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
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Of Mosques, Moms and Mayhem

Source: http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/of-mosques-moms-and-mayhem?f=must_reads

May 23 – Regular readers of *Family Security Matters* will be familiar both with Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin and her discussions of the family origins of contemporary Jihadist terrorism. The current extended glossary of key terms and concepts grows both out of her many contributions to FSM and from her seminars, lectures and other presentations to the groups mentioned in the subtitle to this book, that is, the professionals charged with the monitoring and control of potential terrorist agents, protection of citizens and institutions from such attacks, and providing government officials with information on present and future dangers. This collection of several hundred entries forms both the "Intel" (necessary detailed and practical terms in an historical and cultural context) and the "tools" required for quick reference, immediate application and middle- to long-term strategic planning.

Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin. *The Jihadi Dictionary: The Essential Intel Tool for Military, Law Enforcement, Government and the Concerned Public*. Mamaroneck, NY: Multieducator Press, 2016. 286 pp.



The concerned public includes readers of FSM. For them (us) *The Jihadi Dictionary* is a book to dip into, to follow the cross-referenced entries, and to look up specific matters that turn up in the news or during the reading of other books. The dictionary presupposes that anyone reading it has some basic knowledge of recent history, experience of trying to deal with terrorists and terrorism, and has the knowledge and skill to understand complex ideas. This not an "idiot's guide" to anything.

The issues to be dealt with are too urgent and dangerous to be trifled with.

It is no "easy read" because there is no clear argument developed or plot line to a narrative: the entries are points of discussion and debate, perhaps best appreciated during or after a seminar. However, there are some entries which break out into short essays and allow the reader to understand the basic structures underlying Kobrin's psychohistorical approach. There are, of course, many guides to the historical, political, strategic and social matters; but these tend to be, not superficial or facile in the sense of glossing over essential points; rather they are rooted in positivism, the notion that what can be seen and measured objectively is real and all the rest irrelevant, secondary or even unreal. Such books search for the way in which young men and women "are radicalized" by their parents, mentors or online associates, as though becoming a jihadi terrorist were a conscious, rational choice. The journalists and professional experts called in to advise governments and police forces try to point to incomplete assimilation, abandonment by social engineers, or poverty and neglect as the root causes of such anti-social behaviour. Though hardly as crude as leaders who call for "bombing them into submission" or "defeating them so soundly they will lose their appeal to other would-be jihadists", the usual approach to the problem is to "educate" and "calm" them down, give them useful things to do, bribe them with more social programmes.

Each entry in this dictionary consists of four parts: a short introductory description of the term, concept or action, a breakdown of the etymology and development of the word or phrase (most in English, some in Arabic), a psychological or psychoanalytic explanation of the phenomenon, and a brief discussion how the keyword or phrase is applied by Jihadi terrorists and why, the last three paragraphs marked by a symbol (the mathematical sign for root, the Greek letter psi to indicate the psyche, and crossed scimitars standing for the Jihadi function). The entries are anywhere from one to several pages long, occasionally extending into important analyses of key issues, providing personal details from the author's field and clinical work, and providing a wealth of examples from newspapers and historical texts. Her range of



professional reading is extensive, her understanding deep, her insight into the real nature of the contemporary problems urgent.

Though it may appear that some of the "root" sections on etymology and current syntactical usage are off-target or irrelevant, they do serve several important functions. First, they "root" the discussions into an historical matrix: where words come from, how their meanings have changed over time, and when they took on specific modern technical meanings. Second, they indicate that our experience of terrorism, in all its depth of fear and anxiety, did not emerge out of the blue, but was preceded in many crucial turning points of history and in different cultural contexts. Third, they provide a substantial matrix of background information to help clarify how our own normative mental apparatus in western civilization came into being, and why it is so important to understand its dimensions, be prepared to protect and enhance its defensive mechanisms, and shine a light on those weak spots where the emotionally undeveloped Jihadis, consciously or more likely unconsciously, feel most offended and try hardest to annihilate.

The kind of terrorists who appear in this dictionary are those who come from dysfunctional homes, where especially the mother is abused and the child consequently made to feel of his dependence on her. Detached from normal developmental stages of infancy and early childhood, the potential Jihadist absorbs from the immediate environment a sense of shame rather than guilt that has to be wiped away violently in order to regain a sense of honour for himself, his family and the coreligionists he identifies with. Whereas guilt marks the person with a sense of having done a wrong that can be somehow-by self or some supernatural agency-atoned for, shame occurs only because others see the offender as deficient, weak and tarnished: the shame is imposed rather than generated from within by moral and ethical standards, and because the future terrorist is so alienated from the persons, things and ideas that constitute reality that shame comes back again and again, requiring ever more destructive actions against the outside world upon which the faults and failures can be temporarily projected.

All this constitutes a language of violence always expressed in appearances and deeds, no matter what words are spoken to justify, extenuate, explain away or deny the destruction, maiming and killing. Kobrin calls this language sometimes *Desperando* (playing on the once popular artificial language Esperanto_ and sometimes *Jihadese* (which she models on "motherese" the phenomena of adults modulating their voices into jaunty rhythmic patterns to communicate with infants). But this language of the terrorists appears in violent actions, often symbolic of their repressed dysfunctional mental state in relation to their mothers and the hard and soft, external and internal objects that constitute their experiences infantilized lives.

Consequently attempting to prevent such events by dealing with superficial and rational motivations proves ineffective in almost every case, leaving law enforcement, military and judicial authorities frustrated; at best they can take out a Jihadist before he or she acts or close one venue or another where the terrorism was planned but never get to the root causes. Like the Hydra: cut off one head and other grows back. By learning to decode the secret language of the Jihadis, however, Kobrin claims, we will have the epistemological edge: we will know what they are saying and doing even before they get up to the point of blowing themselves up in a crowded pizza parlour or setting off a bomb in their shoes or anus while riding in a passenger jet. It is fine to monitor and measure the "chatter" of known would-be terrorists to determine where and when they may be planning their next attack, but parents, religious leaders, teachers and social workers should train themselves to pick up the signs much earlier in the lives of those who are susceptible to so-called radicalization.

While this Dictionary is not easy to read at first glance, it might help if one begins with the Coda, a section that as much as anything sums up and puts in order the main psychological arguments of the book. Picking and choosing some of the long entries will also make navigating this work easier.


Norman Simms is the author of Alfred Dreyfus: Man, Milieu, Mentality and Midrash (Academic Studies Press, 2011). The second volume in the series, Alfred Dreyfus: In the Context of His Times: Alfred Dreyfus as Lover, Intellectual, Poet and Jew (also by Academic Studies Press) was published in July 2013; and the third Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus in the Phantasmagoria (Cambridge Scholars Publisher, UK) in September 2013.



Taliban leader Mullah Mansour posed “imminent threat” to U.S.: Pentagon

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160524-taliban-leader-mullah-mansour-posed-imminent-threat-to-u-s-pentagon>

May 24 – **The Pentagon has said it killed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour because he posed a danger to the United States.** The Islamist militant chief was killed in a U.S. strike in Pakistan last week.



“They were specific things that we knew he had engaged in or was preparing to engage in, that were directly threatening coalition and U.S. forces,” Pentagon spokesman Jeff Davis said on Monday.

“This [Mansour] was an individual who was specifically targeting U.S. and coalition personnel and had specifically engaged in operations in the past that had resulted in U.S. and coalition personnel being killed,” he added. The Pentagon spokesman said President Barack Obama approved the strike based on a law authorizing U.S. military force in Afghanistan.

NBC news quoted the spokesman saying that the operation against Mansour was in keeping

with the rules and in continuance with the U.S. conducting strikes of a defensive nature **Pakistan has protested the drone strikes, claiming they violated its sovereignty.**

Mullah Mansour rose to the leadership of the Taliban after the death of its previous leader, Mullah Omar.

Obama called the death of Mansour “an important milestone,” and that the United States had “removed the leader of an organization that has continued to plot against and unleash attacks on American and coalition forces.”

“Mansour rejected efforts by the Afghan government to seriously engage in peace talks and end the violence that has taken the lives of countless innocent Afghan men, women and children,” Obama added. “The Taliban should seize the opportunity to pursue the only real path for ending this long conflict — joining the Afghan government in a reconciliation process that leads to lasting peace and stability.”

Obama said that Mansour, as the head of the Taliban, “was specifically targeting U.S. personnel and troops inside of Afghanistan who are there as part of the mission I have set to maintain a counterterrorism platform and provide assistance,” Obama said.

Killing Mullah Mansour sent a message that “we’re going to protect our people,” he said.

Humor, Counter-terrorism, and ISIS

By A.J. Caschetta

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6018/humor-counterterrorism-isis>



Bono’s counter-terrorism dream team (left to right: Chris Rock, Amy Schumer, and Sacha Baron Cohen) lacks a native touch.

May 26 – When Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., invited U2 frontman Bono to speak to a Senate subcommittee hearing last month, the foreign aid impresario did not make big news stating that “Aid in 2016 is not charity; it is national security. It could be the best bulwark against violent extremism.” Instead, the memorable moment came when he told senators that comedians should be enlisted to fight the Islamic State: “laugh at them when they’re goose-stepping down the street, and it takes away their power. So I’m



suggesting that the Senate send in Amy Schumer, Chris Rock, and Sacha Baron Cohen."

Bono is right about the power of humor to deflate bullies. But in order to work against the Islamic State, both Middle East and Western populations need to be targeted. It's doubtful that Schumer, Rock and Cohen could have much impact on the Middle East audience, primarily because they are outsiders. And on the two notable occasions when Saturday Night Live aired skits featuring the Islamic State, it [made fun of Americans](#), not the Islamic State. Even in the skit featuring Chris Rock as

Islam. Effective satire could rebrand them as a collection of backward, ignorant buffoons.

Weaponized humor has a long and rich history, starting with the ancient Greek inventors of satire. But eighteenth-century England is the Golden Age of political satire: William Hogarth (1697-1764) and James Gillray (1756-1815) invented the political cartoon. Alexander Pope (1688-1744) ridiculed his enemies with a mock epic he titled *The Dunciad*. Henry Fielding (1707-1754) mocked a rival's novel, *Pamela*, with a parody titled *Shamela*, transforming its prim and proper heroine into a lascivious one.

To date, the best example of satire targeting the Islamic State came from one particularly brave Kurdish comedy group in a [skit that aired on KurdSat TV](#) in 2014.

[Iraqi Kurdish performers lampoon ISIS in 2014](#)

The musical skit features five comedians with fake beards and Islamic State regalia pretending to be Islamic State fighters, singing their anthem and strumming their Kalashnikovs like guitars. The song parodies the Islamic State with acerbic wit in the tradition of Pope and Fielding, portraying its members as hypocrites who "strive for jihad and sex." The "brainless" Islamic State members sing "We are bearded, dirty and filthy," "Our leader is called qaqa," and "We hate the smell of nice mint." The group's atavism is mocked with "We bring history to the present" and "we scare women and children."

Not only does their parody make Westerners laugh but it also targets prospective Islamic State recruits.

The song's choral refrain is one of the most trenchant insults in the history of satire: "*We are ISIS. We are ISIS. / We milk the goat even if it's male.*"

Imagine the effects of Iraqi youths mocking Islamic State fighters as the milkers of male goats.

Using humor against the Islamic State and all variants of Islamism is worth trying.

Instead of sending in Schumer, Rock and Cohen, the U.S. should send money to the Kurdish comedians of KurdSat TV. Don't send in the clowns. Fund the Kurds.



an Islamic State fighter seeking funding on the TV show [Shark Tank](#), the comedy was directed at Americans, not at the Islamic State.

For humor to be an effective weapon, it must come from within the culture, or at least appear to. And it must use modes of entertainment, if not indigenous, at least familiar to the culture. Even the wittiest romantic comedy is unlikely to work on a Middle Eastern audience. If humor has any chance to "take away their power," it will have to be accessible either to people who come into daily contact with Islamic State fighters or those recruited by the Islamic State. The most effective satirical attack would need to be delivered in a short Internet-friendly video, the likes of which the Islamic State uses. The type of humor employed is also important; it must be caustic, exclusionary wit, not jovial or light-hearted comedy. Satirizing the Islamic State and ridiculing its Islamist ideology should attempt to make the movement and its ideas seem backward, unsophisticated, uncool. The Islamic State portrays itself as a caliphate, comprised of authentic jihadis practicing pure



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The \$4 Trillion War on Terror: New at Reason

Source: <http://reason.com/blog/2016/05/22/the-4-trillion-war-on-terror-new-at-reas>

The biggest costs in the war on terror come from foreign wars. **Between late 2001 and 2014, the U.S. government spent roughly \$2.6 trillion in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq—not just for warfare but also for reconstruction, foreign aid, and health care for veterans, according to the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.**

The Pentagon spent an additional roughly \$100 billion to thwart terrorism overseas in 2015, according to the National Priorities Project, a nonprofit budget watchdog group. And it will likely spend a similar amount this year.

What's more, most estimates of ongoing spending sharply understate the full cost. Why? Because they fail to account for the debts we owe to service members after their return. Almost half the veterans of the Iraq and Afghan wars—more than 700,000—have already sought compensation for injuries incurred, and that percentage will likely rise in the coming years. The Watson Institute estimates that the wars will require an additional \$1 trillion for medical and disability payments, and the administrative burdens that come with them, through 2054.

If a Bomb Brought Down EgyptAir 804, the War on Terror Is About to Change

Source: <http://time.com/4342988/egyptair-crash-isis-terror-bomb/>

May 23 – While the cause of the crash is still unknown, the possibility of terrorism looms large.

First, the caveats: No hard evidence of a bomb has been found, and no claim of responsibility has been announced. But because of the way EgyptAir Flight 804 dropped out of the sky, and the fact that it was headed to Egypt—scene of the only airliner bombing in 14 years—government officials and outside **experts agree that the odds favor a terror strike.**

No one yet knows how it might have happened, but two main possibilities present themselves—and both present mind-boggling implications.

The first and perhaps most likely possibility is that the airliner was brought down as airliners usually are—by a bomb sneaked onto the plane at its last point of departure. That was Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG) in Paris, which was thought to be among the most secure in Europe. If the bomb got onto a plane at CDG, it calls into question all the preventative security measures taken to safeguard global civil aviation since 9/11, because no city would be taking safety more seriously than Paris since the attacks of last November, to say nothing of the Brussels bombings of March.

If Paris was where a bomb got on board a plane, the spotlight then focuses on the 86,000 airport workers cleared to work in the so-called “reserved zone” beyond the reach of passengers. That's a huge number of people to vet for security; and in France, where 7 percent of the population is Muslim, the fear is that any of them could have quietly gone to work for ISIS. As TIME's Vivienne Walt reports, French security services already have tried to detect evidence of radicalism among airport workers, and in fact 57 workers lost their clearances through November of last year. In Belgium, something similar happened at nuclear power plant, where 11 workers were barred after concerns were raised about “insiders” stealing radioactive material for use by ISIS.

This is part of what makes ISIS so challenging. The group does not operate like al-Qaeda, which saw itself as an elite, members-only strike force that put immense thought and planning into choosing its targets. ISIS operates more like a mass movement with a very low bar to entry. The world's perhaps 1.2 billion Sunni Muslims are its declared constituency, but anyone can join—“anyone who is angry,



really,” as former ISIS hostage Nicolas Henin told me recently—and *all* are encouraged to stir up mayhem where they can. A Russian jet carrying 224 people was brought down last November over Egypt by a homemade bomb tucked into a 12-oz. aluminum beverage can and rolled onto the charter flight with the other catering.

The assumption is that the downing was the work of ISIS’s affiliate in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, which took credit for the attack. But it could have been anyone. ISIS can be anywhere there’s an IP address and a mind open to its message. That’s the first of the mind-numbing possibilities of EgyptAir 804.

The other possibility is that the bomb was put on the Airbus 320 *before* it reached Paris. That’s not how terror strikes usually work against airplanes, but it’s been done. Al Qaeda’s deadly Yemen affiliate in 2010 secreted homemade explosives in printer cartridges, then shipped to the United States. They were found, thanks to a tip from Saudi intelligence, in the hold of cargo jets during scheduled stops in Britain and Dubai.

The plane that became EgyptAir 804 the moment it left Paris had, in the previous 48 hours, been to Asmara, Eritrea, and Tunis, Tunisia. Eritrea is a police state, though in the convoluted regional politics of Africa’s Horn it has a history of supporting Islamists in nearby Somalia against its arch-enemy, Ethiopia. But it’s Tunis that draws the eye. Leaders of the north African nation won the Nobel Peace Prize for forming a government that sustained the promise of the Arab Spring. But their country is

also a recruiting hotbed for ISIS, providing more volunteers than any other nation to the war in Syria. It’s not hard to imagine there might be one or two workers thinking of ISIS at Tunis-Carthage International Airport.

Or, for that matter, at the airports where the same plane made stops in the previous days: Khartoum, Riyadh, Medina, Juba. And why rule out Cairo and Alexandria, the largest cities in an Egypt, where the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has equated all expressions of political Islam with terror, forcing millions to take sides? Airplanes are supposed to be searched at every stop, but it’s the job of the airline itself to conduct the search, and anyone who has passed through an Egyptian airport knows how what cursory looks like. And if airline employees are being doubted, wouldn’t that include a mechanic, who could know where to tuck something out of sight? Entirely possible.

But here’s the thing: There are 100,000 flights every day around the world. Airport security monitors the safety of every one. If that task is expanded to take in the recent itinerary of every plane—with a leery eye cast toward stops in the Middle East—the mind boggles again, and goes right on bogging. We quickly approach the level of paranoia that is the ultimate aim of any terror attack, and, with that paranoia, a creeping suspicion toward all Muslims that ISIS explicitly says it wants to encourage. And what’s the good in that? Everyone wants to feel safe. And the best way remains to look out for one another, and not only in the security sense of the expression.

Playing by the al-Qaida gameplan: how the war on terror spread jihadi influence

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/11/al-qaida-war-on-terror-noam-chomsky-masters-of-mankind>

This is part two of Noam Chomsky’s essay “Masters of Mankind” excerpted from his new book, Who Rules the World? [Read part one here](#)

In brief, the global war on terror sledgehammer strategy has spread jihadi terror from a tiny corner of Afghanistan to much of the world, from Africa through the Levant and south Asia to south-east Asia. It has also incited attacks in Europe and the United States.

The invasion of Iraq made a substantial contribution to this process, much as

intelligence agencies had predicted. Terrorism specialists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank estimate that the Iraq war “generated a stunning sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to literally hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and thousands of civilian lives lost;



even when terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan is excluded, fatal attacks in the rest of the world have increased by more than one-third". Other exercises have been similarly productive.

A group of major human rights organizations – Physicians for Social Responsibility (US), Physicians for Global Survival (Canada), and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Germany) – conducted a study that sought "to provide as realistic an estimate as possible of the total body count in the three main war zones [Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan] during 12 years of 'war on terrorism'," including an extensive review "of the major studies and data published on the numbers of victims in these countries", along with additional information on military actions.

Their "conservative estimate" is that these wars killed about 1.3 million people, a toll that "could also be in excess of 2 million". A database search by independent researcher David Peterson in the days following the publication of the report found virtually no mention of it. Who cares?

More generally, studies carried out by the Oslo Peace Research Institute show that two-thirds of the region's conflict fatalities were produced in originally internal disputes where outsiders imposed their solutions.

In such conflicts, 98% of fatalities were produced only after outsiders had entered the domestic dispute with their military might. In Syria, the number of direct conflict fatalities more than tripled after the west initiated airstrikes against the self-declared Islamic State and the CIA started its indirect military interference in the war – interference that appears to have drawn the Russians in as advanced US antitank missiles were decimating the forces of their ally Bashar al-Assad. Early indications are that Russian bombing is having the usual consequences.

The evidence reviewed by political scientist Timo Kivimäki indicates that the "protection wars [fought by 'coalitions of the willing'] have become the main source of violence in the world, occasionally contributing over 50% of total conflict fatalities".

Furthermore, in many of these cases, including Syria, as he reviews, there were opportunities for diplomatic settlement that were ignored. That has also been true in other horrific situations, including the Balkans in the early 1990s, the first Gulf war, and of course the

Indochina wars, the worst crime since the second world war. In the case of Iraq the question does not even arise. There surely are some lessons here.

The general consequences of resorting to the sledgehammer against vulnerable societies comes as little surprise. William Polk's careful study of insurgencies, *Violent Politics*, should be essential reading for those who want to understand today's conflicts, and surely for planners, assuming that they care about human consequences and not merely power and domination.

Polk reveals a pattern that has been replicated over and over. The invaders – perhaps professing the most benign motives – are naturally disliked by the population, who disobey them, at first in small ways, eliciting a forceful response, which increases opposition and support for resistance. The cycle of violence escalates until the invaders withdraw – or gain their ends by something that may approach genocide.

Playing by the al-Qaida gameplan

Obama's global drone assassination campaign, a remarkable innovation in global terrorism, exhibits the same patterns. By most accounts, it is generating terrorists more rapidly than it is murdering those suspected of someday intending to harm us – an impressive contribution by a constitutional lawyer on the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, which established the basis for the principle of presumption of innocence that is the foundation of civilized law.

Another characteristic feature of such interventions is the belief that the insurgency will be overcome by eliminating its leaders. But when such an effort succeeds, the reviled leader is regularly replaced by someone younger, more determined, more brutal, and more effective.

Polk gives many examples. Military historian Andrew Cockburn has reviewed American campaigns to kill drug and then terror "kingpins" over a long period in his important study *Kill Chain* and found the same results. And one can expect with fair confidence that the pattern will continue.

No doubt right now US strategists are seeking ways to murder the "Caliph of the Islamic State" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is a bitter



rival of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The likely result of this achievement is forecast by the prominent terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow at the US Military Academy at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. He predicts that "al-Baghdadi's death would likely pave the way for a rapprochement [with al-Qaida] producing a combined terrorist force unprecedented in scope, size, ambition and resources".

Polk cites a treatise on warfare by Henry Jomini, influenced by Napoleon's defeat at the hands of Spanish guerrillas, that became a textbook for generations of cadets at the West Point military academy. Jomini observed that such interventions by major powers typically result in "wars of opinion" and nearly always "national wars", if not at first then becoming so in the course of the struggle, by the dynamics that Polk describes. Jomini concludes that "commanders of regular armies are ill-advised to engage in such wars because they will lose them", and even apparent successes will prove short-lived.

Careful studies of al-Qaida and Isis have shown that the United States and its allies are following their gameplan with some precision. Their goal is to "draw the west as deeply and actively as possible into the quagmire" and "to perpetually engage and enervate the United States and the west in a series of prolonged overseas ventures" in which they will undermine their own societies, expend their resources, and increase the level of violence, setting off the dynamic that Polk reviews.

Scott Atran, one of the most insightful researchers on jihadi movements, calculates that "the 9/11 attacks cost between \$400,000 and \$500,000 to execute, whereas the military and security response by the US and its allies is in the order of 10m times that figure. On a strictly cost-benefit basis, this violent movement has been wildly successful, beyond even Osama bin Laden's original imagination, and is increasingly so. Herein lies the full measure of jujitsu-style asymmetric warfare. After all, who could claim that we are better off than before, or that the overall danger is declining?"

And if we continue to wield the sledgehammer, tacitly following the jihadi script, the likely effect is even more violent jihadism with broader appeal. The record, Atran advises, "should

inspire a radical change in our counter-strategies".

Al-Qaida/Isis are assisted by Americans who follow their directives: for example, Ted "carpet-bomb 'em" Cruz, a top Republican presidential candidate. Or, at the other end of the mainstream spectrum, the leading Middle East and international affairs columnist of the New York Times, Thomas Friedman, who in 2003 offered Washington advice on how to fight in Iraq on the Charlie Rose show:

"There was what I would call the terrorism bubble ... And what we needed to do was to go over to that part of the world and burst that bubble. We needed to go over there basically, and, uh, take out a very big stick, right in the heart of that world, and burst that bubble. And there was only one way to do it ... What they needed to see was American boys and girls going house to house from Basra to Baghdad, and basically saying, which part of this sentence don't you understand? You don't think we care about our open society, you think this bubble fantasy we're going to just let it go? Well, suck on this. OK. That, Charlie, was what this war was about."

That'll show the ragheads.

Looking forward

Atran and other close observers generally agree on the prescriptions. We should begin by recognizing what careful research has convincingly shown: those drawn to jihad "are longing for something in their history, in their traditions, with their heroes and their morals; and the Islamic State, however brutal and repugnant to us and even to most in the Arab-Muslim world, is speaking directly to that ... What inspires the most lethal assailants today is not so much the Qur'an but a thrilling cause and a call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends."

In fact, few of the jihadis have much of a background in Islamic texts or theology, if any.

The best strategy, Polk advises, would be "a multinational, welfare-oriented and psychologically satisfying program ... that would make the hatred Isis relies upon less virulent. The elements have been identified for us: communal needs, compensation for previous transgressions, and calls for a new beginning."



He adds: “A carefully phrased apology for past transgressions would cost little and do much.” Such a project could be carried out in refugee camps or in the “hovels and grim housing projects of the Paris banlieues”, where, Atran writes, his research team “found fairly wide tolerance or support for Isis’s values”. And even more could be done by true dedication to diplomacy and negotiations instead of reflexive resort to violence.

Not least in significance would be an honorable response to the “refugee crisis” that was a long time coming but surged to prominence in Europe in 2015. That would mean, at the very least, sharply increasing humanitarian relief to the camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey where miserable refugees from Syria barely survive. But the issues go well beyond and provide a picture of the self-described “enlightened states” that is far from attractive and should be an incentive to action.

There are countries that generate refugees through massive violence, like the United States, secondarily Britain and France. Then there are countries that admit huge numbers of refugees, including those fleeing from western violence, like Lebanon (easily the champion, per capita), Jordan, and Syria before it imploded, among others in the region. And partially overlapping, there are countries that both generate refugees and refuse to take them in, not only from the Middle East but also from the US “back yard” south of the border. A strange picture, painful to contemplate.

An honest picture would trace the generation of refugees much further back into history. Veteran Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk reports that one of the first videos produced by Isis “showed a bulldozer pushing down a rampart of sand that had marked the border between Iraq and Syria. As the machine destroyed the dirt revetment, the camera panned down to a handwritten poster lying in the sand. ‘End of Sykes-Picot,’ it said.”

For the people of the region, the Sykes-Picot agreement is the very symbol of the cynicism and brutality of western imperialism. Conspiring in secret during the first world war, Britain’s Mark Sykes and France’s François Georges-Picot carved up the region into artificial states to satisfy their own imperial goals, with utter disdain for the interests of the people living there and in violation of the wartime promises

issued to induce Arabs to join the allied war effort.

The agreement mirrored the practices of the European states that devastated Africa in a similar manner. It “transformed what had been relatively quiet provinces of the Ottoman empire into some of the least stable and most internationally explosive states in the world.”

Repeated western interventions since then in the Middle East and Africa have exacerbated the tensions, conflicts, and disruptions that have shattered the societies. The end result is a “refugee crisis” that the innocent west can scarcely endure.

Germany has emerged as the conscience of Europe, at first (but no longer) admitting almost one million refugees – in one of the richest countries in the world with a population of 80 million. In contrast, the poor country of Lebanon has absorbed an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees, now a quarter of its population, on top of half a million Palestinian refugees registered with the UN refugee agency UNRWA, mostly victims of Israeli policies.

Europe is also groaning under the burden of refugees from the countries it has devastated in Africa – not without US aid, as Congolese and Angolans, among others, can testify. Europe is now seeking to bribe Turkey (with more than two million Syrian refugees) to distance those fleeing the horrors of Syria from Europe’s borders, just as Obama is pressuring Mexico to keep US borders free from miserable people seeking to escape the aftermath of Reagan’s war on terror along with those seeking to escape more recent disasters, including a military coup in Honduras that Obama almost alone legitimized, which created one of the worst horror chambers in the region. Words can hardly capture the US response to the Syrian refugee crisis, at least any words I can think of.

Returning to the opening question “Who rules the world?” we might also want to pose another question: “What principles and values rule the world?”

That question should be foremost in the minds of the citizens of the rich and powerful states, who enjoy an unusual legacy of freedom, privilege and opportunity thanks to the struggles of those who came before them, and who now face fateful choices as to



how to respond to challenges of great human import.

'Credible threat' that ISIS will target the Rio Olympics: Brazil's anti-terror chief says numerous measures are being taken to prevent an attack

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3604692/Credible-threat-ISIS-target-Rio-Olympics-Brazil-s-anti-terror-chief-says-numerous-measures-taken-prevent-attack.html>

May 23 – **Brazil's anti-terror chief has admitted there is a 'credible threat' that ISIS will target the Rio Olympics and that numerous measures are being taken to prevent an attack.**

With just three months until Games begin, the Brazilian national intelligence agency said the country is preparing for all eventualities.

Brazil has long regarded itself as an unlikely target of extremists thanks to its historical standing as a non-aligned, multicultural nation that is free from enemies.

However, counter terrorism director Luiz Alberto Sallaberry said in a statement the threat had increased in recent months due to attacks in other countries, and a rise in what he described as the number of Brazilian nationals suspected of sympathising with Islamic State militants.

Mr Sallaberry also confirmed that a credible threat to state security had been made last year.

A tweet threatening Brazil sent in November by Maxime Hauchard, a French national identified as an executioner in Islamic State propaganda videos, was genuine.

The tweet read: 'Brazil, you are our next target.' Mr Sallaberry said his agency had taken several measures to avert a potential attack, including sharing information with foreign security forces and improved training.

But security experts have warned that many Brazilian officials do not realize how big a stage the Olympics is for anyone seeking to sow terror, either through an attack on game venues, infrastructure nearby or the athletes and 500,000 tourists expected to attend.

Brazilian officials, eager to pull off South America's first Olympics after successfully hosting the soccer World Cup in 2014, have said previously they will ensure a safe games starting August 5.

Olympic organisers plan to deploy around 85,000 security personnel for the games, double the number used in London in 2012.

A large part of this group will be members of the National Force for Public Security, a body of police and other law enforcement officials whose commander stepped down last month amid reports he had criticized embattled President Dilma Rousseff.

Prospective Terror Attacks in Europe and the US

By Sajjad Shaukat

Source: <http://kashmirwatch.com/prospective-terror-attacks-europe-us/>

European and American intelligence officials and counterterrorism experts and analysts have been predicting prospective terror attacks in Europe and the US which would be conducted by the Islamic State group (ISIS or ISIL). Experience of the recent acts of terrorism show that general masses start pointing fingers at the ISIS, without going into depth to know as to who (Entity) is behind this outfit, as to what the aims that entity wants to achieve, and what is the secret game in this respect.

Few days before the ISIS in a video message threatened France, Egypt Air Flight MS804 disappeared from radar screens on May 19, this year with 66 people on board after taking off from Paris-15 French citizens were among the passengers. Security officials and analysts suggest that the ISIS could be behind this crash of the plane.

In a new message on May 21, the ISIS has threatened to launch attacks on the US and Europe during the Islamic holy month of



Ramadan, which will begin in early June, this year.

The chief of France's intelligence agency DGSI, Patrick Calvar warned on May 10, 2016 that "Clearly, France is the most threatened and we know that Islamic State [ISIS] is planning new attacks" in the country.

Germany's Criminal Police Office (BKA) has issued a clear warning of possible attacks by the ISIS at the Euro 2016 football tournament in France.

In this regard, Director of America's national intelligence agency, James Clapper revealed on April 25, 2016 that ISIS has clandestine cells in the UK, Germany and Italy, which carried out the deadly March terrorist attacks in Brussels and the outfit was plotting to attack these countries.

In a speech in Hanover, Germany, while emphasizing EU-US unity, American President Barack Obama said on April 25, "These terrorists are doing everything in their power to strike our cities and kill our citizens, so we need to do everything to stop them." Calling the ISIS the most urgent threat, Obama elaborated, "Europe, including NATO, can still do more...Germany has provided trainers and financial assistance to local forces but its military is not involved in airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria."

On February 14, 2016, CIA Director John Brennan warned that ISIS attacks on "U.S. soil is inevitable."

During his appearance with the National Border Patrol Council's Green Line radio show on May 15, 2016, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald J. Trump has predicted that refugees with ISIS-funded cell phones will conduct another 9/11-like terrorist attack in the US.

However, before the November 13 terror attacks in Paris some intelligence agencies had also warned about these assaults and that warning was manipulated by Israel, as Tel Aviv wanted to obtain a number of secret aims owing to various developments. In order to revive the global war on terror, the neo-conservatives, Zionists and Israel needed the backing of the whole Europe against the Russian-led coalition of Iran, Iraq, the Syrian army-the National Defense Forces (NDF) and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, which had broken the backbone of the US-CIA-assisted ISIS terrorists, Al-Qaeda's Al-Nusra Front and the

rebels who have been fighting to oust the Syrian President Assad's government and against the current Iraqi regime as part of America's double game to obtain Israeli interests. Moscow also exposed the smuggling of oil by ISIS-controlled regions of Iraq to some European countries and inaction of their governments including America in this respect. It is worth-mentioning that some EU member states had officially started recognizing a state of Palestine, and ignored Israeli protests. Besides France, the Belgian parliament had approved a resolution on February 9, 2016, calling for official recognition of Palestine as a state. The positive impact of this recognition was that EU pressure was growing on Tel Aviv to for the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and to restart a negotiation process.

Some other developments like reluctance of NATO countries to support America's fake global war on terror and acceptance of Syrian refugees by the European countries, especially Germany and the EU rule to boycott goods produced in Israeli settlements on the West Bank irritated the Israelis.

In this context, connections of the Israeli secret agency Mossad are also noteworthy. In March 2015, Iraqi Special Forces pointed out that they had arrested several ISIL's foreign military advisors, including American, Israeli and Arab nationals and four foreign passports in an operation in Mosul. Last year, a senior aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin also stated that Mossad is training ISIL terrorists, operating in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, arrest of Israeli Col. Shahak in Iraq, his admission, proving links of Al-Qaeda and ISIS with America and Mossad and medical treatment of the ISIS warriors in the Israeli hospitals might be cited as instance. ISIS which was already being assisted by the CIA and Mossad was directed to send its militants in Paris and in connivance with the home-grown terrorists to conduct terror attacks in Paris.

Mossad links with the ISIS terrorists can also be judged from the fact that this terrorist outfit conducted several suicide assaults and bomb blasts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan. But, it did not target Israel.

Nevertheless, Israel achieved its several sinister designs in the post-Paris attacks phenomena and after the shooting at San



Bernardino, California. Like the drastic aftermath of 9/11 tragedy, rulers and politicians of the US and European countries, including their media started misguiding their general public by creating chauvinism against the Muslims.

As regards the anti-Muslim policy, on January 18, 2015, while singling out only Muslim women British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that Muslim women who fail to learn English to a high enough standard could face deportation from Britain. He also suggested that poor English skills can leave people “more susceptible to the messages of groups like Islamic State (IS).” Earlier, Trump had called for a ban on Muslims, entering the United States.

After the Paris terror attacks, Israel-led America also obtained the support of its Western allies (NATO) against Russia. And as part of their ambivalent policy, American jet fighters and those of its Western coalition started targeting the ISIS terrorists in Iraq and Syria.

But, with the acceleration of threat by ISIS, some of the European leaders began empathizing upon the solution of the Palestinians issue.

In this connection, hours after the Paris tragedy, the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom

said that “to counteract the radicalization, we must go back to the situation in the Middle East of which not the least the Palestinians see that there is no future: we must either accept a desperate situation or resort to violence.”

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin displayed as to how fight the ISIS and Al-Qaeda, as Russian military compelled these terrorist groups to vacate most of the regions of Iraq and Syria. On March 14, 2016, Putin’s announcement to withdraw most of the Russian forces from Syria, after strengthening the Assad regime, while emphasizing upon the political solution of the Syrian crisis gave a setback to the US-led Western allies.

In these circumstances, on March 22, 2016, with the help of ISIS and Mossad, Israel again targetted Europe by arranging the Brussels blasts in order to avoid the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and to implicate Syria-based ISIS—to thwart the UNO-backed ceasefire agreement about Syrian war which was brokered by the major powers including

Russia and the US and to cause a major rift between Russia and the US-led NATO, while provoking the Western Christians against the Muslims. Notably, in the beginning of February, 2016, in the first Vienna meeting on Syrian crisis, the US Secretary of State John Kerry had agreed to keep the Syrian president in power (Contrary to previous demand of regime change) and for a unified state of Syria.

It is of particular attention that after the terror attacks in Paris and Brussels. Israel succeeded in obtaining its clandestine designs. Europe has been put on high alert and these subversive acts are being taken as attacks on the whole continent. In one way or the other, European politicians, especially right-wing leaders and their media are misguiding the general public against the Muslim World by exaggerating the so-called threat of Islamophobia. Owing to their irresponsible approach, right-wing parties and “Stop Islam” movement in the Western countries, particularly in Europe are becoming popular by largely attracting their people. Besides, Muslims in the continent are facing severe backlash in form of attacks on them and threats (In some countries) in wake of anti-Muslim protests. Without caring for human rights, several Muslim refugees have been expelled from various European countries.

Although Israel succeeded in its secret aims after the Brussels attacks, yet some developments have frustrated its rulers. In this connection, besides a number of human rights groups, particularly Amnesty International in its press release on April 1, 2016 has criticized, the controversial Turkish-EU refugee deal by pointing out, “Large-scale forced returns of refugees from Turkey to war-ravaged Syria expose the fatal flaws in a refugee deal signed between Turkey and the European Union...all forced returns to Syria are illegal under Turkish, EU and international law.”

Protests and violence have become commonplace at the Greek border, where more than 50,000 refugees have been stranded since Macedonia and other Balkan countries shut their borders in February. On May 7, 2016, hundreds of pro-refugee activists who came to Brenner mountain pass from other Italian regions as well as from Germany, Italy and Spain spurred unrest in protest of the closure of the Austrian-Italian



border. However, these double standards of the US-led West will result into recruitment of more terrorists by the militant outfits like ISIS on global and regional level. This is what Tel Aviv wants.

Differences have arisen among the European countries in relation to the refugees and the asylum-seekers. Austria's plan to build a fence along its border with Italy has been met with disapproval by Italy and Germany.

Besides some EU countries, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, while criticizing Austria's controversial new laws said that he was "concerned that European countries are now adopting increasingly restrictive immigration and refugee policies...such policies and measures negatively affect the obligations of member states under international humanitarian law and European law."

A rift has been created between the West and Turkey, the close ally of NATO. On May 8, 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has kept up his rebuke of European nations, accusing them of dictatorship and cruelty for keeping their frontiers closed to migrants and refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict. He clarified that "Turkey would not meet a EU demand for his country to reform its anti-terrorism legislation."

And on February 10, 2016, President Erdogan lashed out at the US over its support for Syria's main Kurdish group, saying, "The failure to recognise the Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a terrorist group is creating a "sea of blood" in Syria. He explained, "The PYD, on which the US relies to battle so-called Islamic State (ISIS or Daesh) in Syria, is an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party."

In the meantime, in the March, this year, Syrian fighters with the support of popular volunteer combatants liberated more towns from the ISIS militants' control like the Thayyem Oil Field, especially the ancient city of Palmyra, and may recapture the group's self-proclaimed caliphate-capital in Raqqa.

As part of the US double game, Syrian rebel groups on April 12, 2016 launched a major offensive on positions of the ISIS and were able to recapture key areas in Syria's northern province of Aleppo. In order to show to the international community and Western public that America is fighting against the ISIS terrorists, US has accelerated air strikes on the ISIS-controlled regions.

As per CIA directions, in Aleppo city, shell and mortar attacks by the Al-Nusra Front, ISIS and the rebel groups have continued on the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsoud. ISIS is also reported to have continued firing rockets across the border into the Turkish town of Kilis. In the pretext, the Turkish military is retaliating with shell fire.

It shows that the US and Israel have created a very complicated situation in Syria and the vulnerable countries of the Middle East including Turkey by making a vicious circle of terrorism; so that American-Israeli covert aims to divide Syria in accordance with the CIA-prepared Plan B could be justified, which could also get the favour of the Western countries which are already biased against Assad's government.

It is mentionable that the US-led West, especially Europe has already started a new Cold War with Russia. The US has decided to station permanently additional troops in Eastern Europe as part of NATO move to defend the continent against the presumed threat of Moscow. In this context, on May 4, 2016, the US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter declared that the Pentagon had to "prioritize deterrence" against Russia and accused Moscow of "nuclear saber-rattling."

In response, Moscow also responded that it would send 30,000 Russian troops along its western and southern borders.

America's former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel who had previously criticized the White House for mishandling the crises strategically stated on May 10, 2016 that NATO's plans to deploy four battalions to the Baltic states could lead to another Cold War with Russia.

Although Cold War has revived between the US-led West and Russia, yet some recent developments have further disheartened the Zionist-Israeli-led America.

On May 2, 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry who opened a second day of talks in Geneva, stated, "The United States and Russia have agreed to make sure that there is more accountability to enforce the cessation of hostilities on a day-to-day basis." On May 3, 2016, after negotiations, Moscow and Washington agreed for a ceasefire in Aleppo.

While as part of American dual strategy, fighting continued in Aleppo, because Israeli Mossad



and American CIA did not forbid the ISIS terrorists and the rebel groups from attacking the Syrian army.

At the same time, Kerry changed American previous stance to keep Assad in power and warned Syria's government on May 3, 2016 that they face an August 1 deadline for starting a political transition to move President Assad out, or they risk the consequences of a new US approach toward ending the 5-year-old civil war.

The US and Israel think that before Syrian forces-backed by Russia occupy more territories, especially Aleppo which is strategically important and is industrial capital of Syria, rebel groups and ISIS should be given a free hand to continue fighting.

Besides, movement of the left-wing parties which welcome the refugees is also becoming popular in the West, particularly Europe in response to the far right-wing groups.

British Prime Minister David Cameron had sparked a furious row over the contest for the May 5, 2016 election of London mayoralty after he accused Labour candidate Sadiq Khan of sharing a platform with Islamic extremists and a supporter of the ISIS. During the debate in the House of Commons, Angry Labour MPs accused Cameron of racism. Despite it, Londoners elected their first Muslim mayor of Pakistan's origin Sadiq Khan by defeating the Conservative rival Zac Goldsmith—a wealthy Jew.

America's anti-Muslim and pro-Israeli Trump has become the nominee of the Republican Party which has still to confirm his candidacy. While, leaders of his own parties are opposing his nominee, due to his extremist statements during the election-campaign in wake of secret documents leaked by the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, which pointed out on May 9, 2016 that Trump empire is linked to 32 offshore companies, including the real estate project Trump Ocean Club International Hotel and Tower in Panama—and thus, avoided taxes. Earlier in statement, Sen. Bernie Sanders had criticized US Hillary Clinton for supporting the Panama Free Trade Agreement as Secretary of State. He explained that the agreement, which “he opposed, opened the door to greater tax evasion by Americans.”

The TTIP leak by Greenpeace on May, 2, 2016, relating to a sweeping free trade agreement under negotiation by the EU and

the US has shown how US can pressure EU to compromise health and the environment under trade deal.

On May 1, 2016, in connection with the Congressional investigation, CIA Director Brennan said that documents which could link Saudi Arabia to 9/11 terrorists should be kept classified.

It is also of particular attention that US internal problems such as curtailment of liberties, failure of the Obamacare, criticism of Hilary Clinton about contributions of election-campaign from Wall Street backers, email-scandal etc. disappointed the Obama Administration. While in wake of the election-campaign, Republicans and American public have also been criticizing the government of Democrats and CIA for America's (NATO) longest war in Afghanistan, facing defeatism, useless proxy wars under the cover of global war on terror and US heavy cost of war which caused serious financial crisis, adding to the dilemmas of Americans.

Owing to its confused policies, at present, the Obama Administration is pressing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree for the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. A majority of the intellectuals and analysts of the West have also been emphasizing upon the settlement of this dispute.

In a speech to the Israel advocacy group J Street, American Vice President Joe Biden remarked on April 18, 2016, “I firmly believe that the actions that Israel's government has taken over the past several years...the steady and systematic expansion of settlements, the legalization of outposts, land seizures...are moving us and...Israel in the wrong direction.”

Even, a debate has started between the Zionists and non-Zionist Jews for the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. On March 21, 2016, in a speech in Utah, the only Jewish Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders had sparked controversy by saying, “The US should be even-handed and must not always say that Netanyahu is right.” He criticized Israel's treatment of Palestinians, condemning the expansion of West Bank settlements and blasting Prime Minister Netanyahu's withholding of tax dollars from Palestinian authorities and called for an end to the economic blockade of



Gaza. Earlier, in an interview with the New York Daily News on April 1, 2016, Sanders remarked about Israel with blood libel in relation to the August 2014 Israeli war in the Gaza Strip by elaborating that Israeli forces bombed apartment houses and hospitals and “killed 10,000 Palestinian civilians..Israel’s force was more indiscriminate than it should have been.”

Here, it is also notable that since the fundamentalist party BJP led by the Indian Prime Minister Narindra Modi came to power in India, it has been implementing anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan agenda. India which have strategic partnership with Israel has perennially been manipulating the double standards of the US-led West regarding world phenomena of terrorism, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan etc., while exploiting their anti-Muslim approach to obtain Indo-Israeli secret designs. Both Tel Aviv and New Delhi have been equating the ‘wars of liberation’ in Palestine and Kashmir with terrorism, and under the cover, accelerated state terrorism on these controlled territories. Their main purpose is to divert the attention of the West from their own atrocities, while employing delaying tactics in the solution of these issues.

Particularly, fast growing economic power of China coupled with her rising strategic relationship with the Third World, and especially Pakistan—after signing of the agreement, “China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor” has irked the eyes of Americans, Indians and some major European countries.

The US-led European countries’ double standards are likely to provide Israel with an opportunity to manipulate the situation to conduct more terror attacks in Europe and the US so as to implicate Syrian-based ISIS.

Nonetheless, the above mentioned developments like differences among the EU countries, refugee crisis and to fortify the US alliance with the Western countries, particularly Europe, to divert the attention of American public from internal problems, prolonged war on terror etc., and especially to avoid the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Mossad can avail the vicious circle of terrorism to arrange terror attacks in the US and Europe. Therefore, instead of pursuing secret states’ strategies of the past in the modern era, Western counterterrorism experts and policy makers must follow realistic approach by thinking on these lines. They need to detect the role of Mossad which would continue to target Europe and the US by conducting terror attacks through the ISIS terrorists. They must also seek solution of the Syrian and Palestinian crises, including the Kashmir dispute. While, loyalist Americans, non-Zionist Jews and peace-loving citizens of every other religious community should play their positive role for world peace by stopping the division of the international community on religious and cultural lines.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations.

Global War on Terror a ‘7th-Century Clash Involving 21st-Century Weapons,’ Says New Knesset Intelligence Subcommittee Chair (INTERVIEW)

By Lea Speyer

Source: <https://www.algemeiner.com/2016/05/23/global-war-on-terror-a-7th-century-clash-involving-21st-century-weapons-says-knesset-member-newly-appointed-to-intelligence-subcommittee-interview/>

May 23 – Today’s global fight against terrorism can be characterized as a “seventh-century clash involving 21st-century weapons,” an Israeli parliamentarian and counter-terrorism expert told *The Algemeiner*.

Likud MK Anat Berko (photo), on a visit to the United States, said that in view of this dire situation, world leaders must come to realize they are “in the same boat.”

“Every country should put its ego aside and collaborate against terrorism, because we are in the middle of World War Three,” she urged. “I said this many years ago and, I’m sorry to say, many of the warnings I made have become reality.”



Berko claimed that the global community is so concerned with political correctness that it loses sight of the truth. “Not all Muslims are terrorists, but the first victims are Muslims themselves,” she said. “What we are experiencing right now is a tsunami of terror carried out by Muslims and this cannot be ignored. We can be politically correct about this, but it will not help combat the problem. The international community does not understand Israel is fighting the same enemy.”

However, added Berko, while countries are grappling with how to crush terror networks planning attacks around the world, an even greater and more obvious terror threat is being ignored: Iran.

“Shia Iran is the wrong horse that the West gambled on. Even without its nuclear umbrella, Iran conducts and sponsors terrorism all over the world. The West did not understand from the beginning that Iran wouldn’t be the ‘good cop’ in the Middle East and is in fact using its global proxies to carry out terror attacks, like we saw in its involvement in Buenos Aires [in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center]. The nexus between Shia Iran, Alawite Syria and Hezbollah has become the face of Shia terrorism. They have sleeper cells in the US, Europe, Africa, South America — everywhere,” she said, adding, “This doesn’t mean Sunni countries don’t have them, too.”

With Sunni and Shia terror groups already carrying out and threatening to carry out cross-border attacks against Israel, Berko said, “Israel will not be the policeman of the Middle East. We are a tiny country, the only state for the Jewish people, which is smaller than New Jersey and even Rhode Island. However, we will keep our borders free of terrorism.”



The MK’s resume is impressive for any politician. Berko served in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for 25 years and is now a Lieutenant Colonel in the reserves. She is the author of *The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers*, and *The Smarter Bomb, Women and Children as Suicide Bombers* — the fruit of her years of study of terrorists, particularly women and children. On Friday, she became the first ever woman to be appointed to head the Knesset’s Subcommittee for Intelligence and Secret Services, “the most prestigious and classified of all the subcommittees,” she said.

Study probes impact of terror on business travelers, managers

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160525-study-probes-impact-of-terror-on-business-travelers-managers>

May 25 – **A joint study of terror’s impact on business travelers and business travel managers revealed surprising results, especially with regard to traveler fears and anxiety.**

The study was conducted by the Association of Corporate Travel Executives (ACTE) and *Business Traveler Magazine* — in association with American Express Global Business Travel. The study’s findings also indicated that corporate travel managers may be missing key traveler concerns.

“This study is the first to see the business traveler as less of a road warrior and more of an executive whose office just happens to be the world,” said ACTE Executive Director Greeley Koch. “These are people who balance their families and the challenges of life against meeting their corporate objectives. Their candid perspectives of the terror issue add a whole new dimension to this discussion.”

ACTE notes that some of the study’s more surprising results were:

- That **31 percent** of business travelers worry that a reluctance to travel could hurt their career, and that 6 percent would not feel comfortable expressing their concerns to upper management.
- **Sixty-seven percent** of travelers state that there is a psychological effect on either them or their families when travelling to a region where they may not feel safe
- **Ten percent** of business travelers remain “utterly fearless” regarding terrorism, and 25 percent have very little fear.
- **Sixty-five percent** of business travelers have varied fears, including being stranded in a security lockdown, in-flight terror incidents, and the threat of medical health risks.
- **A majority of business travelers fear mugging and**



traffic accidents while on the road more than the possibility of a terrorist attack.

“This study emphasizes the necessity for a broader discussion on the anxieties caused by business travel overall,” said Tom Otley, Editor of *Business Traveler Magazine*. “Whilst the resilience of the business traveler terrorism fears remain high, this does not indicate an absence of other cumulative effects. For example, how does a traveler to a recently troubled area explain away the fears of her or his children? And this is but one of a number of issues.”

“In the world we live in today, traveler care is a growing concern and top priority for companies of all shapes and sizes,” said Evan Konwiser, VP, Digital Traveler, American Express Global Business Travel. “We’ve heard this time and time again from our customers who want access to advanced products and services that ensure the safety and security of their employees, no matter what happens. Equipping our customers with great tools is the first step, followed by ensuring these

functionalities are properly communicated to employees so there are no disconnects. At GBT, we continue to add new functionality to our traveler care platform Expert Care to arm our customers with customized and scalable solutions to meet the specific size, geographic footprint and travel behaviors of their companies.”

The study also focused on how business travel managers (identified as “corporate travel executives”) interpreted traveler response to terrorist issues. Travel managers had a higher estimation regarding their policy’s effectiveness addressing risk than more skeptical business travelers. Specifically, travelers wanted more access to up-to-date risk management tools and specific safety briefings for various destinations. Likewise, corporate travel executives may be assuming that traveler silence indicates total acceptance of a travel program.

The study polled 605 business travelers and 270 corporate travel executives over a two-month period, prior to the attacks in Belgium.

— Read more in [ACTE-Business Traveler study: the impact of terrorism on business travel \(ACTE and BBT, May 2016\)](#).

ISIS Ambushes British, Italian Troops in Libya

Source: <http://news.antiwar.com/2016/05/01/isis-ambushes-british-italian-troops-in-libya/>



to endorse the invasion.

May 01 – Details are extremely scant, mostly because both nations continue to deny having ground troops in Libya, but a group of British and Italian Special Forces inside Libya were [said to have been ambushed by ISIS forces](#) in an incident on Wednesday.

The ambush included suicide bombers, and Italian troops were said to have been “[killed or wounded](#)” in the incident, while some reports also suggested some of the British special forces may have been captured in the attack, which began with vehicle bombers.

Reports from earlier this month suggested Italy is looking to lead a [6,000-troop ground invasion of Libya](#), with Britain expected to provide about 1,000 of those troops. The invasion is predicated on the UN-backed “unity government” ever getting enough legitimacy






Yet Britain is believed to have had troops in Libya for months, as have the US, Italy, and France. The special forces deployments are being presented as something short of an invasion, however, with the US claiming their troops are there trying to find allies for a future war.

Terrorist or pedophile? This start-up says it can out secrets by analyzing faces

Source: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/24/terrorist-or-pedophile-this-start-up-says-it-can-out-secrets-by-analyzing-faces/>

May 24 – **An Israeli start-up says it can take one look at a person's face and realize character traits that are undetectable to the human eye.**



Faception said it's already signed a contract with a homeland security agency to help identify terrorists. The company said its technology also can be used to identify everything from great poker players to

extroverts, pedophiles, geniuses and white collar-criminals.

"We understand the human much better than other humans understand each other," said Faception chief executive Shai Gilboa. "Our personality is determined by our DNA and reflected in our face. It's a kind of signal."

Faception has built 15 different classifiers, which Gilboa said evaluate with 80 percent accuracy certain traits. The start-up is pushing forward, seeing tremendous power in a machine's ability to analyze images.

Yet experts caution there are ethical questions and profound limits to the effectiveness of technology such as this.

"Can I predict that you're an ax murderer by looking at your face and therefore should I arrest



you?” said Pedro Domingos, a professor of computer science at the University of Washington and author of “The Master Algorithm.” “You can see how this would be controversial.”

Gilboa said he also serves as the company’s chief ethics officer and will never make his classifiers that predict negative traits available to the general public.

The danger lies in the computer system’s imperfections. Because of that, Gilboa envisions governments considering his findings along with other sources to better identify terrorists. Even so, the use of the data is troubling to some.

“The evidence that there is accuracy in these judgments is extremely weak,” said Alexander Todorov, a Princeton psychology professor whose research includes facial perception. “Just when we thought that physiognomy ended 100 years ago. Oh, well.”

Faception recently showed off its technology at a poker tournament organized by a start-up that shares investors with Faception. Gilboa said that Faception predicted before the tournament that four players out of the 50 amateurs would be the best. When the dust settled two of those four were among the event’s three finalists. To make its prediction Faception analyzed photos of the 50 players against a Faception database of professional poker players.

There are challenges in trying to use artificial intelligence systems to draw conclusions such as this. A computer that is trained to analyze images will only be as good as the examples it is trained on. If the computer is exposed to a narrow or outdated sample of data, its conclusions will be skewed. Additionally, there’s the risk the system will make an accurate prediction, but not necessarily for the right reasons.

Domingos, the University of Washington professor, shared the example of a colleague who trained a computer system to tell the difference between dogs and wolves. Tests proved the system was almost 100 percent accurate. But it turned out the computer was successful because it learned to look for snow in the background of the photos. All of the wolf photos were taken in the snow, whereas the dog pictures weren’t.

Also, an artificial intelligence system might zero in on a trait that could be changed by a person — such as the presence of a beard — limiting its ability to make an accurate prediction.


“If somebody came to me and said ‘I have a company that’s going to try to do this,’ my answer to them would be ‘nah, go do something more promising,’” Domingos said. “But on the other hand, machine learning brings us lots of surprises every day.”

Declassified documents offer insights into ISIS origins, how to defeat the group

Source:<http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160526-declassified-documents-offer-insights-into-isis-origins-how-to-defeat-the-group>

May 26 – **Drawing from more than 140 recently declassified documents from the predecessors of the Islamic State, a new RAND Corporation study shows that the group has been operating for years with remarkable continuity in its philosophy, methods, and goals, including the long-standing aspiration for creating a caliphate.**

The documents show that the leadership consciously



designed the organization not just to fight, but also to build a state governed by the laws dictated by its strict Islamist ideology.

“The lessons from examining the group’s history are useful for setting expectations about the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Islamic State and its ability to combat its opponents,” said Patrick Johnston, the lead author of the report and a political scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “Understanding the

origins of the Islamic State can help lead to a coordinated and effective campaign against it. It also can explain how the Islamic State may be able to survive such an effort and sustain itself in the future, albeit perhaps at a lower level of threat.”

RAND reports that researchers conclude that the record of the military efforts by the United States and Iraq against the Islamic State's predecessors shows that defeating the group will require a persistent military campaign, coupled with a political solution to the longstanding political crises in Iraqi and Syrian. Although it seemed to burst on to the global scene with its June 2014 conquest of the Iraqi city of Mosul, records show that as early as 2008 the Islamic State of Iraq — a predecessor of the Islamic State — organized itself for statehood.

The Islamic State of Iraq used a bureaucratic management model based on that of the core operating principles of al-Qaeda, but replicated the model at different geographic levels. It also carefully demarcated the administrative boundaries of its planned state.

The group paid its personnel low wages that would draw true believers rather than opportunists, trained and allocated its membership with an eye toward group effectiveness, raised revenues locally through diversified sources and was able to maintain itself, albeit at much reduced strength, in the face of an aggressive counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy put in place by its opponents.

“Its own records show that the group was rational in its administration, adaptive in its actions, careful about spending and diversified in revenue raising,” said Howard J. Shatz, a co-author of the report and a senior economist at

RAND. “This made it — and continues to make it — a formidable enemy.”

The RAND report recommends that any counter-personnel strategy should strive to eliminate layers of high-level and mid-level managers from the Islamic State. Capitalizing on any fissures within the group can speed its decline, as can degrading its revenues and therefore its ability to make payments.

When the predecessor group Islamic State of Iraq was under great pressure, it missed or delayed salary payments, and the Islamic State's recently reported salary cuts are in line with its standard operations. Under such circumstances, appeals to ideology, battlefield victory and intimidation may not be enough to maintain morale, according to researchers. The most difficult counter-finance challenge is that group has long focused on local fundraising, which means territory must be retaken.

In addition, researchers say that tracking and targeting the Islamic State's foreign recruits will be essential to reducing the group's ability to threaten the broader Middle East, Europe and the United States.

