



CBRNE

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NEWSLETTER TERRORISM

E-Journal for CBRNE & CT First Responders



Cruisers' terrorism

An emerging threat?

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Collection**

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Cruisers' Terrorism – An emerging threat?

This Special Collection came as a result of recent statement of Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, the UK's highest naval officer in NATO who warned in January 2015 that ISIS next target could be cruise ships in the Mediterranean Sea. It was the first time that such a threat was made public and it is a good thing that high officials can still think out of the box. The problem is what cruisers' owners and companies do to counter such a threat that can be materialized not only in the Med area but also worldwide?

The Editor



ISIS's next target could be cruise ships in the Med

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3422044/Terrorists-target-cruise-ships-Med-ranking-commander-says-ISIS-s-spread-Libya-casts-uncomfortable-shadow.html>



Warning: Vice Adm Johnstone (centre, with Spanish Rear Admiral Jose Delgado, left, and Commander Ignacio Paz, right) said yesterday that Nato must not get 'hustled out' of eastern Mediterranean water space

Jan 29 – **Cruise ships in the Mediterranean could be targeted in a terror attack by militant groups armed with Russian weapons, a top British commander warned yesterday.**

Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, the UK's highest naval officer in NATO, said Islamic State's spread into Libya had cast an 'uncomfortable shadow' over the sea.

In stark remarks, he revealed the IS terror group are attempting to build a navy to wage war against the West.

He said there was a 'horrible opportunity' that a 'very high quality weapons system' would be used to hit ships crossing the sea, having 'extraordinary implications' for the Western World.

Speaking onboard a Spanish Nato ship in London yesterday, Vice Adm Johnstone said that NATO must not get 'hustled out' of eastern Mediterranean water space.

He said: 'NATO mustn't think the Mediterranean is just about immigration. It is the spread along



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the North African seaboard, it is the Daesh entry into Libya, it is the Daesh control of Sirte and other places, which has an uncomfortable shadow over maritime trade and maritime access.'

Conflict and revolt across the region had made it more difficult for NATO countries, including Britain, to 'ascertain what threats are there', he said.

He added: **'At the same time, we are tracking the spreads of really quite capable Korean, Chinese and Russian hardware, into bodies such as Hamas and Hezbollah and other places.'**

While they were not targeted at Nato or commercial shipping at the moment, he said: 'There is a horrible opportunity in the future that a misdirected, untargeted round of a very high quality weapons system will just happen to target a cruise liner, or an oil platform, or a container ship.'

He said: 'The eastern Mediterranean has started to become a competed space.

'We are not in any war, we are not in any period of tension, but there are quite a lot of actors with a say there and we have just got to make sure we can access that, with all the freedom of navigation in international law we want. Does it worry me, yes, quietly it does worry me a bit.'

He said he believed an attack on ships such as

Does it worry me, yes, quietly it does worry me a bit

Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone

'We know they have had ambitions to go off shore, we know they would like to have a maritime arm, just as al Qaeda had a maritime arm', he said.

Last year it was revealed that IS militants were building a 'retreat zone' in Libya to avoid international air strikes in Syria and Iraq.

As many as 3,000 jihadist fighters are believed to have travelled to the war-torn country to create a strategic hub for recruits unable to reach IS in its Syrian heartland.

Speaking about the Russian threat to NATO, Vice Adm Johnstone revealed how defence officials were looking to move submarines from the Gulf back to protect countries such as Britain.

He said he was 'worried' about Russian submarines coming close to Britain's waters. He said there was more activity from Russian submarines than NATO has seen since the days of the Cold War.

He said: 'Indeed we are seeing that level of activity but with a level of Russian capability that we haven't seen before.

'We were used to in the Cold War playing a game of cat and mouse... but it is very different from the period of quiet submarine activity that perhaps we've seen in the past.'

He said he was starting to see nations 'who in the past had prioritised to have submarines in the Gulf or eastern Mediterranean', 'now looking to reinvest that capability' to protect British, French and American waters.

In October 1985, Palestinian gunmen hijacked an Italian cruise liner in the Mediterranean and threatened to blow it up.

The **Achille Lauro** was on its way to the Israeli port of Ashdod with more than 400 holidaymakers and crew onboard.

The four heavily armed gunmen demanded the release of 50 Palestinian militants imprisoned in Israel.

If their demands were not met, they threatened to blow up the ship and kill the 11 Americans on board. The next morning, they also threatened to kill the British passengers.



cruise liners would be an act 'which is almost a mistake...or it will be an act of random terrorism that will suddenly have extraordinary implications for the Western world'.

While there is not a threat to shipping from Islamic State currently, he said Nato had watched them 'grow and morph in such extraordinary ways', that he could not predict the future.



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They ended up shooting an American-Jewish pensioner in a wheelchair and then threw him overboard.

On July 10, 1986, an Italian court convicted three of the terrorists and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 15 to 30 years.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Despite the anti-Russian rhetoric Admiral is so right! It doesn't happened yet but the possibility is visible. In the first 18 days of 2016, there have been 41 terrorist attacks across the globe that have killed more than 500 people. Several of these attacks took place in popular tourist destinations, such as Paris, Istanbul, and Tel Aviv. In 2015, there were more than 22 million passengers aboard cruise ships worldwide — meaning that at any time, there are tens of thousands of travelers afloat. Even now there is still time to take pre-emptive security/defense measures both in ports and aboard. The stake is huge and the consequences even bigger since apart from those victimized inside the cruiser the vessel can be a floating bomb as well. Mark my words: airplane hijacking and cruisers' piracy would be two future threats we are all going to face in the years to come or tomorrow!

Cruise Ship Terrorism: "The Elephant in the Room" for 2015

By Jim Walker

Source: <http://www.cruiselawnews.com/2015/12/articles/worst-cruise-line-in-the-world/cruise-ship-terrorism-the-elephant-in-the-room-for-2015/>

Dec 31, 2015 – We are just a few hours before placing 2015 in our rear view mirror as we start upon a fresh New Year. So what are the memories which come to mind when we think of taking a cruise in 2015? And what are the lessons that the cruise industry learned in 2015 which will ensure that history does not repeat itself in 2016?

I started the draft of this article by listing all of the ship fires this year, as well as the cases of passenger and crew member overboards, children drowning in cruise ship swimming pools without lifeguards, and sexual assaults of children and women. But all of these incidents, no matter how tragic, don't come close to the scope of the death

and mayhem associated with the murder of two dozen cruise passengers by terrorists in Tunisia, Tunisia.


The incident which kept coming back to me as I wrote this article was the massacre of twenty-two cruise passengers from Costa and MSC cruise ships in Tunisia. This terrifying incident involving cruise ships which were docked at the La Goulette cruise port in Tunis should have brought the reality of radical Islamic terrorism directly to the attention of cruise executives in

the U.S. and Europe. We warned about incidents like this happening a month prior in [ISIS Poses Terrorist Threat to Cruise Ships in Mediterranean](#). The passengers, however, received no warnings from the cruise operators which sent bus loads of tourists to the Bardo Museum without making any security arrangements whatsoever.

The day before the massacre, the cruise executives presented a "state of the cruise industry" speech at the annual trade convention on Miami Beach, Cruise Shipping Miami. The CEOs of Carnival, Royal Caribbean, Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL), and MSC

Cruises discussed building bigger ships and expanding into new markets such as Cuba and

China. The CEO of NCL, Frank Del Rio, remarked that "Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon could be more lucrative than Cuba." The convention audience politely applauded and the other cruise executives smiled. I couldn't help tweeting "have you heard of ISIS?" With the blood of twenty-two dead passengers on their hands, the cruise lines doubled down and announced that there were no indications that terrorism could strike a cruise ship



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or its passengers and crew in Tunis. The cruise industry not only refused to take any responsibility for the massacre but the spokesperson for the Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) boasted that "cruise ships are a safe and secure place for our guests in the rare event of a shore side incident." MSC Cruises USA CEO Rick Sasso said "There was no hint of terrorism or uncertainty in Tunisia before the attack . . . There are a zillion ports around the world, and we follow all of them. . . There was nothing going on there that indicated this should've been a concern."

The truth is that Tunisian soldiers were engaged in ongoing battles against Al Qaeda when the MSC and Costa ships sailed there. There were prior suicides bombers which targeted hotels and museums filled with tourists. The U.K. had issued a prior warning of a terrorist attack on tourist sites and the U.S. repeatedly urged caution. ISIS was recruiting young men from mosques in Tunis to be trained and radicalized in Libya. The signs of trouble were all there.

The most frequent question which I have received this year is "is it safe to cruise in the Mediterranean with my family?" Yahoo asked me to write an opinion piece about the cruise industry shortly after disaster struck at the Bardo museum. In response, I penned [Is Cruising Safe? A Chilling Look at an Industry Under Siege](#) which provides my thoughts about the issue of safety and international terrorism.

The cruise industry needs to wake up. Tunis was preventable. Greater attention to Al Qaeda and ISIS is necessary to avoid a similar if not worse attack on innocent passengers. Dangerous ports need to be avoided. In the past, Princess Cruises used security teams / police to accompany tour bus excursions in Egypt. Maritime security teams are also required in foreign ports of call to address the risk of waterborne attacks. Cruise lines are overflowing with cash. The cruise industry collects around \$45 billion a year, pays their crew members peanuts and doesn't pay U.S. taxes. The industry needs to start investing some of those tens of millions of dollars into substantial security to keep their guests safe.

NCL's executive Del Rio, who salivated over record profits in Tunis and other risky

Arab/Middle Eastern ports earlier this year was interviewed by Travel Weekly last week. Of course he remains bullish about cruising in 2016 but said that terrorism is always the "elephant in the room." Well it's time that the cruise lines began talking about the elephant.

In the past couple of weeks, travel agents and travel writers have written articles about whether cruise lines are prepared for radical Islamic terrorism. A Florida travel agent wrote "[A Boatload of Reasons Why You Should Feel Secure on a Cruise Ship](#)" for Travel Pulse. Australian travel writer Michael Gebicki wrote "[How Do Cruise Ships Guard Against Terrorism?](#)" Neither article explains what cruise lines are actually doing or provide any reason why you should feel protected on a cruise ship. Both articles are just spinning the story to assure that travel in places like North Africa and the Middle East are not disrupted. These articles don't even admit that most cruise lines do not have any weapons on the ships to repel an organized attack up the gangway. Take a look at the pitiful way [cruise ships responded to the threat of pirates](#) and you can quickly realize that the industry is unarmed and not prepared to protect the passengers or crew.

Cruise ship security teams seem to have their hands full responding to drunk passengers on their ships. A well organized attack by ISIS will send the weapon-less security guards scurrying into the ship. The obvious will then become apparent - that cruise ships are sitting ducks. We already know that [al Qaeda has planned to seize cruise ships and execute passengers](#) years ago. The difference today is that terrorists are no longer interested in holding hostages, but are motivated to simply kill and terrorize as many people as possible.

There will be travelers who read this and will respond that the threat of terrorism is everywhere; just ask the residents of Paris or the citizens in San Bernardino, California. Don't be afraid because the terrorists will already be winning, they will say. Perhaps so. But my thoughts are that a family looking for a relaxing vacation who picks a cruise vacation to the Mediterranean on a huge cruise ship filled with thousands of other passengers is just asking for trouble.

The New York Times describes [Jim Walker](#) as "a maritime lawyer in Miami who has attended more than half a dozen Congressional hearings about cruise ship



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crime and passenger safety." Jim has been involved in maritime litigation since 1983. Based in Miami, Florida, Jim represents passengers and crew members injured or assaulted on cruise ships around the world. He is interviewed frequently when there are fires and mishaps at seas. He is asked to appear regularly on television programs and share his views of disasters at sea. In 2016, Jim has continued as one of the "go to" maritime lawyers when things go wrong on the high seas.

Are Cruise Ships Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack?

By Paul Bruno

Source: <http://maritime.about.com/od/Engineering/fl/Are-Cruise-Ships-Vulnerable-to-Terrorist-Attack.htm>



The 225,000-GRT Oasis of the Seas is the world's largest cruise ship, carrying 5,400 guests in double occupancy, and 6,296 when full. The ship has 2,165 crew from over 70 countries onboard. Oasis of the Seas has a 30-foot draft, towers 213 feet above the water, and is 1,184 feet long and 208 feet wide. She's big!

May 2015 – Until recently the cruise industry was lucky to avoid terrorist related violence on shore excursions. The killing of cruise passengers visiting a Tunis museum in 2015 sparked a lingering fear that a ship could be hijacked.

The world's largest cruise ship can carry more passengers and crew than everyone who died in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Five thousand lives could be in danger or even more if a second ship is involved.

Before we get into the specific risks of cruise terrorism let's clear a few issues from the discussion.

First, I'm writing this independently without additional editorial oversight just like everything else on the site. The issue is overlooked and important in my eyes. This twitter user is another person raising a warning and has been interviewed on CNN. He is a recommended follow on Facebook too.

We have a strong body of cruise content on our About.Com Cruising and other travel sites. About.Com accepts advertising from cruise companies and I will stress that my opinions are not influenced by these relationships.

This is particularly true of the next statement.

Overall cruising is a very safe activity that has minimal risk of accidents and an even smaller risk of attack. The risk of a flooded bathroom is thousands of times more likely to inconvenience you than a terrorist hijacking.

If you think I'm soft on cruise lines take a look at my [Costa Concordia coverage](#) and you will see pointed and deserved criticism.

Risks in Port

Historically ships in port are seen at great risk. Tight quarters and risk of fire at wooden docks were real. The same congestion at cruise ports poses a similar risk.



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Accessing the ship is much easier and all ships at berth are only as secure as the least secure ship in the bunch. Bombing is a real threat since resupply cargo must move through local ports. Hijack in port is a possibility and it could be a long standoff, some commercial piracy standoffs lasted for years. Movement out of the port would likely be blocked and the ship would eventually be taken by local forces.

A cruise ship has three distinct areas; a hotel section made up of the front of the house seen by passengers, the back of the house used by staff.

The amount of explosives to breach the hull from a below the waterline cabin is massive, far more than could get through a security gap at the terminal. Boarding of small parties is possible while underway but they are outnumbered even by the security team alone.

The Worst Situation Imaginable

An internal conspiracy to staff ships on similar routes over a long period of time is a security hole that relies on good screening of employees. Cruise lines and their staffing services don't always do a great job of background checks.



This is how all the laundry and garbage and supplies move around the ship. They are parallel worlds inches apart.

The third area contains the command and mechanical spaces that support the ship itself. These areas offer a second level of security since they are hardened against break in and only are accessible from a few controlled points of entry.

Risks at Sea

Security teams are made up of several well qualified gentlemen with plenty of sea and land security training. The few you see patrolling public spaces are only the most publicly presentable. These personnel act like other passengers or may be hidden in the back of house areas.

Cameras are everywhere and new RFID technology allows individual passengers to be located. Most of the new safety technology on cruise ships plays a dual role and speeds evacuation no matter what the emergency.

It would take a few dozen internal terrorists per ship and plenty of outside help to gain control over a ship. Hostages could be held or killed for ransom. Since financial gain is rare among terrorist motivations it is clear that their preferred currency of change is violent killing of innocent victims.

It's difficult to kill many people on a ship when you are outnumbered and there are so many resources and places to hide. **Destroying the entire ship is the penultimate evil goal, unless it's two ships. Two large cruise ships crashed together at high speed could kill as many as ten thousand people.**

This is the only way to destroy two very strong and large structures like cruise ships and no explosives or bulky equipment is needed.

At one time we thought the idea of flying airliners into tall buildings was a silly idea. The cruise business is full of smart and experienced people who may have a plan in place to deal with such risk, we won't likely ever know and that is a strong security itself.



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Paul Bruno is a United States Coast Guard licensed Ship Master with Passenger Certification. He has been involved in the maritime industry for almost two decades. Throughout his maritime career Paul has worked with a variety of vessels. Commercial ships and work boats mostly, but occasionally something really different, like the Great Lakes schooner reproduction "Dennis Sullivan". As a marine contractor Paul is familiar with all ship systems. Recently a lifelong passion for electronics has sparked an effort to focus on marine hardware and software development. Knot work is a hobby when he is not working, and with nearly 4,000 documented knots, splices, and eyes he will be busy for awhile. Paul studied creative non-fiction and technical writing at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee and University of Waikato, Hamilton NZ. He earned his USCG Master's License in 1993.

Are cruise holidays safe from terrorism?

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/cruises/12129394/Are-cruise-holidays-safe-from-terrorism.html>



"Cruise lines conduct stringent security checks on everyone embarking their ships. Luggage is put through X-ray scanners, just as it is at an airport before flying" Photo: AP

Where are the danger zones and are any ports out of bounds?

Jan 29 – Several countries have become no-go areas since the start of the Arab Spring in 2010. Syria and Libya are obvious examples. Most cruise lines have cancelled calls to Tunisia after terrorist attacks last year and none are going to Lebanon at the moment.

Calls at Egyptian ports come and go depending on Foreign Office advice. There is currently no ban on travel to the majority of Egypt, however, and cruise lines regularly visit Safaga, a port on the Suez Canal used for excursions to Luxor. Nile cruises are also still running although there are fewer boats plying the river than in the past. Indeed, this actually makes the whole experience much more pleasant as the temples you visit are not overrun with tourists.

Most cruise lines cancelled their Black Sea itineraries when Russia occupied the Crimea two years ago. A few have returned and visit Odessa in the Ukraine but the Crimean ports of Sevastopol and Yalta remain off-limits.



Special Collection**CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – February 2016****Have cruise lines altered their itineraries in recent years?**

One of the benefits of a cruise holiday is that cruise companies can change itineraries immediately in response to incidents. Hotels cannot do that. If the cruise lines believe it is dangerous to visit a particular port, they can simply alter course and so somewhere else so holidays are not ruined.

Over the past five years or so they have had to skip ports in countries including Bahrain, Egypt and Israel. [Most recently Celebrity Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, Crystal Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line and MSC Cruises cancelled calls to Turkey](#) in the wake of the terrorist attack in Istanbul on January 15. Cancelling a port visit is a last resort but passenger and crew safety always comes first.



[Norwegian Cruise Line and MSC Cruises cancelled calls to Turkey in the wake of the terrorist attack in Istanbul on January 15](#)

What security measures are in place on board cruise ships?

Cruise lines conduct stringent security checks on everyone embarking their ships. Luggage is put through X-ray scanners, just as it is at an airport before flying, and passengers have to walk through detectors before being allowed on board. They also have to put anything they have bought ashore through X-ray machines either in the terminal or on board the ship.

Most cruise lines also establish an exclusion zone around their ships while in port to make sure no small boats approach. In the unlikely event of an attack, a mayday can be sent from the Bridge.

The Cruise Lines International Association, which represents most cruise companies worldwide, would not disclose its members' security protocols but said all ships have security staff, some of whom are former police officers. The Bridge carries out regular test situations for crew while sailing or in port to ensure everyone on board knows what to do in an emergency.

Piracy, an issue a few years ago in the waters around East Africa, is now under control.

What about on shore?

Cruise passengers are issued with credit card-like ID as soon as they embark their ship and this will have to be shown to get into the terminal in most ports or to get on tender boats if their ship is at anchor. This ID is checked a second time once they are on the ship. River cruise companies don't use terminals. However, a few ports have security gates to prevent anyone who does not have the code getting close to the vessels.



Special Collection**CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – February 2016****Have there been any major incidents involving attacks on cruise passengers?**

There have been attacks on cruise passengers just as there have been on other holidaymakers in various parts of the world. In 2013 two British cruise passengers were shot by an armed robber in Barbados. The same year a group of cruise passengers was robbed at gunpoint in St Lucia. Thankfully no one was hurt. Most shocking was the attack by terrorists last year on an excursion group in Tunis. At least 17 people were killed and more than 20 injured. They had been on an excursion to the city's Bardo Museum.

Is there evidence that terrorists target cruise passengers?

None at all. Terrorists want to kill as many people as they can. The attack in Tunisia could equally have been on tourists on a tour from a city hotel.

What would happen in the event of an attack?

Cruise-ship captains have years of experience and are highly trained to deal with emergencies (Costa Concordia was an unfortunate exception). A lot of cruise captains started their careers working on merchant or cargo ships and will be trained how to deal with an attack. When Somali pirates were active in the Gulf of Aden it was usual for passengers to be mustered inside the ship and all lights to be switched off.

Can I cancel my holiday if I'm concerned?

No. The only time you can cancel a holiday and get your money back is if the Foreign Office advises against all travel. Again, one of the benefits of a cruise is that if you are due to visit a country that appears on the no-go list, the cruise line can simply change the itinerary.

A bit of conspiracy or...

CRUISE SHIP/TERMINAL TERROR ALERT (DEC 31, 2015): CIA Plotting Attack on Cruise Ships and/or Cruise Ship Terminals, Possibly via Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370—'Carnival Ecstasy' Cruise Ship & New Abu Dhabi Cruise Ship Terminal Latest Targets

By David Chase Taylor

Source: <https://truthernews.wordpress.com/category/cruise-ship-terror/>

Dec 31, 2015 – Based on breaking news and events, it appears that [CIA Headquarters beneath Lake Geneva](#) is plotting horrific bio-terror attack on cruise ships, possibly via Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370. That being said, the CIA may resort to attacking cruise-related buses as well.



As depicted in the [Bio-Terror Bible](#), the [genesis of the 2015 bio-terror pandemic will be a "made-for-TV event"](#) whereby millions will witness a bio-terror outbreak on "live" television. This so called bio-terror "event" will likely occur when the agents anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*) and/or smallpox (*Variola major*) are released into a controlled environment such as a cruise ship.

Although terror plots are always subject to change, a cruise ship-related bio-terror attack will likely be executed by so-called Islamic terrorists, including but not limited to: Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Boko



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Haram, the Free Syrian Army (Rebels), Libyan Rebels, the Lord's Resistance Army, ISIS, and the Somali Pirates. Since these terror groups are all state-sponsored, they will have no problem collaborating together.

While an attack using Flight MH 370 is always a possibility, a cruise ship-related bio-terror attack will likely entail an attack by another ship. A made-for-TV siege on the high seas will capture a global audience as helpless cruise passengers upload photos and videos of the attack onto social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.).

Consequently, the cruise ship in question may suffer a 9/11-style bio-chemical attack via Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 which was previously hijacked by CIA back on March 8, 2014, in order to execute a surprise WMD attack is the most likely terror scenario. Said bio-attack is designed to spark the bio-terror pandemic planned for 2015.

Back on July 9, 2015, the Independent published a report entitled "Leaked Police Report Shows Two Indonesian Airline Pilots Were 'Radicalized by ISIS'", foreshadowing that a 9/11-style terror attack emanating from Indonesia (which borders Singapore to the south) may now be in play.

In what appears to be the latest cruise ship slated for a state-sponsored bio-terror attack, it was reported back on December 29, 2015, that a [couple cruising on the Carnival Ecstasy saw what looked to be blood](#) pouring out of the top of the elevator as the doors were struggling to open and close. Authorities later stated that a cruise ship employee was crushed to death, hence the blood.

Whether the timely incident on the [Carnival Ecstasy](#) (which appears to have been staged) provided the necessary cover for the installation of bio-chemical weapons and/or explosives inside the ship is not



known, but it's highly likely. Said bio-chemical weapons and/or explosives could be utilized at a later date in a coordinated state-sponsored terror attack. In what appears to be the latest cruise ship port slated for terror, it was reported on December 18, 2015, that [Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, opened a "glittering new cruise ship terminal"](#) with big plans for further expansion into Gulf. The terminal will reportedly welcome 205,000 passengers on 111 ships this winter.

Whether the new Abu Dhabi cruise ship terminal was specifically built for a horrific state-sponsored cruise-ship-related terror attack is not known, but it's highly likely. Consequently, bio-chemical weapons and/or explosives were likely placed within the terminal so that they can be utilized at a later date in a coordinated state-sponsored terror attack.

Cruise Ship Terror

The notion that Islamic terrorists may execute a cruise-ship related terror attack in Europe was first revealed on May 1, 2012, when CNN published a report entitled "[Documents Reveal Al Qaeda's Plans for Seizing Cruise Ships, Carnage in Europe](#)". More recently, on February 19, 2015, it was revealed that [ISIS could become the pirates of the Mediterranean](#), wreaking havoc in European waters. Roughly a month later on March 14, 2015, it was reported that the [Costa Fascinosa had 14 passengers which did return to the ship](#) in the aftermath of the deadly terror attack in Tunis. Four days later on March 18, 2015, it was reported that [cruise passengers may have been victims of the Tunis Terrorist Attack](#), associating cruise ships with terrorism. That same day, March 18, 2015, Cruise Law News published a report entitled "[Terrorists Kill Tourists as Costa Fascinosa and MSC Splendida Visit Tunis](#)", highlighting the notion of cruise ship-related terror. Three days later on March 23, 2015, Cruise Law News published a second report entitled "[Cruise Lines Start Media Campaign to Downplay Threat of Terrorism](#)", further hyping cruise-related terrorism. Lastly, on March 24, 2015, Cruise Law News published third report entitled "[How the Next Jihadist Terror Attack Against Cruise](#)



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[Passengers Will Happen](#)”, confirming, albeit in a de facto manner, that a cruise ship-related terror attack is imminent.

