

Osama bin Laden – the End

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Osama bin Laden

U.S. commandos kill Osama bin Laden

Source: <http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-commandos-kill-osama-bin-laden>

In a brilliant special forces operation (“Neptune Spear”) deep inside Pakistan, U.S. special forces yesterday (Sunday) attacked a compound in the town of Abbottabad, killed al Qaeda founder and leader Osama bin Laden, and took his body to an American military base in Afghanistan for DNA analysis.

The operation was carried out by a team of Navy SEALs who arrived at the location by helicopters. The operation lasted less than forty minutes. One of the helicopters crashed on its way to the target owing to mechanical failure. No American soldiers were injured in the crash, and the helicopter was destroyed to prevent al Qaeda from gaining any intelli-

gence information from sifting through the wreckage.

The operation killed three adult males in addition to Bin Laden — one of the dead was Bin Laden’s son —

and a female resident of the compound who was used as a human shield by the men.


President Barack Obama, who made the announcement late Sunday evening in a live speech to the nation, revealed that information about Bin Laden’s whereabouts was discovered last August, and that in the months since, as the information was ascertained and augmented, contingency plans were developed for yesterday’s raid.

President Obama gave the go-ahead for the operation on Friday, 29 April.

The Pakistani NDTV reports that on 25 January this year, Pakistani forces arrested another wanted terrorist who was hiding in Abbottabad — Umar Patek, an al Qaeda-linked Indonesian militant who, for ten years, had been on the run from a \$1 million bounty on his head. Patek allegedly helped build the bombs used in the 2002 bombings of nightclubs in Bali that killed 202 people.

The Pakistanis kept Patek’s arrest a secret until 1 April, when the Associated Press came out with the story.

It is not known whether Patek had knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence in the town, and if he did, whether or not he shared that information with his captors.



The town of Abbottabad – a mid-size town of 81,000 residents — is situated in the Orash Valley, 150 km north of Islamabad and 200 km east of Peshawar. The city is known for its beautiful vistas (it is located at an altitude of 4,120 feet, or 1,260 meter), its pleasant weather, high standard educational institutions, and military establishments.



Bin Laden lived in a compound which was built in 2005. It was the largest estates in the town, was surrounded by security

walls 12- and 18-ft tall and topped with razor wire. U.S. intelligence noted that although it was valued at a \$1 million, it had no telephone or Internet connection. Also, unlike neighboring residences which left their trash for collection outside their gates, the residents of this compound were in the habit of burning their own trash. Another anomaly: although the residents of the compound were listed as two brother and a sister and their children, the number of people who appeared to live in the compound was much larger and their ages did not match the ages of families with kids.



Abbottabad Compound

Preconstruction, 2004




Postconstruction, 2011



Bin Laden "kill operation"

A U.S. strike team of about 15 special forces operatives, dropped by helicopter to bin Laden's hide-out near the Pakistani capital Islamabad under the cover of night, shot the al Qaeda leader to death on Sunday.

1 The U.S. strike team was based in Afghanistan and carried by helicopter to bin Laden's hide-out in Pakistan




Team probably took off from Jalalabad or Bagram airbases

- ▶ Bin Laden was unarmed but offered "resistance"
- ▶ Bin Laden's wife, originally reported killed, was wounded by a shot in the leg

2 Aircraft — three or four, according to different reports - attacked the compound and dropped a team composed of U.S. Navy SEALs and forensic specialists

3 A MH-60 Black Hawk chopper was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade during the raid, but the pilot put the craft down safely





4 Commandos cleared the building where one family lived, while another team entered the first floor of bin Laden's house, where another family lived

5 On the ground floor two al Qaeda couriers and a woman were killed. The commandos then found bin Laden and his family on the second and third floor

Bin Laden's body was taken to Afghanistan and later buried at sea

Sources: Thomson Reuters, media reports, U.S. officials








GeoEye IKONOS Sat image few hours after the attack

Analysis

1. The killing of Bin Laden is an impressive achievement for the U.S. intelligence community and military. In the military they say that persistence overcomes resistance, and in this case, the sheer persistence of the U.S. intelligence community – and the unwavering determination of the Bush and Obama administrations – overcame years of confusing information and lack of information, and the frustration of pursuing leads which led nowhere except dead-ends and trails which grew cold.
2. The last preparations for the operation began six weeks ago. During that period, Obama's national security team met five or six times, in secrecy, to hash out the details. It is impressive – very impressive – that these preparations were kept in total
3. The fact that Bin Laden was not killed by a UAV but by a Navy SEALs team means that Pakistan allowed a U.S. ground operation deep inside Pakistan. Pakistan's attitude toward cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism has been ambivalent at best. It is not clear whether the permission to the United States to launch the ground operation signifies a change of direction on the part of the Pakistanis.
4. The killing of Bin Laden does not mean the end of Islamic terrorism. Since 9/11, Bin Laden's involvement in operational details of operations was limited because of his inability to communicate directly with al Qaeda operatives around the world. Still, there is no denial that the killing of Bin



Laden is a major psychological and symbolic blow to al Qaeda and terrorism.

The analysis can wait for another day. Today we should reflect on pledges made and promises kept. In his speech to Congress on 20 September 2001, President George W.

Bush said: "Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done."

On Sunday, the United States fulfilled that pledge, and brought justice to its enemies.

Osama Bin Laden: The most wanted face of terrorism

Osama bin Laden, who was killed in Pakistan on Sunday (May 1st, 2011), was a son of the Saudi elite whose radical, violent campaign to recreate a seventh-century Muslim empire redefined the threat of terrorism for the 21st century.

With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, Bin Laden was elevated to the realm of evil in the American imagination once reserved for dictators like Hitler and Stalin. He was a new national enemy, his face on wanted posters, gloating on videotape, taunting the United States and Western civilization.

"Do you want bin Laden dead?" a reporter asked President George W. Bush six days after the Sept. 11 attacks.

"I want him — I want justice," the president answered. "And there's an old poster out West, as I recall, that said, 'Wanted: Dead or Alive.'"

It took nearly a decade before that quest finally ended in Pakistan with the death of Bin Laden during a confrontation with American forces who attacked a compound where officials said he had been hiding.

The manhunt was punctuated by a December 2001 battle at an Afghan mountain redoubt called Tora Bora, near the border of Pakistan, where Bin Laden and his allies were hiding. Despite days of pounding by American bombers, Bin Laden escaped. For more than nine years afterward, he remained an elusive, shadowy figure frustratingly beyond the grasp of his pursuers and thought to be hiding somewhere in Pakistan and plotting new attacks.

Long before, he had become a hero in much of the Islamic world, as much a myth as a man — what a longtime officer of the C.I.A. called "the North Star" of global terrorism. He

had united disparate militant groups, from Egypt to Chechnya, from Yemen to the Philippines, under the banner of his Al Qaeda organization and his ideal of a borderless brotherhood of radical Islam.

Terrorism before Bin Laden was often state-sponsored, but he was a terrorist who had sponsored a state. For five years, 1996 to 2001, he paid for the protection of the Taliban, then the rulers of Afghanistan. He bought the time and the freedom to make his group, Al Qaeda — which means "the base" — a multinational enterprise to export terror around the globe.

For years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the name of Al Qaeda and the fame of Bin Laden spread like a 21st-century political plague. Groups calling themselves Al Qaeda, or acting in the name of its cause, attacked American troops in Iraq, bombed tourist spots in Bali and blew up passenger trains in Spain.



Holy war

To this day, the precise reach of his power remains unknown: how many members Al Qaeda could truly count on, how many countries its cells had penetrated, and whether, as Bin Laden boasted, he sought to arm Al Qaeda with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

He waged holy war with distinctly modern methods. He sent fatwas — religious decrees — by fax and declared war on Americans in an e-mail beamed by satellite around the world. Al Qaeda members kept bomb-making



manuals on CD-ROM and communicated with encrypted memos on laptops, leading one American official to declare that Bin Laden possessed better communication technology than the United States. He railed against globalization, even as his agents in Europe and North America took advantage of a globalized world to carry out their attacks, insinuating themselves into the very Western culture he despised.

He styled himself a Muslim ascetic, a billionaire's son who gave up a life of privilege for the cause. But he was media savvy and acutely image conscious; before a CNN crew that interviewed him in 1997 was allowed to leave, his media advisers insisted on editing out unflattering shots. He summoned reporters to a cave in Afghanistan when he needed to get his message out, but like the most controlling of C.E.O.'s, he insisted on receiving written questions in advance.

His reedy voice seemed to belie the warrior image he cultivated, a man whose constant companion was a Kalashnikov rifle that he boasted he had taken from a Russian soldier he had killed. The world's most threatening terrorist, he was also known to submit to frequent dressings down by his mother. While

he built his reputation on his combat experience against Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, even some of his supporters question whether he had actually fought.

And though he claimed to follow the purest form of Islam, many scholars insisted that he was glossing over the faith's edicts against killing innocents and civilians. Islam draws boundaries on where and why holy war can be waged; Bin Laden declared the entire world fair territory.

Yet it was the United States, Bin Laden insisted, that was guilty of a double standard.

"It wants to occupy our countries, steal our resources, impose agents on us to rule us and then wants us to agree to all this," he told CNN in the 1997 interview. "If we refuse to do so, it says we are terrorists. When Palestinian children throw stones against the Israeli occupation, the U.S. says they are terrorists. Whereas when Israel bombed the United Nations building in Lebanon while it was full of children and women, the U.S. stopped any plan to condemn Israel. At the same time that they condemn any Muslim who calls for his rights, they receive the top official of the Irish Republican Army at the White House as a political leader. Wherever we look, we find the U.S. as the leader of terrorism and crime in the world."


The turning point

For Bin Laden, as for the United States, the turning point came in 1989, with the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan.

For the United States, which had supported the Afghan resistance with billions of dollars in arms and ammunition, that defeat marked the beginning of the end of the cold war and the birth of a new world order.

Bin Laden, who had supported the resistance with money, construction equipment and housing, saw the retreat of the Soviets as an affirmation of Muslim power and an opportunity to recreate Islamic political power and topple infidel governments through jihad, or holy war.

He declared to an interviewer, "I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America."



In its place, he built his own legend, modeling himself after the Prophet Muhammad, who in the seventh century led the Muslim people to rout the infidels, or nonbelievers, from North Africa and the Middle East. As the Koran had been revealed to Muhammad amid intense persecution, Bin Laden saw his own expulsions during the 1990s — from Saudi Arabia and then Sudan — as affirmation of himself as a chosen one.

