

**Hospital CBRNE Preparedness – Are we Ready?**

# **CBRNE Newsletter Terrorism**

Volume 42, 2012



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# Reading Audience

## CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter is:

- Read by First Responders in more than 60 countries around the globe;
- Distributed to more than 700 institutions, organizations, state agencies, think tanks, defense companies, institutions and universities.



# Editor's Corner

## Editorial

### *Dear Colleagues,*

Newsletter is now reaching CBRNE-CT First Responders in more than 60 countries around the globe. Following a 2011 six-month poll amongst our readers we decided to go bimonthly. Starting from previous issue, the CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter will be uploaded every two months. Next issue will be ready by the end of June 2012. In addition we added a Blog into our Newsletter's website in order to cover news on daily basis. The Editorial Team would like to thank you all for your enthusiastic comments and beneficial suggestions that will surely be taken under consideration.

London 2012 Olympiad is less than 100 days away! Mega sport events were always an attractive target for international terrorists and Summer Olympics will be no exception. We sincerely hope that it will be a peaceful Olympiad and we are sure that British security forces and agencies will do their best to provide a safe environment for athletes, visitors and global spectators. Still our only is the preparedness of medical/hospital community to deal with mass casualties deriving from a real CBRNE terrorist incident in megapolis environment. Although we are sure that London's Ambulance Service is well prepared and trained (HART teams) there are some doubts about acute care hospitals' preparedness. In a recent "CBRNE defence in Hospital Environment" Masterclass held in London (April 2<sup>nd</sup>) one more time there were no NHS representatives at the audience – LAS was there, active as always! Hospitals' preparedness is either top secret or a top gap...

In this issue we are still short out of advertising – in that respect we reduced prices even more and if this does not work we will continue to incorporate ads from other sources as part of your information process.

It is important to realize that CBRNE-CT issues are kind of "passion" for us and not a main stream profession for profit. Even if the ads will not work out well, we will continue to edit the Newsletter even in its previous amateuristic format because it is the content that matters not how the whole thing looks like! It is self-evident that your remarks, comments and suggestions are more than welcomed and will be highly appreciated and incorporated in future issues!

Enjoy the CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter and if you really like it, please feel free to pass it over to colleagues in your networks!

*The Editor*



BG(ret) Ioannis Galatas, MD, MA, MC



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### Many German Muslims 'refuse to integrate'

Source: <http://www.thelocal.de/society/20120301-41079.html>

Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said the study's results were worrying, according to in an interview published on Thursday (Mar, 1). "Germany respects the background and cultural identity of its immigrants. But we don't accept the importation of authoritarian, anti-democratic



and religiously fanatical points of view," Friedrich told the *Bild* newspaper.

Whoever fights against freedom and democracy will not have a future here, said the minister - a member of the ruling Christian Democratic Union's sister party, the Christian Social Union.

The survey showed that of Muslims living in Germany who were not German citizens, 52 percent favored integration, while 48 percent "strongly leaned toward separation" and clearly rejected German majority culture.

But when taking into account both Muslims who were German citizens and those who were not, the figure rose to 78 percent in favor of integration, versus 22 percent who favoured a more separatist approach.

The interior ministry's study, "The Daily Life of Young Muslims in Germany" surveyed Muslims between 14 and 32 who had not become German citizens. It also interviewed several generations of Muslims living in Germany and evaluated television programmes.

There are currently around four million Muslims living in Germany, of which nearly half are German citizens.

The survey also showed that among the 14 to 32-year-olds there exists a "subgroup" of religious extremists who hold anti-western views and are reportedly prepared to use violence.

This group amounts to about 15 percent of Muslims with German citizenship and about 24 percent for Muslims who are not German.

Hans-Peter Uhl, the domestic affairs spokesman of the CDU/CSU faction in the German parliament, the Bundestag, told the

*Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung* that the high number of Muslims who don't want to integrate is "alarming."

"Rejecting integration can, but it doesn't have to, provide fertile ground for religious fanaticism and terrorism," Uhl said in an article published Thursday. Uhl is calling for non-German Muslims to show proof of their integration.

The study was criticized by the Free Democratic Party, the government's junior coalition partner. "I have to wonder that the BMI (Interior Ministry) used taxpayers' money to finance a study that produces headlines but no findings," said Serkan Tören, the FDP's parliamentary faction speaker for domestic politics. Tören said religious commitment among young Muslims is often an "empty shell" that has nothing to do with actual religious practice but with "provocation and cultural segregation." The German-Turkish politician said there is no automatic connection between religion and violence. "Other



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studies and my personal experience show that."

Wolfgang Frindte, a psychologist and a key investigator for the study, said its results did not surprise him. He told news

magazine *Spiegel Online* that the number of Muslims living in Germany who hold radical views is decreasing, as more Muslims distance themselves significantly from Islamic terrorism.

### DCBRNC Medical Simulation Suite

By Surg Cdr Steve Bland RN

Source:<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/TrainingandExercisesPublications/DCBRNC/CbrnNewsletter.htm>

The Surgeon General, Surgeon Vice Admiral Philip Raffaelli QHP, visited the Defence CBRN Centre (DCBRNC) at Winterbourne Gunner on 19 April 2011. Following a brief by the

scenarios to train and test medical personnel as part of specialist training and preparation for deployed operations. Medical training in CBRN, led by Medical Director, Surgeon Commander Steve Bland



Surgeon General, Surg VAdm Philip Rafaelli QHP formally opens the Centre's CBRN Medical Simulation Suite. Surg Cdr Steve Bland briefs the Surgeon General on SimMan 3G.

Commandant Wing Commander Lee Taylor on the role of the Centre that includes CBRN generalist and medical training, the Surgeon General opened the new CBRN Medical Simulation Suite. The simulation suite uses a combination of hi-definition clinical simulation and operational

RN, uses a blended training approach with lectures, pre-hospital scenarios using the outdoor training area and table top exercises. The new suite adds to this learning by providing hospital specialists with a simulated resuscitation



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
and critical care area using a wide range of CBRN medical scenarios. DCBRNC runs a number of medical courses including the Emergency Medical Treatment course for new entry medical officers, and the more advanced multidisciplinary CBRN Clinical course which has students from the Defence Medical Services, National Health Service as well as NATO and other allied nations. The Centre also hosts the Department of Health provided Hazardous

Area Response Team (HART) training. Speaking during his visit, the Surgeon General said “I was very impressed with the new training suite which has only come about because of the initiative shown by the team at Winterbourne Gunner. The Defence Medical Services would be in the forefront in the event of a CBRN event so it is important that their training is as realistic and comprehensive as possible. This new facility goes some way to providing that.”

*Surg Cdr Steve Bland RN is the Medical Director of Joint CBRN Medical Faculty*

### Global CBRN Threats and Activity

Source: [http://www.cbrneworld.com/\\_uploads/download\\_magazines/News.pdf](http://www.cbrneworld.com/_uploads/download_magazines/News.pdf)




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### Infrastructure security, disaster planning “Super map” developed

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120306-infrastructure-security-disaster-planning-super-map-developed>

A U.S. Marine stationed at the Quantico base in Virginia has developed sophisticated mapping software that can give users full situational awareness of their surroundings in real-time.

Based on that model, I-COP can impose roughly 500 layers of data and that number is growing. I-COP currently has feeds from antiterrorism officials and the CBRN officer on the base as well as outside sources like DHS’



infrastructure program, NASA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Geological Survey, the Pacific Disaster Center, the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control.

For instance, with all this information available, if an earthquake hit near the base, I-COP can generate a map that shows the projected damage in a specific area and allow commanders to see if there were any hazardous material stored near there or if the nuclear power plant was damaged.

Meanwhile in the event of a major snowstorm, all of the roads

The Installation Common Operational Picture (I-COP), developed by Marine specialist Michael Lisovich, is essentially a “super map,” taking in a torrent of data streams from emergency dispatch reports to weather forecasts, traffic reports, and security system alerts.

Pete Streng, Quantico’s director of operations, said the tool, which is accessible online, essentially provides users with up to the minute information on everything around the base, allowing officials to make fast, informed decisions.

*InsideNovareports* that Streng contacted Lisovich several years ago requesting a system that would give officials a better grasp of the base’s critical infrastructure system.


Lisovich said in the past, generals would use layers of acetate to superimpose various battlefield conditions over a map. “He wanted something like that to show critical infrastructure. So I looked around and determined that GIS [Graphic Information System] would do that,” Lisovich said.

on the map would turn red and slowly return to normal once they’ve been plowed. In addition, all of the base’s fire hydrants have been mapped and color-coded to indicate the last time they were tested or replaced.

“There’s really no limit to what you can do with it,” Streng said.

The map is also able to account for global phenomenon like disease outbreaks, which Lisovich said is critical to providing decision-makers with all the necessary information they need to give quick orders. “A big part of this is not just emergency response, but also planning,” he said.

To prevent malicious actors from gaining access to all of the base’s critical information, I-COP has several layers of tiered access. At the most basic level is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Situational Awareness map, which is available to most people with a common access card. The map does not show “things you don’t want the bad guys to see,” Lisovich said. “This is the



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sanitized version of the I-COP for the public.” This map is particularly useful during emergencies, where any member of the base can pull up the EOC and figure out what is happening around the base and what they should be doing. As an example, Lisovich pointed to a hypothetical hazardous material accident. With a few clicks, users can generate a model that displays the hypothetical hazard plume which also shows roadblocks,

evacuation routes, and decontamination sites as well as instructions for individuals in different buildings.

“So now, instead of everyone trying to call in and find out what’s going on, everyone has access to what the situation is,” Lisovich said. I-COP went live at Quantico on 1 February and Lisovich is currently helping other Marine Corps bases set up pilot versions of I-COP.

## Terrorism Insurance: Coming out of Shadows

By Manoj Kumar

Source: <http://www.einsuranceprofessional.com/artterror.html>


More than one year after the mega-catastrophy, “Terrorism Insurance” has acquired the status of probably the most controversial insurance coverage ever. Not only has it emerged from the shadow of “political risks insurance” to be underwritten as stand-alone policy by many carriers, it has stirred the businesses across the globe and worried the risk managers in trying to keep their enterprises properly protected. It is today

the most sought after insurance coverage by small and big businesses alike, but not all are lucky to get one.

A new term ‘macroterrorism’ has been coined after 9/11 to describe an act of terrorism that causes more than \$1 billion in losses or 500 deaths. As a benchmark, this is about the insurance loss level caused by the most costly IRA bomb blast at Bishopsgate in London in April 1993. Macroterrorism has opened a new risk landscape. Latest Swiss Re estimates on 9/11 event point to a total loss of between \$30 and \$58 billion for all lines of business, out of which \$12 billion bill is alone for property and casualty line insurers and reinsurers. Compared to this the previous largest catastrophic loss known to the insurance industry, i.e. Hurricane Andrew caused only \$16 billion in insured losses in 1991.

### Impact

Terrorism insurance was available globally as part of most of the commercial policies covering business establishments. For multinational establishments, it was available as part of their political risks insurance policy. Terrorism was a companion risk in the spectrum of other political risks like nationalisation, seizure, overthrow of the governments, etc. and it required only a casual glance by the underwriters writing for most of the territories. The pricing of terrorism cover was based on the market forces of demand and supply and the risk was looked at as part of the whole package. For larger risks however, careful selection of countries, political stability and site security were the underwriting factors before granting terrorism



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cover.

The WTC attack changed the whole scenario. In US, the terrorism cover was immediately and completely withdrawn (except in some states) by express exclusion to various commercial policies. World's remaining insurance markets including Lloyds' of London also responded in a similar fashion by putting exclusions to various policies. Cover could be granted in rare cases but the pricing was exorbitant and prohibitive.

This led to the sagging morale of the industries and enterprises when banks and financial institutions refused to advance loans in the absence of a proper terrorism cover. Since the attack, \$15.5 billion in real estate projects in 17 states have been stalled or canceled because of a scarcity of terrorism insurance in US alone, according to a September survey by the Real Estate Roundtable of USA.

### State's Intervention

The trend continued till the middle of 2002 when governments stepped in to initiate measures to bolster the availability of terrorism insurance and dilute its negative impact on the overall economy.

In UK, the government and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) announced the new arrangements for terrorism insurance by amending the provisions of Pool Re, an existing (since 1990s) government backed pool for terrorism risks. Pool Re initially covered terrorism losses from fire and explosion but under the new arrangements it will be possible to obtain cover against a wider range of perils including biological contamination and impact by aircraft. From 1 January 2003 nuclear contamination will

be added. The arrangements also include a cap on insurers' liability, after which the government will step in as insurer of last resort. From 1 January 2003 the maximum liability of individual insurers will be capped per terrorist event and per year. The level of the cap for each individual insurer will be based on its market share. The annual aggregate limits will be:

In US, the SENATE recently passed a bill to shield the insurance industry from catastrophic

costs of future terror onslaughts. The provisions of the bill are as under:

- The program would be triggered if a terrorist attack produced at least \$5 billion in insured losses in the USA.
- Each insurance company would pay a deductible before federal assistance kicks in. The deductible would be a percentage of an insurer's annual premiums: 7% in 2003, 10% in 2004 and 15% in 2005. If a terrorist incident were to occur in 2004, a company with \$1 billion in premiums would pay \$100 million in insured losses before receiving federal aid.
- The federal government would pay 90% of losses in excess of the deductible, and the company would pay the remaining 10%.
- Losses covered by the federal government would be capped at \$100 billion a year.

In the past too, various governments all over the world have been involved with Terrorism Insurance. In Israel, the government runs a mandatory insurance programme (PCTF) that pays for all the terrorist losses, funded by tax revenues. France has established a new pool for terrorism exposure, i.e. state backed GAREAT which began operating on January 1, 2002. Spain maintains a mandatory

Effective Date	Cap per Event	Cap per annum
1 January 2003	£30 million	£60 million
1 January 2004	£50 million	£100 million
1 January 2005	£75 million	£150 million
1 January 2006	£100 million	£200 million

government run programme (Consortio) financed by premiums based on property values. South Africa has SASRIA since 1979 which tackles terror insurance. In response to 9/11 attacks, many other countries including Canada, Germany and Australia are considering government backed solutions to insure against terrorist acts.

### Availability and Pricing Issues

The political risk insurance market, particularly Lloyd's, is already offering stand-alone terrorism coverage. Lloyd's coverage is going for rates of between 1 percent and 5 percent of insured limits, for both domestic



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and foreign assets. The policies cover physical damage or business interruption caused by terrorist acts. AIG is also providing stand-alone terrorism coverage, but sold out of the insurer's property and casualty division.

Another way is to buy terror coverage as part of an overall political risk package. Political risk insurers already underwrite terrorism perils in that context, usually as a component of political-violence policies. Since 9/11, there has also been a 25 percent to 50 percent across-the-board premium rate increase for political risk insurance. Those policies also cover losses associated with sabotage, war, civil conflict, and revolutions. The only catch is that political risk insurance packages cover only overseas assets against terrorist attacks, leaving domestic assets uncovered. But this option is still good for those companies that are faced with multinational terror exposure.

A survey conducted by "Risk & Insurance" to find out the availability of terrorism coverage in all industries found that only nine out of thousands of companies in US were providing first-party stand-alone coverage. Other companies were providing some level of

insurance currently available in insurance markets globally.

### Source: Risk & Insurance

Special partnerships have also begun to spring up to address terrorism coverage shortages as well. Special Risk Insurance and Reinsurance, Luxembourg (SRIR) has been created with the partnership of XL Capital Ltd., Swiss Re, SCOR, Hannover Re, and Allianz. SRIR has reported a total committed capital of EUR 500 million. But policies will only cover damage to property directly from an act of terrorism and will only be focused on Europe. Business interruption and liability losses will not be insured.

### Risk Modelling: Insurability Factor

Many in the industry believe that terrorism risk is not insurable because it cannot be quantified. Modeling companies and insurers, however, are beginning to develop new risk simulation tools for analyzing the risk and bringing clarity to the process of underwriting the terrorism risk.

COMPANY	MARKET	PRODUCT & HIGHLIGHTS OF COVERAGE	CAPACITY	BASE PREMIUM
Ace USA, Philadelphia	US & Canadian commercial property	1st party stand-alone coverage, both admitted & non-admitted	\$100 million	Exposure dependent
AIG, New York	Airline Industry	1 <sup>st</sup> party stand-alone coverage, aviation war risk, hijacking liability American International Companies, Property Terrorism Facility- worldwide, domestic & foreign property cover; property damage & BI cover; locations must be specifically named, policy period not to exceed 1 year.	\$150 million in excess of \$ 50 million in aggregate, up to \$ 850 million in excess of \$ 150 million; total of \$ 1 billion per airline. \$ 150 million per event and in aggregate (maximum any one insured).	NA  \$ 50,000 minimum
Allianz AG, Frankfurt, Germany	Airline Industry	3 <sup>rd</sup> party liability for airlines.	Up to \$ 1 billion per aircraft and up to \$ 2 billion per airline per year.	Calculated per passenger carried
Arch Capital, Bermuda	Multiple markets	Coverage on a selected basis – 1 <sup>st</sup> party property damage, excluding nuclear biochemical. Availability varies by territory.	Varies by zone.	Exposure dependent.
AXIS Specialty, Bermuda	Multiple markets	Terrorism as a 1 <sup>st</sup> party stand-alone; property, aviation, marine.	\$100 million	Between 1–2 % online
Berkshire Hathaway	Multiple markets	1 <sup>st</sup> party property coverage; 3 <sup>rd</sup> party coverage available.	\$500 million	Exposure dependent
Oil Insurance Ltd., Bermuda	Energy company cover (Oil Insurance Ltd.)	All Risks Physical Damage, Control of Well & 3 <sup>rd</sup> party Pollution Liability-open to all eligible energy companies.	\$250 million per occurrence— no sublimit.  \$150 million  \$200 million	\$250,000 per OIL rules with a \$ 5 million deductible. \$25,000 per OIL rules with a \$ 50 million deductible. \$375,000 for excess PD & \$ 1.5 million for BI.
Lloyd's of London	Multiple markets	1 <sup>st</sup> party physical damage or BI caused by terrorist acts.	\$200 million	1-5 % of insured limits.
SRIR Luxembourg (Zurich Financial Services, XL Capital Ltd., Swiss Re, Hannover Re, SCOR, Allianz)	Property Coverage	Physical loss or damages to insured properties – directly resulting from an act of terrorism. European risks only.	EUR 500 million	NA

Source: Risk & Insurance

coverage for terrorism either under third-party policies or within the specialty lines.

The table below illustrates the market, capacity and indicative premium level for the terrorism

Risk simulation requires various possibilities and their attributes to be captured within a model which will generate a large number of alternative outcomes of terrorist



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activities. Each simulated outcome is produced by sampling from probability distribution for the attack time using different weapons, the attack multiplicity, the choice of targets, the effectiveness of counter-terrorism intelligence, the security systems, weapon reliability and the loss for each weapon-target combination.

A new model, i.e. "The RMS Terrorism Risk Model" has already been developed to estimate the probability and cost of property damage, business interruption and casualties caused by 16 different modes of terrorist attacks including conventional explosives and weapons, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear scenarios. For each attack mode, the model offers high resolution simulations of all the principal agents of damage and loss, including blast pressure, airborne and ground based contaminants and the impact of exclusion zones.

### Crisis Management

It is back to basics as the WTC attack has brought the focus back on crisis management and having a proper disaster recovery plan. According to a Marsh study, for every dollar spent on developing crisis management plans, \$7 is saved in losses. Companies who didn't take the concept seriously perished without a trace but the ones who practised it, came out with flying colours after the WTC crisis.

We have a livewire example in "Morgan Stanley" who occupied the 44 through 74 floors of the WTC-2 with its 2700 employees and had another 1000 employees across Austin Tobin Plaza at 5 WTC. Morgan Stanley was the largest employer at site and had the

highest risk exposure. The second aircraft crashed directly into upper floor occupies by Morgan Stanley but all the staff had been evacuated by then. The next morning the securities firm released a well researched analysis of the financial impact of the WTC attack on the insurance industry. The company had a nicely drawn and well rehearsed crisis management plan and therefore were back in business in no time as if nothing had happened.

### Predictions and conclusion

Putting a price tag on a terror attack is extraordinarily difficult. Natural disasters such as floods or hurricanes are more predictable than the intentions and acts of terrorists. Nevertheless, the market seems to have recovered from the initial shock and trauma. Reluctance and withdrawal symptoms have given way to cautious underwriting and an increased number of insurers and reinsurers are now attempting to provide a solution to the coverage crisis. Unlike early 2001, terrorism insurance is now clearly available and a cover of even \$1 billion per location is not far-fetched. Market is set to grow further as catastrophic bond market is evincing interest in macroterrorism risks. Other Alternative Risk Techniques like securitization should follow suit. This is no surprise as risk modelling and simulation techniques on terrorism is further being strengthened by dedicated researches. Coverage is likely to further get broadened with business interruption getting its due share and the pricing becoming logical, affordable and reasonable.

*Manoj Kumar, ACII (UK), CPCU (USA), ARe (USA), ARM (USA), FIII (India). MBA is President & Managing Partner, Bancassurance Consultants Worldwide Ltd. (BCWL)*

## Public health expert: budget cuts will erode response capabilities

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bull20120307-public-health-expert-budget-cuts-will-erode-response-capabilities>

Homeland Security NewsWire's executive editor Eugene K. Chow recently got the opportunity to speak with Dr. John R. Finnegan, the dean of the University of Minnesota School of Public Health; in their interview, Dr. Finnegan discusses the devastating effects of proposed budget cuts on the U.S. public health system, why it was a

wise decision to censor the release of H5N1 flu research; and the creation of a medical reserve corps at universities.

### Homeland Security NewsWire:


In recent years, worries over a pandemic flu sweeping across the globe have made headlines



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several times. Given the increased focus on the issue in the last few years, has the United States made adequate preparations to respond effectively to a global flu incident?

**Dr. John Finnegan:** We've certainly come a



long way, there's no question about that. The federal expenditures have helped us develop plans, create the national stockpiles, and ramp up the competencies of the public health work. In some ways, it's a tough question to answer whether we've done enough. In some ways, you can answer the "have we done enough" question when something happens and you can judge what the results are.

One of my biggest concerns right now in light of federal budgetary issues is that we may lose some of the ground that I think we have gained. Lots of people like my good friend Michael Osterholm (the director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy) will have many strong opinions about additional areas we need to improve in, but for me the biggest issue right now is the loss of funding, at least with the current budget proposals, and what that actually means for our state of preparedness.

I tend to look at this a bit like military training, where the job of training is never done. It's never completed – you have new people coming in, you have new systems that need to be learned, and new processes and procedures. I know here in Minnesota, given the centers that we have here that are oriented towards public health training, I know that the job of training is never done. I put that out there because I really do believe that the funding that has gone into public health preparedness from DHS, CDC, all the federal agencies, and states, has gone a long way in taking us from total inadequate preparation to a heightened state of preparation. But, preparedness is one

of those things that if you don't pay attention to it every day you could lose it in a flash.

**HSNW:** On that note, are there any particular programs that have been slated for cuts that you're most concerned with preserving funding for?

