical

Israel would act to prevent such a move”. The current speculation and belligerent rhetoric



This map demonstrates the maximum missile ranges determined from the border of southern Lebanon. It also includes projected missile ranges from South Beqa'a Valley (dotted circles).

Photo Credit: Critical Threats <http://www.criticalthreats.org/lebanon/hezbollah-potential-missile-ranges-map>

weaponry. Israel's Hayom daily (12 June 2012) quoted a senior Israeli Defence official who warned that

comes at a time of renewed internal Lebanese National Dialogue. The



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National Dialogue facilitates the resumption of formal discussions between the various Lebanese parliamentary blocks that effectively stalled in November 2010 concerning primarily Hezbollah's weapons and what role, legitimate or otherwise, the Hezbollah's arsenal plays in Lebanese security. Hezbollah's Chemical Weapons Capability Syria has successfully tested delivery systems for its chemical warheads, namely Scud B-C-D class missiles. Hezbollah has acknowledged that the Scud missile is a major component of its arsenal following the war in 2006. Given that Syria and Hezbollah's military hardware are strategically linked, they have one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region, made up of hundreds of Scud-derived missile systems. Israeli intelligence warns that the transfer of unconventional weapons to Hezbollah commenced following the 2006 conflict with Israel. However, the weapons remain in Syrian territory to prevent their destruction in an Israeli strike. In the event that Hezbollah relocates its Scud D missiles and other advanced weapons, out of undisclosed storage facilities in Syria and transfers them across the border to Lebanon, Israel would be forced to act on its promise and destroy Hezbollah's Scuds. Hezbollah is rumoured to keep its most advanced hardware in the Syrian Al Hame and Al Zabadani military bases near Damascus. The most intense fighting between Syrian opposition groups and pro-Assad forces has occurred in areas corresponding to Syria's weapons storage facilities (Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia). Hence, securing Assad regime's military assets has become a priority for Iran and Hezbollah. This situation prompted Tehran and Hezbollah to come up with a new strategy to facilitate relocation of these weapons. Israeli Defence Force officials believe that various jihadist groups — such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others — may attempt to divert Israel's attention from Hezbollah and its arsenal by instigating conflicts on Israel's western and southern fronts.

A CW attack on one of Israel's major population centres would be catastrophic. The densely populated areas of Tel Aviv, Haifa or the Galilee would be priority targets for such an

attack and within range of Hezbollah's current missile capability. According to the reports of Council on Foreign Relations (2006) and DEBKAFfile (2012), Syria has produced, tested and continues to store VX nerve agents which is the deadliest nerve agent ever created. A fraction of a drop of VX, absorbed through the skin, can fatally disrupt the nervous system. Although an antidote is available, the chemical is absorbed so rapidly that unless victims received immediate medical attention, the casualty rate would be extremely high. Sources claim that Saddam Hussein used VX against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. He also used chemical weapons on Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in 1988, which resulted in the deaths of 5,000 people. Additionally, thousands more were left with horrific medical side-effects.

VX is highly unstable and thus only an organisation with a high technical capability would be able to handle the weaponization process. If Hezbollah possesses this technical ability among its ranks, then this would add credibility to the current threat scenario espoused by the Israelis.

Hezbollah was implicated in a series of events in Thailand, India, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2012. In this year, some individuals associated with Hezbollah were arrested and persecuted in the US. On 21 March 2012, the Republican Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, Peter King, said

“the Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah may have hundreds of operatives based in the United States”, adding that “Hezbollah, and not Al Qaeda, poses the greatest terrorist threat to Americans”.

Iran requires that Hezbollah maintain an effective presence in the region especially with the uncertainty facing its operational ally Syria. With officials claiming that a pre-emptive strike on Iran will unleash a barrage onto Israel's northern border coupled with Nasrallah's insistence that Tel Aviv is within rocket range, the outcome of renewed IAEA negotiations which commenced in May 2012 has intensified the focus on Hezbollah's intentions. Israel is concerned with the escalating regional dynamics and a lausible threat from CW attack in which Hezbollah would be a likely perpetrator.





U.S. Marines assigned to the Heavy Marine Helicopter 364 Unit run in formation during the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Memorial 5-K Run April 2, 2011 at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. (Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Dawn Price)

More than 60 Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines took part in the **Explosive Ordnance Disposal Memorial 5-K Run** April 2, 2011 at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

“This run symbolizes the unselfish and unyielding dedication to one another that we all share as service members,” said Gunnery Sgt. Eric Allen, a U.S. Marine Corps participant. “It’s extremely important to honor those who paid the ultimate price for our nation.”

Petty Officer 3rd Class Ryan Donofrio, Petty Officer 2nd Class Barry Despot and Petty Officer 1st Class Dave Lyman, all EOD technicians, ran the 3.1-mile course while wearing bomb disposal suits that weigh approximately 85 pounds each.

“You don’t honor someone by doing something easy, you do something hard to recognize their sacrifice,” said Lyman. “Wearing the suit was one way to do that, even if it doesn’t really come close to their hardship”.

### **Washington: Hizballah has got hold of chemical weapons**

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/22803/Washington-Hizballah-has-got-hold-of-chemical-weapons>

For the first time in many years, voices in the US administration were criticizing the Israeli defense forces for under-reacting and, in this case, also underestimating the chemical weapons threat emanating from Syria and neglecting to pursue counter-measures. This is what visiting Israeli Defense Minister Ehud

Barak heard when he met US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel at the Pentagon Tuesday, March 5, as the new defense secretary’s first foreign visitor. debkafle’s military and Washington sources disclose that Barak was berated for “inadequate and cursory”




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military preparations which failed to take into account that a chemical attack on Israel would

4, of a dangerous situation developing in the area of separation on the Golan captured by

Israel in the 1967 war. Syrian troops were forbidden to enter this area under a ceasefire formalized in 1974 between Syria and Israel.

Israeli UN Ambassador Ron Proser complained to the Security Council about five shells fired from this very area which landed in Israel Saturday, March 2. "Israel cannot be expected to stand idle as the lives of its citizens are being put at risk by the Syrian government's reckless actions," Proser wrote in a Note to the council. "Israel has shown maximum restraint thus far."



make it necessary for the IDF to enter Syria – most likely for an offensive operation coordinated against the common threat with the Turkish and Jordanian armies.

Present at the meeting between Hagel and Barak were also Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the US Chiefs of Staff and Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren. Our sources add that the conversation ranged over the Syrian crisis with no reference to a nuclear Iran.

**From the defense secretary, Barak heard intelligence estimates confirmed for the first time by an American official that Hizballah has been able to procure a quantity of chemical weapons from Syria – a development which Israel's leaders have vowed to prevent.**

The proliferation of chemical weapons to Hizballah and other armed bands on Israel's borders was apparently in the mind of Russia's UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin, UN Security Council president for March, when he cautioned Monday that trouble was building up between Israel and Syria.