In his vision, he would be the “emir,” or prince, in a restoration of the khalifa, a political empire extending from Afghanistan across the globe. “These countries belong to Islam,” he told the same interviewer in 1998, “not the rulers.”



Al Qaeda became the infrastructure for his dream. Under it, Bin Laden created a web of businesses — some legitimate, some less so — to obtain and move the weapons, chemicals and money he needed. He created training camps for his foot soldiers, a media office to spread his word, even “shuras,” or councils, to approve his military plans and his fatwas.

Through the 90s, Al Qaeda evolved into a far-flung and loosely connected network of symbiotic relationships: Bin Laden gave affiliated terrorist groups money, training and expertise; they gave him operational cover and a furthering of his cause. Perhaps the most important of those alliances was with the Taliban, who rose to power in Afghanistan largely on the strength of Bin Laden’s aid, and in turn provided him refuge and a launching pad for holy war.

Long before Sept. 11, though the evidentiary trails were often thin, American officials considered Bin Laden at least in part responsible for the killing of American soldiers in So-

malia and in Saudi Arabia; the first attack on the World Trade Center, in 1993; the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia; and a foiled plot to hijack a dozen jets, crash a plane into C.I.A. headquarters and kill President Bill Clinton.

In 1996, the officials described Bin Laden as “one of the most significant financial sponsors of Islamic extremism in the world.” But he was thought at the time to be primarily a financier of terrorism, not someone capable of orchestrating international terrorist plots. Yet when the United States put out a list of the most wanted terrorists in 1997, neither Bin Laden nor Al Qaeda was on it.

Bin Laden, however, demanded to be noticed. In February 1998, he declared it the duty of every Muslim to “kill Americans wherever they are found.” After the bombings of two American Embassies in East Africa in August 1998, President Clinton declared Bin Laden “Public Enemy No. 1.”


The C.I.A. spent much of the next three years hunting Bin Laden. The goal was to capture him with recruited Afghan agents or to kill him with a precision-guided missile, according to the 2004 report of the 9/11 commission and the memoirs of George J. Tenet, director of Central Intelligence from July 1997 to July 2004.

The intelligence was never good enough to pull the trigger. By the summer of 2001, the C.I.A. was convinced that Al Qaeda was on the verge of a spectacular attack. But no one knew where or when it would come.

The early life

By accounts of people close to the family, Osama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Laden was born in 1957, the seventh son and 17th child among 50 or more of his father’s children.

His father, Muhammad bin Awad bin Laden, had emigrated to what would soon become Saudi Arabia in 1931 from the family’s ancestral village in a conservative province of Southern Yemen. He found work in Jidda as a porter to the pilgrims on their way to the holy city of Mecca, and years later, when he would own the largest construction company in Saudi Arabia, he displayed his porter’s bag in





the main reception room of his palace as a reminder of his humble origins.

According to family friends, the Bin Laden family's rise began with a risk — when the father offered to build a palace for King Saud in the 1950s for far less than the lowest bid. By the 1960s he had ingratiated himself so well with the Saudi royal family that King Faisal decreed that all construction projects be awarded to the Bin Laden group. When the Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem was set on fire by a deranged tourist in 1969, the senior Bin Laden was chosen to rebuild it. Soon afterward, he was chosen to refurbish the mosques at Mecca and Medina as well. In interviews years later, Osama bin Laden would recall proudly that his father had sometimes prayed in all three holy places in one day.

His father was a devout Muslim who welcomed pilgrims and clergy into his home. He required all his children to work for the family company, meaning that Osama spent summers working on road projects. The elder Bin Laden died in a plane crash when Osama was 10. The siblings each inherited millions — the precise amount was a matter of some debate — and led a life of near-royalty. Osama — the name means “young lion” — grew up playing with Saudi princes and had his own stable of horses by age 15.

But some people close to the family paint a portrait of Bin Laden as a misfit. His mother, the last of his father's four wives, was from Syria, the only one of the wives not from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden senior had met her on a vacation, and Osama was their only child. Within the family, she was said to be known as “the slave” and Osama, “the slave child.”

Within the Saudi elite, it was rare to have both parents born outside the kingdom. In a

profile of Osama bin Laden in *The New Yorker*, Mary Anne Weaver quoted a family friend who suggested that he had felt alienated in a culture that so obsessed over lineage, saying: “It must have been difficult for him, Osama was almost a double outsider. His paternal roots are in Yemen, and within the family, his mother was a double outsider as well — she was neither Saudi nor Yemeni but Syrian.”

According to one of his brothers, Osama was the only one of the Bin Laden children who never traveled abroad to study. A biography of Bin Laden, provided to the PBS television program “Frontline” by an unidentified family friend, asserted that Bin Laden never traveled outside the Middle East.


That lack of exposure to Western culture would prove a crucial distinction; the other siblings went on to lead lives that would not be unfamiliar to most Americans. They took over the family business, estimated to be worth billion, distributing Snapple drinks, Volkswagen cars and Disney products across the Middle East. On Sept. 11, 2001, several Bin Laden siblings were living in the United States.

Bin Laden had been educated — and, indeed, steeped, as many Saudi children are — in Wahhabism, the puritanical, ardently anti-Western strain of Islam. Even years later, he so despised the Saudi ruling family's coziness with Western nations that he refused to refer to Saudi Arabia by its modern name, instead calling it “the Country of the Two Holy Places.”

Newspapers have quoted anonymous sources — particularly, an unidentified Lebanese barber — about a wild period of drinking and womanizing in Bin Laden's life. But by most accounts he was devout and quiet, marrying a relative, the first of his four wives, at age 17.

Soon afterward, he began earning a degree at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jidda. It was there that he shaped his future militancy. He became involved with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group of Islamic radicals who believed that much of the Muslim world, including the leaders of Saudi Arabia, lived as infidels, in violation of the true meaning of the Koran.

And he fell under the influence of two Islamic scholars: Muhammad Quttub and Ab-





dullah Azzam, whose ideas would become the underpinnings for Al Qaeda. Mr. Azzam became a mentor to the young Bin Laden. Jihad was the responsibility of all Muslims, he taught, until the lands once held by Islam were reclaimed. His motto: "Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences and no dialogue."

The Middle East was becoming increasingly unsettled in 1979, when Bin Laden was at the university. In Iran, Shiite Muslims mounted an Islamic revolution that overthrew the shah and began to make the United States a target. Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty. And as the year ended, Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan.

Bin Laden arrived in Pakistan on the border of Afghanistan within two weeks of the occupation. He said later that he had been asked to go by Saudi officials, who were eager to support the resistance movement. In his book "Taliban," the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid said that the Saudis had originally hoped that a member of the royal family might serve as an inspirational leader in Afghanistan but that they settled on Bin Laden as the next closest thing when no princes volunteered.

He traveled like a visiting diplomat more than a soldier, meeting with leaders and observing the refugees coming into Peshawar, Pakistan. As the family friend says, it "was an


exploratory rather than an action trip." He would return twice a year for the next few years, in between finishing his degree and lobbying family members to support the Afghan mujahedeen.

Bin Laden began traveling beyond the border into Afghanistan in 1982, bringing with him construction machinery and recruits. In 1984, he and Mr. Azzam began setting up guest houses in Peshawar, which served as the first stop for holy warriors on their way to Afghanistan. With the money they had raised in Saudi Arabia, they established the Office of Services, which branched out across the world to recruit young jihadists.

The men came to be known as the Afghan Arabs, though they came from all over the world, and their numbers were estimated as high as 20,000. By 1986, Bin Laden had begun setting up training camps for them as well, and was paying roughly \$25,000 a month to subsidize them.

To young would-be recruits across the Arab world, Bin Laden's was an attractive story: the rich young man who had become a warrior. His own descriptions of the battles he had seen, how he lost the fear of death and slept in the face of artillery fire, were brushstrokes of an almost divine figure.

But intelligence sources insist that Bin Laden actually saw combat only once, in a weeklong barrage by the Soviets at Jalal



where the Arab Afghans had dug themselves into caves using Bin Laden's construction equipment.

"Afghanistan, the jihad, was one terrific photo op for a lot of people," Milton Bearden, the C.I.A. officer who described Bin Laden as "the North Star," said in an interview on "Frontline," adding, "There's a lot of fiction in there."

Still, Jaji became a kind of touchstone in the Bin Laden myth. Stories sent back from the battle to Arab newspaper readers, and photographs of Bin Laden in combat gear, burnished his image.

The flood of young men following him to Afghanistan prompted the founding of Al Qaeda. The genesis was essentially bureaucratic; Bin Laden wanted a way to track the men so he could tell their families what had happened to them. The documentation Al Qaeda provided became a primitive database of young jihadists.

Afghanistan also brought Bin Laden into contact with leaders of other militant Islamic groups, including Ayman al-Zawahri, the bespectacled doctor who would later appear at Bin Laden's side in televised messages from the caves of Afghanistan. Ultimately Dr. Zawahri's group, Egyptian Jihad, and others would merge with Al Qaeda, making it an umbrella for various terrorist groups.

The movement

Through the looking glass of Sept. 11, it seemed ironic that the Americans and Osama bin Laden had fought on the same side against the Soviets in Afghanistan — as if the Americans had somehow created the Bin Laden monster by providing arms and cash to the Arabs. The complex at Tora Bora where Al Qaeda members hid had been created with the help of the C.I.A. as a base for the Afghans fighting the Soviets.

Bin Laden himself described the fight in Afghanistan this way: "There

I received volunteers who came from the Saudi kingdom and from all over the Arab and Muslim countries. I set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers. The weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis."

In truth, however, the American contact was not directly with Bin Laden; both worked through the middlemen of the Pakistani intelligence service.

In the revisionism of the Bin Laden myth, his defenders would later say that he had not worked with the Americans but that he had only tolerated them as a means to his end. As proof, they insisted he had made anti-American statements as early as 1980.


Bin Laden would say in retrospect that he was always aware who his enemies were.

"For us, the idea was not to get involved more than necessary in the fight against the Russians, which was the business of the Americans, but rather to show our solidarity with our Islamist brothers," he told a French journalist in 1995. "I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we had to fight on all fronts against Communism or Western oppression. The urgent thing was Communism, but the next target was America."

Afghanistan had infused the movement with new confidence.

"Most of what we benefited from was that the myth of the superpower was destroyed not only in my mind but also in the minds of all Muslims," Bin Laden later told an interviewer. "Slumber and fatigue vanished, and so was the terror which the U.S. would use in its media by attributing itself superpower status, or which the Soviet Union used by attributing itself as a superpower."