**Dr. John R. Finnegan, dean of UM School of Public Health // Source: University of Minnesota**

**JF:** I would say the ones that worry me the most are the ones zeroing out the centers for public health preparedness in the president's proposed 2013 budget. Then there are a few other centers in the CDC budget that are zeroed out as well. One is the education and research centers and the other is the agricultural, forestry, and fishing centers – those are two centers that are focused very strongly on occupational health and safety and by zeroing out those programs, it means you'll see a dramatic reduction in the training of our public health workforce and occupational health and safety. You'll also see a decline in research that's done in that area. I'm sorry if I seem critical of the president on this, but I really do believe that the president's professed support for the working class in this country doesn't quite connect up very well with eliminating these two centers.

The Centers for Public Health Preparedness are also a major concern. I know DHS is experiencing budget cuts, like so many other agencies, and I know we're in a time where we have these budgetary issues that we have to deal with – I get that, but these programs are not consuming extraordinary amounts of money. I think the benefit that we derive from the small amount of funding that goes into these programs – the whole ends up being much bigger than just the sum of the parts here. It's an investment in the network of prevention, especially in the area of preparedness, it's an investment in building those connections, and it's an investment in connecting those dots from the federal level to the local and state level. So the loss of the Center for Public Health Preparedness, for example, is a major concern to me. As I said before, in a flash you can lose preparedness that you spent a lot of time developing.



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**HSNW:** Are there any technological developments or programs out there, in your opinion, that would be great cost savers and bolster efficacy and efficiency?

**JF:** One of the things that we did here in Minnesota was to really invest in e-learning infrastructure. We've been able to use the technology that we've developed through the state's centers and grants to reach out to a three-state area. Now we don't have to always hop in a car and drive out to rural North Dakota. We're able to do these things online, sometimes in real-time and sometimes asynchronously.

This technology in our century really makes it possible for relatively less investment than in the analog world to reach enormous numbers of people in the public health workforce with the skills they need – not just in the long-run, but also what I call “just in time learning.” The just in time learning piece is an enormously important thing because what it means is that as new issues of preparedness emerge, the learning technology allows you to quickly respond, turn that around, and get the knowledge and training out there as rapidly as you can. This is not new, when you think of the U.S. military. They are perfectly aware of the power of just in time training and of its power to accomplish these kinds of things.

One other thing I'd like to add is here in Minnesota we've made some major investments at this university in a medical reserve corps. We're probably one of the only major universities in the country that has done this. A medical reserve corps is sort of like a National Guard for public health. We basically have about 700 health science faculty, staff, and students. They range all the way from well-trained surgeons to public health students who can man phones.

The idea came about after 9/11 and we began developing it in earnest in 2003. During Katrina and Rita, we deployed four teams during the whole period of time down there. I cannot tell you how much we learned from that. Since then we've deployed in more localized disaster settings up in our neck in the woods. Not too long ago we deployed the medical corps for river flooding nearby as well as for the substantial flooding down in Iowa a few years ago. We actually deployed a veterinary team down there because the issue was there were quite a few farm animals threatened.


That's the biggest problem with preparedness when you think about it is you can't afford to maintain enormous numbers of people with nothing to do. So we're looking for strategies where you can use existing workforces like existing faculties and students when you need to increase the public health work force in case you have some sort of major emergency or issue.

We're here in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and a few years ago a bridge over the Mississippi collapsed. When it went down the response to that was so fast and well-coordinated –all the services here at the universities, city, and county were able to respond well. I'm absolutely convinced that the death toll from that bridge collapse would have been much higher had we not made the investment in the infrastructure in Minnesota to respond to that sort of utterly unexpected event and to respond smoothly, rapidly, and effectively.

**HSNW:** Last December, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity made the unprecedented move of asking journalists to censor the findings of scientists who had created an infectious new form of the H5N1 influenza virus. Was this the right move, or do you agree with critics who say this act of censorship was overly dramatic and hinders research?

**JF:** I have to say I agree with the original finding. Obviously this research that has been done had a very good scientific motivation — to understand from a genetic stand point what are the steps by which an organism like H5N1 can easily become easily passable from person to person. But it's a bit of a leap of a faith for me – and I'm not a researcher in this particular area, but as a public health person, it's a bit of a leap of faith to say, “Oh well what we were doing in the lab, even though we created the setting where this virus is much more transmissible between ferrets in an animal model, is really not lethal and not to worry.” I'm not sure I would like to take that chance at this point.

I remember in the 70s when a progressive magazine in Madison, Wisconsin published the plans to build a hydrogen bomb. It was highly controversial and everyone was afraid, but what you saw when the plan got published was you couldn't build one in your basement. If you wanted to build a hydrogen bomb you needed an enormously



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expensive military-industrial complex. Initially it seemed like the nuclear genie was going to be out of the bottle and everyone would be marching into their basement to build a nuclear bomb, but you can't do it. That is not the case with this kind of genetic work with viruses. You don't need the same kind of very complex

to do public health now and in the near future. The CDC in particular has taken an enormous whack in the current budget proposals. If you look at what's happened to it since about 2010, it's about a 20 percent decline. That to me is really cutting past the bone – you're getting to the point of amputation.



infrastructure to be able to do this and there are plenty of people all over the place with access to everything they need to engineer something along these lines.

Revealing the quantum level details of how to do this, I don't see the value in that. I don't think it would be any mystery for any good laboratory virologist for how it was done. But putting stuff like that out there does not add to our prevention knowledge per se as far as the public is concerned and probably doesn't contribute that much to other scientists. I could be wrong. I'm not a virologist, but I did not disagree with that decision to withhold some of the key details.

**HSNW:** Moving forward, what do you foresee as the greatest public health challenge over the next five years?

**JF:** I've got some real concerns about the current budget proposal impacts on our ability

You can already see what the implications of that are. Some public health organizations are estimating that nationwide you are talking about the loss of 30-40,000 front line public health jobs. That means those people are not going to be there and you need them. Public health is not just about emergencies and responding to disasters, it's about all the other aspects of chronic diseases and everything else. That helps, but it's one of those things that an agency that is so front line engaged such as CDC will suffer a blow with the loss of people, resources, and connections with the states that it may not be able to recover for a very long time. I would say one of the huge things that confronts public health in the short term, which could have very long term consequences, is our willingness as a people to fund these important activities.



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*Dr. John R. Finnegan is the dean of the University of Minnesota School of Public Health*



**Faith on the Move**

Source: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2214/religion-religious-migrants-christians-muslims-jews>

An estimated 214 million people -- about 3% of the world's population -- have migrated across international borders as of 2010. While the percentage may seem small, if the migrants were counted as one nation, they would constitute the fifth most populous country in the world, just behind Indonesia and ahead of Brazil. Nearly half of these migrants (49%) are Christians, and the top country of origin has been Mexico, followed by Russia and the Ukraine where borders changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second-largest group of migrants are Muslims (27%), among whom the largest share has come from the Palestinian territories, followed by Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.

Jewish migrants represent a smaller share of the total number of those who have crossed international borders to a new destination country. But relative to their numbers, they have by far the highest level of migration compared with other religious groups. About one-quarter of Jews alive today

have left their birth country and now live




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somewhere else. While migrants come from a very diverse and widespread array of countries, the vast majority




end up immigrating to a relatively few areas -- North America, Europe, Australia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

## EDITOR: I found it difficult to believe it...

Source: <http://thesirenvoice.blogspot.com/>



## Terrorist Network and Training Camps in America



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### The Evolution of Terrorism in Greece (1975-2009)

By Georgia Chantzi


Source: <http://www.rieas.gr>

Almost a century of international terrorism indicates that there are patterns in the development of the phenomenon that repeat throughout the years. Social, political and economic

transformations have resulted in the emergence of numerous different terrorist groups that have aimed through violence to shape the current status quo based on their ideology. Nonetheless, as stated in previous chapters each armed organization constitutes a unique case and as such should be regarded.

Terrorism in Greece emerged in an environment of international and domestic sociopolitical transformations that influenced its evolution. In general, Greek terrorist groups are mainly left oriented. They denounce any form of state authority; hence they attack government and police targets, as well as US-related which they hold responsible for the deterioration, as they perceive it, of the country.

However, nearly thirty years of continuous terrorism in Greece indicate that although left ideology is the organizations' starting point, it does not define the whole existence of the group. An excellent proof of that is RO17N, the most known yet lethal Greek



terrorist group. Even though it emerged as an ultra left extra parliamentary armed group, eventually ended as an organization of common criminals that without any solid ideological background would carry out lethal attacks for as it was proved, their personal economic profit or because they were under the delusion that in that way they were actually offering to the society. Similarly, the new generation it is adopting more of a nihilistic approach rather than an ultra left ideology.

To that extent, in order for the Greek authorities to best counter and eventually eradicate the phenomenon, it is imperative that they examine the deeper causes that lead to the eruption of extremist behaviors. The persistence of not only the authorities but also the society to conspiracy theories and the government's pursuit of their political interest could only result in serious trouble domestically; while eventually it will jeopardize country's international position.



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*Georgia Chantzis is Associate in the International Centre for Black Sea Studies, ICBSS*

**NOTE:** Read full MA thesis (Coventry University) at the Newsletter's website – "CBRNE-CT Papers" section.

### Al-Qaeda creates terrorists' base in Nigeria

Source: <http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/37425-al-qaeda-creates-terrorists-base-in-nigeria>

The terrorism challenges facing Nigeria may have been complicated by credible reports indicating that Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb has established an operational base in the North-Western part of the country to source for funding through high-profile hostage business.

led joint military command fighting the group in the Sahel region.

Contrary to reports that it was Boko Haram that kidnapped the hostages, Nigerian Tribune learnt that Maghreb group had shifted attention to Nigeria to expand its hostage taking



This is coming at a time the United States Department is said to be considering adding the Boko Haram sect to the official list of terrorist organisations in the world.

Reliable intelligence sources disclosed that the old Sokoto axis is now home to a very violent arm of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, which, during the last week, claimed responsibility for the bombing of the headquarters of the Algerian-

operations, which was said to account for large part of Al-Qaeda operational fund worldwide.

According to the source, more foreigners may be targeted in the North with possibility of extension into some southern zones, because of the belief that Nigeria is a centre for big foreign construction and oil operations.

It was learnt that while Boko Haram continues its field



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operations across the North, the Maghreb group would focus on hostage taking to fund terrorist activities of both groups within and outside Nigeria.

Reports had indicated that between 2010 and 2011, the Maghreb Al-Qaeda raked in close to fifty million dollar in ransom payments from kidnapped Europeans, part of which were

### Carlos the Jackal to Obama: Help me find terrorist pal

Source: <http://www.wnd.com/2009/03/90398/>

Emboldened by President Barack Obama's announcement he will close the Guantanamo facility housing suspected terrorists, one of the most notorious leftist terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s has written the president, asking him for help in finding a "former comrade-in-arms" missing for 14 years, and closing his letter with "Allahu akbar! ... yours in revolution."

Ilich Ramirez Sanchez – aka Carlos the Jackal – penned his letter to Obama from the Paris prison where he is serving a life sentence for the murder of two French agents and an informer, and for a series of deadly bomb attacks in Paris and on French trains, the Glasgow Sunday Herald reported today.

"Mister President, Your decision to close secret CIA jails, honors you," Carlos began before raising the issue of Bruno Breguet, a Swiss national who served as his right-hand man.

The letter continued:

Our comrade Bruno Breguet, a Swiss citizen, was abducted on 11th November 1995 from a ferry-boat between Italy and Greece, in a special operation with NATO naval support.

We pray you to have Bruno released.

We were informed, unofficially, that Bruno died accidentally during interrogation at a U.S. base in the south of Hungary.

Breguet, born in 1950, served 7 years of a 15-year sentence in the 1970s for bringing explosives into Israel to blow up a high rise in Tel Aviv on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. While Israel refused to release him in response

reportedly contributed to the worldwide jihadist movement.

The presence of the group in Nigeria, credible security sources noted, was not just to support Boko Haram but to expand the source of revenue for the worldwide jihadist movement, which had suffered some funding setbacks from Western Europe and Middle East.



Bruno Breguet

to PFLP demands during the hijacking of several airliners to Jordan in September 1970, the Jewish state pardoned him in 1977 following a "humanitarian campaign" led by numerous intellectuals, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Noam Chomsky.

In 1982, Breguet was arrested by Paris police, along with Carlos' wife, for transporting explosives and attempting to shoot a police officer. The gun misfired. The arrests and subsequent prosecution were met with a reign of terror orchestrated by the Venezuela-born Carlos, who was supported

by the Soviet KGB and other Eastern European communist secret services.

In the months that followed, eight deadly attacks were launched on French targets after France refused to release his wife and Breguet.

Twenty people were killed and many more injured.

Breguet, who was convicted, received early release in 1985 and returned to Switzerland where, by all accounts, he lived a quiet life. Carlos was sentenced to life in absentia in 1992 by France for his terror attacks and captured in Sudan in 1994. He was returned to Paris and has been in prison since.

**Breguet disappeared in November 1995 after traveling from Greece (Igoumenitsa port) to Italy by ferry. Italian**

**authorities refused him entry and returned him on the same boat. He was not seen again.**



Carlos the Jackal ... captured



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Rumors of Breguet's fate abound: He was taken by NATO naval commandos from the ferry and moved to Hungary where he died during interrogation. Hungary denies any rendition occurred on its soil. He was arrested by Greek authorities, a claim denied by Greece's interior minister three months after the disappearance. A Hungarian paper reported rumors that Breguet was killed by Carlos' associates after he expressed his intention to break all ties to his former comrades. A body found partially encased in concrete in a Greek village near Albania and Italy in 2001 raised false hopes among authorities they had solved the mystery.

Carlos' 2003 book, "Revolutionary Islam" called on "all revolutionaries, including those of the left, even atheists," to accept the leadership of Islamists such as Osama bin Laden in order to turn Iraq and Afghanistan into "graveyards of American imperialism."

"Only a coalition of Marxists and Islamists can destroy the United States," the communist

revolutionary and convert to Islam wrote in his book.

His Islamic worldview was reflected in the letter to Obama, where he referred to Breguet as a "martyr":

If Bruno truly is dead, we need his body back, so his relatives, friends and comrades, may mourn in neutral Switzerland, this hero of the Palestinian cause, and his eternal soul join our martyrs in heaven.

Carlos concluded by reminding the president of his own Muslim grandfather, Hussein Onyango Obama, who converted to Islam in the 1950s after having been imprisoned and tortured in Kenya by the British during the Mau Mau rebellion.

I pray God Almighty that one day the peoples of our continent, free at last, may shout with one voice: "God bless our America! And as your Luo grandfather would say: ALLAHU AKBAR!

I remain, Mister President, yours in revolution, "Carlos".

## Medical CBRNE Response Integration

By LTC Ken Shaw, U.S. Army, O.D.

Source: <http://cbrnresourcenetwork.com/newsDetail.cfm?id=36>

Medical CBRNE response is seeing greater integration within special event contingency planning.

### There is No Excuse for Being Unprepared


Special events are of great importance in emergency management. What qualifies as a special event varies depending on the size of the emergency management agency responsible for protecting it. This article will discuss the integration of medical capabilities into the Special Event Contingency Planning process with particular attention to CBRNE medical capabilities. It will also discuss the detailed planning steps and coordination necessary between diverse agencies to achieve the desired effective response capability. There are different ways to achieve the same result (a capable plan with adequate assets available).

Special events may be festivals, concerts, Independence Day celebrations, parades, or any other event that draws large crowds. Hazards that create dangers to the public vary considerably from the spectators themselves when they create incidents (such as have

happened in European soccer matches) to dangers resulting from the event itself (for example, accidents involving crowd at NASCAR races, airshow accidents, etc.). Events that draw large crowds may be attractive to terrorists, such as Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, New Year's Eve at Times Square, and other venues. There are several specific types of special events, including Incidents of National Significance and National Special Security Events (NSSE).

### Planning

"The purpose of having a pre-event plan in place is to reduce response times and better enable agencies to improvise because they have discussed contingencies beforehand. A pre-event plan defines roles and responsibilities in advance and creates ownership of potential problems for agencies that are involved in the process." (FEMA 2005) FEMA defines the Special Event Contingency Planning process as consisting of forming the planning team, conducting a threat/risk



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assessment, and responding to incidents. (FEMA n.d.)

The planning team can be implemented through a two-step process using a Preliminary Working Group to define the mission and the chain of command; perform the threat/risk assessment (also known as an event hazard analysis or security assessment); develop facts and assumptions; determine the capabilities needed and assets available within the region; and determine those who will be required for the formal Planning Group. The Planning Group then develops the full plan and conducts exercises or rehearsals to test the plan.

The mission needs to be defined clearly to get everyone working on the same goal. A clear chain of command is necessary to define who has the authority to make decisions and resolve conflicts. The Incident Command System can be used as a model.

The threat assessment/risk assessment drives the requirements for both personnel and equipment assets. Terrorism may be the primary threat, although natural disasters such as tornados, earthquakes and such may be of greater concern. Industrial or transportation accidents that release toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) may be the primary threat. Planners must know the local threats including nuclear power plants, chemical factories, rail lines or highways that carry TICs or nuclear materials. These may become “tools” for the terrorists to use. A thorough knowledge of the vulnerabilities is essential. Critical infrastructure such as power, water, gas, telecommunications and other assets must be protected. Transportation modes and facilities – railroad and bus depots, airports, public and private parking garages, and the like should be considered. Even airspace in some instances may fall under the planners’ responsibilities. Fortunately, there are a number of resources to access. Local governments are required to conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, and the FBI and state law enforcement agencies often have fusion cells. If not, they have intelligence cells and specialists who can provide much relevant information.

After the hazards have been identified, the team must weigh and compare the risks. This is accomplished by determining the relative threat posed by each, identifying the most likely, and the most dangerous (highest potential for mass casualties). The team can then develop scenarios from these. It is

important for all to understand that the scenarios cannot anticipate all possible hazards or risks. Facts and assumptions are necessary to identify important factors to the response. Implied tasks are developed from each fact and assumption.

### Role of Groups

The Preliminary Planning Group will decide which agencies, organizations, and individuals will be necessary to develop the plan. These will likely include the fire department, police, EOD, and certainly medical assets such as EMS, local hospitals, public health agencies, and other individuals with special knowledge/experience. Note that some jurisdictions require minimal levels of medical support for various sized events. Ensure you comply with the local regulations. Some medical options may include aid stations which must be well positioned and marked.

Having ambulances on site may be adequate for most conventional incident scenarios, but will not if large Mass Casualty (MASCAL) scenarios are possible. These may result if improvised explosive devices (IEDs), chemical, biological, or radiological terrorism is possible. The ideal response includes triage, staging, and transportation areas. Many hospitals and EMS Systems cannot provide this capability; they rely on “Scoop & Run.” In CBRN incidents, the “Scoop & Run” plan is totally inadequate. The Planning Group must learn the capabilities of the medical assets in the area and include them in exercises prior to special events or emergency responses.

The Planning Group will choose which of the scenarios is most important to develop. The ideal choices will include a combination of the most likely and the most dangerous. It is important not to choose too many. The base scenario should require a response that is most applicable to all scenarios. The response to almost all scenarios will have 90 to 95 percent of the elements in common, so the other scenarios chosen should emphasize elements that differ significantly from the base scenario. Representative differing elements include decontamination and an active shooter or sniper.

There are many medical factors to consider. An excellent list is available in the Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual (FEMA 2005) from page



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2-34 to 2-43. An Emergency Medical Services Venue Assessment Checklist is included on pages A-53 and A-54 of Appendix A: Job Aids. There is a long list of medical factors from concerns about alcohol and drug use at some events to how medical personnel will be identified to communication methods to the methods of ensuring the proper patients go to the proper types of hospitals.

In-Progress Reviews (IPRs) are meetings used to develop the response plans from each participating agency. IPRs should be held on the actual ground of the event so that the planners can walk (or drive) the area as they plan the response. During the IPR, a synchronization matrix should be developed to coordinate the actions of each responding agency at each step of the response. The Planning Group begins with the base scenario. Each organization records their response to each step in the scenario in a step-by-step fashion. Then synchronize all actions for each step of the response. After the base scenario is complete, the other scenarios are developed in the same way. Have each agency determine what actions will be different at each step.

The synchronization matrix should detail whom each organization needs to communicate with at each step of the matrix. Ensure there is a dedicated, integrated, multi-agency frequency (or frequencies) for communications and a common radio system for all responders. The Planning Group should develop a common list of responders, radio frequencies, and cell phone numbers for all organizations.

The synchronization matrix should also list all of the equipment and transportation needs for

each organization for each step of the matrix. It can prescribe reserved routes for emergency vehicles, reverse traffic flow patterns, VIP evacuation routes, and staging and transportation areas.

Maps of the site should be developed and given to all responders to provide a common operating picture. The maps should allow everyone to see the same street names and important points such as landing zones, command posts, aid stations, evacuation routes, decontamination and secondary decontamination locations and Quick Response Force positions. It should have grids for easy reference and all should understand the reference system. Of course, as the maps contain sensitive information, they should be numbered and responders held accountable for them. After the plan has been developed, an exercise should be conducted to test the plan. All key leaders and participants should physically walk through the main scenarios on site using the final plan and synchronization matrix.

The process of planning for special events is a time-intensive process, but it is crucial to ensure the safety of those for whom we are responsible. The plan provides a framework, and for any response it will be necessary to depart from the plan at some point. An essential quality of good emergency managers and responders is the ability to adapt to rapidly changing and unforeseeable situations. The plan is a product, but not the most important; the planning process is far more important.

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### Olympics 2012 security: welcome to lockdown London

Source: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/mar/12/london-olympics-security-lockdown-london>

As a metaphor for the London Olympics, it could hardly be more stark. The much-derided "Wenlock" Olympic mascot is now available in London Olympic stores dressed as a Metropolitan police officer. For £10.25 you, too, can own the ultimate symbol of the



Games: a member of by far the biggest and most expensive security operation in recent British history packaged as tourist commodity. Eerily, his single panoptic-style eye, peering out from



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beneath the police helmet, is reminiscent of the all-seeing eye of God so commonly depicted at the top of Enlightenment paintings. In these, God's eye maintained a custodial and omniscient surveillance on His unruly subjects far below on terra firma.

The imminent Olympics will take place in a city still recovering from riots that the Guardian-LSE Reading the Riots project showed were partly fuelled by resentment at their lavish cost. Last week, the UK spending watchdog warned that the overall costs of the Games were set to be at least £11bn – £2 bn over even recently inflated budgets. When major infrastructure projects such as Crossrail, speeded up for the Games, are factored in, the figure may be as high as £24bn, according to Sky News. The estimated cost put forward only seven years ago when the Games were won was £2.37 bn. With the required numbers of security staff more than doubling in the last year, estimates of the Games' immediate security costs have doubled from £282m to £553m. Even these figures are likely to end up as dramatic underestimates: the final security budget of the 2004 Athens Olympics were around £1bn.

All this in a city convulsed by massive welfare, housing benefit and legal aid cuts, spiralling unemployment and rising social protests. It is darkly ironic, indeed, that large swaths of London and the UK are being thrown into ever deeper insecurity while being asked to pay for a massive security operation, of unprecedented scale, largely to protect wealthy and powerful people and corporations.

Critics of the Olympics have not been slow to point out the dark ironies surrounding the police Wenlock figure. "Water cannon and steel cordon sold separately," mocks Dan Hancox on the influential Games Monitor website. "Baton rounds may be unsuitable for small children."

