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Terror News

Profile of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's Heir as Leader of Al-Qaeda[1]

Source: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/gj_e008.htm

Ayman al-Zawahiri, left, sitting next to Osama bin Laden, praises those who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 (YouTube video, April 15, 2002).

Overview

1. On June 16 Al-Qaeda announced that after a period of consultations, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri had been appointed as Osama bin Laden's heir. The announcement stressed Al-Qaeda's commitment to jihad, which was the "personal duty of every Muslim." The jihad would be waged against the various "infidels" – the United States, Israel and the Arab-Muslim rulers, "until the Resurrection."[2] This study profiles Ayman al-Zawahiri, his ideology and activities, and evaluates the possible outcome of his appointment as leader of Al-Qaeda.

2. Sheikh Dr. Ayman Mohammed Rabi'a al-Zawahiri (Abu Mohammed) was born in 1951 to a wealthy family whose members held senior positions in the Egyptian religious establishment. His piety was evident from an early age, and at 14 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. In his youth he was influenced by the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, a central figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, who developed the radical Islamic ideology from which the extremist faction of the Muslim Brotherhood sprang. He began studying medicine at the University of Cairo in 1968 and graduated with honors in 1974. He specialized in surgery at a university in Pakistan, receiving a PhD, again graduating with honors.

3. When Sayyid Qutb was executed by Nasser in 1966 and thousands of Muslim Brotherhood activists were imprisoned, al-Zawahiri, along with a number of other young men, set up an underground cell (1966-1967) with the intention of overthrowing the Egyptian regime and establishing an Islamic government. During the 1970s, while still at school, he joined an extremist Islamic organization called the Islamic Jihad, which was behind a wave of terrorist attacks in Egypt, and became one of its most prominent operatives. In 1991 he formally became the organization's head.

4. Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, al-Zawahiri was arrested along with other radical Islamic operatives. He was cleared of involvement in the assassination because of lack of evidence, but convicted of membership in a terrorist organization and having weapons and explosives in his possession. He was sentenced to a term of three years in prison, which he served from 1981 to 1984. In his book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner he said that assassinating Sadat was part of a comprehensive program of assassinating senior figures in the Egyptian regime and using the army to take over vital broadcasting stations.

5. After his release from prison he went from Egypt to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to practice medicine and to promote the activities of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad beyond the borders of Egypt. There he apparently met Osama bin Laden for the first time, and from Saudi Arabia he went to Pakistan and Afghanistan to wage his jihad against the Egyptian regime. While in Peshawar, Afghanistan, he founded an organization called Talai'i al-fath ("pioneers of conquest"), which in effect served as the operational wing of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. He established a network of bases, training camps and headquarters, all with the support of Osama bin Laden.

6. At the beginning of the 1990s al-Zawahiri and bin Laden went to Sudan, where they set up a network of bases. During the 1990s he also set up a new network in Yemen, from which he conducted a campaign of terrorist attacks against Egyptian targets, both inside and outside Egypt. He was also involved in an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the murder of tourists in Luxor in 1997. He was apparently also involved in the attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Ethiopia in July 1995. Because of his involvement in terrorist attacks, he was sentenced to death in absentia in Egypt, April 1999.

7. Al-Zawahiri's involvement in terrorism in the 1990s did not focus only on the Egyptian arena. In the middle of the decade, instructed by bin Laden, he constructed Al-Qaeda terrorist networks in Britain and the United States, strengthened the radical Islamic militias in the Balkans, supported radical Islamic groups in Somalia and Ethiopia and aided the rebels in Chechnya. In 1996, with two other operatives, he tried to enter Chechnya and was arrested

by the Russian security forces, only to be released "for lack of evidence."

8. At the beginning of 1998 al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden founded the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. It was an umbrella network for Al-Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and various radical Islamic organizations operating in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir and the Philippines. Al-Zawahiri became bin Laden's deputy in the Front and second in command of Al-Qaeda. In June 2001 al-Zawahiri announced the formal union of all the organizations, whose official name is [Tanzim] Qaedat al-Jihad (the formal name of Al-Qaeda to this day).

9. In February 1998 Qaedat al-Jihad issued an appeal calling for the killing of Americans throughout the world, saying it was the "personal duty" of every Muslim. In practical terms, Al-Qaeda initiated a campaign of global terrorism against the United States, beginning with the terrorist attacks of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and culminating with the September 11, 2001 attacks.

10. Al-Zawahiri continued holding key positions in Al-Qaeda (as far as is known, he was responsible for producing anthrax spores for the organization) and became even more dominant than bin Laden in Al-Qaeda's global propaganda campaign.

11. His worldview and ideology:

a) As noted, al-Zawahiri was particularly influenced by the radical Islam of Sayyid Qutb, according to which the Arab-Muslim regimes ("the internal enemy ") were no less dangerous than external enemies. His ideology justified using violence and terrorism against them, since, it claimed, they had deviated from the precepts of Islam and did not govern according to religious Muslim law (the Shari'a). He was also influenced by Dr. Abdullah Azzam,

Palestinian from northern Samaria, who became Osama bin Laden's ideological mentor. Azzam developed and institutionalized the concept of jihad as the "personal duty" of every Muslim.

b) Based on experienced gained from decades of terrorist activity, al-Zawahiri formulated his worldview of radical jihadist Islam. According to his worldview, a global jihad movement was necessary, based on a territorial infrastructure which would serve as a "hothouse" for breeding the jihadist campaign (in a region such as Afghanistan, although al-Zawahiri would have preferred to locate the hothouse in the Arab Middle East). Young men imbued with radical Islamic ideology would be sent from the hothouse to wage a violent campaign against Islam's various enemies: the "treacherous" Arab-Muslim regimes, the superpowers (the United States, the main enemy, and Russia), other countries hostile to Islam (especially those in Western Europe), and the State of Israel, as well as Jews around the world.

His Own Words

A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri

by Laura Mansfield

12. Al-Zawahiri's ideology expresses particular hostility and hatred for the State of Israel, which he regards as the spearhead of the Christian West (the "Crusaders") in the Middle East, and to the Jews in general (his ideology incorporates anti-Semitic motifs directly from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion).

13. Al-Zawahiri calls for a violent jihad against Israel as the only way to "liberate Palestine," and advocates attacking Jews around the globe. Israel was also mentioned in the Al-Qaeda announcement naming al-Zawahiri as its leader. In our assessment, under al-Zawahiri Al-Qaeda will increase its attempts to attack Israel. As for the Jews, al-Zawahiri has often specifically instructed Muslims to attack Jews beyond the borders of Israel, and Al-Qaeda has been and will continue to be involved in attacks against Jewish targets all over the world. At the same time, he will pursue his activities against Christians, the United States and Western countries, and against the Arab-Muslim regimes.

14. The uprisings taking place in the Arab world during the first half of 2011 are an ideological challenge for Al-Qaeda. That is because they are based, at least partially, on an agenda of freedom, which is completely opposed to jihadist ideology. Moreover, Al-Qaeda and the Islamists have so far not played a significant role in them. Al-Zawahiri expressed support for the overthrow of regimes of Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, accused them of corruption and serving the interests of the United States, encouraged the Libyan "jihad fighters" (mujahideen) for their actions against Qaddafi's regime, and called for the establishment of "just Islamic regimes" in the Arab countries, where religious Islamic law (Shari'a) would prevail. He also expressed support for the uprisings in Syria and Yemen.

The Significance of Appointing al-Zawahiri as Al-Qaeda's Leader

15. Al-Zawahiri's appointment to the leadership of Al-Qaeda was expected, although it took several weeks instead of occurring immediately. He had the reputation of being the "brain" behind Al-Qaeda and its head ideologue,3 amassed considerable operational and organizational experience in terrorism and possibly, at various times in recent years, even the de facto head of the organization.

16. According to Al-Qaeda's bylaws written 2002, which are apparently still in force, the

organization's second in command is supposed to succeed the leader (emir) should he be killed or captured without hope of release.4 Appearing in a video issued on June 8, 2011, a month after the death of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri promised the United States he would continue Osama bin Laden's path of jihad, thus positioning himself as bin Laden's heir [at that time there had not yet been an official confirmation of his appointment, which came eight days later].

17. The possible consequences of al-Zawahiri's appointment for Al-Qaeda's nature and methods are the following: Ideologically, because of his usually close cooperation with bin Laden and their mutual worldview, it is unlikely that significant changes will be made in its concept of waging a global jihad against the United States and its allies. However, it is possible that changes may occur in Al-Qaeda's order of priorities, due to al-Zawahiri's worldview, personality, Egyptian origin and personal experience.

18. Al-Zawahiri's Achilles' heel, the fact that he does not have bin Laden's charisma and his leadership is not a foregone conclusion, may influence Al-Qaeda in the future. Thus potentially, power struggles may arise over the "inheritance" of the Al-Qaeda leadership, and charismatic local commanders with their own power bases or operational terrorist experience may make demands for leadership or act independently.

19. Al-Zawahiri may give high priority to terrorist attacks against Arab-Muslim regimes he considers Western collaborators and enemies of Islam, as well as against Israel (possibly from Al-Qaeda bases in the areas on its borders, especially the Gaza Strip) and against Jewish targets around that globe. He may emphasize terrorist activity in Egypt, exploiting the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the weakening of internal security control, the legalization of the Muslim Brotherhood and its return to the forefront of the political stage; and al-Zawahiri's long experience with subversion and terrorism within Egypt. At the same time, the United States and Western countries will continue to be perceived as a prime target.

20. Organizationally, Al-Qaeda's financial capabilities may be affected because al-

Zawahiri lacks bin Laden's resources. If that happens, its operational and logistic capabilities may suffer. It is also possible that there will be changes in Al-Qaeda's structure and methods, with the decentralization of various local focal points, the result of possible power struggles and al-Zawahiri's difficulties in enforcing his authority on local commanders in distant confrontation arenas.

Sources Used in This Study

21. This study is based on the following sources: an analysis of videos and audio cassettes issued by al-Zawahiri (many of them on YouTube); his book, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, translated into English by Laura Mansfield (first edition); a book in Arabic about al-Zawahiri by Montasser al-Zayat, an Egyptian lawyer affiliated with the Islamic movement, called Ayman al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him; an article by Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli about al-Zawahiri's life and activities (published 2002); books and reports, including those issued by research institutes dealing with global terrorism; Islamic Internet forums; interviews with experts on Al-Qaeda and the global jihad which appeared in the global media and information based on security sources.

22. The study is divided into the following sections:
1) Biography
2) Islamists who influenced al-Zawahiri's ideology
3) Overview of al-Zawahiri's ideology
4) Al-Zawahiri's position on the United States
5) Al-Zawahiri's position on Western Europe
6) Al-Zawahiri's position on the State of Israel and the Jewish people
7) Al-Zawahiri's position on the Arab and Muslim regimes
8) Al-Zawahiri's position on the Muslim Brotherhood
9) Al-Zawahiri's criticism of the Hamas movement
10) Al-Zawahiri's centrality in the battle for hearts and minds
11) Initial evaluation of the significance of al-Zawahiri's appointment as Al-Qaeda leader

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1 The study is available in Hebrew, and the full English translation will shortly be posted on the ITIC website.

2 The Al-Fajr Media Center quoted by Al-Arabiya TV, June 16, 2011. The announcement was issued by other jihadist sites as well.
3 Laura Mansfield, His Own Words, The Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri (USA: TLG, 2006), p. 13;http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1031/p6s1-wosc.html
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/78454,news-comment,news-politics,hunt-is-on-for-ayman-al-zawahiri-brains-behind-osama-bin-laden
4 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600048-Trans.pdf, April 18, 2002.

Al-Qaeda's Zawahiri, Bigger Threat Than Osama?
By Raymond Ibrahim
Source: http://www.meforum.org/2971/al-qaeda-zawahiri-bigger-threat-than-osama

Now that Ayman Zawahiri has assumed leadership of al-Qaeda, it is important to end the widespread perception that he is a dour intellectual who is disconnected from young, would-be jihadists. The fact is, Zawahiri is a wily, dangerous and imposing leader who should be considered no less of a threat—and perhaps even more so—than his predecessor.

Like Osama bin Laden, the Egyptian Zawahiri has jihadi bona fides and served in the Afghan war against the Soviets, primarily as a physician. Moreover, Zawahiri's imprisonment and torture after the assassination of Anwar Sadat by Islamic Jihad, which he headed, seems to have hardened him more than bin Laden. From his

Zawahiri, preaching from an Egyptian prison cell 30 years ago

prison cell he memorably delivered a passionate speech—in English no less. Seeing a video of it dispels any notion that he is an uncharismatic leader.

Even so, focusing on charisma is misleading. Although charisma has its place in leadership positions in Islam, knowledge demands greater authority. After all, the guardians of Islam are called ulema—literally, "those who know." And compared with bin Laden, Zawahiri is certainly more knowledgeable. He has long been seen as the group's theoretician, and thus commands great respect.

Because I have always believed that Zawahiri was key to understanding al-Qaeda's worldview, when I compiled The Al Qaeda Reader in 2007, I included more of his writings than bin Laden's, specifically Zawahiri's three long treatises.

Feign Friendship
According to his own words, Zawahiri insists that Muslims must always harbor enmity for "infidels," or non-Muslims, particularly Jews and Christians. He advocates that Muslims feign friendship with infidels whenever it is advantageous: "We grin to the faces of some peoples, while our hearts curse them." He is a great proponent and articulator of the "superiority" of martyrdom/suicide operations and despises democracy because it creates "equality between the citizenry," allows

freedom of religion and abolishes "man's domination over woman."

Al Qaeda's longtime theoretician and staunch advocate of jihad takes the helm

Zawahiri's views may be best summed up by the following passage:

Warfare against infidels, loyalty to the believers, and jihad in the path of Allah: Such is a course of action that all who are vigilant for the triumph of Islam should vie in, giving and sacrificing in the cause of liberating the lands of the Muslims, making Islam supreme in its own land, and then spreading it around the world.

Relentless Dedication

Indeed, what makes Zawahiri so dangerous is his harsh and relentless dedication to jihad. Although many Islamist organizations have learned that violence isn't the best vehicle to power, Zawahiri has a long history of being a staunch upholder of the popular jihadist slogan "Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences and no dialogues."

He wrote a long book in the early 1990s, Al Hisad Al Murr ("The Bitter Harvest"), condemning Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood for taking the nonviolent course to power and actually participating in elections. It's worth noting, in retrospect, that the Brotherhood's approach has been more successful at achieving political influence.

Likewise, Zawahiri is primarily responsible for redirecting the jihadists' terror attacks from Middle East targets to the U.S. in order to foment a mass conflagration between the West and Islamists—an all or nothing strategy.

Would-be Jihadists

Will his severity turn off aspiring jihadists, as some analysts suggest? Perhaps. But it will make those who remain that much more committed and lethal. Moreover, numbers don't matter much when it comes to engaging in terrorism: the Sept. 11 attacks were committed by 19 jihadists.

Finally, when it comes to questioning the popularity, charisma or even efficacy of Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's new leader himself once made a relevant point. Asked about the status of bin Laden and other jihadists, Zawahiri waxed philosophically:

Jihad in the path of Allah is greater than any individual or organization. It is a struggle between truth and falsehood, until Allah Almighty inherits the Earth and those who live in it. Mullah Muhammad Omar and Sheikh Osama bin Laden—may Allah protect them from all evil—are merely two soldiers of Islam in the journey of jihad, while the struggle between truth (Islam) and falsehood (non-Islam) transcends time.

As independent jihadists increasingly take action into their own hands—whether the would-be shoe bomber and Christmas bomber, the Madrid and London bombers, or Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood army base attack—we must acknowledge that the doctrine of jihad, the idea itself, is more dangerous than the jihadists who come and go, including bin Laden and Zawahiri himself.

Cash-Strapped Al Qaeda Turns to Kidnapping and Ransoms to Pay Operational Costs

Source:http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/06/19/turn-to-kidnapping-showed-bin-ladens-interest/#ixzz 1Pq89HK98

In this 1998 file photo made available Friday, March 19, 2004, Ayman al-Zawahri, left, poses for a photograph with Osama bin Laden, right, in Khost, Afghanistan. Al-Qaida has selected its longtime No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahri, to succeed Osama bin Laden following last month's U.S. commando raid that killed the terror leader, according to a statement posted Thursday, June 16, 2011 on a website affiliated with the network.

Pressured by increased scrutiny of terrorist money sources and strikes aimed at its financiers, Al Qaeda's core organization in Pakistan has turned to kidnapping for ransom to offset dwindling cash reserves, according to U.S. officials and information in files retrieved from Usama bin Laden's compound.

Bin Laden's interest in kidnapping as a cash-raiser bolsters accounts that the financial squeeze has staggered Al Qaeda, forcing it to search for alternative funding sources. Officials would not detail Al Qaeda's role in specific crimes, but the group's affiliates have targeted diplomats, tourists and merchants.

His awareness of Al Qaeda's growing use of kidnapping is evidence that even in isolation behind high walls in Abbottabad, Pakistan, bin Laden kept tabs on how his network moved its money. The Al Qaeda founder was killed last month by U.S. Navy SEALs.

"There are clearly times for them when money is tight," said Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. "We've seen that their donors have been less dependable and we're seeing them turning more to kidnapping as a way of keeping the money coming in."

Experts from the CIA's National Counterterrorism Center, the Treasury Department and the FBI and military are trying to learn more from the recovered files about Al Qaeda's money sources and the impact of bin Laden's death on the group's financial future. They hope to identify important Al Qaeda donors, especially wealthy Persian Gulf figures who dealt with bin Laden dating to his work with Afghan fighters in the campaign against Soviet occupiers in the late 1980s.

The Treasury Department's acting undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, David Cohen, said U.S. efforts are focused on disrupting Al Qaeda's cash flow from donors, fundraisers and facilitators. "Al Qaeda's supporters ought to be wondering if their identities have been revealed," Cohen said.

Analysts are examining lists of numbers found in bin Laden's files, hoping to find bank accounts, credit cards or ledgers depicting the financial underpinnings of network known to demand strict accounting from its operatives.

Al Qaeda's leadership inside Pakistan rarely championed kidnappings publicly and was not known previously to widely support its use as a funding source. The group historically relied on donations through a pipeline of couriers and money-changing operations. At the time of the Sept. 11 attacks, the network took in as much as $30 million annually, but that money flow has tightened, Ruppersberger said.

CIA drone attacks, combined with economic penalties by the U.S. and its allies, have cut into that stream. At the same time, Al Qaeda affiliates have shown that abductions could rake in millions of dollars. As a result, attitudes about ransom operations inside the core group changed.

"That kind of money could go a long way to sustaining a terrorist organization," said Scott Helfstein, director of research at the U.S.

Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center.

A U.S. official familiar with the review of bin Laden's files cautioned that the kidnapping-for-ransom material found in the seized files was outweighed by bin Laden's more copious notes on terrorist plots and long-range planning.

The official, who insisted on anonymity to discuss the continuing review of classified files, would not elaborate on bin Laden's interest in kidnapping or the precise role Al Qaeda's core played in any operations.

The official said the material is consistent with other evidence showing that Al Qaeda had turned to abductions within the past two years as money from sympathetic donors dried up and that the group resorted to "basic criminal tactics" to compensate. "People paid up, helping the terrorist group reline its coffers," the official said.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the offshoot in North Africa, long has used kidnapping as a terrorist tool and a major funding source. Canadian diplomats, Italian tourists and Algerian merchants have been abducted; some ransoms have approached $2 million per hostage.

The ransoms have totaled more than $80 million for this branch since 2008, according to Matthieu Guidere, a former French military counterterrorism trainer.

The terrorist group's affiliate in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, and its affiliates in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, have used kidnapping for ransom, too.

Figures from the National Counterterrorism Center show that 1,264 hostages were taken in Pakistan in 2008, compared with 3,366 in 2009. Pakistanis were the usual victims. Foreign hostages included a Chinese engineer, a Polish oil worker and an American, John Solecki, who worked for the U.N. refugee agency and was released after two months in captivity.

A similar wave plagued Afghanistan from 2008 to 2009 as the number of hostages taken climbed from 584 to 2,088. Four Americans were targeted, including New York Times reporter David Rohde, later released by militant captors.

Officials in Pakistan and Afghanistan say criminal gangs account for many ransom plots, though they are known to work with militant nodes like the Pakistani Taliban.

Citing the recent kidnapping of a European journalist in Afghanistan, a security consultant in Kabul said hostages are sometimes sold or traded to militants. Insurgents also can levy "taxes" on groups transporting hostages through their turf, said the consultant, who insisted on anonymity to discuss the handling of sensitive abduction cases.

Bin Laden justified the use of kidnapping in an audio message sent last October, but solely as an instrument of vengeance. He said the abduction of five French nationals by the North African affiliate was a reaction to that country's ban on Muslim veils and support for the war in Afghanistan. "It is a simple and clear equation," bin Laden said. "As you kill, you will be killed. As you capture, you will be captured."

Al Qaeda for years relied primarily on donations as its main source of income, using its cash stream mostly for sustenance, including training, weapons, pay for operatives and their families and money for bribes and hideouts, officials said.

Terrorist plots rarely require large amounts of cash. The Sept. 11 attacks cost an estimated $500,000, but tens of thousands of dollars in unspent funds were sent back by the hijackers to Al Qaeda accounts. Last year, Yemeni operatives bragged that their failed attempt to ship package bombs on two airlines cost a paltry $4,500.

Bin Laden styled Al Qaeda's network's financial operation similarly to an international corporation. A financial wing oversaw finances, headed by skilled money men who monitored the books and primed streams of donated cash. Donations were ferried from militant clerics, charities and social service organizations and money-changing hawalas in the Gulf and central Asia that made tracing the money pipelines almost impossible.

Much of the group's heavy funding is believed to originate from wealthy Gulf donors who either knew bin Laden from past dealings or viewed him as an inspiration. Some dealt with him in his days as a logistics commander and fundraiser for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Others were royals and merchants who reportedly met him during on hunting expeditions in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, said Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA unit that tracked bin Laden.

Scheuer said bin Laden's death probably would mean only a temporary setback to donors who reflexively give in support of Al Qaeda's brand

of jihad. But Cohen and others insist that bin Laden's death will cause lasting damage. Ayman al-Zawahri, the Al Qaeda second-in-command who was elevated to bin Laden's leadership post Thursday, according to a communique from the group, does not approach bin Laden either in donor contacts or quixotic sway, they said.

"Bin Laden was a symbolic and galvanizing figure for Al Qaeda's fundraising efforts, and Al Qaeda's donor base will likely be less willing to contribute to an Al Qaeda that has lost its founder, not knowing who is in charge or how their money might be used," Cohen said.

The Treasury Department's terrorist finance unit and allies in the U.N. and other nations have cut into Al-Qaeda's money pipeline by adding more than 500 individuals to a list whose assets should be frozen, Ruppersberger said. Last month, the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Controls reported it had frozen a total of $13.5 million in Al Qaeda funds since first targeting bin Laden in 1998.

Stuart Levey, the department's former top official on terrorist finance, described that effort as a success. But he said freezing the assets of terrorists won't work alone in the long term and needs to be augmented by criminal prosecutions and penalties aimed at their donors and supporters.

The CIA's ramped-up program of pilotless drone aircraft over Pakistan also took a toll on the group's internal financiers. A year ago, a drone missile attack killed Mustafa al-Yazid, al-Qaida's third in command and a critical overseer who managed the bank accounts used to launch the Sept. 11 attacks. Other operatives with financial duties have also been targeted, officials said.

"Al Qaeda became sensitive to the risks that their financial system posed to their security," Levey said. "They were under real financial stress. We knew about that stress from their pleas for more money and from the fact that they passed up some (plot) opportunities."

The situation grew so dire, Levey said, that some operatives had to pay their own room and board, training and weapons. In one instance in 2008, Saudi authorities seized memory cards from the cell phones of arrested militant suspects that contained an audio message from al-Zawahri.

The man who succeeded bin Laden was pleading for donations.

Somali Pirates Turn Violent
Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/201106200192.html

Over 4,000 international seafarers were violently attacked by Somali pirates last year, says a new report, signaling the rising human cost of piracy.

The Human Cost of Somali Piracy report states that seafarers captured by Somali pirates have faced beatings, been used as human shields and undergone other forms of torture over the past year.

The findings indicate that in the course of 2010, some 4,185 seafarers were attacked with firearms and rocket propelled grenades, 1,090 seafarers were taken hostage and 516 seafarers were used as human shields.

However, despite the violent nature of these crimes, the new study says the human cost of piracy is still under-reported and misunderstood. "There is very little reporting of the personal violence against seafarers in the waters off Somalia," says Kaija Hurlburt, the lead researcher.

New methods of torture
Per Gullestrup, the C.E.O. of a shipping company, the Clipper Group said, "Somali piracy has a tendency to be discussed in economic terms, but the real issue is the untold misery and trauma imposed on our colleagues at sea and their relatives by the criminals."

The report said seafarers were sometimes locked in freezers, hung from ships' masts or meat hooks or had their genitals attached to electric wires. Pirates also sometimes called seafarers' families from their mobile phones, then beat them in their families' hearing -- a tactic to increase pressure on ship owners to pay ransoms.

The new tactics break a previous code of conduct, that had kept violence to a minimum. This year has seen the first deliberate murders of hostages off Somalia - four American tourists in February and two crew members from the Beluga Nomination in January.

The pirates' change of tactics reflects the shift of activity away from the relatively easily monitored Gulf of Aden to attacks off the East African coast and in the Indian Ocean.

The tactical shift has seen pirates capturing merchant vessels and forcing their crew to let their ships be used as floating bases for attacks.

Pirates typically deter international naval forces' efforts to intercept the mother ships by parading captive seafarers on deck with guns held to their heads.

Improved tracking system being developed for firefighters
Source: http://www.gizmag.com/firefighter-tracking-system/18969/

Even though firefighting is one of the most dangerous jobs in the world, firefighters still communicate using analog radio signals, that can be blocked by concrete walls. This means that, upon venturing into a burning building, a firefighter might have no way of letting their commander know their present location - a situation that could prove deadly, if they ended

being of every member of their team, all the time.

The first part of the system is a paperback book-sized tracking device known as the Geospatial Location

The WISPER routers (top left), the WISPER dispenser (middle) and base station modules (bottom) are all part of the new firefighter

up trapped or injured. In order to address the situation, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate has created a new three-part system that lets fire crews keep track of the location and well-

tracking system (Image: Department of Homeland Security)

Accountability and Navigation System for Emergency Responders (GLANSER). Using its microwave radio, lightweight battery and

various navigation devices, GLANSER sends and receives signals to and from a small base station module, which is plugged into a laptop located back at the fire truck. On the laptop's screen, a graphic display constantly indicates the firefighter's location within the building, no matter where they go.

Besides GLANSER, firefighters would also wear a Physiological Health Assessment System for Emergency Responders (PHASER). The PHASER monitors body temperature, blood pressure, and pulse, and relays these parameters back to the base station. If the firefighter were to pass out, the PHASER output would indicate as much. Using GLANSER as a guide, other firefighters could then locate and rescue them.

It sounds good so far, although in order to remain portable, the transmitters for the two devices are quite small - potentially too small, in fact, to generate a signal that can penetrate walls. That's where the Wireless Intelligent Sensor Platform for Emergency Responders (WISPER) routers come in.

Each disposable WISPER unit measures one square inch by half an inch thick (6.45 sq.cm. x 1.27 cm.), is waterproof, and heat resistant up to 500F (260C). It contains a two-way digital radio, antenna, and 3-volt lithium battery. Every firefighter would wear a belt-mounted waterproof canister, that contained five of the units.