“Targeting the Islamic State's training camps and its flow of skilled terrorists returning to their home counties could be a new approach to reducing the group's ability to strike abroad, especially if it is combined with the current campaign to eliminate their revenue sources and bulk cash holdings,” said Benjamin Bahney, a co-author of the report and a RAND policy analyst.

The report was sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA).

This report is a joint effort among RAND, the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University, and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Key Findings

ISI Adopted a Vertically Integrated Bureaucratic Model

- ISI's bureaucratic model looked like the ideal structure al-Qa'ida operatives described in memos, but ISI replicated that structure at local levels to implement territorial control.
- By 2008, ISI had subdivided Iraq into specific sectors but was struggling to fill its designated positions at the subnational level.
- ISI allocated human capital rationally, with the suicide-bomber corps dominated by foreigners (more likely than Iraqis to be fanatical believers in the group's ideology) and with intelligence and security personnel (where local knowledge was critical) dominated by its Iraqi members. However, the majority of foreign fighters were not suicide bombers.



- ISI's management and information reporting requirements appeared quite systematic for an ostensibly covert militant organization.

As with the Present-Day Islamic State, ISI Demonstrated Sophisticated Financial Management

- The salaries and other compensation ISI paid to its members seem designed for an environment where labor was plentiful and the organization needed to attract loyal members and screen out opportunists and spies.
- ISI's monthly payroll consistently consumed the largest single portion of its revenues. ISI had a well-developed payroll system with clearly defined salaries.
- There was significant personnel mobility within ISI. Turnover was high, and the group frequently reassigned members to different military units or back-office positions.
- ISI aimed to raise money locally, largely from criminal activities but also partly from activities that resembled state action, such as taxation.
- ISI placed a premium on local fundraising because that gave it maximum control. Fundraising also allowed the group to look more like a state; its taxation activities resembled what any state might do.
- ISI leadership sought substantial oversight of the group's finances and put in place detailed record-keeping requirements for tracking and auditing purposes.

Recommendations

- Any counterpersonnel strategy against ISI must strive to eliminate entire layers of high-level and midlevel managers.
- Capitalizing on any fissures within the group will be essential to defeating the Islamic State and ensuring that the group does not reemerge.
- If the coalition can cause a cutoff of salaries, it could harm morale within, and support for, the Islamic State for a failure to deliver on promises made to recruits. This could be even more damaging if combined with evidence that some leaders were embezzling money.
- To broaden the fight against the Islamic State's revenues, the coalition will need to identify the intermediaries and end purchasers of the group's products and either target these people or sanction them and their financial institutions.
- The coalition has elevated efforts to interdict oil transport, including targeting oil infrastructure and trucks. Other measures could include destroying road entrances to oil fields and giving heightened attention to any oil trucks leaving the Islamic State territory. Any such truck must pass through checkpoints or border crossings and should be noticed or recorded, suggesting official complicity. Further investigation into how such trucks are able to get through checkpoints is merited and official complicity should be addressed.
- Stop the flow of foreign fighters in both directions: Enhance border controls in transit countries (Turkey, most especially); more effectively scrutinize potential members from source countries; stop people from getting first-hand training and becoming integrated directly into fighter facilitation networks; and improve information-sharing among intelligence and law-enforcement organizations, both within and across countries.

— *Read more in Patrick B. Johnston et al., [Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010](#) (RAND Corporation, May 2016).*

Suspected ISIS-linked cell foiled in southern Russia, large weapons cache destroyed

Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/343941-isis-cell-russia-foiled/>

May 21 – A militant cell with suspected links to the Islamic State terror group was foiled in Russia's southern Republic of Ingushetia, the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) said.



"The FSB and Russian Interior Ministry units have foiled the criminal activities of an underground conspiratorial bandit cell, associated with the international terrorist organization Islamic State (IS, Daesh, formerly ISIS/ISIL)," the statement read.



The four members of the group, all of whom were residents of Ingushetia, were detained during the operation, the NAC said.

The militant cell located in the Republic's Nazran District was in possession of a "large weapons cache," which was destroyed by the security forces.

The arsenal of the terrorists consisted of "three ready-to-use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), grenades, Kalashnikov assault rifles and pistols with silencers, including foreign-made ones, as well as over 2,000 rounds from small arms."


"The group... was created for committing crimes against government officials, law enforcers and supporters of traditional Islam," the NAC statement said.

Last week, a recruiter for Islamic State was detained by the police in Ingushetia.

Niger: AQIM Target French Uranium Mine

Source: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=45477&no_cache=1#.V0kab-SWsgU](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45477&no_cache=1#.V0kab-SWsgU)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed a rocket attack on French nuclear company Areva's Somair uranium mine in Arlit, Niger on May 24 ([Alakhbar \[Mauritania\]](#), May 24). No injuries were reported as a result of the attack.



In a statement released on social media, the group attributed the attack to its al-Nasser Brigade, saying the attackers had used grad rockets and proclaiming they had carried out the operation successfully despite tight security measures at the mine. The group's statement also included references to "the Crusader thieves" who "plunder" the country's resources, echoing the rhetoric it used in March after its rocket attack on Algeria's In Salah gas field, a facility run jointly by BP and Statoil (see [Terrorism Monitor](#), April 1).



AQIM has increasingly partnered with local jihadists to carry out its attacks. The rhetoric of resource nationalism is both a reflection of this and an attempt to play on local discontent, which is easy to do in a place where the local population has seen little evidence of the mineral wealth their country generates. Earlier this month Areva faced down strike action at Cominak, its other uranium mine in the country, ostensibly over bonus payments ([Pulse.ng](#), May 3; [Reuters](#), May 2). Workers claimed they had received only part of the promised payments, while the management said an earlier agreement meant the remainder of the bonus was subject to shareholder approval.

AQIM appears to have been careful to specifically target the mining facility, avoiding civilian casualties. The mine was attacked once before in 2013; the bomb blast killed at least one person and injured 14 others. The government blamed the attack on MUJAO, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, which had by then split with AQIM ([Le Sahel](#), May 23, 2013). Other reports attributed the blast to Mokhtar Belmokhtar's outfit ([Middle East Online](#), May 24, 2013).

The French maintain an intelligence base in Niamey, Niger's capital, as part of 'Operation Barkhane', its 3,000-strong regional anti-terror force. The initiative began in August 2014 with the intention of bringing together counterterrorism efforts in five countries across the Sahel. But with weak state institutions, a high-level of corruption, and endemic poverty – as well porous borders and vast areas of sparsely populated land – Niger remains an attractive operating environment for AQIM.

Afghanistan: Taliban Moves Quickly to Name New Leader

Source: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=45477&no_cache=1#.V0kab-SWsgU](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45477&no_cache=1#.V0kab-SWsgU)

Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed in a US drone strike early on May 21, a move that might have initiated the Taliban's second leadership crisis in less than a year, but **the group quickly appointed Maulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada as Mansour's successor.**



Mansour was killed, along with his driver, while travelling in a Toyota Corolla on a highway through Quetta, in Pakistan's restive southwestern province of Baluchistan ([Dawn](#), May 22). Pakistan's President Nawaz Sharif labeled the drone strike a violation of his country's sovereignty ([Dawn](#), May 23). While the incident is the first drone attack inside Baluchistan, there have been plenty of strikes in Pakistani and Afghan territory in the past. Furthermore, a statement from Pakistan's foreign ministry indicated Pakistani officials, the

president included, had been made aware of the strike in advance ([Dawn](#), May 22).

Interestingly, Mansour appears to have been killed while returning from Iran, having travelled there on a Pakistani passport under the name Wali Muhammad ([Gandhara](#), May 22). **His passport was found to contain a valid**

Iranian visa. An Iranian connection is not unexpected. Iran's Quds Force was long suspected of supplying the Taliban with weapons for use against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Since the withdrawal of Western combat troops in 2014, Tehran has likely seen the Taliban as a useful and effective way of tackling Islamic State in Afghanistan.

The speed with which the Taliban announced Akhundzada's appointment – he took over as leader in under a week – was likely a move to avoid a repeat of the leadership crisis the group has faced since July 2015 with the death of Mullah Omar, a development that was kept secret from the group's foot soldiers for two years. It also heads off any setbacks to the Taliban's recent offensive, which has seen it gain ground in Afghanistan's north, including



around Baghlan's provincial capital ([Tolo News](#), May 14).

U.S. officials appear to hope Mansour's killing will make peace talks with the Taliban easier. That seems optimistic. Akhundzada and his deputies – Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani network and Mullah Yakoub, the son of Mullah Omar – are no keener on peace talks than Mansour was, and the Taliban's current strength means it has little incentive to negotiate.

Divisions could still emerge within the Taliban. Mansour had only just begun to consolidate his position, seeing off a series of challenges including from rival Mohammad Rasool Akhund, thought to have been a close friend of Mullah Omar. While splitting the Taliban among different leaders – which may be what Afghan and U.S. officials hoped for by removing Mansour – could perhaps see a faction emerge that is less implacably opposed to talks, it would seem to be a dangerous game.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Killing terrorists' leaders is like an ECG. Isoelectric line is the only solution. US expectations for easier peace talks is just utopic.

Oman as a Counter-Terrorism Model for the GCC States

By Alexandria Caputo

Source: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=45478&no_cache=1#.V0kbyOSWsgU](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45478&no_cache=1#.V0kbyOSWsgU)

May 27 – Omani youth, according to one recent poll, see the ideology of Islamic State (IS) as the largest obstacle facing their Gulf nation ([Times of Oman](#), April 16). The survey, conducted by international polling firm Penn Schoen Berland, found that young Omanis – and indeed many Arab youth across the Middle East – are far from open to the violent organization that has increasingly exploited vulnerable populations on a global scale.



[Qaboos bin Said Al Said, the Sultan of Oman](#)

Despite the fears of IS' violent ideology, peaceful Oman scored a zero on the on the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), a survey that looks at four indicators: the total number of terror incidents, fatalities caused by terrorists, injuries produced, and the measure of total property damage from terrorist incidents within a given year ([Institute for Economics and Peace](#), 2015). Qatar was

the only other Gulf nation to score similarly. The GTI, however, makes no determination of how many people have been radicalized and recruited to militant causes within a state. Qatar has seen at least 15 of its nationals joined IS, leaving Oman as the Gulf State's safest nation ([Gulf News](#), November 2015).

This article looks at the reasons for Oman's success and asks if the oft-overlooked Gulf State can, under Sultan Qaboos bin Said, serve as a counter-terrorism model for other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).



Modernization Drive

Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970 in a British-backed coup. His rise ushered in what has been described as Oman's "modern era" ([IBT](#), November 28, 2015). Prior to this, Oman's southern Dhofar Governorate had adopted the Marxist-style ideologies of South Yemen, but Qaboos' takeover took the country

and pay, regardless of gender. State interference in citizens' lives is limited, particularly in terms of employment and expression of faith, in contrast to, for example, the *mutaween* of Saudi Arabia. The Omani government does not record statistics regarding the religious practice of its population, although in this case noninterventionism in the



in another direction. He worked to modernize the nation. He bolstered the country's infrastructure and tackled the underdevelopment, poverty, and ethnic divisions that had existed under his father, Said bin Taimur, eroding the conditions that might have allowed radicalization to find purchase. The education sector was reformed and properly funded, and the country's then-separate northern and southern regions were brought together and sealed under the Sultanate of Oman ([Country Studies](#), 1993).

Such reforms have created an environment where it is tough for radicals to take hold, despite the presence of militant groups in neighboring Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Despite economic and structural reforms, Oman remains a socially conservative nation, whose citizens strive to protect their values and traditions in marriage and religious practice. Nonetheless, Omanis expect equal treatment

personal affairs of citizens appears to arise largely a result of a lack of interest ([Gulf State Analytics](#), June 17, 2015).

The Ibadi Influence

The dominant school of Islam in Oman is Ibadism, an Islamic religious philosophy that predates both the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam and is known for its tolerance of other faiths. Sunni and Shia minorities exist in Oman without the tension seen in other Middle Eastern and North African nations ([Gulf State Analytics](#), June 17, 2015).

As a 75 percent majority population, the Ibadi faith and teachings has affected the formation of law, ranging from forbidding proselytization to moderating the application of the death penalty. Ibadism is also reflected in Oman's foreign policy, giving the country a distinctively



tolerant position on the global stage.

As a result of the Ibadi tradition, Oman works to prevent radicalization by promoting freedom of thought and belief, although this remains marred by social pressures and state censorship of the media ([The US-Middle East Youth Network](#), March 18). Opinions on God and the government, and Sultan Qaboos in particular, remain taboo subjects to criticize since such views can be seen as aggressive ([Human Rights Watch](#), 2016). This month an Omani journalist was arrested for expressing his political beliefs, sparking debate over the Sultanate's real views on freedom of speech ([Gulf News](#), May 13).

Anti-Terrorism Laws

Despite a high degree of tolerance for religious expression, Oman has put in place robust anti-terrorism legislation. In April, the Shura Council approved amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Acts, which target money laundering and the financing of terrorism ([Gulf News](#), April 4). The move is an attempt to confront terrorist activity at a grassroots level, tackling financiers of criminal activity and bolstering the ability of law enforcement to track down offenders. Heavier penalties and longer jail sentences have also been put in place under the amendments ([Gulf News](#), April 4).

With violent radical groups harbored in neighboring countries, Oman is also concerned with the protection of its own borders. The crisis in Yemen, however, demonstrates that the Omani leadership would prefer to act as a mediator than institute military force. Oman is the only GCC nation that has yet to join the

Saudi coalition in Yemen. Instead, it has taken a role in critical negotiations between the Yemeni government and rebel forces, as well as talks between the United States and representatives of Yemen's Houthis. The Sultanate has even brokered the release of hostages held in the country ([Al Arabiya](#), May 23).

While Oman is not a proponent of hard power on the international stage, its diplomats continue to play a role in counterterrorism in the international arena. This was affirmed recently by the Sultanate's presence at an international conference on the subject in Geneva last month ([Time of Oman](#), April 10).

Stable Foundations

Despite being situated in a conflict-prone region, Oman, through persistent initiatives to bolster education, boost societal development and maintain in the integrity of its borders, has avoided terrorist attacks and the radicalization of its nationals.

Modernizing efforts have helped meet the population's social and economic needs without uprooting Omanis from their culture and heritage. Non-interventionist foreign and domestic policies are at the forefront of Oman's security policies. It has forged a position as a mediator, not only for the GCC but for Western nations as well, recently hosting talks between American and Iranian officials in relation to the Iran nuclear deal ([Al Monitor](#), April 29).

While not every nation can effectively play the role Oman has carved for itself, Oman's success in maintaining domestic stability in a troubled region should make other Gulf nations take note.

Alexandria Caputo is to obtain her Masters degree in International Security at Charles University in Prague.

Taliban or ISIL, which one!?

Source: <http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/402910/Taliban-or-ISIL-which-one>

May 28 – In the face of the concealed but rising threat of ISIL in Afghanistan, what significance does the death of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor have?

Mullah Omar, Mullah Mansoor, Mullah Rasool, or Mullah Yaqoob or today Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada!? The breathless terrorist leaders, do they have much difference?

Almost nine months after the death of Mullah Omar and the selection of Mullah Mansoor as the new leader of the militant group, once again the death of Mullah Mansoor made Taliban, beyond its leaders, the focal point of political and security analysts.



Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor was killed in an American drone strike in the restive Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

question that why our efforts to negotiate with Taliban in the past year did not bear any fruit.” He said, “They have closed their eyes on a reality named Islamabad.”



Mullah Mansoor, the heavyweight Taliban leader who also held the first rank in illicit drug smuggling, was selected as the leader of the Taliban nine months ago. However, since two years ago when Mullah Omar was killed he was secretly the Ace of Spades of the Taliban in the dark.

In the phenomenology of terrorism from both political and security aspects this is a shameful intelligence weakness. It is not only a failure for security sources in Kabul, but also a total embarrassment for NATO and the United States, who rely on such intelligence to counter Taliban.

In a snap look at the incident considering the intelligence they receive, the question still remains that how the abovementioned sources did not get informed of Mullah Omar's death in two years!?

Now one can learn about the real reasons behind the failure in the fight against terrorism.

A high ranking official in the Afghan presidential office says: “The case is not only getting the right intelligence. The West is watching the Taliban from a far distance, but they can't see the tip of their nose.”

The official who requested not to be named went on to say: “No one is ready to answer the

Analyzing the election of Mullah Haibatullah Akhonzada as Taliban leader, the official said: “Did you expect anything else? He is the first name of the past two months' acts of terrorism and a professional drug dealer. But his outstanding character is being a full servant of ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). Our friends do not want to realize this fact.”

However what would be the political and security consequences of Mullah Mansoor's death and the succession of Akhonzada in Afghanistan's developments?

From my point of view this is not a very important issue. The Taliban issue is not just abbreviated in its leadership. Washington and Kabul say by Mullah Mansoor's death an obstacle to peace negotiations has been removed. Well, attack on a vehicle that Mullah Mansoor was travelling in was a masterpiece in military attacks. But if we look and analyze the Taliban beyond its leadership we will find ourselves facing a bunch of Taliban loyalists that ISIL is trying to hunt them and eventually make optimum use of such fighters.

The terrorists who are not so loyal to their leaders anymore, within such framework it does not make



a big difference if the Taliban leader be the slain Mullah Mansoor or Akhunzada or Mullah Yaqoob or Mullah Rasool.

The main cause of worry is the ability of Taliban fighters to run out of the traditional circle of Taliban leadership and join more organized forces or groups such as ISIL.

Many of the aforementioned Taliban fighters in north and northeast, under the guidance of a man called Shahidullah Shahid, made allegiance with ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in mid-July last year.

The ISIL terrorist group - enjoying the charm of "limitless geographical boundaries", "self-interpreted Islamic rule" and "high level of financial power" - has a very good chance in attracting the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters

and so far ISIL has proven to be successful in recruiting them.

Local reports also indicated the vast and calm influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. An official from Helmand province says: "We feel their eyes and the fridity of their weapons behind our heads (hunting us)."

The shock of the fall of Kunduz province to the Taliban in late September or the loss of the strategic town of Sangin in Helmand province with the help of ISIL has not been forgotten yet, while Mullah Mansoor was still alive.

We have to be more concerned and worried about ISIL in Afghanistan than Mullah Mansoor or Haibatullah, particularly when it comes to Western and Central Asia.

What Was Mullah Mansour Doing in Iran?

Source: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/mullah-mansour-iran-afghanistan-taliban-drone/>

On May 21, after a drone strike obliterated a car and its two occupants in Pakistan's Balochistan province, [local officials discovered](#) a Pakistani passport, [miraculously intact](#), amid the smoldering wreckage and two bodies charred beyond recognition. The passport belonged to a man identified as Wali

Mullah Mansour's decision to visit Iran and leave his sanctuary in Balochistan — where the Afghan Taliban's top leadership had long been safely ensconced — is odd. After all, Tehran is no friend of the Taliban; on the contrary, it has formally aligned itself with Afghanistan's Northern

Alliance and other anti-Taliban actors. It [played](#) an instrumental role at the 2001 Bonn Conference that established a post-Taliban government. In the early years of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Tehran [gave Washington maps](#) showing Taliban positions, and its military [offered to train](#) 20,000 Afghan troops.

Iran also has good reason to distance itself from the Taliban. Simple sectarian considerations — Iran is Shiite, the Taliban is Sunni — offer one explanation. But the divergences run deeper: The Taliban harbors links to [Jundallah](#), an anti-state Sunni terror group in Iran. It oversees a

flourishing narcotics trade that feeds Iran's crippling heroin epidemic, and it has been [blamed for the killings](#) of nearly a dozen Iranian diplomats at their consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, which brought Iran and Taliban-run Afghanistan to the brink of war ([according to some accounts](#), the Pakistani anti-Shiite militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba was behind that attack).



Muhammad. Its [photo](#) bore an uncanny resemblance to Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban targeted by the drone strike, who lay dead close by. According to [reports](#) in the Pakistani press, the passport indicated that its owner, presumably Mullah Mansour, had been returning from Iran, where he had been since April 26. He had also traveled there for several weeks in February and March.



Western authorities have a simple explanation for Mullah Mansour's presence in Iran: He was there to receive medical treatment, [according to a European official](#) quoted in the *New York Times*, in order to avoid Pakistani hospitals and the watchful eye of his patron, Pakistan's intelligence agency. No specifics were given as to what he was being treated for. The *Wall Street Journal*, curiously, has [reported](#) that Mullah Mansour was actually in Iran to visit family. In any case, U.S. officials knew of his whereabouts and, aided by communications intercepts, were able to [track him](#) there. [According to a tweet](#) by NPR correspondent Tom Bowman, Washington even had his SIM card number.

Mullah Mansour's trip to Iran may well have been a simple trip to the doctor. But the trip may have had more nefarious purposes, too. Despite the differences between Tehran and the Taliban, they share some key interests and have often cooperated operationally.

Indeed, Tehran and the Taliban have a more symbiotic relationship than meets the eye. In particular, they are both wary of the West and particularly the United States. And each seeks to undercut Washington's influence.

Thomas Joscelyn, an international security analyst and senior editor with the *Long War Journal*, has presented a compelling case of long-standing [links](#) between Iran and the Taliban. These links date back to 2000, when, according to unclassified U.S. government [memos](#), Mullah Mohammed Omar tasked Khirullah Said Wali Khairkhwa, the Taliban governor of Herat province, with improving relations between the organization and Tehran. As a [result](#) of this outreach, Iran agreed to supply the Taliban with mines and small arms. (On two separate occasions in [2007](#) and [2011](#), international forces in Afghanistan intercepted arms shipments from Iran destined for the Taliban.) The two sides also inked an open border agreement that enabled the Taliban to smuggle money, goods, and fighters into Iran. Khairkhwa's outreach laid the groundwork for a later, major triumph of Iran-Taliban cooperation: the 2012 [opening of a Taliban office](#) in the Iranian city of Zahedan, home to many of the [several million Afghans](#) residing in Iran.

Historically, a key factor driving Iran's cooperation with the Taliban has been mutual concern about the U.S. military presence, and

broader American influence, in Afghanistan. Tehran, for example, has that U.S. forces could launch attacks on its nuclear facilities from Afghanistan.

Today, circumstances have changed. U.S. combat forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan, and Iran and the United States have concluded a landmark nuclear agreement. One might assume these developments would ease some of Iran's anxieties about America's designs and suggest fewer incentives for Tehran to cooperate with the Taliban — think again.

[News reports](#) over the last year suggest increased levels of Iranian cash and arms transfers to the Taliban. But why? One reason, which may also help explain [Moscow's recent outreach to the Taliban](#), is the [shared unease about the rising influence of the Islamic State](#) in Afghanistan, where several thousand former Taliban fighters, most of them in the eastern province of Nangarhar, have declared their allegiance to the group. Some of Mullah Mansour's supporters, demoralized by their leader's sudden death, could join these Islamic State-aligned fighters.

Another factor that may help explain Iran-Taliban comity is the [Taliban's desire to wean itself off](#) Pakistani sanctuaries and other largesse. [As I've written previously](#), NATO interviews with Taliban detainees reveal that many of the group's leaders and fighters chafe at their reliance on Islamabad, a patron many Taliban members do not trust because of the tight control it likes to exert over them as well as its willingness to arrest those Taliban personnel deemed uncooperative. With the Taliban reeling from the death of Mullah Mansour in Balochistan — a sanctuary where the group had never felt vulnerable before — it may have an even stronger incentive to secure alternative arrangements that do not involve Pakistan. For the Taliban, this could amplify the utility of retaining, if not intensifying, its ties to Tehran — and particularly, as [some observers have suggested](#), by using areas it controls in Afghanistan to work out arrangements with Iran to receive covert financial support.

For Iran, a strong incentive for continuing cooperation with the Taliban is the need for a hedging strategy: Amid all the uncertainty and volatility in Afghanistan, where the insurgency continues to make



inroads and a weak national unity government faces an uncertain future, it pays for Iran to keep its options open with the Taliban, arguably Afghanistan's most consequential non-state actor.

This isn't to say that the Taliban have no reason to cooperate with Kabul. On the contrary, Iran would be much better served by scaling back measures — from arms shipments and money transfers to the provision of the Taliban office in Zahedan — that strengthen the Taliban. A stronger Taliban means more instability in Afghanistan, which in turn portends a more robust narcotics trade and higher refugee outflows. Both have direct and deleterious consequences for Iran.

Additionally, a more destabilized Afghanistan imperils promising development projects critical to Iran as it struggles to recover from years of sanctions. This week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tehran to conclude a series of accords with Iran and Afghanistan linked to the development of Iran's Chabahar port, an initiative meant to facilitate trade and transport among gas-rich Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India. In effect, Iran could serve as a gateway to much-coveted markets

and a lynchpin of a major effort to scale up regional connectivity. Yet if Iran keeps showering the Taliban with money and arms, thereby contributing to Afghanistan's destabilization, Chabahar may be a port to nowhere.

In reality, Tehran is likely to play a double game: It will continue to work with Kabul while providing covert support to the Taliban. The U.S.-Iran nuclear deal may have eased some of the tensions in U.S.-Iran relations, but the two nations have not magically become friends. Meanwhile, the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, which may not be drawn down as quickly as President Barack Obama had wished, will continue to trouble Iran, even if it is secretly reassured that U.S. forces could help bring a modicum of stability to Afghanistan. Furthermore, Iran is unlikely to simply wash its hands of an organization that controls more territory in Afghanistan than at any time since 2001.

Ultimately, the complex ties between Tehran and the Taliban exemplify a slight variation of a well-known diplomatic dictum: The enemy of my enemy is my frenemy.

Real Madrid Supporters Club in Iraq Attacked by Terrorists

Source: <http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2643107-real-madrid-supporters-club-in-iraq-attacked-by-terrorists>

May 29 – **Terrorists have attacked a Real Madrid fan club in Iraq for the second time in a month, this time targeting and killing 12 Blancos faithful on the night their club won its 11th European Cup by beating Atletico Madrid on penalties in the UEFA Champions League final.**

Per AS' Calum Roche, the attack took place in the town of Baqubah, some 50 kilometers from the capital city of Baghdad. Four men reportedly opened fire shortly before the conclusion of the second extra-time period prior to escaping.

AS spoke to club president Ziad Albidani:

It was a similar type of attack to the one that took place earlier in the month. Twelve people have been killed and at least eight wounded, who have been taken to hospital.

It took place at the end of the second half of extra-time, ahead of the penalty shoot-out, at around midnight local time.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Earlier this month, 16 fans and security guards were killed in a similar ambush less than 100 kilometers away in Balad, for which a group associated with the Islamic State claimed responsibility, per Roche.

Per [Sky Sports](#), the club wore black armbands in its match against Deportivo La Coruna in response to the tragedy.

Survivors and fellow fans gathered at the same club just weeks later to watch Real Madrid win the title, per Agence France-Presse's Jean-Marc Mojon.



Jean-Marc Mojon
@mojobaghdad

Joy at the Al-Furat cafe in #Balad, #Iraq as @realmadrid wins #uclfinal 2 weeks after deadly attack @AFP

2:25 AM - 29 May 2016

558 430



According to the president of an affiliated fan club, information regarding this latest attack is being withheld, per Roche: "The army are restricting the information that is coming out of the scene. This is a terrible situation. They are destroying the happiness of all Madrid fans on such a special night."

Real Madrid president Florentino Perez has dedicated the club's Champions League victory to the club's Iraqi fans killed in an ISIS massacre earlier this month.

Music festivals on 'high alert' for terror attacks, say police

Source: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/music-festivals-on-high-alert-for-terror-attacks-say-police-a7055011.html>

May 30 – **Music festivals this summer will be on "high alert" for terror attacks along with large sporting events,** according to a senior Metropolitan Police officer.

Neil Basu, deputy assistant commissioner with the Metropolitan police said that crowded entertainment events such as music festivals would be "right at the top of the agenda" for the police.

festival, Mr Basu told the newspaper that these sorts of events were particularly vulnerable.

Open air festivals, he said, are harder to safeguard than concert venues: "They tend to have one big stage with high perimeter security. It's kind of the equivalent [to a stadium] but even harder to control because the perimeters are much larger."

Around 135,000 people will attend the



**GLASTONBURY
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Mr Basu said Isis suicide bombers were considered by police to pose a "principle threat" to public security in the UK.

"The threat has become more difficult, because it's now potentially any time any place, anywhere," Mr Basu told The Sunday Times.

"These people are perfectly happy to target civilians with the maximum terror impact. Crowded places were always a concern for us, but now they are right at the top of the agenda."

Although there is no specific intelligence to suggest that terrorist groups will attack a music

Glastonbury festival this year, an event that covers 900 acres of land.

Adrian Coombs, the security director for the festival said: "The Glastonbury festival thoroughly plans the event each year, where necessary with the support of the police, and puts in place all essential measures to protect the public and maximise public safety."

Mr Basu said that attacks in Paris, including on the Bataclan theatre, have shown that small concert venues and night clubs are also at risk.

"I want to see the owners and event managers [of smaller



venues] taking the same kind of security precautions," he said.

Mr Basu, who is in charge of the UK's protective security, also mentioned that managers of sporting events, along with all big music events, should be on high alert.

He spoke to sports bosses and music executives at Wembley on Monday to

emphasise the importance of security at events.

Basu recently travelled to France to be briefed on the security measures to be put in place at the UEFA European Championship, and said that security teams will be armed.

Paris tourism hit by attacks, protests

Source: <http://m.timesofindia.com/world/europe/paris-tourism-hit-by-attacks-protests/articleshow/52503870.cms>

May 31 – Already suffering from the impact of last year's jihadist attacks, tourism in Paris faces a fresh challenge from the recent wave of violent strikes and protests, tourism bosses warned on Monday.

Hotel bookings by Japanese visitors were down 56 percent in the first quarter of the year compared to the same period in 2015, while Russians were down by 35 percent, the city's tourist board said.

Chinese tourists had been a major driver of growth last year — reaching a new record of 1.2 million — but their numbers had also dropped by 13.9 percent.

"The start of 2016 is still feeling the disastrous consequences of the attacks in 2015," the tourism board said in a statement.

France is the world's most visited country, but tourists have been scared off by the November attacks in the capital that left 130 people dead and the January 2015 killings at Charlie Hebdo magazine and a Jewish supermarket.

While the atmosphere in Paris had returned to normal in recent months, an outburst of social

unrest over controversial labour reforms has once again put doubts in tourists' minds.

Three months of student and union-led protests have descended into violent clashes between demonstrators and police around the country.

"The scenes of guerrilla-type action in the middle of Paris, beamed around the world, reinforce the feeling of fear and misunderstanding," the tourist board


said.

Unions have threatened to disrupt transport for the millions of visitors to the Euro 2016 football championship which kicks off across France on June 10.

"There is still time to save the tourist season by putting an end to these blockades that are being shown the world over," said Frederic Valletoux, head of the Paris tourist board.

"It's the entire tourism and leisure network that is penalised. **The challenge for employees is immense**

because 500,000 of them depend on the sector in the Paris region," he added.



White House Lockdown Lifted After Suspicious Object Thrown Over Fence

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/reports-white-house-placed-on-lockdown_us_574c7ce6e4b055bb11728861

May 30 – The White House has returned to "normal operations" after a partial lockdown triggered when an individual threw a metal object over the fence, a U.S. Secret Service spokesman said on Monday.



"An individual threw a metal object over the north fence line at the White House. Secret Service Uniformed Division officers immediately apprehended the individual without incident. All



protective sweeps of the metal object were met with negative results," spokesman Shawn Holtzclaw said in an emailed statement.

The north side of the White House was placed on a security lockdown on Monday because of a suspicious package, a Secret Service official said.

The partial lockdown on the Memorial Day holiday occurred while President Barack Obama was home.

Reporters were not allowed to leave the White House compound through its northwest gate and flashing lights from emergency responders could be seen nearby. **The**

official said hazardous material checks were being made.

Local news radio station WTOP reported that one person was in custody, citing a federal law enforcement official. Obama had visited Arlington Cemetery earlier in the day as part of the annual commemoration for armed services members.



Jeh Johnson: We all need to invest in "E-ZPass of airports"

Source: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jeh-johnson-homeland-security-secretary-on-solutions-to-tsa-security-line-delay/>

May 27 – As the TSA struggles to fix the airport security gridlock, airlines are jumping in to help. [Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson airport](#) is experimenting with a new system to expedite the process with new automated security lanes, which Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson describes as "the **E-ZPass** of airports."

"We've talked about innovation lines and innovation lanes in Atlanta airport. We think that's a good thing that we all need to invest in," Johnson told "CBS This Morning" Friday.

Johnson has also "asked the airlines to consider" eliminating checked-baggage fees, which earned airlines over \$3.8 billion in 2015. But the real issue lies in under-staffing. Some airlines are having their own employees help TSA officials with non-security aspects at checkpoints.

Johnson is working with Congress to bring on more transportation security officers. He said 768 new screeners will be added by mid-June, but the union representing TSA workers said that is still not enough, calling for 6,000 more.

"I just yesterday sent to Congress a request for what we refer to as a 'reprogramming,' so we can convert 2,700 TSOs from part-time to full-time, which would enable to screen people a lot faster," Johnson said,

Johnson said that **nationwide 90 percent of travelers experience an average of a 30-minute wait or less** - longer in busier airports such as in Chicago, Los Angeles and Newark. But he said that becoming a TSA PreCheck member would help cut the wait down to an average of five minutes or less.

In addition to the lack of resources, Johnson also attributed the long delays to tightened security procedures in airlines.

"Well, a year ago, we focused and rededicated ourselves to aviation security based on world events, based on the findings of our inspector general, which really was significant," Johnson said. "Couple that with the fact that we've seen record numbers of air travelers and that has led to longer, unexpected wait times at some of the nation's busiest airports."

An estimated 2.6 million travelers are flying over the Memorial Day Weekend, and airlines could expect an all-time high of fliers this summer. But Johnson said that even "in the face of increased travel volume, we are not going to compromise aviation security."

"We're going to keep passengers moving this weekend, but we're also going to keep them safe," Johnson said. "That's the principal responsibility of TSA."



For those flying this holiday weekend, Johnson advised some "short-term fixes" that could offer some relief.

"First of all, pack carefully, think about the prohibited items, limit the size of your carry-on to what the airlines expect... and plan to get to the airport around two hours early," he said.



Toronto man facing terrorism charges for stabbing two soldiers found unfit to stand trial

Source: <http://news.nationalpost.com/toronto/suspect-in-double-stabbing-at-canadian-forces-recruitment-centre-now-facing-terrorism-charge>

May 31 – **A Toronto man who attacked soldiers at a Canadian Forces recruiting centre was declared unfit to stand trial** on Tuesday, shortly after the RCMP charged with him terrorism offences.

According to court records, Ayanle Hassan Ali, 28, was ordered to undergo treatment and return to court on July 29. He could stand trial at a later date if a judge finds him fit for prosecution.

The twist in the case followed concerns voiced by family members about Ali's mental health after he walked into a Toronto military office on March 14 and slashed two soldiers with a large knife.

During the attack, Ali said that "Allah told me to come here and kill people," Toronto police chief Mark Saunders told reporters. He was charged with three counts of attempted murder and six other offences.

But the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Team laid additional charges Tuesday alleging the attack was carried out "for the benefit of a terrorist group."

The RCMP declined to name the terrorist group involved but the online propaganda of both al-Qaida and ISIL have been encouraging extremists to conduct attacks in Western countries.

Ali was born in Montreal and moved to Toronto in 2011. **A relative said he was deeply affected by his mother's mental illness and was obsessed with conspiracy theories.**

Mental health issues have surfaced at a number of recent Canadian terrorism cases, notably the prosecution of Chiheb Esseghaier, convicted of plotting to attack a Toronto-bound passenger train.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: Come on! Cut the BS! He was fit to attack the soldiers but not fit to stand trial? Be merciful and put him behind bars for 50 years. Perhaps by then science would be able to fix his obsessions.

Jihadese 101: The Distorted Mindset of the Jihadis


By Dr. Ron Spielman

Source: <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/jihadese-101-the-distorted-mindset-of-the-jihadis>

June 01 – This is an *extraordinary* book! I mean 'extra-ordinary' in the sense of 'outside-of-the-ordinary'. It deals with a topic which is frighteningly outside-of -the -ordinary in an outside-of-the-ordinary manner. The topic is the attempt to understand what is a global threat to international security by attempting to describe and explain what is likely to be the nature of the mind of those posing the threat: the "Jihadis". The structure of the book is itself 'outside-of-the-ordinary'. It lists around 200 'ordinary' words and phrases and describes their ordinary usage. The unique contribution of this scholarly work is to describe the application of each entry to the mind of the Jihadi.



Since the focus of any dictionary is on words, the word 'dictionary' itself in the title "Jihadi Dictionary" should provoke a question: isn't a 'dictionary' a compilation of words being translated from one language to another? In this 'dictionary', English words are explained in more English words. But one key entry in the dictionary is "Jihadese". This strange term is one invented by the author, Nancy Hartvelt Kobrin, to encapsulate the unconscious communicative "language" between Jihadis themselves. She creatively appropriates the psychoanalytically inspired term "motherese" which was coined to convey the unconscious communication between mothers and their babies.



The Jihadi DICTIONARY

The Essential Intel Tool for Military, Law Enforcement, Government and the Concerned Public

By Nancy Hartvelt Kobrin, PhD

Multieducator Press (2016)

Here, my readers will encounter the basis of this entire book under review: its grounding in psychoanalytic theory. **For me, a psychoanalyst**, this exemplifies the Jihadi Dictionary's unique value. For any reader encountering a psychoanalytically-informed work for the first time, I would encourage you to grapple with the complex concepts involved. Kobrin does use 'ordinary' language to

describe each term - but the underlying concepts are themselves both ordinary (as in ordinary infant development) and extraordinary (as applied to the extraordinary processes which produce, she asserts, the Jihadi mind).

To get back to the structure of The Jihadi Dictionary itself. Each word, phrase and term is explained by what Kobrin calls a "four-pronged method": a basic dictionary definition; a brief etymology; a psychological definition; and fourthly, a description of the term as it applies to the "Jihadi Mind".

This book is not easily approached, being basically, a compilation of around 200 separate entries. I have thought of it as comprising an "entrée" of about three pages (its introduction), a "main meal" (an excellent 15 page essay right at the end of the book - its "Coda" - which puts everything in context), while the body of the book is comprised of 200 or so "snacks" which one can dip into according to one's own interests.

An example of an early entry: "Aggression" - 'ordinary aggression' occurs when one's actions are influenced by feelings of competition, rage or violence, thereby producing injury to, or the deterioration or conquering of people, sometimes, one's own self." The Jihadi entry, the 'extra-ordinary' version of aggression is "both unconsciously and consciously displayed, is psychotic, out of touch with reality. It seeks to annihilate rather than engage to win and be magnanimous. All must be wiped out. An example of jihadis' annihilatory aggression is the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and its graphic, psychotic imagery."

A big question is "Who should read this book?" The book is directed to the intelligence gathering and law enforcement (police and military) community and written as a tool of understanding for them. Government officials as well as politicians concerned with understanding the current serious threats posed to communal safety, as well as concerned citizens, will be better informed about what apparently motivates those avowed Jihadis who act out their own personal and group issues on the wider community - acts so often well designed to wreak maximum destruction and invoke maximum terror.

In order to deal with any problem, the problem needs to be understood as comprehensively as possible. This may not readily lead to easy solutions, but it is far better that find the effective solutions rather than spurious ones.

This Jihadi Dictionary offers a new prism through which to view the mind of the jihadi.

It is not an easy read - but an important one.

Reviewed by Dr. Ron Spielman
Sydney, Australia





Sports Team Travel Security

By Peter Tarlow, Ph.D and Jacques R. Island

Source: <https://foundation.asisonline.org/FoundationResearch/CRISP-Reports/CRISP-Report-Library/sports-team-travel-security/Pages/default.aspx>



As we were writing the final draft of this paper, news broke about the terrorism incidents in Paris. We also learned that Brussels was under security lockdown due to the threat of potential terror attacks. The first breaking news concerned the November 13 attacks at the *Stade de France*, France's largest sports stadium. At the time of the attacks, a soccer match was occurring between the French and German national teams; the match was attended by the President of France, François Hollande. There were no deaths in the stadium that night, possibly because good security measures blocked the suicide bombers from entering the crowded 80,000-seat stadium; there was, however, much bloodshed just outside of the stadium and across the city. The Paris attacks serve as backdrop for this paper and as a reminder of the importance of security at large sporting events.

It appears that the terrorists took the French authorities completely by surprise. Does this surprise attack indicate good planning on the part of the terrorist or failures on the part of the international security community—or both? Did the terrorist choose their targets for political or economic reasons? Was their goal economic destruction, to deliver a political warning to France to stay out of the Middle East, or merely murder for murder's sake? We may never fully know the answers to these questions.

Despite the paucity of our knowledge, the Paris events still remind us that sporting events are first and foremost composed of living human beings.

Executive Summary

Sports Team Travel Security (STTS) provides visible and behind-the-scenes mobile security to traveling athletic teams participating in all levels of competitive sports, from amateur and collegiate teams in practice or competition to pro sports participating in major events such as the Olympic Games, World Cups, and Super Bowls. This report reviews and summarizes the existing STTS literature to meet five objectives:

1. **Identify the types of literature currently available**, which we found to be focused on major special events, academic studies of the causes and effects of crime on the sports industry, the growing awareness of violence against athletes, and medical information for travelers;
2. **Review the current responses by public agencies and private security**, to include the changing role of hotel security staff, training, coordination between public and



- private security organizations, lessons learned and best practices expressed by public safety officials, the importance of planning, risk assessments, and media relations for successful crisis management;
3. **Synthesize the dispersed bits of relevant STTS wisdom into this report's suggested approaches**, to which we add our STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation model as a low-profile or stand-alone STTS operating alternative to the complex, major special events model;
 4. **Offer two ways for measuring STTS activities**, namely: its overall effectiveness over time, and the effectiveness of a single event; and,
 5. **Identify future research needs**, with the following issues being worthy of mention as understudied and in need of primary research: a growing problem of violence against athletes, especially female athletes; the kinds of security training needed for STTS personnel; a better definition of the functions and conduct of an STTS event; and better models, templates and tools based on primary research for STTS managers and practitioners.

Definitions, Scope and Purpose

Sports and athletic events are major industries around the globe. In a world of sporting mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, World Cups, and Super Bowls, we also find a host of behind-the-scenes and supporting activities. Because competitions occur not only in the athletes' local communities but also at other, often distant locales, travel can be an integral part of the athletic experience. In fact, the field of travel for sport is highly diverse and must be approached from various perspectives. There is no one accepted definition or scope for sports team travel security. Different authors have unique opinions on defining terms such as security, safety, travel, problems in travel, and risks.

Consequently, the STTS community does not have a wealth of literature that addresses questions of sports travel according to such criteria as age groups, type of sport and location, gender, and media coverage.

Sports Team Travel Security Defined

Frosdick (2009) differentiates between security as the measures we take to protect from intentional criminal attack or terrorism; and safety as the activities that consider the overall well-being of the people within a public space, such as a sports arena, where thought is given to such issues as public ingress and egress, the structural integrity of the construction, capacity, fire procedures, and issues of health. In this report, we consider both security and safety issues, and we use the two terms synonymously. As such, we focus on the total safety and security needs of traveling sports teams. A more succinct definition follows:

Sports team travel security includes standards, tools, and best practices to protect adult amateur, collegiate, and professional team athletes during travels to and from sports venues and while lodging away from their home base, by identifying, mitigating, or managing potential threats or actual incidents of harassment, demonstrations, criminal assaults, theft or robbery, sabotage, terrorism, natural disasters, health hazards, and other safety issues.

For purposes of brevity, the authors also use the STTS acronym to refer to a traveling sports team or its various members (athletes, coaches and support staff) under a security program as an "STTS group" or "STTS member." And we refer to STTS security professionals, whether traveling with an STTS group or not, as STTS practitioners, managers or consultants.

Limited Scope

Some STTS topics, like travel health and medicine, are well-covered in the literature but other topics such as the security needs of female athletes or the actual practices of sports teams traveling to less than complex activities or mega events, to name just two, remain largely unaddressed. This affects our scope and limits the suggested approaches later in this paper to those in the existing literature, but for three exceptions that are based on the authors' own experiences or extrapolations from the literature: our suggested [STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation model](#) (Figure 3) that is conceived as a variation of Connors' (2007) [major special events model](#) (Figure 1), a [risk-based planning methodology adapted to STTS](#) (Figure 2), and [STTS checklists](#) that are provided to jumpstart the planning of STTS activities.



STTS as a Discipline

Security at an athlete's home turf differs from security on the road in that travel is typically to less familiar or unfamiliar places. When traveling to another locale, the athlete is both a sports figure and also a visitor to this new location. As such, others must provide for the athlete's on-the-road needs. As in the case of all travel, STTS requires flexibility, diplomacy, and ingenuity to create a secure environment at an on-the-road location.

The STTS function may be added to an already existing sports team security position or department, it may be an interaction between the team's security or risk management department, or it may be treated as an independent entity. For example, teams that are too small to maintain a dedicated security position may outsource this function to STTS consultants on an as-needed basis. From time to time, outsourcing may be appropriate for all sports teams and athletic departments in order to introduce new or evolving methods to the existing sports security complement.

Summation of Valid Literature

The great preponderance of the relevant existing literature focuses on the planning of mega-events (including sporting events) and not on events of lesser magnitude, or on planning for the needs of individual sports teams (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009; Connors, 2007; Fonio, 2014; DCMS, 2008; Jones, 2005). The coverage deals with issues that are nearly always beyond an STTS organizer's purview. They offer no middle ground or planning for less complex or lower-profile events. However, this literature review identified the following themes related to STTS:

A Focus on Mega-Event Planning

There are a number of papers that focus on the planning of (sporting and other) mega-events. By and large, the authors have written these papers from the perspective of government entities charged with public safety and national security (Coaffee, 2010; Fussey, 2013; Plecas, Dow, Diplock, & Martin, 2010). One report also considers the role of private security (as agents of the venue owner) in "quasi-public" (hybrid) spaces while working alongside law enforcement (Button, 2003; Hall, Byon, & Baker, 2013). Another article by Hall, Marciani, Cooper, and Rolan (2008) gives us an understanding of what goes into the protection of a major sports venue, and pays particular attention to risk assessments and analyses. There is also a great deal of indirect information to be gathered from the book *Event Risk Management and Safety* (Tarlow, 2002).

Another relevant source for traveling athletes is the U.S. State Department. It is the one agency that addresses the needs of business people traveling abroad (OSAC, 1994). Since traveling athletes have a similar sociological profile to that of business people, the travel security information provided by the OSAC booklet is also valid for athletes. However, precious little attention is given, to planning for simple low-key or low-threat sports events.

Academic Analyses of Limited Value to STTS

Many papers are academic analyses of the social issues (demographic, geographic, crime, and terrorism) attendant to sporting and other mega-events, usually seeking to identify statistical causation or social policy solutions (Biagi & Detotto, 2010; Chiang, 2000; Crotts, 1996; Horn, 2009). Such literature is of little use to a practitioner except as background information that can help understand the industry of sports tourism.

Growing Awareness of Violence Against Athletes

There is a growing awareness of the causes of violence against athletes in general, and female athletes in particular, from spectators, teammates, and coaches. These causes include various social problems such as domestic violence, substance abuse, and a male-dominated sports cult (Crowley, 2014; Fasting, 2007, 2015; Palmer, 2011). More generally, the stalking of celebrities, including elite and professional athletes, for various motives and without regard to sex, can also result in stress and violence against the athletes (Hyman & Sierra, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2004; Meloy, 2003).



A Bounty of Medical Information

We found publications that directly address the medical and health needs of traveling athletes, whether the athletes are traveling alone or as part of a team (Heggie, 2009). One article in particular provides a thorough discussion of health concerns and provides checklist for athletes prior to and during travel (Kary, 2007).

In a different vein, LaVetter and Kim (2010) point out a major safety hazard for collegiate sports teams: the use of 15-passenger vans for ground transportation. The National Health and Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) has demonstrated that these vans are excessively risky; yet, despite the fact that this mode of transportation has resulted in many injuries and deaths among collegiate athletes, their use continues. Apart from this caution, LaVetter also offers many safety and security suggestions for college athletes.

Other STTS issues, such as Freifelder's (1983) discussion of the cost of sports team security, can be found on a piecemeal basis but do not constitute a theme.

Current Responses: Strategies and Methods in Use

When traveling, university or professional athletes will be “guests” at rest stops, places of lodging, the venue where they will practice or compete, the host locale's restaurants and attractions, and even its nightlife. As guests, athletes often fall under the safety and security umbrella of the host or host organization. This umbrella may not include all of the security provisions needed and expected by traveling athletes, or the host's safety and security umbrella may conflict with the athlete's requirements. Traveling athletes or sports teams may need to supplement the host's security provisions. In doing so, STTS practitioners need to be both diplomatic and demanding to ensure that the security standards of both the host and the traveling teams are met.

The literature contains a number of sports security practices that have proven successful for law enforcement, public safety, and private travel security professionals. Responses found in the literature are discussed in this section for consideration as strategies available to the STTS industry.

The Increasing Role of Hotel Security

Whenever possible, it is in the interest of sports teams to perform surveys of facilities and venues to be visited and to verify the service arrangements expected (“advances”). For lower-profile events, a team may perform surveys through an on-site representative who understands the team's needs and can be trusted to perform advances in its stead. Alternatively, for significant or complex events, a team may be wise to dispatch its own security “agent” ahead of the team to perform advances in person.

Often times, the arrangements made by third parties (such as travel agents, hosts, or hotel security), may suffice if the STTS practitioner can verify beforehand that the arrangements will provide the level of security desired (Plecas, Dow, Diplock, & Martin, 2010). As hotels host more sporting teams and vie for sports teams' ongoing business, they also become sensitized to the teams' particular needs both during the visit and for future visits. STTS practitioners will want to direct their business to hotels where trusted hotel security managers or other trained personnel can represent their interests.

One Point of Contact

Along with the increasing role of hotel security, another trend is also making the STTS practitioners' job easier: the expanding professional role of hotel security managers from “simple agents providing guarding and loss prevention” to include a number of other security issues such as the management of health, safety, IT security, fire safety, and insurance matters (Gill, Moon, Seaman & Turbin, 2002; Hilliard & Baloglu, 2008). In the case of the larger chains or specialized hotels, STTS practitioners may now expect to deal with one person, or at least one department, to handle the range of security and safety needs at the team's place of lodging.

Along with the increasing role of hotel security, many hotels—especially the major ones—are also making efforts to attract the business of sports teams by determining beforehand the teams' security requirements and advertising their security availability to the teams (Hilliard & Baloglu, 2015; Tse & Ho, 2006). This growing practice among hoteliers will make the STTS practitioner's job easier as preparations for their team's security and safety needs are made with fewer points-of-contact.



Team Separation From Guests

When we speak of hotel security we mean an athlete's place of lodging while in transit or at a venue, be it an inn, hotel, motel, or private residence. In his major special events manual for law enforcement, Connors (2007, p. 24) emphasizes how critical it is to establish and cultivate relationships with hotel security because their staff can be a "force multiplier." Hotel (or venue) security is where the STTS practitioner will go for access controls and credentialing—the function of identifying and vetting personnel who will be tasked with providing services or who will otherwise need access to the athletes and their entourage. The degree of access controls needed by the STTS contingent will depend on the size of the group, the threat level, and the group's own resources.

Ingress and Egress

A good relationship with the hotel's entire staff, and especially its security staff, can multiply the STTS's own security capabilities tremendously. This good rapport can translate into housing in preferred areas of the hotel where public access is restricted and where egress may be clearer and shorter (DCMS 2008 p. 83).

When participating in special events, it is likely that the venue host (or law enforcement agency, if law enforcement is involved) will establish access controls and credentialing for the event. In this case, the STTS professional will be a user of the venue's or law enforcement's credentialing system and access rules. The STTS practitioner needs to coordinate with event managers early on to ensure that they can influence planning and procure adequate levels of security support.

Crime Avoidance Training

The issue of crime against tourists and sporting venues, discussed in the sociological analyses we reviewed (Biagi & Detotto, 2010; Chiang, 2000; Crotts, 1996; Horn, 2009, Tarlow 2014), affects traveling business people and athletes as well. Athletes are as liable as anyone else to fall victim to crimes of opportunity.

Human beings are still the biggest problem in security lapses but—when they are properly and continuously trained—they are also the solution. The literature agrees with this premise. For instance, hoteliers have been using counter-victim training programs to reduce the impact of crime in their venues (Chiang 2000). Traveling athletes and sports teams should receive similar training to avoid becoming victims of thieves, street criminals, stalkers, or terrorists.

Training also helps mitigate violence against athletes, particularly female athletes, from spectators, other athletes, and their own coaches (Kavanagh, 2014). This training is directed at both potential victims and perpetrators, in the case of team members and coaches. One institution, the Australian Football League (AFL), provides all of its athletes training in crime avoidance and sexual harassment. Another example, a U.S. program known as Mentors in Violence Prevention (MVP), prepares high school, collegiate and professional athletes for confrontations with aggressors through training that includes realistic role plays of sexual assaults, harassment and other forms of abuse of women (Palmer, 2011, pp. 18-20). Other types of training that could benefit athletes would be basic first aid and the prevention of Deep Venous Thrombosis (DVT).

Ultimately the standardized or specialized training that should be considered for individuals or groups of athletes will be unique to the institution's objectives, risk tolerance, and budget. However, a full list of practical and training topics for sports travel should be available for sports managers to choose from.

Depending on a team's resources, some, if not all, training may be provided by its own security personnel if STTS talent exists in-house. In other cases, a better solution may be to outsource training to specialized STTS consultants.

Coordination Between Public and Private Sectors

Many special events occur on private property, with the leadership for the events shared among a mix of law enforcement, public safety, and private owners. Such situations only make coordination all the more important. Fussey (2013) and Connors (2007) both point out that private security should be a part of the command and control structure and that law enforcement has tended toward using private sector volunteers to help them carry out



their responsibilities. Thus, for complex events, STTS practitioners oftentimes can assist law enforcement by embedding an STTS member into the command and control structure of the lead agency. The benefits of such volunteerism are increased communication, intelligence that would otherwise not be shared, and contacts for additional public (and host) resources when warranted.

There are many reasons why law enforcement may want to embed STTS professionals into its command structure. Whether law enforcement wishes or is willing to embed an STTS member into its command and control group will depend upon numerous factors. Among these factors are: the availability of security resources; the level of competence exhibited by the STTS member; factors of trust; and the perceived overall benefit to participants, the venue, and the spectators. The embedded representative need not be an STTS manager; depending on the circumstances, a personable and well-trained communicator may be able to liaise between the sports team and law enforcement. The STTS liaison may remain posted in the command center or he or she may visit the center on a scheduled basis for updates.

Establishing Policies and Planning Early

In 2011, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) emphasized the importance of an early start in special events planning. Law enforcement executives from all walks and levels of government conferred at the conference with the hope of taking away lessons learned from myriad disasters and crises other departments had faced. The forum even included a former police chief turned National Football League (NFL) sports security executive.

Those attending discussed national level crises beyond what an STTS professional would most likely face. Forum participants emphasized that the time to produce policies and procedures to deal with crises and emergencies, and train to fulfill them, is before planning begins for an event; they added that planning itself needs to start as early as possible. They noted that one of the main approaches that had resulted in STTS successes was an early start in emergency planning.

Strategic Use of Logistics

In a discussion of common themes that run through the disasters and crises that they have faced, the PERF executives noted that logistics has been a critical weak point. One solution is to have logistical supplies strategically dispersed and warehoused in different areas of their jurisdictions to cope with emergencies. When disaster strikes or a crisis blocks an egress route, security officers or other personnel dealing with the crisis may not have access to communications, medical supplies, gear, or whatever else may be needed unless they had the foresight to procure easy access to additional personnel, equipment and communications. As part of its preparations, the STTS group should also be sure to establish rapport with local individuals who may serve as a needed personnel reserves (PERF, 2011 p. 6).

Logistics discussions also cover some technical aspects of security operations—namely, the fact that a great deal of what once was expensive or hard-to-obtain technology is now easily obtainable and much cheaper. For example, it is not difficult to obtain and install CCTVs to monitor restricted space. This technology is no longer beyond the reach of most security organizations and surveillance cameras are now affordable, small, light, and portable, and can be useful additions to an STTS practitioners' tool kit (PERF, 2011 p. 39; DCMS, 2008 pp. 16.18).

Assessments of Threats and Vulnerabilities

Connors (2007) also provides the best overview of the U.S. Government's special events planning and management system in place. This system considers many factors, mostly of concern to national critical infrastructure, to evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities of major special events it will be asked to protect. The complexity of the formulas created by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (CRS, 2008) are inappropriate to sports travel assessments, but a simplified version would be useful to an STTS manager. Once a methodology for using the formula is created, the STTS practitioner may find objective assessments to be a rational way to approach an otherwise difficult to assess intangible problem: the questions of whether or not to travel, and how much security should be applied.



Communications

As noted above, some local police departments are beginning to look for ways to include other, smaller law enforcement agencies and even private security in a limited way in the lead agency's communications center (Connors, 2007, p. 28). But doing so makes the maintenance of radio discipline a problem that these agencies must overcome, especially during a crisis. A solution is to issue radios on a different frequency to external agencies and private security elements. In the case of private security, only one radio is issued to each private concern's supervisor. Another approach has been to issue listen-only radios to private security. This development may be a huge assistance to an STTS group, permitting it to stay in direct contact with law enforcement for quick support and timely intelligence.

Another potentially more viable form of communication for STTS managers is the use of social media (PERF, 2011, p. 37). Social media communication is available to STTS professionals at any moment and is not dependent on others. Services such as Twitter or Facebook are being used to broadcast updates to designated group members, such as an STTS entourage and can be composed and sent quickly.

The Importance of Good Media Relations

Organizations that have gone through crises know how integral media relations and an ongoing informational campaign can be throughout an event (Connors, 2007 p. xiv; Hall, Byon & Baker (2013). It is better to control the media by establishing rapport during the planning phase and cooperating with information during "good times" than to have the media produce a message without the STTS manager's input when a crisis breaks (Island, 2016).

Medical Issues for Sports Travelers

There is a great deal of literature dealing with the topic of travel medicine. As noted previously, we found publications that directly address the medical and health needs of traveling athletes, alone or in teams (Heggie, 2009). One article in particular provides a thorough discussion about health concerns and provides checklists for athletes prior to and during travel (Kary & Lavalee, 2007). Some people assume that athletes are in better shape than the population as a whole. However, athletes are not only vulnerable to certain health problems, but heavy travel schedules may also make athletes more vulnerable than individuals who do not travel. Following are examples of medical conditions faced by traveling athletes:

Eating disorders. Apart from the expected physical ailments, travel can also result in poor sleeping and eating habits.