He returned to Saudi Arabia, welcomed as a hero, and took up the family business. But Saudi royals grew increasingly wary of him as he became more outspoken against the government.





The breaking point — for Bin Laden and for the Saudis — came when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Bin Laden volunteered to the Saudis that the men and equipment he had used in Afghanistan could defend the kingdom. He was “shocked,” a family friend said, to learn that the Americans — the enemy, in his mind — would defend it instead. To him, it was the height of American arrogance.

The United States, he told an interviewer later, “has started to look at itself as a master of this world and established what it calls the new world order.”


The Saudi government restricted him to Jidda, fearing that his outspokenness would

offend the Americans. Bin Laden fled to Sudan, which was offering itself as a sort of haven for terrorists, and there he began setting up legitimate businesses that would help finance Al Qaeda. He also built his reserves, in 1992, paying for about 500 mujahedeen who had been expelled from Pakistan to come work for him.

The terrorism

It was during that time that it is believed he honed his resolve against the United States.

Within Al Qaeda, he argued that the organization should put aside its differences with Shiite terrorist groups like Hezbollah. In



Lebanon, the better to concentrate on the common enemy: the United States. He called for attacks against American forces in the Saudi peninsula and in the Horn of Africa.

On Dec. 29, 1992, a bomb exploded in a hotel in Aden, Yemen, where American troops had been staying while on their way to Somalia. The troops had already left, and the bomb killed two Austrian tourists. American intelligence officials later came to believe that that was the first Bin Laden attack.



On Feb. 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in a truck driven into the underground garage at the World Trade Center, killing six people. Bin Laden later praised Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted of the bombing. In October of that year in Somalia, 18 American troops were killed — some of their bodies dragged through the streets — while on a peacekeeping mission; Bin Laden was almost giddy about the deaths.

“After leaving Afghanistan, the Muslim fighters headed for Somalia and prepared for a long battle, thinking that the Americans were “like the Russians,” he told an interviewer.

“The youth were surprised at the low morale of the American soldiers and realized more than before that the American soldier was a paper tiger and after a few blows ran in defeat,” he said. “And America forgot all the hoopla and media propaganda about being the world leader and the leader of the new world order, and after a few blows, they forgot about this title and left, dragging their corpses and their shameful defeat.”

By 1994, Bin Laden had established new training camps in Sudan, but he became a man without a country. The Saudi government froze his assets and revoked his citizenship. His family, which had become rich on its relations to the royals, denounced him publicly after he was caught smuggling weapons from Yemen.

This only seemed to make him more zealous. He sent an open letter to King Fahd, out-

lining the sins of the Saudi government and calling for a campaign of guerrilla attacks to drive Americans from Saudi Arabia. Three months later, in November 1995, a truck bomb exploded at a Saudi National Guard training center operated by the United States in Riyadh, killing seven people. That year, Belgian investigators found a kind of how-to manual for terrorists on a CD-ROM. The preface dedicated it to Bin Laden, the hero of the holy war.


The next May, when the men accused of the Riyadh bombing were beheaded in Riyadh’s main square, they were forced to read a confession in which they acknowledged the connection to Bin Laden. The next month, June 1996, a truck bomb destroyed Khobar Towers, an American military residence in Dhahran. It killed 19 soldiers.

Bin Laden fled to Afghanistan that summer after Sudan expelled him under pressure from the Americans and Saudis, and he forged an alliance with Mullah Muhammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban. In August 1996, from the Afghan mountain stronghold of Tora Bora, Bin Laden issued his “Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.”

“Muslims burn with anger at America,” it read. The presence of American forces in the Persian Gulf states “will provoke the people of the country and induces aggression on their religion, feelings, and prides and pushes them to take up armed struggle against the invaders occupying the land.”

The imbalance of power between American forces and Muslim forces demanded a new kind of fighting, he wrote, “in other words, to initiate a guerrilla war, where sons of the nation, not the military forces, take part in it.”

That same month in New York City, a federal grand jury began meeting to consider charges against Bin Laden. Disputes arose among prosecutors and American law enforcement and intelligence officers about which attacks against American interests





could truly be attributed to Bin Laden — whether in fact he had, as an indictment eventually charged, trained and paid the men who killed the Americans in Somalia.

His foot soldiers, in testimony, offered differing pictures of Bin Laden's actual involvement. In some cases he could be as aloof as any boss with thousands of employees. Yet one of the men convicted of the bombings of the embassies said that Bin Laden had been so involved that he was the one who had pointed at surveillance photos to direct where the truck bomb should be driven.

Bin Laden was becoming more emboldened, summoning Western reporters to his hideouts in Afghanistan to relay his message: He would wage war against the United States and its allies if Washington did not remove its troops from the gulf region.

“So we tell the Americans as a people,” he told ABC News, “and we tell the mothers of soldiers and American mothers in general that if they value their lives and the lives of their children, to find a nationalistic government that will look after their interests and not the interests of the Jews. The continuation of tyranny will bring the fight to America, as Ramzi Yousef and others did. This is my message to the American people: to look for a se-

rious government that looks out for their interests and does not attack others, their lands, or their honor.”


In February 1998, he issued the edict calling for attacks on Americans anywhere in the world, declaring it an “individual duty” for all Muslims.

In June, the grand jury convened two years earlier issued its indictment, charging Bin Laden with conspiracy to attack the United States abroad, for heading Al Qaeda and for financing terrorist activities around the world.

On Aug. 7, the eighth anniversary of the United States' order sending troops into the gulf region, two bombs exploded simultaneously at the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Nairobi bomb killed 213 people and wounded 4,500; the bomb in Dar es Salaam killed 11 and wounded 85.

The United States retaliated two weeks later with strikes against suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which officials contended— erroneously, it turned out — was producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda.

Bin Laden had trapped the United States in an escalating spiral of tension, where any defensive or retaliatory actions would affirm



the evils he said had provoked the attacks in the first place. In an interview with Time magazine that December, he brushed aside President Clinton's threats against him, and referred to himself in the third person, as if recognizing or encouraging the notion that he had become larger than life.

"To call us Enemy No. 1 or Enemy No. 2 does not hurt us," he said. "Osama bin Laden

against them on terrorism; Bin Laden held up a mirror image, declaring the world divided between infidels and believers.

Bin Laden had never before claimed or accepted responsibility for terrorist attacks. In a videotape found in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar weeks after the attacks, he firmly took responsibility for — and reveled in — the horror of Sept. 11.



is confident that the Islamic nation will carry out its duty."

In January 1999, the United States government issued a superseding indictment that affirmed the power Bin Laden had sought all along, declaring Al Qaeda an international terrorist organization in a conspiracy to kill American citizens.


The aftermath

After the attacks of Sept. 11, Bin Laden did what had become routine: He took to Arab television. He appeared, in his statement to the world, to be at the top of his powers. President Bush had declared that the nations of the world were either with the Americans or

"We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower," he said. "We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all."

In the videotape, showing him talking to followers nearly two months after the attacks, Bin Laden smiles, hungers to hear more approval, and notes proudly that the attacks let loose a surge of interest in Islam around the world.

He explained that the hijackers on the planes — "the brothers who conducted the operation" — did not know what the mission would be until just before they boarded the



planes. They knew only that they were going to the United States on a martyrdom mission.

Bin Laden had long eluded the allied forces in pursuit of him, moving, it was said, under cover of night with his wives and children, apparently between mountain caves. Yet he was

determined that if he had to die, he, too, would die a martyr's death.

His greatest hope, he told supporters, was that if he died at the hands of the Americans, the Muslim world would rise up and defeat the nation that had killed him.

Bin Laden's killing: intriguing questions, few answers

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bin-ladens-killing-intriguing-questions-few-answers>

The brilliant operation conducted by the U.S. Navy SEALs to kill Osama bin Laden should be celebrated, but the information provided so far by the administration leaves many questions unanswered; one of them has to do with Pakistan: it is inconceivable that bin Laden and his entourage could have stayed in their ostentatious compound for five years without elements in the Pakistani security services protecting them; it is bad enough for Pakistan to train and support several local Islamist terrorist groups so that they do Pakistan's bidding in its conflict with India; it is another thing altogether for Pakistan to help hide the leader of a movement that declared war on -- and has pursued active acts of war against -- the United States, and do so while receiving billions of dollars in aid from the United States; we typically use the adjective "ambivalent" to describe Pakistan's attitude toward the war on Islamic terrorism; perhaps it is time to search for another adjective; there are also some intriguing questions about the operational aspects of the raid on bin Laden's compound

The brilliant operation conducted by the U.S. Navy SEALs to kill Osama bin Laden should be celebrated, but the information provided so far by the administration leaves many questions unanswered. Here are a few of them:

1. Pakistan

A. Advise and consent

In his speech last night, the president thanked Pakistan for its help in the operation, and gave the impression that the Pakistanis gave permission for the operation. Other administration officials, in background conversations,

said no other country was involved, or informed about, the operation.

The truth is probably something like this:

There is little doubt that there was no consultation or sharing of information at the professional level. It is highly unlikely that the CIA and the U.S. military advised their Pakistani counterparts of the information that reached the United States last August about bin Laden's location, and about the plans being drawn up to kill him. The Pakistani military and intelligence service (ISI) are so penetrated by Islamists sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda, that sharing information with these organizations means that the information will find its way to the terrorists sooner rather than later.

Some parts of ISI support the Taliban and several Pakistani Islamist organizations with weapons, training, and intelligence, and use them as foot soldiers in Pakistan's campaign to gain control of the disputed territory of Kashmir and, more generally, as a weapon against India and pro-Indian actors in the region.

Not sharing information at the professional level before or during the operation does not mean that President Obama did not call President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan while the helicopters were on their way to bin Laden's compound -- or, more likely, after the operation was concluded but before the Navy Seal team left Pakistani soil -- to advise the Pakistani president of the operation.

This way, the United States could "share" information with the Pakistani leadership, in the process giving the impression of consultation and information sharing -- that the United States was seeking Pakistan's advice



and consent — but without jeopardizing the operation. Obama could thus thank Zardari for Pakistani cooperation — an assertion which can be seen as technically and linguistically correct — and thus maintain the appearance that the United States did not violate Pakistani sovereignty and that the Pakistani leadership was on board.