Cruise Ship Bio-Terror Trending

Prior to a high-profile cruise ship-related bio-terror attack, the world must be psychologically prepared to accept that this is in fact possible. Fraudulent headlines and fabricated events are a slick way of convincing people that yes, it can happen. As evidenced cruise ship-related bio-terror and medical evacuations are at an all-time high which suggests that a state-sponsored bio-terror attack on a cruise ship America or Europe is imminent.

Cruise Ship Bio-Terror Timeline:

1. October 17, 2014: [Worker who may have handled Ebola specimen on cruise ship](#)
2. November 12, 2014: [Princess Cruise Ship Delayed by Medical Emergency](#)
3. November 16, 2014: [CDC says 172 people on Crown Princess cruise ship ill with norovirus](#)
4. November 17, 2014: [Pacific Ocean Quarantined After Contact With Carnival Cruise Ship](#) (Satire)
5. November 19, 2014: [A Doctor Explains Why Cruise Ships Should Be Banned](#)
6. November 23, 2014: [Ruling increases cruise lines' exposure to medical lawsuits](#)
7. January 15, 2015: [Passenger Medevaced from the Seabourn Odyssey](#)
8. January 17, 2015: [Coast Guard Medevacs Passenger from Norwegian Breakaway](#)
9. January 27, 2015: [Coast Guard Medevacs 8-Month-Old Baby from Carnival Triumph](#)
10. January 27, 2015: [Sick Infant Flown From Cruise Ship To Texas Hospital](#)
11. January 30, 2015: [Coast Guard Medevacs Passenger from NCL's Norwegian Gem](#)
12. February 2, 2015: [Coast Guard Medevacs Passenger from Carnival Magic](#)
13. February 2, 2015: [Norovirus Forces Grandeur of the Seas' Early Return to Baltimore](#)
14. February 10, 2015: [Regal Princess Diverted to Miami for Medical Emergencies](#)
15. February 20, 2015: [Tramper rescued – ill passenger evacuated from cruise ship](#)
16. February 22, 2015: [Over 100 Sick With GI Bug On Celebrity Equinox](#)
17. March 26, 2015: [Passenger Medevaced from Diamond Princess](#)
18. March 17, 2015: [Medial Issue causes 1,500 to be held on cruise ship in Ireland](#)
19. April 13, 2015: [Royal Caribbean Guests Suffer Vomiting Outbreak on 2 Ships](#)

David Chase Taylor is an American journalist and the editor-in-chief of [Truther.org](#), a state-sponsored terror whistle-blower website. Taylor currently



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lives in Switzerland where he [applied for political asylum on July 17, 2015](#). Taylor authored [The Nuclear Bible](#), a book credited with foiling a nuclear terror attack upon Super Bowl XLV in Dallas, Texas on February 6, 2011, and [Greenland Theory: Apocalypse Now](#), a book and website exposing the true power structure of the world, especially in respect to Greenland and its primary proxy state of [Switzerland which is coincidentally home to the CIA](#).

How Safe are We at Sea?

By **Tim Rubacky** (Consumer Affairs Correspondent)

Source: <http://www.cruisemates.com/articles/consumer/security.cfm>

And although the world changed dramatically on September 11, one thing that has not been required to change as much as other aspects of travel is cruise ship security. That's because cruise ships have, for the most part, always adhered to very strict security guidelines and practices. While the cruise lines and governments around the world have tightened and refined security after the recent turn of events, cruise ships have always been relatively secure.

As an avid and frequent cruiser, I decided to explore the subject. I talked to a number of people in the cruise industry and some in the U.S. government. Some things you'll find surprising, others you will not. If you're looking for real in-depth information about precautions, policies and tactics, please look elsewhere. It wouldn't be proper to discuss or divulge any information that is considered sensitive.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, cruise lines implemented what they call "Level 3" security measures, as outlined by the U.S. Coast Guard's "Security for Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals" regulations. These measures include:

- Screening of all passenger baggage, carry-on luggage, ship stores and cargo; intensified screening of passenger lists and passenger identification; close coordination with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and other federal agencies to ensure that any passengers or crew suspected of being on the INS "Prevent Departure" list are promptly reported to the federal authorities.
- Restricting access to any sensitive vessel areas, such as the bridge and the engine room.
- Implementing onboard security measures to deter unauthorized entry and illegal activity.
- Requiring all commercial vessels to give 96 hours notice before entering U.S. ports. Previously, ships had to give 24 hours' notice.
- Maintaining a 100-yard security zone around cruise ships.

Let's look at some of the basic fundamentals of cruise ship security.

Controlled Access

One thing that contributes to the security of cruise ships is that it's relatively easy for them to move about and alter ports of call if any are deemed unsafe. Cruise ships are also relatively easy to "contain"--that is, it's easy to control and limit access to the ships. When a ship is in port, passengers and crew can only enter through one or two controlled access points, where ship's security personnel can check IDs, manifests and such. Because access to the terminals and docking areas is limited as well, it's relatively tough to get onboard if you don't belong there.

Anti-Terrorism Measures

The greatest threat to passengers and the ships themselves is terrorism. Consequently, the cruise lines are taking preventive measures like security checks of all passengers, carry-on parcels and checked baggage. Unlike the airlines, which only x-ray 10 to 20 percent of all checked baggage, cruise lines have the time to thoroughly x-ray every bag that goes into the ship. All passengers and crew are now required to pass through metal detectors before boarding. The crew and port officials also examine every shipment of supplies that is brought aboard. When ships are in port, watches are posted on deck, and at night, the decks are lit and ropes are let in.

The ships are also keeping records of who is aboard and not aboard at any given time, and most major lines now have automated systems that enable security personnel to see exactly who is on the ship at any given moment, at the touch of a button. Recently, when the Golden



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Princess departed the Azores for Fort Lauderdale, it happened that two passengers had suddenly disembarked the vessel without notice. At that point, the ship abruptly reversed course heading back for the Azores and the entire ship was searched from stem to stern. Eventually the staff realized that there was no threat and all was well.

Trained Security

Security onboard varies from line to line and ship to ship. Some cruise lines hire former military and naval personnel to implement and oversee their security, while others hire private security firms or former law enforcement officers. In the past, most security measures were intended to deal with passenger disturbances, but the focus now is on maintaining a safe and secure environment, eliminating or minimizing the threat of harm to passengers, crew and ship. Some lines even have dedicated security personnel whose primary job is to assess the risk potential and work with onboard crew to make sure all the proper procedures are taken. Each port is reviewed for its history of security-related incidents, stowaway threat, contraband threat, shore-side security operations and equipment, and so on. Ship staffers are trained to recognize and deal with things like a crew member being in an unauthorized area, an unfamiliar face in a crew area, a passenger in an off-limits area, or a bag being found somewhere it shouldn't be. Some lines carry security to extremes: Princess Cruises uses Gurkhas, the famed and extremely fierce Nepalese fighters of the British Army, for its fleetwide security force. They have been in place for some time; at last report, there were at least six on both Grand Princess and Golden Princess.

Passengers often ask if there are armed security personnel aboard. For obvious reasons, I can't answer that—but no one really wants to find out, do they?

Big Brother is Watching

Did you realize there are surveillance cameras all around you onboard ship? Security personnel, officers, staff and crew can visually monitor virtually every area of the ship. There are cameras in the embarkation areas; corridors; public rooms; entry points to the "out of bounds" areas for passengers such as crew areas; machinery spaces; and even common deck areas such as the promenade and pool areas.

Port Security Abroad

Don't assume that foreign ports are any less secure, or security conscious, than North American ports. England, for instance, has laws that oblige the terminal owner/operator to take specific actions and provide certain equipment and procedures, and require the ship owner to take specific measures as well. As one cruise ship captain with a great deal of security experience told me, "European ports have always struck me as being more security conscious in general. When sailing from countries that have had previous land-based terrorist activities, there has been more active screening processes, identification checks, and a higher general awareness of port security. The general level of security in the European ports, both on the northern coast and on the Mediterranean coasts, has been fairly consistent. Most European countries have, unfortunately, been touched by terrorism. England has dealt with the IRA, Spain with the ETA and Germany, Greece, and others have all dealt with various threats."

What to Expect Now

Since September 11th, much stricter security measures have been in place to protect ships and their passengers.

Every U.S. port now maintains and enforces a minimum 300-foot "no float zone," a security perimeter that prohibits private craft from coming near cruise ships. In addition, cruise ships are getting an armed U.S. Coast Guard escort in and out of port.

There is also stricter access control to ports and terminals: Passengers are now required to show their tickets to enter both the port area and the terminal.

Look for multiple security checkpoints: You can expect to pass through three or four security checkpoints before being granted access to your cruise ship.

Cruise lines are working with local, state, federal and international authorities such as the port authorities where ships call, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Immigration and



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Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Interpol. This will enhance the safety and security of everyone onboard cruise ships.

Embarkation and debarkation may take longer to accommodate additional security procedures, so plan your flights accordingly.

Expect strict enforcement of required ID and nationality/travel papers. Boarding will be denied if you don't have the proper documents.

Don't expect to catch that early morning flight home. Passengers and lines have been reporting delays in disembarking passengers. In most cases, don't expect to be ashore before 9-10 a.m.

Have patience. You may encounter some long lines as you wait to embark or disembark. Everyone is in the same boat, so keep your sense of humor and remember, it's for your own safety!

International Cruise Ship Security Issues

Source: <http://traveltips.usatoday.com/international-cruise-ship-security-issues-9955.html>



Cruise ships make for a fun vacation, but potential cruisers may worry about possible security issues, especially in the wake of 9/11. Pirates roam international waters, criminals prey on on-shore excursions and even passengers themselves may pose a potential threat. Cruise ship companies take security very seriously and most have implemented strict steps to keep their vessels safe.

Passengers

Unauthorized passengers remain a grave concern for cruise ships. Terrorists can book tickets just as regular passengers do and more benign criminals such as thieves and pickpockets can make a great deal of money working a cruise ship. The International Ship and Port Safety Code, implemented in 2004, requires all cruise ships to engage in strict screening measures. This means that all passengers must pass through metal detectors before they enter the ship, and that their clothes and baggage are X-rayed as well. Ships can also log passengers in and out, using electronic measures to determine who is on or off the vessel at any given time. Most passengers must pass through multiple security checkpoints to get onboard a vessel, and they must show their ticket, ID and passport at each stop. Because cruise ships are very tightly controlled--with only one or two ways on or off a given vessel--security personnel can screen passengers quite readily.

On the Water

U.S. ports maintain a 300-foot "no float" zone around cruise ships to make sure no other vessels approach them with the intent of causing mischief. Out on the open seas, that becomes much harder to enforce: pirates and terrorists can approach other vessels easily, and there may not be any attendant ships in the vicinity to help. The International Council of



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Cruise Lines takes steps to address such open seas by working closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. That allows them to better identify danger areas on the open seas, stay aware of pirate activity or impending terrorist attacks, and adjust their itinerary to move away from potentially troublesome ports.


In Port

Cruise ships cannot be responsible for incidents involving passengers on shore. Those who wander into the wrong parts of town, who flash a lot of money or jewelry around, or who just find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time may be robbed or worse. To minimize such incidents, cruise ships carefully review all their ports of call. They check local security and police forces, monitor incidents that other cruise ships experience at a given port, and train their staff to spot things like unattended bags and people being where they shouldn't onboard. Cruise ships also rate ports for incidents such as smuggled goods, contraband and stowaways; such statistics allow them to find the most tourist-friendly ports to visit.

Cruising for Trouble: Cruise Ships as Soft Targets for Pirates, Terrorists, and Common Criminals

By Mark Gaouette (Author)

Source: <http://www.amazon.com/Cruising-Trouble-Targets-Terrorists-Criminals/dp/0313382344>



This book offers an alarming inside look at the security preparations of the cruise industry and the potential for cruise ships to be the target for pirates, terrorists, and criminal activity.

- A combination of photographs from the author, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and API illustrate innovative security measures found on cruise ships, results of terrorist attacks, fire, piracy, and victims of cruise ship incidents.
- Provides a list of acronyms found throughout the book, such as the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) codes and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
- Includes over 500 endnote references
- Offers a comprehensive index

Commander Mark Gaouette is a maritime security consultant to the Department of Homeland Security.

A reader commented:

The book can't help but be a little biased in assuming that cruise ships are targets for terrorists and pirates. Of course they are. A lot of information is devoted to making the case for more security both on and off cruise ships and why passengers should assume more responsibility for their own safety. Not a book to read on how fun cruises can be but useful when discussing maritime security as it relates to cruise ship vacations.

I personally found this book very interesting. I was fascinated to hear first hand accounts of passengers missing or going over board. The chapters about terrorism were so interesting it was hard to put down and should raise some serious red flags with the cruise industry. I think this book should represent a real sea-change of how security and safety on these vessels is regulated by the governments of the world, marketed and perceived to you and me the consumer, and how the cruise line industry conducts their business in general.

In my opinion anyone that has ever been on a cruise or wants to go on one should read this book. It might make you think twice about going, and might also serve as a guide of what not to do on a cruise. I would like to see what else the author has up his sleeve for a follow up.



Terrorists Can't Stop These Cruise Ships

Source: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/21/terrorists-can-t-stop-these-cruise-ships.html>

March 2015 – Remember the TV series “Love Boat”? It aired back in the day when going on a cruise conjured up images of fancy umbrella drinks, stolen moonlight kisses and the blissful banality of total relaxation before anyone heard of Wi-Fi. Since then, the cruise industry has weathered more bad press than perhaps any other tourism sector, from stories of contagious Novo virus diarrhea, stinky overflowing toilets and the unforgettable wreck of the *Costa Concordia* on the Tuscan island of Giglio.

Up to now, the industry has stayed afloat through it all. In 2014, the worldwide cruise industry lured 22.2 million passengers and nabbed a whopping \$39.6 billion of the market share of tourism according to Cruise Market Watch. But will it be able to survive the threat of terrorism after last week's Tunisian terror attack that killed 17 cruise ship passengers who were on an excursion to the Bardo Museum when their liners were docked in the Tunis harbor? Most analysts say yes, in part because cruise companies have no intention to stop the party.

The Tunisian terrorist attack seems undeniably aimed at international tourists, and not specifically at cruise ship passengers *per se*, though it was no secret that the two big Italian-flagged ships—each carrying more 3,000 passengers and crew—were docked in the La Goulette port in Tunis. The *Costa Fascinosa* lost five passengers and the *MSC Splendida* lost 12. Scores more were injured from each ship. And the fact that many of the passengers were shot as they got off the excursion Pullman buses coming straight from the port suggests the gunmen had studied the timing.



Moments after shots rang out, both the *Costa Fascinosa* and the *MSC Splendida*, immediately called back all of their passengers to their ships using safety protocol that includes beepers and cellphones. Several passengers on board the *Fascinosa* applauded Costa through their Facebook page for doing a great job calming fears by offering an open bar and free counseling while they waited for word about the fate of several missing passengers. Passengers on the *MSC Splendida* tweeted that they were safe back on board and couldn't wait to get out of Tunisia.

Hours after the attack, both companies were able to ascertain with certainty just how many people hadn't made it back on board. And once the cruise companies' emergency care teams arrived in Tunisia, the ships left harbor for their next scheduled destination even though both ships had missing passengers who were neither on the list of the dead or injured. The *Splendida's* missing passengers later showed up after hiding for 24 hours in the Bardo museum, but by



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then their ship (and their belongings) were at sea. The *Fascinosa's* missing passengers were sadly identified at a local morgue.



Richard Clayton, chief maritime analyst with HIS, a data and technical consultancy firm, says leaving port right away was the right thing to do because staying in the port would have just created tension and insecurity among the passengers. “It was a very unusual situation to be in,” he told *The Daily Beast*. “Many cruise lines aren’t prepared for a situation like that, but the best thing to do was to get to sea and head to a new port.”

He said that by keeping the cruise rolling, the cruise companies were able to control the situation. “I applaud Costa and MSC for the way they responded,” he said. “Especially Costa after how they mishandled the *Concordia* disaster. If Costa had not handled it well this time, it would have been the end of Costa.”

After leaving Tunisia, the *Costa Fascinosa* headed for the island of Mallorca and the *MSC Splendida* for Barcelona where they both made landfall early Friday morning. Around 500 passengers from both ships then took advantage of offers to end their cruises without penalty and fly home on the company’s dime. “You have to clear the deck and control the situation,” Clayton says. “A lot of people stayed on the cruises because the companies made them feel safe enough to go on. And those who wanted off the ship were given the opportunity to do so at no cost. It’s like an air disaster—you don’t immediately stop flying when something happens unless you want to.”

The ships may have been cruising, but neither the *Fascinosa* nor *Splendida* was in full swing from Tunisia to Spain. The Costa cruise company, which is owned by American cruise giant Carnival, announced that they had suspended all entertainment services immediately after the tragedy and would slowly reintroduce them in the coming days, once the shaken passengers who wanted to get off the ship were gone.

A representative told *The Daily Beast* that 300 of the ship’s 3,161 passengers took Costa’s offer to terminate the cruise and fly home. The rest kept cruising. MSC also flew hundreds home and then carried on with the rest of their itinerary. Antonella Floria, an Italian woman from Turin who was on a company retreat with several people from Turin’s city government, said she didn’t blame others for staying on the cruise. “I couldn’t have done it myself, because Italians were killed,” she told *The Daily Beast* by telephone after returning home. “But for those who are detached, I don’t see why they wouldn’t continue. That would let the terrorists win.”

Clayton says that he doesn’t believe that cruise ships themselves are likely targets for terrorists because security is high and it would take a lot of manpower and weaponry to commandeer a floating city with so many people onboard. He also says that the success of the industry will hinge on cruise companies convincing passengers that they have assessed the risks and put safety first, and that visiting parts of the world where Disneyfication hasn’t secured a foothold is still worth it. “It will be argued that profitability in the high-throughput, low-margin world of cruising rests on persuading passengers that it remains safe to disembark and visit world treasures,” he says. “But when the unthinkable happens, damage to reputation and to revenue must be firmly pushed aside in favor of the immediate need to do everything possible to keep both passengers and crew safe and secure, and to work with emergency teams ashore and afloat to ensure the situation is controlled. That was done.”



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Still, he says, passengers may be wary in the short term. Both Costa and MSC almost immediately announced they would reroute all their summer cruises to bypass Tunisia for the foreseeable future. But cancelling ports of call after an attack has taken place won't help the dead and injured passengers. "The Middle East and North Africa is an unhappy region, however recent incidents in Paris and Copenhagen have shown that terrorists can strike anywhere," Clayton says. "The problem isn't Tunis or the Bardo Museum, it's much wider than that." And stopping the party won't make the world—or cruisers—any safer.

Documents reveal al Qaeda's plans for seizing cruise ships, carnage in Europe

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-future/>

May 2012 – On May 16 last year, a 22-year-old Austrian named Maqsood Lodin was being questioned by police in Berlin. He had recently returned from Pakistan via Budapest, Hungary, and then traveled overland to Germany. His interrogators were surprised to find that hidden in his underpants were a digital storage device and memory cards.

Buried inside them was a pornographic video called "Kick Ass" -- and a file marked "Sexy Tanja."

Several weeks later, after laborious efforts to crack a password and software to make the file almost invisible, German investigators discovered encoded inside the actual video a treasure trove of intelligence -- more than 100 al Qaeda documents that included an inside track on some of the terror group's most audacious plots and a road map for future operations.

Future plots include the idea of seizing cruise ships and carrying out attacks in Europe similar to the gun attacks by Pakistani militants that paralyzed the Indian city of Mumbai in November 2008. Ten gunmen killed 164 people in that three-day rampage.

Terrorist training manuals in PDF format in German, English and Arabic were among the documents, too, according to intelligence sources.

U.S. intelligence sources tell CNN that the documents uncovered are "pure gold;" one source says that they are the most important haul of al Qaeda materials in the last year, besides those found when U.S. Navy SEALs raided Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a year ago and killed the al Qaeda leader.

One document was called "Future Works." Its authorship is unclear, but intelligence officials believe it came from al Qaeda's inner core. It may have been the work of Younis al Mauretani, a senior al Qaeda operative until his capture by Pakistani police in 2011.

The document appears to have been the product of discussions to find new targets and methods of attack. German investigators believe it was written in 2009 -- and that it remains the template for al Qaeda's plans.

Investigative journalist Yassin Musharbash, a reporter with the [German newspaper Die Zeit](#), was the first to report on the documents. One plan: to seize passenger ships. According to Musharbash, the writer "says that we could hijack a passenger ship and use it to pressurize the public."

Musharbash takes that to mean that the terrorists "would then start executing passengers on those ships and demand the release of particular prisoners."

The plan would include dressing passengers in orange jump suits, as if they were al Qaeda prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and then videotaping their execution.

Lodin and a man called Yusuf Ocak, who allegedly traveled back to Europe with him, are now on trial in Berlin where they are pleading not guilty. Ocak was detained in Vienna two weeks after Lodin's arrest.

According to a senior Western counterterrorism official, their names were on a watch list, and when they handed over documents at a European border crossing, their names registered with counterterrorism agencies.

Both men have pleaded not guilty to terrorism charges. Ocak is also charged with helping to form a group called the German Taliban Mujahedeen, and is alleged to have made a video for the group threatening attacks in Germany.



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Prosecutors believe the pair met at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan's tribal territories and were sent back to Europe to recruit a network of suicide bombers.

"We do not know what those men were up to but there are certain files of information that would make it plausible that they were probably thinking of a Mumbai-style attack," says Musharbash.

In the fall of 2010, a year after the document was written, European intelligence agencies were scrambling to investigate a Mumbai-style plot involving German and other European militants -- which sparked an unprecedented U.S. State Department travel warning for Americans in Europe.

"I think it is plausible to think that the 'Future Works' document is part of that particular project," says Musharbash.

"Future Works" suggests al Qaeda was an organization under great pressure, without a major attack to its name in several years, harried by Western intelligence. If anything, its predicament is even more dire today.

"The document delivers very clearly the notion that al Qaeda knows it is being followed very closely," Musharbash tells CNN. "It specifically says that Western intelligence agencies have become very good at spoiling attacks, that they have to come up with new ways and better plotting."

Part of the response, according to the document, should be to train European jihadists quickly and send them home -- rather than use them as fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan -- with instructions on how to keep in secret contact with their handlers.

What emerges from the document is a twin-track strategy -- with the author apparently convinced that al Qaeda needs low-cost, low-tech attacks (perhaps such as the recent gun attacks in France carried out by Mohammed Merah) to keep security services preoccupied while it plans large-scale attacks on a scale similar to 9/11.

Those already under suspicion in Europe and elsewhere would be used as decoys, while others would prepare major attacks.

That is yet to materialize, but Musharbash believes a complex gun attack in Europe is still on al Qaeda's radar.

"I believe that the general idea is still alive and I believe that as soon as al Qaeda has the capacities to go after that scenario, they will immediately do it," he says.

While "Future Works" does not include dates or places, nor specific plans, it appears to be a brainstorming exercise to seize the initiative -- and reinstate al Qaeda on front pages around the world.

Was a terror attack on cruise passengers inevitable?

Source: http://www.travelmole.com/news_feature.php?news_id=2015908

Feb 01 – When US cruise lawyer Jim Walker wrote on his [website](#) about the threat of terrorism to cruise passengers last month, he had no idea that within weeks his predictions would chillingly ring true. Here he outlines his fears to TravelMole readers, and explains why he believes cruise lines are putting passengers at risk.



"Having often been asked whether Islamic terrorists pose a threat to cruise ships, a few weeks ago I decided to write an article on this subject on my website. At the end, I concluded that although families thinking of cruising in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle, Vancouver, Alaska) may be reasonably safe from an ISIS attack, and that a terrorist attack seems extremely unlikely in the Caribbean, when it comes to sailing into a port in Morocco, Tunisia or Egypt on a cruise ship, it's not a matter of if, it's just a matter of when. Following the terrible attack on cruise passengers

in Tunis this week, I am sad to say that my fears were justified.