As soon they stepped behind a concrete wall or otherwise went out of GLANSER contact, the base station would instruct the canister to automatically drop a WISPER router. It would continue dropping them periodically, as long as the firefighter was out of contact. The dropped units would form a network, each relaying the GLANSER and PHASER signals, until they reached back to the base station. Even if one of the units got kicked or hosed out of place, the network would be able to reconfigure itself.

In order to get the most life out of each unit's tiny battery, WISPER utilizes the low-power Zigbee communications protocol. At no more than 100 kilobits per second, it's over 99 percent slower than Wi-Fi. That may be slow, but still fast enough to transmit the basic data required.

While GLANSER and PHASER are already existing products, Homeland Security is now trying to find a company interested in manufacturing the WISPER routers. Once production is under way, the entire system will be tested for performance and consistency.

The al-Qaeda Crescent in Yemen
By Daniel Green
Source: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3374

The key battle with al-Qaeda in Yemen is in the countryside, where the U.S. government is paying too little attention.

The June 22 jailbreak of dozens of al-Qaeda-linked prisoners in southern Yemen's Hadramawt province is the latest evidence that the main battle with the group has been taking place in the countryside. Although conflicts in the capital -- such as the ongoing faceoff between supporters of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and members of the Hashid tribal confederation -- will affect Yemen's future course as a nation, efforts to control the provinces more directly affect U.S. national security interests.

Poor Government Control Benefits al-Qaeda
Even before the current unrest in Sana'a, the Yemeni regime was never able to attain full control of the country beyond the major cities and provincial capitals. Large areas of the countryside lack government security oversight, economic development, and other services. In many of these areas, a robust tribal government system with extended kinship groups has effectively assumed responsibility for local governance. Tribal sheiks are often granted state patronage, including direct monetary payments and quasi-legal authority in the regions they control. The regime has also used its security forces to sanction tribal groups and punish individual leaders through incarceration or direct military operations.

Currently, however, many security personnel are preoccupied with either regime survival or regime change in Sana'a, creating a security vacuum in the countryside. The government's mechanisms of patronage and control have also broken down , allowing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and tribal elements to assert themselves and expand their power. On May 29, for example, more than two

hundred alleged AQAP members overran the town of Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan province in southern Yemen. This followed a similar operation in the same area, where supposed AQAP members seized a munitions factory in the town of Jaar on March 27.

In addition to these widely noted episodes, the past year has seen numerous smaller-scale killings, thefts, and assassinations by AQAP. These incidents have contributed to a general sense of lawlessness and may indicate that the group is planning attacks on foreign targets as it raises money for future operations, intimidates security forces, and weakens local government.

War in the Provinces

AQAP's activities are largely concentrated in five provinces in central and eastern Yemen, located along the old border between north and south Yemen and stretching from the country's northern border with Saudi Arabia to the Gulf of Aden in the south:

- ☑ **Marib.** Located next to the capital, this province sits astride the Incense Road, one of the main arteries out of Sana'a. It also contains one of Yemen's three main oil fields and a number of archeological sites visited regularly by tourists. An oil and gas pipeline originates in Marib and flows west until it reaches al-Salif, one of five Yemeni ports configured to handle hydrocarbon shipments. In 2006, AQAP launched an unsuccessful attack in Marib and Hadramawt in which four suicide car bombs were destroyed by security forces before they could harm the facilities. And in May 2010, an alleged U.S. strike against AQAP killed the deputy governor of Marib, which led to riots in the region and deeply alienated the local population from the government. The two largest tribes in the area are the Murab and the Abida.

- ☑ **Shabwa.** Similar to Marib, this province contains a number of oil and gas fields and has pipelines flowing south to the ports of Bir Ali and Balhaf. The Incense Road passes through this area as well. Shabwa is the ancestral home of al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki, a key recruiter who participates in some operational planning. The al-Awlaki and al-Dhiyayb are the largest tribes in the area.

- ☑ **Hadramawt.** This province, located directly in the middle of Yemen, contains a number of oil fields and a pipeline that flows south to the port of al-Shihr. It also has the longest border with Saudi Arabia and, together with al-Jawf, serves as a key infiltration route for AQAP members, weapons, explosives, and money. Al-Qaeda's 2002 attack on the French oil tanker Limburg, in which a bomb-laden boat severely damaged the ship, was launched from the province's al-Mukalla port. AQAP has also killed a number of tourists in Hadramawt, including two Belgians in 2008 and four South Koreans in 2009. Moreover, the previously mentioned June 22 prison break occurred in al-Mukalla. The al-Tamim and al-Kinda are the largest tribes in the area.

- ☑ **Al-Jawf.** This province borders Saudi Arabia as well as the Yemeni governorate of Sadah, the site of the Houthi rebellion for the past several years. Al-Jawf has also experienced AQAP violence. In November 2010, a car bomb killed more than a dozen Shiites, including a local councilman. The attack indicated a sectarian tinge to AQAP's strategy in Yemen and is consistent with the group's January 2011 proclamation of "holy war" against Houthi-led northern Shiite rebels. The Dhaw Husayn and Baqil are the largest tribes in the area.

- ☑ **Abyan.** This province is located next to Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, and borders the Arabian Sea. As mentioned previously, it was the site of the March 27 and May 29 AQAP attacks on Jaar and Zinjibar, respectively. The al-Yafi and the al-Fadhli are the largest tribes in the area.

Focus U.S. Efforts on the Countryside

Much like AQAP, the U.S. approach must be decentralized, locally based, long-term, and holistic, blending military and civil approaches. Saleh has typically been the greatest impediment to an expanded U.S. presence in the countryside. Yet with the president convalescing in Saudi Arabia and Yemen's political factions in a stalemate, now is the time to offer Sana'a an expanded aid package to help the government stabilize the provinces.

Specifically, Washington should propose a more robust training program for Yemen's security services, concentrating on both its conventional forces and counterterrorism units. In particular, U.S. trainers should be embedded with Yemeni units deployed in the provinces. Government forces could then benefit directly

from U.S. training and equipment as they confront AQAP in the countryside. Additionally, Washington's understanding of provincial dynamics would improve.

Once this security initiative is underway, the United States could evaluate the practical aspects of decentralizing its governance and development programs, moving some of them from the capital to the countryside in partnership with provincial governors. This approach would bolster local governance and mitigate some of the underlying grievances that AQAP exploits to increase its support.

Washington should also consider a dedicated effort to map Yemen's human terrain and gain a better understanding of local communities, which would in turn help in the effort against AQAP. Specifically, the State Department,

United States Agency for International Development, and the U.S. military should extend the tours of selected personnel at the U.S. embassy in Sana'a in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the local situation. The United States should also develop a "Yemen Hands" initiative similar to the "Afghan Hands" program, wherein U.S. personnel work in the country for a number of years. These approaches would also even out the continuity problems that result from constant personnel rotations.

Although any U.S. strategy for Yemen will be difficult to implement, it will be harder if little is known about the country outside the major cities. Only through a better understanding of local dynamics in the provinces will U.S. policymakers be able to make the crucial

decisions needed to defeat AQAP and thwart any new attacks it may be planning on the United States.

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Checkbook Jihad
By Matthew Levitt
Source: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1625

Terrorist financiers must be under tremendous stress since news broke that U.S. Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden and seized hard drives and other electronic media from his safe house. Intelligence analysts and document exploitation ("Doc X") specialists are reportedly already sifting through this intelligence treasure trove and have found evidence of notional al Qaeda plots, including aspirational plans to attack the U.S. train system, and more. In all likelihood, the files will include clues pointing to bin Laden's money trail as well.

This puts people like Abd al-Hamid al-Mujil in an uncomfortable position. Described by fellow jihadists as the "million-dollar man" for his successful fundraising on behalf of al Qaeda and other jihadi groups, Mujil directed the office of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a charity in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Both he and the IIRO office he headed were designated as terrorist entities by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2006.

But even if being "named and shamed" forced Mujil out of the terror-finance business, there are many others just like him. Just this week, David Cohen, the head of the Treasury Department's Terrorism and Financial

Intelligence branch, told CNN that major donors from the Gulf states remain the key sources of funding for the al Qaeda core. There are no doubt dozens of radical funders now worrying that their names, bank accounts, or addresses will comes up in bin Laden's spreadsheets -- or "pocket litter" -- and for good reason.

It would not be the first time authorities have recovered revealing documents about al Qaeda's finances in a raid. In March 2002, Bosnian authorities raided the Sarajevo offices of the Benevolence International Foundation, a charity designated by the Treasury Department as an al Qaeda front. Among the material found on the seized computers was an al Qaeda memorandum from 1988 or 1989 listing 20 Saudi financial backers described by bin Laden as the "Golden Chain," so named because they were a reliable source of funding for his organization. According to the 9/11 Commission report, the Golden Chain was put together mainly by bin Laden's financial backers in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

But even if the files seized in bin Laden's Abbottabad safe house do not include explicit references to the next "million-dollar man" or

"golden chain," they will likely contain information that could help expose the money trail sustaining the al Qaeda core. First, they may point to who covered bin Laden's personal expenses, which could have added up quickly. Think of the 500 euros sown into his clothes, the costs of feeding his 18-person entourage, the salaries of his bodyguards and couriers, the expense of building and renovating his compound, and the cash that may have been needed to bribe Pakistani authorities not to look too closely at his fortified three-story villa. The files may even reveal information about the current balance sheets of al Qaeda, which, as of October 2009, was said to be "in its weakest financial condition in several years."

Even then, though, U.S. authorities were quick to add they were not "taking any victory laps," because there were still likely new donors willing to step in. At the time, Cohen warned that the international community's success in disrupting al Qaeda's finances might only be temporary, because "we have not yet dissuaded nearly enough donors from wanting to give in the first place." News of the Abbottabad raid alone may dissuade many of those donors in the near term, and the intelligence windfall from the raid may lead to more tangible disruptions of some donor channels. That could place the al Qaeda core under still further financial strain, but it would have little if any impact on the funding of key al Qaeda franchises such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), affiliated groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, foreign-directed al Qaeda networks like those recently arrested in Germany, or the homegrown violent extremists like Maj. Nidal Hassan, who present the most immediate terrorist threats to the United States and its allies.

Whereas al Qaeda directly funded and controlled operations from its base in Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, today al Qaeda franchises and homegrown extremists are self-financed. We know that al Qaeda provided funding for the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, and the 2001 World Trade Center attacks. Even after 9/11, al Qaeda continued to provide money for operations, such as the $20,000 it furnished for the 2002 Bali bombings.

The terrorist threat is far more decentralized today, and al Qaeda's central command is not funding operations as it once did. To help finance the Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah operatives had to resort to robbing jewelry stores because the al Qaeda core's contribution was not enough to foot the bill. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the group's North African branch, raises significant funds through kidnapping and other types of organized crime. AQAP, now based in Yemen, has worked hard to develop its own network of major donors. For example, in September 2009, Saudi security forces found a video clip of AQAP leader and former Guantanamo detainee Saeed al-Shihri making a pitch for money to help "jihad to keep going," calling the need for funding "the core of life and the core jihad."

Left to their own devices, budding terrorist cells have resorted to criminal activity to raise funds for attacks or have used personal funds or government welfare benefits. Some of these cells, such as the terrorists who carried out the July 7, 2005, attacks on the transportation system in London, may have connections to al Qaeda's senior leadership but are independently and locally funded. In that case, while several members of the cell traveled to Pakistan for training and met up with al Qaeda, they were on their own when it came to the funding for the attack. One cell member provided the majority of the money, defaulting on a 10,000-pound personal loan and overdrawing from his multiple bank accounts. The cell also obtained funding through credit card fraud. In the end, British investigators found "no evidence of external sources of income" and stressed that the group raised the necessary funds by "methods that would be extremely difficult to identify as related to terrorism or other serious criminality." The cell that executed the devastating 2004 Madrid train bombing is another good example, partially financing the attack by selling hashish.

A rare exception to this new pattern was the 2007 "Dagger" case in Copenhagen, in which the alleged perpetrator, Hamad Khurshid, reportedly received $5,000 from al Qaeda core to conduct a bombing attack in Copenhagen.

Increasingly, however, terrorism watchers see the money going the other way. In Spain, for example, authorities have seen Pakistani jihadists not only finance their local activities through petty crime, such as money laundering and credit card fraud, but also send millions of dollars back home -- some of which, it is suspected, finances extremist groups there.

Singapore, a self-radicalized cell leader collected contributions from fellow cell members with the intent of sending the money to support violent causes abroad.

In other cases, terrorist recruits are often being asked to bring funds with them to cover their expenses. For example, in January 2008, five members of a Bahrain-based cell were convicted of terrorist activities, including receiving explosives and weapons training, engaging in terrorism overseas, and financing terrorism. According to Bahraini officials, one of the individuals acknowledged having traveled to Afghanistan to engage in combat against coalition forces, and several members of the cell traveled from the kingdom to Afghanistan via Iran. Two of the suspects admitted bringing funds to cover their expenses (one cell member provided 3,000 euros and 1,000 dinars, while a second gave thousands of dinars to his handler). In another case in December 2008, Belgian and French counterterrorism authorities arrested 14 individuals with ties to core al Qaeda, some of whom had visited Pakistan's tribal areas and had been instructed to bring 2,400 euros with them to pay their travel and training costs.

At times, al Qaeda has explicitly asked its affiliates for financial support. In 2005, bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, sent a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then the head of al Qaeda in Iraq. In the letter, which was intercepted by the U.S. government and subsequently declassified, Zawahiri asked Zarqawi for 100,000 (without specifying a currency), noting that "many lines [of support] had been cut off."

More recently, al Qaeda has received assistance from Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), its powerful and dangerous affiliate in South Asia. In July 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Arif Qasmani, whom it described as the "chief coordinator" for the group's dealings with other terrorist organizations. According to Treasury, Qasmani has provided a wide variety of financial and other support to al Qaeda since 2001, including facilitating al Qaeda members' travel and providing supplies and weapons. In exchange, al Qaeda provided Qasmani with operatives that helped LeT carry out the 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India, and the 2007 attack on the Samjhauta Express in Panipat, India.

The Abbottabad files may help analysts better understand the current nature of the financial relationship, if any, between al Qaeda core and its regional franchises. And beyond the files themselves, bin Laden's killing may also have an impact. For example, if fissures break out between Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders, freelance fundraisers who have raised funds for both the al Qaeda core and affiliated groups could shift away from Zawahiri and toward groups like AQAP, which U.S. authorities unanimously describe as the greatest terrorist threat to the United States today. Consider someone like Mubarak al-Bathali, a Kuwaiti designated a terrorist financier by the United States in December 2006 and by the United Nations in January 2008. According to the Treasury Department, Bathali raised funds in Kuwait for a range of terrorist organizations -- including al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Al Qaeda's late leader may still bring in the big bucks for a while, as his old videos get passed around like "greatest hits." But while bin Laden served as a unifying figurehead, Zawahiri is a divisive figure whose presumed accession to the top spot in the al Qaeda hierarchy may well rekindle simmering tensions between the organization's Egyptian and Yemeni factions. Moreover, the al Qaeda core -- lacking the power of the purse and stripped of its founding icon -- may find itself less able to exert authority over its self-financed franchises. The death of bin Laden does not mark the end of al Qaeda, but it may mark the beginning of the end of its core -- and the rise of al Qaeda affiliates and homegrown violent extremists.

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The United States and the Policy of Targeted Killing

By Schweitzer, Yoram and Yogev, Einav

Source: http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=5282

United States policy on targeted killings in the war on terror made headlines with the May 2011 raid by the Navy SEALs in the heart of Pakistan that killed al-Qaeda leader Osama B

Laden. The SEALs were previously involved in commando actions of this type against other senior al-Qaeda figures. In September 2009, a SEALs team killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, an al-Qaeda commander in Somalia, in a land operation that was carried out in Somalia. Nabhan was the partner of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who was killed two weeks ago by Somali security forces. Fazul was sought by the United States for his involvement in the 1998 al-Qaeda suicide attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as the operational chief on the ground, and for his involvement as a commander, alongside Nabhan, in the coordinated al-Qaeda terror attack in Kenya in 2002. This attack included the attempted use of an anti-aircraft missile to shoot down an Arkia passenger plane departing from Kenya to Israel, at the same time that a suicide attack, which killed fifteen people, including three Israelis, was underway in the Mombasa Paradise Hotel. Another important object of US targeted killings was Ilyas Kashmiri, who was killed in early June in an aerial operation. Kashmiri was also in al-Qaeda's external branch unit and was a senior operational commander in a Pakistani jihad organization. His name was tied to fatal terrorist attacks executed and planned in India, Pakistan, and Europe.

These targeted killings are part of an intensive campaign in the war against global terrorism begun by the United States immediately after September 11. In the course of this campaign the United States has become entangled in a conventional war and in other ongoing, expensive, and bloody sub-conventional battles in a number of states. Given the complexity and the prolonged nature of the war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, public opinion has come to feel that the terrorists have succeeded in making a mockery of the world's largest superpower and its allies.

However, a careful examination of the terror fighting strategy, and especially the operational conduct of the United States, indicates that the combination of technology and human resources, along with actions by armed unmanned aerial vehicles, has allowed the Americans to carry out effective targeted attacks within the territories in which their ground forces' freedom of movement is limited. In this way, the United States and its allies have succeeded in killing or capturing the commanders of the special al-Qaeda unit that is responsible for carrying out terror attacks abroad. They have also been able to expel many additional senior military commanders and most of the senior activists of al-Qaeda and its main affiliates in the Taliban and other terrorist organizations and networks that operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan sector. At the same time, the United States and its allies have succeeded in foiling most of the attempted terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and global jihad activists.

In spite of the protests heard recently, mostly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, against the aerial killings because of the harm done to uninvolved civilians – harm caused both by the terrorist organizations' deliberate custom of taking shelter among a civilian population, and by human error – the United States, which is leading the struggle against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, has unmistakably and publicly adopted this pattern of action and is in particular implementing it in the sub-conventional battles underway in these theaters. Furthermore, the Americans have also recently been preparing to step up the use of targeted killings from the air in politically unstable Yemen, which against the backdrop of the increased activity of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been marked as another central theater of conflict. The United States, which about a decade ago had already used targeted killings sporadically in Yemen, recently began using them again when it attempted an aerial killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric and an official of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The faint criticism of the intensive targeted killings campaign by the United States, which is heard only rarely around the world, is especially noteworthy in light of the serious condemnations Israel has received for the same conduct. For decades Israel has fought

terrorism that threatened its citizens, and during this period it made sparing use of the tools of targeted killings against prominent terrorist leaders. The murderous large scale terrorism carried out against Israeli citizens during the second intifada, which was manifested largely in suicide terrorism, led to the government of Israel's developing and expanding the use of this operational tool and aiming it at the most prominent and dangerous planners and perpetrators of terrorism. Targeted killings played a major though not exclusive role in Israel's success in rooting out suicide terrorism and undermining the violence of the first years of the second intifada. Significantly, the use of targeted killings was regulated by Israel's Supreme Court and was permitted only against those who beyond a doubt were actively engaged in terrorism aimed at harming the civilian population. Needless to say, there was no similar criticism of the United States following the killing of Bin Laden, or even after the killings of the rest of the officials of al-Qaeda, who were also perceived as a threat to the security and stability of the international community. Furthermore, the clear threat made by American officials that Ayman Zawahiri, whose official selection as Bin Laden's successor was announced publicly by the organization on June 16, is a target for assassination, makes it clear that the United States and its allies do not intend to stop this policy.

The coordinated activity among many of the world's security services, including from rival states that collaborate ad hoc, demonstrates that in spite of moral dilemmas and legal restrictions, the selective and precise use of targeted killings is deemed an effective and essential option, and therefore cannot be relinquished as one of the tools in democratic states' arsenals. Nevertheless, it is clear that decision makers and public opinion in democratic countries must understand that the problem of worldwide terrorism cannot be solved by means of one operational tool, no matter how effective, because of the possible – albeit unintentional – collateral damage. Therefore, adoption of the tool of targeted killings always requires prudent and cautious implementation, subject to ongoing scrutiny and review by the attacking state. This scrutiny must consider the level of concrete threat from the objects of the targeted killings and the circumstances in which they are acting, with serious consideration given to the long and short term ramifications on the overall policy of the fight against terror.

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Israel drills for potential mass missile attacks

Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/22/c_13944486.htm

The Israeli government, the military, rescue services, 80 municipalities, and millions of civilians on Wednesday drilled responses to a simultaneous mass missile strikes across the country.

This year's test, which was the high point of the week-long " Turning Point 5" drill, marks the first time in the five years the exercise has been held that the entire population was instructed to seek cover.

In the drill's scenario, it is the 13th day of a full-scale war, and Israel's foes have lobbed some 7,000 missiles, hitting Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and other major population centers. Hundreds are dead and thousands wounded, according to Home Front Command Minister Matan Vilna'i, who led the government's civilian responses to the mass attack.

"In last year's exercise, about 47 percent of the population entered protected areas," Col. Efi Mishov, head of the Home Front Command's Population Department, told the Yisrael Hayom newspaper.

"The past several years have seen a moderate increase in exercise participation, and this trend is expected to continue this year, but not in drastic numbers," Mishov said.

The government security cabinet, as part of the drill, met for the first time in a secret underground bunker in the Jerusalem area. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and government ministers would use the facility in such a missile attack. Part of the drill included direct missile hits on the Knesset parliament building and on the nearby Prime Minister's Office.

Members of Israeli Army participate in an exercise which simulates a rocket attack on Ashdod Port, Israel, on June 22, 2011. Israel is holding a nation-wide, week-long emergency drills simulating simultaneous mass-casualty events. (Xinhua/Rafael Ben-Ari)

The sirens were to sound once, as a part of the drill, and a second only in the event of a real attack. In several cities, among them coastal Ashkelon and Ashdod, and Beer Sheba in the northern Negev, malfunctioning sirens went off twice, scaring residents who thought it was a

A member of Israeli Army participates in an exercise which simulates a rocket attack on Ashdod Port, Israel, on June 22, 2011. Israel is holding a nation-wide, week-long emergency drills simulating simultaneous mass-casualty events. (Xinhua/Rafael Ben-Ari)

genuine emergency.

In hospital parking lots, police and Israeli Defense Forces soldiers, and civilian first-responders garbed in chemical warfare protection suits practiced mass intake and triage, spraying down adults, and -- using baby dolls -- infants suffering from chemical burns and wounds.

Dozens of ambulances pulled up, one after another, to discharge patients, in order to test the logistics of dealing with mass- casualty attacks on a scale Israel has not seen before.

As sirens across the country wailed, the country's 7.5 million citizens were instructed to enter bomb shelters and other " protected spaces," and remain inside for a short period.

Schools across the country practiced quickly and calmly entering prepared bomb shelters, and remaining inside for 15 minutes.

"At first I thought it was real, but then they told me it wasn' t real," said nine-year-old Maya Firestone, a student at Jerusalem 's Evelina De Rothschild school. "It was a little crazy because everyone was running around," Firestone said.

Before its 400 pupils filed out of the shelters and back to their classes, school principal Yossi Ohana, using a bullhorn, debriefed the students.

"Our goal was to evacuate all of the students within one-and-a- half minutes into this shelter," Ohana told Xinhua after the drill concluded.

The exercise, which was widely publicized in radio and television spots, as well as online, is meant to ready the populace for the worst, and comprehensively synchronize crisis-management responses to salvos of rockets from neighboring areas slamming into Israeli cities.

One of the simulation's goals is also to warn potential foes that such an attack would cause little damage to a government, public and military protected and readied for the worst.

"Our enemies know perfectly well that if they attack us, we will strike them with very tough blows, but we must prepare," Israel's Home Front Command Minister, Matan Vilnai, told Army Radio on Sunday, "because they have the capacity to fire missiles and rockets at all of our territory."

The Israeli army's former intelligence chief Amos Yadlin said on Wednesday that "these missiles will not disappear, even if a peace agreement with the Palestinians is signed."

A member of Israeli Army participates in an exercise which simulates a rocket attack on Kiryat Malachi industrial site, Israel, on June 22, 2011. Israel is holding a nation-wide, week-long emergency drills simulating simultaneous mass-casualty events. (Xinhua/Rafael Ben-Ari)

Members of Israeli Army participate in an exercise which simulates a rocket attack on Ashdod Port, Israel, on June 22, 2011. Israel is holding a nation-wide, week-long emergency drills simulating simultaneous mass-casualty events. (Xinhua/Rafael Ben-Ari)

Members of Israeli Army participate in an exercise which simulates a rocket attack on Ashdod Port, Israel, on June 22, 2011. Israel is holding a nation-wide, week-long emergency drills simulating simultaneous mass-casualty events. (Xinhua/Rafael Ben-Ari)

Al-Qaeda and the Libyan Rebellion

Source:http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/270293/al-qaeda-and-libyan-rebellion-john-rosenthal?page=1

A new report from two French think tanks concludes that jihadists have played a predominant role in the eastern-Libyan rebellion against the rule of Moammar Qaddafi, and that "true democrats" represent only a minority in the rebellion. The report, furthermore, calls into question the justifications given for Western military intervention in Libya, arguing that they are largely based on media exaggerations and "outright disinformation."

The sponsors of the report are the Paris-based International Center for Research and Study on Terrorism and Aide to Victims of Terrorism (CIRET-AVT) and the French Center for Research on Intelligence (CF2R). The organizations sent a six-member expert mission to Libya to evaluate the situation and consult with representatives on both sides of the conflict. From March 31 to April 6, the mission visited the Libyan capital of Tripoli and the region of Tripolitania; from April 19 to April 25, it visited the rebel capital of Benghazi and the surrounding Cyrenaica region in eastern Libya.

The report identifies four factions among the members of the eastern Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC). Apart from a minority of "true democrats," the other three factions comprise partisans of a restoration of the monarchy that was overthrown by Qaddafi in 1969, Islamic extremists seeking the establishment of an Islamic state, and former fixtures of the Qaddafi regime who defected to the rebels for opportunistic or other reasons.

There is a clear overlap between the Islamists and the monarchists, inasmuch as the deposed King Idris I was himself the head of the Senussi brotherhood, which the authors describe as "an anti-Western Muslim sect that practices an austere and conservative form of Islam." The monarchists are thus, more precisely, "monarchists-fundamentalists."

The most prominent of the defectors, the president of the NTC, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, is likewise described by the authors as a "traditionalist" who is "supported by the Islamists." The authors point out that Jalil played an important role in the "Bulgarian nurses affair," so called for five Bulgarian nurses who, along with a Palestinian doctor, were charged with deliberately infecting hundreds of children with AIDS in a hospital in Benghazi. As chair of the Appeals Court in Tripoli, Jalil twice upheld the death penalty for the nurses. In 2007, the nurses and the Palestinian doctor were released by the Libyan government following negotiations in which French president Nicolas Sarkozy's then wife, Cecilia, played a highly publicized role.

The report describes members of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as the "main pillar of the armed insurrection." "Thus the military coalition under NATO leadership is supporting a rebellion that includes Islamic terrorists," the authors write. Alluding to the major role played by the Cyrenaica region in supplying recruits for al-Qaeda in Iraq, they add, "No one can deny that the Libyan rebels who are today supported by Washington were only yesterday jihadists killing American GIs in Iraq."