In addition to the concentration of sporting talent and global media, the London Olympics will host the biggest mobilisation of military and security forces seen in the UK since the Second World War. **More troops – around 13,500 – will be deployed than are currently at war in Afghanistan.** The growing security

force is being estimated at anything between 24,000 and 49,000 in total. Such is the secrecy that no one seems to know for sure.

During the Games an aircraft carrier will dock on the Thames. Surface-to-air missile systems will scan the skies. Unmanned drones, thankfully without lethal missiles, will loiter above the gleaming stadiums and opening and closing ceremonies. RAF Typhoon Eurofighters will fly from RAF Northolt. A thousand armed US diplomatic and FBI agents and 55 dog teams will patrol an Olympic zone partitioned off from the wider city by an 11-mile, £80m, 5,000-volt electric fence.

Beyond these security spectacles, more stealthy changes are underway. New, punitive and potentially invasive laws such as the London Olympic Games Act 2006 are in force. These legitimise the use of force, potentially by private security companies, to proscribe Occupy-style protests. They also allow Olympic security personnel to deal forcibly with the display of any commercial material that is deemed to challenge the complete



management of London as a "clean city" to be branded for the global TV audience wholly by prime corporate sponsors (including McDonald's, Visa and Dow Chemical).

London is also being wired up with a new range of scanners, biometric ID cards, number-plate and facial-recognition CCTV systems, disease tracking systems, new police control centres and checkpoints. These will intensify the sense of lockdown in a city which is already a byword across the world



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for remarkably intensive surveillance.

Many such systems, deliberately installed to exploit unparalleled security budgets and relatively little scrutiny or protest, have been designed to linger long after the athletes and VIPs have left. Already, the Dorset police are proudly boasting that their new number-plate recognition cameras, built for sailing events, are allowing them to catch criminals more effectively.

In Athens, the \$300m "super-panopticon" CCTV and information system built for the Games following intense US pressure remained after the event, along with the disused sports facilities. In fact, the system has been used by Greek police trying in vain to control the mass uprisings responding to the crash and savage austerity measures in the

In the context of post-austerity Britain, these figures are eye-watering. Even more remarkably, given that Olympics budgets have drawn down from many other public and lottery funds, and are no doubt adding hugely to UK national debt, the Daily Telegraph recently argued that the security operation for the Olympics were "key to aiding the recovery of UK plc".

How can we make sense of this situation? Four connected points need emphasis here. The first is that, amid a global economic crash, so-called "homeland security" industries – a loose confederation of defence, IT and biotechnology industries – are in bonanza mode. As this post 9/11 paradigm is being diffused around the world, the industry – worth \$142bn in 2009 – is expected to be worth a staggering \$2.7tn



country.

It is important to remember that all this is ostensibly designed to secure the spectacle of 17,000 athletes competing for 17 days. Even if London's overall security budget remains similar to that of Athens, that works out at the startling figure of £59,000 of public money to secure each competitor or £3,500 per competitor per day. In 2004, the cost in now-bankrupt Athens was £90,000 per competitor (for a smaller number of athletes than are likely to attend London). This was a major contributor, as part of the overall £10bn costs, to Greece's subsequent debt crisis.

globally between 2010 and 2020. Growth rates are between 5% and 12% a year.

The UK, long an exemplar "surveillance society", is especially attractive to these industries, especially when hosting the Olympics. Recent security industry magazines have been full of articles excitedly extolling the Olympics as a "key driver of the industry" or as "keeping the market buoyant".

Nation states, and the EU, are struggling to ensure that their corporations get a piece of the action in markets long dominated by US and Israeli firms. Ramping up surveillance is thus now as much a part of



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economic policy as a response to purported threats.

The security boom is unaffected, or perhaps even fuelled, by the global crash, as wealthy and powerful elites across the world seek ever-more fortified lifestyles. Essentially, it is about defence and security corporations building huge new income streams by systematically exploiting three linked trends: the lucrative possibilities created by post 9/11 fears; widening privatisation and out-sourcing in the context of deep austerity programmes; and the desire of big city and national governments to brand themselves as secure destinations for major global events.

Particular glee that Israeli-style security arrangements are now being widely implemented is evident among the CEOs of large Israeli security and defence contractors, which are doing especially well in the security boom. Leo Gleser is president of ISDS, a company that proudly proclaims that it was established by ex-Mossad agents and which was involved in £200m worth of security contracts for the Athens Games. He talks of "growing tsunamis of violence, criminal acts, and global insecurity triggered by the 9/11 events" which made the "the western world finally understand that measures had to be taken".



Booming security markets are so lucrative that accusations of corruption are often made. Siemens, a major security contractor at Athens, allegedly paid huge bribes to get the job from its internal slush fund.

Crucially, though, as Naomi Klein points out in her book *The Shock Doctrine*, the security boom also involves attempts to diffuse the technologies honed in counterinsurgency and colonial war in places such as Gaza, Kabul and Baghdad – drones, helicopters, data mining, biometrics, security zones, so-called "non-lethal weapons" (devices used to disperse crowds) – to the domestic "global" cities of Asia and the west.

Olympics are especially important opportunities to cement the security boom still further. They are the ultimate global security shop windows through which states and corporations can advertise their latest high-tech wares to burgeoning global markets while making massive profits.

"The Olympics is a tremendous opportunity to showcase what the private sector can do in the security space," a Whitehall official was quoted recently as saying in a *Financial Times* defence supplement. "Not only do you have a UK security kitemark on the product but



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you've got an Olympic kitemark to boot."

The main security contractor for the London Olympics – G4S, more familiar under its old Group 4 moniker – is the world's largest security company. Beyond its £130m Olympic security contracts, it operates the world's largest private security force – 630,000 people – taking up a myriad of outsourced contracts. It secures prisons, asylum detention centres, oil and gas installations, VIPs, embassies, airports (including those in Doncaster and Baghdad) and infrastructure, and operates in 125 countries.

According to its website, G4S specialises in particular in what it terms "executive style life-support in hazardous environments". (Presumably this refers to Baghdad and not east London.) After buying up the ArmorGroup security company in 2008, it also now runs a large number of operations in Iraq. This month

civilian threats that lurk within their own cities and the infrastructures that connect them.

In practice, such a shift has massive and troubling implications. As we have seen with the so-called war on terror, it works to dramatically blur longstanding legal, political and ethical lines demarcating war and war-like acts from peace and criminal acts. It also fuses policing, military operations and the intelligence services much more closely as all three seek to build bigger and bigger surveillance operations to try to predict threats, especially those within the vulnerable labyrinths of big cities.

Such an approach translates easily into a deep suspicion of cosmopolitan cities, multi-ethnic populations and the rights of migrant citizens, a process accelerated by the 7/7 atrocities in London the day after the Olympics were announced in 2005.

In May 2011 the Metropolitan Police



it was announced that G4S will also be the first private security corporation to run UK police stations with over half of Lincolnshire's police force actually moving over to the company.

The second point is that the homeland and Olympic security boom is being fuelled by the widening adoption of the idea of "asymmetric" war as the key security idea among nation states, militaries and corporations. Here, rather than war with other states, the main challenge for states is deemed to be mobilising more or less permanently against vague non-state or

announced that they were redeploying 290 cameras that had been installed as counter-terror systems in two predominantly Muslim areas of Birmingham to London for the Games. Recently, the Home Office warned Waltham Forest Council – home of part of the Olympic Park – that it is home to a large group of radicalised second- and third-generation Asian Britons who potentially pose a terrorist threat to the Games.



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More visibly, this shift means that the familiar security architecture of airports and international borders – checkpoints, scanners, ID cars, cordons, security zones – start to materialise in the hearts of cities. What this amounts to, in practice, is an effort to roll out the well-established architecture and surveillance of the airport to parts of the wider, open city. The "rings of steel" around the City and Docklands in London were early examples of this.

The third explanation for the Olympic security boom is to be found by looking in more detail at how risks are considered in planning the events since the 9/11 attacks. Olympics security operations have grown beyond all recognition since 2000 because they have

London Games outlines in detail 27 possible threat scenarios and the means to counter them. Meeting them helps also to demonstrate the awesome power, and elite status, of the host city or state in the wider world.

This helps account for the ever-more baroque security and surveillance operations surrounding Olympic events. It also helps explain how, under enormous pressure from the US – whose security corporations benefited hugely in the process – the security budget for Sydney (\$180m, or \$16,000 an athlete) was multiplied eight times for Athens only four years later (\$1.5bn and \$142,000, respectively). The Beijing operations, in an authoritarian country, not surprisingly eclipsed both Athens and London and came in at a staggering \$6.5bn.



been shaped by new types of risk assessment. The symbolic importance and prestige of the Games for cities, nations and corporations has meant that historical ideas of proportionality have basically been abandoned. Instead, as Canadian sociologists Phil Boyle and Kevin Haggerty have shown, security planning has tried to create the impossible illusion of total security by countering all threats, no matter how outlandish, unlikely or nightmarish. Crucially, all such threats are now deemed equally valid. A model developed by the Rand corporation to help with planning for the

The final point is how the security operations of Olympics have major long-term legacies for their host cities and nations. The security preoccupations of Olympics present unprecedented opportunities to push through highly elitist, authoritarian and speculative urban planning efforts that otherwise would be much more heavily contested – especially in democracies. These often work to "purify" or "cleanse" diverse and messy realities of city life and portray existing places as "waste" or "derelict" spaces to be



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transformed by mysterious "trickle-down effects". The scale and nature of evictions and the clearance of streets of those deemed not to befit such events can seem like systematic ethnic or social cleansing. To make way for the Beijing Games, 1.5 million were evicted; clearances of local businesses and residents in London, though more stealthy, have been marked.

Such efforts often amount in effect to expensive, privatised, elitist and gentrifying projects such as the Westfield shopping centre in Stratford (the first UK shopping centre, incidentally, to have explosives scanners at all entrances).

During the Games themselves, so-called "Olympic Divides" are especially stark. In London, a citywide system of dedicated VIP "Games lanes" are being installed. Using normally public road space, these will allow 4,000 luxury, chauffeur-driven BMWs to shuttle 40,000 Olympic officials, national bureaucrats, politicians and corporate sponsors speedily between their five-star hotels, super-yachts and cordoned-off VIP lounges within the arenas. It has recently been shown that wealthy tourists

will be able to enter the VIP lanes by purchasing £20,000 package trips.

Ordinary Londoners, meanwhile – who are paying heavily for the Games through council tax hikes – will experience much worse congestion. Even their ambulances will be proscribed from the lanes if they are not running blue lights.

More broadly, a huge increase in land values tends to benefit only the wealthy property speculators and financiers that are best placed to ride the wave. Already, the Qatar royal family have bought the 1,400 homes of the Olympic village in a deal worth £557m.

Looking at these various points together shows one thing: contemporary Olympics are society on steroids. They exaggerate wider trends. Far removed from their notional or founding ideals, these events dramatically embody changes in the wider world: fast-increasing inequality, growing corporate power, the rise of the homeland security complex, and the shift toward much more authoritarian styles of governance utterly obsessed by the global gaze and prestige of media spectacles.

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## A Practical Guide to Situational Awareness

By Scott Stewart

Source: <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/practical-guide-situational-awareness>

For the past three weeks we have been running a series in the Security Weekly that focuses on some of the fundamentals of terrorism. First, we noted that terrorism is a tactic not exclusive to any one group and that the tactic would not end even if the jihadist threat were to disappear. We then discussed how actors planning terrorist attacks have to follow a planning process and noted that there are times during that process when such plots are vulnerable to detection.

Last week we discussed how one of the most important vulnerabilities during the terrorism planning process is surveillance, and we outlined what bad surveillance looks like and described some basic tools to help identify those conducting it. At the end of last week's Security Weekly we also discussed how living in a state of paranoia and looking for a terrorist behind every bush not only is

dangerous to one's physical and mental health but also results in poor security. This brings us to this week, where we want to discuss the fundamentals of situational awareness and explain how people can practice the technique in a relaxed and sustainable way.

Situational awareness is very important, not just for personal security but as a fundamental building block in collective security. Because of this importance, Stratfor has written about situational awareness many times in the past. However, we believe it merits repeating again in order to share these concepts with our new readers as well as serve as a reminder for our longtime readers.

### More Mindset than Skill

It is important to note that situational awareness -- being aware of one's surroundings and



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identifying potential threats and dangerous situations -- is more of a mindset than a hard skill. Because of this, situational awareness is not something that can be practiced only by highly trained government agents or specialized corporate security teams. Indeed, it can be exercised by anyone with the will and the discipline to do so. Situational awareness is not only important for recognizing terrorist threats, but it also serves to identify criminal behavior and other dangerous situations.

The primary element in establishing this mindset is first to recognize that threats exist. Ignorance or denial of a threat make a person's chances of quickly recognizing an emerging threat and avoiding it highly unlikely. Bad things do happen. Apathy, denial and complacency can be deadly.

A second important element of the proper mindset is understanding the need to take responsibility for one's own security. The resources of any government are finite and the authorities simply cannot be everywhere and cannot stop every potential terrorist attack or other criminal action. The same principle applies to private security at businesses or other institutions, like places of worship. Therefore, people need to look out for themselves and their neighbors.

Another important facet of this mindset is learning to trust your "gut" or intuition. Many times a person's subconscious can notice subtle signs of danger that the conscious mind has difficulty quantifying or articulating. I have interviewed many victims who experienced such feelings of danger prior to an incident but who chose to ignore them. Trusting your gut and avoiding a potentially dangerous situation may cause you a bit of inconvenience, but ignoring such feelings can lead to serious trouble.

The discipline part of practicing situational awareness refers to the conscious effort required to pay attention to gut feelings and to surrounding events even while you are busy and distracted. At such times even obvious hostile activity can go unnoticed, so individuals need to learn to be observant even while doing other things.

### Levels of Awareness

People typically operate on five distinct levels of awareness. There are many ways to describe these levels ("Cooper's colors," for example, which is a system frequently used in

law enforcement and military training), but perhaps the most effective way to illustrate the differences between the levels is to compare them to the different degrees of attention we practice while driving. For our purposes here we will refer to the five levels as "tuned out," "relaxed awareness," "focused awareness," "high alert" and "comatose."

The first level, tuned out, is similar to when you are driving in a very familiar environment or are engrossed in thought, a daydream, a song on the radio or even by the kids fighting in the backseat. Increasingly, cellphone calls and texting are also causing people to tune out while they drive. Have you ever arrived somewhere in your vehicle without even really thinking about your drive there? If so, then you've experienced being tuned out.

The second level of awareness, relaxed awareness, is like defensive driving. This is a state in which you are relaxed but are also watching the other cars on the road and are looking at the road ahead for potential hazards. For example, if you are approaching an intersection and another driver looks like he may not stop, you tap your brakes to slow your car in case he does not. Defensive driving does not make you weary, and you can drive this way for a long time if you have the discipline to keep yourself from slipping into tuned-out mode. If you are practicing defensive driving you can still enjoy the trip, look at the scenery and listen to the radio, but you cannot allow yourself to get so engrossed in those distractions that they exclude everything else. You are relaxed and enjoying your drive, but you are still watching for road hazards, maintaining a safe following distance and keeping an eye on the behavior of the drivers around you.

The next level of awareness, focused awareness, is like driving in hazardous road conditions. You need to practice this level of awareness when you are driving on icy or slushy roads -- or the pothole-infested roads populated by erratic drivers that exist in many developing countries. When you are driving in such an environment, you need to keep two hands on the wheel at all times and have your attention totally focused on the road and the other drivers around you. You don't dare take your eyes off the road or let your attention wander. There is no time for cellphone calls or other distractions. The



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level of concentration required for this type of driving makes it extremely tiring and stressful. A drive that you normally would not think twice about will totally exhaust you under these conditions because it demands prolonged and total concentration.

The fourth level of awareness is high alert. This is the level that induces an adrenaline rush, a prayer and a gasp for air all at the same time. This is what happens when that car you are watching at the intersection ahead doesn't stop at the stop sign and pulls out right in front of you. High alert can be scary, but at this level you are still able to function. You can hit your brakes and keep your car under control. In fact, the adrenaline rush you get at this stage can sometimes aid your reflexes.

The last level of awareness, comatose, is what happens when you literally freeze at the wheel and cannot respond to stimuli, either because you have fallen asleep or, at the other end of the spectrum, because you are petrified. It is this panic-induced paralysis that concerns us most in relation to situational awareness. The comatose level is where you go into shock, your brain ceases to process information and you simply cannot react to the reality of the situation. Many times when this happens, a person can go into denial, believing that "this can't be happening to me," or the person can feel as though he or she is observing the event rather than actually participating in it. Often, the passage of time will seem to grind to a halt. Crime victims frequently report experiencing this sensation and being unable to act during an unfolding crime.


### Finding the Right Level

Now that we've discussed the different levels of awareness, let's focus on identifying what level is ideal at a given time. The body and mind both require rest, so we have to spend several hours each day at the comatose level while asleep. When we are sitting at our homes watching a movie or reading a book, it is perfectly fine to operate in the tuned-out mode. However, some people will attempt to maintain the tuned-out mode in decidedly inappropriate environments (e.g., when they are out on the street at night in a Third World barrio), or they will maintain a mindset wherein they deny that criminals can victimize them. "That couldn't happen to me, so there's no need to watch for it." This results in their being tuned out to any potential threats.

If you are tuned out while you are driving and something happens -- say, a child runs out into the road or a car stops quickly in front of you -- you will not see the problem coming. This usually means that you either do not see the hazard in time to avoid it and you hit it, or you totally panic, freeze and cannot react to it -- neither is good. These reactions (or lack of reactions) occur because it is very difficult to change mental states quickly, especially when the adjustment requires moving several steps, say, from tuned out to high alert. It is like trying to shift your car directly from first gear into fifth and it shudders and stalls. Many times, when people are forced to make this mental jump and they panic (and stall), they go into shock and will actually freeze and be unable to take any action -- they go comatose. This happens not only when driving but also when a criminal catches someone totally unaware and unprepared. While training does help people move up and down the alertness continuum, it is difficult for even highly trained individuals to transition from tuned out to high alert. This is why law enforcement and military personnel receive so much training on situational awareness.

It is critical to stress here that situational awareness does not mean being paranoid or obsessively concerned about security. In fact, people simply cannot operate in a state of focused awareness for extended periods, and high alert can be maintained only for very brief periods before exhaustion sets in. The "fight-or-flight" response can be very helpful if it can be controlled. When it gets out of control, however, a constant stream of adrenaline and stress is simply not healthy for the body and mind, and this also hampers security. Therefore, operating constantly in a state of high alert is not the answer, nor is operating for prolonged periods in a state of focused alert, which can also be demanding and completely enervating. The human body was simply not designed to operate under constant stress. All people, even highly skilled operators, require time to rest and recover.

Because of this, the basic level of situational awareness that should be practiced most of the time is relaxed awareness, a state of mind that can be maintained indefinitely without all the stress and fatigue associated with focused awareness or high alert. Relaxed awareness is not tiring, and it



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allows you to enjoy life while rewarding you with an effective level of personal security. When people are in an area where there is potential danger (which, in reality, is almost anywhere), they should go through most of the day in a state of relaxed awareness. Then if they spot something out of the ordinary that could be a threat, they can "dial up" to a state of focused awareness and take a careful look at that potential threat (and also look for others in the area). If the possible threat proves innocuous, or is simply a false alarm, they can dial back down into relaxed awareness and continue on their way. If, on the other hand, the potential threat becomes a probable threat, seeing it in advance allows a person to take actions to avoid it. In such a case they may never need to elevate to high alert, since they have avoided the problem at an early stage.

However, once a person is in a state of focused awareness they are far better prepared to handle the jump to high alert if the threat does change from potential to actual -- if the three guys lurking on the corner do start advancing and look as if they are reaching for weapons.

Of course, when a person knowingly ventures into an area that is very dangerous, it is only prudent to practice focused awareness while in that area. For example, if there is a specific section of highway where a lot of improvised explosive devices detonate and ambushes occur, or if there is a part of a city that is controlled (and patrolled) by criminal gangs -- and the area cannot be avoided for whatever reason -- it would be prudent to practice a heightened level of awareness when in those areas. An increased level of awareness is also prudent when engaging in common or everyday tasks, such as visiting an ATM or walking to the car in a dark parking lot. When the time of potential danger has passed, it is then easy to shift back to a state of relaxed awareness.

People can hone their situational awareness ability by practicing some simple drills. For example, you can consciously move your awareness level up to a focused state for short periods of time during the day. Some examples

of this can include identifying all the exits when you enter a building, counting the number of people in a restaurant or subway car, or noting which cars take the same turns in traffic. One trick that many law enforcement officers are taught is to take a look at the people around them and attempt to figure out their stories, in other words, what they do for a living, their mood, what they are focused on and what it appears they are preparing to do that day, based merely on observation. Employing such simple focused-awareness drills will train a person's mind to be aware of these things almost subconsciously when the person is in a relaxed state of awareness.

This situational awareness process also demonstrates the importance of people being familiar with their environment and the dangers that are present there. Such awareness permits some threats to be avoided and others to be guarded against when you must venture into a dangerous area.

Not everyone is forced to live in the type of intense threat environment currently found in places like Mogadishu, Juarez or Kandahar. Nonetheless, average citizens all over the world face many different kinds of threats on a daily basis -- from common thieves and assailants to criminals and mentally disturbed individuals intending to conduct violent acts to militants wanting to carry out large-scale attacks.

As we noted two weeks ago, some of the steps required to conduct these attacks must be accomplished in a manner that makes the actions visible to the potential victim and outside observers -- if people are looking for such actions. It is at these junctures that people practicing situational awareness can detect these attack steps, avoid the danger themselves and alert the authorities to protect others.

As the jihadist threat continues to devolve from one based on al Qaeda the group to one based on grassroots cells and lone wolves, grassroots defenders -- ordinary citizens practicing good situational awareness -- become more important than ever before.



**Saudi Grand Mufti Calls for "Destruction of All Churches in Region"****By Raymond Ibrahim**Source: <http://www.meforum.org/3191/saudi-church-destruction>

According to several Arabic news sources, last Monday, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, declared that it is "necessary to destroy all the churches of the region."

The Grand Mufti made his assertion in response to a question posed by a delegation from Kuwait: a Kuwaiti parliament member recently called for the "removal" of churches (he later "clarified" by saying he merely meant that no churches should be built in Kuwait), and the delegation wanted to confirm Sharia's position on churches.

Accordingly, the Grand Mufti "stressed that Kuwait was a part of the Arabian Peninsula, and therefore it is necessary to destroy all churches in it."

As with many grand muftis before him, the Sheikh based his proclamation on the famous tradition, or hadith, wherein the prophet of Islam declared on his deathbed that "There are not to be two religions in the [Arabian] Peninsula," which has always been interpreted to mean that only Islam can be practiced in the region.

While the facts of this account speak for themselves, consider further:

Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah is not just some random Muslim hating on churches. He is the Grand Mufti of the nation that brought Islam to the world. Moreover, he is the President of the Supreme Council of Ulema [Islamic scholars] and Chairman of the Standing Committee for Scientific Research and Issuing of Fatwas. Accordingly, when it comes to what Islam teaches, his words are immensely authoritative.

Considering the hysteria that besets the West whenever non-authoritative individuals offend Islam—for instance, a fringe, unknown pastor—imagine what would happen if a

Christian counterpart to the Grand Mufti, say the Pope, were to declare that all mosques in Italy must be destroyed; imagine the nonstop Western media frenzy that would erupt, all the shrill screams of "intolerance" and "bigot," demands for apologies if not resignation, nonstop handwringing by sensitive politicians,



and worse.