The problem is that cruise lines are continuing to put profits before passenger protection. Cruise lines take passengers to dangerous ports because they profit handsomely from selling cruises, irrespective of the dangers in the port. We see this in the Caribbean ports where all of the ports have murder rates substantially higher than in the US. The murder rate in the US is 4.5 per 100,000 compared to the murder rates in the Caribbean which is 30 per 100,000



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(Bahamas) to 90 per 100,000 (Honduras). But most cruise passengers sailing to Nassau or Roatan don't realize this.

Cruise lines tell their passengers they should use official tours marketed and sold by the cruise lines, including bus excursions. Excursions are a substantial part of the business model of cruise lines and they profit from the tours they sell. But being on a bus with other cruise passengers, in my assessment, makes you more far more likely to be a target of crime and violence. Tour buses in the Caribbean, for example, have been targeted by criminals with all cruise passengers aboard robbed. Being on a tour bus filled with Europeans or US citizens in a North African port is dangerous.

Cruise lines have a legal obligation not to take their passengers to unreasonably dangerous ports. The cruise industry has a legal obligation to warn of dangers throughout the entire cruise. This is to be contrasted with airlines, which the courts have found to provide only 'point to point' transportation, and have no duty to issue warnings. Cruise lines, on the other hand, advertise not only about their cruise ships but the entire cruise experience, including the ports of call.

Earlier this week I was at a major cruise convention, Cruise Shipping Miami, where I heard NCL's Frank Del Rio bragging that his cruise line is way ahead of competitors, Carnival and Royal Caribbean, in preparing to do business in Havana. He then remarked that 'Libya, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon could be more lucrative than Cuba.' I couldn't help tweeting: 'Have you heard of ISIS?'

Cruise lines have taken thousands of passengers ashore to Tunis on excursions, thinking of their sales and profits, but ignoring how dangerous it may be. I believe this is a trademark of the cruise executive mindset. Tragically, terrorists have now targeted and killed cruise tourists in buses visiting a museum in Tunisia. Del Rio might be regretting his words."

How do cruise ships guard against terrorism?

Source: <http://www.traveller.com.au/how-do-cruise-ships-guard-against-terrorism-glktnw>

Dec 13, 2015 – This is an interesting question and since I'm writing this from Ponant's Le Soleal cruising off the north coast of New Guinea I put it to the ship's officer in charge of security.

There are specific and rigorous measures in place to ensure the security of the vessel but for obvious reasons these cannot be divulged.

Were I to do that I would become shark food on my next voyage, but what I can tell you is that every



cruise ship has a security officer who has undergone a course of instruction, in this case prescribed by the French government as well as by Ponant, the cruise line.

As part of their safety drills, and on Le Soleal these seem to happen every second day, the crew practise countermeasures they would take in the event of a terrorist attack. The wheelhouse is a secure

area with closed-circuit cameras to monitor access, in addition to the closed-circuit cameras throughout public areas of the vessel.

Passengers' luggage is screened before it comes on board and passengers can expect to pass through a metal detector, although when we boarded Le Soleal in Manado this was not operating.

The French government has a three-level alert system that applies to ships sailing under its flag. At the moment we're on level 1, the lowest. Some cruise vessels carry armed security guards although passengers would not know who they are.



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According to Le Soleal's security officer, in future it will become more common for all cruise ships to do the same. While it has been many years since terrorists directed their attention to cruise ships, operators are well aware of the risks and they're not complacent.

Are Cruise Ships Easy Targets for Terrorists?

Source: http://www.frommers.com/community/blogs/arthur-frommer-online/_cruise-ships-easy-targets-terrorists



Dec 29, 2015 – There's no need to be complicated about this answer.

Yes.

This week, Disney Cruise Line announced that [it will no longer stop](#) in Greece, Turkey, or Malta on its upcoming 12-night Mediterranean voyage of the *Disney Magic*. When asked why, a spokesperson told Frommer's, "We regularly review our itineraries and occasionally make the changes needed to provide the best possible experiences on shore."

"Safety, of course, is very important to us, so we're of course looking at [the region] like the rest of the world is," the spokesperson said, adding that the company is "continually monitoring" the activities in the area.

Disney did not explicitly say why the ports were dropped. But earlier this year, Celebrity [ended overnight stays](#) in Istanbul, citing safety concerns.

Then again, neither one needed to. Anyone with a TV knows what's going on in the area, starting with the flood of migrants that visitors now find begging in the streets as they make their way to better lives. The migrant situation on land and in the water is a deeply distressing situation, but those people are not a tourist safety threat.

Ship security in a troubled region is a graver concern. Cruise ships are indeed soft targets, and there's not much that can be done to secure them. I myself was on a cruise ship in Turkey and Greece in late November—at ports that Disney has now removed—and to be sure, guards poured scrutiny on passengers as they boarded our ship, with each of us going through the ship's detectors. In Turkey, we passed through land-based checkpoints and metal detectors, too, for an extra layer of inspection.

Those checkpoints might do the trick if attackers always arrived through passenger doors. They may not. Attacks can easily come from the water instead.

You might remember an incident in 2000 when a speedboat laden with explosives rammed into the *USS Cole*, an American ship, killing 17 and injuring 39. And that was a Navy destroyer, presumably constructed to absorb such blows, and with the weapons to potentially prevent it. The human cost of an explosive rammed against a pleasure vessel that isn't fortified against explosives, such as giant cruise ship, has thankfully not yet been made manifest by



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reality. Short of sailing under the protection of an armed flotilla, there's not much that can be done to thwart an improvised attack of this kind. And that just one scenario that makes cruise ships so vulnerable. Fact: The Gatestone Institute, a non-partisan international policy organization, has determined that ISIS intends to make [the Mediterranean a battleground](#), [using Libya](#), which is just a few hundred miles from Europe, as a base.

Fact: The RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy explicitly outlined not only several methods by which a cruise ship could easily be attacked, but also the high likelihood that such a thing is bound to happen sooner or later. A cruise ship attack, it reasons, would have a far larger international impact than many any other types of attacks. ([Click here for a PDF of its report](#); the cruise section starts on page 73).

Of course, an attack by ISIS is extremely unlikely to happen in the Caribbean or Alaskan cruise markets—they're just not based around there—and they're most likely to happen in the eastern Mediterranean, which is nearest its strongholds. The heat is definitely turning up in the waters around Turkey and Syria: Not many tourists realize that since 1971, Russia has maintained a naval facility in the Syrian port of Tartus, a few hours' sail from the island of Cypress, and this year, it began the process of expanding. This means Russian warships will soon have a heavier presence in the region, and given that Russia is involved in the Syrian struggles, it means more wartime activity will be happening on the waters of the eastern Mediterranean.

None of this is meant to discourage people from traveling. As I said, I was there myself just a few weeks ago and found the locals were in good spirits and happy to welcome me. There was no detectable tension in the air. But we must also be realistic about the ebb and flow of geopolitics—and we must recognize vulnerability where it exists.

Although Disney has not publically admitted to pulling out of the region because of the fear of terrorism, it's a safe assumption. The Disney brand is a plump, consumerist target for terrorists eager to make a splash on the world stage—the company's land-based theme parks have also recently tightened security. I applaud Disney Cruise Line's early wisdom. When it pulled out of Tunisia a few years ago, it was a crushing blow for the honest and welcoming Tunisians that were excited to be a part of a prime tourist destination, and it was a blow for the thousands of Americans who would have experienced firsthand that mainstream Muslim culture is warm and decent.

But pulling out was a good early call by Disney. In March of this year, cruise tourists were slaughtered on a shore excursion to Tunis' Bardo Museum. Only then did most of the other cruise lines follow suit and pull out of Tunisia. Then, last summer, it happened again: Thirty-eight tourists were killed at a beach resort there.

I deeply regret the cost of pulling out of any destination. In this case, it means that thousands of Americans will not be transformed by being exposed to the wonderful Turkish, Greek, and Maltese people who are already suffering from economic and tourism downturns. This isn't their fault, their countries are truly worthy of experiencing and exploring, and for their sake I hope this anxious period will soon pass.

Until then, we must send our cruise ships to parts of the world where we can feel more assured of their safety—and this is entirely down to the fact that we cannot reasonably protect them. Until we know how to protect cruise ships from catastrophic incidents (and to be blunt, I'm not sure we ever can), then we must do all we can to ensure they sail in safer waters.

Maritime tourism and terrorism: Customer perceptions of the potential terrorist threat to cruise shipping

By Clare Bowen, Paul Fidgeon and Stephen J. Page

Current Issues in Tourism 09/2013; 17(7):610-639.

Source:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271938712_Maritime_tourism_and_terrorism_Customer_perceptions_of_the_potential_terrorist_threat_to_cruise_shipping

Maritime terrorism is a neglected area of research in tourism, particularly the use of scenario planning to understand potential threats to the cruise industry. Since the events of 9/11,



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terrorism, and the threat of terrorism, has become a major concern within the tourism industry. This article analyses tourist perception of perceived terrorist threats given that many ships are American owned. Using the scenario analysis presented by Greenberg, Chalk, Willis, Khilko, and Ortiz, this study suggests that an attack on a cruise ship is a distinct possibility. Indeed, **44% of respondents questioned perceived the possibility of a terrorist attack on a cruise ship to be likely** despite the fact that safety and security is seen by the industry as a 'hallmark' of cruising. Differences in attitude among potential passengers revealed a high level of confidence in the cruise ship companies. This finding is particularly marked among more experienced cruise ship passengers. However, this did not necessarily preclude the possibility of security measures being improved. All passengers appeared generally resigned to the fact that risk is associated with travel in the twenty-first century and welcomed any efforts by cruise shipping companies to improve safety and security.

MedSecuritySummit

16-18 September 2015 – Genoa, Italy

Source: <http://www.medsecuritysummit.com/wp-content/uploads/MSS-InDepth-May-2015.pdf>

The Threat of Maritime Terrorism

By Mark William Lowe

The recent attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis brought the spectre and potential for terrorism in the Mediterranean region into stark relief.

Government, intelligence and law-enforcement authorities are still studying the attack and evaluating the possibility of similar incidents in the future.

Meanwhile, the maritime community remains concerned as to the risks posed by terrorist attacks against international shipping and port infrastructure.

Where do the Risks Lie

While the potential for attacks and terrorist operations in the Mediterranean remains a threat, how does it compare to other regions?

With the Yemen on the verge of total collapse there are many legitimate fears as to how terrorist organizations in the country could take advantage of the vacuum and expand. Currently access to the Red Sea is assured, however, the only guarantee that a failed state delivers is a categorical absence of positive guarantees. Will a further collapse jeopardise maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden?

On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, the acceleration of work at the Omani port of Sohar demonstrates regional nervousness as to the risks posed by the Strait of Hormuz. Should access to The Gulf be compromised then a large part of regional trade could enter the Gulf States via Sohar which lies to the south of the Strait.

The construction of the ambitious Gulf Cooperation Council rail network which will link Muscat to Kuwait should be functional by 2017. The individual Gulf nations intend linking their various rail projects into one network to service both freight and passengers. Over 2,000km of rail infrastructure will unite Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and allow for extensions and spurs to serve industrial centres.

The potential for terrorist attacks to rail infrastructure is an issue that the various Gulf partners are well aware of, however, the general consensus of opinion appears to be that Iran represents a far greater potential threat to transport routes.

The delicate nature of the current situation in the Middle East is a source of considerable concern to many observers. According to Edward Luttwak, security expert and senior



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associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran represents a particularly alarming threat.

As a former consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, as well as the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, Luttwak is a recognised expert on military strategy and terrorism.

In Luttwak's opinion: *"The largest single risk to the stability of the world economy is the possibility of an overt or covert attack on the Ras Tanura tanker-loading terminal of Saudi Arabia."*

In the security expert's opinion the risk is that: *"Given that Iran's regime is drastically weakened by current oil prices that compound the effect of diminished production, and given that Iran is already in conflict with Saudi Arabia over its expansionism, most recently in the Yemen, an attack by Iranian naval units, or by Iran's followers among the Saudi Shi'a who are the majority population in that same part of the country, or by clandestine operatives masquerading as Islamic State followers for the sake of plausible deniability, must be considered a distinct possibility."*

The risk of a similar attack is well understood in Riyadh, according to Luttwak: *"The Saudi authorities must be of the same opinion because the already very elaborate security provisions for the Ras Tanura facilities have been stepped up."*

Indeed the vast refinery, tank farm and set of pipelines to loading jetties on artificial islands were significantly reinforced in March 2015.

"It must be presumed that one or more forms of attack are policy options that the usual suspects, one or more of the competing Revolutionary Guard factions, are proposing to the entourage of the Supreme Leader, given that for them any improvement of Iran's relations with its neighbours and the United States is disadvantageous."

"Even a nuclear agreement would not extinguish the risk of an Iranian attack on Ras Tanura, indeed it would make it even more advantageous for the usual suspects who naturally oppose any nuclear agreement."

► **Read the full report at source's URL.**

*Mark William Lowe is the co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of the **Maritime Security Review**, a global publication for maritime security supported by a web-based multimedia platform. Mark is a qualified Port and Facility Security Officer (PFSO) and Ship Security Officer (SSO).*

The *Achille Lauro* Incident

Source: <http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id301.htm>

In the 1980s more of the world's populace than ever before lived in fear of a terrorist act. There were in excess of 600 international terrorist incidents in 1984, a 20 percent increase over the previous five years' averages. Between 1982 and 1985, terrorist acts in the Mideast doubled annually. This sharp rise in assassinations, bombings, hijackings and kidnappings was attributable in part to improved technology -- better communications, more rapid transportation, and weapons that were both more compact and more deadly. Another factor was the rise in state-supported terrorism, with Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba and Nicaragua actively promoting terrorist acts. Terrorists usually targeted civilians; innocent people were routinely blown up in discos and buses or gunned down on street corners and airport concourses. Kidnapping businessmen brought terrorist cells tens of millions of dollars in ransom, while attacks on diplomatic personnel and facilities rose by 60 percent in 1980-81 over the previous two years. In the mid-Eighties, \$300-400 million was spent by the United States each year to enhance security at U.S. diplomatic posts, while the number of security personnel was doubled.

On Monday, 7 October 1985, Palestinian terrorists seized control of the *Achille Lauro*, an Italian cruise ship carrying over 400 passengers and crew, of whom 19 were Americans. Communicating by ship-to-shore radio, the hijackers demanded the release of fifty of their Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) comrades imprisoned in Israel. The Reagan administration responded by urging Israel to make no deals with the terrorists. It also called on all Mediterranean



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nations to forbid the *Achille Lauro* from docking at their ports. Three months earlier, Shi'ite terrorists had hijacked TWA Flight 847 and landed the plane at Beirut Airport, where the 37 hostages were dispersed throughout the city, and the crisis dragged on for two and a half weeks as a result. This time the administration hoped to contain the situation aboard the *Achille Lauro*.

While the vessel was shadowed by American and Italian ships using "over the horizon" surveillance,



British and Italian commandos made preparations at the Royal Air Force base at Akrotiri, Cyprus. U.S. Navy SEALs also arrived at Akrotiri, but by Wednesday, when the commandos were ready to attempt a rescue mission, the terrorists were no longer aboard the *Achille Lauro*. On Tuesday the hijackers had steered for Egypt's Port Said and requested a deal -- they would surrender if they were immunized from prosecution and released into the custody of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Much to the chagrin of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, Egypt agreed to a deal negotiate with PLO leader Yasser Arafat, who posed during the crisis as a peace-loving statesman in an interview with ABC *Nightline's* Ted Koppel. "Arafat," said Secretary Shultz, "wanted a medal for helping to put out the fire he had set." Israeli intelligence learned that Arafat's right-hand man, Abul Abbas -- cofounder of the PLF, commander of a 1500-man Palestinian army based in Tunis, and one of the world's most wanted terrorists -- had masterminded the hijacking and was now with Arafat negotiating for the escape of his men.



Apparently the four hijackers had intended to remain incognito until the cruise ship docked at Ashdod, Israel, but were discovered by a ship's steward -- only then did they seize the ship. (This was later confirmed by Abbas himself.)

On Wednesday the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Nick Veliotes, reported that the terrorists had executed an American tourist named **Leon Klinghoffer**, a retired appliance manufacturer from Manhattan. The victim of two strokes, Klinghoffer had been **wheelchair-bound**. He was

shot in the chest and head and his body tossed into the sea. Americans relived a nightmare; U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem had been murdered by the Hezbollah Shi'ites who hijacked TWA Flight 847. The world had watched, horrified, as Stethem's corpse was thrown out of the plane onto the Beirut Airport tarmac. Those criminals had escaped justice. Would the



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murderers of Leon Klinghoffer also get off scot-free? At first it seemed so. Ignoring U.S. protests, the Egyptian government rushed Abul Abbas and the *Achille Lauro* hijackers into an EgyptAir 737 charter plane bound for Tunis.

At 5:30 P.M. on Thursday, October 10, President Reagan was aboard Air Force One, returning to Washington, D.C. from a speaking engagement in the Chicago area, when word reached him that the terrorists were getting away. He authorized the carrier USS *Saratoga*, patrolling the Adriatic Sea, to put seven F-14 Tomcats into the air. Their orders: divert the Egyptian aircraft to a NATO base at Sigonella, Sicily. The appearance of the Tomcats unnerved the EgyptAir pilot, who compliantly altered course for Sicily. He had no way of knowing that the American "top guns" had orders to refrain from shooting down the 737 without direct instructions from the president.

Initially the Italians were not disposed to cooperate, scrambling their own warplanes to prevent a landing at Sigonella, but after a call from Reagan, Italy's Prime Minister Bettino Craxi gave permission to land. The American plan was to load the Palestinians onto a U.S. military aircraft and transport them to the States. But when American troops encircled the 737 they found themselves surrounded in turn by Italian soldiers. Italy had decided that since the *Achille Lauro* was an Italian vessel, the hijackers should be tried in Italian courts. The terrorists faced charges of premeditated murder, kidnapping and hijacking. When Reagan called Craxi this time, the Italian leader wouldn't budge -- Abul Abbas and his cronies would remain in Italian hands. After Arafat threatened "uncontrollable reactions" if the Italians turned Abbas over to the Americans, Italy refused a U.S. request to extradite the terrorist leader. Abbas was soon freed. In 1986 the four hijackers were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms,

The American public emphatically approved of the bold mid-flight interception of the *Achille Lauro* terrorists. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak decorated the 737 pilot and demanded an apology from the United States. Reagan vowed he would never apologize, and Cairo University students staged several anti-American demonstrations. The Craxi coalition government in Italy collapsed as crucial members abandoned it to protest what they deemed to be an anti-Israel, pro-PLO stance. And, bowing to U.S. pressure, the United Nations General Assembly shelved a proposal to invite Yasser Arafat to speak at an event celebrating the UN's fortieth anniversary. Having himself condoned the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*, Arafat accused Reagan of an "act of piracy" by intercepting the EgyptAir 737.

Klinghoffer Daughters Recall: The Palestinian Terrorists Killed Our Father to Prove They Had No Mercy

Source: <http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/10/09/klinghoffer-daughters-recall-the-palestinian-terrorists-killed-our-father-to-prove-they-had-no-mercy/#>



Lisa (R) and Ilsa Klinghoffer, daughters to Leon Klinghoffer, who was tragically murdered by Palestinian terrorists aboard an Italian cruise ship in 1985. Photo: Courtesy

Oct 09, 2015 - "The reason they killed our father was because they wanted the world to know that they had no mercy," Ilsa Klinghoffer told an audience of hundreds at the Center for Jewish History in Manhattan on Thursday, recalling her father's macabre death 30 years ago at the hands of Palestinian terrorists on a hijacked cruise ship in 1985.

Her tone, although composed,

was nevertheless emphatic: her father, Leon Klinghoffer had been destined to become the sole victim aboard the *Achille Lauro*, which was hijacked by four terrorists from the Palestinian Liberation Front traveling on fake passports. Though their original plan, sisters Ilsa and Lisa recalled, was to moor the vessel at an Israeli port and detonate the ship, killing



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and maiming as many Israelis as they possibly could, instead their mission dissolved and they decided to make an example out of just one hapless passenger.

Discovering Klinghoffer, a 69-year-old wheelchair-bound New York Jew who had already survived two strokes in his life, they wheeled his helpless body toward the edge of the ship, shot him in the back of the head, and dumped his body along with the wheelchair into the churning Mediterranean waters below. Fascinatingly, they recalled how their father's body washed up on Syria's shore, and the country sent it back to the U.S. for a proper burial.

On Thursday, the Klinghoffer daughters, public health worker Ilsa (57) and local artist Lisa (64), elegantly retold their tale to a full audience of mostly middle-aged and senior individuals, at the Center for Jewish History in New York's chic Chelsea neighborhood, divulging little-known details of the excruciating moments when the family, home in New York, discovered that their father, Leon, had been slaughtered and cast away into the seas between Alexandria and Port Said.

Former *New York Times* correspondent Sara Rimer, recalled that the night began as a celebration at the Klinghoffer home in New York. The State Department had yet to reveal the details concerning their father's death; actually, the true facts were obfuscated to avoid more casualties. But, as the Klinghoffers gathered friends and relatives to celebrate, slowly news broke out, and Rimer was there to witness the grief that unfolded when the truth was revealed that night. It was the most profound she had ever experienced, Rimer explained.

The *Times* correspondent recalled a hardened Marilyn Klinghoffer, Leon's wife, conjuring up a message of vaguely cynical personal strength, despite the trying circumstances: "I'm strong... All these situations add up, one after the other, and then you're old and strong."

Marilyn, whose character was colorfully portrayed through the memories of her daughter, was also described in a situation where she identified each terrorist for law enforcement. Ilsa rose from her chair and assumed her mother's role: Pointing toward the audience, she declared "murderer," dramatically repeating the process four times. Then, to punctuate her disgust with the men who took her husband's life, Marilyn spit in each of their faces.

Marilyn's retribution did not end there. A formidable woman, she decided it proper to sue the Palestinian Liberation Organization — though the group's allegiance with the Palestinian Liberation Front was, at that point, somewhat tenuous itself, as these things go in the capricious political landscape of Middle East terrorism.

"We were petrified," quipped Ilsa. "We were terrified," added her sister, Lisa, recalling their mother's pronouncement one night in the kitchen.

While Marilyn tragically died just four months later, as Lisa explained, her attempt to put a face on the abstract concept that was (and, really, still is) terrorism, the sisters managed to see out one lawsuit against a Palestinian arms dealer whose weapons ended up in the hands of the very Palestinian terrorists who took their father's life.

Following the settling of this lawsuit, the Klinghoffer sisters went on to found The Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation League, whose goal it is to educate law enforcement about terrorism and its victims. The two sisters heaped praise on former longtime national director Abraham Foxman, who was present at the event, and recently resigned from the ADL and joined Israel's Institute for National Security Studies.

At the time, the Klinghoffer story quickly became a high-profile affair, especially in an era of frequent plane hijackings and mass bombings against U.S. military installations across the Middle East and especially in the eastern Mediterranean.

Marilyn Klinghoffer even met with a touched Ronald and Nancy Reagan, a meeting that was captured in a photograph on display among the trove of Klinghoffer archive material at the Center for Jewish History, which also includes some family pictures of a youthful Marilyn (in a wedding dress) and Leon (in his army uniform), official correspondences with President Reagan and even crude sketches of the terrorists aboard the *Achille Lauro*, which were long-sequestered by the FBI.

"Once Again, we had a crisis in the Middle East in which American lives were hanging in the balance," President Ronald Reagan wrote in his diary at the time, according to U.S. historian and Israeli lawmaker Michael Oren in his history on U.S. involvement in the Middle East:

[Power, Faith and Fantasy.](#)



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In fact, once the cruise ship docked in Egypt, the north African nation (which had recently signed a peace deal with Israel) allowed the terrorists safe passage to the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, and the Italians promptly released the ringleader once the plane he traveled on was forced by U.S. military personnel to land in Sicily.

Terrorism concerns growing as cruise industry diversifies, documents show

Source: <http://www.davidmckie.com/documents-say-terrorism-concerns-growing-as-cruise-industry-diversifies/>

March 26, 2014 – As the international cruise ship industry expands, concerns about terrorism are growing, according to documents obtained from Transport Canada.

The documents, released under the Access to Information law, say demand for cruising worldwide nearly doubled between 1999 and 2009, with the number of passengers increasing to 16.93 million from 8.59 million. In addition, vacationers are coming from an increasing range of national, racial, ethnic and religious groups.