Weather and atmospheric conditions. Climatic changes impact all travelers, athletes included. Weather difficulties can be a challenge when the athlete is in his or her own environment; but they become even more problematic when the athlete is not accustomed to the climatic conditions of the host area. Environmental changes such as altitude, humidity, change of food, time zones (and jet lag) can impact negatively on the athlete's performance and health.

Pollution. Air pollution is hard on the lungs and especially hard on athletes who must exert a great deal of physical energy. What is physically challenging for people exercising in their own locale may become dangerous for visitors who must demonstrate a great deal of physical stress in a locale to which their bodies are not accustomed.

Deep Venous Thrombosis (DVT). This condition is a potential health risk to traveling athletes. It should be noted that some 85% of air travel thrombosis victims are athletic, usually endurance athletes, and the great majority of DVT sufferers are younger than 60 years of age. The reason why so many victims of DVT are athletes has to do with several issues:

1. Often athletes must take long flights;
2. Many athletes are large;
3. Airlines continue to reduce both the size of seats and the space between rows; and,
4. Athletes often travel as a team in coach-class on commercial flights where space is limited and the opportunity to stretch one's legs is minimal.

Body clocks and jet lag. East-west travel oftentimes requires that athletes cross one or more time zones at a rate faster than the body can adjust. In the case of north-south travel, there is less time zone crossing but an increased potential for climate changes. Competitive athletes suffer even more stress when traveling than do those in the general



public. For example, Schweltnus, et al. (2012) noted that athletes who cross five time zones to compete run a much higher risk of getting sick than when they play on their home turf. Jet lag is not only hard on the body but also impacts an athlete's ability to make rapid decisions and to perform. Jet lag also produces a "visiting team's disadvantage."

Revelations and Conclusions

Three main observations are made here to summarize the existing body of knowledge about STTS:

A Dearth of Information About Sports Travel


The lack of attention to STTS issues in the literature leaves one to ponder where STTS practitioners turn for information. The lack of information may mean that STTS practitioners may be forced to formulate their planning or operating guidelines from their own experiences or their imagination. They may also be borrowing ideas and information from existing parallel literatures such as those that address executive protection. In the existing sporting events literature, the relevant articles are almost all government-produced special events checklists and procedures for law enforcement and national security entities. Although these listings typically include suggestions for government agencies to contact and to coordinate with private security, they often fail to provide specifics.

Our own experience indicates that the details of a public/private security relationship is usually determined on a case-by-case basis with one or more government entities dictating the agency's needs to the private sector.

Needs of Female Travelers

There are a few articles that focus on the needs of the female traveler. The most significant of which is Zsofia Bende's (2012) thesis about the needs of traveling female intercollegiate athletes. In this article she speaks about female athletes' special needs, like personal protection and health, in addition to the needs they share with other traveling business people.

Figure 1: STTS Group Embedded Into a Major Special Event



From Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement, p. 37, by E. Connors, 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Adapted from an open source publication.

Need to Downscale and Adapt Existing Data

Several studies by various government/national security entities provide best practices and lessons learned from past sports mega-events that experienced crises or successfully thwarted them (Connors 2007). The studies delve into every facet of special events security at the venues of major special events, but do not address the issues revolving around the travel of sports teams to or from the venue. STTS practitioners and managers will not benefit from the high-gear-only approach in these reports. They are only useful to STTS professionals who dissect and analyze the existing data and then downscale the findings to the micro-operational level of a traveling sports group, as we have done in the sections that follow.

Approaches Suggested by the Literature

Crises at mega-events such as the Olympic Games and Super Bowls have been the catalyst to devising procedures and methods for STTS, the best of which may come to be adopted by law enforcement and the sports industry. Indeed, sports events and, by extension, STTS, experienced paradigm shifts with the 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists and the September 11, 2001 attacks. Each new major incident has the potential of causing another paradigm shift. Modern-day



terrorists have shown repeatedly their ability to move weapons, money, and militants across borders to commit mass mayhem against sports and travel targets, exemplified in 2015 by the downing of the Russian airliner over Egypt, the attacks against the Stade de France soccer match and other Paris spots, and the hotel siege in Mali.

In this section, we define the role of the STTS practitioner or manager and the scope of STTS, and we offer STTS procedures founded on the existing literature.

The STTS Practitioner's Scope

A majority of the security and safety services used by an STTS group are normally provided by others, such as hoteliers and sports arena operators, for the benefit of sports teams, individual athletes, or spectators. The STTS organizer's task is to understand and recognize good security, ensure that the needed services are available, and that they have been reserved for the traveling athletic group.

An STTS practitioner's role is one element in a larger network. The scope is more than simply deciding whether or not to travel. The STTS practitioner also determines which preparations and capabilities others have or are providing in support. The STTS practitioner must also add what he or she considers to be crucial but missing elements for the athlete's or team's security.

The literature currently indicates that the STTS manager's focus is on the lowest operational level and he or she is not normally expected to provide a full security operation. The STTS manager is expected to blend into, and make use of, the existing security framework of transportation, lodging, and sports venue providers, and to coordinate with local law enforcement, public safety, public health, and medical facilities for support as needed (as depicted in Figure 1). The STTS professional's task, in most cases, is to procure services and ensure that these services are both delivered and of high quality.

The Sports Team Travel Security Cycle

Figure 2 depicts the cycle of STTS, from the creation and maintenance of STTS policies and training, to planning and execution, to the final phase of an STTS event: evaluations. The cycle is discussed in more detail below.

Early Preparations: Policies and Procedures

Any program, including an STTS program, begins with a simple or extensive list of policies that set the rules and requirements. Policies and procedures need to be thought out in advance. The larger an institution (e.g., an athletic club, a university sports department or a professional team), the more important it is to develop specific protocols, policies, and procedures. Consistently updated protocols reduce planning time and preparations for a new event and help avoid repeating past mistakes or committing new ones.

Risk-Based Planning

Intelligence. The gathering of protective intelligence should be started early in the planning cycle. The results of this reconnaissance form the basis for a risk assessment that considers both threats and vulnerabilities, which we discuss in the next section. Available intelligence may result in a quick "no-go" decision when the threat forecast clearly overshadows the benefits of the event. If intelligence produces a no-go decision, then the STTS practitioner need not spend any more time or energy on the trip's preparations.

Private sports teams normally do not get access to the sensitive information held by higher levels of government, but open sources are available for the protective intelligence needed for an STTS event. STTS practitioners will probably find that the following examples of open sources serve their purpose:

- **Regional intelligence** can be procured from the U.S. government and other countries in the form of travel advisories and warnings (e.g. the U.S. State Department's Travel website).
- **Fact Book** of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is openly available online to provide a good summary about any region or country being visited.
- **Overseas Security Advisory Council** (OSAC), an organ of the U.S. State Department's Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), exists to provide unclassified threat intelligence to traveling U.S. business persons, including U.S. sports groups and athletes traveling abroad (OSAC, 2007). OSAC has branches within



the U.S. embassies in most countries. Likewise, the embassies of many other countries provide similar services to their nationals.




Figure 2: The Sports Team Travel Security Cycle

- **Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC)** of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a relatively new organization patterned after OSAC to assist businesses with security matters within U.S. territories and states. Membership in the DSAC will help security practitioners in the United States stay informed about major threats to U.S. regions, venues and events.
- **Liaisons with local police departments** in the venue being visited is important. Oftentimes local police are the best source for threats within their jurisdictions and they typically can share more information than intelligence agencies.
- **Private intelligence publishers** may also be a source for institutions with active travel programs and a reasonable budget. For a subscription fee, such services provide corporations and other entities with ongoing targeted assessments of criminality and terrorism in the specific locales in which they operate. They also maintain updated regional risk and threat assessments for most countries.

Very often, intelligence is available for the asking from national and local authorities, especially when such authorities are involved in the sporting event. Alternatively, a workable intelligence report can be produced from existing open sources.

Risk assessments. For our purposes, these are tools used to evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities to an STTS athlete or group posed by an individual, gangs, protestors, vandals, terrorists, fire, natural disasters, or safety lapses. These risks would be juxtaposed with the characteristics of the physical structures and the security practices that



protect the STTS event. An evaluation may be either qualitative—a narrative that simply reviews the known and potential threats in light of known vulnerabilities—or it can use a quantitative formula to measure the relative gravity of a threat versus the protections against it.

A risk assessment is not meant to determine whether or not to hold an event but to determine what level of security is appropriate. If the level of security required to mitigate a serious threat is prohibitive in cost or unavailable, then cancellation may be in order.

Different organizations employ various methodologies for risk assessments. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and the DSS each use different sets of risk factors and each have developed quantitative formulas that reflect their specific missions. One universal formula is the DHS's (DHS, 2011) $R=TVC$, where "R" is risk, "T" is threat, "V" is vulnerability, and "C" is consequence.

For STTS events, this formula can be simplified to $R=TV$. When monetary consequences need to be considered, STTS practitioners can calculate the costs of certain decisions, such as the cancellation of a scheduled event, by employing a simpler tool, a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), instead of using the DHS's more complex formula.

To determine vulnerabilities for athletes or sporting events, we may use the following document from the United Kingdom's Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, 2008). It lists factors for a major special event that seem to be potentially relevant for an athletic risk assessment:

- Service personnel screening/vetting,
- Barriers and access controls,
- Ingress and egress to lodging and venues,
- Emergency plans and equipment for fire and other hazards,
- Medical response and facilities availability, and
- Status of media relations

We would also add the following to the DCMS list of risks:

- Natural disaster preparedness appropriate for the destination,
- Health hazards or pandemics known to the region, and
- Exposure en route between locations (lodging to sports arena, etc.)

Measuring risk is not totally objective; much of the measurement's accuracy depends on judgments, such as assigned weights and vulnerability levels, made by those who set STTS organizational policies. Table 1 provides a sample list of threats, with assigned weights, that could be of concern to an STTS event, followed by our definitions of vulnerability levels:

Threat	Weight x	Vulnerability =	STTS Score	Comments/Observations
Vandals active in hotel/venue	1			Can deface STTS image/property
Thieves active in hotel/venue	1			Can result in loss of property
Seemingly benign stalker	1			Unstable fan of of STTS member
Threatening stalker	2			Directed against STTS member
Passive protestors	2			Can affect the STTS event
Street crimes of opportunity	2			Can victimize STTS members
Disruptive protestors	3			Can affect the STTS event
Natural disaster preparedness	3			Emergency procedures/equip.
Known health hazard	3			Can affect health, performance



Fire safety status in venue	4			Potentially unsafe structure
Violence-prone protestors	4			Can turn against STTS group
Violent group/gang threats	5			Expressed desire to harm STTS
Terrorism threat to area	5			STTS as target of opportunity

Vulnerability Levels:

1. All physical characteristics of structure and security procedures are adequate for the threat
2. A part of the structure/venue/route has a minor but mostly mitigated weakness
3. A significant structural or procedural weakness is not mitigated adequately
4. A significant structural or procedural weakness is not mitigated at all
5. The structure/venue/route is not secure and cannot be mitigated against the known threat

Table 1: Examples of STTS Threats with Assigned Weights on an Interval Scale of 1-5

Take the following hypothetical scenario to illustrate Table 1's use: In planning a new STTS event, the STTS practitioner receives intelligence through liaison that the hotel site is likely to be the focus of protestors known to be violence prone. The police advise that they will not interfere with the planned demonstration unless the protestors break the law first. The practitioner fears that waiting until the protestors turn into a destructive mob may be too late, so he or she determines the risk level and mitigation necessary as follows:

The practitioner surveys the hotel and finds that the public can enter freely and that there is a stairway from the lobby that leads to the team's suites in a separate wing of the hotel; however, there are no physical barriers to the hallway to impede an uninvited intruder, let alone a mob. The STTS practitioner decides that the usual complement of one unarmed floor guard for credentialing/screening will not pose a barrier to an aggressive individual or a mob.

In this example, we see a quick calculation of one threat, an intelligence report that "violence prone protestors are anticipated" at the STTS group's venue. In this case, the STTS practitioner determines that there is no deterring police presence at the hotel perimeter or lobby and that, if given the opportunity, a mob could proceed up a stairway to the team's floor and force its way past one unarmed guard.

In assessing the [DCMS "barriers and access controls" factor](#), the STTS practitioner would use Table 1 to assign a vulnerability level of 4 (or even 5) to the "violence prone protestors" threat. That vulnerability value (4) is multiplied by the threat's weight (4), which produces an STTS score of 16; that score is assigned a "High" DHS risk level in Table 2 (see below), calling for extraordinary security measures.

Risk Levels						Concurrent STTS Responses	
DHS Rating	Risk Level	Venue Threat	Security Measures	Action Steps	STTS Score	Recommended Matched Response	STTS
Severe	5	Cancel	Secured	"Lock down" patrol perimeters restricting access	21-25	Cancel participation in event or, if under way, "lock down" in secure areas	
High	4	Maximum	Govt. Control	National law officials/security agencies screen public and take control	16-20	High threat to the general public, including athletes - extra physical security for STTS members; consider cancellation	



Elevated	3	Elevated	Restrictive	May involve regional or local law officials with "pat down" measures	11-15	Suspected gen. threat to STTS - screening; restrict STTS contingent to guarded spaces
Guarded	2	Moderate	Protective	Limited access to venue with screening precautions implemented	6-10	Known stalker threat(s) - add screening
Low	1	Minimum	Routine	No primary factors of concern exist outside normal routine measures	1-5	No STTS threats; standard measures

Table 2: DHS Special Events Risk Levels and Suggested Concurrent STTS Responses
From Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement, p. 17, by E. Connors, 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Adapted from an open source publication.

Each location, lodging, practice arena, competitive arena, eatery, place of rest and recreation, as well as the travel segments between them, should be submitted to a similar risk assessment. All of the scores for different risks could then be averaged for a mean risk posture, or the STTS practitioner can decide to assign the risk posture of the highest-weight risk assessment of any location or segment and apply that to the entire STTS event since the measures protecting against the worst threat should protect against lesser threats as well.

Business continuity and crisis management. Successful threat mitigation comes from careful planning followed by faithful execution. The goal of business continuity and crisis management is to avoid potentially dangerous situations and, when that fails, to manage the incident to a successful recovery. Even if the challenges put before the STTS practitioner are not on the threats list, it is likely that one or more of the contingencies in the plan can be quickly adapted to handle unforeseen problems.

The likelihood of a successful sports event typically relates to the amount and thoroughness of the planning and, in the event of an emergency or crisis, to the training, experience, and resources available to the crisis managers. How much to plan for depends on such factors as the mode of transportation, the services provided at the venues visited, the places of lodging, and the issues that surround the individual athletes or sports team.


Ideally, the crisis management actions to be taken while in travel status should be an extension of a broader business continuity plan for the team, whether they are on their home turf or traveling. Island (2016) provides methods and tools needed by a sports team or athletic department to establish an effective business continuity program to deal with crises ranging from potential damage to the team's reputation to criminal attacks and natural disasters.

Execution

To use a popular refrain: In war it is the months of planning and training (99% sweat) that prepares the soldier for a few moments of terror (1% action). The same holds true for STTS.



Figure 3: STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation



This is also the case for competitive sports. Most athletes train and "play" long hours in preparation for a brief competitive performance. If they really excel, they may participate in major leagues or major events like the Olympics. For such major special events they will be enveloped in a security blanket provided by government authorities or by a highly organized and complex private sports venue, as illustrated in Figure 1 (STTS Group Embedded into a Major Special Event).

Most of the time, however, athletes are alone, in small groups, or with a small entourage of athletes and their support personnel. Figure 3 (STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation)

represents the operating model in the great majority of the time in which the athletic group depends on contacts and liaisons with government security and safety services, and relies on hoteliers, transportation companies, private venues, private residences, and others, for services.

Post Operative Evaluation

By its very nature, evaluations will vary from event to event. It suffices to say that evaluations may result in policy changes, new policies, and new planning tools that evolve with experience and changing times.

Measuring Effectiveness

The effectiveness of an STTS program can be measured in two ways: its overall effectiveness over time, and the effectiveness of a particular event. Protective operations, which include STTS events, measure success by the lowest number of incidents that needed resolution. An event that experiences no incidents is perfectly successful. The adage "no news is good news" is true for protective operations. The security practitioner's world exists because incidents do happen and these incidents call for professional resolution. Realistically, there are always numerous small problems and incidents to smooth out and resolve. Reports are not only to inform upper echelons of the practitioner's work, but also to prevent similar occurrences in the future, or to learn how to produce better responses to similar problems. Reports are the "brain cells" in the institution's memory from which we learn lessons and evolve better practices.

It should be the STTS manager's responsibility to assure that everyone in the institution or group populates the database. The following types of information are examples of what might be useful in measuring the overall effectiveness of an STTS program:

- Security lapses at hotels or venues (to include a reason for the occurrence, how it was corrected, and how to prevent it in the future);
- Attempts to breach security;
- Actual breaches of security;
- Accidents that affected the STTS group (type and number);
- List of requested security services not provided by a host (and host's rationale for not providing it, and suggestion of how to get such service(s) in the future);
- Satisfaction surveys from STTS participants;
- Threats against STTS members;
- Aggression against STTS members;
- Property thefts or damage reports; and



- News articles about groups or issues that affect venues that may be destinations of the STTS group.

The information collected will be useful in organizing new events and providing data for:

- Risk assessments
- Cost-benefit analyses
- After-action reports (AAR)
- Intelligence assessments
- Historical reports

Future Research Needs

During our research and review we sought to locate literature that addressed issues, lessons learned, and best practices that we believe are important to STTS. We succeeded in many of the topics of interest and found literature on topics we thought would be sparse. On the other hand, research on some of the issues we expected to be adequately covered was scarce.

From the many articles reviewed, only one researcher, Bende (2012), provided a suggestion for future STTS research. In her thesis on the regional security needs of collegiate female athletes, Bende concluded that future research could augment her work by considering the greater distances and travel time requirements for national and international sports events; she also recommended that the results of such research be distributed to the traveling athletes themselves and to the sports travel industry.

As seen in this report, there is much work for researchers to do in this area. Below are some of the subjects that researchers may need to explore:

Sports Teams and Terrorism

- How does the threat of terrorism affect major sporting events?
- What are proven ways for securing public agency cooperation for athletes and venues?
- How can security practitioners reduce the impact of terrorism on athletic performance?
- What role does the media play in threats to athletes, sporting venues, and the local community?
- What are the interactive security issues between the local community, athletic events and security?

Relationship Between Security and Athletic Health

- What impact does travel security have on the results of athletic events?
- What is the role of security on the athlete's mental health?

About Athlete Travel

- What are the best practices for travel security?
 - Teams?
 - Individual athletes?
 - Professional athletes?
 - Elite (collegiate) athletes?
- What are the greatest threats that the athletes state they face?
- Are there differences between the athlete's perceptions of threats and the athletic travel manager's perception of threats?
- Do athletes worry about their security when traveling to foreign lands for international competition? What differences do they perceive between domestic and international travels?
- What are the best practices used in the protection of athletes?
- Are there significant differences between the security expectations of team managers and security personnel? How do successful sports teams bridge these differences?
- What are the practices that have been discarded as not helpful?

Mitigating Violence Against Athletes

- Female athletes
- Athletes in general

Other Subjects

- Can one model serve to provide the planning tools to protect athletes? Do we need multiple models to protect athletes?



- How do we coordinate "in stadium" (in venue) security with the potential for violence outside of the venue, such as attacks on athletes at local hotels, transportation centers or city streets?
- What is the role of local security professionals in the pursuit of athlete security? How do their roles fit into best practices? How do we distinguish between travel security and athlete security? Is the latter a subgroup of the former or are they two different fields of study?
- The production of a cost-benefit analysis answering such questions as: Does an STTS model produce sufficient acquired or saved revenue to justify the expenditure and if so, can this revenue stream be predicted?
- From an interview process, what are the problems and solutions of current STTS professionals? How do we protect athletes in an ever more dangerous world of terrorism and social unrest?

► References are available at source's URL.

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Tarlow is a contributing author to multiple books on tourism security, and has published numerous academic and applied research articles. In 2002 Tarlow published Event Risk Management and Safety (John Wiley & Sons). In 2011, Tarlow published Twenty Years of Tourism Tidbits: The Book. He has co-published a book on cruise safety (written in Portuguese), Abordagem Multidisciplinar dos Cruzeiros Turísticos (2013), and in 2014, he published Tourism Security: Strategies for Effective Managing Travel Risk and Safety. (Elsevier). Since 1992, Tarlow has organized multiple tourism conferences around the world.

Jacques Island has been the president of the Inquesta Corporation, a security consulting firm, since retiring from the FBI in 2002. He served as an FBI agent for 20 years investigating and resolving prison uprisings, terrorist incidents, hijackings, and hostage takings. Before joining the FBI, he was a U.S. Foreign Service officer and was awarded a U.S. Department of State Meritorious Honor Service medal for organizing and executing the ground and air evacuation of U.S. Embassy personnel from a war zone. During his career, he has conducted myriad risk and threat assessments, managed many special events, and managed the security of U.S. missions, dignitaries, diplomatic personnel, and business executives in high-threat foreign areas. He earned a Master of Public Administration degree from the Florida International University.

Terrifying ISIS executioner dubbed The Bulldozer is 'captured' by the Syrian Army

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3620037/Flattened-Terrifying-20st-ISIS-executioner-dubbed-Bulldozer-captured-Syrian-army-dumped-half-naked-truck.html>

June 01 – This dramatic footage appears to show the 20-stone ISIS executioner dubbed The Bulldozer being captured by the Syrian Army.

The obese extremist, a member of the terror group's so-called Chopping Committee, is seen lying half-naked in the back of a truck with his hands tied behind his back.

Crowds gather round to take pictures of the hulking jihadi, who appears to be grimacing, before he is driven off by Syrian Armed Forces in the footage posted online by Syrian sources.



The militant has gained a bloody reputation as one of ISIS's most feared butchers after beheading dozens of prisoners and amputating young children.



He has infamously been pictured in black robes and a mask while wielding a three-foot sword to behead his victims.

But just like Jihadi John, the ISIS executioner who was eventually unveiled as Mohammed Emwazi, the coward has apparently never dared to show his face on camera.

One of the first images of The Bulldozer surfaced in June 2014 when he was pictured wielding what appears to be a five-foot-long, 52kg Browning machine gun, with armour-piercing bullets.

The weapon, which can be used as a light anti-aircraft gun, is usually mounted on turrets, tanks or fixed structures.

ISIS websites also published pictures of the same man beheading two suspected blasphemers in

front of hundreds of men and young boys in Iraq's Anbar province.

Images show the terrorist leaping into the air before bringing the large sword crashing down onto the neck of his helpless victims.

A final picture shows the bloody corpses of the headless men strewn across the courtyard as his fellow terrorists disperse the gathered crowds.

Last year, a 14-year-old Syrian boy told how the mammoth extremist chopped off his hand and foot because he refused to join ISIS.

Omar, who was captured fighting for a rebel group and tortured for more than a month, said the Bulldozer gathered a large group of children to watch the bloody amputation.

Omar kept an image of the man who mutilated him on his mobile phone. It showed the monster, dressed-head-toe in black, propping himself up with the blade he uses to maim helpless youngsters. In March, a picture of a chubby militant emerged that led to speculation it could be the face of The Bulldozer.



Al-Shabab hits Hotel Ambassador in Somalia's Mogadishu

Source: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/al-shabab-somalia-mogadishu-hotel-attack-160601160821384.html>

June 02 – Somali authorities say at least 16 people have been killed and 55 more wounded in a car bomb and gun attack on a hotel in the centre of Mogadishu.



Sporadic gunfire could still be heard on Thursday, a day after the attack on Hotel Ambassador.

Al-Shabaab, the anti-government group affiliated with al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for Wednesday's attack.

Two legislators were among the dead.

"So far we have confirmed 16 people, mostly civilians, died and 55 others were injured," Major Nur Mohamed, a police officer, told Reuters news agency on Thursday.

He said gunfire had died down at the hotel, adding: "We suspect the roof top is not safe. Security forces are inside from the first to fourth floor." Government forces have blocked off all the main roads near the hotel.



Extensively damaged

Reuters witnesses said intermittent gunfire could still be heard at the Hotel Ambassador, a five-storey building which has been extensively damaged.



Relatives were gathering at hospitals and at the hotel searching for loved ones, with some people believed trapped inside.

A Reuters witness heard one man on the fifth floor crying out: "Please rescue me."

Sources earlier told Al Jazeera that at least three fighters were involved in the attack.

The attack happened shortly before the arrival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Mogadishu.

Al Jazeera's Mohammed Adow, reporting from Nairobi in neighbouring Kenya, said Ambassador Hotel is located along the road that Erdogan "was supposed to take from the airport to the presidential palace".

He said the attack "has the signature of al-Shabab", adding that it was not the first time the hotel, popular with politicians, was targeted.

"They want to send a message that although they might have lost control of the city, they can still carry out such attacks with audacity," he said.

In February, at least nine people were killed when al-Shabab fighters set off a car bomb at the gate of a popular park near a hotel in the capital. In January, an attack on a beach-front restaurant killed at least 17 people. In recent

attacks, the armed fighters have also taken civilians as "legitimate targets", Al Jazeera's Adow said.

Loss of strongholds

Al-Shabaab was pushed out of Mogadishu by the African Union peacekeeping force AMISOM in 2011.

Last year it was turfed out from strongholds elsewhere in the south by AMISOM and the Somali National Army.

However, it has remained a potent threat in Somalia, launching frequent attacks aimed at overthrowing the government.

The group has also been behind deadly attacks in Kenya and Uganda. Both contribute troops to an African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.

Islamic State seen shifting to more international attacks: UN

Source: <https://nz.news.yahoo.com/world/a/31742515/islamic-state-seen-shifting-to-more-international-attacks-un/?cmp=st>

June 02 – **The Islamic State group is moving into a new phase of warfare that is likely to lead to more attacks on international civilian targets**, according to a new report by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

In the last six months, IS has been linked to attacks in 11 countries that have killed over 500 people, in Bangladesh, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon,

Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and the United States.

"Recent international attacks perpetrated by members of ISIL demonstrate that the terrorist group is now moving into a new phase, with the increased risk that well-prepared and centrally directed attacks on international civilian targets may become a more frequent



occurrence," said the report obtained by AFP on Wednesday.

UN member-states are reporting a marked increase in the number of foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq where IS has suffered military setbacks, Ban said in the report to the Security Council.

The Paris and Brussels assaults demonstrate the jihadist group's "ability to mount complex, multi-wave attacks" that were coordinated by foreign fighters returning from Syria, with some direction from IS leaders.

These leaders are seeking to "elevate the role" of IS affiliates, suggesting a broader theater for its military campaign.

Several hundred foreign fighters have "relocated back to Libya" while other returnees are seeking to establish new affiliates as part of the IS strategy to expand its global footprint, said the report.

The presence of Malaysian and Indonesian fighters in Syria and Iraq has raised concerns that Southeast Asia is at risk of attacks, the report said.

Squeeze on IS finances

Ban sent the report to the council on Tuesday in line with a UN resolution adopted in December that takes aim at the financing networks of IS and Al-Qaeda.

For the first time since it proclaimed its caliphate in June 2014, IS has come under financial pressure following a sharp drop in oil production in territory it controls among other measures, the report said.

A recent 50-percent-cut in salaries paid to IS fighters in Raqqa was seen as a sign that finances were becoming tighter.

"The global threat emanating from ISIL remains high and continues to diversify," said Ban in the report, prepared with input from the UN's counter-terrorism committee.

The document quoted an unidentified member-state as saying that the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria had reached 38,000, but most governments estimate that figure at 30,000.

The council is set to discuss the report during a meeting on June 8.

Qaddafi's Foresight

Source: <http://acdemocracy.org/qaddafis-foresight/>

June 01 – Tents of African migrants that are popping up under bridges in Paris look nothing like Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's tent (pic. left) that was pitched in the garden of Hôtel de Marigny,



the government's official guest house, opposite the Elysée Palace in December 2007. But Gaddafi's tent was the foretaste to today's African illegal immigrants' makeshift camps littering the French Capital. Their spread forced the Mayor Anne Hidalgo, to announce the creation of the city's first refugee camp.

immigration. On August 30, 2010, as he Libyan leader packed his tent and Union pays Libya €5 billion a year "to preventing illegal immigration from Africa."

In 2010, Qaddafi warned the Europeans of the growing threat of African illegal ended his visit to Italy, the demanded that the European ensure its co-operation in

Gaddafi warned: "Europe runs the risk of turning black from illegal immigration; it could turn into Africa. There is a dangerous level of immigration from Africa into Europe, and we don't know what will happen. What will be the reaction of the white Christian Europeans to this mass of hungry, uneducated Africans? We don't know if Europe will remain an advanced and cohesive continent or if it will be destroyed by this barbarian invasion."

Qaddafi urged the Europeans to "imagine that this could happen, but before it does we need to work together." But the Europeans, despite the already increase number of African



refugees, accused Qaddafi of blackmail. And when Libyan Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated rebels joined the “Arab Spring”, European and American forces intervened militarily in March 2011 to remove Qaddafi.

Their help resulted in a war-torn country with daily violent clashes. This gave al Qaeda’s adherents the opportunity “to establish well-armed, well-trained and combat-experienced militias,” as a report by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress concluded in August 2012.

This turned Libya into fertile ground for ISIS. And ISIS has been using Libya

Libya’s coastline’s strategic importance as a step-stone to Europe was not wasted on ISIS. In January 2015, ISIS started to ship more than a million Muslim refugees to the Italian island of Lampedusa, just 162 nm from the Libyan coastline. This was followed by repeated calls for ISIS operatives to travel to Libya. Intelligence sources reported that “ISIS earns millions of dollars from taking part in the networks that smuggle migrants to Europe.”

It is unknown the ISIS operatives arrived in Europe via Libya as refugees. But until February 18, 2016 (!) ISIS operatives who traveled to Libya after March 1, 2011, had the ability to return to the U.S. from any country with a U.S. Visa Waiver Program. This made it also easier for ISIS operatives to legally enter European countries.

Qaddafi rightly predicted that the economic, social and security problems would overwhelm Europe. He did not threaten Europe and demanded less than Turkey’s Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

As refugees from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa are continuing to flood Europe, Muslim Brother Erdogan, who initially assisted ISIS, and who has made no secret of his aspiration to re-establish the Ottoman Empire, is demanding billions of euros (€6 bn according to the Turks, only €3bn according to the EU) from the European Union to hold millions of refugees in Turkey. Moreover, he demands the money together with speeding up Turkey’s full accession into the EU, and in the interim, allowing all Turkish nationals visa-free travel.

In the meantime, Erdogan attempts, sometimes successfully, to curb Europeans’ free speech, and intervenes in EU members’ internal affairs. This week he threatened the German parliament from adopting a resolution labeling the 1915 Turkish massacre of 1.5 million Armenians, as “genocide.” The vote is on Thursday

Terrorist attack on Ghana, a myth or reality?

By Maximus Attah

Source: <http://www.myjoyonline.com/opinion/2016/June-1st/terrorist-attack-on-ghana-a-myth-or-reality.php>



June 01 – Terrorism is the new word on the block taking the world by surprise and creating panic, particularly on the African continent.

The recent one is the EgyptAir

Flight MS804 from Paris to Cairo which disappeared over the Mediterranean Sea. Though some reports suggest the crash could have occurred as a result of a terrorist act, others believe it was a technical failure. This shows how Terrorism is taking over the world and keeps bringing more panic to our world.

In actual fact, there has never been a time in life where security has become a pressing issue than our generation. Our generation is under imminent security threat and this is the time for us to take security more seriously. Everyone has a role to play from government, security agencies, media, and the citizenry in fighting terrorism. Our life is under threat and it is obvious no one is safe, crime and terrorism are on the



ascendancy and curbing it is becoming more of a challenge than finding solutions.

Life has really changed over the years. I remember when we were growing up in the 80s, your next door neighbor's house was opened to you 24 hours a day and there were no sophisticated security systems protecting homes. Life was good and we were each other's keeper. Fast forwarded to the 21st century and our lives are more at risk than ever before. Hence, security today is more of a pressing issue such that going through bus and train stations, airports and other border controls which were without stress in the past are compounded with so many restrictions and regulations governing the use of such public places.

Considering all the terrorist acts happening around Ghana's neighbouring countries, is a terrorist attack to Ghana a myth or reality? We have two options as a nation, to shy away from the truth or to face it and find solutions to it. It has become obvious that we are at risk of a terrorist attack in Ghana. The evidence are there for all to see from Prophet T.B Joshua's forecast which some sect of the population sees it as a myth to what is happening around the neighbor's of Ghana in relation to terrorist activities becoming rampant.

There is no doubt about Ghana being the next target for any terrorist activity considering Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria have all been attacked. The threat to Nigeria is an ongoing experience and Boko Haram is also devising new ways of creating havoc in Nigeria. Ghana sharing its western border with Ivory Coast where Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) recently dispatched three gunmen leading to the death of 15 civilians and three Ivorian security forces is an indication Ghana needs to be on the alert. Burkina Faso, which is also our neighbours has been attacked.

There is an African proverb that says, "if you see your friends beard on fire, then you need to get your water ready in case it happens to you". The fact is what intelligence systems are we putting in place to stop these terrorists? How prepared are we if the worse happens? Are our security personnel trained to deal with terrorism? Are we investing in technology and other sophisticated devices to counter terrorism or are we still banking our hopes on our AK47s? Are our borders secured?

Answers to these questions depict how prepared we are or else we have a long way to go. Even the west that has invested heavily in terrorism still has them slipping through the net from time to time. The West has invested in technology, armory, security agencies and people. In our part of the world, when security is mentioned, what comes to mind are the government and security agencies? The people are not involved in security issues making dealing with security issues very unbalanced.

I remember traveling to London on one occasion and my brother who was supposed to pick me from Heathrow was stuck in traffic for hours. It was winter and I underestimated the cold as I wore a light jacket. I then had to walk about keeping myself warm, however, I did that at the expense of leaving my luggage behind at all times. An elderly woman who was watching my movements saw I was leaving my luggage unattended and hence behaving suspiciously, approached me politely and whispered that if I leave my luggage unattended the security staff and police would destroy it if they see that it's unattended.

In no time, I heard from the loudspeakers announcing that, if you see anything suspicious, do not hesitate to tell a member of staff or the police. What I'm I trying to tell you? The West has conscientised their citizenry to look out for suspicious behaviors, actions and strange movements by people. This is the lifestyle of the West and that in itself is a way of gathering intelligence from the citizenry when it matters most.

We have a long way to go when it comes to security. The earlier we take security seriously, the better for us. I know the Government is doing its best but there is more room for improvement. Hence government in its quest to tackle terrorism in a recent communiqué issued on Tuesday, March 15, 2016, by the Ministry of Communication, stipulates that "the National Security Council on the basis of briefings by the intelligence agencies and partners has determined that there is credible terrorist threat to all countries in the sub-region".

This was further reiterated by the British High Commission to Ghana, Mr. Jon Benjamin, "alerting its citizens in Ghana or those that intend to travel to Ghana to be security conscious". This shows the in-



depth of the seriousness of the threat and how important we deal with it in a swift manner to bring back confidence in the citizenry is the fundamental step in fighting Terrorism.

The good news here is that government has admitted that there is an imminent threat not only to Ghana but the whole West Africa sub-region. The fact is knowing something is different from not knowing. Meaning your approach to dealing with a known situation is different from an unknown one. Therefore, how we secure and protect our cross borders, patrol to stop the influx of potential terrorists and undertake vigorous checks at our borders will determine our first step to fighting terrorism considering the fact that the threat is to the whole ECOWAS communities.

Hence, the Government should treat this threat with all the needed attention and resources as we cannot afford to lose a soul for something we are aware of. Though terrorism cannot be eradicated at the moment but it can be minimized if we take the right steps. We need to be action oriented and not just usual discussions on media platforms with no substantive plans to fight this battle of terrorism.

To me, I believe Africa can be a breeding ground for terrorist activities considering certain factors that resonate with our continent. Hence, we need to find answers to questions that have the capacity to fight terrorism from the grassroots. This is the only way to reduce terrorist activities to the barest minimum if not to eradicate it. Therefore, for us to be on top of our game in fighting terrorism, we need to consider the following factors;

Economic Factors

Are there jobs for people on the continent? Do we create an enabling environment for businesses to thrive not forgetting small businesses? According to the National Bureau of Economic Research site, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, politicians and policy experts drew a quick and intuitive line between terrorism and poverty. Much of the existing academic literature on conflict suggested that poverty increased the likelihood of political coups and civil war, so conflating terrorism with poor economic conditions seemed logical.

Thus in my own opinion, you can't leave poverty out of the equation as anyone that

does not have a sense of belonging in any community can rise up against it to use terrorism as a response to the unbalanced wealth sharing in any society. That's why terrorism is one way to fight the ideologies of society and a way of making their grievances heard. Therefore, Terrorism has a voice and that is to send a message to others by killing and maiming innocent people.

Africa needs to wake up and start providing a safe haven of political dispensation that enhances economic stability and a platform that enables dreams to thrive and grow. Jobs must be provided; career progression must be a lifestyle for people and opportunities to have education and skills must be provided to help citizenry to have stability in life.

Political Factors

The tone of language used by political parties, leaders in society and the citizenry can incite violence that can lead to terrorist acts. For instance, in recent times, some leaders and members of political parties in Ghana have made religious and tribal comments that can fuel terrorists' insurgency. Hence, how we communicate to foster unity and peace to stop religious divide and tribal tensions should be our mantra as a nation. Our leaders need to set good examples for others to emulate. You were voted to make a difference that brings progress to the life of the ordinary citizen, not to make it worse.

Technology and Social Media

One of the greatest achievements of technology is how it has improved communication. Terrorists today use sophisticated communication tools to communicate in our communities, towns, cities and across borders and continents. They easily communicate to recruit terrorists, train them and release them back into their communities to cause havoc. Hence, these are one of the areas African countries needs to invest in especially Ghana to monitor potential terrorists and weed them out of the system.

In my opinion, the two Gitmo prisoners sent to Ghana is not an issue if the security agencies do their job well. If we had an option, then they should not have been sent to Ghana in the first place. However, as far as they are here, the security agencies need



to monitor their communication, internet use, and social media to curb any iota of terrorist connection or threat before they surface. Hence, the use of technology and social media is one communication tool for terrorists and hence monitoring it 24 hours a day, 365 days a year is the key to fighting terrorism.

Training and Development for Security Agencies

Are our security agencies well trained to fight terrorism? Are we prepared enough if there is a terrorist attack now? The answers to these questions will determine how prepared we are for the task ahead. Fighting terrorism is not a lip service but a conscious effort to fight it by acquiring the right resources, current training and developments trends and our preparedness if there is an attack.

I read an article recently in the Sun newspaper where the Greater Manchester police took exercise at the Manchester Trafford Centre to test the response of the emergency services in reaction to a terrorist attack. I'm not sure if Ghana has done this before and if they have, how frequent do we do it. We need to wake up from our slumber and start getting serious because we are sitting on a time bomb and the earlier we get serious the better for us.

Building an Intelligence Hub

Intelligence building is not a job for just one department but a team effort where information is shared among security agencies,

government, and the citizenry. Also, cross-border sharing of intelligence among countries is a powerful way to share information and knowledge pertaining to terrorism. The experiences of Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso can be an asset for Ghana. According to a recent report in the Metro newspaper in London, "three men accused of plotting attacks in Britain have been arrested in Italy". This was achieved as a result of intelligence shared among the British intelligence and that of the Italians. Hence, the African continent must work in their quest to fight terrorism.

In conclusion, we need to secure our borders through cross-border controls and patrols, increase police presence at public places, increase security at gatherings especially during campaign and elections, implementation of random security checks on individuals and on vehicles, alter primary entrances and exits of public spaces, presence of law enforcement cars in public domains and awareness creation by government using the media and all social media platforms to educate the citizenry and everyone involved in fighting terrorism.

In all, there is a saying in security circles that says "absence of the normal, presence of the abnormal" if you see something, say something". Never close your mouth whenever you see something suspicious. Keeping quite can be deadly but saying something can save lives.

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Brazil, after Europe attacks, raises guard against Olympic terror

Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-rio-security-idUSKCN0YN50S>

June 01 – Brazil is raising its guard and tightening security ahead of the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro after the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels and a threat by an alleged Islamic State militant.

"A bell went off in terms of terrorism," Admiral Ademir Sobrinho, the chairman of Brazil's joint chiefs of staff told Reuters, adding that Brazil has ramped up cooperation with foreign governments to prevent possible attacks from radical groups such as Islamic State or from a lone wolf.

With the Olympics set to start Aug. 5 and Rio expecting as many as 600,000 foreign visitors, Brazil is sharing intelligence, conducting security drills and setting up joint facilities.

In addition to a police hub where officers from over 50 countries will help monitor security at the Games, Brazil will also operate an anti-terrorism center with experts from nations including the United States, Britain, France and Spain.





"We'll have people there from around the world to better share information and advise one another on their respective areas of expertise," says Andrei Rodrigues, a police inspector who heads a special secretariat at the federal government established for security during big events.

It is not that Brazil wasn't preparing for terrorism before. But after years of hosting big events, like giant annual Carnival celebrations and the soccer World Cup in 2014, security officials didn't consider it the biggest concern.

With no political enemies, no recent history of war and no evidence of homegrown militants to threaten it, Brazil focused mostly on the street crime and violence that are everyday problems here.

Even at the World Cup, which was held successfully in 12 different cities, the biggest fear was a rekindling of mass protests that erupted across Brazil a year earlier because of corruption and a slowing economy.

Intelligence chatter

But the attacks that killed 130 people in Paris last November and 32 in Brussels in March forced a reassessment by Brazil's security forces. An anti-terrorism effort is now at the heart of their planning for the Olympics.

Security experts are scouring social media, foreign intelligence reports and immigration records for red flags on suspected militants, their networks and their movements the world over.

They have been working closely with foreign governments on readiness drills for scenarios ranging from a Paris-style assault at nightclubs or restaurants to a biological attack.

So far, security officials familiar with the so-called intelligence "chatter" about the Olympics say no credible terrorist threat has been detected.

One blatant warning came in November, when an alleged Islamic State operative claimed that

one of the group's "wolf packs" was already in Brazil.

Though it caused alarm in security circles, and wasn't publicly acknowledged by Brazilian security sources until months later, further investigation led officials to believe it was mostly bluster.

"It's not so surprising with an event of this nature that someone would be out there bragging," says Saulo Moura da Cunha, a director at Brazil's National Intelligence Agency.

Officials say the most difficult threat to detect is that of an individual or a small group inspired by but not necessarily affiliated with the organized factions that intelligence agencies know best.

"One person can cause a lot of damage," says Jose Mariano Beltrame, Rio's state security secretary, "and you need to



operate at a micro level to get ahead of it."

Vulnerabilities

Longstanding concerns about potential terrorist breeding grounds in Brazil have until now proven hollow.

Despite hand-wringing about an influx of more than **2,000 Syrian refugees in Brazil**, six of whom were caught last year traversing Central America with false passports as they sought to reach distant family, security officials say they have no credible evidence that terrorists might be among them.

And years of investigations by police and intelligence agencies have yielded **no signs of terrorists in the notorious "triple-frontier" region along Brazil's borders with Paraguay and Argentina.**



Although the region is well known for contraband commerce and as a center for Arab immigrants in the middle of the 20th century, rumored links between area merchants and Islamist militants have never been proven.

Brazil clearly has vulnerabilities. Its vast borders, more than 10,000 miles (16,000 km) shared with 10 other countries, are more than five times longer than the U.S. border with Mexico. Much of it, remote jungle, is unprotected.

An ongoing recession and budget shortfalls mean security forces lack funding, including in Rio, where some precincts are so strapped that neighbors donate office and cleaning supplies. But the government is sparing few resources for the Olympics.

For visitors, the most obvious sign of security will be patrols by 85,000 police and soldiers, a massive deployment more than twice the size of that for the 2012 Olympics in London.

Between the justice and defense ministries, which together are footing most of the bill for security, Brazil's government has spent more than \$640 million on preparations.

Security experts say the many boots on the ground will be useful in terms of deterrence. The Paris attackers, for instance, would likely have killed many more in November had police perimeters around a stadium hosting an international soccer match not prevented one suicide bomber from entering.

"It's a souped-up response that may seem disproportionate but is helpful in terms of minimizing risk," says Robert Muggah, research director at the Igarapé Institute, a security and development think tank based in Rio.

Brazilian authorities believe the Olympics will in many ways be more challenging than the World Cup.

Compared with individual games on separate days in different cities for the soccer tournament, the Olympics involves sustained multi-sport competitions from dawn to dusk across a city that is chaotic even on normal days.

"The complexity and size of the event are bigger and so, then, must be the security effort," says Rodrigues, from the special secretariat.



GAO: TSA neglected perimeter security at small airports

Source: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/05/31/tsa-airport-perimeter-security/85204236/>

May 31 – Since 2009, a lack of resources in the Transportation Security Administration has prevented the agency from conducting comprehensive perimeter-security studies at the nation's smaller airports, a watchdog report said Tuesday.



TSA conducted “joint vulnerability assessments” with the FBI on perimeter security at 81 of 437 commercial airports during that period, or nearly 19%, according to the Government Accountability Office.

Those reviews covered all 28 of the largest hub airports, which combine to handle more than half of all airline passengers, every three years. Large hubs include airports in New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles. **The security reviews also covered more than half – 33 of 57 – of the medium hubs, while neglecting most smaller airports.** Medium hubs include Houston Hobby and Kansas City, while smaller airports had less than 380,000 board planes in 2014, such as Charleston, S.C., or Des Moines, Iowa.

“By assessing vulnerability of airports system-wide, TSA could better ensure that it has comprehensively assessed risks to commercial airports’ perimeter and access control security,” said the 85-page report from Jennifer Grover, GAO’s director for homeland security.

TSA said it lacked resources to comprehensively review all airports with FBI. The reviews require a month of preparation, a week for two to five staffers to conduct the visit and then two months to write the report.

But TSA agreed with GAO’s six recommendations, including developing a system for all airports to better gauge their vulnerabilities.

“TSA also continues to identify ways to partner and collaborate with industry in performing vulnerability assessments and mitigating risks to transportation security,” Jim Crumpacker, the Department of Homeland Security’s liaison to GAO, said in a formal reply to the report.

While TSA focuses on screening passengers and luggage, airport perimeters are a security concern as it becomes tougher to get weapons aboard planes. Suicide bombers killed 16 people at the Brussels airport in March. In 2014, a 15-year-old boy stowed away aboard a plane at San Jose’s airport in April and a baggage handler at the Atlanta airport allegedly smuggled guns to New York in December.

The Associated Press released a [report](#) this month detailing hundreds of airport perimeter incidents, or about one every 10 days where somebody hopped a fence or slipped through a gate. But TSA officials denied that some of the cases were security breaches.

Tightening perimeter security is expensive because each airport has miles of fencing, and strategies that work at one might not work for another because of unique airport designs, GAO found.

One unnamed large airport spent \$40 million to add security cameras, active-shooter alarms and card readers to identify workers, the report said.

But screening every worker every day at one airport would cost \$35 million the first year and \$10 million annually, the airport told GAO. One airport spent \$3 million to update worker credentials, and another spent \$1 million for biometric technology at gates.

For its report, GAO visited airports in Atlanta, Baltimore, Chattanooga, and California’s Merced, Monterey and San Jose. GAO also called security directors at airports in Boston, Charleston, Dallas/Fort Worth, Miami and New York’s John F. Kennedy.

Airport executives from forty countries to visit Israel for security lessons

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160602-airport-executives-from-forty-countries-to-visit-israel-for-security-lessons>

June 02 – With concern rising after a string of terror attacks, airport representatives from forty countries will visit Israel’s Ben-Gurion International Airport next month to learn about Ben-Gurion’s security procedures.

Ben-Gurion is one of the world’s safest airports — no flight departing Israel has ever been hijacked, and there has not been a terrorist attack at Ben-Gurion since 1972. The layers of security are largely unnoticed by the more than sixteen million passengers who arrive and embark there annually.

The first layer occurs in **Ben-Gurion’s Airport Security Operations Center**, which monitors every flight in the area and conducts background checks on every passenger and



flight crew scheduled to pass through Israeli airspace. Around ten flights per day are flagged for security irregularities and checked further, Dvir Rubinshtein, operations center manager for the Israeli Ministry of Transportation, explained to CNN. “There is, every day, a situation where we have such concerns [about a flight],” he said, “and we check that and verify that everything is security cleared.”

Because of its record, other nations are looking into adopting Israeli security methods for their airports. “Most of the countries are actually coming here often to see how Israel is dealing with security aviation and the threats from terror aviation,” Rubinshtein said.

Aviation security expert Shalom Dolev told CNN that “some [of Ben-Gurion’s] fundamental principles and some best practices can be deployed in other parts of the world,” but because of its relatively smaller size, “it’s not a copy and paste because it’s not a situation where one size fits all.”

For example, Ben-Gurion handles about 20 percent of the passenger traffic of London’s Heathrow airport and 15 percent of the traffic handled by Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, which just signed a cooperation agreement with Ben-Gurion. (Heathrow is also [reportedly](#) considering adopting Israeli airport security methods.)

In February, Israel added a new security directive to airlines traveling to Israel in order to address other potential threats to flights, such as from “insiders that are working at resorts and may have access to the luggage of passengers, insiders that may work at airports or even in cabin crew,” Dolev said. “And last but not least, the phenomenon we are facing since the early-90s of suicide pilots.”

Dolev emphasized that Israeli airport security is ultimately at an advantage against threats because they “are more flexible, more dynamic to respond to emerging threats and respond effectively.”

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Having the BGA Security Operations Center’s inside tour some years ago, the overall experience is still vivid. Especially the UGVs guarding the perimeter of the airport and the department that neutralizes potential explosive threats. There is no doubt the Ben-Gurion is a safe airport mainly because the security culture of the personnel that integrates modern technologies on daily practices.



Move 'to shut Paris Euro 2016 fan zone'

Source: <http://planetgeniusmagazine.com/news/move-to-shut-paris-euro-2016-fan-zone/>



June 02 – France’s police chief is keen to close a zone for up to 90,000 fans for part of the Euro 2016 football tournament, Agence France-Presse reports.



CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – June 2016

In a letter to Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve, Michel Cadot cited the “exhaustion” of overstretched police and the threat of terrorism, according to AFP.

Paris is one of 10 host cities during the competition that starts next week.

Every match will be screened at the fan zone, but Mr Cadot is aiming for it to be shut during all 12 matches that take place in Paris’ two stadiums.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: This is a good decision – if finally approved. Just listen the field responders and put money and profits aside. Human lives are priceless!

Militants attack oil firm boat in Nigerian Delta, killing six

Source: <http://www.robinspost.com/news/world-news/daily-global-news/269346-world-news-militants-attack-oil-firm-boat-in-nigerian-delta-killing-six-army.html>




June 02 – Militants have attacked a boat belonging to Nigeria's state oil firm NNPC in the Niger Delta, killing at least six people, the army said on Thursday. "During the deliberate attack two soldiers were killed, one wounded, one soldier missing while four civilian staff attached to the house boat were shot dead," the army said in a statement. The attack took place on Wednesday in the Warri area, where militants have staged a series of attacks on oil pipelines in recent weeks.



THE COSTANZI REPORT ON PIRACY AND MARITIME SECURITY

Source: <http://www.costanzireport.com/p/2016.html>



Colors

- Red: major piracy attacks that resulted in one or more of the following: hijacking, stealing of large amounts of cargo, kidnapping, serious wounding and/or killing of seafarers.
- Green: less serious piracy attacks that resulted at most in petty thefts.
- Blue: foiled attacks.
- White: attacks at sea of a non-piracy nature.

Shapes

- Circles: attacks in international waters*



- *Diamonds:attacks in territorial waters**

*Approximate determination, based on the reported coordinates, whenever available, or the incident description.

Germany Arrests Three in Suspected Islamic State Plot to Attack Düsseldorf

Source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-arrests-3-syrians-over-terror-attack-plot-on-busy-dusseldorf-street-1464872522>

June 02 – **Germany arrested three suspected Islamic State members from Syria on suspicion of preparing an attack on the city of Düsseldorf**, the country's top prosecutor said Thursday, detailing allegations of a long-planned plot that could further inflame the German and European debate over migration and security.



At least one of the three suspects came to Germany as a refugee, officials said. He was taken into custody

at a small-town migrant shelter near the Polish border in a morning raid by heavily armed police commandos.

That suspect, identified as Hamza C., joined Islamic State in early 2014 along with a man named Saleh A., according to the prosecutor's statement on the arrests.


The German prosecutor's allegations indicate that Islamic State has been seeking to strike the West for years. Shortly after the two men joined, the organization's leadership ordered them to carry out an attack in the bustling central pedestrian zone of Düsseldorf, the prosecutor's office said. **The two plotted to attack one of the main streets (photo below) with two suicide bombings and "to kill as**

many passersby as possible with guns and further explosives," the prosecutor said.

The plot ran aground after Saleh A. turned himself in to French authorities on Feb. 1, according to the prosecutor. Hamza C. and two alleged accomplices in western Germany were arrested Thursday. Prosecutors didn't say why Thursday's arrests came more than four months later.

The arrests could present a new challenge for German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has staked her chancellorship on a welcoming approach to refugees even as critics say that she has exposed her country to security risks and unwanted cultural change by allowing hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers to enter the country. While she remains relatively popular in the polls with a 55% approval rating, an upstart populist party has reached new heights amid public discontent with her migrant policy.

German security officials have warned repeatedly that the country, the most populous in the European Union, is in the crosshairs of international terrorists even



though it has so far been spared a large-scale attack as seen in Paris and Brussels in recent months. Germany is part of the U.S.-led military coalition to defeat Islamic State, providing reconnaissance jets, airborne refueling, and other support.

But officials initially played down the risk of terrorists sneaking into the country as part of last year's influx of refugees and migrants. Roughly a million people from Syria and elsewhere arrived seeking asylum last year, at a rate of as many as 10,000 a day, many of them entering the country without the background checks typical for people applying for a visa.

"It's possible that terrorists are coming among the refugees," domestic intelligence chief Hans-Georg Maassen told a consortium of regional newspapers last fall, "but we don't think it is very likely."

Mr. Maassen and other German officials have since increasingly sounded alarm about the security risks of the migrant flow and have raced to improve methods of identifying the migrants and keeping track of them after they arrive.

They say that while Islamic State has more reliable means of sending terrorists to Europe—for example, by dispatching radicalized EU citizens—smuggling in attackers posing as migrants can serve the group's purpose by inflaming anti-refugee and anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe.

In the Nov. 13 Paris attacks that killed 130 people, two of the attackers used the refugee route from Greece to enter Europe, according to the authorities. Terror fears have chilled attitudes toward migrants across Europe, helping push EU leaders to take increasingly tough measures to limit the flow.

Austria this winter declared a cap on how many asylum seekers it would accept, instituting stringent new border controls that set off a domino effect of similar measures in the countries down the migrant path to Greece.

Meanwhile, Ms. Merkel brokered a deal between the EU and Turkey in which Ankara agreed to work to stop refugees and migrants from crossing to Europe in the first place.

Thursday's arrests provided fresh arguments for critics who say Germany hasn't done enough to mitigate security risks stemming from the large number of new arrivals.

"We must cast aside the naive belief that people are only coming to us with good

intentions," said Gregor Golland, a conservative lawmaker in the state parliament in Düsseldorf who specializes in security issues.

"We have a right to know who comes to us and with what intentions."

After receiving the orders to attack Germany, Hamza C. and Saleh A. left for Turkey and then traveled separately to Germany via Greece in March and July 2015, the prosecutor said. The sea-and-land route from Turkey to Greece to Germany was used by hundreds of thousands of migrants from Syria and elsewhere last year. Saleh A. and Hamza C. recruited another Syrian national, Mahood B., to take part in the attack, while a fourth Syrian, Abd Arahman A. K., had already traveled to Germany in October 2014 to participate in the attack on orders from Islamic State leadership, according to the prosecutor.

Abd Arahman A. K. was charged with producing explosive vests, a job he had already done in Syria in 2013 for the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, the prosecutor said.

Hamza C. arrived at a migrant shelter in the small eastern German town of Bliesdorf on Sept. 11, 2015, the county's migration commissioner, Thomas Berendt, said in an interview. A soccer field-size meadow overgrown with tall grass separates the four-story gabled building, which once housed a training center for construction apprentices, from a small neighborhood of single-family houses.

Hamza C. was absent for five months and missed his benefit payouts, Mr. Berendt said. But on Wednesday, Hamza C. arrived to collect his payment. He was arrested Thursday morning by masked police commandos and taken away by helicopter, locals said.

The two alleged accomplices were arrested in the western German states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg. Officials there declined to comment on the case and whether those two men also arrived as refugees. The federal prosecutor's office also declined to comment further.

Saleh A., who surrendered to authorities in Paris on Feb. 1,



continues to be detained in France, the prosecutor said, adding that his office would

seek to have him extradited to Germany.

Container with thousands of pills seized in Greece

Source: Local media

June 02 – Greek Financial Crime authorities in cooperation with US DEA seized a container filled with thousands of opiates' pills at the Port of Piraeus. The final destination (from India) was the city of Tobruk in Libya.



When officials of the Financial Crime opened the 40-foot length container, they discover hidden behind paper products (officially declared content) thousands of Tramol and Tramadol 225 mg pills with an estimated value of over \$ 13,000,000.

According to "sources" of Financial Crime, the consignment was destined for the fighters of the Islamic State. As they say, a large part will be thrown into the black market and the rest would be distributed to suicide bombers as this substance can "block consciousness and feeling" in users.

How Islamic terrorists infiltrate U.S. airport security

By Leo Hohmann

Source: <http://www.wnd.com/2016/06/how-islamic-terrorists-infiltrate-u-s-airport-security/>

June 02 – **The fact that a Somali Muslim war criminal booted from Canada could somehow land a job at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C., appears shocking on its face – but at least six dozen other employees with suspected terror links have been caught working at U.S. airports.**

A CNN investigation found that



He was deported from Canada after that country found out about his past. But he found refuge in the U.S., which gave him a visa based on his marriage to a Somali-American woman who claimed to be a refugee fleeing war in Somalia. But even that claim turned out to be bogus, as the woman had falsified her refugee application. Still, nothing has been done to remove either Ali or his wife from the U.S.



As shocking as it may sound, this is not the first incidence of an immigrant with ties to Islamic terrorism or other crimes working at an airport in America. Documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request in March reveal 73 people employed by major airlines at 40

airports nationwide were flagged for potential ties to terrorism. Terrorism-linked employees have also been flagged at Boston's Logan International Airport,

Yusuf Abdi Ali, who is accused of committing atrocities while he was a military commander during Somalia's civil war, has been living a quiet suburban life in posh Alexandria, Virginia, for about 20 years, CNN reported.