Yet the Grand Mufti—the highest Islamic law authority of our "friend-and-ally" Saudi Arabia—gets a free pass when he incites Muslims to destroy churches, not that any extra incitement is needed (nary a month goes by without several churches being bombed and destroyed throughout the Islamic world). In fact, at the time of this writing, I have not seen this story, already some three days old, translated on any English news source, though "newsworthy" stories are often translated in mere hours.

Likewise, consider the significance of the Grand Mufti's rationale for destroying churches: it is simply based on a hadith. But when non-Muslims evoke hadiths—this one or the countless others that incite violence and intolerance against the "infidel"—they are accused of being "Islamophobes," of intentionally slandering and misrepresenting



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Islam, of being obstacles on the road to "dialogue," and so forth.

Which leads to perhaps the most important point: Islam's teachings are so easily ascertained; there is no mystery in determining what is "right" and "wrong" in Islam. The Grand Mufti based his fatwa on a canonical hadith, which Muslims and (informed) non-Muslims know is part of Islam's sources of jurisprudence (or *usul al-fiqh*). And yet the West—with all its institutions of higher learning, including

governmental agencies dealing with cultural and religious questions—is still thoroughly "confused" as to what Islam teaches.

All of this is nothing short of a scandal—a reminder of just how deep the mainstream media, academia, and most politicians have their collective heads thrust in the sand.

Meanwhile, here is the latest piece of evidence of just how bad churches have it in the Muslim world, for those who care to know.

*Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.*

### Insurgents Used Cell Phone Geotags to Destroy AH-64s in Iraq

Source: <http://defensetech.org/2012/03/15/insurgents-used-cell-phone-geotags-to-destroy-ah-64s-in-iraq/#ixzz1paJZ6gFc>

**Here's a battlefield safety issue that some people have been warning about —and**

this in Afghanistan, think again. Insurgents figured out how to use this to their advantage in



**others have been ignoring — for a while now; an enemy using social media and cell-phone geo-tagging to identify the precise location of troops on a battlefield.**

When you take a photo with your cellphone, the gps coordinates of the location you took the picture is embedded into the image. When you upload said photo onto the internet for all to see, people can pull the location data from that picture. If you think this is just people being paranoid and that the Taliban would never do

Iraq years ago. In 2007, a group of Iraqi insurgents used geotags to destroy several American AH-64 Apache choppers sitting on a flightline in Iraq.

From an Army press release warning of the dangers of geotags:

When a new fleet of helicopters arrived with an aviation unit at a base in Iraq, some Soldiers took pictures on the flightline, he said. From the photos that were uploaded to the



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Internet, the enemy was able to determine the exact location of the helicopters inside the compound and conduct a mortar attack, destroying four of the AH-64 Apaches.

During Israel's 2006 war in southern Lebanon with Iranian-backed militia (more like a full on army) Hezbollah, Iranian SIGINT professionals tracked signals coming from personal cell

phones of Israeli soldiers to identify “assembly points of Israeli troops that may have telegraphed the points of offensive thrusts into Lebanon.”

This is just one more example of low-end cyber warfare that can be as deadly as expensive software worms designed to infiltrate an enemy's most heavily defended networks.

### Medical tattoos – a growing trend

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120318-medical-tattoos-a-growing-trend>

Forget medical bracelets, a growing number of individuals with special medical needs have taken to tattooing their bodies to warn first responders about critical medical conditions.

Dr. Friedlander has “No CPR” inked on the center of his chest where an emergency paramedic would see it. He explained that the tattoo is meant to emphasize his desire to



avoid CPR in the event that his heart stops. Medical tattoos are currently unregulated and it is unclear whether emergency responders would be obligated to honor them.

According to Dr. Saleh Aldasouqi, an endocrinologist at Michigan State University, the American Medical Association does not currently regulate medical tattoos, but Dr. Aldasouqi hopes that will soon change.

He has seen an increasing number of tattoos among his diabetic patients and believes that since they are growing in popularity the medical profession should step in and provide some uniformity.


As an example, he hopes to establish regulations where medical tattoos are made uniform or placed in the same area of the body, so first

responders would be obligated to honor them.

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
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responders know where to search.  
 “My perspective is that we as physicians need to be involved in this,” Dr. Aldasouqi said.

Dr. Aldasouqi does not necessarily advocate for or against the tattoos, but believes that patients should discuss them with their



Dr. Ed Friedlander displays his tattoo with a medical directive to not use CPR. Friedlander is among a growing number of people who are getting tattoos that tell doctors and first responders about...

“My intention has been to bring this issue to the surface so that medical organizations can have a say in that,” he said. “When you just Google it, you’re going to find hundreds of stories and discussions, but no medical say. So I feel we leave our patients kind of afloat.”

doctors beforehand.

Ramesh Srinivasan, a spokesperson for the MedicAlert Foundation, which sells more than 100,000 pieces of medical jewelry a year, believes that tattoos will never replace medical alert jewelry. In an interview with *The Star*, Srinivasan said that unlike tattoos, MedicAlert jewelry provides a “complete snapshot” of an individual’s health and their medical conditions.

### Seven incredibly loyal dogs

Source: <http://www.mnn.com/family/pets/photos/7-incredibly-loyal-dogs/mans-best-friend>

**EDITOR’S COMMENT:** Life, death, war, catastrophes, men and dogs – an ancient chain of moving stories and realities...

Good friends are loyal and stick by you no matter what, and that’s especially true when it comes to man’s best friend. We’ve found some of the most faithful dogs in history — from courageous canines who saved their owners’ lives to dedicated dogs who stayed by their loved ones’ sides even after death. Read on for some amazing tales of love and devotion that are sure to warm you from head to tail. (Text: Laura Moss)



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### Lao Pan's dog

When 68-year-old Lao Pan died in China in November 2011, the only surviving member of his family was a small yellow dog. The heartbroken pup took up residence at Pan's graveside and refused to leave even after going seven days without food. However, villagers took notice of the loyal canine and began bringing food and water to the gravesite — they even plan to build a kennel there for the dog.



### Hawkeye

Hawkeye the Labrador retriever is proof that dogs, too, suffer from heartbreak. During Navy SEAL John Tumilson's funeral on Aug. 19, Hawkeye ambled up to his owner's coffin and dropped to the ground with a heaving sigh. Tumilson's cousin, Lisa Pembleton, snapped this photo of the devoted dog and posted it on her [Facebook](#) page, and the heartbreaking photo was soon shared around the world.

### Hachiko

Hidesamuro Ueno brought his dog, Hachiko, to Tokyo in 1924, and every day when he left for his teaching job, Hachiko would stand by the door and watch him go. Then at 4 p.m. the Akita would arrive at Shibuya Station to meet his owner. A year later Ueno died of a stroke at work, but Hachiko continued to return to the train station at 4 p.m. every single day, searching for his owner's face amid the slew of passengers getting off the train. Eventually, the stationmaster made the dog a bed at the station and began leaving him bowls of food and water. Hachiko returned to the train station every day for 10 years until he died in 1935, but in a way, the dedicated dog remains at the station. A year before his death, Shibuya Station installed a bronze statue of Hachiko, and although the original statue was melted down during World War II, a new version was created in 1948 by the original artist's son.





### Tsunami guard dog

After an earthquake and [tsunami](#) hit Japan on March 11, the media was full of tragic news as well as amazing stories of survival. One such survival story centered on a dog that stood guard over an injured canine on a debris-strewn beach. Although the dog was extremely protective of its wounded pal, rescuers were eventually able to calm the him and get the injured pup to a veterinary clinic. The loyal guard dog was then taken to an animal shelter.

### Dorado

On Sept. 11, 2001, Omar Eduardo Rivera, a blind computer technician, was working on the 71st floor of the World Trade Center with his guide dog, Dorado. When the hijacked plane hit the tower, Rivera knew it would take him a long time to evacuate the building, but he wanted his Labrador retriever to have a chance to get out so he unclipped his leash in the crowded stairwell. "I thought I was lost forever — the noise and the heat were terrifying — but I had to give Dorado the chance of escape. So I unclipped his leash, ruffled his head, gave him a nudge and ordered Dorado to go," Rivera said. Dorado was swept downstairs by the mass of evacuating people, but a few minutes later Rivera felt the dog nuzzling his legs — Dorado had come right back to his side. Dorado and a co-worker then helped Rivera climb down 70 flights of stairs, which took nearly an hour. Soon after they escaped the tower, the building collapsed, and Rivera says he owes his life to his faithful dog.



### Shrek

In January 2009, 10-year-old Maxim Kurguzov was playing outside his Russian home when a fox wandered into the yard, killed one of the family chickens and then turned on the young boy. Then Shrek, the family dog, gallantly leapt in front of Maxim and fought off the fox with several bites to the head. Upon hearing the commotion, Maxim's father, Alexey, grabbed his son and began snapping photos of his fearless dog, which engaged in a 25-minute standoff with the fox.



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### Lady

Lady the golden retriever was 81-year-old Parley Nichols' constant companion for six years, and the dog stayed by Nichols' side even as he developed dementia and began to lose his memory. When Nichols went missing in Ohio on April 8, 2010, so did Lady, and the police spent a week searching for the pair until they found the canine and her owner in a field. Nichols had died of heart failure, but Lady never left his side, staying alive by drinking water from a nearby creek. The loyal dog didn't want to leave Nichols, but his family eventually took her away from the tragic scene and adopted Lady as their own.



### 2012 - 17th anniversary of Aum's subway gas attack marked

Tokyo subway officials commemorated the 17th anniversary of Aum Shinrikyo's deadly 1995 sarin gas attack Tuesday at Kasumigaseki Station.



Twenty-four Tokyo Metro Co. employees observed a moment of silence at the station, one of the subway stations where members of the cult released the deadly nerve agent on **March 20, 1995**, killing 13 people and sickening more than 6,000 others.

Commemorative stands were set up for relatives of the victims to offer flowers at Kasumigaseki and five other stations.

"I have come to the commemoration every year, hoping the memories don't fade," said a 46-year-old man who was injured in the subway attack.

Aum founder Shoko Asahara, whose real name is Chizuo Matsumoto, and 12 other Aum members are on death row for the cult's murderous crimes, and two are still on the run.

### French attacks could inspire next generation of terrorists

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/21/world/europe/lone-wolf-future-of-terrorists/>

"Lone wolves" who plot to carry out small-scale attacks on soft targets, like those in which seven people have been killed in France, could be the future of terrorism, a security expert has warned.

"We are witnessing the next stage of terrorism in Europe," said Sajjan Gohel, director of International Security at the Asia Pacific Foundation, a London-based counterterrorism think tank.



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Hundreds of French police have surrounded the home of Mohammed Merah, 23, a self-styled al Qaeda jihadist who is suspected of carrying out a series of shootings in which seven people, three of them young children, have died in recent days.

Gohel told CNN that killings like those in Toulouse and Montauban would likely inspire other radical Islamists to action.

"This has sent out the message that followers of al Qaeda can carry out successful attacks, can precipitate terror, on their own.

"This is exactly what happened in

France: People were scared to go out, schools were under guard, there was a real sense of insecurity -- that is true terrorism."


He said the actions of Anders Breivik, whose twin bomb and gun attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utoya in Norway in July last year left 77 people dead, had also encouraged would-be terrorists.

"Although it wasn't linked to al Qaeda, the Norway attack set a dangerous precedent, because it showed that a plot like this could succeed."

And Gohel said there were fears the upcoming

"The sort of attack we've seen in Toulouse is not a model that is unique to France -- it could be replicated in Germany, in Britain, or elsewhere -- and that is a real concern,

### South-west France shootings



especially in the lead-up to the Olympics in London later this year.

"The Olympics are of symbolic significance, because the day after the 2012 games were awarded to London, in 2005, we had the 7/7 bombings [on public transport, in which 52 people were killed].

"And so there is a sort of a scar associated with that, and it could be that those who sympathize with the motives of the bombers see the Olympics as a symbolic time to attack."

But he said counter-terrorism forces faced a major challenge in tackling 'lone wolf' attacks.

"They are a real headache for the authorities, because they are very difficult to thwart: If a 'cell' is only one or two people it's a lot harder to monitor their activities, to trace their networks, and so on.

"In previous cases, the ability of the authorities to disrupt the planning stage has been low, because you don't get the leakage of information that you get with a larger cell."



Olympic Games, due to be held in London this summer, could be targeted.

Merah, the suspect in the French killings, is a supporter of radical Islamist group Forsane Alizza, the



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Knights of Glory, France's Interior Minister Claude Geant said.

Gohel said the organization, which has



members in Paris and Limoges in central France, acts as an "antechamber towards terrorism," encouraging its followers to go abroad for training.

"Before it was banned earlier this year, it had posted a chilling warning on Facebook, encouraging its followers to attack Americans, Jews and French soldiers," said Gohel. "Unfortunately, that threat seems to have been carried out in recent days."

The security analyst told CNN al Qaeda's role in the Toulouse and Montauban killings remained unclear.

"There are two schools of thought -- that it could be an al Qaeda-controlled attack,

or that it could be an al Qaeda-inspired attack - and either way, it's a real concern.

"If it's al Qaeda-controlled, it shows that al

Qaeda is able to recruit European-based followers, and to train and guide them into carrying out attacks. "If it's al Qaeda-inspired, then it's the first 'lone wolf' act of terror of its kind to succeed in the West. There have been many al Qaeda-inspired attempts, but so far

they have all failed -- are we seeing that in this instance it has succeeded?"



### Attacks push terror to heart of French elections

Source: [http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu\\_no=2&ite](http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&ite)

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&template\_id=39&parent\_id=21

The self-declared Al Qaeda fighter holed up in a besieged flat in southern France yesterday has forced the issue of Islamist terror to the heart of the French presidential race.

Analysts say the drama around the suspected killer of seven people will likely give a boost to far-right candidate Marine Le Pen of the National Front (FN), known for her fierce anti-immigration and anti-Islamist rhetoric.

As President Nicolas Sarkozy called for national unity, some of the candidates seeking to replace him in next month's vote began to manoeuvre to take advantage of the crisis mood generated by the gunman's attacks.

The shooter, allegedly a young Frenchman of Algerian descent, is sought for the murders of three Jewish children, a teacher and three soldiers.

Le Pen – running third in the polls – was first off the blocks, claiming: "The danger of fundamentalism has been underestimated in our country."

Brushing off protests from a television interviewer that she was seeking to manipulate a national tragedy for her own ends, Le Pen insisted she had warned of the dangers of



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extremist violence before the killings.



“Politico-religious groups are developing in a lax climate,” she said. “We need to fight this war against politico-religious fundamentalist groups which are killing Christian children, young Christian men, young Muslim men and, two days ago, Jewish children.”

A spokesman for far-left challenger Jean-Luc Melenchon did not mince his words in response, denouncing the National Front as “vultures” feeding at the scenes of the crimes. “Throughout this campaign, yesterday as today, Marine Le Pen has had the same goal – to feed a Crusader spirit inspired by religious war under the theory of a clash of civilisations,” alleged Alexis Corbiere.

Centre-right candidate Francois Bayrou also accused the “extreme right” of trying to “surf” to power on the wave of violence.

Sociologist Sylvain Crepon, a specialist on the far-right, said that the incident was “a godsend for Marine Le Pen”.

“In the short term this could benefit Nicolas Sarkozy, but in the medium and long terms this will legitimise the FN and its discourse,” he said. “She will be able to say ‘I was stigmatised while I was right all along.’”

Political scientist Jean-Yves Camus said Le Pen was “certainly not the loser” from the attacks.

“For years the FN has been saying that immigration is the exporter of terrorism. Marine Le Pen will be able to say that all the measures taken by Nicolas Sarkozy during his term were not able to prevent these murders,” he said.

But analysts said that Sarkozy may also win credit for being the man in charge when the killer was found two days after his third attack – unless voters ask why the militant was not under closer watch.

After authorities said the suspect had been known to French intelligence for years, the FN’s deputy leader Louis Aliot moved in quickly on the attack.

It is important to “ask whether he (the shooter) could have been arrested” earlier, Aliot said, adding that the incident “casts doubt” on the French government’s ability to fight Islamist extremist organisations.

Pollsters said all surveys taken before the crisis had suggested that voters care more about jobs and household spending power – and trusted Socialist Francois Hollande more than Sarkozy on these issues.

For at least five months Hollande has enjoyed a clear lead over the right-wing incumbent in opinion polls, at least in second-round voting intentions, but Sarkozy has begun to make up ground.

The first round is to be held on April 22 followed by a May 6 run-off vote.

## Removing All Traces of Islamist Terror from Toulouse Shootings

By D. G. Myers

Source: <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/03/21/removing-all-traces-of-muslim-terror-from-toulouse-shootings/>

How could the same man gun down three French soldiers in the city of Toulouse — two of them Muslim, the other North African — and then attack children at a Jewish school? Something just didn’t add up. There was “no clear motive” for the attacks, the *New York Times* said in an early draft of its story on the shooting at Collège et Lycée Ozar Hatorah on



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Monday. In later versions, after an outcry of disbelief, this was self-protectively revised to read: “Speculation over the motives for the killings ranged from anger at Muslims fighting in Afghanistan — the unit of three of the soldiers has been deployed there — and anti-Semitism, to a hatred of immigrants.”

Wrong. The alleged gunman, who reportedly has claimed all three French shootings, is a 24-year-old Muslim named Mohammad Merah.

Please don't tell M. Jay Rosenberg of Media Matters Action Network. He will be badly disappointed at the news. When I first wrote about the Toulouse school shooting on Monday, Rosenberg tweeted:



**MJ Rosenberg** @MJayRosenberg

19 Mar

COMMENTARYexploits attack on school in France.Will lose interest now that it appears killers were rightist not Muslims.

Oops. Oh, well. Rosenberg won't be alone in trying to cover his tracks. In reporting that “French Police Say They Have Cornered Suspect in School Shooting,” the *New York Times* earlier today described Merah as a “French national of Algerian descent,” carefully avoiding any mention of his religion. After saying that Merah “told negotiators that he belonged to Al Qaeda,” and after identifying his motives at last (“the attacks were meant to avenge the deaths of Palestinian children and to protest French military deployments abroad”), the *Times* went on to reveal that Merah “called

himself a mujahedeen [sic],” which the newspaper helpfully translated as a “freedom fighter.” (Because, you know, to shoot Jewish schoolchildren in the head at close range is obviously to strike a blow for freedom.)

No further mention was made of Al Qaeda or mujahedeen, and none at all of anti-Semitism or Islamist terror. Instead, the *Times* found a way, like Rosenberg, to keep talking about rightists. Three times its story mentioned the political right in connection with the murders. Easily the best passage was this:

Muslims [in France] complain widely of feeling vilified by some political elements, on the right

in particular, and the anti-immigration far right has been gaining unprecedented popularity in recent months.

Still no mention of Merah's being a Muslim, by the way. Nor any suggestion that French Jews might complain of feeling targeted for murder.

And so it goes. The campaign by the mainstream media to whitewash Islamist terrorism and pin Jew hatred only on the extreme political right is being conducted even now, even as a self-confessed Islamist terrorist holds French police at bay. In a few hours, of course, Merah will be captured or killed. And the *New York Times* will have removed all traces of its self-embarrassment again.

*A frequent contributor to Commentary, D. G. Myers has been writing for the magazine since 1989. He recently joined the faculty of the Melton Center for Jewish Studies at the Ohio State University after two decades at Texas A&M. Author of The Elephant's Teach, the definitive history of creative writing, he blogs about books at Literary Commentary and writes a monthly fiction chronicle for the magazine.*

### **Killings in France: CT-Interview with Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin, a psychoanalyst and specialist on Islamic terrorism.**

Source: <http://www.citizentimes.eu/2012/03/21/there-was-not-a-fear-of-a-neo-nazi-attack/>

In the city of Toulouse in southern France special police forces besiege the house of the alleged murderer of seven people, including three Jewish students and their Jewish teacher. After first speculations of a right-wing background, it turned out now that the 24-year-old Mohammed probably belongs to Islamist groups. *Citizen Times* Editor in Chief Felix

Strüning spoke with Nancy Kobrin Hartevelt, who is a psychoanalyst and Arabist with a specialization on Islamic terrorism, based in Israel.

**Citizen Times:** Ms Hartevelt Kobrin, the four victims of Toulouse killings arrived this



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morning. How is the mood in Israel?

**Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin:** The mood is very somber. The gathering at the funeral in Jerusalem is huge. I believe it particularly hit hard the Sephardi community coming from North Africa. Sephardic Jews have lived among the North African Muslims for centuries and many immigrated to France because of the violence several generations ago. Now French Jews, many of whom who are Sephardic are once again having to immigrate to Israel because security has deteriorated in France. Sadly, it did not surprise me that this tragedy happened. I have long feared such an attack even in America where Jewish schools, summer camps and institutions are very vulnerable.

**Citizen Times:** Will there be any diplomatic changes between France and Israel?

**Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin:** A kind of psychological bond has been strengthened on the one hand as it is such a shock for the French to have this happen on their soil so that it might make it a bit easier for the French to relate to the Israeli situation. It is unclear to me how the diplomatic relationship will change. Remember that Sarkozy did play a big role in Gilad Shalit's release as Noam, his father, holds dual citizenship so while there had been a tension between Netanyahu and Sarkozy, there still has to be a viable working relationship.

**Citizen Times:** Was there the fear of an anti-Jewish A. Breivik?

**Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin:** Generally there was not a fear of a Neo-Nazi attack. I would even say that while Israelis bit their tongue when it was reported at first that the killer was a Neo-Nazi, the majority did not buy it and were waiting for the other shoe to drop, i.e. an Islamic terrorist attack. After all, Israelis had been put on alert even before the attacks in India and Thailand that they were vulnerable. I immediately thought of the Beltway snipers and the serial killings in October 2002 though Jews were not specifically targeted.

**Citizen Times:** Now, it seems that the killer is Muslim and is connected to al-Qaeda. Does this fact changes something in the Israeli perspective?

**Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin:** Israelis are so used to Islamic terrorism, that life resumes very quickly. For example, a young woman Israeli soldier was nearly stabbed to death in cold blood by a Palestinian last week on the new lite rail train in Jerusalem. It was covered on the news and we moved on. On the other hand there are great concern among experts as to what degree Al Qaeda is operating in the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza and I assume it probably has a cell or two even within Israel though I can't confirm that, but why not? Israel is a nation like any other nation and al-Qaeda is quick and skillful at infiltrating. So when an attack takes places anywhere outside of Israel, it heightens the focus locally as well.

**Citizen Times:** As a specialist on Islamic terrorism, how do you see the situation?

**Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin:** I am very saddened by this senseless loss of life and at times frustrated by the amount of changes which need to take place. The legal systems need to come up with a new category to deal with murdering in the name of God and/or Allah. The media needs to figure out ways to lessen the hype when they mediate the terrorism. The hype and the drama feed the problem when it is kept at such a superficial level in its discussion. Much more thought needs to be given to the early childhood development of the Islamic terrorists. It holds the key to decoding the unconscious dimension of the violent behavior.

I worry tremendously that because Israel and Jews in the diaspora have been so saturated by its bloody violence that it is degrading Jewish culture as well. Aggression breeds aggression. Now we have the problem of both Tag Mehir, the Jewish terrorist group (Price Tag) as well as ultra Orthodox men effacing harassing women and little girls in places like Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem.

