


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


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House Homeland Security Committee to release monthly Terror Threat Snapshot

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150623-house-homeland-security-committee-to-release-monthly-terror-threat-snapshot>



<https://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/documents/June%20Terror%20Threat%20Snapshot.pdf>

House Homeland Security Committee chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) on Friday released a new Committee product called the Terror Threat Snapshot. McCaul said the snapshot is a new, regular monthly feature which tracks “the escalating and grave threat environment” facing the United States. The Terror Threat Snapshot will be kept up to date on the Committee’s Web site. Additionally, monthly summaries will be available.

Key takeaways in this month’s Terror Threat Snapshot include:

- There have been 24 ISIS-linked plots or attacks against Western targets in the first half of 2015, up from 19 in all of last year.
- The number of homegrown terror plots since 9/11 has reached 116, tripling in just the past five years.
- Foreign fighters continue to flow into Syria and Iraq. There has been an 80 percent increase in fighters traveling to the conflict zone since ISIS declared its “caliphate” one year ago.
- More than 200 Americans are believed to have traveled — or attempted to travel — to fight in Syria, a 33 percent increase overall since the beginning of this year.

McCaul said: “Terror threats to the U.S. homeland have reached unprecedented levels. There have been 116 homegrown jihadist plots in America since 9/11 — more than half of those have occurred in just the past three years. Violent Extremism is going viral, but our response to it is moving at bureaucratic, sluggish speed. It is time for President Obama to admit that — in this new age of peer-to-peer terror — we need a real strategy to combat radicalization at home and destroy extremist safe havens abroad.”



Daesh calypso in Caribbean?

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/06/daesh-calypto-in-caribbean.html>

It is no secret that Daesh has grand plans to conquer more of the Middle East from the vast terrain it currently controls in Syria and Iraq. The dreaded terror organisation has also fanned out to Europe with its rabid ideology



that has triggered self-starter attacks like the one against the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. But Latin America and the Caribbean?

Two months ago, General John Kelly of the US Southern Command warned of extremists radicalising Muslim converts and others in South America and the Caribbean. Security concerns were raised because these countries have weak law enforcement systems that allow extremist elements and wannabe terrorists an environment in which they can move freely across the region and to the thick of action in Syria and Iraq.

General Kelly estimated that there were around 100 that left from the Caribbean for *Ash Sham*, or the greater Levant region, which covers Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The general's revelations then raised some eyebrows but could not be verified.

Now, an independent probe has confirmed extremist doctrine has indeed spread to the Caribbean.

Veryan Khan, an analyst with the US-based Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), who tracks and studies social media and other channels to understand the recruitment tactics of terrorist groups, self-

starter cells and separatist movements, says there are confirmed and documented Daesh cases in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, as well as in Guyana. Speaking to *Khaleej Times*, Veryan, who is also TRAC's Editorial Director, says these cases are, however, sparse and do not amount to a groundswell of new activity for Daesh.

"If you look at Daesh propaganda, (digitised computer generated maps at the beginning of their big budget films like *Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such*), their global vision starts in Rome, moves through the world ending with North America in the United States. South America isn't even portrayed/visualised in their global propaganda map as existing," she explains. Veryan says there are Daesh-affiliated Twitter accounts lamenting that a certain popular propaganda item has been translated into every other language besides Spanish. "This tells us that Latin

America is low on Daesh's outreach programme. The Caribbean, depending on the island, speaks a greater variety of languages (English, Spanish, French and Dutch or European language-based creoles). Therefore, Daesh's message is more likely to get through to them."

On May 16th 2014, the terror tracking group noticed the very first tweet on the claim of the existence of **Al Mexiki**. Since then, all references to the Mexican in Daesh can be traced back to that first tweet but no new intelligence has been gathered on him.

"I am not saying he doesn't exist but I am saying that Tweet doesn't pass our test for making a claim that it's true. (Twitter is a very good source of primary resource information — but — Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium relies on key indicators and cross references to verify the veracity of any claim on Twitter.)

She says **Latin America, particularly, Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil have been much more receptive to Shia groups like Hezbollah than Sunni.**

Traditionally, the Shia discourse



fits in better with the Leftist viewpoints from Venezuela and the overall revolutionary rhetoric.

There may be little cause for alarm about Daesh recruitments in South America, but Johan Obdola, a narco-terrorism expert and a former police chief in Venezuela, who heads the International Organization of Security and Intelligence, echoes Veryan's views on Daesh in the Caribbean and says Trinidad and Tobago government officials have indicated that several of their nationals have joined the group

"In the Caribbean, there is a group called Jamaat Al Muslimeen. Many of its members are based in Trinidad and Tobago. The group leader is Yasin Abu Bk, who could be playing an important role in recruitments for Daesh along with other actors," says Johan.

So what are countries in the Caribbean and Latin America doing to counter Daesh's propaganda and recruitment strategy? Veryan says individual countries are engaged at a planning level to counter threats posed by the group.

US border with Mexico on radar

US Republicans and members of Congress fear that the border with Mexico is porous and training camps have been established in Texas, but the Director of the FBI, in early May, termed the claims as "nonsense."

Church Shooting Suspect an Enigma, But Domestic Terrorism Threat Is Clear

Source: <http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Suspect-in-church-shootings-is-an-enigma-but-threat-of-domestic-terrorism-is-clear.html>

As the nation mobilizes to determine what motivated the gunman in the Charleston, S.C., massacre, the shootings highlight what a number of experts said Thursday is a chilling reality: The greatest danger from terrorism may be from our own ranks and within our own borders.

"Since 9/11, our country has been fixated on the threat of jihadi terrorism," said Richard Cohen, president of the Southern Poverty Law Center. "But the horrific tragedy at the Emanuel AME reminds us that the threat of homegrown domestic terrorism is very real."

Dylann Storm Roof, 21, was arrested Thursday in Shelby, N.C., ending a massive manhunt

In a recent Daesh video called *We will Burn America* the group compiled a long series of "on the spot" reporting from local media outlets hyping up the porous border — so the border is on their radar. "But I think more in terms of calling for self-starters in North America rather than being in operational stages for cross-border activity," clarifies Veryan.

Sneaking a nuclear weapon through Mexico is not impossible, but such claims lack credibility. "I believe that is part of the propaganda of Daesh to attract supporters," says Johan, who believes the confrontation between Daesh and Hezbollah in the Middle East could reach dangerous levels in Latin America, if states do not ramp up their security and guard against the drug trade that funds Hezbollah activities.

The big concern for US intelligence agencies is not young Daesh sympathisers who want to leave for Iraq-Syria to join Daesh, but local operatives or lone wolves who might be preparing for some coordinated terrorist attacks.

Veryan agrees and says Daesh specialises in seeking out the disenfranchised, the people who feel guilty about their lives, the ones who want to make a difference for others. "Daesh has been very successful in cell strategy in Spain, but it has yet to really spread its message in Spanish. Which tells TRAC, again, if the person from Latin America is not actively searching it out and translating it, then the message is less likely to be heard."



shootings are clearly more than a hate crime. “Yes, it’s hate-motivated,” Johnson said. “But the definition of terrorism is violence committed for a political or social change that instills fear in a population. It definitely fits the bill because of the target — he went into a historical, symbolic facility — and because of (racial statements) he reportedly shouted during the



shooting.” The Kansas City Star reported in April that domestic terrorism used to be a major focus for police and federal agents, especially after the Oklahoma City bombing 20 years ago. But the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11 led to a shift in law enforcement’s focus from domestic to foreign terrorism. And today, The Star found, while the number of violent incidents committed by domestic extremists is actually increasing, the holes in the net to catch them are growing larger. Incidents of violence have been making headlines for years. Last year, avowed neo-Nazi F. Glenn Miller Jr. allegedly shot to death three people outside two Jewish centers in Overland Park. In 2012, white supremacist Wade Michael Page stormed a Sikh temple south of Milwaukee, shooting and killing six people. In 2009, white supremacist James W. von Brunn shot and fatally wounded a security guard at the crowded U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., in an attack that sent tourists running for cover.

While those shooters were known white nationalists, little is known yet about Roof’s ideologies. Although he appeared to have an interest in white supremacy, many of his Facebook friends were black. He wasn’t known to groups that monitor white nationalist activity, and unlike some who have committed violence, he hadn’t been publicly promoting a racist agenda.

Yet there also was evidence of racist leanings. A photo posted May 21 on Roof’s Facebook page shows a scowling young man with a bowl-style haircut standing in a wooded area. He is wearing a jacket with patches that depict the flags of apartheid-era South Africa and Rhodesia, a former British colony once ruled by a white minority. Rhodesia became independent in 1980 and changed its name to Zimbabwe. Another photo that surfaced Thursday showed Roof leaning against the front of a car with a plate that said “Confederate States of America.”

Roof was arrested in March on a misdemeanor drug possession charge, and that case is pending. On Thursday morning, Roof had 89 Facebook friends. Later in the day, the number had dropped to 80 before the page was taken down. The site said that Roof attended White Knoll High School near Columbia, S.C. Leonard Zeskind, president of the Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights, said the patches on Roof’s jacket and comments that Roof allegedly made inside the church indicated a white supremacist mindset. “He said, ‘You’re raping our women, you’re taking over, this is our country, we want it back,’” Zeskind said. “It’s in line with someone who’s thinking along the lines of the white nationalist universe.” Zeskind said the shootings were “a terrible reminder that white supremacy remains a danger in our communities.” “It’s horrible on its face, but it’s also a reminder that this problem has not been done away with,” he said. “Nine people dead — it’s beyond belief.” Cohen called the shootings “an obvious hate crime by someone



who feels threatened by our country's changing demographics and the increasing prominence of African-Americans in public life."

"Since 2000, we've seen an increase in the number of hate groups in our country — groups that vilify others on the basis of characteristics such as race or ethnicity," he said. "Though the numbers have gone down somewhat in the last two years, they are still at historically high levels."

Brian Levin, director of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University-San Bernardino, said mass killers don't always easily fit into a simple category.

"We tend to make mass killers 10 feet tall when oftentimes they're 10 inches tall and hunched," he said. "Many of these attacks, while symbolically hitting a deep chord with citizens, are often part of a chaotic mix of motives, some of which will only ever be known to the offender himself."

"This may be a situation where mental distress is as much an explanation as anything else. But let's see what comes out from family and friends. Was there some kind of catalytic incident in his life that filled him with some kind of rage where he felt comfortable lashing out against a symbolic target?"

Levin said Roof's Facebook photo says a lot about him.

"Generally, when we're looking at motives, we try to start with what are they saying," he said. "He certainly looks like an angry fellow, and that was the message that he was trying to present."

Kansas City Bethel AME Church holds prayer response to Charleston, S.C. shooting

Area pastors and the community respond to the shooting deaths at the Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, S.C., with a prayer vigil at Bethel AME Church in Kansas City Thursday, June 18, 2015.

The shootings were the talk of social media throughout the day — including online forums that espouse racism. On Stormfront, the largest online white nationalist forum in the country, dozens of members had posted more than 70 pages of comments by Thursday afternoon. Some suggested the rampage was part of a conspiracy to start a race war in the country; others said the incident would bring down more scrutiny on their movement.

"If anyone wants to go weapons free on drug dealers, or rioters ... Hell, I'll chip in for ammo," wrote a poster named CelticUbermensch. "Just tell me where to send the cheque. But killing a group of Christians, no matter what colour they are, just make us look like White versions of ISIS."

Others responded more calmly.

Marcus Stanley, who wasn't a Facebook friend of Roof's, came across his page Thursday and wrote:

"Children do not grow up with hatred in their hearts. In this world we are born color blind. Somewhere along the line, you were taught to hate people that are not like you, and that is truly tragic. You have accomplished nothing from this killing, but planting seeds of pain that will forever remain in the hearts of the families that lost their lives and countless hearts around our country."

Four Questions on ISIS: A "Trend" Analysis of the Islamic State

By Boaz Ganor

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/436/html>

During the past year, the Islamic State (IS) has taken control of extensive areas of the Middle East. Its military achievements, extreme and historically unprecedented barbarism, success in recruiting thousands of young people from around the world to its ranks in Iraq and Syria, its store of financial resources and, above all, its skilled use of social and other media to publicize its terrorist acts and spread its propaganda, have all made IS an increasing and alarming threat to global security.

Although experts on terrorism, security officials and decision makers worldwide concur that IS pose an unparalleled threat, they disagree about the answers to the following four key questions:

1. What is the Nature of the Islamic State? Should IS be regarded as a terrorist organization? Does its scope of operations, paramilitary activities, involvement in guerilla warfare and insurgency, and control over vast territories and populations not stretch the definition of a terrorist organization?[1]



2. Are the Doctrines of the Islamic State an Innovation? By its actions, is the Islamic State introducing new doctrines and concepts, or is it merely implementing and refining modern terrorism strategies, which aim to spread fear and anxiety to achieve political goals?
3. What are the Islamic State's Aspirations? Are the Islamic State's aspirations limited to the Middle East, or does it see itself as *avant garde*, spearheading an operation whose objective is global? Is the Islamic State striving for hegemony and, ultimately, to establish a caliphate in Syria, Iraq and the Levant? Or does it see such a caliphate as only the first step in its drive to establish a global caliphate? In this regard, how does IS differ from Al-Qaeda, if at all?[2]
4. What is the Islamic State's Strategic Situation? Following the successful military campaign of summer 2014 that enabled IS to seize extensive swaths of Syria and Iraq, the organization's progress seems to have stalled – in part thanks to the establishment of a broad coalition of international allies, whose goal was to halt the organization's advance and eradicate it. Does this mark “the beginning of the end” for IS? Is it on the brink of disappearing? Or, despite the air and ground military campaign of the international coalition, will the Islamic State recoup its losses and experience a resurgence, pushing past Syria and Iraq?[3]

How we answer these four questions will affect not only our understanding of the nature, aims and activities of the Islamic State; it will also dictate what counter-strategy should be implemented in order to stop, if not trounce, the Islamic State. To this end, I will analyze the essence of the Islamic State and revisit its definition as a “terrorist organization”.

What is the Nature of the Islamic State?

As is well known, for the nearly half-century since the emergence of modern terrorism in the 1960s [4], no one international definition of terrorism has become consensus[5]. On the contrary, most researchers and counter-terrorism experts see “terrorism” as a loaded, problematic term, and have therefore avoided using it, favoring alternatives to describe and define the phenomenon we experience as terrorism[6]. This hesitance to define terrorism has grown concurrent with the increasing involvement of Islamists in the perpetration of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and elsewhere, out of a fear of besmirching Muslims as a whole and provoking their opposition. In an attempt to circumvent this problem, and in service to “political correctness”, decision makers have chosen to refer to terrorist attacks carried out against Jewish and other targets throughout Europe as “hate crimes”, and to their perpetrators as “violent extremists”[7]. However, insistent replacement of the loaded term “terrorism” with terms that are seemingly more neutral only serves to hinder an effective response to the phenomenon. “Violent extremists” may be driven by any number of motives to achieve any number of objectives – as witnessed by the brutal acts committed by members of criminal organizations and cults. “Escape” from the need to define terrorism to more palatable terminology turns the act of definition into a useless tool, which merely paves the way for a “photo opportunity” of mock international unity

in the face of heinous acts. Above all, the lack of an essential consensus on a definition of terrorism impedes the formulation of a real and effective international campaign against terrorism.

Moreover, the reluctance to use the term “terrorism” stems from its negative connotation, which various countries have manipulated to portray their opponents as “terrorists”. Yet it is precisely this negative connotation that is now needed in naming and shaming IS. If we define the Islamic State as a terrorist organization, we may then differentiate it from the rest of the Muslim world, including those Muslims who hold radical but non-violent religious views. If we define terrorism as “a modus operandi by which violence is deliberately used against civilians to achieve political goals”[8], we clear the way to label IS a terrorist organization, thereby obviating any potential justification for its barbaric actions. Labeling any organization a terrorist organization is, first and foremost, a way of saying that that organization has violated a moral boundary by deliberately and systematically targeting civilians. No argument – be it political, socio-economic, ideological, or religious – justifies the targeting of innocent civilians, and the Islamic State is a terrorist organization expressly because it perpetrates extremely barbaric attacks – including mass murder, kidnapping and beheading, mutilation, rape and maiming – against the civilians under its control and elsewhere in the world.



At the same time, the Islamic State is not only a terrorist organization. Its operatives also engage in guerilla warfare, military attacks against other non-state actors, and insurgency against the Iraqi and Syrian armies.[9] Concurrently, others of its members engage in “law enforcement” among the civilian populations under its control, and in service provision to these same populations. Specifically, immediately after taking over a city or town, the Islamic State imposes Shari’a (Islamic) law, which it enforces with extreme and terrifying violence to ensure compliance; at the same time, it provides essential welfare, education, and religious services (Da’wa) to the citizens who have come under its control. These varied actions make the Islamic State a “hybrid terrorist organization”[10] – that is, an organization that operates simultaneously in the (illegitimate) military-terrorist sphere and in the (pseudo-legitimate) civilian sphere. In this sense, the Islamic State is no different from other hybrid terrorist organizations like Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which also control a given territory and govern all aspects of the lives of the people living there.

It is important to note, however, that IS has gone a step further than Hamas or Hezbollah, by deeming itself “the Islamic State”. IS’s declaration of itself as a state is designed to promote it as an Islamic caliphate (in parts of Iraq and Syria) and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the caliph. Needless to say, IS’s attempt to position itself as a sovereign state should not be condoned, even though it sees itself as one and controls extensive territory. Indeed, IS has not been recognized by any international institution, state or entity.

In light of the above, we may answer the first question by determining that the Islamic State is a “hybrid terrorist organization”, a sub-state actor, which operates simultaneously in the military, civilian and political spheres. Through its terrorist acts and crimes, IS severely challenges international norms, defies morality, and breaks international humanitarian law. In so doing, IS has positioned itself as an enemy of the enlightened world.

Are the Doctrines of the Islamic State an Innovation?

To answer the second question – is IS introducing an innovative modus operandi or is it merely using the strategic framework of

modern terrorism more efficiently – I will analyze the characteristics of modern terrorism, as it has evolved during the past half century.

Modern terrorism emerged in the 1960s[11] as a result, in part, of certain countries’ use of terrorist proxies to promote their interests and spread their ideology.[12] In addition, the increasing cost of conventional warfare and the threat of unconventional warfare, the burgeoning of technology and, especially, innovations such as television stimulated the growth of modern terrorism.[13] Beginning in the late 1960s, we can identify the development of successive waves of terrorism. Each wave would swell when a terrorist organization employed a violent means of achieving its political aims, which was perceived as being effective and efficient and which therefore was then copied by other terrorist organizations. To illustrate: during the 1960s airplane hijacking was the preferred modus operandi; during the 1970s terrorists favored hostage negotiations; and during the 1990s suicide attack became the dominant mode of attack and remained so into the early 21st century. These successive waves of terrorism, and the transition from one to another, can be viewed as the development of consecutive trends: each time a new form of attack was deemed effective, terrorist organizations would adopt it. In this context, we can see the Islamic State as the harbinger of a new trend in terrorism.

Albeit, IS did not invent the strategy of modern terrorism, whose essence is to spread fear and terror to advance chosen aims, but it certainly has honed this strategy, taking it to a more extreme level of barbarism, cruelty and violence than ever seen before. IS’s terrorism and guerilla warfare have one goal: to instill horror and dread. The beheading of captives, the immolation of a Jordanian pilot, the mass public executions, the mutilation of civilians and other heinous acts intensify the fear imposed by the terrorist organization on its various target audiences. However, extreme cruelty would not in and of itself be sufficient to achieve the desired effect. To bring its message home, IS has developed a deft system of “translating” fear and loathing so that they can be disseminated through the media to its target audiences: opponents and enemies, followers and



supporters in the Muslim world, the civilian populations under its control, and the international audience.[14] IS's leadership has not only comprehended and adopted the strategy of modern terrorism, but has made unprecedented, sophisticated use of the Internet and social networks such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram to reach vast audiences while evading censorship. Moreover, it appears that IS's leaders have cracked the code of what becomes popular on the Internet; they have succeeded in skillfully editing their video clips such that they quickly "go viral". The viciousness of the terrorist attacks themselves and the choice of camera angles used to film them, along with psychological warfare and intimidation, have intensified IS's influence. Like the horror movies about zombies and the violent video and computer games that have become so popular in the West, IS's video clips pique the curiosity of young people worldwide. As I will detail below, the Islamic State's sophisticated propaganda and visual fear-mongering have succeeded in promoting three of its goals: to gain control of more territory in Iraq and Syria; to recruit young people to its arenas of battle; and to cow those under its control into obedience.

1. First, the Islamic State's strategy of fear was designed to help it expand its territorial control. During the past year, IS struck dread into the hearts of the Iraqi and Syrian armies and the Kurdish militias that rose to oppose it. Often, when these fighters were exposed to IS's heinous acts – either online or on the battlefield – they chose to lay down their arms[15] (which were then plundered by IS), don civilian clothes, and run for their lives lest they fall captive to IS and suffer the atrocities they had seen. This enabled IS to rapidly conquer extensive territory, and afforded it the opportunity to amass state-of-the-art weapons, which were originally supplied by the US and other countries to the armies and militias opposing it.
2. Second, IS has succeeded in using the Internet and social media to transmit a message of cruelty, which has won the hearts and minds of those young Muslims who have come from around the world to join its ranks, or who have conducted lone wolf attacks of their own. Its message has inspired marginalized Muslim youth in

Europe and the West, second- and third-generation immigrants (some of them with a criminal past) who are disaffected, frustrated, seeking a sense of identity and belonging, full of hatred for the societies that have not adequately integrated them, and facing a bleak future with few prospects for development and self-actualization[16]. When these problems are compounded by real personal and family distress, such young people become easy prey for IS's Internet propaganda, which seems to offer an outlet for their frustration and yearning for power and control. The Islamic State's use of images of brutality, coupled with its message of victory, spark these young people's curiosity and yen for adventure, give vent to their loathing and sense of helplessness, and take advantage of their adrenaline-propelled hormones – to the point where they are willing to leave home to join IS in Iraq or Syria or to purchase weapons and initiate attacks where they live, usually without any contact with IS, let alone direct orders from it. Already in 2014, IS had recruited some 10,000 impassioned and incensed Muslim youth to its struggles in Syria and Iraq[17] - a figure that has probably doubled since then. Some of them return home after having spent time with IS in these countries, where they were both trained to fight and exposed to an intensified and accelerated process of radicalization. In other cases, so-called "lone wolves" have been stirred by IS's instructional videos and other materials that it posts to the Internet with the express aim of their being used or imitated.

3. Third, the profound unease aroused by IS's nauseating violence and propaganda has yet another goal: to ensure the complete obedience of the civilians under its control. In this, the IS is no different from other sinister dictatorships and totalitarian regimes that have used cruelty and brutality to assure compliance and suppress opposition.

We may therefore conclude that IS has not invented any new strategies of violence, but rather has enhanced the strategies of modern terrorism. By spreading terror and panic among its target audiences, it has garnered concrete military gains and achieved its psychological aims.



The Islamic State's achievements cannot be understood without taking into account the religious component of its essence. Its main target audience is young Muslims everywhere. IS captivates these young people, not only by virally disseminating its messages of victory and barbarism, but also, and perhaps mainly, by inviting them to join an alternative conceptual system. IS offers these young people a new identity, a sense of belonging, and a different set of values and beliefs: that of the Salafist-jihadist interpretation of Islam. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has appointed himself the new Muslim caliph and the successor to the Prophet Muhammad, calls on these young people to accept what he defines as the religious imperative of restoring Islam to its former glory. He demands that they take an active role in the fight against the infidel "enemies of Islam"; using the conspiratorial claim that Islam is currently in an existential struggle against "heretics" from within and without. The young Muslims exposed to this religious propaganda are ordered to join in the "defense of Islam" and sacrifice their lives to defeating the infidels. IS leaders and propagandists cynically exploit Islam to arouse, recruit and motivate Muslim youth to take radical, violent action, and even to commit suicide for the cause. To paraphrase Karl Marx, IS exploits religion as an "opium of the masses", which it manipulates to justify a viciousness that knows no restraint or moral inhibition.

If we ignore the Islamist-religious dimension of the Islamic State, we risk steering our analysis away from the root causes of radical Islamist terrorism and failing to find the appropriate means of consistent and effective action against it. At the same time, laying the blame for the heinous acts of Islamist-jihadist extremists such as the Islamic State at the doorstep of Islam is also wrong; in fact, it is no less dangerous because, in defiance of reality, it gives the Salafist-jihadist interpretation of Islam more prominence than it warrants, thereby excluding the vast majority of Muslims – who do not subscribe to this interpretation or support such acts – from playing an active role in destroying IS, in particular, and radical Islamist-jihadist terrorism in general. In this respect, the trend exemplified by IS reflects not a problem with Islam, but a problem within Islam, one that requires in-depth internal

analysis and criticism, first and foremost by Muslims themselves.

What are the Islamic State's Aspirations?

The third question we would address concerns whether the Islamic State is a local or global phenomenon. On one hand, there is a tendency to view IS as a local phenomenon limited to parts of Iraq, Syria and even the whole of the Levant (Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, etc.).[18] This tendency is based on the history of the organization and the beginning of the dispute between al-Zarqawi, who headed an early version of the Islamic State between 2001 and 2006, and al-Zawahiri, who during those same years served as a deputy to Osama bin Laden and as the spiritual leader of Al-Qaeda. At that time, Al-Qaeda intended to promote a global Islamic caliphate, and feared the diversion of resources, power and focus to local Islamic caliphates in one or another territory. In contrast, al-Zarqawi emphasized the need to liberate Iraq from the American occupation and establish an Islamic caliphate there. Ostensibly, this dispute seemed to concern timing – that is, whether the global campaign to establish an Islamic caliphate should precede the campaign to establish local caliphates, or vice versa – absent any question as to the ultimate goal of establishing a global caliphate. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of the Islamic State in 2011, his goal seemed to be to establish an Islamic caliphate first in Iraq, and then in Syria and the Levant. In fact, the Islamic State's aim of expansion developed as its control of territories in Iraq and Syria expanded; this is reflected in its name changes: from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), to simply the Islamic State (IS), without any territorial designation. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's global aspirations developed over time, as is illustrated by his public speeches. His self-appointment as caliph and as the successor to the Prophet Muhammad can be seen as an expression of his global aspirations, perhaps even of his megalomania. The Islamic State's global ambitions were also stoked by its military successes and by the viral propaganda that quickly made it a role model for other individuals and terrorist organizations, including those that had previously sworn allegiance to Al-Qaeda and bin Laden but



which now switched their allegiance to IS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the new caliph.

As the heir of Al-Qaeda, IS is the new trend in modern terrorism, an inspiration to other terrorist networks and organizations, and individuals. Analysis of the evolution of modern terrorism reveals many instances in which an organization split up when some of its members left because they believed its leadership was too moderate, too willing to compromise, not militant enough, or not sufficiently dedicated to achieving the goals for which it was established. The dissident members then form a splinter organization, which is usually more violent and dangerous than its predecessor. Such splinter organizations tend to claim that they are “the real thing”, the keepers of the flame who are loyal to the goal, unlike those in the mother organization, whom they claim have deviated from the path. This is illustrated by the Real IRA, which split off from the IRA; the PFLP/General Command led by Ahmed Jibril, which split off from the PFLP led by George Habash; and Hamas, which defines itself as “the real thing” vis à vis Fatah. In the case under review, it would seem that many radical Islamists are beginning to perceive IS as the “real thing”, as opposed to Al-Qaeda. Although in its nascency, this process may be expected to expand, increasing the power of IS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi at the expense of Al-Qaeda and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Regardless of whether this was al-Baghdadi’s intention all along or whether circumstances led him to make establishing a global caliphate IS’s ideological platform, IS should today be regarded as striving to extend its authority to networks, organizations and individuals around the world. At present, the Islamic State is focused on Syria and Iraq, and is developing an agenda that includes Libya and the Sinai Peninsula, but if it succeeds in stabilizing its rule in the areas under its control, we can expect it to expand further. Alternatively, if IS loses its territorial strongholds in Iraq and Syria, we can anticipate that it will not disappear, but rather will take on another form based in territories such as northern or central Africa, for example, or in Southeast Asia. This is what happened to Al-Qaeda, which changed following the loss of territory in Afghanistan, and especially following the killing of bin Laden. If and when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is killed, IS will likely change its nature and rate of expansion,

although the course this change will take will naturally depend on the identity and capabilities of al-Baghdadi’s successor – specifically, whether he is able to fill al-Baghdadi’s shoes and inherit his status as caliph.

What is the Islamic State’s Strategic Situation?

This insight brings us to our fourth question about the Islamic State: what is its position today? Is it stagnating? In retreat? Or can we expect it to grow stronger in the near future? Many researchers believe that IS and al-Baghdadi have made a staggering number of enemies because of IS’s violence and cruelty to Muslims and others, the danger it constitutes to the world, and the challenge posed by the foreigners who fight in its ranks, as well as because of al-Baghdadi’s megalomaniac agenda. For example, Shi’ites, Christians, Yazidis and Kurds in Iraq and Syria – all of whom have suffered and continue to suffer greatly at the hands of IS – are actively fighting it. Even other Islamist organizations active in Syria, such as the Al-Nusra Front (some of whose members used to belong to IS), the Muslim Brotherhood and, of course, Iran’s proxy Hezbollah – are opposing IS no less than is Assad’s army. Multiple countries are fighting IS, among them Saudi Arabia (which supports the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria just as Iran supports the Assad regime); Jordan, which wishes to avenge the brutal killing of its pilot and which fears IS will advance to its border; and an international coalition of the Gulf States and Western countries, led by the United States. That IS’s acts have given rise to the establishment of this coalition is unprecedented, even if the coalition has made do with an ongoing air campaign and limited achievements on the ground in Iraq and Syria, and has yet to wage an extensive ground offensive.

Beyond the difficulty of making additional military gains in Syria and Iraq, IS may yet have to cope with an economic crisis. Thanks to its takeover of several oilfields and of gold and monetary reserves in the commercial banks of the cities it has conquered, the Islamic State has larger financial coffers than do other terrorist organizations. In addition, its policy of kidnapping foreigners and demanding large ransoms for



them has swelled its income. However, it may reasonably be assumed that without additional significant military victories, the Islamic State's financial resources will eventually dry up. Since IS does not have an ally that could support it financially, and since it has no sea access, the organization may find itself in a financial crisis, unable to restock its weapons or meet the demand for the essential supplies it needs to keep itself running.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the members of the coalition fighting IS have differing, sometimes even opposing, interests. For example, the interests of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States differ from those of Iran, Hezbollah and the Assad regime. These differences make it difficult to undermine IS and translate the fear it instills into an effective, unified strategy to neutralize it. It is also important to remember that so far, the air strikes against IS have been limited in scope and, at present, most members of the coalition are unwilling to embark on a ground campaign

against IS. Moreover, some of the countries that are ostensibly part of the coalition are simultaneously maintaining informal or even formal ties with members of the Islamic State. For example, large amounts of oil are being piped to Turkey from oil fields now in the Islamic State's purview, for a price that is financial oxygen for IS[19]. Consequently, it seems that the campaign currently being waged against IS in Syria and Iraq – given its level of intensity, the lack of an extensive ground operation, and the conflicting interests of the coalition members – is unlikely to neutralize or eradicate IS. The growing support for IS among other Islamist-jihadist organizations (such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula), the strengthening of its branch in Libya and elsewhere, and the success of its viral propaganda campaign all guarantee that IS will continue to present a significant local and global security threat.

Conclusion

To summarize the four questions I have tried to answer here, we can see the Islamic State as a new and dangerous trend in modern terrorism, one that has brought the heartlessness and barbarism of terrorism to previously inconceivable extremes. However, the Islamic State has not changed the rules of the game or altered the strategy of modern terrorism adopted by multiple organizations worldwide during the past half century; rather, it has intensified and enhanced that strategy through its skillful wielding of propaganda. At present, the Islamic State is enjoying growing popularity among young Muslims, who consider it to be the “real deal” compared to rival organizations and ideologies. IS is exploiting the chaos that has ensued from the Arab Spring, especially in Syria, Iraq and Libya, to conquer large swaths of territory. It is also exploiting the confusion and indecision in the policies of Western countries, chiefly the US, concerning the Arab Spring – the result of unstinting support for any process that appears to promote “the will of the people”, even when that process is actually a springboard for the overthrow of an existing regime and its replacement by an Islamist-fundamentalist one based on Shari'a (Islamic) law, under the guise of democracy. At the same time, IS activists and supporters are exploiting the liberal-democratic values and slack immigration policies of Western countries, especially those in Europe, and of the European Union's belief in multiculturalism, accord and cooperation (as evidenced by the Schengen Agreement, which permits the free passage of people among countries in Europe, without border checks or luggage inspection). Moreover, the Islamic State is brainwashing young second- and third-generation immigrants to Europe, recruiting them to its ranks and inspiring them to carry out “lone wolf” terrorist attacks in Western countries.

In order for Western countries to effectively counteract the trend of IS, they must first abandon political correctness and “call a spade a spade”: they must define the Islamist-jihadist terrorist threat as such. It is first necessary to recognize that the enemy is not just one lone wolf, or a group of violent extremists, or a certain terrorist organization; rather, it is the Islamist-jihadist ideology and world view, which distorts Islam. True, this world view is accepted by only a fraction of the members of the Muslim Nation, but they are a very vocal and dangerous fraction, and their doctrines must be acknowledged for what they are and neutralized if this new trend in the evolution of local and global terrorism is to be addressed effectively.

Therefore, Muslim clerics and religious leaders have a key role to play in formulating a doctrine that will combat the message of the Islamic State. They must proffer and disseminate an interpretation of Islam that constitutes an alternative to the religious laws



and teachings being warped and misused by jihadist terrorists. Their key role will be not to defend the Western world or other religions and cultures but rather, first and foremost, to defend Muslims from Islamist jihadists, to defend their own religion from those who are trying to twist it and drag believers nearly 1,500 years back in time. Also, Muslim clerics should take a stand against Islamist-jihadist ideology so as to mitigate the waves of “aftershock” that follow jihadist terrorist attacks in Western countries, which are manifested as Islamophobia.

In addition, the entire world – Muslims, Christians, Jews and others – must unite around a normative standard that prohibits intentional terrorist attacks against civilians and refuses to accept any religious, political or operative justification for deviation from this standard. An interfaith agreement is needed, which will divorce the personal, religious value system of a man and his Creator from political policies and goals. The spiritual leaders of various religions must jointly sign a pact prohibiting the use of violence for religious propagation, forbidding forced conversion, and preventing the conquest of territory in the name of religion. Only thus will it be possible to counteract the expanding scope of international terrorism emanating from the madrasas (Islamic schools) of local and global Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, and particularly of IS, the severity of the Islamist-jihadist threat, and the implications of IS for the stability of Arab regimes and for the lives of the citizens of Arab, Muslim, Western and other countries. This must be accompanied by a broad yet focused and effective military campaign against terrorist organizations in general, and against IS and its offshoots in particular.

In formulating such a doctrine, it will be necessary to distinguish between good and evil, between those who hold pragmatic religious views, and those who pose as pragmatists but ally themselves with thugs. There are no shortcuts, and there can be no leniency, in the war against terrorism, which cannot be waged well with a wink and a nod and lip service. The war against terrorism is first and foremost a war of values, a war for morality and ideology. It is a lengthy war of attrition, with military, psychological and social components – but it is not a holy war between religions. It is a war between civilization and barbarism.


Prof. Boaz Ganor is the Founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) as well as the Dean and the Ronald S. Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya.

13

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 20 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/430/html>



Simon Cottee, *The Apostates: When Muslims Leave Islam* (London, UK: Hurst & Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 263 pp., US \$ 35.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-849-0444691.


An interesting and important account of the experiences of ex-Muslims documenting the difficulties and challenges they face in traversing the two opposing worlds of Islam and the secularism in diaspora communities in the United Kingdom and Canada. The author, a senior lecturer in criminology at Kent University, England, draws on what he terms “life-history” interviews with ex-Muslims (whose identities are concealed in order to protect their security) to explore the processes, predicaments and negative consequences, especially from their families, that face them upon leaving Islam and becoming “irreligious” and apostates in their home communities. Simon Cottee also focuses on the problems they face in adjusting to their new “secular” environments. Explaining that “Islamic apostasy in the secular West is perhaps best understood not as a legal or political problem, but as a moral issue within Muslim families



and communities,” (p. 211) the author concludes that “The crucial policy issue is how to effectively challenge and change illiberal attitudes within Muslim communities in the West and how to provide better support for wavering and ex-Muslims in moral jeopardy.” (p. 212) Although this book does not discuss violent extremism or terrorism, as such, “The Apostates” is highly recommended for contextualizing the challenges involved in attempting to de-radicalize violent extremists in Western societies.

Leon T. Goldsmith, Cycle of Fear: Syria’s Alawites in War and Peace (London, UK: Hurst & Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 317 pp., US \$ 37.50 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-849044684.

A comprehensive survey of the history and evolution of Syria’s minority Alawite community in order to provide a deeper perspective on its response to the events that led up to the early 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ uprising by the Sunni majority against Alawite continuous rule over Syrian society. As explained by the author, who teaches in the Department of Political Science, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Oman, his book “seeks to illustrate an important example of how fear affects the political behavior of ethno- religious minorities, influences their support for authoritarian regimes and leads to recurring conflict and social dislocation.” (p. 4) The author concludes on the hopeful note that “the aftermath of the [current] war will be setting forth on an open and honest collective reckoning with sectarianism and the cycle of fear among communities, in a way that has not been possible or attempted before” (p. 209). However, in this reviewer’s opinion this is highly unlikely given the zero-sum game type genocidal fighting being waged by the jihadi opposition and the Assad regime. Nevertheless this book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the nature, aspirations, and likely future fate of



Syria’s Alawite minority.

Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (London, UK: Hurst & Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 355 pp., US \$ 25.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-849044202.

A fascinating insider’s account of the history and origins of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Arab groupings that formed al Qaida – the Taliban’s ally in Afghanistan and later on in Pakistan. This collaborative account takes the form of a series of interviews between Mustafa Hamid (aka Abu Walid al-Masri) and Leah Farrall, an Australian academic and former senior counter-terrorism analyst with the Australian Federal Police. Dr. Farrall provides additional analysis to contextualize these accounts. Mr. Hamid, an Egyptian, was one of the first Arabs to join the jihad against Soviet rule in Afghanistan. He became a senior Mujahideen leader, but had fled Afghanistan after 9/11, spending nearly a decade in detention in Iran, after which he was able to return to Egypt, where he renounced his jihadi ideology. After explaining how the two authors met and established a common dialogue, the book’s chapters cover topics such as the origins of the Arab-Afghan jihad, how the Taliban was formed and how al Qaida established its training camps in Afghanistan. Further chapters cover the nature of the relations between the Taliban and al Qaida and tensions in the relations with other extremist ethnic groupings, such as the Uzbeks.

The motivations and events that led to al Qaida’s 9/11 attacks against the United States, and the failure of both Taliban and al Qaida to anticipate the massive retaliation by America are also covered. Mr. Hamid concludes that one of the lessons he has learned from his experience in Afghanistan is that al Qaida/Taliban-type “Salafi Wahabbism is a key obstacle...to natural human rights....with the events of the Arab Spring and its aftermath [signaling] the complete failure of the Islamist project, which in part grew in the soil of Egypt from the hands of Sayyid Qutb, and in Afghanistan from the hands of Azzam, Abu Abdullah and the Jalalabad School. This failure is clearly visible in people’s loss of sympathy for the



Islamists – and in Egypt, this took only one year.” (p. 325) The book includes a detailed listing of notable people mentioned in the discussion, as well as a glossary of terms, a listing of Mujahideen training camps, and a listing of significant doctrinal publications to provide a wider context for understanding the authors’ account.

Raffaello Pantucci, “We Love Death As You Love Life”: Britain’s Suburban Terrorists (London, UK: Hurst & Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 377 pp., US \$ 25.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-849041652.

This is a highly detailed and comprehensive account of the history, evolution and terrorist activities of Islamist extremists in the United Kingdom, including the influence of their countries of origin in shaping their radicalization and mobilization into terrorism. In addition to setting the stage for the rest of the book, the introduction also includes a valuable discussion of how the confluence of the drivers of radicalization, ideology, grievances, and mobilization has shaped the emergence of Islamist extremism in the UK. Within this framework the author explains how numerous British Muslims, such as Mohammed Siddique Khan and others, turned to al Qaida-inspired terrorism to carry out their attacks, whether in the UK or overseas – up to the present period with its foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. The book’s first chapter examines the roots of Britain’s Muslim population, with many of them immigrating from Pakistan. Interestingly, a sizeable portion of those who became extremist activists had claimed to flee ‘persecution’ in their homelands in the Middle East, but ended up, as in the case of the cleric Abu Hamza, as firebrand Islamist extremists in Britain where they took advantage of its “long tradition as a home for foreign political activists.” (p. 5) This is followed by discussions of the socialization of Britain’s Muslims, including social tensions arising from (non-) integration into British society, the early involvement in terrorism by operatives such as Richard Reid (the “shoe-bomber”). Raffaello Pantucci also explores the impacts of the post 9/11 conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in mobilizing British Islamists to join their al Qaida ‘compatriots’ in those conflict zones. In addition, he focuses on the role of the new Jihadist battlefields in the Internet’s social media platforms, including online extremist clerics such as Anwar al-Awlaki, in mobilizing the British Islamists for violent activities. In the concluding chapter, Mr. Pantucci observes that even with improved British counterterrorism capabilities, “the threat has not disappeared. Indeed, with events in Syria it appears that the threat may be growing once again. Old narratives playing out again show that the complacency produced by a long period of success is dangerous. The reality is that while the British security services understand much better the networks they are dealing with and what radicalization looks like, there is still very little understanding of how to counter and de-radicalise.” (p. 292) The numerous well-researched accounts of Islamist terrorist operatives, their associated networks and cells, and their terrorist plots and activities in the UK and in overseas conflict zones make Mr. Pantucci’s book an indispensable resource for understanding Britain’s continuing Islamist terrorist threats and the sub-cultures that sustain them.