Seattle's Sea Tac Airport, Denver International Airport, Honolulu International Airport, Dallas Love Field, San Francisco International Airport, and Los Angeles International Airport, among others.

These employees were not properly vetted because the TSA said it did not have full access to terrorist databases during their hiring, according to an Inspector General's report.

"Without complete and accurate information, TSA risks credentialing and providing unescorted access to secure airport areas for workers with potential to harm the nation's air transportation system," the report found.

In 2014, three Somali "refugees" with ties to either ISIS and/or al-Shabab were arrested after it was discovered they had plans to travel overseas and fight with the terrorist organizations. All three had security clearances for jobs at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport that allowed them to go into areas travelers were not allowed, Fox 9 reported.

One of the men, Abdisalan Hussein Ali, blew himself up at a military checkpoint in Mogadishu in 2010. Just four years earlier, he was serving coffee at the Caribou Coffee in Concourse G, right across from customs. One of the other two also became a suicide bomber. In light of the missing EgyptAir Flight MS804 that went down in the Mediterranean Sea two weeks ago, it was reported in November, 2015 that [dozens of Paris airport workers were on a terror watch list](#).

One can only guess how many others are jihad sympathizers or how many still work there and at other airports throughout Europe, Canada and the U.S.

As a result of CNN's investigation, Ali has been placed on administrative leave.

Clare Lopez, vice president for research and analysis at the Washington-based Center for Security Policy, said the entire U.S. system for screening applicants to enter this country – whether asylee, immigrant, non-immigrant or refugee – is broken.

She said it is forbidden to ask the kind of direct questions about a person's ideological beliefs that a trained officer might ask to ensure the applicant honestly will renounce all other legal allegiances to live only under the U.S. Constitution.

"Worse yet, we know from DHS whistleblower Phil Haney that even when derogatory information about individuals with connections to terrorist organizations is entered into the system, it sometimes gets deleted – on purpose," she adds.

Haney, a 12-year veteran officer with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, has co-authored a new book, ["See Something Say Nothing: A Homeland Security Officer Exposes the Government's Submission to Jihad,"](#) about the Obama administration's focus on protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of suspected jihadists, placing those concerns above that of protecting the American public.

"As any frequent traveler knows, there are visibly Shariah-compliant Muslims – with full Salafi-cut beards and mustaches, hijabs, and other clothing intended to communicate allegiance to the Islamic legal system called Shariah – at most major metropolitan airports in America," Lopez told WND.

"Some of them even combine their Shariah-compliant clothing with TSA 'uniforms.' At a time when the threat from Islamic terrorism to the flying public has never been more dangerous, screening procedures for entry to the U.S. as well as for airport employment must be tightened."


Name checks with terrorist databases are inadequate for the thousands who don't appear on such lists, or whose names are spelled in various ways, or whose documents are either fraudulent or non-existent to begin with, Lopez said.

"As things are now, the potential for jihadist infiltration is a disaster waiting to happen," she said.

Somali war criminal has 'rights' in U.S., lawyer claims

Ali is being sued in a U.S. civil court. The lawsuit, which a human rights group initially filed in 2006, calls Ali a "war criminal" who committed "crimes against humanity."

Ali and his lawyer, Joseph Peter Drennan, deny all accusations listed in the CJA lawsuit. Drennan said his client "has as much right as anyone else to live in the United States."



Ali was deported from Canada after news about his alleged war crimes in Somalia became public through the CBC documentary. Ali entered the U.S. on a visa through his Somali wife, Intisar Farah, who became a U.S. citizen after coming to the U.S. as a refugee. The U.S. has taken in more than 132,000 Somali refugees since 1983.

But even his wife's history is marred. In 2006, she was found guilty of naturalization fraud for claiming she was a "refugee" from the very Somali clan that Ali is accused of torturing. But

she apparently served a light sentence and was never deported as the CNN crew filmed Ali walking out of his apartment with his hijab-wearing wife.

His lawyer, Drennan, said there should be no concerns whatsoever that Ali was working at an airport, according to the CNN report.

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement told CNN it was aware of Ali's past but refused to answer any questions about him, nor would ICE give CNN the terror suspect's immigration status.

Leo Hohmann is a news editor for WND. He has been a reporter and editor at several suburban newspapers in the Atlanta and Charlotte, North Carolina, areas and also served as managing editor of Triangle Business Journal in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Daesh reaches the doorstep of China

Source: <http://saudigazette.com.sa/opinion/daesh-reaches-doorstep-china/>

June 03 – On August 2, 2014, the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia said in a speech that "terrorism poses a renewable global threat to the whole world from east to west, and from north to south. It does not distinguish between places, religions, nationalities, colors or races. Therefore, it has to be confronted collectively and internationally". These words come to mind as the world witnesses the terrorist organization Daesh (the self-proclaimed IS) which has successfully moved from a regional level in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf countries to an international level, striking many major countries including France, Russia and the USA.

It is remarkable that China has not yet witnessed any attacks, having refused to take part in any international counterterrorism alliances in the region and also tending to leave regional issues and international crises to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, viz. United States, Britain, France and Russia. However, Daesh has reached the doorstep of China as some of its

Chinese affiliates have clandestinely left to fight for the terrorist organization. In July 2014, Daesh announced its "country map" indicating the area in which it seeks to establish its country in the next five years. This map includes Eastern Turkestan, the area currently known as Xinjiang, in West China, as the organization's leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi claims they are "seeking to defend Muslims' violated rights in China, India and Palestine".

On September 21, 2014, Muir Analytics warned of Daesh's penetration of the "biome" of China and its presence in surrounding countries including the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Muir Analytics is a company that provides threat intelligence that helps corporations reduce exposure to severe financial loss from political violence, terrorism, insurgency and such conflicts. It is a CIA "associate" in Virginia, often operating under the parent company for deployment of "information" that serves its operations.

On December 8, 2015, Al-Hayat Media Center, the media arm of Daesh, broadcast a chant on the Internet in Mandarin called "I am a Mujahid" calling on "Chinese Muslim brothers" to join the alleged "army of the Caliphate". Following this broadcast, the Chinese deputy foreign minister declared that China was uniting with the US and Russia in their efforts to counter terrorism. The Chinese foreign ministry, then,



called on the international community to cooperate in the fight against all forms of terrorism and stated that no country can counter terrorism alone in isolation.

Following a visit to the region in July 2014, the Chinese envoy to the Middle East, Wu Si Kai, declared that the number of Chinese citizens who are thought to be involved in terrorism, whether actively or under training, in the Middle East is estimated to be 100, most of whom are members of the East Turkestan Movement. Wu Si Kai explained that “those extremists come from Islamic countries, Europe, North America and China. When they develop radical ideas, they form a great security threat to their countries”.

The Chinese members of Daesh have caused concern for decision makers in China. In his speech during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in September 2014, China’s President Xi Jinping stressed the need for the coordination of efforts to confront “three evil forces; terrorism, extremism, and

separatism”. Moreover, on December 27, 2015, China adopted the first law of counterterrorism. In spite of the existence of some articles addressing terrorism in numerous resolutions of the Standing Committee of the National Council alongside criminal law, the code of criminal procedures and the law of emergency, China did not previously have a law for counterterrorism.


Thus, all countries have a clear interest in unifying efforts and institutionalized cooperation through countering, encirclement and cutting the sources of funding to all forms of terrorism and extremism. There must be a genuine will and seriousness from all countries to counter this eminent danger that has become a cancer, growing and posing a serious threat to world peace and stability. International silence will “breed a generation that only believes in violence and rejects any opportunity for peace, cloaked in mottoes of ‘clash of civilizations’ instead of ‘dialogue of civilizations’”.

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Othaimin is a Middle East affairs specialist and security analyst based in Riyadh.

Author of the Month for June 2016: Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin, Ph.D.

By Meryll Levine Page

Source: <http://www.morejewishluck.com/easyblog/keep-up-with-vera-and-alisa-2/author-of-the-month-for-june-2016-nancy-hartevelt-kobrin-ph-d-1>



June 02 – Dr. Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin’s books have nothing to do with *Jewish Luck*. Many nonfiction books cue a reader through the title or subtitle if the book is meant for them. I feel I am one of the “concerned public” when it comes to the topic of terrorism. I’m also tired of hearing pundits talk about terrorism in terms of airport security or border control. I don’t want to rely on instant replays and reactive reporting. Maybe it’s my background as a historian that makes me want to know more about the root causes, the culture, the language of jihadis. For me it’s more than an academic exercise. Understanding the “whys” allows us to address the question, “how could this be different?”

When I saw the title, *The Jihadi Dictionary*, I assumed I wouldn’t read the book from A-Z (yes, it’s arranged like a dictionary). I’ve found that reading the entries as the terms that connect to jihadi thought and behavior arise in the news up my perceptions. At times I understand the news better, at other times it makes me want to question the validity of the pundit. For example, the term “weapons of mass destruction” seems to have emerged under the Bush administration. However, you’ll learn from the dictionary that the term was coined

in 1937 by the Archbishop of Canterbury referring to the bombing of Guernica. When I read the section about relevance to jihadis, it really made me think. Dr. Kobrin writes, “Weapons of mass destruction afford the jihadis a unique means of bonding with hard objects, which are a replacement for the mother.” She concludes by stating that jihadis tell



the public what they want to do and they will do it. This statement alone shakes up what historians (including me) learned about the art of brinksmanship in the Cold War. This is a different war. The psychology of the jihadi was not an approach I'd ever considered before reading Dr. Kobrin's works and it's certainly worth seriously considering. If you're someone with unshakeable opinions, you might not want a challenge of this sort. Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin's holistic approach and introduction of psychology offers me a different lens for understanding. After reading the dictionary I feel how important it is to change the way women in the Muslim world are treated and how imperative it is to encourage shifts in education for both boys and girls.

If you, too, consider yourself a concerned citizen, (and certainly if you fit one of the three professional categories of the subtitle) here's a primer on consulting *The Jihadi Dictionary*. The introduction clearly explains the format of the entries and how to use the dictionary. I also suggest reading The Coda and the other end matter first to understand the theories and beliefs underpinning the dictionary. Her theory about the role of maternal attachment will challenge you and provoke you to think more deeply about the roots of Jihadism and think more creatively about the solutions. I

Currently Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin is a fellow at the American Center for Democracy (acdemocracy.org). Her background includes a PhD in Comparative Literature and certificates from The Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis and the US Army's Human Terrain Program. She has varying degrees of fluency in thirteen languages. Reading both *The Jihadi Dictionary* and *The Maternal Drama of the Chechen Jihadi*, I could see the different strands of Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin's background come into play. She has a broad vantage point.

With all the rhetoric that surrounds us in the United States during this election cycle, it's imperative to take a few steps back from reflexive responses like "kick the Muslims out of the US." Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin's work helps experts and ordinary citizens understand the deeper reasons for terrorism.

I suggest anyone running for President should read at least one of Dr. Hartevelt Kobrin's books—even better, read them all. It wouldn't hurt Mr. Putin to read these books either.


Meryll Levine Page is a retired high school history teacher with a special interest in women's history. She taught extensively about the Soviet Union and its break-up. Currently she co-facilitates the Minneapolis Jewish Artists' Lab.



The Jihadi Dictionary

By the Editor-in-Chief @ CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter

Having read some of Dr. Kobrin's books in the past, the dictionary was a very pleasant surprise. There is no doubt that it is a difficult book to study especially if not being a psychoanalyst expert.



On the other hand it helps operational people to understand many things related to the enemy and it is a vivid proof that entities involved into the war on terrorism should work together in order to have a more thorough operational picture. Sun Tzu in *The Art of War* wrote: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." *The Jihadi Dictionary* does exactly this. It provides many insights of terrorists' mindset that might provide a better way to effectively counter them. It should also be noted that in all Kobrin's books the

key player is "the mother" and in the dictionary the key-word "father" provides some reasonable explanation for this. This is a reference book that can be read (again and again) either as a whole but also partially depending on the circumstances.

Decision makers must read this book mainly because they see the enemy only in the field missing what lies under the numbers or the attacks executed. One might say that those in charge do not read anymore and that their decisions are influenced by those around them that also do not study a lot. This is very prominent in modern wars and this is the main reason that almost all of them are



lost. In contrast the biggest conqueror of all ages Alexander the Great cared more about the transfusion of civilization instead of ground occupation and military dominance.

A small addition to the dictionary would be the key-word “disruption” (in reference to “Weapons of Mass Destruction”). Out of the full CBRN spectrum, only the “N” component causes destruction; the “CBR” components will mainly cause disruption without the “B” might balance between both depending on the biopathogen released.

I gladly passed the info about Jihadi Dictionary to many of my former and present colleagues and first responders since I do believe that this is one of few books that need to have as an asset to their intellectual weaponry. Congratulations Nancy for an excellent work!

Athens, 02 June 2016

Briggen (ret'd) Ioannis Galatas, MD, MA, MC (Army)

TSA Discovers Record Breaking 74 Firearms in Carry-On Bags

By Amanda Vicinanza (Online Managing Editor), and Anthony Kimery (Editor-in-Chief)

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/tsa-discovers-record-breaking-74-firearms-in-carry-on-bags/be300eccae44a54f7806c68d3da153f3.html>



May 31 – As the busy travel season rapidly approaches and the controversy over the long lines at airport security checkpoints across the nation continues to heat up, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) found a record breaking 74 firearms—65 of which were loaded—in carry-on bags this past week.

This broke the previous record of 73 firearms set in April.

In addition to firearms, TSA officers also discovered a number of other prohibited items in carry-on bags, including firearm components, realistic replica firearms, bb and pellet guns, airsoft guns, brass knuckles,

ammunition, batons, stun guns, and small pocketknives, among numerous other items.

During the previous week, May 13th through the 19th, TSA discovered an axe and a sword, as well as 56 firearms. TSA explained that these items not only pose a threat to security, they also slow down checkpoint security lines.

“Sure, it’s great to share the things that our officers are finding, but at the same time, each time we find a dangerous item, the line is slowed down and a passenger that likely had no ill intent ends up with a citation or in some cases is even arrested,” TSA explained in a blog post.



Year after year, the number of firearms confiscated by TSA continues to escalate. 2015 was a record setting year of firearms confiscations, with TSA intercepting 2,653



Comb Dagger (CHS), Cane Sword (IAH)

firearms—seven a day—in carry-on bags at airport security checkpoints across the United States.

This represents a nearly 20 percent increase over the 2,212 firearms discovered in 2014 in carry-on bags at checkpoints across the country, averaging more than six firearms per day. Of those, 1,835 (83 percent) were loaded. Firearms were intercepted at a total of 224 airports; 19 more airports than during 2013.

The number of hand guns found in 2014 represented a 22 percent increase over the 1,813 firearms discovered by TSA in carry-on bags in 2013.

Of the 1,813 firearms TSA screeners found in carry-on bags in 2013, 1,477 (81 percent) were loaded. Firearms were intercepted at a total of 205 airports with Atlanta on top of the list for the most firearms intercepted (111).

Firearms confiscated by TSA screeners at 199 airports in carry-on bags in 2013 was a 16.5 percent increase (257) over the 1,556 firearms -- or more than four firearms a day -- discovered in 2012. A whopping 78.7 percent (1,215) were loaded and dozens had a round chambered.

The number of handguns confiscated in 2012 was up from the 1,320 handguns discovered by TSA screeners in 2011, which in turn was up from the 1,123 firearms screeners found in 2010.

As in the previous four years, the majority of handguns found in carry-on bags were loaded and many had a bullet chambered.

“The transport of firearms by commercial air in

carry-on bags represents a threat to the safety and security of air travelers. Through increased training in detection methods, our officers are becoming more adept at intercepting these prohibited items,” TSA Administrator Peter V. Neffenger commented in a statement earlier this year.

The continued escalation of TSA hand gun seizures comes at a time when the threat of homegrown Islamist jihadists also is continuing to grow, and

attacks on airliners continues to be a target of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in particular.

In December 2015, “*Destination Airport, and Guess What’s on the Menu?*” was the title to the opening spread of the cover story about how to bomb passenger planes in the slick, professionally designed issue of *Inspire* magazine published by AQAP. Releasing the digital magazine on Christmas Eve was unlikely a coincidence; it was the 5th anniversary of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 as it was on its landing approach to Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

The entire issue was devoted to inspiring lone wolf jihadists in the US and the West, and especially urged attacks on commercial passenger planes. A lengthy section provided detailed instructions on how to build a new bomb AQAP purports can be “hidden” not only on an aircraft, but also to blow up other targets with the intent of causing ripples throughout US and Western economies.

The successively record-breaking number of passengers trying to slip by TSA screeners with a handgun – not an insignificant number of handguns were what TSA says were “artfully concealed,” which raises the disturbing question: were these



individuals deliberately trying to sneak the guns past screeners?

While TSA attributes the vast majority of the handguns its screeners continue to confiscate to forgetfulness on the part of passengers who simply forgot they'd put a weapon in their luggage before attempting to board a plane, in those instances in which the owners of sidearms clearly tried to conceal their guns from security screeners -- many loaded and chambered -- nevertheless begs the question about the persons' intent ... and motivation.

"Unfortunately, these sorts of occurrences are all too frequent, which is why we talk about these finds," Bob Burns wrote on the TSA Blog. Burns is a ten year TSA veteran who has served as a Transportation Security Officer, Operations Watch Officer, instructor, training coordinator, Behavior Detection Officer and vice chairman of TSA's first National Advisory Council. He also served as a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Decontamination Specialist in the US Army and served in Operations Desert Shield & Storm.

As *Homeland Security Today* previously reported, authorities are clearly disturbed by the fact that more than a decade after 9/11 so many people are deliberately trying to take a concealed firearm -- including handguns that are loaded or chambered -- onboard a passenger plane.

The authorities added there's no logical reason why someone would "artfully conceal" a handgun (or some other dangerous weapon like a knife or incendiary) unless its a premeditated effort to try to smuggle them past TSA screeners. They noted there's been sufficient efforts to make the flying public aware that concealed weapons -- especially guns --

are strictly prohibited. It's not a secret what people are prohibited from carrying onboard a passenger plane.

"I find it very hard to believe these are people who just simply forgot they were carrying a handgun ... or a handgun that was loaded and chambered," a government counterterrorism official previously told *Homeland Security Today*. "In these cases," the official said, "I just don't buy that these people just forgot ... there was something else going on."

The official expressed exasperation with TSA's critics and members of the flying public who, he said, seem to believe finding loaded handguns in carry-on bags to be "no big deal."

"This is completely unacceptable, I don't care what excuses ... people have -- as for me, the ban on guns on planes has long been known, passengers should know this -- more so [14] years after 9/11. In other words, there's just no rational excuse whatsoever. Passengers saying, 'well, I just forgot,' just doesn't cut it when we're dealing with the level of escalation in [the] numbers of guns we're now finding in carry-ons ... especially with way too many that have a bullet chambered and ready to fire," said a veteran TSA at a large metropolitan domestic airport.

Firearm possession laws vary by state and locality, but the increasing number of firearms discovered in carry-on bags is prompting some hefty penalties. In Georgia, starting June 1, **anyone who brings a gun in their carry-on luggage could face up to a year in jail and a \$100,000 fine if the firearm is caught at the security check point at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. Offenders are also subject to TSA civil penalties of up to \$11,000.**

Terrorist or criminal? New software uses face analysis to find out

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160603-terrorist-or-criminal-new-software-uses-face-analysis-to-find-out>

June 03 -- Pulling a poker face means betraying no visible emotion, so that opponents cannot tell what you are really thinking.

But a Tel Aviv startup's face-profiling technology recently proved fairly accurate at predicting which four players were most likely to beat out forty-six other contenders in an

amateur poker tournament. Two of those four were among the event's three finalists.

And now, the company reports that it has signed a contract with an unnamed "leading homeland security agency" **to help identify terrorists through its**



technology, which analyzes faces shown in photos and videos and classifies them according to fifteen parameters predictive of personality traits and types.

Purportedly it can detect with high accuracy if you are, say, a genius, an extrovert, or a criminal.



“We understand the human much better than other humans understand each other,” Faception CEO Shai Gilboa told the *Washington Post*. “Our personality is determined by our DNA and reflected in our face. It’s a kind of signal.”

Gilboa said Faception evaluate faces with 80 percent accuracy for certain traits. “Utilizing advanced machine-learning techniques, we developed and continue to evolve an array of classifiers. These classifiers represent a certain persona, with a unique personality type, a collection of personality traits or behaviors. Our algorithms can score an individual according to their fit to these classifiers.

“Ultimately, we can score facial images on a set of classifiers and provide our clients with a better understanding of their customers, the people in front of them or in front of their cameras.”

Faception is offering the software as one tool among many that governments can use in the global war on terror.

Unlike face-recognition technology, which relies on matching faces to those already in a database, facial profiling relies on scientific studies suggesting that personality is determined by DNA and reflected in the face.

Therefore, it can pinpoint potentially problematic people not previously known to authorities.

Only three of the eleven terrorists behind the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris had criminal records, Gilboa points out in a video about Faception. “Our technology classified

nine of them as potential terrorists with no prior knowledge.”

Despite, or perhaps because of, the ethical controversy raised by its proprietary computer-vision and machine-learning technology, Faception has been getting a lot of press.

The company, founded in 2014, was a finalist in the LDV Vision Summit 2016 on 25 May in New York City. An alumnus of the 500 Startups accelerator in San Francisco, Faception is now a member of Sosa innovators’ community in South Tel Aviv.

Banks and marketers are among other professionals who might find Faception’s methodology valuable. Gilboa said he and his team believe their technology represents a multibillion-dollar opportunity.

Faception’s Web site describes the team as including “world-class experts in the areas of computer vision, face analysis, machine learning, psychology, technology and marketing.”

“Our mission is to revolutionize how companies, organizations and even robots understand people to dramatically improve public safety, communications, decision-making, and experiences.”



With new tactics, Taliban gain ground in south Afghanistan

Source: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/with-new-tactics-taliban-gain-ground-in-south-afghanistan/article8686463.ece>

June 03 – In the rugged terrain of the Taliban heartland in southern Afghanistan, the fight against Kabul has become a war for control of key stretches of main roads and highways as the insurgents use a new tactic to gain ground.

First they storm a checkpoint, kill all the policemen, seize their weapons and equipment and effectively cut off the main road to a remote village. They raise the white Taliban flag and plant roadside bombs to prevent cars from coming through the checkpoint. Any vehicle that attempts to pass through is either blown up or attacked, residents and local leaders say.

Forcing villagers to move out

Then they wait. Faced with shortages of basic food items and price hikes as their supplies dwindle, the villagers are eventually forced to abandon their homes and to move to a place where they can afford to eat and live. Most sneak out on foot or on donkeys through back-roads and mountain paths, leaving many of their belongings behind.

Though the new tactic may be obviously simple, it has helped the Taliban gain ground albeit at a slower pace than a deadly, surprise raid on an entire village.

At war since 2001

The Taliban have been waging war against the Kabul government since 2001, when their regime was overthrown in the U.S.-led invasion. Since the international combat troops pulled out of Afghanistan at the end of 2014, leaving behind only a largely training and advising contingent, the insurgency has intensified as Afghan forces struggle to take the lead in the battle.

The Taliban are now refocusing their attention mostly on the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan, U.S. and Afghan military officials say, although the insurgents have also struck elsewhere, such as the northern Kunduz province where they briefly

overran and held the provincial capital for a few days last fall.

See the results

The results have been daunting: the United Nations says 3,545 Afghan civilians were killed and 7,457 wounded in the war in 2015, most of them by the Taliban.

In the south, one of the worst hit areas is Uruzgan province where the Taliban have been putting pressure in recent weeks on Afghan forces around the provincial capital of Tirin Kot, said the U.S. military spokesman in Kabul, Brig. Gen. Charles Cleveland.

Main focus: Uruzgan

“The Taliban’s main focus in the south is now



Uruzgan” and U.S. forces have been providing assistance and air support as needed, Cleveland said.

The director of Uruzgan’s provincial council, Abdul Hakeem Khadimzai, described the situation there as the “worst in 15 years.” In May alone, he said, “around 200 security forces were killed and more than 300 were wounded” in Uruzgan.

The figures are an estimate but Mr. Khadimzai insisted that if he were to “include civilians, then they would be doubled.” The numbers could not be independently verified as the Afghan government does not release military and police casualty figures.





French suspected terrorist held in Ukraine

Source: <http://en.rfi.fr/europe/20160604-french-suspected-terrorist-held-ukraine>

June 04 – **A Frenchman is being held in Ukraine after being caught transporting a large quantity of explosives and weapons across the Polish border.** He admitted plans to launch terror attacks in France, sources told a French TV channel that cited evidence that he had far-right sympathies. The 25-year-old Frenchman is currently held by Ukrainian police after being arrested at the Polish frontier on 21 May and could be extradited to France.



At least three rocket-launchers, about 100 detonators, more than 100 kilos of TNT, half a dozen Kalashnikov assault rifles and a number of balaclava helmets were found in his car,

according to the M6 TV channel which broke the story on Friday. Ukrainian security services had spotted him several days earlier and suspected he was trying to buy weapons.

M6's sources said he admitted planning attacks on French territory. A search of his home in eastern France found material for making explosives and a T-shirt with the logo of a [far-right organisation](#), the channel reports.

He has no criminal record and was not on the security services' radar.

A source told the Reuters news agency on Saturday that it was not "totally established" that a terror attack was being planned.

Seven police chiefs warn over Brexit terror risk

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/04/exclusive-seven-police-chiefs-warn-over-brexit-terror-risk/>

June 04 – Leaving the European Union would be a "gamble" with Britain's security that would put the country at greater risk of terrorist attacks, an alliance of seven top police chiefs warns today.

In an open letter, the former chief constables say it is "vital" to be able to share fingerprint data and criminal records with police forces across Europe to stop jihadists and criminal gangs.

There is "no case" for putting Britain's security at risk by withdrawing from the EU, they warn.

The letter comes as Sir Hugh Orde, the former president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, warned of potential tragedies in the English Channel, if more migrants try to get to Britain in small inflatable boats.

The letter has been signed by Sir Hugh, who was chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI); two former Metropolitan Police Commissioners – Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Condon; Sir Matt Baggott, former chief constable of the PSNI; Sir Peter Fahy, former chief constable of Greater

Manchester Police; Sir Paul Scott-Lee, former chief constable of Suffolk Constabulary and West Midlands Police; and Peter Neyroud former chief constable of Thames Valley Police.

In the letter, they say: "We believe that Britain will be safer inside the European Union, and that leaving Europe would make us less safe and put us at a disadvantage in tackling terrorism and organised crime.

"We can see no case for taking such a gamble with our security that leaving the EU would entail."

EU membership means British police can "freely share" fingerprints and criminal records with 27 other countries. "Access to this information is vital to track down criminals who want to cause us harm," the letter says.

"The EU helps our police forces to work together, making it harder for criminals and terrorists to evade justice."

Sir Hugh told The Telegraph that it was inevitable that jihadists plotting "attacks will get through" but the ability to share intelligence about terror suspects between



security forces across Europe was the best way to keep Britain safe.

The European Arrest Warrant allows suspects to be transferred to Britain when they are caught in other EU countries. This would be lost if Britain votes to Leave, he said.

Joint investigation units involving forces from different EU member states would also exclude Britain outside the EU, Sir Hugh warned.

"I am really conscious that everything the Remain campaign say is seen as scaremongering," he said. "This is not scaremongering – it is a hard fact. If you're not in the club, you don't get the benefits."

He said it was "a distinct possibility" that more migrant-smuggling gangs would try to cross the busy shipping lanes of the English Channel in inflatable boats to get into Britain, potentially putting lives at risk. Collaboration between police to stop the traffickers would be harder outside the EU, he said.

James Brokenshire, the Home Office minister, said: "At a time of continuing terrorist threat our domestic security requires us to work even more closely with our European partners. It's difficult to see how we can possibly do this by shouting from the sidelines rather than sitting at the table as an equal member."

Six hurt as shots fired at tourist bus in France

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36455641>

June 05 – Six people were hurt when shots were fired at a tourist bus on a motorway in south-east France, police say.

The bus carrying 75 Czech tourists, some schoolchildren, was travelling from Spain to the Czech Republic when it was hit on Saturday night.

Two shots smashed the front and rear windows, Alex Perrin, a prosecutor in the Drome region, said.



Le Dauphin Libere newspaper said more police were stationed on bridges over the road in case of repeat incidents.

It is believed the attacker was using a hunting rifle to target the bus from a bridge over the A7 motorway near Saulce sur Rhone, roughly halfway between Lyon and Marseille.

Among the six people injured by broken glass was a child, Mr Perrin said.

One passenger suffered a serious eye injury, he added.

"We don't have any reason to believe this bus was targeted instead of any other," Mr Perrin said. No-one has yet been arrested.

Euro 2016: 82 security staff revealed to be on terror watch list – French intelligence

Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/345469-euro-football-terrorist-watchlist/>

June 05 – A new shocking twist in the Euro 2016 saga has emerged just days after stark warnings ISIS would make the event a target. It turns out **82 of the people hired for security posts on the football cup are on French terror watch lists.**

The Directorate General of Internal Security (ISB) has screened a total of 3,500 individuals already hired for the job of ensuring the safety of visitors, according to Le Point. Those among the 82 found on the watch list could by definition either belong to a terrorist group,

such as Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL), or have a history of questionable behavior or extreme beliefs on either the left or right.

According to French authorities, some 90,000 personnel in total will be on duty during Euro 2016, including the stadiums, fan zones and on the streets. Of those, 77,000 are police and gendarmerie, while the rest comprise security and military personnel, as well as 1,000 or so volunteers.





"Such a unique event in exceptional circumstances requires extra security measures," Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve told journalists.

In the meantime, French President Francois Hollande admitted that the risk of a terrorist attack taking place during the Euro 2016 football championship exists.

"This threat will last for a long time. But we must do everything to ensure that the Euro 2016 is a success," the French president told radio France Inter on Sunday.

The French had made promises that the championship would be entirely secure, and the Mediterranean resort of Nice is set to spend about €1.2 million on preparations, which is almost half the €2.5 million budget, according to Le Point. The city will host four matches.

Each football team will also be given 17 police officers and two agents with France's elite special forces for extra protection.

Russian police officers will also form part of the international operation deployed to maintain order during the championship. Six specially trained officers will be sent to France, while the need for more rank-and-file boots on the ground will depend on how far the national team gets in the tournament.

Governments of nations with ardent football fans have been warning citizens to exhibit caution, following warnings by members of the intelligence community that the Euro cup increasingly looks like a high-value terrorist target.

"Euro Cup Stadiums, fan zones and unaffiliated entertainment venues broadcasting the tournaments in France represent potential targets for terrorists," the US State Department said in a warning to its traveling fans. That statement came following intelligence warnings that the Euro, along with seaside resorts and areas with a high concentration of people are all potential IS targets.

Embassies and consulates in Paris have also been reinforcing their premises with extra staff and security.

France has seen a wave of horrific terrorist attacks in recent months that leave many understandably worried about the prospect of security at the upcoming championship, to be held across 10 French cities, starting on June 10.

Inside ISIS' looted antiquities trade

By Fiona Rose-Greenland

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160606-inside-isis-looted-antiquities-trade>



June 06 – For excavators – archaeologists, but also looters like the Islamic State, or ISIS – the opportunity for discovery in modern Iraq and Syria is dazzling.

The countries lie within the Fertile Crescent, a broad swath of land stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to the Zagros Mountains and the Persian Gulf that gave rise to some of the earliest complex societies.

The human settlement record begins around 9000 B.C., which means, among other things, that the soil is rich with artifacts. Syria alone has [4,500 surveyed and published archaeological sites](#), and scholars estimate that there are many more.



[Everyone seems to agree](#) that ISIS is digging up and selling archaeological artifacts to make money. But no one seems to agree on how much money it's actually making from its illegal antiquities trade: amounts have ranged from [\\$4 million](#) to [\\$7 billion](#).

Despite a number of challenges, my University of Chicago research team – known as [MANTIS](#) (Modeling the Antiquities Trade in Iraq and Syria) – has worked to outline the framework of ISIS's antiquities trade as well as accurately estimate how much cash ISIS and other insurgent groups are making from the endeavor.

An interdisciplinary project comprising archaeologists and social scientists, MANTIS has created a new data set drawn from past excavation publications and auction sales reports. Using these data, we are building a



revenue estimate tool that will give us a better idea of what the trade is worth.

From the ground to the auction house

We began with the goal of measuring profit. What we now understand is that specifying the *process* – or the means by which ISIS unearths, moves and sells antiquities – is just as important as measuring the profit.

Antiquities are looted and trafficked all over the world, and the specific mechanisms and structures [differ according to cultural and political context](#). In the Islamic State, the antiquities pipeline seems to involve three basic steps: a dig permit is secured from ISIS authorities, unearthed artifacts are evaluated (possibly by officials with the Antiquities Division of the [Islamic State's Department of Natural Resources](#)) and artifacts are moved out of the Islamic State into the [international market](#) (including but not limited to Turkey). At

some point in the process, ISIS imposes a tax on the salable antiquities, widely reported as [20 percent](#). There are several details yet to be specified in this pipeline, but it provides a basic picture of the flow of goods.

Studying this process gives us important insights that can be shared with policymakers who are trying to cut off terrorist finance sources and protect culturally significant objects.

For example, we know that artifact hunters have been illegally excavating Syrian and Iraqi archaeology sites for decades. Archaeological looting is a longstanding practice embedded in local economic and tribal arrangements. Defeating ISIS will not guarantee the end of archaeological looting; rather, in the absence of economic alternatives, looting will remain in place as a source of revenue for the next

regime that rolls through.

Studying the process also reveals the problem of politics – at both regional and international levels.

On the regional level, ISIS has competition from other insurgent groups that are looting artifacts. On the international level, [uneven efforts to change cultural policies or enforce existing ones](#) reveal disagreements about how archaeological

materials should be regulated by the state and the private market.

These disputes have simmered for years, and the ISIS crisis intensifies them. Mistrust among scholars, museum professionals and participants in the legal antiquities trade blocks cooperation on data sharing that might advance our knowledge.

Projecting profit

Nonetheless, profit remains an important topic of study. Thus far, a stable estimate of the trade continues to elude us because there are so many unknowns.

Unknowns are a familiar problem for anyone studying a black market. Participants in illegal trading and smuggling keep a low profile, and data sets have to be built using diverse sources of evidence, including interviews, police records and customs



seizures. The work that goes into this type of data compilation is complicated, sensitive and sometimes dangerous (this is certainly the case in Iraq and Syria right now).

Studying the ISIS antiquities trade has a further set of challenges that predate the conflict:

- We don't have reliable quantitative data on the legal antiquities trade from the region, never mind the illegal trade.
- We don't know what was in the ground when ISIS started digging.
- We don't have established revenue estimate methodologies for this type of good.

Still, we have been able to get a better handle on figuring out how much money ISIS has earned. For example, we project gross market value that can then be broken down into discrete money flows.

One way to think of gross market value is the hammer price at auction. Not every artifact ends up in an online or physical house auction like Bonhams, Christie's, and Sotheby's, but enough of them do that it's a reasonable starting point.

From the gross market value we can hypothetically apportion out proceeds to at least three stakeholders: looters, ISIS and dealers. ISIS seems to be involved in the earliest stages of the pipeline, suggesting a slim percentage of the overall profit. Because there are specialized skills involved in international smuggling, it is unlikely that the same person who loots physically moves the artifacts out of Syria or Iraq and into the foreign marketplace. Successful smuggling, like successful looting, requires its own social network.

What all of these caveats and complications boil down to is that ISIS is likely to have earned [several million dollars](#) in profit since launching its looting program.

That's a far cry from \$7 billion, but it's still enough money to carry out devastating attacks on civilians in Europe and closer to home. The November 2015 Paris attacks, which left 130 innocent people dead, are estimated to have cost no more than [\\$10,000](#).

The allure of numbers that awe

And yet, patchy data and methodological challenges do not fully explain why \$7 billion fell to \$4 million in public discussions about the ISIS antiquities trade.

What's really going on here, I think, can be explained in two ways. First, there is an overactive collective imagination about how much art is actually worth. It's an understandable proclivity. We hear all the time about astronomical prices paid at auction for contemporary artworks or rare masterpieces. Moreover, antiquities are imbued with mystique. They are treasure, hidden away in the ancient soil and waiting to be rediscovered. This, in turn, motivates governments and other groups opposed to the Islamic State to describe their actions in attention-grabbing terms. It's a lot easier to call for action against a \$7 billion crime than a \$4 million one.

While market mystique and over-the-top plot lines are fine for Hollywood films and adventure novels, it's no way to understand terrorist finance, and without that understanding we are unlikely to arrive at genuine and lasting solutions.



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The Puzzle of Nonviolence in Western Sahara

Source: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2015.1100500>

May 27 – Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony that has been controlled by Morocco since 1975, has seen virtually no violent resistance by the indigenous Sahrawi people since the conclusion of a 1975–1991 war between Morocco and the pro-independence Polisario Front. That lack of political violence is puzzling in light of several factors, including broad support for independence, socio-economic disparities between Moroccan and Sahrawi inhabitants and Morocco's repression of Sahrawi culture, resistance, and expressions of pro-independence sentiment. This



article examines the absence of violence and draws lessons from Western Sahara: why some populations resort to violent resistance and others do not, and how best to frame and to study politically charged subjects such as insurgency, terrorism, and sovereignty. In addition to advancing theories of nonviolence, this article makes a methodological contribution to the study of resistance movements and improves our understanding of the conflict through fieldwork that included approximately 60 interviews with Sahrawi activists conducted in Morocco and Western Sahara. Western Sahara is difficult to study for a number of reasons, including its remoteness, relative international obscurity, and Moroccan suppression of dissenting research.

Al-Qaeda's propaganda decoded: A psycholinguistic system for detecting variations in terrorism ideology

By Shuki J. Cohen, Arie Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, David Webber and Rohan Gunaratna

Source: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2016.1165214>

May 09 – We describe a novel hybrid method of content analysis that combines the speed of computerized text analysis with the contextual sensitivity of human raters, and apply it to speeches that were given by major leaders of Al-Qaeda (AQ)—both in its “core” Afghanistan/Pakistan region and its affiliate group in Iraq. The proposed “Ideology Extraction using Linguistic Extremization” (IELEX) categorization method has acceptable levels of inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities. The method uncovered subtle (and potentially non-conscious) differences in the emphases that Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri put on the various components of their ideological justification for terrorism. We show how these differences were independently recognized as the crux of the rift in AQ, based on documents that were confiscated in Abbottabad following Usama Bin Laden’s assassination. Additionally, several of the ideological discrepancies that we detected between AQ “core” and its Iraqi affiliate correspond to schisms that presumably led to the splintering of AQ Iraq and the rise of ISIS. We discuss IELEX’s capability to quantify a variety of grievance-based terrorist ideologies, along with its use towards more focused and efficient counter-terrorism and counter-messaging policies.

ISIS Made \$2.4 Billion Last Year, Say Analysts

Source: <http://m.clarionproject.org/news/isis-made-24-billion-last-year-say-analysts-0>

June 07 – The Islamic State has diversified its income streams by increasing taxes and does not look like it will collapse soon, according to analysts.

The Islamic State made \$2.4 billion in 2015, making it the richest terrorist group in the world by a substantial margin, according to the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism as reported by The Economic Times reported.

Despite losing territory and suffering airstrikes against its oil refineries, the group maintained income by increasing taxes on the estimated eight million people under its control from \$360 million to \$800 million in 2015. The Islamic State’s income for 2015 was \$500 million less than its income the previous year.

The report’s authors concluded that “ISIS’s military defeat is not imminent ... as things stand, ISIS economic collapse remains some way off in the mid-term.”

The Islamic State continues to brutally assert dominance over its dominion. On Thursday, 19 Yazidi girls were publicly burned alive in iron cages in Mosul, according to ARA News. “They were punished for refusing to have sex with ISIS militants,” local media activist Abdullah al-Malla told ARA News.

Nor are the Islamic State’s activities limited to the territories it controls in Syria and Iraq.

An alleged sleeper cell consisting of four Syrian men planning terrorist attacks in Dusseldorf was arrested on Thursday. One of the men had turned himself into authorities in Paris on February 1 and provided evidence against his fellow conspirators. It took German police four months to gather enough evidence to arrest the other three.

One of the suspects had filed for asylum. But the head of the German Police Trade Union has said that to run



background checks on all refugees entering Germany would be unaffordable and that such a policy is too late.

“It would have been useful in the second half of last year to create conditions for background checks on all people who came to us, in fact,

before they traveled [to Germany]. But that is past history now, as we cannot afford it,” he said, according to *Russia Today*.

At the moment the German Justice Ministry is investigating 180 terror suspects who have either returned from or have links to Syria.

South African shopping malls step up security amid warning of 'high threat' of terrorist attack

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/06/south-african-shopping-malls-step-up-security-amid-warning-of-hi/>

June 06 – South African shopping malls have stepped up security after Western intelligence agencies warned of a “high threat” of a terrorist attack on places popular with foreigners.



American, Canadian and now British citizens living in the country or visiting have been sent advisories in recent days saying the attacks could coincide with the month of Ramadan and be motivated by a global call to action by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil).

“Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners such as shopping areas in Johannesburg and Cape Town,” the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said, adding that British citizens were targets because of its involvement in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

“You should be vigilant at this time.”

The American government said the “near-term” attacks facing South Africa could focus on “upscale shopping areas and malls” in the country’s two biggest cities during Ramadan.

As a result, both visible and covert security has been stepped up at well-known tourist destinations including the newly-opened Mall of Africa outside Johannesburg, the designer brand-heavy shopping mall of Sandton City

and Cape Town’s Victoria and Albert Waterfront, visited in December by Prince Harry as part of a regional tour.

South Africa, whose population is 1.5 per cent Muslim, has long been a transit point for terror groups because of its patchy intelligence and police networks and populous and impenetrable townships.

Like most African nations, a small number of its countrymen are believed

to have travelled north to fight with Isil.

Those known to have spent time in the country include Samantha Lewthwaite, the so-called White Widow of one of the London July 7 suicide bombers who is on Interpol’s “most wanted” list because of her links to the Somali terror group al-Shabaab.

Lewthwaite is understood to have lived in South Africa under an assumed name between 2008 and 2011, giving birth to her fourth child in an upmarket Johannesburg maternity clinic before moving to Kenya. There, she was implicated in several attacks including one on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 that left 67 people dead.

At present, South Africa’s weak rand has made it an even more attractive destination for tourists, tens of thousands whom flock to



its safari parks and wine region each year. David Mahlobo, the state security minister, on Monday sought to play down the reports, whose origin remains unknown.

"We remain a strong and stable, democratic country and is no immediate danger posed by the alert," he said in a statement.

Some analysts agreed, saying South Africa's neutral foreign policy meant it flew under the terrorist radar. President Jacob Zuma has also been outspoken in his criticism of western intervention in the Arab Spring that brought with it the rise of Isis.

But Robert Besseling, an American risk analyst, said a successful terrorist attack in South Africa was "feasible, given police ineffectiveness, serious weaknesses within the

intelligence apparatus and the lack of a counter-terrorism strategy".

He said that while there was "ample evidence" to show international terrorist networks were operational in South Africa, there was "little credible indication" of a direct threat to the country. However, a worsening economic climate and xenophobic attacks on foreigners including Somalis might have raised tensions, he added.

Last May, a statement issued by Muslim organisations and scholars in South Africa said there was concern about "growing sympathy for ISIS among some South African Muslims, and reports received that more South Africans have left for Syria".

Fear of Islamism in Vienna

By Tarek Fatah

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6057/fear-of-islamism-in-vienna>



[A contemporaneous painting of the siege of Vienna by Frans Geffels \(1683\).](#)

May 31 – It was on 9/11, but not in 2001 and not in New York.

Rather, it was September 11, 1683, when Europe stopped the invading Islamic armies at the Gates of Vienna, marking the end of the Islamic conquest of Europe.

That is, until now. The Battle of Vienna took place after the city had been besieged by 300,000 jihadis of the Ottoman Caliphate for two months.

Behind the city gates was the army of the Holy Roman Empire, led by the Habsburg Monarchy and aided by Catholic legions from Poland and Lithuania.

Today, no Turkish troops besiege Vienna, but Islamism and the idea of the Islamic Caliphate still haunt Austria.

Last week, I was invited by the University of Vienna to a conference whose title the hosts had borrowed from my book *Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State*. Academics from Maldives to Malaysia, Indonesia, Israel, Turkey, Tatarstan and Egypt joined Nigerian, Senegalese and UK professors to discuss and debate issues, leading to some spirited exchanges.



A week is too little time to get a feel for a city, let alone a country. But through interacting with graduate students at the 600-year-old university and judging from their questions, I sensed a genuine fear of Islamist ideology in Austria. (And, I was told, in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria as well).

Leading up to the conference, the Islamist factor was key in the photo-finish, May 22 Austrian presidential election. Independent candidate Alexander Van der Bellen barely defeated Norbert Hofer of the right-wing anti-Islamist Freedom Party, by 50.35% to 49.65%. A poll published by the OGM institute in 2015 found 58% of Austrians felt "radicalization" of the nation's Muslims was underway. A string of crimes committed by newly arrived Muslim refugees has enhanced that fear.

Earlier this month, as reported by the New York Times, a grandmother of three, walking her dog, was raped while a 10-year-old boy was sexually assaulted at a public swimming pool.

A 21-year-old student was gang raped in Vienna's famed Prater Park and another 54-year-old woman beaten to death on the street. Next door in Germany, the infamous sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year's Eve helped

to trigger the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party.

The German philosopher Marc Jongen, associated with the AfD, recently talked to the *Times of India* and raised the "cultural factor" of recent immigrants.

"They come from Muslim countries – a different cultural background. ... They will keep their way of thinking, their habits – and we see a problem in it. Muslims have been here for decades but have had problems to integrate," he told the newspaper.

At the university conference, a young, second-generation Austrian woman of Turkish descent asked me how one could tell if one had integrated into Austrian society or failed to do so.

I suggested one litmus test for Austrian Muslims was relatively simple: "When you think of the 1683 Siege of Vienna, if you feel for the besieged inside the city walls, you have integrated. But if you cheer for the Ottomans, you have not."

There were a few gasps, then complete silence in the room. Later, the student came up and shook my hand. "Thank you," she said to me as she and her mom beamed ear to ear.

Tarek Fatah, a founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress and columnist at the Toronto Sun, is a Robert J. and Abby B. Levine Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Revisiting the relationship between hate crime and terrorism

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160607-revisiting-the-relationship-between-hate-crime-and-terrorism>

June 07 – New research from START examines the link between hate crime (bias-motivated crime) and terrorism at the county level, focusing on far-right extremism in the United States and pulling data from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

START notes that the report's major findings include:

- Counties experiencing increases in one type of bias-motivated or extremist violence are likely to see significant increases in other types of extremist activity.
- The results indicate that increases in counties' fatal hate crimes by the far-right are associated with approximately four times more far-right terrorist acts. Furthermore, the results also show that increases in non-right-wing terrorist acts see between a 64% and 78% increase in far-right fatal hate crime.
- The results support hypotheses drawn from the tenets of group conflict theories in that greater minority presence and diversity as well as increasing minority presence and diversity over time are correlated with increases in far-right activity.
- Contrary to expectations, greater levels of poverty are associated with fewer far-right acts. Alternatively, counties suffering from other poor or worsening economic conditions (greater unemployment and increasing poverty over time) see associated increases in both types of far-right violence.



— Read more in Colleen E. Mills et al., “Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are “Close Cousins” or “Distant Relatives,” *Crime & Delinquency* (6 June 2016): 1-33 (DOI: 10.1177/0011128715620626); and *Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship*, *START Research Brief* (May 2016)

► To read the full report, published in *Crime and Delinquency*, [click here](#).


Captured Hamas operative: Terror tunnel network extends across Gaza

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160607-captured-hamas-operative-terror-tunnel-network-extends-across-gaza>



IDF soldiers use a camera to peer into the Hamas attack tunnel discovered near the Gaza border in a video released on April 18, 2016. (Screen capture: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)

June 07 – Hamas fighters can travel underground throughout the entirety of the Gaza Strip using the terror group's tunnel network, according to a Hamas operative who was captured last month after he crossed illegally into Israel from Gaza.



“Hamas has dug an extensive network for moving fighters around the Strip exclusively underground,” which includes rest quarters for use by elite fighters, Israel's Shin Bet security agency said. The revelation follows the IDF's recent discovery of two Hamas [terror](#) tunnels that crossed into Israeli territory. IDF spokesman Col. Peter Lerner attributed the detection of the second tunnel to improved intelligence and technology. Another Hamas operative, who was arrested in April after sneaking into Israel on a

self-described mission to murder Israelis, told authorities that Hamas digs tunnels from private homes and institutions in Gaza.



During Operation Protective Edge (OPE) in 2014, which was launched in response to Hamas' continued rocket fire, the IDF discovered and destroyed at least thirty-four tunnels in Gaza. Hamas killed several Israeli soldiers through its use of cross-border tunnels, including five soldiers in Israeli territory near Kibbutz Nahal Oz. The IDF explained that Hamas intended to use the tunnels "to carry out attacks such as abductions of Israeli civilians and soldiers alike; infiltrations into Israeli communities, mass murders and hostage-taking scenarios."

Palestinians in Gaza have recently expressed fears that Hamas tunnels built in or near civilian areas are putting non-combatants at risk of being hurt by Israeli strikes. "I am sure, one million percent, that those with tunnels under their houses cannot sleep, or taste the joy of life," one anonymous 42-year-old woman in Gaza told the *New York Times*.

According to the UN, only 23 percent of Palestinian homes that were destroyed during the war have been reconstructed. Israel has accused Hamas of confiscating 95 percent of the cement entering Gaza, diverting it from civilian reconstruction and using it to build its tunnels instead. The Gaza-based terror group has invested heavily in expanding and building its network of tunnels since the 2014 conflict. **Hamas reportedly spends hundreds of thousands of dollars each month and employs more than a thousand operatives "24 hours a day, six days a week" to build tunnels.** "We have a Gaza City under the ground, and we have nothing up here," a 23-year-old Gazan who lives in a mobile home told the *New York Times* in May.

Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, formerly the head of the research division of Israeli military intelligence and later the director general of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, told reporters weeks earlier that the discovery of the tunnels was a sign that Hamas was preparing for another war against Israel. He added that the tunnel digging means that "they definitely invest a lot in making the necessary preparations so that in the next round, when they decide to start it, they will be able to inflict the heaviest damage on Israel, including through those tunnels."

Last surviving 9/11 search-and-rescue dog dies, receives hero's send-off

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160607-last-surviving-9-11-searchandrescue-dog-dies-receives-heros-sendoff>



June 07 – The last surviving search and rescue dog who worked at Ground Zero following the 9/11 terrorist attacks died on Monday.

CNN reports that Bretagne, a 16-year-old golden retriever, was put down at Fairfield Animal Hospital in Cypress, Texas. His handler, Denise Corliss, was by her side.

As Bretagne slowly walked into the hospital, she was saluted by representatives of agencies including the Cy-Fair Volunteer Fire Department and Texas Task Force 1, who came to pay their respects.

After she was euthanized, her body was covered by an American flag and officers saluted once again as she was taken away.

Denise told NBC TODAY that Bretagne's kidneys had started to fail in recent days, and that the food-



loving retriever refused her meals for three consecutive days.



Cy-Fair Volunteer Fire Department Captain David Padovan told TODAY that his team's attendance was "a very small way for us to pay tribute to a dog who truly has been a hero ... Just because she's a K9 doesn't make her any less part of our department than any other member."

Corliss took ownership of Bretagne, then an 8-week-old puppy, in 1999, and began training as a volunteer with a dog-handler team formed to support federal emergency response efforts at disaster sites.

Corliss and Bretagne qualified as members of Texas Task Force 1 in 2000, and their first deployment was at the World Trade Center site in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Together they spent two weeks working 12-hour shifts at Ground Zero.

CNN reports that in the following years they were



deployed to disaster sites including Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, and Hurricane Ivan, before Bretagne's retirement from search work at age 9.



Bretagne was last survivor of around 300 dogs who



worked at Ground Zero. Dr. Cindy Otto, a vet who worked with 9/11 search dogs, said: "You'd see firefighters sitting there, unanimated, stone-faced, no emotion, and then they'd see a dog and break out into a smile. "Those dogs brought the power of hope. They



removed the gloom for just an instant — and that was huge because it was a pretty dismal place to be.”

2015 GTD data informs latest State Department ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’ Release

Source: <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/2015-gtd-data-informs-latest-state-department-country-reports-terrorism-release>

June 03 – On Thursday, June 2, the Department of State released the 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism. The report is provided to Congress each year and covers developments in countries in which acts of terrorism occurred, countries that are state sponsors of terrorism, and countries determined by the Secretary to be of particular national security interest.

START’s Global Terrorism Database provides the foundation for the statistical annex section of the CRT, which marks the first time that trends in 2015 terrorism data from the GTD have been publicly released. **Major findings from the report include:**

- The total number of terrorist attacks in 2015 decreased by 13% and total deaths due to terrorist attacks decreased by 14%, compared to 2014. This was largely due to fewer attacks and deaths in Iraq, Pakistan, and Nigeria. This represents the first decline in total terrorist attacks and deaths worldwide since 2012.
- In several countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines, Syria, and Turkey, terrorist attacks and total deaths increased in 2015.
- Although **terrorist attacks took place in 92 countries in 2015**, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than 55% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria), and 74% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan).
- While the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was responsible for 31% fewer terrorist attacks in Iraq, the number of attacks carried out by ISIL in Syria increased by 39%. The geographic reach of attacks by ISIL and its affiliates expanded as several existing terrorist groups pledged allegiance to ISIL. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIL branches were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
- The number of attacks in which victims were kidnapped or taken hostage declined in 2015; however, the number of kidnapping victims and hostages increased. This was primarily due to an increase in the number of attacks involving exceptionally large numbers of victims.

The full dataset of 2015 terror attacks will be available for download on the Global Terrorism Database website later this month.

► To read the full Country Reports on Terrorism report, [click here](#).

Terrorist attacks show biggest decline in a decade; but let's wait before celebrating

Source: <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/terrorist-attacks-show-biggest-decline-decade-lets-wait-celebrating>

June 06 – The number of terrorist attacks and fatalities has shown its largest decline in more than a decade, according to the U.S. State Department’s latest report on global terrorism. The report concludes that terrorist attacks declined by 13% and deaths by 14%, following years of striking increases.

While statistics like these are often sensationalized, it is important to take a critical look at what they represent. As is often the

case with metrics on complicated phenomena, there are reasons to be encouraged and reasons for concern.

While the fact that more than 28,000 deaths and 35,000 injuries resulted from nearly 12,000 terrorist attacks in 2015 can hardly be regarded as good news, these numbers are an improvement over the previous year. In fact any decline, regardless of the size, is a



welcome development given the record-breaking numbers that have been recorded recently. What does the 2015 decline mean?

Those who study terrorism note that it moves in waves, declining in some areas, while peaking in others. In the 1970s, terrorist attacks occurred most frequently in Western Europe. A decade later the greatest concentration was in Latin America. Today, attacks are comparatively rare in both places, but all too common in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.

The decline in global terrorism in 2015 may mark a tipping point in the current wave of terrorism that has devastated these regions. It is still too early to be certain, but it is sensible to expect that this wave, like the others, will some day pass.

Terrorist attacks and deaths in 2015 dropped substantially in some of the countries that have suffered the most in recent years. In Pakistan, attacks were nearly cut in half and fatalities declined by more than one-third. Iraq and Nigeria also experienced considerable declines.

But worldwide statistics may obscure regional and national developments.

For example, violence worsened last year in conflict-ridden Afghanistan, which witnessed a 20% increase in attacks. Terrorism also increased in several countries where it had previously been less common, like Bangladesh and Egypt. Perhaps most troubling, the decades-old conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers Party, which once showed promising signs of coming to an end, reignited, resulting in a large increase in attacks.

Breaking down the 2015 data also reveals important developments in the number of

attacks committed by the world's deadliest terrorist organizations. Some groups, like the Shabab in Somalia and Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan, were considerably less active, while others, like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Boko Haram in West Africa, carried out more attacks than in previous years.

Perhaps most notably, terrorist attacks carried out in Iraq by the Islamic State declined by 31% in 2015. While fewer attacks are undeniably better than the alternative, this is obviously not the only metric by which to gauge the strength of terrorist organizations. Groups are sometimes most active when they are desperately trying to engender support. However, healthy organizations may also curtail their activity, especially when they have consolidated power in certain states, and secured regional allies in others.

So, while it is encouraging that Islamic State was considerably less active in Iraq in 2015, the group's activity in Syria increased, and it managed to expand operations into several new countries, as well as attract the allegiance of numerous additional affiliates and allies. This suggests that while Islamic State may be changing, it may nevertheless pose a serious threat for years to come.

Interpreting patterns of terrorism is a complex challenge because situations can, and often do, evolve in unexpected ways. Despite a welcome decrease in the total number of terrorist attacks and fatalities that occurred worldwide, trends are not universally positive. Nor is there a guarantee that global declines will continue. Nevertheless, these latest numbers provide a bit of good news in an area where it has been in short supply.

ISIS launches Ramadan with terror strike in Jordan

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/25465/ISIS-launches-Ramadan-with-terror-strike-in-Jordan>



Of all the possible places braced for ISIS terror attacks when Ramadan began, the first attack on the first day of the month-long fast was launched Monday, June 6, in Jordan. Five armed men, in two cars, attacked the Jordanian General Intelligence Command in the Baqaa Palestinian camp, near the capital Amman. Three armed men left their car, while two remained at the wheel.



The three entered the command building and opened fire, killing five intelligence personnel. They then retreated to their cars and drove away.

No organization took responsibility for the attack.

debkafile sources on terrorism report that this ranked as a classical terrorist operation, in which the killers appear suddenly, kill their prey and disappear without leaving traces. For a country with advanced intelligence and counter terror agencies, which posts armed security personnel at every city corner and junction, backed by the presence of American special forces trained to fight terror targets, this attack was a grave warning.

How did they all come to be caught unawares? But this was not just a warning for Jordan but for Israel as well.

If armed groups, consisting of Palestinians who joined ISIS, are able to move freely around Jordan, without the local intelligence and security forces catching on, there is no guarantee that killer-squads will not cross the Jordanian-Israeli security fence or infiltrate Israel through the southern Arava border for terror attacks in Israel.

Even though Jordan tries to keep its war against ISIS low profile, the kingdom tops the jihadists' hit list, ahead even of the Euro-2016 games.

There are several reasons for this:

1. The Jordanian intelligence' undercover units behind the front lines of the wars in

Iraq and Syria feed the Americans on-site information on ISIS. Data of this high quality is unavailable from any other source.