**Citizen Times:** But what can we do?

**Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin:** Finally, this kind of violence is learned in the home by age three, the need to hate and the need to have an enemy. Israel like France has a significant Muslim population. While the majority of Muslims are good people and they want to put bread on the table, dress their children and educate them, more attention



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must be paid to how they are educating their children about Jews and the unique relationship that Muslims have to their holy texts, the Quran, and Judaism. This is a key issue which is repeatedly swept under the rug. It must be addressed openly without political correctness. Al-Qaeda takes its ideologies from

this scriptural hatred. While the ideologies serve as a girdle for a very fragile personality, nothing will change until the silent majority of Muslims decide to take a stand and fight the terrorism perpetrated against Israel and the Jews, specifically.

### The Mother Of the Toulouse Terrorist

An Accomplice to the Crime in France

By Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin

Source: <http://www.citizenimes.eu/2012/03/21/the-mother-of-the-toulouse-terrorist/>

It should come as no surprise that the mother of the Toulouse al-Qaeda killer, Muhammad Merah, who is described as a French citizen of Algerian descent, was brought to the scene by the police in order to negotiate with her son. She refused to help, claiming that that she had “no control over her son” according to French 24 broadcast 21 March.<sup>1</sup> It is my hope that she will change her mind and cooperate with the police. If not she should be brought up on charges for being an accomplice to the horrific crimes committed by her son. Her other son has also been arrested.

I have written extensively about the disturbing maternal bond laying at the base of Islamic political violence ranging from suicide bombing, to stabbings, to rocket attacks on southern Israel to the DC serial killer converts to Islam John Allen Muhammad and Lee Malvo the Beltway snipers, who murdered over a three week period in October 2002. The mother looms larger than life in the mind of these sociopathic murderers. The Toulouse terrorist even filmed his horrific attacks. Yet his mother is, however, nothing more than a hated devalued female to him. He feels emasculated and suffocated by her and develops paranoia projecting his rage outwards under the phony guise of revenge for Palestinian children, under the phony guise of political violence of Islamic terrorism.

Hence he murders defenseless children in cold blood and films them as they die. Such killers obviously lack empathy but the public, the

military, law enforcement and especially the media which mass mediates the terrorism, remain less aware that empathy is something which is developed early on in the bonding between mother and infant. It is very hard to develop empathy later but not impossible.

The leading French Al Qaeda expert Jean-Charles Brisard endorsed my descriptive analysis of this failed mother

bonding and dysfunctional family dynamics in *The Banality of Suicide Terrorism*. I corresponded with Brisard when he served as expert witness in the Christian Ganczarski trial, the Al Qaeda operative that provided extensive support for the Djerba Synagogue bombing in April 2002. Ganczarski also had a disturbed childhood.

I have repeatedly come out against blaming the mother or the female with regard to my theory but stepping outside the frame of theorizing and analyzing, given the fact that the Toulouse Terrorist’s mother will not cooperate with law enforcement, she is collaborating with her son. Her oppositional behavior is what Tawfik Hamid, former Islamic extremist and Chair for the Study of Islamic Radicalism, calls *passive terrorism*. Hamid also endorsed my book. By not assisting the police she has crossed the line of being able to hide behind her devalued abused/traumatized status to that of willfully revealing herself as a terrorist. Hence, she should be prosecuted as such if she does not help. As this is a developing story, I do not know how the standoff will end.

However, what we must take away from this tragedy is that such wanton killing links back to a



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failed maternal bonding. To minimize the meaning of the importance of the female/mother in the life of a terrorist merely takes their bait and we run the risk of unconsciously colluding with them and we fail

to understand how and why, they do what they do, which further compounds the problem, running the risk of more innocent victims and further delaying effective solutions to this critical problem.

*Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin is a psychoanalyst and Arabist with a specialisation on Islamic terrorism. She is the author of [The Banality of Suicide Terrorism](#). [The Naked Truth About the Psychology of Islamic Suicide Bombing](#) and has been interviewed by [Citizen Times](#) [alreday in 2010](#).*

### END OF STORY: French standoff ends with suspect shot in the head

Source: <http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/53770729-68/molins-police-says-shot.html.csp>

In a dramatic end to a 32-hour standoff, a masked French SWAT team slipped into the apartment of an Islamist extremist Thursday, sparking a firefight that ended with the suspect **jumping out the window and being shot dead in the head. (???)**

Mohamed Merah, 23, was wanted in the deaths of three French paratroopers, three Jewish schoolchildren and a rabbi — all killed

had been on the no-fly list since 2010. The list includes thousands of known or suspected terrorists.

Claim to killings » The SITE Intelligence Group is reporting that a lesser-known jihadist group is claiming responsibility for three shootings in southern France that left seven people dead.

The reported claim Thursday by Jund al-Khilafah, a group that has also claimed past



since March 11 in what Merah reportedly told police was an attempt to "bring France to its knees."

No-fly list » A U.S. counterterrorism official says Mohamed Merah was on the list of known or suspected terrorists who are prohibited from flying to the U.S. The counterterrorism official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the ongoing investigation, says Merah

attacks in Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, comes after Mohamed Merah died after a firefight with French police.

SITE, which monitors jihadist messages on the Internet, said the group issued a statement in jihadist forums saying "Yusuf of France" led an attack Monday, the day of



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shootings that killed a rabbi and three Jewish children in Toulouse.

Police had been trying to capture him alive since a predawn raid Wednesday to arrest him at his apartment in the southwestern city of Toulouse. The killings he was accused of — and boasted about to police — have shocked France, ignited fear in moderate Muslims about stoking discrimination and may even affect the country's upcoming presidential election.

The seven slayings, carried out in three motorcycle shooting attacks, are believed to be the first killings inspired by Islamic radical motives in France since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking in Paris, said an investigation was under way to see if Merah, a French citizen of Algerian descent who claimed links to al-Qaida, had any accomplices.

A U.S. counterterrorism official says Merah was on the list of known or suspected terrorists who are prohibited from flying to the U.S. The counterterrorism official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the ongoing investigation, says Merah had been on the no-fly list since 2010. The list includes thousands of known or suspected terrorists.

His mother and a brother were detained Wednesday by police after the mother's computer became a critical link in tracking Merah down. The brother Abdelkader had already been linked to Iraqi Islamist networks.

The SITE Intelligence Group, which monitors Internet messages, reported Thursday that a lesser-known jihadist group was claiming responsibility for the attacks in France. SITE said Jund al-Khilafah issued a statement saying "Yusuf of France" led an attack Monday,

the day of Jewish school shootings. There was no independent confirmation of the claim.

Authorities said Merah espoused a radical form of Islam and had been to Afghanistan and the Pakistani militant stronghold of Waziristan, where he claimed to have received training from al-Qaida. He also had a long record of petty crimes in France for which he served time in prison.

Merah told negotiators he killed to avenge the deaths of Palestinian children and to protest the French army's involvement in Afghanistan. After initially agreeing to surrender, Merah declared he would resist and that it would be either them or him.

"If it's me, who cares? I'll go to paradise," Prosecutor Francois Molins quoted Merah as saying.

Molins said Merah burst out of his bathroom when police gingerly entered his apartment Thursday morning, wildly firing his gun about 30 times before jumping out an apartment window.

"(He) launches an assault, charging police through the apartment and firing at them with a Colt .45, continuing to advance, armed and firing, as he jumps from the balcony," Molins said.

Merah fired "until he was hit by a retaliatory shot from the RAID (elite police unit), which felled him with a bullet to the head," Molins said, insisting that police fired in self-defense.

It was not clearly exactly when he was hit by the bullet to the head.

The prosecutor said police had gone in cautiously, using robot cameras to see if there were any boobytraps. Three members of the special squad were wounded Thursday, bringing the total of injured French officers throughout the standoff to five.

### Jund al Khilafah claims French shooting

Source:[http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/03/jund\\_al\\_khilafah\\_claims\\_french.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/03/jund_al_khilafah_claims_french.php)

Jund al Khilafah, or Soldiers of the Caliphate, an al Qaeda and Haqqani Network-linked terror group that is based along the Afghan-Pakistani border, claimed credit for one of the shootings attributed to Mohamed Merah, a French citizen and resident of Toulouse who was killed in a

shootout by French police earlier today after a two-day-long standoff. The terror group released a statement today that was published on several jihadist web forums. A portion of the statement, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, is below:



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On Tuesday, 19 March, one of the knights of Islam, our brother Yusuf al-Firansi [the French], we ask Allah to accept him, went out in an operation that shook the foundations of Zio-Crusaderdom in the whole world and filled the hearts of the enemies of Allah with fear. While we claim our responsibility for these blessed operations, we say that the crimes that Israel is committing against our people in the pure land of Palestine, and in Gaza in particular, will not pass without punishment. The mujahideen everywhere are determined to retaliate for every drop of blood that was spilled unjustly and aggressively in Palestine, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries. The Jund al Khilafah statement also said the French must reconsider their "hostile tendency towards Islam and its Shariah" - a reference to their deployment of forces in Afghanistan as well as the ban on the veil for women in public places in France. The Jund al Khilafah statement did not, however, take credit for the other shootings carried out by Merah that killed three French soldiers.

Interestingly enough, SITE noted that the Shumukh al-Islam forum, which is linked to al Qaeda and is a primary means of distribution for al Qaeda and other jihadist materials, pulled the statement from its website. "The communiqué offered no evidence to substantiate the claim of responsibility but was posted by the same user who posted prior messages from the group," the SITE Intelligence Group stated.

Merah is known to have spent time in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is said to have attended training camps in Waziristan, so it is possible that he interacted with Jund al

Khilafah in the past. However there is no



evidence available to confirm that this has happened, nor has there been any indication at this time that Merah went by the name Yusuf al Firansi.

Jund al Khilafah has claimed credit for three attacks in Kazakhstan last fall, and has also released two videos of attacks against ISAF forces in Khost province, Afghanistan last year. For more information on the Jund al Khilafah, see *LWJ* report, Kazakh jihadi leader seeks restoration of Islamic caliphate.

Last November, Rawil Kusaynuv, the emir of the Zahir Baibars Battalion, one of the units that comprises the Jund al Khilafah, said his battalion has "a group of mujahideen of different nationalities" but is primarily made up of Kazakh nationals.


"As for us in the Battalion, more than 90% of us are from Kazakhstan, and we have many military activities on the fighting lines in Afghanistan in collaboration with the rest of the battalions," he said. "We are also interested in the military, faith, intellectual, and political support for our brothers in order for them to rise to an acceptable level of ability to wage the fight."

### **Mohammed Merah is dead. He was a new breed of Iron Man terrorist**

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/21847/>

The French-born al Qaeda killer, Mohammed Merah - who shocked the world by murdering three Jewish schoolchildren and their teacher in Toulouse by shots to the head, after killing

three French paratroopers - was found dead after jumping out of a window still shooting Thursday, March 22. First, he injured three



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police officers searching his apartment, bursting out of the bathroom firing madly.

This 23-year old Muslim extremist made history by the callousness of his murders and by forcing French police and security forces to conduct the biggest and longest siege in their history against a lone armed terrorist

Many mysteries surround the episode -both concerning the gunman and the methods used by French security to apprehend him. One applies to the official reporting of the incident and the many conflicting accounts, some of them coming from the French minister of interior Claude Guiant.

Another relates to the unnamed man who entered the killer's apartment on a quiet Toulouse street some time Wednesday. Was he sent for some face-to-face bargaining with Merah on terms for ending the siege?

There were powerful explosions around the apartment over midnight Wednesday and sustained gunfire from various weapons just before the terrorist was officially reported to be dead. None were explained. One reason for the dragging out the police assault on the apartment may have been that the occupant had not only barricaded himself with basic supplies of food, water, medicines and ammo, but also booby-trapped the entrance ready to strike down a large number of raiders while he remained unharmed.

The apartment may have been rigged as a fortified chamber for a long haul. In that and other respects, he may fit the model of an Iron Man, a terrorist prototype and Salafi extremist who drives fast cars and motorbikes, enjoys the good life, is at ease with electronic gadgets and used a high tech video camera from a Formula One car to record his murderous rampage in high resolution for propaganda and posterity.

Youthful copycat admirers in jihadist circles will no doubt emulate the Merah style. Another unanswered riddle is who bankrolled this high-end style and his operations?

One of the big questions facing the French president and security authorities is what took them so long – a day and a half - to raid the apartment? If their plan was to capture him alive to grill him for intelligence on al Qaeda networks, they failed.

Why did they not use stun grenades or a special gas to paralyze him in the initial stage or after the doors were breached? **French counterterrorism units are adept in the use**

**of a special gas designed over 40 years ago and were the first to use it.**

debkafile's counter-terror sources recall that in November, 1979, when the Saudi royal family was unable to put down a revolt against the throne, they asked urgently for a French counterterrorism unit to break the siege the rebels had laid on the Kaaba mosque in Mecca, Islam's most sacred shrine. The unit poured gas into the ancient underground passages and forced the rebels to surrender. debkafile reported Wednesday, March 21:

Questions are already being asked about how French intelligence and counter-terror agencies, which had held him and family members under surveillance for some time, failed to discover the deadly plans they were hatching against Jewish and Moslem targets.

Mohammed Merah said he had trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which countries he visited in 2010 and 2011. A Kandahar prison official identified him as an al Qaeda bomber who was imprisoned for three years and escaped in a mass Taliban jailbreak in 2008, only to be rearrested and sent back to France

Toulouse police hunted him down to an address 2 kilometers from the Ozar Hatorah school where he committed his murders after identifying him as the motorcyclist in black who also killed two French paratroopers and wounded a third in neighboring Montauban last Thursday.

Merah fell under police suspicion after that attack but was not arrested. He was active in the extremist Islamic organization called Forsane Alizze which was only outlawed in February although it was long identified with al Qaeda.

The terrorist called French TV stations after the attacks and said he had avenged French participation in the Afghan war, the suffering of Gaza Palestinians and the Sarkozy government's ban on the veil in public places for Muslim women. He had videotaped his murders to further propagate their impact. The Jewish teacher, Yonathan Sandler, 30, his sons Arieih, 3 and Gavriel, 6 and the Ozar Hatorah principal's daughter, Miriam Monstango, aged 8, whom he shot dead Monday at the Jewish school, were laid to rest at the Har Menuhot cemetery in Jerusalem Wednesday attended by masses of people and notables.



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French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe flew to Israel with the victims and attended the funerals as a mark of French-Israeli solidarity in the face of the terrible murders. "Never doubt our determination to fight anti-Semitism in

France which violates all our values and will not be tolerated," he declared.

The dawn raid in Toulouse was accompanied by security police swoops on extremist Muslim hideouts across France.

### Mohamed: used, transformed in a terrorist and then killed

Source: <http://www.rinascita.eu/index.php?action=news&id=13946&lang=en>

So - sure enough - the anti-Semitic bomber of France was nothing but a Semite. Nay more: Mohamed Mesrah, who yesterday committed suicide, had worked for the French "barbouzes" - the secret agents from across the Alps - for years and, in particular, was among the militants in the "liberation" of Libya Belhadj, the Salafist terrorist at the orders of the Atlantic intelligence of Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy and Henry-Levy. After having completed his task in Libya, he was present last October, in Homs, where he and his comrades had lit the fuse of the anti-Damascus terrorism initiated with the killing of innocent Alawites civilians. In order to provoke an "uprising" which was immediately proclaimed "popular" despite it being external and "trained" by Turkish officials, Saudis, the French DSGE and the British MI6.

After having been left unemployed due to his escape from Homs, Mohammed Mesrah already at service with a French passport, between Afghanistan (in the "Forzane Alizza" band) and the same metropolitan area, as any good mercenary who feels abandoned by his principals, retaliated with seven murders, and at last, after a siege of 32 hours, preferred to kill himself rather than surrender. Of course in the reportages on him, his "ceremonial" (Atlantic) militancy is fading by the minute. Monitored, and well known for his "mujahideen" work, a zealous "retoucher" of his curriculum vitae has quite clearly put himself into motion, in France and in the embedded media of the West, including our own - Let's face it: what is needed is an image of an anti-Semitic Mohamed Mesrah. It's more appropriate to Sarkozy's current presidential campaign.

### Tactical Realities of the Toulouse Shootings

By Scott Stewart

Source: [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/tactical-realities-toulouse-shootings?utm\\_source=free-list-f&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=20120405&utm\\_term=sweekly&utm\\_content=readmore&elq=10ae08ffa3bc4dfe8426670497515540](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/tactical-realities-toulouse-shootings?utm_source=free-list-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120405&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=10ae08ffa3bc4dfe8426670497515540)

Mohammed Merah, the suspect in a string of violent attacks culminating with the March 19 shooting deaths of three children and a rabbi at the Ozar Hatorah School in Toulouse, France, committed suicide by cop March 22 after a prolonged standoff at his Toulouse apartment. Authorities believed Merah also to have shot and killed a paratrooper March 11 in Toulouse and two other paratroopers March 15 in Montauban.

While Merah's death ended his attacks, it also began the inevitable inquiry process as French

officials consider how the attacks could have been prevented. The commissions or committees appointed to investigate such attacks normally take months to complete their inquiries, so the findings of the panel looking into the Merah case will not be released in time to have any impact on the French presidential election set to begin April 22.

However, such findings are routinely used for political purposes and as ammunition for bureaucratic infighting.





Like the suspects in many recent terrorist attacks in other countries, Merah had previously come to the attention of French authorities. He reportedly traveled at least twice to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region and was interviewed by authorities upon his return to France in November 2011. Some media reports have even suggested that Merah had worked as an informant for French authorities. Merah's older brother, Abdulkader Merah, also reportedly was investigated in 2007 for helping French Muslim men travel to Iraq to fight. These facets of the case will certainly be examined in detail.

While it will be many months before the official reports are published, already we can draw several conclusions from this case. This is because the same essential problems occur whenever a Western government attempts to pre-empt vague, potential threats posed by an amorphous enemy. Indeed, these issues surfaced several times following attacks by Islamist militants in the United States, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. They also were seen in the July 2011 attacks in Norway.

In short, government bureaucracies do not deal well with ambiguity -- and terrorist actors, particularly at the grassroots and lone-wolf levels, are nothing if not ambiguous. They tend to be insular and dedicated, and they might not be meaningfully connected to the command, control and communication mechanism of any

known militant group or actor. This makes them exceedingly hard to identify, let alone pre-empt, before an attack is carried out.

As the political debates in London following the 2005 attacks (and in Washington following 9/11) have shown, that governments somehow are expected to prevent all terrorist attacks. When one occurs, political investigations into the cause of intelligence failures ensue and, on occasion, considerable finger-pointing and agency reorganizing. The public, after all, needs to feel secure.

But the uncomfortable truth is that there is no such thing as complete security. Given the nature of the terrorist threat and terrorist actors, no intelligence or security service in the world could identify every aspiring militant who lives in or enters a country or could pre-empt their potential acts of violence. This is impossible even in states that employ draconian security measures, and the challenge is obviously amplified in societies that value civil liberties and due process. The challenge is especially pronounced in cases where the subject is a citizen who has not yet broken any laws, or there is not sufficient evidence to support prosecution for any violations. A distinct tension exists between security and individual liberties.

Within that context, then, the tactical challenges and expectations faced by



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counterterrorism agencies are useful to consider.

### Puzzles

Certainly, when the Merah case is reviewed in hindsight and in isolation it will become obvious

what could be called "jihadist cheerleaders" -- radicals who voice political or ideological support for the jihadist cause but are not actually violent -- from those militant jihadists willing to commit attacks. The most vociferous are not always the most likely to conduct an



that there were clues -- pieces of a puzzle -- that could have been fitted together to indicate Merah posed a threat and warranted focused intelligence and investigative efforts. As noted above, a few of those clues already have appeared in the press, and there are sure to be other clues revealed as the investigation progresses.

Anyone can be a brilliant investigator after the fact, but solving a puzzle in real time is very difficult -- especially considering that Merah did not exist in isolation but was one of myriad potential threats French authorities faced. France is not North Korea, a homogeneous society where the few resident foreigners easily can be monitored. France is a huge, multicultural country that is home to many religious and political dissidents and refugees. Moreover, France's Muslim population may number as many as 5 or 6 million, which equates to somewhere between 8 and 10 percent of the total population. Thus, even if one were to use profiling techniques, which can be problematic in their own right, identifying radical Islamists -- who make up only a small percentage of France's Muslim population -- would be a tremendous undertaking. Even if one were able to positively identify all the radical Islamists in France, there would be a further challenge of differentiating between

attack, but their heated rhetoric usually draws a lot of scarce government resources. Even among those willing to wage physical jihad, there is an additional difference between those who believe they can fight only in Muslim lands and those who believe they can conduct attacks in the West.

Sorting through the galaxy of potential suspects is a daunting task for the French government. Obviously, if there is intelligence that a suspect is directly linked to al Qaeda or another known terrorist group, it is easy to classify that individual as a high-priority intelligence target. Such a suspect would then merit 24/7 physical and electronic surveillance, an endeavor that could tie up as many as 100 people, including surveillance operatives, supervisors, technicians, photographers, forensics experts, analysts and interpreters -- and this would be to monitor only one suspect. But in the real world, intelligence is seldom, if ever, so black-and-white. And quite often, investigators and analysts are left to work with bits of partial information. This problem is compounded by the very structure of the jihadist movement, which consists of al Qaeda, its franchises, grassroots sympathizers and lone wolves. The jihadist landscape has been described as a "network



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of networks" or a "network of relationships," a characterization that has become even more apt as the capabilities of the central al Qaeda group have been degraded. In application, this means that when considering any particular plot, there may not be any clear-cut chain of command or communications networks on which to focus intelligence resources. The network within which jihadists operate is difficult to delineate, as are the targets they choose to attack. This same ambiguity also exists in the non-jihadist realm as seen in attackers such as Anders Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph.

This means that, without hard intelligence indicating a link between a particular suspect and a known militant group or network, government agencies often place suspected operatives into lower priority categories, which means they receive less investigation and intelligence monitoring. Indeed, it is often nearly impossible to gather hard intelligence about a person's thoughts and intentions, and this is the crux of the dilemma facing the French and other governments as they attempt to assess the threat posed by individuals and small, insular groups.

Not all puzzles are equal. Investigating an attack after the fact is a matter of identifying the puzzle pieces and placing them together to form a complete picture of what happened. But identifying plotters and their plans before an attack occurs is far more difficult. It is more like sifting through the pieces of thousands of different puzzles, all jumbled together in one big pile, and then attempting to create a complete picture, without knowing what the end result -- the attack -- will look like.

### Tools and Limitations

Several tools can be used to identify and preempt terrorist attacks. These are human-intelligence sources, signals intelligence, investigation and analysis. All of these tools are useful, but none are perfect.

Recruiting human sources from the communities in which militants are likely to live and move is invaluable, but any source can see only what is within his or her field of vision, and many sources exhibit biases that can cloud their collection. Militant cells are built on relationships and trust -- often based on familial or tribal connections -- which are difficult to establish quickly. And when the concern is

about militants at the grassroots or lone-wolf level, the universe of people with whom human sources would need to establish close relationships becomes very large indeed. Moreover, even if a source is well-placed, it can be difficult to judge a suspect's motivations and intentions unless one knows him or her intimately. In the Merah case, even some who claimed to have known the suspect well were surprised to learn of his alleged involvement in the attacks.