Cristina Archetti, Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communications Approach (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 232 pp., US \$ 90.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-230-36049-5.

This is a well-argued critique of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The author calls for greater rigor in conducting research and pleads for formulating empirically-derived findings on the root causes and how terrorist groups operate, radicalize and mobilize adherents to their cause in today’s all-pervasive media environment. Dr. Archetti, a Lecturer in Politics and Media at the University of Salford, UK, believes that to analyze these components of terrorism “in an age of interconnectedness and globalization” it is essential to “understand the processes of communication that underpin it.” (p. 1) These issues are first addressed in the chapter on “The Problems with Terrorism Research,” which criticizes the discipline for being largely “a-theoretical” because of what she terms “The missing dimension of theory testing.” (p. 28). Other problem areas she identifies include the discipline’s inability to formulate a consensual definition of terrorism, and what the author terms “The missing ‘why’ of terrorism” – i.e., the lack of explanations that provide “any insight into the causation of terrorism.” (p. 25) The book’s remaining chapters cover topics such as the relationship between terrorists, how they communicate, and how they employ the mass media (including the Internet) in their operations. The book’s chapters also focus on the importance of applying what is termed the theoretical framework of




“relational sociology” to understand how terrorists “negotiate”, terrorists’ relations with their adherents, and the roles of persuasion, ‘messaging,’ narratives, and myth-making in terrorists’ radicalization and mobilization of their adherents. The author concludes that in countering terrorists’ communications, i.e. “attempting to target radicalized individuals with the ‘right’ message” is a waste of time. She holds that Western democracies “can stop fueling the terrorists’ narrative by being consistent with what they claim to represent and what they actually do.” (p. 142) While one may argue that the author’s survey of current literature overlooks numerous studies that do, in fact, apply social science rigor and empiricism in their analysis of these components of terrorism, and that even the solutions that she proposes are not as effective or empirically-based as she claims, the issues that she raises in this well-written study merit wide attention in the discipline.

Wolfgang Benedek, Christopher Daase, Vojin Dimitrijevic, and Petrus van Duyne, (Eds.), Transnational Terrorism, Organized Crime and Peace-Building: Human Security in the Western Balkans (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 288 pp., US \$ 125.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-230-23462-8.

This comprehensive edited volume is the product of a collaborative and multidisciplinary research program funded by the European Union (EU) and carried out by the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), in Graz, Austria. It examines the impact of transnational terrorism and organized crime on the prospects for peace-building and stability in the Western Balkans – the former Yugoslavia. This is a serious challenge, as one of the volume’s editors, Wolfgang Benedek, concludes that “The post-conflict and transitional situation is an obstacle to counter-crime strategies and security sector reform as they run against vested interests that benefit from state fragility in order to capture part of the security sector, the economy, or the media.” (p. 361) With civil society playing an “important watchdog role in this process,” Dr. Benedek calls on the European Union “to use its ‘soft power’” to improve the region’s human security. (p. 361)

Hamed El-Said, New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 312 pp., US \$ 100.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 40.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-137-48002-6.

This book attempts to fill a gap in the literature on countering violent extremism by Islamists. In order to facilitate their de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism Prof. El-Said proposes a “framework through which Counter-de-Rad programs can be studied, understood and even effectively designed and implemented.” (p. 6) To do so, the author analyzes and evaluates Counter-de-Rad programs in the Muslim-majority states of Mauritania, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey, as well as similar programs in two Muslim-minority states—Australia and Singapore. Hamed El-Said is Chair and Professor of International Business and Political Economy at the Faculty of Business and Law, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. He has served as an advisor to the Arab Thought Forum and the United Nations al-Qaida and Taliban 1267 Monitoring Team. This enabled him and his collaborators to work on Counter-de-Rad programs (which provided the foundation for this book’s updated research). Following a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Counter-de-Rad programs in the six case studies, the concluding chapter offers numerous findings that are worth noting. One is the need to move “away from the narrow focus on religious rehabilitation to inject a more secular focus in the Saudi de-radicalization policies: through education, including political education, vocational training, painting, physical education and social and economic programs to facilitate reintegration of detainees.” (p. 256) Another finding is that there is no one size fits all model for all countries or ‘silver bullet’ that can end violent extremism. This is because “The key lies in designing programs which are consistent with and derived from each country’s political,



legal, cultural, historical and social capital tradition.” (p. 257) The most important finding – and arguably the most crucial component in effective Counter-de-Rad programs – is that “States with strong developmental capacity, strong political capacity and which enjoy an active and dynamic civil society are not only at lower risk of VEm [violent extremism], but are also better positioned and equipped to deal with it wherever it arises than countries characterized by weak development capacity, political capacity and hostile and thwarted civil society.” (p. 258) Prof. El-Said’s “New Approaches to Countering Terrorism” is an important contribution to the sub-discipline’s study of the effectiveness of Counter-de-Rad programs around the world.

Hugh Gouch, *The Terror in the French Revolution [Second Edition]* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 144 pp., US \$ 32.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-230-20181-1.

A highly interesting, concise account of the French Revolution during the period of 1793-95 as the first instance when a newly formed revolutionary government employed the brutality of terror as a political weapon against its ‘counter-revolutionary’ opposition. The author is Emeritus Professor at University College Dublin and a noted expert on the history of the French Revolution.

George C. Lovewine, *Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism: Private Military Companies and American Intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 244 pp., US \$ 105.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-137-37282-6.

A highly detailed account of the role and impact of private military security companies (PMSCs), such as KBR and DynCorp International, in supporting the U.S. government’s military and political-economic development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The author concludes that PMSCs contribute in a positive way by creating “an environment where the US military is able to respond to crises, to surge in additional capabilities and focus on the battlefield requirements, while fulfilling essential support needs.” (p. 149) The risks in their involvement, however, “are also great,” the author explains, because “any advantage they provide on the battlefield can be negated by activities that either cast a negative light on US activities or present a negative perception of US mission.” The author, a retired U.S. Army Officer, is a civilian military analyst with the U.S. Department of Defense.

Ron Schleifer, *Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 228 pages, US \$ 100.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-137-46702-7.


This is an important account of how psychological operations as ‘non-lethal’ weapons serve as crucial force multipliers in a nation’s warfare against its adversaries. As Dr. Schleifer points out, they are also employed in asymmetric warfare by weaker non-state adversaries against their more powerful state adversaries in order to undermine their legitimacy and continued will to fight. These issues are discussed within the context of how such ‘non-lethal’ weapons have been used by Israel and its Palestinian and Hizballah adversaries. The book begins with an overview of psychological warfare theory and how it is applied in warfare, its use by Israel’s pre-State Zionist insurgents against the British Mandatory authorities in Palestine, the evolution in the employment of psychological warfare by Palestinian armed groups against Israel from 1948 to 2010, Hizballah’s use of psychological warfare against Israel in Southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000, and Israel’s own psychological warfare operations against Arab adversaries. Although this book’s focus is on the Arab-Israeli conflict, its discussion of the use of psychological warfare is also especially relevant for understanding how these issues play out in the military campaigns being waged against al Qaida- and Islamic State-type insurgents around the world. Dr. Schleifer is Head of the Ariel Research Center for Defense and Communication, Israel (For full disclosure, this reviewer wrote the blurb for the book’s back cover).

Natasha Underhill, *Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency: Calculating the Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 264 pp., US \$ 100.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-137-38370-9.

An interesting theoretical examination of the role and impact of failed/failing states (such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq) in the proliferation of terrorism and insurgency, in comparison with strong states. To conduct this assessment, the book’s first two chapters attempt to explain terrorism, insurgency and state failure. In addition, the initial chapters explore the extent to which failed states



might play a role in the emergence and proliferation of terrorism and insurgency. The author also explores whether a “pattern of failure” and other underlying conditions make such failed states more susceptible to attracting militant groups into their territory. The following six chapters apply the conceptual framework to discuss the three case studies of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. In the concluding chapter the author presents several interesting findings, such as “there is a significant lack of correlation between a state’s level of failure and the number of terrorist groups that are based there.” She also notes that “the placement or ranking of a particular state on the [Fund for Peace’s] Failed State Index does not appear to exhibit any significant difference with respect to the incidence of terrorism.”




She demonstrates that “there are significant numbers of FTSS [Foreign Terrorist Organizations] and domestic terrorist groups present in states with a low level of failure, as well as in relatively strong democracies.” (p. 177) The concluding chapter also includes a valuable table that lists the impact of the conceptual framework’s factors in the three case studies. The author is Senior Lecturer at Nottingham Trent University, UK.

Gwen Brookes, Julie Ann Pooley and Jaya Earnest, *Terrorism, Trauma and Psychology: A Multilevel Victim Perspective of the Bali Bombings* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 192 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-78884-8.

A systematic, field research-based examination, based on the October 12, 2002, Bali bombings. The authors explore the direct and indirect impacts of terrorism on the individuals and communities that are affected by such incidents, including the forms of post-attack disaster support offered to victims and their families. The introductory chapter presents an overview of terrorism, its objectives, a survey of countries that have experienced protracted terrorist attacks, the types of groups that conduct terrorism, and, more specifically, how the Bali bombings were conducted and their impact in terms of fatalities and injuries. The remaining chapters discuss the effects of the bombings on the victims in Bali and the Australian tourists, and the types of support that was provided to these victims. In conclusion, a framework is proposed by the authors for post-disaster planning. The authors are academic psychologists and public health specialists who are associated with the University of Western Australia and Curtin University, also in Western Australia.

Cheryl Lynn Duckworth, *9/11 and Collective Memory in US Classrooms: Teaching About Terror* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 134 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-415-74201-6.

An examination based on quantitative and qualitative survey data of how the traumatic events of 9/11 are taught by teachers at American middle and high schools, particularly the narrative that is used to teach students about that fateful day. The author concludes that in teaching about terrorism, curriculum units need to discuss questions such as the right balance between liberty and security and how people in history have handled fear, loss and trauma. Further suggested topics for discussion are: Is religion the cause of conflict?, What has been the impact of U.S. interventions in the world. What causes violence and how can it be prevented, and how can peace and justice be attained in society. (p. 116) The appendices include the study’s quantitative survey and interview protocol. The author is a professor of conflict resolution at Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.



Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory (Eds.), *Terrorism and International Law* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997/Reissued 2014), 396 pp., US \$ 190.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-87432-9.

First published in 1997, the contributors to this reissued edited volume present the approaches of British and French legal experts on how to apply effective legal measures to counter terrorism domestically and internationally. The chapters cover topics such as the international legislation on terrorism, principles of jurisdiction, legal aspects of maritime terrorism, extradition of terrorists, the rights of victims, State liability for terrorist acts on its territory, and international action against state terrorism. Although some of this discussion may be dated, it provides a valuable foundation for understanding the role and application of international law in counterterrorism and the prosecution of terrorists.

Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Thomas M. Chen, (Eds.), *Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 210 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9780415732888.

The contributors to this edited volume apply multi-disciplinary approaches to examine how terrorists utilize digital technologies for their operations in cyberspace. The chapters cover topics such as terrorism online as a new strategic environment, how lone wolves use the Internet and how they are radicalized and mobilized into terrorism, hacktivism as an emerging form of cyberterrorism, how governments monitor and track terrorism in cyberspace, including how to identify the source and perpetrators of a cyberterrorist attack, as well as how to define cyberterrorism as a 'terrorist' act. The volume also covers issues of international cooperation, including United Nations authorization for countering cyberterrorism. The volume's editors, respectively, are professors of security, including cyber security, at the University of East Anglia, the College of Law, Swansea University, and City University, London, UK.

George Klay Kieh and Kelechi Kalu,(Eds.), *West Africa and the U.S. War on Terror* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 208 pp., US \$ 44.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-85143-6.

The contributors to this edited volume examine possible roles and strategies for the United States in assisting to counter terrorism in West Africa at bilateral and multilateral levels. This is a difficult and complex task, as recognized in the concluding chapter, since countering the sub-region's criminal gangs and international terrorists also involves "consistently urging the governments in this sub-region to protect the rights of their citizens against repressive state institutions and structures..." (p. 186) since such an undertaking is difficult to achieve. Dr. Kieh is Professor of Political Science at the University of West Georgia, and Dr. Kalu is Director of the Center for African Studies at Ohio State University.

Alan J. Kuperman, (Ed.), *Nuclear Terrorism and Global Security* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 256 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 54.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-84762-0.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the challenges posed by the attempts at a global phase-out of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the risks that some of the remaining material might be acquired by terrorists, such as al Qaeda and its affiliates, to manufacture and weaponize atomic bombs to deploy against their adversaries. Following the editor's conceptual overview, the remaining chapters present case studies of the nuclear programs, including in certain cases, phase-outs of such programs, in Argentina, South Africa, United States, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands, France, Germany, China, Russia, as well as phasing out the use of HEU from use in space-based nuclear reactors. Attesting to the difficulty in achieving a global phase-out of HEU, the concluding chapter cautions that "so long as HEU commerce persists for non-weapons purposes, the danger of nuclear terrorism will be much greater than it needs to be. That is one risk to humanity that can, and should, be phased out." (p. 228) The volume's editor is Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin.

Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark, (Eds.), *Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and Beyond* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 298 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-84743-9.


Since this reviewer contributed one of the chapters to this edited volume (which will likely be reviewed in



greater depth in a future issue of this journal by another reviewer), this capsule note is intended merely as an overview of the book's contents. Following an introductory survey of the subject of terrorism innovation and learning as it is applied to the case of al Qaida and its affiliates (a theme running throughout the volume), the book's chapters discuss topics such as the theoretical underpinnings of the terrorist innovation decisions (by Gary Ackerman), innovation in terrorists' manufacture of IEDs (John Allison), trends in terrorists' weaponry and targeting (Adam Dolnik), innovation in al Qaida's ideology of attacking the West (Soren Hove), Jihadists' innovation in utilizing cyberspace's new social media (Nico Prucha), innovation in jihadists' training (Paul Cruickshank), and innovation in terrorists' counter-surveillance tradecraft (Joshua Sinai). The remaining chapters provide case studies of innovation and learning in the British Jihad scene (Rafaello Pantucci), Denmark (Morten Skjoldager), and Germany (Yassin Musharabash and Guido Steinberg). The editors' concluding chapter discusses the volume's general findings. Dr. Ranstorp is Research Director at the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, and Dr. Normark is a Senior Analyst at the Division of CBRN Defence and Security at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Mattia Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya and American Intervention in the Middle East* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 218 pp., US \$ 140.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 45.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-85138-2.

A detailed account based on news reports and declassified archival resources of the early formative period in United States' counterterrorism policy when it responded to the terrorist threats against it in the cases of Lebanon and Libya in the 1980s. With much of the discussion sound, one may not necessarily agree with some of the author's assumptions, such as that "American policy in the Middle East during the Cold War was indeed based on the idea that the West held the monopoly over modernity" (p. 168) – with 'modernity' viewed by the author as a negative notion when in fact, if it had been implemented in the Middle East it would have prevented its current political upheaval and instability. In any case, the components of 'modernity' (e.g. education) were never massively promoted by the United States during that period in its counterterrorism campaigns in Lebanon and Libya. Finally, although the author is correct that the Reagan legacy continues to influence U.S. counterterrorism policy, the current terrorism landscape in the Middle East is vastly different and much more threatening than what is portrayed in this book. The author is a lecturer of Political Science and International Relations at IES-Rome.



Awet T. Weldemichael, Patricia Schneider, and Andrew C. Winner, (Eds.), *Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Indian Ocean Region* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 124 pp., US \$ 145.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-138-85064-4.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the challenges presented by maritime terrorism and piracy in the Indian Ocean region, including Somalia and Yemen. Following an introductory overview, the book's chapters cover topics such as "maritime corporate terrorism" in the form of illegal fishing, waste dumping and piracy off the coast of Somalia. These are no doubt criminal activities but hardly actions that fall under the concept of terrorism. The volume also covers maritime security countermeasures by European countries such as Germany and Spain, the security dynamics in Yemen and their impact on maritime threats and the role of international law in countering piracy. This book was originally published as a special issue of the "Journal of the Indian Ocean Region."

About the Reviewer: *Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.*



PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Bibliography: Lone Wolves/Actors of Terrorism

Compiled by Eric Price

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/432/html>

Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who worked for many years for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. After retirement he became an Editorial Assistant of 'Perspectives on Terrorism' where he has so far published 35 bibliographies (search archive for the topics covered).

Isis Currency: Islamic Dinar Coins Spotted, One Gold Dinar Pegged at \$139

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/06/isis-currency-islamic-dinar-coins.html>

Several pictures on social media suggest that the Islamic State is set to use its own minted currency in



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its territory, a first for the terror group which declared a caliphate last year.

Self-proclaimed Isis caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had last year reportedly ordered the minting of the caliphate's own 'Islamic dinar' coins in gold, silver and copper in order to free Muslims from the 'satanic global economic system'.

Raqqa-based activist Abu Ibrahim Raqqawi, who heads the anti-Isis group Raqqa is being Slaughtered Silently, posted photos of the Isis coins on Twitter, and said that they will be put into use soon.

The photos of the Isis dinar gold coins were shared by pro-Isis accounts on social media, Terrormonitor.org tweeted.

In fact, the Islamic State has also reportedly announced its currency exchange rate - 1 Gold Dinar is \$139 and 1 Silver Dinar is \$1, according to the Terrormonitor.

Isis had released designs of its proposed currency coins last year, and the recent images of the dinar gold coins show symbols of seven wheat stalks, which is reportedly mentioned in the Quran.

The prototype design had also shown that the coins would carry an Arabic message on the lines of - 'The Islamic State / A Caliphate Based on the Doctrine of the Prophet', according to last year's reports.





The coins could likely be put into use soon as the Islamic State is set to mark its first anniversary of declaring a caliphate on 29 June 2014.

Australia's double game on terrorism

Source: http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/26-06-2015/131119-australia_terrorism-0/#sthash.AVIVqbUs.dpuf

In the name of anti-terrorism Canberra has cancelled dozens of passports and, more recently, passed a law to strip citizenship from dual citizens believed to be involved with some of the armed groups plaguing Syria and Iraq. Since 2012 about 200 Australian citizens are thought to have joined these groups and several dozen have been killed.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott recently attacked the state-owned Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) for allowing Zaky Mallah, a notorious supporter of anti-Syrian Islamists, to speak on national television. Yet Mallah, who boasts of his close relations Australia's domestic intelligence, has enjoyed substantial media attention in recent years.

His media status is part of a wider pattern. The western media has carried many stories about the 'family man turned suicide bomber' or the Islamist 'humanitarian workers' who travelled to Syria, supposedly to help children and refugees. If the humanitarian story did not fit they were said to have been backing 'moderate' armed groups.

It is the Australians of Syrian origin who have been frozen out of the national media. The great majority of them backed the Syrian

Government against western backed terrorism. Their impassioned demonstrations in Australian cities, over 2011-2013, were mostly ignored. In face of a propaganda war, with a string of stories falsely implicating the Syrian Army in massacres and chemical weapons attacks, very few pro-Syrian voices have been permitted.

This effective media blockade has banished voices who might challenge the latest 'chemical weapons' or 'barrel bombing' story, churned out against 'the regime' year after year. Considerable evidence has accumulated on these fabrications.

Much of it has to do with sectarian Islamists either blaming the Syrian Army for their own atrocities or rebadging their own casualties as 'civilians'. Yet vigorous self-censorship has meant that very few exposés appear in the Australian media.

Dissidents have faced ferocious attacks. Reme Sakr, a young Syrian-Australian who visited her father in Syria in late 2013, was

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vilified by the ABC program Media Watch in early 2014. The ABC condemned the Good Weekend magazine for running a sympathetic profile of someone who was clearly pro-Syrian. They falsely accused her of supporting war crimes. She is now suing the ABC.

Throughout 2012-2013 Australia's Labor Government was an active collaborator with Washington over the ill-fated 'regime change' plan for Syria. Canberra backed a series of absurd exile groups set up by the US and the Gulf monarchies as the 'legitimate representatives of the Syrian people'. Along with a number of European states, Australia also expelled the Syrian Ambassador, after it was falsely claimed the Syrian Army had murdered pro-Government villagers at Houla.

Some 'government massacre' claims were even debunked in the western media. The Aqrab massacre, very close to Houla and also of pro-government villagers, was blamed on the Army but exposed by Alex Thompson. The Daraya massacre of civilians, kidnapped as part of a failed prisoner exchange, was also blamed on the Army but debunked by Robert Fisk. Both were carried out by groups of the western backed 'Free Syrian Army'.

Western propaganda offensive

Such exposures were exceptions to the rule. The western propaganda offensive encouraged extremists to join in a virtual holy war against Syria. No Australian was detained or deterred from travelling to Syria in the first two years of the crisis. The first few killed were often praised as 'humanitarian workers' or victims of the regime's 'indiscriminate bombing'.

Yet in August 2012 a US intelligence report (DIA) noted two things, at odds with Washington's public position. First, the 'Syrian Revolution' had been dominated by sectarian Islamists from the beginning: 'the Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood and AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq, later ISIS) are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria'. Second, the idea of a sectarian Islamic State was anticipated and thought to suit western purposes. AQI wanted a sectarian war in Syria, which could lead to 'a Salafist principality in Eastern Syria ... exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition ['the West, Gulf Countries and Turkey'] want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime ... ISI could also declare an Islamic State through its union with other terrorist organisations'.

US intelligence did not waste time with the political 'for public consumption' statements. They knew were working with terrorist groups in yet another Middle Eastern 'regime change' operation.

Australia's home-grown terrorists must have been further emboldened in their belief that Canberra shared their aims when, in October 2012, Foreign Minister Bob Carr told national television that resolution of the Syrian crisis needed 'an assassination' and 'major defections' from the Syrian Army. This very un-diplomatic (and probably criminal) statement signalled to the fanatics that they could travel to Syria to attack and kill, imagining they had Canberra's blessing.

But it was not so simple. In late 2013 events forced a change in US strategy. First, a Russian initiative on chemical weapons (the Syrian Government maintains it had never used them) defused a planned US missile strike on Syria. Second, the Syrian Government began to gain the upper hand in the populated areas of western Syria, securing a number of towns along the Lebanese border with the help of the Lebanese resistance movement, led by Hezbollah. Third, the open sectarianism and well publicised atrocities of 'rebel' groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), attracted worldwide attention. The previous talk of 'humanitarian intervention' was displaced by western 'anti-terrorist' intervention, aimed at ISIS.

Yet the 'moderate rebel' myth persists and the western attacks on ISIS have been 'cosmetic'. (The Syrian and Iraqi Armies, backed by Hezbollah and Iran, remain the main forces combating ISIS.) There are obvious reasons for this. US leaders including Vice President Joe Biden and Armed Forces Chief Martin Dempsey have admitted that their 'major allies' back ISIS. The evidence is quite clear that US regards ISIS and other al Qaeda factions as strategic assets.

Nevertheless, designation of significant sections of the Syrian and Iraqi insurgency as 'terrorists' has unsettled US collaborators, including Australia. Reinforcing this is the recognition that the 'Syrian regime' is not going away, and that many foreign terrorists are trying to return home. What this might mean is well illustrated by the videos of terrorist head-chopping and throat cutting.



Those who were happy to foment terrorism against others have become worried that the proverbial 'chickens' are coming home to roost.

Caught in their own double game they are blaming everyone but themselves.


Terrorist Attacks in France, Tunisia and Kuwait Kill Dozens

June 26, 2015

Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/world/middleeast/terror-attacks-france-tunisia-kuwait.html>

In a matter of hours and on three different continents, militants carried out attacks on

civilians from small-scale terrorist actions, whether in a mosque, at work or at the beach.



Friday that killed scores of civilians, horrified populations and raised thorny questions about the evolving nature of international terrorism and what can be done to fight it. On the surface, the attacks appeared to be linked only by timing.

In France, a man stormed an American-owned chemical plant, decapitated one person and apparently tried to blow up the facility.

In Tunisia, a gunman drew an assault rifle from a beach umbrella and killed at least 38 people at a seaside resort.

And in Kuwait, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a mosque during communal prayers, killing at least 25 Shiite worshippers.

The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for the attacks in Tunisia and Kuwait, according to statements on Twitter. But it almost did not matter for terrorism's global implications whether the three attacks were coordinated. Each in a different way underlined the difficulties of anticipating threats and protecting

The attacks occurred at a time of fast evolution for the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations, which continue to find ways to strike and spread their ideology despite more than a decade of costly efforts by the United States and others to kill their leaders and deny them sanctuary.

The United States has killed leaders of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Yemen and elsewhere, but the group has maintained a string of branches and melded itself into local insurgencies. The Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has worked on two levels, seeking to build its self-declared caliphate on captured territory in Iraq and Syria while inciting attacks abroad.

Fueling that expansion are civil wars and the collapse of state structures in Arab countries from Libya to Yemen that have opened up ungoverned spaces where jihadists thrive, while social media has given extremists a global megaphone to spread their message.



While officials in the three countries investigated the attacks, many noted that leaders of the Islamic State have repeatedly called for sympathizers to kill and sow mayhem at home.

Earlier this week, the spokesman for the Islamic State, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, greeted the group's followers for Ramadan, telling them that acts during the Muslim holy month earned greater rewards in heaven.

"Muslims, embark and hasten toward jihad," Mr. Adnani said in an audio message. "O mujahedeen everywhere, rush and go to make Ramadan a month of disasters for the infidels." The attacks targeted each country in a particularly sensitive spot.

Tunisia, widely hailed as the sole success of the Arab Spring uprisings that began more than four years ago, suffered a sharp blow to its tourism sector, a pillar of the local economy.

The bombing in Kuwait followed the pattern of similar attacks on Shiite mosques in Saudi Arabia and was aimed at sowing sectarian divisions in a country where Sunnis and Shiites serve together in top government bodies and open friction between the sects is uncommon.

The motivation behind the attack in France was less clear, although the beheading suggested that the perpetrator had at least been inspired by the Islamic State, which frequently propagandizes similar killings in the territories it occupies.

And because the day's events appeared to bear some of the infamous hallmarks of the Islamic State and its supporters, some analysts speculated that the attacks had been timed to mark the first anniversary of its declaration of a caliphate. Even if that is not the case, the SITE intelligence Group, which tracks extremist propaganda, said the attacks inspired "celebration from Twitter accounts of jihadi fighters and supporters of the Islamic State."

Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said "We have entered a new jihadist era," adding that the Islamic State had used its international brand to establish sleeper cells abroad, whose actions were meant to advance its efforts to build a state.

"Everything in the end serves the purpose of strengthening the project of the Islamic State," she said.

United States intelligence and counterterrorism officials were scrambling Friday to assess the connections, if any, between the attacks in France, Kuwait and Tunisia. Officials said that

if the assessment found that the attacks were linked, officials would seek to determine whether the Islamic State had actively directed, coordinated or inspired them.

Col. Steve Warren, a Pentagon spokesman, condemned the attacks, which he called "heinous." But there was no word yet on whether they were coordinated, he said. "We just don't know yet."

In claiming the Kuwait attack, the Islamic State called the suicide bomber "one of the knights of the Sunni people" and lauded him for killing Shiites, who are considered apostates in the group's hard interpretation of Islam.

The assault resembled others launched by the Islamic State recently on Shiite mosques in neighboring Saudi Arabia, prompting many to believe that the militant group is seeking to set off a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites.

Some Kuwaitis said that with sectarian tensions rising across the region, it was only a matter of time before they reached Kuwait.

"Ever since I heard about Qatif and the Shiite mosques there, I just had this feeling that we were next," said Bodour Behbehani, a Shiite graduate student in Kuwait City, recalling a mosque bombing last month near Qatif, a city in Saudi Arabia.

The American war on terrorism has taken many forms over the years. But the spread of such small-scale attacks highlighted what even American officials have called a failure to win the ideological — or information — war that feeds militancy and inspires recruits.

The challenge, analysts and government officials say, is to reorient a strategy centered on combat to one that challenges extremist groups on all fronts simultaneously: political, social, ideological and religious. A primary aim, they say, should be to win the information war and undermine the appeal of radical Islamist ideologies.

Such terrorist attacks have shattered the assumption that the Islamic State can be confined to territories it controls in the Middle East, said Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. Although Western governments can work to monitor those who might be plotting attacks, this will not solve their root cause.

"Chasing individuals is probably a fool's errand given the geographically disparate nature of



the threat,” Dr. Hoffman said. “There comes a point where you have to tackle the organization behind it.”

And monitoring has limits. The authorities in Tunisia said the gunman there was a young Tunisian with no prior police record. The authorities in France said that the attacker arrested there had connections to radical Islamists but that surveillance of him stopped in 2008.

The Kuwaiti authorities did not identify the attacker in their country.

To fight the Islamic State, the United States has formed an international coalition that is bombing its fighters and their bases in Iraq and Syria, a process that President Obama has

said seeks to degrade and destroy the group. But while the group has lost many fighters and some territory, Friday’s attacks demonstrated the continued power of the jihadist movement to inspire attacks abroad by local actors.

It is an extraordinary coincidence that “all three attacks happened at the same day and time,” said Brian Fishman, a counterterrorism research fellow at New America, a research organization in Washington. He said the attacks suggested that the focus on taking territory from the Islamic State could make the United States miss other ways it poses dangers.

“We can’t get attached to a single metric for understanding this organization,” he said.

One Person Decapitated in Chemical Plant Attack

A man drove into an American-owned industrial chemical plant, decapitated one person and may have been trying to blow up the factory. The suspect, Yassine Salhi, is a deliveryman who had once been under surveillance by French authorities for connections to radical Islamist groups.



Suicide Bombing in a Mosque

About two hours after first attack

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in one of the largest Shiite mosques in Kuwait during Friday Prayer. The bomb filled the hall with smoke and left the dead and wounded scattered on the carpet, according to witnesses. The assault



resembled others launched by ISIS recently on Shiite mosques in neighboring Saudi Arabia, indicating that the Islamic State may be trying to incite a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites.



Dozens Killed in Hotel Shootings

About three hours after first attack

At least one gunman, disguised as a vacationer and carrying his rifle in a large beach umbrella, opened fire at a resort, killing at least 37 people. The assailant gunned down victims on the beach, at the hotel pool and in the lobby before being shot to death by security forces. The attack is the second major terrorist attack in a little more than three months targeting the Tunisian tourism industry.



Iowa mall shooting draws attention to lack of private security preparedness

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150626-iowa-mall-shooting-draws-attention-to-lack-of-private-security-preparedness>

June 26 – A fatal 12 June shooting by Alexander Kozak, an off-duty security guard at the Coral Ridge Mall in Coralville, Iowa has

highlighted the lack of screening regulations in private security firms.



As the *Cedar Rapids Gazette* reports, despite licensing by Iowa Code Section 80A, many private security guards working at state malls, schools, and corporations have no training requirements and dodgy background check rules.

“Most organizations want to give the



appearance of security, but they don't want the substance,” said Tom Conley, the president of the Conley Group, a private security company.

Though a mandatory background check is required for new guards, and finger prints must be submitted for state and federal checks, the guards are still given temporary work authorization for fourteen days. A “guard card” is then issued for the employee, but never expires and requires no further background check ups.

“It certainly creates the possibility that a guard could be convicted of crimes without the state's or employer's knowledge,” said Ross Loder, the chief of the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS), which issues the cards. “I'm not aware of any significant problems that result from the current structure. One reason companies may not order periodic background checks is the \$40 cost.”

Additionally, Iowa currently has no required training for employees of private security companies.

“[That] means many guards are not prepared for emergency situations, Conley said. “In traditional guard companies, if you want to apply as a security guard, you do a 10-minute interview and you're hired. By 10:45 a.m.

you've got your uniform and you're on a post by noon.”

Sandi Davies, the executive director of the International Foundation for Protection Officers, added that few states have any training regulations at all.

“Only 10 to 12 states have some form of training requirement, and even that is minimal,” she said. “Back in the old days of security guards, there weren't many threats. There are more threats now, and security employees are protecting people and property in a much bigger way.”

Further, mall shootings in the United States and beyond have also become more common, with the murder of sixty people by masked terrorists in an upscale Kenyan mall in 2013, and nineteen



killed by Robert Hawkins in an Omaha mall in 2007.

“You see these mall security and you wonder what kind of security they are providing, other than a uniform and a radio,” said Representative Clel Baudler (R-Iowa), a retired state trooper who chairs the House Public Safety Committee.

Universal Services of America, the firm which hired Kozak, released a statement that he had quit the company hours before the shooting took place.

Private security professionals report that low wages — Kozak made \$11.25/hr — and high turnover in the industry lead to



inexperienced guards who may not normally fit the ideal character traits that security companies look for. They urge that both the federal and state governments, as well as the companies that employ security guards,

consider the greater responsibilities of regulation.

“When you’re responsible for other people, you have to operate at a higher level,” Conley said.

ISIS goes underground for guerilla warfare against new US “lily pad” strategy in Iraq

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/24668/ISIS-goes-underground-for-guerilla-warfare-against-new-US-%E2%80%9Clily-pad%E2%80%9D-strategy-in-Iraq>

June 15 – While the Obama administration was compiling a plan to send American advisers to work with Iraqi troops and tribesmen in “lily pad” bases near the frontlines, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant adopted a new strategy. debkafile’s exclusive military and counter-terror sources disclose that ISIS is going underground to pursue guerilla tactics on all five of its active fronts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,



Iraq, Egyptian Sinai and the Palestinian Gaza Strip. They turned to this strategy after being impressed by the effectiveness of Hamas’ assault and smuggling tunnel system for terrorist assaults on Israel and Egyptian forces in Sinai.

An ISIS tunnel in Al-Qaim

Military experts expect to see soon small, highly-trained squads of ISIS fighters jumping out of underground lairs to strike their victims.

One Western intelligence source told debkafile: This is

the end of the long columns of armed jihadis appearing on the horizon to fall on major locations, such as we last saw in mid-May when 400 US-made trucks loaded with thousands of jihadis carrying a variety of weapons captured the central Iraqi city of Ramadi. A similar column from the ISIS base in Raqqa seized the strategic Syrian heritage town of Palmyra.

According to our military experts, the new Islamic State strategy is designed to combat the American “lily pad” plan, whereby small US bases can float from point to point affording small US contingents great flexibility of movement for action.

ISIS is already moving ahead. US pilots have started complaining that as targets for air strikes on the ground ISIS forces have become few and far between.

In Syria, the Islamic State has turned to guerrilla tactics for undermining Hizballah forces on the Qalamoun mountains on the Lebanese border. They keep their heads down until Hizballah seizes territory - and then surround the new positions and pick them off. Nusra Front has joined ISIS in this sector and together they have killed more than 100 Hizballah fighters in the last ten days.



US reassessing Islamic State after 'Bloody Friday'

Source: <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/486345/us-reassessing-islamic-state-bloody.html>

June 28 – The US National Counter-terrorism Center is working with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to determine the extent to which the attacks were coordinated by IS terrorists, a report on Politico website said on Saturday.

"IS is very rapidly becoming a global threat and it is doing so on the cheap," said Peter Mansoor, a retired US Army colonel who was one of the architects of the US military campaign against Al Qaeda in Iraq. "It can simply evangelise followers and get them to plan and conduct terrorist attacks on their own. This will only continue unless something is done to destroy the IS and reduce its appeal to the extremist fringe in the Islamic community."

The attacks came just a few days after the group urged followers to "rush and go to make Ramadan a month of disasters for the infidels", sparking fears of a spate of attacks during the Muslim holy month.

They were also carried out just days before the first anniversary of IS's declaration of a "caliphate" in the territory it controls.

Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce, however, did not see the attacks as coincidental.

"These attacks show that the (IS) threat is spreading well beyond Iraq and Syria," he said.

"A continued haven there means more attacks across the region, Europe and even here at home," Royce warned.

He called for "better regional cooperation and more targeted air strikes" adding that: "We also must destroy the online messaging that attracts so many young people with the counter message that [IS] offers no peace, no community, and no future."

Earlier this year, US's top intelligence officer James Clapper, currently the Director of National Intelligence, said the IS was only a "regional threat" and "probably plans to conduct operations against regional allies, Western facilities, and personnel in the Middle East".


General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, downplayed the threat to Western nations, saying IS was the product of "an internal conflict (internal to Islam)".

But the eerily timed terror attacks by IS terrorists on three continents on Friday, collectively hailed by IS sympathisers on social media as "Bloody Friday", were prompting the security US agencies Pentagon and CIA to reconsider the terror group's reach, ambitions and the threat it and its adherents may pose to the country, the report said.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: "Reconsider"??? Are they living in another planet? Or do they honestly believe that the ocean will protect them for ever? New terrorism is here and expanding. We are all eager to read or see how the new threat evaluation will be translated into actions.

Public Mass Shooting a Persistent Threat (CRS)

Source: <http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/06/mass-shooting-crs/>



**Public Mass Shootings in the United States:
Selected Implications for Federal Public
Health and Safety Policy**

Jerome P. Bjelopera, Coordinator
Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism

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March 18, 2013

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CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Mass killings of the sort that took place yesterday in Charleston, South Carolina are a distressingly frequent occurrence. There were 78 public mass shootings in the United States between 1983 and 2013, according to a report by the Congressional Research Service.

"According to CRS estimates, over the last three decades public mass shootings have claimed 547 lives and led to an additional 476 injured victims," the report said.

Of course, gun violence in America is much more common than mass killings. "While tragic and shocking, public mass shootings account for few of the murders or non-negligent homicides related to firearms that occur annually in the United States." In 2011 alone, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,



firearms were used to murder 8,583 people.

Nevertheless, despite these grim statistics, “over the last two decades, the nation has experienced a general *decline* in violent crime,” the CRS report said. “In 1992, 1.9 million violent crimes were reported, while 2011 saw 1.2 million. In the same period, the national murder rate dropped from 9.3 to 4.7 per 100,000 inhabitants.”

► Read: [Public Mass Shootings in the United States: Selected Implications for Federal Public Health and Safety Policy](#), March 18, 2013.

Anti-government extremism most prevalent terrorist threat inside U.S.: Law enforcement

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150629-antigovernment-extremism-most-prevalent-terrorist-threat-inside-u-s-law-enforcement>

June 29 – **U.S. law enforcement agencies rank the threat of violence from anti-government extremists higher than the threat from radicalized Muslims**, according to a report released last Thursday by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security (TCHS).

The report, Law Enforcement Assessment of the Violent Extremism Threat, was based on survey research by Charles Kurzman, professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and David Schanzer, director of TCHS and associate professor of the practice at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy.

“The data show that we have two distinct, serious, ongoing terrorist threats in the United States,” Schanzer said. “Tragic incidents of violence, whether they be in Charleston or the Boston Marathon, tend to exaggerate the magnitude of the threat, but both will require consistent societal and law enforcement vigilance in the foreseeable future.”

A Duke University release reports that the survey — conducted by the center with the Police Executive Research Forum — found that 74 percent of 382 law enforcement agencies rated anti-government extremism as one of the top three terrorist threats in their jurisdiction. By comparison, 39 percent listed extremism connected with al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist organizations as a Top 3 terrorist threat.

Seven percent of the departments rated the threat from anti-government and other forms of

extremism as severe, while 3 percent considered the threat from Muslim extremists severe.

Local agencies perceive violent extremism to be more of a threat nationally than within their own jurisdictions. Rural agencies report threats of all forms of violent extremism lower than agencies in mid-size and larger cities.

The data were collected in early 2014, before security agencies began noting increased activity and recruitment of Americans by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS). In follow-up telephone interviews, the officers did not modify their initial responses in light of ISIS threats within the United States.

Schanzer and Kurzman wrote about their findings in an op-ed published in the *New York Times* 16 June 2015, the day before the shooting of nine African-Americans in a church in Charleston, South Carolina. Their research has become part of the national dialogue in the aftermath of the crime.

“While public attention focuses primarily on violent extremism associated with Muslims, this horrible crime appears to be drawing public attention to other forms of violent extremism that law enforcement agencies have been concerned about for a while,” Kurzman said.

The report is the first issued from a larger project that also covers community-outreach programs by law enforcement agencies as a technique for countering terrorism.

The project is supported by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.