Read debkafle's earlier report:

At UN Center in New York, Israeli and Russian delegates separately warned Monday, March

Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin then spoke of "a very new and dangerous phenomenon" of armed groups operating in the Golan area of separation. "It's something which potentially can undermine security between Syria and Israel," said Churkin, who is acting Security Council president for March. He pointed out that the UN peacekeeping force is unarmed and unable to cope with this new situation. Israel and Syria are technically in a state of war.

debkafle's military and intelligence sources note that the exchange of warnings between Israel and Russia touched two sensitive nerves:

1. It occurred the day before definitive talks open in Moscow between the Syrian government and opposition. The Russians fear Israel might embark on military action in response to the round of shells fired from the Syrian Golan Saturday, and force a delay in the talks. The last time this happened, in late January, Israel reacted with a cross-border attack on Syrian military installations.

2. Saturday, too, debkafle exposed the no-man's lands unfolding along Syria's borderlands with Israel and Jordan following the withdrawal of the



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bulk of Syrian forces from these areas. Moscow fears additionally that Israel's armed forces will seize strategic points in the abandoned territory to clear out armed bands of the pro-al Qaeda Jabhat al Nusra, which are believed responsible for the latest round of

shelling into the Israeli Golan. Churkin's warning referred to "armed groups" as the potential troublemakers, but he was also cautioning Israel to desist from fighting back so as not to upset Moscow's diplomatic initiative for resolving the Syrian civil war.

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**Monument to Victims of Chemical Weapons Unveiled at OPCW Headquarters in The Hague**

Source: <http://www.opcw.org/news/article/monument-to-victims-of-chemical-weapons-unveiled-at-opcw-headquarters-in-the-hague/>



OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü (left) and Deputy Foreign Minister for International Affairs of Iran, H.E. Mohammad Mehdi Akhoundzadeh unveiled the monument dedicated to victims of chemical weapons.



An elegant new monument dedicated to victims of chemical weapons was unveiled in the garden of the OPCW headquarters in The Hague during an afternoon ceremony on 26 November 2012, the first day of the 17th Session of the Conference of the States Parties.

The monument was dedicated to the OPCW by the Islamic Republic of Iran and unveiled by Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for International Affairs, H.E. Mohammad Mehdi Akhoundzadeh. OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü participated in the unveiling and addressed remarks to the gathering. The monument was created by Mr Taher Sheykh-ol-Hokamaii, an instructor at the University of Tehran's faculty of fine arts whose works have been exhibited in 17 countries. The monument represents a victim gradually losing his/her life from the effects of chemical weapons whose body is simultaneously converted into peace doves.

Since the development of modern chemical warfare in World War I, hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives or suffered life-long health problems as a result of exposure to chemical weapons, including many in Iran during the 1980s war with Iraq.





**CBRN Art in Qatar**

Open air exhibition at Doha Cultural Village (Katara) – sculptures are made of metal (brass) utensils  
(courtesy of Mr. Ervin Farkas – 2013)



**CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013****EnviroNics – ChemProDM module provides comprehensive CWA and TIC detection for vehicles, robots and OEMs now with 10,000 hour pump**Source: <http://www.enviroNicsusa.com/>

The newly improved ChemProDM (ChemPro Detector Module) now includes a 10,000 hour pump similar to the pump used in our permanently mounted 24/7 detectors. Now this compact module for the detection and classification of Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) and Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) vapors can easily be utilized in 24 hour 7 day a week applications. Its multi-sensor detection array has 10 sensing channels, with our unique open loop Ion Mobility Spectroscopy (IMS) sensor at its heart, to provide CWA sensitivity below military action levels, quick response and industry-leading false alarm rejection even to low vapor pressure threats like VX. It can also detect a wide range of TICs. The ChemProDM's compact package has the lowest logistics footprint of any CWA detector and includes mounting flanges for vehicle, robot mounting or incorporation into OEM systems. The ChemProDM does not have its own display. If the building, vehicle or robot has a digital backbone the digital output of the ChemProDM can easily be directly integrated into it. If a digital backbone is not available the optional Remote Alarm Unit (RAU) can be mounted away from the ChemProDM module. The RAU fully emulates the proven intuitive display of the ChemPro100i. An optional Vehicle Radiation Detector allows the ChemProDM and RAU to simultaneously provide both vapor and gamma radiation detection for CRN protection with a very compact footprint. The ChemProDM has the ability to detect more than 40 TICs and CWAs.



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### EnVision CBRN - 24/7 Integrated CBRN Detection System

Source:[http://www.environicsusa.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=192](http://www.environicsusa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=192)

EnVision CBRN is a 24/7 integrated CBRN detection system. It is a portable system, which integrates high quality equipment into one portable case enabling fast creation of a full CBRN detection network without fixed hardware installation.



#### Full CBRN Capability

EnVision CBRN is based on well-known and proven detectors designed and manufactured by Environics. The solution is unique; providing fully portable CBRN detection system including simultaneous CWA and market's largest scale TIC detection. The biological detector that is part of the EnVision CBRN is the only portable Bio detector in the market.

#### One System For Many Situations

The utilizing of EnVision CBRN is flexible because it can be used in many type of places – depending on characteristics of the task. For example the first responders can create a detection network quickly to a catastrophe area, rapid protection of VIP visits, international high level conferences or mass sport events.

EnVision CBRN gives every safety organization a possibility to fulfill their tasks in all conceivable situations. It is a complete and cost effective CBRN Security Solution.

#### Key Features

- Fast and easy deployment
- Real-time situational awareness
- Complete CBRN detection system
- More features with external detectors
- Versatile connectivity
- Man portable



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- High-end control software
- Real-time GPS point location
- No calibration needed
- Vehicle applications
- Naval applications
- Critical Infrastructure Protection
- VIP protection solutions
- Area monitoring systems

### Applications

- Fixed and mobile detection systems

## A better cyanide antidote for terrorist attacks, mass casualty events

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130318-a-better-cyanide-antidote-for-terrorist-attacks-mass-casualty-events>

The current procedure for treating cyanide poisoning requires highly trained paramedical personnel and takes time. Cyanide, however, is a fast-acting poison. In a situation involving mass casualties, only a limited number of victims could be saved with IV medication. Scientists are reporting discovery of a promising substance that could be the basis for development of a better antidote for cyanide poisoning.