The utility of signals intelligence can also be limited, especially in light of past successes. Signals intelligence does not work well when suspects practice careful operational security (such as foregoing the use of satellite telephones, email or cell phones). Even a fairly moderate and intuitive amount of operational security can increase the difficulty of detection by orders of magnitude. In the case of grassroots operatives, escaping scrutiny simply means not committing acts that would bring someone to the attention of authorities, such as communicating with known members of terrorist groups or visiting radical Internet sites.

A potential suspect can be investigated, as was apparently the case with Merah, as well as suspects in past attacks such as London bomber Mohamed Siddique Khan, Norwegian bomber and shooter Anders Breivik and Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan. However, due to the large numbers of potential suspects it is very unlikely investigators will conduct a full probe unless they note obvious signs of criminal intent or activity during their preliminary inquiry. Certainly, attackers are bound to the terrorist attack cycle, but unless they exhibit such behavior while being investigated, chances are the authorities are going to miss it even if the attackers are practicing sloppy tradecraft.

In any setting, intelligence is little more than raw data until analysis is applied -- but drawing the correct conclusions is difficult if one has incomplete data, is given the wrong kinds of material to analyze or lacks the proper mindset and training to make useful inferences. Bias, assumptions and preconceptions also pose significant problems. In the Breivik case, authorities noted his acquisition of large quantities of fertilizer but discounted him as a threat after interviewing him. It appears that as a white Norwegian, he did not fit the investigators' preconception



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of a potential threat. In other words, they were envisioning the wrong finished picture for that particular puzzle.

The fact is the resources available for investigations; physical and electronic surveillance; recruiting and handling human sources; and completing analyses from the field are finite for any government. In the French case particularly, one problem was that authorities had to devote significant resources to monitoring the "jihadist cheerleaders" (although some of those individuals are now being rounded up; the French government announced April 2 that it was deporting five radical Islamic preachers).

Monitoring and deporting cheerleaders does not fully address the problem of distinguishing those intending to conduct an attack from a host of potential attackers when the government has not been able to collect hard intelligence pertaining to that intent and activity. It is from this constellation of individuals that Merah and several other successful attackers have arisen in recent years. For the authorities, it is a question of justifying the expenditure of limited resources to monitor an individual or group whose connections to terrorism are questionable while staying fully engaged in monitoring others with solid connections to terrorism. This is how grassroots jihadists and lone wolves can, and will, slip through the net, sometimes with deadly effect.

At this time, it is impossible to tell how many individuals or small cells are or might be planning attacks in France, Britain or the

United States. There are many variables involved, and no government agency should be expected to provide complete security against potential -- but unknown -- threats. Moreover, with each arrest, each intelligence find, each videotaped speech or warning, the game changes: Each side shifts, adjusts and adapts to the moves being made by the other side in order to attain or maintain an advantage. This type of shift was clearly illustrated by the calls by jihadist leaders in recent years for sympathizers to conduct simple attacks close to home with readily available weapons.

None of this is intended to argue that the missions of intelligence and security agencies are futile, that funding should be cut or efforts abandoned. In a world where complete safety is not possible, the question becomes one of aligning resources to prevent the most serious threats to a society and mitigating the effects of attacks that cannot be prevented. Such an approach stands in stark contrast to that of attempting to guard every potential target against every conceivable threat.

Indeed, acknowledging that it is impossible to prevent all acts of violence could provide a starting point for a more meaningful discussion of effective counterterrorism tactics. Knowing there is a limit to what governments can do can lead to smarter ways of doing things -- focusing efforts and resources, collecting information and turning that information into actionable intelligence while safeguarding individual liberties.

### **NYPD says Iran has conducted surveillance in New York City**

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/03/21/nypd-says-iran-has-conducted-surveillance-in-new-york-city/#ixzz1pq9IANid>

Iranians with ties to the Tehran government have been caught videotaping and snapping photos of New York City landmarks several times over the past decade, a top city police official testified Wednesday, as he warned the city could be the "ideal target" for Iran if tensions escalate.

Mitchell Silber, the NYPD's director of intelligence analysis, told Congress that Iranians may be using "diplomatic cover" to conduct "hostile reconnaissance" on America's biggest city.

Silber cycled a string of incidents where law enforcement questioned Iranians, who turned out to be working with the Iranian mission to the United Nations or otherwise tied to the government.

He said the Iran-backed Hezbollah also has a presence in the New York area.

"Iran and/or Hezbollah remain deeply committed to striking against Israeli and Western targets and they are willing to deploy a variety of methods in order to do so," he said, citing recent attacks "plausibly linked to Iran" in Georgia, India and Thailand.

"Given the recent alleged Iranian directed plot against a foreign diplomat here in Washington, Iran's increasingly bellicose rhetoric and its recent as well as long history of sponsoring terrorist attacks abroad, the NYPD must remain vigilant in attempting to detect and disrupt any attack by Iran or its



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proxies," Silber told the House Homeland Security Committee.

He said authorities have interviewed at least 13 people since 2005 with ties to Tehran who were seen taking pictures of city landmarks.

In May 2005, Silber said, tips led the NYPD to six people on sightseeing cruises who were taking pictures and movies of city landmarks like the Brooklyn Bridge. In September 2008, police interviewed three people taking pictures of railroad tracks. And in September 2010, federal air marshals saw four people taking pictures and videos at a New York heliport.

Interviews with law enforcement revealed that all were associated with the Iranian government, but they were ultimately released and never charged, Silber said.



He also recalled three separate incidents between 2002 and 2004 where Iranian mission guards were caught videotaping infrastructure and landmarks in the city. "The last of these resulted in the expulsion of two guards by the United States for engaging in activities that were not consistent with their duties -- in other words, spying,"

he said.

U.S. officials long have worried that Iran would use Hezbollah to carry out attacks inside the United States. And Iran was previously accused in a disrupted plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. here last year, a plan interpreted in the U.S. intelligence community as a clear message that Iran is not afraid to carry out an attack inside this country.


In January, James Clapper, the top U.S. intelligence official, said some Iranian officials are probably "more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime."

But government officials have said there are no known or specific threats indicating Iranian plans to attack inside the U.S.

## 'Antimagnet' Renders Magnets Invisible


Source: <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=antimagnet-renders-magnets-invisible>

Physicists have already unveiled invisibility cloaks that hide objects from static magnetic fields. This



cloaks that can hide objects from light, sound, seismic and even water waves. Now researchers report a cloak that can hide

'antimagnet' could have medical applications, but might also subvert airport security.



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Writing in *Science*, a team of theorists led by Alvaro Sanchez at the Autonomous University of Barcelona in Spain, together with experimentalists at the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, describe a magnetic cloak made with inexpensive, readily available materials.

The cloak's interior is lined with turns of tape made from a high-temperature superconductor. Superconductors repel magnetic fields, so any magnetic field enclosed within a superconductor would be undetectable from outside. But the superconductor itself would still perturb an external magnetic field, so the researchers coated its external side with an ordinary ferromagnet -- the material that kitchen fridge magnets are made of. The superconductor tries to repel external field lines, whereas the ferromagnet tries to draw them in -- together, the two layers cancel each other out.

To test the antimagnet, the Slovak group cooled the cloak with liquid nitrogen to activate the superconductor, and placed it in a static, uniform magnetic field with a strength of 40 millitesla. Using a measuring device called a Hall probe to map the magnetic field, the researchers found that the field lines did not enter the cloak, even through from the outside they appeared to pass straight through. They say that theirs is an 'exact' cloak -- one for which the cloaking could, in principle, be made perfect using currently available materials.

### Wildly variable

The theory behind invisibility cloaks was put forward independently in 2006 by physicists John Pendry and colleagues from Imperial College London and Ulf Leonhardt of the University of St Andrews, UK. Their idea was that materials with well-tuned electromagnetic properties could guide light around an object so that the light's overall path remained unperturbed: from a distance, both the object and cloak would appear invisible. But for this to work with visible light, the electric permittivity and magnetic permeability -- which describe a material's response to electric and magnetic fields -- of the material used would probably need to vary wildly throughout the cloak. So scientists have turned their attention to simpler forms of cloaking that are easier to implement. In 2008, Pendry and others demonstrated the beginnings of a cloak for static magnetic fields, the simplicity of which resided in the need to

vary only the cloak's magnetic permeability, and not its electric permittivity.

That design still had one complex aspect: the permeability had to be anisotropic, taking different values in different directions. But Sanchez and colleagues' cloak is simpler still. Its permeability is isotropic -- that is, it has the same value in all directions.



Pendry calls the new work "seminal" in the progress of cloaking technology. "Although the final result shows a less-than-perfect cloak, it is convincingly demonstrated that the raw concept works and there is no doubt that further improvement of manufacture would considerably improve the quality," he says.

Sanchez points out that the magnetic cloak is straightforward to make: it requires only off-the-shelf materials and costs in the region of €1,000 (US\$1,300) -- very little in research terms. He believes the cloak could have uses in medicine, protecting delicate pacemakers from the strong magnetic fields of magnetic resonance imaging machines. **But he admits there could also be unsavory applications -- the technology could, for example, be used to hide metallic weapons from security portals. "I would prefer to consider it the other way -- that our ideas can help to design safer security procedures," Sanchez says.**

Richard Tomsett, a border-security adviser who works for London-based consultancy firm Dextera Global, points out that there are other technologies used in airport security, such as X-ray machines and sniffer dogs, that the cloak may not fool. But he thinks security officials will still keep



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abreast of technological developments. "While the cloak may present another operational challenge for security organizations, they will

actively respond by working with technology manufacturers and scientists to combat the potential threat," he says.

### "Green"

A "must see" film...

Source: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-WNgoqBGw4Y&feature=player\\_embedded](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-WNgoqBGw4Y&feature=player_embedded)

The film "Green", is a 48 min long documentary on the Indonesian rainforest, deforestation and orangutan extinction. It is a silent film (without narration, but with music) which addresses itself both to the Indonesians and the consumers of wood/paper/palm oil around the world.

This important documentary was filmed in the fast disappearing Indonesian rainforest and is not narrated; however, its message is clear and frightening. The home of the Orangutan and many other wildlife species in Indonesia is being decimated at an alarming rate by consumer need and greed.


The film features the widespread practice of 'slash and burn' to clear the lush rainforest to make way for extensive palm oil plantations which we, the consumer, support in our demand for our favorite foods, magazines, cosmetics, and, increasingly, bio-fuel. The practice has also seen Indonesia move into third place behind the US and China with regard to carbon emissions due to the uncovering of peat soil which has lain, undisturbed, below the tropical rainforest for centuries. The film exposes the illegal pet



trade that thrives in Indonesia and the sick, despairing lives of those Orangutan who spend years, often all their lives, locked in small cages, suffering, alone.

The story thread follows the fate of a female Orangutan who has been captured and brought in because her forest home has been decimated. She is one of the lucky ones – most are slaughtered without mercy when caught. Her fate though, is not a happy one, as her trauma at the hands of

man is too great. Your heart will break with resounding pity, but it is even more sobering to know that she is only one of hundreds every week who will suffer a similar fate. Make sure everyone you know watches this documentary. We owe it to our friends, the gentle Orangutan, we owe it to our planet, and we owe it to ourselves so that we can learn from it.



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### Muslim population in European cities

Source:<http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2007/11/muslim-population-in-european-cities.html>

I was recently asked which cities in Europe have the highest Muslim percentage. The following is what I found in my research. I linked to my sources, but note that not all sources have the same reliability level. STAT - official municipal or national statistics, EUMAP - [EU Research program](#), WIKI - Wikipedia, NEWS - mentioned in the news. If my readers have more information, I will be glad to integrate it into this list. Note that in some of these cities, there are neighborhoods which have a much higher percentage of Muslims (for example: Kreuzberg in Berlin, Molenbeek in Brussels and Tower Hamlets in London) and neighborhoods with a much lower percentage.

#### Austria

Vienna - 8% (120,000) ([NEWS](#))

#### Belgium

Antwerp- 6.7% (>30,000 of >450,000) ([EUMAP](#))

Brussels (region) - 17%-20% (160,000-220,000) [some say 33% (City of Brussels?)] ([NEWS](#), [NEWS](#))

#### Denmark

Aarhus - ~10% ([NEWS](#))

Copenhagen - 12.6% (63,000 of 500,000) ([EUMAP](#))

#### France

Ile de France - 10%-15% (up to 1.7 million) ([NEWS](#))

Marseilles - 25% (200,000 of 800,000) ([NEWS](#)), PACA region - 20% (0.7-1.0 million of 1.5 million) ([EUMAP](#))

Paris - 7.38% (155,000 of 2.1 million) ([EUMAP](#))

Strasbourg - 10% ([NEWS](#))

#### Germany

Berlin - 5.9% (~200,000 of 3.40 million) ([EUMAP](#))

Cologne - 12% (120,000 of 1 million) ([WIKI](#))

Hamburg - 6.4% (~110,000 of 1.73 million) ([EUMAP](#))

#### The Netherlands

Amsterdam - 24% (180,000 of 750,000) ([STAT](#)), Greater Amsterdam - 12.7% ([STAT](#))

The Hague - 14.2% ( 67,896 of 475,580) ([STAT](#)), Greater Hague - 11% ([STAT](#))

Rotterdam - 13% (80,000 of 600,000) ([EUMAP](#)), Greater Rotterdam - 9.9% ([STAT](#))

Utrecht - 13.2% (38,300 of 289,000) ([STAT](#)), Greater Utrecht - 7% ([STAT](#))


Zaan district - 8.8% ([STAT](#))



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### Russia

Moscow - 16%-20% (2 million of 10-12 million) ([NEWS](#))



### Sweden

Malmö - ~25% ([NEWS](#)) [percent of immigrants, foreign born or both parents foreign born: 36% ([STAT](#))]

Stockholm - 20% (>155,000 of 771,038) ([EUMAP](#)) [percent of immigrants: 36% ([STAT](#))]

### United Kingdom

Birmingham - 14.3% (139,771) ([WIKI](#))

Bradford - 16% (75,000) ([NEWS](#))

Leicester - 11% (>30,000 of 280,000) ([EUMAP](#))

Greater London - 8.5%-17% (1.3 million of 7.5 million) ([NEWS](#), [WIKI](#))

Luton - 14.6% (26,963) ([WIKI](#))



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### For U.S. Analysts, Rethinking The Terror Threat

Source: <http://www.npr.org/2012/03/27/149408570/for-u-s-analysts-rethinking-the-terror-threat>

U.S. officials are looking more closely for signs of state-sponsored terrorism these days. In this attack, Israel blamed Iran for bombing a car belonging to the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi, India, on Feb. 13. The wife of an Israeli diplomat was injured. Iran denied it was involved.

There has been a subtle shift taking place in the intelligence community in recent months. Intelligence and law enforcement officials say analysts and experts who have been tracking al-Qaida for more than a decade have been quietly reassigned. Some are being moved completely out of al-Qaida units. Others are being asked to spend less time watching al-Qaida and more time tracking more traditional foes — like state-sponsored terrorists.

U.S. officials declined to provide specific numbers or detail which intelligence units have changed priorities, but they did say that a goodly portion of the analysts who have been reassigned from their al-Qaida duties are being asked to focus on one country: Iran.

Officials said that with the relative threat from al-Qaida declining, it made sense to reallocate resources, and with the increase in terrorism-related activity linked to Iran, it also made sense to focus on it.

The concern tore into public consciousness last fall, when FBI Director Robert Mueller, Attorney General Eric Holder and a roster of high-level Justice Department officials announced that the U.S. had uncovered a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States.

U.S. officials didn't mince words. They said the scheme could be traced — through money transfers — to the top ranks of the Iranian government.

"As a career intelligence analyst, I always look at problems from two perspectives, that is capability and intent," said Philip Mudd, a former top counterterrorism official in both the CIA and the FBI. "Clearly the Iranians have had

the capability since the revolution in 1979 to assassinate members of the opposition in Europe, which they did in the 1980s. The question now is intent. ... Do they want to do this?"

Iran denied that it had anything to do with the plot and demanded an apology. But just months later, there were other suspicious episodes that suggested that the intelligence community's concern about Iran was well placed.

#### New Evidence



In February, two bombs exploded in India and the country of Georgia, and they appeared to be targeting Israeli diplomats. It is unclear who was responsible, but India issued warrants for three Iranian citizens. They stood accused of helping several men attach a magnetic bomb to the back of an Israeli diplomatic vehicle in New Delhi. The same day, a similar attack was launched against an Israeli diplomat in Georgia. Again, the Iranians denied any involvement.

Mudd says he's suspicious.

"When I saw those attacks, to me the light that went on in my head was the intent light. Iran's intent is back," he says.

Now a senior adviser at the consulting group Oxford Analytica, Mudd says that after years of relatively low-level operations by Iranian-backed terrorists, Teheran appears to be back on the offensive.



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"There is no way you conduct that number of attacks without having senior leadership saying this is what we want to do," he says. "So, that's a problem." And that goes a long way toward explaining why Iran is fast becoming such a priority in the U.S. intelligence community.

### Not A New Problem

To be sure, this is a problem with some history. Iran assassinated political opponents in Europe in the 1980s. Closer to home, the Justice Department has long suspected that Iran was behind the 1996 truck bombing of a U.S. military dormitory in Saudi Arabia known as the Khobar Towers.

The U.S. government handed down more than a dozen indictments in that case in June 2001, and specifically said it would continue the investigation to track down just how the Iranian government was involved. But just months later, the Sept. 11 attacks happened, priorities changed overnight, and al-Qaida became the focus. U.S. officials say the pendulum is starting to swing back again in the direction of state-sponsored terrorism.

"There is no question in the current environment, with a diminished al-Qaida core, that state sponsorship and in particular Iranian state sponsorship grows in relevance and importance for counterterrorism officials," says Juan Zarate, a former deputy national security adviser and now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"And that will be a major focus over the next couple of years," Zarate says. "The challenge is that going after state-sponsored terrorist organizations, especially those that are well-funded and well-organized and sponsored by

Iran, is a very different proposition than chasing a metastasized nonstate network like al-Qaida. It takes a different set of skills."

The difference is that al-Qaida, while hiding out in third-world countries, was brazen in its attacks. They were showy plots for which the group proudly took credit. Iran, on the other hand, has been known to use proxies and groups like Hezbollah to launch attacks that are difficult to trace back to their source.

So the blunt instruments that worked so well in dismantling al-Qaida — like drone strikes — won't work on this kind of terrorism, says Brian Fishman, a terrorism fellow at the New America Foundation.

"If you're going to deal with state-sponsored terrorism, what you need is not just those drones but very skilled operators," says Fishman. "You need people who can insert themselves into a wide range of societies and wide range of organizations and networks to gather intelligence and in some cases operate offensively against these kinds of groups."

Put simply, analysts say the U.S. will have to go back to basics. They will need to find ways to collect better human intelligence, recruit more spies inside Iran, and use the carrots and brickbats of diplomacy and sanctions. The trick, they say, will be adding those methods to the tools the U.S. has developed fighting al-Qaida.

"The way the U.S. government chases people now is light years different than it was a decade ago," says Mudd. "The capabilities we have now to look at data and understand an adversary, the kind of data that let us break foreign fighter networks in Iraq, I think some of those skills will really come into play if we have to deal with the Iran problem."

## New strategies needed to eliminate piracy in Gulf of Aden

By Hussein Mouldid Bosh

Source: <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=263851>

Somalian pirates have caused mayhem in the waters off the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia, one of the world's busiest shipping routes, where more than 20,000 ships transit the waters annually.

The Gulf of Aden is now considered the world's most dangerous due to persistent pirates, who have become more sophisticated and broadened their range of attack.

Dozens of warships, most notably from US, EU and NATO are currently patrolling the waters under a UN mandate to deter the pirate attacks. But this has not deterred the pirates from disrupting the free passage of vessels in the shipping lane.

Thus, questions have been raised about the capability of the naval forces to counter a land-based menace. Is



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international anti-piracy policy effective, or is forming regional maritime force that can fight on land the most cost-effective and lasting solution? The operating cost of anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden is estimated at \$2 billion annually, including the cost of naval vessels, aircraft and military personnel.

**If 30 percent of this amount could go to fighting on land, it would have piracy in**

ransoms.

A RESEARCH document, entitled “**Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy**,” by Dr. Anja Shortland, is claiming that around a third of pirate ransoms (in between US \$7b. and US \$12b. annually) are converted into Somali shillings, benefiting laborers and pastoralists in Puntland.



### **Gulf of Aden by at least 40%.**

At least 19 foreign vessels with 257 crew members, including a Panama-flagged Ro/Ro cargo ship with 24 crew members reportedly seized on Friday, February 18 off the Somali coast, are currently in the hands of pirates.


Operating only at sea has allowed the buccaneers to carry out attacks from the mainland or even nearby islands, “mother ships,” using speedboats.

There are several pirate strongholds off Somali coastlines, including two main towns of Hobyo and Harardhere, where at least 10 vessels are still being held by the pirates. Both towns are well known to be where pirates and their beneficiaries hide themselves to await the multi-billion dollar


If Dr. Anja knows where pirates’ ransoms end up, why can’t international maritime actors coordinate with the locals to detain the ransom receivers based inside Somalia? This is what many Africans are asking themselves, including One Somali

elder in Puntland, Sheikh Ahmed Abdullahi.

He argued that if international anti-piracy forces are serious about their fight against piracy, they could come here (Puntland) and at least handle them on land



whenever they are in the




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country.

On the other hand, a leaked draft from the London Conference on Somalia, which took place at Lancaster house on February 23, 2012, said that “On piracy, we agreed that the roots of the issues are on land not at sea, and our work on regional stability would be central to tackling the causes of piracy.”

The draft stated that the Republic of Seychelles has found ways to accept custody of pirates captured by naval forces

compared to Seychelles or other African countries. Take a look at this example: On January 24, 2012, two Danish Refugee Council workers held hostage by Somali pirates were rescued by US military forces that flew in helicopters under the cover of darkness in a raid on a Somali village. The planes landed at the town’s airport on the night of January 23 before they carried out the overnight raid on a tiny village located in between the regions of Mudug and Galgadud.



and try them, and a number of regions of Somalia are now agreeing to imprison those found guilty; “We noted the creation of a regional anti-piracy prosecution and information coordination in the Seychelles which will look at disrupting the money involved in piracy activity and seek to prosecute those who benefit from the proceeds of crime,” the draft said, adding, “We welcome the European Union commitment to supporting better maritime security arrangements from neighbouring states of East Africa.”

However, using naval forces inside Somalia can only disrupt the ransoms,

Only one raid that was carried out on land this year has succeeded, and this can be equivalent to four to six raids at the sea.

There are reports of naval forces targeting Somali fishermen because it is hard for them to differentiate.

As an example of a success story, Puntland, which declared itself an independent state in 1998, enjoys relative peace compared to south central Somalia which has been ravaged by bloody conflict since 1991, and is home to local armed militia and a notorious base used by local pirates to launch attacks on merchant vessels transiting the Indian Ocean.

*The writer is a freelance journalist, covering stories around East Africa, especially Somalia.*

**NOTE:** You can download the full Chatham House report from the Newsletter’s website – “CBRNE-CT Papers” section.



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### Christians Targeted in Sudan's 'Ethnic Cleansing'

Source: [http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/sudan/article\\_1454719.html](http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/sudan/article_1454719.html)


The "ethnic cleansing" that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has undertaken against black Africans in the Nuba Mountains is also aimed at ridding the area of Christianity, according to humanitarian workers. By targeting Christians among people who are also adherents of Islam and other faiths in the Nuba Mountains, military force helps the regime in Khartoum to portray the violence as "*jihad*" to Muslims abroad and thus raise support from Islamic nations, said one humanitarian worker on condition of anonymity.