— Read more in Charles Kurzman and David Schanzer, [Law Enforcement Assessment of the Violent Extremism Threat \(Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security \[TCHS\], Duke University, June 2015\)](#); see also Kurzman



and Schanzer, "The Growing Right-Wing Terror Threat," *New York Times* (16 June 2015)

They are neither a 'state' nor 'Islamic': Why we shouldn't call them Isis, Isil or IS

Source: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/they-are-neither-a-state-nor-islamic-why-we-shouldnt-call-them-isis-isil-or-is-10353365.html>



The shocking attack last week at a peaceful Tunisian tourist resort has shown us once again that terror continues to be a threat. There is no question that the group behind this attack, which refers to itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis) or as "Islamic State" is an evil terror organisation. But I believe that for too long we have allowed them to define themselves as something which they are not, and now we need to change how we label them. This is why I have started a campaign to get the government, the BBC, and other organisations to alter the title that they use.

In the wake of the horrific Tunisian attacks, our resolve to fight terrorism at home and abroad means we should not give credence to the propaganda which is being used to suck more vulnerable, disillusioned and some clearly dangerous individuals to their cause.

You may wonder - what's so important about a name? But names have a significance because their impact, as Professor James Bruning has said, "comes from how people expect to see

you." By referring to them as the 'Islamic State' they gain legitimacy where none should exist.

The atrocities they have committed in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere clearly demonstrate that they have no right to be called a state. We all know what a state looks like – it is internationally and legally recognised as one, has a defined sovereign territory and ordered institutions. This group has none of these things, and ignores international law and norms.

Nor are they Islamic. This criminal gang is distorting a peaceful religion for its own violent ends, which the vast majority of Muslims, here in the UK and around the world, find despicable and insulting. I have spent time travelling the country, speaking with communities and holding meetings in mosques, and I have found that people from far and wide are deeply upset that their faith is being linked with these terrorists and their monstrous acts.



My campaign to get the Government and the BBC to call these criminals by their true identity - 'Daesh' - has now secured the backing of over 125 MPs from across the political spectrum, and earlier, on the BBC Today Programme, the Prime Minister joined us. As he said: "It's not an Islamic State; what it is, is an appalling, barbarous regime." I applaud this statement by the Prime Minister, and call for the next step: to stop calling them Isis or Isil all together.

So what is an alternative name for them? There is one title that has gained traction across the Middle East, which is an Arabic acronym for the group's name. The word they use is "Daesh" which also holds negative connotations. It is similar to the word "Daes"

meaning "one who crushes something underfoot" and "Daesh" meaning "one who sows discord".

In September last year, France officially adopted this title. The French Foreign Minister urged media outlets to refer to the group as Daesh because, as he said, the Islamic State "blurs the lines between Islam, Muslims and Islamists."

We need to change the way we speak about this organisation and decouple it from religion, which for too long has been hijacked to justify terrorist acts. Joining our international partners and uniting around one name – Daesh, would certainly help.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: When the hand was pointing the moon, some were focused on the finger!

Scotland Yard creates SAS-style unit to counter threat of terrorist gun attack

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/29/scotland-yard-creates-sas-style-unit-to-counter-threat-of-terrorist-gun-attack>

June 29 – Scotland Yard has created an SAS-style unit of armed officers to counter the threat of a terrorist gun attack in Britain.

The 130 counter-terrorism specialist firearms officers (CTSFOs) who make up the elite unit have been equipped with new weapons and retrained in new tactics, such as fast-roping from helicopters and storming burning buildings to rescue hostages.

The unit has trained alongside the army's special forces to respond to assaults such as the 2008 attacks in Mumbai and the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, which developed into a siege. It will also be looking to see if any lessons can be learned from Friday's massacre in Tunisia. Police and the emergency services will hold their biggest ever counter-terrorism exercise in central London on Tuesday. Police chiefs are adamant that their officers rather than soldiers would respond to a terrorist gun attack on Britain's streets, but accept the military would probably have to become involved as the crisis played out.

They have been wrestling with how a largely unarmed police service might deal with such an event, possibly across multiple locations in an urban area. Regular officers have been told to call in armed colleagues. First on the scene would be one of the hundreds of armed officers who routinely patrol in armed response vehicles.

They would take no longer than 15 minutes to arrive, or even less for areas identified as prime targets, such as Whitehall. The new CTSFO unit would also be scrambled.

Police chiefs believe terrorist attacks such as the one in Nairobi show that most casualties happen in the first hour or two.

A senior police source said the new unit would aim to arrest the attackers, but would be prepared to contain and "neutralise" them. "We're police officers, not soldiers. We're not at war. Our job is to arrest people," the source said.

Even if faced with a gunman or gunmen on the rampage, the unit would not have orders to shoot to kill, but would be told to use



minimum force. They would not be “firing the maximum number of bullets” and their actions would be subject to the criminal law.

They have, nevertheless, been issued with SIG 516 weapons and trained to shoot to the head if necessary. Armed officers are traditionally trained to shoot towards the centre of the chest.

They new unit has also been trained to take to speedboats in case of an attack from water, and to “fast-rope” from helicopters should road traffic be gridlocked following an attack.

There is no intelligence of an imminent gun attack on Britain, but the two-day exercise in London this week will test how police, the emergency services and government would cope with the intense strain of such an event.

The government’s Cobra emergency committee will take part in the exercise, which was devised in January.

The announcement by the prime minister, David Cameron, of beefed up counter-terrorism measures and a renewed drive against extremism is otherwise expected to make little difference to policing practices. Officers have been engaged in unprecedented levels of activity for nine months already, making nearly one terrorism-related arrest a day.

The deployment of hundreds of officers, 600 so far, to deal with the attack on Britons in Tunisia,



comes at a time of strain for the police counter-terrorism network, made up of Scotland Yard’s S015 and a series of regional units.

Senior officers have convinced the government to give counter-terrorism policing more money, but they worry privately that cuts to neighbourhood policing, including a potential reduction in the number of frontline officers, would damage the contacts and trust gained among communities and thus the intelligence gathered.

In May, Britain’s top counter-terrorism officer, Mark Rowley, said: “Our discussions over the next few months in terms of the spending rounds ... around counter-terrorism, will make the point it’s not simply about the counter-terrorism network enforcement, its about the strength of those other elements of policing.”



Islamic State planning sophisticated attacks on the West

Source: <http://wtop.com/national-security/2015/06/islamic-state-planning-sophisticated-attacks-west/>

June 29 – Weeks ahead of terror attacks that rocked France, Tunisia, Kuwait and Somalia on Friday, U.S. authorities learned that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has tried to create Western terror cells.

The June 26 attacks coincided with the first anniversary of ISIL’s announcement of the creation of a caliphate.

A plot disrupted by Belgian police in early 2015 tipped U.S. authorities off that the group is trying to plan large, complex attacks against Western targets, possibly including the U.S.

“The plot was the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL’s direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more sophisticated operations in the West,” a recent U.S. intelligence bulletin stated.

In January, authorities raided multiple locations, including a safe house in Verviers, a suburb of Brussels, where a firefight ended in the deaths of two suspects and the arrest of a

third. Belgian authorities told their U.S. counterparts that they disrupted an alleged plot involving an ISIL cell with at least 10 operatives that were possibly targeting police or the public. After the initial raids, several people in European countries, including foreign fighters, were arrested and charged in connection with the cell’s activities.

Even though the group’s targets were likely in Belgium, the investigation determined that operatives were active in France, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands, as well as countries with limited to no counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, such as Syria.

Experts believe the group’s multinational operations reflect significant challenges U.S. law enforcement may face in detecting and investigating multi-jurisdictional threats. Several intelligence specialists suggest the operating environment for terrorists is



evolving rapidly and requires almost foolproof inter-agency information sharing to prevent their attacks.

"The scale of the threats is changing; because of the sheer number of global foreign terrorist fighters — more than 25,000 in more than 100 countries — and because of the variety of operating spaces these fighters are in," said Alexander Evans, coordinator of the United Nations expert group on terrorism.

Retired Gen. Michael Flynn, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told WTOP the pace of technological change is benefiting terror groups and paving the way for more sophisticated tools and tactics to plan and launch complex attacks.

"That pace of changes and the changes that we are seeing in the Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa and parts of West Africa, with this radical version of Islam, is something that should concern all of us," said Flynn.

Flynn warns U.S. officials not to underestimate them.

"I've been up close and personal with these individuals and I've seen the viciousness of how they see their world, their future, and I think we have to pay very, very close attention to what's going right here at home, and we certainly need to do much more."

After the June 26 attacks, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson released a

statement looking ahead to the July 4 holiday, saying, "here in the United States the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI continue to communicate with state and local law enforcement about what we know and see. We are encouraging all law enforcement to be vigilant and prepared. We will also adjust security measures, seen and unseen, as necessary to protect the American people."

The U.S. intelligence bulletin indicated that Europe could immediately face increased plotting and attacks because of the number of European foreign fighters currently in Iraq and Syria, and Europe's proximity to the conflicts in those countries. But the bulletin also pointed out that the tactics, targets and tradecraft allegedly used in the Belgian plot "could be used in the Homeland."

The bulletin said, "ISIL plots involving multiple operatives may grow, but are more likely to occur in Europe, where several recruitment networks have been disrupted, and several returning fighters have already demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks — than in the United States."

The analyst who wrote the bulletin also expressed concern that small-scale attacks such as the May 3, 2015, attempt against the "Draw the Prophet" event in Garland, Texas, by individuals allegedly inspired by ISIL could happen "with little to no warning."

Gulf Arabs on the rise in Islamic State

Source: <http://www.firstpost.com/world/factbox-gulf-arabs-on-the-rise-in-islamic-state-reuters-2318516.html>

June 30 — Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for Kuwait's worst militant attack last Friday, has built a network of militants in Gulf Arab states responsible for a campaign of suicide bombings against the Arabian Peninsula's Shi'ite minority.

Some of the Sunni Muslim group's leaders hail from the Gulf, and its Saudi branch, called Wilayat Najd (Najd province), has called for clearing Shi'ites from the Peninsula and especially from Saudi Arabia, its largest country and home to Islam's holiest places.

Islamic State subscribes to a puritanical school of Sunni Islam that considers Shi'ites as heretics and wants to sweep away a hereditary monarchy it regards as un-Islamic.

Following are details about Gulf Arab nationals belonging to Islamic State, recent attacks

claimed by the group in the Peninsula, and a note on militant financing.

Gulf Arabs at senior levels in Islamic State

Turki al-Bin'ali: From the Sunni-ruled kingdom of Bahrain, this prominent ideologue and recruiter for the group has stridently denounced its many Muslim critics and defended its status as a state. He issued a treatise soon after Islamic State declared a "caliphate" based in Iraq and Syria a year ago rallying Muslims to the cause. According to a biography by one of his students, Bin'ali, about 30, has been banned from several Gulf States as well as Egypt.

Mohammed Emwazi: Reported by Western officials to be "Jihadi John", the group's most notorious



executioner, was born in Kuwait, although he moved to Britain at age 6, later graduating with a computer programming degree from the University of Westminster. Emwazi, identified as the masked man wielding a knife over Western hostages such as James Foley and Stephen Sotloff, is a 'bidoon', an underclass of stateless people in Kuwait that numbers tens of thousands. A lawyer representing Emwazi's father has said Western officials have presented no proof his client's son is "Jihadi John". [ID:nL5NOW631A]

Bandar bin Shaalan: A former officer in the Saudi security services, helped organise Islamic State and encourage religious scholars to endorse the group. According to an unverified series of leaks on Twitter from an alleged militant insider in Syria, bin Shaalan played an important role when Islamic State and al Qaeda's Nusra Front parted company, soliciting loyalty oaths and donations from jihadi figures in the Gulf.

Omar "Abu Bakr" al-Qahtani: A Saudi Islamic scholar, was appointed as one of the group's three principal leaders for Islamic Law affairs.

Othman al Nazeh al-Asiri: A Saudi who travelled to fight in Syria in 2013, was a prominent voice advocating membership of Islamic State during its split with the Nusra Front. He was reported to have been killed in Syria in January.

A total of 2,284 Saudis have joined militant groups in Syria since the conflict began in 2011, Interior Ministry spokesman Major General Mansour Turki told Reuters in March, of whom 645 had returned to the kingdom and about 570 had been killed.

Militant financing

The United States suspects that some of the Islamic State's financing comes from private donations by wealthy Gulf Arabs.

In a March 2014 speech, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen described Kuwait as "the epicentre of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria." In an Oct. 2014 address, Cohen said that while the group does not rely heavily on external donor networks, "it maintains important links to financiers in the Gulf."

Ideology

Saudi Arabia's strict official Wahhabi school of Sunni Islam differs from the ideology of Islamic State in outlawing rebellion against

governments it regards as legitimate and opposing attacks on non-Muslims in most circumstances. Saudi top clerics have decried militants as "deviants", but most refuse to acknowledge Shi'ites as being Muslims or to repudiate the teachings of earlier Wahhabi thinkers who argued for permanent jihad against heretics and infidels.

Attacks in Saudi Arabia

The attacks have targeted members of the Shi'ite Muslim minority, policemen and Western expatriates, and represent the most serious militant threat inside the kingdom since it ended an al Qaeda campaign that lasted from 2003 to 2006.

Two suicide bombings on Shi'ite mosques in Saudi Arabia's eastern region killed 24 people in May, carried out by Saudi militants and claimed by Islamic State.

The first attack in al-Qadeeh village on May 22 killed 21 worshippers and wounded nearly 100 in the bloodiest militant attack in the kingdom, the world's top oil exporter, in years.

An Islamist militant suicide bomber disguised as a woman blew himself up outside a Shi'ite mosque in the city of Dammam the following Friday, killing himself and three other people.

The Interior Ministry said there was evidence of a link between Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and a militant cell in Saudi Arabia that had included the al-Qadeeh bomber.

An unidentified subordinate of Baghdadi communicated with five Saudi men, now in Saudi custody, belonging to the same cell as the suicide bomber, Saleh bin Abdul Rahman Saleh Qashimi, ministry spokesman Bassam al-Attiyeh said in May.

Attacks in Kuwait

A suicide bomber killed 27 people when he blew himself up inside a Shi'ite Muslim mosque in Kuwait city on June 26, in the worst militant attack in the Gulf state.

Kuwait identified the bomber as a Saudi citizen, Fahd Suliman Abdul-Muhsen al-Qabaa.

According to the U.S. State Department's annual report on terrorism released this month, Kuwait foiled several Islamic State bomb plots in 2014 and beefed up its border defences against infiltration by militants in Iraq.

In December 2014, Kuwait arrested a 12-person cell, among them two former police officers



planning bomb attacks on civilian and government targets. The interior ministry said in May that seven members of an alleged militant

cell affiliated with the Islamic State were arrested in May for seeking to carry out sectarian attacks.

Turkey's Double Game with ISIS

By Burak Bekdil

Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2015)

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5317/turkey-isis>

Turkey's Islamist government has had rational reasons to support discreetly its own Frankenstein monster: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The jihadists who have conquered large swathes of Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2014 may have the habit of beheading every infidel they catch, Muslim or non-Muslim. But they are merely the excessively savage next of kin to Turkish Islamists, who pursue similar political goals in Western-style suits and neckties instead of Arab gowns imitating the Prophet Muhammad's attire.

Their kinship diverges over methodology rather than objectives. But there is also a pragmatic attachment built on a shared obsession with common enemies. The Shiites whom ISIS militants love to slaughter are privately viewed by Turkey's Sunni supremacists as heretics (therefore, infidels). Likewise, Ankara views Syria's Kurds as a major security threat. The Turkish government believed that investing in ISIS (and its brothers in arms such as Ahrar ash-Sham and an-Nusra Front) would facilitate the downfall of Syrian president Bashar Assad, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's friend-turned-nemesis. They miscalculated, and thus began Turkey's own Frankenstein story.

Supporting the Islamists

Ankara's quiet support for any jihadist, ISIS or otherwise, has long been an open secret. It became undeniable in January 2014 when Turkish prosecutors sent a team of gendarmerie officers to search three trucks in the southern province of Adana. The Syria-bound trucks, with a bizarre cargo of missiles, rockets, and ammunition in boxes marked in Cyrillic—were escorted by Turkish intelligence officers.[1]

A prosecutor arrested the men and seized the cargo, but then all hell broke loose. The governor rushed to the scene and declared that the trucks were moving on orders from then prime minister, now president Erdoğan. They were then handed back to Turkish intelligence. One of the drivers testified that the cargo had been loaded from a foreign airplane at Ankara's Esenboga Airport and that "we carried similar loads several times before." [2]

In the summer of 2014, a military prosecutor took charge of the legal proceedings and ruled that "this is a military affair." [3] Shortly afterward a court ordered a total media blackout on the incident. Today, the law enforcement officers who searched the trucks stand trial on charges of "international espionage." [4]

But what was the destination of the cargo in Syria? The answer, once again, is an open

secret. Two months after the seizure of the cargo, an audio recording was leaked to the social media by unknown sources. It contained full minutes of a top-secret meeting at the Turkish foreign ministry's premises of some of Turkey's most important men: then-foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (now prime minister); his undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu; chief intelligence officer Hakan Fidan; and deputy chief of the general staff, Gen. Yaşar Güler.

The recording offered a realistic reading of Ankara's Syria policy. For instance, the Turkish bigwigs were heard saying that "an attack on Syria 'must be seen as an opportunity for us [Turks].'" The spymaster is heard saying that a false flag operation would be very easy, and he could "send a few men to Syria to attack Turkey." Fidan is also heard saying that "he had successfully sent two thousands trucks into Syria before." [5] That solved the mystery of the trucks with the curious cargo two months earlier.

A year later, further evidence of support for ISIS emerged when an ISIS jihadist indicated that the Turkish government had delivered stocks of weapons and military hardware to the group's fighters in Syria. Mehmet Askar, now being tried in a high criminal court in Turkey along with eleven other suspected ISIS



fighters, revealed that a 2011 plan to transfer arms to ISIS and to an-Nusra Front, as well as to the more moderate Free Syrian Army, was hampered by the Syrian army's capture of a key border town. Askar's accomplice, Haisam Toubalijeh, who was involved in a weapons transfer thwarted in 2013 by Turkish forces, reassured him that contacts inside the Turkish state would help facilitate the movement of the cache, which included some one hundred NATO rifles.[6] The secret was out.

Ideological Fault Lines

As the Arab upheavals spread across the region, then-foreign minister Davutoğlu hoped that a belt of Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-ruled regimes, subservient to an emerging Turkish

11.3 percent of Turks think generously of ISIS, there are nearly nine million Turks sympathetic to jihadists. Even if a fraction of these sympathizers decided to join the jihad, then tens of thousands of new jihadists might be willing to fight in Iraq and Syria or inside Turkey if they thought that Ankara were allied with the West against their Salafist comrades.

President Erdoğan's euphemism for ISIS is another indication of his semi-hidden sympathy for the jihadist cause. In October 2014, after a meeting in Paris with French president Francois Hollande, he criticized those "who try to portray ISIS as an Islamic organization. ... I am deliberately avoiding the use of the acronym ISIS," he told his audience. "I use the name 'Daesh' because these are terrorists." [10]

Shortly afterward, key Turkish government agencies including the military general staff and foreign ministry happily endorsed the new acronym.[11]



Books about Osama bin Laden and other Islamists are displayed at an Islamic bookstore in the Fatih district of Istanbul, October 13, 2014.

empire, would proliferate in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Libya. Therefore, Syria's Alawaite strongman, President Bashar Assad, had to go. In August 2012, Davutoğlu predicted that Assad's days in power numbered only "a few weeks." [7]

Assad's downfall was a priority for Ankara, so it began to cultivate both ideological and pragmatic ties with and support for a rich array of jihadist groups in Syria, from moderates to ISIS and its variants.[8] These jihadists would ward off Shiite influence in Syria, fight and topple Assad, and rebuild the country according to Ankara's ideological and geostrategic preferences.

Ideologically, the Erdoğan government is not alien to ISIS. In August 2014, Turkish polling service MetroPOLL found that "11.3 percent of Turks did not view ISIS as a terrorist organization." [9] That figure may appear marginal, but it is actually horrifying. If a mere

But, Erdoğan and his chieftains have been less than truthful with their Western counterparts for no other reason than that ISIS is a precise translation of the Arabic acronym "Daesh"—ad-Dawla al-Islamiya fi-l-Iraq wa-sh-Sham (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and as such—includes the term "Islamic." As one European ambassador said at the time, "This is childish ... and in many ways illustrative of Erdoğan's [Islamic] supremacism that the words Islam and an evil concept cannot come together." [12]

Prime Minister Davutoğlu, architect of Turkey's foreign policy, has a similar narrative: "In our peripheral geography [and in Turkey, he then added], you cannot explain anything without the religion factor." [13] Perhaps. But devising foreign policy based on the idea of explaining everything with the religion factor will not bring success. Religion as one's primary lens in policy-making is doomed.



Frankenstein Hits Back

The Turkish government's support for ISIS and other jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq has not been cost-free. In June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and raided the Turkish consulate compound, taking forty-six personnel hostage, including the consul-general.[14] In doing so, the organization apparently sought to prevent the Ankara government—deemed too pragmatic and "Western" by its standards—from betraying the Islamist cause.

In reality, ISIS had seized not merely forty-six hostages but the entire nation, serving as a wakeup call for Ankara: If you deal with jihadists, you can one day become their victim. Turkey's 910-kilometer-long border with Syria had become an open highway for jihadists from around the world flocking to join ISIS. Border crossings and medical treatment for injured ISIS fighters that had been officially tolerated were upgraded to create a de facto hub that augmented ISIS's logistical base and firepower.[15]

In the aftermath of the incident, Turkish intelligence heavily lobbied Sunni tribal leaders in both Iraq and Syria and managed to broker a deal with ISIS. Although the precise terms remain unknown, Ankara is believed to have freed several ISIS prisoners from Turkish jails and pledged not to attack ISIS strongholds directly in neighboring territories in return for the safe return of the hostages. Generous amounts of cash and other Turkish niceties were reportedly granted to ISIS, leading to the release of all hostages after 101 days of captivity. This, according to the Ankara government, "shows the level achieved by the great Turkey." [16]

In fact, the Erdoğan government has a love-hate relationship with the "more barbaric comrades of the same cause [*da'wa*]," whose violent conduct threatens to undermine its carefully contrived narrative of Islam's peaceful ways. But the family feud began to threaten Ankara and its interests in Syria. In October 2014, an ISIS video, titled "A Message to Erdoğan," warned that "Turkey shall be conquered with the shouts of Allahu Akbar." A narrator in the background was heard addressing the Turkish president: "Be prepared for the good news, for the time for your rule to end is getting close at the hands of the state of the caliphate [ISIS]." The narrator added: "Turkey has been spearheading the armies of

'Kufr' (infidelity) in fighting the mujahideen. It was the leader of the NATO forces in chasing the Taliban fighters. And today, the people of treachery refuse but to continue in their malicious ways although it is in a 'new and different look.'" [17]

A major divergence between the Turks and ISIS ensued when Ankara, under increasing pressure from its Western allies, switched to more cautious support for the jihadists, provoking ISIS to threaten to capture Turkish soldiers and bomb the Syria-based tomb of Suleiman Shah, grandfather of Osman I, founder of the Ottoman Empire and a revered figure for the Turks. ISIS chose this threat because its followers believe that tombs are sinful and must be destroyed. The tomb was built in 1886, and in 1921, when France controlled Syria, a peace treaty granted Ankara sovereignty over the small plot of land containing the tomb. That land is Turkey's only sovereign land outside its own territory.[18]

Had the group made good on its threat and killed dozens of Turkish soldiers guarding the tomb, this would have greatly embarrassed the Turkish government. By way of preempting this eventuality, on February 21, 2015, the Turkish military sent 572 troops, 39 tanks, 57 armored vehicles, and 100 other vehicles to Syria to extract its besieged soldiers from the tomb. Shortly afterward, Davutoğlu and chief-of-staff Necdet Özel proudly announced that the tomb had been relocated just a stone's throw away from the Turkish border.[19] Privately, the Turkish government was resentful of ISIS, which until recently had not been viewed as a security threat.

Public Diplomacy Efforts

Following months of Western media accusations over Turkey's quiet support for ISIS, the Turkish leadership, in early 2015, decided to launch its own public diplomacy offensive. In January, the government announced that—for the first time—it had arrested a Turkish national on charges of joining ISIS. About a month later, on February 11, the Turkish General Staff announced that security forces had arrested thirteen foreign nationals and one Turkish citizen en route to joining ISIS.[20] On March 12, Foreign Ministry spokesman Tanju Bilgiç said that Ankara was glad its Western allies were now sharing intelligence more freely



(about potential ISIS fighters crossing Turkish territory). He claimed that the government had a list of 12,000 such names and had so far arrested and deported 1,100 people who would have otherwise joined ISIS.[21] Commenting on the news to this author, a European Union ambassador said, "This is merely window dressing. We still have strong evidence that Turkey's counterterrorism officials do not wholeheartedly cooperate [with us] in our efforts to fight ISIS."



Syrian rebels pose after seizing control of the Bab al-Hawa crossing on Turkey's border, July 20, 2012. In February 2015, Ankara and Washington signed an agreement stipulating the initial training of some 2,000 Free Syrian Army fighters by a Turkish-U.S. team at a military base in Turkey, with an expansion of the program possible. However, the two countries remained divided over whether the priority target in Syria is Assad or ISIS.

Meanwhile, after months of negotiations, in February 2015, Ankara and Washington signed an agreement detailing a train-and-equip program stipulating the initial training of some 2,000 Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters by a Turkish-U.S. team at a military base in Turkey with the possible expansion of the program to 15,000 trainees or more depending on the progression of FSA operations.[22]

This agreement notwithstanding, the parties remained divided over both the program's strategic rationale, namely "who is the priority target in Syria: Assad (for the Turks); or ISIS (for the Americans)"[23] and its operational details, notably Ankara's conviction (and Washington's skepticism) of the importance of a no-fly and safe zone for toppling the Assad

regime.[24] "We remain allies with a common view to Syria's future, but we have different priorities," a U.S. diplomat told this author.[25] The West is thus reluctant to trust Turkey's loyalty to the anti-ISIS alliance. In the words of a *New York Times* editorial:

For months, the Western allies have pressured Turkey to close its porous border, which has allowed thousands of jihadists to cross into Syria to join the Islamic State ... and has enabled ISIS to smuggle in weapons and smuggle out oil on which it relies for revenue. Although the Turkish government has taken some steps to make transit harder, it has been unwilling, or unable, to stem the flow, according to Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt's reporting in *The [New York] Times*. One smuggler said that while his job has become more difficult, sometimes the Turkish border guards look the other way.[26]

Ankara's Nonsensical Wish List

The Erdoğan government's Syria policy has been a fiasco. From the start, it was too sectarian and lacked coherence. It underestimated both the scope of Tehran's and Moscow's support for the Assad regime and the potential costs of supporting Islamist groups in the hope that they would solve Ankara's anti-Assad obsession. It was similarly based on the unrealistic hope of transforming radical groups into pragmatic Islamists subservient to Turkish interests merely on the basis of Sunni solidarity without calculating the major ideological differences between Turkish Islamists and jihadists.

More importantly, Turkish policy calculus contained a self-contradictory wish list:

- Pretend to cooperate with Western allies with the aim of winning hearts and minds by cheating without ISIS noticing.
- Keep ISIS men docked at a Turkish bay, tease them with logistical support and the idea of Sunni solidarity against infidels including Shiites —without Iran noticing— so that ISIS's sleeper cells inside Turkey do



not attack and embarrass the government before the June 2015 parliamentary elections.

- Win Western support for Assad's downfall in return for reluctant and limited support for the West's fight against ISIS.
- Challenge Russian interests in Syria without alienating Moscow, so as not to spoil the booming bilateral trade and energy deals.
- Play the peace game with Turkey's restive Kurds and offer timid support to Kurdish troops fighting ISIS in Syria, but not too staunchly or publicly (but also not too reluctantly so as to prompt the Kurds to leave the negotiating table in Ankara).
- Do not support the Kurds too much in case the peace talks collapse and rebel Kurds turn against Turkish targets.
- Launch a charm offensive to look like an ally to all involved parties: the West, Kurds, ISIS, and various groups of Islamists at home and in the neighborhood.

All the same, the Turkish government does not feel comfortable with its past (and probably present) with ISIS. There is too much to hide

from its allies. Proof is simple to find. A member of parliament, Nazmi Gür, from the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) filed a parliamentary motion on February 20, 2015, asking for an inquiry into ISIS's activities inside Turkey. The next day, the motion was rejected by Erdoğan supporters' overwhelming majority in the Turkish parliament leading Gür to decry the vote as "a sign that the Turkish government still refrains from taking a clear position against ISIS."^[27]

Ankara's support for ISIS (and various other jihadist groups) has been back and forth from stealth, to not-so-stealth, from open to temporarily suspended, curbed, suspended again, and rebooted, depending on what method the government felt it could use to hoodwink a suspicious Western audience and how much it thought it could lean on ISIS for the downfall of the Assad regime. Eventually ISIS has become a security threat to Ankara itself. Not embarrassed at all, the Turkish administration still invests in any radical group it thinks can help the Turks in toppling Assad and creating a Muslim Brotherhood-type regime in Syria.

► References are available at source's URL.

Burak Bekdil is an Ankara-based columnist for Hürriyet Daily News and a fellow of the Middle East Forum. He has also written for the U.S. weekly Defense News since 1997.

Will Mauritania be the New Terrorist Haven?

By Michael Rubin

Source: <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/2015/06/30/mauritania-islamists-terrorist-haven/>

When it comes to the Middle East, Americans and Europeans are good at neither prediction nor threat assessment. The Middle East today looks very different from what anyone ever expected just two decades ago. In 1991, there was huge optimism in Washington when Secretary of State James Baker, capturing the momentum of the lightening quick victory in Operation Desert Storm, cobbled together the Madrid Conference, bringing together most of the Middle East's most intractable foes (minus Iran) for the first time. That optimism culminated in 1993 with the Oslo Accords and the famous handshake between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn. Leaving Saddam in power was a huge mistake, however. Not only did he retrench himself, but

it also gave Iran time to train and cultivate Iraqi Shi'ites who previously had comparatively little to do with their neighbor to the east. Meanwhile, the hope that diplomats and professional peace-processors placed in Arafat quickly proved naïve. Iraq and the Palestinian question became slow-burning fuses. They are real problems but, until the eruption of the Islamic State in the former, they remained essentially local problems.

How ironic it was that the two issues that soaked up so much diplomatic attention ended up being so peripheral to the real forces that would destabilize the region.

Sure, partisans can debate the 2003 Iraq War, but what has happened in the Middle East in recent years is much bigger than



Baghdad. Likewise, while the Palestinian-Israel conflict is an equally virulent obsession among activists or activists masquerading as journalists. No matter how much Americans may like to navel-gaze, and no matter how shrilly biased European officials may be on the issue, neither the Arab Spring nor the rise of al-Qaeda and its violent offshoots have had much if anything to do with questions over the fate of Jerusalem. For Bin Laden, Israel was an occasional talking point thrown into his “Mad Libs”-style rants. Simply put, the West is neither responsible for everything that occurs in the region nor can American and European bureaucrats wielding screwdrivers thousands of miles long be able to tweak policies and implement some magic formula.

Consider how unexpected events in the region have been over the past few years:

- Popular uprisings have swept aside dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya.
- Civil war continues to rage in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.
- Turkey and Qatar are catalysts of regional instability.
- al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists continue to destabilize Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula
- Mali, once scored by Freedom House as the most democratic majority Muslim country, remains chaotic after an al-Qaeda group seized its northern half until French forces drove them out.
- There have been two successions in Saudi Arabia.
- Kurdistan is on the verge of statehood.

If the Middle East were the Powerball Lottery, no one would have won the pot that would be worth billions by now. So what problem do policymakers ignore that might rear its ugly head on the horizon to the detriment of U.S. and European security? As a historian, I’m paid to predict the past, but in this case I’ll stick my neck out based simply on growing whispered concern in North Africa and Europe. The problem to watch is Mauritania.

A largely desert country wedged between Senegal and Morocco, Mauritania has the population of the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area but spread over an area more than twice the size of California.

Diplomatically, Mauritania has been all over the map. It declared war on Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War, but only joined the Arab League six years later. In 1999, however, Mauritania

recognized Israel, becoming only the third Arab country (after Egypt and Jordan) to do so. That openness and moderation would not last long. On August 5, 2009, the current president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, overthrew the democratically elected leader and returned Mauritania largely into the geopolitical rejectionist camp.

Mauritania is also an Islamic Republic and culturally embraces some noxious practices. While Islamic State slavery is the stuff of headlines, slavery has long been rife in Mauritania, with the Arab Berbers victimizing the country’s black population. (When I was in Senegal in 1989, I visited refugee camps filled with black Mauritanian refugees fleeing the country).

The problem is not Mauritanian human rights or lack thereof, but rather poor governance coupled with lack of government control over broad swaths of the country mixed with loose weaponry pouring in from unsecured Libyan depots looted against the backdrop of Muammar Qaddafi’s fall, as well as militants who have poured into Mauritania to escape French intervention in northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb also has unfettered access to most of the country. In short, Mauritania increasingly resembles Fezzan, the southern portion of Libya that is a virtual Club Med for terrorists, smugglers, and weapons dealers. The government in Nouakchott is both



unable and unwilling to crack down and control its territory. In short, Mauritania is now pre-9/11 Afghanistan, only with a greater number of terrorist groups calling it home. The next devastating attack on Europe or



the United States might just as easily be planned in this West African country as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Yemen. The only difference between them is that Mauritania is much closer to both Europe and the United States.

The United States no more pays attention to Mauritania than the European Union concerns itself with Honduras, but just because a country is peripheral to U.S. interest and Washington

largely defers policy to Europe doesn't mean that country cannot pose a threat. Indeed, ask any European security professional, and Mauritania is the grave and growing threat that they have on their radar. It is the next domino to fall, but the culture of counter-terrorism and diplomacy in the White House today is to ignore threats until terrorists shed the blood of innocents.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations; and a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Between 2002 and 2004, Rubin worked as a staff adviser for Iran and Iraq in OSD/ISA/NESA at the Pentagon, in which capacity he was seconded to Iraq. A native of Philadelphia, Rubin received a B.S. degree in biology from Yale University in 1994, and a Ph.D. in history from the same institution in 1999. He has previously worked as a lecturer in history at Yale University, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and at three different universities in northern Iraq. Rubin currently provides academic instruction on regional issues for senior U.S. Army and Marine officers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. Rubin is author of Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington Institute, 2001), co-author of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave, 2005), and co-editor of Dissent and Reform in the Arab World: Empowering Democrats (American Enterprise Institute Press, 2008). Rubin was primary drafter of the Bipartisan Policy Center's 2008 task-force report, "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development."

Major counter-terrorism exercise in London

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33315691>

June 30 – Police officers, soldiers, emergency services and intelligence officials are taking part in London's largest counter-terrorism exercise to date. The simulation of a terror attack has been six months in the planning.

The exercise - codenamed **Strong Tower** - involves 1,000 police officers at locations across the capital until Wednesday afternoon. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe said it would test responses to extremists using firearms.

It comes days after 38 people were killed by a gunman in Tunisia, the majority of them British holidaymakers.

The Metropolitan Police says this week's exercise in London is not based on any specific intelligence and is part of a long-term strategy of planning and preparing for all possible types of terror attack.

Loud noises

Scotland Yard began planning the two-day event in January and only a dozen people know the full script to ensure that the officers

and other services taking part face the maximum challenge.

Senior officers say that while much of the exercise will be hidden from view, there may be occasions when the public hear loud noises or see areas being cordoned off. Scotland Yard will be posting updates about the exercise to Twitter, using the hashtag #999exercise.

The exercise was planned in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January. Actors have been drafted in to play injured people for the training exercise.

Sir Bernard said the threat level for terrorism had been raised over the last year, making it vital "that we train and we learn".

He said: "The reason we have exercises like today is because, obviously, we are concerned there are people planning terrorist events. We intend first of all to stop them from getting to attack. But should we not stop the terrorists in their planning, it's essential we disrupt them in any of the attacks that may take place."

Ch Supt Paul Rickett told the BBC it was "incredibly important" that



the emergency services were prepared for this type of scenario. "Events have told us around the world that the last thing you can be is complacent, so that is

why it is important we continually respond to the emerging threat, change our tactics and we test our capability and readiness to respond," he said.

Analysis

By Dominic Casciani, BBC home affairs correspondent

Although the nature of this "live play" exercise sounds similar to the



attack in Tunisia, this event has been six months in the planning and is part of a regular programme.

The officers who came on shift this morning knew they were taking part in an exercise - but nothing about what they would be facing. Not even the "gold commander", the senior officer making the big decisions in the operations room, will know what's going to happen.

what happened during two incidents: the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris and the cafe siege in Sydney. Scotland Yard stresses that whatever happens during this exercise, it doesn't mean they have specific

The exercise is influenced by intelligence that such an event could occur. But they do want to ensure they have planned for every conceivable type of incident in case it should ever come to pass.



Deputy Assistant Commissioner Maxine de Brunner, the exercise's director, said the aim was to test and challenge police and other agencies in an "ambitious multi-site marauding terrorist attack".

"This exercise will be an on-going fast-paced terrorist situation and we will explore how we as London's agencies respond," said DAC de Brunner.

"The exercise is at the extreme end of what might happen."

Crisis-management skills

Emergency services are under a legal duty to test their preparedness for all manner of crises from terrorism attacks to flooding.

Many counter-terrorism training exercises take place out of view around the country and the last comparable exercise of this nature was in London was in 2012.

In that exercise, the Metropolitan Police and others tested how they would respond to an attack on the London Underground involving a possible radiological or chemical device.

But while Tuesday and Wednesday's exercise is likely to involve comparable numbers of people, it has been designed to stretch them much further by moving the incident around the city - although nobody other than the directors know exactly what is going to happen.

The agencies involved in the operation include the police, London Fire Brigade, London Ambulance Service, Transport for London, the NHS and a string of government departments who will face tests of their decision-making and crisis-management skills.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: Drills are great! 1000 police officers participated. But how many played the role of victims? Because it is different when we use 50 or 100 (usually) compared to 500-1000 that might be actually involved (never practice with such "real" numbers). Good to see modern transportation equipment. Not happy to see AGAIN the Level A people – I only hope that will not (again) carry stretchers. And there was not a single line on actual hospitals' involvement (apart reference to NHS).

7/7 attacks: Ten years on, how safe is the UK?

By Dominic Casciani (Home affairs correspondent)

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33328716>

June 30 – Almost exactly 10 years ago, Londoners saw the bleeding and the injured emerge from the Underground - survivors of the 7 July bomb attacks.

The four bombs on three Tubes and a bus killed 52 and left many more with life-changing injuries.

There was no longer any doubt, al-Qaeda's brand of violent extremism was capable of hitting the UK.

The tenth anniversary of those attacks is now a week away. So are we safer or under a greater threat?

'Severe threat'

The official government position, for headline purposes, is that there is a "severe" threat from international terrorism, which means security chiefs have concluded an attack is highly likely.

This conclusion is not an exercise of sticking a finger in the air and seeing which way the wind blows. It is based on some cold, hard calculations of what the intelligence picture suggests is going on, both what we can see in the public and what we can't.

And that is why London sees a major counter-terrorism exercise this week, codenamed Operation Strong Tower and designed to test to the limit how the police and other emergency services would respond should the worst come to pass.

Over the last decade, the nature of threat from extremist violence has changed.

The 7/7 attacks were directed at arms length by al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A number of other plots during the same period followed the same trajectory, including the foiled attempt to take liquid-based bombs onto transatlantic airliners in 2006.

Drone attacks

But as the US tightened the noose around al-Qaeda's leadership, particularly after it began firing missiles from drones, the would-be jihadists briefly shifted attention to the Horn of Africa.

Deprived of an easy route to one hoped-for land of jihad, British recruits tried to get to Somalia to join al-Shabab. One of those would-be recruits was Michael Adebolajo, one of the two men who killed Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich.

Aside from that attack, the number of major plots had appeared to be falling as al-Qaeda increasingly looked a spent force and al-Shabab too weak and remote to take up its banner.

But the implosion of three countries in the wake of the Arab Spring has changed things yet again. First Libya, then Syria and Iraq. In the remains of each nation, the jihadist cause has found a new lease of life.

The group that calls itself Islamic State has projected a utopian image of a resurrected caliphate and, simultaneously, presented its sectarian ultra-violence as a solution to Sunni Muslims who have suffered in both Iraq and Syria.

That toxic revolutionary mix, projected by young followers through social media, and further wrapped up in an arcane prophecy that the "end times" will begin in a Syrian town, has been its trump card.

Sceptics say all of this poses no threat to us in the UK - but there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Extreme violence

If Tunisia's events were not clear enough, France, Australia, Canada and Belgium have all seen acts of extreme violence that were either directly or indirectly inspired by the ideology and aims of ISIS.

France's worst security crisis in decades began with a massacre at Charlie Hebdo

The UK has not suffered an act of ISIS-inspired violence on its streets - but there have been at least two major counter-terrorism operations which can be directly



linked to conspirators receiving directions or guidance from jihadists active in the Syrian conflict.