B. Pakistan's ambivalence

There is no hiding the fact that bin Laden's presence, in his ostentatious compound in the middle of a Pakistani town and right next to a Pakistani military academy — Pakistan's West point — means only one thing: Bin Laden was protected by elements within the Pakistani government. It is inconceivable — inconceivable — that bin Laden and his entourage could have lived in that place for the last five years without the knowledge of at least some elements — perhaps rogue elements — of the ISI.

Pakistan is not exactly a country where the security services and law enforcement units are hampered by notions of civil rights or the right to privacy. The reach of the government is more limited in the semi-autonomous North-western tribal regions, but that reach is unlimited in Pakistan proper.

The fact that bin Laden could have received the protection of important elements in a government that receives billions of dollars in aid from the United States is troubling. It is troubling enough that the ISI trains and supports local or regional Islamist groups that do Pakistan's bidding against India, but it is another thing to hide the leader of a movement that declared war on — and has pursued active acts of war against — the United States.

We should also be disappointed in the Pakistani lack of sophistication here: they should have understood that they would have been better off sacrificing bin Laden and giving him to us. Just think of the good will they would have generated in U.S. — and Western — public opinion. Moreover, they should have realized that, for their own strategic goals, they should strive more energetically to prove to the United States that they make a distinction between groups fighting for what they — the Pakistanis — regard as their rights in Kashmir, and groups that fight the United States.

The fact that important elements in the Pakistani ruling circles did not make this distinction may raise questions about whether or not the adjective “ambivalent,” so often used to describe Pakistan's attitude toward Islamic terrorism and those who carry terrorist acts in the name of Islam, should be replaced. We may conclude that the protection bin Laden has received may justify the realization that perhaps the Pakistani true attitude is not so ambivalent after all.

2. Operational aspects


There three things that are unclear about the operational aspects of what happened yesterday.

A. The number of dead

Too few people were killed — and thankfully, no Americans were killed — for there to have been a real “firefight.” In a firefight in which the two sides are seriously engaged, more people die and get injured on both sides. In this instance only three combatants other than bin Laden were killed — two of his couriers and possibly one of his sons. Where were bin Laden's many body guards? We were told that he was surrounded by a phalanx of guards who were willing to die protecting their leader. Where were they? How many of them were there? Why did they not spring into action to protect their leader?

B. Compound layout

This was a large compound — large enough and ostentatious enough for Donald Trump to be its proud owner. How did the Navy SEALs know in which of the many rooms in the compound bin Laden was staying? How did they manage to get to that room without being noticed? If they had been noticed, they would have had to overpower those sentries and guards who noticed them. This would have created a lot of noise — not just any noise, but fire arms noise — alerting bin Laden and the guards who were physically close to him at the time, thus allowing them to put up more of a fight when the American showed up at the door. It may well be the case that the Navy Seals used guns with silencers, but even then, complete silence is difficult to maintain.



C. Escape route

How come bin Laden did not have an escape route – a tunnel leading outside the compound? The compound was built in 2005 and whoever designed it, knew it was designed for a wanted man. It may well be the case that there was an escape tunnel, but that bin Laden and his people were taken by surprise and thus were unable to reach it.

There are other questions to which we may receive answers in days to come. For now, it appears that the United States may have had someone on the inside providing information. The ability to arrive stealthily, enter the highly

secure compound, find the room where bin Laden was staying, kill only four people, and do it all in less than forty minutes means that the Navy Seals team had either unusually precise and current information, or an unusually high degree – extremely high degree – of sheer luck.

I vote for precise and current actionable information.

Ben Frankel is editor of the Homeland Security NewsWire

2009 – Geographers Had Calculated 89% Chance That Osama Was in Abbottabad

Source: <http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/05/geographers-had-calculated.html?ref=hp>

Could Osama bin Laden have been found faster if the CIA had followed the advice of ecosystem geographers from the University of California, Los Angeles? Probably not, but the predictions of UCLA geographer Thomas Gillespie, who, along with colleague John Agnew and a class of undergraduates, authored a 2009 paper predicting the terrorist's whereabouts, were none too shabby. Accord-

was killed last night. And they correctly predicted that he would be in a large town, not a cave. The bin Laden tracking idea began as a project in an undergraduate class on remote sensing that Gillespie, whose expertise is using remote sensing data from satellites to study ecosystems, taught in 2009. Based on information from satellites and other remote sensing systems, and reports on his move-




Credit: MIT International Review

ments since his last known location, the students created a probabilistic model of where he was likely to be. Their prediction of a town was based on a geographical theory called “island biogeography”: basically, that a species on a large island is much less likely to go extinct following a catastrophic event than a species on a small one.

“The theory was basically that if you’re going to try and survive, you’re going to a region with a low extinction rate: a large town,” Gillespie says. “We hypothesized he would-

ing to a probabilistic model they created, there was an 88.9% chance that bin Laden was hiding out in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where he

n’t be in a small town where people could report on him.” “It’s not my thing to do this type of [terrorism] stuff,” he says. “But the same



theories we use to study endangered birds can be used to do this.” In the end, they zeroed in on a Pakistani border town called Parachinar which has, among other things, access to medical care. Then they predicted the exact building he would be in by making assumptions as to the characteristics of the building itself, such as high enough ceilings to accommodate bin Laden’s 6’4” frame, a fence, privacy, and electricity. The undergraduates did such a nice job on the project, Gillespie says, that he wrote the results up as a paper and submitted it to a small journal, MIT International Review. The next day, he was shocked to find his inbox full of requests for interviews from everyone from USA Today to Sean Hannity. (He declined the latter.)

The paper’s precise predictions were treated with some skepticism by other researchers, who said the authors were overconfident in predicting the terrorist’s hidey hole down to specific buildings. Gillespie says that one of its weaknesses was a lack of hard data on bin Laden’s location, last known in

2001. As to intelligence agencies’ taking interest in his work, “I didn’t hear from them, didn’t expect to. But they obviously did a pretty good job,” he says. Gillespie says he was surprised to hear bin Laden ended up being only 268 km away from his last known location, but not surprised that he was in a town. “Caves are cold, and you can’t see people walking up to them,” he says. Still, the late Al Qaeda leader made a bad choice of real estate, in Gillespie’s opinion. “An inconspicuous house would have suited him better.” Finding bin Laden’s deputies—the terrorist mastermind is said to be only one of 40 “high-value” targets the Pentagon seeks—is not on Gillespie’s to-do list. “Right now, I’m working on the dry forests of Hawaii where 45% of the trees are on the endangered species list,” says Gillespie. “I’m far more interested in getting trees off the endangered species list.”

NOTE: Download the full paper from “CBRNE-CT Papers” section of Newsletter’s website.

CSI bin Laden: Commandos Use Thumb, Eye Scans to Track Terrorists

Source: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/05/csi-bin-laden-commandos-use-thumb-eye-scans-to-track-terrorists/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+WiredDangerRoom+%28Blog+-+Danger+Room%29&utm_content=Google+Reader


The U.S. forces who killed Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad compound were more than expert marksmen. Some of them were forensics experts as well, using sophisticated tools to ensure that they got the right man. Speaking at a White House briefing, counterterrorism adviser John Brennan said he had “99 percent” certainty the commando team killed bin Laden, thanks to “facial recognition, [his] height, [and] an initial DNA analysis.” The initial DNA analysis appears to have been done far from the scene, by “CIA and other spe-



cialists in the intelligence community” on Monday, according to an intelligence official who briefed Pentagon reporters, and it returned a “virtually 100 percent DNA match.”

Press reports say the DNA used to identify bin Laden may have come from one of his sisters, who allegedly died at Boston’s Massachusetts General Hospital. (However, hospital spokeswoman Katie Marquedant wouldn’t confirm this, telling Danger Room, “We have no information at all.”)

But according to a senior Defense De-





The latest version, developed by a company called Crossmatch, is known as SEEK II (picture – left), and it came out last year. It weighs less than 4 pounds, and its ability to send information back to the FBI database is “wham-bam,” even from low-connectivity areas. To pull that off, SEEK II has built-in wireless capability and optional 3G to push or pull biometric info from the database. If that doesn’t work, USB ports connect SEEK to other computers.

partment official, chances are they used the tool pictured above to verify his biometric in-



The device runs on Windows XP. SEEK II doesn’t have a touch-screen, so troops or their FBI partners will still need to key in information the old fashioned way. But its fingerprint sensors are more sensitive, allowing troops to scan in both pressed and rolled prints for a fuller scope of whom they’re targeting. According to the defense official, it took “probably a million, 2 million” dollars to develop.

formation. The device is called a Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit, or SEEK, a handheld biometrics recorder that takes iris scans, fingerprints and facial scans and ports them back to an FBI database in West Virginia in seconds.


The U.S. military has other biometric tools that it’s put to work in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify insurgents and distinguish them from civilians. One’s called the Biometrics Automated Toolset, or BATS (picture below). Another’s called the Handheld Interagency Identification Detection System, or HIIDE. Those don’t appear to be state-of-the-art any-



“We’ve always said this is about more than finding people in a crowd,” said the senior defense official, who requested anonymity to talk about the CSI-like gear that Special Operations Forces carry.



more. “This is better than BATS or HIIDE. We did that early,” the defense official said. “It’s faster, it can pick up more information, better than the iris scan, and get it into the system.” For one thing, the connection speed with SEEK II is a lot better, the official said. And it syncs up with a much bigger database.





AN/PPS-26 STTW
("Sense Through
The Wall")

BATS and HIIDE feed into a military database called the Automated Biometric Information System. ABIS contains detainee information only from the country in which U.S. forces are operating. SEEK II, on the other hand, feeds into an FBI database with far more fingerprint and biometric data than the military possesses, the defense official said. Plus, the machine has its own "local database," allowing operators to store specific biometric data on the device if they know who they're looking for.

But for all you're hearing now about facial recognition, the official said, the old-fashioned fingerprint remains more reliable. SEEK has facial-recognition capability, but it's still pretty weak. "We've evolved face recognition very significantly, but it's still not as good as people would like you to believe," the official said. Several factors still mess up positive identification: "different angles, different lighting, a lot of false pieces."

It wasn't long ago that Special Operations Forces didn't have access to much biometric data of any kind. "Matthew Alexander" is a pseudonym for one of the members of a special mission unit that hunted and ultimately killed the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi, in 2006. "I'm working for an elite task force," Alexander recalled. "We're supposed to have the best of everything. But we had just then started entering people's biometric data. We were basically creating this database in '06, three years into the war."