In South Kordofan state – which lies on Sudan's border with the newly created nation of South Sudan but is home to sympathizers of the southern military that fought against northern forces during Sudan's long civil war – Bashir's military strikes are directed at Muslims as well as Christians, but churches and Christians are especially targeted, he said.

"The ongoing war against Christians and African indigenous people is more of an 'ethnic cleansing' in that they kill all black people, including Muslims, but they give specific connotation to the war in targeting Christians to secure funding and support from the Arab and Islamic world by saying this war is a religious war," he said. "And in so doing, they get huge support from those countries."

Aerial bombardment killed the five members of the Asaja Dalami Kuku family, which belonged to the Episcopal Church of Sudan, in Umsirdipa in the Nuba Mountains on Feb. 25, the source said.

The government in Khartoum is using



Antonov airplanes to drop bombs, "coupled with state-sponsored militia targeting churches and Christian families," said the humanitarian worker.

"The brutal state-sponsored militias are moving from house to house searching for Christian and African indigenous homes as the government continues with air strikes," he added.

The Satellite Sentinel Project has gathered evidence that Antonov aircraft have indiscriminately bombed civilian populations in South Kordofan, although after a recent crash the government has said it will no longer use the planes.

In Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, at least four church buildings have been razed and more than 20 Christians killed, he said.

"The Islamic north sees Nuba Christians as infidels who need to be Islamized through Jihad," the source said. "But the fact of the matter is this war is ethnic cleansing – a religious as well as political war, indeed a complex situation."

Between June 2011 and March 2012, four church buildings have been destroyed, said another humanitarian worker; they belonged to the Episcopal Church of Sudan, the Roman Catholic Church, the Sudanese Church of Christ and the Evangelical Presbyterian Church.

"On Aug. 18, 2011, the Sudanese Church of Christ building was razed to ashes," the worker said.

On June 7, 2011, state-sponsored militia



destroyed the office of the Sudan Council of Churches at Kadugli, along with its vehicle, the sources said.



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On Feb. 26, three church leaders visited the devastated areas of Kaduguli, led by Bishop Daniel Deng of the Episcopal Church of Sudan, and then presented grievances to the government. They were surprised that the government denied the attack on the church buildings.

“A government official said [southern and other] militia groups were the ones destroying the churches, and not the government,” one of the aid workers said.

Fighting in South Kordofan, a major battleground during Sudan’s 1983-2005 civil war, broke out again in June 2011 as Khartoum moved to assert its authority against gunmen formerly allied to the now independent South Sudan. The conflict between Bashir’s forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) spread from South Kordofan to Sudan’s Blue Nile state in September 2011.

The United Nations estimates the conflict has displaced 400,000 people, with 300,000 in danger of starving within a month. Additionally, the U.N. Commissioner for Refugees estimates

there are 185,000 refugees from South Kordofan and Blue Nile in South Sudan and Ethiopia.


Sudan’s Interim National Constitution holds up *sharia* (Islamic law) as a source of legislation, and the laws and policies of the government favor Islam, according to a U.S. Department of State report. On several occasions in the past year, Bashir has warned that Sudan’s constitution will become more firmly entrenched in *sharia*.

When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005, the people of South Kordofan were to decide whether to join the North or the South, but the state governor, wanted for war crimes himself, suspended the process, and Khartoum instead decided to disarm the SPLM-N by force.

“The church and enfeebled women and children have become victims of this fight,” one of the humanitarian workers said. “We as the church have a moral and spiritual obligation to stand with our brothers and sisters who are suffering in the Nuba Mountains.”

### Proceedings of the 1st International Conference in Safety and Crisis Management in the Construction, Tourism and SME Sectors

Source: <http://www.brownwalker.com/book.php?method=ISBN&book=1612335578>



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**Year:** 2012

This book includes selected papers from those presented during the 1st International Conference in



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Safety and Crisis Management in the Construction, Tourism and SME Sectors (1st CoSaCM) that took place in the Cultural Center of European University Cyprus in Nicosia, Cyprus between 24-28 June 2011.

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**NOTE:** Editor's contribution: "*Hospital CBRNE Defense in Megapolis Environment*" – pp.227-229.

**EDITOR'S CHOICE:** A very well written Newsletter from **Canada**. Contact the Editor-in-Chief for details at email on banner.

# THREATWATCH

Bimonthly CBRNE Newsletter,  
Contact: [Threatwatchtoronto@gmail.com](mailto:Threatwatchtoronto@gmail.com)



### New York Is Lucky Not to Have the Games

By Mitchell L. Moss

Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/02/are-the-olympics-more-trouble-than-theyre-worth/new-york-is-lucky-not-to-have-the-games>

Now is the time for New York to mount a counter-Olympics: one based on the High Line, a rejuvenated Coney Island, free museums and fantastic street life. Why would anyone choose to visit London — when even London cabbies are threatening a work stoppage and major theatrical productions are closing down during the Olympic Games — when New York is safe, easy to move through by foot, subway, bike or taxi, and filled with world-class food trucks and restaurants rather than the McDonald's fare that will be served at all Olympic venues.

London will be a morass this summer. Meanwhile, New York City has never been a better place to visit.

New York, which competed unsuccessfully for the 2012 Olympics, may well turn out to be the big winner this summer. Thousands of

Londoners intend to flee their homes, and non-Olympic tourists plan to avoid Britain, rather than endure Internet slowdowns, Olympic-generated traffic congestion, extortionate hotel prices and airport delays caused by airspace restrictions throughout the 2012 Games.

Although the British have extensive experience countering Irish freedom fighters, the \$1.58 billion allocated to prevent any disruption of the 2012 Olympic Games far exceeds anything that Scotland Yard or MI5 ever spent to combat the I.R.A. London, which experienced a terrorist subway bombing in July 2005, is now competing with itself to show that it can attract 17,000 athletes and almost one million visitors without any big disruption. It won't be easy; during riots last year, the



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local police did not even have sufficient manpower and vans to arrest groups of looters. The true competition this summer is between a free and open New York City — where new pedestrian plazas are jammed with visitors and theaters are open seven days a week. New York relies on its civilian-controlled police department to maintain safety, while Britain is preparing a military deployment and private security forces along with drones in the sky and an aircraft carrier on the Thames River. In fact, as *The Guardian* notes, there will be more British troops swarming London (about 13,500) “than are currently at war in Afghanistan.”

The London Department for Transport is already urging local residents to avoid the subway, to work from home and to even go to a pub before taking the subway home from work. And hotel rooms during early August are available for only 14-day stays, often with a severe price increase — another disincentive

for the typical global tourist lacking a passion for athletic competition. In order to make sure the athletes are not tied up in traffic, an extensive

Olympic road network has been designated for the exclusive use of the athletes, corporate sponsors, media, V.I.P.'s and Olympic officials. All nonemergency vehicles are banned from this network, including ambulances carrying blood supplies and noncritical patients. Referring to the London Olympic Committee for the Olympic Games, one observer wrote, “healthcare transports risk being mired in semi-permanent jams, and the decision has been widely interpreted as a victory for LOCOG over the little people.”

Let the games begin: New York's high-energy, sidewalk fashion show, and spontaneous flow of people all day and night would win the gold medal for urban life — with or without the Olympics.

*Mitchell L. Moss, the director of the Rudin Center for Transportation and the Henry Hart Rice professor of urban policy and planning at New York University's Wagner School of Public Service, is the author of "How New York City Won the Olympics."*

## EU Provides Specialist Detection Equipment for Euro 2012

Source: <http://english.cri.cn/6966/2012/04/03/2561s690860.htm>

Warsaw's Frederic Chopin Airport will receive EU-funded CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) detection equipment for this year's Euro 2012 Football Championship starting on June.

The agreement on the CBRN gear is the effect of a recent visit in Warsaw by EC security inspector Radoslaw Olszewski. During his two-day visit, Olszewski, a CBRN expert, and border guard authorities discussed possible terrorist threats during the championship.

Olszewski confirmed after the talks that the EC planned further cooperation in security matters with the EU states.

Olszewski said Chopin Airport belonged to the most secure air terminals in Europe but noted that security needed to be monitored as “this may always change”.



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Chopin Airport is the biggest air terminal in Poland. Last year it processed over eight million



passengers. The 16-nation Euro 2012 soccer championships, slated for June 8 to July 1, 2012, will take place in four Polish cities of Warsaw, Gdansk, Wroclaw and Poznan as well as four Ukrainian cities of Kiev, Lvov, Donetsk and Kharkov

### The bicycle's next frontier: disaster response

Source:<http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120403-the-bicycles-next-frontier-disaster-response>



In the wake of the devastation of last year's earthquake and tsunami in Japan, residents and officials of cities and towns began revisiting their emergency plans. Those in seismically active regions, in particular, revisited the expected impact of a large earthquake, not only in terms of damage that could be expected to buildings and key infrastructure components such as bridges and

roadways, and extending the effect of that damage to provision of food, fuel, medical supplies, tools, emergency services and general transportation around the area. The city of Portland, Oregon, as well as citizen-led Neighborhood Emergency Teams (NET), have been including the cargo bike in their plans. Heavier framed than the standard bicycle, the cargo, or freight, bicycle was common in dense urban environments. They were commonly used for deliveries of commodities such as milk or bread, though they were capable of carrying relatively heavy loads. According to Jonathan Maus, writing in *bikeportland.org*, Portland considers itself to be the most bicycle-friendly city in the United States. Though admittedly difficult to be accurate, the City of Portland estimates in its 2011 Bicycle Count Report that approximately 100,000 residents use the bicycle in their daily commute with steady



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growth every year in the since 2000. The city's bicycle consciousness has led disaster planners to include cargo bicycles in the Portland Bureau of Emergency Management's (PBEM) disaster plans. Maus reports that the city's PBEM director, Carmen Merlo, sees the cargo bike as integral to the city's disaster response, and will be specifically included in the Portland Plan, the

comprehensive disaster response plan nearing adoption by the city council. Emergency readiness aside, there is a growing group of cargo bike enthusiasts that love cargo bikes. That are planning to put the cargo bikes to the test in an event called the Disaster Relief Trials, a cargo bike trials-type race scheduled for this June.

**EDITOR'S PROPOSAL FOR CBRN ENVIRONMENT**

**Traffic Jam vs. Fast Response**

Magen David Adom

**Traffic Jam vs. Fast Response**

Civilian Support Equipment

Overall Width: 1,145 mm (45.1 in.)

PPE

GWAS HART Polaris ATV 76 in

Additional construction

BACK

JOHN DEERE M-Gator A1

FRONT

**Moving IN BETWEEN Lanes**






### **State sponsorship, religious ideology, don't correlate to CBRN pursuit**

Source: <http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/study-state-sponsorship-religious-ideology-dont-correlate-cbrn-pursuit/2012-04-05#ixzz1rHEVw6F8>

A quantitative study of terrorist organizations that pursue chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons says that state sponsorship and religious ideology aren't predictors of their likelihood to undertake CBRN attacks.



The study, by three American academics, was published in the March edition of the journal *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. Victor

Asal and Karl Rethemeyer, both of the State University of New York-Albany, and Gary Ackerman, director for special projects and the University of Maryland's Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, examine 395 unique organizations that undertook a CBRN attack or attempted attack from 1998 through 2005. They correlate them to variables such as size, state sponsorship, level of host state embeddedness in Western culture (as measured by the number of McDonalds in a country) or global trade, whether the organization



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had control of territory, religious ideology and other factors.

The result is that a profile of a likely CBRN terrorist organization is one that's located in a country embedded into global trade, that's relatively large, has already conducted three or more non-CBRN attacks and has alliances with other terrorist organizations.

Access to trade routes allows terrorists to overcome technical barriers and buy key components, while larger organizations with experience arguably have the substantial resources necessary to acquire, produce and maybe even test a CBRN weapon. However, there's some evidence, the authors say, for a **"middle age" hypothesis** – that as organizations pass a certain age threshold, they become increasingly institutionalized and headed by leaders "that may wish to be accepted as 'statesmen,'" and so become less likely to pursue CBRN. Collective action through alliances, meanwhile, help terrorist organizations just as they help all organizations.

The control of territory has no measurable effect, although the authors' null hypothesis was that it would, since al Qaeda was known to have experimented with CBRN weapons in Afghanistan when the Taliban controlled that country. In fact, control of territory "had a negative coefficient, indicating that any effect

would be to *reduce* the propensity to pursue CBRN capabilities."

Surprisingly, **religious ideology has no effect**

as an independent variable, the authors say – perhaps because there is a substantial correlation between shared religious ideology and alliances (coreligionists probably find it easier to get along) and because religious groups

appear to cluster in countries integrated into world trade. The authors acknowledge a possible alternative explanation, that "religion" may be too broad a variable, and that other factors such as the specific nature of the religious beliefs may be determinative, a hypothesis that would require more research.

The null hypothesis that state sponsorship makes CBRN terrorism more likely also isn't borne out by the findings. Probably states view encouraging CBRN attacks as too risky and destabilizing, the authors say. In fact, the lack of any correlation between CBRN use and state sponsorship "perhaps signals that state sponsors go out of their way to discourage the use of CBRN among their proxies."

The study is based on a limited data set, authors acknowledge, and is further limited by the fact that unclaimed attacks couldn't be attributed to terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, some previous assumptions regarding CBRN pursuit may have to be rethought, they say.



### A FINE EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO DO THINGS...

#### Handling of Capitol threat bashed

Source: <http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20120405/NEWS/304050061/-1/WWW/Handling-Capitol-threat-bashed>

A day after a mysterious white powder spilled from an envelope opened on the Iowa House floor, public safety officials and lawmakers said it appears the potential threat was not handled properly.

Gov. Terry Branstad and others said on Wednesday that even though it was later determined the powder posed no threat, the incident underscored the need to review public safety policies at the Capitol.

"I would say, like anything, it was a very learning experience and that it will be handled differently next time," said Rep. Steve Olson, R-De Witt.

A hazardous materials team eventually determined the substance was not dangerous and on Tuesday night released about 300 lawmakers, staffers and others who were sequestered for hours in the House chambers and



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elsewhere in the locked-down Statehouse.

The biggest problem, experts say, was containment — or lack of it — potentially exposing hundreds of people to what could have been a toxic substance.

**Soon after the powder spilled from the envelope onto the desk of Rep. Ako Abdul-Samad around 3:45 p.m. Tuesday, legislative staff brought the letter from the House chambers into the Capitol rotunda. And it was more than an hour later that the hazmat team arrived and authorities closed the building to prevent others from entering or exiting.**

The ideal response would have been to quarantine the substance and limit its exposure to as few people as possible, several

initially away from the Capitol when the event began. “I contacted a postal inspector I sometimes work with and basically get the same outcome without throwing the hazmat switch.”

The direction of the investigation changed after some began complaining of headaches, a possible sign of a toxic substance.

The Capitol was locked down until about 8 p.m. while crews conducted tests. Had the letter been contained to the House chamber, it’s possible only that area would have needed to be shut off, Logsdon said.

Under normal circumstances, state mail goes through an irradiation process at the Grimes building before it is distributed to state offices. The letter to Abdul-Samad, however, was hand



emergency management officials said.

Instead, the failure to isolate the material could have proven dangerous or even deadly had the substance been a contaminant such as anthrax, experts said, recalling a 2001 incident that sparked a national panic when anthrax spores were mailed to some Congress members and news organizations. Five people died and 17 others were infected.

On Tuesday, Capitol security at first thought the matter could be adequately handled by a postal inspector and did not summon hazmat specialists.

“The fact of the matter is, the early assessment I had is that they were pretty certain that the material was a laundry detergent,” said Iowa State Patrol Capt. Mark Logsdon, who was

delivered to a legislative mailbox, perhaps indicating someone with knowledge about the Capitol’s inner workings was involved, Logsdon said.

The powder likely would have been discovered had the letter gone through the regular mail system, said Caleb Hunter, a spokesman for the Iowa Department of Administrative Services.

The FBI is now among the agencies investigating the incident, and security is reviewing video footage in an attempt to determine who delivered the letter.

“I just think it was a learning experience for us,” Abdul-Samad said Wednesday. “It brought up a



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point how accessible we are as legislators and it's something we need to look at because we are up here serving the people. That's our job." Some states, like Florida and California, have off-site government mailrooms, some of which were enhanced or put into place after the 2001 anthrax incident, said Kae Warnock, a policy specialist with the National Conference of State Legislatures.

Iowa lawmakers, unlike some states, do not have their own offices and instead share a relatively small desk space with their clerk. It's acceptable for them to open mail on the House or Senate floor. However, letters or packages that appear suspicious should be called to the attention of Capitol security and possibly scanned in a device at the Capitol prior to being opened, Logsdon said.

Legislatures typically train staff on security precautions, but there is no set protocol among states, Warnock said.

"One of the things I can tell you about legislatures is that there are no two that are identical," Warnock said. "The way that they operate is so vastly different that you are never comparing an orange to an orange. They are all completely different entities in the way they operate their security."

In Iowa, the state does have written policy directing those whose job it is to handle mail to watch for suspicious items. But lawmakers said Wednesday that they have not been instructed on what to look for.

"I would hope both caucuses would instruct their members on how to handle it if it happens in the future," said Rep. Clel Baudler, R-Greenfield and a retired state patrolman. "You isolate, you contain, you call the proper authorities and you turn off the air handlers."

That precaution was not taken on Tuesday, according to Hunter, who said building operators did not shut down the Capitol's air circulation systems. Ideally, that should have happened immediately.

Sen. Jeff Danielson, D-Cedar Falls and a professional firefighter, said he will wait for the emergency agencies that responded to complete an after-action report before pushing for specific changes.

"A lot of this is anecdotal and observations," Danielson said. "The responsible way to approach it if people are critical of the action is to say to the agencies, let's do a 'lessons-learned' and look at how we can improve."

Branstad, who spoke with Logsdon on Wednesday, said overall he is satisfied with the ultimate outcome and handling of the incident. He and Lt. Gov. Kim Reynolds were meeting with Iowans in several events outside the Capitol on Tuesday afternoon and were not part of the Capitol lockdown.

"You want to try to learn from everything," Branstad said. "I'm sure they'll do an after-action report and try to determine what can be done differently or better. We want error on the side of being safe."

### FBI: U.S. Colleges Infected by Foreign Spies

► Source: <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-08/american-universities-infected-by-foreign-spies-detected-by-fbi>

### Islam Conquers European Football

By Soeren Kern

Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2994/islam-conquers-european-football>

As part of the agreement, however, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah required Real Madrid to remove the cross from the crown on its logo for all promotional materials. The president of Real Madrid dutifully complied.

The top-ranked football team in Spain, Real Madrid, has removed a Christian cross from its

official logo as a way to strengthen its fan base among Muslims in Europe and the Middle East. According to Spain's top sports newspaper, *Marca*, the change was made to "avoid any form of confusion or misinterpretation in a region where the majority of the population is Muslim."



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Real Madrid says its decision to remove the cross from its logo is simply a cost of doing business in a globalized world. But critics say the move represents yet another erosion of European culture and tradition in the face of encroaching Islam.

The cross controversy comes as Real Madrid begins to build a \$1 billion sports tourist resort in the United Arab Emirates. The foundation stone for the 50 hectare Real Madrid Resort Island was laid in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah on March 29; the complex is scheduled to open in January 2015.

Real Madrid says its resort island will be the first theme park on an artificial island to combine tourism and sports, and it will be the first recreational tourism complex built under the Real Madrid trademark. The complex will include a 450-room luxury hotel, luxury villas, a sporting harbor, and the world's first-ever football stadium that is open to the sea.

According to Real Madrid, "This is a decisive and strategic step that will enhance the strength of this institution in the Middle East and Asia, a key region in which the passion for this club has been apparent. Real Madrid and the Government of Ras al-Khaimah want to transmit the passion of Real Madrid and what it

means throughout the world."

As part of the agreement, however, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Sheikh Saud Bin Saqr al Qasimi, **required Real Madrid to remove the cross from the crown on its logo for all promotional materials related to the resort island.** The president of Real Madrid, Florentino Pérez, dutifully complied.

The cross was first to Real Madrid's logo in 1920, when King Alfonso XIII granted the club his royal patronage. The word *Real* is Spanish for royal, and the cross still forms an integral part of the coat of arms of the King of Spain.

To be sure, Real Madrid is not the first Spanish football club to remove a "religiously incorrect" cross from its logo in an effort to appease Muslim sensibilities. Some observers, in fact, say Real Madrid's move is part of a concerted effort to prevent a rival football team in Barcelona from winning over the Middle East.

FC Barcelona recently signed a five-year €150 million (\$200 million) shirt sponsorship deal with the Doha-based Qatar

Foundation, a so-called charitable trust that has been accused by the Spanish newspaper *El Mundo* of providing funding to the extremist cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an advocate of terrorism, wife beating and murderous anti-Semitism. The agreement permits the Qatar Foundation to place its logo on FC Barcelona's official team shirt.



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In addition to earning €30 million per season, the agreement has enabled FC Barcelona -- which claims to be "the undisputed brand leader in world football" -- to expand its influence throughout the Middle East.

FC Barcelona's public relations efforts in the Muslim world have not been without controversy. Like Real Madrid, FC Barcelona has a cross in its official logo. But after Saudi Arabia complained that the so-called Cruz de San Jorge -- a red and white cross that forms an integral part of FC Barcelona's logo -- was offensive to Islam because it evokes memories of the medieval Crusades, the horizontal line (and thus the offending cross) was removed from all FC Barcelona shirts sold in the Middle East.

Football clubs in Italy have also had run-ins with Muslim fashion police. In Milan, for example, the football team Inter Milan was sued by a Turkish lawyer named Baris Kaska. He filed a complaint with the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) against Inter Milan after the team wore shirts with a "Crusader-style" red cross that Kaska alleged was "offensive to Muslim sensibilities." The shirt's design -- to mark the 100th anniversary of the club -- included a big red cross on a white background, a symbol of the city of Milan. But Muslims said the emblem reminded them of the Knights Templar, which Kaska said symbolized "Western racist superiority over Islam."

In an interview with the Barcelona-based newspaper *La Vanguardia*, Kaska said Inter Milan had "manifested in the most explicit manner the superiority of one religion over another." He also said that Inter should be "heavily fined for displaying an offensive symbol."

In neighboring Germany, the Gelsenkirchen-based FC Schalke 04, which plays in Germany's top league, the Bundesliga, asked an Islam expert to consider whether the team's anthem is insulting to Muslims.

The third verse of the anthem, which is titled "Blue and White, How I Love You," contains the words: "Mohammed was a prophet who understood nothing about football. But of all the lovely colors he chose [Schalke's] blue and white."

Although the song was written in 1924, the football team began receiving complaints --

hundreds of them -- after a Turkish newspaper reported that the song is insulting to Mohammed. Muslims are now demanding that the offending line be struck from the song, which is chanted by Schalke's fans before every match.

Elsewhere in Germany, the German Central Council of Muslims issued a fatwa (religious ruling) stating that Muslim football players are not required to fast during the month of Ramadan.

The ruling was issued after the German football club FSV Frankfurt issued an official warning to three of their players for fasting and failing to tell their manager. The club said fasting harms the performance of its players.