2. These units mark targets for US air strikes.
3. Jordanian intelligence officers engage Sunni tribal chiefs across Iraqi and Syrian borders to persuade them to fight against ISIS. These Jordanian officers have joined the Sunni fighters in the battle for Fallujah in Iraq.
4. Jordan, with US assistance, is now building one of the longest security fences, 442km, and the most advanced in the Middle East along all its borders with Iraq and Syria.
5. The westernmost segment of this Jordanian border wall will also serve Israel. It will block off corridors running through the Syria-Jordan-Israel border junction and so hold back ISIS from infiltrating the Golan and the Sea of Galilee region.
6. Jordan is the only Arab nation to send its air force against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Just three months ago, on March, the Jordanian security forces raided the Irbid Palestinian refugee camp in northern Jordan, and tackled an ISIS cell set up in the camp, killing seven.

The recent terror attack shows that, while Jordanian intelligence and its special forces are deeply involved in the war against ISIS beyond Jordan's borders, the terror organization is gaining strength and abilities inside the kingdom, especially among the Palestinian population.

Leading Turkish tourism player expects \$15 bln loss in revenue in 2016

Source: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/leading-turkish-tourism-player-expects-15-bln-loss-in-revenue-in-2016.aspx?pageID=238&nID=99999&NewsCatID=349>

June 07 – **Turkey's losses in tourism revenue may increase up to \$15 billion over this year due to rising security concerns and the Russian crisis,** according to a leading sector representative.

"Our country's loss in tourism revenue may increase up to \$15 billion over this year and the decline in tourist numbers by 30 percent compared to 2015," said the head of the Tourism Investors Association (TYD), Murat Ersoy, in a press meeting on June 1.

The number of foreign arrivals visiting Turkey slumped by 28 percent in April to 1.75 million compared to the same month of 2015, marking the steepest decline since May 1999, according to data by the Tourism Ministry. The number of foreign people visiting Turkey decreased by 16.5 percent to 5.82 million in the first four months of this year compared to the same period of 2015, data also showed. In the first three months of 2016, tourism revenue decreased to \$4.07 billion with a 16.5 percent drop, according to data that was released by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TÜİK) on April 29. Tourism revenue was \$31.5 billion in 2015, an 8.3 percent decline compared to the previous year.



The main problem for the sector is that many foreign tour operators are focused on alternative markets, creating new competitors for Turkey, according to Ersoy.

He said the total revenue of leading tour operators in the region came mainly from Turkey and Egypt, but with rising security concerns in these two markets they have started to turn their eyes to alternative markets.

“These companies have faced the risk of losing some 60 percent of their revenue so they started promoting new countries in a bid to diversify their markets. This will lead to the creation of some permanent competitors for Turkey. We can overcome these cloudy days by finding new markets,” he said. The launch of direct flights to tourism destinations will be crucial, as tour operators halt flights to any destination where they see even minor risk, according to Ersoy.

Saying that the state offered considerable support to companies which make scheduled flights, he added: “This was quite a positive step which will secure the tourist inflow into Turkey. We also need more international hotel

brands, which will launch cooperation with leading airline companies in Turkey to lure more foreign tourists. In short, we need to create new markets by ourselves.”

‘Rise in tourist number after Eid Ramadan’

According to Ersoy, Turkey will continue to see a decline in tourist numbers until Eid Ramadan, but the number of tourists visiting Turkey will start to increase after this date, mainly from Muslim countries.


Denizbank CEO Hakan Ateş said the lender continues to offer loans to 108 TYD members, adding that a total of \$18.3 billion in loans were offered to the tourism sector as of March 2016.

“Denizbank offered 16 percent of this amount, topping the list. While the loans offered to the sector decreased by 11 percent in the first quarter of the year compared to the same period of 2015, our loans to the sector increased 4 percent. Tourism revenue plays a crucial role in Turkey’s economy, especially in closing the current account gap,” he said, vowing that the lender would continue to support the sector

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Terrorism and Russian crisis sunked Turkish tourism. Refugees and illegal immigrants’ sunked Greek tourism industry. According to data from Lesvos Island “Odysseas Elytis” airport, in May 2016 4,217 visitors arrived compared to 12,043 in May 2015 (-65%); charter flights 85 (2015) vs. 38 (2016). In May only 415 Austrians and 534 Germans arrived – two countries that traditionally visit this Aegean island...

France unveils app to alert people to terror attacks

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160608-france-unveils-app-to-alert-people-to-terror-attacks>



June 08 – Euro 2016 soccer tournament begins on Friday, and as part of the massive security operation undertaken to secure the ten millions spectators who will be watching the games from 10 June to 10 July, **the French government has created a smartphone app designed to send warnings directly to people’s phones in the event of a bombing, shooting, or other disaster.**

This week has already seen a major beefing up of police and military presence in the cities where the games will be played, and earlier this week the French Interior Ministry unveiled a new app — called SAIP (Système d’alerte et d’information des populations) —



which was developed after last November's terrorist attacks in Paris.

Libération reports that the app, available in English and French, receives an alert if an attack occurs near the user. In the event of a terrorist bombing or shooting, **the smartphone screen turns crimson and displays the word "ALERT," a brief description of the incident, and suggestions how to react.**

The screen turns red, but there is no sound or vibration so that if a user is hiding near where the attackers are, the alert does not put the user in danger. The alert also offers a button the user may click on for

information on whether a police rescue operation is under way and instructions from the police on what to do.

Officials at the French Interior Ministry say that another role the app aims to play is to offer an official version of events to counter inaccurate information on social media.

The alerts may be shared on Facebook and Twitter.

Libération notes that the app was initially meant to issue alerts only on armed attacks and bombings, but that it will be upgraded so it could flag industrial accidents, floods, and other emergencies.


World violence reaches new all-time high

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160608-world-violence-reaches-new-alltime-high>

June 08 – On the face of it, the world is becoming less and less peaceful, with the level of global violence reaching its highest level in the last twenty-five years – but: In fact, violence ranking do show that the world would be growing more peaceful if it were not for the growing violence of Middle East conflicts.

conflicts in the Middle East, and these conflicts' intensifying violence, were mostly to blame for the rising levels of global conflict.

Most attacks categorized as "terrorist" attacks were concentrated in five countries: Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.



The just-published [2016 Global Peace Index](#), which measures and evaluates twenty-three indicators — including incidents of violent crime, levels of militarization, and imports of weaponry — said the increasing number of

“Quite often, in the mayhem which is happening in the Middle East currently, we lose sight of the other positive trends,” said Steve Killelea, founder of the Institute



for Economics and Peace (IEP), which produces the annual index.

“If we look in the last year, if we took out the Middle East ... the world would have become more peaceful,” Killelea said.

The Telegraph reports that more than 100,000 people were killed in conflicts in 2014, up from almost 20,000 in 2008. Syria, with about 67,000 such deaths in 2014, accounted for most of that increase.

The UN said the number of displaced people had probably “far surpassed” a record sixty million in 2015. IEP notes that funding for UN peacekeeping operations reached record highs in 2016.

The economic cost of violence in 2015 was \$13.6 trillion, or 13.3 percent of global GDP, according to the index. That is about 11 times the size of global foreign direct investment.

“However, peacebuilding and peacekeeping spending remains proportionately small compared to the economic impact of violence, representing just 2 percent of global losses from armed conflict,” Killelea said.

The Index shows that Europe mains safest and most peaceful part of the world, although the region’s peace score dropped in the wake of attacks in Paris and Brussels. Iceland is the world’s most peaceful country listed in the Index, followed by Denmark, Austria, New Zealand, and Portugal.

The United States was ranked 103rd most peaceful out of 163. Japan was ninth, Germany came in 16th, and Britain was 47th. After last year’s terror attacks, France dropped only one place to 46th.

The least peaceful country is Syria, followed by South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

2015 was the most lethal year for terrorism in Europe in a decade

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160413-2015-was-the-most-lethal-year-for-terrorism-in-europe-in-a-decade>

April 2016 – Aon Risk Solutions, the global risk management business of Aon plc, the other day released its annual [Terrorism and Political Violence Map](#), highlighting 2015 as the most lethal year for terrorist violence in Europe in nearly a decade, as terrorists increasingly target private citizens and public gatherings. This marks the first net increase in global terrorism risk ratings since 2013, with the risk ratings of eighteen countries experiencing an increase and thirteen countries seeing a decrease.

AON says that for the first time since Aon and the Risk Advisory Group jointly began collecting empirical data to create the map in 2007, **shootings have overtaken bombings in the Western world, while the targeting of civilians in public spaces has become more commonplace.** Since January 2015, nearly one-third (31 percent) of all attacks in the Western world targeted private citizens and public gatherings.

The global threat posed by ISIS dominates many of the map findings this year, as the group entered a more aggressive phase of mounting mass casualty attacks in 2015 and early 2016, with the United States, France, Turkey, and Belgium all affected. The terrorist

organization’s activities have contributed to sustaining or increasing risk levels in more than a dozen countries worldwide. Far-right activism as well as civil unrest risks stemming from the European migrant crisis and the increasing influence of extremist parties have also driven rating increases.

“Our 2016 map demonstrates increasing regional instability and a growing spectrum of potential risks,” said Scott Bolton, director in Crisis Management at Aon Risk Solutions. “The threats highlighted in the map should encourage business leaders with global footprints to adopt a more strategic risk management approach to limit the impact of attacks on their people, operations and assets. Understanding how they are exposed to the peril is key to achieving this outcome.”

“The most business-threatening political violence risks continue to emerge from war and sudden changes in government control, such as those which occur through coups d’état,” said Henry Wilkinson, head of Intelligence and Analysis at The Risk Advisory Group plc, which has collaborated with Aon to produce the Terrorism and Political Violence map since 2007. “These are less



manageable risks and our findings flag several countries where there is heightened probability of both. Businesses need to be flexible and robust in how they anticipate and manage risks

in the fluid world the map depicts. This requires actionable assessments that take both a strategic and a more detailed operational view of the markets in which they seek to thrive.”

3 killed, 6 injured in Tel Aviv terror attack

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bull20160608-3-killed-6-injured-in-tel-aviv-terror-attack>



June 08 – Three (Update: 4) people were killed and six injured in an attack by two armed terrorists near a shopping mall in the center of Tel Aviv.

Of the six injured, one is in critical condition and four are in serious condition.

Then Sharona Mall is located within walking distance of the Kyria compound, the location of Israel's Ministry of Defense and headquarters of the Israel Defense Force (IDF).

The two suspects were caught, and one of them was wounded and is being treated in a Tel Aviv hospital.

Initial reports say the two suspects were dressed in business attire, with jackets and ties.

Israeli intelligence says there was no specific information about a terrorist attack.

The two suspects ordered food in a café just outside the Sharona shopping mall. The police says that the attack could have resulted in many more victims, but rather than enter the mall, which was full of evening shoppers, the gunmen chose to start shooting outside the café.

All Israeli shopping mall have security personnel stationed at the entrances, and one security guard was close enough to the Max Brenner café to realize what was going on. He opened fire at the two assailants, and wounded one of them.

The second terrorist joined civilians in running for cover, but an off-duty policeman suspected him, overpowered him, and turned him over to security personnel.

The police is now searching the area to see if there was another gunman involved in the attack.

The police say the two gunmen were cousins, both 21-years old, from a West Bank village. The police has not identified what village the terrorists came from.



The police also said there were no known ties between the two and terrorists organizations.

ISIS-Jordan cell linked to Tel Aviv terror attack

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/25467/ISIS-Jordan-cell-linked-to-Tel-Aviv-terror-attack>

June 09 – Khaled al-Mahmara, one of the two Palestinian cousins who opened fire at the Sarona Market in Tel Aviv Wednesday night, killing three Israelis and injuring 17, was a member of a secret ISIS cell at al-Mutah University in al Karak, Jordan. He was in a mission to lead mass terror attacks in Israel, to be orchestrated from Jordan.

debkafile terrorism experts report that this university has become a hotbed of extremist Islamist terrorists with cells that are almost all linked operationally or ideologically to the Islamic State.

Muhammad Al-Dala'een, the son of a Jordanian Parliament member, who crossed the border from Jordan to Iraq and joined the terror organization, blew himself up 10 months ago in a suicide attack near Mosul. Al-Dala'een was a student at al-Mutah University.

DEBKAFfile reported Wednesday: Two terrorists, dressed in white button-down shirts, ties and black pants, both from Yatta village in southern Mount Hebron, entered a restaurant near the Sarona Market in Tel Aviv on Wednesday and ordered food, then took out Karl Gustav sub-machine guns and started shooting at people seated inside the restaurant.

As a result, in one of the most harrowing shooting attacks in the current wave of Palestinian terror, at least 3 Israelis were murdered and 4 fighting for their lives in the Ichilov Hospital operating rooms. Two more are slightly and moderately wounded.

One of the two terrorists was captured and the other wounded and transferred to a hospital. Tel Aviv District Police chief Chico Edry said that there is currently no information regarding



Eight months ago, a Jordanian officer started shooting at a police training facility, murdering three foreign instructors - two Americans and a South-African. This officer, Captain Anwar Abu Zaid, was a graduate of al-Mutah University and proven by an investigation to be tied to clandestine ISIS terror cells operating there.

debkafile sources say that Jordanian General Intelligence has been co-opted to the Israeli investigation of the Tel Aviv outrage. Both agencies view the Sarona Market attack as a continuation of the wave of ISIS attacks that began on Monday at Jordanian Intelligence Headquarters in the Baqaa Palestinian camp near Amman, which left five intelligence officers dead.

more terrorists, and called for the residents of Tel Aviv to return to normal. This call, other than the attempt to reassure, is of no great value, because just as Commander Edry had no prior information on the shooting attack, he has no information on what is going to happen in the next hours and days.

Commander Edry also exposes the fact that Israeli security forces did not detect the news running through the social networks since Wednesday morning, claiming that an armed terrorist squad has reached Tel Aviv with the intent to carry out a terror attack.

The fact is that these terrorist were declared missing by the PA a day ago. One would assume that the



word of their disappearance did not reach the ears of the GSS and the Military Intelligence who are usually coordinated with their counterparts in Ramallah.

There is no doubt that this attack was well planned for a long time.

The terrorists were armed with two Karl Gustav sub-machine guns, cartridges and knives. It appears they had excellent preliminary intelligence: The Sarona Market has countless entrances and exits and in fact it is impossible to check those entering or leaving the compound.

The proximity to the Defense Ministry and to the IDF Headquarters, the two most secure Israeli facilities, located in the Kirya in Tel Aviv, makes the compound a target of terrorist

attacks. With these attacks the Palestinians wish to demonstrate that they can reach these facilities and the surrounding area. Undoubtedly, there was someone who armed the terrorists, instructed them how to load the weapons, manipulate jams and change cartridges, and how to choose the seating at the restaurant from which they observed the victims prior to the attack.

The fact that the terrorists split and then opened fire on two fronts slightly apart, indicates that someone trained them on a method that will produce the maximum number of Israeli casualties. Their intention was to escape after the attack in two different directions, while sowing panic among the general public in the area.

Thirsty Tel Aviv terror suspect was arrested after cop unwittingly let him into his home

Source: <http://jta.org/2016/06/09/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/thirsty-tel-aviv-terror-suspect-was-arrested-after-unwittingly-entering-cops-home>

June 09 – One of the alleged Palestinian gunmen in Wednesday's shooting attack in Tel Aviv stopped to drink a glass of water in an off-duty Israeli cop's home as he was fleeing the scene.

According to Haaretz, the suspected gunman encountered the policeman at the entrance of



the policeman's apartment building, a short walk from the shooting scene, and asked in broken Hebrew for water.

The two gunmen are alleged to be Haled and Muhammad al-Mahmar, cousins from a West Bank town near Hebron. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Thursday that

a third man suspected of being involved in the attack has also been apprehended.

Not realizing the thirsty man was the alleged terrorist — it was not clear from reports whether it was Haled or Muhammad — the policeman allowed the man to join his wife and children inside as the policeman was rushing home to put on his uniform and leave for the Sarona Market, where the gunmen had opened fire, killing four and injuring 16.

The policeman has not been identified, but Haaretz said he is the son-in-law of former Police Commissioner Assaf Hefetz.

When he reached the terror scene, the policeman realized who his guest was, noticing he was dressed identically to his accomplice, who security forces had shot. The accomplice is being treated at Ichilov Hospital, where his victims also are

being treated.

Accompanied by other police officers, the cop rushed back to his home and arrested the alleged terrorist, who was still there — but was then wounded by a bullet mistakenly fired by another cop.



Terrorism: Military tactics are not the only option

Source: http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2016-06/uok-tmt060916.php

A University of Kent expert in International Conflict Analysis who investigates conflict resolution approaches to terrorism presents a new critique of the effectiveness of traditional counter terrorism measures, advising they are not the only option.

In a paper published by NATO's *Centre of Excellence*, Dr Harmonie Toros, a member of the University's Conflict Analysis Research Group, says countries could 'break out of the counter terrorism strait jacket' if they understood that terrorism should not be tackled as isolated forms of violence.

Currently mainstream counter terrorism incorporates military tactics and strategies, law

enforcement and intelligence work to combat or prevent terrorism. Dr Toros recommends a broader approach of communication before groups turn to violence as well as examining the potential for negotiations once violence has started.

Dr Toros' research lies at the crossroad between conflict resolution and terrorism studies. She has published works examining the transformation of conflicts marked by terrorist violence, focusing in particular on Northern Ireland and on the southern Philippine province of Mindanao where the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been fighting for independence for three decades.

Her findings suggest that:

- Conflict prevention can help avoid the turn to terrorist violence and can lead to a de-escalation of such violence or the marginalisation of violent groups among broader social movements
- Negotiation is an option that has successfully prevented conflicts in the past.
- Direct negotiations are unlikely to be adopted by NATO as they could potentially be a challenge to political, social, and economic positions of member states
- The Alliance can however ensure that its policies do not hinder the possibility of peacemaking by avoiding campaigns that vilify or demonise non-state armed groups
- A conflict resolution approach requires that NATO examines the effects of its counterterrorism strategy on the broader conflict to avoid exacerbation of underlying grievances or triggering a further escalation of violence
- NATO can ensure that its peacebuilding strategies are based on locally driven priorities and processes and do not lead to an increase in tensions due to opposition to a top-down Western-led approach
- Member states can adopt a conflict resolution approach to terrorist violence.
- Engaging in a conflict resolution approach does not guarantee an end to terrorist violence but neither will it automatically undermine the legitimacy of states or international organisations

Dr Harmonie Toros has worked as reporter and editor for major international news agencies (The Associated Press and Agence France-Presse) for eight years in Turkey, Italy, France, and the United States, before returning to academia in 2003. She is the author of Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach (Routledge, 2012), editor of Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition (Routledge, 2015), and is an editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism.

ISIS in crisis: Mummy-boy jihadis fleeing caliphate as Europe braced for terror influx

Source: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/678077/Islamic-State-foreign-fighters-fleeing-Dash-caliphate-returning-Europe>

June 08 – **More than 150 foreign-born militants have so far registered with their respective embassies in neighbouring Turkey in the hope of returning to Europe, in a sign that frustration and fear is spreading.**



ISIS continues to cede territory in Fallujah, west of the Iraqi capital Baghdad, as well as besieged towns in the north of Syria.

The group is witnessing its biggest wave of desertions since its formation and rise to prominence in 2014.



Some are contacting their embassies in Turkey directly asking for permission to return home. Others are sending desperate notes pleading for help in escaping ISIS-held towns and cities. Once an application is received, security services investigate the individual to judge whether they might pose a risk on their return. Similarly, those seeking help in person in Turkey are detained while investigators from the home nation probe the potential threat from allowing them back in.

France's national intelligence coordinator, Didier le Bret, acknowledged the problem: "Their troops are now starting to leave. There are a lot of French people who are coming back

"They've got a feeling it's not going that well."

While security experts are hopeful this may signal the beginning of the end of the caliphate in the Middle East, European terror experts warn that a fresh influx of radicalised, battle-hardened fighters arriving on European soil could spell trouble.

Britain and Germany are estimated to have sent around 760 foreign fighters to join ISIS, while France is believed to have 1,700 citizens fighting for the Islamist organisation.

Russia and Turkey have even more, with 2,400 and 2,100 fighters thought to have travelled to the region respectively.

But desertions are likely to continue as ISIS struggles to cling on to its territory.

In Fallujah, once an ISIS stronghold which is on the cusp of falling to Iraqi government

forces, the terror army is facing its biggest ever military battle.

Early signs show the fanatical Islamists are crumbling under the onslaught of Western-backed firepower.

Support for the barbaric terror regime has fallen to an all-time low as food, water and medical supplies begin to run dry.

Swathes of Fallujah have already fallen to Iraqi forces and hopes are growing ISIS will be wiped from the city in a matter of days.

ISIS is also close to capitulating along a stretch of northern Syria which has until now offered jihadi militants unfettered access to Turkey and the rest of

Europe.

The group currently controls a 50-mile stretch of land, dubbed the Manbij pocket, in northern Syria along the border with Turkey.

However, US-backed Syrian forces launched an offensive last week in a battle that is likely to last several weeks but could choke off their access to Europe.

Earlier today, rebel groups also managed to brake an ISIS siege around a town in northwestern Syria, reopening their main road to the Turkish border, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said.

The rebel groups besieged in the town of Marea had launched a counter attack against ISIS after issuing a statement saying they had united ranks.

The stranded rebels were air dropped weapons last week by the US-led coalition against Daesh, rebel sources said at the time.

The fighting had trapped thousands of civilians in the town of Marea.

Last month, Express.co.uk reported on a British man fighting with ISIS in Syria complained about the lack of home comforts.

The jihadi, named Abu Abdullah Britani, complained about the lack of fast food options including Greggs bakery and Morley's fried chicken.

Panicked ISIS leaders have taken to burying deserters alive or burning their to death with acid in a bid to stem the flow of fleeing recruits.




EDITOR'S COMMENT: So now they want to come back? DO NOT LET THEM DO THIS! Strip them from their IDs and citizenship and let them be in the countries they chose to fight for. It would be a good lesson for those are planning to do the same. It is not a game to explore and then come back home if they do not like it. It is real life. And real life have both rules and consequences.

Security industry gathers in London for SCTX

Source: <http://www.counterterrorexp.com/>

Following an increase in terrorist activity across the globe, a record number of security industry professionals gathered in London for Security & Counter Terror Expo (SCTX) 2016, to discuss how to tackle extremism and prevent future attacks.

9,517 security professionals from 109 countries travelled to London in April for the latest instalment of SCTX, which incorporated leading forensics show Forensics Europe Expo and Ambition – the event for the emergency preparedness, resilience & response (EPRR) community. The event organisers, Clarion



Events, reported that the number of visitors was up 17 percent on the 2015 event, with one in ten representing a police or counter terror force. 354 companies showcased their latest products, technologies and services, alongside a series of seminars and the eagerly anticipated World Counter Terror Congress.

David Thompson, Event Manager at Security & Counter Terror Expo, commented: "This year's event was extremely important due to the recent events in Europe. Many countries have a high threat level in place and it is vital to be implementing the best strategies to tackle extremist behaviour and prevent future attacks from happening. We developed the SCTX programme around these themes, ensuring international security professionals went away with a clear idea on how they can better protect the public and infrastructure."

The World Counter Terror Congress

One of the main attractions of this year's event was the World Counter Terror Congress, which was attended by almost 1,000 high level delegates, including diplomats and high-ranking police officers. Covering policy and strategy in a number of key areas, such as de-radicalisation and preventing attacks, the congress featured dozens of high profile speakers, including Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Jamie O'Shea (NATO), Rob Wainwright (Europol) and Scott Wilson of the National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ.

Naturally, ISIS was high on the agenda. Jorge Berto Silva, deputy head of counter-extremism for the European Commission, discussed the "justified concern" that ISIS was planning attacks using chemical or biological weapons, while highlighting strategies to stay one-step ahead of the group. Rob Wainwright, the head of Europol, also revealed a belief that the extremist group was keen to carry out more spectacular attacks in Europe.



Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Foreign Secretary and former chairman of the Intelligence & Security Committee of Parliament, said: “With the safety of millions of people on the line, security professionals have an increasingly important role to play as the threat evolves. Events such as the World Counter Terror Congress provide the ideal platform to discuss the latest advances in counter terror tactics and to debate how far is it possible for the UK and its security services to protect the country from terror.”

Bob Broadhurst, former Gold Command for the Metropolitan Police Service during the London Olympic Games, added: “Groups like ISIS are intent on causing as much disruption as possible and it’s no surprise to hear that they’re thinking about planning sophisticated future attacks. What’s clear is that nations need to be prepared to prevent these atrocities from happening. The World Counter Terror Congress provides an excellent forum for experts across the globe to present their latest research, strategies and advice to governments and police forces, as well as those tasked with protecting businesses and infrastructure from attacks.”



Protecting infrastructure and businesses

Alongside the congress, SCTX provided four additional, free-to-attend conference streams that focused on infrastructure, cyber threat, transport and advanced technologies. Located on the show floor, the sessions were at capacity throughout both days, with visitors keen to hear the latest thinking from internationally recognised experts.

The Critical National Infrastructure & Business Reliance conference featured a series of presentations examining the policy and strategy responses to today’s terror threat. Among the 20 high-ranking officials and academics who presented was Thomas Wuchte, head of anti-terrorism issues, action against terrorism Unit, OSCE. He discussed the latest initiatives of the regional organisation in the protection of critical national infrastructure in Europe.

“We rely on a sophisticated electric energy infrastructure to bring us water, light, heat, and the power to run the many tools and devices we use almost every minute of our waking lives. If it were to stop functioning, so would life as we know it,” said Wuchte. “The lesson we need to learn is that it is crucial to be aware of the vulnerability of the infrastructure we rely on. We need to invest thought, time and money into its protection. The key to ensuring that a disaster will never happen is minimising the possibility that it could.”

The evolving cyber threat

The techUK-sponsored Cyber Threat Intelligence Conference brought together those who work to prevent cyber terrorism and crime – one of the security industry’s growing concerns. Among the topics discussed was an overview of global cyber security threats



and how to mitigate against them. Key speakers included Chris Gibson, Director at CERT-UK; Richard Parris, Chairman and Chief Executive of Intercede; Professor Chris Hankin, Director at the Institute for Security Science and Technology; and representatives from the National Crime Agency's National Cyber Crime Unit.

Talal Rajab, Programme Manager for techUK's Cyber, National Security and Criminal Justice programmes, added: "What was once considered a niche area in the wider national security debate has emerged front and centre in many government's priorities. Security & Counter Terror Expo offers us the ideal platform to present the latest, invaluable thinking from some of the most prominent figures."

Preventing transport attacks

With transport links increasingly a target for terrorists, aeroplanes, mass transit buses, rail terminals, ports, vehicles and transport facilities all face the risk of future attacks. The SCTX Transport Security Live sessions focussed on discussing effective solutions to prevent and detect future atrocities. Key stakeholders from the government, police, aviation, maritime, public transport, and rail sectors attended the sessions that featured international case studies and the latest developments in protecting transport networks, hubs and passengers.

Highlighting the latest technologies

Public and private sector buyers, influencers and government delegations from across the globe attended SCTX to explore how the latest technology can be matched to their current and future needs. Advanced Technologies Live played a key role in delivering this as visitors were able to see and hear more about innovative solutions that the industry has to offer through a series of live demonstrations.

Day two of the event saw a focus on drones. With technology developments enhancing their capabilities, the devices are becoming increasingly important to the security industry. As a result a number of leading businesses, including Yuneec, UAS Flight Ops and Aeraccess, showcased their latest solutions at the show.

A platform to source the latest services, solutions and technologies

The exhibition at SCTX has established itself as an international hub where the industry elite come together to identify the security sector's most significant innovations and new product launches.

This year was no different with a wide range of product innovations on display, including the latest in high security fencing, cybersecurity modelling, simulation and training platforms, surveillance control systems and drone technology. Geoquip, CLD Fencing, NEC, Aselsan and Jacksons Fencing were among the major companies at 2016 show.

Among those showcasing new technologies was **Yuneec International**, one of the world's most influential high-tech companies in electric aviation. It showcased the new Typhoon H at SCTX, which incorporates a 720p down link and extensive new features, including capturing 4K video and 12 megapixel images, making it one of the most advanced available.

BBI Detection demonstrated its simple to use IMASS (Integrated Multiplex Assay and Sampling System) platform for Biothreat Detection and Explosive Detection at the show. It also discussed its development pipeline which includes a new Chemical Warfare Agent Detection system, which is due to launch next year.

LOCKEN, a pioneer in cable-free access control based on a unique digital smart key, showcased its new Bluetooth enabled electronic Cyberkey, Wi-Fi capabilities and the MyLocken mobile app at this year's show. Meanwhile, Abloy UK showcased its PROTEC2 CLIQ Connect system, which includes a range of compliant and secure electric locks, and LPCB-rated padlocks.

Globalstar, which provides mobile satellite voice and data services to governments, commercial users and individuals around the world, presented a number of solutions including SPOT Gen3 that provides security and peace of mind for remote and lone personnel who carry out activities in areas with unreliable or no mobile coverage. The pocket-sized GPS messenger is a rugged and affordable device that uses the company's low earth orbiting satellite network to allow remote workers to send an SOS with just the touch of a button. Emergency services instantly receive GPS location information and help is immediately dispatched to the person or people in distress.



Planning for the 2017 event

During the event, Clarion Events announced that the 2017 edition of SCTX will return to London at the later dates of 3-4 May.

David Thompson added: “The 2016 show was highly successful and we aim to build on that next year by providing a conference programme and exhibition that ensures the world’s security professionals can source innovations and identify new tactics and strategies. We look forward to working with all our key partners over the coming months to develop an event that serves the needs of all our stakeholders.”



PILOTING A COURSE FOR AVIATION SECURITY AS TERRORIST THREAT TAKES OFF

Tim Compston, Features Editor with SecurityNewsDesk considers the security situation for airports and airlines following a spate of terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East and other incidents that may be the shape of things to come.

When it comes to aviation security the past year has thrown up its fair share of challenges with airports and aircraft in the terrorists’ sights like never before. First there was the downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 over Sinai – with the loss of 224 passengers and crew on board – and, more recently, the tragic events involving IS (Islamic State) sanctioned suicide bombers at Brussels Zaventem International airport which saw two blasts in the departures hall of the main terminal. Also serving to focus airport and airline operators minds regarding an emerging safety – and security issue – was the report this month (April) of a drone hitting a British Airways Airbus aircraft coming in to land at Heathrow, although, thankfully, in this case it appears to have been more by accident rather than design.



Source: <http://www.uksecurityexpo.com/media/UKSE-Feature-1-Aviation-Security.pdf>



THE CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY IN CROWDED PLACES

Tim Compston, Features Editor at SecurityNewsDesk, finds out why the safety and security of large groups of people is high on the agenda.

Sadly the events in Paris and more recently the suicide bombing of Brussels airport and Metro have underlined the difficulties of protecting crowds in public spaces. There is certainly a recognition, Europe-wide, that more can and should be done at stadiums, airports/transport hubs, entertainment venues, shopping centres and other public spaces. So how can the authorities, the police, and governments, do to dial-up public protection at a time when multiple, marauding attacks – like Brussels, Paris, Tunisia, Mumbai, and 7/7 in London – and, lone wolf incidents such as those visited on Ottawa and Sydney, are on very much on an upward trajectory?



Source: <http://www.uksecurityexpo.com/media/UKSE-Feature-2-Crowd-Security.pdf>



Attack On Tel Aviv And Never Ending Failures

By Arie Egozi

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2016/06/fast-draw-attack-on-tel-aviv-and-never-ending-failures/>

June 09 – Had the heads of state tried to treat the problem at the same speed in which they arrive at the scene of every terror attack to appear on TV, we would have been much better off.

Mere hours after last night's terror attack in Tel Aviv, we could see prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, new appointed defense minister Avigdor Liberman and minister for public security Gilad Erdan touring the scene with sober expressions where only a short time before, people were injured and killed.

The two terrorists came from the village of Yatta in Mount. Hebron. The fence in that part, like other parts, is more like a colander with large holes than a security fence. Everyone keeps alerting – me included – but nothing is being done.

This failure takes its toll time and time again, and time and time again we see the prime minister and his ministers repeat the same empty words, such as “we have evaluated the situation and are taking the necessary steps...” etc. etc.

And again, in a laughable cycle, all the second and third rate politicians appear in the morning shows on TV, joining the choir of nonsense.

And if that isn't enough, sitting in those TV studios are all the security “formers”, offering advice to the whole world on how to prevent future terror attacks. All these advices are bull, as there is nothing easier than entering Israel's borders.

It would be interesting to see if something will change now that the current minister of defense is combatant and aggressive – according to his own statements, anyway.


It's very easy to promise that the leader of Hamas be killed in 48 hours unless he returns the Israeli soldiers' bodies. The test is in actions – in putting up a secured fence, in ending the entrance of illegal aliens, and more. But that you cannot do with mere words. That can only be done with clear instructions and actually checking that they were followed.

It's embarrassing to see our leaders so pathetic, hastening to arrive at the scene with their combat pose. Instead, it would be better if they took care of the fence, of the thousands of illegal aliens entering Israel every day, and a long line of well-known failures which take their toll every time.

The failures that made last night's terror attack are nothing new. No one handled them, it was all talk. That's the way it goes here. People are running towards the cameras with expressions of tough wild west sheriffs, but beyond that – nothing, nada. Only words.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: Universal truths in “red box” – pre-emptive vs. post-active actions as a consequence of the inherent belief that “it will not happen to us!” Beware of “experts” and “politicians”!



What if PTSD Is More Physical Than Psychological?

By Robert F. Worth

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/magazine/what-if-ptsd-is-more-physical-than-psychological.html?_r=0

June 10 – In early 2012, a neuropathologist named Daniel Perl was examining a slide of human brain tissue when he saw something odd and unfamiliar in the wormlike squiggles and folds. It looked like brown dust; a distinctive pattern of tiny scars. Perl was intrigued. At 69, he had examined 20,000 brains over a four-decade career,



focusing mostly on Alzheimer's and other degenerative disorders. He had peered through his microscope at countless malformed proteins and twisted axons. He knew as much about the biology of brain disease as just about anyone on earth. But he had never seen anything like this.

The brain under Perl's microscope belonged to an American soldier who had been five feet away when a suicide bomber detonated his belt of explosives in 2009. The soldier survived the blast, thanks to his body armor, but died two years later of an apparent drug overdose after suffering symptoms that have become the hallmark of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: memory loss, cognitive problems, inability to sleep and profound, often suicidal depression. Nearly 350,000 service members have been given a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury over the past 15 years, many of them from blast exposure. The real number is likely to be much higher, because so many who have enlisted are too proud to report a wound that remains invisible.

For years, many scientists have assumed that explosive blasts affect the brain in much the same way as concussions from football or car accidents. Perl himself was a leading researcher on chronic traumatic encephalopathy, or C.T.E., which has caused dementia in N.F.L. players. Several veterans who died after suffering blast wounds have in fact developed C.T.E. But those veterans had other, nonblast injuries too. No one had done a systematic post-mortem study of blast-injured troops. That was exactly what the Pentagon asked Perl to do in 2010, offering him access to the brains they had gathered for research. It was a rare opportunity, and Perl left his post as director of neuropathology at the medical school at Mount Sinai to come to Washington.

Perl and his lab colleagues recognized that the injury that they were looking at was nothing like concussion. The hallmark of C.T.E. is an abnormal protein called tau, which builds up, usually over years, throughout the cerebral cortex but especially in the temporal lobes, visible across the stained tissue like brown mold. What they found in these traumatic-brain-injury cases was totally different: a dustlike scarring, often at the border between gray matter (where synapses reside) and the white matter that interconnects it. Over the following months, Perl and his team examined several more brains of service members who died well after their blast exposure, including a highly decorated Special Operations Forces soldier who committed suicide. All of them had the same pattern of scarring in the same places, which appeared to correspond to the brain's centers for sleep, cognition and other classic brain-injury trouble spots.

Then came an even more surprising discovery. They examined the brains of two veterans who died just days after their blast exposure and found embryonic versions of the same injury, in the same areas, and the development of the injuries seemed to match the time elapsed since the blast event. Perl and his team then compared the damaged brains with those of people who suffered ordinary concussions and others who had drug addictions (which can also cause visible brain changes) and a final group with no injuries at all. No one in these post-mortem control groups had the brown-dust pattern.

Perl's findings, [published in the scientific journal *The Lancet Neurology*](#), may represent the key to a medical mystery first glimpsed a century ago in the trenches of World War I. It was first known as shell shock, then combat fatigue and finally PTSD, and in each case, it was almost universally understood as a psychic rather than a physical affliction. Only in the past decade or so did an elite group of neurologists, physicists and senior officers begin pushing back at a military leadership that had long told recruits with these wounds to "deal with it," fed them pills and sent them back into battle.

If Perl's discovery is confirmed by other scientists — and if one of blast's short-term signatures is indeed a pattern of scarring in the brain — then the implications for the military and for society at large could be vast. Much of what has passed for emotional trauma may be reinterpreted, and many veterans may step forward to demand recognition of an injury that cannot be definitively diagnosed until after death. There will be calls for more research, for drug trials, for better helmets and for expanded veteran care. But these palliatives are unlikely to erase the crude message that lurks, unavoidable, behind Perl's discovery: Modern warfare destroys your brain.

The physics behind blast forces was almost unknown until the modern era, and it remains so mysterious and terrifying that scientists sometimes invoke the word "magic" when talking about it. A blast begins simply: A detonator turns a lump of solid matter into a deadly fireball. Within that moment, three distinct things happen. The first is the blast wave, a wall of static pressure traveling outward in all directions faster than the speed of sound. Next, a blast wind fills the void and carries with it any objects it encounters. This is the most



manifestly destructive part of the blast, capable of hurling cars, people and shrapnel against buildings and roadsides. The remaining effects include fire and toxic gases, which can sear, poison and asphyxiate anyone within range.

The effects of all of this on the human body are myriad and more complicated than the blast itself. People who have been exposed to blasts at close range usually describe it as an overpowering, full-body experience unlike anything they have ever known. Many soldiers do not recall the moment of impact: it gets lost in the flash of light, the deafening sound or unconsciousness. Those who do remember it often speak of a simultaneous punching and squeezing effect, a feeling at once generalized and intensely violent, as if someone had put a board against your body and then struck it



with dozens of hammers. From a distance, a blast makes a distinctive thump, the sound of air pressure clapping outward. When I lived in Baghdad, reporting for this newspaper, I would sometimes be awakened by that sound early in the morning. I would sit up in bed, instantly alert, with a surreal and awful realization: Someone who was just as healthy as me 30 seconds ago has been shredded to pieces.

[Dr. Daniel Perl holds a slide with brain tissue \(top\) that shows signs of a blast injury. The other slide shows a healthy brain. Credit Greg Kahn for The New York Times](#)

Trinitrotoluene, or TNT, was first used in artillery shells by the German Army in 1902. Soon after the First World War started in 1914, a rain of these devices was falling on the hapless men on each side of the front. It was a level of violence and horror far beyond the cavalry charges of earlier wars. Very quickly, soldiers began emerging with bizarre symptoms; they shuddered and gibbered or became unable to speak at all. Many observers were struck by the apparent capacity of these blasts to kill and maim without leaving any visible trace. The British journalist Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett famously described the sight of seven Turks at Gallipoli in 1915, sitting together with their rifles across their knees: “One man has his arm across the neck of his friend and a smile on his face as if they had been cracking a joke when death overwhelmed them. All now have the appearance of being merely asleep; for of the several I can only see one who shows any outward injury.”

For those who survived a blast and suffered the mysterious symptoms, soldiers quickly coined their own phrase: shell shock. One period lyric went like this:

Perhaps you're broke and paralyzed

Perhaps your memory goes

But it's only just called shell shock

For you've nothing there that shows.

One British doctor, Frederick Mott, believed the shock was caused by a physical wound and proposed dissecting the brains of men who suffered from it. He even had some prescient hunches about the mechanism of blast's effects: the compression wave, the concussion and the toxic gases. In a paper published in *The Lancet* in February 1916, he posited a “physical or chemical change and a break in the links of the chain of neurons which subserve a particular function.” Mott might not have seen anything abnormal in the soldiers' brains, even if he had examined them under a microscope; neuropathology was still in its infancy. But his prophetic intuitions made him something of a hero to Perl.

Mott's views were soon eclipsed by those of other doctors who saw shell shock more as a matter of emotional trauma. This was partly a function of the intellectual climate; Freud and



other early psychologists had recently begun sketching provocative new ideas about how the mind responds to stress. Soldiers suffering from shell shock were often described as possessing “a neuropathic tendency or inheritance” or even a lack of manly vigor and patriotic spirit. Many shell-shock victims were derided as shirkers; some were even sentenced to death by firing squad after fleeing the field in a state of mental confusion.

This consensus held sway for decades, even as the terminology shifted, settling in 1980 on “post-traumatic stress disorder,” a coinage tailored to the unique social and emotional strain of returning veterans of the war in Vietnam. No one doubted that blasts had powerful and mysterious effects on the body, and starting in 1951, the U.S. government established the Blast Overpressure Program to observe the effects of large explosions, including atomic bombs, on living tissue. One of my uncles recalls standing in the Nevada desert as an Army private in 1955, taking photographs of a nuclear blast amid a weird landscape of test objects: cars, houses and mannequins in Chinese and Soviet military uniforms. At the time, scientists believed blasts would mainly affect air pockets in the body like the lungs, the digestive system and the ears. Few asked what it would mean for the body’s most complex and vulnerable organ.

Only after yet another European war broke out did scientists begin looking again at blast’s effects on the brain. When the Balkans collapsed into fratricidal violence in the early 1990s, Ibolja Cernak, a small, tenacious woman who grew up in the countryside of what is now Serbia, was working as a doctor and researcher at a military hospital in Belgrade. She soon began seeing large numbers of soldiers with blast trauma, usually from mortars and artillery fire, a common feature of that war. As in World War I, the men often suffered from striking mental impairments but few visible wounds. Cernak, whose colleagues call her Ibi, has an appealing blend of briskness and warmth, along with a clinician’s conviction that you must listen to your patients. It is easy to imagine her running around the battlefields of Bosnia and Serbia, collecting blood samples from soldiers. That is what she did for several years, at no small risk to her life, for a study cataloging the neurological effects of blast on 1,300 recruits. “The blast covers the entire body,” she told me. “It has a squeezing effect. Ask soldiers what they felt: The first thing they say is that their ears were popped out, they were gasping for air, like some huge fist is squeezing them. The entire body is involved in that interaction.”

Cernak became convinced that blast ripples through the body like rings on a pond’s surface. Its speed changes when it encounters materials of different density, like air pockets or the border between the brain’s gray and white matter, and can inflict greater damage in those places. As it happens, physicists would later theorize some very similar models for how blast damages the brain. Several possibilities have now been explored, including surges of blood upward from the chest; shearing loads on brain tissue; and the brain bouncing back and forth inside the skull, as happens with concussion. Charles Needham, a renowned authority on blast physics, told me post-mortems on blast injuries have lent some support to all of those theories, and the truth may be that several are at play simultaneously.

A decade after her initial battlefield surveys in the Balkans, Cernak took a position at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where she did animal research that bolstered her conviction about blast’s full-body effects. She found that even if an animal’s head is protected during a blast, the brain can sustain damage, because the blast wave transfers through the body via blood and tissue. Cernak also came to believe that blast injuries to the brain were cumulative and that even small explosions with no discernible effects could, if repeated, produce terrible and irreversible damage. Much of this would later be confirmed by other scientists.

Even Cernak’s limited conclusions about blast injuries were heresy to much of the military-medical establishment at the time. She presented some of her findings at a conference in Vienna in the late 1990s, and before she was even finished, “an older gentleman stood up, a military doctor from the U.S.A.,” she recalled. “He said: ‘Stop with this nonsense. If you give soldiers fluid replacement, they’ll do fine after 24 hours, so it’s not this.’ ... I was taken aback. It’s been an uphill battle.”

It was not until 2001, when America embarked on what became an era of constant warfare, that doctors began to move slowly toward Cernak’s way of thinking. A new generation of more powerful roadside bombs — improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.s, in military parlance — became a signature of the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, yielding an epidemic of blast injury. Medics soon noticed an oddity of blast: It reflects off hard surfaces and multiplies, so that people who appear to be protected inside an enclosed space like a Humvee often



suffer much worse brain injuries than those outside. Military and civilian researchers began focusing their work on the brain rather than just the body. But it was still very difficult to isolate blast from all the other physical and mental effects of being exposed to an explosion in a combat zone.

Finally, finally, medical science is catching up to the effects of modern combat on the soldiers who fight in it. Perhaps we should also...

A landmark advance came in 2007, when an engineering firm called Applied Research Associates received a call from the SWAT team of the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office in Colorado. The officers were worried about possible neurological effects from breaching, the practice of blowing open doors with small explosive charges. Almost every major city in the United States has breacher teams, as do militaries in war zones. The Applied Research team quickly recognized that monitoring breachers would allow them to observe blast in its pure form, because the charges are too small to knock soldiers over or give them concussions; they are subject to the blast wave only. Plus, the researchers could bypass any ethical concerns about running tests on human subjects, because the breachers were doing it anyway.

The Applied Research team quickly designed and led a study on military breachers, rigging its own blast gauges and subjecting the recruits and trainers to neuropsychological tests at the beginning and end of a two-week breaching course. The resulting report, circulated in 2008, found a small but distinct decline in performance among the instructors, who are exposed to far more blasts than students. It was only a pilot study, but one author, Leanne Young, told me it added to "converging evidence that there is a cumulative effect with chronic exposure to blast," even at relatively low levels.

The military was still reluctant to take blast seriously or even to concede that the symptoms it caused were a matter of physical harm. As late as 2008, researchers at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research published a paper suggesting that the symptoms of traumatic brain injury could be caused in large part by PTSD and brushing off "theoretical concern" about neurological effects of the blast wave. By that time, American doctors who had gained Cernak's unusual blend of medical expertise and battle experience were starting to draw their own conclusions.

One of the first to challenge the military from within was a 44-year-old Army lieutenant colonel named Christian Macedonia. In March 2008, Macedonia was in Arlington, Va., listening to a group of scientists and government bureaucrats talk about roadside bombs. The talk was dry and technical, and finally Macedonia, a square-jawed man with an air of urgent candor, could no longer contain himself. He lashed out against the military's inaction on brain injury, using what he recalls as "some pretty salty language" to make his point. "I see no movement, and I'm kind of sick of it," he concluded. As the meeting broke up, Macedonia expected other participants to politely avoid him. Instead, a younger aide approached, gave him a business card and urged him to get in touch with Adm. Michael Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Macedonia contacted Mullen and repeated his pitch. To his surprise, Mullen hired him.

At the time, "you had an entrenched military-medical community that did not want to go down that road," Macedonia told me. "They didn't want to give any credence to the idea that these symptoms were anything other than emotional difficulty." Macedonia, an obstetrician as well as a soldier, knew otherwise. He did a tour in Anbar province in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 with soldiers who were being targeted frequently by mortars and roadside bombs. As an officer and doctor, he felt responsible for younger soldiers and their injuries. "Kids exposed to explosions were asking for help, and I was mouthing the party line: 'You'll be O.K.' I was part of the machine that didn't help. That's what haunts me."

Like Macedonia, some senior officers, including Gen. Peter Chiarelli of the Army and Gen. James Amos of the Marines, were also frustrated. They had seen too many soldiers discharged for disciplinary issues that were related to brain injury. Mullen hired several other experts to join Macedonia, asking them to monitor and improve the treatment of brain injury across the entire military. They called it the "Gray Team" — partly a play on gray matter and partly because the men were mostly in their 40s and going gray. They were an extraordinary group: mostly military officers, all of them had advanced degrees in medicine or science. And almost all of them had seen combat.

One of them was Jim Hancock, an emergency physician and Navy captain whose main qualification, he told me, was that he had suffered a traumatic brain injury himself, in southern Afghanistan. He also suffered concussions twice as a college athlete, so he had a basis for comparison. "The theory at the time was, it was a concussive event," Hancock



told me. “I said, ‘B.S.’ I’ve been concussed. I’ve never had anything like blast.” Like other members of the team, Hancock had noticed that soldiers exposed to blasts often had memory and focus problems that did not go away and that seemed distinct from battlefield trauma. If the blasts were repeated, the lapses sometimes devolved into career-ending mental and behavioral struggles. The Gray Team shared a gut-level belief that a blast wave’s effects on the body were far more extreme, and more complex, than the concussion model could account for. But their main task was to push the military to take brain injury more seriously, whatever its causes.

In early 2009, the Gray Team’s first five members traveled to military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, meeting with trauma surgeons and other doctors to see how they handled brain injury. They found a wildly inconsistent picture. There were three extraordinary doctors who understood brain trauma and how to handle it. But “our fear was, those three rotate out, and it disappears,” said Dr. Geoffrey Ling, another member of the Gray Team.



Brandon Matthews, 33, is a former Army Ranger exposed to blasts in Iraq and elsewhere who now has cognitive problems. The 24 names tattooed on his back include war buddies who died in action or who killed themselves after coming home. Credit Nick Oza for The New York Times

When they got home, the team identified the most valuable practices and, along with Chiarelli and Amos, had them codified. Any soldier who was within 50 meters of a blast or who was in a vehicle behind or ahead of one struck by a bomb would have to be screened for brain injury. Anyone who suffered a concussion would have to be pulled out of combat. The Gray Team used a checklist to help identify concussed soldiers, although they were soon forced to write six different versions of it, because so many Marines memorized the correct answers to avoid being pulled out of combat. They also found a civilian contractor to build blast gauges, like the ones used in the breacher study. Every recruit or officer in a combat zone now wears three of these tiny devices, which weigh 20 grams each. The gauges are designed to turn red if they register a force of more than 12 pounds per square inch, the lower limit indicating a possible concussion or brain injury. The soldiers can no longer brush it off: If your sensor is red, you must be screened for brain injury.

The military has taken the new rules seriously. Less than a year after its first tour, the Gray Team went out to the field again and found that 90 percent of the bases they visited were in compliance. Still, the larger question of blast’s residue inside the skull remained a mystery.



Brandon Matthews is built like a tank, with huge humps of muscle outlining his back and shoulders. Ugly scars run down his biceps and forearms, cutting deep creases into the muscle. Others line his legs and sides, the legacy of an 11-year career as an Army Ranger. Matthews, registered with the military as Brandon Matthew Sipp, was exposed to so many blasts, in Iraq and other places, that he cannot count them all. The worst was a suicide bombing that sent him flying down a corridor and left him in a coma. He was hospitalized for months, and his military career was over. But his struggles with brain injury were only starting.

“I have moments when I forget everything: who I am, where I am, what I’m doing,” he told me. “It happens almost every day,” sometimes while he is driving. Decisions, once easy, have become impossible. He turns the kitchen burner on and then walks out, returning to discover a fire raging.

Matthews has 24 names tattooed down the center of his back. Eighteen are former war buddies who were killed in action. The more painful losses, in a sense, are five others: friends who have killed themselves since returning from the war. One of them, another Special Operations veteran with an undiagnosed traumatic brain injury, threatened his wife and children with a gun six months ago, Matthews told me, then shot himself in the head. Matthews spoke at the funeral. Undiagnosed blast injuries are common among the Special Operations soldiers, he said, because members of this military elite prize their toughness and do not want to risk losing their careers. “Here’s the harsh reality,” another veteran told me. “In the Special Forces especially, if I fail my physical, I’m done. That’s all there is to it. My cool-guy stuff is done.” So they keep their heads down, say nothing and suffer more blasts. Until one day, like Brandon Matthews, they are too damaged to fight.

I met Matthews at a hotel in Scottsdale, Ariz., where he now lives, and within an hour he had consumed several vodka-and-waters. He was warm and talkative, but every now and then he got a lost, plaintive look in his green eyes; I had the impression of a man who is clinging to a precipice. Before I could turn in, he insisted on steering me to a series of nightclubs, where he drank round after round and regaled strangers with his war stories. I asked him about friends, and he told me that almost all of them were dead. He lives on his military pension, and at 33, seems to have given up on holding down a job.

All this is fairly typical of service members and veterans who have suffered serious or repeated blast injuries, I was told by Susan Ullman, who runs an outreach network called Warrior2Warrior. (Ullman’s own husband, a Green Beret who suffered a traumatic brain injury, killed himself in 2013.) When I asked Matthews about other veterans and suicide, he grimaced and unleashed a string of obscenities about the cowardice of taking your own life. It felt cruel, and a little unnecessary, to ask if he had been tempted that way himself. (He has his own name tattooed on his back after those of friends who have killed themselves.)

Even if the underlying wounds of men like Matthews cannot be treated, the symptoms of brain injury, like those of trauma, can often be alleviated. The distinction between organic and emotional injury can be very blurry; trauma changes neuronal patterns, and therapy can alter a brain that has been physically damaged. “Everything we know suggests that people with structural lesion will also respond to pharmacological and psychological treatment,” said David Brody, a neurologist who has worked extensively with the military. Finding the right treatment is the key. Many veterans told me that they had gone to the V.A. and been handed pills indiscriminately. A number of mostly untested treatments have gained traction in the past few years, from hyperbaric chambers to ergonomic mouth guards, and some veterans swear by them.

For all his mental confusion, Matthews told me that he thinks he can now distinguish between the emotional wounds he suffered — the survivor’s guilt, the bad dreams and night terrors — and the more concrete cognitive problems that he traces to his blast exposure. A number of Special Operations soldiers said the same thing. They also said it makes a big difference to be told they have a physical wound rather than a mental one, even if it is incurable. Some brain injuries can now be seen on M.R.I.-type brain scans of living people, though precise diagnoses remain elusive. Matthews told me he would find some solace in simply being able to see what was going on inside his head.

Daniel Perl is continuing to examine the brains of blast-injured soldiers. After five years of working with the military, he feels sure, he told me, that many blast injuries have not been identified. “We could be talking many thousands,” he said. “And what scares me is that what we’re seeing now might just be the first round. If they survive the initial injuries, many of them may develop C.T.E. years or decades later.”



Perl takes some solace from the past. He has read a great deal about the men who suffered from shell shock during World War I and the doctors who struggled to treat them. He mentioned a monument in central England called “Shot at Dawn,” dedicated to British and Commonwealth soldiers who were executed by a firing squad after being convicted of cowardice or desertion. It is a stone figure of a blindfolded man in a military storm coat, his hands bound behind him. At his back is a field of thin stakes, each of them bearing a name, rank, age and date of execution. Some of these men, Perl believes, probably had traumatic brain injuries from blasts and should not have been held responsible for their actions. He has begun looking into the possibility of obtaining brain samples of shellshocked soldiers from that war. He hopes to examine them under the microscope, and perhaps, a century later, grant them and their descendants the diagnoses they deserve.

Robert F. Worth is a contributing writer for the magazine and the author of “A Rage for Order,” about the Arab Spring uprisings. He last wrote about [Turkey’s hidden war against the Kurds](#).

Terrorism and the Fire Service

By Derek DeLuca

Source: http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/special-terrorism-and-the-fire-service/a66835849329f6e8_98ed9f4ff0db9d46.html



June 06 – Over the past decade, the fire service has undergone significant changes. Arguably, those changes are the result of the domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, OK in 1995. Although the typical call a firefighter responds to is not an act of terrorism, the fire service is now an integral partner in the War on Terror.

In an exclusive interview, Chief Keith Bryant of the Oklahoma City Fire Department said the threat of terrorism has changed the role of the firefighter.

“Whereas the fire service once focused solely on response to fire, emergency medical, hazardous materials and rescue incidents, the Firefighter now has to have an increased awareness of potential terrorist threats, the ability to recognize situations and circumstances as possible terrorist actions, and is increasingly involved in identifying potential targets in order to take preventive measures,” Bryant explained.

Since the fire service has a role in the fight against terrorism, training and preparedness must become integral to fire departments around the nation. Fire departments are now involved in identifying threats aimed at a range of targets, including critical infrastructure, such as bridges and tunnels, and public events, such as concerts, fairs, and sporting events. The fire service needs its training to evolve

around incidents that may occur at those targets and in those venues.

Chief Bryant further explained that although there was no specific training in terrorism response before the Oklahoma City bombing, the city had experienced frequent natural disasters, including tornados, floods, wildfires, etc., and therefore was “well trained and experienced in responding to large scale, high casualty events.”

Fire departments across the United States, including Oklahoma City, have adapted their training from basic search and rescue operations to now include training in the use of specialized equipment. Firefighters are warned about the need to exercise additional caution, especially as it relates to secondary explosive devices.

Fire academies around the country, including the Monmouth County Fire Academy in New Jersey, which I attended, teach terrorism response courses in order to raise awareness of the heightened threats we face. This training includes responding to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive attacks, as well as secondary explosive devices, which are typically aimed at killing and injuring firefighters, as well as police officers, paramedics, and other first responders.

In a 2011 interview with *FireRescue Magazine*, Chief of



Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness for the FDNY Joseph Pfeifer commented, “We sent all people through awareness training and what to do on particular events. Fortunately, we got some grant money to do that—it cost about \$1 million an hour to train the entire department, but we wanted people to be fully aware of this new threat environment.”

Pfeifer added, “Since then, we’ve greatly enhanced the level of training, so [for example] we recently trained on a bus bomb incident where firefighters and EMTs had to determine, what would you do? How do you remove victims quickly? We’ve learned new techniques for moving patients, such as with a Sked. So we’ve developed new ideas on how to deal with this type of an event.”

Chief Bryant also sees training between the fire service and other agencies at all levels of government as “absolutely crucial.” He explained, “Our experience with natural and manmade disasters has taught us you need expertise, personnel and resources outside of our Department to efficiently manage these incidents.”

To that point, the fire service in New Jersey works in concert with the Regional Operations and Intelligence Center in order to better understand current threats. The reports we receive from them include everything from weather risks to emergency response to information regarding threats against critical infrastructure and first responders. Those reports allow us to be better prepared to respond to a multitude of events.

On December 7, 2015, 5 days after the San Bernardino terrorist attack, Marlboro, NJ experienced a terrorism scare. A passenger on a New Jersey Transit bus called police to report a suspicious man who was holding a

bag with a clock on the front of it. The bus was evacuated and the man was questioned. Luckily, it was false alarm, but the response to the incident was massive.

Aside from the state, county and local police response, all four fire companies in Marlboro, including my own, responded to the scene and stood ready to suppress any potential explosion and treat victims. Fortunately, it did not come to that, but it was a relief to see how our fire departments, being all-volunteer, could respond quickly to a call out of our normal scope.

Going forward, Chief Bryant has concerns regarding how the fire service will be able to remain a critical component of the homeland security stakeholder community. In a word, that concern is “money.”

“I’m very concerned about the decreasing funding at the federal and state level in terms of that resulting in less training and equipment available in a time of heightened threats,” said Bryant. “The biggest need in my mind will always be in planning and preparedness which certainly includes training. All of the components of response to incidents of terrorism have to be in place to maintain the highest state of readiness possible.”