More than 330 people were arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences in the UK in the year to April 2015 - a third more than the previous year.

Crucially, the average age of those being arrested has been falling, with almost a fifth under 20.

In other words, given that the self-proclaimed caliphate isn't going away anytime soon, this is shaping up to be an enduring security problem.

While the jihadist threat persists, the UK also runs the risk of more violence from far-right extremists. One of the most serious acts of terrorism since 7/7 came from a neo-Nazi who

tried to bomb three West Midlands mosques and murdered an elderly Muslim man as he returned home from prayers.

That is why London's massive counter-terrorism training exercise over Tuesday and Wednesday is important to the security services.


The emergency services believe they are in a far better place to deal with a repeat of 7/7 - their secure communications systems now all talk to each other, for a start.

But they don't know what's coming around the corner.

Operation Strong Tower, which is focused on a "marauding" attack, such as the shootings in Mumbai or Paris, is the latest and most complex event to date - and it won't be the last.

Terrorism trends with focus on Energy and Mining

Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_TerrorismEnergyAttacks_ResearchBrief_June2015.pdf



START
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

RESEARCH BRIEF

Terrorism Trends with a Focus on Energy and Mining

OVERVIEW

Terrorist attacks on energy- and mining-related targets have the potential to result in significant economic damage as well as causing considerable disruptions to everyday life in the affected communities. This analysis was conducted to provide information on the prevalence and characteristics of terrorist attacks (and their perpetrators) on energy- and mining-related targets from 1970 through 2014, and was presented to the Southeast Analysts' Roundtable, held in Houston, Texas, in June 2015.

METHOD


Data for this analysis was taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which was supplemented with independently collected data on the ideological orientation of perpetrators.

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FINDINGS

Attacks on energy and mining-related targets were most prevalent in the 1980s. During that decade, an average of 8 percent of all attacks were on this type of target each year, with more than 10 percent of all attacks targeting energy and mining-related entities in 1984 and 1985.

- The number of attacks on these targets increased dramatically in 2013 and 2014, as the number of attacks in 2014 surpassed the total for any year in the 1980s.
- However, these only accounted for 3 percent of all terrorist attacks.
- In fact, attacks on energy and mining-related targets increased less from 2013 to 2014 than the general increase of terrorist incidents across all targets.



Year	Number of Attacks
1970	10
1973	10
1976	10
1979	10
1982	150
1985	380
1988	320
1991	420
1994	100
1997	100
2000	100
2003	100
2006	100
2009	150
2012	200
2013	320
2014	490

► Read the full report at source's URL.




Criminology Theory and Terrorism – New Applications and Approaches

Edited by Joshua D. Freilich, Gary LaFree

Routledge – 2015 – 210 pages

Source: <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138858268/>

Although there has been an increase in research on terrorism across the social and behavioural



sciences in the past few decades, until recently most of this work has originated from political science, psychology or economics. Therefore, our focus in this book on criminological conceptual frameworks and empirical studies that engage terrorism and responses to it is unique. We include a distinguished group of researchers that offer their distinctive insights into criminological perspectives on terrorism.

The contributors focus on criminological perspectives that have rarely, if ever, been previously applied to the study of terrorism. This includes a range of perspectives from rational choice to social disorganization; from strain to routine activities theory. This volume will advance understanding of terrorism by taking advantage of criminological contributions, and at the same time will serve as a useful update to the criminologists and their students already working in this area. It would also be a helpful introduction to those criminologists and their students

who would like to be more engaged in this important area of research.

This book was originally published as a special issue of *Terrorism and Political Violence*.

Joshua D. Freilich is a member of the Criminal Justice Department, and the Criminal Justice PhD Program at John Jay College, CUNY, USA, the Creator and co-Director of the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) study, an Executive Committee member of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and a member of the Global Terrorism Database's Advisory Board. His research focuses on the causes of and responses to terrorism; criminological theory, especially environmental criminology and crime prevention; and measurement issues.

Gary LaFree is Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, USA. He is a Fellow of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) and served as President of the ASC (2005-6). He also serves on the Executive Committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Crime, Law and Justice Committee and the World Economic Forum's Committee Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Much of his research is related to understanding criminal violence.

Studying the connections between organized crime, terrorism in Eurasia

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150701-studying-the-connections-between-organized-crime-terrorism-in-eurasia>

July 01 – Eurasia is a major international drug trafficking hotspot that supports insurgent movements and terrorism, and it is an important site where terrorism and transnational organized crime intersect, according to the grant application. The breakup of the Soviet Union, which eliminated some terrorist organization funding, and the U.S.

crackdown on money laundering and financial operations that supported terrorism after 9/11 have led terrorist groups to rely more heavily on organized crime. The U.S. Department of Defense has awarded researchers a \$935,500 grant to study the connection of



organized crime, terrorism and insurgency in Eurasia.

Rowan University Political Science professor Lawrence Markowitz is among three scholars selected to receive a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense's Minerva Research Institute to study the connection of organized crime, terrorism and insurgency in Eurasia.

The three-year, \$953,500 grant to the researchers from Rowan and the University of Kansas will help the scholars determine connections between drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime in Central Asia, South Caucasus, and Russia. Their findings will help inform policymakers on American national security.

The study will investigate the nature of terrorism/criminal connections in a number of former Soviet countries. It will examine the conditions under which terrorist-trafficking alliances are forged and change and will assess the capacity of national and foreign governments and international organizations to prevent, monitor, and dismantle the trafficking/terrorism nexus.

A Rowan University release notes that Eurasia is a major international drug trafficking hotspot that supports insurgent movements and terrorism, and it is an important site where terrorism and transnational organized crime intersect, according to the grant application. The breakup of the Soviet Union, which eliminated some terrorist organization funding, and the U.S. crackdown on money laundering and financial operations that supported terrorism after 9/11 have led terrorist groups to rely more heavily on organized crime, according to the researchers.

Findings from the study will assist the Department of Defense (DoD) in strategizing ways to think innovatively about approaches to terrorism and conflict and the types of resources it deploys internationally, the grant application notes.

Collaboration with Kansas scholars

Markowitz is collaborating on the study with University of Kansas (KU) professors Mariya Omelicheva (principal investigator) and Stephen Egbert. The grant includes a \$224,830 sub-

award to Rowan. Markowitz's research will focus on the capacity of national governments to respond to trafficking/terrorism in Eurasia.

Next spring through the summer of 2017, Markowitz will travel to Eurasia as part of his research of nine in-depth case studies that will assess the political, economic, and security responses of national governments to monitor, prevent and dismantle intersections of terrorism and trafficking within their borders.

Markowitz also will work with Omelicheva and KU graduate students to examine how international organizations and U.S. missions understand and respond to the terrorism and trafficking in Eurasia.

The study of the region is critical because 25-30 percent of drugs produced in Afghanistan are transported through Eurasia. Drug trafficking partly explains the strength of the region's terrorist groups, which adversely impact government, security, stability and development and can lead to the rise of crime, violence in extremism in states that are U.S. partners and allies, according to the researchers.


"By mapping the trafficking/terrorism nexus, this program will identify the areas of particular concerns where the U.S. military assets may be directed for its disruption," the grant application states. "Overall, the findings will support interagency cooperation and collaboration with partner nations."

The study includes the use of GIS tools by KU researchers, who will map and model the nexus between trafficking and terrorism in the Eurasian countries.

Transnational terrorist ties, local insurgencies

"These are countries that have a good amount of intersection with transnational terrorist ties and local insurgencies," says Markowitz, author of the 2013 book *State Erosion: Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in Central Asia*. Published by Cornell University Press, the book received honorable mention for the 2014 Ed A. Hewett Book Prize, awarded annually to an outstanding monograph on the political economy of Russia, Eurasia and/or Eastern Europe.

"The study focuses on how terrorism and security threats and insurgency are



interconnected with organized crime,” continues Markowitz, a six-year professor in Rowan’s College of Humanities & Social Sciences whose research work has focused on the political, economic and social forces in these regions. “We will see where and how the crimes happen and then draw some general lessons to help us understand other parts of the world.

“Generally speaking, these are weak states not unlike countries in Asia or Africa,” Markowitz adds, noting that the countries have difficulty collecting taxes, maintaining stability and combatting security threats. “At the same time, it’s a post-Communist area and there are very deeply ingrained legacies from the Soviet era. Legacies of real problems remain. It’s a very unique part of the world.”

In addition to publishing articles and a book on the Minerva research, Markowitz also will develop an undergraduate course focusing on Eurasian security.

Addressing societal needs

The Minerva Institute grant is a first for Rowan, according to Dr. Kenneth Blank, the University’s senior vice president.

“Rowan has and presently is performing work under Department of Defense contracts, but this is the first time that our investigators are undertaking work for the DoD in areas related to the social sciences,” Blank notes, adding that the research by Markowitz and his Kansas colleagues is critical to national security.

“This award demonstrates the depth of Rowan’s capabilities to meet societal needs through our research initiatives.”

Markowitz, who speaks Russian and Uzbek, has two decades of fieldwork experience in Eurasia. Since 2012, Markowitz has served as director of Rowan’s Hollybush Institute, a multi-disciplinary institute that promotes scholarly research and education on the intersections of science, technology, social science and the humanities.

Report warns of Islamist ‘time bomb’ in French prisons

Source: <http://www.france24.com/en/20150630-france-report-prison-islamist-time-bomb>



A few miles south of Paris, in the suburb Fleury-Mérogis, lays the Fleury-Mérogis Prison. It houses 3,800 prisoners, which is relatively small when you compare it to the prisons in the USA, but it is Europe’s largest jail complex.

June 30 – **A French government policy of grouping together and isolating radical Islamist inmates in prisons is “potentially dangerous” and risks creating a “time bomb”, the country’s independent prisons authority has warned.**

In a report published Tuesday, Adeline Hazan, France’s controller general for prisons, said the policy could lead to those with less extreme views becoming influenced by some of the more



radical prisoners they are confined with. "The grouping facilitates proselytism. There is a risk of exacerbation and a snowball effect," she said in the report. "We risk creating time bombs."

France has been separating radical Islamist inmates from the rest of the prison population at certain detention facilities since October last year, when a pilot scheme was launched at Fresnes Prison just south of Paris.

Under the trial scheme, 22 prisoners identified as having radical Islamist beliefs were held together in a separate part of the prison, where it was hoped they would be unable to influence and potentially radicalise other prisoners.

Plans were made to extend the scheme to four other prisons in January in the wake of terror attacks in Paris, after it merged that two of the perpetrators, Amedy Coulibaly and Chérif Kouachi, had been inmates together in Fleury-Mérogis Prison, near Paris.

"It's like with radioactive waste," a French magistrate told Reuters at the time. "You either disperse it or you contain it in an ultra-secure site. There is always a risk of radioactivity, but this could allow for better risk management."

'Widely disparate levels of radicalisation'

But far from stopping the spread of radicalisation, the new scheme could be

promoting it, said Hazan, whose report was based on months of interviews with inmates, guards and prison wardens at Fresnes as well as lawyers, judges and members of the intelligence services.

Part of the problem, Hazan found, was that some of the "radicalised" inmates being held together had significantly more extreme beliefs than others.

"The consolidation of radicalised inmates poses risks that do not seem to have been taken into account, including the cohabitation of prisoners exhibiting widely disparate levels of radicalisation," said Hazan's report.

She also said that prison authorities at Fresnes had not observed any "calming effect" on the rest of the prison population since the measure was introduced.

Meanwhile, those who had been separated "for the most part expressed their fear of being labelled in the long term as Islamist radicals and of not being able to rid themselves of the influence of their fellow inmates," Hazan said in her report.

In a radio interview earlier this year, Prime Minister Manuel Valls estimated that around 1,400 of a total of 66,000 inmates in French prisons are thought to have extremist tendencies.

From Church to a Beach: The New Terrorist Target Is You

Source: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/01/from-church-to-a-beach-the-new-terrorist-target-is-you.html>



Only good intelligence gathering can stop terror attacks before they begin, and that's harder to do post-Snowden. Meanwhile jihadist targets are getting ever more random.

The photograph of Seifeddine Rezgui that surfaced after he slaughtered dozens of mainly Western vacationers in the Tunisian resort of Sousse is a picture of beachside nonchalance. Take away the Kalashnikov held languidly in his right hand with the barrel pointed down and he looks like just another beachcomber going for a stroll, kicking up some spray by the Mediterranean's edge.

The targets Rezgui chose couldn't have been much softer. This wasn't some battlefield action

with bombs and bullets flying, some jihadist war against armed "Crusaders," this was the cold-blooded and methodical shooting of vacationers unarmed and relaxing and utterly vulnerable.

And that fits into the increasingly common modus operandi of these jihadist killers. They are likely to hit softer and softer targets, not least, because improved security and greater vigilance are making it harder for more complex terror plots to be executed.

Intelligence officials on both sides of the Atlantic say this chapter of "low-grade" 24/7 terrorism with any Westerner a target wherever he or she might be—sunning on a Mediterranean beach or



nipping out to the corner shop in London—needs to be answered with more intrusive intelligence and surveillance and a dramatic increase in resources. They bewail the fact that it coincides with Edward Snowden's revelations about the NSA's metadata surveillance and, at least in the U.S., just as the threat of random terror is rising, some restrictions are being placed on the government's authority to conduct surveillance.

In Europe, despite the theatrical criticism of the scale of U.S. surveillance whenever there's another disclosure of American spying on European leaders, the EU governments themselves are gearing up to mount more

invasive intelligence operations involving NSA-style surveillance, and even the manipulation of social media sites to disrupt and sow confusion among jihadis.

From Britain to the Netherlands, France to Italy, legislation similar to parts of America's much criticized post-9/11 Patriot Act have been passed or are being proposed. Civil libertarians remain opposed, arguing the increase in surveillance is dangerous for basic democratic freedoms, but for many in the West the war on terror is the higher priority for now, the governments' reactions inevitable and, more to the point, necessary.

There was a time when the kind of killings we are witnessing now would have been rejected by jihadist leaders as too simple.

Forget the spectacular 9/11s that require some ingenuity, planning and training for months even years. What we have now is the targeting of the easiest, most vulnerable victims and in the least challenging circumstances for the gunmen armed with the most rudimentary of weapons available to them.

In Tunisia, it was a Kalashnikov and a couple of grenades—not difficult to secure in a North Africa awash with weaponry. Nowadays guns are also not so hard to secure in France, where in Paris earlier this year Jewish shoppers in a kosher supermarket and French cartoonists gathered for an editorial meeting were gunned down. In London in 2013 the target was an off-duty 25-year-old soldier hacked to death on a residential street in front of distraught shoppers.

And on it goes.

Likewise, the perpetrators don't need any more military training than white supremacist Dylann Storm Roof had for his terrorism in a church in Charleston in June. The new-generation jihadis, encouraged from afar, inspired rather than operationally controlled in many cases, are as ignorant about warfare as they are about the Quran. When veteran extremists start returning from the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, the military skills of the murderers may improve, but the targets are likely to remain the helpless and the unwary.

"This is a threat that faces all of us," said British Prime Minister David Cameron as Black Friday

unfolded. "These events have taken place today in Tunisia and in France but they can happen anywhere."

There was a time when the kind of killings we are witnessing now would have been rejected by jihadist leaders as too simple, not "spectacular" enough and lacking in the kind of apocalyptic significance they wanted from targets. The 9/11 attacks were meant to be symbolic, striking at icons of American financial, military and political power. Gunning down holiday-makers on a Tunisian beach isn't in the same league.

Egyptian ideologue Ayman Zawahri, for years Osama bin Laden's deputy and now the leader of al Qaeda, reportedly vetoed a plot for a cyanide gas attack in the New York subway in 2003 as he felt the target wasn't big or symbolic enough. He was also a longtime critic of the beheadings so favored by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant and mentor of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-declared caliph of the so-called Islamic State.

Slowly but surely the jihadis have been lowering their sights. A desperate bin Laden, months before his death, began to examine the potential of the U.S. rail sector as a target.

And the new generation who have come in his wake are even more nihilistic in their approach, going for targets wherever and whoever, if they are Western or can be linked with the West—or if they are Shia Muslims. Hence the



murderous 2013 assault on a shopping mall in Kenya or the bombing of Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

There is, in fact, little that Western governments can do to protect their citizens when they holiday abroad. "With mass tourism now there are many parts of the world where people want to travel and want to take holidays and enjoy them where security is not of the standard we expect here," says Paul Clarke, the former head of Britain's Counter Terrorism Command. British vacationers bore the brunt of the beach massacre in Tunisia 30 or more Britons killed in the attack.

Even at home in the West governments can't promise total security, especially if the targets are going to be as "low-grade" and quotidian as they are now. In some ways the move away from the highly complex attacks like 9/11 and the 7/7/2005 London bombings that left 56 people dead and 700 injured is a reflection of how effective intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been foiling large plots—and forcing the extremists to go for ever easier targets.

Since 9/11 more than 50 terror plots have been foiled in the U.S., mostly due to old-fashioned intelligence and law enforcement methods using informants rather than the National

Security Agency's "bulk" surveillance of phone and email communications, according to the New America Foundation, a U.S. think tank.

In the UK, at least 45 terror plots have been disrupted by British security services since the 7/7 bombings in 2005.

But as the extremists cast their sights lower it becomes much harder to foil random attacks against targets that lack obvious symbolic significance and are being mounted by a mixed bag of mentally unbalanced "lone wolves" recently radicalized and more inspired by the ISIS than operationally directed by it. Western intelligence agencies are stretched.

Says the UK's former anti-terror chief Clarke: "About 350 people have returned from Syria. It is assessed that one in five are a high risk. The level of arrests of people in connection with terrorism is at its highest ever level, it is about one per day. There are about 120 people waiting trial on terrorist related charges. So the tempo in terms of counter-terrorism and law enforcement is the highest it has ever been."

But on a day like last Friday, the tempo of terror seems to be setting the pace.

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EDITOR'S COMMENT: Chief Clark: "Sir! Since you know the number of those returned home strip all their ID documents and citizens' privileges; force them to return back to Syria. AND STAY THERE! You can also do this in advance the moment you verify their departure. If you continue to have them under surveillance the unexpected WILL happen. In all recent incidents terrorists were KNOWN to authorities!"

Pirates and Hold-ups: Crime Strikes Venezuela's Oil Industry

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/pirates-and-hold-ups-crime-strikes.html>

When night falls over western Venezuela, armed gangs known as "pirates" sometimes ride boats into muggy Lake Maracaibo to steal equipment from oil wells.

In the country's Paraguana peninsula, opposite the Caribbean island of Aruba, slum dwellers at times break through a perimeter wall into Venezuela's biggest refinery and rob machinery, construction tools, and cables to sell as scrap.

On the other side of the OPEC country in Monagas state, around 26,000 potential barrels

were lost in March during a shutdown after state oil company employees and contractors stole copper cables and caused a tank to overflow.

Venezuela's national crime pandemic - the United Nations says the country has the world's second-highest murder rate after Honduras - is a growing headache for the oil industry, which accounts for nearly all of the country's export revenues.



Hold-ups and thefts in the sector are on the rise, taking a toll on output, according to

"A high frequency of events linked to insecurity in oil fields has affected operational continuity in generation and maintenance due to theft and loss of components of equipment, materials and consumer goods," it read.

The ministry and state oil company PDVSA did not respond to detailed requests for further information.

Gangs, including those that have for years prowled the waters of Lake Maracaibo, are lured by the oil sector's valuable infrastructure as Venezuela's economic crisis turns tools, computers and machinery into rare and coveted goods.

Some workers, foreign executives and opposition politicians allege this trend has been exacerbated by lax oversight that has allowed crime groups to form within PDVSA's workforce of around 152,000.

"Workers recruited to be drillers end up as bandits who kill, rob, and hold up their colleagues or steal equipment," said Americo De Grazia, an opposition legislator on the National Assembly's commission on energy and petrol who is in touch with oil workers and union bosses.

"They're turning the oil industry into a no man's land where no one can instill order," said De Grazia, adding his attempts to debate the issue have been rebuffed in parliament.

Political 'Sabotage'?

PDVSA says it is up against "sabotage" from political enemies who see damaging the oil industry as a means to weaken President Nicolas Maduro's socialist government.

The company points to measures, including the arrest of employees for the Monagas theft and the deployment of the army to protect installations in that state, as proof Venezuela is taking oil crime seriously.

"We are trying to increase security," PDVSA president Eulogio Del Pino told Reuters in April during a media trip to the Orinoco Belt in the country's southeast. He added that the problem was far more serious in neighboring Colombia, for instance, where



interviews with around 40 people, including oil workers, union leaders, foreign executives, opposition politicians, scrap dealers, and people who live near oil installations.

Shortages of spare parts or the prospect of further theft stymie replacements of the stolen items, forcing some wells to function at partial capacity or at times even shut down, the people said.

"The scrap seekers are uncontrollable," said National Guard Lieutenant Lenin Osuna, who helps oversee security at the northern Paraguana's 645,000 barrel-per-day Amuay refinery where, he added, 20-30 people sometimes sneak in at once.

"Any day now they could commit irreparable harm to the refinery," added Osuna, speaking in a barracks next to Amuay as he leafed through a thick folder documenting criminal incidents.

Evidence of the rising crime threat to the oil industry is chiefly anecdotal due to a dearth of data and publicly disclosed cases, which the sources chiefly attributed to fears of retribution from perpetrators and a climate of impunity.

The Oil Ministry's 2014 annual report acknowledged the problem but did not provide details.



guerrillas frequently blow up pipelines. Fellow oil-rich nations like Nigeria and Mexico have also struggled with oil crime for years. Currency controls that hurt imports and cash flow, as well as a brain drain of Venezuelans leaving the country, are more salient challenges for Venezuelan output, which PDVSA recently put at roughly 2.85 million

Small groups of armed men on boats typically zip up to an oil platform at night and hold up workers, stealing everything from microwaves to wallets to machinery, according to oil workers.

That crimps operations at wells, and at times forces them to shut down entirely. A shortage of boats - due to stolen motors and a scarcity



barrels per day.

Oil output in Venezuela, which has the world's largest proven reserves, has been falling or stagnating for about a decade, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration figures. Venezuela's output figures often conflict with international agencies. PDVSA says it has shored up production in recent months, thanks to the heavy-crude-rich Orinoco region.

Venezuela's western border - known locally as the "hot frontier"- is particularly restive due to a mix of Colombian paramilitaries, Marxist FARC rebels, drug gangs, and smuggling rings.

In January, for instance, PDVSA reported one of its employees was killed during a night-time hold-up by seven criminals at a well near Lake Maracaibo.

The "pirates" of Lake Maracaibo, a massive bay where the country's oil boom took off a century ago, target cables and devices that control gas injection, according to several PDVSA employees who work on the water and spoke on condition of anonymity.

of parts- further curbs surveillance on the lake, they added.

"We've returned to the stone age due to theft," one PDVSA engineer said, resting at a relative's home after his shift in the sweltering Caribbean area. "Whatever you replace, they'll steal."

Convoys, Fences, Surveillance

Robbers also target the vast Orinoco Belt, where Venezuela is pinning its hopes of sustaining a production increase to fight declines in mature fields like those around Maracaibo.

Foreign oil companies who operate joint ventures with PDVSA there are pushing for increased security and some have already introduced convoy systems, built fences, and boosted surveillance, sources close to the JVs said.

Russia's top oil producer Rosneft, for instance, is seeking more safety guarantees for its Orinoco



operations, a source close to the issue said. Del Pino, a Stanford-educated engineer tapped in September to lead PDVSA, said the company is working with the government to



declare the Orinoco a national security area. "[That means] if someone tries something there they will have a lot of problems," said Del Pino, widely seen as a pragmatist trying to depoliticize and clean up the oil giant critics say has become bloated. Amuay's security was doubled in January. Soldiers disguised as workers patrol the refinery at all times and several workers are under investigation, Lieutenant Osuna said.

Critics counter that is a drop in the ocean. Criminals still break into Amuay daily, local union leaders say, at times on motorbikes. Night shift workers fear being held up on their way to the bathroom and fret for their cars after a rash of robberies at the Amuay parking lot this year.

"They can rob you here in the actual refinery, it's happened," one worker said. "It happened in the past too but never in such a nasty way."

Security is also tight for foreign executives visiting the capital Caracas, with measures at times including use of armored vehicles or a ban on travel after dark, according to security consultants and sources in the oil industry.

Meanwhile, the "pirates" attack oil platforms between five and six times a month, estimated Francisco Luna, a machinist in Lake Maracaibo and a leader of Venezuela's oil workers' federation.

"The platforms are in isolated areas. It's easier than stealing in the city," he said.

While Venezuela's sprawling and remote oilfields have suffered crime for decades, industry veterans say the situation has taken a turn for the worse.

"I wouldn't work in Lake Maracaibo now," said one retired PDVSA worker who gave his last name as Sanchez as he rode a bike near the water, wearing old PDVSA work overalls. "It's too dangerous."

Is Tunisia fighting terrorism or fuelling terrorism?

Source: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/19599-is-tunisia-fighting-terrorism-or-fuelling-terrorism>

July 02 – Those who commit terrorist acts are usually killed in the process. It is as if they deliberately want to bury the truth with them, along with the victims, whether they are military officials, security officials or foreign tourists.

After each atrocity, the voices of condemnation grow louder and make baseless accusations. Islam is always put in the dock and the government announces new measures to combat terrorism, some of which remain as ink on a paper while others complicate the security situation due to poor execution. This is followed by a media storm in which the truth is lost and the blood of the victims is distributed amongst the political tribes. Hence, the situation is back to square one until another attack surprises

everyone again; amid all of the chaos and noise, nothing is actually understood.

Every time, the terrorists' "black box" keeps its secrets to itself. We know nothing about the mastermind behind the operation, and nothing about who provided the intelligence that determined the target, location, timing and means of execution. All we have to go on are superficial conclusions based on religious extremism and social marginalisation. Then there is usually a call for a national conference on terrorism in which they talk about terrorism per se, but never about the real terrorists who are monitoring the discussions behind the scenes.



I believe that the media's policy for dealing with terrorism, as well as the measures adopted by the executive authority, consciously or unconsciously fuel terrorism. They strengthen

the desire to expand the circle of accusations to include all political actors in the name of Islam?

Such extreme media discourse contributes directly to strengthening the popular incubators for terrorism, rather than dismantling them. While one effective means of the latter is allowing moderate and balanced Islamic discourse to respond to and discuss extremist proposals, there is no way to combat extremist religious discourse with extremist discourse against religion and those acting in its name.

If the final conclusion about the media policy reached by peaceful Muslims who have no relation to so-called jihadi Islam is that most of the media outlets have a problem with religion per se and not just religious terrorism, then what conclusion would be reached by those who believe in the traditional interpretation of religion? Therefore, despite the fact that the adopted media policy promotes anti-terror slogans, it gives terrorism fuel and a suitable framework within which it can



the ranks of the terrorists rather than weaken them; combine mistakes in diagnosing the phenomenon with mistakes in addressing it. Indeed, they provide terrorists with reasons to carry on.

Media policy

The focal point of the media policy is to shed light on those who execute the attacks rather than those behind them. Since the terrorists' appearance and discourse portray them as being affiliated with extremist religious groups, most media outlets adopt the approach of fighting religious extremism by being extremist against religion. There have been calls to shut down some mosques on suspicion of providing physical or moral support to extremists, without determining clear standards or criteria for classifying such mosques. One media personality went as far as to say on live television, "Our bars are more honourable than your mosques." This was very controversial. There have even been calls to close Qur'an-memorisation schools for children that do not respect the law. The question is why are they being shut down after a terrorist act? Why weren't they shut down earlier if there was something wrong with them? What is the secret behind linking the Qur'an and terrorism? Is it

expand its influence,

Security policy

It is natural to confront terrorism by intensifying security campaigns against it and monitoring all suspicious behaviour, but it is also important for such accountability to be applied to all citizens. Moreover, this should be done out of patriotic motives rather than financial rewards to those who provide information leading to the arrest of terrorists, which is what the Tunisian government wants to do.

If public services are put in the circle of financial rewards and benefits, then the service will be paid to the highest bidders, and we know that those sponsoring terrorism have large financial resources. However, all of these efforts will not bear fruit if a judicial follow-up is not carried out with regards to the security agencies known for dealing with corrupt businessmen.

The first priority in security work must be to separate the terrorist network from security officials providing it with intelligence information, without which criminal activity would be impossible. It is no secret how terrorism has been used to serve



financial mafias and political agendas.

It is unreasonable for some, including security officials, to talk about the security breaches that occurred without this leading to reforms within the security agencies to rid them of the corrupt elements therein. The ease with which the terrorists execute their plans and achieve their goals is alarming. It is enough to find a small group working with these terrorists in order for all security strategies to unravel.

Terrorism incubator

Those who believe that the fight against terrorism is most effective when we sacrifice freedom are mistaken. The first battle that must be won against terrorism is the dismantlement of its popular incubator and this is only possible by means of people who are proud of their freedom and dignity, as well as their affiliation and support for the country that provides them with security and food; a country that "has fed them, [saving them] from hunger and made them safe, [saving them] from fear."(Qur'an, 106:4)

Terrorism will gain more when the fight against corruption is believed to be a false battle. In his speech following the terrorist attack that took place in Sousse, the Tunisian president went as far as considering the "Where is the oil" campaign, which calls for transparency in the energy sector and disclosure of corruption within the sector, to be a direct cause of terrorism.

The call to reduce the margin of personal freedom, which is the most precious gain of the revolution, is the greatest gift presented to the terrorists. It boils the issue down to two options: tyranny or terrorism. Such calls help to provide

an appropriate base for young people to be involved in a culture of terrorism in order to get rid of the perceived tyranny. The only thing more heinous than terrorism is its use as an excuse to restore oppressive government policies.

National unity remains a necessity to confront the threat of terrorism, but does national unity have any sort of meaning when the left-wing continues to accuse moderate Islam of supporting terrorism? Meanwhile, moderate Muslims continue to make accusations indiscriminately against the religious extremists and the members of Democratic Constitutional Rally, which continue to look for a political cover that they never had to begin with, accusing everyone implicitly and explicitly.

In addition to the "television platforms", which have all become legitimate means of prosecuting Islam and Muslims, now moderate Muslims are being considered extremists in the eyes of others. If mutual trust and good faith are not established amongst all the parties, then there is no hope of winning the battle against terrorism. It isn't possible for the Tunisian political class to succeed in its war against terrorism while it is weaving and fabricating charges and accusations against others. The Qur'anic verse, "Their violence among themselves is severe. You think they are together, but their hearts are diverse" (Qur'an, 59:14) applies to them.

If there is a serious and real will to fight terrorism, then the political actors and those acting within civil society must review themselves radically and get rid of their current political legacy, which is based on the rule of "the end justifies the means".

Islamic State will be recognized, only Damascus stands between them and Balkans

Source: <http://inserbia.info/today/2015/07/expert-islamic-state-will-be-recognized-only-damascus-stands-between-them-and-balkans/>

July 02 – A security expert Predrag Ceranic warned that the Balkans is the next hot spot if Damascus falls in the hands of the jihadist Islamic state, because volunteers who arrived from the Balkans to the Syrian battlefield will return to their homes and continue the fight for the same ideology.

"If Damascus falls, and it is expected from the troops of the Islamic state, they are stimulated in that direction, we should expect

an international conference on the Middle East that could have as a result lobbying for international recognition of the Islamic state. Turkey and certain Western countries will lead in it," said Ceranic.

He added that in that case returnees from the Syrian battlefield would fight "under another flag", or act on behalf of Al Qaeda, given the plans for the



international recognition of the Islamic state.

Their priority task is to create a 'Greater Albania' which should, in the first phase, expand at the expense of Serbia and FYROM, in the second phase at the expense of Greece. Montenegro will be spared because it reached an agreement with



NATO to receive an invitation for membership at the next NATO summit. We should expect a new caliphate in the Transcaucasia, where main troops of the Islamic state will be transferred through Turkey," said Ceranic for FYROM's portal "Pres 24". He said that the security situation in the Balkans is worrying, and that the destabilization of the Western Balkans will continue, as it is a "testing ground for various experiments".

"We can expect new terrorist attacks in the autumn," said Ceranic. Speaking about countering terrorist threats in the Balkans, Ceranic said that the Balkan countries will be able to adequately respond only when they mutually bind, or realize a full and sincere cooperation.

"In this regard, it is necessary to create the connection Banja Luka – Belgrade – Skopje. I mean bridges, or connections in media, political and security terms between FYROM,

Serbia and the Republika Srpska," said Ceranic.

Speaking about the relationship between "awakening" of the radical Islam and the "color" revolutions in the Arab world, Ceranic said that "color" revolutions are a contemporary mechanism to tackle undesirable government, but also the state, and they begin with so-called non-violent protests, but they always end up in violence.

"What is left of Libya, Syria, Ukraine...? Gaddafi in vain appealed to fight against Al Qaeda. NATO bombed Libya from the air, and the country was attacked on the ground by Al Qaeda. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would be targeted by NATO attacks if it weren't for Russia's opposition and Russian military base in Tartus."

"Assad's army is fighting against Al Qaeda's squad Al Nusra Front, but also the newly created units of the Islamic state," said Ceranic. He noted that there was a mutual interest of the Western countries and radical Islamic movements in it, which resulted in demolition of Arab states in northern Africa – Libya, Syria and Egypt, where a military coup was executed after the election victory of the "Muslim Brotherhood".

"Terrorism today is in the function of political and geopolitical conflicts," said Ceranic, noting that the Islamic state and Greater Albania are two connected vessels and that their creation should be viewed in the context of geopolitical standoff between the US and EU on one, and Russia and Iran on the other side.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Albania, a NATO member will threaten Greece, another NATO member but will spare Montenegro, an about to be a NATO member via a future Transcaucasia chaliphate? Interesting! Wait to see it happen! And a good opportunity to settle some long lasting accounts in the Balkans!

Keeping Radical Islamists in Groups in Prison Could Create 'Time Bombs'

Source: <http://www.newsweek.com/keeping-radical-islamists-groups-prison-could-create-time-bombs-349607>

An initiative in France to isolate radicalized prisoners to prevent recruitment was heavily criticized on Tuesday in a report by France's independent prison authority, which called it "potentially dangerous."

"The grouping facilitates proselytism. There is a risk of exacerbation and a snowball effect," Prisons Controller Adeline



Hazan wrote in the report. "We risk creating time bombs."

The program was first piloted in Fresnes Prison in late 2014. Twenty inmates deemed "radical Islamists" were grouped in a separate living unit to "avoid contact with the prison population and to protect the latter from this pressure," a government website reads.

A few months after the program launched, three gunmen forced their way into the offices of the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris, killing 10 journalists and two policemen.

Amedy Coulibaly, one of the attackers, had previously served time in the French prison system for armed robbery. It was during his time in Fleury-Merogis, France's largest prison, that Coulibaly said he was in contact with Djamel Beghal, a man convicted of planning to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris in 2001. Shortly after Coulibaly's death, a video surfaced in which he declares allegiance to the Islamic State, the group commonly known as ISIS.

The attacks prompted Prime Minister Manuel Valls to announce he'd extend the isolation

program to other prisons. But not everyone believes it is the right move.

Speaking to Vice News on Tuesday, Hazan, the author of the study, said "leaping to the conclusion that [radicalized] inmates should be kept in isolation was premature" and that prisoners can "exhibit widely disparate levels of radicalization."

"As well as being potentially dangerous, the isolation of detainees in separate living units is not backed by any applicable legislation," she added.

Prison guard Ahmed El Houmass echoed Hazan's sentiment in the French paper *Le Figaro*:

"Their isolation is in fact a form of 'career development...They will teach each other how to better practice radicalization. On top of that, the real leaders never show their face, they don't draw attention to themselves. It's the most vulnerable that get labeled extremists."

Hazan offers two alternative methods for combating the spread of radicalization: de-radicalization programs and scattering radicalized inmates to different prisons—a stark contrast to the current approach.

Mass killings, school shootings are contagious

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150703-mass-killings-school-shootings-are-contagious>

July 03 – **Mass killings and school shootings in the United States appear to be contagious,** according to a team of scientists from Arizona State University and Northeastern Illinois University.

Study author Sherry Towers, research professor in the ASU Simon A. Levin Mathematical, Computational and Modeling Sciences Center, explained, "The hallmark of contagion is observing patterns of many events that are bunched in time, rather than occurring randomly in time."

Her team examined databases on past high-profile mass killings and school shootings in the United States and fit a contagion model to the data to determine if these tragedies inspired similar events in the near future.

ASU reports that they determined that mass killings — events with four or more deaths — and school shootings create a period of contagion that lasts an average of thirteen days. Roughly 20 to 30 percent of such tragedies appear to arise from contagion.

Their paper, "Contagion in Mass Killings and School Shootings," appears in the 2 July edition of *PLOS ONE*.

The analysis was inspired by actual events in Towers' life.

"In January of 2014 I was due to have a meeting with a group of researchers at Purdue University," she said. "That morning there was a tragic campus shooting and stabbing incident that left one student dead. I realized that there had been three other school shootings in the news in the week prior, and I wondered if it was just a statistical fluke, or if somehow through news media those events were sometimes planting unconscious ideation in vulnerable people for a short time after each event."

The researchers noted that previous studies have shown that suicide in youths can be contagious, where one suicide in a school appears to spark the idea in other vulnerable youths to do the same.

"It occurred to us that mass killings and school shootings that



attract attention in the national news media can potentially do the same thing, but at a larger scale," Towers said. "While we can never determine which particular shootings were inspired by unconscious ideation, this analysis helps us understand aspects of the complex dynamics that can underlie these events."


On average, mass killings involving firearms occur approximately every two weeks in the United States, and school shootings occur on average monthly. The team found that the incidence of these tragedies is significantly higher in states with a high prevalence of firearm ownership.

— Read more in Sherry Towers et al., "Contagion in Mass Killings and School Shootings," *PLOSOne* 92 July 2015)

Separation of church and terror? UN passes resolution against linking terrorism with religion

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/separation-of-church-and-terror-un.html>

The United Nations Human Rights Council has voted in favor of a resolution concerning the grave human rights situation in Syria and reaffirmed that terrorism, including the actions of Daesh, cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization.




The resolution was adopted by a vote of 29-6, with 12 abstentions, at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on Thursday.

The council said that the resolution reaffirmed its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria.

The resolution strongly condemned "the terrorist acts and violence committed against civilians by the so-called Daesh, al-Nusra Front and other extremist groups; [it] condemns in the strongest terms the violent extremist ideology professed by Daesh and its continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, and reaffirms that terrorism, including the actions of the Daesh, cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization".

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It condemned "the grave deterioration of the human rights situation and the indiscriminate or deliberate targeting of civilians as such, in violation of international humanitarian law, and acts of violence that foment sectarian tensions".



It also expressed full support for the diplomatic efforts on finding a political solution on the basis of the Geneva communique, including for the formation of a transitional governing body with full executive powers.

The resolution also strongly condemned "the continued gross systematic and widespread violations and abuses of human rights and all violations of international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities and affiliated militias, including foreign terrorist fighters and those foreign organizations fighting on behalf of the Syrian authorities, in particular Hizbullah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Liwa' Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas".

It also strongly condemned all arbitrary detention of individuals by the Syrian authorities and demanded the immediate release of all persons detained.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Finally the United Nations' resolution is justifying the Newsletter's covers of August 2014 and March 2015 indicating that IS terrorists are ALIENS! An aliens do not have a religion or if they do have is not one of our planet! I only wondr how many paid working hours they spent to come to this brilliant resolution and the reasoning behind it.



'All 12 of us are in the Islamic State': Luton family call on more Britons to join IS rule

Source: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/588830/ISIS-terrorists-use-Luton-family-letter-lure-Britons-Syria-extremism>



The twisted leaders of the murderous Islamic gang issued their propaganda message together with a suicidal call for other British Muslims to follow them to the conflict-torn failing state.

The Mannan family was reported missing after they did not return from visiting family in Dhaka, Bangladesh in mid-May.

Two grandparents and a one-year-old toddler are among those that crossed over into Syria. ISIS terrorists released the 'press statement', intended as a propaganda message to lure others to their cruel extremist regime.

It is not known if the Mannan family were coerced into releasing a statement, or indeed if they had any knowledge of it, but according to the ISIS release the Mannan family said: "We release this statement to confirm that indeed we are in the Islamic State."

The note came with photos of Muhammed Abdul Mannan, the head of the family, smiling and pointing to the sky and his wife in a niqab. Friends of Mr Mannan, 75, claim the elderly family man was likely tricked into crossing over into the ISIS heartland.

However, the statement claims Mr. Mannan, and his wife, Minera Khatun, 53, led their young adult children and grandchild into Syria. They took with them their daughter Rajia Khanom, 21, their sons Mohammed Zayd

Hussain, 25, Mohammed Toufique Hussain, 19, Mohammed Abil Kashem Saker, 31, and his wife Sheida Khanam, 27.

British police feared the family had run away after they went missing during a layover in Istanbul, a popular destination for IS fanatics wanting to join the barbaric 'caliphate'.