In France, the referee of a woman's football match on March 18 in the southern French city of Narbonne refused to officiate the game when players for one of the teams took to the pitch wearing Muslim headscarves. The incident involved players from Petit-Bard Montpellier, who had been due to play Narbonne in a regional promotional tie.

The international governing body of football, known as FIFA, banned players from wearing the Islamic headscarf, also known as the hijab, in 2007, saying it was unsafe. But on March 3, FIFA accepted in principal that female footballers could wear headscarves when playing in official competitions.

The rule change, instigated by the brother of the King of Jordan, Ali bin al-Hussein who is also FIFA vice president, is due to come into effect on July 2.

FIFA secretary general, Jerome Vacke, says al-Hussein successfully convinced FIFA that the hijab is a cultural rather than a religious symbol, and that the rule change will allow women all over the world to play football. But the change has angered many Europeans, including some feminist groups, who say the Muslim headscarf is a sign of "male domination."

In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Parisien*, Asma Guenifi, the director of a women's rights group called Ni Putes, Ni Soumises, said the rule change is "a total regression." She added: "I think FIFA is influenced by intense lobbying from rich Middle Eastern countries, like Qatar."



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*Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group.*

### Securing the Olympics: A marathon not a sprint?

Source: [http://www.defenceiq.com/air-forces-and-military-aircraft/articles/securing-the-olympics-a-marathon-not-a-sprint/?mac=DFIQ\\_OI\\_Featured\\_2011&utm\\_source=defenceiq.com&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=DefOptIn&utm\\_content=4/12/12](http://www.defenceiq.com/air-forces-and-military-aircraft/articles/securing-the-olympics-a-marathon-not-a-sprint/?mac=DFIQ_OI_Featured_2011&utm_source=defenceiq.com&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DefOptIn&utm_content=4/12/12)

The clock in Trafalgar Square tells us there are 106 days until the London 2012 Olympic Games begin. As the days continue to drop off the calendar, concerns over security at the Games will undoubtedly increase as the authorities hurriedly put the final measures in place to ensure the capital is a safe and



Joint training exercise on the Thames.  
Photo: Finbarr O'Reilly/Reuters

sporting environment for all this summer.

At a conference on explosives and weapon detection earlier this year, James Brokenshire, Minister for Crime and Security, explained that security at the games was a top priority, and one that the UK more than prepared for.

“Our experience in security is one of the reasons that we won the bid in the first instance,” Brokenshire said.

Confidence is high then. Hugo Rosemont, Policy Advisor for Security and Resilience at trade association ADS Group, is equally optimistic, telling me in an interview last week:

“We haven’t delivered successful Games as yet, although clearly everybody expects and intends that to be the case and has high confidence in those plans.”

One of the key threats the government is preparing for is a 9/11-style attack from the air, although there have only been whispered suggestions of this over the last few months.

In November last year, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond told Parliament that “all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of the London Olympic Games will be taken including, if the advice of the military is that it is required, including [sic] the appropriate ground-to-air defences.”

The announcement indicated in the strongest possible terms the government was prepared to deploy C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) systems if necessary. Although movement on this issue has been muted of late, various sites around London have been surveyed as suitable bases for the C-RAM systems.

Tim Robinson, Editor at Aerospace International, reminds us that air traffic will see a massive increase over the summer period, which will only heighten the threat.

“During the 31-day Olympics peak period over 110,000 air movements are expected in the London area including an estimated 700 additional charter flights, together with 1,250-1,500 extra helicopter flights per day. There will also be up to 10,000 private jet flights, as well as around 240 flights carrying heads of state.”

The military’s presence at the Olympics will be keenly felt. In January, Hammond visited Royal

“ [The Olympics is] the biggest peacetime security operation ever undertaken in the UK. ”

Audit and Review of Olympic & Paralympic Safety and Security Planning report

Fleet Auxiliary personnel in south west England: “The Royal Navy will form an integral part of the



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security operation around Weymouth during the Games, with HMS Bulwark and RFA Mounts Bay and a contingent of Royal Marines assisting the Dorset Police in securing the area.

"The Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force between them will provide up to 13,500 personnel. Up to 7,500 of them will support the smooth running of Olympic sites, while the remainder will use their specialist capabilities and equipment to contribute to the delivery of Olympic security."

Last year the Home Office released its Audit and Review of Olympic & Paralympic Safety and Security Planning report, which was a comprehensive evaluation of security preparedness measures at the Games. Among its key conclusions was that more needed to be done in the cyber domain.

"The need for a strengthened approach in mitigating the risks of cyber threats was identified. Cyber threats may come from a number of sources," the report said.

David Cameron drew his line in the sand on the issue when he allocated £650 million to increase the UK's cyber resilience and security infrastructure shortly after becoming PM. Following this the government also released its Cyber Security Strategy, which details the safeguards required to ensure the country's cyber networks are secured against potential digital threats, putting it on a par with physical attacks for the first time. The strategy followed the Foreign Office's London Conference on Cyberspace in November.

Rosemont is encouraged by the government's work in this area, saying that "to their credit ... there has been a greater emphasis towards improving the country's cyber security infrastructure" since coming into office in 2010.

"So, while the UK's cyber security strategy is emerging and evolving quite radically anyway," Rosemont says, "there are specific systems that will also be required for the Games," as identified in the Home Office's Audit and Review.

Keeping a balanced budget in check while attempting to deliver a robust security strategy is probably as challenging as it sounds. A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report, 'Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games', released last month, aired concerns over the climbing security spend.

"The cost of venue security has nearly doubled in the past year, from £282 million to £553 million. Despite significantly increasing the business for its security contractor, there is no evidence of LOCOG (London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games) securing any price advantage when renegotiating the contract."

But maybe that £553 million figure should be put into perspective. According to the Audit and Review, this summer will see "the biggest peacetime security operation ever undertaken in the UK."

Although more needs to be done, the Audit and Review concluded that: "the Safety and Security Strategy remains on track and the work done to date has established an effective base for Games safety and security operations."

In the final analysis the government has tackled the security issue with aplomb so far; however, Lord Moynihan, Chairman of the British Olympic Association, conveyed his 'single idiot' theory this week after seeing the Oxford Cambridge boat race interrupted by a protester at the weekend.

**"It just takes, and is likely to be, one idiot," Lord Moynihan said. "It's not likely to be a well-orchestrated campaign through Twitter or websites. Every conceivable scenario is being reviewed. I'm confident no more can be done."**

"You can never get it perfect unless you remove the crowds and nobody is going to dream of doing anything like that."

And after all, as Rosemont told me quoting the government line, "the **Olympics are not a security event; it's a sporting event with a security overlay.**"

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** Dear Lord Moynihan excuse me for saying so but your statement is beyond logic. There are always many things to be done! Ask those who know and are involved. They will reply that instead of the almost 40,000 people involved in security operations they would be happy with 80,000. And if they had 80,000 they would be happier with 100,000! As for "every conceivable scenario is being reviewed" do not forget the proven innovative mind of those in the dark side of the moon. So it is better to say "anything possible" instead "no more



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can be done”.

As for the last paragraph of the article although it surely is a fine example of British phlegm it should be better kept in mind than said in public.

### Journal of Special Operations Medicine

Source: [www.jsomonline.org](http://www.jsomonline.org)

Because human are more important than hardware, the Journal of Special Operations Medicine (JSOM) was established by the Command Surgeon's Office of the Special Operations Command in 2000 as a tool to improve quality of care by promoting education amongst the Special Operations Forces (SOF) medical personnel that encompass all branches and all ranks. Since that time, the JSOM has become an integral part of SOF medicine and is the preeminent journal for SOF medical personnel.

The JSOM transitioned to being privately published by Breakaway Media, LLC in April 2011. Michelle DuGuay Landers, who is now the publisher and editor, has been with the JSOM as its managing editor since its inception. *The JSOM's mission remains the same: to promote professional development by providing a peer-reviewed forum for the examination of the latest advancements in unconventional warfare medicine and provide worldwide identification and debate of medical issues that are relevant to SOF and Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS).*

#### Foster your Professional Development with the Journal of Special Operations Medicine

The JSOM is the only quarterly peer-reviewed medical journal indexed in the National Library of Medicine's PubMed that specifically addresses the Special Operations medical professionals work and allows a forum for universal SOF contribution and discussion. It is an official forum for professional discourse on global Special Operations medicine. The JSOM transcends the boundary between military and civilian medicine by bringing forth practical and sensible ideas and techniques to the civilian

TEMS provider currently operating in a law enforcement environment.

The

JSOM is one of very few venues for military SOF, civilian, and Department of Justice agencies with TEMS assets, to share knowledge and promote the very unique tradecraft they



have

trained so hard to be proficient at. The ability to identify, propose, and debate issues through professional writing is invaluable to the force of SOF medics worldwide, and to their professional development. The JSOM communicates to all SOF medical personnel – Peer-reviewed feature articles that are relevant to Special Operations medicine – Updates from the Command Surgeons, the Committee of Tactical Combat Casualty Care



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(TCCC) and TEMS – Special Operations training and education issues and initiatives – available continuing medical education (CME) offerings – as well as sections of Medic Recognition and Dedication to a fallen SOF Medic and much more.

The JSOM provides our readers with current information that saves lives on the battlefield, whether it is urban or abroad. The articles relate real world information that medical personnel can implement in real time to provide expert care and treatment to our forces, as well as to many of the host nations military that are trained by or accompany our SOF personnel. Many HN civilians also benefit from the diffusion of medical knowledge that the JSOM imparts.

Our readers say the JSOM is the most practical and popular journal in tactical, operational, and clinical medicine!

### Training Supplement

Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. Therefore, the JSOM's annual Training Supplement was implemented by the United States Special Operations

Command, Surgeon's Office in 2007 and is the Advanced Tactical Practitioners (ATP) checklist to emergent medical care. The guidelines contained in this supplement are created, compiled, and reviewed annually by the Curriculum and Examination Board, which consists of a combined group of Special Operations Forces (SOF) physicians, advanced tactical practitioners (ATPs), SOF medical personnel from all of the SOCOM component branches, and civilian medical personnel working to assure that our Special Operations personnel have the most highly trained medical care in the field. For quick reference in a lifesaving situation, the uniform pocket-sized Training Supplement contains the USSOCOM Tactical Trauma Protocol and the Tactical Emergency Medical Protocol for SOF Advanced Tactical Practitioners; Canine-TCCC; the Recommended Drug List (RDL), which covers the side-effects, adverse effects, contraindications/warnings, adult and pediatric dosages, and what protocols they would be relevant to; Burn and Nerve Charts, and the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE) Charts that are approved for use by the ATP.

## Why Airport Security Is Broken— And How To Fix It

By Kip Hawley

Source: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577335783535660546.html>

Airport security in America is broken. I should know. For 3½ years—from my confirmation in July 2005 to President Barack Obama's inauguration in January 2009—I served as the head of the Transportation Security Administration.

You know the TSA. We're the ones who make you take off your shoes before padding through a metal detector in your socks (hopefully without holes in them). We're the ones who make you throw out your water bottles. We're the ones who end up on the evening news when someone's grandma gets



patted down or a child's toy gets confiscated as a security risk. If you're a frequent traveler, you probably hate us.

More than a decade after 9/11, it is a national embarrassment that our airport security system remains so hopelessly bureaucratic and disconnected from the people whom it is meant to protect. Preventing terrorist attacks on air travel demands flexibility and the constant



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reassessment of threats. It also demands strong public support, which the current system has plainly failed to achieve.

The crux of the problem, as I learned in my years at the helm, is our wrongheaded approach to risk. In attempting to eliminate all risk from flying, we have made air travel an unending nightmare for U.S. passengers and visitors from overseas, while at the same time creating a security system that is brittle where it needs to be supple.

Any effort to rebuild TSA and get airport security right in the U.S. has to start with two basic principles:

First, the TSA's mission is to prevent a catastrophic attack on the transportation system, not to ensure that every single passenger can avoid harm while traveling. Much of the friction in the system today results from rules that are direct responses to how we were attacked on 9/11. But it's simply no longer the case that killing a few people on board a plane could lead to a hijacking. Never again will a terrorist be able to breach the cockpit simply with a box cutter or a knife. The cockpit doors have been reinforced, and passengers, flight crews and air marshals would intervene.

Second, the TSA's job is to manage risk, not to enforce regulations. Terrorists are adaptive, and we need to be adaptive, too. Regulations are always playing catch-up, because terrorists design their plots around the loopholes.

I tried to follow these principles as the head of the TSA, and I believe that the agency made strides during my tenure. But I readily acknowledge my share of failures as well. I arrived in 2005 with naive notions of wrangling the organization into shape, only to discover the power of the TSA's bureaucratic momentum and political pressures.

There is a way out of this mess—below, I'll set out five specific ideas for reform—but it helps to understand how we got here in the first place.

The airport checkpoint as we know it today sprang into existence in spring 2002, over a month and a half at Baltimore/Washington International airport. New demands on the system after 9/11, like an exhaustive manual check of all carry-on bags, had left checkpoints overwhelmed by long lines and backlogs. A team of management consultants from Accenture delved into the minutiae of checkpoint activity at BWI: How long did it take to pass from one point to another? How did the

behavior of travelers affect line speed? How were people interacting with the equipment?

The consultants had a million ideas for improvement, but with no infrastructure, acquiring even the most ordinary items became a quest. For example, before passengers walked through the metal detectors, they needed to place their keys, jewelry and change into a container. But the long, skinny plastic dishes in use at the time tipped over. So a team member went to PetSmart, bought a bunch of different dog bowls and tested each one. The result was the white bowl with a rubber bottom that's still in use at many airports. (Please, no jokes about the TSA treating passengers like dogs.)

One brilliant bit of streamlining from the consultants: It turned out that if the outline of two footprints was drawn on a mat in the area for using metal-detecting wands, most people stepped on the feet with no prompting and spread their legs in the most efficient stance. Every second counts when you're processing thousands of passengers a day.

Members of Congress, who often fly home to their districts for the weekend, had begun demanding wait times of no longer than 10 minutes. But security is always about trade-offs: A two-minute standard would delight passengers but cost billions more in staffing; ignoring wait times would choke the system.

After I was confirmed as TSA administrator in 2005, one of the first things I did in office was to attend screener training at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport.

I sat down at a computer with Gary, a solidly built guy in his 40s with a mustache and a shaved head. Gary pointed at a screen that simulated the carry-on bag monitors at checkpoints. "What do you see?" he asked, a half smile on his face.

I stared at the series of colorful, ghostly images that Gary froze on the screen and tried to pick an easy one. "Well, that's a computer or some electronic, there are wires, maybe a battery." The sharp edges were easy to pick out, and the recognizable pattern of a motherboard jumped out. "But I don't know about that big orange blob on top of it."

"Right," said Gary. "The orange-colored part.... That means it's organic. Anything made of organic material—clothes, shoes, food—it's all going to register orange here."



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As a confidence boost, Gary gave me a series of images with guns and knives in various positions. Knives lying flat were giveaways, but when viewed lengthwise, they had very little visible surface. Explosives were a whole different story. A plastic explosive like C4 is organic and dense. It appears as a heavy orange mass. Unfortunately, a block of cheddar cheese looks roughly the same.

As we started testing with a moving scanner, Gary warned me that too many false positives would be a big problem. A "hair-trigger" strategy would get me flunked. Images with guns took about one second to identify. Clear bags took roughly five seconds to double check for blade edges. It was cluttered bags—with their multihued oranges, blues, greens and grays jumbled together—that were the killers.

I wish that more of our passengers could see the system from the perspective of a screener. It is here, at the front lines, where the conundrum of airport security is in sharpest relief: the fear of missing even the smallest thing, versus the likelihood that you'll miss the big picture when you're focused on the small stuff.

Clearly, things needed to change. By the time of my arrival, the agency was focused almost entirely on finding prohibited items. Constant positive reinforcement on finding items like lighters had turned our checkpoint operations into an Easter-egg hunt. When we ran a test, putting dummy bomb components near lighters in bags at checkpoints, officers caught the lighters, not the bomb parts.

I wanted to reduce the amount of time that officers spent searching for low-risk objects, but politics intervened at every turn. Lighters were untouchable, having been banned by an act of Congress. And despite the radically reduced risk that knives and box cutters presented in the post-9/11 world, allowing them back on board was considered too emotionally charged for the American public.

We did succeed in getting some items (small scissors, ice skates) off the list of prohibited items. And we had explosives experts retrain the entire work force in terrorist tradecraft and bomb-making. Most important, Charlie Allen, the chief of intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security, tied the TSA into the wider world of U.S. intelligence, arranging for our leadership to participate in the daily counterterrorism video conference chaired from the White House. With a constant stream of

live threat reporting to start each day, I was done with playing defense.

But the frustrations outweighed the progress. I had hoped to advance the idea of a Registered Traveler program, but the second that you create a population of travelers who are considered "trusted," that category of fliers moves to the top of al Qaeda's training list, whether they are old, young, white, Asian, military, civilian, male or female. The men who bombed the London Underground in July 2005 would all have been eligible for the Registered Traveler cards we were developing at the time. No realistic amount of prescreening can alleviate this threat when al Qaeda is working to recruit "clean" agents. TSA dropped the idea on my watch—though new versions of it continue to pop up.

Taking your shoes off for security is probably your least favorite part of flying these days. Mine, too. I came into office dead set on allowing people to keep their shoes on during screening. But, contrary to popular belief, it isn't just Richard Reid's failed shoe-bomb attempt in December 2001 that is responsible for the shoe rule. For years, the TSA has received intelligence on the terrorists' footwear-related innovations. Some very capable engineer on the other side is spending a lot of time improving shoe bombs, which can now be completely nonmetallic and concealed in a normal street shoe. There's still no quick way to detect them without an X-ray.

I was initially against a ban on liquids as well, because I thought that, with proper briefing, TSA officers could stop al Qaeda's new liquid bombs. Unfortunately, al Qaeda's advancing skill with hydrogen-peroxide-based bombs made a total liquid ban necessary for a brief period and a restriction on the amount of liquid one could carry on a plane necessary thereafter.

Existing scanners could allow passengers to carry on any amount of liquid they want, so long as they put it in the gray bins. The scanners have yet to be used in this way because of concern for the large number of false alarms and delays that they could cause. When I left TSA in 2009, the plan was to designate "liquid lanes" where waits might be longer but passengers could board with snow globes, beauty products or booze. That plan is still sitting on someone's desk.



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The hijackings of the 1960s gave us magnetometers, to keep guns off planes. After the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, a small amount of international checked baggage was scanned and people were required to fly with their luggage. After 9/11, the TSA was created and blades were banned.

Looking at the airport security system that we have today, each measure has a reason—and each one provides some security value. But taken together they tell the story of an agency that, while effective at stopping anticipated threats, is too reactive and always finds itself fighting the last war.

Airport security has to change. The relationship



between the public and the TSA has become too poisonous to be sustained. And the way that we use TSA officers—as little more than human versions of our scanners—is a tremendous waste of well-trained, engaged brains that could be evaluating risk rather than looking for violations of the Standard Operating Procedure.

What would a better system look like? If politicians gave the TSA some political cover, the agency could institute the following changes before the start of the summer travel season:

Embracing risk could reduce the hassle of today's airport while making us safer at the same time.

**1. No more banned items:** Aside from obvious weapons capable of fast, multiple killings—such as guns, toxins and explosive devices—it

is time to end the TSA's use of well-trained security officers as kindergarten teachers to millions of passengers a day. The list of banned items has created an "Easter-egg hunt" mentality at the TSA. Worse, banning certain items gives terrorists a complete list of what not to use in their next attack. Lighters are banned? The next attack will use an electric trigger.


**2. Allow all liquids:** Simple checkpoint signage, a small software update and some traffic management are all that stand between you and bringing all your liquids on every U.S. flight. Really.

**3. Give TSA officers more flexibility and rewards for initiative, and hold them accountable:** No security agency on earth has the experience and pattern-recognition skills of TSA officers. We need to leverage that ability. TSA officers should have more discretion to interact with passengers and to work in looser teams throughout airports. And TSA's leaders must be prepared to support initiative even when officers make mistakes. Currently, independence on the ground is more likely to lead to discipline than reward.

**4. Eliminate baggage fees:** Much of the pain at TSA checkpoints these days can be attributed to passengers overstuffing their carry-on luggage to avoid baggage fees. The airlines had their reasons for implementing these fees, but the result has been a checkpoint nightmare. Airlines might increase ticket prices slightly to compensate for the lost revenue, but the main impact would be that checkpoint screening for everybody will be faster and safer.

**5. Randomize security:** Predictability is deadly. Banned-item lists, rigid protocols—if terrorists know what to expect at the airport, they have a greater chance of evading our system.

In Richmond, Va., we tested a system that randomized the security procedures encountered by passengers (additional upper-torso pat-downs, a thorough bag search, a swab test of carry-ons, etc.), while not subjecting everyone to the full gamut. At other airports, we tried out a system called "Playbook," which gave airports a virtual encyclopedia of possible security actions and let local law-enforcement, airport and TSA officials choose a customized set of counterterror measures.



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Implemented nationally, this approach would give to the system as a whole a value greater than the sum of its parts—making it much harder for terrorists to learn how to evade our security protocols.

To be effective, airport security needs to embrace flexibility and risk management—principles that it is difficult for both the bureaucracy and the public to accept. The public wants the airport experience to be predictable, hassle-free and airtight and for it to keep us 100% safe. But 100% safety is unattainable. Embracing a bit of risk could reduce the hassle of today's airport experience while making us safer at the same time.

Over the past 10 years, most Americans have had extensive personal experience with the TSA, and this familiarity has bred contempt.

People often suggest that the U.S. should adopt the "Israeli method" of airport security—which relies on less screening of banned items and more interviewing of passengers. But Israeli citizens accept the continued existence of a common enemy that requires them to tolerate necessary inconveniences, and they know that terror plots are ongoing.

In America, any successful attack—no matter how small—is likely to lead to a series of public recriminations and witch hunts. But security is a series of trade-offs. We've made it through the 10 years after 9/11 without another attack, something that was not a given. But no security system can be maintained over the long term without public support and cooperation. If Americans are ready to embrace risk, it is time to strike a new balance.

*Mr. Hawley is the author of "Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security," to be published April 24 by Palgrave Macmillan.*

**EDITOR'S COMMENT:** This is a very good and realistic article indicating that overreaction is not always supporting security. It is well known that when you strengthen your door you weaken your windows! And terrorists do know this rule very well. We take measures costing millions for something that will be used again once discovered in a failed plot. And we keep these measures for ever and we add more when a new gap in our security systems comes to surface. So, increase the baggage permit by 5 kg, let passengers carry only small bags on board and apply the rule to all. What do we really need during a flight – domestic, international or trans-continent? Travelling documents, valet, some electronics (laptop, iPod, PC-tablet, eBook), mobile, a book or magazines/ newspapers, medications (optional), sleeping aids (optional), cosmetics (basic) and perhaps a sweater. A normal backpack would be half empty with all these items inside. On the other hand baggage can undergo screening for almost everything. So make travelling as comfortable and light as possible but increase the human observation factor that can spot abnormal human behavior on the ground. You might say that screeners are not very successful so far. Make them better by modern training. You cannot see something if you do not know what you are looking for. And not everybody can do the job. Select the right people and train them as if they were terrorists themselves. Then for sure they will know what they are looking for!





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