The full composition of the NTC has not been made public. But, according to the authors, one avowed al-Qaeda recruiter, Abdul-Hakim al-Hasadi, is himself a member of the NTC. Al-Hasadi is described by the authors as the "leader of the Libyan rebels." Although Western media reports commonly say that he is in charge of the defense of his home town of Darnah in eastern Libya, the CIRET-CF2R report suggests that in mid-April, al-Hasadi left Cyrenaica by boat in order to participate in the battle of Misrata. He is supposed to have taken arms and 25 "well-trained fighters" with him. Misrata is in western Libya, a mere 135 miles from Tripoli.

Regarding the effects of western military intervention in support of the rebels, the authors conclude:

> *Western intervention is in the process of creating more problems than it resolves. It is one thing to force Qaddafi to leave. It is another thing to spread chaos and destruction in Libya to this end and to prepare the ground for fundamentalist Islam. The current moves risk destabilizing all of North Africa, the Sahel, and the*

Middle East and favoring the emergence of a new regional base for radical Islam and terrorism.

Some parts from this study:

On the Battle of Misrata:
Little by little, the city is starting to appear like a Libyan version of Sarajevo in the eyes of the "free" world. The rebels from Benghazi hope that a humanitarian crisis in Misrata will convince the Western coalition to deploy ground troops in order to save the population.
. . . During the course of April, the NGO Human Rights Watch published casualty figures concerning Misrata that reveal that, contrary to the claims made in the international media, Qaddafi loyalist forces have not massacred the residents of the town. During two months of hostilities, only 257 persons — including combatants — were killed. Among the 949 wounded, only 22 — or fewer than 3 percent — were women. If regime forces had deliberately targeted civilians, women would have represented around half of the victims.
It is thus now obvious that Western leaders — first and foremost, President Obama — have grossly exaggerated the humanitarian risk in order to justify their military action in Libya.
The real interest of Misrata lies elsewhere. . . . The control of this port, at only 220 kilometers from Tripoli, would make it an ideal base for launching a land offensive against Qaddafi.

On Benghazi and the Cyrenaica Region:
Benghazi is well-known as a hot-bed of religious extremism. The Cyrenaica region has a long Islamist tradition going back to the Senussi brotherhood. Religious fundamentalism is much more evident here than in the western part of the country. Women are completely veiled from head to foot. They cannot drive and their social life is reduced to a minimum. Bearded men predominate. They often have the black mark of piety on their foreheads [the "zebibah," which is formed by repeated prostration during Muslim prayers].
It is a little-known fact that Benghazi has become over the last 15 years the epicenter of African migration to Europe. This traffic in human beings has been transformed into a veritable industry, generating billions of dollars. Parallel mafia structures have developed in the city, where the traffic is firmly implanted and

employs thousands of people, while corrupting police and civil servants. It was only a year ago that the Libyan government, with the help of Italy, managed to bring this cancer under control.
Following the disappearance of its main source of revenue and the arrest of a number of its bosses, the local mafia took the lead in financing and supporting the Libyan rebellion. Numerous gangs and members of the city's criminal underworld are known to have conducted punitive expeditions against African migrant workers in Benghazi and the surrounding area. Since the start of the rebellion, several hundred migrant workers — Sudanese, Somalis, Ethiopians, and Eritreans — have been robbed and murdered by rebel militias. This fact is carefully hidden by the international media.

On African "Mercenaries" and Tuaregs:
One of the greatest successes [of Qaddafi's African policy] is his "alliance" with the Tuaregs [a traditionally nomadic population spread over the region of the Sahara], whom he actively financed and supported when their movement was repressed in Mali in the 1990s.
. . . In 2005, Qaddafi accorded an unlimited residency permit to all Nigerian and Malian Tuaregs on Libyan territory. Then, in 2006, he called on all the tribes of the Sahara region, including Tuareg tribes, to form a common entity to oppose terrorism and drug trafficking . . .
This is why hundreds of combatants came from Niger and Mali to help Qaddafi [after the outbreak of the rebellion]. In their view, they were indebted to Gaddafi and had an obligation to do so. . . .
Many things have been written about the "mercenaries" serving in the Libyan security forces, but few of them are accurate. . . .
In recent years, foreigners have . . . been recruited [into the Libyan army]. The phenomenon is entirely comparable to the phenomenon that one observes on all levels of Libyan economic life. There is a very large population of foreign workers in search of employment in the country. The majority of the recruits originally come from Mali, Chad, Niger, Congo, and Sudan. . . .
The information from rebel sources on supposed foreign intrusions [i.e. mercenaries] is vague and should be treated with caution. . . .

On the other hand, it is a proven fact — and the mission was able to confirm this itself — that Tuaregs from Niger came to Tripoli to offer their support to Qaddafi. They did so spontaneously and out of a sense of debt.

 . . . It seems that Libyans of foreign origin and genuine volunteers coming from foreign countries are being deliberately confused [in the reports on "mercenaries"]. Whatever the actual number [of foreign fighters], they form only a small part of the Libyan forces.

On the role of the international media:
Up until the end of February, the situation in western Libyan cities was extremely tense and there were clashes — more so than in the east. But the situation was the subject of exaggeration and outright disinformation in the media. For example, a report that Libyan aircraft bombed Tripoli is completely inaccurate: No Libyan bomb fell on the capital, even though bloody clashes seem to have taken place in certain neighbourhoods. . . .
The consequences of this disinformation are clear. The U.N. resolution [mandating intervention] was approved on the basis of such media reports. No investigative commission was sent to the country. It is no exaggeration to say that sensationalist reporting by al-Jazeera influenced the U.N.

On the insurrection in Benghazi:

As soon as the protests started, Islamists and criminals immediately took advantage of the situation in order to attack high-security prisons outside Benghazi where their comrades were being held. Following the liberation of their leaders, the rebellion attacked police stations and public buildings. The residents of the city woke up to see the corpses of policemen hanging from bridges.
Numerous atrocities were likewise committed against African workers, who have all been treated as "mercenaries." African workers were expelled, murdered, imprisoned, and tortured.

On the insurrection in Zawiya (a town in western Libya):
During the three weeks [that the town was controlled by the rebels], all public buildings were pillaged and set on fire. . . . Everywhere, there was destruction and pillaging (of arms, money, archives). There was no trace of combat, which confirms the testimony of the police [who claim to have received orders not to intervene]. . . .
There were also atrocities committed (women who were raped, and some police officers who were killed), as well as civilian victims during these three weeks. . . . The victims were killed in the manner of the Algerian GIA [Armed Islamic Group]: throats cut, eyes gauged out, arms and legs cut off, sometimes the bodies were burned . . .

John Rosenthal writes on European politics and transatlantic security issues.

NOTE: Full report [in French] can be downloaded from the Newsletter's website – section: "CBRNE-CT Papers"

U.S. no longer mandating 100 percent screening of cargo containers

Source:http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-no-longer-mandating-100-percent-screening-cargo-containers

DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that the United States is no longer going to screen every cargo container before it enters the United States.
On a visit to the Netherlands' Rotterdam port, the fourth largest in the world, Napolitano said, "We believe the so-called 100 percent requirement is probably not the best way to go."
In 2007 Congress mandated that all containers entering the United States must be scanned at

their ports of exit by 2012, but Napolitano said, "We at this point are not going to insist on that."
Earlier this week, Napolitano met with Home Secretary Theresa May, her British counterpart, as well as with other EU ministers to explain the U.S. position on the security mandate.
The 2007 bill empowers DHS to extend the 2012 deadline if the agency believed that the goal was not achievable and in the past Napolitano has expressed doubts about the

feasibility of screening 100 percent of the cargo entering the United States.

Napolitano says rather than scanning all cargo containers, DHS prefers a "layered approach" that includes increased cooperation between countries and better intelligence sharing and analysis in addition to screening some containers.

She explained, "I think what we have learnt over time is that there are many different ways to achieve a security objective. You have to have multiple layers that operate effectively."

Napolitano is currently abroad on week-long visit to Britain and other European nations to bolster support for global efforts to secure the supply chain.

So far **about fifty ports around the world** have signed on to the U.S.-led **Container Security Initiative** (CSI) which is aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and the smuggling of dangerous materials by mandating that port authorities pre-scan and evaluate containers.

Background Report on Suicide Attack on Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan

Source: http:// www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Following June 28th, 2011 coordinated attack by the Taliban on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism [START] has released a background report featuring information on terrorist activities in Afghanistan, attacks by the Taliban, attacks using complex tactics, and attacks by terrorist groups against hotels.

Key findings from the report include:

☑ Since 1970, there have been 2,417 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, with the majority of those occurring since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

☑ The Taliban are now the most active terrorist organization in Afghanistan, accounting for 1,323 attacks against civilians, or 57.7% of all attacks in Afghanistan since 1970.

☑ Since 1970, terrorist groups throughout the world have conducted 2,515 tactically complex attacks (using both firearms and explosives in the commission of a single attack).

☑ More than 660 attacks against hotels have occurred in the past 40 years, with at least three attacks occurring each year.

☑ Hotels appear to be of increasing interest to terrorist organizations, targeted in more than 100 attacks since 2005 alone.

Terrorist Attacks Against Hotels, 1970-2010

Fatalities and Injuries from Attacks Against Hotels, 1970-2010

Source: Global Terrorism Database

These data were collected and compiled from the Global Terrorism Database. An updated version of the database, with information on incidents through 2010, was released in June 2011. Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on domestic as well as transnational and international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the perpetrator.

Notable instances of hotel attacks include:
- March 2002 – a Hamas suicide bomber detonated an IED inside the Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel, killing 20 and wounding 72.
- July 2005 – three coordinated vehicle bombs targeted resorts and hotels in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, killing 91 and wounding over 100. The attack was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades.
- November 2005 – three bombings of hotels in Amman, Jordan, by Al Qaeda in Iraq killed 57 and wounded over 100.
- January 2008 - an attack by the Taliban using suicide bombers and gunmen targeted the Serena Hotel in Kabul, killing eight people.
- September 2008 – a truck bomb detonated at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing 60 and injuring more than 200.
- November 2008 – a coordinated attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba in Mumbai targeted the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel and the Oberoi Trident Hotel, among other sites, killing 171 and wounding 250.

NOTE: Full report can be downloaded from the Newsletter's website – section: "CBRNE-CT Papers".

Taliban Hotel Attack: Low Death Toll, High Psychological Value

By Scott Stewart
Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110706-taliban-hotel-attack-low-death-toll-high-psychological-value?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110707&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore &elq=b42deeac504248dc9a0a3f42a89f4a93

At about 10 p.m. on June 28, a group of heavily armed militants attacked the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan. According to government and media reports, the attack team consisted of eight or nine militants who were reportedly wearing suicide vests in addition to carrying other weapons. At least three of the attackers detonated their vests during the drawn-out fight. Afghan security forces, assisted by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), needed some eight hours to clear the hotel of attackers. One group of militants even worked their way up to the roof of the hotel, where they

fired several rocket-propelled grenades.

The attack resulted in the deaths of 12 people, as well as all the militants. The Taliban had a different take on the attack, posting a series of statements on their website claiming responsibility and saying the assault was conducted by eight operatives who killed 90 people and that the real news of their success was being suppressed. (Initially, the Taliban claimed to have killed 200 in the attack but reduced the toll to 90 in later statements.)
NATO and ISAF spokesmen have noted their belief that, due to the location and use of suicide bombers in the attack, the Haqqani network was involved in the operation. On the evening of June 29, a NATO airstrike killed Ismail Jan, a senior Haqqani leader in Afghanistan who NATO claims was involved in planning the hotel attack.
When viewed in the context of other recent attacks in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan,

the attack on the Intercontinental Hotel was not all that spectacular. It certainly did not kill the 90 people the Taliban claim, although it does have a number of interesting security implications.

Past Attacks
Militants in Afghanistan have conducted several armed-assault style attacks in Kabul in recent years. In April 2011, a group of militants dressed in Afghan army uniforms stormed the

Ministry of Defense in Kabul and killed two people in what the Taliban later claimed was an assassination attempt aimed at the visiting French defense minister.
On Jan. 18, 2010, the day that the Afghan Cabinet was sworn in, 11 militants conducted a wave of armed assaults against a variety of high-profile targets in Kabul that included the presidential palace, the Central Bank and the Defense and Justice ministries. The most prolonged fighting occurred at the newly opened Grand Afghan Shopping Center. The shopping center was heavily damaged by a fire apparently initiated by the detonation of a suicide device. In spite of the large number of militants participating in this attack, it resulted only in seven deaths.
In February 2009, eight militants attacked the Justice Ministry, the Department of Prison Affairs and the Education Ministry. The attack killed 21 people and took place the day before

former U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke was scheduled to arrive in Kabul.

The Taliban have also targeted hotels in Kabul. In January 2008, the Serena Hotel was attacked by four militants who used an explosive device to breach the front security perimeter and then stormed the hotel. One of the attackers detonated his suicide vest in the lobby and another roamed through the hotel shooting guests. The attack, which resulted in six deaths, occurred while the Norwegian foreign minister was staying there.

In October 2009, three militants attacked a guest house being used by U.N. personnel in Kabul. The attack resulted in the deaths of five U.N. staff members and three Afghans. The Taliban took credit for this attack, which targeted U.N. election workers in an attempt to disrupt the November 2009 Afghan election.

Sending a Message

When STRATFOR began looking at these Kabul attacks from a tactical viewpoint, we

were initially surprised by the relatively low death toll considering the number of militant operatives employed. None of the Taliban's armed assaults in Kabul have produced the high casualty count of the November 2009 Mumbai attacks. However, over time it became quite apparent that the objective of these armed assaults in Kabul was not only to cause carnage. If so, the Taliban would have discontinued conducting such attacks due to the relatively low return on investment they were providing. Instead, the Taliban have shown that they like to use such attacks at strategic times to make sure the threat they pose is not forgotten.

Consider the context of the attacks described above. They all happened in relation to other events that were occurring at the time over which the Taliban wished to voice their displeasure. The attack on the Intercontinental Hotel occurred during a conference to discuss the transfer of security authority from the ISAF to the Afghan government — an event the Taliban certainly wanted to comment on, and did.

These multi-man armed attacks in Kabul were true acts of terrorism — attacks conducted for their symbolic propaganda value — and not acts conducted to be tactically significant from a military standpoint. When taken together, these less than spectacular individual attacks were conducted with enough frequency to cultivate a perception of instability and lack of security in the Afghan capital — an important goal for the Taliban.

In their official statement claiming responsibility, the Taliban said the Intercontinental Hotel attack was intended to disrupt the handover conference. They also claimed their primary goal was to target U.S. and NATO spies and agents who would be staying at the hotel, but that was

obviously a red herring since very few Western government employees stay at that hotel, though some do attend meetings there.

This attack also illustrated some other facts about the Taliban movement: First, the Taliban do not appear to have any shortage of men. Despite almost 10 year of war, they have the

international chain of hotels with the same name, now known as the InterContinental Hotels Group. Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the hotel ceased to be part of the InterContinental Hotels brand, but the hotel's local ownership continued to use the Intercontinental name.

resources to burn through eight suicide operatives on a mission that did not appear to be strategically significant. Second, they do not appear to be suffering from morale problems. They are able to readily recruit militants willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause. And they

are able to make outlandish propaganda claims — that they killed 90 people in the hotel attack, for example — to a target audience that will take their statements at face value.

This brings us to our final point, a discussion of the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel itself.

The 'Intercontinental'

Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel, known widely as the "Intercon," opened for business in 1969. At that time it was the Afghanistan's first international luxury hotel and was a part of the

This is not an uncommon situation, particularly in countries like Afghanistan where it is hard for large corporate hotel groups to enforce their trademarks. One potential downside of this type of arrangement is that it can give an international traveler a false sense of security. Generally, the large hotel chains are very serious about security, and if a chain does not own a specific hotel property, the local owner of the property who wants to use the chain's name will be forced to adhere to the chain's stringent security standards. Therefore, anyone seeing the InterContinental Hotel name would assume that the Intercon in Kabul would adhere to the global chain's security standards. In this case, they would be wrong.

Most U.S. and Western visitors to Kabul stay at the Serena Hotel rather than the Intercon because the Serena has better security. The Intercon tends to get more local traffic, which belies the Taliban's claim that the primary reason they attacked the Intercon was to kill U.S. and NATO spies. We have heard rumors that the operation may have been intended to target a specific VIP who was supposed to be visiting the property but have not been able to confirm this. If a VIP was indeed the target, the operation failed to kill him or her.

The false assumption that the Kabul Intercon would adhere to the stringent security standards of the InterContinental Hotels Group illustrates the importance of properly preparing for a trip by thoroughly researching your destination before traveling. This week, STRATFOR began publishing a series of reports on travel security that are designed to assist travelers during the busy summer travel season in the Northern Hemisphere.

As U.S. and other international forces begin withdrawing from Afghanistan, we can expect the Taliban and their allies to continue conducting high-profile attacks in the heart of

Kabul that coincide with significant events. Such attacks will be a fact of life in the city for the foreseeable future, and people traveling to and from or living in Kabul should pay close attention to events that could trigger Taliban attacks and plan their activities and make personal security arrangements accordingly.

Even the Taliban cannot attack without conducting preoperational surveillance, which highlights the utility of surveillance detection and counterintelligence to uncover Taliban agents who have penetrated facilities in order to turn them into targets.

The Seattle Plot: Jihadists Shifting Away From Civilian Targets?

By Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110629-seattle-plot-jihadists-shifting-away-civilian-targets?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20110630&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=917231c43be74001822827c30f49275b

On June 22 in a Seattle warehouse, Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif pulled an unloaded M16 rifle to his shoulder, aimed it, and pulled the trigger

small number of hand grenades were to be used in an upcoming mission: an attack on a U.S. Military Entrance Processing Station

repeatedly as he imagined himself gunning down young U.S. military recruits. His longtime friend Walli Mujahidh (photo – right) did likewise with an identical rifle, assuming a kneeling position as he engaged his notional targets. The two men had come to the warehouse with another man to inspect the firearms the latter had purchased with money Abdul-Latif had provided him. The rifles and a

(MEPS) in an industrial area south of downtown Seattle.

After confirming that the rifles were capable of automatic fire and discussing the capacity of the magazines they had purchased, the men placed the rifles back into a storage bag intending to transport them to a temporary cache location. As they prepared to leave the warehouse, they were suddenly swarmed by

large number of FBI agents and other law enforcement officers and quickly arrested. Their plan to conduct a terrorist attack inside the United States had been discovered when the man they had invited to join their plot (the man who had allegedly purchased the weapons for them) reported the plot to the Seattle Police Department, which in turn reported it to the FBI. According to the federal criminal complaint filed in the case, the third unidentified man had an extensive criminal record and had known Abdul-Latif for several years, but he had not been willing to undertake such a terrorist attack.

While the behavior of Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh in this plot demonstrates that they were amateur "wannabe" jihadists rather than seasoned terrorist operatives, their plot could have ended very differently if they had found a kindred spirit in the man they approached for help instead of someone who turned them into the authorities. This case also illustrates some important trends in jihadist terrorism that we have been watching for the past few years as well as a possible shift in mindset within the jihadist movement.

Trends
First, Abu-Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh, both American converts to Islam, are prime examples of what we refer to as grassroots jihadists. They are individuals who were inspired by the al Qaeda movement but who had no known connection to the al Qaeda core or one of its franchise groups. In late 2009, in response to the success of the U.S. government and its allies in preventing jihadist attacks in the West, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) began a campaign to encourage jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks using readily available items, rather than travel abroad for military and terrorism training with jihadist groups. After successes such as the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting, this theme of encouraging grassroots attacks was adopted by the core al Qaeda group.

While the grassroots approach does present a challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies in that attackers can seemingly appear out of nowhere with no prior warning, the paradox presented by grassroots operatives is that they are also far less skilled than trained terrorist operatives. In other words, while they are hard to detect, they frequently lack the skill to conduct large, complex attacks and frequently make mistakes that expose them to detection in smaller plots.

And that is what we saw in the Seattle plot. Abdul-Latif had originally wanted to hit U.S. Joint Base Lewis-McChord (formerly known as Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base), which is located some 70 kilometers (44 miles) south of Seattle, but later decided against that plan since he considered the military base to be too hardened a target. While Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh were amateurs, they seem to have reached a reasonable assessment of their own abilities and which targets were beyond their abilities to strike.

Another trend we noted in this case was that the attack plan called for the use of firearms and hand grenades in an armed assault, rather than the use of an improvised explosive device (IED). There have been a number of botched IED attacks, such as the May 2010 Times Square attack and Najibullah Zazi's plot to attack the New York subway system.

These were some of the failures that caused jihadist leaders such as AQAP's Nasir al-Wahayshi to encourage grassroots jihadists to undertake simple attacks. Indeed, the most successful jihadist attacks in the West in recent years, such as the Fort Hood shooting, the June 2009 attack on a military recruitment center in Little Rock, Ark., and the March 2011 attack on U.S. troops at a civilian airport in Frankfurt, Germany, involved the use of firearms rather than IEDs. When combined with the thwarted plot in New York in May 2011, these incidents support the trend we identified in May 2010 of grassroots jihadist conducting more armed assaults and fewer attacks involving IEDs.

Another interesting aspect of the Seattle case was that Abdul-Latif was an admirer of AQAP ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki. Unlike the Fort Hood case, where U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan had been in email contact with al-Awlaki, it does not appear that Abdul-Latif had been in contact with the AQAP preacher. However, from video statements and comments Abdul-Latif himself posted on the Internet, he appears to have had a high opinion of al-Awlaki and to have been influenced by his preaching. It does not appear that Abdul-Latif, who was known as Joseph Anthony Davis before his conversion to Islam, or Mujahidh, whose pre-conversion name was Frederick Domingue Jr., spoke Arabic. This underscores

the importance of al-Awlaki's role within AQAP as its primary spokesman to the English-speaking world and his mission of radicalizing English-speaking Muslims and encouraging them to conduct terrorist attacks in the West.

Vulnerabilities

Once again, in the Seattle case, the attack on the MEPS was not thwarted by some CIA source in Yemen, an intercept by the National Security Agency or an intentional FBI undercover operation. Rather, the attack was thwarted by a Muslim who was approached by Abdul-Latif and asked to participate in the attack. The man then went to the Seattle Police Department, which brought the man to the attention of the FBI. This is what we refer to as grassroots counterterrorism, that is, local cops and citizens bringing things to the attention of federal authorities. As the jihadist threat has become more diffuse and harder to detect, grassroots defenders have become an even more critical component of international counterterrorism efforts. This is especially true for Muslims, many of whom consider themselves engaged in a struggle to defend their faith (and their sons) from the threat of jihadism.

But, even if the third man had chosen to participate in the attack rather than report it to the authorities, the group would have been vulnerable to detection. First, there were the various statements Abdul-Latif made on the Internet in support of attacks against the United States. Second, any Muslim convert who chooses a name such as Mujahidh (holy warrior) for himself must certainly anticipate the possibility that it will bring him to the attention of the authorities. Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh were also somewhat cavalier in their telephone conversations, although those conversations do not appear to have brought them to the attention of the authorities.

Perhaps their most significant vulnerability to detection, aside from their desire to obtain automatic weapons and hand grenades, would have been their need to conduct preoperational surveillance of their intended target. After conducting some preliminary research using the Internet, Abdul-Latif quickly realized that they needed more detailed intelligence. He then briefly conducted physical surveillance of the exterior of the MEPS to see what it looked like in person. Despite the technological advances it represents, the Internet cannot

replace the physical surveillance process, which is a critical requirement for terrorist planners. Indeed, after the external surveillance of the building, Abdul-Latif asked the informant to return to the building under a ruse in order to enter it and obtain a detailed floor plan of the facility for use in planning the attack.

In this case, the informant was able to obtain the information he needed from his FBI handlers, but had he been a genuine participant in the plot, he would have had to have exposed himself to detection by entering the MEPS facility after conducting surveillance of the building's exterior. If some sort of surveillance detection program was in place, it likely would have flagged him as a person of interest for follow-up investigation, which could have led authorities back to the other conspirators in the attack.

A New Twist

One aspect of this plot that was different from many other recent plots was that Abdul-Latif insisted that he wanted to target the U.S. military and did not want to kill people he considered innocents. Certainly he had no problem with the idea of killing the armed civilian security guards at the MEPS — the plan called for the attackers to kill them first, or the unarmed still-civilian recruits being screened at the facility, then to kill as many other military personnel as possible before being neutralized by the responding authorities. However, even in the limited conversations documented in the federal criminal complaint, Abdul-Latif repeated several times that he did not want to kill innocents. This stands in stark contrast to the actions of previous attackers and plotters such as John Allen Mohammed, the so-called D.C. sniper, or Faisal Shahzad, who planned the failed Times Square attack. Abdul-Latif's reluctance to attack civilians may be a reflection of the debate we are seeing among jihadists in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and even Algeria over the killing of those they consider innocents. This debate is also raging on many of the English-language jihadist message boards Abdul-Latif frequented. Most recently, this tension was seen in the defection of a Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan faction in Pakistan's Kurram agency. If this sentiment begins to take wider hold in the jihadist movement, and especially the English-speaking jihadist community in the

West, it could have an impact on the target-selection process for future attacks by grassroots operatives in the West. It could also mean that commonly attacked targets such as subway systems, civilian aircraft, hotels and public spaces will be seen as less desirable than comparably soft military targets. Given the limitations of grassroots jihadists, and their tendency to focus on soft targets, such a shift would result in a much smaller universe of potential targets for such attacks — the softer military targets such as recruit-processing stations and troops in transit that have been targeted in recent months.

Removing some of the most vulnerable targets from the potential-target list is not something that militants do lightly. If this is indeed happening, it could be an indication that some important shifts are under way on the ideological battlefield and that jihadists may be concerned about losing their popular support. It is still too early to know if this is a trend and not merely the idiosyncrasy of one attack planner — and it is contrary to the target sets laid out in recent messages from AQAP and the al Qaeda core — but when viewed in light of the Little Rock, Fort Hood and Frankfurt shootings, it is definitely a concept worth further examination.

Questions arise surrounding the assassination of Ilyas Kashmiri

Source: http://www.jamestown.org

As images of a dead Muhammed Ilyas Kashmiri have yet to surface or be produced by either Pakistani government officials or any of the myriad militant organizations operating freely in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), some in both Pakistan and Washington have expressed doubts over the veracity of the claim that Kashmiri was wiped out in a South Waziristan drone attack on June 3. Kashmiri has been a major militant leader heading both the 'Brigade 313' of Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) and al-Qaeda's Lashkar-e-Zil (LeZ) 'shadow army' (For more on Kashmiri, see Militant Leadership Monitor, January 2010). At the time of his supposed assassination, he was in an area of South Waziristan controlled by Maulvi Nazir in the village of Ghwakhwa when the compound he was in was leveled by a missile launched from a CIA-operated unmanned aerial vehicle (The News International, June 5). As some American officials began to express doubts about whether Kashmiri had indeed been eliminated from the theater, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik told the media that

there was a "98 percent chance he is dead" (Reuters, June 5). Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani asserted that American officials were on board with the Pakistani narrative that Kashmiri had been eliminated but when pressed neither the United States Department of State or Department of Defense was willing to publicly line up with PM Gilani's statement (Economic Times [New Delhi], June 7). CIA-run drones continue to pummel the Wana area of South Waziristan in the weeks after Kashmiri's alleged death, while Pakistani authorities have still not been able to confirm beyond a shadow of a doubt that Kashmiri has been removed from the militant scene in that agency (AFP, June 15).