Facial recognition was a far-off dream. All of this had real consequences for the man-hunt. "One guy fooled us," he remembered. "He gave us a fake name. It was not till an analyst found a picture of him on old slides [that we learned] he was an operations commander for northern Iraq." But before the SEALs can verify the data they find during their raids, they've got to finish the raids first. The scene of a firefight like the one that killed bin Laden isn't the place for checking information, given the insecurity of the locations where troops are fighting. To prepare them for what they're getting into, elite troops also have a tool called Forward Looking Infrared, or FLIR (picture – left). A more mature technology than SEEK, the optic-mounted FLIR system gives troops a sense of where their enemies are inside a compound by tracking their heat sensors. It's not that sensitive — "it can't see through a wall," the defense official said — but it provides a glimpse of where in an open space someone might be, using his heat signature. (The Army's currently working on a device called Sense Through The Wall, which, as its name suggests, has a sophisticated sensor to learn where people are on the other side of structures that are too dense for heat scanning.)



If all of this seems like the Joint Special Operations Command is acting like a federal SWAT team, that's not by accident. These days, special operations teams "have FBI representation on them," said Ali Soufan, a former FBI counterterrorism agent who hunted al-Qaida before and after 9/11. The FBI might not go on raids with the commandos, but back at the base, "they do the fingerprints, they can do the DNA [analysis] and collect the evidence."

That was something Alexander saw firsthand. "It's definitely moving more toward police work," he said, because law enforcement has more experience painstakingly collecting, analyzing and tracing evidence to get the right man. SEEK II represents an unlikely mind-meld — or, at least, fingerprint meld — between the door-kickers at JSOC and the FBI. But the apotheosis of this new influence now has global prestige, as the commandos just took down the FBI's most-wanted terrorist.

Already-Written Book About Navy Seal Group That Killed Osama Bin Laden Suddenly Hot


Source: <http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/written-book-navy-seal-group-184084>

A book about the Navy Seal group Seal Team Six, members of which killed Osama Bin Laden in a mansion near Islamabad, will be published this May. According to Publisher's

wood Reporter when asked about the print run, an updated publish date and if movie rights had been optioned. The book will be published by Thomas Dunne. Scott Miller of the Trident Media Group tells The Hollywood Reporter that he's "already gotten calls" from scouts and studios to turn the film into a movie. As for the print run, he says it's "too soon to tell how many more copies [the publisher] will get out."

It will chronicle the specialized military group, called Naval Special Warfare Development Group or DevGru for short. It's a unit of the Joint Special Operations Command, which costs the country more than \$1 billion annually to fund. Members flew to the Abbottabad mansion in which Bin Laden was captured from the Ghazi Air Base in Pakistan. The gunfire went on for more than 40 minutes. 22 people were killed or captured.

Laura Ingraham will have the first interview Monday with Wasdin, who was a Navy Seal in the first Gulf War and in the Somalia conflict. He was a top-ranked sniper of the Seal Team Six, and tasked with trying to kill warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid.



Weekly, the book, Seal Team Six is by Howard Wasdin, is due to hit stores on May 24. Wasdin declined comment to The Holly-





Ilyas Kashmiri

Source: http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1799




Ilyas Kashmiri came from the Kotli District of Azad-Kashmir, the Pakistani administrated part of Kashmir. Ilyas Kashmiri was a junior commander in Afghanistan in the war against the Russians in the 80s. He trained the Afghan Mujahideen in mine warfare in Miran-shah on behalf of Pakistani ISI and at one point lost an eye.

After the war ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, Ilyas Kashmiri continued his official militant work in Kashmir with the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami HuJI. Disagreements with leader Qari Saifulah Akhtar led Ilyas Kashmiri, in the mid 90s, to establish his own new unit within HuJI, know as the 313 Brigade.

During the mid-1990s Ilyas Kashmiri and Nasrullah Mansoor Langrial were captured by the Indian Army near Poonch in Indian Kashmir and sent to prison, where he would spend the next two years before escaping and returning to Pakistan. Upon his return Ilyas Kashmiri continued to conduct operations against India, once reportedly being rewarded personally with cash by then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf for presenting the head of a dead Indian army officer.

In 2000 Ilyas Kashmiri rejected orders from ISI to serve under Maulana Masood Azhar in the newly founded Jaish-e-Mohammed and was even once targeted by the group. Falling out of favor with the Pakistani military, he was



even taken into custody and tortured in late 2003 in the wake of President Musharraf's assassination attempts in 12/2003.

In 02/2004 Ilyas Kashmiri was released from jail. Until the Lal Mosque Crisis, in 07/2007, he apparently did little, but afterwards he returned to the 313 Brigade in Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and rebuilt its strength while collaborating with the Taliban. Ilyas Kashmiri moved his base of operation from his home town Kotli, in Kashmir, to FATA Waziristan, Razmak district, on the Afghan border.

Ilyas Kashmiri was pronounced dead following the USA UAV missile attack, on 09/14/2009, in which Kalimullah Mehsud was, probably, killed, but later reports



suggested he escaped the attack unharmed. Ilyas Kashmiri granted an interview with Asia Times Online in mid 10/2009. Ilyas Kashmiri was associated with a number of attacks, including a 2008 plan to assassinate the Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, but Al Qaeda leadership rejected the plan on strategic grounds.

Ilyas Kashmiri was in regular contact for some time with David C. Headley, who was arrested in Chicago, USA, on 10/27/2009 (see - Headley and Rana). Their communications suggested that they were in the process of plotting fresh attacks in India. (It is most likely that the communication was monitored by USA intelligence, which led to the missile attack, on 09/14/2009, in which Kalimullah Mehsud was killed). Ilyas Kashmiri was also in contact with Raja L. Khan, a Pakistani from Chicago, who was arrested in USA for sending money to support terror in Pakistan, on Friday 03/26/2010.

- Ilyas Kashmiri was charged, on 01/14/2010, in absentia, in USA, with plotting international terror attacks (see - Chicago 01.14.10).
- Following the Times-Square plot investigation, in 05/2010, Intelligence sources said that the prime suspect Faisal Shahzad was, during his visit to Peshawar in 07/2009, in direct contact with Ilyas Kashmiri.
- The USA announced a reward of \$5 million, on Wednesday 04/06/2011, for information leading to the arrest of HuJI commander Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, holding him responsible for a 2006 attack on its consulate in Karachi, among others.

Bin Laden Raid Discovery: Al Qaeda Considered Attacking U.S. Train On 9/11 Anniversary


Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/06/bin-laden-raid-train_n_858315.html

Holed up in a compound in Pakistan, Osama bin Laden was scheming how to hit the United States hard again, according to newly uncovered documents that show al-Qaida plans for derailing an American train on the upcoming 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Details of the plan emerged Thursday as some of the first intelligence was gleaned from the trove of information found in bin Laden's residence when Navy SEALs killed the al-Qaida leader and four of his associates. They took his body and scooped up computers, DVDs and documents from the com-

pound where U.S. officials think he had been living for as long as six years.

The confiscated materials reveal the rail attack planning as of February 2010. One idea outlined in handwritten notes was to tamper with an unspecified U.S. rail track so that a train would fall off the track at a valley or a bridge. Counterterrorism officials said they believe the plot was only in the initial planning stages, and there is no recent intelligence about any active plan for such an attack. The FBI and Homeland Security issued an intelligence bulletin with details of the plan to law





enforcement around the country. The bulletin, marked "for official use only," was obtained by The Associated Press.

Other intelligence pulled from the compound represented a terrorist wish list but has revealed no specific plan so far. Some documents indicated a desire to strike the U.S. with large-scale attacks in major cities and on key dates such as anniversaries and holidays. But there never was any sign that those were anything more than ambitions, said a U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the intelligence.


Even before the raid, intelligence officials for years had warned that al-Qaida

was interested in attacking major U.S. cities on prominent dates on the American calendar.

Monday's raid by helicopter-borne SEALs was fraught with risk, sensationally bold and a historic success, netting a man who had been on the run for nearly a decade after his terrorist organization pulled off the devastating Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. During the raid, the SEALs met far less resistance than the Obama administration initially described. The commandos encountered gunshots from only one man, whom they quickly killed, before sweeping the house and shooting others, who were unarmed, a senior defense official said in the latest account.

The New York Times and Washington Post reported Thursday on their websites that a CIA surveillance team had been watching bin Laden's residence from a rented house near the compound for months. The agency declined to comment on the reports.

President Barack Obama visited New York's ground zero on Thursday during a somber and understated event where he avoided mentioning bin Laden by name.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter

Summer 2011

The U.S. account of what happened inside bin Laden's Abbottabad compound is so far the only one most Americans have. Pakistan has custody of the people rounded up after-

ward, including more than two dozen children and women. Differing accounts purporting to be from witnesses have appeared in Pakistani and Arab media, and on the Internet.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Surprised? If yes, this is another proof of why terrorists are always ahead of us. Train attack – especially derailment is far much easier than airplane operations, equally or more catastrophic and of high impact if timing is successful i.e. a chemical train derailment... So take nothing for granted and keep an eye on all possible scenarios – even those who look simplistic.

My name is Cairo and I serve at SEAL Team VI !



Semper Fido



The perfect woofing warrior is a product of intense training, high technology – and animal instinct. Here's a look at how the modern military has adapted canines to capture, or kill, the enemy.


An ear radio allows soldiers to give remote orders to the dog, including the potentially life-saving (for the bad guy) "stay" command.

A head-mounted infrared camera streams live video of what the dog sees to soldiers in other positions, as well as commanders back at base.

Adjustable body armor protects the canine commando in battle from shrapnel, stab wounds, and other attacks – all while providing sufficient ventilation.

The U.S. military often replaces a working dog's teeth with titanium fangs capable of ripping through enemy protective armor. Talk about ruff justice!





Belgian Malinois "Cairo" - The 80th SEAL hero!!!



The Bulletproof Dog That Stormed Bin Laden's Lair

Source: <http://www.fastcompany.com/1753360/the-tech-that-outfits-the-dogs-of-war>

If you see this dog coming for you, run. Thanks to his extensive training--and customized body armor that can cost upwards of \$30,000--he's bulletproof, can hear through concrete, and can record high-def video of missions, even in the dead of night.

who has trained dogs from Israeli bomb-sniffing units to the Navy SEALs. "It is much more than just body armor."

The big idea behind the armor add-ons boils down to a simple one: the key to any healthy relationship is communication. Each



160digg Since the moment it was revealed that the "nation's most courageous dog" [Update: named "Cairo"] served alongside the 80 Navy SEALs who took out Osama bin Laden, America's fascination with war dogs has hit a fevered pitch. And while the heart-tugging photos of these four-legged heroes are worth a look, so is the high-tech gear that helps them do their job.