The family claim that ISIS rule is "free from the corruption and oppression of man made law and is governed by the Shariah.

"Why should this number be shocking, when there are thousands and thousands of Muslims from all corners of the world that are crossing over land and sea everyday to come to the Islamic State?

"That are willingly leaving the so called freedom and democracy that was forced down our throat in the attempt to brainwash Muslims to forget about their powerful and glorious past and now present."

The confirmation comes as British police admit they had raided the Mannan family home the day before they left for Bangladesh.

They also stopped an unnamed family member from boarding the flight.

Loved ones of the family in the UK had made a tearful appeal for their return.

The husbands of those missing said their disappearance had left



them "devastated" and was "out of character". The family's ISIS message reads like a professionally-penned press release – part of ISIS' sophisticated media strategy - rather than the actual words of family members.

It claims: "We say to those that are concerned for our safety to put your hearts at rest for we feel safer than we have ever felt before.

"Don't be shocked when we say that none of us were forced against our will.

"In fact it is outrageous to think that an entire family could be kidnapped and made to migrate like this.

"It wasn't by the command of a single person in the family but by the command of the Khalifah of the Muslims.

The family called on more British Muslims to join them and make the journey over into ISIS-ruled territory.

"We call all Muslims, to rush to the command of your khalif. Race to your state.

"Race to what will give you honour in this life and the hereafter. Hasten to the obedience of Allah."

The confirmation of the Luton runaways follows footage released today of the three Bethnal Green teenage schoolgirls in Raqqa, Syria.

Shamima Begum, 15, Kadiza Sultana, 16, and Amira Abase, 15, fled to the Islamic State territory via Istanbul in February this year.

The video filmed by anti-IS activists shows the young girls carrying grocery bags and machine guns, covered head to toe in a niqab.

UK police believe at least 700 people have travelled from Britain to support or fight for terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq.

However, it was reported that more and more foreign fighters are changing their mind about their move to Syria and Iraq but fear execution if they try to flee back home.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: No problem if they pursue their dreams in Syria or elsewhere! The big issue is this: are they still British citizens? (if they have got the citizenship while living in the UK). On the other hand if you would like to experience how life is in a traditional Islamic state but without traveling away from Europe, just visit Luton!

Sex Slavery and the Islamic State

By Mark Durie

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5361/islamic-state-sex-slavery>

Jamie Walker, Middle East correspondent for *The Australian*, asked two critical questions in

refugee camp, where the ABC caught up with them and interviewed them. Elomar had also boasted on Twitter that he had "1 of 7 Yehzidi slave girls for sale" at \$2500 each.

Walker's questions were "why this debased appeal seems to be gaining traction with Islamic State's target audience, which increasingly includes women, and why it's not challenged more stridently in the public arena."

The Islamic State has given its own answer to the first question. In the fourth edition of its magazine *Dabiq*, it aggressively promoted sex slavery as an Islamic practice, arguing that the practice conforms to the teaching and example of Muhammad and his

companions.

Does this argument have any wider appeal than among Islamic State recruits?



a recent article that discussed the involvement of two Australian citizens, Mohamed Elomar and Khaled Sharrouf, in Islamic State sex slavery. In 2014 Elomar purchased sex slaves, of whom four, all Yazidis, later escaped to a



The reality is that many Muslim scholars have upheld the practice of enslaving captives of war. For example Islamic revivalist Abul A'la Maududi wrote in his influential and widely disseminated tract *Human Rights in Islam* that for Muslims to enslave their captives was "a more humane and proper way of disposing of them" than Western approaches. Enslavement by Muslims, he argued, is preferable to the provisions of the Geneva Convention because of the value of this policy for fuelling the growth of Islam:

The result of this humane policy was that most of the men who were captured on foreign battlefields and brought to the Muslim countries as slaves embraced Islam and their descendants produced great scholars, imams, jurists, commentators, statesmen and generals of the army.

Islamic revivalist movements that look forward to the restoration of an Islamic Caliphate have repeatedly endorsed the practice of slavery in the name of their religious convictions. For example the (now banned) Mujahidoun movement in the UK announced in an article, "How does Islam Classify Lands?" that once a true Islamic State is established, no-one living in other nations (which it calls *Dar al Harb*, 'house of war') will have a right to their life or their wealth:

[H]ence a Muslim in such circumstances can then go into Dar Al Harb and take the wealth from the people unless there is a treaty with that state. If there is no treaty individual Muslims can even go to Dar Al Harb and take women to keep as slaves.

It is a problem that the Qur'an itself endorses having sex with captive women (Sura 4:24). According to a secure tradition (hadith) attributed to one of Muhammad's companions, Abu Sa'id al-Khudri, this verse of the Qur'an was revealed to Muhammad at a time when Muslims had been 'refraining' from having sex with their married female captives. Verse 4:24 relieved them of this restraint by giving them permission to have sex with captive women, even if the women were already married.

Abd-al-Hamid Siddiqui, a Fellow of the Islamic Research Academy of Karachi and the translator into English of the *Sahih Muslim*, commented on this tradition, saying:

When women are taken captive their previous marriages are automatically annulled. It should, however, be

remembered that sexual intercourse with these women is lawful with certain conditions.

There have been many cases reported across the centuries of Islamic armies using captive women for sex slavery, but is this any different from all wars? It is different in one important respect — that the mainstream of Islamic jurisprudence has justified and supported this practice on the basis of Islam's canonical sources, including Muhammad's own example and teaching. Islamic sex slavery is religiously sanctioned 'guilt-free sex'.

This religious teaching is impacting our world today because the global Islamic community has been deeply affected by a grassroots religious revival, which seeks to purify Islam and restore it to its foundational principles, which include rules for war and the treatment of captives.

This leads us to Walker's second question: why is the Islamic State's 'debased appeal' not 'challenged more stridently in the public arena'?

An obstacle that stands in the way of such a challenge is that it would require a sober evaluation of the Islamic character of sex slavery. However, even suggesting a link between Islam and 'terrorism' has become taboo to those who are afraid of being judged intolerant. Not only do some impose this taboo upon themselves, but they are quick to stigmatise those who do not partner with them in this ill-considered 'tolerance'.

The taboo attached to making any link between Islamic State atrocities and the religion of Islam was apparent in comments by Greg Bearup on his interview with South Australian politician Cory Bernardi. During the course of the interview Senator Bernardi linked the Islamic State with Muhammad's example, to which the interviewer wrote "*Kaboom!*", and called the comment a 'hand grenade', 'inflammatory' and 'divisive'.

While it is a hopeful sign that some Muslims, such as Anoooshe Mushtaq, have been willing to explore the Islamic character of the Islamic State, non-Muslim opinion-makers should show more backbone by engaging with the issue at hand.

It is not a sign of tolerance when free people deliberately silence themselves about the ideological drivers of sex trafficking. The same can also be said of acts of



terrorism, such as the world has witnessed over the past week in France, Tunisia and Kuwait.

Until societies are able and willing to have a frank and free discussion of the ideological

drivers which motivate acts of terror and abuse, they should not expect to be able to develop effective strategies to contain or wind back such atrocities.

A state of denial is a state of defeat.

Mark Durie is the pastor of an Anglican church, a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum, and Founder of the Institute for Spiritual Awareness.

Airport security in the U.S. – a complete failure

Source: <http://i-hls.com/2015/07/airport-security-in-the-u-s-a-complete-failure/>



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Aerial transportation security is one of the critical issues security authorities have to deal with all over the world, since an airport is the entry gate to a country through which many tourists and commodity enter. Furthermore, the fact that once a plane is up in the air, it is completely detached from factors outside it make it a desirable target for terrorist abduction, as happened many times in the past. In light of this, it is of the utmost importance that airports' security will be at the top of its readiness and quality at all times.

At the start of June, many drills were conducted in airports all around the United States to test security. In this drills, federal agents were able to smuggle false cargo in 95% of the cases. The results of the experiment can tell about the high levels of the federal agents' ability, but it's much more important to analyze the abysmal failure of security in placed which are defines as having top security. The head of the Department of Homeland Security's immediate reaction was to be reassigned, but security experts claim that this is not enough and that the body in charge of airport security must be thoroughly rearranged. More concretely, experts think that a lot of funding must be put into developing better x-ray screening technology.

Anthony Roman, a former commercial pilot and president of Roman & Associates Inc., a global investigation and risk management company, claims that the American Transportation Security Administration must apply biometric face-recognition technology in order to detect potential terrorists in advance as well as conduct constant reviews in order to find weak points in security.

Douglas Laird, a former CIA agent and head of security in Northwest Airlines, suggests changing the x-ray screens and replacing outdated system being used with new and better x-ray technologies. Other critics have called for a change in overall security and to return the responsibility of it back to airline companies, as it used to be, although the companies refused to carry the full weight of security measures.



7/7 London bombings, 10 years on

Source: <http://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/77-london-bombings-10-years-on>

July 06 – **Ms Martine Wright** knew she was late for work in central London, so she jumped into the wrong underground train, hoping that this would get her closer to the office.



She never made it. Instead, she recalls seeing her train carriage explode, and found herself in a heap of twisted metal and mutilated bodies. She lost 80 per cent of her blood, had both legs amputated and spent 10 days in a coma. But, as she frequently reminds people, she was the lucky one, for in three additional terrorist explosions in other parts of London, 52 people died and a further 700 were maimed.

Tomorrow, London marks a decade since that tragic July 7, 2005, morning with a sense of justifiable pride. No one who witnessed the carnage would easily forget the bravery of firefighters and paramedics who descended into dark and smoke-filled underground tunnels aware that they could face further bombs, or the surreal sight of hundreds of doctors rushing out to help with their bare hands the victims of a bus that exploded near the building where they happened to be holding a convention.

The very next day, most Londoners used the same underground railway network to go to work, and the heavily armed soldiers and policemen who guarded every station still managed to smile while greeting passers-by. Few nations are better than Britain at confronting disasters with such a stoic, grim determination.

But although the "7/7 bombings", as they are now popularly known, have spawned a whole new approach to tackling domestic terrorism


and a raft of security measures now adopted by governments worldwide, the fundamental threat of terrorism remains unchanged: British flags have flown at half-mast during the past weekend in memory of the 38 tourists, mostly Britons, recently murdered on a beach in Tunisia.

In terms of sheer carnage, the London bombings are overshadowed by the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in America and by the explosions in trains in the Spanish capital of Madrid in 2004, where 191 people were killed and a further 1,800 were wounded.

Domestic terrorism

Still, London's 7/7 atrocity was the first big example of suicide attacks generated by domestic terrorism, since all the four bombers were British-born and raised. As Mr John Stevens, who commanded London's Metropolitan Police, put it at the time, the terrorists did not "fit the caricature (of an) Al-Qaeda fanatic from some backward village in Algeria or Afghanistan".

The realisation that some British young men were prepared to leave behind the gentle West Yorkshire hills in northern England, where they were born, in order to blow themselves up in London trains and buses, with the explicit mission of murdering as many of their co-citizens as possible, seemed shocking at that time. But in many respects, the individual profiles of the terrorists who perpetrated the London attacks provided an early warning to security services worldwide that the men of violence do not fit, and probably never will fit, into established stereotypes.



The clearest proof that all of Europe's counter-radicalisation programmes launched after London's 7/7 bombings had no practical outcome emerges from the current wave of European volunteers travelling to Iraq to join the ranks of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria terrorist group.



Although many Islamic terrorists claim and are assumed to be very pious, few really are, as the London example showed. Germaine Lindsay, who blew himself up in a train travelling from London's King's Cross station a decade ago, killing 26 people, spoke no Arabic, was brought up as a Christian and converted to Islam only shortly before his death. It is certain that, at the tender age of 19, he knew next to nothing about the faith.

And Shehzad Tanweer, an accomplice who blew up another train, was having an affair, something considered a major sin even in liberal Islamic circles. In short, such people do not die for a religion, but for their own warped ideology in which the Islamic faith is used as merely a highly selective backdrop.

And, as the London attacks indicated, suicide bombers are neither poor nor necessarily socially excluded.

Two of the terrorists had wives and young children, all came from stable middle-class families, and members of the family of one of the terrorists were previously invited to tea with Britain's Queen Elizabeth II because they were seen as good promoters of integration into local society.

New measures

The realisation that those prone to terrorism may be less unusual, less freakish and more outwardly ordinary than previously assumed spawned massive counter-radicalisation programmes in Britain and many other European countries.

Initially, Britain's signature counter-radicalisation programme, which bore the title "Prevent", was hailed as a great innovation as it sought not only to stop would-be terrorists, but also to discredit extremism itself, by steering young people away from violence.

But as British Home Secretary Theresa May later admitted, the programme failed, because "it confused the delivery of government policy to promote integration with government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that Prevent should have been confronting". Similar but less well-funded projects in Germany and France also faded.

The clearest proof that all of Europe's counter-radicalisation programmes launched after

London's 7/7 bombings had no practical outcome emerges from the current wave of European volunteers travelling to Iraq to join the ranks of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist group.

And, once again, British volunteers are making a particularly grisly contribution to the wars in the Middle East: The knife-wielding executioner who became known to the world as "Jihadi John" in the videos released by ISIS was raised in a middle-class area of north-west London.

And British young women also seem to be leading a new trend - of female volunteers travelling to Iraq in order to become sex slaves for local terrorists.

Returning terrorists

The fear is that, although many of these volunteers will be killed in the current Middle East fighting, a sufficient number of them will return, providing the basis for the next generation of European terrorists. Lord Alexander Carlile, one of Britain's best lawyers, who was appointed to oversee all the anti-terrorism legislation, initially believed that the threat of domestic terrorism in his country would last for about a generation. Recently, he admitted that "I think we were probably looking at a generation and a half".

Lessons from 7/7

Still, both Britain and many other countries are safer today as a result of lessons learnt from the London tragedy. Britain's security services have done an excellent job at penetrating various terrorist networks and dismantling them. An average of five potentially significant terrorist plots were foiled each year over the past decade. The fact that Britain has not experienced a major terrorist attack since 2005 is remarkable, particularly when one considers that during that period London hosted the Olympic Games.

The cooperation between various national intelligence services is better today than a decade ago. Legislation has given security services greater powers to nip terrorist networks in the bud. Technological advances are helping intelligence agencies in "joining up the dots" by identifying suspect individuals who may be engaged in activities that look inoffensive, but ultimately result in the recruitment of new terrorists.



"Relational" software that constantly queries computerised databases to aid investigations by identifying trends that may not be obvious to the naked eye, better face-recognition software that looks for suspects in closed-circuit television camera footage, as well as many other innovations - all have been boosted because of the London tragedy a decade ago. Emergency services worldwide have also studied extensively the lessons drawn from the 7/7 bombings. Modular urban transport control systems that can be switched off in portions, rather than having an entire network shut off, are now the norm in many big European cities. Britain's Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, which seeks to improve the ways in which the police and fire and ambulance services work together in emergencies, is being adapted by other

countries. And the British model of a small unit based in the Cabinet Office in London that can swing into action to handle a major crisis is also being exported to other nations.

The worst can still happen. But many nations are now prepared to give the best they can under such circumstances.

Ultimately, the men of violence may not disappear, but they are being marginalised and will be forgotten. Far from being hailed as heroes - as they dreamt they would be - the four London bombers have their names remembered by few.

But that is not the case for Ms Wright, who proudly pushed her wheelchair behind the British flag as part of her country's team for the London Paralympics in 2012. It is not the terrorists, but people like her, who represent the future.

The lexicon of Islamist terrorism

By Rodger Shanahan

Source: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/07/06/The-lexicon-of-Islamist-terrorism.aspx>

The controversy over the naming rights to 'Islamic State' has been much ado about nothing from the start. The Prime Minister began to refer to Islamic State by its Arabic acronym 'Da'ish' from the beginning of the year, saying that he didn't like 'Islamic State' or 'ISIS' because it was a 'perversion of religion'. The French foreign minister has urged media outlets to do the same, while the British parliament debated the lexicon of Islamic terrorist groups last week. Also last week, the BBC quite sensibly resisted a push by some British MPs to change its use of the term Islamic State to Da'ish.

Those who advocate using Da'ish instead of Islamic State say the group is neither Islamic nor a state, and they argue that the name perverts the name of Islam. But these arguments open a can of nomenclature worms. If it is perverting religion to refer to Islamic State as Islamic, then what of the myriad other armed Islamist groups who hijack Islam and God to reinforce their religious credentials for power?

How should politicians refer to Hizbullah (Party of God), for instance? Isn't it also a perversion of religion to think that God would be happy for an Australian to blow up a tourist bus in Bulgaria in his name? Some Sunni Islamists in the region, including Turkey's justice minister,

have demanded that Hizbullah change its name to Hizb al-Shaytan (Party of Satan), but we are yet to see the same demand from those who prefer Dai'sh over Islamic State.

And how to describe the recent execution of 18 Islamic State members by Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam)? Is a group calling itself the Army of Islam not perverting religion, just as Islamic State is?

This must surely provide a conundrum for the Government's intelligence briefers – how do they inform the PM that Dai'sh members have been killed by a group calling itself the Army of Islam? Perhaps they could seek guidance from the PM's office as to whether they have a term for Jaysh al-Islam which neither connotes they are Islamic nor supports their claim to be an army?

And what about the Islamic Front, or any group that uses terms such as *mujahideen* (those engaged in jihad), *muhajiroon* (referring to those who followed Muhammad on his move from Mecca to Medina) or *ansar* (referring to Muhammad's earliest Medinan supporters). All of these have specific Islamic religious connotations that attempt to hijack religious terminology to justify killing others.

We can't stop groups calling themselves what they want to be



called. Getting into detailed discussion about it is largely a waste of time.

I travel to the region frequently and the interlocutors I speak to variously refer to the group as ISIS, IS, Islamic State or Da'ish (ISIL

appears to have lost currency for some unknown reason). **If people in the region are relatively sanguine about the lexicon of Islamist terrorist groups, why are we in the West so concerned?**

Associate Professor Rodger Shanahan is a Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute. A former army officer, he had extensive service within the Parachute Battalion Group (PBG) and has had operational service with the UN in South Lebanon and Syria, with the PBG in East Timor, in Beirut during the 2006 war, and in Afghanistan. He was the former director of the Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre, and has also been posted to the Australian Embassies in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Assoc Prof Shanahan has MAs in International Relations and Middle East Studies from the ANU, and a PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies from the University of Sydney. He is also on the staff of the National Security College, Australian National University and a part-time member of the Refugee Review Tribunal. He has written numerous journal, media and policy articles, is a frequent commentator on Middle East issues for Australian and international media and is the author of Clans, Parties and Clerics: the Shi'a of Lebanon.

Killer Workout – Are gyms, not mosques, the main breeding ground for Islamic terrorists?

By Brendan O'Neill

Source:http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2006/06/killer_workout.sing le.html

There have been three major terror attacks in the West over the past five years—9/11, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, and the 7/7 suicide attacks on the London Underground. For all the talk of a radical Islamist conspiracy to topple Western civilization, there are many differences between the men who executed these attacks. The ringleaders of 9/11 were middle-class students; the organizers of the Madrid bombings were mainly immigrants from North Africa; the 7/7 bombers were British citizens, well-liked and respected in their local communities. And interpretations of Islam also varied wildly from one terror cell to another. Mohamed Atta embraced a mystical (and pretty much made-up) version of Islam. For the Madrid attackers, Islam was a kind of comfort blanket. The men behind 7/7 were into community-based Islam, which emphasized being good and resisting a life of decadence.

The three cells appear to have had at least one thing in common, though—their members' immersion in gym culture. Often, they met and bonded over a workout. If you'll

forgive the pun, they were fitness fanatics. Is there something about today's preening and narcissistic gym culture that either nurtures terrorists or massages their self-delusions and desires? Mosques, even radical ones,



emphasize Muslims' relationships with others—whether it be God, the ummah (Islamic world), or the local community. The gym, on the other hand, allows individuals to focus myopically on themselves. Perhaps it was there, among the weightlifting and rowing machines, that

these Western-based terror cells really set their course.

The British government recently published its Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. It reveals that three of the four members of the 7/7 cell seem to have become radicalized in gyms rather than in mosques. Mohammed Sidique Khan, leader of the cell, worked on his protégés in "informal settings," primarily at a local Islamic bookshop where they watched radical DVDs and at local gyms, some of which were



based in rooms below mosques. According to the report, "Khan gave talks [at the gyms], and worked out." He set up two gyms, one in 2000 with local government money—which means that government officials unwittingly funded one of the settings for his efforts—and another in 2004. Shehzad Tanweer, the 22-year-old who seems to have been the second-in-command of the 7/7 cell, "got to know [Khan] again (having known him a little as a child) through one of the gyms." Indeed, Tanweer was as much a fitness fanatic as he was a religious one. Shortly after 7/7, one of his former friends told the *Guardian*: "Shehzad went to a few mosques around here but he was more interested in his jujitsu. I trained with him all the time. He is really fit." Jermaine Lindsay, another of the 7/7 bombers, has also been described as a "fitness fanatic." A report published by the Terrorism Monitor at the end of July 2005 said that he "met his fellow bombers while attending one of the gyms set up by Khan."

According to the British government's report, one of Khan's gyms was known locally as "the al-Qaida gym." Khan also seems to have used outdoor sporting activities to win over and indoctrinate recruits, and the report suggests that other alleged terror cells in the United Kingdom may have done so as well. "Camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and other outward bound type activities are of particular interest because they appear common factors for the 7 July bombers and other cells disrupted previously and since." The report asks if such outings may have been used to "help with bonding between members of cells."

Khan seemed to view gym and sports activities as more than an opportunity for physical bonding; he also appeared to consider them moral and pure, an alternative to the decadent temptations of contemporary society. Healthy living, as a doctrine, appears to have been close to his radical heart. In Khan's talks to young Muslims and potential recruits, he reportedly made numerous references to keeping fit. His talks "focused on clean living, staying away from crime and drugs, and the value of sport and outdoor activity," says the British government's 7/7 report. Perhaps it was the gym setting that nurtured the 7/7 cell's combination of arrogance and fury, its seeming belief that they were good and the rest of us were rotten.

One of the chief suspects in the Madrid bombings, Moroccan immigrant Jamal Zougam, was also known for his devotion to keeping fit. Zougam ran a mobile-phone shop in an immigrant quarter in Madrid, and he is thought to have provided the mobile phones for the remote detonators that exploded the bombs and killed 191 commuters in March 2004. According to reports, he was a "gym-loving man." The French newspaper *Le Monde* reported that his friends and acquaintances were shocked to discover Zougam's involvement in the Madrid bombings, because he liked nothing better than attending the "gym or the discotèque." The bomb that did not explode, and that subsequently led police to Zougam's shop, had been planted in a gym bag. It is also reported that Zougam and Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhed, the Tunisian ringleader of the Madrid bombings who blew himself up when surrounded by Spanish police a few weeks later, attended gym together and sometimes discussed politics there.

The 9/11 hijackers spent a great deal of time in gyms. Mohamed Atta joined one in Hamburg in 1999. Upon arrival in America in 2000, he and other leaders of his cell—Ziad Jarrah and Marwan al-Shehhi—signed up for gym memberships. When the "muscle hijackers" from Saudi Arabia, whose job was to use physical force on 9/11, joined the ringleaders in the United States, they were encouraged to find housing close to gyms and to get gym memberships. In the first week of September 2001, five of the muscle hijackers—Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, Majed Moqed, and Hani Hanjour—were regularly seen training and talking at Gold's Gym in Greenbelt, Md.

The 9/11 hijackers needed to be reasonably fit for their operation. They had to overpower airline staff and passengers in order to commandeer the jets. Yet there seems to have been more to their interest in gyms than building up muscle. One gym owner said the men seemed to gather for "social reasons." And it was Atta, Jarrah, and al-Shehhi, the pilots of 9/11 who would spend that fateful morning locked inside the cockpit, who seemed most keen on keeping fit. According to Complete 9/11 Timeline, published by the Center for Cooperative Research, Jarrah "train[ed] intensively" from May to August 2001 and Atta and al-



Shehhi "also took exercising very seriously." The muscle hijackers, meanwhile, tended to "simply cluster around a small circuit of machines, never asking for help and, according to a trainer, never pushing any weights."

Perhaps the ringleaders of 9/11, like one of the prime suspects in Madrid and three of the four 7/7 bombers, had a penchant for healthy living. Certainly Atta seemed to be obsessed with bodily appearance. He advised his team of hijackers to shave off their pubic hair and to douse themselves in cologne the night before the attacks, to ready themselves for arrival in paradise. Islamic scholars have pointed out that these stipulations have little grounding in Quranic law. But they do reflect our keep-fit age. Bodybuilders, among others, are known to shave off their body hair in order to make the contours of their bodies look more impressive.

Today's gym culture seems like the perfect vehicle for nurturing the combination of narcissism and loathing of the masses necessary to carry out a terrorist suicide mission. If some of these attackers viewed their own bodies as pure instruments, and everyone else as wasteful and deserving of punishment, they could just as well have come to that conclusion through absorbing the healthy-living agenda of the gym as by reading the Quran. At the gym, Atta, Khan, and the others could focus on perfecting the self, the body, as a pure and righteous thing—and hone their disdain for others.

So, should we shut down all gyms in the name of fighting terrorism? Of course not. It's a ludicrous idea. But no more ludicrous, perhaps, than the infiltration of Western mosques.

Brendan O'Neill is deputy editor of spiked in London.

Teaching terror: what role for schools in countering violent extremism?

By Anne Aly

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150706-teaching-terror-what-role-for-schools-in-countering-violent-extremism>

July 06 – A [new report](#) by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute calls for the inclusion of counter-radicalization messages in the school curriculum and for the teaching of the situation in the Middle East and Australia's involvement.

This recommendation is much more useful than the one which sees teachers and school personnel being trained in how to "spot a jihadi," as the government recently proposed.

However, broader teaching on peace, pluralism and tolerance in all aspects of school would be more beneficial than curriculum additions on specific world conflicts and religions.

Teachers can't be expected to recognize extremism

Any approach that attempts to identify people for law enforcement and other forms of intervention risks over-reporting on



radicalization. It also fails to understand that young people may superficially engage with some of the symbols of violent extremist organizations without fully comprehending the implications of such actions or without ever actually agreeing with those ideologies that promote and justify violent extremism.

Perhaps even more concerning is that certain behaviors considered indicative of radicalization could potentially "misdiagnose" other issues such as drug abuse, family violence or mental illness.

Assessing whether or not an individual is radicalized to the point where they pose a risk of violent extremism is far beyond the core business of education.

Education does play a role

There is no denying that education plays an important role in the socialization of young people and their moral development.



Consequently, education features strongly in counter-radicalization programs in several countries – such as the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Austria and Belgium. For the most part, these education interventions focus on teaching subjects that promote tolerance, understanding and citizenship.

The compulsory school curriculum in Australia includes civic values. Suggestions have also been made that the curriculum should include teaching young people about different religions – including Islam.

While these may be valuable in their own right, proposing curriculum changes that focus on a particular context such as the Middle East, or on a single issue such as democratic participation, or on the teaching of religion, is problematic. For a start, the argument that all schools should teach young people the core principles of Islam misses the point.

A study of vulnerability and resilience to al-Qaeda violent extremism and other types of violent activity (animal rights activism; cults; gangs; right wing extremism and youth crime) found tolerance of other religious and ethnic groups is a factor in resilience to violent extremism.

Religious pluralism is an important feature of our democratic society and is embedded in our Constitution. Section 116 of the Constitution states that the Commonwealth shall not make any law for “... imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion.”

As an alternative to teaching young people about specific religions, focusing on religious pluralism through the teaching of our Constitution and fostering a sense of Australian identity is a much more useful exercise.

Broad lessons about peace and pluralism more beneficial

In March, I delivered a workshop on countering violent extremism and education. Part of the workshop program was based on my own research into how moral disengagement theory (avoiding shame or guilt from bad behavior by justifying it as moral) could be used to build resilience to violent extremism through education.

It was also informed by research that identified good practice based on a review of teaching methods targeting violent extremism, gang involvement and crime.

Rather than require teachers and schools to undertake the onerous task of changing the curriculum, the workshop – delivered to teachers and education policymakers from Pakistan, Jordan, Nigeria and Kenya – was designed to help teachers embed countering violent extremism into their current practice. We attempted to develop their understanding of how teaching can be used to build resilience within the existing curriculum.

The participants learned how to develop their own practices to challenge violent extremist messages, reinforce moral self-sanctions that prevent people from becoming violent extremists and develop young people’s awareness of how violent extremist messages are constructed.

Within this, teachers may well choose to teach their students about events in the Middle East. Or they may find that they can draw on teaching resources from civic values and citizenship education.

Alternatively, they may use existing education resources such as the Beyond Bali Education Package. This provides teachers with a set of activities to teach young people about the harmful consequences of conflict using stories of Bali Bombing survivors.

One of the more concerning issues for counter-terrorism is that we seem to consistently ignore lessons from the past. Almost a decade of teaching young people about values and citizenship has not stemmed the flow of foreign fighters or home-based violent extremists.

Introducing new curriculum requirements to teach young people about specific issues or requiring teachers to look out for signs of radicalization are just as likely to have little or no impact if not supported by evidence.

While we still struggle to find empirical studies on educational approaches to preventing violent extremism, there are lessons that can be learned by examining how resilience to other forms of criminal or gang behavior is embedded in education.





Why you really shouldn't worry about terrorism

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/thinking-man/11717090/Why-you-really-shouldnt-worry-about-terrorism.html>

**It's not terrorism that should keep you awake at night,
it's the way our governments respond to the terrorist threat**

Alex Proud

Gallerist and club owner Alex Proud is the founder of Proud Galleries and Proud Camden and appears on Channel 4's Four Rooms. He writes a regular column for Telegraph Men



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July 06 – The events in Tunisia were tragic and obviously I hate terrorists. But I hate our government's reaction to terrorists just as much. At the time of writing, our Prime Minister was busily attacking the BBC for calling the Islamic State what it usually calls itself. Yes, 30 of the citizens he represents are dead and our PM is engaged in petty nitpicking with a broadcaster. The kind of argument you might have with your sister, aged nine, on a long drive with your parents. But this is the least of it.

I used to think our leaders' reactions to terrorism were a bit like a bad conspiracy movie. You know, those films where they start by pencilling in the explosions and the CGI and, half way through, someone says, "Oh, we better put some plot in here." So they find the one guy in the room who has read a John Le Carre novel and he crowbars in a narrative which normally goes: bad guys bomb the good guys, then, in the race to stop the next bomb, the good guys lose their souls.

In the end, amongst the blood and dust and rubble the hero (or heroine) has an epiphany.

"Perhaps... perhaps... we've become what we used to hate. Perhaps there are no good guys." Just in case you missed this thunderingly obvious point, it will probably be reiterated several times by a portentous voice-over backed by some vaguely Middle-Eastern sounding music.

But actually, I've come to see that real life is a lot worse. Sure, there are a plenty of situations which are morally murky where realpolitik and hard-headed pragmatism are the right play. However, there are also loads of situations where the right thing to do is blindingly obvious. The trouble is we don't do the thing. We don't even fudge out some dubious compromise. Rather, we do the wrong thing. And what is more, we often do exactly what the terrorists want.

To be fair, most of our politicians manage to get their initial reactions to attacks right. They'll condemn them and say their thoughts are with the families of the victims. But it's the longer, more strategic reaction that we get utterly, awfully wrong – and it's often done on purpose.



Terrorist attacks are meant to inspire terror (which they do, very effectively). But what they don't do is kill very many people. Even 9/11 didn't kill many people compared to other avoidable causes of death. For the US, 9/11 was about a month's worth of road deaths or gun deaths. In terms of the risks to individual Americans, 9/11 was a blip and not a very big one.

Of course, intelligent people could do the maths. But they were brushed aside. And so, the US did exactly what Bin Laden wanted. It freaked out and invaded several countries, creating a lot more terrorists in the process. It is hardly a controversial view today that 9/11 was a trap the US and its allies blundered into and that the Middle East would be a far better place today, had we not smashed Iraq (which had nothing to do with 9/11) to pieces. Yes, Saddam was revolting. But there are plenty of revolting dictators our leaders are happy to sup with when it suits them.

Anyway, it would be nice to think that our government might have learned from Bush and Blair's fool's errand in the blood-stained sands of the Middle East. That the Tories might look at Tunisia and say, "Let's take a calm and reasoned view of the risks here and then decide on the best course of action." Which, presumably, would not involve twisting the Beeb's arm until it says "Daesh".

But no. Instead of saying, "The best thing we as a nation can all do is very little because your chances of dying crossing the road are a thousand times greater", they tell us now is the time to allow our elected representatives to slash and burn their way through our remaining civil liberties. You know, those western values that we hold dear. The things that make us the good guys. You do find yourself wondering how ministerial algebra goes: the blood of a dozen tourists is enough to grease the skids for the next piece of Big Brother legislation.

It goes without saying **that this is what the terrorists want. They want over-reaction.** They want to destroy our values. They want to make us like them. And we go right along with it. Seriously! It's like an episode of South Park. You can imagine Cameron, Isil and Obama sitting in a secret bunker working it all out. "Look, we'll agree to support an oppressive regime in Egypt and keep everyone's emails for ever if you promise to commit one headline-

grabbing atrocity... Where... Oh, anywhere except Notting hill, because, you know, chums and house prices."

How many lives has all this hysteria saved? Well, there's a fun report you can read here. **In the decade to 2011, in the UK terrorism killed as many people as bees and wasps each year.** Is that really worth a bonfire of your civil liberties? Also, why has nobody thought of reclassifying stinging insects as terrorists?


After all, some bees are drones – WAKE UP SHEEPLE.

The flip side of this utter lack of proportionality is the things that actually do kill us. **Junk food causes around 40,000 deaths a year in the UK.** There are plenty of good suggestions as to what we could do here. Compared to what we spend on trashing privacy, the costs would be cab fare. And, what's more, even if we did a really bad job of it, we'd still save way more lives than we would by combating terrorism.

But do we do anything? Nah. The political donors in big junk wouldn't like it. The supermarkets wouldn't like it. And besides, it's not as much fun as calling an emergency session of COBRA. Honestly, if healthy activists were serious, they'd find a way to get Ronald McDonald to shoot up a shopping centre. You see the same utter lack of inaction with other preventable causes of death too. Hey, sorry if your kid got run over, but cars are nice, car-makers are rich, cyclists are annoying and making our roads work for everyone would be hard and boring.

But here, hard and boring is the answer to pretty much everything. If we were serious about combating terrorism, there's one obvious (but hard and boring) thing we could do. We could take a tough line against the countries that fund terrorism and export extremist ideology. We could stop selling them arms. If we really, really wanted to do something about fundamentalist Islam and Isil, we could stop treating countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar as our friends – and start treating them as the terrorist paymasters and extremist sugar daddies they are.

In tandem with this we could get really serious about clean energy. It would be hard. It would be



boring. Much more boring than bombing random Middle Eastern countries. Much more boring than grandstanding with other leaders and chairing exciting sounding committees, while doing deals for chunks of the capital with Qatar. Much more boring than letting Theresa May have everyone's Gmail passwords. But it might actually work.

It would be very cheap compared to our various wars and the ongoing techno-fascist boondoggle that is the surveillance state. In fact, it wouldn't just be cheap. It would be profitable – but profitable for everyone and in

the long term, not just powerful corporations in the short term.

Quite simply we need to man up and grow up. We need to do the hard, boring things that actually have some chance of success. We need to learn to say no to extreme wealth and big corporations. And we need to stop letting our leaders get away with telling us that the world is a morally murky place when, often, the right course of action is blindingly obvious to anyone who isn't up to their neck in a swamp of money and power.

7 July London bombings: 15 changes to anti-terror planning

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33388286>

The 7 July bombings on London were a wake-up call for those charged with preventing such attacks, and those expected to respond quickly in order to minimise injuries and loss of life.

Inquests into the deaths of the 52 people killed in the attacks resulted in several recommendations for security and rescue procedures, while the government has in place an ambitious counter-terrorism strategy.

So what has changed since that day?

1) **Bollards.** Since 7 July 2005 there have been substantial but often subtle changes to some



cityscapes designed to make it harder for someone to launch a bomb attack. For instance, if you visit any of the UK's big cities you may pass bollards, low-level walls and even planters around buildings that have been designed to absorb the direct impact of a lorry carrying a bomb. One of England's largest sporting venues, the Arsenal Emirates Stadium, had features to withstand a terrorist attack built into it from the drawing board. Approaches to many train stations have been - or are being - redesigned to include what's known in the jargon as "hostile vehicle mitigation measures".

2) **Regional MI5.** The men who carried out the attack targeted London but came from outside the capital. In the wake of the bombings, MI5, the Security Service, increased its presence around the UK by setting up regional hubs, working with police to find out more about what was happening in communities outside London.



3) Intelligence sharing. Some of the 7/7 bombers had crossed the security services' radar before. While it was later decided the London attacks could not have been prevented, improved procedures would ensure intelligence - such as surveillance photos - were better shared among police and MI5. It was also agreed that more should be done to re-assess those who had come across the radar in the past and been judged a lower threat, to see if that had changed.

4) Digital data gathering. The realisation these were home-grown suicide bombers also led to a better focus on collecting digital intelligence, since targets were increasingly leaving an electronic trail, including one of their online behaviour. This led to the creation of new capabilities at GCHQ specifically to look for signs like communication or contact with places like Pakistan or the visiting of extremist websites. Overall, this was part of a wider push to have all three British intelligence agencies - MI5, MI6 and GCHQ - work much closer together.

5) Ambulance response. Medics were late to some of the attack scenes - including a 52-minute delay to Tavistock Square, scene of the bus attack. Training has since been improved and the service has introduced different protocols for major incidents. There is now a pre-determined response for anything that is characterised as one - the Apollo Theatre roof collapse in December 2013 was an example. Twenty ambulances are sent immediately along with other available emergency support vehicles. Extra supplies of bandages and tourniquets are also sent, while 10 specially-trained officers are dispatched to co-ordinate the response on the ground.

6) Tube stations numbered. One reason for the ambulance delays was the fact some were sent to the wrong location. There was a lack of co-ordination at some Tube stations. Each Tube station now has a specific "meeting point" for the emergency services to gather at, along with an individual code number and exact co-ordinates. From there, supervisors are meant to co-ordinate all of the emergency services. Also, every station and tunnel now has a unique number so the location of the incident can be identified - and everyone working on the response knows where it is.

7) Tube communications. If communications were flawed above ground, in the tunnels where the bombs were set off they were "inadequate" and "non-existent", according to one report. Now there are new radio systems for London Underground (LU) and the emergency services - different systems, but ones which talk to each other at command level. "These systems give every Tube staff member a personal radio and the ability to contact any other," says LU. "They also allow the broadcast of centralised messages from control rooms to any number of staff across the network." However, the Fire Brigades Union disputes that communications work flawlessly - saying the new radios work erratically.

8) Police-like command structure. The Underground has also adopted the Gold, Silver and Bronze command structure used by emergency services in major incidents. Gold commanders in the control room oversee the entire response and set strategy. There is then a silver commander at each site who decides on the precise tactics needed. Bronze commanders manage individual teams carrying out specific tasks. Also, to increase co-ordination many of the major commands - radios, power, British Transport Police - are now in the same room. In 2005 they were in different buildings across London and did not have a coherent or consistent system for talking to each other.

9) Power down. Some emergency services were delayed getting onto the tracks on 7 July as they didn't know if the electric rails were still live. Now a designated staff member will go to an agreed meeting point to brief the emergency services when they arrive. Tube engineers used to get stuck in traffic. Now, they have police drivers so are able to use blue lights to get to incidents.

10) Staffing changes. As the Tube hits a record number of passengers, ticket offices are being closed in favour of automated machines. Tube bosses say this means more staff at ticket barriers, ready to help in emergencies. However, the RMT union fears safety will be hurt and it wants the changes frozen.



11) First aid kits. After 7/7 multi-casualty kits have been put in 170 locations around London. These major trauma kits are a key part of the emergency response: the police know where they are and the first responders to an incident would be told to pick them up because they could help save someone's limb.

12) Preparing for the worst. Police and security chiefs in Whitehall are now tasked with thinking through every "what if" scenario they can come up with so they have a tactic to confront a range of threats. Those tactics are regularly refined based on the general intelligence picture, and, as shown in a recent major exercise, key agencies train together. The immediate priority after 7 July was rethinking urban transport security. Recent atrocities in Paris, Sydney and Ottawa have underlined that the police need tactics to deal with attackers on the move.

13) Relations with Muslims. One of the great unresolved questions for government is its complex and difficult relationship with Muslim communities and a whole series of groups that say they speak for them. Labour tried a series of approaches - reaching out through its traditional political base. A lot of those links were ditched with the 2010 change in government for two reasons:

- officials had long suspected they may have been backing the wrong groups - throwing money at people who, with hindsight, didn't know the extremists or, worse, didn't want to admit the problem
- secondly, incoming Conservative ministers took a far harder line, saying they would not deal with anyone who they felt had the whiff of intolerance about them

Today, Whitehall insiders who tailor the message to British Muslims and the wider Islamic world know they still face an uphill struggle to be heard. But at the same time, the sheer scale of the Syria crisis - and the undeniable fact that some entire families seem to believe in the self-styled Islamic State's utopian vision, has opened up a far more public debate among Britain's Muslim communities over how to counter extremism.