It has been speculated that Kashmiri has been involved in a host of terror plots across the wider region including the bombing of a restaurant frequented by foreigners on February 13, 2010 in Pune, India that killed 17 (The Hindu, June 17). Kashmiri's lifelong enmity toward India stems from his jihadi involvement in the Kashmir conflict and his hatred of the Indian state. His desire to attack India proper may have been part of a strategy to divert Pakistani military attention back toward the Indian border thereby depriving Pakistan of the troop numbers it would need to launch

operations in North Waziristan and elsewhere in the FATA. Pakistan, constantly seesawing back and forth between American pressure to go to war against its own citizenry in the FATA and its military stance toward India, would be much more comfortable in its traditional mode of mobilizing against India to the east than

or the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (The Express Tribune [Karachi], May 24). After Syed Saleem Shahzad reported the depth of Kashmiri's Brigade 313 penetration into the Pakistan Navy for Asia Times Online, he was subsequently abducted and killed while en route to a television interview in Islamabad. An

facing Kashmiri's militants in the west.

The most recent operation attributed to Kashmiri, a May 22 attack on the Pakistan Naval Station Mehran in Karachi – home of the Pakistan's Navy's air wing – led many, including Pakistani journalists and police, to believe that Kashmiri's arm of al-Qaeda had tentacles inside the Pakistani military (Asia Times Online, May 27). Initial reactions in Pakistan were colored by two consecutive bombings on buses transporting Pakistani navy personnel in late April. Islamabad promulgated the notion that ethno-nationalist Balochi separatists were behind these attacks and that perhaps the attack on the Mehran base was a continuation of a spate of said attacks. A Pakistani counter-terrorism official described a Pashto-language phone intercept after the April 26 and 28 IED attacks which greatly lessened the idea that Balochi radicals were involved and pointed to either Pakistan-based al-Qaeda

anonymous Inter-Services Intelligence official stated that it may be in Kashmiri's interest for the world to believe he is gone, as he is (or was) well aware of his being targeted by the United States government (Asia Times Online, June 8). The U.S. Department of State website links Kashmiri to a March 2, 2006 suicide bombing on the American consulate in Karachi which resulted in the death of a U.S. diplomat and three others. [3] HuJI purportedly released a photo said to be Kashmiri's corpse but upon closer inspection, it was in fact an image of one of the killed Lashkar-e-Taiba attackers involved in the November 2008 Mumbai siege (Frontline [Chennai], June 15). If the ISI officer's comment is accurate, that would make HuJI's claim that Kashmiri has been killed part of a ruse aimed at helping him go even deeper underground as the drone war in the FATA grinds on.

Notes:
1. Robert I. Rotberg, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p.184.
2. To view Fazul Abdullah Mohammed's Rewards for Justice listing, see: http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/fazul-abdullah-mohammed.
3. To view Muhammed Ilyas Kashmiri Rewards for Justice listing, see: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160071.htm.

Money, men in short supply to execute Al Qaeda's terror plans

Source: http://www.firstpost.com/fwire/money-men-in-short-supply-to-execute-al-qaedas-terror-plans-35596.html

That all is not well with Al Qaeda is obvious from the plethora of electronic data accessed from Osama bin Laden's last hideout in Pakistan's Abbottabad as the decoding of communication details among the top brass reflects a serious financial crunch in the terrorist oraganisation including a shortage of manpower in lead positions due to killing of leaders by US drone attacks.

During the six weeks of intensive study of the materials obtained from Abbottabad compound of Osama bin Laden, where he was killed by special US forces on 2 May, the CIA-led inter-agency team prepared some 400 intelligence reports.

Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahri warns the US of terror attacks. But where is the money and men for this terror network? Reuters

The most important information gleaned from the 15 computers and 100 storage devices recovered from his compound is the information about the internal strains of the terrorist outfit and the repeated attempt of bin Laden to carry out attacks on the US, The Washington Post reported.

"The trove makes it clear that bin Laden's primary goal—you can call it an obsession—was to attack the US homeland," a senior US counter-terrorism official was quoted as saying. "He pushed for this every way he could," he added.

According to The Washington Post over the past year, the Al Qaeda leader fielded e-mails from followers lamenting the toll being taken by CIA drone "explosions" as well as the network's financial plight.

"Bin Laden approved the creation of a counter-intelligence unit to root out traitors and spies, only to receive a complaint in mid-2010 from the unit's leader that it was losing the 'espionage war' and couldn't function on its paltry budget," it said.

"Just months before the Arab Spring took hold, bin Laden warned affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere that it was too soon to create an Islamic state. The Saudi native, whose family had made its fortune in construction, concluded that there wasn't 'enough steel' in Al Qaeda's regional support structures to warrant even tentative steps toward reestablishing the caliphate," the daily said.

One of bin Laden's principal correspondents Atiyah abd al-Rahman, who served as No 3 in Al Qaeda before his death, expressed concern over the US drone strikes.

"A 2010 message from Rahman expressed frustration with the CIA drone campaign, a source of particular concern because many of his predecessors in the third-ranking slot had been killed in strikes by the unmanned aircraft," it said.

"He was saying in the letter that their guys were getting killed faster than they could be

replaced," the US counter-terrorism official was quoted as saying.

Other messages sounded a similar theme. At least two came from the head of Al Qaeda's security unit, a group that had been established to protect against penetrations by informants who might provide targeting tips to the CIA, the daily said.

The unit leader complains "about having a very low budget, a few thousand dollars", the official said. "The letter refers to 'ideas' about how to better guard against informants and electronic eavesdropping. But the most obvious solutions, including restricting meetings and movements, would also hamper Al Qaeda's ability to function," the daily said.

Other messages make frequent mention of the organisation's financial hardships, including e-mails in which bin Laden himself complains about the lack of funds.

One bin Laden message sent in spring 2010 "instructed a deputy to form a group that would get money through kidnapping and ransom of diplomats", the US official said.

"The term 'financial hardship' was used" in the message," the US official was quoted as saying.

But there are no files that provide specific figures or a comprehensive picture of Al Qaeda's financial position, the daily reported.

The Brutal Mind of Al-Qaeda's New Boss
By Jamie Glazov
Source: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/06/28/the-brutal-mind-of-al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-new-boss/

Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in Russian, U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He is the author of the critically acclaimed and best-selling, United in Hate: The Left's Romance with Tyranny and Terror. His new book is Showdown With Evil.

FrontPage Interview's guest today is al-Qaeda expert Raymond Ibrahim. His work includes the al-Qaeda entry for the World Almanac of Islamism; an analysis of al- Qaeda's worldview for the Middle East Review of International Affairs; and most recently an article on Ayman al-Zawahiri for Bloomberg. He is best known for compiling, translating, and annotating The Al Qaeda Reader (Doubleday, 2007), the definitive work on the terrorist organization's writings. Because the book contains al-Zawahiri's premiere treatises and provides a snapshot of his mind, it takes on renewed relevance now that al-Zawahiri has been declared the leader of al-Qaeda.

FP: Raymond Ibrahim, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
I would like to talk to you today about what you know about Ayman al-Zawahiri. But I think it would be best to begin with The Al Qaeda Reader. Tell us what the book is about and why you wrote it.
Ibrahim: Sure, Jamie. I primarily wrote **The Al Qaeda Reader** (AQR) to demonstrate the organization's doubletalk. After the strikes of 9/11, al-Qaeda's messages to the West began to be translated and disseminated in the media; and their theme was one—that al-Qaeda's terrorism was in retaliation to any number of Western crimes. Then, back in 2005 when I was working at the Library of Congress, I came across unknown Arabic texts written by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri that articulated their violence and terrorism purely within a jihadist paradigm; the temporal and emotive language directed at the West, when re-directed at fellow Muslims, was discarded for the eternal and immutable language of Islam.

For example, for all of al-Qaeda's talk that Israel is the heart of the problem, bin Laden exposed his true position when he wrote to fellow Arabic-speaking Muslims not long after the 9/11 strikes the following:

Our talks with the infidel West and our conflict with them ultimately revolve around one issue—one that demands our total support, with power and determination, with one voice—and it is: Does Islam, or does it not, force people by the power of the sword to submit to its authority corporeally if not spiritually? Yes. There are only three choices in Islam: [1] either willing submission [conversion]; or [2] payment of the jizya, through physical, though not spiritual, submission to the authority of Islam; or [3] the sword — for it is not right to let him [an infidel] live. The matter is summed up for every person alive: Either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or die. (AQR, p. 42)

As you can see, this view, which is well codified in Sharia, is the ultimate source of conflict—not political, temporal grievances.

FP: Ok, so how does al-Zawahiri fit into the AQR?

Ibrahim: I have always believed that al-Zawahiri was the key to understanding al-Qaeda's worldview. When I compiled the book between 2005-2006, I intentionally included more of his writings than bin Laden's (an approach deemed unconventional then, as most people were more interested in learning what the more visible and notorious bin Laden had to say). The ironic result is that today the AQR exposes the philosophy of al-Qaeda's new chief more than other al-Qaeda books, which had focused on (the now moot) bin Laden.

FP: What does the book tell us of al-Zawahiri and what can be learned from his words?

Ibrahim: I split the book into two sections, "Theology" and "Propaganda." In the theology section, I included three long treatises by al-Zawahiri amounting to over 100 pages:

According to his "Loyalty and Enmity" (AQR pgs. 63-115), the Muslim believer is "obligated to befriend a believer—even if he is oppressive and violent towards you and must be hostile to the infidel, even if he is liberal and kind to you." Al-Zawahiri bases this doctrine on Koranic verses that prohibit Muslims from befriending non-Muslims, specifically Jews and Christians (e.g., 5:51, 60:4).

He advocates deception, or taqiyya—that Muslims feign friendship with non-Muslims whenever it is advantageous; he quotes early Muslims saying "We grin to the faces of some peoples, while our hearts curse them" and recommending "lamenting and mourning in order to dupe the infidels."

In "Sharia and Democracy" (AQR pgs.116-136), he advocates strict enforcement of Sharia law and animosity for democracy—complaining that democracy creates "equality between the citizenry," allows freedom of religion, and abolishes "man's domination over woman."

In "Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents," (AQR, pgs. 137-171), al-Zawahiri goes to great lengths to promote suicide operations, grounding them in little known hadiths and historical anecdotes, as well as Koranic verses like 9:111; he quotes Islam's prophet saying that the "martyred" jihadist "will couple with 72 maidens" in paradise. And he adheres to a very narrow definition as to who is considered "innocent" during the jihad—which precludes women, children, and even Muslims, if necessity calls for it.

The propaganda section of the book makes clear that al-Zawahiri also plays the double-talk game. For example, even though he too tries to frame al-Qaeda's terrorism as retaliation to Western aggression, when writing to Muslims he says things like

"Warfare against infidels, loyalty to the believers, and jihad in the path of Allah: Such is a course of action that all who are vigilant for the triumph of Islam should vie in, giving and sacrificing in the cause of liberating the lands of the Muslims, making Islam supreme in its own land, and then spreading it around the world (AQR, p.113)."

Note that last part about "spreading it [Islam] around the world," which again indicates that, once Islam is strong enough, it should, in accordance to Islamic law and history, go on the offensive.

FP: What do you think of al-Zawahiri as a leader? Do you think he'll steer al-Qaeda in a different direction than his predecessor?

Ibrahim: Al-Zawahiri, who just turned 60, is a seasoned veteran, who founded his first jihadi cell in Egypt when he was only 15 years-old, i.e., he's been at it for 45 years. Like bin Laden, al-Zawahiri has jihadi bona fides and served in the Afghan war, primarily as a physician; unlike bin Laden, al-Zawahiri

was imprisoned and tortured for his convictions in the early 1980s following the assassination of Anwar Sadat—an experience which seems to have hardened him more than bin Laden.

While many argue that he is lacking in charisma, it should be noted that in leadership positions in Islam, knowledge demands more authority. Even the guardians of Islam are collectively called ulema—literally, "those who know." In comparison to bin Laden, al-Zawahiri is certainly more knowledgeable—as his treatises demonstrate—and commands greater respect in this regard.

As for the direction al-Zawahiri will steer al-Qaeda, he may believe that, unless al-Qaeda steps up with something spectacular, its credibility will wane; and he only recently promised an attack of the magnitude of 9/11. Still, al-Zawahiri's 45 years of jihadi experience will probably prevent him from acting precipitously.

It also bears mentioning that because al-Qaeda has not achieved another major terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11, it does not mean that it is incapable. Moreover, it has other factors to consider. After all, if one let's their imagination stray for a bit, there are many ways to terrorize civilian populations with little chance of being caught—an especially moot point for suicide bombers. So I believe al-Zawahiri's decision to attack is guided by many factors, including the fact that another attack may undermine all the subversive efforts of his nonviolent Islamist colleagues.

FP: I assume you don't think the death of Osama bin Laden was as severe a blow to al-Qaeda as some portray?

Ibrahim: Right. Whenever a jihadist is killed—including top leaders like bin Laden—I like to point out that jihadists are not the cause of hostilities; they are symptoms of a much greater cause. Individually killing them off is like a doctor temporarily treating a sick patient's symptoms without eliminating the cause of sickness—the 1400 year-old doctrine of jihad.

Bin Laden for a decade was the face of radical Islam to the West; now it looks to be al-Zawahiri. Others—remember all the hoopla surrounding the killing of Zarqawi?—have come and gone, but the ideology is still there, still motivating others to emulate al-Qaeda.

This is also why questions concerning al-Zawahiri's popularity, charisma, and even efficacy are a bit irrelevant. Al-Qaeda's new leader himself once made this clear. Asked about the status of bin Laden and other jihadists, al-Zawahiri waxed philosophically:

> *Jihad in the path of Allah is greater than any individual or organization. It is a struggle between Truth and Falsehood, until Allah Almighty inherits the earth and those who live in it. Mullah Muhammad Omar and Sheikh Osama bin Laden—may Allah protect them from all evil—are merely two soldiers of Islam in the journey of jihad, while the struggle between Truth [Islam] and Falsehood [non-Islam] transcends time.* (AQR, p.182)

Accordingly, as independent jihadists start taking action into their own hands—whether the Shoe Bomber, the Christmas Bomber, the Madrid and London bombers, or Nidal Hasan and Fort Hood—we must acknowledge that the very idea of perpetual jihad is more dangerous than the jihadists who come and go, be they bin Laden or al-Zawahiri.

FP: Raymond Ibrahim, thanks for helping to place al-Qaeda's new leader in better context for us.
Ibrahim: Of course, Jamie; thanks for the invite.

Belgium: Muslim extremists moving to the suburbs

Source:http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/Belgie/article/detail/1287767/2011/07/04/Islamitisch-extremisme-niet-langer-enkel-in-grootsteden.dhtml

Manifestations of extreme Islam are now being observed not only in the big cities, but also in small towns and municipalities, according to the Belgian security service report of 2009 which was published today.

Among other issues the report also deals with religious extremism. In 2009 the security service followed the activities of diverse extreme Muslim entities: individuals, mosques, centers, groups and organization who continuously and systematically spread extremist ideas. According to the report, the most radical elements preach hatred towards

anybody who doesn't agree with their point of view.

These extreme Muslim entities are geographically spread out more than ever before. The phenomena was observed more and more often in small towns and municipalities, and the security service now considers Islamic extremism less and less as a pure big city phenomenon.

Russian Navy captures Somali pirates
Source: http://true-turtle.livejournal.com/85315.html

This video shows Russian Navy commandos on a Somalian pirate ship shortly after the pirates had captured a Russian oil

The soldiers freed their compatriots and the tanker. The Russian Navy Commandos moved the pirates back to their own ship, searched it

tanker. Reportedly, the Euro Union Navy which patrols these waters would not interfere because they feared there could be casualties. All explanations are in Russian with a single exception when a wounded pirate says something in English and the Russian soldier says "You lied to me, this is not a fishing boat." All conversations between the commandos are in Russian. If you don't understand Russian, the pictures speak for themselves.

for weapons and explosives which they commandeered and then left the ship and exploded it with all remaining pirates hand-cuffed to it.

The ship burned and sank along with the pirates and without any court proceedings, lawyers etc., using the anti-piracy laws of the 18th and 19th centuries where the captain of the rescuing ship has the right to decide what to do with the pirates. Usually, they were hung,

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The power of a King lies in his mighty arms...

Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only Saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

— Chanakya

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June 2011

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Pawan Agrawal
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ICE lists Israel among countries that promote, produce, or protect terrorists

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/ice-lists-israel-among-countries-promote-produce-or-protect-terrorists

In May 2011 DHS released a report titled Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk. The report describes the methodology on which the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) relies to arrest, detain, and, if necessary, deport undesirable aliens.

What has drawn attention to this otherwise rather dry bureaucratic report was the fact that an appendix, which is attached to the report, lists "specially designated countries" whose detained nationals should be more closely examined. The Algemeiner reports that among the countries whose nationals should be paid special attention as potential terror risks is Israel — which the report considers a "Promoter, Producer, or Protector" of terrorists

ICE spokeswoman Gillian Christensen told the Algemeiner that the list was initiated at least seven years ago, and was not created by ICE.

Only five countries listed do not have majority Muslim populations — but each of those five countries has had significant problems with radical Muslim terrorist groups or insurgencies — including Israel.

Christensen also told the Algemeiner that DHS list of thirty-six nations does not necessarily fault a listed government's policies, but rather, examines the possibility that a suspect from that country might have terrorist ties.

The list includes a number of other close U.S. allies, including Turkey, Bahrain, Morocco, and Philippines, as well as nations experiencing internal fighting, such as Sudan and Somalia. Israel was not on the list released in 2008, but is on the list released in 2011. ICE declined to say who put Israel on the list or when Israel was put there.

NOTE (8 July): DHS officials are now saying Israel's inclusion on a list of countries that promote, produce, or protect terrorists was a mistake; John Morton, director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), said, "The addition of Israel to the list--- was based on inaccurate information provided to the OIG during the course of its audit"; a May 2011 report contained an appendix which lists "specially designated countries" that promote terrorism; the list instructed ICE agents to pay special attention to, and investigate more thoroughly, individuals from these countries arrested by ICE; ICE spokesperson suggested that Israel was included not because its government supports terrorism, but because some individual Israelis do pose a terror threat; 1.5 million of Israel's 7.5 million citizens are Arabs (Source: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4092186,00.html)

NOTE 2: You can download the report from the website hosting the Newsletter at "CBRNE-CT Papers" section.

Germany says Islamic terrorism still a threat

Source:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gfNmVypUbgXcpe_T2OtF71SUu6oQ?docId=735e7259d20a4449b61f954ede7a19d7

Germany's top security official said Friday that

the terrorist threat to the country hasn't

decreased and the number of radicals continues to grow, even with the death of Osama bin Laden.

Security officials saw no reason to lower Germany's threat level following the death of the al-Qaida leader, said Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich (photo), presenting the annual report by Germany's domestic intelligence agency.

"The Islamist terrorist threat is widely varied and has not concentrated on a single leader of al-Qaida for a long time," he said.

"We have had a general threat situation in Germany and Europe that has not changed for two years, but there are no concrete dangers."

Though there have been several unsuccessful or foiled attacks by Islamic radicals in Germany, the first fatalities attributed to a Muslim extremist came this year in March when a 21-year-old Kosovo-born ethnic Albanian allegedly gunned down two U.S. airmen outside Frankfurt's airport.

Overall, the number of people in Germany

"Not every Salafi is a terrorist but almost every terrorist that we are aware of has had contact with a Salafi," Fromm said.

In other findings, the report said the number of right-wing extremists dropped to 25,000 last year from 26,600 in 2009 — but the number considered to be neo-Nazis rose to 5,600 from 5,000.

About one-fifth of the neo-Nazis are now considered part of a growing group of violence-prone extremists who target leftist radicals,

linked to radical Islamic groups rose to 37,470 in Germany in 2010, up from 36,270 the year before, according to the report from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Most of those — 31,370 — were connected to Turkish groups, nearly all of them in **Milli Gorus**, a group whose founder advocates creating an Islamic state in Turkey.

Most worrying was the increase in numbers in "Salafi" groups that espouse an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam and have been especially successful at recruiting young people, said Heinz Fromm, who heads the domestic intelligence agency.

He noted that the suspect in the March killing of the two U.S. airmen outside Frankfurt's airport had allegedly been inspired by watching Salafi videos online.

Friedrich said.

"Their target group is no longer foreigners, but political enemies," he said.

Incidences of right-wing criminality dropped to 15,905 in 2010 from 18,750 in 2009 — or 4,521 cases in 2010 when excluding "propaganda" crimes like the scrawling of swastikas or other banned symbols on walls.

By contrast, far-left criminality, for which there is no "propaganda" category, was down to 3,747 in 2010 from 4,734 in 2009.

Friedrich warned, however, that a spike in leftist criminality — such as the torching of cars in Berlin and elsewhere and attacks on police — in the first five months of 2011 indicate that that drop was an anomaly.

The number of left-wing extremists grew to 32,200 last year from 31,600 in 2009. That included a rise to 6,800 violent radicals from 6,600 the previous year.

Somali Piracy becoming an industry

Source: http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2011/07/01/somali-piracy-becoming-an-industry

Somali pirates are taking 'f piracy to an industrial scale' says Pottengal Mukundan, director of the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting centre. The centre has been

for 61 percent of all attacks on ships, with 362 crew members taken hostage, he said. Mukundan said Somali pirates were still holding 21 vessels and 405 hostages for

monitoring incidents worldwide since 1991. Mukundan said the pirates were using hijacked vessels as bases to extend their range of operations against ships in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden.

In March the Indian navy captured 61 heavily armed pirates aboard a hijacked Mozambique-flagged ship in the Arabian sea which was being used as a mother-ship.

Piracy has surged in recent years off Somalia, a lawless, war-torn country that sits alongside one of the world's most important shipping routes.

The IMB is concerned that some countries which have deployed naval assets off the Horn of Africa may cut their anti-piracy surveillance in the area.

The impact

Mukundan, who is based in London, told AFP that so far this year there were 162 attacks off Somalia with 21 ships captured. Hijackings off the coast of the east African country accounted

ransom. "Since 2007 there has been 62 fatalities as a result of piracy," he said, adding that "the situation is getting very serious." "We are calling for more naval ships be made available to protect ships off Somalia," he said. Mukundan said this year despite the monsoon period (June to August), Somali pirates had escalated their attacks off the Gulf of Aden. "It is an important shipping lane for very large crude carriers which sail from the Arabian Gulf to Asian countries such as Japan, China and Singapore," he said. In previous years, there was a respite in attacks during the monsoon period due to strong winds and heavy seas.

Violence and ransoms rise

Mukundan said another worrying trend was the increase in violence against seafarers and hostages in the past six months.

In one incident, Mukundan said two senior officers were put in a ship's meat storage refrigerator for 40 minutes and in another case pirates carried out mock executions. "The violence and threat used is unprecedented and unacceptable," he said. Mukundan warned that

the IMB expects the number of attacks to be higher than last year. "Pirates are getting more ransom, so they are escalating their attacks," he said.

Mukundan urged countries to prosecute pirates captured at sea and not to release them. "We want captured pirates to be prosecuted and punished. Now more than 80 percent of the captured pirates are freed. It is sending the wrong signal to the pirates," he said.

EUROPOL: TE-SAT 2011 – EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
Source:

Key judgements
The threat of attacks by Islamist terrorists in the EU remains high and diverse.

In the past year, several EU Member States have successfully prevented attacks by Islamist terrorist groups, which aimed to cause mass casualties. During 2010, 179 individuals were arrested for offences linked to Islamist terrorism, representing a 50% increase compared with 2009. Furthermore a higher proportion of those arrests related to the preparation of attacks in the EU (47% compared with 10% in 2009). Additionally, the high number of threat statements to the EU (46) posted by Islamist terrorist organisations or their media fronts indicates terrorist groups' clear intent to target the European Union.

Islamist terrorist groups are changing in composition and leadership. Terrorist groups are becoming multi-national, command and control from outside the EU is decreasing and more lone actors with EU citizenship are involved in terrorist activities.

Returning jihadists from conflict zones continue to be a threat to the EU. They return with specific contacts, skills and modi operandi, and the potential intent to apply these in EU Member States. The political situation in the Northern Caucasus is increasingly reflected by the activities of members of the Caucasian diaspora in the EU, supporting activities of terrorist groups in the Northern Caucasus financially and otherwise.

The **turmoil in North Africa** that began in January 2011 is likely to impact al-Qaeda's core and affiliated organisations, in both the short and long term. The current situation could lead to a setback for al-Qaeda but it could also result in more powerful terrorist organisations impacting the EU, and an increase in the radicalisation of individuals both in North Africa and the EU. In the short term, the absence of terrorist organisations amongst the mass Arab protests across the region has left al-Qaeda struggling for a response. Should Arab expectations not be met, the consequence may be a surge in support for those terrorist organisations, and an increase in radicalisation, both in North Africa and elsewhere. The current and future flow of immigrants originating from North Africa could have an influence on the EU's security situation. Individuals with terrorist aims could easily enter Europe amongst the large numbers of immigrants.

Although the goals of terrorist and organised crime groups (OCGs) are different, the connections between terrorist and organised criminal activities appear to be growing. **Crime is being extensively used to finance terrorist activities.** Criminal activities that terrorist groups are involved in, either through affiliation with individual criminals and criminal groups or through their own operations, can include the trafficking of illegal goods and substances such as weapons and drugs, trafficking in human beings, financial fraud, money laundering and extortion. Separatist terrorist groups such as the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and LTTE are involved in the trafficking of drugs and human beings to raise funds for their terrorism activities.

Separatist and ethno-nationalist terrorist groups rely substantially on extortion to finance their activities. It is unlikely that ceasefire declarations by separatist terrorist groups will mark the end of terrorist attacks or activities. In 2010, 123 individuals in France and 104 in Spain were arrested on terrorist offences related to violent separatist activities. These figures represent a decline from 2009 levels.

The **economic recession** is conducive to political tensions and, in a number of Member States, is triggering both left- and right-wing extremists to demonstrate their views both on the recession's causes and on the solutions required. This is raising public order concerns and threatening social cohesion. Growing unemployment, especially among young people seeking to enter the job market, has radicalised some youths, even those with relatively high levels of education. In 2010, 45 left-wing and anarchist attacks occurred. The increased use of violence led to six fatalities.

Evidence shows increased **international cooperation between terrorist and extremist groups** in and outside the EU. Left–wing, but also separatist groups, are collaborating internationally. During 2010, clear links between ETA and FARC were determined. The coordination of activities is greatly facilitated by the wide availability of online communication tools and applications, and the rise of social media.

The professionalism of right-wing propaganda shows that right-wing extremist groups have the will to enlarge and spread their ideology, and still pose a threat in EU Member States. If the unrest in North Africa leads to a major influx of immigrants into Europe**, right-wing terrorism** might gain a new lease of life by articulating more widespread public apprehension about immigration.

In 2010, protests by single-issue extremist groups increasingly focused on the fur industry. These groups are becoming increasingly network-based- they use various methods of communication to prioritise, coordinate and support direct action. Campaigns of **animal-rights activists** indicate a shift of activities from the UK towards the European mainland which started in 2008/2009 and continued in 2010. There are indications that some members of animal rights, anarchist and environmental extremist groups are moving towards a shared ideology. Environmental extremism is on the increase.

Terrorist and extremist groups are demonstrating increased professionalism in using web-based technologies to present themselves and communicate their ideologies to a larger audience. The **internet is developing into a crucial facilitator** for both terrorists and extremists.

NOTE: You can download the report from the website hosting the Newsletter at "CBRNE-CT Papers" section.

Is Al Qaeda Planning Terrorist Attack on AeroVironment Inc? Here's the L.A. County Firm's 5 Coolest Spy Drones

Source:http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2011/07/al_qaeda_planning_terrorist_attack_on_aerovironment_inc_spy_drones.php

Reports abound this morning of a possible Al Qaeda attack plan against 11 officials at L.A. County's own AeroVironment Inc., a top drone manufacturer in the U.S. War on Terror.