The latest episode in the American Chemical Society's (ACS) Global Challenges/Chemistry Solutions podcast series describes a new advance toward closing a major gap in defenses against terrorist attacks and other mass casualty events. Scientists are reporting discovery of a promising substance that could be the basis for development of a better antidote for cyanide poisoning. The potential antidote could be self-administered, much like the medication delivered by allergy injection pens. Based on a report by Steven E. Patterson, Ph.D., and colleagues in ACS *Journal of Medicinal Chemistry*, the new podcast is available without charge at iTunes and from [www.acs.org/globalchallenges](http://www.acs.org/globalchallenges).

An ACS release reports that in the new episode, Patterson explains that the only existing antidotes for cyanide — recognized as a high-risk substance for potential use by terrorists — must be administered by intravenous infusion, or an "IV."

That procedure requires highly trained paramedical personnel and takes time. Cyanide, however, is a fast-acting poison. In a situation involving mass casualties, only a limited number of victims could be saved with IV medication. Patterson's team thus sought an antidote that could be administered by intra-muscular (IM) injection, a

simpler procedure that could be administered rapidly to a large number of victims or even be self-administered.

Their report describes discovery of a substance, sulfanegen TEA, "which should be amenable for development as an IM injectable antidote suitable for treatment of cyanide victims in a mass casualty setting. Further development, including efficacy in lethal cyanide animal models, will be reported at a later date."

The release notes that Global Challenges/Chemistry Solutions is a series of podcasts describing some of the twenty-first century's most daunting problems, and how cutting-edge research in chemistry matters in the quest for solutions. Global Challenges is the centerpiece in an alliance on sustainability between ACS and the Royal Society of Chemistry.

— Read more in Steven E. Patterson et al., "Cyanide Antidotes for Mass Casualties: Water-Soluble Salts of the Dithiane (Sulfanegen) from 3-Mercaptopyruvate for



*Intramuscular Administration,” Journal of Medicinal Chemistry 56, no. 3 (9 January 2013): 1346–49*

### First use of a chemical weapon in Syria appears confirmed

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bull20130319-first-use-of-a-chemical-weapon-in-syria-appears-confirmed>



**Israeli military intelligence sources said, with “high degree of confidence,” that a single chemical weapon – either a SCUD chemical warhead or, more likely, an artillery shell – was fired on the Khan al-Assal neighborhood in Aleppo earlier today, killing twenty-six people, including eleven government soldiers.**

Scores of injured people were taken to area hospitals. The Syrian government and the anti-government rebels accuse each other for firing the chemical weapon.

In a speech last week, Maj. Gen Aviv Kochavi, the head of Israel’s military intelligence, said the President Assad was preparing his chemical arsenal for operational use, but that the order to use them had not yet been given (see: “Syrie, Iran, Palestine: les scénarios de l’armée israélienne,” *Slate.fr*, 15 March 2013).

Kochavi also noted that the Assad regime, in fighting the rebel forces, has steadily escalated its use of advanced weapon systems against civilians. The Syrian military has used SCUD and M-600 missiles on populated areas of the country. Kochavi said that so far, Syrian government forces have launched seventy missiles on civilian areas.

The anti-government rebels charged the Assad regime for the first confirmed use a chemical weapon in the two-year old civil war, saying the firing came hours after a coalition of anti-regime groups, meeting in Istanbul, elected Ghassan Hitto, a Syrian-American, to be the prime minister of a rebel-supported interim Syrian government. The Assad regime and the Russian Foreign Ministry both accused the rebels for firing the chemical shell.

The official Syrian news agency, SANA, said: “Terrorists fired a rocket containing chemical substances in the Khan al-Assal area of rural Aleppo and initial reports

indicate that around 15 people were killed, most of them civilians.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying:

*A case of the use of chemical weapons by the armed opposition was recorded early in the morning of March 19 in Aleppo province. We are very seriously concerned by the fact that weapons of mass destruction are falling into the hands of the rebels, which further worsens the situation in Syria and elevates the confrontation in the country to a new level.”*

The United States has been cautious in its reaction to the news.

White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters that “We are looking carefully at allegations of ... chemical weapons use, we are evaluating them. We have no evidence to substantiate the charge that the opposition has used chemical weapons. We are deeply skeptical of a regime that has lost all credibility and we would also warn the regime against making these kinds of charges as any kind of pretext or cover for its use of chemical weapons.”

Pentagon spokesman George Little said: “I have no information at this time to corroborate any claims that chemical weapons have been used in Syria. The use of chemical weapons in Syria would be deplorable.”

The United States has stressed all along that the it would take action if Assad used chemical weapons. Back in December, President Barack Obama said: “Today I want to make it absolutely clear to Assad and those under his command: The world is watching. The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable. If you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences, and you will be held accountable.”



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Then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said: "This is a red line for the United States. I am not going to telegraph in any specifics what we would do in the event of credible evidence that the Assad regime has resorted to using chemical weapons against their own people. But suffice it to say, we are certainly planning to take action if that eventuality were to occur."

The *Guardian* reported the other day that President Obama, who begins an official visit to Israel tomorrow, will discuss with the Israeli leadership the operational aspects of destroying Syria's chemical arsenals and

missile fleet. The *Guardian's* reporter notes that while the United States is likely to resist an Israeli push for an early military attack on Iran's nuclear weapons infrastructure, and while Israel is likely to resist an American pressure to be more conciliatory toward the Palestinians, both the United States and Israel agree on the urgent need to deal with Syria's large chemical weapons arsenal – the world's largest – to make sure the regime or the rebels do not use it, and that chemical weapons are not transferred to Assad's, and Iran's, ally Hezbollah.

### The meaning of Halabja

Source: [http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-meaning-of-halabja?goback=.gde\\_3711808\\_member\\_226335190](http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-meaning-of-halabja?goback=.gde_3711808_member_226335190)

Halabja is a name etched in the history of chemical warfare. There are few documented instances of deliberate chemical weapons attacks against civilian communities; the one that Saddam

including secondary infections that overwhelm compromised immune systems. Children are born with genetic defects or die prematurely because genetic damage is being passed down the generations.



Hussein's forces made against the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja 25 years ago is the largest. Human Rights Watch recorded more than 3,200 immediate fatalities, with many more Kurdish citizens exposed to clouds of poisonous gas. Since the March 16, 1988 assault, thousands of people have succumbed to injuries suffered then, as well as to exposure-related health problems,

In two years, the world will commemorate the centennial of modern chemical warfare. Just as the Belgian city of Ieper -- where the German Imperial Army introduced the first gas attacks during World War I -- is indelibly linked to its chemical past, Halabja stands as an international symbol for the many chemical attacks during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war and the genocidal



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campaigns that Iraq conducted then against its Kurdish minority. In the immediate aftermath, Iran went to great lengths to publicize the bombing of Halabja, so the world would finally take notice Iraq's violations of humanitarian law.