The documents say these trends likely will make cruises more appealing targets for terrorists who are “looking to maximize lives-lost and create publicity.” Cruise lines are also expanding their operations to new, remote and potentially dangerous areas, such as the Middle East, which the documents say increases ships’ chances of dealing with foreign marine facilities whose security practices are not up to par.

Transport Canada withheld information about the documents’ author and publication date, and refused interview requests.

However, Dane Rowlands, director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, said there is no publicly available evidence that suggests terror attacks on cruise ships are a big problem.


There have been five terrorist attacks on cruises in the last 55 years, according to the book *Cruising for Trouble* by Mark Gauvette, a former security director for American cruise line Princess Cruises.

The most recent assault occurred in 2004 when terrorists belonging to an Islamist separatist group bombed the *SuperFerry 14* in Manila Bay, Philippines. The attack resulted in 116 deaths.

However, Rowlands said recent attacks on cruise ships by Somali pirates in 2005, 2008 and 2009 are fuelling concerns about marine security.

“I think people are drawing a link from what they’re observing on the piracy front,” said Rowlands, who studies terrorism and counter-terrorism activities. “They’re saying, ‘Wait, criminals can do it... why not terrorists?’”

Although the number of terrorist attacks on cruise ships is relatively low, Rowlands said it’s important for governments and intelligence agencies to anticipate terrorists’ next moves. He



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said once a terrorist group's ability to act in one area — such as air travel — is limited, it will shift to different tactics.

And there is evidence this is happening. Documents seized from an al-Qaeda operative in Berlin in 2012 revealed the terrorist group's plans to hijack cruise ships.

The Transport Canada documents outline four recommendations for improving cruise ship security, including increased risk assessment and information sharing between governments. Rowlands said cruise lines worldwide should also look at standardizing screening practices in the way airports have.

A [paper](#) published in 2006 by the Rand Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, a non-profit research institution, says cruise security checks remain “far less stringent” than those in airports.

According to the [website](#) for Cruise Lines International Association Inc. — the world's largest cruise industry association — cruise passengers, crew and baggage must pass through a security checkpoint before embarking or disembarking. Additionally, crew members must undergo pre-employment background screening. But the website does not specify whether screening methods vary by cruise line or not.

The association did not respond to requests for an interview.

Rowlands said he thinks cruise ship companies tend to be more reactive than proactive with security practices because they don't want to hurt business.

“This is a classic case where you're more likely to see the barn door being closed long after the horses have galloped across the field,” he said.

Canada doesn't own any cruise lines but the documents say Canadians represent about one-quarter of all cruise vacationers, not including U.S. passengers. Because of this, Rowlands said Canada should have an interest in helping improve cruise ship security.

“You don't always want to be fighting the last war.”

Terrorism and Commercial Transportation: Use of Ships, Cargoes, Containers to Transport Terrorists and Materials

Author: Michael McNicholas

Pages: 51 - 66

Series

[NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics](#)

Ebook

[Volume 98: Maritime Security and Defence Against Terrorism](#)

Source: <http://ebooks.iospress.nl/publication/25847>

There is a plethora of case studies, incidents, and open-source reporting substantiating the wide-spread usage of commercial maritime conveyances – large ocean-going vessels, cruise ships, and coastal freighters – by terrorist groups to transport personnel from one country to another. While ships are being used as unwitting hosts, the preponderance of reporting of such incidents suggests that in the majority of the cases, either the ship owner or crew are knowledgeable of or participate in these transport operations. The transport of large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and explosives to terrorists groups generally is via maritime containers. The existence of a ‘business alliance’ between terrorists and a vast network of profit-oriented transnational criminal organizations greatly enhances the operational control, complexity, and likely success of these activities; in the Western Hemisphere, this alliance is the primary driver directing the transport of terrorists and materials via commercial maritime transport. These terror transport operations present a formidable challenge to the security programs of unsuspecting seaports and ships; however, the terrorists' usage of innocent ships, cargoes and containers can be mitigated, in part, through the design, implementation, and management of a well-planned seaport/ship security strategy.




Maritime Terrorism

Risk and Liability

by Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz

Related Topics: Cargo Ships, Counterterrorism, Infrastructure and Transportation, Law and Business, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Water Transportation

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Source: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf

Cruise-ship terrorism and the media

By George H. Quester

Political Communication Volume 3, Issue 4, 1986

Source: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584609.1986.9962798?journalCode=upcp20>

An attempt is made to analyze physical differences between the *Achille Lauro* incident and seizure of hostages on board aircraft, for their impact on terrorist use of the news media. Among the important differences considered are the following: the number of hostages, the range and endurance of the transportation vehicle, the possibilities of disappearing into the unknown, the degree of “de facto torture” in the physical situation of the hostages, the ease of media (especially television) access, the general accessibility of the vehicle for rescue efforts, and the sheer novelty of this mode of terrorist attack. Some analogies are drawn with terrorist seizures of railroad trains and buses, including comparisons of media behavior.



Australian Government
Department of Infrastructure
and Regional Development

Preventive Security Guidance for Cruise Ship Visits to Unregulated Places

Purpose

The purpose of the document is to provide general preventive security guidance to local industry operators that may receive or provide services to cruise ships visiting unregulated places in Australian waters. Unregulated places are those locations that are not security regulated under the *Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003*. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (the Department) considers these locations to present a low or negligible security risk of unlawful interference with maritime transport due to a number of factors, including their remote or regional locations and the pattern and frequency of cruise ship visits to these destinations.

Source: <https://infrastructure.gov.au/security/files/Preventive-security-guidance-for-Cruise-Ship-Visits-to-unregulated-places-guidance.pdf>



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Cruise industry believe red tape and visa restrictions are a bigger threat than terrorism

Source: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/travel/cruises/cruise-industry-believe-red-tape-6420113>

Sep 12, 2015 – The world's cruise line bosses talked down the impact of [terrorism](#) this week. They accepted that atrocities, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, had shrunk the size of the Mediterranean, and conceded that conflict in the Ukraine had effectively shut the Black Sea to cruises.



But David Dingle, chairman of [Carnival UK](#), said: "We are absorbing these circumstances. We can open up new ports, and cruise beyond Europe."

The [MSC Splendido](#) cruise ship arrived in Tunisia shortly before the terror attack

And Wybcke Meier, boss of [TUI](#), went so far as to say: "We haven't noticed any effect."

The executives met at the State of the Industry session at the Seatrade Europe conference held in Hamburg.

Cruise Lines International Association chairman Pierfrancesco Vago, who is also chairman of MSC Cruises, boasted of cruising's 40.2 billion euro contribution to the European economy and congratulated Germany for overtaking the UK to become the second-largest consumer market outside the US.

But instead of accepting the damage inflicted on tourism by terrorism and the refugee crisis, [Royal Caribbean's](#) Dominic Paul chose to blame the fall in numbers visiting the Med on visa red tape, especially for visitors from Asia.

He claimed one in five scrapped visa applications because the process was too complicated.

It was left to Michael Thamm, CEO of [Costa Group](#), to demand: "Let's stop talking about visas and tackle the central problem of why cruising has such a low market penetration – just 1% of all European holidaymakers."

Targets for Terrorism: Ports

Source: <http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/targets-terrorism-ports/p10215>

Could terrorists attack U.S. ports?

Yes. Experts warn that U.S. seaports could be tempting targets for terrorists bent on killing large numbers of people, grabbing media attention, and disrupting the U.S. economy. Port, ferry, and cruise-ship terminals are often located in highly congested areas where large numbers of people live and work. [Liquefied natural gas](#) terminals and refineries that produce highly volatile petrochemicals and convert crude oil into gasoline and heating oil are also often nearby. Given the importance of foreign trade to the U.S. economy, an attack that shut down a major American port for even a few days could devastate the regional economy served by that port.

Are U.S. ports vulnerable to terrorist attacks?

Yes. CFR Senior Fellow [Stephen Flynn](#) says "maritime transportation is one of our nation's most serious vulnerabilities." At current staffing and funding levels, U.S. Coast Guard personnel and Customs agents can thoroughly inspect only about 5 percent of the 9 million shipping containers that arrive at U.S. ports every year. Though the Customs Service is using increasingly sophisticated risk-assessment technology to choose which shipments to inspect, many outside experts are unsure about the system's effectiveness.



Special Collection**CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – February 2016****What's the volume of traffic at U.S. ports?**

Some 7,500 ships with foreign flags make 51,000 calls on U.S. ports each year. They carry the bulk of the approximately two billion tons of freight, three billion tons of oil transports, and 134 million passengers by ferry each year. The volume of traffic gives terrorists opportunities to smuggle themselves or their weapons into the United States with little risk of detection; in May 2002 there were reports that twenty-five Islamist extremists entered the United States by hiding in shipping containers.

Are ports hard to protect?

Yes. They're often large and busy, offering multiple opportunities for terrorists to get in and attack. The port of Houston, for example, is twenty-six miles long, and thousands of trucks enter and exit its major terminals every day. Moreover, ships often traverse narrow channels; a sunken ship in such a channel could close the port for weeks or months and cause economic chaos.

How many large seaports are there in the United States?

There are 361 major ports in the United States and many other harbors, piers, and ferry landings.

Who guards U.S. ports?

The captain of the port—an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard—is responsible for providing security on the water, inspecting and regulating ships coming in and out. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection—which has absorbed the personnel and the border inspection functions of both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Customs—is responsible for security on the ground, inspecting foreign vessels' cargoes and clearing crews and passengers. Ports are owned by state port authorities, which lease pier and terminal space to private companies. These firms often hire their own private security; usually low-paid contract guards who patrol the facilities and staff the entrances and exits. The role of private companies at U.S. ports was thrust into the spotlight in early 2006, when [Dubai Ports World](#), a state-owned shipping company, took over leases at six major ports along the United States' East Coast. The company backed out of the deal after significant pressure from Congress.

What has been done to protect our ports?

While the Coast Guard remains at a heightened state of alert, some of the reforms to secure nationwide ports include:

- Implementing uniform standards of security throughout the U.S. ports under the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
- Commissioning new Maritime Safety and Security Teams in San Francisco, Houston, New York and St. Mary's, Ga., bringing the total number of teams nationwide to eight.
- Identifying and funding business-driven initiatives to enhance security for the movement of cargo throughout the entire supply chain. Many such initiatives are being spearheaded by Operation Safe Commerce, a test bed project between the Transportation Safety Authority, the Department of Transportation, Customs, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the State Department, and the Justice and Commerce departments.
- Launching a Container Security Initiative, aimed at identifying and inspecting potentially dangerous containers as they are being loaded abroad, before they ever reach U.S. ports.

Terrorism and security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11

Dion E. Phillips (2008), *Terrorism and security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11*, in Giuseppe Caforio, Gerhard Kümmel, Bandana Purkayastha (ed.) *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution: Sociological Perspectives (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 7)* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.97 - 138

Source: <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1016/S1572-8323%2808%2907007-0>

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response



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to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region’s police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.

Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea

By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Source: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>



Globally, terrorists have shown an increasing interest in using small boats to attack military and commercial shipping and maritime facilities. The tactics and techniques of using commercial or non-commercial vessels (under 500 tons) or swimmers to emplace or deliver improvised explosive devices have proven effective and exportable. Contemporary operational practices by transnational terrorist groups include refining proven attack methods, sharing lessons learned, and encouraging others to adopt effective tactics. Thus, the possibility of such attacks in U.S. waters should not be ignored.

The small-boat threat needs to be addressed, but rather than focusing on this particular terrorist tactic, Congress and the Administration should invest in assets that improve the overall security of the maritime domain. The maritime sector is a large and diverse field with unique and daunting threats. Efforts should be expanded to improve U.S. situational awareness and law enforcement response rather than fixating on specific attack scenarios involving small boats or other terrorist threats.

The Small-Boat Threat

The definition of “small-boat threat” encompasses a variety of possible weapon-delivery vehicles, tactics, and payloads. Vessels include everything from large craft such as small freighters, large privately owned yachts, fishing trawlers, and commercial tugs to dinghies, jet-skies, and submarines, including mini-submarines like those used by the Japanese in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

An attack could involve suicide bombers, as in the case of the attack on the USS *Cole*, or vessels on autopilot or remotely controlled. Improvised explosive devices could be delivered or emplaced by boats or swimmers (assisted or unassisted by breathing devices). This could involve placing a “parasite” on the hull of a craft or deploying tethered (anchored to the sea bottom) or untethered (floating) mines in a sea lane, waterway, or port traffic area.

Besides conventional explosives, the bombers could detonate nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological devices. Attacks could occur while the targeted ship is docked at shore, approaching a port, sailing in international waters, or in U.S. or Canadian coastal waterways.



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In addition to ships, attacks could target port facilities; commercial infrastructure (e.g., an entertainment pier, bridge piling, or pipeline); or public events.

How Small-Boat Attacks Are Carried Out

In many respects, small-boat threats resemble other terrorist plots and have a similar signature. They require recruiting, training and planning, surveillance and intelligence collection, operational security, logistical support, rehearsals, information operations, and execution.

On the other hand, these threats have some unique characteristics and considerations. They can require unique attributes and knowledge such as maritime skills (e.g., sailing and scuba diving); familiarity with the target area (such as traffic patterns near a port facility); or explosives training. Unique environmental concerns that can affect the planning and conduct of maritime attacks include weather, tides, and other variables that could affect the dependability and reliability of the strike method. For example, salt, water, and wind can adversely affect weapons delivery and detonation.

Terrorists like predictability. They like to know the obstacles that they will face and the probable results of an attack. Uncertainties in the maritime domain could significantly affect the desirability of employing the small-boat attack method. For example, large public events like a "tall ship" week or a national sporting event might seem inviting targets because of the large crowds of people and the public attention focused on the events. However, large, one-time events are less promising targets because of the additional security and the greater difficulty in predicting the security conditions.

Often, strikes on public venues are more appealing to "lone wolf" attackers who might not weigh the risks and benefits of less well-planned operations as carefully. Likewise, targets such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers or other ships carrying hazardous materials might seem to present tempting opportunities to generate spectacular catastrophic affects. However, from material on the Internet, terrorists already know of the debate over whether or not a small-boat attack could realistically achieve a catastrophic outcome.

On the other hand, normal commercial traffic and port operations bear many of the same characteristics of a desirable terrorist target, including limited responsive security and highly predictable patterns of behavior. For example, high-value ships such as cruise ships and tankers carrying extremely hazardous materials are much more vulnerable when entering or leaving restricted navigable waters along the U.S. coastline, in port areas, or along domestic waterways. During these periods, a large ship typically has a pilot on board, is moving at a low speed, and is following a tight and predictable course because of underwater obstructions and maritime traffic.

Previous al-Qaeda Small-Boat Attacks

The most prominent small-boat attack on a military ship occurred on October 12, 2000, when al-Qaeda operatives detonated a small boat filled with explosives against the hull of the USS *Cole*, which was refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. The attack killed 17 U.S. sailors and wounded 39 others. It also garnered much publicity for al-Qaeda, which subsequently highlighted the attack in its recruiting videos and other propaganda.

In October 2002, al-Qaeda undertook its first successful attack against a commercial ship using a small boat. Its operatives rammed the French supertanker *Limburg* with a small fishing craft packed with explosives. The attack, which occurred while the *Limburg* was 12 miles off the coast of Yemen, killed one crew member, injured 12 others, and caused a spill of 50,000 barrels of crude oil along 45 miles of coastline.

Other terrorist groups besides al-Qaeda have attempted to use small boats as weapons-delivery vehicles. On November 7, 2000, a Hamas suicide bomber aboard a fishing boat tried to attack an Israeli patrol craft sailing off the Gaza Strip. Alert crew members detected the threat and sank the boat before the Hamas operative could consummate the attack. The Tamil Tigers have also attempted a number of improvised maritime attacks in Sri Lanka.

In addition to terrorist threats, transnational criminals have used similar tactics to smuggle drugs, weapons, humans, and other contraband. These include everything from building mini-submarines to smuggle drugs across the Gulf of Mexico to trafficking Cuban refugees to Key West. Many of the operational practices employed by transnational criminals are



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adaptable to terrorist attacks. (Conversely, countermeasures designed to address small-boat threats might also be valuable in combating illicit trafficking by small boats.)

How Serious Is the Threat?

The risks associated with small-boat threats are complex. An assessment of risk combines an evaluation of criticality (or consequences), threat, and vulnerability. Three major risks connected with small-boat threats should be considered.

The Psychological Impact. Research data make a compelling case that "man-made malicious" events create more fear, apprehension, and uncertainty than natural disasters or accidents. Almost every week, the U.S. experiences maritime incidents that are equivalent to a small-scale terrorist attack in terms of endangering life and property. These range from boating episodes involving individuals to commercial industrial accidents that put hundreds of lives and millions of dollars of infrastructure at risk.

The United States has also experienced a number of large-scale maritime disruptions, which have affected thousands to tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in damage. These include everything from the Texas City (1947) and San Francisco (1944) disasters, which involved large commercial ships carrying extremely hazardous materials, to Hurricane Katrina, which crippled the ports of New Orleans and Mobile. A terrorist attack of similar scale would certainly have a significantly greater impact on the public, particularly because many Americans have only a minimal appreciation of what occurs in the maritime domain. Anxiety is always greater when individuals are less familiar with the situation.

The impact of a terrorist attack might be reflected in many different behaviors and attitudes, from undermining the confidence of Americans in their government to panic buying because of the fear of economic disruption. The scale and duration of psychological damage could vary significantly, depending on the nature of the incident and the character of the response.

Physical Destruction. A small-boat attack is unlikely to cause a large loss of life or property unless it involves a weapon of mass destruction or highly hazardous material that causes a large-scale fire or explosion. Even a large-scale disaster involving thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage is unlikely to have long-term negative consequences for the U.S. economy.

In many respects, the response required in the event of a small-boat attack would resemble the response to a fire, explosion, or industrial accident. Thus, many of the current safety measures, equipment, drills, and training required for maritime safety would be applicable to reducing the loss of life and property in the event of a small-boat attack. Likewise, any measures to improve overall safety, firefighting assets, all-hazards disaster response capabilities, search and rescue, other emergency services, and salvage and recovery would contribute to reducing damage in the event of a successful attack.

Disruption of Services. Much of the U.S. maritime infrastructure is clustered near urban centers. Thus, attacks might disrupt mass transit, interrupt delivery of goods and services, or require the evacuation of local populations. Some attacks might seek to disable larger vessels to block waterways, bridges, or tunnels. Physical disruptions would likely be highly localized and have little impact on the overall economy or long-term economic growth, even in the case of large-scale disasters.

Near-term economic impact might be more significant and widespread if terrorists conducted multiple attacks at multiple locations or if the attack affected the national supply chain. Government (U.S., Canadian, or Mexican) and/or private-sector responses after a strike (such as closing ports of entry) might be more likely to have a significant economic impact than would the direct results of the physical destruction caused by the attack itself.

On the other hand, individual companies or industries might suffer long-term negative affects, such as the cruise industry if a cruise ship were attacked. This might be reflected in increased insurance rates or loss of customer confidence.

The Scope of the Challenge

The small-boat problem is complicated by the magnitude of areas and activities encompassing small-boat activity; the lack of situational awareness by federal, state, and local authorities; and the limited capacity to interdict active threats.



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Policing a Vast Domain. Small boats operate on thousands of miles of U.S. coastline, inland waterways, and lakes. Frequent undeclared entries by small boats occur between the U.S. and Canada and between the U.S. and the Bahamas every day. On any given day, the number of small craft in U.S. waters is vast. Thousands of boats are bought and sold every year, and many small boats are operated with minimal training or licensing requirements. In many areas, small boats operate in proximity to high-value ships and maritime infrastructure without restriction.

Situational Awareness. The requirement for situational awareness in U.S. ports, coastal areas, and waterways evolved primarily in response to the need for aids to navigation and safety. Situational awareness to support physical security and law enforcement activities was not a primary concern.

Post-9/11 situational awareness has been enhanced by adapting existing technologies, such as surface radars in some ports, and by applying new technologies, such as infrared video surveillance and GPS. Few of these capabilities have been or can be applied practically to the monitoring of small-boat activities, although there are some ongoing initiatives. For example, the Coast Guard Research and Development Center has experimented with employing Navy sonobuoys to detect small boats in high-density smuggling areas, but implementing such solutions has major technical and cost implications.

Interdiction and Response. Local, state, and federal law enforcement have limited capability to detect threats, and standoff detection is usually restricted to meters at best. For example, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and some local law enforcement authorities have the capability to scan the hulls of boats for parasites. Current detection capabilities are a mix of intrusive and non-intrusive systems. Almost all of them are time-consuming and costly, and almost all of them present significant "false negatives" and "false positives" problems in attempting to identify threats.

Law enforcement at all levels also has very limited capacity to disable small craft or swimmers and ineffective response times in meeting unanticipated threats. Methods of incapacitation mostly involve the use of potentially lethal force. Rules for the employment of lethal force are not consistent across government agencies. In addition, methods for disabling small boats using non-lethal technologies are neither widely available nor particularly effective.

Only the U.S. Navy has any notable capacity to detect and clear mines and improvised explosive devices at sea or in waterways. No dedicated domestic assets can address waterborne mines. The U.S. navy has conducted some research and has developed some capability to detect and interdict swimmers, but this capacity is not widely available for U.S. ports or waterways. Any application of additional technologies or capabilities for interdiction and response has significant cost and technical implications.

Ensuring Economic Competitiveness. Moving people, goods, and services by sea and waterway is extremely cost-effective. In addition, waterborne traffic, while not without environmental consequences, produces much less air pollution than does moving goods by truck. A significant expansion of domestic maritime traffic for the transportation of goods and people could give the United States a key economic competitive advantage in the 21st century. Smaller craft could play a critical role in this economic expansion. The key challenge to exploiting this potential advantage will be public and private investment in maritime infrastructure.

Currently, the nation as a whole does a poor job of investing in maritime infrastructure. Federal and state laws do not provide adequate incentives and in some cases discourage investment. In regard to security, this provides a dual challenge to policymakers. On the one hand, further excessive regulation and restrictions in the name of enhancing security will only further discourage investment. On the other hand, as the nation increasingly exploits its ability to move by sea, maritime infrastructure will become even more critical to the economy, and concerns over its security will become even more pressing.

The U.S. Response

Post-9/11 security initiatives have only marginally improved the U.S. capacity to deal with the small-boat threat. The recently adopted International Maritime Organization International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the corresponding requirements in the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act address small-boat threats only incidentally by requiring vulnerability assessments, security plans, and security coordinators.

U.S. law requires ships over 500 tons to provide 96 hours notice to the U.S. Coast Guard before entering U.S. waters. This requirement does not address the small-boat threat.



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Following the attack on the *Cole*, the U.S. Navy and many of its foreign counterparts substantially improved their force protection procedures. These better military defenses mean that terrorists in the future will more likely choose to attack softer targets such as commercial vessels flagged in the U.S. or friendly countries.

Since 9/11, security has received increased emphasis in U.S. ports and waterways, including more coordination among federal, state, and local entities; greater access control; and added security measures. Some security measures have been introduced specifically to address the small-boat threat. For example, LNG tankers are escorted into port and guarded, although other more vulnerable and volatile hazardous cargo is often not given the same attention. While in port, cruise ships are required to post a picket craft to warn off or interdict small boats.

Some ports have established operational coordination or information sharing centers, such as Operation Seahawk in Charleston, South Carolina. Typically, these centers do not focus on the small-boat threat, although some coordinate reports of suspicious activity or investigations that might uncover such a threat. While there have also been some efforts to increase and coordinate police, county sheriff, state game and wildlife, and U.S. Coast Guard waterborne patrolling, these programs are modest. In some cases, volunteer groups such as state maritime defense forces have been used to supplement waterborne patrolling.

Development of the national maritime security strategy and the Maritime Operations Threat Response Plan has improved maritime security coordination overall, but it does not address the small-boat threat specifically.

There have been some marginal efforts to coordinate research and development of technologies and techniques and tactics among the Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Laboratories, federally funded research and development centers (such as RAND and the Homeland Security Institute), and other federal and private-sector entities. However, many disparate pilot projects, experiments, and ongoing initiatives are poorly coordinated and lack a clear plan to operationalize the research results.

In June 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard plans to convene a major conference of maritime stakeholders to propose new measures for dealing with the small-boat threat. The recommendations will likely include a combination of new regulatory requirements and sharing best practices.

Possible Countermeasures

Countermeasures generally fall into one of three categories, and each set of solutions faces significant challenges.