Last year, the military spent \$86,000 on four tactical vests to outfit Navy Seal dogs. The SEALs hired Winnipeg, Canada-based contractor K9 Storm to gear up their four-legged, canine partners, which it has used in battle since World War I. K9 Storm's flagship product is the \$20,000-\$30,000 Intruder, an upgradeable version of their doggie armor. The tactical body armor is wired with a collapsible video arm, two-way audio, and other attachable gadgets.


"Various special ops units use the vest, including those in current headlines," says Mike Herstik, a consultant with International K-9,

dog is assigned one human handler. To operate efficiently in a tactical situation, they need to be connected.

So how much high-tech connectivity does a dog get for \$30,000 anyway?

Using a high-def camera mounted on the dog's back, handlers can see what the dog sees, using handheld monitors. Jim Slater, who cofounded K9 Storm with his wife Glori, says footage is stable because the entire module is sewn into the vest. With unpredictable light conditions, like middle-of-the-night missions, the camera adjusts automatically to night vision. The lens is protected by impact-resistant shielding. And since we're talking about SEALs notorious for amphibious assaults, the system is waterproof.

In Abbottabad, the patented load-bearing harness would have enabled a Navy SEAL handler to rappel from the helicopter with his dog strapped to his body. Once in the com-




pound, the dog could run ahead to scout as the handler issued commands through an integrated microphone and speaker in the armor. The proprietary speaker system enables handlers to relay commands at low levels to the dog. "Handlers need to see and hear how their dog is responding," said Slater. "In a tactical situation, every second counts." The encrypted signal from dog to handler penetrates fortified barriers like concrete, steel-fortified ships, and tunnels. That translates to standard operating ranges up to four football fields.

or ice picks like a mitt wrapping around a baseball; knives and sharpened screw drivers welded by prisoners require tighter weaves.


Keeping the armor strong, but light, is a priority. "Every gram counts for our clients. So we prefer advanced fibers and innovative textiles," said Slater. "The entire communication module is 20 ounces." The average armor weighs between three to seven pounds, depending on the size of the dog and the level of protection.

They've even gone stealth. A silent hardware system prevents any metal to metal con-



The armor itself protects against shots from 9mm and .45 magnum handguns. Slater is a veteran police dog trainer and built the first vest after a prison riot. He realized he wore full riot gear, while his K9 partner, Olaf, was basically naked. So he started making vests. The weave technology catches bullets

tact--you won't hear any jangling or see any reflective give-aways. K9 took the average 150-gram V-ring and developed a 5-gram version made of a Kevlar, poly-propylene, and nylon fiber blend. "It's actually stronger, rated to 2,500 pounds. Completely silent, and ultra-light," said Slater.



Of course, these systems don't come cheap--and it's the dogs themselves that are the real investment. The Navy's first Master Military Working Dog Trainer (a trainer of other dog trainers), Luis Reyes emailed from Afghanistan: "There are many products that help MWDs [military work dogs] and many are 'cool' but not necessary. No amount of money can replace the life of a canine that saves the precious lives of our troops in harm's way."

Although new tech is the buzz, what put K9 Storm on the map is dedication to customization. Its mainstay dog armor is the more-affordable \$2,000-\$3,000 base model. Each vest they make is custom sized for the dog. "The fit has to be perfect or it will flop around," said Slater. That hinders mobility, or worse, can cause injury.

Clients can measure dogs themselves, or Slater will fly out for dog fittings. They've done 15-pound West Highland Terriers--which look like playful white puffballs but were bred to scare badgers out of holes, and are helpful in drug raids with confined spaces like air ducts.

On the other end are St. Bernards, which push 240 pounds.

K9's client list spans 15 countries, from China to Switzerland. Buyers include SWAT teams, police and corrections agencies, security firms, search and rescue units, and border patrols. Slater and 12 employees spent years developing a proprietary computer-assisted design program to translate measurements into accurate patterns, which are hand sewn. However, it's as much a tech company as it is an armor manufacturer.

The next phase of development includes plans for remote-delivery systems and enhanced accessory functionality. They describe a system that would help dogs transport medical supplies, walkie-talkies, or water into constricted areas like rubble. They're also planning new appendages like air-level quality meters for mines.

No word on mounting mini heat-seeking missiles just yet. So, for now, bad guys will only have to tussle with highly-trained fangs exerting 700 pounds of pressure per square inch.

One Osama gone: Many more in the making

By Anita Rai

Source: <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/islamic-studies/1490-one-osama-gone-many-more-in-the-making.html>


Osama bin Laden is dead. Islamist terrorism, is nonetheless alive and kicking. US Navy Seals sealed his fate and buried him at sea. The fight against terrorism is however, far from over. This century is going to be shaped by how we fare in this war and how heavy the cost will be in terms of invaluable lives, both military service members and civilians. Muslim supremacists have thrust this war upon the free world and in order to survive we have to fight back. Human hearts should welcome the news of Osama's elimination. Somehow the concept and clear identification, of good and evil and a clear difference between the two are lost upon many people.

Ismail Haniya, the head of Hamas administration in the Gaza strip expressed his sorrow and anger at the death of this monster terrorist in these words: "We condemn the assassination and the killing of an Arab holy

warrior. We ask God to offer him mercy with the true believers and the martyrs."

How can anyone forget the response of the people of Gaza to the news of the slaughter of 9/11? They erupted into loud cheers and vulgar chants. Sweets and candies were distributed in celebration of the carnage. Haniya told the reporters that Hamas sees the killing of Osama bin Laden as "a continuation of the American policy based on oppression and the shedding of Muslim and Arab blood".

We have seen comparable show of solidarity with, and sympathy for the dead terrorist in numerous Muslim countries. In Pakistan, two elected parliamentarians from two different parties lifted their hands in prayer for the departed soul of a mass murderer. This happened on the Floor of the House and the Speaker did not stop these Members of the National Assembly from praying for a terror-



ist. The headline of Daily Ausaf, a Pakistan-based Urdu newspaper, read: American Raid, Osama “martyred”.

An Imam of Al-Aqsa mosque when expressing his support for the dead terrorist threatened President Obama and Bush (Jr.) with death. Imam of a mosque is extremely important for Muslims and plays an intrinsic role. Mosque plays a pivotal role in the lives of Muslims everywhere. And it acquires an immensely heightened significance on Fridays. For Muslims, Friday is the most sacred day of the week. Most Muslims including those who do not pray the daily five obligatory prayers attend the Friday congregational prayers held in the mosques. While many perform the daily prayers at home or at work, the Friday prayers would necessarily mean a large gathering of Muslims in the mosques. Khutbaah (Sermon) is an integral part of Friday congregational Salaat / Namaaz (prayer). It is delivered by the cleric of the particular mosque who leads the congregation in prayer. He is known as the Imam of the mosque.

Most of the clerics who on a weekly basis lecture large-to-huge gathering of Muslims and lead them in prayers, are devoid of any creditable education at the formal level. At most mosques the sermon comes before the obligatory prayer. Be it a mosque in a remote village of Indonesia or Bangladesh, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the Great Mosque in Mecca or the University of Tehran, the congregation of Muslims are obligated by religious pinning to sit through the clerics' sermons. This is how a clergy that is highly uneducated commands the attention and attendance of masses of worshippers when they are riding a religious high.

The Friday sermon has a set theme. The khateeb (lecturer/sermon-deliverer) and the mosque's financier however have the privilege of choosing its tone and scale. Thematically, the Friday sermon is: Christians, Jews, every other non-Muslim and those Muslims who prefer peaceful co-existence to Islamist supremacy, are all enemies of Allah, and therefore your enemies too. Infidels can never be your friends. Muslims who are friends with non-Muslims are bad Muslims and must not be trusted. These bad Muslims, Jews, Chris-

tians, and every other infidel are hostile to the fundamentals of Islam, which is to convert, conquer, and coerce until all submit to the one true creed of Allah. It is therefore, the obligation of all true Muslims to fight for the destruction of Satans of all sizes (USA, UK, and other free nations) and to wipe Israel “from the face of the earth”.


Special mention is made of the “holy” warriors like Hamas and Hezbollah and in a highly charged atmosphere of religious ardour, their horrific deeds are heroised. The total thrust of the sermon is on a Muslim's holy duty of combative jihad and how to sustain an atmosphere of continuous aggression until the Muslim domination over the infidels is complete and conclusive.

On Friday 13 March 1998, Sheikh Ali Abdur-Rahman al-Huzaifi, Imam of Masjid-e-Nabavi (the Prophet's Mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia) said the following in his sermon to a huge congregation of Muslims. For Sunni Muslims, the Imam of this mosque is amongst the excellent of Allah's creation. He is revered as a Muslim man of extraordinary virtue, wisdom, piety and truth. His words are believed to be in perfect alignment with the “Will of Allah”. In his sermon, Imam Huzaifi said: “... How can there be any similarity, any bond between Islam and Yehudiyyat, (the Jewish faith) when... Yehudiyyat is a collection of materialism and narrow-mindedness, bears malice towards humanity, is steeped in moral degradation, greed and covetousness. ... Can the Muslims bear the presence of the Jews who call Hazrat Esa Alayhissalam (Jesus) the son of a whore? ...

Similarly there is no similarity between Christianity and Islam. Islam is a pure and clean religion believing in the oneness of Allah, in Tauheed....Whereas Christianity is a deviation from the right path...

The Shias are the followers of Ibn Sabaa, the Yehudi, and of Abu Lulu, the Majoosi (Zoroastrian)... The enemies of Islam have united in their false beliefs to fight against Islam. This applies whether the enemies are of old or new.

Thus the only reason for the creation of a Jewish, Zionist state in Palestine was to start an armed conflict with the Muslims and thus



create tension and terror in the region. After they had succeeded in creating Israel, the Jewish colonial powers then set in motion such basic and collective plans....Among these the major plan was to bring about a dissolution of all Sharaee courts from the Islamic countries....To a large extent the Kuffar succeeded in their aim. But praise is to Allah Ta-Aala, that the Saudi government did not fall a prey to this conspiracy and there still exist many Sharaee courts in the country. Today, amongst all the Muslim governments of the world, the government of Saudi Arabia is the only representative, model Islamic government. ...forces of Kufr (infidelity) have now all united against Islam and the Muslims.