Employees of the Monrovia company tell the San Gabriel Valley Tribune they were called into a meeting Thursday afternoon and warned

that the FBI was looking into a terrorist plot against AeroVironment -- part of the retaliation

miniature robotic [unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs] like the Raven, Wasp and Digital Puma

effort against Osama Bin Laden's recent U.S. assassination. Creepy stuff.

After combing an Al Qaeda-linked jihadist hit

that are being used over the battlefields in Afghanistan in the US-led war on Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The firm is the largest maker of the

list online, the Homeland Security Today blog confirmed:

tiny drone spy planes that are being used in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In addition to the top US military leaders targeted by Al Qaeda sympathizers, 11 top and senior executives of AeroVironment Inc., including CEO Timothy Conver, were identified by the jihadist forums members. ... AeroVironment manufactures the thousands of

Al Qaeda has every reason to hate AeroVironment execs: They're thinking up some of the nation's most advanced anti-terrorist technology at a time we need it most (because romping around in the desert with an AK-47 doesn't always do the trick).

And given an attack is (hopefully) averted by the FBI, the Al Qaeda threat might be considered bragging rights for a cutting-edge drone manufacturer like Monrovia's. In honor of their badassery (forgive the barfy patriotism; this Fourth of July business is really getting to us), here are the five coolest spy bots being birthed over in east County right now:

5. The Global Observer is the hugest of the company's UAVs. Instead of buzzy street-level spying (and we'll get to that), the unmanned Observer satellite floats 5,000 feet above Earth, providing "a 24/7/365 unblinking eye and continuous communications link over any location on the earth's surface for as long as needed."

4. Moving a bit closer to Earth but gliding far enough above to avoid enemy detection, the Raven, a small plane with 4.5-foot wingspan, can focus on land targets up to 10 kilometers down. In the day, it sends back exceptionally clear color imagery, and it's not so shabby by night.

3. Though this guy looks more like an old Amelia Earhart relic, AeroVironment's water-friendly Puma is all parts 21st century. It can communicate up to 15 kilometers away, fly with almost no noise for two hours straight and can land on virtually any surface, free of gear.

2. The Wasp, weighing only 430 grams, is designed for front-line surveillance.

Awesomely, he (yes, we're sexist when it comes to UAVs) can either be controlled manually or left to navigate the warzone on his own. He can even dodge a bird of prey's most carnivorous advances.

1. By far the most inconspicuous of AeroVironment's war gadgets, the Nano Hummingbird got big press early in 2011 for its creepy realism and insane superpowers, like

an "autonomous 360 degree lateral flip." Pretty hardcore for an iridescent flower flitter.

Now that the tech company itself looks to be a terrorist target, it might think about putting some of its military dronage to personal use. Any former U.S. Defense Secretaries looking for a retirement project?

SEMPER FI

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

U.S. NAVY SEALS

Petty Officer Jon Tumilson, 35, killed in a major U.S. helicopter crash in Afghanistan. Jon's Labrador retriever Hawkeye was loyal to the end, as he refused to leave his master's side during an emotional funeral

Al-Qaeda's Egyptian Ideologues Planning Caliphate's Return to Egypt

By Hani Nasira
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

While al-Qaeda focused on the global jihad under the leadership of the late Osama bin Laden, an examination of the speeches and publications of his Egyptian successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, show that renewing his own failed jihad in Egypt has never been far from al-Zawahiri's mind.

- In speeches delivered before February 2010, al-Zawahiri mentioned Egypt 226 times, second only to the United States (mentioned 636 times).
- Al Zawahiri recently released the last in his six-part series about Egypt titled "The Message of Hope and Good Tidings for Our People in Egypt." The last four of its six parts focused on the Egyptian Revolution and ex-president Hosni Mubarak.
- In The Exoneration, his last and most important book, al-Zawahiri referred to Egypt 195 times and Mubarak 41 times while referring to Saudi leaders only once and the Kingdom not at all. The United States was mentioned 150 times. [1]

These works reveal the central position of Egypt in al Zawahiri's thought and suggest the direction al-Qaeda may take now that al-Zawahiri has assumed leadership of the movement.

Conditions in Egypt now provide a suitable environment for al-Qaeda following the chaos in the internal security services, the rise of Salafist movements and the release from detention of a number of jihadi ideologues and the return of others from abroad. Al-Zawahiri may see a golden opportunity to renew jihad activities in Egypt after he was forced to suspend the activities of the Egyptian Jihad movement in 1995 due to the movement's inability to cope with severe pressure from the Egyptian security forces.

Al-Qaeda is expected to witness a new phase of activity coinciding with the popular Arab revolutions that may see the movement grow stronger due to al-Zawahiri's pragmatism and deep and effective relations with a number of al-Qaeda sub-organizations in the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula.

Al-Zawahiri claims to support the revolutions in Syria, Libya and Yemen, insisting they will result in an Islamic state with the help of an alliance of Islamist and jihadist groups. The al-Qaeda leader's views are mirrored in the works of Anwar al-Awlaki on the Yemeni Revolution and those of Attiya Allah al-Libi on the Libyan Revolution (for Attiya, see Terrorism Monitor, August 12, 2010; June 9).

A process of ideological reconsideration is taking place in Egypt's Salafist leadership. Some have opted for political action while others have announced they will focus on the Islamic Call. All of them stress the need for an Islamic state and Shari'a rule.

This process requires very little departure from the decisions adopted by many of the Islamist movements in Egypt to renounce violence since 1997. Nonetheless, the debate within the Egyptian Islamic Group over its future course has ended with the departure of a number of its historically prominent leaders and the appointment of cousins Aboud and Tarek al-Zomor as new leaders. The two were freed from three decades of imprisonment during the revolution after being connected to the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. [2] Despite describing al-Zawahiri as "a man who loves his religion and justice," the cousins have been eager to reassure Egyptians that they have renounced violence and believe the Islamic state in Egypt will be established "at the ballot box" (The Daily News Egypt, March 21).

Al Zawahiri's view of the Arab revolutions and the role of Islamists and mujahideen were outlined in his series "The Message of Hope and Assurance for Our People in Egypt." In his perspective, America retreated from supporting the overthrown leaders in Tunisia and Egypt as a result of al-Qaeda's activities. Al-Zawahiri also warned of "predators" who would seek to manipulate the revolutions in their own interests and insisted that "secular change" was not an option for the people of Egypt, claiming Shari'a has been the demand of the vast majority of Egyptians since the death of

Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna in 1949.

Perhaps in keeping with the revolutionary demands for social reforms, al-Zawahiri also addresses "social injustice" in a nationalist fashion unfamiliar to most Salafi-Jihadi literature:

"Egypt must begin a popular campaign to regain the Egyptians' rights, especially those of the impoverished, and this campaign must seek to uproot the social injustice, poverty, needs and short-handedness in Egypt. Islamic advocacy must consider the social justice cases as one of its main priorities. The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) said: "the believer is one who doesn't feel fed while his neighbor is hungry next to him." The zakat obligation must be revived… Stealing Egypt's resources must stop, and the clearest example is exporting gas to Israel, which the Egyptian judiciary ruled on and disallowed, and in spite of that the military council keeps exporting it to Israel" (As-Sahab Media/al-Fajr Media Center, May 21).

Al-Zawahiri has repeatedly warned of U.S. attempts to install a secular leader in Egypt after having abandoned its ally, first in a February 28 statement, again in two parts of "The Message of Hope and Assurance for Our People in Egypt," and finally in "The Noble Knight Alighted," his June 8 eulogy of Bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri has highlighted in various speeches the need to prepare for an Islamic state after these revolutions and the importance of making alliances with other Islamic forces in revolutionary countries to prevent the establishment of a secular state.

Explaining this vision was a recent essay released by al-Qaeda entitled "The People's Revolution and the End of Forced Rule" (al-Fajr Media Center, June 1). The document was written by Egyptian al-Qaeda member Abu Ubaydah Abdallah al-Adm, who appears to be very close to the movement's high command.

The essay outlines a strategic vision for al-Qaeda in dealing with the popular revolutions and interpreting them in a religious way favorable to the various Islamist movements, especially those with a focus on restoring the Islamic state (the Caliphate), such as al-Qaeda and Egyptian Jihad.

In his paper, Al-Adm explains that the revolutions and overthrow of regimes represent the end of forced rule or tyrannies, a phase that followed the eras of the prophets and Caliphates. Al-Adm believes that these revolutions hasten the arrival of the Islamic state, though he notes that the establishment of such a state may be preceded by a period of chaos – possibly as long as 50 years, as suggested by Syrian jihad theorist Mus'ab al-Suri (a.k.a. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar). In al-Adm's view, God has driven these revolutions, supporting the mujahideen as the Muslim people wake up to reject everything else but Islamic Shari'a.

At the end of the paper, al-Adm emphasizes that "The Global Jihad Movement, no doubt, is waiting for the fruits of this popular movement in which it sacrificed the blood of its members and spent decades calling for it and fighting to plant the idea in the minds of Muslims who rose up today demonstrating [against] the tyrannical oppression they used to face. Al-Qaeda paved the way for these revolutions and waits for its fruits…"

Notes:
1. Al-Zawahiri's book (Full title: A Treatise Exonerating the Community of the Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness) was a March 2008 refutation of a book entitled Tarshid al-amal al-jihadi fi misr wa al-alam (Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World) by the imprisoned founder of the Islamic Jihad organization, Sayed Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl). (See Terrorism Focus, April 30, 3008).
2. http://www.egyig.com//Public/articles/announce/index.shtml.

Hani Nasira is an Egyptian writer who specializes in ideological movements.

Google Earth is Used by Terrorists

By Matthew Uhlmann
Source: http://www.deathandtaxesmag.com/114992/google-earth-is-used-by-terrorists/

Say you plugged any random US city into Google Earth. Next, you plugged in the Israeli

town of Netivot, which borders the Gaza Strip to the east. You would notice that in comparison the image of Netivot is quite pixelated and blurry. It's because of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act that the entirety of Israel can only be viewed in low-resolution.

There's a good reason for this.

Palestinian fighters are pretty creative. In an interview with Slate, a Gaza militant explained how they use Google Earth to aim the infamous homemade Qassam rockets and Soviet-era Grads into the Israeli border towns surrounding the blockaded Gaza Strip. It's unclear exactly how the rudimentary artillery placement works, only that the Google program, despite its highly pixelated imaging of Israel, is used to locate targets.

Does this mean that Google Earth is evil?
The software is a fantastic tool when not used maliciously. It allows all of us to momentarily make believe that we're spies with access to

satellite technology. It can be used to explore distant neighborhoods when apartment hunting. It can be used to keep tabs on an ex-girlfriend's front driveway, to see if some other dude's car is parked out front (which I've never done).

Google Earth gives new potential to entertainment for the virtual globe trotters among us. It was the main tool used to build Arcade Fire's "The Wilderness Downtown" project last year, which totally reoriented the music video as we knew it. (For the first time in the history of internet advertising, the online interactive music video actually made entertaining use of the online pop-up.)

No, Google Earth isn't evil. But the best programs always seem to attract the biggest bastards who swoop in and tarnish all that's good about the internet.

Remember when online instant messaging came out? It was the grandfather of Facebook and it was fantastic—as were those online chat rooms where lonely people with common interests could all talk amongst themselves, anonymously. But then online predators ruined

it. One never knew if that person who claimed to be a 15 year-old kid was really some middle-aged man living in his parents' basement.

Google Earth and instant messaging are entirely different beasts. But what they both can do is make the world we live in feel smaller than it really is, less alienating, and more manageable.

But while those among us like Arcade Fire will use tools like Google Earth to take viewers on a heart-warming virtual trip home, there's always someone else waiting to use that same tool to aim rockets into the sides of school buses.

As it's always been, I guess that's the price we pay for new technologies.

Dewsbury, Bradford and Tower Hamlets ... where Islamic extremists want to establish independent states with sharia law

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2011433/Islamic-extremists-set-independent-states-UK-fall-Shariah-law.html#ixzz1SKvmhLTb

Islamic extremists have called on British Muslims to establish three independent states

© Stephanie Schaerer

within the UK.

The notorious Muslims Against the Crusades (MAC) group have named Yorkshire towns Bradford and Dewsbury and Tower Hamlets in

Bradford
Dewsbury
Tower Hamlets, London

East London as testbeds for blanket sharia rule.

The medieval 'emirates' would operate entirely outside British law, according to a document on the MAC website.

Veiled women in the London borough of Tower Hamlets which has seen a rise in extremism. The Muslims Against the Crusades group says the medieval 'emirates' would function as autonomous territories and operate entirely outside British law, according to a document published on their website

The MAC group, led by Abu Assadullah, was set up last year and has become notorious because of its violent protests, most provocatively burning poppies during the Remembrance Day silence.

Under the heading 'Muslims should set up Islamic emirates in the UK', MAC says: 'We suggest it is time that areas with large Muslim populations declare an emirate delineating that Muslims trying to live within this area are trying to live by the sharia as much as possible with their own courts and community watch and schools and even self sufficient trade.

'Likely areas for these projects might be Dewsbury or Bradford or Tower Hamlets to begin with.

'In time we can envisage that the whole of the sharia might one day be implemented starting with these enclaves.'

The call is likely to cause anger among moderate Muslims and community leaders in the areas concerned.

Ian Greenwood, leader of Bradford Council, said people would 'not allow extremists to provoke them into violence'.

London 7/7 bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan

lived in Dewsbury, which has battled to diffuse extremism in recent years. In 2007, it was alleged that a number of Muslims in Dewsbury were running an illegal Islamic court from a school and similar claims have been made in Tower Hamlets and Bradford.

Tower Hamlets council was last year accused of falling under the control of extremist groups following a documentary by the Daily Telegraph journalist Andrew Gilligan.

The plan is part of the MAC's response to the government's revised Prevent strategy to combat Islamic extremism.

A general view of Bradford in Yorkshire which Muslims Against the Crusades (MAC) group have named as one of three testbeds for blanket sharia rule

In its document, called Islamic Prevent, the fanatics also call for an end to CCTV cameras in and around mosques.

It says: 'Muslims must get rid of all CCTV cameras from Muslim institutions. Sadly many mosques have today adopted CCTV cameras to spy on Muslims on behalf of the police and local authorities.'

Other inflammatory instructions include demanding the release of all Muslim prisoners, a ban on Muslims joining the police or armed forces and a rejection of British democracy.

The document ends: 'We can conclude that measures by the UK government are nothing more than an attempt by them to strip the Muslim community of their Islamic identity and to integrate them into the non-Islamic way of life.'

The revised Prevent programme, announced last month, is aimed at tackling home-grown terrorism and radicalisation of students.

It demands stricter controls on extremist literature and a more proactive approach by universities to prevent extremism.

Councillor Greenwood added: 'Extremism is less likely to emerge when people get the opportunity to come together.

'Local voluntary, community and faith groups, the council, and other public and private sector

© bruce adams

partners, all work together in Bradford to strengthen community relations and encourage better understanding and respect between all our communities.

'We believe that this is one of the best ways to build a tolerant society in which extremism plays no part.'

Tower Hamlets and Kirklees Council, the local authority for Dewsbury, refused to comment.

Exploring Memories Of The London Bombing
Source: http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/230618.php

Six years on from the devastating 7/7 London bombings and in the wake of the inquest into the attacks, a special issue of the journal Memory Studies, published by SAGE, explores new research into our collective memories of this tragic event.

"The London attacks make for a particularly

compelling case study of contemporary remembrance and commemoration," say authors of the lead editorial, Matthew Allen and Annie Bryan. "Significantly, it would seem that a wider social project of remembering the bombings is at odds with the inquest's aim of providing an official, finalized historical account of 7/7."

The three-year UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)-funded research project set out to pioneer the study of mass-mediated commemoration. Researchers analyzed both media coverage of the bombings, and personal memories of the events as part of the project, entitled Conflicts of Memory: Mediating and Commemorating the 2005 London Bombings.

Where commemoration results from social engagement, memorialization involves using the media as a memory aid. In-depth analysis of television coverage both immediately following the event and the coverage of commemorative events a year later revealed interesting shifts.

In the paper Dynamics of memory: Commemorating the 2005 London bombings in British television news, Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Annie Bryan explore how images of the bombings as they unfolded shot on mobile phones spread rapidly around the globe, first via social media and then through more traditional media channels such as newspapers and television coverage. However the authors show that, despite this apparent breakthrough for citizen journalism, the mainstream media re-asserted generic conventions for coverage a year later. The camera-phone images were then displaced from commemorative programming by the theme of commemoration itself, as media channels gave a high news value to personal accounts of the events and to the theme of trauma a year on.

Anna Reading discusses in the paper The London Bombings: Mobile Witnessing, Mortal Bodies and Globital time how mobile phones represent not just the ultimate in convergence of digital media technologies in the early part of the 21st century but also a personal and globally networked prosthetic to human

memory. She compares media accounts of the 2005 bombing with a bombing of the London Underground in 1897 to explore the different time frames through which media technologies communicate, witness and commemorate public memory.

She argues that mobile and networked media appear to compress the time between the instant, the moment of the event and the instances, the repeatable moments in which that instant can be communicated. With mobile technologies images can be captured by witnesses and rapidly and widely circulated and reassembled across different connected media, dynamically traversing the private and public memory in new ways. But time, she argues, is not only compressed, since the process of commemoration of the terrorist atrocity also has its own time (s) tied to dates such as anniversaries and to events such as the Coroner's inquest with the London bombings. While the rapidity of mobile witnessing was important at the time, it is the slower mediated narratives of survivors, witnesses and rescuers from the coroner's inquest that help us understand the scars that remain to the mortal body over time.

These two papers form part of a series of articles in this special issue of Memory Studies resulting from the research project which explores some of the debates generated by the London bombings, illustrating the range of disciplines that can be brought to bear on the many issues and perspectives surrounding this event.

The London bombings: Mobile witnessing, mortal bodies and globital time by Anna Reading, London South Bank University, UK and University of Western Sydney, Australia and Dynamics of memory: Commemorating the 2005 London bombings in British television news by Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Annie Bryan.

Swansea University, UK, are published in   Memory Studies.

The Dog That Cornered Osama Bin Laden

Source: http://blogs.canoe.ca/parker/general/the-dog-that-cornered-osama-bin-laden/

When U.S. President Barack Obama went to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, last week for a highly publicized but very private meeting with the commando team that killed Osama bin Laden, only one of the 81 members of the super-secret SEAL DevGru unit was identified by name: Cairo, the war dog.

Cairo, like most canine members of the elite U.S. Navy SEALs, is a Belgian Malinois. The Malinois breed is similar to German shepherds but smaller and more compact, with an adult male weighing in the 30-kilo range.

Trends in Global Violence and Norway's Peace Diplomacy

By Andrew Mack

Source:http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/mack.html?id=4927 50

At the end of 2006 just 32 armed conflicts were being fought around the world in which a government was one of the warring parties This was some 40% fewer than the post-World War II peak in 1992. High-intensity conflicts—those with at least 1000 battle-related deaths a year––declined by 72% over the same period.

During the Cold War years the number of armed conflicts more than tripled, rising inexorably decade by decade.

Most of the conflicts in the period under review were fought within states (the green band) in Figure 1 below. Interstate wars (blue band) have only been a small proportion of the total, while wars of colonial liberation (red band) were virtually over by the end of the 1970s.

The yellow band––'internationalised intrastate conflicts'––indicates the number of conflicts fought within a state but with military involvement from other states. The fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the

end of the 1990s and early in the new   Millennium is a case in point.

Figure 1

Number of armed conflicts by type, 1946-2006

Some observers doubt that there has been a real improvement in global security and have suggested that while the number of conflicts may have decreased, their deadliness has increased––i.e., fewer wars, but more deaths.

This is not the case. In fact, the decline in the deadliness of armed conflict has been even greater and over a longer period than the decline in conflict numbers as Figure 2 below shows.

The average number of battle-related deaths per conflict in 1950 (the deadliest year with 700,000 plus deaths) was about 37,000; in 2006 it was little more than 500. This decline reflects changes in the nature of warfare––a

move away from major conventional wars fought with heavy weapons to so-called 'low-intensity conflicts' fought with small armies, light weapons, and few military engagements.

There have also been a number of short-lived, low-casualty, high-tech conventional wars fought by the US and its allies since the end of the Cold War––Gulf War I, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the conventional phase of the most recent Iraq war. In each case the US and its allies quickly prevailed over their weak opponents with relatively few casualties. Where the US has sought to fight insurgents on their own terms––from Vietnam to the current insurgency in Iraq––casualties have been high and victory illusive.

Figure 2

Source: Human Security Report Project 2006, from data supplied by Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch

However, the trend data in Figures 1 and 2 only deal with conflicts in which a government is one of the warring parties. They tell us nothing about the many armed conflicts fought between communal groups, militias, warlords and others––cases of armed violence with no direct government involvement. Until relatively recently no research institute collected data specifically on these 'non-state' conflicts.

Since 2002, however, Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program has been collecting data on 'non-state' conflicts for the Human Security Report. In that year there were actually more non-state conflicts than those involving a government (36 versus 32)––though death tolls were (and have continued to be) considerably lower.

Since 2002, there has also been a startling 33% decline in non-state conflicts. This has been driven by the remarkable, but largely unacknowledged, improvement in security in sub-Saharan Africa, where the number of non–

state conflicts dropped from 26 in 2002, to 12 in 2006––a 54% decline.

This improvement was also evident with respect to African conflicts in which the state was one of the warring parties. Here the change was from 12 in 2002 and 9 in 2006. The death tolls from these non-state conflicts have also declined significantly over the past four years.

The decline in armed conflicts has been mirrored by a sharp drop in the number of genocides and other campaigns of mass violence––mostly directed at civilians. Most such slaughters take place in the context of high–intensity conflicts. So it is not surprising that while the latter has declined by 72% since the end of the Cold War, the former should have declined by 80%.

This extraordinary reduction in all forms of armed conflict remains one of the least–examined major security changes of recent

times. Not one full-length study has been devoted to explaining it. Indeed the very fact that there has been a decline is still cause for surprise––and skepticism––in some quarters.

Terrorism

The one apparent exception to this encouraging trend is terrorism. The official US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) shows the number of terrorist fatalities worldwide increasing from 4,911 in 2004, to 20,840 in 2006––an increase of more than 400% in two years.[1]

NCTC, which was created following major criticisms of the State Department's 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' dataset, only has data from 2004 to 2006. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), which is funded in part by the US Department of Homeland Security, has data––for domestic as well as international terrorism––going back to 1998. MIPT's dataset shows global fatalities from terrorism increasing from 2,346 in 1998 to 12,065 in 2006, an increase of more than 500%. The apparently steep increase in the fatality toll from terrorism is not the only reason for concern. The Islamic terror groups that are perceived as the major threat are well–organized and well–funded. Their members are resolutely committed to the cause, they have a substantial base of support around the world, their networks have a global reach, they communicate and propagandize via hundreds of radical Islamic websites, and they have launched major terror attacks on six continents. Terrorist weapons systems are becoming more sophisticated and lethal and this, together with increased resort to suicide missions, has driven the death rate per terrorist incident sharply upwards over the past ten years. Some analysts believe it is simply a matter of time before terrorists obtain weapons of mass destruction.

Figure 3

Global Terrorism Fatalities, 1998-2006

The NCTC (red) and MIPT (blue) trend lines in Figure 3 not only support the contention that the threat of global terrorism has increased,[2] they also suggest that what the Bush Administration calls the Global War on Terror is failing.

However, the other two datasets tell a very different story. The yellow trend line is plotted from the new START dataset created by a research team at the University of Maryland. It records fatality data from 1998 to 2004.[3] START is also funded by the US Department of Homeland Security. The START yearly trend data (which are only available up to 2004) reveal far fewer fatalities from terrorism worldwide than NCTC and MIPT. More importantly, the fatality trend from 1998 to 2004 reveals only a relatively minor increase.

The green trend line is derived from a dataset collated by Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program that tracks 'one-sided violence'–– politically motivated fatal attacks on civilians by non-state groups. This definition is very close to most definitions of terrorism.[4] Uppsala's data show a modest net decline from 1998 to 2006. If Iraqi fatalities from terrorism are removed from the datasets the picture changes dramatically as Figure 4 below demonstrates. This is not surprising. MIPT claims that in 2006 a remarkable 79% of the world's fatalities were in Iraq; NCTC puts the figure at 65%.

With Iraq out of the equation, the NCTC and MPT fatality levels for the rest of the world drop dramatically. The three datasets that go back to 1998 now reveal either a net decline in annual fatalities (Uppsala and START), or only a very modest increase (MIPT). Only NCTC shows a major increase (approximately 50% between 2004 and 2006) in fatalities.[5]


Figure 4

The difference between the global trend graphs with and without Iraq, clearly indicates that both NCTC and to a lesser degree MIPT, are counting as terrorist victims a very large number of the civil war deaths in Iraq. Defining sectarian and militia violence against civilians in a civil war as terrorism is unusual––and controversial. As a recent US Congressional Research Service report noted that:

"Some would argue … that NCTC data concerning Iraq casualties—which are largely

the product of sectarian violence, rampant criminal activity, and home–grown insurgency—grossly distort the global terrorism picture and perhaps should not be attributed to terrorist activity."[6]

The deliberate slaughter of civilians in the context of a war is usually described as a war crime, not terrorism. Indeed, Alex Schmid, former head of the UN's Prevention of Terrorism Branch in Vienna, has defined terrorism as the "peacetime equivalent of a war crime[7].

The controversial claim that Iraq is the locale of 65–76% of the world's terrorist fatalities has obvious political implications. Critics can and have used MIPT data to argue that the war on Iraq has created a massive and ever-increasing terrorist threat where previously none existed. But official Washington can also use the data to support Administration assertions that terrorism in Iraq is a major threat to US––and global––security. If we reject the conflation of war deaths in Iraq with terrorist fatalities, the global threat from terrorism appears far less alarming than that so often portrayed in the media. To put the terrorist toll in perspective, the average global fatality estimate for 2004 (less Iraq) is just over 4,000. This is one tenth the number of road deaths in the US and around one quarter the number of American homicides.

Future Threats

The data reviewed in this short paper suggest that there has been a major reduction in armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War and an even greater reduction in battle-related deaths over a longer period. This has been complemented by declines international crises, military coups and in genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians. (See www.humansecurityreport.info)

Will this improvement in global security be sustained, or are we likely to witness more and increasingly deadly conflicts in the future? It is impossible to answer this question with any degree of confidence. There are too many unknowables. We can however point to a number of changes in the international system that provide some grounds for optimism, as

well as some reasons to reject complacency. The 2005 Human Security Report and 2006 Human Security Brief outlined some of the grounds for optimism.

- Two critically important drivers of global conflict vanished completely with the end of colonialism and the end of the Cold War. There is no prospect that either will return.
- Since the early 1990s there has been a dramatic explosion of international activism directed at:

o   Preventing armed conflicts (primarily via preventive diplomacy)

o   Stopping wars that cannot be prevented ('peacemaking' in UN–speak)

o   Preventing those that have stopped from starting again ('peacebuilding').