Identification and Accreditation. These measures include proposals for new regulatory regimes requiring additional stipulations for licensing individual operators and craft; national standardization of licensing processes and documents (including both the licenses themselves and "breeder" documents such as the documents used to verify identity and legal status); reporting of lost and stolen licenses and craft; and requirements for transponders, which would enable authorities to identify and track small boats. These proposals raise significant cost and effectiveness issues that need to be addressed, as well as significant issues concerning cost-sharing and responsibility among federal, state, and local entities. Identification and accreditation regimes will also raise privacy concerns similar to those involved in implementing REAL ID. Further regulation of the maritime transport, boating, and recreation industries could have negative economic impacts.

Another challenge is identifying and accrediting the many small boats in U.S. waters that come from outside the United States, particularly from Canada and the Bahamas and/or that are registered overseas and licensed under flags of convenience. One set of proposals would extend the 96-hour notification requirement to all ships (even those under 500 tons) entering U.S. waters.

Yet proposals to extend notification requirements to small boats raise a number of concerns. For example, many small boats can travel to U.S. waters in less than 96 hours (e.g., from Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas). Small-boat owners are concerned about the cost and inconvenience of complying with such regulations. In addition, such reporting would generate mounds of data, and screening and evaluating those data for useful information poses significant cost and human capital challenges.



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Finally, identification and accreditation programs are effective when combined with capabilities to investigate fraud, identify and respond to suspicious activities and persons, and prosecute violators.

Improving Situational Awareness and Detecting Threats. These measures could involve a range of activities from "neighborhood watch" and public awareness programs to technologies that provide wide-area surveillance and standoff detection of explosives and materials used in weapons of mass destruction.

Identifying and monitoring small craft and swimmers poses serious technological challenges. For example, distinguishing small boats and swimmers from waves is often technologically difficult. Detecting suspicious materials at a distance is perhaps the most daunting technical challenge. The costs of establishing and maintaining wide-area surveillance are especially significant.

Finally, situational awareness and threat detection are effective only if they are linked to responsive investigation of suspicious activities and interdiction of threats.

Controlling Access and Interdicting Threats. This approach involves restricting access to sensitive areas, which might include critical infrastructure, extremely hazardous material, national icons, high-value ships such as passenger ships or ferries, or densely populated areas.

Interdiction raises issues concerning the manpower and capabilities available to control access and conduct interdiction. For example, significantly enhancing community policing at sea could be extremely costly. In some cases, restricting or controlling passage is impractical or would significantly disrupt the movement of goods, people, and services.

The most significant technical challenge is developing non-lethal disabling technologies to limit the requirement for employing deadly force. Effective interoperable communications, information sharing, and coordinating joint action among federal, state, and local authorities and the private sector remain significant concerns.

Mitigating the Threat

The maritime domain has a vast number of vulnerabilities, and terrorists have many options and opportunities for determining how, when, and where to attack maritime infrastructure. Fixating on a particular method of attack or trying to protect a particular target set is a self-defeating strategy that not only imposes significant costs on the defender, but also can easily be circumvented by an adaptive enemy.

In that regard, focusing specifically on the small-boat threat is probably not the best way to address the challenge. Rather, maritime security solutions should focus on:

- **Ensuring resiliency.** Trade accounts for one-third of the U.S. economy, and much of that trade and a significant portion of the nation's transportation and energy infrastructure depends on or is located near maritime infrastructure. The most important national objective in the maritime domain should be to ensure that commerce continues regardless of any natural or man-made disaster.
- **Getting the biggest bang for the buck.** Security investments should be focused on initiatives that provide the most value for improving maritime security overall. Hard choices need to be made. Piecemeal investments in maritime security will add little real security. On the other hand, effective counterterrorism operations that focus broadly on identifying, investigating, and thwarting terrorist activities and plots in the maritime domain offer more value than those that focus narrowly on trying to deny terrorists access to a specific target or delivery means.

What the Government Should Do

To create the most effective public policies to keep the nation safe, free, and prosperous, Congress and the Administration must take a broad and long-term view of the small-boat threat. Any proposed efforts should:

- **Address economic competitiveness, not just security, with solutions that support both objectives.** In particular, the Administration should not impose significant new regulatory restrictions on the operation and licensing of small boats and small-boat operators. Such measures will add little security at significant cost.
- **Insist on programs that best enhance the overall security of the maritime domain and contribute to the resiliency of maritime commerce.** First and foremost, the government



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should ensure that maritime commerce is not adversely affected in the event of an incident. The Administration should complete, exercise, and refine the plan required by the national maritime security strategy to address issues of business continuity and reconstitution after major disruptions in maritime commerce.

- **Invest more heavily in Coast Guard modernization, particularly in programs that improve situational awareness, law enforcement, and special operations capabilities.** Specifically, priority funding should be given to Coast Guard initiatives that expand the capacity of the service's maritime security teams, develop capabilities for effective non-lethal interdiction of small boats, extend visibility of craft over the horizon by using unmanned aerial vehicles and other technologies, field new state-of-the-art patrol craft, and increase law enforcement investigation and intelligence means.
- **Ensure the right balance of roles, missions, and resources and close cooperation between U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard maritime security missions.** The U.S. Navy should focus on providing intelligence support and mine-clearing expertise and capabilities, as well as sharing research and development in countering small-boat threats with the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard should lead in developing a national maritime domain awareness system, expand its capabilities to investigate and interdict potential threats, and work with state and local governments and the private sector to share information and intelligence effectively.
- **Respect the principles of federalism and exploit the inherent advantages of a free-enterprise approach to providing the most creative, efficient, and effective solutions.** Homeland security grants should be minimal. Instead, the federal government should facilitate the sharing of best practices and allow state and local governments and the private sector the freedom to innovate and adopt measures that are most appropriate for their needs and that would best perform the due diligence necessary to ensure business continuity and disaster recovery.

Government should also encourage and provide incentives for craft under 500 tons to employ transponder locator and identification technologies. These transponders perform a function similar to what OnStar offers for automobiles. Adopting these technologies would enhance public safety and increase situational awareness, and use of these systems would better enable the Coast Guard and other rescue services to find craft in need of assistance. The widespread use of transponders would also assist in monitoring maritime traffic.

The Way Ahead

For the United States to develop a comprehensive and multilayered approach to homeland security, it must address the small-boat threat. While the maritime sector is a large and diverse field with unique and daunting threats, the U.S. should develop plans to improve U.S. situational awareness rather than defend against specific threat types. Investing in measures that bolster the U.S. economy and provide the best return for the amount spent are also good approaches for formulating a protection plan against small boats.

In the end, guarding U.S. maritime craft and infrastructure will not only protect the resilience of the U.S. economy and international trade, but also protect a sector that serves as a source of enjoyment and work for millions of American citizens.

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Piracy versus Terrorism

Source: <http://www.cindyvallar.com/terrorism.html>

In the predawn hours of March 2003, twelve masked men, dressed in black, boarded the Dewi Madrim. They smashed the tanker's bridge windows with automatic rifles while one



pirate pressed a pistol to an officer's head. Captain Surahmat Johar said, "All of us were then gathered in one room. They tied our hands tight behind our backs with a white, plastic wire--the kind that tightens even harder if you try to loosen it." Later he was taken to the bridge where one pirate steered the vessel. "I realized that they were completely familiar with all the equipment. Someone was expertly steering the vessel, reading the radar very well. I remember thinking: 'My God, he can handle the ship better than I can.' I'd thought pirates were just a bunch of petty robbers who jumped onto a ship, robbed the crew, and then disappeared. But these pirates were totally beyond my imagination. They were professionals."¹ Tony Tan, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, said of the attack, "The *Dewi Madrim* pirates had fast boats, VHF radios, machineguns. They disabled the ship's radio, took over the helm, and steered the ship for an hour before their escape."² Tan believes the attack "was a dry run for a terrorist attack."³

But are pirates terrorists? A gut reaction would be yes, but few things in life are that simple. On 22 January 1961, Captain Henrique Carlos Malta Galvao, of the Portuguese navy, and twenty-five others hijacked the *Santa Maria* soon after she left Curaçao. The cruise ship's Third Mate, Nascimento Costa, was killed in the attack, and six hundred passengers plus the crew became hostages. "My grandmother was...aboard the liner and I remember her telling the tales of what happened.... How all of the passengers were held at gunpoint in the ships[sic] dining hall..."⁴ Although labeled "the first piracy act in modern time,"⁵ the hijackers were deemed not to be pirates because they seized the *Santa Maria* to force the ousting of Antonio de Salazar and his repressive dictatorship that had ruled Portugal for thirty-nine years.

The primary motive behind a piracy attack is financial, rather than political. This is the main distinction between pirates and terrorists. Pirates do what they do for private gain. "Terrorists have political motivations that are fuelled by ideology, ethno-nationalist demands, or religious fundamentalism..."⁶ Another difference between these two criminals is that pirates prefer to remain anonymous. They want to make a profit, and to do so, it is better to avoid the spotlight and not leave behind traces of their crime. Terrorists, however, want the media's attention. What better way to promote their cause?

Just as there are differences, there are also similarities. Pirates and terrorists employ violence or the threat of violence to intimidate their victims into complying with their demands. Long ago when one ship met another at sea, it was common to ask each other's country of origin. Pirates answered "the sea," for they gave no allegiance to any country. They had declared war on the world, just as terrorists do today. Like terrorists, pirates are small groups of people who live outside the protection and jurisdiction of a country. Both hide in remote places where discovery and infiltration are difficult.

The two entities are not treated equally under the law, though. The UNCLOS and the Geneva Convention on the High Seas preclude acts of terrorism as piracy because those acts are carried out for political ends. If terrorists carry out an attack on the high seas, no laws or nations have jurisdiction over the crime. If the act occurs within territorial waters, it is considered maritime violence rather than piracy, and as such how the nation deals with enforcement of its laws lies totally within that country's discretion.

A particular concern of officials is that terrorists could hire pirates to steal a ship for them. As Singapore's national security czar, Tony Tan noticed something new after a piracy attack during the second quarter of 2005 in the Malacca Straits. "In previous years when you had a pirate attack, what it meant is that you have a sampan or a boat coming up to a cargo ship, pirates throwing up some ropes, scrambling on board, ransacking the ship for valuables, stealing money and then running away. But the last piracy attack that took place in the Straits of Malacca showed a different pattern. [The pirates] conducted the operation almost with military precision. Instead of just ransacking the ship for valuables, they took command of the ship, and steered the ship for about an hour, and then eventually left with the captain in their captivity. To all of us, this is reminiscent of the pattern by which terrorists mount an attack."⁷

This possibility elicits one worrisome scenario because of where it occurred. Passage through the Malacca Straits involves a five-hundred-mile voyage along narrow shipping lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. One-fourth of world trade and fifty percent of all oil passes through this critical waterway aboard two hundred ships a day. A Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), slightly longer than three football fields, carries two million barrels of crude oil, which when refined is about what all the cars and SUVs in America consume in one day. "Armed



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pirates at night scamper up the sides, creep aboard, take over the ship, tie up the crew; the VLCC will steam out of control down the narrow, heavily trafficked channel and collide with another ship or break up on the rocks, closing this vital commercial conduit and creating an economic and environmental catastrophe of global proportions.”⁸ Now suppose that instead of a VLCC, pirates hijack a tanker carrying six hundred tons of liquefied natural gas and turn it over to terrorists. They turn it into a floating bomb and sail it into the port of Singapore. The explosion “would cause a fireball with a diameter of 1,200 meters, destroying almost everything within this range and causing a large number of fatalities and casualties well beyond it.”⁹ Costs due to the closure of this port “could easily exceed US\$200 billion per year.”¹⁰

In reality could this happen? In October 2000, terrorists pulled alongside the USS Cole while it was refueling in Aden, Yemen. They detonated a bomb that ripped a hole forty feet by forty feet in the destroyer and killed seventeen Americans and injured forty-two. Two years later a small boat struck a French supertanker and exploded. The ship caught fire, oil spilled, and one sailor died. In August 2004, Admiral Sir Alan West, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff for the United Kingdom, warned that Al Qa’eda and other terrorists had plans to attack merchant ships.¹¹ The Naval Intelligence Agency in Indonesia concurred. Members of Jemaah Islamiah, a terrorist group linked to Al Qa’eda, had told them that ships navigating the Malacca Straits were possible targets.¹² “The discovery of plans detailing vulnerabilities in US naval fleets on Al Qa’eda-linked terrorist suspect Babar Ahmad also puts a shadow of doubt that terrorist groups have been looking at the maritime domain as a possible mode of attack.”¹³

Endnotes

1. Simon Elegant. “Dire Straits,” *Time Asia* (29 November 2004).
2. Ibid.
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7. “Global insecurity: private navies combat Malacca Strait pirates,” *WorldNetDaily* (31 July 2005).
8. John S. Burnett. *Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas*. Dutton, 2002, 12.
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13. Ibid.

Nile Cruises - the risk of terrorism

Source: http://www.wanderlust.co.uk/mywanderlust/members/libyan-soup/experiences/nile-cruises---the-risk-of-terrorism_3040

Nov 13, 2015 – **Every large cruise ship on the Nile has armed guards aboard.** Between 1992 and 2000 a total of over 1,300 people have died in Egypt as the result of the conflict with Islamic militants. The last 7 years has seen this number rise by several hundred more. Below are some of the terrorist incidents directly related to Nile Cruises.

1992

* Sept. 30 - A spokesman for the main militant movement, the Gama'a al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), warned tourists not to enter the province of Qena, which includes some of Egypt's most famous Pharaonic temples & tombs.

* Oct. 1 -- Gama'a gunmen fired at a Nile cruiser carrying 140 Germans near Assiut, injuring three Egyptian crew.

* Aug 16 - A lone gunman fired shots at tourist boat in southern Egypt, but nobody is hurt in the brief random attack.



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* Sept 15 & 18 -- Muslim militants fired at two Nile cruise boats, the first near the village of al-Qusiya, the second on a boat carrying 22 French tourists near Abu Tig, in Upper Egypt. Both attacks missed & nobody was hurt.

1994

*Feb. 17 -- Gunmen opened fire at a Nile cruiser in Assiut, but no one hurt. Gama'a again claimed responsibility.
 *March 4 -- Gunmen fired at a Nile cruiser in southern Egypt, wounding a German woman tourist, who died after being flown back to Germany.
 *March 13 -- Gunmen fired at a Nile cruiser in southern Egypt, but no one was hurt.
 *Nov. 6 -- Gunmen opened fire at a Nile cruiser carrying 30 tourists in southern Egypt, but do not cause any damage or casualties.



A global display of terrorism and other suspicious events and security alerts is updated every 240 seconds on this [incident map](#). You can also search by individual countries and review their recent time line of events.

For security reasons all large cruise ships travel in convoy on the Nile. This means they end up in the same place at the same time as everyone else. This also means that ships are moored together and stacked up side by side often 6 deep off the riverbank. So you can forget about having a Nile view from your cabin window.

Cruise ships may be required to hand over passenger reservation data

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/cruise-ships-may-be-required-hand-over-passenger-reservation-data>

May 2010 – Security experts worry about a waterside attack using a waterborne improvised explosive device; such an attack could conceivably come while the ship was in transit or docked at port; to address this worry, DHS will require cruise ships departing and entering the United States to provide Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with passenger reservation data

Cruise ships departing and entering the United States may be required in the future to provide Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with [passenger reservation data](#) because of terrorism concerns, according to a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.

Matthew Harwood [writes](#) that in a recent report on cruise ship security, the GAO recommended that CBP study the cost and security benefits of requiring the cruise ship industry to provide automated [Passenger Name Record](#) (PNR) data to the agency for passenger screening purposes. DHS, the CBP's parent organization, agreed and responded that the agency would conduct the study and determine whether the program should be implemented.



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Harwood notes that the idea is to bring the same attention to detail to screening cruise-ship passengers that already exists for airline passengers. International airlines are already required to submit PNR information to the CBP as part of its mission to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States.

Currently, cruise ships departing or entering the United States only submit passenger manifests for CBP to check against terrorist watch-lists and the National Crime Information Center database.

CBP officials told GAO investigators that PNR data provides a fuller picture for better targeting of high-risk passengers, including those with suspected terrorist ties. “[PNR] data may include, among other things, a passenger’s full itinerary, reservation booking date, phone number, and billing information, which is not usually available in the manifest data,” reports the GAO.

A representative from the [Cruise Lines International Association](#) told GAO investigators that the industry

would comply with the program if CBP required them to do so, although the representative did not know if such a rule would hurt reservation rates. In 2008, 9.3 million passengers departed the United States on board cruise ships, according to the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration.



[Cruise ship docked in Venice, Italy // Source: nytimes.com](#)

Officials across DHS believe cruise ships could be a terrorist target, but a recent intelligence report from the U.S. military’s National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in January found no credible terrorist threat to cruise ships existed in 2009.

Nevertheless, the NMIC pointed to the 1985 terrorist hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship by four terrorists from the Palestinian Liberation Front as evidence that terrorists could target these vessels. After the four terrorists took control of the cruise ship off of Egypt, [they executed Leon Klinghoffer — a 69-year-old, wheelchair-bound American Jew](#) — and dumped his body and wheelchair into the sea.

Harwood writes that the big fear for homeland security officials has nothing to with terrorists finding their way on board a cruise ship though. What they dread most is a waterside attack using a waterborne improvised explosive device. Such an attack could conceivably come while the ship was in transit or docked at port. In 2000, two al Qaeda members rammed the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden with an explosive-packed 35-foot-long boat, killing themselves and seventeen sailors.

Cruise ships, however, are considered strong, resilient vessels, reports the GAO. “Coast Guard officials stated that cruise ships are built to sustain various types of attack scenarios and keep passengers safe until they are able to be rescued, and that a very large hole in the hull would have to occur to cause any significant damage to the ship.”

Joining ISIS from Seaside Resorts on Cruise Ships

Source: <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/187166#.Vq8cSFLKqHs>

2014 – If you’re on your way to Syria or Iraq to wage jihad Islamic holy war for the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist organization, why not do it in style in a cruise ship?

Apparently that’s what more and more foreign jihadists are thinking, with many of them coming from seaside resort tourist attractions.

Interpol officials revealed the new cruise ship trend to the *Associated Press*, noting the phenomenon is relatively new having sprouted up in the last three months.

Aside from sailing in the lap of luxury, the jihadists apparently seek to avoid security efforts by traveling in the ships according to Pierre St. Hilaire, director of counter-terrorism at Interpol.



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"Because they know the airports are monitored more closely now, there's a use of cruise ships to travel to those areas," St. Hilaire told *Associated Press* on Thursday. "There is evidence that the individuals, especially in Europe, are traveling mostly to Izmit (a coastal town in Turkey - ed.) and other places to engage in this type of activity."

In order to combat the new terror travel threat, Interpol is launching a pilot program known as I-Checkit to have airlines bounce passenger information through Interpol's databases. Plans are to expand the system to include cruise operators, banks, hotels and more.

Assessing the danger, St. Hilaire stated "it's a global threat - 15,000 fighters or more from 81 countries traveling to one specific conflict zone." He added that there are roughly 300 ISIS jihadists who came from China.

From seaside paradise - to jihadi "paradise"?

Not only are more and more jihadists traveling to join ISIS on cruise ships, they also are largely coming from the north African Muslim country of Tunisia - and particularly from the tourist seaside resort town of Sousse.

According to analysts who spoke to *Al Jazeera*, Sousse has provided up to 1,000 jihadists to Syria and Iraq, and Tunisia is perhaps the leading source of foreign jihadists in Syria, with figures by April already being as high as 3,000 Tunisian jihadists.

The Qatar-based paper noted that within Sousse certain neighborhoods such as Al-Qalaa Al-Kubra, Al Riyadh and others are centers of jihadist recruit, and likewise are sites of clashes between the jihadists and state authorities.

Many of the recruits are not particularly religious, although most are young Muslims who recently rediscovered their Islamic faith, according to an analyst who spoke to the paper.

He added that they are recruited through "religious rhetoric that combines sermonizing with stories of the suffering of Muslims around the world," and that the message is spread over the internet.

In most cases the jihadists reach Syria or Iraq by leaving for Turkey, where they can enter without a visa. Some go to Libya first to participate in military training before joining the jihad.

While most of the jihadists from Sousse die or go missing, a large number have reportedly returned to Tunisia and evade prosecution.

The United States Coast Guard proposes airport style security checkpoints at cruise ship terminals

Source: <https://technology.ihs.com/518579/the-united-states-coast-guard-proposes-airport-style-security-checkpoints-at-cruise-ship-terminals>

Dec 2014 – While the aviation industry has implemented strict security screening regulations, cruise ship security screening remains relatively soft in comparison. This is expected to change as the United States Coast Guard looks to increase screening requirements for passengers and their baggage in 2015.

The US Coast Guard recently announced plans to standardize passenger security screening procedures at cruise ship terminals throughout the United States with the creation of the Terminal Screening Program (TSP). Based on US Coast Guard figures there are currently 137 regulated cruise ship terminals, operated by 23 cruise line companies in the United States. IHS found that the proposed regulations are not mandatory, resulting in projected slow uptake over the short-term of new explosives, weapons and contraband (EWC) detection equipment in the cruise ship industry.

In IHS' recently published report on the explosives, weapons and contraband detection equipment market the seaports market is forecast to grow by a CAGR of 6.7% to \$241.6 million in 2018. Currently many cruise ship terminals use a combination of X-Ray, people screening, explosives detection systems (EDS), canine teams, and manual inspections. Larger cruise ship terminals are expected to prefer the efficiency and greater throughput that newer X-Ray and EDS equipment offers, while smaller cruise ship terminals will be slower to adopt new EWC equipment, preferring instead to use a combination of canine teams, manual inspections, and EWC detection equipment.



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The TSP is expected to increase security at cruise ship terminals by:

- Developing a standardized list of prohibited items.
- Developing training standards to consolidate requirements for screeners and eliminate redundancies in cruise ship security regulations.
- Requiring the screening of all passenger, crew, and visitors' baggage and personal items.

IHS found that the TSP does not require cruise ship terminals to purchase EWC detection equipment; however, those that do will be required to purchase equipment with similar detection capabilities to those installed at airports. EWC detection equipment for use in airports typically carries a higher purchase price due to the increased capability of this equipment resulting from strict detection standards. IHS expects the long-term impact of the TSP to be positive, as cruise ship terminals in the United States replace older equipment with newer, more advanced EWC detection equipment. However, IHS does not expect the TSP to generate a spike in growth over the short-term. Instead, normal replacement cycles are expected for most of the cruise ship industry over the next 12 – 24 months.

While the long-term impact on the United States cruise ship market is expected to be positive, IHS believes that the adoption of the TSP in the United States will have long-term implications for the global cruise ship market. Much like the aviation industry, the United States became a leader in airport screening regulations after the September 11, 2001 attacks. IHS expects the adoption of cruise ship screening regulations in the United States to result in the development of similar screening regulations in other regions.

Although terrorist threats to the cruise ship industry are very small in comparison to aviation, cruise ships are considered a unique target due to the large number of passengers carried on each ship. Unlike the aviation industry, cruise ships are more resilient than aircraft which will result in the development of specific screening requirements for the cruise ship industry. IHS found only five terrorist attacks against cruise ships in the last 55 years. Despite the proposal of new regulations on the cruise ship industry, the low probability of a terrorist attack on cruise ships is expected to result in less stringent screening requirements at cruise ship terminals.

Similar to airports, the cruise ship market is event driven, and an attack on a cruise line would undoubtedly result in increased screening regulation at cruise ship terminals. While the TSP only applies to US cruise ship terminals, airport equipment manufacturers are expected to see increased opportunities to sell premium EWC detection equipment to the cruise ship market.

Jihadists take holiday cruises to warzones following intl. screening step-up

Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/203067-isis-cruise-ships-turkey/>

Nov 07, 2015 – ISIS is showing new ingenuity in ferrying fighters into Syria and Iraq untraced, after Turkey stepped up its own efforts at border check-ups. Terrorists are now reportedly taking cruise ships to the warzones, Interpol told the AP.



The problem of the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) bulking up and recruiting en masse has been one of the greatest obstacles to eradicating the group. For a while now the world didn't have a proper mechanism to stem the flow of fighters to the IS' new heartland.

The recent airstrike campaign by the US has hardly put a dent in the movement of fighters making their way to Syria, which "remains

constant, so the overall number continues to rise," according to a US intelligence official.



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And it's not just cruise ships that worry Interpol, which is having its general assembly in Monaco this week. *"Originally, our concern about people on cruise ships — dangerous people on cruise ships — really focused on the classic sort of rapist, burglar or violent criminal,"* outgoing chief Ronald Noble told the news agency.