Despite the powerful pictures of mothers

The story of Halabja is a tale of two cities and a struggle over symbols.

### The legacy of Halabja

At the end of the 1980s, negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were sputtering. The United States had just



and elderly men having dropped dead in their tracks, still clutching infants, and of the discolored, bloated bodies of children, Iran has had difficulty accepting Halabja -- located some 15 kilometers inside Iraq -- as a symbol of the pain it suffered from chemical weapons attacks.

From the end of 1983 onward, Iran's soldiers were regularly exposed to Iraqi chemical attack. Unprotected and ill-prepared for chemical warfare until the war's final year, they suffered many casualties from mustard gas, tabun, and sarin; many died prolonged, painful deaths. Iran still must tend to tens of thousands of people exposed to toxic chemicals during the war.

One attack was especially indiscriminate. On June 28, 1987, Saddam's air force struck the northern Iranian town of Sardasht. Almost three quarters of the 12,000 inhabitants were exposed to mustard gas; half of those exposed required medical treatment. Some 130 people, overwhelmingly civilians, died. Iran has since pressed for Sardasht to be internationally recognized as a memorial to the victims of chemical warfare, just as Halabja has been.

started production of then-new binary artillery shells that would, when fired, deliver the nerve gas sarin. Revelation of the Halabja attack injected impetus and urgency into the treaty negotiations and forced nations across the world to focus on terminating chemical weapons programs. Despite Western concerns about the size of the Soviet chemical arsenal and its purpose in Warsaw Pact military doctrine, almost all European NATO members vehemently opposed any plans to have binary munitions or their components pre-positioned on their territory. National political debates forced the US Army to withdraw its forward-deployed chemical munitions from West Germany in 1990.

In 1989, because Iraq had so blatantly violated international law, French President François Mitterrand convened an international conference in Paris to restore the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Western complicity in Iraq's chemical warfare -- through the sale of chemical precursors and relevant equipment, arms shipments, and political and intelligence support of Iraqi war operations -- had seriously undermined the protocol, the only legal instrument banning chemical



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weapons use then in existence.

The meeting was eventful. While Iraq was given all the consideration of a party to the Geneva Protocol, Kurdish representatives were denied a platform to address the delegates. Iran was furious about the continuing refusal to hold Iraq responsible PDF for six years of chemical

When the United Nations independently confirmed that chemical warfare had been conducted PDF during the Iran-Iraq war, Western nations imposed chemical weapons-related export controls on *both* belligerents, even though Iraq was a violator of the Geneva Protocol. Iran was denied the right to retaliate against Iraqi chemical



warfare, claiming a moral high ground for having never retaliated in kind, despite its right to do so under then-existing international law.

In the end, delegates agreed on a final declaration that supported the Geneva Protocol and urged redoubled efforts to adopt the Chemical Weapons Convention at the earliest possible date. Following the Paris conference, several other high-level meetings that involved stakeholders other than governments -- including the chemical industry -- in CWC negotiations were held later in the year. In September, the United States and Soviet Union concluded the bilateral Wyoming Agreement, by which both sides agreed to verified destruction of their respective chemical weapons arsenals. It was one atrocity among many during the Iran-Iraq war, but Halabja heralded the beginning of the end of legitimate possession of chemical weapons by anyone.

### The tale of two cities revisited

Iran's struggle to have Sardasht recognized as an international symbol of its suffering reflects the isolation the country felt during the eight-year war with Iraq. The ramifications of that isolation continue today.

attacks, and, according to Iranian officials I spoke with, it was also denied the defensive equipment and medical stores that would have protected its soldiers and citizens from the effects of poison gas. Iranian diplomats had to turn to the black market in the countries where they were stationed for ingredients as basic as charcoal for gasmask filters. Often they were conned, and the country started developing indigenous offensive and defensive capabilities in regard to chemical weapons. In the years since the end of the war, Iran has declared the destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal and joined the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Today's political leaders and much of the population belong to a generation that grew up on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war. The experience of chemical warfare taught them that they must overcome technological backwardness to survive. It also taught them that they cannot rely on the international law for justice, or on the international community to come to their assistance in the darkest hour.

The international community's denial of Sardasht -- even more than material support for Saddam Hussein that enabled the attack on Halabja -- is





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central to Iran's defiance in regard to its nuclear enrichment program. Self-

Weapons Convention, thereby contributing to the establishment of a global prohibitory



sufficiency, self-reliance, autarky -- in all security-related matters, these are the concerns that drive the present leadership of Iran. Economic and political sanctions only confirm convictions that had eight long years to take root in the bloody soil of the trenches along the Iran-Iraq border.

Halabja may have instilled urgency in the negotiations that led to the Chemical

regime on the acquisition, manufacture, possession and use of an entire category of non-conventional weaponry. However, the international disregard of legitimate claims of major violations of international law for immediate geostrategic reasons makes the town also a symbol of the long-term danger of pursuing short-term interests.

### Article Highlights

- A chemical weapons attack by Saddam Hussein's forces 25 years ago killed thousands of Kurds in the Iraqi town of Halabja, making it an international symbol and hastening negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- But the international community failed to acknowledge repeated Iraqi chemical attacks that Iran suffered during the Iran-Iraq war, including an especially indiscriminate gassing of the Iranian town of Sardasht.
- The international denial of Iraq's chemical attacks is central to Iran's defiance in regard to its nuclear enrichment program.

### Studying ecological risks of sea dumped munitions

Source: <http://chemsea.eu/newsletter.php?id=272>

This past December 2012, the Thünen Institute of Fisheries Ecology (FI) carried out the third CHEMSEA fish sampling campaign in the Baltic Sea onboard the RV Walther

Herwig III to study ecological risks associated with dumped chemical munitions and warfare agents.



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A team of 12 scientists from three CHEMSEA partner labs (FI, AWI, LEPA)



and from the Universities of Galway (Ireland), Berlin, Hannover and Kiel (Germany) visited six sampling sites located at dumpsites of chemical warfare agents (Bornholm Basin, Gotland Deep, and the

vicinity of Little Belt) as well as reference areas in the western and eastern Baltic Sea (Arkona Sea, outside Gulf of Gdansk).

Cod (*Gadus morhua*) was the main target species. A total of 1,400 cod were examined onboard for the presence of a range of externally and internally visible diseases and parasites. In addition, various tissue samples were taken for subsequent lab analyses of contaminant concentrations (including CWA-specific compounds) and biological contaminant effects performed by CHEMSEA partners. Hydrographic parameters were also recorded in order to study their impact on the horizontal and vertical distribution of the fish in the study sites.

A final CHEMSEA fish sampling campaign is scheduled for early September 2013 and will mainly focus on the Bornholm dumpsite. It is anticipated that cod will be more abundant here than during the winter samplings because the Bornholm Basin is the main spawning area of the eastern Baltic cod stock which reproduces in summer.