As in all matters of government, funding will continue to remain an issue, and will become more pronounced as the fight against extremism escalates.

If the Oklahoma City bombing began the process of integrating terrorism response to the functions of the fire service, the attacks of September 11, 2001 cemented that process. However, since 9/11, the fire service has quickly adapted to its new role as an integral partner in the War on Terror, which still rages, fiercer than ever.

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The security effectiveness of TSA’s expedited screening can be improved: GAO

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160610-the-security-effectiveness-of-tsa-s-expedited-screening-can-be-improved-gao>

June 10 – In 2015, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screened or oversaw the

screening of more than 708 million passengers at more than



450 U.S. airports. In carrying out the screening process, TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of civil aviation while also managing the efficient flow of passengers. TSA employs screening personnel, called TSOs, to carry out passenger and baggage screening operations. Each year, TSA tests TSO performance as part of its efforts to monitor the effectiveness of aviation security screening. In 2011, TSA began providing expedited screening procedures to selected passengers, intended to strengthen security and improve the passenger experience by shortening lines and wait times.

GAO says that two recent reports address the extent to which TSA (1) has taken steps to improve the security effectiveness of expedited screening, and (2) uses TSO performance testing data to enhance TSO performance in screening for prohibited items.

The reports were issued in May 2016 and December 2014, accompanied by selected updates. Among other things, GAO analyzed TSA documentation on expedited screening and TSO testing data.

GAO notes that the TSA has taken steps intended to improve the security effectiveness of expedited passenger screening since GAO reported on it in December 2014. **These steps include**

- Adjusting the TSA Pre✓® Risk Assessment program algorithm used to assign passengers scores and identify low risk passengers;
- Limiting the use of Managed Inclusion to airports that employ canine teams to detect explosives; and,
- Developing plans to test the security effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as an overall system—ensuring that the testing adheres to established design practices.

According to a TSA memorandum dated November 2015, TSA made changes to TSA Pre✓® Risk Assessment program and Managed Inclusion process as a result of the findings and recommendations included in three prior DHS Office of Inspector General audit reports. According to TSA, these changes were necessary to ensure security and resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the number of individuals receiving expedited screening. Previously, in December 2014, GAO found that

TSA had not tested the overall effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process, and recommended that TSA ensure that its planned testing adhere to established evaluation design practices to yield reliable test results. DHS has said it concurred with the recommendation and plans to begin testing the effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as a system during fiscal year 2016.

GAO notes that TSA uses data on Transportation Security Officer (TSO) performance obtained from its various testing programs to ensure that individual TSOs are (1) demonstrating through annual proficiency reviews and resulting recertification that they are qualified to continue conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, and (2) demonstrating proficiency during live screening operations in adhering to screening procedures.

However, in a report containing sensitive security information completed in May 2016, GAO found that TSA's ability fully to evaluate TSO performance in screening passengers and baggage for prohibited items is constrained by incomplete and unreliable testing data and a lack of data analysis. For example, some airports did not report testing data on TSOs' ability to identify prohibited items over fiscal years 2009 through 2014 as required by TSA policy. TSA officials also stated they do not systematically analyze test results to determine any national trends for informing future TSO training. In addition, TSA determined that pass rate data for one of its covert testing programs that uses role players at airports to assess TSO performance was unreliable. Specifically, testing by an independent contractor indicated that TSA's covert testing data likely overstated TSO performance. TSA said it is taking action to determine the root cause of the variance in the testing results and is implementing corrective actions.

Further, GAO found that TSA does not track the implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations made based on the covert testing results. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations made in its May 2016 report and is planning actions to address them.

In its May 2016 report, GAO recommended that TSA ensure that (1) airports submit complete TSO performance data, (2) the data are analyzed nationally, and



(3) implementation of covert testing recommendations are tracked. DHS says it agrees with the recommendations, and is

taking actions to address the recommendations.

— *Read more in [Aviation Security: TSA Is Taking Steps to Improve Expedited Screening Effectiveness, but Improvements in Screener Oversight Are Needed](#), GAO-16-707T (7 June 2016)*



Hezbollah moving 'tons of cocaine' in Latin America, Europe to finance terror operations

Source: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/8/hezbollah-moving-tons-of-cocaine-in-latin-america/>

June 11 – **Hezbollah's terrorism finance operations are thriving across Latin America months after the Drug Enforcement Administration linked the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group to drug cartels in the region,** U.S. lawmakers were told Wednesday.

Former DEA operations chief Michael Braun said **Hezbollah is "moving [multiple] tons of cocaine" from South America to Europe and has developed "the most sophisticated money laundering scheme or schemes that we have ever witnessed."**

The agency announced in February that it had arrested several Hezbollah operatives accused of working with a major Colombian drug cartel to traffic drugs to Europe and launder money through Lebanon. Those arrests come against a backdrop of rising fears in Washington about smuggling connections between Middle East terrorist groups and the Western Hemisphere.

Hezbollah has "metastasized into a hydra with international connections that the likes of [the Islamic State] and groups like al Qaeda could only hope to have," Mr. Braun told the House Financial Services Committee.

Adding to concerns about security threats from Central and South America, intelligence reports have also tracked how smugglers managed to sneak illegal immigrants from the Middle Eastern and South Asia straight to the doorstep of the U.S. — including helping one Afghan who U.S. authorities say was part of an attack plot in North America.

Immigration officials identified at least a dozen Middle Eastern men smuggled into the Western Hemisphere **by a Brazilian-based network that connected them with Mexicans who guided them to the U.S. border,** according to internal government documents

reviewed this month by The Washington Times.

Those smuggled included Palestinians, Pakistanis and the Afghan man who Homeland Security officials said had family ties to the Taliban and was "involved in a plot to conduct an attack in the U.S. and/or Canada."

Concerns about Hezbollah's activities in Latin America have surged the DEA's announcement in February that top operatives from the group's so-called Business Affairs Component, or BAC, "have established business relationships" with South American drug cartels such as the Colombia-based Oficina de Envigado, a crime syndicate "responsible for supplying large quantities of cocaine to the European and United States drug markets."

The DEA said several of the BAC's Europe-based operatives had been arrested on charges of trafficking drugs and laundering money from South America to purchase weapons and finance the group's military activities in Syria. The agency described an intricate network of money couriers who collect and transport millions of euros in drug proceeds from Europe to the Middle East.

"The currency is then paid in Colombia to drug traffickers," it said, adding that **"a large portion of the drug proceeds was found to transit through Lebanon,** and a significant percentage of these proceeds are benefiting terrorist organizations, namely Hezbollah."

The DEA said seven countries, including France, Germany, Italy and Belgium, were involved in an ongoing investigation. But few details were provided about how many suspects had been apprehended or where they are being held.



Officials said **the most significant arrest** was of Mohamad Nouredine, whom the DEA accused of being a Lebanese money launderer for Hezbollah. A week prior to the announcement, the Treasury Department had imposed sanctions freezing any U.S. accounts tied to Mr. Nouredine as well as to Hamdi Zaher El Dine, another suspected money launderer.

Decades of activity

U.S. officials have long been wary of Hezbollah, a Shiite Islamic group.

While it has a mainstream political arm in Lebanon, officials have linked the group to terrorist attacks in various corners of the world over the past 25 years — the vast majority targeting Israel. **The State Department listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in the late 1990s** and has characterized Iran as a leading state sponsor of terrorism largely on grounds that it supplies the group with weapons.

But the full scope of Hezbollah's operations has long been a subject of debate in Washington. The DEA's recent claims followed years of speculation about Iranian activities in Latin America.

Responding to pressure from Republican lawmakers, the State Department conducted a formal probe into the matter in 2013 and issued a report claiming that Iran was not supporting any active terrorist cells in the region.

While the report said the number of Iranian officials operating in Latin America had increased, the report concluded Tehran had far less influence in Latin America than critics claimed.

But former officials like Mr. Braun, who retired as DEA chief of operations in 2008, **say Hezbollah is extremely active in the region.**

President Obama signed the "Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act" last year, authorizing a range of actions,

including sanctions, to block Hezbollah's ability to fund itself.

Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow on Iran and illicit finance with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told lawmakers at Wednesday's hearing that Congress and the administration should use the law to "aggressively focus" on Hezbollah's presence in Latin America.

Brazilian connection

Mr. Ottolenghi pointed to the group's "vast network of support," particularly in Brazil, which is home to some 7 million people of Lebanese descent, including an estimated 1 million Shiite Muslims.

"Hezbollah generates loyalty among the local Shia communities by managing their religious and educational structures," Mr. Ottolenghi told the hearing. "It then leverages loyalty to solicit funds and use business connections to its own advantage, including, critically, to facilitate its interactions with organized crime."

He cited a 2014 report by the Brazilian newspaper O Globo that outlined **a connection between Hezbollah and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, a Sao Paulo-based prison gang**, which is widely regarded



to be among the country's biggest exporters of cocaine.

"Drug cartels need middlemen, as well as commodity and service providers, for the supply line and delivery to cartels in Colombia, Venezuela and Central America," Mr. Ottolenghi said. "They need assistance facilitating transit to West Africa before drugs cross the Sahara on their way to Western Europe and enabling the producers, refiners and cartels to launder their revenues and



acquire the accessories for the trade in the process.”

Gunman kills 49, injures 53 in an Orlando, Florida club

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160613-gunman-kills-49-injures-53-in-an-orlando-florida-club-updated>

June 13 – Omar Mir Seddique Mateen, a 29-year American citizen whose parents are from Afghanistan, entered a night club in Orlando, Florida, at about 2:00 a.m., armed with an AR-15 assault-rifle and a hand gun, and opened fire. He killed 49 people and injured 53 – the deadliest mass shooting in the history of the United States – before being killed by police officers who stormed the club.



The shooting occurred at Pulse, a dance club catering to gay and lesbian patrons.

Law enforcement authorities said that Mateen called 911 from inside to declare his allegiance to ISIS.



The police said that after emptying a few magazines shooting into the crowds, the gunman took hostages for about three hours, trying to negotiate with then police.

The three-hour standoff ended around 5 a.m., when law enforcement officers led by a SWAT team stormed the club, using an armored vehicle and explosives designed to disorient and distract. More than a dozen police

officers and sheriff's deputies engaged in a shootout with Mateen, killing him.

There were thirty people still inside the club when the police stormed it.



Until the shooting early Sunday, the most lethal mass shooting in the United States was the 2007 Virginia Tech rampage, in which 32 people were killed and 30 injured.

Orlando Police Chief John Mina said in a press conference that the death toll could have been even greater, saying that a SWAT team “rescued at least 30 possible victims and brought them to safety.” Police said it was not yet clear if all of the people killed or injured were shot during the initial round of gunfire at 2 a.m., or during the shootout with police three hours later.



“It’s absolutely terrible,” Mina said during a news briefing. “Fifty victims in one location, one shooting, is absolutely one of the worst tragedies we’ve seen.”

Ronald Hopper, an assistant agent in charge of the FBI’s Tampa Division, suggested that the killer was an Islamist radical, and law enforcement officials said they were investigating the massacre as a terrorist attack. The FBI set up a hotline for tips.

“We do have suggestions that that individual may have leanings towards that, that particular ideology,” Agent

Hopper said at a news conference. “But right now we can’t say definitively, so we’re still running everything around.”

The *New York Times* reports that court records show that Mr. Mateen was born in New York, and had been married and divorced.

In a Sunday interview, Mateen’s ex-wife said that he was abusive, beating her repeatedly during their marriage. She said that during their brief marriage, Mateen, who was Muslim, was not very religious and gave no indications that he was devoted to radical Islam.

Mateen was from Fort Pierce, which is also where Moner Mohammad Abusalha, the first American to carry out a suicide attack in Syria, had lived in Florida.

Hours after the attack, ISIS claimed responsibility in a statement released over an encrypted phone app used by the group. It stated that the attack “was carried out by an Islamic State fighter,” according to a transcript provided by the SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks jihadist propaganda.

Officials cautioned that even if Mateen was inspired by the group, there was no indication that it had trained or instructed him, or had any direct connection with him. Some other terrorist attackers have been “self-radicalized,” including the husband and wife who killed fourteen people in December in San Bernardino, California, who also proclaimed allegiance to the Islamic State, but apparently had no contact with the group.

Orlando Shootings: Terrorism or False Flag?

By Stephen Lendman

Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/orlando-shootings-terrorism-or-false-flag/5530600>

June 13 – It’s too soon to know whether Sunday’s Orlando incident was terrorism or false flag deception.

Yet it has distinct earmarks of the latter, likely the latest example of domestic state terror, another fear-mongering pretext for out-of-

control militarism, endless wars of choice, and domestic repression, America more a police state than free society on a slippery slope toward full-blown tyranny.



Muslims are Washington's target of choice, falsely blamed for numerous state-sponsored domestic crimes – 9/11 the mother of all false flags.

Convincing evidence indicates the alleged Boston bombers, San Bernardino bombers, Sandy Hook shooter, a shoe bomber, an underwear bomber, Times Square bomber, shampoo bombers, synagogue bombers, and numerous other convenient patsies blamed for similar incidents were victims of elaborate hoaxes, state-sponsored false flag deception. Pre-dawn Sunday, alleged heavily armed gunman Omar Mateen managed to kill or wound over 100 individuals at Orlando's Pulse LGBT nightclub before city SWAT police killed him.

Dead men tell no tales. All we know is what authorities say and the mainstream media repeat without due diligence checking.

According to official reports, Mateen called 911, declaring his allegiance to ISIS. Following the shootings, the group allegedly claimed responsibility, saying they were "carried out by an Islamic State fighter."

America created and supports the group. Why would any of its members or supporters want its benefactor harmed?

Sunday's incident represents the largest domestic mass-casualty event since 9/11. An obvious unanswered question is how could an alleged lone gunman manage to kill or injure so many before SWAT police stopped him?

Were multiple gunmen involved? Mass shootings on this scale seem unlikely for

anyone to be able to pull off single-handedly. Was state-sponsored terrorism responsible? As expected, Obama politicized the incident,



calling it "an act of terror and an act of hate" – vowing "to protect our people and defend our nation, (acting) against those who threaten us." Hillary Clinton revealed her rage for endless wars, abhorrence of rule of law principles, and antipathy to fundamental freedoms – urging "redouble(d) efforts to defend our country from threats at home and abroad."

She failed to explain America faces invented ones only, pretexts for waging war on humanity.

The groundwork is being laid for continuing wars of aggression, launching new ones, and eliminating what remains of constitutional rights.

People are being manipulated to believe the price of security requires sacrificing fundamental freedoms – failing to realize they're losing both.

Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago. His new book as editor and contributor is titled "Flashpoint in Ukraine: US Drive for Hegemony Risks WW III."

Orlando shootings highlight debate on Islam's LGBT acceptance

Source: http://www.nola.com/religion/index.ssf/2016/06/orlando_shootings_highlight_de.html

The horrific killings at a gay club in Orlando by a Muslim man who reportedly swore loyalty to the Islamic State set off immediate condemnation from many Muslims - and debate about whether Muslim communities need to be more welcoming of gay people.

Popular U.S. playwright and journalist Wajahat Ali sparked debate on his Facebook page Sunday when he bemoaned the murders and called for his fellow Muslims to speak out:

"I hope we empower and uplift our LGBT Muslim brothers and sisters, who often suffer in silence and have been ostracized and demonized by multiple communities in America for their sexuality, religion and ethnicity. They are at the cultural fault lines -- blasted for being both gay and Muslim in an America that often uses them as pawns for an absolutist cultural war. This is a



moment to call out ignorance that creates an atmosphere which tolerates and breeds hate. . . . I believe this is a moment for us straight Muslims to aggressively and sincerely assert our solidarity with the LGBT community, not for sake of politics, talking points and expedient alliances, but around shared values and visions of creating an America where no one is hazed, victimized, brutalized or murdered simply for 'being.'

"Their struggle for freedoms and equality is our struggle and is the American struggle. Period. We should denounce the draconian and unnecessary anti LGBT legislation that is being introduced in several states around the country just like LGBT members have routinely denounced Trump's anti Muslim bigotry and anti Sharia legislation for years. This is what it means to be American."

More than 2,600 people liked the post by the progressive writer.

Ali was lauded by many for condemning the violence, but many of the comments on his post that triggered the most interaction noted that Islam - like several other faiths - rejects the acceptance of gay relationships.

"I don't think true empathy and sympathy requires one to shed one's own personal moral beliefs," wrote one. Multiple people made similar comments.

In the Pew Research Center's major study of American religions in 2014, Muslims were split on homosexuality. The poll found that 45 percent of American Muslims thought homosexuality should be accepted, and 47 percent should be discouraged.

That means Muslims are less accepting of homosexuality than most religious groups in the study – **66 percent of mainline Protestants, 70 percent of Catholics and more than 80 percent of Jews and Buddhists say gay relationships should be accepted.** But it puts Muslims ahead of evangelical Christians and Mormons, just 36 percent of whom say homosexuality is acceptable.

On Facebook on Sunday, some Muslim commenters called for their community to address homophobia in the wake of the tragedy in Orlando.

"An apology from the boy's father or 'condemnation' from CAIR and other Muslim groups is not good enough. All our cultures need to raise our children to be tolerant and

accepting. Father needs to own up to the homophobia ingrained in our culture- as do all those Christians calling it 'an act of god.'"

Others compared the topic to other areas in which people disagree.

"Muslims have non Muslim friends that drink, right? Friends who eat pork, like going to rock concerts (I go to many), and so on. So people's lifestyle choices, sexual orientation, etc is what makes this country, our community so diverse and accepting. That is the beauty of America. I can go drink iced tea with lemon while my friends drink a glass of wine. To each it's own, let God judge, not us."

Fawzia Mirza, a Pakistani-Canadian comedian who is Muslim and lesbian, tweeted her "mixed" feelings:

"Feeling a complexity of emotions as a Muslim #LGBTQ American -- not done in my name. not done by my family to my family. #FloridaShooting"

The D.C.-based Muslim Alliance for Sexual and Gender Diversity, which runs workshops for LGBT Muslims, asked Sunday that people not "rush" to blame any person or group aside from the shooter himself. The shooting should not be framed as a conflict between the gay and Muslim communities, the group wrote:

"It is also not lost on us that this horrific tragedy occurred during LGBTQ Pride month, which this year coincides with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, typically a period of peace and intense self-reflection. It pains us to see that these periods of joy, celebration, and peace have been marred so violently with such horror. "There is no religious justification or precedent in Islam for mass shootings targeting any population, regardless of identity, nor is there justification in American law or values. This tragedy is a reminder of the terrible harm that can result from the wide availability of guns and explosives. . . .

"This tragedy cannot be neatly categorized as a fight between the LGBTQ community and the Muslim community. As LGBTQ Muslims, we know that there are many of us who are living at the intersections of LGBTQ identities and Islam. At moments like this, we are doubly affected. We reject attempts to perpetuate hatred against our LGBTQ communities as well as our Muslim communities. We ask all Americans to resist the forces of division and hatred, and to stand



against homophobia as well as against Islamophobia and anti-Muslim bigotry."


Major mass-shooting attacks in the U.S. since January 2009

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/major-mass-shooting-attacks-us-january-2009>

June 13 – Between 2008 and 2013, the FBI used a narrow definition of mass shootings – limiting the designation “mass shootings” to incidents in which an individual (in a handful of cases, more than one individual) “kills four or more people in a single incident (not including the shooter), typically in a single location.” In 2013, the FBI **changed its definition**, moving away from “mass shootings” to identifying an “active shooter” as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” Frederic Lemieux [notes](#) that this change means that the agency, when referring to incidents which used to be described as mass shootings, now includes incidents in which fewer than four people are killed, but in which several are injured.

The change in definition has resulted in some confusion regarding specific cases, and whether or not they should be included in studies of mass shootings. It has also made it more difficult to conduct comparative studies of trends in mass shootings before and after 2013 – and compare studies which were made with the researchers using the earlier definition to studies in which the researchers used the more recent definition.

The *Telegraph* offers a list of the major mass shooting incidents in the United States since January 2009 (these are incidents which the FBI would describe as mass under both the 2008 and the 2013 definitions).



March 2009 / Geneva County Massacre, Alabama

10 dead

Laid-off worker Michael Kenneth McLendon, 28, opens fire while driving through several towns.

April 2009 / Binghamton shootings, New York

13 dead

Jiverly Antares Wong, a naturalized American citizen from Vietnam, starts shooting at a civic center.

November 2009 / Fort Hood, Texas

13 dead, 42 wounded

Self-radicalized U.S. army psychologist, Major Nidal Hasan, opens fire at a Texas military base.



February 2010 / University of Alabama in Huntsville

3 dead, 3 wounded

Amy Bishop, a biology professor angry at being denied tenure, starts shooting fifty minutes into a Biological Sciences Department faculty meeting.

August 2010 / Manchester, Connecticut

8 dead

Omar Thornton, 34, a driver for Hartford Distributors, leaves a disciplinary hearing and begins shooting before turning the gun on himself.

January 2011 / Tuscon, Arizona

6 dead, 11 wounded

Jared Lee Loughner, 22, shoots Arizona Representative Gabrielle Giffords in the head during a constituents' meet-and-greet at a supermarket.

October 2011 / Seal Beach, California

8 dead, 1 wounded

Amid a child custody dispute, Scott Dekraai, 41, walks into a crowded hair salon and opens fire on his former wife. Dekraai pleads not guilty.

April 2012 / Oikos University, California

7 dead, 3 wounded

43-year-old One L Goh, a former student at the small Christian college, starts shooting in a classroom.

July 2012 / Aurora, Colorado

12 dead, 58 wounded

James Holmes, 24, opens fire during the late-night premiere of "The Dark Knight Rises." He had booby-trapped his apartment with explosives, and was recently sentenced to twelve life terms.

December 2012 / Sandy Hook Massacre, Connecticut

27 dead, 1 wounded

Adam Lanza, 20, forces his way into Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newtown. He kills twenty first-graders and six adults. Before arriving at the school, he had killed his mother at their home.

June 2013 / Santa Monica College, California

5 dead

John Zawahri, an unemployed 23-year-old, kills five people in a rampage which begins at his father home and ends in the college's library.

September 2013 / Washington Navy Yard

13 dead, 3 injured

Aaron Alexis, a Navy contractor and former Navy man, engages police in a running firefight through the Washington, D.C. complex, before being shot and killed.

May 2014 / University of California, Santa Barbara

7 dead, 7 wounded

Elliot Rodger opens fire on the campus town of Isla Vista, California from inside a black BMW. Rodgers left written and video evidence, suggesting the attack is premeditated.

October 2014 / Marysville Pilchuck High School, Marysville, Washington

5 dead, 1 injured

Jaylen Fryberg, a 15-year old high school freshman, kills four students – including his cousin – after arranging to meet them at the school's cafeteria. He then kills himself. The killing appears to be the result of a conflict over a girl (the girl was also killed).

June 2015 / Charleston, South Carolina

9 dead

White supremacist Dylann Roof begins shooting in a historic black church, attempting to spark a race-war.

August 2015 / Roanoke, Virginia

3 dead, 1 wounded

Vester Lee Flanagan II (AKA Bryce Williams) shoots dead two former colleagues from the WDBJ7 news team.

October 2015 / Umpqua Community College, Oregon

10 dead, at least 7 wounded



CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – June 2016

Chris Harper-Mercer, 26, who was enrolled at the college and had posted online messages about other recent massacres, shoots people at random on campus.

December 2015 / San Bernadino, California

14 dead

Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik shoot fourteen people dead at a holiday party in San Bernardino, California. They were killed in a shootout with police five hours after the massacre at the Inland Regional Center social services agency, and are reported to have been inspired by Islamist militants.

March 2016/ Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania

6 dead, 5 injured

A shooting at a backyard party in the town of Wilkinsburg, near Pittsburgh, leaves five people dead and three others injured.

June 2016 / Orlando, Florida

50 dead, 53 injured

A heavily armed gunman opens fire and seizes hostages at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. It is the worst mass shooting in America's history.

AR-15: The most popular assault-style rifle in the United States

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160613-ar15-the-most-popular-assaultstyle-rifle-in-the-united-states>

June 13 – The gunman who killed dozens of people in Aurora, Sandy Hook, San Bernardino, and, yesterday, Orlando all used an AR-15 rifle.

According to the National Rifle Association (NRA), the gun, which was designed by ArmaLite for the U.S. Army and originally produced by Colt in the 1960s, is the most popular rifle in the United States. It is lightweight, holds high-capacity magazines, and is relatively easy customization.

DW notes that for a decade, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB) banned the purchase of the AR-15. Congress passed the AWB in the wake of the 1989 death of thirty-four children and a

In 1994 President Bill Clinton signed the AWB into law as part of a larger crime bill. The AWB had a 10-year sunset clause, and in 2004 the U.S. Congress allowed the law to expire without extending it.

A lawyer representing the families of victims who died at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut — and who are now suing the gun's manufacturers for negligence — said that since retaining its full legal status, the AR-15 has become the "gold standard for the mass murder of innocent civilians."

Following the Sandy Hook mass shooting, the AR-15 cannot be sold in Connecticut, New York, Maryland, and a few other states.

The NRA has argued that the AR-15 is useful as a hunting rifle, but both



teacher in Stockton, California at the hands of a gunman using an AK-47 semi-automatic rifle. The purpose of the AWB was to prevent would-be mass-shooters from exploiting the accuracy and speed of guns such as the AR-15 and AK-47 can facilitate.

advocates of gun safety laws and gun rights agree that hunters regard the AR-15 as unsuitable for pursuing game at a distance.

Omar Mateen, the Orlando terrorist, was investigated by the FBI in 2013 and 2014 for possible ties to terrorism, but the investigation yielded no concrete results and Mateen was not found to constitute "a substantive threat."

He legally purchased his weapons, at least one of them an



AR-15, a few days before the shooting. Even if the FBI had found more substantive evidence about his ties to terrorism, it would not have prevented him from legally purchasing weapons. Individuals with suspected connections to terrorism – but not enough evidence to bring charges against them – may be placed on the No-Fly List and prevented from boarding a plane, but unless charges are


brought against them in court, they cannot be prevented from legally buying a weapon.

USA Today reports that in its 2013 address to U.S. Congress, the National Shooting Sports Foundation estimated that between 5 and 8.2 million assault-style rifles are privately owned by U.S. citizens. Online magazine *Slate*, in a survey conducted in 2012, concluded that 3.3 million of those were AR-15.

What we know about Omar Mateen

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160613-what-we-know-about-omar-mateen>

June 13 – Omar Mateen, 29, was born in New York to Afghan parents. Since September 2007 he had worked as a security guard for G4 Security in Florida. The large security contractor provides security personnel to guard building, among them federal buildings. He underwent background checks in both 2007 and 2013. In March, British born Islamic preacher Sheikh Farrokh Sekaleshfar gave a speech outside Orlando in which he called for the death of all homosexuals. “Death is the sentence. There’s nothing to be embarrassed about this. Death is the sentence,” he said.



What we know about the man behind America's worst-ever mass shooting:

- Omar Mateen, 29, was born in New York to Afghan parents.
- Since September 2007 he had worked as a security guard for G4 Security in Florida. The large security contractor provides security personnel to guard building, among them federal buildings. He underwent background checks in both 2007 and 2013.
- He had a licence for concealed carry — in Florida, you do not require a permit to carry a weapon, but you do to conceal it.
- He lived in the Port St. Lucie area.
- He was married to Sitora Yusufiy in New Jersey. The pair had met online around eight years ago, and she moved to Florida to marry him. They were married for only four months.
- She told the *Washington Post* that “He was not a stable person.” She described him as a violent man who beat her regularly. “He beat me. He would just come home and start beating me up because the laundry wasn’t finished or something like that.”
- Yusufiy said Mateen was bipolar and also had a history with steroids.
- She said that he cut her off from her family, and that members of her family, who came to their home to rescue her from the situation, had to use considerable force literally to pull her out of his arms, because he would not let go of her. She added that she has had no contact with him for seven or eight years.
- The *Daily Beast* reports that he was known to the police, having become “a person of interest” in 2013 and again in 2014. A senior law enforcement source told the *Beast* that the FBI at one point opened an investigation into Mateen, but that the case was subsequently closed when the investigation produced nothing that appeared to warrant further investigation.
- In March, British born Islamic preacher Sheikh Farrokh Sekaleshfar gave a speech outside Orlando in which he called for the death of all homosexuals. “Death is the sentence. There’s nothing to be embarrassed about this. Death is the sentence,” he said.



Imam Invited to Florida Says It Is Compassionate to Kill Gays

Source: <https://www.clarionproject.org/videos/imam-invited-florida-says-it-compassionate-kill-gays#>



A visiting imam speaking at the Hussein Islamic Center in Sanford, Florida argues that it is “compassionate” to execute homosexuals, saying, “Let’s get rid of them now.” Why was he invited to speak at a Florida Islamic center?

▶ Watch the video at source’s URL.

Does it matter if Obama uses the term 'Islamic terrorism'?

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/13/politics/islamic-terrorism-trump-obama-clinton/>



June 13 – As millions of Americans processed the news that a terror attack had left 49 people dead at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Donald Trump reignited a political debate.

"Is President Obama going to finally mention the words radical Islamic terrorism? If he doesn't he should immediately resign in disgrace!" Trump tweeted moments before President Barack Obama addressed the nation from the White House. He doubled down on those comments in a statement later Sunday that also called on Hillary Clinton to toughen her tone on terror.

As expected, Obama did not utter the words "radical" or "Islam," instead referring to the attack as "an act of terror and an act of hate." Indeed, he has resisted using the term "radical Islam" throughout his presidency despite pressure from Republicans.

Hillary Clinton was asked about the terminology on CNN's "New Day" Monday and made clear she would use the words "radical Islam," but she added an important qualifier.

"From my perspective, it matters what we do more than what we say," she said. "And it mattered we got bin Laden, not what name we called him. I have clearly said we -- whether you call it radical jihadism or radical Islamism, I'm happy to say either. I think they mean the same thing." Though investigators had yet to officially conclude that the Orlando assailant was inspired by radical Islamic ideology, Sunday's tragedy returns questions over the importance of such terminology to the center of American politics.



Here's a look at why "radical Islam" and "radical Islamic terrorism" are such loaded terms and the arguments for and against using them.

Why do Donald Trump and other Republicans say using the term "radical Islamic terrorism" is so important?

Trump and other Republicans have hewed the same line: If you don't name your enemy, you can't defeat it.

Trump explained his outrage at Obama's refusal to use the term at a campaign rally this spring: "Unless you're going to talk about it, you're not going to solve the damn problem folks. You're not going to solve it."

Trump and other Republicans have argued that the Obama administration fails to understand the enemy -- a key component of which, they argue, is the radical Islamic ideology that is fueling terrorist attacks in the Middle East and increasingly in the West.

Terrorists who perpetrated the most recent attacks in Europe and the U.S. -- like the shootings in San Bernardino, California, and Paris -- all subscribed to radical Islamic ideologies. The White House, Republicans say, shouldn't be afraid to call out the source of this violence.

Do experts back up this reasoning?

For Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, identifying the motivations and ideology behind the terrorist threat is essential to combating it.

"It's always critical to understand the nature and gravity of the threat you face and correctly identify the motivating factors," said Dubowitz. "It's equally critical to understand the ideological motivation of the terrorisms we face so, again, we can correctly identify who's likely to attack and ... mobilize against it."

For example, he said, Islamic terrorism can't be defeated without the help of Muslim communities around the world.

He added that while "it's dangerous and foolhardy to besmirch all Muslims," it's "equally foolhardy" not to understand that Islamism "is a political ideology which borrows from Islam and is motivated by Islam," even though it only represents a tiny minority of Muslims.

Other terrorism experts, however, tend to disagree with the take of FDD -- a conservative-leaning think tank that focuses on foreign policy and combatting terrorism -- over the issue of rhetoric, pointing out that the

administration has clearly spoken about ISIS as a group inspired by a perverted form of Islam.

So why are Obama and Hillary Clinton so vigorously opposed to this language?

The core of their argument is that associating terrorists with Islam helps to legitimize their interpretation of the religion and does a disservice to the majority of Muslims who don't believe there's anything Islamic about barbaric groups like ISIS, also known as ISIL.

"We are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam," Obama said during remarks at a summit on combating violent extremism in February. "These terrorists are desperate for legitimacy. And all of us have a responsibility to refute the notion that groups like ISIL somehow represent Islam, because that is a falsehood that embraces the terrorist narrative."

Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee, has defended her refusal to use the term along similar lines.

"That sounds like we are declaring war against a religion," Clinton said in an interview with ABC News in December.

"Number one, it doesn't do justice to the vast numbers of Muslims in our own country and around the world who are peaceful people. Number two, it helps to create this clash of civilizations that is actually a recruiting tool for ISIS and other radical jihadists who use this as a way of saying, 'We're in a war against the West. You must join us. If you are Muslim, you must join us,'" she said in the interview.

Terrorist groups like ISIS have sought to radicalize Muslims living in non-Muslim countries by defining jihad in the context of an "us versus them" mentality, in particular pointing to foreign interventions in Muslim countries as attacks on all Muslims.

Do experts back up this line of thinking?

Most terrorism experts believe that labeling terror attacks as radical Islamic terrorism is either detrimental to efforts to combat them or simply not strategically important to defeating terrorist groups like ISIS and their ideology.



The rhetorical battle has little to do with the nuts-and-bolts fight against these groups, said Daniel Serwer, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and director of the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

"ISIS claims a connection to Islam, but are we better off accepting the ISIS claim rather than believing the many Muslims who say terrorism has no legitimate connection to their religion?" Serwer asked. "I personally have no problem talking about Islamic extremism, but would it make the fight against it more successful if our officials were willing to call it that? I doubt it."

Serwer added that using the label could alienate moderate Muslims and hinder efforts to get Muslims on board in the fight against ISIS.

"Anything that stands in the way of Muslims joining the fight against ISIS is not a good thing," he said.

Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer who now directs the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution, said the debate is just semantics.

"Whether or not we call it Islamic terrorism is not the issue," Riedel said in an interview Sunday, pointing to actions the administration takes rather than rhetoric.

But this seems to have become a debate that goes beyond the words "radical Islamic terrorism," right?

Republican criticism of Obama's refusal to use the term goes hand in hand with their critique of his strategy to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria -- that Obama has not done enough to keep the country safe.

And it also goes toward a broader perception that Trump has fueled throughout his campaign to succeed Obama as commander-in-chief: that political correctness is holding the U.S. back.

Trump has repeatedly dismissed criticism of his numerous controversial policies --including banning on all foreign Muslims from entering the U.S. -- as the forces of political correctness at work.

And Obama's refusal to say the words "radical Islamic terrorism" present another opportunity for Trump to hammer his message.

"If we do not get tough and smart real fast, we are not going to have a country anymore," he warned Sunday. "I am trying to save lives and prevent the next terrorist attack. We can't afford to be politically correct anymore."

Has not using this terminology affected policy?

The Obama administration has engaged in a wide-ranging drone war against terrorists abroad since taking office and as the ISIS threat has grown has expanded U.S. forces taking on "advise and assist" roles with local troops in Syria and Iraq to root out ISIS. It has also kept more troops in Afghanistan than originally slated as the situation there has remained unstable.

It hasn't, however, taken as aggressive a stance as many Republicans have argued for in Iraq and in Syria, and it has taken out more U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan than the GOP would have liked to see.

On the other hand, terrorism experts say lone wolf attacks by people radicalized online are almost impossible to detect and stop.

Still, Dubowitz said that he thinks that "the administration has wrongly downplayed the motivating and mobilizing ideology that underpins the threat."

To Reidel, however, "The issue is what do we do about it, and the President has done far more about Islamic terrorists like Osama bin Laden than the presumptive Republican candidate ever has."


Cities under Siege: Mass Casualty Urban Terrorism Assaults

Source: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/faffcfbd-962c-4da5-8800-ca79064e263a>

According to Ahmed Hashim, cities around the world are being confronted by a new kind of terrorism: assaults by well-trained and motivated "terrorist commandos" whose primary goal is to reap as many civilian casualties as possible. Here's his analysis of three such attacks – Mumbai (2008), Nairobi (2013), and Paris (November 2015).



Cities around the world have come under siege from a new kind of terrorism: assault by well-trained and motivated “terrorist commandos” whose primary goal is to cause as much death among civilians as possible. Such has been the case in a number of key attacks in recent years: Mumbai (2008), Nairobi



(2013), and Paris (November 2015). There are other cases such as the Chechen terrorist assaults in Moscow and other locales in Russia and the Islamic State (IS) terrorist attack in Brussels in March 2016.[1] The trio selected above for study here, however, represent the deadliest and most extensively analysed incidents of this new type of urban terrorism. This study will address the factors behind these attacks: reasons, methods and characteristics of the attacks, the government responses, and consequences or fallout. It will also include a brief assessment of whether Singapore can be a target of a major assault by “terrorist commandos.”

Cities have constituted the foundation of settled human civilisation.[2] They first arose historically as protective or defensive structures for a community or a society against land-based attacks by marauders or enemies. Cities had the advantages of large concentrations of people and walls to hold off attack thus ensuring that it was better to be in a city than alone in the hinterland where marauders and invaders could loot, ravage, and pillage

unprotected communities and villages.[3] Cities are important because they have the highest density of population within a territorial entity and they are the locus of most human social activity within societies. They are the centres of gravity for cultural and socio-economic activities and of politics. By 2030, around 60 per cent of the global population will live in cities and towns, with nearly all of this growth occurring in the Global South.[4]


Cities have not been strangers to nature’s fury or man’s capacity for violence. They have either withstood or succumbed to a wide variety of structural or environmental catastrophes—famine, plague, flooding, and fire—and to mankind’s almost infinite capacity for inflicting violence on itself and its property. Taking a city or paralyzing it has been an important military goal throughout history, even though militaries have often been loath to directly assault defended cities because of the vast expenditure of personnel, time, and resources. Cities have suffered from sieges, revolutions, coups d’états, and sustained urban combat between regular military forces. They have been the targets of organised criminal networks and of large violent gangs in many countries, whether it is in the Global North—the developed world—or the Global South—the developing world. Lastly, cities have been the targets of terrorist groups. There have been multiple ways in which terrorists have “terrorised” cities but none have been as deadly as the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of mass casualty urban terrorist assaults (MCUTA) as those that have occurred in Mumbai, Nairobi, and Paris. This paper will address MCUTA and their TTPs.

Definitions and Clarifications: Terrorism, Insurgency and Urban Insurgency and Urban Terrorism

An extended discussion of the differences between terrorism and guerrilla warfare/insurgency and on the differences between urban terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare is not possible here. It suffices to state a few propositions here that may hopefully clarify what this paper will focus on. Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against innocent civilians in order to force governments to bend to the terrorists’ will. Cities have emerged as the preferred targets of terrorism. To paraphrase what an American gangster, Willy Sutton, said when asked why he robbed banks and answered: “because that is where the money’s at.” Similarly terrorists attack cities because that is where the lucrative targets are. Terrorism has been overwhelmingly an urban phenomenon— and has been characterised by the emergence of small groups of radicalised individuals undertaking acts of sabotage, assassination, kidnapping, and killing of innocent civilians to make a political point vis-à-vis the government. Cities are now without protective walls as in the past, and the lucrative targets within them makes them attractive to assault.[5]



In summer 2015, several journalistic analyses appeared discussing the cities most likely to be the targets of terrorist attacks in the coming years.[6] The relevance of the discussions was further highlighted by the stunning terrorist assaults on separate targets in Paris in November 2015, which killed 130 people in the worst act of terrorism in Europe since the bombings in Madrid in 2004. Four



months later, a group from IS attacked Brussels airport—Zvante—and a downtown metro station. These were not as deadly as the Paris attackers, nonetheless 35 people were killed and the attacks caused a gaping wound in the fabric of an already fragile society. David Kilcullen, a specialist who has written extensively on and participated in wars, believes that cities are under assault: “The goal is to shut [cities] down for as long as possible, separate people from one another, break down communities, and push them into mental fortresses.”[7]


An insurgency is an uprising by a disgruntled group of people traditionally located in a rural environment. Historically, the insurgent organisation builds a sanctuary, seeks to draw people to its side, and conducts guerrilla warfare—hit-and-run, raids, ambushes, destruction of infrastructure, assassinations, and selective terrorism against opponents whether within the movement itself in order to rid it of troublesome individuals or against representatives of the state.

In reality, the lines between (rural) insurgency and (urban) terrorism were never as clear-cut. In the 1920s, when the Irish fought their war of independence against the British, they set up an urban force whose mission was to unravel British control of the cities and deny them intelligence about the Irish Republican Army. They also had a larger rural fighting force (“Flying Columns”) whose mission was to hunt small units of British security forces in a fight for control of the hinterland.[8]

During the Vietnamese War of Independence against the French in the 1950s, the Vietcong built an army but they also conducted a short-lived urban terrorism campaign in Saigon under a commander named Nguyen Binh.[9] During the Algerian War of Independence in the 1960s, the insurgents built a professional army, a guerrilla force fighting in the mountains, and an urban terrorist outfit that waged terrorism in the capital, Algiers. The French took the terrorist infrastructure down in a painstaking operation.

During the 1960s and 1970s, insurgents in most cases fought in very hostile and treacherous terrain in rural areas throughout the world. However, some urban terrorist groups devoted resources to thinking about and practicing urban insurgency. Urban insurgency represented an attempt by terrorist groups to conduct a form of “super-empowered” terrorism, which would rely on the terrorists setting up an infrastructure to maintain themselves within the urban environment through safe-houses and sanctuaries (that could be mobile or moved quickly due to the power of the state apparatus) and a capability to wage sustained combat operations against security forces rather than merely indiscriminate terrorist actions, as was the norm previously. In contemporary times, Islamist militant groups have taken up the search for effective urban insurgency practice.[10]

The purpose of this study is to address a particular terrorist modus operandi, the Mass Casualty Urban Terrorist Assault (MCUTA), which is executed against a specific soft target or set of separate soft targets within an urban area by highly trained and prepared suicide assault teams or “terrorist commandos.” The political goals are not to negotiate over a specific set of demands that the terrorists expect the government to implement immediately, rather they are to highlight to the government the “negative consequences” of its foreign/security and domestic policies, to exploit fissures within the



society—particularly if it is multi-national and multi-confessional—and polarise inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations within the society.

The prime operational goal is to cause as much mayhem by killing as many people as possible—the victims are not hostages but “doomed captives.” The second operational goal is to ensure that the attackers are able to hold off the forces of the government for as long as possible so that they can: (i) kill as many people as they are able to; (ii) gain as much media mileage of their butchery; and (iii) highlight government ineptitude. The tertiary goal is to take advantage of existing vulnerabilities—actual or latent, obvious or even concealed— within the target city and thus cause as much polarisation as possible by the attacks on that society’s centre of gravity: an iconic city or capital.

Case Studies of Mass Casualty Urban Terrorist Assaults

Each case in this study will proceed along the following lines: (i) why was that particular city and country attacked; (ii) how did the attack proceed in terms of tactics, techniques and procedures and how did the government forces respond to the assault; and (iii) did the government have any prior warnings and indicators?

One of the case studies, Nairobi (2013), deals with a complex attack by heavily armed squads on one specific target set: a busy mall. The other two attacks Mumbai (2008) and Paris (November 2015) were complex simultaneous attacks on multiple targets: restaurants, bars, stadiums, concert hall, train station, religious centre, and hotels.

The Assaults on Mumbai, 2008

The 26 November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, which killed at least 172 people, has been called “India’s 9/11.” The attack was bold, complex, targeted multiple locations simultaneously, and lasted three days.[11] The duration of the attack—almost three days in the full view of the world’s media—itsself was a significant milestone. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a radical Islamist terrorist group based in Pakistan, was responsible for the attack.

Why Mumbai? Many Pakistan-based terrorists see Hindu-majority India as an enemy of Islam. LeT has declared that its objective is not merely liberating Kashmir—a region currently split between India and Pakistan—but breaking up India. A terrorist attack on India exacerbates religious antagonisms between India’s Hindu majority and its Muslim community provoking Hindu reprisals that Islamist extremists hope would polarise India and facilitate recruitment of Muslims to their cause.[12] Mumbai is India’s commercial and entertainment centre—“India’s Wall Street, its Hollywood, its Milan.”[13] The Taj Mahal Palace and Trident-Oberoi Hotels, landmark institutions, were filled with foreigners and the local elite. LeT probably hoped that the negative international publicity would result in damage to India’s economy. The Mumbai attacks were well planned by LeT, which was allegedly helped by the highly professional intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of a state sponsor, Pakistan.[14] An American of both Pakistani and American heritage, David Headley, claimed from prison in the United States that there was coordination between ISI and LeT. He travelled to Mumbai on eight separate occasions to conduct a “recon” of the Mumbai targets. His videos and descriptions of the iconic Taj hotel were used to build up a mock-up for the assault team then in training.[15] The planning for the attack itself began in 2006. LeT engaged in thorough preparation of the assault team, both physical and mental, in a training camp in Muzzaferabad in Pakistani Kashmir. The terrorists were given pre-planned routes through the city from the point of their landing in Mumbai to their final objective. The LeT trainers provided the assault team with maps and images of their targets in a compact disc. Guided by their controllers in Pakistan, the trained terrorists made their way by sea from Pakistan, evaded Indian coastal patrols, transferred from their vessels to an Indian fishing vessel that they seized and made landfall in Mumbai in a closed fishing community. Their sudden arrival aroused suspicion but nothing was done and they proceeded to unleash carnage on the city in two-man teams.

The Indian response was slow, piecemeal, and confused. The various agencies involved in responding to the terrorist assault were unable to coordinate with one another. Despite the number of terrorist attacks India has suffered over the years, Mumbai did not seem to have protocols in place for dealing with a major terrorist event. Moreover, the Indian police units that initially responded were simply outgunned due to inadequate training and lack of requisite firearms.[16] There were tussles between the state in which Mumbai is located and the



centre, New Delhi, over turf and who had authority over the response. The result was that the centrally controlled National Security Guards (NSG) did not receive the orders to mobilise for hours and then had to wait for transport before they could be deployed to fight the terrorists.[17]

The terrorist attack on Mumbai is also noteworthy for the enormous amount of chatter it generated on jihadist websites. The chatter was mainly about the tactics, techniques and procedures of the terrorists and about the perceived weaknesses of the responding government agencies. One jihadist website, the al-Yaqin Media Center, released a study titled “The Mumbai Operations: A Study in the Local, Regional, and International Ramifications.”[18] The study is worth examining in summary form as the author or authors were profoundly impressed by a number of factors ranging from the politico-strategic to the operational and tactical. The study noted that:

- The jihadists/terrorists split into “small units that simultaneously hit numerous targets. Some were to spread fear and chaos within the city, while the others took foreign hostages...”
- The operation in Mumbai reflected “high level of planning” and demonstrated the attackers “high level of training.”
- The attackers did not have to use car bombs (VBIEDs) or suicide belts. The attackers constituted a highly trained assault team divided into smaller two man teams. The study referred to it as a commando operation, which was rare in jihadist operational annals.
- The attacks “were considered a serious blow to the reputation of the Indian security forces... It revealed the weakness of the organisation and its lagging behind in the arming, training, and technology fields.” The study knew a significant amount about Indian security weaknesses. “This giant police structure...” is weak because India does not have enough police. Its capabilities are deficient due to lack of training and antiquated weaponry: “From the arms aspect, it is still living in the time of the English occupation of India, where most of the police weapons are rifles used in the English army during the fifties [presumably referring to the bolt-action .303 Lee Enfield rifle].

There was plenty of information that terrorists were planning something in Mumbai. In February 2008, a suspected terrorist arrested in northern India, was found to possess drawings of various iconic sites in Mumbai, some of which were targets in the November 2008 attack. The suspect indicated that he had begun his reconnaissance in late 2007. On September 24, India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), issued a warning that LeT was showing unusual interest in Mumbai and listed six potential targets of the group.

By late October 2008, Great Britain and the United States also suspected something untoward was about to happen and while they did exchange information with India, the three countries did not communicate extensively with one another until the terrorist operation was underway. Since September 2008, Great Britain had amassed considerable information about the online activities of one Zarrar Shah, the “technology chief” of LeT who was using Google Earth to map out the routes for the assault team from their landing site into the city and who was searching for “4 and 5 star” hotels in Mumbai. This did not find its way to the Indians because according to the British, Shah’s activities did not show intent to do anything specific. By October 2008, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had already provided India with some vital tip-offs, including the fact that terrorists planning to attack Mumbai might arrive by sea.[19] The three countries were not able to connect the dots by themselves and did not communicate and collaborate with one another, which might have allowed them to put together the pieces of the puzzle.[20]

The Assault on Westgate Mall, Nairobi 2013[21]

Around 12:30 on Saturday, 21 September 2013, closed circuit television (CCTV) footage inside the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya showed two armed individuals entering the mall through the main entrance while two others made their way up a ramp to the rear parking deck. The Westgate mall is located in the affluent Westlands district of Nairobi, approximately 3.5 kilometres northwest of the city centre. The area is home to the capital’s expatriate population, and the mall is popular with foreigners and middle-class Kenyans making it a lucrative target for the attackers.

The formal claim of responsibility issued by al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, on 25 September 2013, stated that the Westgate attack was revenge for Kenya’s policies, specifically as a legitimate response to Kenya’s invasion of Somalia. Godane told the Kenyan people they were targeted “because it’s you who have chosen your politicians...it’s you who have supported your government’s decision to go to war.” Damaging its economy



was a specific objective. al-Shabaab claimed the attack was “a slap in the face of the dwindling economy of the Kenyan government,” and warned that it would bring about Kenya’s “economic downfall” if Kenyan forces failed to withdraw from Somalia.

The attackers were armed with pistols, fully automatic AK-47 assault rifles and hand grenades. When the terrorists encountered civilians in the mall, they began shooting and lobbing grenades indiscriminately. They roamed the mall hunting for those still alive. The terrorists made no attempts to take hostages during the attack. Survivors reported that the attackers walked through the mall, identified themselves as police helping with the evacuation and then executed individuals who revealed themselves. The assault witnessed the extensive use of social media by al-Shabaab. Throughout the event, al-Shabaab’s press office generated Twitter content justifying the attack and mocking the police and military response.

The initial response to the terrorists consisted of a group of armed security guards, armed local citizens, and off-duty members of the security services who were in the mall when the attack took place. Even though this response was disorganised, it helped evacuate and save many people. In a terrorist assault like the one at Westgate, where the terrorists are bent on killing as many people as possible, a response by those who can respond—and the response must be one of attempting to flee or hide—is better than no response at all. Shortly thereafter, members of the Flying Squad, a paramilitary arm of the police that deals with organised crime, arrived because they were under the impression that a gang of criminals was responsible for the on-going mayhem. When they engaged the “criminals,” Flying Squad members found out that they did not have adequate firepower to thwart the terrorists.

Only three and half-hours after the attack began, elements of the General Services Unit (GSU) “Recce Company”—Kenya’s internal anti-terrorism response force—arrived at the Westgate Mall. GSU Officers engaged the terrorists in a firefight and pinned them down inside the Nukumatt Store. Units of the Kenyan Army Ranger Regiment arrived and entered the mall. No command, coordination, and communication system was set up between the police forces already there and the military units that arrived shortly thereafter. Even if it had been set up, it would not have made a difference as soldiers and police officers were equipped with incompatible radio systems. Little or no effort was made by members of the security forces to inform each other of planned assaults on the mall. This may be the reason why a “friendly fire” situation between Rangers/GSU and police occurred claiming the life of one of the GSU “Recce Company” commanders and wounded three other GSU officers. At night, government forces lacking night vision gear, withdrew from the mall into perimeter positions. The militants appear to have used the confusion of the Kenyan forces to regroup and equip themselves with large-calibre weapons that had not featured in the initial phase of the attack. Government forces reported that the terrorists appeared to have hidden caches of ammunition and explosives inside the mall prior to the attack. The pre-positioning of heavier weapons suggests that the militants anticipated a transition to a more defensive posture following their murderous spree. By early Sunday, 22 September, a siege had developed. The following two days brought more firefights. On Tuesday, 24 September, the siege finally came to an end with the storming of the mall by Kenyan forces.

There were warnings that al-Shabaab intended to attack key targets in Nairobi. A year before, a Kenyan government intelligence report warned of a potential attack at Westgate. The briefing, dated 21 September 2012, assessed that the Somali terrorist organisation, al-Shabaab, was planning to target the mall: “The following suspected al-Shabaab operatives are in Nairobi and are planning to mount suicide attacks on undisclosed date, targeting Westgate Mall.”[22] Another intelligence briefing warned of attacks like those that struck Mumbai in late 2008, “Where the operatives storm into a building with guns and grenades and probably hold hostages.”[23] On 26 September 2013, Kenyan newspapers cited a leaked National Intelligence Service (NIS) report that revealed that the NIS had briefed ministers in January 2013 and again at the beginning of September, about terrorist plans to launch simultaneous terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa around September. The NIS warned that al-Shabaab was planning to carry out suicide attacks on targets including the Westgate Mall. Another report even named the eventual target, stating, “The following suspected al-Shabaab operatives are in Nairobi and are planning to mount suicide attacks on undisclosed date, targeting Westgate Mall and Holy Family Basilica [church].” It was dated 21 September 2012—exactly one year earlier.[24]



The leak of the 32-page intelligence file, obtained by Al Jazeera, suggested five senior officials—including the secretaries of interior, defence, foreign affairs, and treasury, as well as the chief of defence forces—were aware of imminent threats. The senior officials were briefed on the “noticeable rise in the level of threat” starting on 13 September, eight days before the Westgate attack. Several security analysts told Al Jazeera that institutional rivalry and unclear command lines within Kenyan security agencies were the likely reasons behind the failure to foil the Westgate strike. The Kenyan intelligence service has become politicised and appear to be more focused on neutralising political opponents, rather than protecting the country from internal and external aggression.[25]

The security crackdown that unfolded in the wake of the attack created a climate of fear and distrust among many of the country’s Muslims. The homes of ethnic Somalis in Nairobi’s Eastleigh—a neighbourhood of more than a million ethnic Somalis—became frequent targets of police raids. For the ethnic Somalis, the harassment has succeeded only in turning residents further against the police. In the coastal city of Mombasa—which has a large Muslim population—relations between Muslims and Christians deteriorated significantly in the wake of the attack. The mall attack and its aftermath has deepened Kenya’s ethnic and political divisions, fomenting unrest in a country long seen as an icon of stability in increasingly volatile East Africa.

Paris Attacks of November 2015

On Friday, 13 November 2015, eight IS operatives divided into three teams attacked seven different locations, murdering at least 130 and wounding at least 352 in less than 60 minutes. While IS has made clear that Europe in general is a target for the group, France has always been of particular interest for jihadist terrorists. IS seems to have a particular hatred for France, made very clear in a French-language article entitled “L’ Histoire de l’Inimite de France envers l’Islam” or the History of French Hatred of Islam. The article describes the days of the first Crusades (1096- 1099) when the French Pope Urban II urged the nobles of France to go “fight Islam” in the Holy Land. For IS, France’s secular and democratic values were anathema as was its presence in the Middle East and North Africa where it was first a colonial power and later, provided support to local governments fighting extremists. France’s military was already involved in airstrikes against IS positions in Syria before the November 2015 terrorist attack. IS relied on the extensive number of French or Belgian-born jihadists who had gone to fight overseas and on logistics networks in both countries.[26] IS hope that attacks by French-born militants on home-soil would vex the French government and force it to commit scarce resources to security rather than economic recovery. The attacks would provoke France into taking harsh security measures that would target the Muslim population in the hope that this would engender the growth of radicalisation of Muslims and political polarisation within French society.

The Paris operation in November 2015 targeted the following locales:

Stade de France: One team of three operatives detonated their suicide belts outside the Stade de France. According to unconfirmed accounts, one suicide bomber allegedly tried to enter the France-Germany football match and detonated his device after being denied entry to the stadium by security. A second suicide bomber detonated himself outside the stadium, while the third detonated himself outside an American fast food restaurant near the stadium. The stadium attacks were the least successful. This trio would not have been able to secure an installation as large as a stadium. Their goal was merely to inflict as many casualties as possible by blowing themselves up. They were also the least well-trained of the terrorist commandos, which is presumably why they were expected to be just suicide bombers and nothing else. If they had penetrated the stadium the terrorists might have been able to inflict a certain amount of casualties but it is not clear how much since their suicide belts contained only a small amount of the explosive TATP.[27]

- Restaurants: Two operatives opened fire on patrons of Le Carillon bar and Le Petit Cambodge restaurant in the city’s 10th district, killing 15 and injuring more than 20. The gunmen then drove to the La Bonn Biere and opened fire, killing another five people before moving onto La Belle Equipe restaurant and killing 19.
- Concert Hall: Three gunmen wearing suicide belts stormed the Bataclan hall during a rock concert, took hostages, and reportedly started executing them, resulting in more than 80 deaths and scores of injuries. One of the operatives detonated his suicide belt, while the final two gunmen were killed in a shoot-out with police. The tactical



movements of the attackers observed by survivors at the Bataclan theatre reflected prior training. Two of the shooters sought a high-ground position, possibly on the second level of the theatre, which provided an advantageous position to maximise casualties. Survivors also reported that the operatives maintained a disciplined firing approach: while one operative would reload, another would continue firing to avoid being disrupted and continue the carnage; and when one moved, the other provided covering fire.

The near-simultaneous attacks targeting a stadium, multiple restaurants, and a concert hall in Paris demonstrated a great degree of coordination and use of multiple tactics, resulting in higher casualties than has been seen in any previous IS Western attack.[28] The attackers were equipped with assault rifles and explosive-laden suicide belts, and operated in a manner reflecting prior training. They maintained a high degree of operational security. The attack was planned in Belgium, giving the terrorists opportunities to discuss operational details free of surveillance by French intelligence, which despite its failures in thwarting the terrorist operation is large, more proactive and more capable than its overstretched and undermanned Belgian counterpart. The operatives rented vehicles to move to a forward logistics base in Paris.

Why was a large-scale attack like this, which would have a pre-operational footprint, not picked up by the intelligence services? The intelligence services in France and Belgium knew about the suspects' backgrounds. Five had travelled to fight in Syria and returned to France or Belgium. One of the attackers at the Stade de France, Omar Ismail Mostefai, had a French police "S" file indicating suspected radicalisation since 2010. He had gone to Syria in 2013 and returned to France in the spring of 2014. Sami Amimour, one of the gunmen at the Bataclan, had been detained in October 2012 on suspicion of terrorist links, and had an international arrest warrant and yet was able to travel to Syria in 2013. He returned in mid-October 2014, and was able to evade surveillance and apprehension until the attacks. Salah Abdeslam, who took on a logistics role, is the brother of one of the terrorists who blew himself up outside the Comptoir Voltaire café. Salah Abdeslam was stopped on the French-Belgian border a few hours after the attack and questioned, but then released. He was only apprehended in late March 2016 in Molenbeek, a Brussels suburb, because he made the mistake of using a mobile that was being tracked by the authorities. Abdel Hamid Abaaoud was operational leader and not the mastermind—the latter was either in Syria or somewhere else in Europe—behind the attack and had been identified as a colleague of two terrorists killed in a shootout at a house in the Belgian town of Verviers in January 2015. His footprints were all over planned or failed attacks in Europe.