The evil intentions and aims of the world powers are:

- To strengthen and fortify the Zionist, Jewish state of Israel
- To tear down Al-Aqsa Mosque and build a synagogue in its place, thus satisfying the ancient desire of the Jews
- To maintain the military supremacy of the Jews over the Muslim Arab countries
- To appropriate a major part of the oil-wealth of the Gulf States for themselves, leaving the Saudis with the residue only
- To deal a death-blow to Islam at the slightest provocation
- To promote everything which is against Islam...

The Americans should learn a lesson from the Muslims of Afghanistan who had started Jihad against Russia armed with sticks only. They had thus brought about the total destruction of the super power of the day...

O people! There is religious enmity between the Muslims and the Kuffar. So how can they be the well-wishers of the Muslims? ...Muslims cannot tolerate...the presence of any power of Kufr in the Arabian Peninsula... Two religions cannot co-exist in Arabia...

Ya Allah! Confer upon the Muslims and Islam, honour and victory, upon Kufr and the Kuffar dishonour and defeat.... Ya Allah! Lord of the universe cause the powers of Kufr to go to war against each other.... Ya Allah! Seize the Jews and Christians in the grip of your punishment. Seize the Hindus and the Mushrikeen (polytheists) too.... Ya Allah!


Send down upon them a torment most grievous.... Ya Allah, we seek only thy shelter against the mischief of the Rawafiz (Shias), the heretics..."

The current Imam of the Great Mosque in Mecca, Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Sudais, is one of the most powerful religious advisors of the Saudi government. On Friday 19 April 2002, he delivered a sermon from the Great Mosque to a large gathering of pilgrims in which he said: the Jews are, "the dregs of the human race... the rats of the planet...killers of prophets...pigs and monkeys," and prayed to Allah to "exterminate them". (Laurent Murawiec, Princes of Darkness, 2003, chapter 8, p 88).

Thursday 24 March 2011, this Saudi cleric came to India upon the invitation of Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind, an organisation of hardliner Sunni clerics. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims from different parts of the country flocked to the Darul-Uloom seminary (founded and run by Deoband Muslims who follow the Wahhabi school of Islam) in the state of Uttar Pradesh to welcome their Imam.

On Friday 25 March 2011, Imam Al-Sudais led this sea of Indian Muslims in prayer. Every road and alley leading to this Wahhabi seminary was bursting to its seams with people who had come to offer their Friday Namaaz (Salaat) under the leadership of Imam Sudais. The Friday fervour was such that worshippers prayed from every place conceivable and otherwise. Streets, lanes, pavements, parks, rooftops, terraces, verandas, back and front yards, highways – all became grounds for prayer.

Around the world the Friday prayer is followed by a Dua (supplication) marking the end of the midday worship session. Suppliant Muslims invoke Allah to annihilate the Jews and grant fataah (victory) to Filisteen (Palestine) and bless the Muslim ummah (community) with victory over the kuffar (infidels). It is not incomprehensible why the day of Friday is so important in the "Revolutions" that are rising and rolling in the Muslim territories, and in every anti-government demonstration by Muslims living in the West. Peace is conspicuously absent in the regimen of Friday's obligatory congregational worship.



Muslim clerics easily obtain Visas to Western countries as appointed Imams of mosques and/or as visiting preachers/lecturers. A greater number of Sunni brand of mosques, Islamic centres, and schools in the West are run by Wahhabi and Salafi Islamists blessed by the Saudi government. Likewise, centres labelled Shiite are “inspired” and “moved” by the Islamist Revolution of Iran. The “spiritual” sustenance these “men of Allah” serve to the believers inside these places of worship has little difference to what they feed the millions of Muslims inside the mosques and madrassas in Islamic countries. Large number of young generation Muslims are growing up on a staple diet of hatred dished up to them inside places of worship.

The show put up by the mosques and Islamic centres in the West for the benefit of law enforcement and security agencies is truly a master workmanship of duplicity and hypocrisy. Every prominent Islamist organisation in the West carefully and meticulously keeps and updates a “front-office” for inter-faith understanding and peace. An army of Western educated professional Muslim brothers and sisters are assigned the ‘jihad’ of glossing the way for various government aids and charity grants to glide in. For one who is not aware of what is really going on behind

the showbiz of Islamism, legions of clerics barely versed in one Western language and basic IT skills and donning robes of religion are damn convincing in their public performances. More than anything else, this has more to do with performance-based pay packets here, and a congregation of paradisiacal virgins hereafter.

Freedom of the West, enshrined in its laws, allows people of all faiths to practice, preach, and promote their faiths without any fear and discrimination. Hence, the Muslim minorities easily build mosques and religious centres in the West, some of which stand out in size and opulence. Like believers of other faiths, they too practice, preach, and promote their respective sects of Islam in an atmosphere of fairness and freedom. The minorities in Muslim countries on the other hand do not have this privilege. People are being slain just because they subscribe to faiths other than Islam. Their places of worship and those who worship therein are constantly terrorised by Muslims inflamed by Islamist clerics and preachers at home and abroad.

Anita Rai is the author of the book: Jihad and Terrorism

Understanding Strategic Change in al-Qaeda’s Central Leadership after Bin Laden


By Murad Batal al-Shishani

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

Since the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was killed on May 2, much analysis has appeared speculating potential changes to the organization and its leadership. This article aims to answer the basic question of in which direction core al-Qaeda (based along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border) will go in the post-Bin Laden era according to the ideology of its remaining leaders. These figures include Egyptian jihadist Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who will probably emerge as the undeclared leader, as al-Qaeda members considers themselves not an organization, but rather “vanguards” of the jihadist movement. As al-

Qaeda ideologue Abdul Majid Abdul Majid put it: “Al-Qaeda is no longer just a hierarchal organization [built] on specific names, but has become a jihadi mission held [in common] by all mujahedeen of the umma [Islamic community].” [1]

Some indication of al-Zawahiri’s emerging role can be found in his eulogy for Osama bin Laden which was released on jihadi websites on June 8. [2] In the message, entitled “The Noble Knight Alighted,” al-Zawahiri announced the renewal of al-Qaeda’s Bai’a (oath of allegiance) to the Amir al-Mu’mineen (Commander of the Faithful) Mullah Omar, indicating



that al-Zawahiri has the authority to do so on behalf of those “vanguards.”

In order to assess the future behavior of al-Qaeda this article will examine the ideology of three members of al-Qaeda’s Shura council in addition to al-Zawahiri: Abu Yahya al-Libi (a.k.a. Hassan Muhammad Qaid), Abu Abdulrahman Attiya al-Libi (a.k.a. Jamal Ibrahim Shtelwi al-Misrati) and Abdul Majid Abdul Majid. A fourth Shura member, Abu Khalil al-Madani, is not included in this analysis due to a lack of information about his views.

Saif al-Adel in the al-Qaeda Leadership

Although al-Zawahiri has been described as the deputy leader of al-Qaeda over the last 15 years, some recent reports have suggested that Egyptian commander Saif al-Adel would be appointed as the new al-Qaeda leader. However, al-Adel is a military professional, as can be noted from his writings, which means that his lack of ideological credentials make such reports unlikely. [3] A retired Egyptian military officer, al-Adel is believed to be the leader of al-Qaeda’s military committee and returned to Waziristan in 2010 after being released from detention in Iran (Foreign Policy, May 26). Saif al-Adel is commonly identified in reports as the alias of a retired Egyptian intelligence (or Special Forces) officer named Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi; however, there are reasons to question this identification. Al-Adel’s father-in-law, an Afghan jihad veteran named Abu Hamid al-Masri (a.k.a. Mustafa Hamid), has denied Makkawi is al-Adel’s real name. In 2004, the London-based “Islamic Media Observatory” released a statement saying al-Adel and Makkawi are not the same person. [4] More recently, an Egyptian newspaper published a letter from an individual identifying himself as Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, a veteran of the Afghan jihad, stating that he is not Saif al-Adel and has been experiencing problems as a result of this misidentification. The author appears to also be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but claims to have denounced al-Qaeda since 9/11 (al-Youm al-Sabi’i, May 18).


It is important to note that killing Bin Laden does not mean the dismantlement of al-Qaeda. A June 16, 2010 video recording by

Abu Yahya al-Libi, entitled “Our Leaders’ Blood Fuels Our Battle”, eulogized the former leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who were killed in a U.S. air strike on April 19, 2010. Al-Libi’s eulogy indicates the mind-set influencing the behavior of al-Qaeda post-Bin Laden: “There is no mujahid who has fought in bouts and stepped into battlefields, whether he is a leader or a soldier, [who] has not prepared himself for death; he is eagerly awaiting it, hour by hour, no, moment by moment... this worship [Jihad], which is part of our glorious religion, cannot be stopped, disrupted or delayed by the death, killing or capture of someone, whoever he is and [whatever] his status is.” [5] Abu Yahya escaped from the American detention centre in Bagram-Afghanistan in 2005. Since then he has appeared as one of the most prominent ideologues of Salafi-Jihadism after studying Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) in Mauritania. Jihadists often refer to his writings, especially his opinions on killing civilians.

Far Enemy and Near Enemy

Bin Laden was fond of the idea of fighting against “the far enemy” (the “Crusaders and Jews”). Seventy percent of his speeches and appearances were focused on the far enemy, with 20% consisting of general advice and instructions to jihadis, and just 10% directed at toppling local regimes of “the near enemy” (“apostate” regimes in the Muslim world). [6] These figures suggest that although Bin Laden served as a symbol for jihadis, he was a strategist more than a religious ideologue.

Unlike Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri is focused more on the near enemy, this being due to his background as leader of a national jihad group before it adopted Salafism and joined the larger international jihad movement in the 1980s, of which al-Qaeda is the prime example. Al-Zawahiri’s focus on “the near enemy” comprised 50% of his speeches; in contrast “the far-enemy” was the focus of only 15% of his speeches, the rest being comprised mainly of general advice and instructions. The works of Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Abdulrahman Attiya al-Libi and Abdul Majid Abdul Majid reflect a similar lack of focus on fighting the far enemy.



This suggests that core al-Qaeda will focus on targeting near enemies in the future. In his June 8 eulogy for Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri made explicit calls for jihad against the near enemy in Pakistan, Syria, Yemen and Libya.