### Alarming Footage: Who Is Really Using Chemical Weapons in Syria?

Source: <http://frontpagemag.com/2013/theodore-and-walid-shoebat/alarming-footage-who-is-really-using-chemical-weapons-in-syria/>

### The thin red line

Source: [http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-thin-red-line?utm\\_source=iContact&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Bulletin%20of%20the%20Atomic%20Scientists%20-%20Newsletter&utm\\_content=](http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-thin-red-line?utm_source=iContact&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Bulletin%20of%20the%20Atomic%20Scientists%20-%20Newsletter&utm_content=)

- *An attack on the village of Khan al-Assal is the latest in a number of incidents during which the use of chemical weapons has been claimed by either, or both, sides of the Syrian civil war.*
- *In reporting chemical attacks, citizen journalists have apparently conflated lethal and non-lethal chemical agents, creating the perception that the United States has failed to act, even though President Obama's "red line" warning against chemical weapons use has been crossed.*
- *US policy toward Syria may unintentionally have helped erode the international taboo against chemical weapons use; to buttress that taboo, the United States now must make clear what would and would not constitute crossing the chemical warfare red line, in Syria and elsewhere.*

Both opposition forces and the Syrian government have alleged that chemical weapons were used in last Tuesday's attack

on the village of Khan al-Assal, bringing to the fore one of the most potentially far-reaching of the many dangers that



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have arisen during Syria's civil war. Now entering its third year, the Syrian revolt -- by far the longest uprising of the Arab Spring -- is the first in history that threatens to violently topple a government armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This unique case naturally precipitates profound concerns that elements of Syria's large stockpiles of chemical agents and munitions will find themselves in the hands of insurgents or terrorist groups. To date, however, the West has largely ignored the threat of non-state acquisition of such arms, instead focusing its concern around the use of chemical weapons by the regime of



Bashar al-Assad.

With more than 70,000 dead and over one million Syrians displaced by civil war, international pressure mounts for more substantive intervention by Western powers. Even absent confirmed use of WMD, France and the United Kingdom are moving toward greater support of the disparate forces fighting the Assad regime.

In contrast, the United States has refrained from direct military support of the opposition. At the same time, President Obama has clearly, directly declared the use of chemical weapons in Syria as the red line that would call for substantive action from the United States. While avoiding any *carte blanche* backing of opposition forces that include significant numbers of jihadists and other terrorists, the US policy places significant emphasis on reinforcing the international moral norm against the use of weaponry that is considered "beyond the pale." But recent allegations highlight the potential unintended consequences of this strategy:

Khan al-Assal is the latest in a growing series of incidents in the country during which the use of chemical weapons has been claimed by either, or both, sides of the conflict.

Undoubtedly anticipating that violation of this boundary will spur American intervention, the Syrian rebels have significant motivation to charge the Assad regime with the use of chemical weapons. Conversely, the Syrian government has a vested interest in casting the rebels as a fringe element willing to use any means necessary to overthrow the regime, including violating the opprobrium against chemical weapons use. The extreme stakes created by the American red line make it incumbent upon the United States to articulate precisely what is meant by the term chemical weapon -- which, under international law, includes non-lethal agents as well as more well-known and lethal agents such as sarin and VX.

Given the general absence of foreign media from the conflict, reports of chemical attacks increasingly are based on citizen journalism. As Western news standards evolve with the growth of social media, the nuances that differentiate classes of chemical weapons appear to be dissolving. The public conflation of lethal and non-lethal chemical agents increasingly creates the perception that the United States has failed to act, despite evidence that President Obama's red line has been crossed. In short, US policy may unintentionally have created a situation in which the public is desensitized to chemical weapons use, eroding the international taboo against them. To buttress and even strengthen that taboo, the United States now must make crystal clear to the international community what would and would not constitute crossing the chemical warfare red line, in Syria and elsewhere.

### Many chemical weapons, no proven use

Most experts assume that the Assad regime possesses a vast and sophisticated chemical arsenal. Chemical agents most frequently cited



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as components of the Syrian arsenal include mustard gas, a blistering agent with properties that historically have generated large numbers of casualties, the vast majority requiring long-term medical care. A persistent chemical, mustard agent also creates long-term battlefield contamination. Vastly more toxic and lethal than mustard agent, sarin nerve agent is reportedly easily readied for use by the Syrian military for delivery via aircraft, artillery, and the country's 100 to 200 Scud missiles. Syria likely also possesses VX nerve agents; several hundred times more lethal than sarin, VX is the most deadly of all chemical agents. Apart from these three agents, some experts expand their assessment of Syrian's probable chemical arsenal to include choking agents such as chlorine gas and phosgene, which, according to a 1997 report by the US Surgeon General and US Army, was last used militarily in 1918. The latter agent, the effects of which appear only after a delay, was responsible for 80 percent of those killed by chemicals during World War I.

Last week's incident in Khan al-Assal, the most dramatic to date, is the latest in a series of accusations of chemical weapons use by the Syrian opposition, with counterclaims by the Syrian regime. The attack is reported to have killed at least 31 people and injured more than 100; US and other Western officials place responsibility for the attack with the Syrian government. Still, among the dead were 16 pro-Assad soldiers, and Damascus blames opposition forces for the incident, claiming they used a rocket laden with chemicals. Government officials have requested a UN investigation into chemical weapons use in Tuesday's incident "by the terrorists groups operating in Syria." The same day, opposition forces reportedly claimed that Syrian "chemical rockets" had also struck the village of Ataibah near Damascus.

Before recent events, two purported chemical attacks in Homs in December 2012 generated unprecedented allegations of chemical weapons use, with some observers concluding that the American red line had been crossed. In the first instance, on December 6, victims were allegedly targeted with white phosphorus munitions fired by Syrian military helicopters. Two

weeks later, on December 23, another incident occurred in Homs, killing at least seven and reportedly wounding more than 70; opposition forces assert that the attack used poisonous gases. Despite some journalistic assertions that nerve agents were responsible, a US State Department investigation concluded that no chemical weapons were used. Demonstrating the need to differentiate lethal and non-lethal chemical agents, US officials reportedly believe that casualties from the December 23 Homs incident are linked to Syrian military "misuse [of] a riot-control gas."