François Heisbourg, a former member of a French presidential commission on defence and security, and one of Europe's leading strategic thinkers, argued that the biggest problem was not a shortage of information about suspects but a lack of capacity to process that information. It was less a failure of intelligence than the ability to follow through on the intelligence data. The terrorists were giving off signals but the French security and intelligence services were inundated with information and were unable to connect the dots.

Failure to analyse the information was not the only problem. French intelligence faces a problem created by the gap between available personnel and the huge number of suspects. French intelligence and police have an estimated of only 500-600 personnel whose task is to follow suspects but the country has about 11,000 people on their books classified as potential threats to national security. An operation to monitor one person 24-hours-a-day requires about 30 to 40 people. They have to make hard choices about which people to focus on.[29] The domestic security service was revamped in 2013 but it is still underfunded and undermanned, and, in any case reform only produces fruit over four or five years.[30]

One of the biggest failings was the long-running lack of cooperation between European intelligence agencies—and reluctance to share information— due to fears about leaks.[31] When they do cooperate, the process is mind-numbingly slow and bureaucratic.[32]

Overall Lessons Learned from MCUTA

During a terrorist commando assault of the types considered above, there is no intent by the attackers to take hostages or negotiate with law enforcement. The longer the attackers remain operational, the more victims will be killed or injured in the attack.



Rapid response by available law enforcement and security forces, even if disorganised as seen in the initial response in both Nairobi and Mumbai, saves lives during the early phase of an active shooter attack. As long as the terrorists remain focused on firefights with responding police, paramilitary, and military units, they have less time to focus on butchering their “doomed captives.” Lightly armed police will invariably often respond first before the “heavy guns” are brought in. There is nothing wrong with them coming in first and setting up a defensive perimeter. These “cops” engaged in firefights with the heavily armed terrorists are unlikely to win and consequently SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams should not be far behind. Attackers who have advanced, detailed knowledge of a facility will try to use that knowledge to ambush and flank security forces, effectively engaging (and in some cases, pinning down) a far larger group of officers—as was seen during the siege at The Taj Hotel in Mumbai—which is why it is imperative that special police units must respond rapidly.

First responders to an attack of this type must consider the possibility of advanced tactics by the terrorists: (i) ambushes targeted on first responders; (ii) supporting sniper fire; (iii) the possibility of remotely controlled improvised explosive devices emplaced near command posts or staging areas; and (iv) diversionary explosions in vehicles or in public places designed to distract and divert security forces. Effective command and control measures are essential, including use of the incident command system (ICS). ICS refers to measures used for the command, control, and coordination of an emergency response. It allows agencies to work together using common terminology and operating procedures for controlling personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications at a single incident scene, establishes accountability for all personnel at the scene, and allows planning for counter-assault operations. The planning must take into account all units present and ensure the establishment of interoperable communications between all responders.

Coordination and cooperation stand out as key to the success of the government response. A single organisation cannot tackle major crises alone. The effectiveness of crisis response is to a very considerable extent determined by the breadth and depth of inter-organisational relations in its crisis management systems. Response to the major attacks on soft targets such as resorts, hotels, malls, railroads, etc. requires the collaboration of a wide range of institutions and organisations. Rapid recognition and declaration of a major incident, agreed-upon command and control systems, limited confusion over roles and responsibilities, effective handling of casualties, and coordinated media messages, are critical to the success of the government’s response.

Implications for Singapore



After 9/11 and the launching of the war on terror by the United States and its allies, Southeast Asia was referred to as the “second front” in the struggle against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. There was a flurry of terrorist activity by notorious groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. They committed a number of atrocities but were eventually foiled by robust counter-terrorism measures, by mistakes made by the terrorists, and by sheer luck due to fortuitous intelligence received about terrorist plans. The threat now is of a different kind and Southeast Asian countries must prepare to thwart or deal with mass casualty urban terrorist assaults (MCUTAs) in the future. IS—based in Syria and Iraq—has developed an extensive set of multi-form capabilities that range from



terrorism through guerrilla warfare to semi-conventional warfare capabilities. Within this spectrum of violence, IS has also begun to develop a capacity for MCUTAs, which has benefited from skills, tactics, and procedures developed in targeting Iraqi and Syrian cities and particularly military bases of the Syrian and Iraqi armed forces.[33]

IS has gained adherents at an alarming rate in Southeast Asia. This is not merely limited to those who have gone on to fight as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, but it has also extended to those who have stayed at home and might be tempted to engage in violent action against the state or fellow citizens they deem to have deviated from “true Islam.” It is, therefore, not inconceivable that in the not too distant future, the mass casualty urban terrorist assault will hit a city in this sub-region. The assessment here suggests that the following cities in Southeast Asia are under the greatest level of threat: Manila, Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore. They are major capital cities and they are cities of countries with which violent Islamist militants have serious issues.

Can Such Attack Happen in Singapore?

Singapore has paid considerable attention to the threat posed by terrorists to its security. More recently, the potential threat of IS in Southeast Asia has not escaped the attention of the Singapore government. In May 2015, during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, an event that brought together military and civilian officials from 20 Asia Pacific countries, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made remarks about IS: “The threat is no longer over there; it is over here. The idea that ISIS can turn Southeast Asia into a province of its worldwide Islamic caliphate is a grandiose, pie-in-the-sky dream. But it is not so far-fetched that ISIS could establish a base somewhere in the region, a geographical area under its physical control like in Syria and Iraq, somewhere far removed from the centres of power of state governments, where the governments’ writ does not run. That would pose a threat to the whole of Southeast Asia.[34]”

This belief in a severe threat to Southeast Asia was reinforced by Mr Lee after the Brussels attack when he said on his Facebook page, “It is not a matter of if, but when, that an attack will take place here.” Politically, Singapore is a target because of its pro-Western policy and its involvement in the Persian Gulf in support of the coalition against IS. It is a lucrative soft target rich environment. It has them all: hotels, tourists, resorts, religious sites, multi-national corporations, malls, large expatriate population of Westerners, multi-ethnic and multi-national population whose potential fissures can be exploited.

Organisation, Planning and Execution

While Singapore is a lucrative target, this does not make it an easy target to penetrate. What the perpetrators require is a successful attack. A successful attack is defined here as the ability to execute a surprise attack of sufficient duration to cause maximum casualties under the limelight of the media. Large-scale sabotage (the destruction of infrastructure) in contrast with pure terrorism (the killing of innocent civilians) may be a step too far for a terrorist assault in Singapore. The assessment is that the terrorists would largely focus on the latter in order to kill as many people as possible.

To execute a MCUTA, the terrorists will require elaborate organisation, planning, and surprise execution. One of the key operational goals of the terrorists is to ensure that the authorities are unable to connect the dots of the footprint until after the terror operation has been executed successfully. For the planning of such an attack in Singapore, terrorists will need a maximum of eight to ten individuals who are well trained, well-prepared, and thoroughly familiar with small arms and the tactics and techniques of assaulting “soft targets.” Will this assault team be made up of native Singaporeans, foreigners, or a mix? This is something that the terrorists will have to consider in depth. Whatever the mix of terrorists, they will need to have complete knowledge of the layout of the island and specifically the soft targets to be assaulted. A team that is not part of the assault squad will, in theory, have conducted pre-operational surveillance and reconnaissance beforehand. The assault squad will then have to be briefed on the findings of the pre-operational team.

One of the hardest tasks of a planned operation against Singapore would be the setting up of sanctuaries and safe houses in which to store weapons and make final preparations before the operation. This will not be easy in Singapore where surveillance is quite high and where acquisition and storage of small arms is not readily available. What the terrorists might consider is the establishment of a base of operations across the causeway



in Malaysia under the radar of the Malaysian authorities and then, as in the case of the Mumbai attack in India, the landing in Singapore will be tantamount to the launching of the assault. The planners of the terrorist attack might require assistance from sympathisers in Singapore itself because once the terrorists land in Singapore they may need vehicles to transport them to their specific or respective targets. The terrorist planners will focus exclusively on how to infiltrate the terrorists into Singapore and not on how to exfiltrate them from the island. The assault team will be going in with the knowledge that this is a one-way mission.

The terrorists are also faced with developing an effective maritime component of the planned event: how to get the terrorists into Singapore unscathed with their arms and equipment? It is assessed here that the infiltration of an assault team onto Singaporean territory ready to move into the assault will be a difficult operation itself and will require detailed planning and preparation such as acquisition of small vessels to transport the assault team and knowledge of Singaporean coastal surveillance and protection protocols to mention but a few key issues. However, Singapore is not lax about its maritime security and its coastal maritime forces pack a heavy punch in terms of surveillance and capacity to respond.[35]

What is the general course of action (COA) for Singapore to thwart or deal with such a terrorist event? First, Singapore needs to work to prevent such an attack. Though a terrorist organisation is a clandestine one, the effort involved in organising, planning, and executing such an operation always leaves a footprint. This stage of terrorist preparations will likely leave a large footprint, which Singapore security services must be ready to pick up. Prevention is, of course, what states aspire to. It is not always possible to prevent a terrorist attack even though we have already established the fact that terrorists planning havoc almost invariably leave a footprint of some kind. Terrorist attacks often succeed because of failures of analytical imagination within intelligence and police services, a lack of long-term strategic intelligence on the threat, and organisational limitations that prevent any intelligence community from being able to “connect the dots” of the existing intelligence.

Second, if Singapore fails to prevent such a type of attack, it needs to fight successfully against it. What does this mean? Firstly, the kind of chaos in command, control, and coordination exhibited in Mumbai and Nairobi must be avoided. Secondly, it must move to minimise the cost by bringing it to an end as quickly as possible. Authorities will need to plan their response based on the knowledge that the “terrorist commandos” are not undertaking their action as a form of negotiation with the government. The hostages they take are not really hostages but “doomed captives,” whom they intend to kill.

Third, if an attack takes place, authorities need to deal successfully with the fall-out and consequences. This response falls back as much on societal resilience as it does on a proactive approach by the government to prevent a breakdown in society and inter-communal relations. Both the government and Singaporeans of all creeds and races must realise that one of the key goals of the terrorists is to cause polarisation between the communities.

We cannot ignore the possibility that the terrorists might conclude that a major assault on urban Singapore would be infeasible. Singapore’s intelligence and security services must think “outside the box” and go down a checklist of what terrorists might think is operationally feasible and what is not. In this context, IS may decide that a major maritime terrorist event might be their best way to do harm to the country. To be sure, major maritime terrorist events are actually quite rare. Al-Qaeda has written about it and conducted two significant maritime attacks off the coast of Yemen years ago. The most successful terrorist or insurgent organisation with a maritime terrorist capability was the now defunct Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), whose capabilities in this domain were eventually defeated by the Sri Lankan Navy in 2009. We cannot discount the fact that IS might choose “to go maritime” in the near future.

When we address the issue of whether a MCUTA can be executed in Singapore, we are entering the realm of speculation. This policy paper was an exercise in trying to heighten awareness in Singapore, getting the requisite authorities to pay attention to this particular operational method and capability that has already been used by terrorists elsewhere.

Conclusion

Mass casualty urban terrorist assaults are the modus operandi of well-organised and resilient terrorist organisations that are functionally

specialised and have the resources to engage in such deadly actions. IS is at the



“cutting edge” of this type of operation. It has set up an “External Operations Department” within its sprawling Security Department (“Diwan al-Amn”). The purpose of External Ops is to carry out deadly operations like mass casualty urban assaults in hostile territory. The “department” is made up of high-level planners, bomb-makers, financiers, and combat units. The combat units themselves are split into two types: well-trained individuals—the suicide commandos—with combat experience in Syria and Iraq and maybe drawn from the Inghimasi [assault suicide commandos] unit. The Inghimasi are IS’ assault or storm-troops who attack fortified and defended positions. Theirs is often a one-way mission, but they are not suicide bombers. The second and less skilled group consists of those who are provided with very quick and basic training such as that undergone by Reda Hame, an incompetent would-be terrorist—he could not learn how to handle an AK-47 assault rifle—who surrendered to French police in August 2015. The primary mission of this second group is to do suicide missions or attack soft targets by themselves (to give the impression that they

are lone wolves). “External Operations” has to rely on a forward logistical network within the target countries, which consists of members or sympathisers who can provide safe houses, supplies, food, cars, acquire the necessary ingredients for explosives, and lastly small arms from organised criminal networks.[36]

The threat posed by a new subset of terrorist operational art or method, the mass casualty urban terrorist attack (MCUTA), cannot be minimised or underestimated. It is not, however, an insurmountable obstacle that cannot be prevented or dealt with if it occurs. Dealing with a potential or actual MCUTA requires authorities in each target country to pay greater attention to the possibility of such an attack and accordingly engage in the requisite changes that must include bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation. The terrorists who have done this in the past have committed appalling blunders that could have thwarted them and prevented large-scale mayhem and destruction. Unfortunately, however, to date the terrorists seem to have blundered less than the authorities.

► Notes are available at source’s URL.

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FBI searching Orlando gunman's computer for digital evidence he scouted Disney World

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/06/13/orlando-gunmans-descent-into-islamic-terror-comes-into-focus.html>



June 13 – Investigators from the FBI are searching the electronic devices of the Muslim terrorist who killed at least 49 people in an Orlando nightclub for any direct indications that he planned to target Disney World or nearby Downtown Disney, a law enforcement source close to the investigation told Fox News on Monday.

The search for evidence of any plan to target Disney is in



CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – June 2016

addition to scrubbing those devices for communications with any FBI-flagged individuals, domestic or international, the source said.



As of Monday, investigators are currently scrubbing the Pulse nightclub gunman's computer for any pictures or videos of Disney World that would suggest Omar Mateen cased the park or its surrounding areas as a potential target, according to the source.

When asked if any direct evidence was found so far, the source told Fox News "it's still early."

The FBI has also been in contact with security officials at Disney World to review security camera footage that would place Mateen at the park or at any of its surrounding attractions, the law enforcement source said.

When also asked if investigators were able to access the gunman's phone, source could not say, but did tell Fox News that once on his phone, investigators would direct attention to the device's geolocation history to determine any extended periods of time spent in the area of Disney World.

At a press briefing Monday afternoon, FBI Director James Comey told reporters that investigators were "still working through" whether Mateen scouted the theme park as a

potential terror target.

People Magazine reported earlier on Monday that Mateen's ex-wife told the feds he had recently scouted Disney World.

Salman told authorities the couple had recently been to Downtown Disney as well as Pulse in April, a federal law enforcement source told People. People's source indicated Mateen may have been scouting the locations for a potential attack.

"Unfortunately we've all been living in a world of uncertainty, and we have been increasing our security measures across our properties for some time, adding such visible safeguards as magnetometers, additional canine units, and law enforcement officers on site, as well as less visible systems that employ state-of-the-art security technologies," a Disney spokesperson said in a statement to Fox News.

People who knew Mateen and law enforcement authorities piecing together his descent into radical Islam described him as an angry loner who beat his ex-wife, alienated co-workers and made at least two mysterious trips to Saudi Arabia.

[Omar Mateen purchased at least two weapons used during the Orlando terror attack at the St. Lucie Shooting Center. \(FoxNews.com\)](#)



On Monday, FBI Director Comey said that three phone calls between Omar Mateen and a 911 operator while Mateen was holed up in a club bathroom with hostages may provide insight into his radicalization. During those calls, Comey said, Mateen "made clear his support for" ISIS and pledged loyalty to the terror group's leader.



Media Moves to Cover Up Worst Islamic Terror Attack Since 9/11

Source: <http://bearingarms.com/bob-o/2016/06/13/insane-media-moves-cover-worst-islamic-terror-attack-since-911/>

June 13 – The liberal media is in full damage-control mode this morning, just 24 hours after the deadliest Islamic terror attack since 9/11. Nauseatingly leftist WRAL (Raleigh, NC) was a perfect example of the attempt to “memory hole” the reason for the attack, in a Goebbelized Associated Press story that buried the reason for the attack until the [fourth paragraph](#).

Bodies removed after worst mass shooting in US history

Dozens of bodies were slowly removed overnight from a popular Orlando gay club after a gunman sprayed the helpless crowd with bullets in violence that killed 50 people and devastated a city famous for family-friendly theme parks.

When the attacker opened fire in the early hours of Sunday morning, it interrupted an evening of drinking, dancing and drag shows at a club known for tolerance for all people.

Authorities say suspect O___ M___* emerged, carrying an AR-15 and fired relentlessly — 20 rounds, 40, then 50 and more. In such tight quarters, the bullets could hardly miss. He shot at police. He took hostages.

When the gunfire at the Pulse Orlando club finally stopped, 50 people were dead and dozens critically wounded in the deadliest mass shooting in modern U.S. history. M___, who authorities said had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in a 911 around the time of the attack, died in a gun battle with SWAT team members.

The screenshot shows the WRAL.com website interface. At the top, there are navigation links for Spotlight, Notices, Instant Savings, Classifieds, Jobs, and Real Estate. The main navigation bar includes News, Weather, Sports, Business, Consumer, Health & Life, Entertainment, and Video. The weather is 65°. The main headline reads "Bodies removed after worst mass shooting in US history" with a sub-headline "Orlando natives in shock". Below the headline, there are several news items:

- LIVE: Authorities provide update on Orlando shooting** - Authorities provide an update as they continue to investigate the deadly shooting of 50 people inside a nightclub in Orlando, Florida. 20 mins ago.
- Nightclub shooter was a body builder, security guard** - 5 mins ago.
- As mass shootings plague US, survivors mourn lack of change** - 45 mins ago.
- 2 charged after mobile meth lab discovered in Four Oaks**
- Today @NCCapitol: Math standards, reg reform, eugenics bills on calendars**
- Monday brings short-lived cool down to Triangle**
- Fire damages kitchen at La Residence in Chapel Hill**

On the right side, there is a "MORE TOP NEWS" section with the following items:

- 1st 'Moral Monday' in far western part in NC planned - 46 mins ago
- Shark bite reported at Atlantic Beach
- Penguins beat Sharks 3-1 for 4th Stanley Cup title
- Florida police seek motive for killing of 'The Voice' singer

At the bottom right, there is a "SUMMER CAMPS ARE BACK!" banner.

The article was intentionally written to bury the lede, playing up the “mass shooting” angle, while burying the harsh reality that an Islamic terrorist loyal to a group known for thrown



gays off of buildings and burning them alive for sport had specifically targeted gay Americans for slaughter during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

As of 7:30 AM, the rest of the WRAL home page was [equally, intentionally deceptive](#).

[LIVE: Authorities provide update on Orlando shooting](#) blared the next headline, which was a link to a live press conference.

[Nightclub shooter was a body builder, security guard](#) read the next headline. It completely buries the widely known fact that the terrorist who carried out the attack hated gays and pledged allegiance to ISIS, a terrorist group especially known for their brutality towards gays.

He was a body builder and a security guard, a religious man who attended the local mosque and wanted to become a police officer.

Early Sunday, 29-year-old O___ M___ opened fire at a gay nightclub in Orlando in an attack that left 50 people dead and 53 wounded, police said.

M___ was the son of an Afghan immigrant who had a talk show in the United States, the nature of which was not entirely clear: A former Afghan official said the program was pro-Taliban and a former colleague said it was enthusiastically pro-American.

He attended evening prayer services at the city's Islamic Center three to four times a week, most recently with his young son, said Imam Syed Shafeeq Rahman. Although he was not very social, he also showed no signs of violence, Rahman said. He said he last saw M___ on Friday.

Of course, WRAL completely skips the reality that the terrorist's coworkers complained repeatedly to their employer that the devout Muslim terrorist was [incredibly violent, racist, misogynist and homophobic](#).

These Associated Press stories chosen by WRAL are spinning the reality of the worst Islamic terrorist attack since 9/11 in a blindingly obvious attempt to deflect away from the threat of radical Islam and the federal government's refusal to seriously deal with the threat. Instead, the Associated Press (and WRAL) are attempting—once again—to blame the 110+ million peaceful, law-abiding American citizens who own guns. [As mass shootings plague the US, survivors more lack of change](#) laments the last terror-attack related article on the page.

It, too, does its very best it can to shift the blame to peaceful American gun owners and bury the fact that this was an Islamic terrorist attack.

The deadliest shooting in modern U.S. history has people around the world wondering why mass violence keeps happening in America.

For those who have lived through mass shootings, and for the law enforcement officers trying to prevent them, the answer is self-evident.

"Because we allow it," said Sandy Phillips, whose daughter was among 12 killed at Colorado movie theater in July 2012.

The nation began the week mourning the 50 people killed early Sunday when a gunman wielding an assault-type rifle and a handgun opened fire inside a crowded gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Authorities are investigating whether the assault was an act of terrorism, a hate crime, or both. Politicians lamented the violence as tragically familiar despite its staggering scale.

The causes of mass shootings are as disparate as the cases themselves, but those involved in other tragedies couldn't help but feel the similarities.

The Associated Press lacks the integrity to mention that Phillips is an employee of the radical Brady Campaign gun control group, or that she was berated by a judge who hammered her for a frivolous lawsuit against gun companies.

Every single one of these Associated Press stories chosen by the WRAL staff buried the fact that the terrorist hated gays, beat women, could barely go a sentence without attacking minorities, pledged himself to the Islamic State, and screamed the glory of Allah as he put bullets into more than 100 people in a gay nightclub that he targeted in the middle of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

American gays are waking up to a harsh reality this morning: the radicalized leftist news media cares far more about protecting Islamic radicals and attacking the right of citizens to defend themselves from terrorists than they do protecting gay American lives.

* Bearing Arms does not publish the names of mass or spree killers.



Paris policeman and wife killed in possible Isis-linked terror attack

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/13/french-policeman-stabbed-death-paris>

June 14 – A man who claimed allegiance to the Islamic State group stabbed a French policeman to death on Monday night before being killed when police moved in, sources close to the investigation said.

The man's wife was also found dead when police stormed the house. A three-year-old boy was rescued alive.



French prosecutors have launched an anti-terror probe into the attack in the Paris suburb of Magnanville that was apparently carried out by a neighbour of the family.

Witnesses told investigators the attacker may have shouted "Allahu akbar" (God is greatest) as he stabbed the policeman

repeatedly outside his home before holding the woman and the boy inside. The child was described as the couple's son by some of the French authorities.



The police officer who died was named in the French media as Jean-Baptiste Salvaing, 42, described as an assistant chief in the nearby district of Les Mureaux. He was reported to have been wearing civilian clothes at the time.

The suspect was a neighbour and authorities tried to negotiate with him before storming the property at around midnight local time,

according to French media reports.

Loud detonations were heard at the scene as Raid officers moved in.

Officers found the woman's body when they stormed the building and the attacker was killed during the assault, said interior ministry spokesman Pierre-Henry Brandet said.

The boy was "in shock but unharmed" and receiving medical attention, a prosecutor added.





“The toll is a heavy one,” Brandet told reporters at the scene. “This commander, this police officer was killed by the individual [and] we discovered the body of a woman. The assailant, the criminal, was killed. Thankfully a little boy was saved. He was in the house. He’s safe and sound. He was saved by police officers.”

Magnanville is about 35 miles north-west of the Paris CBD.

François Hollande said a meeting would be held at the presidential

palace on Tuesday morning and declared that “all light will be shed” on the case. The French president condemned what he described as an “odious act”.

“Light will be shed on the circumstances of this abominable drama whose investigation, under the authority of justice, will determine the exact nature,” Hollande said in a statement.

The interior minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, expressed his “infinite sadness” at the death of the police commander and his partner, who had worked for his ministry.

“The attacker was neutralised by Raid forces, who showed great composure and great professionalism and who saved the couple’s little boy,” Cazeneuve said in a statement.

“The inquiry opened by the justice authorities will establish the precise circumstances of this tragedy.”

Sources close to the inquiry told



AFP the attacker had claimed allegiance to the Islamic State jihadist group while negotiating with police from the elite Raid unit.

“The anti-terror department of the Paris prosecution service is taking into account at this stage the mode of operation, the target and the comments made during negotiations with the Raid,” one source said.

Policeman slaughtered and his wife

The Site Intelligence Group, a US-based monitor, cited the Isis-linked Amaq News Agency as saying on its Telegram channels:

“Islamic State fighter kills deputy chief of the police station in the city of Les Mureaux and his wife with blade weapons near Paris.”

Police sources had told AFP earlier in the evening that the attacker had taken the policeman’s partner and the boy hostage after stabbing the officer to death when he returned home around 9pm.

“The negotiations were unsuccessful – a decision was made to launch an assault” around midnight, said interior ministry spokesman Brandet.

French prosecutor Vincent Lesclous, who said he knew the slain police commander, said:

“The investigation is beginning.

“We have no certainty about the attacker’s motivations,” Lesclous said.



The killing in France came a day after a gunman claiming to be acting in the name of Isis shot dead 49 people at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in the worst mass shooting in US history. France is hosting the Euro 2016 football tournament under tight security. The country is still reeling from the November 2015 jihadist attacks in Paris that left 130 people dead.

Orlando shooter was regular at Pulse gay club; former classmate says Omar Mateen was homosexual

Source: <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/orlando-shooter-reported-pulse-club-regular-patrons-article-1.2672445>

June 13 – Omar Mateen lived a double life.

The homophobic maniac who murdered 49 people inside Orlando's gay-friendly nightclub Pulse Sunday morning had been hanging out there for three years — and chatted with men via online dating services like Grindr, said multiple witnesses who



claimed to have firsthand knowledge of Mateen's habits.

Mateen's family said his bloody rampage was sparked by anti-gay hatred. But his ex-wife, Sitora Yusufiy, when asked on CNN Monday if he was gay, sat in silence for a few seconds before answering, "I don't know." She said Mateen — who she married in 2009 but left months later, claiming he beat her — confessed to her that he liked to go nightclubbing. "When we had gotten married, he confessed to me about his past -- that was recent at that

time -- and that he very much enjoyed going to clubs and the nightlife," Yusufiy said. "So, I feel like it's a side of him or a part of him that he lived but probably didn't want everybody to know about."

As rumors circulated that Mateen had been hiding a double life, his father Seddique Mateen insisted Monday his son was not gay.

"It's not true. Why, if he is gay, would he do this?" said the elder Mateen.

"If it was true I would say yes, if it's not true I say it's not true," he added.

A former classmate of Omar Mateen's 2006 police academy class, however, said he believed Mateen was gay.

Speaking to WFTV9 in Orlando, the classmate, who asked not to be named, said he was gay in 2006 but had not yet come out about his sexuality.

Mateen had asked him out, the classmate said.

"We went to a few gay bars with him, and I was not

out at the time, so I declined his offer," the former classmate said.

"He just wanted to fit in and no one liked him," he said. "He was always socially awkward," the classmate told WFTV9.

Mateen, who had married again, this time to Noor Salman who bore him a son, also visited Pulse several times over the past three years, according to club patrons.

One couple, who work together as drag-dancing performers, said they'd seen Mateen as many as a dozen times at Pulse.





Chris Callen and Ty Smith also said they'd seen him escorted drunk from Pulse more than once.

(Courtesy of Chris Callen)

Callen and his husband said they were headed to Pulse that night after celebrating Smith's 40th birthday.

But Smith was too tired to make it, so they went home.

"We could have been there. So far, I know 12 people (who) didn't make it," said Callen.

The couple said they didn't buy the story spun by Mateen's father. Seddique Mateen told NBC News immediately after the attack that his son had been motivated by rage after seeing two men kissing recently in Miami.

Ty Smith and Chris Callen also said they'd seen him escorted drunk from the club more than once.

"I've seen him a couple of times at Pulse, a couple of other people that I've spoken with, including an-ex security guard, have actually witnessed this guy at Pulse many times before," said Callen, who performs as Kristina McLaughlin.

"One friend was a security guard there two years ago and she remembers him," Callen told the Daily News.

He estimates Mateen began showing up about three years ago. Everybody was blown away to realize he was the man responsible for the slaughter.

"It's shocking to everyone because we saw him there before," said Callen.

He said one night Mateen got angry about a religious joke and pulled a knife on a friend. But it was nothing the friend couldn't handle, Callen said.

The performer recalled his first words with Mateen three years ago.

"He was a nice guy," he said of the shooter.

"He was at the bar. He was actually talking with another guy. I turned around. I was in drag. I said hello. He seemed comfortable," Callen said.

"As I was onstage he was standing next to somebody, having a conversation, having a good time close to the stage. Later on that night ... he was out there dancing with another guy. It could be he just went crazy. Maybe he got radicalized and hated who he was," Callen said.



Seddique Mir Mateen, father of Orlando shooter Omar Mateen.
(Joe Cavaretta/AP)

Mateen, who spent part of his early life in Queens and Westbury, L.I., had seen plenty of public displays of affection between gay couples before his Sunday blood bath.

"That's bullcrap, right there. No offense. That's straight-up crap. He's been around us," Smith told the Canadian Press earlier Monday.

"Some of those people did a little more than (kiss) outside the bar. ... He was partying with the people who supposedly drove him to do this?" Smith said.

Another report claimed Mateen was known to contact men on gay online apps. At least one man came forward Monday to say Mateen had contacted him on Grindr, according to MSNBC.

The man also said he knew friends who'd been contacted by Mateen on Jack'd and Adam4Adam, other online gay dating services. Callen and Smith said Mateen liked to let loose at Pulse in a way he could not around his religious family at home.

"(He'd get) really, really drunk. ... He couldn't drink when he was at home — around his wife, or family. His father was really strict. ... He used to bitch about it," Smith told Canadian Press.



Orlando shooting: Homosexuality and radical Islam have long been at war

Source: <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/orlando-mass-shooting-florida-pulse-nightclub-club-omar-mateen-isis-donald-trump-gun-control-act-san-bernardino/story/1/11158.html>

June 14 – As with all terror attacks, the one in Orlando too will invoke calls to maintain calm, to not blame a particular religion or community, to look upon it as a tragedy perpetrated by someone with mental health issues.

And as with all terror attacks, it will become increasingly clear that the attack was part of a well-established pattern witnessed earlier in Paris and London and Mumbai, of radical Islam trying to force its vision of the right and proper on the world, of its adherents willing to commit grave injustices in the name of Allah.

is here that he finds love, however temporary it may be, however lustful its contours. Even as the West moves inexorably towards granting gays the same rights as straights, it is the nightclub and its hallucinatory promise that will always make a gay man skip a heartbeat.

It is this heart of gay life that was attacked in Orlando. There is no sweeter way to say this: radical Islam is the number one threat of our times. It harbours an ideology whose lifeblood is a deep hatred of freedom. Mateen, who pledged allegiance to the IS in a call to 911, only took forward what the terror group has



Islamic state homosexual execution

It is not easy writing about the attack. It targeted a community of which I am a member. It was just another Saturday night in Pulse, the nightclub that became the target of Omar Mateen, an American citizen, born and brought up in that country, yet who harboured such a visceral hatred for it that he thought nothing of gunning down 50 of his compatriots only because they were gay.

For the gay man, the nightclub is a place of particular sanctity. It is here that he truly finds himself, as he unpeels layer upon layer of the subterfuge that lets him survive in the world. It

been proudly doing in its occupied territories in West Asia.

A few months ago, pictures of gay men in IS-controlled territories in Iraq and Syria made the rounds of media. Their faces covered, they were thrown off cliffs, their bloodied, battered bodies joining hundreds others in the macabre dance of death that the IS slickly performs from time to time.

Starting from West Asia but hoping to conquer the world, the terror group wants to establish a global Caliphate where the rule of Sharia will reign supreme. Women, gays, and minorities of every stripe will have



no rights in this land. The IS believes that the concept of rights itself is an Occidental construct that deserves to be junked.

This by itself is evil enough. But when American and European Muslims start subscribing to this depraved ideology and are willing to carry out lone wolf attacks on its behalf, we face a problem of altogether different proportions.

As Europe grapples with one of the worst refugee crises in history, this latest attack will reinforce the problems of assimilating diverse populations. Europe has been at the receiving end of this problem far longer than the US. The continent, which prided itself on its open borders, has been forced to rethink its strategy due to the massive inflow of refugees from West Asia.

For men and women trooping in from regressive societies, adjustment requires more than attaining physical and financial security. The mass sexual attacks on women in Cologne on this New Year's Eve by men of West Asian and North African origin highlight the problems with assimilating people from vastly different socio-cultural backgrounds.

The European model of multiculturalism, where minorities are encouraged to retain their customs, has backfired terribly in failing to integrate its Muslim immigrant populations whose children are now adopting radical Islam in droves.

Up to 2015, over 6,000 European Muslims had travelled to Syria to join IS. Tracking them has proven to be a logistical nightmare. Besides, a culture of political correctness has ensured that discussing the dangers of radical Islam invites social ridicule. When a society starts getting offended by words, it becomes numb to the threat of real violence.

Homosexuality and radical Islam have long been in battle in Europe. One of the earliest detractors of multiculturalism was gay Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, who was labelled far-right because he deemed Islam incompatible with modern Europe.

Murdered by an activist in 2002, Fortuyn was prescient about the impending churn in Europe. In recent years, other politicians such as Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen have spoken openly about the incapacity of Islam to accept homosexuality.

America, with its melting-pot tradition, was believed to be more secure. But as the cases

of Mateen and the San Bernardino shooters, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, show, the country is as vulnerable to terror strikes as Europe. Thanks to easy availability of guns and a vast Muslim population, chances of individuals taking the law into their hands in grisly manner is a real threat.

When Donald Trump said on the campaign trail that he will ban entry of Muslims to America, a furore ensued. But even he could not have envisioned the ready source of home-grown terror staring America in the face.

Mateen's father has said that his son was not a terrorist; rather he was a homophobe who had once spoken about being disgusted by the sight of two men kissing. If that were so, this would be a hate crime.

But even here radical Islam rears its ugly head. Not liking gay people and massacring 50 of them is not the same thing. Many conservative members of other religions have reservations about homosexuality.

Indeed, when the United States Supreme Court made same-sex marriage legal across the country last year, many conservatives balked at the dilution of a beloved institution.

But those reservations pale in comparison to the physical threat that radical Islam presents. It believes in the supremacy of its ways, and insists they be adopted on pain of death. It brooks no opposition, no argument or analysis that might expose the hollowness of its shockingly dated vision of the world.

Even as it hates the West, it has no compunction in exploiting the fruits of Western enterprise and innovation to further its cause. Mateen had never travelled outside the US and was radicalised online.

For all the belated hand-wringing, there is little hope of a solution. Even as radical Islam spreads its tentacles, the dominant narrative in the West is stuck on refugee rights and anti-Trump rhetoric. The failure of the Arab world to reform itself is brushed aside in pleas to build more politically correct societies.

Radical Islam presents the most potent challenge to Enlightenment ideals dominant in the West for hundreds of years. From the looks of it, we seem doomed to shedding helpless tears as an abstract, faceless threat chokes us with its vice-like grip.




ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 'killed in US air strike in Raqqa' according to pro-Islamic State news agency

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3640726/ISIS-leader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-killed-air-strike-Raqqa-according-pro-Islamic-State-news-agency.html>

June 14 – ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has reportedly been killed in a US air strike in Raqqa.



His death, reported by ISIS's own news agency, is a major blow for the jihadists and comes only two days after 50 people killed in an Orlando nightclub. There have previously been reports that Baghdadi was killed or wounded after proclaiming himself caliph of all Muslims two years ago. Reports of his death were running on Iranian state media and the Turkish daily Yenisafak.



He was born as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri, in 1971 in Samarra, Iraq, to a lower-middle class Sunni family. His tribe claimed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad.

As a youth Baghdadi was a meticulous observer of religious law and could recite the Koran from cover to cover.

Wolf Dens, Not Lone Wolves, The Norm In US ISIS Plots

Source: <http://m.ndtv.com/world-news/wolf-dens-not-lone-wolves-the-norm-in-us-isis-plots-1418916>

June 14 – **If Omar Mateen acted alone in plotting the massacre of 49 people at Orlando's Pulse gay nightclub, he would be the exception rather than the rule in U.S. cases involving suspected ISIS supporters.**

Sunday's worst mass shooting in modern U.S. history prompted renewed warnings from officials of "lone wolf" attackers, a term that commonly invokes images of isolated individuals, radicalized online by violent propaganda and plotting alone.

But a Reuters review of the approximately 90 ISIS court cases brought by the Department of Justice since 2014 found that three-quarters of those charged were alleged to be part of a group of anywhere

from two to more than 10 co-conspirators who met in person to discuss their plans.

Even in those cases that did not involve in-person meetings, defendants were almost always in contact with other sympathizers, whether via text message, email or networking websites, according to court documents. Fewer than 10 cases involved someone accused of acting entirely alone.

The "lone wolf" image obscures the extent to which individuals become radicalized through personal association with like-minded people, in what might be termed "wolf dens," experts on radicalization and counter-terrorism say.

"We focus so much on the online stuff that we're missing that there's a very human connection going on here," said Karen Greenberg, who runs the Center on National Security at Fordham University in New York.

U.S. authorities on Monday were investigating whether Mateen -- who pledged allegiance to ISIS during the attack -- had any help, but officials stressed they



believed there were no other attackers.

FBI director James Comey said his exact motives remain unclear, but that there were strong indications he was inspired by foreign terrorist groups and that authorities were "highly confident" he was radicalized in part over the Internet.

Infiltrating Groups

Law enforcement efforts to combat homegrown extremism have started to focus more on group dynamics. In a December speech at a counterterrorism conference in New York, Comey said investigators need family and friends to help them identify potentially radicalized individuals who may not have a visible online presence.

"If they go out and interact with small groups of people, who sees them?" he said. "Community members."

In February, the FBI launched a website to educate teenagers about the dangers of extremism and help parents and community leaders decide when to intervene and when to report troubling behavior.

The Justice Department has secured convictions in around half the 90 ISIS-linked cases. Other cases are ongoing, with some of the charges unproven in court and disputed by defendants.

The relationships between accused co-conspirators range from casual acquaintances to lifelong friends, from married couples to cousins and from roommates to college buddies.

In some cases, the group included several defendants from the same community, such as the sprawling investigation in Minnesota in which 10 Somali-Americans were charged with plotting to aid ISIS. Three were convicted at trial this month, while six others pleaded guilty in the case.

In others, such as the married couple responsible for killing 14 people in December in San Bernardino, California, the relationship was far more intimate.

In an increasingly frequent occurrence, the defendant was unwittingly working with an FBI informant posing as a co-conspirator, as federal authorities rely more on human intelligence and less on the comparatively low-hanging fruit of social media to identify potential attackers.

Face-to-face interactions can accelerate extremist viewpoints, turning the group to

violence, experts said. And it can draw in others who might otherwise not have been susceptible to the lure of jihadism.

"The true lone wolf is usually psychotic, and very few jihadists are truly psychotic," said Jytte Klausen, a professor at Brandeis University who specializes in radicalization.

Online propaganda is merely stoking the fire rather than igniting it, some experts said.

"Imagine if Match.com were set up in such a way that the people could never meet," said Max Abrahms, a professor at Northeastern University who has studied extremist groups. "Clearly there's no replacement for actual socialization in person."

"Preying" On Insecurities

One of the cases showing the crucial role of group dynamics involves a cluster of six defendants in the New York area.

Nader Saadeh and his friend, a New York City college student named Munther Omar Saleh, had become convinced in 2013 that the end of the world was near, according to prosecutors.

The two 20-year-olds decided to create a "small army" of friends, prosecutors said, and eventually recruited four others, including 21-year-old student Samuel Topaz and a 16-year-old friend of Saleh's named Imran Rabbani.

The men spent months discussing plans to join ISIS in Syria or to launch a bomb attack on U.S. soil, according to investigators.

Authorities first became aware of the group when Topaz's mother called the FBI in early 2015 after becoming increasingly concerned about his behavior.

Topaz, raised by a Catholic mother from the Dominican Republic and a Jewish father from Israel, had dropped out of college and begun spending most of his time with two classmates, Saadeh and his older brother, Alaa. Topaz converted to Islam and had begun talking about traveling overseas, his mother told the FBI, according to court documents.

The Saadeh brothers were trying to recruit Topaz by "preying" on his insecurities, she said.

In May this year, Alaa Saadeh was sentenced to 15 years in prison after pleading guilty in October to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. His brother, Topaz and Rabbani also pleaded guilty and are awaiting sentencing.



Saleh, who is accused of plotting to set off a homemade bomb in New York, was arrested in June 2015 when he and Rabbani attacked a law enforcement surveillance vehicle that had been following them. Saleh and the other defendant, Fareed Mumuni, have pleaded not guilty.

At his sentencing, Alaa Saadeh told the judge he had acted in part out of love for his younger brother in the absence of their deported parents.

"I could have helped him," he said. "I could have done a lot more."

Terrorism and tourism: what cities should do to prepare for an attack

By Lori Pennington-Gray

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160615-terrorism-and-tourism-what-cities-should-do-to-prepare-for-an-attack>

June 15 – Citizens of the U.S. and the world were deeply shocked and saddened when a gunman shot and killed about fifty patrons at an Orlando nightclub this past weekend.

While the shooter's primary targets were the people enjoying an evening out, a secondary object of such incidents is typically tourism, with the aim of terrorizing a population so much that people don't travel there, thereby harming the economy.

Thus it was no surprise that the United Nations World Tourism Organization was among the many groups to swiftly condemn the attack and express its condolences to the victims' families and "full solidarity" with Americans.

But is sending messages of solidarity and support enough?

At the Tourism Crisis Management Initiative at the University of Florida, which I oversee, we conduct research on a host of issues to help inform management, marketing and policy decisions in the industry.

In recent years, we've looked into how cities and other destinations react to shootings and other situations that negatively affect tourism to uncover best practices to mitigate the impact. We've learned several important lessons

about what cities can do to assure tourists they can maintain their safety.



Importance of tourism

Orlando relies on tourism as a major contributor to its economy. In fact, the city that is home to Disney World, the Wizarding World of Harry Potter and SeaWorld received more than 60 million visitors in 2015, ranking it among the top destinations in the U.S. Tourism is responsible for an economic impact to surrounding Orange County of more than \$60 billion annually.

While [research confirms](#) that crime and terror have a negative impact on the cities where they take place, the tourism industry has actually become more resilient in recent years. For example, the time it takes to fully recover has declined significantly. **Back in 2001, it took hotels in New York thirty-four months to return to pre-attack occupancy levels, while other U.S. cities averaged forty-five months following 9/11.** Four years later, London hotels were back to normal occupancy just nine months after a series of suicide

bombers on Underground trains killed 52 people. Perhaps this is because of London's greater experience with terrorism attacks.

And more recently, the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 had only a [limited impact](#) on hotel occupancy rates – with some reporting that tourism actually surged.

Signaling safety

That's in part because destinations have gotten better about being proactive in their tourism crisis management. However, many destinations still do not engage sufficiently in preparedness and thus are at risk of losing visitors to other destinations.

Shootings like the one in Orlando tend not to depress overall demand. Tourists like to travel and feel the need for travel and take a vacation. Therefore, tourists tend to alter their travel plans rather than cancel.



This is good news for tourism destinations. But since tourism is a zero sum gain, some destinations win while others will lose. [Research suggests](#) that tourists tend to flock to cities and other destinations where they feel safe and the risk is minimal.

As such, Orlando's tourism industry will need to implement a tourism crisis management plan immediately if it hopes to prevent would-be visitors from going elsewhere and minimize the shooting's impact on its economy.

Managing the perceived safety of visitors is above all about having a strong communication plan – that provides timely, accurate and informative messages – as well as a strong safety management program – putting more boots on the ground so there are visibly more police in tourist-dominated areas. One cannot effectively exist without the other.

Visit Orlando, the local destination management organization, for example, quickly posted the following statement after the nightclub shooting:

Our deepest sympathies go toward those impacted and affected by this tragedy. We are appalled and saddened by this act of violence. We continue to work with our community partners on the evolving nature of this incident and have total trust in the dedication of our public officials' leadership during this difficult time.

While offering condolences is important in the communication process, it is not very informative to someone who is vacationing in the area or has booked a flight to Orlando next week and is wondering whether it's safe to visit. Rather, it is critical for an organization like Visit Orlando to inform visitors already there what they are doing to keep them safe and assure those with plans why they maintain keep them.

More than ever, tourists require true, informative, directive and honest information. The greater the destination can do this, the greater feelings of trust that are held for the destination management organization [leads to greater feelings of trust](#) and thus less economic loss to the destination.


Lessons learned

The [Tourism Crisis Management Initiative](#) has worked with destinations all over the world over the past five years to increase preparedness.

Specifically, we've studied how they responded to a variety of crises, such as a crime wave, terrorism, hurricanes and viruses such as Zika and Ebola, to learn what works and what doesn't. Here are some of those findings that are relevant for Orlando.

First, our research has revealed that due to the rise in citizen journalism and access to digital media, tourists turn to social media for information more frequently than ever before. Realizing this, [Facebook developed a program](#) in 2014 that turns on in a crisis and allows users to easily notify friends that they are safe.

The Orlando attack prompted Facebook to



activate it in the U.S. for the first time.

We recommend groups like Visit Orlando help publicize Facebook's Safety Check and similar apps so visitors know how to share their location and status with loved ones.

Our research also suggests that tourists need more specific safety information than locals do. Since visitors are usually unfamiliar with the geography and other aspects of their destination, it can be difficult to find information that's relevant to them and that they can make sense of. An example is when authorities are asking people to stay away from certain areas, and a tourist has no context for the directive.

Thus tourist organizations need to fill in these gaps and help visitors understand these messages using landmark-filled maps and other methods. This will go a long way toward making a tourist feel safe, less



likely to leave and more likely to stick to a planned trip.

In the same vein, Visit Orlando and other sites should make themselves the trusted source for one-stop shopping for all pertinent information on safety and security, with relevant links and regularly updated details. **It's also a good idea to set up visitor safety stations and 1-800 hotlines, both of which demonstrate a commitment to safety and security.**

Lori Pennington-Gray is Professor and Director of Tourism Crisis Management Initiative , University of Florida.

Hezbollah has more rockets than 27 NATO countries combined

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160615-report-hezbollah-has-more-rockets-than-27-nato-countries-combined>

June 15 – Any future war between Israel and Hezbollah will take a devastating toll on civilians due to the Iran-backed terrorist group's practice of embedding its military assets in residential areas, Willy Stern wrote in the 20 June issue of the *Weekly Standard*.



Hezbollah-bound Iranian missiles intercepted by Israeli navy // Source: commons.wikimedia.org

Hezbollah currently has a stockpile of over 130,000 rockets, more than the combined arsenal of all NATO countries, with the exception of the United States. This number includes long-range rockets and M-600 ballistic

missiles, which carry a high payload and would be able to “wipe out a good chunk of Times Square and maim and kill people four football fields away from the point of impact,” Stern noted. Hezbollah also has approximately 100,000 short-range rockets trained on schools, homes, and hospitals in northern Israel, which could potentially kill hundreds of civilians.

“You don't collect 130,000 missiles if you don't intend to use them,” said Matthew Levitt, an expert on counter-terrorism and intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Hezbollah's positioning of this weaponry in civilian areas poses a challenge to Israeli officers, added Geoff Corn, an international military law expert at the South Texas College of Law in Houston. “After exhausting all feasible efforts to reduce civilian



risk, IDF commanders must resolve the decisive question: Is the potential for civilian harm excessive in comparison to the advantages the attack would provide? When you talk of an M-600 in the hands of an enemy that targets vital military assets or the civilian population — even if that apartment building is full — launching the attack will be necessary to mitigate the threat,” he explained.

If Israel were to launch a strike in this instance, he concluded that “both legally and morally, the cause of these tragic consequences will lie solely at the feet of Hezbollah.” As such, “Hezbollah should be pressured starting today to avoid locating such vital military assets among civilians.” Otherwise “the instinctual condemnation of Israel will only encourage continuation of these illicit tactics.”

Stern explained that while Hezbollah has the manpower and weapons arsenal “of a nation-state...its tactics are those of a terrorist organization.” The destruction inflicted upon Lebanon in the event of war will therefore be massive, despite the fact that the IDF wages war in a cautious way to minimize civilian



casualties. “The IDF’s warnings certainly go beyond what the law requires, but they also sometimes go beyond what would be operational good sense elsewhere,” noted Michael Schmitt, chairman of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. “People are going to start thinking that the U.S. and other Western democracies should follow the same examples in different types of conflict. That’s a real risk.”

Israeli military officials in May 2015 told the *New York Times* that Hezbollah has “moved most of its military infrastructure” in and around Shiite villages, which “amounts to using the civilians as a human shield.” One senior military official added that Lebanese civilians are “living in a military compound,” noting: “We will hit Hezbollah hard, while making every effort to limit civilian casualties as much as we can...We do not intend to stand by helplessly in the face of rocket attacks.”

Stern, who was shown classified IDF maps of the locations of Hezbollah weapons, said that they are not only being stored in these southern villages, but in Beirut itself. He added that he was provided access to these documents, as well as military simulations, strategic projections, and top IDF officials, “because Israel wants the world to know that (1) a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon will be, unavoidably, awful; and (2) the massive collateral damage won’t be -Israel’s fault. Even more than that, the IDF seems to be pleading to the international community: Do something. Stop Hezbollah. Before it is too late, and they drag the region into a bloody hellhole.”

Yaakov Amidror, Israel’s former national security advisor, met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in the summer of 2013 and showed him “detailed evidence of Hezbollah’s deadly arsenal and the fact that it was strategically placed within densely populated civilian



centers.” When Amidror asked Ban what the Israelis should do, he “offered no response and no suggestions.”

“Nobody, it seems, in times of peace is willing to offer Israel a constructive suggestion on how to deal with an Iranian-backed terrorist organization in possession of a massive arsenal on its northern border,” Stern concluded. “But these same organizations stand front and center to criticize Israel for acting legally and proportionately for protecting its own citizens in wartime.”

2016 National Preparedness Report

Source: <http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-report>



The *National Preparedness Report* provides all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public with practical insights into preparedness to support decisions about program priorities, resource allocations, and community actions. The 2016 *National Preparedness Report* identifies cross-cutting findings that evaluate core capability performance, key findings in the Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas, and notable examples of preparedness progress over the past five years.

No, the Council on American-Islamic Relations Doesn't Like Homosexuals

By Gregg Roman

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6069/cair-doesnt-like-homosexuals>

June 15 – The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has touched the hearts of many journalists since an ISIS-inspired terror

[solidarity](#) with “all communities who are the victims of violence and persecution in our country.” CAIR-San Francisco Director Zahra

Billoo [vowed](#) to “stand with the LGBT community against homophobic violence.” The head of the organization’s Florida chapter, Hassan Shibly, [declared](#) his “overwhelming love and support and unity” for the LGBT community.

In light of Islam's well-known prohibitions against homosexuality, it's great to

hear such words in any context.

But let's not kid ourselves. CAIR was founded by members of the



attack left 49 dead at a gay nightclub in Orlando early Sunday morning. CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad [called for](#)



Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, whose hatred of homosexuals is quite explicit. Shibly himself [decried](#) homosexuality as "evil" and a "quick way to earn God's wrath" in a 2009 Facebook essay on gay marriage.

In order not to jeopardize their pursuit of U.S. governmental access and partnerships with left wing anti-Israel activists, most CAIR officials have avoided expressing such opinions publicly. More often they have ignored the issue of homosexuality or denied that it is prevalent in the Muslim community. Echoing the laughable claims of former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that his country has no homosexuals, CAIR-Chicago director Ahmed Rehab once [objected](#) to the presence of a gay Muslim American character in a local theater production, saying that homosexuality is an issue "not...very prevalent in the Muslim community" that was "imposed upon it by the play makers."

Moreover, CAIR coordinates very closely with other Islamist organizations that have not felt the need to bite their tongues when talking about homosexuality. Tahirah Amatul Wadud, a [member](#) of the CAIR-Massachusetts Executive Board of Directors, also happens to be general counsel for the notoriously anti-gay organization The Muslims of America Inc. (TMOA), led by Mubarak Ali Gilani (for high-profile cases handled at TMOA by Wadud, see [here](#) and [here](#)). Gilani [called](#) the U.S. Supreme Court's legalization of gay marriage on June

26, 2015 "a black day in the history of mankind."

CAIR frequently hosts events featuring Muslim preachers known for virulent anti-gay rhetoric. A frequent [speaker](#) at CAIR fundraisers, Siraj Wahhaj, famously [threatened](#) to burn down a proposed LGBT-friendly mosque in Toronto in 1992. Suhaib Webb, another [favorite](#) of CAIR events, [called](#) homosexuality an "evil inclination" in 2007. Omar Suleiman, who has recorded numerous [promotional videos](#) for CAIR, has [called](#) homosexuality a "disease" and a "repugnant, shameless sin." Islamic Shura Council of Southern California leader Muzammil Siddiqi, with whom CAIR held a [joint press conference](#) following the December 2015 San Bernardino terror attack, has advocated the [death penalty for homosexuals](#) in Muslim countries.

In short, CAIR has done nothing to stand up for the rights of LGBT Americans or promote more tolerant Muslim-American attitudes toward sexual orientation, while giving radical Islamist preachers on whom it depends for support a platform for anti-gay incitement.

CAIR's sudden expressions of affinity for the LGBT community are nothing more than damage control, designed to obscure its role in propagating the murderous ideology that led Orlando shooter Omar Mateen on his rampage. Fancy PR footwork aside, CAIR is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

Gregg Roman is director of the Middle East Forum.

On Islamic terror, words do matter

By Ben Voth

Source:http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/06/on_islamic_terror_words_do_matter.html

June 15 – Yesterday, President Obama responded to years of criticism arguing that he refused to say "radical Islam" as an identity for America's enemy:

"What exactly would using this label accomplish? What exactly would it change? Would it make ISIL less committed to kill Americans? Would it bring in more allies? Is there a military strategy that is served by this?" he said. "The answer is none of the above."

The president is convinced that the words "radical Islamist" do not matter and, in fact,

continued to imply that their usage would give the terrorist what they want – which is the interpretive position of authority over more than one billion Muslims. The president is mistaken and misguided to continue defending a refusal to use this terminology.

It is possible to refine this term. **Radical** may not as a term

appropriate the authoritarian nature of this

**bla,
bla,
bla!**



enemy. A term such as **"Islamic supremacist"** might do better in conveying that there are some Muslims who seek to establish an absolute interpretive control over the second largest religion in the world by way of authoritarian violence. An astute secular critic and former Muslim, Ayaan Hirsi Ali has suggested a distinction between "Medina Muslims" and "Mecca Muslims." Ali is utilizing her in-depth knowledge of the Koran and Islamic teachings to highlight a key distinction in Koranic literature. The Prophet Muhammad did offer the more benign methodologies of peace and moral suasion in the narratives bound in Mecca. But in the Medina events, the narratives become battle stories, where violence is textually rooted and justified. By highlighting this difference, the bold and endangered voice of Ali points to a path away from violence and toward peace while preserving the integrity of Muslim devotion to teachings of the Prophet.

The president may feel he had to swallow a bitter pill Tuesday. The tenor of his remarks seemed angry and retributive. But this was indeed a necessary first step, and it must guide the other questions he asked about military strategy. The president and FBI director Comey need to withdraw from their interpretive isolation on these questions and stop trying to reframe terrorism and acts of war as cultural failings of American citizens.

The Islamic supremacists who have attacked America again and again and again did so not because of a lack of gun control. When the president again put his finger on the problem as he saw it Sunday – guns – he felt he was properly naming the problem. He thought that was a first step in creating a solution: legislative limits on firearms purchases. His ideological opponents also believe that naming the problem is a good first step. Radical Islamist terrorism is the problem, and gun control legislation or refusing to name the enemy will not solve it.

The FBI director's statement that they were confused by the attacker's avowals about ISIS,

the Boston bombing, and other Islamic supremacist attacks was disingenuous. It makes the public nervous and angry about their leadership. The president and his ideological comrades have concluded that the basic decency of mourning and reflecting on the value of lives lost is not only pointless, but counterproductive. It is now expected under the President's rhetorical example that the innocent victims of terrorism like the gay community decimated in Orlando should have their lives immediately commandeered in the service of a deliberative political agenda. There simply is no time for moments of silence or commemoration as congressional Democrats walk out of a moment of silence for the victims of Orlando. Prayer shaming is now a trendy neo-Jacobin concept for the 21st century.

In one of the first presidential primary debates, Hillary Clinton was asked who her enemies were. She paused and then laughed: "Republicans." That was probably one of the more candid admissions we will get in this political season. Who are your enemies, Mr. President? Are they Republicans? Are they the NRA? Are they gun owners? Is it Donald Trump?

It is understandable that Americans do not want to hear in such an outrageous act of war that is the Orlando massacre that *they* are the enemy. Leading an entire nation, rather than a political party, is much more difficult than the more ideological task of a campaign. In a world of 24-hour campaigning, even once elected, that patriotic duty may be easy to forget.

Republicans, the NRA, gun owners, conservatives, and the American public are not the enemy. They did not condone, encourage, or compel the murders of 49 innocent individuals at a gay night club in Orlando. The horror of Orlando is a presidential moment, and one that should rise above partisan causes – even in an election year. That is not what we have seen since Sunday morning from the president. Words do matter.

Ben Voth is an associate professor of corporate communication and public affairs and director of debate at Southern Methodist University. Voth is the author of Death as a Text: The Rhetoric of Genocide, which analyzes the motivations and communication basis of crimes like those that happened in Orlando and around the world.



Orlando's Game-Changing Lesson: **See A Gun, Think Terrorism**

By Ariel Moutsatsos

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ariel-moutsatsos/orlandos-game-changing-le_b_10481310.html

June 15 – The attack in Orlando is a game changer for how to address the guns issue. The massacre exposed a vulnerable U. S. national security flank which the FBI and other agencies can do little to secure within the current legal framework. The fact is that last Sunday a man killed 49 people and injured 53 others using an assault rifle he bought locally; and that entails an essential lesson: A gun can be equally or even more effective as a terrorist weapon than a bomb, and terrorists can legally buy such a weapon in the U.S. without even being traced.

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and the majority of the world improved and strengthened security controls in airports and public venues. The Department of Homeland Security was created along with a new intelligence coordination entity. The Patriot Act was signed and the security, intelligence, defense and justice institutions of the U.S. were given greater capabilities and authority to face the “new” terrorist threat. Citizens gave away some of their rights in exchange for security. The attacks of March 11th, 2004 in Madrid and the 7/7 attacks in London were also a game changer for Europe and the world. More recently, the terrorist acts in Paris triggered a re-assessment of security and intelligence practices and lifted international alerts and cooperation to new levels. In all those cases measures were taken with one central goal: to prevent or at least dramatically reduce the possibility of a similar attack.