"But as we've gathered data, we've realized that there are more and more reports that people are using cruise ships in order to get to launch pads, if you will — sort of closer to the conflict zones — of Syria and Iraq."

Catching the terrorists on water has proven more difficult. The mode of transportation allows would-be fighters to confuse their trail by getting on and disembarking at ports of their choosing.

However, Interpol thinks it has a solution. With Turkey no longer a viable option (although the country was never truly instrumental in curtailing cross-border movements), the international policy body is reaching out to airlines.

They're preparing to expand I-Checkit – a platform allowing airlines to cross-check information with Interpol databases.

Changes to travel routes have only been registered over the last three months. But it's not known at this time how big a flow of militants is utilizing new ones.

According to Noble, *"airports and, more and more, cruise lines"* will receive support from the program. This will lead to stepped up security across all transportation hubs. Speaking to reporters in Monaco, Noble confirmed that Turkey was a high-priority destination, but declined to name others.

The NATO member previously sustained a flurry of international criticism for its porous borders – not to mention allegations of deliberately allowing terrorist movement into Syria for the purpose of weakening President Bashar Assad's hold on his country.

The Turkish government had promised to take care of airports and bus stations for its part, and claims to have already deported hundreds of suspected IS recruits. According to Interpol's director of counterterrorism, Pierre St. Hilaire, it's those successes that have led to militants finding alternate routes. *"Because they know the airports are monitored more closely now, there's a use of cruise ships to travel to those areas,"* St. Hilaire said on Thursday. *"There is evidence that the individuals, especially in Europe, are traveling mostly to Izmit and other places to engage in this type of activity."*

St. Hilaire made clear that more methods of transportation will be used in future, and that Europe is neither the only, nor the main source of the flow of fighters. China apparently is responsible for some 300.

"It's a global threat — 15,000 fighters or more from 81 countries traveling to one specific conflict zone... In order to prevent their travel and identify them, there needs to be greater information-sharing among the region, among national security agencies."

Could Pirates Attack Your Cruise Ship?

Source: <http://www.cruisecritic.com/v-5/news/news.cfm?ID=2963>

Dec 2008 – Wen [Oceania Cruises](#) announced this weekend that pirates had attempted to approach its [Nautica](#) as it cruised through the Gulf of Aden, it heightened existing concerns about passenger and cruise ship safety in that dangerous part of the world.

Nautica's captain, officers and crew [successfully evaded the pirates](#) yesterday, which is obviously the good news. No one was injured, and the ship is not even off schedule at this point. Still, increasing attacks by pirates on cargo vessels and oil tankers, not to mention this latest incident affecting a cruise ship, begs the question: If you're on a cruise ship that passes through the Gulf of Aden, what is the likelihood that pirates will attack?

In the past three years, there have been three known incidents in which pirates have targeted cruise ships in the Gulf of Aden. In 2005, [Seabourn Spirit](#) was about 100 miles off the coast of Somalia when pirates fired AK-47 machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades in an attempt to hijack the ship. That failed.

A more recent effort by pirates to attack [Le Ponant](#) -- a French, luxury sailing vessel -- in April 2008 was more successful. The ship (sailing crew-only) was hijacked; crewmembers were ultimately rescued, and the ship was recovered after a ransom was paid.



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Compared to the sheer quantity of cruise and commercial ships moving through this area -- and based on the fact that incidents impacting cargo vessels and oil tankers are clearly more common -- these three incidents do not make as big of a splash. And the cruise lines, not to mention international maritime agencies, want to keep it that way.



You're never going to hear too much from cruise lines about their tactics involving security in the Gulf of Aden (or the Straits of Malacca, between Indonesia and Malaysia, which is another hot zone for pirates). Aside from the obvious (why tip your hand to criminals), one reason is that there are no official regulations with which lines must comply. Case in point: last week, when [Seabourn Spirit](#) (photo above) made its way through the Gulf of Aden, the cruise line decided to have the ship join a convoy, led by a French military vessel, as an extra safety precaution. It was the first time that Seabourn had joined such an effort, "and we changed our schedule to do so," said Bruce Good, Seabourn spokesman. The ship followed others along a protected course on the north side of the Gulf of Aden.



Zodiac commando boats arrive at the rear of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant, whose crew was held hostage by pirates, in April 2008

Oceania's Nautica traveled on its own, but according to cruise line spokesman Tim Rubacky, it did stick to the Maritime Safety Protection Area, which is patrolled by international anti-piracy task forces. What all lines tend to do consistently is gather intelligence -- whether via government organizations, private security companies, military coalitions or the insurance companies that cover their ships. Some support is available for ship operators cruising in troubled waterways. Currently, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has four ships patrolling the region (namely in the Gulf of Aden and on a route from Mombasa, Kenya, to Mogadishu and Somalia). The main



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purpose of these ships (operated by British, Turkish, Italian and Greek navies) is to escort vessels delivering supplies for the World Food Programme, but they also provide general anti-piracy patrols. The European Union will take over the job later this month.

Although there are no laws on the books to force shipping company compliance, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) does suggest tactics, techniques and technologies that offer interesting tips for pirate-attack evasion. For instance:

Ships should have a security plan that anticipates an attack by pirates. "Planning and training must be on the basis that an attack will take place and not in the belief that, with some luck, it will not happen." Officers and crew are asked to rehearse elements of the plan.

"Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent," the IMO guidelines stress. Tools to offer advance warning include, among others, "low-light binoculars," yacht radar that detects small crafts, night vision devices and barbed wire.

To avoid pirates, the IMO guidelines offer suggestions on evasion tools, ranging from relatively low-tech options to somewhat more sophisticated ones. On the common sense scale is the recommendation that "ships should travel with lights blacked out, except for mandatory navigation lights... in addition, turning on the ship's lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dazzle them, and encourage them to desist."

One of the niftiest uses of technology to deter pirates, as employed by Seabourn Spirit in 2005, is the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD). Primarily used by warships, it serves as "a long-range hailing and warning, directed acoustic device, designed to communicate with authority and exceptionally high intelligibility in a 15-30 degree beam," Defense Update magazine said. It's, in essence, a device that sends sonic waves out to a target, and the resulting din can cause eardrums to pop and bleed, which, in effect, stuns the criminals.

One Cruise Critic member who traveled on Holland America through the Gulf of Aden reported seeing water hoses laid out on open decks, and the IMO report notes that water pressure of 80 pounds per square inch can deter attackers. Another tactic? "Provided that navigational safety allows, masters should consider 'riding off' attackers' craft by heavy wheel movements...the effect of the bow wave and swash may deter would-be attackers."

Interestingly, ships' officers are not encouraged to carry firearms. The rationale? "Carriage of arms on board may encourage attackers to carry firearms, thereby escalating an already dangerous situation."

One of the major differences between commercial vessels and cruise ships is that, for the former, leaving the region -- with its proximity to the Suez Canal, which connects the east to the west -- is not a possibility. For cruise lines? The reality, said Seabourn's Good, is that "the impact of continued predation by these pirates has a much bigger effect on the shipping economy than on us."

Still, if enough passengers vote with their wallets to skip the repositioning cruises that transit ships from the Mediterranean to Asia, it could impact deployment. "One of the basics of deployment is that you put ships where people will buy tickets," Good said. If the stakes get riskier -- and if passengers are increasingly put off -- you could see a real drop in opportunities to cruise in such diverse and exotic places as the Middle East and Asia.

Piracy precautions serious business on cruise ships

By Jane Ann Morrison

Source: <http://www.reviewjournal.com/columns-blogs/jane-ann-morrison/piracy-precautions-serious-business-cruise-ships>

April 2015 – Watching Tom Hanks in "Captain Phillips," the real-life story of Somali pirates taking over an unarmed cargo ship, probably wasn't the smartest way to prepare for a cruise that would sail past Somalia and other pirate waters.

However, I had faith that Holland America was not about to let anything happen to the Amsterdam. Even before I left, the itinerary had been changed so that the ship would not be stopping at three ports in Egypt because of security concerns.



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Despite my confidence in the cruise line, it was a little shocking, when boarding the Amsterdam in Dubai, to see the barbed wire on the third deck, the first open deck pirates could possibly board. Then there were the water hoses, pointed down toward the water line. Also noticeable were the security guards with binoculars on guard 24 hours a day.

Those were just the visible anti-pirate precautions.

Piracy protection was no joke, although when I showed Capt. Jonathan Mercer a photo of my cat wearing a pirate hat for Halloween, he did laugh.



Mercer informed passengers what steps would be taken as the ship sailed through the Arabian Sea through the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea before heading through the Suez Canal.

When I asked for someone to interview, he set me up with security officer Dennis Superable, an anti-piracy expert who had been on the Amsterdam for 15 years, the last seven as a supervisor.

His knowledge is useful in other places as well. Pirates are not just in the Suez Canal or Somalia. The Indian Ocean has pirates, as does Indonesia and the

Singapore Straits. So does the west coast of Africa.

Superable answered the question "Captain Phillips" raised. Were there guns on board the Amsterdam? No.

He explained because Holland America ships fly under the Dutch flag, they do not have firearms. "Our weapon is our ship," he said.

The Amsterdam is not like other ships that pirates have attempted to board, such as the Seabourn Spirit in 2005, carrying 302 passengers and crew. A BBC story at the time said at least two speedboats fired weapons and rocket-propelled grenades at the ship. However, the crew fended off the pirate attack.

Seabourn now has armed security guards because their ships don't sail under the Dutch flag. They sail under the Bahamian flag.

That ship was more vulnerable because it was "low and slow," Superable said.

The Amsterdam was capable of going 25 knots and actually picked up its travel pace to 20 knots in areas where there were concerns.

Holland America also has fleet inspectors, security experts who fly from the United States into ports and gather intelligence if there are concerns. That's one reason Egypt was nixed.

The captain's letter to passengers spelled out other invisible precautions. The ship reports to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization, which coordinates all the coalition warships in the area assigned to anti-piracy operations. Warships and AWACS, a military surveillance system carried by aircraft, also monitored the cruise ship.

Long Range Acoustic Devices were "rigged, manned and ready for immediate use," according to Mercer. LRADS, or sound cannons, are acoustic hailing devices and sonic weapons capable of sending harmful, pain-inducing tones over longer distances than normal loudspeakers.

He said if pirates did try to board, there would be an announcement, and passengers would be asked to move out of their staterooms and into corridors or interior spaces but to stay away from windows and doors and sit down "as any maneuver attempted by myself may result in heeling of the ship."

Some people made it clear they were nervous about a potential pirate attack. One woman told me she "didn't like it" when a pilot boarded the ship to lead it through the Suez Canal, though it was just one man boarding at the water level.

At one point, Stein Kruse, chief executive officer of the Holland America Group, joined the ship for a few days between Haifa and Athens and told passengers that the ship could tap into the intelligence resources of the FBI and the CIA.

Pirates weren't the only concern.



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Starting March 26, Saudi Arabia began airstrikes against Yemen, and there was violence in the port city of Aden. The next day, two Saudi jet fighters had mechanical problems and ejected into the Gulf of Aden. The Amsterdam would be sailing in that area a few days later.

Mercer made defensive changes along the way.

On March 30, we were entering the Red Sea less than four miles from the Yemen coast, and Capt. Mercer kicked our speed up to 23 knots in that area, before dropping back to 16 knots.

The ship stayed longer in Dubai, not for shopping but because he was concerned that the route between Dubai to Muscat, Oman, involved a very slow speed through the high-risk area for piracy. So the schedule was altered and the ship hustled to Muscat.

But there was one bit of excitement that day. A small vessel was spotted heading straight toward the Amsterdam. The officers on the bridge took note while people on the decks who noticed it rushed to take photos.

Now, they have photos of an off-course fishing ship. But no pirate photos.

Terror for 1,200 Britons as Somali pirates with rocket launchers attack cruise ship

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1159564/Terror-1-200-Britons-Somali-pirates-rocket-launchers-attack-cruise-ship.html>

March 05, 2009 – More than 1,200 British holidaymakers on a round-the-world cruise came under a terrifying attack from pirates armed with rocket launchers.

The 715ft-long Balmoral came under fire four times from Somali bandits, a crew member said.

The 43,000-ton cruise ship was forced to zigzag violently to evade its pursuers as the pirates gave chase in two small craft in the notoriously dangerous waters off Somalia.

One crew member said in e-mails to her boyfriend back in Britain that the pirates circled the ship and came within 400 yards of the cruise ship, The Sun reported.



Target: The 43,000-ton Balmoral was circled by pirate vessels in waters off the coast of Somalia

'I stood on the deck and watched through binoculars at men in the fishing boat armed with AK-47 rifles and rocket launchers,' she said.

'People were all over the place and everyone was in tears.

'We could hear shooting. It started following us and we had to call the US Navy.'

Many of the passengers 'were in tears and frightened to death', she added.

The alert was raised on Tuesday morning when the boats appeared out of nowhere and closed in rapidly.

Alarmed by the 'suspicious' activity of the unidentified craft, the Balmoral's crew made emergency calls, holiday firm Fred Olsen Cruise Lines said today.



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They also sent up distress flares and the ship's staff toted fake 'guns' made out of pieces of wood, hoping the pirates would be deterred if crew appeared to be armed, according to reports.

The ship's 1,300 passengers - 95 per cent of them British and mostly elderly - were then herded below deck into 'safe havens' on the Balmoral.

The attack was only averted by the intervention of a U.S. Navy ship which escorted the cruise vessel through the perilous Gulf of Aden.

The incident came just over two weeks into the passengers' three-month cruise, as the Balmoral sailed from Jordan towards India.

Pirates attacked more than 130 merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden last year - more than double the

number of the previous year. From April to December last year 42 vessels were hijacked and Somali pirates extorted £100million as ransom.

[Map showing the African coastline where the cruise ship Balmoral came under attack](#)

The stretch of the Indian Ocean is now monitored by an international military task force.

Passenger Stuart McKellar, speaking from his cabin on the Balmoral, said the crew realised they were being followed by a 'small craft' at around 3.30pm GMT.

He added: 'We had been warned that there may be problems and had drills in advance.'

'But when the captain told us, on the tannoy, to go below deck, he was very clear this was no drill.'

Mr McKellar, 49, a property developer from Morpeth, Northumberland, praised the orderly handling of the crisis.

'All the passengers were ordered to go and sit down in a safe haven - there was concern but it was all quite civilised,' he said.

'The majority of the passengers on board the ship are elderly but everyone was taken safely back to their cabins.'

He added: 'I understand that we were helped to safety by a navy ship - it was either British or US-owned.' Despite the scare the Balmoral was due to arrive on schedule, the holiday company said.

'Balmoral encountered suspicious activity by two small craft, closing at high speed,' a Fred Olsen spokeswoman said.

'The ship's master requested passengers to assemble in "safe havens" as part of a pre-planned safety procedure.

'Aggressive manoeuvring was implemented and contact was made with the EU Coalition Task Force.'

However, military sources involved in monitoring the protected zone of the Gulf of Aden said the incident was 'a false alarm'.

The Balmoral, which is due to arrive tomorrow in Salalah, Oman, was refitted last year and has 738 cabins. The cruise left Dover on February 14, with cabin prices starting at £6,995.

Pirate cruises?

Source: <http://www.idaratmaritime.com/wordpress/?p=211>

For many people cruises in the Indian Ocean have been an idyllic experience, as P&O say on their Website: *"Cruise into the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, and the perfect beaches and idyllic charm of the Maldives and Seychelles will greet you. Regarded by many as*



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paradise isles, they live up to their reputation with ease. Swaying palms, turquoise lagoons, exotic fruits and dense tropical forests can be found, offering a true castaway experience.”

However, the upsurge of pirate attacks on merchant vessels, particularly in 2008 and 2009, in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, has focused attention on the possibility of more pirate attacks on cruise liners.

Since 2005 there have been three confirmed attacks on cruise liners, and the hijacking of the French sail cruising vessel, *Le Ponant*. A number of operators, such as P&O, appear to have withdrawn from this market, partly because of passenger concerns, and also because of their dissatisfaction with poor port facilities and high costs in East Africa.

To date no passengers have been kidnapped by pirates in the Indian Ocean, the *Le Ponant* was carrying only its 30 crew when it was taken in April 2008, and the only injuries sustained were to Michael Groves, Master-at-Arms of the *Seabourn Spirit*, who was hit by shrapnel, while operating an LRAD when that ship was attacked in November 2005. Groves and Som Bahadur both received bravery awards from the Queen in 2007 for their work in defending the ship.

The four incidents that have been reported are:

- **5 November 2005** The *Seabourn Spirit* which was carrying 151 passengers was attacked 115 km. off the Somali coast at 5:50 am, by two skiffs supported by a mothership, RPGs and guns were fired at the ship. The crew used LRADs and firehoses, and sunk one skiff by ramming it. Assistance was given by the USS Gonzalez.
- **4 April 2008** the French sailing cruising vessel *Le Ponant* was hijacked by two skiffs in the Gulf of Aden, 30 crew members were taken hostage and were freed on the 11th April 2008 after a \$2 million ransom was paid. The crew did not appear to resist the attacks.
- **30 November 2008** at 9:30 am local time, the *Oceania Nactica* was attacked in the Gulf of Aden in the Maritime Safety Protection Area by two skiffs. One skiff closed to 300 yards and rifle shots were fired at the ship. No damage was sustained by the ship.
- **5 March 2009** The *MV Balmoral* was subject to a pirate attack, while sailing in the Gulf of Aden. A spokeswoman for Fred Olsen told Sky News, “Balmoral encountered suspicious activity by two small craft, closing at high speed. The ship’s master requested passengers to assemble in safe havens as part of a pre-planned safety procedure. Aggressive manoeuvring was implemented and contact was made with the EU Coalition Task Force (which patrols the Gulf of Aden in an effort to combat piracy).” The Balmoral fired distress flares during the attack.

Given that pirate attacks on merchant vessels have escalated over the past few years and that the area of operations (see our blogs) has now extended into the Mozambique Channel, the Arabian Sea and in the Indian Ocean, between the Seychelles and the Maldives, Idrat Maritime Ltd (IML) believes that the risk of attacks on cruise liners has therefore increased significantly.

While it is clear that all the major operators have security plans in place and that passenger drills are undertaken, we doubt that reliance, as in earlier incidents, on fire hoses and LRADs alone is sufficient, given the sophistication of the pirates’ operation. IML also believes that crew members on board these vessels should not be exposed to incoming fire from pirate boats, as was Michael Groves. Furthermore, if the reports we have seen are true and the crew of the *Balmoral* prepared fake wooden guns to wave at attackers, it is important to understand that anyone displaying such items would be the first to be shot by any attackers; IML regard such tactics as extremely foolhardy.

IML has also reviewed current cruise operations in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, we wouldn’t publish the names of vessels and operators in this blog, but will just make some general observations that we believe apply to any cruise operator carrying passengers in these waters. Although a number of major shipping lines no longer offer cruises in these waters that there are a number of options available for the adventurous traveller.

Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar

There are a number of opportunities to cruise in the waters of the Seychelles, and the islands have an attractive and popular tourist infrastructure. However, as we noted on the 17th November 2009, on the 5th November the *MV Delvina* (a bulk carrier, 53,629 dwt) was



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hijacked at 09°40S 045°05E, about 380 nautical miles south east of Dar es Salaam, and 65 nautical miles due west of Aldabra Island, in the northern part of the Mozambique Channel. There have been a number of attacks in this area, including the attack on the *Jo Cedar* and the four hour long attack on the *Felicitas Rickmers* both on the 10th November 2009. Given the readiness of Somali pirates to attack the largest vessels and their previous attacks on cruise ships, IML believes that any cruise ship entering these waters needs to be fully equipped to deal with any possible threat.

Transits of the Northern Indian Ocean, The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden

Cruise liners on popular round the world cruises still transit the Gulf of Aden en route to India, and other vessels offer cruises to the Persian Gulf via the Gulf of Aden. It is interesting that in December 2008 Hapag-Lloyd took the precaution of flying the passengers, and many of the crew, of the *MS Columbus* from Hodeidah in Yemen to Dubai, in order to avoid the possibility of a hijacking in the Gulf of Aden.

IML strongly advises all vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden, to stay within the agreed corridor, and believes that all cruise liners should seek an escort vessel for the transit. We are also very concerned about the route from the Gulf of Aden, across the Arabian Sea, to the Indian coast, given the number of attacks and hijackings along this route, in an area which is not adequately covered by naval support. The Greek-flagged cargoship, the *MV Sikonos*, was attacked on the 1st December 2009, in the area approximately 12° north and 63° east. The Kuwaiti oil tanker the *MV Album* was attacked on the 30th December 2009, in the same area and on the 2nd January 2010 the ro-ro vessel, the UK-flagged *MV Asian Glory*, was hijacked there.

Small Cruise Liners

Small cruise liners offer an attractive alternative to the larger vessels, carrying many hundreds of passengers, and can enter the smallest port. It is still possible in 2010 to cruise the region in such a vessel. Given the experience of the *Seabourn Spirit*, which is a small ship, effective security precautions are essential for such a voyage.

Overview

IML knows that the companies operating in these waters are very careful about security and all reputable firms have detailed security plans and drills in place. We are, however, concerned about the threat to cruise liners for two reasons; firstly the level of attacks and the scope of pirate operations has increased significantly in the last year, and secondly the level of sophistication of the pirates may lead them to believe that they could successfully undertake the hijacking of a cruise liner.

One of the effects of the extension of the area threatened by piracy in the Indian Ocean is that the idea of anchoring a cruise ship by a remote atoll in the Seychelles, or the Maldives, is now far more risky than it was in the past. Somali pirate “companies” have been sighted near the Maldives, and the Seychelles is now clearly one of their major areas of operations. The great advantage of cruise liners is their relatively high speed, 20 knots is not an uncommon top speed, fast enough to throw most pirate attacks off, if the Master has sufficient warning, but once these vessels are anchored they are very vulnerable to direct assault, and to attacks on their tenders.

The Ramifications of a Successful Hijacking

The only successful hijacking of a cruise ship in modern times was the hijacking of the *Achillo Lauro* in October 1985 by the PLO. This hijacking ended quickly after negotiations with the Egyptian Government, although one passenger was murdered, but the incident caused enormous political ramifications, including a confrontation between US and Italian military forces at an Italian air base, after the Egyptian airliner in which the hijackers were travelling was forced to land by US Navy aircraft. The *Achillo Lauro* was, by modern standards, a small to medium-sized cruise liner, able to take 900 passengers.

If such an incident were to happen today, and the passengers included Americans and Europeans, as would certainly be the case, then the political imperative would be to rescue the passengers. It is extremely unlikely that a hijacked cruise liner would be permitted to precede to Somali waters without a serious attempt to rescue the passengers, or otherwise disable the ship’s engines. If a medium-sized cruise liner with 1,500 elderly Britons and



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Americans was hijacked, half of whom were subject to a medical condition, requiring constant medication, the media would see this as a threat to life and limb, not as a case of kidnapping for ransom. If such a ship were to be subject to the appalling conditions experienced by the crews of vessels like the *Ariana* (see IML's blog, "[Threats, Abuse and Rusty Water: the lot of captives held by Somali Pirates](#)") then it would be difficult for the ship's doctors to maintain their passengers.

The world's 24 hour news services would carry continual reporting on the incident, interviews with distressed relatives, and with anyone who had ever been to sea in the Indian Ocean. Western politicians would be under the most extraordinary pressure, and unlike the case of the two British yachtsmen taken in 2009, this issue would remain centre stage until the problem was resolved. It would also undoubtedly be the catalyst for military intervention on the Somali mainland, with the objective of "taking-out" pirate havens. Some governments would also take the view that this was an act of terrorism, rather than an act of piracy, and this perception would guide their responses. Recent responses to other perceived "threats" show that governments normally take action to improve perceptions at home, rather than because of a detailed assessment of the complexities of the situation. The outcome of any such response could be messy for all concerned.

In short such a hijacking would be an enormous "own goal" by the Somalis, as virtually unlimited military resources would be deployed against them, and the capacity of the Somalis to undertake piracy operations would be severely limited for a number of years. Our focus, as a company, is to assist all the shipping companies that do operate in these waters, in order to ensure that all ships are resilient and can effectively resist pirate attacks.

Attack on the MSC Melody: Passengers Fought Pirates with Tables and Deck Chairs

Source: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/attack-on-the-msc-melody-passengers-fought-pirates-with-tables-and-deck-chairs-a-621708.html>



April 28, 2009 – When pirates attacked the cruise ship *MSC Melody* on Saturday, the captain was making small talk at the bar. Passengers have given a version of events that is more dramatic than the crew's accounts. They were the first to defend the ship and they are now criticizing the crew, who have been portrayed as heroes.