No internationally sanctioned investigation has yet confirmed the use of chemical agents in any of these incidents. Unverified accounts and video footage of casualties purportedly caused by chemical weapons offer virtually no evidence that lethal chemical agents, including those agents likely constituting the Syrian arsenal, were used. Mustard agent, for example, dramatically affects the victim's skin, eyes, and internal tracks. None of the filmed victims of last week's Khan al-Assal attack evidenced the effects of such a blistering agent. Moreover, given its low volatility and high level of persistence, its presence would require victims to be handled with extreme care to avoid secondary contamination. Actions by medical staff treating the victims of the Khan al-Assal attack are incongruous with concerns about secondary contamination, and there are no known reports of subsequent negative health effects on first responders or hospital personnel. Similarly, the effects of sarin or VX nerve agents -- manifest, for example, by a victim's twitching -- are absent from video of the Khan al-Assal incident. Like mustard agent, VX also is extremely persistent. Even sarin, which evaporates at a rate similar to water, is persistent enough to cause secondary contamination during transport and treatment in ambulances and hospitals, as evidenced during the response to a 1995 terror attack on the Tokyo subway. Doctors and civilians filmed at the Aleppo hospital treating the victims of the Khan al-Assal incident spoke of the agent emanating from the rocket, post-detonation, as being a powder. But choking agents, including chlorine (the smell of which reportedly was present at



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the Khan al-Assal attack), are delivered in a gaseous state.

No evidence yet exists to support the accusation that the Assad regime had used traditional chemical warfare agents -- that is, those substances posing danger to humans and marked by exceptional lethality.

Evidence does point toward Syrian use of chemical agents designed to be non-lethal -- those that are not entirely banned under the international law. With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), certain agents for purposes of "[l]aw



enforcement including domestic riot-control purposes" are permitted. Riot-control agents, commonly lumped together in the public consciousness as tear gas or mace, cause rapid, short-lived irritation of the eyes, skin, and respiratory system, producing symptoms such as shortness of breath, choking, rashes, and temporary blindness due to swelling of the eyes. Riot-control agents are not banned under the CWC and are used by governments throughout the world, including the United States.

Loopholes in the CWC allow for use of other non-lethal agents, including so-called incapacitants, for domestic law enforcement and, in other interpretations, counterterrorism activities. In contrast to riot-control agents, the effects of incapacitants can last for days after exposure. Moreover, their effects are psychological or mental, designed to leave the victim confused, disabled, or, in general, ineffective. (Although Syria is not generally thought to possess such agents, some have theorized that the Assad regime may use

incapacitants to test the waters of international reaction.) Also not addressed by the CWC is white phosphorus, an incendiary chemical agent that has been traditionally utilized by militaries to provide ground cover for operations as well as to illuminate targets. Its use as an offensive weapon lies in a legal gray area vis-a-vis chemical weapons law; it can produce severe chemical burns, irritation of mucus membranes (particularly of the eyes), and even death. From Homs forward to last week's attack in Khan al-Assal, the symptoms displayed by victims of alleged chemical weapons are not of a severity that would evince white phosphorus use, though the mere mention of white phosphorus by a doctor treating victims of the Khan-al-Assal incident adds to the growing scrutiny of that chemical. Also, US responses to reports of Syrian use of white phosphorus

are complicated by past American and Israeli military operations in which white phosphorus was used.

### Strengthening the taboo

A disturbing pattern is emerging in Syria. Each purported use of chemical weapons -- instantly communicated by the opposition, citizen journalists, or the Syrian government -- is left unresolved, as demonstrated most recently with the Khan al-Assal attack. If chemicals were used in any of incidents to date, they were agents -- white phosphorus, riot-control agents, and incapacitants -- that the CWC either conditionally allows, addresses in a manner that creates a legal gray zone, or ignores altogether. Atop these realities, the nature of the Syrian conflict has severely curtailed the ability of traditional authorities to verify or refute allegations of chemical weapons use, regardless of type, often leaving international audiences uncertain at best as to whether the United States' red line has been crossed. This dynamic likely contributes



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to the number of instances in which the use of chemical weapons has been alleged. More important, repeated unresolved claims of chemical weapons use slowly normalizes the concept that chemical weapons *can* be used, eroding the taboo against chemical warfare and desensitizing the public to its horrors.

The undermining of this moral prohibition relates directly to the discourse surrounding "non-lethal" chemical agents such as riot-control agents, incapacitants, and white phosphorus. While the technical and legal classifications of these agents are, one

assumes, crucial to international leaders, the distinctions are lost on the layperson. With the United States' *casus belli* inextricably predicated on Syria's use of chemical weapons, and the future of the chemical warfare taboo in the balance, it is incumbent on the Obama administration to clearly articulate what definitions are being used in determining whether its red line has been breached, and to make a compelling case for why the use of certain chemical agents is not grounds for another US military foray into the Middle East.



# DomPrep Journal

US Annual \$100 Volume 9 Issue 2, February 2013

# HAZMAT



#### Locked & Loaded With Chemicals in Syria

By Richard Schoebert, Public Health

#### Developing & Deploying Multi-Use Technologies

By Glen Rudner, Fire/HazMat

#### Protecting Chemical Facilities Against Terrorist Attack

By Patrick Coyle, Building Protection

#### A Continuing Need for Accurate All-Hazard Assessments

By Joseph Trindal, Law Enforcement

#### Implementing PPD-8: New Opportunities, Greater Challenges

By Amanda Faul, Standards

#### Liability Protection: An Often Overlooked Aspect of Business Continuity

By David McWhorter, Private Sector

#### The Timely Art of Declaring a Public Health Emergency

By Joseph Cahill, EMS

#### Partnering: A Key to Effective Preparation & Response

By Thomas Moran, Private Sector

#### Preparing Health Professionals & Emergency Managers in 2013

By Jack Herrmann, Public Health

Since 1998, Integrating Professional Communities of Homeland Security, Preparedness, Response & Recovery



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### Ansell announces that TRELLECHEM® has been approved

Source: [http://www.cbrneworld.com/news/ansell\\_announces\\_that\\_trellchem\\_has\\_been\\_approved](http://www.cbrneworld.com/news/ansell_announces_that_trellchem_has_been_approved)  
#axzz2Oldl7UhN

Ansell, a global leader in protection solutions, today announces the Trelchem Super gastight chemical protective suit has been tested to and fulfills the requirements of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC for equipment to be used in potentially explosive atmospheres.

Trelchem Super has been on the market nearly 30 years and has an extensive track record of satisfied customers all around the world. It holds certificates to the highest standards in Europe and is popular in various industrial applications.

“Since it is a requirement within most chemical industries to wear antistatic protective clothing, we are very happy to announce that the Trelchem Super now also fulfills this requirement”, says Thomas Draskovics, President and General Manager Ansell Specialty Markets. “Ansell’s commitment to innovation is reflected in the design of this product, and we are proud to make it available to our customers.”

The Trelchem Super garment material has been upgraded by adding conductive carbon black in one of the rubber layers, thereby achieving new antistatic properties. Already well-known

for its outstanding durability in combination with excellent resistance to a variety of chemical substances, this new antistatic property will add to the list of positive properties and guarantee its position on the market for a number of years ahead.