14) Border protection. The Home Office has dedicated millions of pounds to rethinking the way it receives and analyses data about people coming in and out of the country. Slowly but surely, border officers are able to collect more and more information about incoming passengers - and they have the power now to order airlines to remove someone from a plane before it leaves for the UK.

15) Dealing with the aftermath. Beyond the emergency services, government officials have been training for their role in helping families cope with the aftermath. The recent attack on a beach in Tunisia has been the first major test of those responses. The coming inquests will reveal whether the bereaved families got all the support they needed.

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Isis flag: What do the words mean and what are its origins?

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/isis-flag-what-do-words-mean-and-what.html>



In the year that the extremist group Isis has risen to international attention by establishing

its so-called Islamic state across swathes of Iraq and Syria, it has proven itself as a powerful propaganda machine capable of attracting recruits from across the world and inspiring bloody terror attacks.

One of the group's most recognisable symbols is its black and white flag adorned with Arabic lettering. But what are the origins of the flag and why did the group chose it to represent them?

What does the writing mean?

The white banner at the top of the flag reads: **"There is no god but God, Muhammad is the**



messenger of God.” This phrase is a declaration of faith used across Islam, and is known as the shahada.

Underneath is a white circle emblazoned with white writing reading "Mohammed is the messenger of God", which is meant to resemble the Prophet's seal, similar to that used to close an envelope.

Is the flag unique to Isis?

Monochrome flags are an ancient tradition in ancient Eastern, Arabic, and Islamic tradition, and some people believe one of the Prophet's original banners was black, according to the Quilliam Foundation. Modern jihadists therefore adopted this style to legitimise their causes.

Therefore, the flag is in fact not unique to the group, according to Charlie Winter, senior researcher on Jihadism at the counter-extremism think tank the Quilliam Foundation.

"A lot of people talk about the Isis flag or the Islamic State flag, however there is no such thing. It's a flag they have adopted that has political and theological significance." he told *The Independent*.

The flag in its entirety is used by Al-Shabab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula amongst others, Winter added.

He went on to explain that Isis "have done a good job of co-opting" the flag for their cause, even when it is used in a context unrelated to the organisation.

Winter gives the example of a photo of AQAP, al-Qaeda's branch in Yemen, brandishing the flag sparking fears that it had teamed up with Isis, even though this was not the case.

Why did they choose such a common symbol?

"They want to align themselves with other movements and place themselves in a jihadist context," Winter said.

"[The flag] is recognisable and it is symbolism



that jihadists and Islamists will recognise." Emphasising how the words on the flag are not symbols of extremism in themselves, but were rather hijacked by extremists, he added: "The shahada and the Prophet's seal are important symbols that all Muslims share.

"So, by co-opting words which have nothing to do with jihadism, they [Isis] broaden themselves and try to claim ideological territory that they wouldn't be able to if they had something specific."

Who, What, Why: Is it illegal to display an IS flag?

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33406768>

Police have been criticised for not arresting a



man who walked through Westminster displaying the black flag associated with the

Islamic State group. Is such an act against the law, asks Finlo Rohrer.

The man, with a small child on his shoulders also holding a flag, walked near the Houses of Parliament while draped in the black flag, apparently similar to that used by the Islamist militant group.

The Metropolitan Police said they stopped him but then let him go on his way. "This man was spoken to by officers, with consideration given to relevant legislation, particularly the Public Order Act, and the decision was taken by officers at the time that the man was acting within the law. He was not arrested.

"Wearing, carrying or displaying of an emblem or flag, by itself, is



not an offence unless the way in which, or the circumstance in which, the emblem is worn, carried or displayed is such as to cause reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter or member of a proscribed organisation. While support of and membership of [IS] is unlawful it is not a criminal offence to advocate the creation of an independent state."

The answer

- Police decided it was not an offence under Public Order Act 1986 or Terrorism Act 2000
- But the latter does ban display of clothing showing someone is a supporter of a banned group



Garwood, New Jersey, home

The black flag with a white shahada [Islamic creed] has been used by other militant groups before Islamic State.

One relevant passage from the Public Order Act 1986, which covers England and Wales, says someone is guilty of causing "harassment, alarm or distress" if they "display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or abusive within the hearing or

sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby".

The pan-UK Terrorism Act 2000 is also relevant. "A person in a public place commits an offence if he (a) wears an item of clothing, or (b) wears, carries or displays an article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation."

The Islamic State grouping has been proscribed in the UK since last year. This offence carries a prison sentence of up to six months and a fine.

"I'm surprised the police didn't at least arrest him," says Edward Elwyn Jones, senior associate solicitor at Hodge, Jones & Allen. "I've seen people legitimately protesting arrested for less than this."

Jones cited the Rankin v Murray case from 2004 where it was established that a ring inscribed with "UVF" (Ulster Volunteer Force) was sufficient for a conviction.

"But having spoken to the [flag wearer] they might have taken a view that he was genuinely not supporting IS," Jones adds.

Gary Watt, professor of law at Warwick University, says: "The police might have been justified in concluding that it didn't breach any strict statutory wording."

But regardless of the Terrorism Act and Public Order Act, Watt says it is interesting that the police didn't think the flag constituted a "breach of the peace" under common law.

"Had this been a naked person walking down the street would the police have intervened? They probably would have intervened even though there is no strict letter of the law against being naked in public."

The key issue is where the offence was felt, Watt says. In this instance there was apparently little reaction from the crowds of tourists passing the man, possibly with some or many unaware of the significance of the flag.

"The real outrage has been a social media outrage," says Watt. And there is currently no suggestion from anyone that the police should be taking into account the global reaction to an event when trying to maintain the peace locally.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: What a silly debate!



Clarion's Ryan Mauro: Results of Four Separate Polls Are Shocking

Source: <http://www.clarionproject.org/videos/clarions-ryan-mauro-isis-supporters-arab-world-number-42-million>



Ryan Mauro, national security analyst for the Clarion Project, on national TV discusses the support for the Islamic State in the Arab world.

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European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report

Source: p_europol_tsat15_09jun15.pdf



The latest edition of the TE-SAT (European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report) has become available online. This strategic document has been prepared by experts at Europol and is based on contributions from EU Member States and Europol partners. The TE-SAT presents an overview of terrorist attacks in the European Union and outlines main trends related to terrorism. It informs, among others, that Islamic State (IS) affiliated groups have the intent,

capability and resources to carry out terrorist attacks against the EU and acts of violence by IS have the potential to increase in number and intensity.




Key judgement and trends:



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- The overall threat to EU security is likely to increase.
- The trend of travelling for terrorist purposes to Syria and Iraq continued in 2014.
- Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliated groups have the intent, capability and resources to carry out terrorist attacks against the EU and the West.
- Attacks carried out by lone actors and the encouragement of small-scale attacks is on the increase.
- The threat to EU citizens and interests abroad, in particular in conflict zones, remains high.
- The ethnic, sectarian and ideological nature of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and the rising tensions caused by it, has manifested itself to a significant extent in the EU over 2014.



Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects 2012 to 2014

- The current situation in Libya and Ukraine may ultimately lead to increased quantities of military grade firearms and explosives becoming available to terrorists in the EU.
- Acts of violence by Islamic State have the potential to increase the number and intensity of extreme-right wing activities, both legal (e.g. demonstrations) and illegal (e.g. violent acts), in EU Member States.
- Increased numbers of incidents targeting symbols of the Jewish faith indicate a presence of anti-Semitic sentiments in the EU.



Islamic State is making itself felt in ever more countries. But how much influence does it really have outside Syria and Iraq?

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/islamic-state-is-making-itself-felt-in.html>

When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a caliphate in June last year he dropped “Iraq and Syria” from his group’s name. From then on, he said, it should be called simply Islamic State (IS), which was more in line with its ambition to spread its ghastly version of “Islamic” rule across the globe. A year later it does indeed have influence well beyond those countries’ borders, as the bloody past week shows.

that, Egypt’s IS-linked group was in gory action against the army.

IS has connections in the Middle East and beyond, but the relationships between its leaders in Syria and Iraq and those who carry its name elsewhere are varied and murky. In 11 countries, including Yemen and, its most recent addition, Russia (see page 24), IS has recognised a group as one of its own. Elsewhere, eg, in India, groups claim to be IS

but are not (yet) accepted by Mr Baghdadi. In Tunisia the gunman may simply have heeded IS’s call on Muslims to carry out attacks; although a group there has pledged allegiance, IS has not recognised it.

Once Mr Baghdadi accepts a *bay’a*, or pledge of allegiance, IS declares a new “province” of the caliphate. But according to *Dabiq*, IS’s English-language magazine, the group sets strict criteria for each affiliate. To have a chance of attracting favour, it must appoint a governor, set up a ruling council and implement IS’s version of Islamic rule. It must have a plan to conquer territory. With its claims to statehood, IS sets itself apart from other terrorists.

Dabiq also stresses a need for communication and says

approved groups will receive support. But for the most part, even these recognised groups appear to have limited operational contact with IS’s leaders in Syria and Iraq. Its Libya outfit appears the most intertwined. That group was established in the northeastern town of Derna in late 2014 by locals who had fought with IS in Syria and Iraq. Its grisly beheading of 21 Coptic Christians in February resembled similar atrocities in Iraq and Syria, right down to the orange jumpsuits worn by the victims.



Groups using the name of IS claimed responsibility for the shooting of tourists in Tunisia and the bombing of a Shia mosque in Kuwait on June 26th. French officials say IS may also be linked to a beheading in Grenoble on the same day. Days later IS said it was behind the bombing of a mosque in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a, while some speculated that it was also behind a bomb that killed Hisham Barakat, Egypt’s prosecutor general, in Cairo. (IS has not claimed that attack, but earlier threatened the judiciary.) On June 29th it grabbed a town in Afghanistan. Two days after



Video of the killings was produced by the IS media branch.

Egypt's "Sinai Province", which grew out of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, an established outfit, also has links with IS's leaders. It has become more lethal since joining up. On July 1st it killed dozens of soldiers during co-ordinated attacks in Sinai. This may be because the Egyptian and Libyan provinces were cultivated by IS's Khilafa army, which is sent out for foreign operations, including training prospective affiliates.

Other groups simply adopt the IS brand, but show no sign of controlling territory or attempting to rule. The group's affiliate in Algeria has carried out just one attack, beheading a French tourist, and that was before Mr Baghdadi accepted its oath. Boko Haram, the Nigerian jihadist group, has put out slicker videos with an IS flag at the bottom since joining up in March. It has copied IS's savage beheadings and started to call itself the "West Africa Province", but little else has changed. "Boko Haram's leadership is not Arab and won't be well known to IS," says Will McCants of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank.

The financial relationship between IS and its offspring is unclear. The group may not have much cash to spare since the coalition against it is targeting the source of its funds, especially oil. Movement of weapons between non-contingent areas of the caliphate is nigh on impossible. Tunisia's attacker appears to have been trained in Libya rather than Syria or Iraq

despite the vast areas under IS control there. Even basic communication may be tricky.

IS may, however, have some sway over where recruits join the fight, which would explain why the large number of Tunisians going to Syria and Iraq has started to drop off. More foreigners are now heading to Libya or staying home to carry out attacks.

Affiliates use varied tactics. In the Gulf, IS members have targeted Shia mosques to foment sectarian strife. In places such as Yemen and Afghanistan, IS seeks to undermine strong branches of al-Qaeda, its jihadist rival. Elsewhere spectacular attacks, such as the massacre in Sousse, have helped IS live up to its slogan of "remaining and expanding"; conveniently diverting attention from the group's losses not only in Syria and Iraq but farther afield. IS fighters in Libya were kicked out of Derna by rival jihadists, and are now trying to assert themselves in Sirte. Boko Haram used to control an area the size of Belgium until a February offensive pushed it out of almost all its territory.

And expansion can be a weakness. Al-Qaeda found it was undermined by franchises that had their own aims. Islamic State in Iraq, the progenitor of IS that subsequently broke from al-Qaeda, was even more brutal, ruining attempts to woo Muslim hearts and minds. IS appears not to worry that people might think it too extreme, but it does not want to appear weak. If its affiliates cannot hold territory, they undermine the group's *raison d'être*. And for now, it looks like they cannot.



ISIS opens a new front on Europe's doorstep: Chechan jihadi group with 'up to 15,000' fighters pledge allegiance to terror horde

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/isis-opens-new-front-on-europes.html>

ISIS has spread its tentacles further around Europe after a major terrorist group which commands 'as many as 15,000' in the Caucasus region of southern Russia pledged its allegiance to it.

The leader of the Caucasus Emirate, which has carried out over 900 terrorist attacks on Russian soil since its formation in 2007, personally declared his loyalty to ISIS commander-in-chief Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

'We need to hurry up and unite so we can cut off the heads of the infidels,' Aslan Byutukayev says in a new propaganda video allegedly filmed inside the predominantly Muslim republic of Chechnya.

The Caucasus Emirate serves as an umbrella group of smaller extremist groups in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, who have been waging bloody battles in an




attempt to break away from Russian rule for decades.

The group may command tens of thousands of loyal subjects, according to Professor Gordon Hahn of the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program.

The entire CE [Caucases Emirate] insurgency and terrorist movement may be estimated to

Russia and the United Nations following a series of deadly high-profile attacks between 2009 and 2014.

The Islamist group was behind the 2009 Nevsky Express disaster when 27 people were killed and over 50 wounded when a bomb was detonated on a high speed train carrying 661 passengers from Moscow St Petersburg.



number some 15,200 soldiers, leaders and facilitators,' he wrote in his book The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin.

Islamic State already commands 'up to 200,000' fighters according to Kurdish commanders and as many as eight million people are thought to be living under its brutal reign across the Middle East and North Africa - after it expanded its territory to Libya earlier this year.

And in a recently released video entitled 'Soon, Soon', an unknown organisation called 'ISIS Tunisia Province' hinted at setting up yet another official base in the north African country which has supplied the extremists with 3,000 jihadi soldiers in recent years.

Caucases Emirate was recognised as a terrorist organisation by the UK, United States,

Its fighters were among over 400 Chechen extremists who joined Islamic State on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq since 2011, according to the Russian Interior Ministry.

And Chechen fighters such as Islamic State's military commander Omar Al-Shishani and Muslem Al-Shishani have taken a prominent role in guiding the terror group to victory throughout the Middle East.

In October 2014, after conquering Mosul, the man known as Omar the Chechen said he would take 'revenge' on Russia.

Bloomberg reported how Omar al-Shishani phoned his father in Georgia to tell him ISIS will someday wage war on Russian President Vladimir Putin.



'He said 'don't worry dad, I'll come home and show the Russians... I have many thousands following me now and I'll get more. We'll have our revenge against Russia,' his father Temur Batirashvili said.

The number of Chechen fighters currently in Syria and Iraq range from 200 to 1,000 and

there are growing concerns they are being told to return to their home countries to continue to wage jihad, according to the Independent.

Earlier this month, worrying images emerged on social media which showed extremists holding up 'love letters' to Islamic State's leader inside Chechnya.

Islamic State terrorists 'crossing Mediterranean to Europe' on smugglers' boats

Source:http://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/NEWS/13373601.Islamic_State_terrorists__crossing_Mediterranean_to_Europe__on_smugglers__boats/

July 07 – The European Union's **top prosecutor** said she has been told that smugglers' boats bringing migrants across the Mediterranean to Europe are also carrying terrorist fighters from Islamic State.

Eurojust, she said, is one of several EU agencies mobilised to shut down traffickers' operations.

"We're going after the criminals. We're going after the money," said Ms Coninx, a career prosecutor from Belgium who is also Eurojust's chief official for terrorism investigations.

"It is an alarming situation because we see obviously that these smugglings are meant to sometimes finance terrorism, that these smugglings are used sometimes to have and ensure exfiltrations and infiltrations of members of Islamic State."

Paying large sums of money for a shot at reaching Europe, tens of

thousands of people have left Libya in unseaworthy and overcrowded boats or dinghies over the past two years. An unknown number have drowned. This year, about 70,000 migrants have been rescued, many by an EU-led naval operation.

Ms Coninx said an Italian official told Eurojust three weeks ago the flow of migrants has risen fivefold.

Often the smugglers mingle with the migrants in the hope they will not be caught - although dozens have been arrested in Sicily and other parts of southern Italy.



Michele Coninx, head of the EU's judicial co-operation agency Eurojust, told reporters she received the information as part of Eurojust's efforts to help EU nations jointly respond to illegal immigration, terrorism and cybercrime.

Ms Coninx said Eurojust's co-ordination efforts are ongoing and she could not divulge what EU nations have told the agency.

She said it is not yet clear what problem the reported infiltration of Islamic militants may pose for European law enforcement.

But she said groups such as Islamic State are also using proceeds from people-trafficking to fund terrorism.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Thanks God ALL bad guys go to Italy! Thanks God ALL good illegal immigrants go to Greece! **Congrats** Mr Top Prosecutor for your thorough analysis of this specific asymmetric threat!





Turkey's View of Terror

By Burak Bekdil

Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6114/turkey-terrorism>

July 07 – Turkey's Islamist government, now squeezed in a political drama in which it lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002, has in many recent years boldly challenged its Western allies by calling them to join an allied fight against terror. But the target was not al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or one of the dozens of different Islamist groups designated by the civilized world as terrorist.

Instead, Turkey wanted the West to fight the "terrorist state, Israel."

Turkey's Islamist rulers have a deeply corrupted perception of which acts count for terror and which ones do not: Anyone who kills in the name of a cause other than Islamism is probably a terrorist.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan once publicly declared a 15-year-old boy, who was shot by the police and died after many months in a coma, "a terrorist." In a claim never proven, Erdogan said the boy was carrying a slingshot in his pocket. He was hit in the head by a tear gas canister fired by anti-riot police. In Erdogan's thinking, the boy was a terrorist because he was hit during anti-government protests, he was carrying a slingshot and he was an Alevi (a member of a heterodox Muslim Shi'ite religious minority).

In 2013, the world was shocked at the dramatic death tolls in Kenya and Pakistan, when jihadists, in separate attacks over one weekend, killed more than 150 innocent people -- with the Kenya attack claiming victims aged between two and 78. Erdogan, then prime minister, looked very sad indeed -- but not for the victims of the terror attacks. He was mourning Asmaa al-Beltagi, a poor, 17-year-old Egyptian girl who had been shot dead by security forces in Cairo, as she was protesting the ouster of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, in a coup d'état. Asmaa's father was a senior Brotherhood figure; after her death, Erdogan once even shed tears during a televised interview. He then commemorated the girl at almost every election rally.

One of Erdogan's favorite statements is his famous line, "There is no Islamic terror."

Erdogan also rejects outright any link between Muslims and massacres or genocide.

Last November, after a meeting in Paris with French President François Hollande, Erdogan accused "those who try to portray ISIS as an Islamic organization...." Fortunately, he did not claim that ISIS was a Jewish organization. But funny, the organization he says is not "Islamic," flags itself as the "Islamic State"...

The Turkish Islamist show of ridiculous denials continues on at full pace. The latest wave of Islamist violence, in five different corners across the world, once again unveiled Turkey's hypocritical take on terrorism. On June 25, ISIS attacked a Kurdish town in northern Syria and slaughtered over 140 people, including women and children.

Then, on June 26, there was the terrorist attack at a tourist hotel in Sousse, east Tunisia. The attack left at least 37 people dead, including many foreign tourists, and injured 36 others. In a separate attack the same day in Kuwait, 25 people were killed and 202 were injured in a suicide bombing that targeted a Shia mosque during Friday prayers. ISIS claimed responsibility for both attacks. Meanwhile, Yassin Salhi, who murdered one man (his employer) at a U.S.-owned industrial gas factory in southern France, was reported to be well known to the French intelligence service for his alleged links with Salafist groups.

Finally, on July 1, the Islamic State killed 50 people in attacks in Egypt's north Sinai.

That put the one-week death toll at nearly 260. Did the Turks watch a weeping president on television in the face of such violent human tragedy, as he had wept for the poor girl from the Muslim Brotherhood? Not at all.

Instead, quite dry statements from Erdogan's office and the Turkish foreign ministry merely condemned the killings in Tunisia, Kuwait and France. "These bloody assaults, which target Kuwait and Tunisia's peace and stability and aim to trigger sectarian clashes in Kuwait, reveal the importance of regional and international cooperation in fighting against terrorism," Erdogan said in a written statement.

Erdogan should be able to understand that fighting terrorism



cannot succeed without a necessary first step: Why are these terrorists terrorizing? What is the ideology they fight for? Are they fighting to impose onto others by force the laws stipulated in Christian, Jewish, Hindu or Shintoist holy books? If their acts of terror are not related to Islam, what are they related to?

Erdogan will never be viewed as a reliable partner in any anti-terror fight before he gives honest and public answers to those questions. This must be how Erdogan's Western partners engage in private, top-secret dialogues with him in their anti-terror fight:

President of an ally: "You know, Mr. President, the acts of terror they commit in the name of Islam..."

Erdogan: "No, shut up, they have nothing to do with Islam."

President of an ally: "But President we all know why they kill, and mostly they kill other Muslims..."

Erdogan: "It has nothing to do with Islam."

President of an ally: "But Mr. President..."

Erdogan: "Nothing to do with Islam."

Burak Bekdil, based in Ankara, is a Turkish columnist for the Hürriyet Daily and a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Where Will They Strike Next? Improving Validity of Counterterrorism Behavioral Models

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/where-will-they-strike-next-improving-validity-of-counterterrorism-behavioral-models/ab5b3a0518adbe2fb18995873a4f751c.html>

As terrorist attacks continue to surge around the globe, from attacks by the Islamic State on multiple continents to the kidnapping of hundreds of innocent school girls by Boko Haram in Africa, intelligence and counterterrorism officials charged with preventing attacks by these malicious actors are left to wonder, "What are they thinking?" and "Where will they strike next?"

A new study, [*In the Opponent's Shoes: Increasing the Behavioral Validity of Attackers' Judgments in Counter-Terrorism Models*](#), by Sumitra Sri Bhashyam and Gilberto Montibeller, challenges the current assumptions employed by counterterrorism analysts in the models they use to gain insight into terrorists' judgments, and suggest ways to achieve more accurate assessments.

Bhashyam and Montibeller conducted the study when they both were affiliated with the Decision Sciences Team at the London School of Economics and Political Science. They believe terrorists' decisions about which targets to attack and how to launch attacks are driven by a variety of emotional factors, challenging the belief terrorists are fully rational actors.

The study, which recently was published in the the Society for Risk Analysis' journal, *Risk Analysis*, urges analysts to consider how "emotions and visceral factors" influence

terrorists' decisions in formulating short- and long-term goals.

Today's counterterrorism behavioral models assume terrorists are rational; that they examine the consequences of their actions and are objective. Bhashyam and Montibeller -- drawing from such fields as behavioral decision research, politics, philosophy of choice and conflict management in terrorism -- proposed modifying these assumptions to make models conform more closely to what actually is known about terrorists' motivations and judgments.

"Current models are incomplete in their key assumptions that terrorists only seek to maximize economic or damaging impacts, that they have well-established and stable preferences, and that they view the probabilities of achieving success of their actions objectively," the report's executive summary said.

Terrorists are rational

One of the major assumptions in counterterrorism modeling the study examined is the notion terrorists are rational actors. Many counterterrorism analysts assume individuals who commit such malicious acts are "fully rational" in striving to achieve goals as efficiently and effectively as possible.



However, the study stated behavioral evidence suggests terrorists are neither fully rational ("*homo economicus*") nor irrational, but rather

it is safe to assume that sympathizers act according to narrow self-interest principles, the case of active and suicidal terrorists requires some adjustments to be made."

In the Opponent's Shoes: Increasing the Behavioral Validity of Attackers' Judgments in Counterterrorism Models

Sumitra Sri Bhashyam^{1,*} and Gilberto Montibeller²

A key objective for policymakers and analysts dealing with terrorist threats is trying to predict the actions that malicious agents may take. A recent trend in counterterrorism risk analysis is to model the terrorists' judgments, as these will guide their choices of such actions. The standard assumptions in most of these models are that terrorists are fully rational, following all the normative desiderata required for rational choices, such as having a set of constant and ordered preferences, being able to perform a cost-benefit analysis of their alternatives, among many others. However, are such assumptions reasonable from a behavioral perspective? In this article, we analyze the types of assumptions made across various counterterrorism analytical models that represent malicious agents' judgments and discuss their suitability from a descriptive point of view. We then suggest how some of these assumptions could be modified to describe terrorists' preferences more accurately, by drawing knowledge from the fields of behavioral decision research, politics, philosophy of choice, public choice, and conflict management in terrorism. Such insight, we hope, might help make the assumptions of these models more behaviorally valid for counterterrorism risk analysis.

KEY WORDS: Behavioral validity; counterterrorism risk analysis; terrorist decision making; terrorist judgments

they have "bounded rationality," which means they are limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds and the time available to make the decision.

An important aspect in considering the question of whether terrorists are rational decision makers is what type of terrorist group they fall into: sympathizer, active or suicide. The type of terrorist can determine what level of rationality to expect from them, Bhashyam and Montibeller stated.

"As different types of terrorists behave slightly differently, knowing which one we are dealing with can give us an indication of the type of rational behavior we can expect from them," they stated.

The rationality of a terrorist actor can be determined by examining the following three standards: responsiveness to incentives, narrow self-interest and rational expectations. Sympathizers appear to behave according to these three standards, while active and suicide terrorists do not. All three groups of terrorists are responsive to incentives, but active and suicide terrorists do not adhere to the other two standards, the study concluded.

In addition, Bhashyam and Montibeller indicated that a rational decision maker will not engage in actions in which he/she is entirely disinterested. The report stated that, "Although

composed of social outcasts. They behave as social solidarity maximizers, rather than political maximizers, and seek to prolong the viability of the units for the social benefits they provide.

"Therefore, when describing the utility of active terrorists, modelers could incorporate the benefit gained from externalizing their anger," the report stated.

Suicidal terrorists do not appear to have rational expectations. Many will carry on and die for their beliefs no matter what the cost, thus risk analysts should consider the psychological reasons behind a terrorist's willingness to participate in such a self-destructive act in order to understand what benefits they seek, Bhashyam and Montibeller stated.

However, their behavior can be considered rational if the advantage they seek by becoming a martyr is the attention they would get from it.

Terrorists are consequentialists

Terrorists have chosen attacks that offer the best compromise between operational aspects, such as costs and feasibility, and the benefits gained from the strike. However, current counterterrorism models



do not consider all the objectives terrorists might take into account, the study found.

The study suggested there is evidence terrorists care about objectives other than economic or political ones. The empirical research indicated active terrorists are 10 times more likely to join for social motives than for the group's ideology. Political goals of the group are rarely known by its members, making the group a social organization rather than politically motivated one.

"Research shows that terrorist organizations appeal to certain kinds of individuals for reasons that are rarely political, and if they are, are of minor importance," the report stated.

Current counterterrorism behavioral models also do not account for changes in motivations, and assume the terrorists' values, preferences and utilities remain static. The authors believe there is a potential for changes in objectives, or fluctuations in beliefs, over time. These changes can occur for various reasons, such as changes in the environment or leadership. Terrorists weigh the consequences of previous acts and adjust accordingly.

"Terrorist' motivations include a reaction to an event," the report stated. "Therefore, an understanding of which objectives terrorists might want to maximize at a given moment requires an appreciation of the state of the environment, and the recent actions from the defender."

Terrorists are objective

The study also examined whether visceral factors influence terrorist decision making, and how psychological forces may drive an individual to commit an act of violence, which he/she will then rationalize.

According to the researchers, active terrorists - including leaders -- can be "impulsive, emotionally unstable and are prone to

externalize their emotions," especially anger. These emotions cause terrorists to behave single mindedly and to seek rewards without regard to detrimental effects. These visceral factors cloud judgment, resulting in the prioritization of certain objectives, even self-destructive ones.

"Visceral factors also affect risk assessments, anger leads the sympathizers and active terrorists to be more optimistic as they have a higher perception of being in control and anger renders them to be risk-seeking," the report stated.

Suicide bombers, for instance, are especially prone to the influence of emotions. The force of these emotions may result in temporary changes in behavior. Temporary distortion of cognition can alter the decision maker's evaluation of an outcome's probability or the outcome itself. The terrorist may also be blind to certain consequences.

"Decision makers' will is altered and weakened such that options with worse outcomes than others are chosen," the report stated.

When building adversarial models, the researchers suggested risk analysts devote more effort to understanding the objectives that drive terrorism to improve the descriptive validity of their models.

Conclusion

The researchers intend the study to support counterterrorism efforts by analyzing terrorists' judgments from a descriptive perspective and pointing out ways counterterrorism models can more accurately represent terrorists' actions.

However, Bhashyam and Montibeller noted, **"It is an open question whether models that are descriptively valid could provide better predictive power to terrorists' actions than those ones that assume full rationality."**

ISIS supporter releases guide on establishing 'Muslim gangs'

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3153237/ISIS-supporter-release-guide-establishing-Muslim-gangs-spread-hate-Islamic-communities-stop-integrating-non-Muslims-using-charities-fronts-raise-cash.html>

Jihadi supporters have been circulating a radical guidebook on social media, providing deadly instructions on how to create a active terror cell.

The shocking handbook, which has not been named by the MailOnline, worryingly contains a

chapter by chapter guide to financing 'Muslim gangs' and obtaining weapons in the UK.

The book appears to be targeting a British audience, with harrowing references to a number of Britain's worst terror cases.



Behind the cover of a charitable organisation raising awareness of Islamic teachings, gang members are urged to draw in recruits covertly off the streets.

Terrifyingly detailed bombmaking instructions are laid out in another chapter, complete with basic diagrams for making a bomb out of a fizzy drink can.

Radicals are encouraged to build pressure cooker bombs, inspired by the horrific Boston Marathon bomb attack. It also lays out advice on cell phone detonators and car bombs.

Gang members are encouraged to carry out muggings and acts of credit card fraud to pay for weapons and materials for large scale attacks.

Even police anti-terror tactics are scrutinised, as well as lengthy quotes of guidance from the dead terror leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

It goes on to explain how to test improvised devices as well as obtain more money and weapons.

Dedicated gang members are given plans on how to best board up houses from an impending terror raid, oddly referencing the American comedy film Home Alone as an example of defending your home.

It praises Anjem Choudary for his knowledge of the law and claims people like the former spokesman for Islam4UK, 'study the latest version of the Anti-Terrorism Act (Law)' so they call for Islamic Law in the UK without being arrested.

The handbook draws on some of the latest terror arrest cases, including the jailing of 20-year-old Zakariya Ashiq, from Coventry, for allegedly trying to join ISIS.

It draws on short, distorted Qu'ranic quotes to justify why Muslims should only fear Allah and not show any fear of being jailed by the authorities.

The financial strategy of carrying out muggings and recruiting people by handing out leaflets on an Islamic street stall, was used by British jihadist Choukri Ellekhlifi before he travelled to Syria.

Video footage emerged of Choukri Ellekhlifi working on a Dawah stall in West London, attempting to convert passers-by. He was also known for being part of a West London gang, who used tasers and mopeds to mug their victims.

When he was arrested for robbery, Ellekhlifi, 22, fled to Syria, joining Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. He was pictured fighting alongside fellow West Londoner, Mohammed el-Araj and renowned Dutch fighter Omar Yilmaz.

Choukri was killed in fighting against pro-Assad forces near the Syrian city of Aleppo.

Whilst dozens of British nationals have travelled to Syria to wage jihad, appalling attacks like the Charlie Hebdo massacre has led police to fear a terror attack on home soil.

It is thought that the British Moroccan jihadi may have been one of the infamous Beatles, a small group of British fighters who beat and tortured foreign hostages.

Jihadi John, revealed to be former Westminster University student Mohammed Emwazi, attended the same school as Ellekhlifi and is believed to have been linked to a West London gang.



UAE sets up US-backed ISIL counter-terrorism intelligence centre

Source: <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/uae-sets-up-us-backed-isil-counter-terrorism-intelligence-centre-598956.html>

A new counter-terrorism centre based in Abu Dhabi will be launched by the anti-ISIL coalition on Wednesday.

Sawab Centre, the first international, online engagement and messaging operation in support of the Global Coalition to counter ISIL will be geared towards countering ISIL's propaganda and its appeal to younger Arabs in the region.

The centre, named after the Arabic word for "the right and spiritual path", will use direct online engagement to counter the terrorist messaging that is used to recruit foreign fighters, raise funds and terrorise local populations.



The US Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Rick Stengel has travelled to the UAE to launch the Sawab Centre, alongside UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Anwar Gargash.

Global piracy on the rise: International Maritime Bureau

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/global-piracy-on-rise-international.html>



90

Global piracy on the high seas is on the rise once again and a small coastal tanker is hijacked by pirates in South East Asia every two weeks, according to a new report.



The joint report by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and International Maritime Bureau (IMB) found that South East Asia accounted for 55 per cent of the world's 54 piracy and armed robbery incidents since the start of 2015.

The report also found that after a steady drop in global piracy over the last few years, attacks rose 10 per cent in the first quarter of 2015.

Worldwide, pirates took 140 hostages in the first three months of 2015, three times as many as during the same period in 2014.

A total of 13 seafarers were assaulted and three injured.

IMB recorded 23 ship hijackings in South East Asia since April 2014.

Most attacks were by armed gangs targeting small

coastal tankers to steal their cargoes of fuel.

"The frequency of these hijackings in South East Asia is an increasing cause for concern. There's a risk that the attacks and violence could increase if left unabated," said Pottengal Mukundan, Director of IMB, which has been monitoring world piracy since 1991.



Indonesia accounts for the highest number of attacks - almost 40 percent of 2015 attacks, with two vessels hijacked and 19 vessels boarded.

IMB report said that the majority of incidents were low-level, opportunistic thefts, though the attackers were usually armed with knives, machetes or guns.

Evolving Terrorist Threats to the Homeland: From al-Qaida to ISIS

By Jeff Gardner

Source: <http://inhomelandsecurity.com/evolving-terrorist-threats-to-the-homeland-from-al-qaida-to-isis/>

July 10 – The al-Qaida (AQ) terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001 was a pivotal and tragic event for this nation. As a direct result of those attacks the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a Director of National Intelligence, a National Counter Terrorism Center, and the U.S Northern Command — just to name a few.

For the next decade plus the U.S. focused on fighting the away game by aggressively going after AQ overseas while strengthening our home game to prevent any more terrorists from entering the country. The Transportation Security Administration was created within DHS to increase airport security while Customs and Border Protection focused on keeping terrorists out and the FBI became very adept at managing watch lists and no-fly lists with their interagency partners.

These efforts were not wasted as AQ and their dangerous affiliates like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula continued to try to attack our homeland. Some attempts by AQ to penetrate our post 9/11 defenses include Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber, who tried to blow up flight 253 descending toward Chicago on Christmas Day in 2009.

However, adversaries adapt, and one of the greatest threats this nation currently faces is from within. The warped al-Qaida message of violence against innocents — or as Peter Bergen has stated “Binladenism” — has proliferated, as well as the highly influential videos by Anwar al Awlaki and Adam Gadahn, who’s fluent English and fiery speeches have spurred many to violence. Now anyone can become radicalized at home without ever visiting an extremist mosque or traveling to a terrorists training camp.

Although Bin Laden, Awlaki, and Gadahn are now all dead, that does not diminish the

influence they continue to have in radicalizing many who are disenfranchised, angry or clinically

gullible. This has led to a significant number of U.S. citizens being inspired to fight for this terrorist cause, such as the many Somali Americans from the Minneapolis area going to fight with the al-Shabab terrorist group in East Africa.

When we discuss homegrown extremism and homegrown terrorism, we are talking about individuals who Sam Mullins has defined as those who were born in or spent most of their lives here and who generally lack any direct foreign support or control, but were radicalized and trained and carried out (or attempted) attacks here at home. Just some of the recent examples of homegrown terrorism by American citizens include the Fort Hood shooting by Major Nidal Hassan in 2009, the New York City subway bombing plot in 2009 by Najibullah Zazi, the Times Square attempted bombing in 2010 by Connecticut financial analyst Faisal Shahzad, and the Tsarnaev brothers with the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.

These homegrown attacks (and attempts) constitute the second phase of terrorism after 9/11. In fact, there have been no external attacks with terrorists from AQ or similar groups attempting to enter the U.S. since 2009. This brings us to the third phase of terrorist threats since 9/11, which is the threat that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or ISIS poses to the homeland. ISIS has overshadowed al-Qaida as the premier terrorist group in the world. ISIS is drawing attention and recruits to their cause by a combination of success on the battlefield and a social media



propaganda machine that is phenomenal. Their apocalyptic messaging coupled with Hollywood quality horrific violence resonates with many. ISIS has inspired multiple terrorist attacks in France such as the Paris cartoon publisher assassinations and the recent attacks in Lyon. ISIS has also inspired attacks here in the U.S. such as the attempted terrorist attack in Garland, Texas by two ISIS inspired extremists in body armor and assault rifles attempting an attack against a cartoon event there. ISIS inspired attacks within the U.S. homeland are likely to become our new normal. Homegrown extremism is now the principal terrorism threat this nation faces, as Secretary

of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson stated in March, "We are concerned about the independent actor, the so-called lone wolf who could strike at a moment's notice."

This does not mean that we should let our guard down or end our focus on overseas terrorist groups. Those traditional homeland security and homeland defense efforts need to be continued as a part of a comprehensive and multilayered security effort.

However, the imperative now is to adapt our homeland security enterprise to address this third phase of terrorist threat.

Jeffrey V. Gardner is an Assistant Professor of Homeland Security Studies at American Military University, and is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel. Jeff is a Homeland Security Ph.D. Candidate who possesses a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence with a concentration in terrorism from National Intelligence University, as well as two other masters' degrees.

When (and Why) Good Muslim Neighbors Turn Bad

By Raymond Ibrahim

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5371/why-muslims-bad-neighbors>

Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers: and whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions. – Koran 3:28

Days ago, after the Islamic State [IS] entered the Syrian city of Hassakè, prompting a mass exodus of Christians, a familiar but often



overlooked scene, took place: many otherwise "normal" Muslims joined ranks with IS, instantly turning on their longtime Christian neighbors. This is the third category of Muslims that lurks between "moderates" and "radicals": "sleepers," Muslims who appear "moderate" but who are merely waiting for circumstances to turn to Islam's advantage before they join the jihad; Muslims who are waiting for the rewards of jihad to become greater than the risks.

There is no lack of examples of these types of Muslims. The following are testimonials from non-Muslims, mostly Christian refugees from those regions of Iraq and Syria now under Islamic State (or other jihadi) control. Consider what they say about their longtime Sunni neighbors who appeared "moderate"—or at least nonviolent—but who, once the jihad came to town, exposed their true colors:

Georgios, a man from the ancient Christian town of Ma'loula—one of the few areas in the world where the language of Christ was still spoken—told of how Muslim neighbors he knew all his life turned on the Christians after al-Nusra, another jihadi outfit, invaded in 2013: *We knew our Muslim neighbours all our lives. Yes, we knew the Diab family was quite radical, but we thought they would never betray us. We ate with them. We are one people.*

A few of the Diab family had left months ago and we guessed they were with the



Nusra [al-Qaeda front]. But their wives and children were still here. We looked after them. Then, two days before the Nusra attacked, the families suddenly left the town. We didn't know why. And then our neighbours led our enemies in among us.

The Christian man explained with disbelief how he saw a young member of the Diab family whom he knew from youth holding a sword and leading foreign jihadis to Christian homes. Continues Georgios:

We had excellent relations. It never occurred to us that Muslim neighbours would betray us. We all said "please let this town live in peace — we don't have to kill each other." But now there is bad blood. They brought in the Nusra to throw out the Christians and get rid of us forever. Some of the Muslims who lived with us are good people but I will never trust 90 per cent of them again.

A teenage Christian girl from Homs, Syria—which once had a Christian population of approximately 80,000, but which is now reportedly zero—relates her story:

We left because they were trying to kill us. . . . They wanted to kill us because we were Christians. They were calling us Kaffirs [infidels], even little children saying these things. Those who were our neighbors turned against us. At the end, when we ran away, we went through balconies. We did not even dare go out on the street in front of our house. I've kept in touch with the few Christian friends left back home, but I cannot speak to my Muslim friends any more. I feel very sorry about that. (Crucified Again, p. 207)

When asked who exactly threatened and drove Christians out of Mosul, which fell to the Islamic State a year ago, another anonymous Christian refugee responded:

We left Mosul because ISIS came to the city. The [Sunni Muslim] people of Mosul embraced ISIS and drove the Christians out of the city. When ISIS entered Mosul, the people hailed them and drove out the Christians....The people who embraced ISIS, the people who lived there with us... Yes, my neighbors. Our neighbors and other people threatened us. They said: "Leave before ISIS get you." What does that mean? Where would we go?... Christians have no support in Iraq.

Whoever claims to be protecting the Christians is a liar. A liar!