Ciro Pinto was certain he was right. The captain was relaxed as he enjoyed a drink at the bar of the *MSC Melody* cruise ship, chatting on Saturday afternoon with two South African passengers. The women asked him if the bands of marauding pirates posed a problem for the cruise. Never, the experienced seaman told them. After all, the ship was far -- 1,000 sea



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miles -- away from the Somali coast as it made its course across the Indian Ocean, a few hundred miles south of the Seychelles, on a 22-day cruise from Durban, South Africa, to Genoa, Italy. It was unimaginable, virtually impossible even, that flip-flop wearing pirates could attack them here.

But the small talk came to an abrupt end. According to eyewitnesses, two passengers came screaming into the bar and gesticulated wildly as they addressed the captain. A speed boat had appeared at the stern and several armed men were preparing to board the cruise ship, they said. One was already trying to scale the vessel. Several passengers were desperately grabbing deck chairs and tables and hurling them down at the men trying to board the ship.

That's when the first shots were fired. It was also the point at which the captain understood what was happening -- his ship was being attacked by pirates.

Pinto radioed an alarm code to his crew and ordered all passengers to go below deck, immediately. He then ran to the bridge. The pirates continued to try to board the ship. Pinto opened the safe and handed pistols to the security guards on board. He then called on the helmsman to steer the ship on a zig-zag course to fend off the pirates by creating large waves. The security guards, who by then had arrived at the ship's stern, fired two warning shots into the air.

Within a few minutes, the acute danger appeared to have been averted. The fact that the cruise ship's crew were armed apparently surprised the pirates. According to the account given by the MSC Cruises Company, the pirates then rode away in their speedboat, but not before firing a few salvos at the ship with their AK-47 rifles. Window panes were shattered and bullets thudded into the ship's side.

"It was like war," the captain proudly announced on an Italian radio station the next morning. The crew and security personnel had defended themselves from the attack professionally, he said.

"You Can't Hold Back Pirates with Tables and Chairs"

This may read like the script of a Hollywood thriller, but new reports from eyewitnesses show that the attack on Saturday evening was considerably more dramatic than accounts provided so far would suggest. Pierfrancesco Vago, head of the Italian shipping company MSC, confirmed the version that cruise ship passengers gave to SPIEGEL ONLINE, describing their statements as "authentic."

The new details show just how close the ship came to getting hijacked. "We were professional," Vago says, rather openly, "but we were also lucky."



He calls it luck. But passenger Jules Tayler, who was on the ship's afterdeck, calls it "pure chance."

Initially, no one noticed the ship was being attacked. The first warning came when a woman intuitively leaned over the railing in semidarkness and noticed something when she peered down. She suddenly turned to her fellow passengers and said: "Yikes, there's a small boat next to us!"

Tayler and the others rushed to the railing and also saw what he described as five or six men sitting in a roofless pirate boat. One

started climbing a rope to the deck beneath them. "He was already halfway up," says Tayler. One passenger screamed: "Pirates!"

Without hesitation, passengers began to grab whatever they could find around them. "We immediately began throwing tables and deck chairs at the rope," said Tayler. One hit a pirate scaling it. He fell off and the boat turned around, Tayler recalls.

The skirmish between the passengers and the pirates lasted for several minutes, he says. Suddenly, the pirates opened fire -- Tayler says he counted three salvos of 25 to 30 rounds each.

Again and again, the pirate boat would approach the ship and disappear under the stern, only to reemerge. Tayler and his fellow passengers continued to throw chairs despite the gunfire. One passenger was shot in the leg and one bullet grazed the head of a crew



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member. The armed security staff finally turned up six to eight minutes into the skirmish, passengers claim.

Eyewitness Rolf R.* who spoke to SPIEGEL ONLINE about the attack over the weekend, and Jules Tayler say they are certain that the fact that chairs and tables were thrown at the pirates saved the ship. If a single armed pirate had managed to board the ship, he would easily have been able to take hostage the 600 passengers who were listening to a classical music concert in another part of the ship at the time of the incident, Rolf R. says. "The crew was totally overwhelmed and no one knew how to ring the alarm," passenger Tayler, a Brit currently residing in South Africa, says.

MSC chief Vago puts it differently: "The passengers obstructed the attackers, but they were scared off by shots from our security people."

Captain Pinto, who has been celebrated in the press as a hero, reported details of the attack to the passengers on Monday. He seemed to almost be poking fun at them. "You can't hold back pirates with chairs and tables," he told the assembled passengers.

"It was only through the exemplary work of his crew and he himself that the ship was able to fend off the pirates," cruise passenger Rolf R. recalls the captain as saying. Pinto, it seems, relished his role as a hero.

Rolf R. says more than a few passengers are irritated by the captain's posturing, and they in no way view him as a hero. "Many are now asking why the captain first had to be alerted about the shots through the passengers," says R. He is also unwilling to accept claims made by the cruise company that the passengers were never in danger. The shots were "fired at windows located just 50 meters from a group of many hundreds of passengers" attending a classical music concert, he says.

During the meeting with passengers, the captain reportedly refused to answer any critical questions. But passengers want to know why it took so long for the crew to react. And why no guards were stationed on deck at night as the ship sailed close to a region that has seen pirate attacks? And why the ship's radar hadn't triggered an early warning as the pirate boat approached?

"We Weren't in the Risk Zone"

The statements of MSC Cruises chief Vago illustrate how poorly prepared cruise ships have been up to now in dealing with the threat of pirate attacks. "Up until now, we have given more consideration to fish specialities or fine wines than attacks on the high seas," the Italian cruise executive says. The company says it has had security personnel on its ships for the past 25 years, but "because of legal provisions," they are required to keep their weapons in a safe. The captain is only permitted to distribute the guns after an alarm has been given.

In the case of the MSC Melody, the delay between the alarm and active defense was too short for pirates to be able to board the ship. Nevertheless, the photos of shattered windows in several cabins show that frustrated pirates firing around like madmen could easily have caused injuries or deaths. That's why Pinto praised his guests. He said all had immediately obeyed his order to go under deck. Many left behind their mobile phones, purses and even their shoes as they dashed to safety, he said.

MSC Cruises chief Vago has denied allegations that the cruise line jeopardized the safety of its passengers. Just before the cruise started, the company had even changed the ship's route to steer it even further away from the dangerous Somali coastal waters than originally planned. "We weren't in the risk zone," Vago emphasizes. But the scope of that zone has grown with each successive pirate attack. The pirates are operating in an ever greater area -- a trend that has grown further with the *MSC Melody* incident.

The details also tell a lot about the pirates -- the extent of their audacity and their high level of organization. Shortly after the ship's passengers had helped fend off the attackers and the captain had alerted international warships, the satellite phone on the bridge rang. "You have been attacked, you need help," a man said in broken English. "Give us your coordinates and we will come to you." Captain Pinto thought the call was strange. The man on the other end of the line didn't want to give the name of his ship, so the captain refused to state the *MSC Melody's* position. He may have saved the passengers and crew from another pirate attack.



Special Collection**CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – February 2016****"The Pirates Tried to Attack us Again"**

"The ship had been completely blacked out and made invisible to the pirates," MSC chief Vago says. "But we've become certain in the meantime that the pirates were trying to get the position data so they could attack us again." The captain has said he believes he heard street sounds in the background in the telephone conversation. And Vago says he believes that accomplices back on the mainland were trying to provide the pirates at sea with assistance.

The MSC chief is shocked by the pirate bands. He says journalists have told him that a Somali who claimed to be the head of the pirates bragged about the attack by phone on Saturday. The caller allegedly said that cruise ships were a new target for pirates. He said that, this time, they had failed due to technical reasons. "The pirates appear to feel downright incited by the war ships and the efforts being made against them," Vago says. It is just a matter of time before the next attack happens, he says.

Vago has already taken his first steps in response to the attack. "We are no longer going to travel through the dangerous areas of the Indian Ocean near the Somali coast," the cruise ship company's chief says. A trip through the region planned for another of the company's ships, the *MSC Symphonia*, for this autumn has been cancelled. "We won't travel this route and will instead take a course along West Africa," he says. The cruise line, apparently, doesn't want to have to rely on luck again as it did on Saturday.

Some good news came late Monday night, too, via the Spanish military. The frigate *Numancia* has detained nine suspected pirates who may have been involved in the attack on the *MSC Melody*. The men were found near the location where the attack took place. After being detained, the men were turned over to the authorities in the Seychelles because the attack took place in that country's waters. Still, we may never know if the men were really involved in the incident.

From Pirates to Piraeus, Transiting the Gulf of Aden: How Risky Was It?

Source: <http://www.avidcruiser.com/2011/05/03/from-pirates-to-piraeus-transiting-the-gulf-of-aden-how-risky-was-it/>



Lookouts were positioned 24/7 during our transit of the Gulf of Aden.

May 03, 2011 – Last week's post, [Silver Spirit's Transit Of The Gulf Of Aden: Uneventful? Not Entirely](#), reported that two ships had been attacked, and one hijacked, at the outset of our five-day sailing on Silver Spirit from Muscat, Oman to Safaga, Egypt.




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I am writing this post in Piraeus, Greece, which suggests that we made it across “Pirate Alley” without incident.

How risky was crossing the Gulf of Aden for us?



Somalian Piracy Threat Map: CC-by-sa Arun Ganesh, National Institute of Design Bangalore

Not very. While my intention is not to minimize the seriousness of the situation, I do want to explain why cruise ships are less susceptible to attack than other vessels that cross the Gulf of Aden.

I understand that people need some reassurances when thinking about cruising this region, so assess the facts you find here and at the links below and make your decision.

For me, traveling through the Middle East on a cruise ship was a vastly rewarding experience. I'm a risk-taker anyway, so I may be more predisposed than others when it comes to traveling in what some perceive as risky areas.

More often than not, though, I find that news is exaggerated and that many of the so-called dangers on this planet are no more risky to our lives than, say, consuming too many cholesterol-producing foods or sitting for long periods of time day after day (a proven health hazard).

Safety Measures Taken By Silver Spirit When Crossing The Gulf of Aden

1. Safety In Numbers. Silver Spirit followed international guidelines, which included passage through a 400-mile-plus “Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor” that is patrolled by an armada of naval vessels from more than 20 member states. Silver Spirit participated in a group transit, where ships are coordinated to enter and exit the corridor at scheduled times based on ship speeds.

Maintaining 18 knots per hour, Silver Spirit, for example, entered the corridor at 10 a.m. whereas Seabourn Pride, maintaining 16 knots per hour, entered 90 minutes earlier. The times are staggered in order to “optimize coordination of military assets” that provide support in higher risk areas during the most vulnerable parts of the day, at dawn and at dusk.



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Silver Spirit also took precautions to protect the most vulnerable parts of the ship, positioning aft a Magnetic Acoustic Device, a so-called “sonic weapon.”

Magnetic Audio Device on Silver Spirit.

Also, as you might imagine, there was additional protection. Think air marshals, but on a ship, two former British marines who regularly travel through the corridor on cruise and cargo ships, and who, I might add, told me that they had never been on a ship that had been attacked, despite multiple transits. And in the event of an attack, helicopters from naval vessels were standing by to provide assistance.



Lookouts had night-vision optics for spotting suspicious vessels.

2. Silver Spirit is fast. Not superfast, like Queen Mary 2, which can zip along at 29.5 knots (three times the speed of a Blue Whale, according to a Cunard fact sheet). Nor is Silver Spirit fast enough to outrun pirates, as they have skiffs that can travel up to 25 knots per hour. But Silver Spirit is fast enough to make it almost impossible for pirates to board. According to the International Chamber of Shipping, pirates have “great difficulty boarding a ship” that is maintaining a speed of more than 15 knots per hour. Silver Spirit’s top speed is 21 knots.

3. Silver Spirit has a capable captain and crew. Kudos to Captain Angelo Corsaro, who addressed passengers early on to explain the risk and the transit. With a large image of the region displayed on a screen in the theater, Corsaro used a laser pointer to show that we would be in a high risk area, but he reassured all aboard that for Silver Spirit the high risk area did not constitute a “major risk.” In a moment of levity, Corsaro pointed out that he

may know pirates better than some, as his last name derives from the word corsair.

4. Silver Spirit is neither slow nor low. The ICS says that successful attacks are often carried out on ships with a low freeboard, less than 8 meters from the waterline to the first point of entry. Silver Spirit’s freeboard is tall.

In an interview during our transit, Corsaro said that pirates look for the most vulnerable part of the ship, open and low to the water level, then use ladders with hooks to board. “It’s not like you see in the movies,” Corsaro said, where swashbuckling buccaneers come swinging onto the deck as cannons blaze. “But boarding any ship at 20 knots is not easy,” he added. “We have to drop to 6 knots for the pilots to be able to board.”

Plus, if pirates were to attempt to board, Silver Spirit was prepared to zig-zap to create a wake. Avid cruisers know how difficult it is to step onto a tender when the ship is at anchor, no less, with waves sloshing. Imagine following a ship zig-zagging along at 21 knots and trying to board.

Because cruise ships pose a difficult target, cargo ships have been the primary target for pirates. Moving at speeds often not exceeding 10 knots and with open areas low to the water level, cargo ships are much easier to board – and to manage, as there are fewer human souls to hold hostage.

Vigilance Required

Of course, cruise ships aren’t immune to piracy attempts. The most publicized pirate attack, and indeed the closest call, was in 2005, when pirates attacked Seabourn Spirit, carrying 151 passengers. The pirates came close but were unsuccessful. Still, that incident did not stop Seabourn Pride from transiting the Gulf of Aden along with us last week. It’s not



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conceivable that a cruise line would risk the lives of its passengers to fulfill an itinerary. I think it's fair to put some trust in the company's whose reputations for safety are at stake.

There is a flip side to piracy. Perhaps piracy would not exist had Somalis not been set afloat in such dire straits. This is not a statement intended to defend the pirate's actions but rather to illustrate the root of the problem.

A United Nations report has suggested that piracy off the coast of Somalia is caused in part by illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign vessels that have, according to Somali fishermen, severely constrained the ability of locals to earn a living and forced many to turn to piracy instead.

Precise data on the current economic situation in Somalia is scarce but with an estimated per capita GDP of \$600 per year, Somalia remains one of the world's poorest countries. Millions of Somalis depend on food aid and in 2008, according to the World Bank, as much as 73% of the population lived on a daily income below \$2.

There are at least two approaches to ending piracy in the Gulf of Aden: 1) Continue to blow pirates out of the water and risk lives. 2) Or find a way to address some of the problems that some say have driven Somalis to their unlikely profession.

Are You Safe From Pirate Attacks on Your Cruise?

Source: <http://seniortravel.about.com/od/cruises/ff/Piracy.htm>

Jan 28 – **The answer to this question depends on your itinerary.**

The best way to avoid having to worry about [pirate attacks](#) is to skip cruises that take you through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, North Indian Ocean, the Malacca Straits or the South China Sea. Many of these voyages are so-called "[repositioning cruises](#)" that are used to move cruise ships from one body of water to another. Unfortunately, [Somali pirates](#) have not only hijacked cargo ships but also pursued passenger liners, according to the International Chamber of Commerce's [International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre](#).

The pirates' objectives are to steal passengers' valuables and demand ransom for the safe return of hostages. In recent years, the pirates have focused primarily on merchant vessels and fishing boats, thanks to the anti-piracy efforts of the international maritime community, but the threat to cruise ships has declined, not disappeared.

The US State Department's [Worldwide Caution for Africa](#), updated July 29, 2015, includes the following warning:

U.S. citizens considering travel by sea near the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, or in the southern Red Sea should exercise extreme caution, as there have been armed attacks, robberies, and kidnappings for ransom by pirates.

The warning also mentions possible hijackings of merchant vessels and tells US travelers planning to take a cruise that travels through the areas mentioned above to contact their cruise lines to find out which anti-hijacking measures have been put in place to protect passengers.

Although an international naval force is patrolling these waters, the [area involved](#) is quite large and it is easy for the naval patrols to miss small pirate vessels.

The State Department's [International Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Fact Sheet](#) mentions pirate attacks and robbery at sea off the coast of Venezuela, but, as of this writing, these attacks appear to be aimed at general cargo vessels and small yachts.

How to Minimize the Risk of Pirate Attacks

With so many cruise itineraries to choose from, avoiding pirate-infested waters is a simple process.

All you have to do is select an itinerary that is far away from [areas where acts of piracy have occurred](#).

Evidence suggests that pirates are moving farther out into international waters, so paying attention to news of pirate attacks will help you choose a safe itinerary.



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Although various media outlets have suggested, as did the Daily Mail in February 2015 that ISIS might take to piracy in the Mediterranean Sea the self-styled Islamic State has not yet committed an act of piracy against a cruise ship.

If you must travel through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, North Indian Ocean or the Malacca Straits, take every precaution. Leave jewelry, cash and valuables at home. Make copies of your passport and other important travel documents. Keep one copy with you and leave a second set with a relative or trusted friend at home. Be sure to [register your trip](#) with your Department of State or Foreign Office. Carry a list of emergency contact numbers, including the numbers of your local embassies and consulates, with you. Be sure your family and friends know your itinerary so they can advocate for you if your cruise ship is attacked by pirates.

How the Next Jihadist Terror Attack against Cruise Passengers Will Happen

By Jim Walker

Source: <http://www.cruiselawnews.com/2015/03/articles/terrorism-1/how-the-next-jihadist-terror-attack-against-cruise-passengers-will-happen/>

March 24, 2015 – For the past couple of years I've been troubled by the increasing violence in North Africa and the Middle East and the unprecedented nature of the cruelty of jihadist terrorists who have beheaded and burned "infidels" alive. I have worried about various scenarios where cruise passengers are at risk of attack.

We already know that al Qaeda has planned to seize cruise ships and execute passengers.


Our readers have sent us various scenarios of how cruise passengers are at risk on the high seas and in ports of call.

A terrorist fires a RPG into a cruise ship: Libya is awash in weapons after Colonel Muammar Gadaffi was killed and lost control of the country. Automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades (RPG's), mortars, bazookas, and anti-aircraft guns have fallen into the hands of violent religious fanatics. The two Tunisian terrorists killed during the attack on Costa and MSC cruise passengers were trained in Libya. ISIS and Al Qaeda, of course, have access to weapons, including RPG's, throughout the Middle East.

Think it's far fetched? Think again. Al Qaeda has already used this weapon to attack tankers in the Middle East. In the video below, you can see the terrorists fire their weapons, yell Allah Akbar ("God is Great") and run off into the bushes. Cruise ships are easy targets, over three football fields long and 15 stories high, moving at only a few knots an hours while entering and leaving ports. A RPG would slice through the aluminum hull like butter and cause fire, damage, injuries and death. They're sitting ducks without military

escorts.

A USS Cole-style kamikaze attack on a cruise ship: Remember the U.S.S. Cole? 17 service men and women were murdered when suicide bombers rammed their speed boat loaded with explosives into the U.S. navy ship. Such an attack during a fueling operation while a fuel barge is alongside a cruise ship



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would result in a tremendous explosion with many hundreds of deaths.

Blowing up a tour excursion bus: There have been many tour buses filled with tourists which terrorists have attacked over the years. A bus with Korean tourists was exploded in Egypt last year. The saying "safety in numbers" doesn't apply to cruise passengers; its more likely to make you a target when you come off of a cruise ship and board a bus with fifty other passengers. You can see what a terrorist attack on a bus looks like in the video below.

Al Qaeda embeds themselves as crew members or passengers: After 9/11 and the attack on the twin towers, my office received a call from an agitated U.S. crew member (a musician). He was upset that other crew members on a U.S based cruise ship which sailed into Miami were literally cheering while watching televised images of the death and destruction. Some cruise lines boast that their crew come from 60 different countries. This may well be an asset in most circumstances but it underscores the fact that the crew members have loyalties to other countries and other causes than those shared by U.S. passengers.



A reader of my recent article for Yahoo Travel titled [Is Cruising Safe? A Chilling Look at an Industry Under Siege](#) offered this scenario:

"... This isn't about the ports and the safety of them. A terrorist could be among you at the buffet, laying by the pool, playing slots, drinking at the bar ... they lay in wait. They're

completely legitimate looking like one of us. 50 of them could board a ship as a passenger with a clean record. They've been trained in other countries. They've lived in the countries they're in for years and they lay in wait anticipating their marching orders. Then three days into the cruise, they take over the ship and start killing passengers . . . And that's how it'll go down."

The cruise industry needs to wake up. Tunis was preventable. Greater attention to Al Qaeda and ISIS is necessary to avoid a similar if not worse attack on innocent passengers. Dangerous ports need to be avoided. In the past, Princess Cruises used security teams / police to accompany tour bus excursions in Egypt. Maritime security teams are also required in foreign ports of call to address the risk of waterborne attacks. Cruise lines are overflowing with cash. The cruise industry collects around \$40 billion a year, pay their crew members peanuts and doesn't pay U.S. taxes. The industry needs to start investing some of those tens of millions of dollars into substantial security to keep their guests safe.

Italian cruise ship adrift in waters known for pirates

Source: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/italian-cruise-ship-adrift-in-waters-known-for-pirates-1.1296025>

Feb 2012 – An Italian cruise liner carrying more than 1,000 people was adrift without power in the pirate-infested Indian Ocean on Monday after a fire erupted in its generator room. The blaze was extinguished without causing any injuries, an official said.

Tug boats from the island nation of Seychelles were steaming toward the drifting Costa Allegra, which had 636 passengers and 413 crew members on board, but they were not expected to arrive until Tuesday afternoon at the earliest.

Italian coast guard officials said a large French fishing boat could be the first vessel to reach the stricken cruise liner.

Monday's fire on the Costa Allegra immediately raised fears, since it occurred only six weeks after one of its sister ships, the Costa Concordia, hit a reef and capsized off Italy, killing 25 people and leaving seven missing and presumed dead. Both ships are operated by Costa Crociere SpA, which is owned by the Florida-based Carnival Corp.

However, company officials rushed to play down concerns.



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The Costa Allegra is adrift "and being pushed by the current. It is stable and upright," Costa Crociere SpA official Giorgio Moretti told reporters in a conference call late Monday from company headquarters in Genoa, Italy.

**Fire under investigation**

No one was injured in the fire in the generator room and the cause of the fire was under investigation, Moretti said. The fire knocked out power to the ship's engines as well as to its lights and air conditioning. Italian Coast Guard officials said emergency generators were keeping the ship's control room illuminated and communications equipment such as radios running. Officials said the cruise liner was holding steady, despite 5-foot (1.5 meter) waves in the area and passengers were being kept in the ship's big communal rooms, not in their cabins.

Moretti, a longtime Costa captain, said he expected the 636 passengers aboard would spend the night on outside decks. Among them were 212 Italian, 31 British and eight U.S. passengers, he said.

Cruise headed for Victoria

Costa Crociere SpA said in a statement the ship was about 20 miles (32 kilometers) from Alphonse Island, one of the atolls in the Seychelles, a nation of islands and atolls that is a popular tourist destination.

The Allegra had left northern Madagascar, off Africa's southeast coast, on Saturday and was cruising toward the port of Victoria, Seychelles' capital, when the fire erupted. Costa said the Allegra had been due in Victoria on Tuesday.

Waters known for pirate attacks

The general region where the cruise ship was adrift -- off the coast of Tanzania -- has seen a rash of attacks by Somali pirates, but they have never hijacked a cruise ship.

Moretti said an armed nine-member Italian military team on anti-pirate duty was aboard, but he insisted the maritime region where the ship was now "isn't a high risk area for pirates."

"If pirates attack, the armed guards on board will respond. But as far as I am aware, no pirates have been sighted in the area," said Seychelles presidential spokeswoman Srdjana Janosevic.

A cargo ship was due to reach the Costa Allegra early Tuesday, and Moretti said it would bring batteries and otherwise help with communications. On Tuesday morning, a helicopter is expected to arrive, ferrying in "fresh food, cell phones and walkie talkies."

Tugs from the Seychelles island of Mahe, the largest island in the Indian Ocean archipelago, will arrive Tuesday afternoon.

"Once they arrive, they will decide which port" to take the Allegra to, Moretti said. "It depends on sea conditions."



Passengers On Board German Cruise Ship AIDA Diva Have a Special Encounter with EU Naval Force Warship FGS Hessen at Sea in the Gulf of Aden

Source: <http://eunavfor.eu/passengers-on-board-german-cruise-ship-aida-diva-have-a-special-encounter-with-eu-naval-force-warship-fgs-hessen-at-sea-in-the-gulf-of-aden/>



March 29, 2014 – It's not every day that passengers on board a civilian cruise liner would get so close to a warship on operations that they could wave to each other, but this is just what happened last week when the German cruise liner, AIDAdiva, with over 2,000 passengers on board, met German frigate FGS Hessen at sea.