Explosive environments (atmospheres) are classified in different Zones, depending on how high the risk of an explosion is. Also, chemicals are classified

into Explosion groups depending on how explosive they are. Trelchem Super is approved for use in Zone 0, 1, 2 (gas)/20, 21, 22 (dust) and Group IIA, IIB, IIC, i.e. within environments with the highest explosive risk.

Trelchem Super is available in both fully encapsulating and non-encapsulating design and can be fitted with boots or socks, a variety of gloves, airline pass-through, pockets, loops etc. to fit each customer’s specific needs. It holds certificates to EN 943-2/ET, EN 943-1, EN 1073-2 (Protection against radioactive particles) and EN 14126 (Protection against Infective agents).



### CBNW Magazine

Source: <http://www.chembio.biz/>

Chemical, Biological & Nuclear Warfare (CBNW) is a twice yearly journal dealing with defence against CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Weapons and Explosives). It is published by React Media each winter and summer, with extra editions published online as an ‘e-zine’, CBNW Digital, every spring and autumn.

CBNW brings you in-depth articles by internationally recognised experts and the latest breakthroughs by companies and defence departments in new CBRN defence countermeasures. Up-to-date accounts of the



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technologies, responses, training, and policies to counter CBRNE threats make CBNW second to none in this expanding and ever-changing field.

Edited by leading CBRNE analyst and author Andy Oppenheimer AIEpE, CBNW is distributed free to defence ministers and procurement officers worldwide and at all major defence trade shows.

Each issue is also available online at the same time as the printed version.

*CBNW Editor Andy Oppenheimer is a UK-based leading authority on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and counterterrorism. He is a Member of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI) and author of 'IRA – The Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity'.*

### **Rapid Test for ChE Inhibition**

Source:<http://www.securetec.net/en/products/rapid-test-cholinesterase-/index-che-check-mobile.html>

#### **Routinely measuring the blood cholinesterase level in the field and in laboratories**

The on-site device is used for in vitro diagnostic determination of cholinesterase levels in whole blood. Based on the photometric measurement, AChE and BChE activity can be measured in a user-friendly way.

#### **Designed for ChE testing in the field**

The small, lightweight testing system features the following characteristics:

- Results within 4 minutes
- Convenient and safe finger prick sampling
- Portable and easy-to-use with touchscreen
- User gets medical advice to interpret critical results
- Memory for 1.000 results and USB interface included
- CE labeled: The device meets the requirements of international standards (Directive 98/79/EC for IVD)

#### **Further advantages**

The device can be operated at temperatures between +10 and +50 °C. ChE check mobile is battery powered and designed for vehicle use (4.8 to 24 V range). Flash memory technology makes the system future proof and user customisable.





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The newly available CE certified cholinesterase (ChE) IVD device, ChE Check Mobile, provides an important diagnostic capability that allows rapid and accurate determination of acetyl cholinesterase (AChE) and butyryl cholinesterase (BChE) activity in whole blood. The device can be used in both permanent medical treatment facilities and under field conditions, in particular during deployed field operations when exposure to organophosphates (OPs) such as nerve agents is suspected.

Even in cases of weak or unspecific symptoms, the ChE check mobile is small and easy to use, and enables medical officers in charge to establish rapid and accurate diagnosis and to provide timely and adequate antidote therapy. The practical test device allows precise and reproducible determination of AChE and BChE activity within four minutes at ambient temperatures of 10°C to 50°C. The simple test procedure requires only a few menu-driven operations and the interpretation of test results is supported by supplemental information and instruction; thus, enabling the test execution after short training.



**FIGURE 1:**  
Components of the ChE Check Mobile

**Developed for military and civil purposes**

- (1) Organophosphate poisoning in military conflicts and terrorist attacks
- (2) Acute pesticide poisoning with toxic agrochemicals

**Photo source and related interview on product:**

<http://www.chembio.biz/digital-issues/cbnw-digital-jan-2013/>



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### ThreatWatch

Toronto CBRNE/Special ops Newsletter (Vol 4, Issue #2, 2013)

Editor: Marc Dugas

#### Interesting insights

#### Arguments against the possibility of terrorist use of nuclear weapons

John Mueller provides this lengthy list of obstacles a terrorist would have to

and executing the heist, and there must be no consequential leaks.

- The insiders must successfully seize and transfer the HEU, the transferred HEU must not be a scam or part of a sting, and it must not be of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence.

- The HEU must be transported across the country over unfamiliar turf while its possessors are being pursued.

- A team of completely loyal and technically accomplished co-conspirators must be assembled within, or infiltrated into, the target country.

- The IND must successfully enter the target country and be received by the in-country co-conspirators.

- A detonation team must transport the IND to the target place and set it off without anybody noticing and interfering, and the untested and much-traveled IND must not prove to be a dud.

- To get the HEU across one or more international borders, smugglers must be employed, and they must remain loyal despite the temptations of massive financial reward, even as no consequential suspicion is generated in other smugglers using the same routes

who may be interested in the same money.

- A machine shop must be set up in an obscure area with imported, sophisticated equipment without anyone becoming suspicious.
- A team of highly skilled scientists and technicians must be assembled, and during production all members of the team must remain absolutely loyal to the cause and develop no misgivings

overcome in order to successfully explode an improvised nuclear device:

- An inadequately secured source of adequate quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) must be found.
- The area must be infiltrated while avoiding detection by local police and locals wary of strangers.
- Several insiders who seem to know what they are doing must be corrupted.
- All the insiders must remain loyal throughout the long process of planning

Toronto CBRNE/Special Ops Newsletter

Volume 4, Issue #2, 2013

# THREATWATCH

## FAILED STATES



The Washington based [National Intelligence Council \(NIC\) in its Global Trends report \(December 2012\)](#)

predicts that 15 countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East will become "failed states" by 2030, due to their "potential for conflict and environmental ills".

The list of countries in the 2012 NIC report includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, DR Congo, Malawi, Haiti, and Yemen.

In its previous 2005 report, published at the outset of Bush's second term, the National Intelligence Council had predicted that Pakistan would become a "failed" state

by 2015 "as it will be affected by a civil war, complete Talibanisation and struggle for control of its nuclear weapons".

Pakistan was compared to Yugoslavia which was carved up into seven proxy states after a decade of US-NATO sponsored "civil wars".

The NIC forecast for Pakistan was a "Yugoslav-like fate" in a "country riven by civil war, bloodshed and inter-provincial rivalries".