- There have been many failures associated with these initiatives––the success rate is rarely much more than 50%. But their combined impact has helped drive the net decline in armed conflicts since 1992. In the 1990s, 42 conflicts were brought to an end by negotiation––some four times more than in any previous decade.
- The positive impact of this activism is likely to continue and even increase since the international community has been on a steep learning curve since the early 1990s. Peacemaking and peacebuilding missions are appreciably more effective today than they were in the early 1990s––and there are a lot more of them.
- In two regions of the world the decline in armed conflicts began well before the end of the Cold War. Here the decline clearly cannot be explained by the upsurge of international activism noted above––this did not start until the beginning of the 1990s.
- In East and Southeast Asia, war numbers started dropping in the mid-1970s. This decline was associated with the ending of major power military intervention, the spread of inclusive democracies and an

extraordinary and sustained increase in economic growth. The latter point is perhaps the most significant. One of the most robust findings from the statistical literature on armed conflict is that the risk of war declines as incomes rise. States that have a per capita GDP of US$250 have a 15% risk of succumbing to armed conflict within five years; the risk is less than half of 1% for states with an income of US$5,000. Since incomes are still rising throughout most of the developing world there is a reasonable expectation that this will have a continuing positive impact on security.

§ In the Middle East and North Africa, armed conflicts started falling in the early 1980s—again well before the end of the Cold war that triggered the decline in most of the rest of the world. But here the decline can be attributed neither to increased economic development, nor to the spread of inclusive democratization. In this region the key factor driving down political violence appears to have been effective, and often ruthless, state repression. However while what might be called 'peace through coercion' may be effective in the short term it is hardly a recipe for human security in the long term.

What about terrorism? Has the threat increased or decreased? As noted above, the data on fatalities from terrorist attacks can be read in different ways. But the deaths tolls are not the only metric. Those who believe that the

During this period support for terrorist tactics declined as terrorist fatalities increased. There remains, of course, more than enough support among the very small minorities of deeply radicalized and alienated Muslims around the world to sustain terrorist operations. But the continued decline in popular support for Islamic terrorism throughout the Muslim world may well have profound and positive strategic consequences.

As longtime terrorism expert Audrey Kurth Cronin has argued, lack of public support for civilians increases the probability that terrorists will fail.[11] Loss of popular support was a major factor in the decline and demise of the

threat is increasing point to compelling public opinion data that show hostility to the US and its anti-terror campaign increasing throughout the Muslim world. Nowhere is this more evident than in Iraq. As a New York Times report late last year noted:

".... 61 percent of Iraqis now approve of attacks on Americans. That figure, is up from 47 percent in January [2006] ... 78% of Iraqis now believe that the American military presence is provoking more conflict than it is preventing."[8]

A major poll released in April 2007 found that growing hostility to the US and its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was evident throughout the Muslim world. [9]

Popular support for the anti-American insurgency, however, does not translate into support for al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden in Iraq or indeed anywhere else in the Muslim world. Quite the contrary. Jihadi terrorism, according to a September 2006 poll of Iraqis, is "rejected by overwhelming majorities of Iraqi Shias and Kurds and large majorities of Sunnis." In fact, no less than 82% of Iraqis have an unfavourable view of al-Qaeda.[10] Indeed, opinion polls taken over the past five years reveal that popular support for jihadi terrorism has been falling sharply throughout the Muslim world. In the case of Pakistan—a country widely believed in the US to be harbouring al-Qaeda fighters, including Osama bin Laden—the number of Pakistanis believing that acts of violence against civilians are 'never justified' increased from 38% in 2002 to 72% in 2007.

Real Irish Republican Army, Spain's ETA and Peru's Shining Path terror campaigns, for example.

This is not all. Evidence suggests that terrorist campaigns that persistently fail to achieve their strategic objectives will eventually be abandoned. A major quantitative study published in 2006 revealed that in this respect terrorist organizations fail in 90% of cases and that "the poor success rate is inherent in the tactic of terrorism itself."[12]

In the 1960s and 1970s, middle-class urban guerrilla/terrorist organizations were active in Europe (the Angry Brigade, Baader Meinhof,

the Red Brigades, etc.) and Latin America (Tupamaros in Uruguay, the ALN, MR–8 and VLN in Brazil, etc.), but their violence alienated potential support bases and mobilized government action against them. Only a small percentage of the active members of these organizations were ever captured, killed or imprisoned. The rest simply gave up on strategies that were going nowhere.

The issue of strategic goals is critical. In al-Qaeda's case, the goal is the creation of a radical pan–Islamic caliphate. Achieving this goal will require the overthrowing of governments throughout the Islamic world. But the extreme form of Islamic governance that the jihadi terrorists seek to impose has little support in the Muslim world. This, together with the persistent failure of pan-Arabism to unite the Arab world and the often brutal effectiveness of state repression of Islamic

achieved by the US–led War on Terror. These successes––in killing key al-Qaeda figures, in disrupting financial flows to terrorist organizations, etc––are not in doubt. However, as an analysis in the Washington Post noted last year:

"… many surveys show that since the U.S.–led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Muslims almost universally have seen the war against terrorism as a war on Islam."[13]

The poll data suggest that the tactical successes that have been achieved in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) should be set against the increased hostility towards Washington that the GWOT has generated–– hostility that translates into increased support for the violent campaigns against the US and its allies in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007 Poll Results for Pakistan*

Question asked: Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

*Does not include the "rarely justified" response that ranged from 5 to 18% between 2002 and 2007
**All responders were muslim and predominantely from urban areas

radicalism, suggest that the Islamic fundamentalist goal of using terrorism to overthrow Muslim governments and creating a global caliphate has little prospect of being realized.

The history of past terror campaigns suggests that those that fail to achieve their goals as the overwhelming majority do, are likely to be abandoned even though the terrorists may never actually be defeated.

Note that none of the above factors has anything to do with the tactical successes

Figure 5

No Room for Complacency

Despite the encouraging trend towards fewer and less deadly campaigns of armed violence, there is no room for complacency. In 2006, there were still some 56 armed conflicts being waged around the globe, plus a further 26 campaigns of violence against defenceless civilians.[14] And there is no iron law dictating that the recent downward trend in numbers of armed conflicts will be sustained.

In addition, the structural risk factors that drive conflicts to erupt in the first place are too rarely addressed in settlements that end the fighting and the risk of old wars starting again remains very real. Currently more than 30% of conflicts that stop, restart within five years.

While there is no reason for complacency, neither is there any cause for pessimism. We know far more today about the drivers of political violence than we did two decades ago. We also know that international action by donors, international agencies and NGOs can make a real difference.

Norway's Peace Diplomacy

A former Australian Foreign Minister once noted that even though Australia was neither rich enough to bribe other countries nor powerful enough to coerce them, it had nevertheless succeeded in 'punching above its weight' in the international community. It did so by practicing what he described as 'niche diplomacy'.

The Australian Labor government of the 1990s played a critical, and sometimes decisive, role in the creation of APEC, the Cairns Group, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Antarctic Treaty, the peace settlement in Cambodia, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Issues were deliberately chosen in which policy options remained open and where a determined middle-power could make a difference diplomatically, primarily by marshalling foreign ministry expertise and other intellectual resources. On the CWC negotiations, for example, more than half of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's experts on arms control were transferred to work on the CW file. Their efforts were closely followed by the minister. Work on the CTBT–– to which the US was then adamantly opposed––was relegated to the back-burner. Australia's energetic and focused diplomacy led to a new rolling text and the eventual signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Norway is a much smaller country than Australia, but it too 'punches above its weight' diplomatically––particularly as a mediator.

Oslo's peace diplomacy in Guatemala, Bosnia, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Philippines, Haiti and Columbia has elevated Norway's reputation as a 'good international citizen', despite a mixed record of success.

Norway's overseas development assistance programs which are focused on the poorest countries––those that experience most wars–– can be seen as addressing the "root causes" of conflict and thus acting as a form of long-term conflict prevention.

Norway, like other major donors, the UN and the World Bank, assents to the now–prevalent slogan that "there can be no security without development". But exactly how Norwegian development assistance should change if it is to be viewed "through the conflict prevention lens" is less than clear. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry's Peacebuilding––a Development Approach had little to say about this.

Perhaps more important than any potential contribution to long-term conflict prevention, Norway's generous ODA and humanitarian programs give Oslo considerable political credibility in the nations of the global South and at the UN. This is an enormously important asset with respect to Oslo's peace diplomacy. In fact, in 2005 a Norwegian PR firm suggested that the government seek to brand Norway as the "humanitarian superpower".

Norway is one of a small number of countries widely perceived in the UN as "serious" and "punching above its weight"––with Jan Egeland doing much to strengthen that image in recent years. I offer this view as a former Director of Strategic Planning in Kofi Annan's Executive Office who continues to have strong contacts in the organization.

The UN connection is important because Norwegian peace diplomacy is also pursued indirectly through its support of the UN, via Norwegian and other NGOs working in the peacebuilding field, as well as the various "Friends" groups created to help countries that are emerging from conflict. Building coalitions of the "like–minded" (other states, international organizations and NGOs) is also a typical niche diplomacy strategy for small and medium

powers and one frequently practiced by Norway.

The establishment of the Oslo Forum, a joint initiative between the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, is evidence of the government's commitment to strengthening the role of mediators in peacemaking and to exploring the idea of their professionalization.

There is one area in which Norway's peace diplomacy falls short, namely in the government's systematic neglect of impact evaluations of its peacemaking and peacebuilding missions.

Notwithstanding the existence of first–rate research institutions such as PRIO, NUPE, Chr. Michelsen and others, there is little work undertaken on evaluating preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or peacebuilding

missions. Government agencies and NGOs do no better.

Norway is by no means unique in this respect. No government or international agency, or research institute, has ever sought to determine which is the most cost-effective policy––preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or post-conflict peacebuilding––and in terms not just of financial cost, but of lives saved.

In principle, prevention is the most cost-effective. In practice, it is attempted far less frequently than peacemaking or peacebuilding.

Norwegian support for a broad-based program of systematic impact evaluations by policymakers, researchers and NGOs and of the absolute and relative efficacy of prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, would make a real contribution towards creating a peace diplomacy that, in being evidence-based, is also more effective.

Sources:

[1] The National Counterterrorism Center notes that its 2004 data are coded something differently to the data for 2005 and 2006 so the figures aren't strictly comparable. The steepness of the increase is not in doubt however.

[2] For an extreme example of terrorist threat inflation see, Norman Podhoretz, "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win," Commentary, September 2004.

[3] The START data have been 'filtered' to exclude attacks on the military and the police.

[4] The one major difference is that Uppsala only records cases of one-sided violence when there are more than 25 fatalities by perpetrator in a country within a calendar year.

[5] Fatality rather than incident counts are used here because definitions of incident can vary considerably; definitions of 'fatality' much less so. This is very clear in the case of countries with good statistics––Spain and Israel, for example––where there is little variation in fatality figures and trends, but considerable variation in incident counts.

[6] Raphael F. Perl, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy and Response, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33600.pdf. Accessed August 10, 2007.

[7] Professor Schmid currently directs the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews.

[8] Nicolas D. Kristof, 'Listen to Iraqis', New York Times, October 8, 2006.

[9] Worldpublicopinion.org, 2007.

[10] See World Public Opinion.org. 'All Iraqi Groups Overwhelmingly Reject al Queda', October 8, 2006. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/248.php?nid=&id=&pnt=248&lb=

[11] Audrey Kurth Cronin, 'How Al–Quida Ends', International Security 31, No.1 (Summer 2006).

[12] Max Abrahams. 'Why Terrorism Doesn't Work'. International Security 31, No.2 (2006): 42–68.

[13] Karl Vick, 'Reunified Islam: Unlikely but Not Entirely Radical' In:Washington Post Foreign Service, January 14, 2006; A01. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011301816_pf.html. Accessed August 13, 2007. See also WorldPublicOpinion.org, 'Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Queda', Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, April 24, 2007. www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf. Accessed, August 13, 2007.

[14] 25 deliberately killed civilians constitutes a campaign.

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EU: Jihadist calls for tourist Jihad

Source: http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/10277878/___Wilders_ideaal_slachtoffer___.html

Jihadist Abu Suleiman al-Nasser wrote on the Shumukh al-Islam forum that Muslims should go to Europe posing as tourists in order to murder Europeans. Al-Nasser wrote on the site that Muslims should buy a sharp knife when they're in Europe. "You could murder more than a hundred people. Walk about and choose your victims." He wrote that Geert Wilders is an ideal victim. "He looks like a fat calf."

Meanwhile, the American intelligence website SITE reports that Jihadists are calling for attacks on Belgium and Belgians in retaliation for the recently enacted burqa-ban. According to one Jihadist: "If you have the freedom to make such decisions, then you must also accept our freedom to take action. I call our Muslim brothers in Belgium to do what they can: bomb them, destroy them, torture and murder them."

The Third Jihad

Source: http://www.thethirdjihad.com/about_new.php

 The Third Jihad, the newest offering from the producers of the captivating documentary film, Obsession, explores the existence of radical Islam in America and the emerging risk that this "homegrown jihad" poses to national security, western liberties and the "American

way of life."
The film, which is narrated by devout Muslim American Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, opens with the following statement: "This is not a film about Islam. It is about the threat of radical Islam. Only a small percentage of the world's 1.3

billion Muslims are radical. This film is about

them."
In 72 minutes, the film reveals that radical Islamists driven by a religiously motivated rejection of western values cultures and religion are engaging in a multifaceted strategy to overcome the western world. In contrast to the use of "violent jihad" and terror to instill fear in "non-believers," The Third Jihad introduces the concept of "cultural jihad" as a means to infiltrate and undermine our society from within.

Norway's Terrorism in Context
By Daniel Pipes
Source: http://www.meforum.org/pipes/10007/norway-terrorism-in-context

Scandinavia may look idyllic from a distance, what with royal families and prime ministers almost without security, but it has endured its fair share of violence, from the assassinations of Swedish prime minister Olof Palme and foreign minister Anna Lindh to two school massacres in one year in Finland, one killing

eight, the other ten. Anders Behring Breivik's rampage, in other words, was hardly unprecedented.

In the past, one had the cold comfort of knowing that deranged acts such as his were

Behring Breivik plagiarized the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski.

carried out by individuals under the sway of extremist ideologies. Not so Behring Breivik. This terrorist lists among his favorite authors George Orwell, Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, John Locke, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Ayn Rand, and William James. The disconnect between Behring Breivik's mainstream political conservatism and his psychological derangement presents a shocking new dilemma and challenge.

That said, there is no reason to think that Behring Breivik has a single follower, that any other mainstream political conservative will emulate him and massacre socialists. This has never happened before and will probably never happen again. This is a gruesome, freakish exception.

And yet, this exception does tell conservatives that we have to be aware of a danger we had not thought of before. We may oppose socialists, but not vilify them.

Given how meticulously Behring Breivik planned not just his bombing attack and gun rampage but also his posting of a manifesto and a video, and given his plans to turn his trial into political theater, his terrorism appears ultimately intended primarily to bring attention to his political views. Indeed, during his initial court appearance on July 25, the Associated Press reports, he presented the violence "as 'marketing' for his manifesto," 2083 — A European Declaration of Independence.

In this way, Behring Breivik resembles the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, who engaged in violence as a means to market his 1995 manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future. Indeed, the tie between these two is very close: Hans Rustad documents how extensively Behring Breivik plagiarized from Kaczynski, changing only some key words.

Add to these two Timothy McVeigh (the 1995 Oklahoma City bomber) and Baruch Goldstein (the 1994 Hebron mass killer) and one has the four outstanding exceptions to the dominant rule of Islamist mass murder. One website, TheReligionOfPeace.com, counts 17,500 terrorist incidents on behalf of Islam in the past ten years; extrapolating, that comes to some 25,000 since 1994. We are dealing with two very different orders of magnitude. As David P. Goldman notes, "there is a world of difference between the organized use of horror by terrorist movements and the depraved actions of individuals." Yes, we must worry about non-Islamist violence too, but the Islamist variety prevails and, being a vital extremist movement, will continue to do so.

Ravi Shankar, executive editor of the New Indian Express, writes that "What happened in Oslo Friday may be the early beginning of a new civil war — Europeans fighting each other, both Muslim and Christian." He could well be right. As I argued in a 2007 analysis, "Europe's Stark Options," the continent's future is likely to consist of either Islamization or protracted civil conflict. I sketched the possibility of "indigenous Europeans — who do still constitute 95 percent of the continent's population — waking up one day and asserting themselves. 'Basta!' they will say, and reclaim their historic order. This is not so remote; a chafing among Europeans, less among elites than the masses, loudly protests changes already underway."

Although he attacked socialists, not Muslims, Behring Breivik clearly fits this chafing. More broadly, he fits into a pattern of growing Christian-Muslim violence visible from Nigeria to Iraq to the Philippines.

Not surprisingly, Behring Breivik belongs to the "Islam is evil" school of thought, as he frequently signaled in his manifesto:

. . . a tolerant Islam is a contradiction, and the "creation" of a tolerant past for Islam to appease the position of liberal Muslims is a lie.

. . . to take the violence out of Islam would require it to jettison two things: the Quran as the word of Allah and Muhammad as Allah's prophet. In other words, to pacify Islam would

require its transformation into something that it is not.

Islam today is what it has been fourteen centuries: violent, intolerant, and expansionary. It is folly to think that we, in the course of a few years or decades, are going to be able to change the basic world outlook of a foreign civilisation. Islam's violent nature must be accepted as given.

Many moderate cultural conservatives have suggested that banning Sharia will solve all our problems and force the Muslims to integrate. Unfortunately, Islam is a lot more resilient than most people can comprehend. . . . Taking Sharia (and all political aspects) out of Islam is simply not possible.

This position differs fundamentally from my own, which holds that "radical Islam is the problem, moderate Islam is the solution." While sharing common opponents, these two outlooks differ on the nature of Islam, its potential for change, and the possibility of allying with Muslims.

Beyond massacring innocent Norwegians, Behring Breivik damaged conservatism, the counterjihad, and (in particular) those authors he cited in his writings, including myself. A close reading of his manifesto suggests this may have been purposeful. Noting that his former membership in Norway's conservative Progress Party would do it harm, he evinces

satisfaction that this will forward his revolutionary goals:

I anticipate that the Norwegian media will persecute and undermine the Progress Party for my earlier involvement in the organisation. This is not a negative thing as an increasing amount of Norwegians will then have their "illusions of democratic change" crushed (if the Progress Party is annihilated by the multiculturalist media) and rather resorts to armed resistance.

In a similar spirit, he writes: "America as a polity is scr*wed, and thank the gods for that."

By extension, Behring Breivik may well have wanted to harm those analysts of Islam cited in the manifesto. He calls me a "moderate," which obviously is not meant as a compliment, and dismisses even the hardest-line critics of Islam as lacking in courage:

The reason why authors on the Eurabia related issues/Islamisation of Europe — Fjordman, Spencer, [Bat] Ye'or, Bostom etc. aren't actively discussing deportation is because the method is considered too extreme (and thus would damage their reputational shields). . . . If these authors are to [sic] scared to propagate a conservative revolution and armed resistance then other authors will have to.

Behring Breivik hopes to undermine anyone he perceives

as obstructing his dreamed-for revolution. Temporarily, at least, he has succeeded.

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Norway: Lessons from a Successful Lone Wolf Attacker

By Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110727-norway-lessons-successful-lone-wolf-attacker?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20110728&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=ced8f91d62e94225a21fbc085794f348

On the afternoon of July 22, a powerful explosion ripped through the streets of Oslo, Norway, as a large improvised explosive device (IED) in a rented van detonated between the government building housing the prime minister's office and Norway's Oil and Energy Department building. According to the diary of Anders Breivik, the man arrested in the case who has confessed to fabricating and placing the device, the van had been filled with 950 kilograms (about 2,100 pounds) of homemade ammonium nitrate-based explosives.

After lighting the fuse on his IED, Breivik left the scene in a rented car and traveled to the island of Utoya, located about 32 kilometers (20 miles) outside of Oslo. The island was the site of a youth campout organized by Norway's ruling Labor Party. Before taking a boat to the island, Breivik donned body armor and tactical gear bearing police insignia (intended to afford him the element of tactical surprise). Once on the island he opened fire on the attendees at the youth camp with his firearms, a semiautomatic 5.56 mm Ruger Mini-14 rifle and a 9 mm Glock pistol. Due to the location of the

camp on a remote island, Breivik had time to kill 68 people and wound another 60 before

police responded to the scene.

AREA OF OSLO EXPLOSION

VG building

Akersgata

Government building

Ploens gate

Extensive damage along street

Hoyesteretts plass

Grubbegata

Oil and Energy Department

Mollergata

Norwegian Sea

SWEDEN

NORWAY

Oslo

North Sea

DENMARK

Source: ArcGIS satellite information   Copyright STRATFOR 2011 www.STRATFOR.com

Shortly before the attack, Breivik posted a manifesto on the Internet that includes his lengthy operational diary. He wrote the diary in English under the Anglicized pen name Andrew Berwick, though a careful reading shows he also posted his true identity in the document. The document also shows that he was a lone wolf attacker who conducted his assault specifically against the Labor Party's current and future leadership. Breivik targeted the Labor Party because of his belief that the party is Marxist-oriented and is responsible for encouraging multiculturalism, Muslim immigration into Norway and, acting with other similar European governments, the coming destruction of European culture. Although the Labor Party members are members of his own race, he considers them traitors and holds them in more contempt than he does Muslims. In fact, in the manifesto, Breivik urged others not to target Muslims because it would elicit sympathy for them.

Breivik put most of his time and effort into the creation of the vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) that he used to attack his primary target, the current

government, which is housed in the government building. It appears that he believed the device would be sufficient to destroy that building. It was indeed a powerful device, but the explosion killed only eight people. This was because the device did not bring down the building as Breivik had planned and many of the government employees who normally work in the area were on summer break. In the end, the government building was damaged but not destroyed in the attack, and no senior government officials were killed. Most of the deaths occurred at the youth camp, which Breivik described as his secondary target.

While Breivik's manifesto indicated he planned and executed the attack as a lone wolf, it also suggests that he is part of a larger organization that he calls the "Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici (PCCTS, also known as the Knights Templar), which seeks to encourage other lone wolves (whom Brevik refers to as "Justiciar Knights") and small cells in other parts of Europe to carry out a plan to

"save" Europe and European culture from destruction.

Because of the possibility that there are other self-appointed Justiciar Knights in Norway or in other parts of Europe and that Breivik's actions, ideology and manifesto could spawn copycats, we thought it useful to examine the Justiciar Knights concept as Breivik explains it to see how it fits into lone wolf theory and how similar actors might be detected in the future.

An Opening Salvo?

From reading his manifesto, it is clear that Breivik, much like Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, believes that his attack is the opening salvo in a wider campaign, in this case to liberate Europeans from what Breivik views as malevolent, Marxist-oriented governments. These beliefs are what drove Breivik to attack the Norwegian Labor Party. As noted above, it is also clear that Breivik planned and executed his attack alone.

However, he also discusses how he was radicalized and influenced by a Serbian living in Liberia whom he visited there. And Breivik claims to have attended a meeting in London in 2002 to "re-found the Knights Templar." This organization, PCCTS, which was founded in 2002, is not related to the much older official and public chivalric order also known as the Knights Templar. According to Breivik, the PCCTS was formed with the stated purpose of fighting back against "European Jihad" and to defend the "free indigenous peoples of Europe." To achieve this goal, the PCCTS would implement a three-phase plan designed to seize political and military power in Europe. In his manifesto Breivik outlines the plan as follows:

- Phase 1 (1999-2030): Cell-based shock attacks, sabotage attacks, etc.
- Phase 2 (2030-2070): Same as above but bigger cells/networks, armed militias.
- Phase 3 (2070-2100): Pan-European coup d'etats, deportation of Muslims and execution of traitors.

As outlined in Breivik's manifesto, the 2002 meeting was attended by seven other individuals, two from England and one each from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Russia. He also asserts that the organization has members from Serbia (his contact living in Liberia), Sweden, Belgium and the United States who were unable to attend the meeting. Brevik states that all the members

of the PCCTS were given code names for security, that his code name was "Sigurd," and that he was mentored by a member with the code name "Richard the Lionhearted" (presumably a Briton). Breivik claims that after meeting these individuals via the Internet he was carefully vetted before being allowed to join the group.

The diary section of Breivik's manifesto reveals that during the planning process for the attack Breivik traveled to Prague to obtain firearms and grenades from Balkan organized-crime groups there (he had hoped to obtain a fully automatic AK-47). Breivik was not able to procure weapons in Prague and instead was forced to use weapons he was able to obtain in Norway by legal means. It is interesting that he did not contact the Serbian member of the PCCTS for assistance in making contact with Balkan arms dealers. Breivik's lawyer told the media July 26 that although Breivik acted alone in conducting his attack, he had been in contact with two terror cells in Norway and other cells abroad. Certainly, Norway and its partners in EUROPOL and the United States will try to identify these other individuals, if they do in fact exist.

In phase one of the PCCTS plan, shock attacks were to be carried out by individuals operating as lone wolves or small cells of Breivik's so-called Justiciar Knights, who are self-appointed guardians who decide to follow the PCCTS code outlined in Breivik's manifesto and who are granted the authority to act as "a judge, jury and executioner until the free, indigenous peoples of Europe are no longer threatened by cultural genocide, subject to cultural Marxist/Islamic tyranny or territorial or existential threats through Islamic demographic warfare."

Breivik's manifesto notes that he does not know how many Justiciar Knights there are in Western Europe but estimates their number to be from 15 to 80. It is unclear if this is a delusion on his part and there are no other Justiciar Knights or if Breivik has some factual basis for his belief that there are more individuals like him planning attacks.

While some observers have noted that the idea of Justiciar Knights operating as lone wolves and in small cells is similar to the calls in recent years for grassroots jihadists to adopt lone wolf tactics, it is important to understand that leaderless resistance has been a central theme of white supremacist groups in the United

States since the early 1990s. While Breivik did not express any anti-Semitism in his manifesto (something he has been heavily criticized for on U.S. anti-Semitic websites), clearly the anti-immigration and anti-Marxist ideology of the PCCTS has been influenced more by white hate groups than by al Qaeda.

Moreover, the concept of a self-identified Justiciar Knight is quite similar to the idea of a "Phineas Priest" in the leaderless resistance model propagated by some white supremacists in the United States who adhere to "Christian Identity" ideology. In this model, Phineas Priests see themselves as lone wolf militants chosen by God and set apart to be his "agents of vengeance" upon the earth. Phineas Priests also believe that their attacks will serve to ignite a wider "racial holy war" that will ultimately lead to the salvation of the white race.

Leaderless resistance has also been advocated by militant anarchists as well as animal rights and environmentalist activists who belong to such groups as the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. So it is not correct to think of leaderless resistance merely as a jihadist construct — it has long been used by a variety of militant actors.

Lone Wolf Challenges

One of the great strengths of our enemies, the Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist regimes is their vast resources and their advanced investigation/forensic capabilities. There are thousands of video cameras all over European major cities and you will always risk leaving behind dna, finger prints, witnesses or other evidence that will eventually lead to your arrest. They are overwhelmingly superior in almost every aspect. But every 7 headed monster has an Achilles heel. This Achilles heel is their vulnerability against single/duo martyr cells. — Anders Breivik

As STRATFOR has long discussed, the lone wolf operational model presents a number of challenges for law enforcement, intelligence and security officers. The primary challenge is that, by definition, lone wolves are solitary actors, and it can be very difficult to determine their intentions before they act because they do not work with anyone else. When militants are operating in a cell consisting of more than one person, there is a larger chance that one of them will get cold feet and reveal the plot to authorities, that law enforcement and intelligence personnel will intercept a communication between conspirators, or that the authorities will be able to insert an informant into the group.

This ability to fly solo and under the radar of law enforcement has meant that some lone wolf militants such as Joseph Paul Franklin, Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph were able to operate for years before being identified and captured. Indeed, from Breivik's diary, we know he took several years to plan and execute his attack without detection.