Nor is such Muslim treachery limited to Christians. Other "infidels," Yazidis for example, have experienced the same betrayal. Discussing IS invasion of his village, a 68-year-old Yazidi man who managed to flee the bloody offensive—which included the slaughter of many Yazidi men and enslavement of women and children—said:

The (non-Iraqi) jihadists were Afghans, Bosnians, Arabs and even Americans and British fighters.... But the worst killings came from the people living among us, our (Sunni) Muslim neighbours.... The Metwet, Khawata and Kejala tribes—they were all our neighbours. But they joined the IS, took heavy weapons from them, and informed on who was Yazidi and who was not. Our neighbours made the IS takeover possible.

Likewise, watch this 60 Minutes interview with a Yazidi woman. When asked why people she knew her whole life would suddenly join IS and savagely turn on her people, she replied:

I can't tell you exactly, but it has to be religion. It has to be religion. They constantly asked us to convert, but we refused. Before this, they never mentioned it. Prior, we thought of each other as family. But I say, it has to be religion. Lest it seem that this phenomenon of Sunni betrayal is limited to Islamic jihad in Mesopotamia, know that it has occurred historically and currently in other nations. The following anecdote from the Ottoman Empire is over 100 years old:

Then one night, my husband came home and told me that the padisha [sultan] had sent word that we were to kill all the Christians in our village, and that we would have to kill our neighbours. I was very angry, and told him that I did not care who gave such orders, they were wrong. These neighbours had always been kind to us, and if he dared to kill them Allah would pay us out. I tried all I could to stop him, but he killed them — killed them with his own hand. (Sir Edwin Pears, Turkey and Its People, London: Methuen and Co., 1911, p. 39)

And in Nigeria—a nation that shares little with Syria, Iraq, or Turkey, other than Islam—a jihadi attack on Christians that left five churches destroyed and several



Christians killed was enabled by "local Muslims":

The Muslims in this town were going round town pointing out church buildings and shops owned by Christians to members of Boko Haram, and they in turn bombed these churches and shops.

Such similar patterns of traitorous behavior—patterns that cross continents and centuries, patterns that regularly appear whenever Muslims live alongside non-Muslims—are easily understood by turning to Koran 3:28:

Let believers [Muslims] not take infidels [non-Muslims] for friends and allies instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with God—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions. But Allah cautions you [to fear] Himself. For the final goal is to Allah.

Here is how Islam's most authoritative ulema and exegetes explain Koran 3:28. Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari (d. 923), author of a standard and authoritative commentary of the Koran, writes:

If you [Muslims] are under their [non-Muslims'] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them with your tongue while harboring inner animosity for them ... [know that] Allah has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the

infidels rather than other believers—except when infidels are above them [in authority]. Should that be the case, let them act friendly towards them while preserving their religion.

Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), another prime authority on the Koran, writes:

The Most High said, "[U]nless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions"—that is, whoever at any time or place fears their evil may protect himself through outward show—not sincere conviction. As al-Bukhari records through Abu al-Darda the words [of the Prophet], "Truly, we grin to the faces of some peoples, while our hearts curse them."

In other words, Muslims are not to befriend non-Muslims, unless circumstances are such that it is in the Muslims' interests to do so. For example, if Muslims are a minority (as in America), or if their leaders brutally crack down on jihadi activities (as in Bashar Assad's pre-Islamic State Syria): then they may preach and even feign peace, tolerance, and coexistence with their non-Muslim neighbors.

However, if and when circumstances to make Islam supreme appear, Muslims are expected to join the jihad—"for the final goal is to Allah." [1]

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Note

[1] For more on Islamic sanctioned forms of deception, read about *taqiyya*, *tawriya*, and *taysir*. For more on how Muslims are never to befriend non-Muslims—except when in their interest—see Ayman al-Zawahiri's "Loyalty and Enmity," [The Al Qaeda Reader](#), pgs., 63-115.

Raymond Ibrahim is a Judith Friedman Rosen Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center. He is the author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam's New War on Christians (2013) and The Al Qaeda Reader (2007).

Pentagon Concludes America Is Not Safe Unless It Conquers The World. US Plans War against Russia

By Dr. Paul Craig Roberts

Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/pentagon-concludes-america-is-not-safe-unless-it-conquers-the-world-us-plans-war-against-russia/5461706>

The Pentagon has released its "National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015," June 2015. <http://news.usni.org/2015/07/02/document-2015-u-s-national-military-strategy>

The document announces a shift in focus from terrorists to "state actors" that "are challenging international norms." It is important to understand what these words mean. Governments that challenge international norms are sovereign countries that pursue policies independently of Washington's policies. These "revisionist states" are threats, not



because they plan to attack the US, which the Pentagon admits neither Russia nor China intend, but because they are independent.


Be sure to grasp the point: The threat is the existence of sovereign states, whose independence of action makes them "revisionist states." In other words, their independence is out of step with the neoconservative Uni-Power doctrine that declares independent action to be the right of Washington alone. Washington's History-given hegemony precludes any other country being independent in its actions. By definition, a country with a foreign policy independent of Washington is a threat.

The Pentagon's report defines the foremost "revisionist states" as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The focus is primarily on Russia. Washington hopes to co-opt China, despite the "tension to the Asia-Pacific region" that China's defense of its sphere of influence causes, a defense "inconsistent with international law" (this from Washington, the great violator of international law), by turning over what remains of the American consumer market to China. It is not yet certain that Iran has escaped the fate that Washington imposed on Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, Ukraine, and by complicity Palestine.

The Pentagon report is sufficiently audacious in its hypocrisy, as all statements from Washington are, to declare that Washington and its vassals "support the established institutions and processes dedicated to preventing conflict, respecting sovereignty, and furthering human rights." This from the military of a government that has invaded, bombed, and overthrown 11 governments, murdering and displacing millions of peoples, since the Clinton regime and is currently working to overthrow governments in Armenia,

Kyrgyzstan, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina.

In the Pentagon document, Russia is under fire for not acting "in accordance with



international norms," which means Russia is not following Washington's leadership and behaving as a vassal, which is the behavior to which the

Uni-Power is entitled

In other words, this is a BS report written by neocons in order to foment war with Russia.

Nothing else can be said about the Pentagon report, which justifies war and more war until no one exists. Without war and conquests, Americans are not safe. This path to nuclear Armageddon is being drilled every day into the heads of Americans and Washington's vassals in Europe by the Western prostitute media. "War makes us safe!"

Washington's view toward Russia is the same as Cato the Elder's view toward Carthage. Cato the Elder finished his every speech on any subject in the Roman Senate with the statement "Carthage must be destroyed."

This Pentagon report tells us that war with Russia is our future unless Russia agrees to become a vassal state like every country in Europe, and Canada, Australia, Ukraine, and Japan. Otherwise, the neoconservatives have decided that it is impossible for Americans to tolerate living in a world in which countries make decisions independently of Washington. If America cannot be The Uni-Power dictating to the world, better that we are all dead. At least that will show the Russians.

Paul Craig Roberts, former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury and Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal, has held numerous university appointments. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.



Turkey, Tears, and Terrorism

By Burak Bekdil

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/5374/turkey-terrorism>

Turkey's Islamist government, now squeezed in a political drama in which it lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002, has in many recent years boldly challenged its Western allies by calling them to join an allied fight against terror. But the target



was not al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or one of the dozens of different Islamist groups designated by the civilized world as terrorist.

Instead, Turkey wanted the West to fight the "terrorist state, Israel."

Turkey's Islamist rulers have a deeply corrupted perception of which acts count for terror and which ones do not: Anyone who kills in the name of a cause other than Islamism is probably a terrorist.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan once publicly declared a 15-year-old boy, who was shot by the police and died after many months in a coma, "a terrorist." In a claim never proven, Erdogan said the boy was carrying a slingshot in his pocket. He was hit in the head by a tear gas canister fired by anti-riot police. In Erdogan's thinking, the boy was a terrorist because he was hit during anti-government protests, he was carrying a slingshot and he was an Alevi (a member of a heterodox Muslim Shi'ite religious minority).

In 2013, the world was shocked at the dramatic death tolls in Kenya and Pakistan, when

jihadists, in separate attacks over one weekend, killed more than 150 innocent people -- with the Kenya attack claiming victims aged between two and 78. Erdogan, then prime minister, looked very sad indeed -- but not for the victims of the terror attacks. He was

mourning Asmaa al-Beltagi, a poor, 17-year-old Egyptian girl who had been shot dead by security forces in Cairo, as she was protesting the ouster of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, in a coup d'état. Asmaa's father was a senior Brotherhood figure; after her death, Erdogan once even shed tears during a televised interview. He then commemorated the girl at almost every election rally.

One of Erdogan's favorite statements is his famous line, "There is no Islamic terror." Erdogan also rejects outright any link between Muslims and massacres or genocide.

Last November, after a meeting in Paris with French President François Hollande, Erdogan accused "those who try to portray ISIS as an Islamic organization...." Fortunately, he did not claim that ISIS was a Jewish organization. But funny, the organization he says is not "Islamic," flags itself as the "Islamic State."

The Turkish Islamist show of ridiculous denials continues on at full pace. The latest wave of Islamist violence, in five different corners across the world, once again unveiled Turkey's hypocritical take on terrorism. On June 25, ISIS attacked a Kurdish town in northern Syria and slaughtered over 140 people, including women and children.

Then, on June 26, there was the terrorist attack at a tourist hotel in Sousse, east Tunisia. The attack left at least 37 people dead, including many foreign tourists, and injured 36 others. In a separate attack the same day in



Kuwait, 25 people were killed and 202 were injured in a suicide bombing that targeted a Shia mosque during Friday prayers. ISIS claimed responsibility for both attacks. Meanwhile, Yassin Salhi, who murdered one man (his employer) at a U.S.-owned industrial gas factory in southern France, was reported to be well known to the French intelligence service for his alleged links with Salafist groups.

Finally, on July 1, the Islamic State killed 50 people in attacks in Egypt's north Sinai. That put the one-week death toll at nearly 260.

Did the Turks watch a weeping president on television in the face of such violent human tragedy, as he had wept for the poor girl from the Muslim Brotherhood?

Not at all! Instead, quite dry statements from Erdogan's office and the Turkish foreign ministry merely condemned the killings in

Tunisia, Kuwait and France. "These bloody assaults, which target Kuwait and Tunisia's peace and stability and aim to trigger sectarian clashes in Kuwait, reveal the importance of regional and international cooperation in fighting against terrorism," Erdogan said in a written statement.

Erdogan should be able to understand that fighting terrorism cannot succeed without a necessary first step: Figuring out why the terrorists are terrorizing. What is the ideology they fight for? Are they fighting to impose onto others by force the laws stipulated in Christian, Jewish, Hindu or Shintoist holy books? If their acts of terror are not related to Islam, what are they related to?

Erdogan will never be viewed as a reliable partner in any anti-terror fight before he gives honest and public answers to those questions.

Burak Bekdil, based in Ankara, is a columnist for the Turkish daily Hürriyet and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Spanish National Court Declares ETA's Actions Crimes Against Humanity

Source: <http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150711/1024480235.html>



July 11 – National Court Judge Juan Pablo Gonzalez partially upheld the relevant claims submitted by the Dignity and Justice, Luis Portero Foundation and a number other organizations.

According to the judge's decision, the actions of ETA "are widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population or its representatives, which qualifies them as a crime against humanity."



"Systematic attacks against the representatives of the civilian population represents the persecution on political and ideological grounds," and "destruction [of the representatives] or removal by force or terror are considered strategically necessary for the organization [ETA] to achieve its political objectives," judge's decision read.

Meanwhile, the judge refused to qualify the ETA's crimes as a genocide.

The Basque terrorist group ETA was founded July 31, 1959. Its goal is gaining the independence for the Greater Basque Country. In 2011, the ETA announced the cessation of the armed struggle.

Can Tunisia Stop Terrorism With a Wall?

By David A. Graham

Source: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/07/can-tunisia-stop-terrorism-wall/117571/>

July 12 – Governments have tried a vast array of tools to fight terrorism: Mass arrests. Intrusive intelligence-gathering. Buying them off. Aggressive checkpoints. Economic

Will it work? Humans have been building defensive walls practically since the beginning of civilization, so there's a decent amount of evidence to draw on. And it doesn't look promising.

First, defensive walls often fail. One of the oldest walled cities known is Jericho, where, as his eponymous book in the Bible relates, Joshua conquered by using trumpets to demolish the fortifications. Whether or not the biblical account is strictly accurate—brass instruments aren't usually useful as a demolition tool—the story sets a template. The ancient walls of Jerusalem? Little help stopping a succession of conquerors. Constantinople's magnificent ring of fortifications? Not much defense against invading Ottomans. The world's most famous defensive line, the Great Wall of China, slowed but failed to prevent the fall of the Ming Dynasty.

The most effective walls tend to share three characteristics. They're in heavily populated urban areas, they're expensive, and they're short. And as Andrew


Schoenholtz, a visiting professor at Georgetown University, told NPR in 2007, they're often more effective at keeping people in than keeping them out. Take the gold standard of walls: the Berlin Wall. While the full wall was almost 100 miles, the inner-city barrier was only about 26 miles. The wall's success depended on heavy militarization and the willingness of guards to shoot and kill hundreds of people trying to escape. Even then it was hardly perfect, and while estimates vary, perhaps tens of thousands of people escaped East Germany by various means.

development. Massive force. How about just building a fence to keep terrorists out though? That's Tunisia's plan. The North African nation has been hit by a string of terror attacks. In March 19 people were killed at a museum in the capital, Tunis. Almost 40 were killed in June at a beach resort. Tunisian officials have told reporters that Islamist terrorists are being trained in Libya and then coming to Tunisia to conduct attacks, so **Tunisia's prime minister has announced the construction of a 100-mile-long wall along the country's eastern border.**



Some of the most effective security walls right now are in Israel. The better-known one is the barrier around the West Bank. Its morality and legality are hotly debated, but its

achieving zero penetration may simply be impossible with a border that long—short of positioning a heavy force of armed guards stretching the entire length, which would be



construction has coincided with a steep drop in terror attacks in Israel. Even more effective has been a fence along Israel's border with Egypt. That 144-mile-long, 16-foot-tall structure cost \$416 million to build. The Israeli government said it has produced an incredible drop-off of more than 99 percent of people crossing the border in the first half of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012, from 9,570 to 34. (Yes, you read that right.) Israel is now adding another fence along its border with Jordan.

In comparison, the U.S. border with Mexico is roughly 2,000 miles long. How effective are the fences along it? It depends on your standard. The construction of some 640 miles of fencing there since 2006 has cost billions of dollars, and in areas where it's very high, it seems to stop crossings. But illegal crossings had already been on a long slide downward over the last few decades. The tens of billions spent on security—building fences, adding more Border Patrol agents—have made a difference, though immigration hawks still insist the border needs to be closer to impermeable. But

prohibitively expensive. One final cautionary historical example for Tunisia is the Maginot Line, the infamous line of defenses that France built between the World Wars on its border with Germany. In 1940, German forces simply cut around it and headed north through Belgium. Tunisia can wall off its border with Libya, and that wall may or may not stop terrorists from crossing that border. But it doesn't close off alternate routes into the country. Algeria shares a huge border with Libya that's tough to effectively patrol, although Algeria says its forces are on high alert. Algeria's border with Tunisia, meanwhile, is also very long, and has been a site of jihadist activity and clashes between fighters and the Tunisian military.

It's easy to see why beleaguered nations reach for the millennia-old solution of a building a defensive perimeter, but their track record isn't great. A good barrier may serve a purpose, but it won't do everything—all in all, it's just another brick in the wall.



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Boston Police Captain's Son Charged With Terror Plot on Behalf of Islamic State

Source: <https://news.vice.com/article/boston-police-captains-son-charged-with-terror-plot-on-behalf-of-islamic-state>

July 14 – The son of a Boston police captain has been arrested and charged on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on behalf of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), in methods echoing those used by the Tsarnaev brothers during the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013. Alexander Ciccolo, 23, was taken into custody by federal officials after authorities said he purchased two rifles and two pistols from an undercover FBI informant from the Western



Massachusetts Terrorism Task Force on July 4. Ciccolo, of Adams, Massachusetts — whose father is Boston police Captain Robert Ciccolo — has a previous criminal conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.

The affidavit alleges that Ciccolo spoke with a "cooperating witness" in recorded conversations about his plans to detonate explosive devices — such as pressure cookers filled with black powder, nails, ball bearings, and glass — targeting public spaces, including college cafeterias, bars, and a police station.

A statement by the Justice Department notes that Ciccolo purchased a pressure cooker from Walmart — similar to the one used in the Boston Marathon bombings that killed three and injured over 260 in April 2013.

When FBI agents raided Ciccolo's apartment following his arrest, they reportedly discovered several Molotov cocktails that were not yet fully built. Also known as petrol bombs, Molotov cocktails are incendiary devices that create a fireball after impact. Ciccolo's Molotov cocktail

recipe used shredded pieces of Styrofoam soaked in motor oil. He chose motor oil because it would stick to people's skin and make it harder to put the fire out, according to the Justice Department.

Court documents state that the FBI first became aware of Ciccolo and his plans to travel overseas and fight alongside IS in 2014 when they received a tip from one of his acquaintances, who said that he had a long history of mental instability, and had recently become "obsessed" with Islam, saying he wasn't "afraid to die for the cause" and that America was "Satan." The FBI says that in October it discovered a Facebook profile of the online alias that Ciccolo was using — Ali Al Amriki.

On July 24, Ciccolo allegedly met with the "cooperating witness" where he also expressed a desire to conduct attacks on civilians, members of the US military, and law enforcement personnel.

A week later, the same witness recorded another conversation with Ciccolo, in which he applauded the recent terrorist attacks on a tourist beach in Tunisia and laid out further plans to conduct attacks at state universities — which he describes as "very sinful" places. He allegedly planned to broadcast the attacks online.

After being taken into custody, Ciccolo stabbed a nurse in the head with a pen during a routine screening, according to the affidavit.

Carmen M. Ortiz, the United States attorney for Massachusetts, requested that Ciccolo be detained pending trial because "he poses a danger to the community," and that he is "a risk of flight."

Ciccolo's father was among the responders to the Boston Marathon bombing. He had reportedly previously alerted



authorities that his son, who he had minimal contact with, was "going off the deep end." "While we were saddened and disappointed to learn of our son's intentions, we are grateful that authorities were able to prevent any loss of life or harm to others," the Ciccolo family said in a statement on Monday. "At this time we

would ask that the public and the media recognize our grief and respect our desire for privacy." Ciccolo, who was arraigned Monday night, was set to be in court in Massachusetts Tuesday morning for a detention hearing.

What Will Happen To You When You Storm a US Military Checkpoint?

By Patrick Tucker

Source: <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/07/what-will-happen-you-when-you-storm-us-military-checkpoint/117898/?oref=d-river>

The military has put a lot of effort into making checkpoint encounters less lethal, through the application of some bizarre-sounding technologies.

The setting: a checkpoint guarded by the United States military. It could be a border crossing, a base, a protected zone in a city under siege, or something else. You, a lawbreaker, want to get past that checkpoint, 300 meters in the distance. You aim your car at the gate and accelerate to 45 mph. You are in for quite an experience. The military is going to stage a full-frontal, high-tech assault on your sensory system...in the hopes of not gunning you down.

The Problem

There are more than 2,900 military checkpoints across the world, presenting obvious targets that different people will engage in different ways. Kamikaze jihadists driving vehicle-borne IEDs have one reason to rush a checkpoint. Refugees fleeing an advancing army have another.

"A few years ago, we were having definite issues that people would be rushing these checkpoints," David Law, the technology division chief at the Defense Department's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, told a group at an industry briefing in Baltimore last spring.

Gen. Anthony Zinni, then commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary, established the Pentagon's nonlethal weapons program in 1996. The program "stimulates and coordinates" non-lethal weapons efforts across the military, according to Kelly Hughes, spokesperson, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. But the Services procure their own non-lethal weapons and train personnel on them.

Today, Law estimates, that the military spends between \$120 million and \$150 million a year on nonlethal technologies — much of it aimed at securing borders and checkpoints.

Here's why. In 2004, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that

U.S. military checkpoints, primarily in Iraq, were seeing one violent event every day.

Three years later, Maj. Ben Connable, a Marine Corps foreign-cultures expert, offered a partial explanation. When drivers refused to yield to commands, guards had few options. "We started out just by trying to wave them down, by putting a hand out — 'Stop!' — with the palm forward. And this wasn't working at all," Connable said. "There were several incidents where we had shot up vans full of families trying to flee the fighting. It was an Army foreign-area officer who realized that [gesture] was the Iraqi symbol for 'Welcome, come forward!' We were actually motioning people to come forward and then shooting them." So the military bought 400 green laser dazzlers, which guards began using to blind drivers who tried to speed past controlled points. Immediately, Law said, the frequency of violent incidents dropped to one per week. Since then, the military has issued more than 16,000 of the lasers. "Now, checkpoint issues, you might see



one every couple of months,” he said. There are plenty of reasons for that, including, of course, the U.S. drawdown in Iraq. But Law says “non-lethals have helped this situation,” and they will surely play a growing role in managing checkpoints in the future.

Scene: Rushing a military checkpoint

When a checkpoint encounter escalates to violence — even when no one dies — the aftermath can snarl a checkpoint for hours, increasing resentment among the local population. When border guards render a car unusable, for example, it can cause a backup and long lines. So the military has asked the Directorate to develop a Notional Escalation of Force: basically, a plan to apply a hierarchy of non-lethal, and in the last resort, lethal effects. Here’s what that looks like.



Back to you, in a car, moving at 45 mph toward a checkpoint 300 meters down the road. The guards spot you; they have precious little time to decide whether to kill you. They’re going to try to slow you down. The first thing you’ll encounter is a series of bright lights and noise. You may hear the clear, amplified voice of one of the guards, coming through a distributed light and sound array.

The Defense Department is currently exploring an 8-speaker, 144-decibel system to achieve this intimidating effect. “Long-range acoustics work pretty well and here’s a case where one plus one equals three. You put both of them together and it is a wonderful and unambiguous warning. There’s nothing really earth-shattering about this piece of hardware,” says Law.

So-called “focused acoustics” systems can send sound in a more-or-less specific direction. “We’ve got an intelligible voice inside that vehicle with the radio and air conditioning on at 600 to 700 meters. That’s better than anything else I’ve ever seen,” said Law.

You ignore all of this and keep going.

300 to 200 Meters

Deafening explosions now erupt all around you. These are non-lethal pyrotechnic grenades, so-called flash-bangs. You have to

look away; the guards are aiming their dazzling lasers into your eyes. (Don’t worry. Causing permanent blindness with a laser is against international law.)

You suddenly feel an intense prickly feeling. This is the military’s **Active Denial System, or ADT**. Unlike microwave guns, the ADT uses 95GHz, or millimeter-wave radiation. The

waves reach only a 64th of an inch into skin at a 1.5 nanometer spot. The military describes it as an “intolerable heating sensation.”

It was deployed to Afghanistan but has never been used in combat. But it could be. The military has put it through a full legal and treaty review and it has been found to be “compliant with the international legal obligations of the United States,” according to Hughes. “These reviews have determined there are no legal prohibitions to the development and use of this technology when it is employed properly and in accordance with appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures,” she added.

Let’s assume that the ADT doesn’t fire for some reason, or there’s some hesitation on the part of the border guard to use it, or you’re a genetically engineered supervillain who lacks nervous matter on the surface of your skin. What happens next?

200 Meters to Checkpoint

The military is done trying to persuade you to abandon this unfortunate course of action. At this point, they’re focusing on your vehicle. They might use a radio-frequency stopper to disrupt your car’s electronics — or they might start firing on it directly, at about 100 meters.





into your undercarriage, disrupting the engine control unit and stalling your vehicle. This is what's called a pre-emplaced electric vehicle stopper. It's a last line of defense, aside from shooting the driver. It halts a vehicle about as well as a net gun fired at a tire, but — unlike the net — it allows the car to be started up again and driven out of the way. Your vehicle is temporarily inoperable. Your vision and hearing are returning to normal.



Once you get to the checkpoint itself, get ready for a shock. As you cruise over a speed bump, a pair of electric fangs attach themselves to the underside of your car, sending 150,000 volts

The stinging sensation on the surface of your skin has subsided. Physically, you're fine. but you're not getting past that checkpoint.

Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He's also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist for nine years. Tucker has written about emerging technology in Slate, The Sun, MIT Technology Review, Wilson Quarterly, The American Legion Magazine, BBC News Magazine, Utne Reader, and elsewhere.

ISIS's Global Strategy: A Wargame

Source: <http://understandingwar.org/report/isiss-global-strategy-wargame>



The United States currently faces multiple national security threats in an environment of growing disorder. ISIS is executing a sophisticated global strategy that involves simultaneous efforts in Iraq and Syria, the Middle East and North Africa, and the wider world. Homegrown terrorism is increasing in the U.S. and Europe. Civil wars are intensifying in Ukraine, Yemen, and Libya, while the U.S. attempts to pivot to the Asia-Pacific. In this complex environment, it is difficult for policymakers to discern the consequences of action or inaction even in the near future.



The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) conducted simulation exercises on February 27 and March 16, 2015 to discover the diplomatic and military opportunities and pitfalls likely to arise in the coming months of the counter-ISIS fight. Several developments that ISW predicted during the simulation have already occurred. Identifying these scenarios and opportunities in advance can enable the U.S. and its allies to make better-informed decisions in the long-term.

ISW's simulation focused on possible outcomes of ISIS's regional activity. The anti-ISIS coalition is currently focused on ISIS only within Iraq and Syria. Therefore the

U.S. is vulnerable to strategic surprise resulting from ISIS's external activity. ISIS has the potential to pressure and divert allies that are critical to the U.S.-led coalition's efforts, while continuing its own expansion program. Simulating the effects of ISIS's endeavor in advance revealed insights that will assist in the creation of a coherent counter-ISIS strategy, rather than a piecemeal strategy formulated as crises occur.

TAKEAWAYS

- ISIS likely will expand regionally and project force globally in the medium term.
- Few countries are willing or able to counter ISIS as a global phenomenon. No simulation participants took multi-front action to limit ISIS's regional expansion, even though most participants opposed ISIS. This was true even of al Qaeda.
- Avoiding or delaying action against ISIS will not necessarily preserve strategic options in the future. Instead, U.S. strategic options may narrow as adversaries grow in strength and potential allies suffer losses and turn to other partners. Participants did not consider that smaller, early action might prevent the need for more drastic steps later on. Simulation participants expressed concern about overreach and

ISW WARGAME FORECAST	
PREDICTED EVENTS	ACTUAL EVENTS
FEBRUARY 2015	EARLY 2015
Egypt	
The U.S. will lift the weapons ban on Egypt . Groups related to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood will mobilize.	March 31: The U.S. lifted the weapons ban on Egypt . July 1: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood called for its supporters to mobilize.
Libya	
ISIS will expand its control on Libya's central coast.	May 28: ISIS seized a major airbase and consolidated its control over Libya's central coast.
Russia	
ISIS will create an affiliate in Russia's North Caucasus.	June 23: ISIS announced an affiliate in Russia's North Caucasus.
Global	
ISIS will launch simultaneous attacks on multiple continents during Ramadan.	June 26: ISIS supporters launched attacks in multiple continents on the same day in Ramadan.
Mediterranean	
ISIS will conduct a major attack against Western tourists in the Mediterranean .	June 26: ISIS claimed a shooting that killed tourists at a beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia .
MENA	
ISIS's affiliates will launch ground offensives in the Middle East and North Africa .	July 1: ISIS's Wilayat Sinai launched a ground assault across North Sinai .

Graphic by Noelle Rutland

www.understandingwar.org



unwittingly playing into sectarian conflicts. However, participants did not recognize that their inaction might also play into those conflicts.

- The military planners in the simulation perceived that the United States does not have enough armed forces to undertake a multi-theater campaign to degrade and defeat ISIS on its own. The U.S. therefore must choose between increasing its armed forces, relying on coalition partners to achieve the defined mission, or changing the defined mission against ISIS.
- The U.S. must define the global counter-ISIS mission, and then determine the nested objectives for ISIS and each of its affiliates in support of that mission.
- In the absence of an explicit strategy to counter ISIS's regional expansion, the U.S. and its allies likely will rely on stable and semi-stable states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. In both simulations the U.S. team's implicit long-term strategy was to contain regional chaos as best possible through these partners, rather than adopt a campaign against extremist groups directly.
- ISIS has an asymmetric advantage because it can project force from disparate regions, potentially exploiting fissures between multiple international organizations and U.S. combatant commands.
- ISIS's Near Abroad and Far Abroad campaigns likely will exacerbate cleavages amongst European actors, leading to interstate and intrastate divergences on security approaches and prioritization of threats.
- Turkey, Russia, and Egypt each have a disproportionate ability to spoil or facilitate counter-ISIS strategies devised by the U.S.
- The U.S. risks strategic failure even if ISIS does not attempt coherent action across global fronts. The campaigns of ISIS's affiliates and supporters across multiple regions may distract and divide the U.S.'s allies and resources, as may other conflicts such as the one in Ukraine.
- ISIS's global campaign likely will increase policymakers' tolerance of frequent, high-level, and widespread violent events, creating opportunities for the United States' adversaries.
- The U.S. and its allies cannot conduct counter-ISIS operations without considering the context of other extremist forces in the region. A strategy focused on ISIS alone likely will allow other radical actors to thrive.

► Read the full study at:

<http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Global%20Strategy%20--%20A%20Wargame%20FINAL.pdf>



Egyptian navy vessel erupts in huge fireball as ISIS carry out rocket strike on patrol ship in the Mediterranean

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3163910/Terror-high-seas-Egyptian-navy-vessel-erupts-huge-fireball-ISIS-carry-rocket-strike-patrol-ship-Mediterranean.html>

July 16 – Extremists loyal to the Islamic State in Egypt have attacked a naval patrol ship in



the Mediterranean Sea, causing it to burst into flames.

The Egyptian military said earlier a coastguard vessel had exchanged shots with militants just two miles off the coast of northern Sinai, an area bordering Israel and the Gaza Strip.

There were no fatalities among the vessel's crew in the shootout with the terrorists,



according to a Facebook message posted by military spokesman, Brigadier General Mohammed Samir. ISIS declared their presence on Sinai - a peninsula popular with British holidaymakers - last



November when up to 2,000 members of the already established jihadi group Ansar Bait al-



Maqdis swore allegiance to ISIS' leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Eyewitnesses said a boat patrolling the Sinai coastline spotted a group of ISIS jihadis on the shore and engaged them. At some point during the fire fight the vessel was struck by a rocket, causing it to burst into flames and withdraw from the battle.

The military said it suffered no casualties although it is understood several patrol workers suffered minor burn injuries. Yesterday (July 15th), the military said it foiled an attempted attack on a military post on a highway linking Cairo with the Red Sea coast. The driver of a car that was carrying 1,100 pounds of dynamite refused to stop at a checkpoint, drawing fire from the troops, the military said. The car then swerved off the road and the driver was killed, the military said in a statement. Egypt faces threats from multiple insurgent factions, including the ISIS affiliate in Sinai, which the military says killed at least 17 soldiers in a July 1 assault there. Officials from several branches of Egypt's security forces previously said that that attack killed dozens more. In another attack claimed by ISIS, Egypt's state prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, was assassinated in Cairo by a car bomb in late June.


EDITOR'S COMMENTS: (1) "Extremists loyal to the Islamic State..." – we have to get used the "politically correct" language of mainstream media! (2) Surprised? Why? Never thought that such an incident might take place? (3) Next piracy incident in Mediterranean Sea or a missile attack against international warships crossing Suez Canal might surprise you more!

What a year of Islamic State terror looks like

Source: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/islamic-state-attacks/>

The Islamic State has grown beyond its original home in Syria and Iraq, extending its operations into other parts of the Middle East and North Africa by establishing alliances and absorbing other terrorist groups. Data from [IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center](#) reveals how the group has claimed responsibility for carrying out attacks across the region.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: This is an **animated website** and I highly suggest visiting the source URL.



ETA warns Spain of 'negative consequences' after refusal to negotiate

Source: <http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2015/07/eta-warns-spain-of-consequences-after.html>

ETA had announced a "definitive end" to its armed activity in October 2011. The armed Basque independentist group ETA warned March 26 that the Spanish government's refusal to negotiate with its leaders will have "negative consequences" and "make it harder to find a solution to the conflict". ETA, blamed for more than 800 deaths in



a four-decade campaign of bombings and shootings for the independence of the Basque homeland which straddles northern Spain and southwestern France, announced a "definitive end" to its armed activity in October 2011.

But the group has not formally disarmed or disbanded as demanded by Madrid and Paris and the Spanish government has repeatedly declined to take part in talks with the outfit.

In a statement published in the website of Basque newspaper Gara, ETA called the Spanish government's refusal to take part in talks with its leaders in Norway "a step backwards" in the statement dated March 17 carried March 26 by the online edition of its mouthpiece Gara.

Several ETA leaders have recently been expelled from Norway where they had met with international mediators and representatives of left-wing Basque independence movement, according to Spanish media reports.

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy reiterated on March 13 his government's refusal to negotiate with the group, which is listed as a terrorist organisation by the United States and the European Union.

ETA repeated that it was willing to talk of disarmament as part of an "agenda of dialogue" if certain conditions are met first, such as the regroupment of hundreds of ETA prisoners held in jails across Spain and France to the Basque region.

ETA has been weakened in recent years by a loss of support among Basque people, and repeated raids by Spanish and French security forces. Its last attack on Spanish soil was in August 2009.

Why misunderstanding Shariah means losing to terror

Source: <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/shariah-islamic-law-terrorism-isis-al-qaeda-christianity-civil-law/story/1/5021.html>



It is always a delight to read yet another article on "Shariah Law" from the English press. As anybody even mildly familiar with Arabic, Urdu or Farsi would tell you, "Shariah" means "law", so it is a wild ride as you read how "Law law" is different from "rule of law" and must be opposed. As most people associate Shariah with the chopping off of limbs and the stoning of women by groups such as the Taliban and ISIS, it is understandable that such confusion exists. Shariah, or Islamic law, currently bears the stains of its most bloodthirsty proponents. But here is the question, if Shariah is Islamic Law, how does it differ from "normal" law? And frankly, does "normal" law have an identity?

The last question is possibly the most important one. There is limited examination of

the civil law that we take for granted in our lives, but the Latin phrases that pepper legal judgements should give some clue to those looking for them. Basically, all law in Europe and the countries it colonised have their roots in Roman law. Even the English law, which relied more on "common law", received a large amount of Roman law in its system through the ecclesiastical courts. This is largely important because the law of the Roman Empire was intimately tied with Christianity. The Codex Theodosianus (438 AD), one of the earliest records of Roman law, was based on the codification of laws by emperor Constantine (272-337 AD) - the 57th Roman Emperor - and the first Christian Roman emperor. Later codes, particularly the Corpus Juris Civilis, which was one of the most important codification of civil laws - promulgated under emperor Justinian- were also adopted by emperors who were explicitly Christian.

This matters primarily because of how law, or rule of law, is viewed by citizens (a word derived from the Latin "civitas" meaning citizenship or community of citizens). In the Christian Roman Empire, the law giver was both civil and religious authority. Religion and the state had no real distinction until the wars of the Enlightenment and Counter-Reformation during which Christian states fought



each other over the differences of law and religion embodied in kings and princes. The Peace of Westphalia, which was signed in 1648, and is seen as the point of birth of the modern state system, explicitly allowed the ruler of his or her province to determine, and have sovereignty over, the religion practised in his or her domain. Ideas such as "rule of law" and other aspects of what we perceive as modern statecraft rose explicitly out of a Christian history, and a Christian understanding of law.

Shariah and 'Just War' theory

Here is an example - the great scholar-saint St Augustine, more properly known as Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (354 -430 AD), Bishop of Hippo Regius, was one of the earliest Christian philosophers dealing with the difficulty of how a faith could reconcile itself with running a state. Of his many concerns was the problem of war. How could a Christian state go to war? To answer this question, he came up with the "Just War theory", or what constitutes a just war and what constitutes a war justly fought - in Latin, it is "jus ad bellum" or the right to go to war, and "jus in bello" or the right conduct during war. These included principles such as legitimate right to declare war, self-defence, proportionality, the safety of civilians which have been developed over the centuries, most famously by the 13th Century Catholic theologian St Thomas Aquinas. Today, much of the core ideas of what we call the Geneva Conventions, trace their origins to this Christian history.

This is not to say that other cultures did not have a "Just War" theory, or that the Romans did not have one before Christianity. They did. Islamic doctrine has such a theory, and the Bhagwad Gita can be read, in one light, as an extended deliberation on "Just War". However, the legal codification of what we call universal principles emerged out of a particular history. The world has largely accepted them because it has evolved beyond being concerned with Christianity and shared key points of overlap with most cultures. However, this should not be used to obscure their origins.

Similarly, what we call civil (from Latin civilis, from which we also get civilised, and civilisation) or "normal" law, is deeply marked by its Christian past, and if you look at the Rule of Law Index maintained by the World Justice Project, you will see an almost exact overlap

with the European Christian countries and the highest scores. The few exceptions in the top 20 - Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong - prove the rule. But just because it has Roman Christian routes, does not mean that it is wrong - the Geneva Conventions above being a case in point.

At the same time, when people familiar with this "normal" view of law try to understand Shariah, they are severely handicapped because, basically, they are trying to see how an Islamic understanding of law fits into the (largely) Christian understanding of law. Is it any surprise that the fit is less than exact?

Two primary differences between Islamic and Christian approaches to law make this stark. The first is that Christian authorities were appointed by the state, thus the highest religious and political authorities were in agreement or often merged. A bishop was both a temporal and religious authority. In Shariah, however, this was not the case. Although important jurists enjoyed the favour of rulers (and sometimes enjoyed their disfavour), the highest authorities on Islamic law were known for their piety and usually earned their living by other means. A judge, or qazi/qadi, might be appointed by the state, but the religious authority would be the alim, and he (almost always a man) was community based and supported. This has been a problem as many European countries try to set up loyalist imams like France's Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM), or even the Egyptian or Turkish "official" Islamic authorities. These never have the same authenticity or legal authority that an independent scholar steeped in Islamic law will have. The one exception would be Iran's system, but arguably the vilayat-e-faqih (or rule of the Islamic jurists) - an innovation by Ayatollah Khomeini - has done more to undermine the authority of the Islamic jurists than give them any respect.

The second primary difference is that, while Christian Roman law, as evidenced by Augustine, separated the path of righteousness from civil law, the whole point of Shariah is for an individual to be a more moral person. The difference breaks down to this: Roman civil law prioritises the better management of civil relations, while Islamic law states that following Shariah will make you a better person. A casual glance at the richest, most powerful, most "successful"



people in countries based on Roman law gives you an assortment of banal, evil, greedy, comical and criminal. This is because civil law is not concerned about your moral character, but only that you follow legal codes - being a better (or worse) person is entirely up to you. ("Then Jesus said to them, 'Give back to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's.'" Mark, 12:17).

The key component of European style secularism is also the same.

Islamic countries are no better when it comes to the mix of characters that rise to the top - on the whole, they are worse. But here is the difference, as Shariah is not the preserve of the "official" jurists - despite the innovations of Khomeini - the failures of the leaders are not seen as reflecting on Shariah. When people mock the failure of these leaders, it does not invalidate Shariah. In fact, it gives greater support to the independent religious jurists who resist state authority and patronage helping, at times, the most extreme movements. Both al Qaeda and ISIS have claimed to rise in resistance to "corrupt" state authorities.

In fact, as Shariah, at best, provides a guide to governance rather than a body of law or a whole code, the governance in many Muslim empires, such as the Mughal empire was not by Shariah. It was by the principles of Shahnama, and only influenced by Shariah to the extent that a ruler - such as Aurangzeb -

wished to be guided by the ulema. This might also explain why the states that have tried hardest to legislate Shariah, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Taliban Emirate of Afghanistan or the Islamic State, have all been such disasters. It is easy to mock something you do not understand, and those mocking the appeal of Shariah do so quite often because they do not understand how the law that we live under came about. Recently, Angela Merkel spoke about how the problem in Europe was not too much Islam, but too little Christianity. In China, the Communist Party is encouraging the rise of indigenous Buddhist movements to deal with what they perceive as a moral vacuum. In India, we have the Naxal movement, the Hindutva movement, and numerous separatist movements - all arguing, to some extent, that we need a "better" society, and "better" human beings.

By sticking to sterile argumentation of the rule of law, we are not engaging with the question being raised, and maybe only in India, with its massive diversity, and its many approaches, can such a question be properly debated - only if we know what we are debating. Otherwise, we will keep mocking movements like ISIS, while they continue to recruit the gullible, the frustrated and the disgusted, who we don't even care to address.

BIG LIST of Muslim terror attacks in U.S. since 9/11

Source: <http://www.wnd.com/2015/07/big-list-of-muslim-terror-attacks-in-u-s-since-911/>

Deadly Islamic jihad on American soil still happening at alarming pace:

Sept. 11, 2001 – Nineteen al-Qaida terrorists hijacked four American passenger planes in a coordinated attack on U.S. soil. Nearly 200 Americans were murdered by the terrorists who hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 and flew it into the Pentagon, collapsing its western side. Meanwhile, two other planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, were flown into the North and South towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Both 110-story towers collapsed, killing 2,752 people. A fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, was flown by terrorists diverting the flight to Washington, D.C. However, passengers fought the hijackers, and the plane crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing 40 passengers.