While the failed states are said to "serve as safe havens for political and religious extremists", the report does not acknowledge the fact that the US and its allies have, since the 1970s, provided covert support to religious extremist organizations as a means to destabilize sovereign secular

## VOLUME 4, ISSUE #2, 2013

### What to expect

- Editorial
- The Hot Zone
- Be Your Own Nuclear Power: A How To Guide
- Canadian Terrorism
- Threat Assessment: Booby Traps
- OXY: Brazil's Savage Street
- Drug
- DISCLAIMER
- Advertisements

nation states. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan were secular states in the 1970s.

A Yugoslav or Somalia-style "failed state status" is not the result of internal social divisions, it is a strategic objective implemented through covert operations and military action.

The destabilization of the world by Western nations is leading us down a garden path for terrorist action within our own borders. Wiping countries off the map has traditionally resulted in a flood of psychopaths with firearms into the destabilized area. Radicalism follows, and with it, the ideology of revenge, at all costs, against the perpetrators. We've been warned.



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or severe interpersonal or financial conflicts.

- The team must be transported to the machine shop, probably from several countries, without suspicion and without leaks from relatives, friends, and colleagues about their being missing.
- The team must have precise technical blueprints to work from and must be able to modify these appropriately for the precise purpose at hand over months (or even years) of labor, and without being able to test.
- Nothing significant must go wrong during the long process of manufacture and assembly of the improvised nuclear device (IND).
- There must be no inadvertent leaks from the team.
- Local and international police, on high alert, must not be able to detect the project using traditional policing methods as well as the most advanced technical detection equipment.
- No criminal gangs or other locals must sense that something out of the ordinary

is going on in the machine shop with the constant coming and going of non-local people.

- The IND must be smuggled without detection out of the machine shop to an international border.
- The IND must be transported to the target country either by trusting the commercial process, filled with people on the alert for cargo of this sort, or by clandestine means, which requires trusting corrupt co-conspirators who may also know about any reward money.
- A team of completely loyal and technically accomplished co-conspirators must be assembled within, or infiltrated into, the target country.
- The IND must successfully enter the target country and be received by the in-country co-conspirators.
- A detonation team must transport the IND to the target place and set it off without anybody noticing and interfering, and the untested and much-traveled IND must not prove to be a dud.

### Why Do Terrorists Choose Not to Attack Canada?

Terrorist events involving Canadians can be grouped into four categories:

- Attacks on Canadian soil;
- Attacks against Canadians outside our borders;
- Attacks against Canadian institutions outside Canada;
- Attacks against third parties outside Canada that have been planned and or staged within Canada.

The rarest of the lot (with the exception of action taken by environmental extremist groups and local activists) are attacks on Canadian soil. A number of reasons have been put forth in an attempt to explain why Canada has remained free of terrorist attacks by outsiders. Consider the following:

**The terrorist's lack technical ability** – Technical ability is a misnomer. Anyone who can use a computer and read can build an explosive device big enough to kill hundreds of people. Firearms have never been much of a challenge for a determined criminal, and even less so for a terrorist with money and a support network.

**Improved Canadian intelligence and "security measures"** – CSIS and the

RCMP have known about terrorist's fundraising and staging activities in Canada for decades. CSIS is very good at this, and their secular arm is the RCMP, which have superb counter-terrorist training. What is lacking is the political will to allow them to do their job.

**Local immigrant community pressure against action** – Local communities have little or no influence on terrorist activity; in fact they live in fear of retaliation here and abroad, where relatives may still dwell. The LTTE were masters of intimidation in their time, as evidenced by their ability to extort money from locals by threatening retaliation against relatives in Sri Lanka.

**Local attacks could be counter-productive to recruiting and fund raising** – This is plausible, as a crackdown would definitely affect a terrorist group's ability to fund raise. It's much easier to operate in Canada, with its open arms policy towards "refugees" of all kinds.

**Lack of connectivity between domestic cells and hostile foreign cells** – Ridiculous reasoning, as any terrorist who can move through Canada



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freely and fundraise is doing so to supply the foreign cells with the means to wage war overseas.

**Terrorists are waiting for reduced vigilance before instigating acts of terrorism** – If history is any measure, terrorists appear to know better than to start

a fight in Canada, which is analogous to crapping in your own nest. Vigilance is not prevention; frankly it would be no stretch for a terrorist to blow up buildings and vehicles anywhere in Canada, at least in the beginning. It serves no purpose. We KNOW they are here, we KNOW they are operating. Vigilance is not the issue.


To read the full Newsletter, please contact the Editor:

**THREATWATCH**   
 Bimonthly CBRNE Newsletter  
 Marc Dugas, Paramedic, CBRNE Technician  
 Contact: Threatwatchtoronto@gmail.com



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## Judge orders 2 Dutch sarin suspects held longer

Updated 9:13 am, Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Source: [http://www.seattlepi.com/news/crime/article/Judge-orders-2-Dutch-sarin-suspects-held-longer-4403233.php?goback=.gde\\_3904448\\_member\\_228783939](http://www.seattlepi.com/news/crime/article/Judge-orders-2-Dutch-sarin-suspects-held-longer-4403233.php?goback=.gde_3904448_member_228783939)




THE HAGUE, Netherlands (AP) — A Dutch investigating judge on Tuesday ordered the continued detention of two men arrested on suspicion of possessing and attempting to sell or use the deadly nerve agent sarin.

The judge said there was insufficient evidence to hold two female suspects beyond Friday. The men can be held for a further 14 days.

The four, three Dutch citizens and a joint Dutch-Turkish national, were arrested last Friday following a tip to police that they may have been trying to sell sarin. The tip

triggered a fruitless three-day hunt for stocks of the nerve agent believed to be buried in a field near the southern city of Maastricht. Police also searched the homes of the suspects but found no trace of any sarin.

The identities of the suspects have not been released, in line with Dutch privacy laws. A lawyer for one of the suspects, Arthur Vonken, told Dutch national broadcaster NOS it was "questionable" that his client's detention was extended even though no sarin has been found.



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Sarin, first created by German scientists just before World War II, is a powerful nerve agent. It was used in an attack by the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 that killed 13 people and sickened around 6,000.

Dutch prosecutors refuse to say what the suspects may have wanted to use sarin for or to whom they might have sold it, but say they have no indication it was to have been used in a terror attack.

Prosecutor's office spokeswoman Cindy Reijnders said that even though neither sarin nor any other nerve agent has been

found, prosecutors have "strong evidence" that the suspects may have had the deadly chemical in their possession. That evidence includes transcripts of phone taps conducted last week.

Two of the suspects were arrested as they were about to start digging in the field close to Maastricht. Police then spent three days painstakingly excavating 400 square meters (4,300 sq. ft) of the field to a depth of a meter (yard) but found no trace of sarin. Police are still guarding the site, but no longer digging there.



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