On Saturday 22 March, FGS Hessen, which is currently operating with the EU Naval Force, was conducting routine counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, when the AIDAdiva, which was built in Papenburg, Germany came over the horizon. The cruise ship was en-route to the Mediterranean, having departed from the port of Salalah in Oman a few days earlier.

Piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden has reduced significantly since 2012 thanks to patrols by naval warships and the self-protection measures of merchant ships transiting the area. In fact, no ship has been pirated off the coast of Somalia since May 2012. That said, the EU Naval Force is fully aware, that whilst the security has improved, the threat from pirate attacks remains, so the warship patrols continue day and night.

Speaking about FGS Hessen's meeting at sea with AIDAdiva, the commanding officer of FGS Hessen, Commander Dirk Jacobus said "It is very important that my crew remains fully trained to protect vulnerable ships as they sail through the piracy high risk area and it is common for German ships to interact in some way when they meet each other at sea. We carried out a small number of training exercises with AIDAdiva, which I think was a nice surprise for the passengers. FGS Hessen has been away from home since December 2013 and I saw big smiles on the faces of my crew when they sighted the German cruise liner, as it was like seeing a little piece of home.

The exercises with FGS Hessen generated a lot of enthusiasm on board AIDAdiva, with the passengers shouting enthusiastically and waving their hands. They were able to watch as the warship's helicopter landed on the deck of the cruise liner and then conducted a 'fast



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roping' exercise at the front of the ship. At the end of the exercises, and with many photographs taken, FGS Hessen gave a traditional 'sail past' farewell. Commander Jacobus then passed a final radio message to AIDADiva. "I wish you and your families a safe and happy trip home. I will remember our meeting for a very long time."

FGS Hessen will remain in the piracy high risk areas until Tuesday 1 April 2014. She will then hand over her counter piracy duties to German frigate, FGS Brandenburg and start her journey home through the Mediterranean to her home port of Wilhelmshaven in the north of Germany.

Mediterranean under threat from Somali-style piracy from fighters loyal to Islamic State

Source: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/559902/Mediterranean-threat-Islamic-state>

Feb 23, 2015 – A report by the Italian Ministry of Defence warned that ISIS had already taken control of Libyan ports and boats and, "could repeat the scenario that has dominated the maritime region between Somalia and Aden for the last ten years".



It added: "Speed boats could attack fishing boats, cruise ships, small merchant ships, as well as coast guards in this case more to capture prisoners to exhibit in orange jumpsuits."

Chris Parry, Rear Admiral, has warned ISIS pirates would pose a greater danger to shipping and yachting than the Somalis because they are more sufficiently armed.

He said: "You are going to get them turning up with surface-to-air missiles. Helicopters are going to come

down if you are not careful."

He added that Isis would hold an "endless supply" of fighters and weapons from Syria and Libya.

According to the United Nations Environment Programme, the Mediterranean constitutes about 15 per cent of global shipping activity.



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Piracy could end leisure sailing, damage the cruise industry and increase living costs for Europeans, with cargo forced to travel by road and rail. In 2014, over 17,000 ships passed through the channel.

Gerard Batten UKIP MEP has spoken out about the latest threat, voicing concern about Britain's defences. "In the past, the royal navy eradicated piracy," he said.

"Now, our defences have been so run down that it's doubtful we could ever mount a serious, independent action against them."

"Even when the royal navy combated piracy off Somalia, the captured pirates were treated with kid gloves and protected by the Court of Human Rights."

"They should be destroyed at sea," Mr Batten added.

Hunt for pirates after ship disappears from UK waters

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/12/arctic-sea-pirate-ship-hijack>

Aug 12, 2009 – Speculation continues about the fate of missing vessel the Arctic Sea, feared taken in Europe's first significant case of maritime piracy in living memory after it was reportedly boarded by an armed group.



Theories include the ship being given a false identity to steal other vessels' cargos, or that Russian gangsters are using it to smuggled illegal arms. But an expert has suggested it may have been seized as part of a commercial dispute. The 98-metre Russian-crewed cargo ship set off from Finland on 23 July carrying timber worth about £1m and bound for the Algerian port of Bejaia.

In the early hours of the next morning, in the Baltic Sea near the Swedish island of Oland, the ship was boarded

by up to 10 armed men dressed in police uniforms, according to reports from the Russian news agency Tass.

The raiders tied up the crew as they searched the vessel and stole a few items, including a satellite phone, before leaving in their rubber dinghy. Three crew members were reportedly injured.

The attack does not seem to have been reported immediately and only emerged 10 days later when Interpol issued an alert. By this time the Maltese-registered ship had vanished. Its last confirmed contact with the outside world came just before 3pm British time on 29 July, when it radioed the British coastguard to say it was in the Dover straits and heading for Algeria. Signals from the ship's automatic identification system (AIS) beacon confirmed the position.

The communication raised no suspicions, but within hours an international police appeal was relayed to the coastguard suggesting the ship may have been hijacked.

Mark Clark, of the Maritime and Coastguard agency, said: "It is possible that the person who spoke was either a pirate or a member of the crew speaking under duress."

Alternative theories have sprung up, including the notion that criminal gangs or someone connected to the crew had been smuggling drugs or another illegal consignment amid the timber. Russian maritime officials have dismissed any notion of crew complicity, saying those on board were experienced and trusted.

Nick Davis, the chief executive of the Merchant Maritime Warfare Centre, told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "It's not carrying a valuable cargo ... [a] small [amount of] timber between the Baltic states and Algiers is not a high-value cargo, so I strongly suspect that this is probably a commercial dispute between its owner and a third party, and they have decided to take matters into their own hands."



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
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According to websites that monitor live AIS signals, the Arctic Sea, built in 1992 and owned by a Finnish company, disappeared from tracking systems in the early hours of 30 July off the northern French port of Brest. This does not necessarily mean the system was turned off, as tracking coverage can be patchy.

MISSING 'ARCTIC SEA' SHIP FOUND

The Russian navy found a missing cargo ship on Monday in the Atlantic Ocean near the Cape Verde islands, raising the prospect of solving a mystery that has baffled maritime authorities for weeks

The MV Arctic Sea, a 4,000 tonne Maltese-registered vessel carrying a \$1.3 million cargo of timber and a Russian crew, was supposed to have docked on Aug. 4 in the Algerian port of Bejaia



The ship was later spotted by a patrol aircraft off the Portuguese coast, Clark said. And then, nothing – the ship and its crew seemingly disappeared into thin air. The vessel was due at Bejaia more than a week ago but never arrived. Spanish reports say it was never seen passing the Straits of Gibraltar, meaning it could have been taken down the west coast of Africa.

"I would strongly feel that the vessel is now down off the west coast of Africa, somewhere even further down towards the Nigeria way and the vessel will probably be renamed, repainted and the crew sort of dropped off at a port somewhere, probably safe and well, to then sort of hand themselves in and say 'We were the crew of this vessel and we want to go home'," said Davis.

The Russian navy has sent ships from its Black Sea fleet to the Atlantic to hunt for the Arctic Sea, according to the country's defence ministry, while Portugal is carrying out its own search.

"We don't know what has happened but it is possible the ship was attacked by pirates," said a spokesman at the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre in Lisbon. "We are searching with planes and boats, but so far there is no sign of it."

If the case does turn out to be piracy, it would be an unprecedented situation, according to Jeremy Harrison, from the UK's

Chamber of Shipping. "It's extraordinary. This just doesn't happen. These are heavily patrolled waters," he said.

If boarders had turned off the AIS signal, finding the vessel could prove hard, Harrison said. "It can take a long time even to find boats in trouble, even when the general location is known. If the vessel is still afloat and is trying to hide – well, it's a big ocean."



Cruise Risks, Threats and Dangers: A Theory

By Peter Tarlow¹, Maximiliano E. Korstanje², Ericka Amorin³ and Jose Manoel Goncalvez Gandara⁴

¹ Texas A&M University, United States

² University of Palermo, Argentina

³ Lisbon New University, Portugal

⁴ Federal University of Parana, Brazil

Source: <http://www.tourismandmore.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Cruise-Risk.pdf>

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The present paper explores the world of cruise tourism considering not only the sociological aspects for what many consumers select these types of mobile hotels for their holidays, but also providing with an all encompassed framework to expand the current understanding of risk and mobilities in our times. The modern world, results in an aplitic tendency not necessarily due to the inevitability of risk, but because it introduces new risks for which the past does not provide us guidance from which to find solutions. From this perspective, modernity' tendency to produce rapid change and with it to introduce ever more challenging risks has greatly changed the role of the tourism security expert. The cruise-related tourism combines the classical order of control with the creation of new risks. Cruises, like all forms of tourism, are a perishable product and the result of a danger that comes to fruition is a new economic danger and risk to a business in particular and a society in general. This paper gives to reader practical suggestions to create and improve the policies aimed at protecting passengers on board.

Maritime tourism and terrorism: customer perceptions of the potential terrorist threat to cruise shipping

By Clare Bowen, Paul Fidgeon and Stephen John Page

Current Issues in Tourism. Volume 17(7), 2014; pp.610-639

Source: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13683500.2012.743973?journalCode=rct20>

Maritime terrorism is a neglected area of research in tourism, particularly the use of scenario planning to understand potential threats to the cruise industry. Since the events of 9/11, terrorism, and the threat of terrorism, has become a major concern within the tourism industry. This article analyses tourist perception of perceived terrorist threats given that many ships are American owned. Using the scenario analysis presented by Greenberg, Chalk, Willis, Khilko, and Ortiz, this study suggests that an attack on a cruise ship is a distinct possibility. Indeed, 44% of respondents questioned perceived the possibility of a terrorist attack on a cruise ship to be likely despite the fact that safety and security is seen by the industry as a 'hallmark' of cruising. Differences in attitude among potential passengers revealed a high level of confidence in the cruise ship companies. This finding is particularly marked among more experienced cruise ship passengers. However, this did not necessarily preclude the possibility of security measures being improved. All passengers appeared generally resigned to the fact that risk is associated with travel in the twenty-first century and welcomed any efforts by cruise shipping companies to improve safety and security.



Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain

GAO-10-400

Source: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf>

The Coast Guard has assessed the risks to cruise ships in accordance with DHS guidance—which requires that the agency analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—and, with other maritime stakeholders, identified some concerns. Specifically, agency officials reported in January 2010 that there had been no credible threats against cruise ships in the prior 12 months, but also noted the presence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship. The Coast Guard, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement officials generally believe waterside attacks are a concern for cruise ships. Agency officials and terrorism researchers also identified terrorists boarding a cruise ship as a concern. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which would include potential loss of life and economic effects. Federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken various actions to enhance the security of cruise ships and their facilities and implement related laws, regulations, and guidance, and additional actions are under way. DHS and component agencies have taken security measures such as the Coast Guard providing escorts of cruise ships during transit, and CBP's review of passenger and crew data to help target passenger inspections. Cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans, among other things. The Coast Guard is also in the process of expanding a program to deter and prevent small vessel attacks, and is developing additional security measures for cruise ships. In addition, CBP's 2005-2010 Strategic Plan states that CBP should seek to improve identification and targeting of potential terrorists through automated advanced information. CBP, however, has not assessed the cost and benefit of requiring cruise lines to provide passenger reservation data, which in the aviation mode, CBP reports to be useful for the targeting of passengers for inspection. GAO's previous work identified evaluations as a way for agencies to explore the benefits of a program. If CBP conducted a study to determine whether collecting additional passenger data is cost effective and addressed privacy implications, CBP would be in a better position to determine whether additional actions should be taken to augment security.



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SPECIAL ISSUE – The Dialectics of Borders Empires and Limens

Cruise passengers' perceptions of safety and security while Cruising the Western Caribbean.

*David Baker*¹

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Each year millions of people vacation aboard cruise ships, some carrying thousands of passengers and crew members. These ships are small, floating cities that offer many options for food and entertainment. However, just as in life ashore, passengers can be exposed to dangerous situations involving their safety and security. Despite lots of bad publicity about the cruise industry especially after the Costa Concordia disaster, the results of this study indicated that cruise passengers were not overly concerned about their safety and security while on a cruise. Cruise ship operators have the obligation to protect all passengers on board, this paper examines passengers' perceptions of safety and security while on a Western Caribbean cruise.



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Is the threat real?

By Ioannis Galatas, MD (Editor CBRNE-T NSL)

As one can conclude attacks against cruise ships is not a hypothetical threat. Although this is a phenomenon that have occurred mostly off-shore Somalia and Horn of Aden current developments suggest that this threat might migrate to Mediterranean Sea as well mainly due to Islamic State's affiliation with terrorist groups in Africa.



“Over the past years, tourism has proven to be a surprisingly strong and resilient economic activity and a fundamental contributor to the economic recovery by generating billions of dollars in exports and creating millions of jobs. This has been true for destinations all around the world, but particularly for Europe, as the region struggles to consolidate its way out of one of the worst economic periods in its history,” said UNWTO Secretary-General, Taleb Rifai, opening the Spain Global Tourism Forum in Madrid (January 2015).

Some important statistics from this forum indicative of why tourism is a "heavy industry" and why any attack against it will bleed any nation worldwide:


- Number of international tourists (overnight visitors): 1,138 million (2014; 51 million more than in 2013 (4.7% increase);
- Increase by region: Americas (+7%); Asia and the Pacific (+5%); Europe (+4%); Middle East (+4%) and Africa (+2%);
- Increase by sub-region: North America (+8%); North-East Asia, South Asia, Southern and Mediterranean Europe, Northern Europe and the Caribbean (7%);



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- International tourism receipts: US\$ 1,197 billion (2013 - 2014 results for international tourism receipts will be released in April 2015)
- International tourist arrivals (UNWTO forecast for 2015): 3%-4% grow;
- Arrivals by region: Asia and the Pacific (+4% to +5%); Americas (+4% to +5%); Europe (+3% to +4%); Africa (+3% to +5%); Middle East (+2% to +5%)
- **Europe consolidates its position as the most visited region in the world: 22 million arrivals in 2014, reaching a total of 588 million (+4%); Northern Europe and Southern and Mediterranean Europe led growth (both +7%), while results were more modest in Western Europe (+2%). Arrivals in Central and Eastern Europe (0%) stagnated after three years of strong growth.**



- International tourist arrivals in Asia and the Pacific (+5%; 263 million); Oceania (+ 6%); South-East Asia (+2%); Americas (+ 7% mainly – driven by North America (+8%), where Mexico posted a double-digit increase, and the Caribbean (+7%);
- International tourism in the Middle East (+4%) attracted an additional 2 million arrivals, bringing the total to 50 million;
- Africa's international tourist numbers grew by an estimated 2% while Sub-Saharan Africa saw international tourist numbers rise by 3% despite the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in a few West African countries.
- China is the world's largest outbound market since 2012 with a total expenditure of US\$ 129 billion in 2013.
- Among the other two main emerging markets, the Russian Federation (-6%) clearly lost strength in 2014, while Brazil still grew by 2%, despite the appreciation of the US dollar against the Brazilian real and slower economic growth.

Based on the above, travel and tourism industry generated US\$7.6 trillion (10% of global GDP) and 277 million jobs (1 in 11 jobs) for the global economy in 2014 indicating that this heavy industry grew at a faster rate than both the wider economy and other significant sectors such as automotive, financial services and health care.



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In Middle East the total contribution of Travel & Tourism to GDP was USD200.5bn (7.4% of GDP) in 2014, and is forecast to rise by 4.6% in 2015, and to rise by 4.6% pa to USD328.1bn (8.3% of GDP) in 2025. In 2014, the total contribution of Travel & Tourism to employment, including jobs indirectly supported by the industry, was 7.6% of total employment (5,330,000 jobs). This is expected to rise by 4.4% in 2015 to 5,564,500 jobs and rise by 3.2% pa to 7,635,000 jobs in 2025 (8.2% of total).

The total contribution of Travel & Tourism to GDP was USD1.019bn (11.3% of GDP) in 2014, and is forecast to rise by 2.9% in 2015, and to rise by 2.8% pa to USD1,375.5bn (11.9% of GDP) in 2025.

In 2014, the total contribution of Travel & Tourism to employment, including jobs indirectly supported by the industry, was 11.5% of total employment (19,628,000 jobs). This is expected to rise by 2.9% in 2015 to 20,197,500 jobs and rise by 1.8% pa to 24,217,000 jobs in 2025 (12.3% of total).

As one can observe (photo – p.70) the vessels traffic in the Mediterranean Sea is quite dense and there



are certain choke-points between North Africa hot spots and European territories (photo above).

Terrorist weaponry

What do they have and how can they use it against cruise ships (or commercial vessels)?

Element of surprise

For decades Mediterranean Sea is considered as a safe environment. This reality greatly enhances the inherent belief of "it will not happen to us!" Perhaps this attitude was understandable before the appearance of Islamic State in Middle East and the ongoing affiliations with African terrorists groups. Surprise is a powerful weapon!

Offshore Somalia piracy experience

It is a fact that piracy in Somalila and Horn of Africa declined greatly due to the presence of the international maritime fleets patrolling the area. At the same time piracy migrated to offshore Niger area while the overall situation in Somalia did not record any significant improvement in favor of the population of this country. Experience gained from piracy operations in Somalia might be recruited and used against new more attractive targets such as cruise ships in the Med Sea. Experience is an equally powerful weapon.


Intelligence



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Most of us always wondered how pirates selected their targets in open seas (e.g. Indian Ocean, Red Sea). But thanks to the Internet many information is freely available (i.e. AIS boad tracking system shown below).

*Mentality*

Brutality and terrorism are almost synonymous words but Islamic State mentality gave new dimensions in brutality characterized by total disrespect of human life. In that respect all means and all sources (symmetric and asymmetric) are expected to be used by terrorists against Western civilian “soft targets” – including CBR agents.

Weapons

The basic weaponry of Somali pirates are AK-47s and RPGs (various types). Both they are easy to acquire and very reliable in various types of environmental operations. RPGs can be used from close range from terrorist on attack speed boats (effective firing range: 200m) but also from a bigger distance (~920m) taking advantage of the self-detonation of the warhead – kind of “light” artillery. With certain modifications they can also be used against helicopters (experience gained in Afghanistan).



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On August 2013 four hundred American surface-to-air missiles were 'taken from Libya' during the terror attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Former U.S. Attorney Joe diGenova stated that the U.S. intelligence community is terrified since they might be used to shoot down airliners.

Light to carry and easy to operate, the FIM-92 Stinger is a passive surface-to-air missile, that can be shoulder-fired by a single operator (although standard military procedure calls for two operators, spotter and gunner). The missile is also capable of being deployed from a Humvee Stinger rack, and can be used by airborne troops. A helicopter launched version exists called Air-to-Air Stinger (ATAS). The warhead is a 3 kg penetrating hit-to-kill warhead type with an impact fuze and a self-destruct timer. FIM-92 Stinger has an effective firing range of 8km. Apart from its dedicated use, Stingers can be used against sea vessels as well (detection of thermal signatures from ship's engines).



As with missing MANPADs there is uncertainty of who is in control of Qaddafi's remaining missile arsenal especially after 2011 and current ongoing instability in Libya along with active Islamic State's infiltration in most of the country's coastal areas (see map below).



Estimated ranges of Libyan ballistic missiles

Modus operandi

In general it should be noted that it is the "attack" against a luxury cruiser or more that will hurt the tourist industry and not the actual killing of few tourists on board.




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The standard Somali piracy approach would be the norm. A new approach might be to disguise the attack vessel as one carrying immigrants – a common picture in the area between Tunisia/Libya and Sicily, Italy. This will allow them to come very close to a cruiser with eliciting any defense mechanisms on board. The main objective is to take over the cruiser and manage to take control of the main deck and operating crew. Of course it would be very difficult a bunch of terrorists/pirates to control hundreds of passengers and search all premises door-to-door. But they can keep on shooting and bombing until they are run out of ammo. Steal as much as possible and then use their boats to escape.

Other options would be to direct the ship in a coastal area in Libya that has been the stronghold of the attack group and demand ransom for releasing passengers and vessel. The presence of a huge “international human shield” would be enough to deter any rescue efforts from European/international security forces.



Second to use the captured ship as a floating bomb against a major European port or a coastal city.. Sometimes movie makers can foresee future and the “Speed 2” movie is worth seen.



Speed 2 – the movie



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Alternative of a port-target would the collision of captured ship with another ship – could be a cruiser or a crude oil tanker/carrier.

**Cruisers' defense issues**

Best Management Practice (BMP) provides guidance and recommendations to seafarers on the steps that should be taken to prepare and conduct a transit through the sea area affected by Somali based piracy. Additional advice and information is provided on the MSCHOA and NATO websites (www.mschoa.org and www.shipping.nato.int) to augment BMP4 (version 4, August 2011).

BMP4 is the standard for vessels' protection but comes with two possible problems: (1) hardening of a cruiser requires money; and (2) protective measures might "spoil the ambient atmosphere offered by



luxury cruisers. One might argue that security is more important than relaxing atmosphere but do all people share similar feelings? This dilemma is similar to the one faced by CEOs of luxury hotels in hot areas. But there the defensive measures are mainly deployed in the perimeter of the hotel and can be "ignored" by guests. On board, all defenses inevitably will be on the main decks all over the ship and passengers will be forced to enjoy the sea through wired fences and alike. Of course there are modern solution that do not

disturb ambience (e.g. long range acoustic devices - LRADs).




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Perhaps the best option is to employ armed security teams in plain clothing or disguised as crew members that will be activated only in case of a real emergency. In parallel, surveillance drones can be used – it can be presented as an additional attraction for the passengers without over-frustrating them. Educating the passengers via on board drills on what to do in case of a sea attack would also be beneficial. Cruisers' do that already via evacuation drills so this addition will be easily incorporated in the overall cruise adventures.

Epilogue

Prevention is better than treatment! But despite the logic of this assumption we seldomly act pre-emptively! We always need a real incident to activate our defenses and change our responses. It was only after November 2015 multiple Paris terrorist attacks that we start openly discussing the CBRNE potential of the Islamic State but I am sure how long this alertness will last – not much I am afraid! Chemical weapons can be disseminated via the central air systems of a vessel; a radiological emitting device can be easily hidden under a table in the main gala room of the cruiser and food/water can be contaminated with certain suitable pathogens – just to name a few of asymmetric scenarios. Do we need to experience them before taking action? Defensive measures and specialized training are expensive but who can state that a human life cost less?



Notes

2015 Spain Global Tourism Forum. Over 1.1 billion tourists travelled abroad in 2014. PR No.: 15006 (Madrid, January 27, 2015)

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400 Surface-air missiles stolen in Libya, Daily Mail

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2390642/400-surface-air-missiles-STOLEN-Libya-Benghazi-attack-says-whistle-blowers-attorney.html>

Brigadier General (ret'd) Ioannis Galatas, MD, MC (Army), is a retired military physician with 35 years of military industry experience (Army Medical Corps). He is specialized in Allergy and Clinical Immunology (Board certified) and for more than two decades he served as Head of the Department of Allergy & Clinical Immunology at Army General Hospital of Athens, Greece. Since 2001 he has been involved in CBRNE operations as planner and instructor trained (including live agent training) in a number of countries abroad. His main passion focus on "Hospitals' CBRN Defense & Preparedness in Megapolis Environment", "CBRNE Design/Hardening of Critical Infrastructure" [airports, shopping malls, hotels etc] and "CBRN Forensics & Management of Contaminated Corps". During the 2004 Athens' Olympic Games, he served as Commandant of the Olympic Hospital CBRN Response Unit – the only hospital-based specialized unit (70 people) deployed for the Olympic & Paralympic Games. He holds a MSc. degree (with merits) on "International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Global Security" from Coventry University, UK (2010) and he is a PhD candidate since May 2012 (Athens Medical School/Dept of Forensics & Toxicology). His last appointment (as of August 2010), was as Head of the Department of Asymmetric Threats at the Intelligence Analysis Branch, Joint Military Intelligence Service of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff in Athens, Greece. After retirement he conducted CBRNE classes for Abu Dhabi Police Authority and continues to participate as invited speaker in many CBRNE/security conferences, congresses and workshops around the globe. Currently he is the Editor-in-Chief of the monthly on-line "CBRNE Terrorism Newsletter" (<http://www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com>) initiated in November 2005 and delivered freely to CBRNE-CT First Responders of more than 80 countries around the globe. He is



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