Feb. 16, 2002 – Muslim snipers Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad kill Keenya Cook in Tacoma, Washington. The snipers would kill 21 more people in a crime wave that stretched from coast to coast.

March 19, 2002 – Jerry Ray Taylor, 60, is shot by snipers Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad at a Tucson, Arizona, golf course.

Sept. 5, 2002 – Paul J. LaRuffa, 55, is shot and wounded by snipers Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad in Clinton, Maryland, in the parking lot of his restaurant.





Sept. 14, 2002 – Muslim snipers Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad wound Rupinder “Benny” Oberoi, 22, outside a liquor store in Silver Spring, Maryland.

Sept. 15, 2002 – Snipers Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad would Muhammad Rashid, 32, outside a liquor store in Brandywine, Maryland.

Sept. 21, 2002 – Snipers Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad kill Million A. Woldemariam, 41, outside an Atlanta, Georgia, liquor store. Snipers also kill Claudine Lee Parker, 52, outside a liquor store in Montgomery, Alabama. The snipers shot Kellie Adams, 24, in the neck as she approached a liquor store in Montgomery, Alabama, where she worked.

Sept. 23, 2002 – Snipers kill Hong Im Ballenger, 45, outside a beauty store in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. They also kill James D. Martin, 55, outside a supermarket in Wheaton, Louisiana.

Oct. 3, 2002 – Snipers kill James L “Sonny” Buchanan, 39, while he mows a lawn near a car dealership in White Flint, Maryland. Premkumar A. Walekar, 54, is murdered while he pumps gas at a station in Aspen Hill, Maryland. The snipers kill Sarah Ramos, 34, as she sat outside a shopping center in Silver Spring, Maryland. They also murder Lori Lewis Rivera, 25, while she vacuums her car at a Shell gas station in Kensington, Maryland. While she attempts to cross a street in Northwest Washington, Pascal Charlot, 72, is shot and killed by the snipers.

Oct. 4, 2002 – Snipers wound Caroline Seawell, 43, as loads her car with her purchases in a Fredericksburg, Virginia, store parking lot.

Oct. 7, 2002 – Snipers wound 13-year-old Iran Brown outside a Nejamin Tasker Middle School in Bowie, Maryland.

Oct. 9, 2002 – Snipers kill Vietnam veteran Dean H. Meyers, 53, while he pumps gas in Manassas, Virginia.

Oct. 11, 2002 – Snipers kill Kenneth H. Bridges, 53, as he pumped gas at a station near Massaponax, Virginia.

Oct. 14, 2002 – Snipers kill Linda Franklin, 47, in a Home Depot parking lot in Falls Church, Virginia.

Oct. 19, 2002 – Snipers wound Jeffrey Hopper, 37, while he walks with his wife in a restaurant parking lot in Ashland, Virginia.

Oct. 22, 2002 – Snipers kill Conrad E. Johnson, 35, a bus driver standing in the doorway of his bus in Aspen Hill, Maryland.

Aug., 6, 2003 – The Muslim son of a Saudi millionaire, Mohammed Ali Alayed, 23, slashes the throat of an estranged Jewish friend, Ariel Sellouk, killing and nearly decapitating the man in Houston, Texas.

Dec. 2, 2003 – A Jewish man, Joseph Applebaum, suffers from a swelling of the stomach that is easily diagnosed and treated. He was identified as Jewish on the front of his medical chart. But instead of receiving treatment, he is left to die by his Muslim doctor.

April 15, 2004 – Fearing that his brother had molested his wife and daughter, Muslim man Ismail Peltek killed his wife by bludgeoning her on the head with a hammer and attacked his 22- and 4-year-old daughters with a knife. Peltek, 41, told investigators, “I was afraid that my family’s honor was taken.” He said he attacked his 4-year-old because he worried that she had been “sullied” by a gynecological exam, according to the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, which reported that both daughters suffered fractured skulls. Investigators



asked him, “if you had the opportunity to kill the family again, would you?” Peltek replied, “My female family, yes. My male family, no.”

January 2005 – Somali immigrant Mustafa Mohamed, 30, slashes and injures six people at a retirement home in Alexandria, Virginia. One resident required 200 stitches. Another suffered a broken neck. A judge rules Mohamed is not guilty by reason of insanity.

March 3, 2006 – Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, an Iranian-American seeking to “avenge the deaths of Muslims worldwide” and “punish” the U.S. government, intentionally runs down and injures nine people with his sport utility vehicle on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He pleaded guilty to nine counts of attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to 33 years in prison.

June 16, 2006 – A 62-year-old Jewish man, Paul Schrum, who had gone to the movies to see “X-Men: The Last Stand” in a heavily Jewish area near Baltimore, Maryland, is shot by Muslim gunman Mujtaba Rabbani Jabbar, 24. Jabbar shot Schrum three times in the upper body, walked into the lobby, placed his gun on a counter and waited for police.

June 25, 2006 – Michael Julius Ford, a 22-year-old convert to Islam, uses a long-barrel handgun to shoot four co-workers and a police officer at a Denver, Colorado, Safeway, claiming the attack was “Allah’s choice.” One person died in the shooting spree. When Ford fired at police, he was shot and killed.

July 28, 2006 – Muslim Pakistani man Naveed Afzal Haq shot six women, killing one, at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle building in Seattle, Washington. Haq grabbed a 14-year-old girl and used her as a hostage during the attack. Officials classified the attack as a “hate crime” rather than terrorism.

Jan. 1, 2008 – Egyptian-born cab driver Yaser Said shoots and kills his two daughters in Irving, Texas, because they were dating non-Muslim boys. The daughters had run away from home a week earlier, fearing their father would kill them.

July 6, 2008 – Muslim Pakistani man Chaudry Rashid, 56, strangled his 25-year-old daughter in Jonesboro, Georgia, after she said she wanted out of an arranged marriage. Police said the daughter, Sandela Kanwal, had argued with her father about the arrangement of her marriage to a man in Chicago. An officer explained, “At some point during the altercation, he ended up killing his daughter.”

Feb. 12, 2009 – Pakistani-American Muzzammil Syed Hassan was the CEO of the first American Muslim TV network broadcast in English, Bridge TV. Hassan beheaded his estranged wife, Aasiya Zubair, after she filed for divorce. Her body was found at the TV station. When he was arrested, he said he “felt an incredible amount of relief” after he killed the woman.

April 12, 2009 – Upon learning that they had patronized a strip club, a Muslim man shoots and kills his brother-in-law and another man in Phoenix, Arizona.

June 1, 2009 – In a drive-by shooting, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad – a convert to Islam who had traveled to Yemen and was deported to the U.S. for overstaying his visa – opened fire on U.S. soldiers standing in front of a Little Rock, Arkansas, recruiting office. Muhammad killed one private and injured another. When he was arrested Muhammad explained that he had planned to kill as many soldiers as possible and was given the assignment by Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.

November 2009 – Iraq-born Muslim man Faleh Hassan Almaleki, 48, intentionally hit his daughter with his car and killed her because she had become “too Westernized.” He also attacked the mother of the girl’s boyfriend. Police said, “It occurred because [of] her not following traditional family values. He felt she was becoming too westernized, and he didn’t like that.” His daughter had backed out of an arranged marriage.

Nov. 5, 2009 – Muslim gunman Nidal Malik Hassan, an Army psychiatrist, fatally shoots 13 people and wounds 30 others at Fort Hood, Texas.

Dec. 4, 2009 – A Muslim graduate student from Saudi Arabia, Abdulsalam S. al-Zahrani, stabbed his non-Muslim Islamic studies professor, Richard T. Antoun, to death to avenge “persecuted” Muslims. One of his roommates said, “He was all the time shouting in Arabic, shouting threats, insulting his country for no reason.”



April 14, 2010 – A Muslim convert, James A. Larry, 33, became angry that his family would not convert to Islam and shot his mother, pregnant wife, infant son and two nieces in Marquette Park, Illinois. He pleaded guilty to multiple counts of murder, attempted murder and the intentional homicide of an unborn child. “He was upset at his wife and their family — he felt disrespected that they would not join his religion,” Assistant State’s Attorney Jim McKay said. “It didn’t matter if they were young or old, pregnant or not. He wanted them dead.” Larry also shot his 13-year-old nephew in the face, but the boy survived. When the man was arrested, he told officers Allah told him to kill his family, according to court records. According to a police report, he said, “I wish I had more bullets. I wish I had more bullets.”

April 30, 2011 – Rahim Abdul Alftlawi, 46, shot his step-daughter in the head at point-blank range in Warren, Michigan, after she refused to strictly adhere to Muslim customs. The family claimed the motive was not religion.

Sept. 11, 2011 – Three Jewish men are discovered in Waltham, Massachusetts, with their throats slit from ear to ear and nearly decapitated. Authorities believed the murders were not random, and thousands of dollars in cash and marijuana were left at the scene. According to reports, authorities believe Boston Marathon bombers Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his younger brother, both Muslims, may have been responsible for the triple homicide.

Jan. 15, 2012 – A Jordanian Muslim man, Ali Mahwood-Awad Irsan, 57, gunned down Iranian medical student, Gelareh Bagherzadeh, a friend of his daughter and a Christian convert who widely denounced Islam. He later killed his Christian son-in-law after his daughter married him without permission. Assistant Harris County District Attorney Tammy Thomas told a district judge, “He said, ‘I killed that b—ch, and you’re next. No one insults my honor as a Muslim and gets away with it.’”

Feb. 7, 2013 – Yusuf Ibrahim, 28, shot two Coptic Christians to death and beheaded them in Buena Vista, New Jersey. He also removed their hands before burying their bodies in the backyard of an abandoned house. Quran 8:12 states, “When thy Lord was revealing to the angels, ‘I am with you; so confirm the believers. I shall cast into the unbelievers’ hearts terror; so smite above the necks, and smite every finger of them!”

March 31, 2013 – Reshad Riddle walked into an Ashtabula, Ohio, church and fatally shot his father after an Easter service. After the shooting, witnesses say, walked through the church holding the gun and shouted that the slaughter was “the will of Allah. This is the will of God.”

April 15, 2013 – Muslim Chechen brothers Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonate two pressure cooker bombs during the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring an estimated 264 others. After the bombing, they killed an MIT policeman, stole an SUV and exchanged gunfire with police. Tamerlan was shot and his brother drove over him with the stolen SUV. Tamerlan was pronounced dead at the scene. After a manhunt, police found Dzhokhar hiding in a boat in a man’s backyard. Dzhokhar has been sentenced to death.

Aug. 4, 2013 – A Muslim convert, Daymond Agnew, 34, went to an Ace Hardware store on a “mission from Allah to help people” before he fatally stabbed employee Daniel Joseph Stone 17 times.

March 6, 2014 – Registered sex offender James Cosby, 46, is accused of bludgeoning his lesbian daughter to death and shooting her lover in Port Bolivar, Texas. Police believe he then dumped the bodies near a ferry gate. In his bedroom, Cosby had the Quran open to a page that says homosexuality is a sin, family advocate Quanell X told KHOU-TV. “It’s quite unfortunate but he had a real, real warped understanding, in my opinion, of the religion of Islam and its position on the gay lifestyle and what one should do,” Quanell X said.

April 27, 2014 – A 30-year-old Muslim man, Ali Muhammad Brown, is accused of shooting to death two men in Seattle and a man in New Jersey. According to local reports, he told police the killings were “vengeance” for U.S. actions in the Mideast. According to court documents, he said they were “just kills” and that he was “just doing my small part” as a self-styled jihadist.


Sept. 25, 2014 – Alton Nolen is accused of beheading a woman in Moore, Oklahoma. Co-workers reported that Nolen had been trying to convert them to Islam. Nolen reportedly used “some Arabic terms” during his attack and had an interest in beheadings. Nolen told



a judge, "I'm Muslim. My question is, do you have any Muslims that can represent me as a Muslim?"

May 3, 2015 – In Garland, Texas, Pamela Geller, along with her group the American Freedom Defense Initiative, hosted a "Draw Muhammad" event. Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi of Phoenix responded to a call to "avenge the prophet" and traveled to Garland, where they were shot and killed by a security guard after opening fire in an apparent attempt to get into the building. The guard was wounded in the attack. Islamic radicals have since called for Geller's head, and vow to kill anyone who "blasphemes" Muhammad.

July 16, 2015 – Four U.S. Marines have been shot dead in an attack, reportedly by a lone Islamic gunman, on U.S. Navy facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Chattanooga Mayor Andy Berke said five people died in all, including the gunman. Two law enforcement sources told CBS News that the shooting suspect was identified as Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez, 24. Abdulazeez was born in Kuwait and emigrated to the U.S. where he reportedly became a naturalized U.S. citizen.



The FBI is investigating two crime scenes, a Navy recruiting center at a strip mall where the first shots were fired, and a Navy reserve center about 7 miles away. More than 100 rounds were reportedly fired in a shootout with police at the recruitment center parking lot. The shooter then drove to the Navy



reserve center and started shooting Marines, four of whom were killed. The Marines would not have been armed at a reserve Navy installation or at a recruitment center, both of which were described as "soft targets."

The four Marines who were fatally shot reportedly were attacked at the Navy Reserve Center on

Amnicola Highway. A police officer at the first location was injured and was being treated at a local hospital for a gunshot wound to the ankle. "We are conducting this as an act of domestic terrorism," said Bill Killian, U.S. Attorney for Tennessee at a 3 p.m. press conference. He came back to the podium 15 minutes later and backtracked, telling reporters "I would encourage you not to get caught up in labels...whether it was an act of terrorism or a crime."



Anders Breivik enrolled on Oslo University political science course

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/17/anders-breivik-serial-killer-study-oslo-university-norway>



July 17 – Anders Breivik, the Norwegian serial killer, has been admitted to a course at the country’s oldest and most illustrious university – though he will study from his prison cell and will not come into contact with staff or students. Norway’s most infamous citizen, jailed for 21 years for shooting dead 69 students at a summer camp in 2011 after a bomb he planted in Oslo killed a further eight people, announced his intention to study politics and write books in 2012.

He applied to Oslo University the following year but was turned down because he did not meet its criteria. Since then he has taken courses in prison and now qualifies for admission.

All Norwegian prisoners have the right to pursue higher education if they meet the admission requirements and compete successfully against other applicants.

Breivik will study political science, during which he will learn about democracy and justice, pluralism and respect for human rights, minorities and fundamental freedoms, said the university’s rector, Ole Petter Ottersen. Prison regulations prevent him from accessing digital

learning resources or communicating with other students through the internet.

University staff who does not consent to teaching him can abstain, Ottersen said. “Even though there are a lot of strong feelings about this, teachers and staff members realise we have to **stick to the rules**,” Ottersen said. He added that denying Breivik the right to study would be “a slippery slope”.

“The last thing we would do is introduce a separate law for Breivik. It is a person’s right to be admitted to university when they are qualified, and if you deny somebody that right it is the equivalent to meting out an additional punishment, which is not the university’s role.”

Ottersen said he had expected more objections from the public, but it was “remarkable” how few people had taken a stance against the university’s position. “One explanation is that when he was taken to court there was a tremendous debate whether he should be granted the same rights and opportunities as any other person, and that discussion concluded that he should.”



The university's political science degree consists of nine subjects, five of which are compulsory seminars, suggesting Breivik can start the degree but will be unable to graduate, Dag Harald Claes, of the department of political science, told Norwegian media.

Lisbeth Kristine Røynealand, who lost her 18-year-old daughter Synne in the Utøya massacre, said: "For us it is irrelevant if he sits in his cell and reads fiction or whether he is

studying a book of political science." Røynealand heads the national support group for survivors of the attack.

Four years after Breivik's rampage on 22 July 2011, the Utøya summer camp is reopening in August with record numbers attending, including Ayat al-Qurmezi, the 24-year-old Bahraini poet and activist, and former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Too much Democracy may be harmful to state of mind!

New Book Offers Insights into ISIS and How International Community Can Combat It

Source: <http://www.newswise.com/articles/wiu-terrorism-researcher-s-new-book-offers-insights-into-isis-and-how-international-community-can-combat-it>

July 16 – A new book co-authored by a Western Illinois University homeland security researcher investigates the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS) and offers insights into the nature of the IS and what the international community can do to combat it.

"The Islamic State: Combating the Caliphate Without Borders" provides critical background information and analysis about the hybrid terror quasi-state's multifaceted activities and effects in the region and beyond, as well as measures to combat it, said WIU School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration (LEJA) Professor Dean Alexander.

Alexander, who is also the director of the WIU School of LEJA's Homeland Security Research Program (HSRP), said the book's subject material ties in with his research and his instruction at Western.

"WIU's HSRP addresses domestic and international terror threats and their implications. The threats posed by the Islamic State to the global community are significant and long lasting, necessitating expansive and far-reaching responses at home and abroad," he noted.

As a faculty member in Western's well known School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration, Alexander integrates his research and insights into his courses and service activities. In Spring 2015, he organized two seminars at Western, which both provided


insights about foreign fighters, the Islamic State and law enforcement responses. In addition, Alexander has delivered lectures about the crises in Iraq and Syria, as well as on the

issues of foreign fighters and the Islamic State. He has also published on those topics in the U.S. and internationally.

Alexander's teaching, research and speaking activities encompass terrorism, security and legal issues. He has delivered topical lectures in ten countries, including to law enforcement and military officials at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. State Department and National Intelligence University events, as

well as presented at the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center, Oregon Fusion Center, Milwaukee Police Department, Michigan State Police, McAllen Police Department, Yuma Police Department and the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department, among others.

"The Islamic State: Combating the Caliphate Without Borders" is co-authored with Yonah Alexander, director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and senior fellow of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (Arlington, VA). The book, which will be published by Lexington Books in September, can be pre-ordered online.



Huge spike in Americans 'very concerned' about domestic Islamic extremism


Source: <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/pew-huge-spike-in-americans-very-concerned-about-domestic-islamic-extremism/article/2568471>

July 17 – Even before the killing of four Marines in Chattanooga, Tenn., in an "act of terrorism," Americans revealed a deep concern about Islamic extremism and a very high worry about ISIS, according to the latest poll from Pew Research.

Some 53 percent, more than the average in the non-Islamic world, said they are "very concerned" about Islamic extremism in the United States, said Pew.

Concern about Islamic Extremism Rising in Many Western and Muslim Countries

Very concerned about Islamic extremism in our country



While the numbers were lower than for some countries in Europe that have experienced domestic Islamic terrorism, they were much higher than a few years ago. In 2011, for example, 32 percent told Pew that they were very concerned.

The slayings Thursday by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez, born in Kuwait, could spike those numbers.

Pew added that Republicans are more concerned than Democrats, though no reason was given.

"In the U.S., these demographic differences also extend to political party and religion. Republicans and Americans who say religion is important are more likely to be concerned about Islamic extremism than are Democrats and independents, and those who say religion is not important to their daily lives," said the survey analysis.

And the numbers are even higher when it comes to concern about ISIS. Pew said that 70 percent of Americans have a high concern about the movement known for seizing key Iraq territories and beheadings.

Concern about ISIS Tracks with Concern about Extremism

Among those who are ___ about ISIS


<i>Very concerned about Islamic extremism in ...</i>	Very concerned %	Less concerned* %
Spain	73	17
Lebanon	76	21
U.S.	70	16
UK	70	16
Italy	69	15
Australia	64	13
France	81	30
Canada	51	8
Senegal	71	27
Israel	61	18
Russia	58	15
Poland	51	10
Palest. ter.	57	18
Burkina Faso	78	42
Germany	55	23
Malaysia	48	20
Turkey	35	9
Nigeria	85	62
Indonesia	25	11
Pakistan	55	45



Abdulazeez was the third Jordanian-Palestinian to attack US military personnel in six years

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/24751/Abdulazeez-was-the-third-Jordanian-Palestinian-to-attack-US-military-personnel-in-six-years>

Mohammed Youssuf Abdulazeez, 24, who Thursday, July 16, murdered four US Marines in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and wounded



three people, was the third Muslim of Jordanian-Palestinian descent to perpetrate a massacre of American military or intelligence personnel in six years. debkafle's intelligence and counter-terrorist experts point out that these acts of terror were the price that US army and intelligence agencies paid for relying on Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate (Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Amman) as a source of penetration agents for fighting Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and other radical Islamist organizations.

US investigators reported Saturday that Abdulazeez had visited Jordan four times in the last 10 years, and during one of those visits traveled to Yemen. There is no chance that the killer - a naturalized American citizen whose real name may be Mohammed Youssuf Said - could have traveled to Yemen on a Jordanian passport "under the radar" of Jordanian intelligence, which may also have succeeded in recruiting him. And there is no way that Jordan's GID would not have tipped off US intelligence and counter-terrorist authorities.

It is obvious that US law enforcement agencies, who claim to have found "no evidence that he had any contact with militants or militant groups," know a lot more about the killer's background than they admit and are feeding out tidbits slowly.

This goes far to explain the unusual aspects of the Chattanooga attack. Within minutes of the shooting, hundreds of agents of the FBI and other agencies dealing with the war on terror were spread out at the scenes of the crime - the Navy recruiting center and the Navy reserve center 12 km away. On the scene with exceptional speed too was the Tennessee US Attorney who said at once that the attacks were being treated as an "act of domestic terrorism." But it is hard to understand how a Muslim, who wrote this message on his blog: "Life is short and bitter. And the opportunity to submit to Allah may pass you by" - managed to acquire an arsenal of deadly weapons, including at least two AK-47 automatic rifles and a handgun, which he used on his murderous rampage in Chattanooga. More weapons were found at his home.

It appears likely to debkafle's intelligence experts that Abdulazeez or Said, whatever his name, exploited a "dead spot" in the cooperation between US and Jordanian intelligence services to coolly and thoroughly prepare his act of terror in Chattanooga. This opportunity and its timing, on the last day of Ramadan, may have been engineered by his handlers, whether a clandestine Islamic State operative in Jordan, or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-AQAP in Yemen.

His methods recalled the modus operandi employed by Al Qaeda in 2009, when Humam Khalil al-Balawi, a Jordanian physician, was recruited by the GID for a US Central Intelligence operation, which was to use his medical qualifications to penetrate Ayman Zawahiri's close circle. Dr. Balawi succeeded in gaining the Al Qaeda leader's confidence. But Zawahiri also managed to turn him round. On Dec. 30, 2009, he arrived at the covert US base of Camp Chapman in southeast Afghanistan to deliver his report on the Al Qaeda leader's plans, which was eagerly awaited and destined to reach the desk of President Barack Obama.

Instead of handing over his report, the Jordanian doctor detonated the bomb vest strapped around his chest, killing himself and nine



of the CIA agents standing around him. A month earlier, on Nov. 9, 2009, Army psychiatrist Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, with whom the Tennessee killer shared the same Jordanian-Palestinian background, shot dead

13 American soldiers and injured 32 in a sudden attack at the US base of Fort Hood in Texas. Abdulazeez clearly followed in the footsteps of both these forerunners.

Was Afghanistan's Invasion Also Based on Lies?

By Jack Balkwill

Source: <http://dissentvoice.org/2015/07/was-afghanistans-invasion-also-based-on-lies/>



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July 18 – There appears to be a bigger lie than “weapons of mass destruction.” It’s not simply that the illegal invasion of Iraq was based on lies, but that the entire “war on terrorism” is likely based on lies.

We were told by our government that Afghanistan was invaded for giving shelter to Osama bin Laden, who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Mainstream press has pushed this so repeatedly that “9/11” and “Osama bin Laden” have become interchangeable.

While working on this piece I asked the first three people I ran into at my local grocery store “Who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks?” three times getting “Osama bin Laden” for replies. This is not scientific, yet it makes one wonder how this would work out in national polling.

But what if bin Laden was not responsible for the 9/11 attacks despite the drumbeat of government officials and the corporate press? What if there has been a rush to judgment to make it appear the Bush regime was taking definitive action?

The invasion of Afghanistan certainly wasn't about the Taliban – the Bush regime gave the Taliban \$43 million in “aid” only four months before the 9/11 attacks, so were on friendly terms.

Following are three reasons to question official sources on their *casus belli* for invading Afghanistan.

Attempts to Peacefully Resolve the Issue

First, before the invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban offered to try bin Laden in exchange for evidence that he was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

President Bush provided no evidence, and invaded Afghanistan instead.

After the start of the U.S. air campaign, the Taliban offered to send bin Laden to a third country for trial if evidence could be provided that he had been involved in the 9/11 attacks –

a proposal the United States also promptly rejected.

Why not provide evidence, if it were available, to prevent a war? It was obvious that the people of Afghanistan would defend their country from a foreign invasion, as they had since Alexander the Great invaded, and there would be a great loss of life (see Roman Empire, British Empire, USSR, etc.).



There can only be two answers— that there was no evidence supporting the cause for invasion, or that former President Bush is a psychopath who doesn't care about human life, so contemptuously ignored the request for evidence.

Bin Laden's Denials

Second, bin Laden denied, more than once, in the months following 9/11, that he was involved in the dirty deed. Less than a week after the 9/11 attacks, *al Jazeera* quoted bin Laden: "The U.S. government has consistently blamed me for being behind every occasion its enemies attack it. I would like to assure the world that I did not plan the recent attacks, which seem to have been planned by people for personal reasons."

In an interview with Pakistan's *Karachi Ummat* on 28 September 2001, bin Laden was quoted: *Neither I had any knowledge of these attacks nor I consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other people. Such a practice is forbidden ever in the course of a battle. ... I have already said that we are against the American system, not against its people, whereas in these attacks, the common American people have been killed.*

This is a translation from Arabic to Urdu to English, and may not be entirely clear. But for those who believe bin Laden was lying, I would suggest they come up with a motive for such a lie. The USA had offered a \$25 million reward for information leading to his capture, and President Bush had threatened "I want justice, and there's an old poster out West that says, 'Wanted Dead or Alive,'" so bin Laden had nothing to gain from such a lie – he was condemned either way. Bin Laden's followers would have admired him as a great hero for having taken on the USA, so he had much to gain by accepting responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, were it a fact.

Demonization

Third, there was an extensive effort to demonize bin Laden, at times with apparently false charges. Why would this be necessary for one who was guilty?

Our government and corporate media, as one on National Security State issues, made him

out to be abominable, and without providing evidence, unceasingly assumed his guilt. Recordings were blasted and headlined in Western corporate print and electronic media of bin Laden accepting responsibility for 9/11. The public were not given the same eyeball-grabbing headlines when the recordings were proven to be likely bogus.

Here is a [Guardian report](#) showing that Swiss Scientists suggested that an audio tape of bin Laden taking responsibility was likely faked, although widely broadcast in the corporate press as evidence of his involvement in 9/11 attacks.

Here's a [BBC report](#) showing how the "smoking gun" video may have been faked, again, after the corporate press hyped the video as incontrovertible evidence.

Conclusion

The official version, that 19 Arab hijackers were responsible, has flaws. One flaw was that many of the alleged hijackers have been found alive and well since 9/11. Of course, it may be that the hijackers used pseudonyms to conceal their identities.

But getting beyond these 19 Arabs is difficult because they are all dead and cannot be interviewed. Official government investigations into 9/11, much of which are classified, look like reflexive actions to neatly tie up loose ends rather than serious inquiries.

Certainly, as Ward Churchill pointed out (and lost his job for raising the issue), Arabs had a clear motive for the 9/11 attacks, with the UN revealing, only two years earlier, that the sanctions pushed mainly by the USA on the people of Iraq resulted in over 500,000 deaths of children under age five, mostly Arab, and most Arabs were aware of this and seething with anger.

To jump to the conclusion that bin Laden was behind the 9/11 attacks causes one to wonder, "Why then did the FBI never bring charges against bin Laden for the hijackings and murders? Why did the wanted posters (up to his death he was on the FBI ten most wanted list) not mention the biggest crime, though they mentioned smaller terrorist incidents as reasons for his being on the list?"

We may never know if bin Laden was responsible for 9/11, but his involvement was used as the excuse for invading Afghanistan and slaughtering a massive



number of people, based on the assumption that they gave bin Laden refuge.

Just as nobody has been charged with a crime for the illegal invasion of Iraq based on lies, it would appear that an investigation is in order involving the justification behind invading

Afghanistan, starting with the matter of proof that bin Laden was directly involved. The American people and the people of Afghanistan have every right to be presented with the evidence.

Jack Balkwill is an activist in Virginia.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Conspiracy? Truth? Smoke without fire? Historians of the future will surely a lot of digging to do!

Russia's Islamic State Challenge In North Caucasus – Analysis

By Observer Research Foundation

By Kanak Gokarn*

Source: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/10072015-russias-islamic-state-challenge-in-north-caucasus-analysis/>

Whenever the conversation turns to the Islamic State, the question on everyone's mind centres around what the US response will be.

Assad, in the violent sectarian civil war, have drawn the Islamic State's ire. ISIL has publicly called out Russian President Vladimir Putin by name for the aforementioned support and declared its intention to "liberate" Chechnya.

Russia has been facing down its own home-grown insurgency in the North Caucasus – the problem of Chechen independence that has already resulted in two devastating wars and a concurrent rise in Islamic extremism. Islam has been a part of the local culture for centuries but it appears that only recently, in the face of conflict and oppression after the First Chechen War, did extremism take hold. Islam



Understandably so, considering its presence in the area over the last several years has had a huge impact on the current state of things. But focusing solely on the United States' actions has led to other major players in the area being neglected, particularly Russia whose connection to the Middle East goes far back and continues well into the present. Its close strategic, geographical and cultural ties to the region makes it an important factor in the struggle against ISIL, and also more vulnerable to its influence.

Given its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, it is no surprise that the parallel, yet intersecting conflict involving the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, has dragged Russia in. Its support and arms shipments to one of the Islamic State's enemies, Syrian President Bashar al-

was, for some, conflated with the struggle for Chechen independence.

The Second Chechen War ended when an agreement was reached between Moscow and Akhmad Kadyrov, the Chief Mufti of this secessionist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria that had been proclaimed in 1991. Kadyrov, a militia commander during the First Chechen War, switched sides in 1999, citing his opposition* to the growing Wahhabi influence in the struggle. Following his assassination in 2004, his son, Ramzan Kadyrov, took over as Head of the Chechen Republic in 2007, a few months after he turned 30, the minimum age for the post. The separatist forces that stayed came into conflict with these pro-Russian Chechen groups, and



some fled to the mountains or to neighbouring areas such as Georgia's Pankisi Gorge and Dagestan – an area that has seen an increase in militant activity over the past several years. There was an attempt to unite the various groups fighting in Chechnya, leading to the formation of the Caucasian Front, functioning as a unit of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria under then-President Abdul-Halim Sadulayev. Subsequently, the Republic itself was abolished and the Caucasus Emirate was formed under Doku Umarov, with the aim of establishing an Islamic Emirate in Russia's North Caucasus region.

Fighters trained in this conflict are a part of the nearly two thousand Russian nationals who have gone on to fight for ISIL. Estimates go as high as five thousand. Several "battle-hardened" Chechens already occupy commanding roles. ISIL has also stepped up its recruitment efforts by releasing several Russian-language magazines that are currently in circulation, notably "Istok" ("Source"), and there have been reports of Central Asian migrant workers in Moscow being recruited by Chechen "gangs" to fight for the Islamic State. Several Chechen and Dagestani youth (among others) have grown increasingly disillusioned by their prospects and the corruption they encounter at home. Many are attracted to the growing influence of Salafism as a counterpoint to Sufism that has been associated with a corrupt and inefficient state. Some are drawn to the idea of living under Sharia law, free from persecution, and no doubt persuaded by the staggering amount of propaganda that has been flooding the Internet.

Although there is a very real risk of these fighters returning to Russia in order to carry out attacks, at the moment it seems unlikely as it is the nature of the Islamic State that it needs physical territory to maintain credibility and establish a caliphate, and until that territory is secure, it cannot afford to have experienced fighters leave Iraq and Syria. Expertise is needed, especially when ISIL is facing strong opposition on various fronts, such as the Kurdish forces. There is, of course, the risk of local actors claiming to carry out attacks in ISIL's name, but Russia has unfortunately been facing such targeted attacks for the last several years as a consequence of the North Caucasus insurgency.

In December 2014, militants from the Caucasus Emirate carried out attacks on

Chechnya's capital Grozny. There are regular clashes between security forces and rebel groups resulting in casualties, although the number has been falling in recent years. Some attribute it to the exodus of fighters to Syria and Iraq; others claim the increase of anti-terror operations in the region. But there is a threat—that of local actors that are willing to take up the cause of the Islamic State in their own region.

In the event that the goals of the Caucasus Emirate and the Islamic State align, the threat to Russia would be even greater, given the presence of a local militant group with very specific interests in the region owing its allegiance to the larger, more global group. It would allow the Islamic State to try and achieve its goals in Chechnya through a local proxy and would solve the problem of needing to acquire contiguous territory, which would have been an obstacle for ISIL since its advance would have been blocked by the enemies surrounding it – Iran, Turkey, the Kurds, Jordan, Israel. Many commanders have already declared support for the Islamic State, including Aslan Byutukayev, commander of the Chechen wing of the Caucasus Emirate, who claims to have command of "as many as 15,000" fighters. But the fact still remains that these two groups are rooted in very different histories even though they may share superficially similar goals. That the Caucasus Emirate is a local phenomenon with local ambitions, and the fact that many Salafis in the region are divided over the issue of the Islamic State raises doubts about the groups' allegiances as a whole.

So far, Russia's response to the threat of ISIL has been very measured — inside and outside its borders. So far the only overt way of combating ISIL has been by providing supplies and arms to its enemies, including the Syrian president. Iran could be a key partner in the region, and Moscow has been seeking to build closer ties with Tehran. Russia can keep ISIL focused on Iraq and Syria for the time being, and must rely on regional powers to act as a stabilizing force. It is unlikely any significant number of troops will be deployed; even countries in the region seem hesitant in sending troops to Syria to fight. Within its boundaries, it has been dealing with the insurgency by continuing anti-terror operations.

Russia, like a lot of European countries, also faces the problem



of returning fighters — not ones intent on doing harm, but those who have become disillusioned with their role in the Islamic State and want to return, as was the situation in with certain French fighters. It needs an effective method to de-radicalize these people and if possible, reintegrate them into society. Efforts are being made in places such as Dagestan to talk to returning fighters. Also, increasingly, the Russian state is being associated with the Russian Orthodox Church, while Chechnya and other republics of the North Caucasus retain their link with Islam. This can and has lead to tensions and misunderstandings between the state authorities and many people living in these regions. Because the Islamic State espouses Salafist ideology, they have been treating all Salafis, including the ones who are sceptical about ISIS, with suspicion. There have been reports of abuse and harassment by officials of Salafis, and they maintain watch lists. Any damage incurred during counter-insurgency operations is often not compensated. Oppression will only breed resentment and the harsher crackdown will only have the opposite effect.

At the moment, it seems that the more immediate concern for Russia is the crisis in Ukraine and its ensuing sanctions, their effects

on the Russian economy and the collapsing ruble. Ukraine is closer to home, and the issues of that region are more familiar. The North Caucasus is extremely diverse ethnically and linguistically. Russia has been dealing with extremism within its borders for several years so it is not exactly unprepared for whatever threat ISIL currently poses. However, there is a degree of complacency that has set in. Because the region's history of instability, it seems as if the change in rhetoric of some of the active insurgent groups is not a particular cause for alarm. Moscow can rely on its strongmen in the region, such as Kadyrov in Chechnya, to maintain the peace, but it also needs to focus on improving the region's economy and opportunities to prevent some of its youth from becoming radicalized, and eroding the insurgency's support base. The tendency to conflate Islam with extremism by the authorities shows up in its attitude towards migrant workers from Central Asia, as well as Russian Muslims, and this simplistic approach can only serve to exacerbate the situation. While the "foreign" nature of ISIL could work against it in a largely local conflict, it still demands more attention than it is getting precisely because of the volatile situation in the region.

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**The writer is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi*



Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, 'think tank' to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

Terrorist attack in Suruç a turning point

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Source: <http://www.dailysabah.com/editorial/2015/07/20/terrorist-attack-in-suruc-a-turning-point>

July 20 – Monday's terrorist attack in Suruç, Şanlıurfa killed at least 30 people and wounded more than 100. Irrespective of which group or groups are to blame, the real culprits are those who allowed the region to degrade so far. This attack targets humanity itself, and we condemn terrorism in all its forms.

This terrorist attack, similar to the 2013 attack in Reyhanlı that had killed 52 people, is an act of retaliation against Turkey's commitment to fight terrorism, which in its turn is fed by the chaos in the region.



The four-year civil war in Syria, coupled with the frail state of Iraq, poses a clear and present

global powers until now have resulted in nothing but the deepening of the ethnic and



sectarian divides in both countries. The Turkish government sees ISIS, the Assad regime and other extremist groups spreading terror in Syria and the rest of the region as a direct threat to its security. With rival powers pulling local groups in differing directions in line with their own national interests, Syria faces a real threat of a break-up.

Turkey's commendable open-door policy vis-a-vis Syrian and Iraqi refugees carries a huge financial and security cost. With constantly

danger to Turkey's security, which Monday's attack once again demonstrated to the entire world. It is no accident that Suruç is located just across the border from Kobani, Syria. When the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attacked Kobani, Turkey rescued several tens of thousands of its residents from certain slaughter by providing them with shelter and allowed peshmerga forces from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to cross its territory to assist pushing back the terrorist group.



As the current state of Syria and Iraq prove, any unilateral action is destined to fail and cause further grief. Efforts by regional and

rising security threats, its allies need to listen a little more closely to concerns raised by Turkey, which has been on the receiving end of terrorist attacks for decades and knows



how such threats need to be tackled. Turkish security forces need to be vigilant to shield the country from violence emanating from its southern neighbors. Authorities also need to find those responsible for Monday's attack as soon as possible. Turkey doesn't have the luxury of pontificating



from afar, as some of its allies do, on how to deal with the millions of people who are in dire straits across the border. What Turkey needs is a comprehensive plan by all those concerned with the future of the region. As mentioned in this column previously, the Turkish government's repeated appeals to the international community and its allies to formulate just such a strategy have fallen on deaf ears.

The U.S.-led international coalition's focus has solely been on ISIS, while cooperating with terrorist groups on the ground and ignoring the real cause behind the rise of groups like ISIS. Such a policy risks the future of both Syria and

Iraq. Turkish security forces detain dozens of foreign fighters almost every week, but this does not seem to result in introspection by Western countries, which are almost One criticism repeatedly cited in Daily Sabah editorials is the fact that some regional powers continue to engage in policies that spark sectarian strife, ignoring the long-term costs.

Still, there are certain encouraging signs that we hope will become a turning point. Talks between Turkey and the U.S. administration earlier this month on how to tackle the threat posed by the chaos in the region are a step in the right direction and seem to have resulted in a mutually satisfactory agreement, which needs to be promptly implemented. Let's hope the understanding reached will translate to

real progress on the ground to the benefit of Syrians and the people of the region. The train-and-equip program for members of the internationally recognized Free Syrian Army is one such plan to legitimize the moderate forces on the ground, while pushing extremists to the fringe while securing the integrity of Syria.

All in all, everyone needs to approach the issue in a responsible manner.

Politicians in Turkey should not make reckless remarks before the entire truth comes to light nor should they exploit the attack to provoke an ethnic or religious rift. What we need is to grieve for the lives lost and ensure no such atrocity is ever repeated.

Islamic State suspected of using Bosnia-Herzegovina village to train terrorists

Source: <http://www.catholic.org/news/international/europe/story.php?id=62189>

The mountain village of Gornja Maoca flies the notorious ISIS flag. Recently raided by police, at least 12 jihadis have been trained in Osve. All had travelled to Syria and five have been killed in combat.



A number of high-profile terrorists are also said to have bought land and properties in the area.

A large number of people are going to Syria from the village, terrorism expert Dzevad Galijasevic says. He describes the village as a major source of terrorism.

"There is no one there who isn't ready to respond to the summons to jihad," Galijasevic added.



Radical Muslims remain a minority in Bosnia. Some younger members have embraced the ideas of the puritanical Sunni Wahhabi sect.



In reaction, Bosnia has instated jail terms of up to 10 years for citizens who fight or recruit fighters for conflicts abroad.

Bosnian police in September "detained 16 people on charges of financing terrorist activities, recruiting and fighting for radical groups in Syria and Iraq, authorities said," according to Daily Mail.

Seventeen raids across the Balkan country yielded the arrests. "Television footage showed police making arrests in Gornja Maoca," stated the Daily Mail.

However, "militant Islam was little known to Bosnia's mostly secular Muslim population until the 1990s Balkans wars, when Arab mercenaries turned up to help the outgunned Bosnian Muslims fend off Serb attacks," according to Daily Mail.

Many Arab mercenaries have since settled in Bosnia, embraced a radical version of Islam that Bosnia's official Islamic community opposes.