Ideologues and Operatives

Al-Qaeda and all its branches have a functional division between political-ideological leaders and military operatives. Switching broad strategies would increase the roles of certain leaders from both groups. For instance, al-Zawahiri will rely on operatives who prefer to target near enemies, such as his old comrade Abu Muhammad al-Masri (a.k.a. Abdullah Ahmad Abdullah). Al-Masri's preference for targeting "near enemies" was a source of disagreement with Bin Laden himself after the 9/11 attacks (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 17, 2003). Al-Masri is an al-Qaeda operative and appears on the FBI's most wanted list. He is accused of involvement in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and is believed to be located in the area of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Al-Zawahiri will also need to rely on operatives such as al-Adel and Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri to maintain al-Qaeda ties with local insurgents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Kashmiri's current status is uncertain; a statement allegedly from Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) announced his death in a June 3 drone strike in North Waziristan, although the spokesman was previously unknown, there were mistakes in the text unlikely to be made by a HuJI spokesman. Moreover, the photo of an allegedly dead Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri was actually the dead body of Abu Ismail Khan, one of the LeT terrorists involved in the 2008 Mumbai attack (The News International [Islamabad], June 7; Asia Times Online, June 8). Kashmiri is known to be an al-Qaeda commander and leader of the Waziristan-based and HuJI-associated "Brigade 313," which is made up of members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and allied Kashmiri groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Karachi-based Jundallah movement.

However, focusing on the near enemy could be the first challenge to al-Zawahiri's


leadership. Al-Qaeda's rhetoric promoting violent jihad has had very little effect on the youths agitating for political change in the streets of the Arab world, which has also hurt its recruitment base.

However, if political violence were to continue to escalate in Libya, Syria and Yemen, for instance, it would provide new opportunities for a movement that has always gravitated to areas in crisis.

Individual Jihad

In this context, it is expected that the ideological role of Abu Abdulrahman Attiya al-Libi will increase. Attiya is a prominent al-Qaeda theorist and a leader of the jihadist movement in Libya (see *Terrorism Monitor*, August 12, 2010). A graduate of Shari'a studies in Mauritania and an expert in explosives, he is considered close to al-Zawahiri. He was also close to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi before the latter was killed in 2006. Attiya has also been described as a coordinator between al-Qaeda leaders and other Islamic groups. Looking at his writings, one notes that all of them fell into the category of "general advice and instructions" until the turmoil in Libya started last February. At that point he started to send messages more regularly denouncing Mu'ammarr al-Qaddafi and NATO military operations in Libya.

Attiya al-Libi's role as a general theorist is essential for al-Qaeda. This was indicated in a recent two-part video recording produced by al-Sahab Media Production entitled "La Tukulif ila Nafsak" (You are not tasked [held responsible] except for yourself only). The first one hour episode was devoted to encouraging al-jihad al-fardi (individual jihad), particularly among Muslims who live in the West. The tactic was described in the recording by both Attiya al-Libi and Abu Yahya al-Libi (asansar.com, June 3). [7] Attiya al-Libi stressed the importance of individual jihadi attacks being in line with "the mujahideen's general strategy... all Western countries are not the same." He further urged potential jihadis to contact "the leaders of mujahideen, if that's possible" before undertaking individual operations.



Besides its tactical advantages, individual jihad suggests that the "far enemy" remains a priority for al-Qaeda. This will increase the importance of the work of Abdul Majid, who clearly stated the priority of targeting the United States when he was asked about the strategy of jihadists: "As for the overall strategy of jihad, I think it is known to all, which is [based] on the importance of focusing on the head of kufr [disbelief] and corruption in the globe - America." [8]

Conclusion

Al-Qaeda will continue after Bin Laden by relying on its ideology, but a change will be seen in its behavior. These changes will be reflected in new roles for the movement's leaders, particularly those involved in developing the group's ideology.

Under al-Zawahiri's leadership, al-Qaeda will be more near-enemy-oriented, but this will depend on developments in the Arab world and the direction of the popular opposition movements. Relying on military operatives to maintain ties with locals in the region could become a problem for core al-Qaeda if they do not dedicate an ideologue for such missions. Though al-Zawahiri will play an important role as al-Qaeda's new leader, the increased roles of various ideologues will mean that the movement will be led in a more collective fashion than has existed previously.

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Notes:

1. Not much is known about him or whether this is his real name. Unlike most Egyptian jihadists he has not come from al-Gama'a al-Islamiya or al-Jihad, but is rather a product of the traditional Egyptian Salafist movement. For the full text of his interview, see: <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=19061015>, June 19, 2010.
2. <http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?p=193941>.
3. For Saif al-Adel's writings, see: <http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=nkpabwye>.
4. <http://www.aljihad.info/vb/showthread.php?t=5859>.
5. The video can be watched at this link: <http://www.archive.org/details/dema3>.
6. All figures compiled by the author.
7. For more details on the al-jihad al-fardi tactic, which was first encouraged by Bin Laden, see Terrorism Monitor, June 17, 2010.
8. <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=19061015>, June 2010.

Al Qaeda Says Al-Zawahiri Has Succeeded Bin Laden

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/06/16/al-qaeda-says-al-zawahiri-has-succeeded-bin-laden/> #ixzz1PRyFYw9xPublished June 16, 2011


Usama bin Laden's longtime deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri has taken control of Al Qaeda, the group said Thursday, a widely anticipated move that comes at a time the terror network is struggling for relevance amid a wave of Arab uprisings that has threatened to upstage it.

Al-Zawahiri, a surgeon by training, has long brought ideological fire as well as tactical and organizational cunning to Al Qaeda, which has found itself increasingly decentralized and prone to internal disputes following

its expulsion from Afghanistan after its invasion by U.S. forces in 2001.

Thursday's announcement comes more than six weeks after the U.S. killed bin Laden in a May 2 raid on his home in Pakistan. Al-Zawahiri pledged to avenge the death of the Al Qaeda founder and mastermind of the Sept. 11 terror attacks and to continue the terror network's campaign of attacks against the U.S. and other Western interests.

"The general command of Al Qaeda, after completing consultations, decided that the





sheik doctor Abu Mohammed Ayman al-Zawahiri take the responsibility and be in charge of the group," said a statement purportedly by Al Qaeda and posted on militant websites, including several known to be affiliated with the group.

Al Qaeda gave no details about the selection process for bin Laden's successor but said that it was the best tribute to the memory of its "martyrs."

Al-Zawahiri, who turns 60 on Sunday and has a \$25 million bounty on his head, has been behind the use of suicide bombings and the independent militant cells that have become the network's trademarks. But U.S. intelligence officials have said that some Al Qaeda members find al-Zawahiri to be a controlling micromanager who lacks bin Laden's populist appeal.

He also faces significant challenges in promoting Al Qaeda's agenda of a religiously led state spanning the Muslim world after finding itself sidelined in the wake of popular revolts that have been driven by aspirations for Western-style democracy instead.

Al-Zawahiri has been in hiding for nearly 10 years and is widely believed to be near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. He has appeared in dozens of videos and audiotapes in recent years, increasingly becoming the face of Al Qaeda as bin Laden kept a lower profile.

Most of his pronouncements on the videos and audiotapes show him to be a man consumed by deep hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and Israel.

Al-Zawahiri had been considered the most likely successor because of his longtime collaboration with bin Laden. Analysts had said that few were likely to challenge the Al Qaeda deputy leader for the top spot despite some reservations.

Many predicted he would step up attacks to prove himself.

"He was a given leader from the outset. But he doesn't have the same iconic status or personality as bin Laden," said Magnus Ranstorp, a terror analyst at the Royal Swedish Defense College. "He will focus on attacking the West in a big way. To avenge (bin Laden's death), but also to make himself ... even more effective and relevant."

Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden first crossed paths in the late 1980s in the caves of Afghanistan, where the Egyptian reportedly provided medical treatment to bin Laden and other Islamic fighters battling Soviet forces. Their alliance would develop years later into the terror network blamed for America's worst terror attack in its history.

In a videotaped eulogy released earlier this month, al-Zawahiri warned that America still faces an international community of Muslims that seek to destroy it.



"Today, praise God, America is not facing an individual, a group or a faction," he said, wearing a white robe and turban with an assault rifle leaned on a wall behind him. "It is facing a nation that is in revolt, having risen from its lethargy to a renaissance of jihad."

Al-Zawahiri also heaped praise on bin Laden and criticized the U.S. for burying him at sea.

"He went to his God as a martyr, the man who terrified America while alive and terrifies it in death, so much so that they trembled at the idea of his having a tomb," he said.

Al-Zawahiri is the son of an upper middle class Egyptian family of doctors and scholars. His father was a pharmacology professor at Cairo University's medical school and his grandfather was the grand imam of Al-Azhar University, Sunni Islam's formal seat of learning.

At the age of 15, he founded his first underground cell of high school students to oppose the Egyptian government. He continued his militant activities while earning his medical degree, later merging his cell with other militants to form Islamic Jihad.

Al-Zawahiri served three years in an Egyptian prison before heading to Afghanistan in 1984 to fight the Soviets, where he linked up with bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri later followed bin Laden to Sudan and then back to Afghanistan, where they found a safe haven under the radical Taliban regime.

Soon after came the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, followed by the 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen, an attack al-Zawahiri is believed to have helped organize.

In a 2001 treatise, he set down the long-term strategy for the jihadi movement -- to inflict "as many casualties as possible" on the Americans.

"Pursuing the Americans and Jews is not an impossible task," he wrote. "Killing them

is not impossible, whether by a bullet, a knife stab, a bomb or a strike with an iron bar."

Al-Zawahiri's hatred for Americans has also become deeply personal: His wife and at least two of their six children were killed in a U.S. airstrike following the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after the 9-11 attacks.

Al-Zawahiri has worked in the years since to rebuild the organization's leadership in the Afghan-Pakistan border. Al Qaeda has inspired or had a direct hand in attacks in North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 transit bombings in London.

The CIA came close to capturing him in 2003 and killing him in 2004 -- both times in Pakistan. In December 2009, they thought they were again close only to be tricked by a double agent who blew himself up, killing seven agency employees and wounding six more in Khost, Afghanistan.

The statement announcing his succession was filled with the terror network's usual rhetoric, vowing to continue the fight against what it called "conquering infidels, led by America and its stooge Israel, who attack the homes of Islam."

The Al Qaeda statement also stated the group's support for this year's popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. It vowed never to recognize the legitimacy of Israel and to support what it called the struggle of the Afghan people under the leadership of Taliban commander Mullah Omar against American occupation.

"We support the uprisings of oppressed Muslim nations in the face of corrupt and oppressive tyrants in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Morocco and we encourage them along with the rest of the Muslim people to continue the struggle until all the corrupt oppressive regimes imposed by the west are removed," it said.



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