As the Breivik case illustrates, lone wolves also pose problems because they can come from a variety of backgrounds with a wide range of motivations. While some lone wolves are politically motivated, others are religiously motivated and some are mentally unstable.

In addition to the wide spectrum of ideologies and motivations among lone wolves, there is also the issue of geographic dispersal. As we've seen from past cases, their plots and attacks have occurred in many different locations and are not confined just to Manhattan, London or Washington. Lone wolf attacks can occur anywhere.

Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between those extremists who intend to commit attacks and those who simply preach hate or hold radical beliefs (things that are not in themselves illegal in many countries). Therefore, to single out likely lone wolves before they strike, authorities must spend a great deal of time and resources looking at individuals who might be moving from radical beliefs to radical actions. This is a daunting task given the large universe of potential suspects.

Vulnerabilities

In spite of the challenges presented by lone wolf operatives, they are vulnerable to detection at several different stages of their attack cycle. One of these vulnerabilities comes during the planning stage when weapons are acquired. From reading Breivik's diary, it is clear that he felt exposed as he tried to purchase the chemicals he needed to build his IED. Because of this vulnerability, Breivik created an extensive cover story that included renting a farm in order to explain his purchase of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The farm also provided a private, spacious place for him to construct his IED.

Breivik also exposed himself to potential detection when he traveled to Prague to attempt to purchase weapons. One of the criminals he contacted could have turned him in to authorities. (In June 2011 we saw a jihadist cell in Seattle detected and arrested while attempting to buy guns from a criminal acquaintance. Another small cell was arrested in New York in May 2011, also while attempting to obtain weapons.) Even if Breivik had succeeded in purchasing weapons in Prague, he would still have been vulnerable as he smuggled the weapons back into Norway in his car (though it is important to remember that EU countries have open borders so security checks would not have been too stringent).

Breivik also exposed himself to detection as he conducted surveillance on his targets. Interestingly, in his diary, Breivik goes into excruciating detail discussing how he manufactured his device based on information he was able to obtain from the Internet, but he mentions very little about how he selected specific targets or how he conducted surveillance on them. He mentions only that he visited the sites and programmed the locations into his GPS. He also discusses using a video camera to record his attack but does not mention if he used still or video cameras in his target surveillance. How Breivik specifically chose his targets and how he conducted surveillance on them will be important for the Norwegian authorities to examine.

Finally, Breivik mentions several times in his diary that the steps he was taking would be far more difficult if he were a foreign-born Muslim instead of a Caucasian Norwegian. This underscores a problem we have discussed with profiling suspects based on their ethnicity or nationality. In an environment where potential threats are hard to identify, it is doubly important to profile individuals based on their

behavior rather than their ethnicity or nationality — what we refer to as focusing on the "how" rather than the "who."

Not All Lone Wolves are Equal

Finally, in the Breivik case we need to recognize that Norwegian authorities were dealing with a very capable lone wolf operator. While lone wolf theory has been propagated for many years now, there have been relatively few successful lone wolf attacks. This is because it takes a special individual to be a successful lone wolf assailant. Unlike many lone wolves, Breivik demonstrated that he possessed the intelligence and discipline to plan and carry out an attack that spanned several years of preparation. For example, he joined a pistol club in 2005 just in case he ever needed to buy a gun through legal means in Norway, and was able to rely on that alternate plan when his efforts to purchase firearms in Prague failed. Breivik was also driven, detail-oriented and meticulous in his planning. His diary documents that he was also extremely patient and careful during the dangerous trial-and-error process of manufacturing explosives.

It is rare to find a lone wolf militant who possesses all those traits, and Breivik stands in stark contrast to other European grassroots operatives like Nick Reilly or Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed, who made amateurish attempts at attacks. Breivik appears to have been a hard worker who claims to have amassed some 500,000 euros by working a variety of jobs and selling a communications company. After some unsuccessful speculation on the stock market he still had enough money and credit to rent the farm and the vehicles he used in the attack and to buy the required bomb components, weapons and body armor. In his diary he says that he began his two tasks — writing the manifesto and conducting the attack — with a war chest of 250,000 euros and several credit cards.

Breivik also is somewhat unique in that he did not attempt to escape after his attacks or become a martyr by his own hand or that of the authorities. Instead, as outlined in his manifesto, he sought to be tried so that he could turn his trial into a grandstand for promoting his ideology beyond what he did with his manifesto and video. He was willing to risk a long prison sentence in order to communicate his principles to the public. This means that the authorities have to be concerned not only about other existing Justiciar Knights but also anyone who may be influenced by Breivik's message and follow his example.

There is also the possibility that individuals who do not adhere to Breivik's ideology will seek to exploit the loopholes and security lapses highlighted by this incident to conduct their own attacks. Breivik's diary provides a detailed step-by-step guide to manufacturing a successful VBIED, and the authorities will be scrutinizing it carefully to address the vulnerabilities Breivik exposed before those instructions can be used again.

The Oslo massacre in pictures

Source:ttp://www.norwaynews.com/en/~view.php?72Tb354LMd4823w285Bkh844UN388bPZ76EDn353K8K8

The 'Lone Wolf' Disconnect
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect

The idea that a lone individual will appear seemingly out of nowhere to launch a horrific terrorist attack sends shivers down the spines of public security planners and law enforcement officers — not to mention average citizens. Because of their unique traits, "lone wolves" present very real challenges to the law enforcement and security professionals charged with guarding against such threats.

However, with the road from desire to actual destruction fraught with obstacles, the lone-wolf terrorist — one capable of causing mass casualties — is a rare individual indeed.

The flames of fear regarding lone wolves are fanned by the near-constant bantering about such operatives in radical circles, in movies and books and even in analyses pertaining to domestic and international terrorism. For many years now, domestic radicals such as neo-Nazi Tom Metzger and former Klansman Louis Beam have championed the "leaderless resistance" model of operation. Beam's 1992 essay, "Leaderless Resistance," has been widely embraced by many on the radical right as the definitive work on the subject and has been translated into many languages.

In his essay, Beam envisions a two-tiered approach to revolutionary struggle. One tier would be the above-ground "organs of information," who would "distribute information using newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc." The organs of information were not to conduct any illegal activities but rather to provide direction for lone wolves, as well as issue propaganda for recruitment purposes. The second tier would be made up of individual operators and small "phantom" cells that would conduct attacks. These people were to remain low-key and anonymous, with no connections to the above-ground activists. Of course, in 1992, Beam likely never imagined how the Internet would become an almost perfect medium for the organs of information to disseminate information to the detached, anonymous lone wolves.

In many ways, the radical Islamist world also has embraced this operational model and the Internet technology. Scores of Web sites dedicated to serving as jihadist organs of information aim to radicalize individual Muslims and then equip these radicalized individuals with information on how to conduct terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda franchises even have produced online magazines, such as Maaskar al-Battar (Al-Battar Training Camp), which was produced by al Qaeda's Saudi node. These magazines are designed to further support radical ideology, teach individual radicals how to train for jihad and provide guidance on how to surveil and select targets — and even how to properly employ a number of weapons systems.

However, in spite of the fact that the concept of leaderless resistance has been publicly and widely embraced in both the domestic terrorism and jihadist realms, few terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by lone-wolf operatives. In fact, we have seen more mentally disturbed lone gunmen than politically motivated lone-wolf terrorists. A main reason for this lack of operatives in the political realm is the disconnect — the lack of translation from theory to action.

Definition of a Lone Wolf

It is important to define the term "lone wolf" because many people — both in the militant realm and in law enforcement and intelligence circles — misuse it or use it imprecisely. A lone wolf is a person who acts on his or her own without orders from — or even connections to — an organization. The theory is that this distance will prevent disclosure of attack planning to informants or technical surveillance and therefore provide superior operational security.

A lone wolf is distinct from a sleeper operative in that a sleeper is an operative who infiltrates the targeted society or organization and then remains dormant — sometimes for quite some time — until being activated, perhaps by a prearranged signal or a certain chain of events. A lone wolf is a standalone operative who by his very nature is embedded in the targeted society and is capable of self-activation at any time.

Most militant groups do not have the resources or patience to launch a true sleeper operation. While militant groups do frequently utilize covert operatives, such as the 9/11 attackers, we are unaware of any instance in which a militant group ran a true sleeper cell operation. (Most of the sleeper operations we know of involve attempts at international espionage.) Clearly, most covert militant operatives engage in some sort of operational activity and do not remain dormant. One cannot carry out operational activities and be a sleeper.

Also, it must be remembered that a sleeper — or other covert operative, for that matter — is trained and dispatched by an organization. The existence of this connection to an organization means that the operative cannot, by definition, be a true lone wolf.

Al Qaeda and its jihadist cousins and progeny across the globe have used a number of different operational models, some of them quite decentralized. However, even decentralized grassroots operatives, such as the London Underground attackers, have contact with an organization and so are not, by definition, lone wolves.

Some lone wolves are ideologically motivated, some are religiously inspired, some are mentally disturbed and still others are influenced by a combination of these factors. Our focus here is on politically or religiously motivated attackers, not on mentally ill individuals motivated for other reasons (such as Virginia Tech shooter Seung-Hui Cho). Certainly such individuals create terror during their rampages, but they are not conducting politically motivated terrorist attacks. We distinguish between lone wolves and "lone nuts" because, although many politically motivated attackers do have some degree of mental illness, rational and irrational individuals operate differently. Mentally disturbed individuals are far more likely to self-radicalize in a vacuum and have less concern for their own safety than do most politically motivated attackers. This lack of concern for their own safety often helps them to overcome their lack of skill.

Easier Said Than Done

The rubber meets the road when potential attackers try to place lone-wolf theory into action. Like much political theory, or even business theory, it often is easier to design a system than it is to apply it to a real-world situation — one that involves fallible people.

One of the biggest problems for lone-wolf operators is acquiring the skills necessary to conduct a successful terrorist attack. Perhaps this is one reason suicide bombers rarely are lone wolves; there simply is too much involved in preparing for such an attack.

In his essay on leaderless resistance, Beam wrote, "It becomes the responsibility of the individual to acquire the necessary skills and information as to what is to be done." This, of course, is an obvious condition of leaderless resistance — and it is easy enough to write. But acquiring these skills in the real world can pose quite a daunting challenge. (As a decorated Vietnam War veteran, Beam likely did not realize how difficult it might be for someone lacking his military and combat experience to pick up those skills.)

In fact, some of the most successful lone-wolf assailants, including Olympic bomber Eric Rudolph, had served in and been trained by the military. Some people consider Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh an example of a military-trained lone wolf, but his possible association with the Aryan Resistance Army, his connections to The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord group in Elohim City, Okla., and his connections to like-minded individuals — including Michael Fortier and Terry Nichols — suggest he was a grassroots operative and not a truly isolated lone wolf.

Military training is not a necessity for lone-wolf success. Joseph Paul Franklin carried out a series of killings (perhaps as many as 20 in several states), robberies and arsons from 1977 to 1980 in an attempt to ignite a race war in the United States. His attempts to assassinate high-profile targets Vernon Jordan and Larry Flynt failed, though he seriously wounded both of them and left Flynt paralyzed. Even though many Web sites and military manuals provide instruction on such things as making bombs and marksmanship, there is no substitute for hands-on experience in the real world. Playing the neo-Nazi video game "Ethnic Cleansing" or similar games for hours will not automatically make a person an expert tactical shooter. Gaining such expertise requires practice. Intellectual prowess also is no substitute for experience. For example, even a genius like Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski had to do much experimentation in order to improve the design of his explosive devices. Of the 16 devices Kaczynski sent, several either did not explode or did not function as designed. In the end, Kaczynski's 18-year bombing campaign killed only three people.

Because of the difficulty of successfully manufacturing (in Kaczynski's case) or even stealing (in Rudolph's case) effective explosives, many would-be lone wolves attempt to procure explosives or military weaponry. It is at this stage, when the lone wolf reaches out for assistance, that many of these individuals have come to the attention of law enforcement. One such case was Derrick Shareef, who was arrested in December 2006 while attempting to trade stereo speakers for hand grenades and a pistol he sought to use in an attack against the CherryVale shopping mall in Rockford, Ill. The person Shareef approached to help him obtain the weapons happened to be a police informant.

Immaturity and lack of common sense also are significant hurdles for some would-be lone-wolf attackers. For instance, a person who attempts to buy an illicit fully automatic weapon when he could easily — and legally — obtain a less expensive semiautomatic version of the same weapon clearly is influenced by Hollywood and does not understand the effectiveness of controlled, sustained fire versus the spray-and-pray shooting he sees in the movies or on TV. As Franklin and several mentally disturbed shooters have demonstrated, automatic weapons are not needed to inflict carnage.

Another consideration is that the process of radicalization — to the point that a person undertakes a terrorist attack — rarely occurs in a solitary setting. Many individuals require the feedback and encouragement of like-minded individuals to help them reach that point. And this group dynamic crosses ideological divides. It is seen in gangs of racist skinheads and radical Jews as much as it is in jihadists. In many cases that first appear to involve a lone wolf, further investigation shows that the person's activities were motivated and facilitated by others. Only certain types of individuals can go through this process of radicalization and indoctrination and then motivate themselves to take violent action outside of a group dynamic. Franklin, Kaczynski and Rudolph, for example, tended to be loners even before they became radicalized. Furthermore, even if someone can cross the hurdle of self-radicalization to the point that he is willing to conduct an attack, and even if he can build effective explosive devices or shoot a gun, he still must have other subtler abilities — street skills — that are difficult to master without practice and actual training. Perhaps the most significant of these street skills is surveillance tradecraft.

Although radical Web sites and online training magazines provide written instruction in surveillance, mastering the complex and subtle set of skills required to be a good surveillance operative takes a great deal of training and practical experience. It is not impossible for someone to develop and hone these skills on his own, but it is extremely difficult. Even Rudolph, a lone wolf who practiced excellent operational security and had good bombmaking and wilderness-survival skills, ultimately was captured because he lacked street skills. It was his suspicious behavior while on a street that caused a citizen to follow him back to his truck and report the vehicle's license tag to the police.

While the fictional and theoretical versions of lone-wolf operatives can be terrifying, real-life examples demonstrate that not only are such attackers fairly rare, but the constraints their isolation imposes on them (in acquiring weapons and training) usually limit the amount of damage they can do. Moreover, a lone wolf who reaches out for external assistance or training eventually finds himself interacting with other militants — and then he no longer is considered a lone wolf.

The Wide-Ranging Psychological Impacts Of The 9/11 Tragedy - 10 Years Later

Source: http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/231746.php

Short-term and long-term psychological effects of the 9/11 attacks spread far beyond New York City, Washington, D.C., and Shanksville, Pa., according to research published by the American Psychological Association. A team of psychologists examine the social, political and psychological impacts of the nation's worst terrorist attack in "9/11: Ten Years Later," a special issue of APA's flagship journal, American Psychologist. With a dozen peer-reviewed articles, the issue illustrates how psychology is helping people understand and cope with 9/11's enduring impacts. It also explores how psychological science has helped us understand the roots of terrorism and how to prevent further attacks. The articles include:

- An Introduction to "9/11: Ten Years Later" - Roxane Cohen Silver, PhD, University of California, Irvine
- A summary explaining the goals of the issue, which explores how the past decade was shaped by the events of 9/11 and their aftermath; lessons learned from individual, community and national responses; and new analyses of psychological research.
- The Expulsion from Disneyland: The Social Psychological Impact of 9/11 - G. Scott Morgan, PhD, Daniel C. Wisneski, BA, and Linda J. Skitka, PhD, University of Illinois at Chicago
- Americans responded to the 9/11 attacks with negative social reactions, such as increased prejudice, as well as positive social reactions, including charitable donations and civic engagement. Psychological theory helps explain why people have such powerful reactions when their way of life is threatened by terrorist attacks.
- Americans Respond Politically to 9/11: Understanding the Impact of the Terrorist Attacks and Their Aftermath - Leonie Huddy, PhD, and Stanley Feldman, PhD, Stony Brook University
- Research on American political reactions to 9/11 suggests that people support a strong government response to terrorism when they perceive a high risk of future terrorism and feel angry at terrorists.
- While Americans who were personally affected by the attacks were more likely to feel anxious about terrorism, they were less supportive of overseas military action.
- Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: A Review of the Literature among Highly Exposed Populations - Yuval Neria, PhD, Columbia University and New York State Psychiatric Institute; Laura DiGrande, DrPH, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; Ben G. Adams, PhD, Columbia University
- The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have brought a substantial and enduring burden of posttraumatic stress disorder on those people who lost loved ones, as well as on firefighters and recovery workers. Research over the past decade has broadened the understanding of PTSD following large-scale disasters such as terrorism.
- Growing Up in the Shadow of Terrorism: Youth in America After 9/11 - Nancy Eisenberg, PhD, Arizona State University; Roxane Cohen Silver, PhD, University of California, Irvine
- For most children, the psychological consequences of 9/11 were relatively transient, particularly for those who only watched the events unfold on TV. However, 9/11 may have affected American youth in other ways, in terms of their sociopolitical attitudes and their general beliefs about the world. Parents played important roles in shaping their children's responses to 9/11.
- Post disaster Psychological Intervention Since 9/11 - Patricia J. Watson, PhD, UCLA/Dartmouth; Melissa J. Brymer, PhD, UCLA; and George A. Bonanno, PhD, Teacher's College, Columbia University
- The primary focus of early interventions at disaster sites should be to promote a sense of safety and a calm atmosphere, instill hope, and connect victims and survivors with appropriate resources, according to post-9/11 research used to develop guidelines and strategies for the best post-disaster mental health care.

Other articles in the special issue include:
- Intelligence Gathering Post-9/11 - Elizabeth F. Loftus, PhD, University of California, Irvine
- Communicating About the Risks of Terrorism (or Anything Else) - Baruch Fischhoff, PhD, Carnegie Mellon University
- Psychology Out of the Laboratory: The Challenge of Violent Extremism - Jeremy Ginges, PhD, New School for Social Research; Scott Atran, PhD, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Institut; Jean Nicod, University of Michigan and John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Sonya Sachdeva, PhD, and Douglas Medin, PhD, Northwestern University
- Impacts of Psychological Science on National Security Agencies Post-9/11 - Susan E. Brandon, PhD, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Roles of Human Factors and Ergonomics in Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism - Raymond S. Nickerson, PhD, Tufts University
- Intelligent Management of Intelligence Agencies: Beyond Accountability Ping-Pong - Philip E. Tetlock, PhD, and Barbara A. Mellers, PhD, University of Pennsylvania
- What Should We Expect After the Next Attack? - Roxane Cohen Silver, PhD, University of California, Irvine; Baruch Fischhoff, PhD, Carnegie Mellon University

The Killing Of Bin Laden Worsened Americans' Views Of US Muslims

Source: http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/231501.php

Instead of calming fears, the death of Osama bin Laden actually led more Americans to feel threatened by Muslims living in the United States, according to a new nationwide survey. In the weeks following the U.S. military campaign that killed bin Laden, the head of the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, American attitudes toward Muslim Americans took a significant negative shift, results showed.

Americans found Muslims living in the United States more threatening after bin Laden's death, positive perceptions of Muslims plummeted, and those surveyed were less likely to oppose restrictions on Muslim Americans' civil liberties. For example, in the weeks before bin Laden's death, nearly half of respondents described Muslim Americans as "trustworthy" and "peaceful." But only one-third of Americans agreed with these positive terms after the killing. Most of the changes in attitude happened among political liberals and moderates, whose views shifted to become more like those of conservatives, the survey found.

The shift in views can be explained by the fact that bin Laden's death reminded some Americans of why they may fear Muslims in the first place, said Erik Nisbet, assistant professor of communication at Ohio State University, and one of the leaders of the survey project. "The death of bin Laden was a focusing event. There was a lot of news coverage and a lot of

discussion about Islam and Muslims and Muslim Americans," Nisbet said. "The frenzy of media coverage reminded people of terrorism and the Sept. 11 attacks and it primed them to think about Islam in terms of terrorism." In fact, while prior to bin Laden's death only 16 percent of respondents believed a terrorist attack in the United States was likely in the next few months, 40 percent believed an attack was likely after the killing. "That is going to have a negative effect on attitudes," Nisbet said.

The researchers' ability to find out how American attitudes changed after bin Laden's death was accidental, Nisbet said. Nisbet and Ohio State colleague Michelle Ortiz, also an assistant professor of communication, had commissioned the Survey Research Institute of Cornell University and the University of New Hampshire Survey Center to jointly conduct a national telephone poll of Americans beginning in early April. The survey focused on perceptions and attitudes about Muslim Americans. Interviews started on April 7, 2011, and 500 interviews were conducted prior to May 1, when bin Laden was killed. The remaining 341 interviews were conducted following the death. Many of the survey responses changed significantly after the killing, Nisbet said.

After bin Laden's death, 34 percent of Americans surveyed agreed that Muslims living in the United States "increased the likelihood

a terrorist attack." That was up from 27 percent prior to the killing. The percentage of respondents agreeing the Muslims in the United States are supportive of the country dropped from 62 percent to 52 percent. Americans were less likely to oppose restrictions on Muslim American civil liberties after the killing, Nisbet said. For example, public opposition to profiling individuals as potential terrorists based solely on being Muslim dropped from 71 percent to 63 percent. Likewise, opposition to requiring Muslims living in the United to register their whereabouts with the government dropped from two-thirds of respondents to about one-half.

Changes in attitudes were not related just to preventing a possible terrorist attack, but also included attitudes about religious tolerance of Muslims. For example, nearly one in three respondents surveyed after bin Laden's death agreed that "Muslims are mostly responsible for creating the religious tension that exists in the United States today." That was up from about one in five respondents before the killing. Correspondingly, opposition to a nationwide ban on mosque construction in the United States fell to 57 percent from 65 percent. The negative feelings even carried over to personal relationships. The percentage of respondents who said they were unwilling to have a Muslim as a close friend doubled after the death, going from 9 percent to 20 percent. "That's important because research has shown that the best way to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations is through personal contact," Nisbet said. "That won't happen if people avoid contact with Muslim Americans."

Many of the changes in attitudes after Bin Laden's death were almost entirely due to political liberals and moderates changing their opinions about the threat posed by Muslims in the United States, the survey found. The percentage of liberal respondents who agreed

that Muslims in the United States "make America a more dangerous place to live" tripled after bin Laden's death, going from 8 to 24 percent. The percentage of moderates believing this increased from 10 percent to 29 percent.

In contrast, the percentage of conservatives who believed this were essentially unchanged - 30 percent before bin Laden's death and 26 percent following. "Liberals and moderates essentially converged toward conservatives in their attitudes about Muslim Americans," Nisbet said. Nisbet said it is unclear whether these changes in attitudes would last long-term or not. But research suggests these negative feelings can be dangerous even if they are short-lived. "Every time these anti-Muslim feelings are activated by media coverage, it makes them that much easier to get reactivated in the future," Nisbet said. "These feelings and attitudes become more constant the more you experience them."

The telephone survey involved adults in the continental United States, including cell-phone only homes, and was designed to be representative of the U.S. population. All percentages reported here were adjusted to control for differences in the characteristics of survey respondents interviewed before and after bin Laden's death. The researchers controlled for age, gender, race, education, political ideology, whether the respondents were evangelical Christians, and their knowledge about Islam. That means any differences in attitudes between respondents polled before and after the death are not the results of any difference on these personal attributes. In addition to Nisbet and Ortiz, the survey was conducted by Yasamin Miller, director of the Survey Research Institute at Cornell and Andrew Smith, associate professor and director of the University of New Hampshire Survey Center.

DHS unveils new Maritime security strategy
Source:http://urgentcomm.com/networks_and_systems/news/maritime-operations-coordination-plan-20110715/

Earlier this month DHS unveiled its Maritime Operations Coordination plan designed to more efficiently secure the nation's coastlines by increasing coordination and information sharing among agencies.

"As America's maritime first responder, the Coast Guard works closely with our fellow DHS components and security partners to deter and respond to threats in our ports, along our coasts, and in waters of U.S. interest," said

Admiral Robert Papp, the commandant of the Coast Guard. "This plan will combine resources from across DHS to strengthen our ability to protect our nation's global trade and our citizens.

In particular, the new operation plans works to integrate intelligence sharing between the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

John Morton, the head of ICE, echoed Admiral Papp's statements adding that the plan will help agencies to better "disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations who wish to do us harm."

Federal officials say that the new plan recognizes the unique operational challenges of securing the maritime domain and the need for a multilevel approach to security that emphasizes information sharing between federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners.

The release of the strategy comes after Admiral Papp's testimony before the House Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. The admiral testified that the Coast Guard currently uses a layered security and communications plan to protect the nation's 350 ports and 95,000 miles of coast line.

Growing problem in Canada: stolen passports

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/growing-problem-canada-stolen-passports

Canadian passports are under siege, with more than 1,000 of them stolen across the country every month on average, Passport Canada has said. The disclosure was made in the agency's latest annual report, which says 13,077 passports were stolen in fiscal 2009-10. By comparison, only 631 were swiped overseas. Another 47,704 passports were reported lost in Canada. The Montreal Gazette reports that before 2006, about 25,000 passports were reportedly lost or stolen annually. That number jumped to almost 43,000 in 2006-7, coinciding with a surge in demand because of new U.S. passport requirements for Canadian and other Western travelers. By 2008-09, the number of lost or stolen passports reached 53,000, and now it is 60,781. The 60,781 lost and stolen passports in 2009-10 represent

0.3205 percent of the 18,962,745 passports in circulation as of April 2010, Beatrice Fenlon, Passport Canada's spokesperson, told the Gazette.

In 2008-9, the number of passports reported lost or stolen was 53,515, which represents 0.3145 percent of the 17,015,462 passports in circulation as of April 2009.

The year before that, 51,915 of the 15,515,042 passports in circulation were reported lost or stolen, representing 0.3346 percent of the total. The agency says that more than 4.8 million Canadian passports were issued in 2009, a 137 percent increase since 2000-1. Late next year, Passport Canada will begin distributing e-Passports. The e-Passports have biometric and holographic security measures to combat tampering and fraud.

Full-body scanning for the shy

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/full-body-scanning-shy

The Transportation and Security Administration will soon launch Full Body Scanning 2.0 at several New York area airports. Individuals who are shy about or uncomfortable with the detailed image of their bodies that appear on the screeners' computers should welcome the news.

The new software, known as Automated Target Recognition (ATR), will auto-detect items that could pose a potential threat that passengers might be carrying under their clothes. The suspicious items, though, will be shown against a generic outline of a person for all passengers.

PC magazine reports that the new software will be installed at Newark, LaGuardia, and JFK airports by the end of the year. "Our top priority is the safety of the traveling public, and TSA constantly strives to explore and implement new technologies that enhance security and strengthen privacy protections for the traveling public," TSA Administrator John Pistole said in a statement.

TSA successfully tested the new software at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International, Las Vegas McCarran International, and Ronald Reagan Washington National airports, according to the agency. "This is a positive step forward to improve TSA's screening procedures at U.S. airports through increased privacy for individual travelers," said Representative Mike Rogers (R – Alabama), the chair of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security.

The announcement comes in response to fierce criticism over the airport scanners which passengers and privacy groups say are too revealing. Last week, a federal appeals court rejected a lawsuit filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) that argued that the scans violated the Fourth Amendment which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. The group said that the "naked" images are too graphic.

Ginger McCall, EPIC's open government counsel, called TSA's recent announcement a "pretty substantial change in agency policy."