So what to do after Orlando?

So far, the guns debate in the United States has been about the spirit and purpose of the Second Amendment — the right of every citizen to bear arms and the limits and interpretation of such right. Different views on this issue have been turned into political flags and the hundreds of shootings that take place in the U. S. and cost the lives of over 30 thousand people every year have been more or less central to the way each side supports its arguments. But the issue has taken on a new dimension now and the debate on how to address it should change.

After the 9/11, March 11, 7/7 and the Paris attacks, governments did not propose arming their citizens as a way to face the new terrorist threat. They modified their laws, changed their approach and took security and intelligence measures to protect their people. That is exactly what must be done after Orlando. This is not only about the Second Amendment anymore; it is about terrorism. Guns are now the terrorist's weapons of choice and it turns out that unlike any other country in the civilized world, in the U.S. it is legal and possible for a person with terrorist intentions to acquire the weapon to execute an attack without being traced, and the FBI can't do anything about it even if they have knowledge of his or her process of radicalization. How about that for a vulnerability? Would people be willing to compromise their right to own high-caliber weapons in exchange for protection against terrorism?

It is urgent that we learn this painful lesson from Orlando and act quickly to prevent another attack.

From now on, we must see guns as potential terrorist weapons and we must do something about it.

Ariel Moutsatsos is communications consultant, strategist, PR and Senior Political Commentator for Noticias MVS (Mexico). He was Minister for Press and Public Affairs at the Mexican Embassies in the USA and the UK. He served as Senior Special Adviser to the Attorney-General of Mexico and as Director at the AG's Strategic Information Analysis Unit. Previously, he was Senior International Correspondent in New York, Europe and the Middle East, for a leading Mexican radio and TV newscast. Then became Foreign Editor of Reforma, later returning to radio as Senior International Commentator for W Radio, Televisa. He is the only Mexican journalist who covered live the 9/11 attacks from New York and the 3/11 attacks from Madrid. Moutsatsos lectured for a few years at the Monterrey Institute of Technology; served in the Directorate of Institutional Relations at the Club of Madrid and was the founding CEO of a strategic communications firm. He is a member of Chatham House, the Mexican Council of International Affairs and the National Association of Hispanic Journalists. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in



Communications from the Monterrey Institute of Technology, and a Master's degree on International Relations from the Complutense University of Madrid. He is Mexican of Greek descent and lives in Washington DC with his wife.



CIA director warns ISIS terror capability **not** slowed despite battle losses

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/16/politics/john-brennan-cia-isis/index.html>

June 16 – **ISIS has a "large cadre of Western fighters" who could attack in the West and is continuing to inspire sympathizers with no "direct links" to ISIS to attack on their own as it did in Orlando**, the director of the CIA will warn this morning,



according to excerpts of his statement to the Senate provided to CNN.

"We judge that ISIL is training and attempting to deploy operatives for further attacks. ISIL has a large cadre of Western fighters who could potentially serve as operatives for attacks in the West. And **the group is probably exploring a variety of means for infiltrating operatives into the West,**

including refugee flows, smuggling routes, and legitimate methods of travel," CIA Director John Brennan will tell the Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday morning.

Brennan also says despite all the efforts by the U.S. against ISIS, it has not stopped the group.

"Unfortunately, despite all our progress against ISIL on the battlefield and in the financial realm, our efforts have not reduced the group's terrorism capability and global reach," Brennan will say.

"The resources needed for terrorism are very modest, and the group would have to suffer even heavier losses of territory, manpower and money for its terrorist capacity to decline significantly," Brennan will say. "In fact, as the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

Brennan will say the group has lost "large stretches" of territory in Iraq and Syria, has experienced a reduction of finances, and has struggled to replenish its ranks as fewer foreign fighters have been traveling to those countries.

Beyond the territory ISIS holds in Iraq and Syria, Brennan says the group's growing presence in Libya presents significant challenges of its own. **"The branch in Libya is probably the most developed and the most dangerous,"** Brennan says, echoing concerns by other security officials that Libya's close proximity to Europe is a problem. "We assess that it is trying to increase its influence in Africa and to plot attacks in the region and in Europe."

The Media's Apologetic Coverage of Islamic Terror

By Tarek Fatah

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6068/media-orlando-terrorism>

June 14 – **In the wake of the Islamic terrorist attack on a Florida gay nightclub, the media's coverage has been almost apologetic. To go by the coverage, it's as if an Islamist jihadi didn't just massacre 49 Americans, and the West bombed Mecca instead.**

Despite the apologetic tone of the media, the words of a spokesman for the Florida mosque attended by ISIS-inspired jihadist Omar Mateen, were inadvertently insightful. This mosque wasn't only frequented by Mateen. Another congregant blew himself up in Syria while serving ISIS.

Asked by Erin Burnett on CNN what was being preached at this mosque that would motivate two young men in the congregation to become ISIS jihadi terrorists, its spokesman was succinct: "It's like any other mosque, it's simple."

With those few words, this spokesman implicitly acknowledged what critics of North America's mosque establishment have been saying for 15 years. That is, many of them are incubators of hate and jihad.



The Orlando media circus started early Sunday morning within hours of the massacre. At the first press briefing, police presented one individual as a spokesman of Orlando's "faith communities." He wasn't a Christian, like many of the victims, but a Muslim.

In addressing reporters, Muhammad Musri, president of the Islamic Society of Central Florida, appeared to shift blame for the mass murder away from the ISIS-inspired jihadi who committed it, towards a concern about mass shootings in general and, presumably, support for gun control.

As he put it: "I would ... like to caution many in the media in rushing to judgment and sensationalizing the story. Because we do not want to shift the story from what it is ... We hope this will be one of the last mass shootings our country has been going through. As a nation, we have to look at the issue of mass



shootings and we should do something to stop the mass shootings that are happening all the time."

Then there was CNN's Don Lemon, an openly gay television anchor who, while talking to a representative of the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) said, "As a matter of fact the Muslim community and the gay community are very close."

Taking the cue, Rasha Mubarak of CAIR responded: "Absolutely. These [Gays] are part of my family. We have been working together ... My friends in the LGBTQ community told me "we are not going to let this divide us; the hugs were tighter ..."

I almost choked, considering that while this may be Mubarak's point of view, others affiliated with CAIR have complained in the past about Muslims not being able to freely express their opposition to same sex marriage and homosexuality.

As the Kurdish activist Ejder Memis commented from Australia on attempts to minimize the hatred jihadists have for homosexuals: "The LGBT community is being sold out to Islamofascists right before our eyes."

On the other side of the globe, the Chilean Palestinian broadcaster Lalo Dagach said it best: "We now live in a world where criticism of Muslim Homophobia is [considered] Islamophobia."

On Monday evening, Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne illustrated Dagach's point. She told hundreds mourning the dead of Florida: "Homophobia cannot be fought with Islamophobia."

The question left unanswered is this: Should we fear Islamophobia or Islamofascism?



In the meantime, a jihadist newspaper in Pakistan carried this as its front-page headline: "Afghan youth roasts 50 Americans." And (addition by the NSL Editor) the far-right Turkish newspaper Yeni Akit writes about "abnormal and perverse" Orlando victims [photo].

Tarek Fatah, a founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress and columnist at the Toronto Sun, is a Robert J. and Abby B. Levine Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Labor MP killed near Leeds by gunman shouting "Britain First!"

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bull20160616-labor-mp-killed-near-leeds-by-gunman-shouting-britain-first>

June 16 – Jo Cox, 41, a Labor MP for Batley and Spen, has been shot and stabbed to death by a man shouting "Britain First!"

She was attacked outside a library in the town of Birstall, West Yorkshire.





The police said that the attacker, a 52-year-old man who was not identified, was arrested in the area.



Hichem Ben Abdallah, who works at the Azzurro Cafe adjacent to the library, [told](#) the



Independent: "I saw a river of people running downhill down the street, screaming. It wasn't a normal scream that you hear, it was a scream like they'd seen something shocking."

"The customers and I went outside and I saw a guy with a baseball cap, of medium height, roughing up someone, moving and kicking his legs."

Ben Abdallah said he saw the attacker pull out a gun. "It looked like a makeshift gun. It was chunky, like a cucumber. It wasn't like a normal gun you see, but like an old-style hand gun," he said.

"He fired the first shot, then the second shot. There was probably three or four seconds between them."

A separate eyewitness, Clarke Rothwell, said Cox was shot three times with what looked like "an old gun... like a musket," once in the face.

Rothwell, a 42-year-old gas engineer, told the *Huddersfield Examiner*: "I was outside the sandwich shop close to the Library when I heard a popping sound."

A man named locally as Tommy Mair has been arrested




"I looked round and there was a guy standing over a woman on the floor. He seemed to have



what looked like an old gun, like a musket, in his hand and he shot her again in the middle. He then seemed to shoot a third time, towards her head or face.”

Graeme Howard, 38, who lives in nearby Bond Street, [told](#) the *Guardian* he heard the man shout “Britain First” before the shooting and during the arrest.

“I heard the shot and I ran outside and saw some ladies from the cafe running out with towels,” he said. “There was loads of screaming and shouting and the police officers showed up.



“He was shouting ‘Britain First’ when he was doing it and being arrested. He was pinned down by two police officers and she was taken away in an ambulance.”

A West Yorkshire police spokesman said: “At 12.53 today, police were called to a report of an incident on Market Street, Birstall, where a woman in her 40s had suffered serious injuries and is in a critical condition.



“A man in his late 40s to early 50s nearby also suffered slight injuries. Armed officers attended and a 52-year-old man was arrested in the area. There are no further details at present.

“Police presence in the area has been increased as a reassurance to the community.”

Britain First, founded in 2011, is a far-right political party campaigning against immigration, multiculturalism, and what it sees

as the Islamization of Britain. The party says it wants to restore traditional British culture.

The group is also tied to Ulster loyalist – Northern Ireland activists who wants Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom — and its rallied are protected by a small group of violent vigilantes who call themselves the Britain First Defense Force.

Members of Britain First Defense Force conduct what they call “Christian patrols” outside of mosques and the homes of Muslim leaders.



Cox was elected to parliament in 2015, after working as a head of policy and humanitarian campaigning for Oxfam.

She chairs the all-party parliamentary group for Friends of Syria, and was vocal in making the case for military action in the country last autumn, on humanitarian grounds.

Her husband is former Labor advisor Brendan Cox, who stepped down as a senior executive of the charity Save the Children last year.

Taliban changing war tactics following heavy casualties: Experts

Source: <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/taliban-changing-war-tactics-following-heavy-casualties-experts-2857076/>

June 16 – **With Taliban suffering heavy casualties on the battlefield against the Afghan forces, experts say that the militant group has changed its war tactics.**

The officials even pointed out that at the beginning of their fighting season this summer, the Taliban launched widespread attacks in Helmand, Uruzgan, Kunduz, Faryab and number of other province, but following the death of their former leader Mullah Mansoor, **they now conduct smaller, focused attacks against security checkpoints.**

The experts believe the Taliban, with this new tactic, suffer fewer casualties but the casualties are higher among the government forces and **the group is now conducting “guerilla” attacks – which also include mass kidnappings on highways.**



Map source: National Counterterrorism Center (https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/afghan_taliban.html)

“Because the Taliban is being defeated, they turn to guerilla attacks. Afghan forces must stand seriously against the armed oppositions and terrorists and fight them,” Khaama Press quoted MP Syed Hussain Sharifi Balkhabi as saying.



However, the Parliament members believe that ignoring the Taliban's new tactics will increase casualties among the security force members and also civilians and said the group will also use civilians as human shields.

Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry spokesman Dawlat Waziri said the Afghan forces will respond to any terrorist activities.

"We are trying to respond to any terrorist activities. Our forces have a strong morale and people are with us," Waziri said.

"Even if Taliban change their war tactics we are after them and no matter where, if they create problems for our people, will we respond to them with force," said Interior Ministry's spokesman Sediq Sediqqi.

The security institutions said that in addition to providing security for the country's highways and that of passengers, the security forces are currently conducting 22 pre-planned military operations in 17 provinces across the country.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: By seeing the map I included in this article it seems that there is a long way to counter terrorism in this country – if ever...

Man arrested for terroristic threats at Denton hospital

Source: <http://www.wfaa.com/news/crime/man-arrested-for-making-threats-at-denton-courthouse/244965312>

June 16 – A man who allegedly made "terroristic threats" at a hospital in Denton was arrested at the county courthouse there

suspiciously and trying to force the Quran on employees. UNT Police cited Waise for criminal trespass.



A short time later, around 8 a.m. Wednesday, police received a "suspicious person" call near **Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital** in the 200 block of North Bonnie Brae Street. Waise entered the Women's Center at the hospital and made a terroristic threat, police said.

"He went inside and began insisting they take the [Quran] from him," read a press release from Denton Police. "He told them to give the Quran to the chaplain or chapel 'or die.'" An arrest warrant affidavit said Waise also claimed the hospital would "go down."

Waise then drove to the Denton County Courthouse just over three miles away and walked through security. Police obtained an arrest warrant for terroristic threats and took Waise to jail.

Witnesses say it was a troubling and tense morning at the courthouse.

"At that time, I could hear somebody being

pulled out of the courthouse, screaming and yelling," Ray said.

Wednesday morning.

Denton police say their first encounter with the suspect in the bizarre incident was Tuesday night. Peshwaz Azad Waise, 28, flagged down a police car on it's way to another call at the intersection of Interstate 35 and Fort Worth Ave.

Police say he was acting irrationally, but doing nothing illegal, so they went on their way.

But Wednesday morning, Waise was back on police radar after the manager at an IHOP on the University of North Texas campus reported him for acting



"I couldn't understand what he was saying, but it was at high volume."

Police say Waise tried to see a judge to give



him or her a Quran. When officers went to detain him, he allegedly said, "I'm imposing the death penalty" on the officers who were dealing with him and "anybody who touches me is going to bleed."

A robot was being used to search the suspect's silver Nissan for explosives. The area around the vehicle was taped off.

"There was no mention of bombs in the car, we're just taking that extra step to make sure nothing is in there," a police spokesman said in a press conference late Wednesday morning. The car was cleared just before noon.

"We just want to make sure everybody's safe," said Orlando Hinojosa with the Denton Police Department. "There was no mention of bombs in the car. We're just taking that extra step."

Police say Waise's American Passport indicates he was born in Iraq. His car has Virginia license plates. It's unknown what brought him to North Texas or if he has a criminal history.

UNT said Waise has never been a student at the university.

"People are realizing that this stuff is real, so we're not taking anything for granted," Hinojosa said.

Meet the adorable comfort dogs who have flown from all over the country to support relatives, victims and volunteers in Orlando

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3641633/Meet-adorable-comfort-dogs-flown-country-support-relatives-victims-volunteers-Orlando.html>



homes, and the Lutheran Church's LGBT outreach center.

They are brought up to provide emotional support for humans at times of stress and devastation.

June 14 – Comfort dogs have been dispatched to Orlando to support grieving relatives, wounded victims and first-responders in the wake of the nightclub shooting.

More than a dozen golden retrievers and dog handlers arrived in the Florida city from all over the country on Monday.

After meeting for instructions in the city center, they were each sent to different scenes - vigils, hospitals, police stations,



CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – June 2016

Comfort dogs are regularly dispatched to scenes of a shooting or terror attack - including Boston after the marathon bombing, Oregon after Umpqua Community College's school shooting last year, and to Sandy Hook in 2012.

But Orlando will see one of the biggest 'national deployments' of golden retrievers to date as the city - and the nation - reels following the deadliest mass shooting in US history.

Jane Marsh-Johnson, 'top dog handler' for the Lutheran Church Charity's nationwide comfort dog network, told Daily Mail Online she believes dogs have a quality that humans cannot get from one another.

One of the team is **Phoebe**, one of just two comfort dogs in Texas.



© Phoebe Comfort Dog/ Facebook

She spends most of her time in hospices in her native Fort Worth.

But she was one of the dozen chosen to put regular duties on pause to attend to Orlando.

Gracie hails from Davenport, Iowa.



© Mahlah Comfort Dog/ Facebook

According to Gracie's handler, the five-year-old allows people to 'open up their hearts and receive help for what is affecting them'.

She was one of a number of dogs sent to a major vigil in the city on Tuesday.

Sasha has traveled from Hiltonhead, South Carolina.

She has been dispatched out of state four times, including to Oregon after the school shooting and to Illinois after a family died in a plane crash.

Ruthie comes from Chicago. She spent the day with police officers and first responders before also attending a vigil.

Mahlah, from Illinois, spent Tuesday at a vigil supporting well-wishers, and visited a hotel where relatives of wounded and killed victims were staying.

Kye, of Belvedere, Illinois, spent time with victims.

A photo was posted on Kye's official Facebook page showing him with a Pulse employee called Russell.

The caption, written from Kye's perspective, said:



'When I first saw Russell he was surrounded by the media. A local LGBT activist and an employee of Pulse, he had a lot of people wanting to interview him. But when he and I met, there wasn't as much talking as there was petting.'

Hannah of Illinois was pictured lying around with a group of volunteers who looked emotional and exhausted.

Jacob of Indiana was pictured giving a TV interview between a vigil and visiting first responders.

The team is also joined by Jewel from Loudon, Tennessee, Susie from Illinois, and Katie from Nebraska - among others.

The service is entirely donation-funded, and the Lutheran Church set up a donation site for support to get their sizeable crew to Orlando.

Gunmen storm Brazil hospital; 1 dead, 2 wounded in shootout

Source: <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-06-19/gunmen-storm-brazil-hospital-1-dead-2-wounded-in-shootout>

June 19 – **A group of heavily armed men stormed a Rio de Janeiro hospital Sunday to free a suspected drug trafficker, sparking a shootout with officers that left a patient dead and a nurse and an off-duty policeman wounded.**

The attack took place at Hospital Souza Aguiar, one of the medical facilities



recommended for tourists seeking emergency treatment during the upcoming Olympic Games.

At least five attackers stormed the hospital before dawn and freed the 28-year-old suspect, who was being treated for a gunshot wound, Rio police said in a statement. As many as 15 other gunmen were outside during the attack, witnesses told police.

Investigators were studying security camera footage, and Rivaldo Barbosa, head of the state's homicide unit, said two of the assailants had been identified.

"This was a carefully orchestrated attack," Barbosa told reporters outside the hospital. "It was a bold action that will not go unpunished. It is unacceptable."

Souza Aguiar is one of five hospitals designated by the city to treat tourists during the sporting event because of its proximity to the famed Maracana Stadium, site of the opening ceremony on Aug. 5. It's also on a U.S. Embassy list of medical facilities recommended for travelers to the games.

Fabio Melo, a sergeant who was guarding the suspect in the hospital, said he feels vulnerable to attacks as Rio de Janeiro state is increasing officers' shifts.

The state declared a financial disaster on Friday largely because revenues from oil royalties have plummeted as a result of low crude prices. The government wants more freedom to manage scarce resources in areas such as public safety, health care and

education as it wraps up Olympic projects and beefs up tourist services during the games.

"People in our line of duty go through these kinds of different experiences. Thank God I was not injured and I was able to help my co-worker," Melo told reporters. "But we are defenseless. I am defenseless, you are defenseless and the whole population, too."

Later in the day, police acknowledged that they had received reports last week that about a plot to free the suspected drug trafficker. Col. Luiz Henrique Pires told



journalists they reinforced security at the hospital but that they don't have the resources "to deploy 30 or 40 police officers to police after every report that is made."

Pires also said public hospitals are not prepared to admit prisoners and that it is necessary to have special medical facilities for such cases.

The Niger Delta Avengers: A New Threat to Oil Producers in Nigeria

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45500&no_cache=1#.V2dpN6KWsgU

June 13 – Since the start of 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), a hitherto unknown group, has claimed responsibility for



increasingly frequent attacks on oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. According to Nigerian Oil Minister Emmanuel Ibe Kachikwu, the attacks have resulted in oil production dropping by 800,000 barrels per day (bpd) to a 20-year-low ([Premium Times](#), May 16; [Leadership](#), May 30). Both

Shell and Chevron are reported to be evacuating staff as a result of the attacks, with Shell also declaring *force majeure* at its Forcados Terminal after an attack on its subsea crude export pipeline in February ([The Guardian \[Nigeria\]](#), May 21; [The Guardian \[Nigeria\]](#), February 22).

The violence, and the resulting disruption to the oil sector, has raised fears of a return to the days of the Niger Delta insurgency, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) between 2004 and 2009. That conflict – which quietened considerably as a result of a 2009 presidential amnesty program (PAP) under which many former insurgents grew extremely

wealthy – halved Nigeria's oil production to 1m bpd ([NTA](#), June 2).

With the emergence of the NDA, the question is whether there is now a possibility of a return to the previous level of violence.

Links to Former Militants

The NDA appears to be a relatively small insurgency made up of Delta residents angered by the continuing failure to redistribute oil wealth from the elites to those living in the region. Although former militants are almost certainly involved in the group, it is unlikely that the NDA has been able to recruit vast numbers of ex-fighters, since many of those who previously fought in the Delta have become wealthy through the PAP and are weary of fighting. Retired General Paul Boroh, Buhari's special adviser on the Niger Delta, said that militants who accepted the amnesty had "disassociated" themselves from the 2016 violence and were actively assisting in tracking down the militants involved in the latest attacks ([The Guardian \[Nigeria\]](#), January 23).

That fits with posts on the NDA's website, where the group repeatedly states it will do a much better job of liberating the Niger Delta than the previous insurgency and that it has no intention of killing innocent people or conducting kidnappings as previous militant groups have done ([Niger Delta Avengers](#), April 17; [Niger Delta Avengers](#), May 12).

The circumstances surrounding the latest violence, however, suggest there are still strong links with some of those from the earlier insurgency. Ex-MEND leader Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a. Tompolo) has stated on several occasions that he has nothing to do with the NDA, but days before



the first attack took place, Abuja issued an arrest warrant for him on 14 charges of money laundering and theft, equivalent to \$171m ([Premium Times](#), January 14). That prompted Tompolo to go into hiding, swiftly followed by the outbreak of attacks on oil facilities. References in the NDA's manifesto to Buhari's one-sided anti-corruption crackdown further underscores the likely involvement of the former commander and his affiliates ([Niger Delta Avengers](#), February 13).

Policy shifts under President Buhari present other obvious triggers for the resurgence in violence. Abuja has angered former fighters by changing the terms of the PAP. Buhari agreed to renew the amnesty, but he halved monthly stipends for former fighters, with a view to removing them completely in 2017 ([Daily Post](#), February 16). The president has also refused to renew several lucrative pipeline security contracts with amnesty program participants ([Naij](#), June 31, 2015). Anger over these changes are evident in the NDA manifesto where the group demands the continuation of the amnesty program with full funding for the foreseeable future ([Niger Delta Avengers](#), February 13).

Potential for Further Attacks

Although the NDA appeared to begin as an ad hoc movement aimed at forcing a change in Buhari's policies, the frequency and intensity of the group's May assaults suggests it has greater ambitions. The group's aims, however, remain unclear. The NDA's social media presence is amateur and posts on its website oscillate between demands that oil wealth be redistributed to the Delta and calls for an autonomous Niger Delta state with UN recognition ([Niger Delta Avengers](#), May 12).

As time goes on and the group generates more support among Delta communities, it will likely be able to carry out attacks on the scale of the previous insurgency. The potential following available to the group was underscored in mid-May when another militant group calling themselves the Red Egbesu Water Lions emerged and vowed to join the NDA in their fight ([This Day Live](#), May 18).

The problem is compounded by the vast array of weaponry at the NDA's disposal. As a result of ineffective disarmament programs carried out at the end of 2009, would-be-militants in the Delta have large stocks of weaponry at

their disposal. Tompolo's purchase of six haulk-class missile boats from Norway during the amnesty period underscores this point ([Premium Times](#), December 13, 2014). Nigerian journalist Fidelis Mbah says that disarmament efforts have been so poor that the weaponry available in the Delta now is greater than during the 2000s conflict. [1]

Although it is unlikely that there were large numbers of fighters behind the recent NDA attacks, several of the assaults demonstrate a high degree of sophistication. The attack on Shell's subsea export pipeline would likely have required high-tech detonators, well-trained fighters, and potentially also a diver. Additionally, the bombing attack on Chevron's offshore facility in May further emphasized the involvement of experienced militants – working offshore requires considerably more skill than opportunistic onshore attacks.

Need for Community Support

In May, the government announced it planned to hold talks with leaders in the Niger Delta to address their grievances, and Buhari has sought to improve development initiatives in the Delta ([Naija Details](#), May 29). These programs, however, are slow to be implemented and continue to be vehicles for embezzlement and corruption ([Premium Times](#), August 19, 2015). Without rapid development, communities in the Delta, where jobs and education are lacking, are likely to form easy recruitment bases for the NDA.

The Delta's creeks and pipelines are also hard to protect without the support of local communities, gang leaders, and the militants themselves. The government has little support in the Delta, not least because of its heavy-handed attempts to crack down on the fighters thus far. In May, troops raided the Delta village of Oporoza in search of militants. Locals reported that troops harassed and wounded residents and prevented children from going to school ([Vanguard](#), May 30).

Despite reported arrests, government efforts to crackdown on militancy and prevent attacks have proven ineffective. Without sustained negotiations, an extension to the 2009 amnesty, or mass development in the Niger Delta, the NDA's insurgency is likely to expand and further attacks can be expected over the next 12 months.



NOTES

[1] Author's Interview, Nigerian journalist Fidelis Mbah, March 31, 2016

Terrorism Alert Level raised in Brazil for Olympics

Source: <http://plus55.com/sports/2016/06/terrorism-alert-level-raised-brazil-olympics>

June 18 – Discouraging pieces of news seem to be piling up in the last months before the beginning of Rio 2016 Olympic Games. This time, it concerns safety risks for tourists and residents of Rio. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency is worried about the dangers of ISIS targeting the country during the games. The agency has discovered Portuguese-speaking online forums used by radicals to recruit Brazilians.

On June 2, a website that monitors the activity of terrorists online revealed the creation of the first Portuguese-speaking version of "Nashir," a chat group to share news about ISIS. It is believed to have been created in May, and the organization is searching for volunteering translators to "spread the word."

Brazilian authorities have shared their concern with the actions of "lone wolves" – people who commit violent acts in support of a group, but does so alone, outside of any command structure. Those are most difficult to monitor, as most have no ties to known terrorist groups and can stay under the radar.

Back in April, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency alerted to the possibility of terrorist acts during the Rio Olympic Games, after a French national who is a known member of ISIS used Twitter to declare that "Brazil was [their] next target."

Terror attack: 33 Dead, 130 Injured in China Knife-Wielding Spree

Source: <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/33-dead-130-injured-china-knife-wielding-spree-n41966>

June 20 – A group of knife-wielding men attacked a train station in southwestern China on Saturday, killing at least 29 people and injuring more than 130 others in what Chinese officials called a terrorist strike, the official Xinhua News Agency said.



a.m. ET) at the Kunming Railway Station in the capital of southwest China's Yunnan Province.

The Kunming government said the "serious violent terrorist attack was planned and organized by Xinjiang separatist forces," Xinhua reported.

Ethnic Turkish Uighur separatists have been sporadically fighting for an independent state in Xinjiang, in northwestern China, home to about 10 million Uighur, who are predominantly Muslim. More than 100 people have been killed in protests in Xinjiang in the past year.

Four of the attackers were also shot dead and only one was captured alive after the mayhem, which broke out about 9 p.m. (8





Yang Haifei, a resident of Yunnan, told Xinhua that he was attacked and sustained injuries on his chest and back.

Yang said he was buying a ticket when he saw a group rush into the station, most of them dressed in black, and started stabbing people.

"I saw a person come straight at me with a long knife, and I ran away with everyone," he said, adding that people who were slower were severely injured.



"They just fell on the ground," he added.





THREATS
Terrorist attacks on Hospitals:
Risk and Emergency Assessment, Tools & Systems

Terrorist attacks on Hospitals: Risk and Emergency Assessment, Tools & Systems



CO FUNDED BY THE PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OF TERRORISM AND OTHER SECURITY-RELATED RISK PROGRAMME OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

► Source: <http://threatsproject.eu/work.html>

Hospitals represent attractive terrorist targets. Attacks on hospitals are physically and psychologically damaging to society, but hospitals typically have open public access, limited physical security and uneven preparedness.

The **THREATS Project** has spent the last two years researching and developing a self assessment tool, the THREATS toolkit, which includes a vulnerability assessment method.



The toolkit is designed to help hospitals assess and reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attacks. From 23rd to 26th May 2016 the THREATS consortium organised the THREATS event at the San Raffaele Hospital in Milan. It included the THREATS Conference, discussing the response to the attacks in Paris in November 2015, looking at different aspects of preparedness and resilience for hospitals against terrorist attacks and summarising the results of the project. The Conference was followed by a training course designed to increase the preparedness of the health sector to handle any emergency and the THREATS exercise which applied the THREATS toolkit to the hospital. The exercise simulated one of the THREATS scenarios, a second strike terrorist attack against a hospital which was already managing casualties from an attack external to the hospital, and measured its response. THREATS aims, through four work packages, to increase the resilience of EU hospitals as a critical infrastructure by improving their protection capability and security awareness against terrorist attacks and other antagonistic acts.

The project started on 1st July 2014 and runs for two years. The four work packages are:

Work Package 0: Management and Coordination of the Project

Work Package 1: Threat, risk assessment and security management research of the state of the art regarding threats and risks to the health centre and how it is protected as part of the critical national infrastructure within Europe

- Deliverable 1.1 [Report](#) on the current state of the Health Sector as part of the European National Infrastructure
- Deliverable 1.2 [Report](#) on the management of the Health Sector risk within those countries which have identified the Health sector risk as part of National Infrastructure
- Deliverable 1.3 [Report](#) on the threat and risk assessment of terrorist threats to European health infrastructure.
- Deliverable 1.4 [Report](#) on the synergies that exist between other Critical Infrastructures and the Health Sector and evaluate their portability to hospitals
- Deliverable 1.5 [Report](#) examining current protective security arrangements within the Health sector and identifying vulnerabilities in existing protection.

Work Package 2: Analysis of current risk management planning and perception within the EU health critical infrastructure sector

- Deliverable 2.1 [Report](#) on art of crisis management situation, in respect of terrorist attacks, in EU hospitals.
- Deliverable 2.3 [Report](#) on Analysis of Risk Management Planning and Perception to Counter the Terrorist Threat within the Health Sector of European Union Critical Infrastructure Protection.
- Deliverable D2.4 [Report](#) on best practices of health sector and EU hospitals for risk management and reduction against terrorist attacks and inter-organisational plans.

Work Package 3: Decision making tools for mitigation and preparedness against a hospital attack

- Deliverable D3.1 [Report](#) on generic hospital model (as is) from task 1. i.e. a reference model of an unprotected hospital including : processes, activities, actors, resources and evaluation indicators
- Deliverable D3.2 [Report](#) on Emergency management plans from task 2. A reference plan for emergency management including: processes; activities; actors; resources; decision variables; decision procedures.
- Deliverable D3.3 [Report](#) on Decision making tools for mitigation: benchmark proposal; emergency management procedures; mathematical models, and results.

Why Jihadists Kill 'Gays'

By A.J. Caschetta

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/6077/why-jihadists-kill-gays>



June 18 – The terrorist attack by a jihadist in Orlando is not only the latest instance of an ISIS fighter killing Americans, but also a reminder that jihadists hate gays. Curiously, the organizations that fight for gay rights have been mostly silent about the dangers Islamic supremacism poses to their constituency. But then, as Douglas Murray [puts it](#): "the battle for gay rights stop[s] at the borders of Islam."



ISIS militants stone a man accused of homosexual acts in Homs, Syria, in June 2015.

To be clear, jihadists do not necessarily hate homosexual acts (prohibited in the Qur'an). They hate "gays." They may oppose the act, but they especially detest the "sinner" who makes the act his identity, rather than hiding and denying what most of the Muslim world tolerates as a common, if temporary, deviation.

[Will Hollywood celebrities' support for the LGBT community last longer than that for the girls kidnapped by Boko Haram?](#)

To jihadist eyes, "gays" celebrate openly, in a very American fashion, what should be hidden. In Iraq, when the Shia militias round up and stone young males with "[Emo haircuts](#)," they justify it as eliminating satanic, Westernized homosexuals. When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke at Columbia University in 2007, he [said](#): "In Iran we don't have homosexuals like in your country...we do not have this phenomenon."

As veterans of the Afghan wars know, homosexuality is not unusual among our allies and enemies alike. A declassified 2010 Pentagon [study](#) indicates that "Pashtun men commonly have sex with other men...have sexual relationships with boys and shun women both socially and sexually – yet they completely reject the label of 'homosexual.'"

Long before Orlando, jihadists have publically executed gay men. In Raqqa, ISIS throws them off rooftops. Many Muslim countries rule by a version of Sharia law that imposes the death penalty for homosexuality.

Bruce Bawer, an iconic gay rights intellectual, warned of the dangers Islam posed to the West in general and to gay men in particular. Bawer witnessed rapid changes in Dutch and Norwegian society after an expansion of immigration by Muslims in the 1990s. "To them," [he wrote](#), "the infidel's 'law' is a joke, and values such as pluralism, tolerance, and sexual equality are alien and immoral. They see Western society as the enemy, European men as wimps, European women as sluts." But there was a special disdain for gay men, and Bawer documents toleration for them in the heart of liberal Europe "slipping away like sand through the fingers."

The response to Orlando from gay rights groups has been tepid and confused. [GLAAD](#) calls the attack a "tragedy" but makes no reference to the ideology behind it. The ACLU calls it "a horrific event" and oddly ends [its statement](#) by expressing "solidarity with the



Muslim community here in Florida and elsewhere" – as though Omar Mateen had targeted and killed Muslims.

Typing the word "Islam" into the search engine of the Gay Men's Health Crisis ([GMHC](#)) website yields a "[No Results Found](#)" message.

The group's June 13 statement on the attack condemns "terror" but not Islamic terror. The GMHC might contemplate Bawer's warnings and consider the crisis



Islamic supremacism poses to the health of gay men.

And where are the Hollywood allies of the LGBT community? With very few exceptions they avoid Islam altogether. True, several made sure that cameras were present when they performed their #BringBackOurGirls [routine](#), and many [boycotted](#) the Beverly Hills Hotel when the Sultan of Brunei (its owner) announced that he would henceforth rule his island nation with strict adherence to Sharia. But the attention span of the beautiful people seems short-lived. No one mentions the Chibok schoolgirls or their Boko Haram kidnappers anymore, and while the [boycott has ended](#), the Sultan of Brunei still owns the Beverly Hills Hotel and still rules with Sharia.

Like most feminist organizations, most gay rights advocates have paid scant attention to Islam. Instead of (or in addition to) fighting Republicans and Evangelicals, or photographers and bakers who oppose gay marriage (Obama's position until [May 9, 2012](#)),

a careful reprioritization of their foes might lead them to worthier enemies.

If so, I say welcome to the fight, and I humbly offer some unsolicited advice.

Seize the Orlando attack and turn it against Islamic supremacists. The celebrations of those killed, the concerts and telethons to benefit their families are natural educational platforms. Use them wisely. Call on your Hollywood allies and take advantage of their access to free publicity and legions of adoring fans.


Finally, and perhaps most importantly, find the face of your cause. Find your Malala. It might be [Hussein Sabat](#), Mr. Gay Syria, whose boyfriend was killed by ISIS three years ago. Sabat now leads the precarious existence of a gay rights activist from his exile in Turkey. His [message](#) is a good start: "Everyone is scared of ISIS but it doesn't stop me from living my life. I won't let them be a barrier and I hate them more than I am scared."

A.J. Caschetta is a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum and a senior lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology.

7 Ways US Can Prevent Another Orlando Attack

By Bridget Mudd

Source: <http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/17/7-ways-us-can-prevent-another-orlando-attack/>



June 17 – In the wake of the Orlando terrorist attack, the Obama administration has been quick to blame gun control laws. This is because the administration refuses to admit its policies to defeat the Islamic State have failed.

Islamist terror attacks within the U.S. have dramatically increased within the past year—with Orlando being the 22nd instance of Islamist terrorism in the U.S. since 2015. This is out of **86 plots since 2001.**

Gun control will not stop this rise in Islamist terror attacks, and the president is wrong to suggest so. To stop these attacks and defeat radical Islamism, the U.S. needs to defend the U.S. homeland and combat terrorism abroad.

We must maintain essential counterterrorism tools to help law enforcement and intelligence agencies find and stop terrorists before they attack.



Here are seven policies that will help prevent another Orlando:

1. Combat Terrorism Abroad and Deny ISIS Territorial Gains

So long as the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, maintains territory in Afghanistan and Iraq, it will be a persistent terror threat.

Rolling back—and defeating—ISIS requires a global approach in which the U.S. leads a multipronged, multinational effort that seeks to deny ISIS the ability to hold territory. This will disrupt its recruitment of foreign fighters, and will counter its destructive ideology.

One part of the solution must be military. ISIS derives much of its cachet and legitimacy from its success. Driving ISIS from its conquered territories will undermine the group's legitimacy in the eyes of aspiring jihadists, thereby hurting its ability to recruit.

2. Shut Down the Foreign Fighter Pipeline

In order to defeat terrorism abroad, the U.S. must lead an international effort to deny ISIS territorial gains and shut down the foreign fighter pipeline. While military victory would undermine ISIS' legitimacy, the U.S. must also improve intelligence capabilities to identify potential recruits and preempt Islamist violence.

This requires hard intelligence work and even closer coordination between countries to identify suspicious travel. This includes pushing allies to take greater intelligence and security measures that reflect the global nature of the threat.

The U.S. should make greater use of state and local law enforcement, both as intelligence sources and as intelligence users.

3. Ensure That the FBI Regularly Shares Information

The FBI must share information with state and local law enforcement—treating state and local partners as critical actors in the fight against terrorism.

State, local, and private sector partners must send and receive timely information from the FBI. Despite the lessons of 9/11 and other terrorist plots, the culture of the FBI continues to resist sharing information with state and local law enforcement.

4. Expand Active Shooter Threat Training Across the Country

Mass shootings in busy areas will always be a threat given America's free society. Since state and local law enforcement officers will be the first to respond, training for active shooter events should be expanded through existing programs such as the Active Shooter Threat Training Program and corresponding instructor training program.

5. Community Outreach Remains a Vital Tool

The U.S. should facilitate strong community outreach and policing. Such capabilities are key to building trust in local communities, especially in high risk areas. If the U.S. is to thwart Islamist terrorist attacks successfully, it must do so by putting effective community outreach operations at the tip of the spear.

6. Maintain Essential Counterterrorism Tools

Support for important investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and should be allowed to continue.

7. Counter Islamist Ideology

The U.S. needs a strong, proactive counterterrorism policy in order to prevent future terrorist attacks like Orlando. We cannot afford to play politics when national security is at stake. The U.S. must do more both at home and abroad in order to uproot and defeat Islamist terrorism.




Bridget Mudd is a research assistant in the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation.



Republicans, Democrats Interpret Orlando Incident Differently

Source: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/192842/republicans-democrats-interpret-orlando-incident-differently.aspx>



June 17 – Republicans and Democrats have starkly different interpretations of what the recent mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub represents. While 79% of Republicans view it primarily as an act of Islamic terrorism, the majority of Democrats, 60%, see it as an act of domestic gun violence. Given Republicans' more lopsided views, Americans as a whole tilt toward describing it as a terrorist act.

Perceptions of Orlando Mass Shooting Incident

From what you know or have heard, do you view the incident in Orlando over the weekend as more -- [ROTATED: An act of Islamic terrorism (or more) an act of domestic gun violence]?

	U.S. adults	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
	%	%	%	%
Islamic terrorism	48	79	44	29
Domestic gun violence	41	16	42	60
Both equally (vol.)	6	1	9	7

(vol.) = volunteered response

Gallup Daily, June 14-15, 2016

The results are based on a June 14-15 Gallup poll, conducted days after a Muslim U.S. citizen, Omar Mateen, perpetrated the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history at an Orlando nightclub. Mateen had been listed on the federal government's terrorism watch list in 2013 and 2014, but was later removed. While both President Barack Obama and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton described the incident as an act of terror, presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump went further, tying the act to radical Islam.

Democrats' interpretation of the Orlando shooting may be influenced by Democratic leaders' calls for stricter gun laws in recent days. This was exemplified by a Democratic-led filibuster on the Senate floor Wednesday and Thursday, which ended after Republican leaders agreed to take up proposals on

background checks and steps to prevent terrorists from obtaining guns.

Trump's statements on the event may be contributing to Republicans' views of the Orlando incident as an act of Islamic terrorism, but Republicans' tendency to define it as terrorism may also stem from their greater concern about terrorism in general.

Independents are evenly divided as to whether the Orlando shooting was an act of Islamic terrorism (44%) or domestic gun violence (42%).

Whether the Orlando incident was inspired by Islamic terrorism or the actions of a killer able to obtain guns is a debate that cannot be easily settled and, regardless, does nothing to diminish the tragedy of the event. But it is clear that Americans' political views influence how they interpret the tragedy and, by extension, shape their views of the policies leaders should pursue to prevent similar incidents.

Republicans, Democrats Agree on Denying Guns to Suspected Terrorists

Americans are most likely to believe banning gun sales to suspected terrorists would be most effective of seven steps the government could take to prevent future incidents like the Orlando shooting. Eighty percent of Americans believe such a move would be very or somewhat effective, including 84% of Democrats and 75% of Republicans.



At least six in 10 Americans also believe increasing U.S. airstrikes against the Islamic State or ISIS, changing state gun laws to allow more people to carry concealed weapons, and passing new laws to make it harder to buy assault weapons would be effective in preventing a repeat of the Orlando attack. The last two proposals garner almost identical public support, although one involves tightening gun restrictions and the other loosening them.

Many fewer think banning Muslims from entering the U.S., a move that Trump has specifically promoted, or requiring Muslims living in the U.S. to carry special IDs would be effective.

Americans' Perceived Effectiveness of Potential Actions to Prevent Incidents Like Orlando Mass Shooting

How effective do you think each of the following will be in preventing incidents such as the one that happened in Orlando this past weekend -- very effective, somewhat effective, not too effective or not at all effective?

	Very/Somewhat effective	Not too/Not at all effective
	%	%
Banning gun sales to people on the federal no-fly terrorism watch list	80	17
Increasing U.S. airstrikes against the Islamic State or ISIS to take out their leaders, heavy weapons and infrastructure	67	29
Changing state gun laws to allow more people to carry concealed weapons if they pass a background check and complete a training program	64	34
Pass new laws making it harder to buy assault weapons	63	36
Limit the sale of ammunition magazines to those with 10 rounds or less	52	46
A new law that would prevent any Muslim from entering the U.S.	32	63
Requiring Muslims, including those who are U.S. citizens, to carry a special ID	25	71

Gallup Daily, June 14-15, 2016



A wide partisan divide exists on all proposals except banning gun sales to suspected terrorists. More than eight in 10 Republicans believe increased airstrikes against the Islamic State and changing state gun laws to allow more Americans to carry concealed weapons would be effective in preventing similar incidents. Meanwhile, most Democrats think passing new laws regarding assault weapons and limiting the sale of ammunition magazines would be effective.

Perceptions of Potential Actions to Prevent Incidents Like Orlando Mass Shooting as "Very/Somewhat Effective," by Political Party

How effective do you think each of the following will be in preventing incidents such as the one that happened in Orlando this past weekend -- very effective, somewhat effective, not too effective or not at all effective?



	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
	%	%	%
Banning gun sales to people on the federal no-fly terrorism watch list	75	80	84
Increasing U.S. airstrikes against the Islamic State or ISIS to take out their leaders, heavy weapons and infrastructure	85	62	57
Changing state gun laws to allow more people to carry concealed weapons if they pass a background check and complete a training program	83	65	45
Pass new laws making it harder to buy assault weapons	43	59	84
Limit the sale of ammunition magazines to those with 10 rounds or less	32	50	70
A new law that would prevent any Muslim from entering the U.S.	54	31	14
Requiring Muslims, including those who are U.S. citizens, to carry a special ID	35	26	16

Gallup Daily, June 14-15, 2016

A majority of Republicans, 54%, think the Trump-favored ban on Muslims would be effective at preventing similar incidents like the one in Orlando, but only 14% of Democrats agree. Because Mateen was born in the U.S. and lived there throughout his life, such a policy would not have prevented the Orlando incident.

Implications

The Orlando tragedy will long be remembered for the scope of the attack, ranking as the largest mass shooting in U.S. history. Given that it was orchestrated by a person of the Islamic faith who claimed allegiance to terrorist groups and who targeted gays and lesbians, the crime has elements of a mass shooting, terrorism and a hate crime.

In its aftermath, Americans' political leaders are trying to sort out what measures the government can take to prevent a reoccurrence. How Americans interpret the event undoubtedly influences what steps they favor, but it may also be that their policy preferences and partisanship influence their interpretations of the event.

Although the proposals members of both parties have put forth are surely well-intentioned, Democrats are focusing their efforts on advancing gun control legislation they long have favored, while Republicans are renewing their calls for tougher anti-terrorism efforts.

Where those two agendas intersect -- namely in taking steps to prevent terrorists from

obtaining guns -- may be the place where lawmakers are most likely to find enough common ground to pass new laws. It is also the policy Americans are most likely to view as effective in preventing a repeat of the Orlando tragedy.

These data are available in Gallup Analytics.

Survey Methods

Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted June 14-15, 2016, on the Gallup U.S. Daily survey, with a random sample of 1,021 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ± 4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

For results based on the total samples of 319 Democrats, 311 Republicans and 349 independents, the margin of sampling error is ± 7 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

All reported margins of sampling error include computed design effects for weighting.



Preparing for the worst case scenario

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160621-preparing-for-the-worst-case-scenario>

June 21 – The number of incidents involving armed attackers (active shooter incidents) has been on the rise over recent years with attacks taking place around the world — from the United States to India, from Norway to France to Kenya. Likely locations for attacks are increasingly “soft” targets with relatively easy, unsecured access; these include commercial offices, public buildings, and open spaces including public gatherings, for example concerts and sports events. And while the likelihood of being



caught up in an active shooter incident is low, companies with employees based in urban centers or staff travelling internationally are increasingly looking to provide their staff with specialist training.

[Teachers participating in active shooter training to bring educators and first responders together](#)

[Control Risks](#) says that its Active Shooter training helps increase awareness of the threat and, in the worst case scenario, how best they can protect themselves.

The company says that this type of targeted training supports an employer’s duty of care responsibilities. Monitoring the evolving global threat landscape and taking appropriate action is integral to an organization’s duty of care, which requires that they take all reasonable steps to ensure the health, safety, and well-being of their staff.

Control Risks’ Active Shooter training course is a scalable and accessible, interactive e-learning course which has been designed by experts in workplace violence, active shooter and terrorist attacks, and crisis management. It aims to raise an individual’s situational awareness, provide guidance on identification of potential perpetrators and how to respond in the event of an incident occurring.

Key elements of Control Risks’ Active Shooter e-learning training course:

1. Awareness and Identification

- Recognizing the potential for violence in the workplace
- Vulnerable times and locations
- Different types of cover and what offers the best protection
- Situational awareness and surroundings.

2. Response

- ‘Run, Hide, Fight’
- Contacting the emergency services
- When law enforcement arrives.

David Graeme, Director of Training at Control Risks, said: “With an increasingly globalized workforce, with staff working and travelling on business internationally, many employers are looking at ways to ensure they keep their people safe, including their non-travelling staff who may be just as at risk from such an attack in their home city. Planning and preparedness can make a real difference to the outcome of an active shooter attack, both in terms of helping save lives as well as minimizing the number of casualties. Given the unpredictable and fast moving nature of this type of incident, prevention is very difficult but through appropriate, expert training, individuals will be better equipped to react quickly to protect themselves and their colleagues.”



Colombian gov't, FARC reach agreement on definite ceasefire

Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/23/c_135458380.htm

June 22 – **The Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla group announced on Wednesday they have reached a deal on a definitive bilateral ceasefire, marking a major step towards ending a half-century conflict.**

In a joint statement, they said they were committed to ending the civil war in the South American nation and this agreement would be a "historical announcement" for Colombia.

The pact will be signed on Thursday in Havana by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and



Timoleon Jimenez, the top leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country's biggest rebel group.

President Santos and FARC leader Timoleon Jimenez together with Cuban president Raúl Castro

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will witness the signing of the agreement, along with Cuban President Raul Castro, the statement said.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Chilean

President Michelle Bachelet and Norwegian Foreign Minister Borge Brende will also be present at the signing ceremony, it added.

Both sides in January tasked the United Nations with monitoring an eventual ceasefire and resolving disputes emerging from the expected demobilization of at least 7,000 armed rebels.

Santos said earlier this week he hoped to ink a final deal by July 20, when Colombia celebrates its declaration of independence from Spain.

Once a deal is reached, Colombians will hold a referendum on whether to endorse the agreements made in Cuba between the FARC rebels and the government.

Negotiations that began in Havana in November 2012 have produced agreements on mechanisms for access to land for poor peasants, transforming the guerrillas to a political party, justice, counter narcotics, mine clearance and search for missing persons.

Colombia's conflict has killed more than 220,000 people and displaced millions since 1964.

Anti-Terror Fatwa Endorsed by 100,000 Bangladeshi Islamic Scholars

Source: <http://www.voanews.com/content/fatwa-endorsed-by-bangladeshi-islamic-scholars-aims-to-curb-terrorism/3384976.html>

June 21 – **A leading Islamic group in Bangladesh has issued a fatwa condemning terrorism and militancy, including violent attacks on non-Muslims and secular writers and activists, as "Haraam," or forbidden and un-Islamic.**

The fatwa, or religious decree, was signed by more than 100,000 Islamic scholars, legal experts and clerics, and presented by Maulana Fariduddin Masoud, chairman of Bangladesh Jamiatul Ulama (BJU), a national body of Islamic scholars.

In presenting the 62-page fatwa along with 30 volumes of books, each carrying over 3,300 signatures, Masoud said he began his campaign because terrorists were launching attacks in the name of Islam. This, he said, was leading to misunderstanding of the religion's tenets.

"As they are indulging in the violent activities, they are terming them jihad and they say that they happily want to become martyrs through jihad. But, Islam stands



against such violent terrorist activities. While Islam is based on peace, love and compassion, they are presenting it as a religion of the uncivilized and terrorist people,” Masoud told VOA.

Explaining jihad in Quranic context

Since most people have an incorrect idea of jihad, the scholars who signed the fatwa sought to explain what jihad means in the Quranic context and how Islamist extremists are misleading both Muslims and non-Muslims on the issue, he said.

“In our fatwa we have tried to explain that their activities cannot be called jihad because they are against the interest of humanity.”



The paperwork of the fatwa on terrorism carried in 30 volumes. (J. Samnoon for VOA)

At least half a dozen secular bloggers and one publisher were killed in the first wave of suspected Islamist attacks in Bangladesh, which began in 2013. However, in recent months, victims have included foreigners, Shi'ites, liberal Muslims and members of other religious minorities.

At least 48 killings in Bangladesh over the last year and a half have been blamed on Islamists. The Islamic State claimed responsibility of more than half of the killings -- including this month's hacking to death of a Hindu priest, a Hindu monastery worker and a Christian grocer. Al-Qaida claimed most of the other killings, according to the U.S.-based SITE Intelligence Group.

Bangladesh's government insists that neither IS nor al-Qaida has a foothold in Bangladesh and that local militant groups are behind the killings.

Minorities seek protection


With attacks on minorities spiking in recent days, minority leaders have sought improved security from the government.

Masoud said that the fatwa also addresses the issue of attacks on minorities.

“Attacking and killing non-Muslims and vandalizing their religious places is completely un-Islamic. We have given that evidence in our fatwa. (The) Prophet Muhammad said, if a Muslim killed any non-Muslim, he would be denied entry to heaven,” Masoud said.

According to Mufti Junud Uddin Maktum, the BJU's legal adviser, after drafting the fatwa, the national body took about five months to collect 101,524 endorsing signatures.

“The legal opinions in the fatwa have been supported by quotations from the Quran and Sunnah, the two most trustworthy sources of Islamic law. It has elevated the authenticity of the fatwa. Furthermore, this fatwa also includes the signatures of around 10,000 female Islamic scholars. Their participation further increased its acceptability to all sections in the society,” Maktum told VOA.



More than 100,000 Islamic clerics, scholars, teachers and others from across Bangladesh signed and endorsed the fatwa on terrorism. The massive process of collecting the signatures over five months involved more than 5,000 volunteers. (J. Samnoon for VOA)

'A singular view on jihad'

The fatwa is highly significant because more than 100,000 Islamic scholars and clerics signed it, said retired army Major General Abdur Rashid, the Executive Director of the Institute of Conflict, Law and Development Studies in Dhaka.

“This is the first such attempt by the Muslim religious leaders in this part of the globe to present a singular view on jihad and influence the mind of the people



against the terrorist activities in the name of Islam," he told VOA, adding, "Since people have [the] inclination to accept the views of Islamic scholars on religious affairs, more than academics and politicians, I think this fatwa will achieve success at least to a good extent."

The fatwa has also been welcomed by minority community leaders in Bangladesh.

"This fatwa can help those who are involved in such militant activities understand that they have been misled. It can help bring a positive change in their life," William Proloy Samadder, organizing secretary of the Bangladesh

Christian Association, told VOA. He said the police in a country as heavily populated as Bangladesh, despite their best efforts, cannot provide security to every vulnerable individual. Samadder said that the fatwa can inspire ordinary Muslims to act against such militant activities.

"These fellow citizens will then come forward to take care of my safety," he said. "To me and other minority community members, this can provide a shield of security more effective than all the other security measures provided by the state so far."

Who supports violent extremism in developing countries?

Source: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/20/who-supports-violent-extremism-in-developing-countries/>

June 22 – An Islamic State fighter waves the terrorist group's flag from a captured government warplane following the battle for the Tabqa air base in Raqqa, Syria, in an undated photo. (AP)

What are the common characteristics among people who justify attacks targeting civilians? In a new [paper](#), we address this question by focusing on attitudes toward violent extremism. We do not study the process of becoming radicalized — or the characteristics of known perpetrators of terrorist attacks — but the characteristics of people surveyed in opinion polls who said they think terrorist attacks


on civilians are justified. People with such an extremist belief may not commit terrorist acts themselves, but they may be at high risk of being recruited by terrorist organizations, or they may sympathize with terrorist organizations and be prepared to help them.

Figure 1: Distribution of responses to the radicalization question
(Percent of all respondents in pooled sample)

We use data Gallup World Polls from 2006 to 2012 that include answers to the question: "I would like you to indicate to which extent it can be morally justified: attacks in which civilians are the target." The


responses, ordered from 1 (for those who think that such attacks "cannot be justified at all") to 5 (for those who consider such attacks "completely justifiable") reveal individuals' attitudes to extreme violence. The comprehensive survey data also has detailed information on a host of individual and household characteristics and views in many countries around the world.

Figure 1: Distribution of responses to the radicalization question
(Percent of all respondents in pooled sample)



The full sample of responses in the Gallup data used in our analysis reflects the attitudes of individuals from 27 developing countries in five geographic regions of the world — the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The vast majority of respondents (close to 74 percent) think that attacks on civilians cannot be justified at all (Figure 1). About 10 percent of those surveyed find such attacks “mildly unjustifiable,” while 7 percent of

Figure 2: Incidence of extremists by region (Percent of respondents)



respondents say they are indifferent to them. But about 9 percent of respondents think attacks on civilians are “mildly justifiable” (3.5 percent) or “completely justifiable” (5.6 percent). We profile the latter group of respondents, with the most extreme views, as they find attacks on civilians completely justifiable.

Figure 2: Incidence of extremists by region (percent of respondents)

The proportion of extremist respondents varies substantially across regions and countries. Overall, in the time period we are looking at, sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the region with the highest incidence of individuals with extreme

views; they represent more than 10 percent of the surveyed population during most of the years in the time period of interest (Figure 2). The region with the second-highest incidence of extremists is South Asia. In both regions, the prevalence of such individuals increased after 2007. In the Middle East and North Africa, the incidence of extremists was as low as it was in Central and Southeast Asia, averaging about 2 percent but increased to 4 percent after the Arab Spring in 2011.

The incidence of support for extremist views varies substantially across MENA countries, ranging from less than a half-percent in Morocco to nearly 34 percent in Djibouti, and averaging close to 6 percent worldwide. So, globally, the prevalence of people with extreme attitudes toward violence is low — but not negligible.

Our findings suggest that individuals with extreme attitudes tend to be young people. The probability that a person holds extreme beliefs increases with age during youth and early adulthood, peaks at age 33 and declines afterward. It is more likely to find people with extreme attitudes among the unemployed, those struggling to make ends meet, the relatively uneducated and individuals who are *not* as religious as others around them but who *are* willing to sacrifice their own life for their beliefs. In other words, extremists may get inspired by militant religious ideas and therefore may support violent acts motivated by such beliefs, but religion may not necessarily play an important role in their lives.

We find important differences across regions. Unlike in MENA countries, people with extreme attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are more likely to be poor and unemployed than others, and they are also likely to be among the least educated in their countries. Not surprisingly, terrorist groups have been able to establish lasting presence in the poorest and most disadvantaged areas of these two regions. In MENA countries, extremists come from all sorts of socioeconomic backgrounds, but they are significantly less likely than others to have college and university diplomas.

Our findings are surprising as they do not support several common views about extremism.

Women are just as likely as men to have extreme attitudes toward violence targeting civilians.

Attitudes toward violent extremism do *not* differ significantly between single and married people, except in Central Asia, where single people are more likely to hold extreme views.

The prevalence of people with extreme attitudes toward violence targeting civilians was relatively low in MENA countries until 2011, the year of the Arab Spring.

Our results dispel the myth that religious people in general are more likely to approve of violence toward civilians. Only in Central Asia (Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan) are extremists more likely to be people for whom religion plays an important role.



But individuals willing to sacrifice their own lives for their beliefs — social, religious, political or economic — are also significantly more likely than others to be extremists in their attitudes toward violence. Of all the people who are willing to risk their lives, they mostly do so to protect the lives of innocent civilians. Police officers and security guards are an example. Extremists are a small but non-negligible subset of this group in the developing world.

This analysis fits into the prevailing narrative on terrorism by providing rigorous empirical evidence on the traits common to individuals who justify extreme violence against civilians. The rise of terrorist incidents around the world suggests that there is a need to deepen our understanding of the complex problems related to extreme violence and our efforts to collect new data on these issues.

Elena Ianchovichina is a lead economist and Youssouf Kiendrebeogo is an economist in the chief economist's office of the World Bank's Middle East and North Africa region.