The group wants TSA to go even further and publish the technical specifications of the software, but the agency has declined.

Meanwhile other privacy groups like the Association for Airline Passenger Rights want the agency to stop using the scanners all together.

Brandon Macsata, the executive director of the airline passenger association said, "We feel there are better ways to balance security and privacy."

According to Greg Soule, a spokesman for TSA, the new software will be installed on the full body scanners in "the coming months."

Currently there are roughly 500 body scanners deployed across seventy-eight airports in the United States. The scanners are manufactured by Rapiscan Systems, a division of L-3 Communications and OSI Systems Inc. All new scanners will already come equipped with the technology.

Computational Models And Algorithms Cast Fresh Light On Terrorism In India

Source: http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/231154.php

Recent advances in computer science at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics cast fresh light on terrorism in India, such as the coordinated attacks in Mumbai. Some important conclusions from two forthcoming papers, accepted for publication at the 2011 European Conference on Intelligence Security Informatics and the 2011 Open Source Intelligence Conference in September 2011, suggest that reining in terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), who carried out the devastating Mumbai attacks in Nov. 2008, can be done only with concurrent action by the United States and India and a reduction in US aid to Pakistan.

In order to understand how terrorism from

groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba can be reduced, University of Maryland researchers led by Computer Science Professor V.S. Subrahmanian developed a number of mathematical models including stochastic opponent modeling agents and multi-player game theoretic models. The research team developed studied 5 entities - the US, India, the Pakistani military (including the Inter Services Intelligence agency), the Pakistani civilian

funded by Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency", explained University of Maryland counter-terrorism analyst Aaron Mannes. "The recent court trial in Chicago of two alleged LeT operatives, David Headley and Tahawwur Rana, strongly suggests an ISI hand in the deadly Mumbai terrorist attack in Nov. 2008."

"In addition to the results about trimming financial aid to Pakistan, we also found that

government (not including the military or ISI), and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The researchers looked for Nash equilibria, named after Nobel-prize winning economist John Nash, whose life was immortalized in the Oscar-winning movie, A Beautiful Mind. Intuitively, Nash equilibria specify situations where no entity involved in the game theoretic model can ``do better'' without upsetting another agency. "We did not find a single Nash equilibrium in which LeT exhibits good behavior in which the US expands financial aid to Pakistan," said Subrahmanian, who went on to remark that "This is consistent with the recent decision by the Obama administration to cut $800M in military aid to Pakistan."

Nevertheless, "this would not be sufficient to de-fang groups like LeT that are reportedly

there was not a single Nash equilibrium in which LeT exhibits good behavior in which both the US and India did not concurrently take either covert action against LeT and/or exercise coercive diplomacy toward Pakistan", said John Dickerson, a University of Maryland scientist who is also earning a doctorate at Carnegie-Mellon University. "The results do not imply that the US and India need to coordinate actions - just that the actions need to occur over an overlapping period of time that is sufficiently long to convince both the Pakistani military and the LeT that terrorist actions will not pay", said Subrahmanian.

In addition to researching Lashkar-e-Taiba, the University of Maryland team has also used their data mining algorithms to learn models of the behavior of other terrorist groups in the Indian sub-continent such as Jaish-e-

Mohammed in Pakistan and the Indian Mujahideen - alleged by some to be responsible for the triple bombings in Mumbai that killed over 20 people. "Though it is too early to identify the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, computational models and algorithms can help decision makers shape improved counter-terrorism strategies and policies for threat reduction," said Subrahmanian.

V.S. Subrahmanian; J. Dickerson, A. Mannes, A. Sliva, J. Shakarian. University of Maryland

Gaping Holes in Intelligence on Overseas Terrorists

Source:http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/07/12/report-shows-gaping-holes-in-intel-on-overseas-terrorists/

Fox News has obtained a draft copy of a new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that concludes, a decade after 9/11, gaping holes remain in databases of overseas terrorists as well as in passport security. "The system truly is as strong only as its weakest link," Maine Sen. Susan Collins, the senior Republican on the Senate Homeland Security Committee, told Fox News after reviewing the report. "We have spent literally billions of dollars to increase security, to make sure our watch lists are more complete, to verify documents, but in fact we have to rely to a certain extent on the systems used by other countries."

According to a year-long investigation by the GAO that included travel to Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, many countries have yet to address the chronic problem of fake documents, such as birth certificates, which are a gateway to a genuine passport. Passport security is described as weak with many countries using no security features, such as biometrics, to prevent fraud.

The GAO report, first obtained by Fox News, reads in part:

"Some countries do not have their own database systems with terrorist screening information or access to other countries' terrorist screening information to keep track of biographical and biometric information about individuals who are known or suspected terrorists. Even when countries have terrorist screening information, they may not have reciprocal relationships to share such information or other travel-related information such as airline passenger lists, with other countries, thereby limiting their ability to identify and prevent travel of known or suspected terrorists."

The GAO report also notes widespread corruption means a wink and a nod at some foreign airports will get a suspected terrorist through security.

Pakistan was problematic for investigators. Even with Usama bin Laden's death at his compound near the capital Islamabad, the country remains the base for Al Qaeda's core leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian doctor who replaced the Al Qaeda leader. Yet, Pakistan's ability to track known and suspected terrorists is substandard.

"It is stunning, that Pakistan which is supposed to be our ally in the war against terrorism, does not even share fingerprint data within its own government," Collins told Fox News. "It doesn't share it with other Pakistani law enforcement agencies. That's a real problem."

While information sharing and passport security has improved in the U.S., the disparity overseas remains a serious problem.

"Fraudulent travel documents are the same as weapons to terrorists; they can't carry out their plots without them," Chad Sweet, co-founder of the Chertoff Group, told Fox News.

Sweet, who is a former chief of staff for the Homeland Security Department and once worked for the CIA's Directorate of Operations, says progress is being made overseas, but it has not kept pace with improvements to domestic security.

"On the defensive homeland game, we're probably at an A. If I give us a grade abroad, with our partners, again some of that is out of our control, we are probably closer to a C."

The GAO report will be officially released on Wednesday when the issue is taken up publicly by the Senate Homeland Security Committee. Sen. Joe Lieberman, who chairs the committee, called for an updated approach.

"As part of our efforts to keep terrorists from entering the United States, we provide security assistance to foreign countries where terrorists are likely to begin their travels. Unfortunately

GAO has found miscommunication and overlap on the part of U.S. agencies trying to help our foreign partners," he said. "I urge the administration to update what is now a five-year-old strategy for preventing terrorist travel so that we can work as effectively as possible to keep terrorists out of the country and away from innocent Americans."

Collins told Fox that the issue has taken on more importance because the threat from Al Qaeda's affiliates in Somalia and Yemen is growing.

The Yemeni affiliate, which includes the American Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki among its leadership, was behind the last two major attempts on the U.S. using airplanes. It was also behind the recent threat intelligence that the group was trying to recruit a surgeon to surgically embed explosive devices in suicide bombers. The threat was not described, by U.S. officials, as imminent, but the intelligence was described as credible and another sign the Yemeni affiliate was thinking out of the box.

"What this latest intelligence tells us about surgically implanting explosives is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates will continue to explore all possibilities to defeat the security that we have in place now," Collins explained. "And that is why the gaps that the GAO found are so troubling because inevitably there is going to be yet another attempt and the terrorists eventually are going to get through. We've got to do everything we can to put in place barriers to terrorists traveling to this country."

Securing critical infrastructure: portfolio based approach

Source:http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/securing-critical-infrastructure-portfolio-based-approach

Bryan Ware, the CEO and co-founder of Digital Sandbox, a firm that provides risk analysis and management software and services to the private and public sectors, was recently interviewed by Homeland Security NewsWire's executive editor Eugene Chow; Ware discusses a portfolio based approach to securing critical infrastructure, what the government can do better to protect critical assets, and the dangers of taking a "Whack-a-Mole" tactic with national security threats

Homeland Security NewsWire: To start off with a broader question, what is the state of preparedness of our national critical infrastructure? Do the bulk of our nation's critical infrastructure operators have plans in place in the event of a large natural disaster or attack?

Bryan Ware: I think that critical infrastructure providers do have plans, but these plans are more in their business interest and may not necessarily be in the national security interest. Sometimes it may be obvious when the two interests are aligned, but I do not think that is the case all the time.

HSNW: The private sector controls the majority of critical infrastructure – electrical grids, financial markets, nuclear reactors – is there buy-in and support for the government's efforts to secure these resources from the private sector? Are they making moves independently or does the government need to do more to partner and incentivize them?

BW: I think the government definitely needs to do more, but I think the hard part is figuring out what the government should do and can do. Traditionally, or at least to date, the word partnering is thrown around a lot. I do not think we have arrived at any kind of meaningful partnership in many of the critical infrastructure sectors.

Incentivizing behavior is the direction I would like to see things go, but in general, of the threats and risks to critical infrastructure that we are concerned about, some of them are easy to see while others are hard to prove. The more emerging those threats or risks may be, the harder it is to build a business case. This is where the government needs to be able to provide incentives to help those critical infrastructure providers to develop that business case.

*HSNW***:** To delve a bit deeper into that, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) heavily emphasizes partnering with the private sector. Is the government a good partner? What can they do to be better a partner for the private sector?

BW: In terms of what the government can really do, I would like to see more effective ways for information to be provided to critical infrastructure owners and operators. I would also like to see management from a portfolio standpoint where we can collaborate overall on the systems of assets. Finally, I would like to see DHS provide tools that the owners and operators could actually use to manage their risks.

*HSNW***:** What kinds of tools are you referring to? Can you elaborate on that a bit more?

*BW***:** When I say tools, I think of ways that businesses can manage all of their critical infrastructure, the information about threats to that critical infrastructure, how prepared they are, and where the gaps in their preparedness are. When I think of that, I think of software tools. This has to go from an ad-hoc meeting driven and speech driven discipline into part of day to day operations. Think of enterprise resource planning (ERP), every business and critical infrastructure operator has core systems for managing the enterprise. We need to make this critical infrastructure protection a part of that in its own way. It is like having ERP for risk management and ERP for homeland security.

There has certainly been a lot of investment that has been made at DHS with this system as a tool, but they are very much internal and they are kind of fractured. I think exposing them, trying to figure out how to leverage industry practices, and tie DHS and industry together more closely would be a very exciting development.

*HSNW***:** At the Government Security conference in March, you outlined a very interesting approach to risk management and infrastructure protection, likening it to managing a shifting portfolio of risks. Can you elaborate on that?

*BW***:** When you think about a big piece of critical infrastructure, it is easy to imagine sending some guys out, doing a security assessment, and having a plan for that particular asset that says what you are going to do in the case of a particular event. What is challenging though is when you have a lot of assets that you are supposed to protect. Take for instance, the chemical sector or the financial services sector as a whole or a particular business if their assets are distributed around the country or the world – that is a lot of assets and when you think about all the threats that could yield some kind a catastrophic event. These threats range from natural hazards like hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes – and we are seeing plenty of those in the Mid-West – to terrorism scenarios.

When you look at all of those different threats and hazards against all those different types of assets and you look at the combinations and scenarios – which ones are more likely to happen, which assets are more vulnerable to different types of events, and which ones would drive greater consequences both from a business standpoint and from a homeland security stand point – in my mind, there is no other way to look at that than with a portfolio approach. In particular, you need a portfolio of assets that you can slice and dice by geography, critical infrastructure type, sectors, vulnerabilities, or by the ones that would produce the greatest consequences. You would also need to have a portfolio of threats with information on the likelihood of the different types of things to happen, but you also need to know the ones that may not be very likely but would have completely unacceptable consequences.

From those portfolios, and only from those portfolios, can you take a strategic risk management approach where you say, "This is where I am going to focus my priorities on, these threats I think are the most likely while these are the most likely to disrupt us, and these critical infrastructure and these key resources are most essential to maintaining the national economy, the national defense," – or whatever your goal is.

HSNW: It seems that this portfolio is real time and shifting where it is constantly adjusting to the threats that are emerging on the horizon. Is such an approach feasible given that there are so many decentralized elements and a finite amount of resources? Is it realistic that companies can actually shift resources and focus in time to respond to these emerging threats?

BW: Yes it is. We already treat properties with this portfolio idea in the same way people treat their stocks, bonds, and investments. All of these are very portfolio driven because whenever you have too many things you have to go with that kind of approach.

Everything we advocate for is software driven, so as things change you are able to immediately update your risk. Outside of cyber, risk is not changing every minute like the stock market is. Instead what we see in practice is that assets do change – they take on new missions, buildings or operations may shut down and move to a new place, or a new security assessment is done that lends some additional insight into particular vulnerabilities and some additional counter-measures are put in place. The threat dynamic and the threat environment also change – new threats emerge and there are alerts and warnings.

It is practical without a lot of manpower and resources to secure all these critical assets if you have a portfolio management system that is able to track all those variables at the same time to see how your risk is changing. The portfolio approach also helps to judge risk not just in the present, but also to see where things are going in the future so you can build a long term strategy or plan to secure your enterprise.

HSNW: Naturally, from the federal perspective there is going to be a certain perspective or priority that differs from local and state governments. How do you reconcile these differences to ensure that all sides are working together and have unity of effort?

BW: This is a really important point and I think this is a point that is lost on federal agencies and their representatives almost all the time. What is important to the federal government is not necessarily the thing that is considered important to a local government and this holds true for industries as well.

The easiest example to draw out is from the defense industrial base. There could be a manufacturer of a very specific kind of composite chemical that is needed for armor. They may not employ a whole lot of people or drive a lot of revenue for a community, but it is nationally important to the defense mission as it is a critical supplier that would have a huge impact on the DOD's abilities. To local authorities it could be one of their smaller businesses, one that they may not even know about, so making it critical to them is difficult to imagine.

The way that you balance this is you have to separate the concept, what we call the "domain model," from the things that a business, local government, or federal agency thinks are important. In other words, you have to separate individual value judgments from the facts. The facts are it has an address, a number of employees, it occupies a certain part of the infrastructure taxonomy that it lives in, and it has an annual revenue. That whole series of attributes is factual data regardless of your opinion or your belief about it.From there, you can compile this data and then apply your judgment from your perspective. In practice those same assets may look different to the DHS than they do to a city, a state, or a corporation, but we can all agree and share information on the same particular set of assets.

HSNW: In the wake of the massive 11 March earthquake that struck Japan, have you noticed any changes in the mindsets of critical infrastructure operators in terms of having plans in place?

BW: I still think it is a still a little too early to tell what is happening in terms of the fallout from those events. Companies are only starting to explore ways to understand, manage, and plan for catastrophic events in the aftermath of Japan.

But, one of the things that is very interesting from the U.S. perspective is we saw plants in the United States idling because of critical commodities or products that they could only get from Japan. I can imagine a case in which an individual auto manufacturing plant in Tennessee could have the best continuity plans with redundant power, good security, and good operational controls to make sure that the plant continues to operate, but if those supplies are not coming in the front door, the plant will idle.

These concerns are very similar to what the cyber world is about as they are many steps removed from what a business can begin to manage and plan for. In other words, like in cyber, your vulnerabilities may not be about your defenses or your critical resources, but things that are many degrees outside of your static control that may impact you.

HSNW: Speaking of cyber, what are your thoughts on the Obama administration's new cybersecurity plan? In particular, what are your thoughts on the proposed provision of having government oversight where DHS reviews a company's cybersecurity plan and will actually penalize them if it is found to be inadequate?

BW: As I read through the plan and think about it, I wonder how it is going to be implemented. I think that implementation is always a challenge with these plans. I do not know that the government feels like it is doing the best job at implementing its own cybersecurity plans and securing its own assets, so how it will look at businesses and their cybersecurity plans will be a big challenge.

This is a new frontier and I like that there is leadership. Every day you read about major intrusions into the networks of large companies that you would think are very serious and have significant capabilities. We are seeing a very hostile environment out there and we do not really have good technology, business practices, standards, or the penalties to go along with it.

I think we need to translate a lot of this stuff into business terms. Businesses are going to have business impacts and we need to separate those business impacts from national security impacts. The government needs to focus first on the things that they need to do to protect cyberspace from a national security standpoint.

HSNW: Of late the majority of attention seems to be focused on cybersecurity and cyber threats to critical infrastructure, but what element of critical infrastructure do you see as being overlooked that needs some attention?

BW: That is a hard question. I think we have a very broad economy and all of the different types of infrastructure yield different targets from a terrorism or natural catastrophe standpoint, so the focus has to be broad and holistic. This is why I am such an advocate of looking broadly at large portfolios and not trying to focus exclusively on the most critical asset or the most critical asset in a particular sector.

You have to be careful when you say "Which of the industry or sector should we be most focused on?" because if you do that you run into a game of "Whack-a-Mole" where all of a sudden something pops up and you divert your focus to the chemical sector or the nuclear sector.

What we are seeing now is threats on urban rail from the intelligence seized from the bin Laden compound. Was urban rail a critical priority before? I am not so sure it was if you look at funding and other things. Not so long ago, we became very focused on large hotels because the Mumbai attacks and the realization that we had those same kind of assets here.

So, again, my belief is we need to be prioritizing all of our threats, vulnerabilities, consequences across all of the industry sectors in a portfolio based approach so we are able to react quickly to something new and urgent, but still have a strategic program where we are constantly trying to increase the depth and breadth of our knowledge about our assets.

*HS/***W:** Finally to wrap things up, if you were responsible for NIPP and had a clichéd magic wand, what would be the first three things you would do to secure critical infrastructure?

BW: I come at this question from the perspective of a relatively focused company, so the way we would look at it is I would first like to see a real program to partner with industry and state and local governments to build a comprehensive library or portfolio of the critical assets that we are supposed to protect. The second thing I would do is gather that data and analyze it so we can all agree on what our national priorities are. We cannot secure everything as well as we would like to, so we need to prioritize where we want to spend our resources. From there we can develop a long term resource plan for how we are going to take care of those vulnerabilities, harden those facilities, and how we are going to deal with those threats that we face overall.

So for me, my three actions would be to set up a system where we bring everyone together, prioritize all those things that we are trying to protect, and based on those priorities set out on a real risk management program. I do not know how much of it is defenses, cyber, or counter-surveillance programs because I do not think we have put together a comprehensive look across the country of what it is we are trying to do yet.

Getting Bin Laden
What happened that night in Abbottabad.
By Nicholas Schmidle (The New Yorker Magazine)
Source: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle

No American was yet inside the residential part of the compound. The operatives had barely been on target for a minute, and the mission was already veering off course. Shortly after eleven o'clock on the night of May 1st, two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters lifted off from Jalalabad Air Field, in eastern Afghanistan, and embarked on a covert mission into Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. Inside the aircraft were twenty-three Navy SEALs from Team Six, which is officially known as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or DEVGRU. A Pakistani-American translator, whom I will call Ahmed, and a dog named Cairo—a Belgian Malinois—were also aboard. It was a moonless evening, and the helicopters' pilots, wearing night-vision goggles, flew without lights over mountains that straddle the border with Pakistan. Radio communications were kept to a minimum, and an eerie calm settled inside the aircraft.

Fifteen minutes later, the helicopters ducked into an alpine valley and slipped, undetected, into Pakistani airspace. For more than sixty years, Pakistan's military has maintained a state of high alert against its eastern neighbor, India. Because of this obsession, Pakistan's "principal air defenses are all pointing east," Shuja Nawaz, an expert on the Pakistani Army and the author of "Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within," told me. Senior

defense and Administration officials concur with this assessment, but a Pakistani senior military official, whom I reached at his office, in Rawalpindi, disagreed. "No one leaves their borders unattended," he said. Though he declined to elaborate on the location or orientation of Pakistan's radars—"It's not where the radars are or aren't"—he said that the American infiltration was the result of "technological gaps we have vis-à-vis the U.S." The Black Hawks, each of which had two pilots and a crewman from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or the Night Stalkers, had been modified to mask heat, noise, and movement; the copters' exteriors had sharp, flat angles and were covered with radar-dampening "skin."

The SEALs' destination was a house in the small city of Abbottabad, which is about a hundred and twenty miles across the Pakistan border. Situated north of Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, Abbottabad is in the foothills of the Pir Panjal Range, and is popular in the summertime with families seeking relief from the blistering heat farther south. Founded in 1853 by a British major named James Abbott, the city became the home of a prestigious military academy after the creation of Pakistan, in 1947. According to information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency, bin Laden was holed up on the third floor of a house in a one-

acre compound just off Kakul Road in Bilal Town, a middle-class neighborhood less than a mile from the entrance to the academy. If all went according to plan, the SEALs would drop from the helicopters into the compound, overpower bin Laden's guards, shoot and kill him at close range, and then take the corpse back to Afghanistan.

The helicopters traversed Mohmand, one of Pakistan's seven tribal areas, skirted the north of Peshawar, and continued due east. The commander of DEVGRU's Red Squadron,

laminated gridded map of the compound. In another pocket was a booklet with photographs and physical descriptions of the people suspected of being inside. He wore a noise-cancelling headset, which blocked out nearly everything besides his heartbeat.

During the ninety-minute helicopter flight, James and his teammates rehearsed the operation in their heads. Since the autumn of 2001, they had rotated through Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa, at a brutal pace. At least three of the SEALs had

whom I will call James, sat on the floor, squeezed among ten other SEALs, Ahmed, and Cairo. (The names of all the covert operators mentioned in this story have been changed.) James, a broad-chested man in his late thirties, does not have the lithe swimmer's frame that one might expect of a SEAL—he is built more like a discus thrower. That night, he wore a shirt and trousers in Desert Digital Camouflage, and carried a silenced Sig Sauer P226 pistol, along with extra ammunition; a CamelBak, for hydration; and gel shots, for endurance. He held a short-barrel, silenced M4 rifle. (Others SEALs had chosen the Heckler & Koch MP7.) A "blowout kit," for treating field trauma, was tucked into the small of James's back. Stuffed into one of his pockets was a

participated in the sniper operation off the coast of Somalia, in April, 2009, that freed Richard Phillips, the captain of the Maersk Alabama, and left three pirates dead. In October, 2010, a DEVGRU team attempted to rescue Linda Norgrove, a Scottish aid worker who had been kidnapped in eastern Afghanistan by the Taliban. During a raid of a Taliban hideout, a SEAL tossed a grenade at an insurgent, not realizing that Norgrove was nearby. She died from the blast. The mistake haunted the SEALs who had been involved; three of them were subsequently expelled from DEVGRU.

The Abbottabad raid was not DEVGRU's maiden venture into Pakistan, either. The team had surreptitiously entered the country on ten

to twelve previous occasions, according to a special-operations officer who is deeply familiar with the bin Laden raid. Most of those missions were forays into North and South Waziristan, where many military and intelligence analysts had thought that bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders were hiding. (Only one such operation—the September, 2008, raid of Angoor Ada, a village in South Waziristan—has been widely reported.) Abbottabad was, by far, the farthest that DEVGRU had ventured into Pakistani territory. It also represented the team's first serious attempt since late 2001 at killing "Crankshaft"—the target name that the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, had given bin Laden. Since escaping that winter during a battle in the Tora Bora region of eastern Afghanistan, bin Laden had defied American efforts to trace him. Indeed, it remains unclear how he ended up living in Abbottabad.

Forty-five minutes after the Black Hawks departed, four MH-47 Chinooks launched from the same runway in Jalalabad. Two of them flew to the border, staying on the Afghan side; the other two proceeded into Pakistan. Deploying four Chinooks was a last-minute decision made after President Barack Obama said he wanted to feel assured that the Americans could "fight their way out of Pakistan." Twenty-five additional SEALs from DEVGRU, pulled from a squadron stationed in Afghanistan, sat in the Chinooks that remained at the border; this "quick-reaction force" would be called into action only if the mission went seriously wrong. The third and fourth Chinooks were each outfitted with a pair of M134 Miniguns. They followed the Black Hawks' initial flight path but landed at a predetermined point on a dry riverbed in a wide, unpopulated valley in northwest Pakistan. The nearest house was half a mile away. On the ground, the copters' rotors were kept whirring while operatives monitored the surrounding hills for encroaching Pakistani helicopters or fighter jets. One of the Chinooks was carrying fuel bladders, in case the other aircraft needed to refill their tanks.

Meanwhile, the two Black Hawks were quickly approaching Abbottabad from the northwest, hiding behind the mountains on the northernmost edge of the city. Then the pilots banked right and went south along a ridge that marks Abbottabad's eastern perimeter. When those hills tapered off, the pilots curled right again, toward the city center, and made their final approach.

During the next four minutes, the interior of the Black Hawks rustled alive with the metallic cough of rounds being chambered. Mark, a master chief petty officer and the ranking noncommissioned officer on the operation, crouched on one knee beside the open door of the lead helicopter. He and the eleven other SEALs on "helo one," who were wearing gloves and had on night-vision goggles, were preparing to fast-rope into bin Laden's yard. They waited for the crew chief to give the signal to throw the rope. But, as the pilot passed over the compound, pulled into a high hover, and began lowering the aircraft, he felt the Black Hawk getting away from him. He sensed that they were going to crash.

One month before the 2008 Presidential election, Obama, then a senator from Illinois, squared off in a debate against John McCain in an arena at Belmont University, in Nashville. A woman in the audience asked Obama if he would be willing to pursue Al Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan, even if that meant invading an ally nation. He replied, "If we have Osama bin Laden in our sights and the Pakistani government is unable, or unwilling, to take them out, then I think that we have to act and we will take them out. We will kill bin Laden. We will crush Al Qaeda. That has to be our biggest national-security priority." McCain, who often criticized Obama for his naïveté on foreign-policy matters, characterized the promise as foolish, saying, "I'm not going to telegraph my punches."

Four months after Obama entered the White House, Leon Panetta, the director of the C.I.A., briefed the President on the agency's latest programs and initiatives for tracking bin Laden. Obama was unimpressed. In June, 2009, he drafted a memo instructing Panetta to create a "detailed operation plan" for finding the Al Qaeda leader and to "ensure that we have expended every effort." Most notably, the President intensified the C.I.A.'s classified drone program; there were more missile strikes inside Pakistan during Obama's first year in office than in George W. Bush's eight. The terrorists swiftly registered the impact: that July, CBS reported that a recent Al Qaeda communiqué had referred to "brave commanders" who had been "snatched away" and to "so many hidden homes [which] have been levelled." The document blamed the "very

grave" situation on spies who had "spread throughout the land like locusts." Nevertheless, bin Laden's trail remained cold.

In August, 2010, Panetta returned to the White House with better news. C.I.A. analysts believed that they had pinpointed bin Laden's courier, a man in his early thirties named Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Kuwaiti drove a white S.U.V. whose spare-tire cover was emblazoned with an image of a white rhino. The C.I.A. began tracking the vehicle. One day, a satellite captured images of the S.U.V. pulling into a large concrete compound in Abbottabad. Agents, determining that Kuwaiti was living there, used aerial surveillance to keep watch on the compound, which consisted of a three-story main house, a guesthouse, and a few outbuildings. They observed that residents of the compound burned their trash, instead of putting it out for collection, and concluded that the compound lacked a phone or an Internet connection. Kuwaiti and his brother came and went, but another man, living on the third floor, never left. When this third individual did venture outside, he stayed behind the compound's walls. Some analysts speculated that the third man was bin Laden, and the agency dubbed him the Pacer.

Obama, though excited, was not yet prepared to order military action. John Brennan, Obama's counterterrorism adviser, told me that the President's advisers began an "interrogation of the data, to see if, by that interrogation, you're going to disprove the theory that bin Laden was there." The C.I.A. intensified its intelligence-collection efforts, and, according to a recent report in the Guardian, a physician working for the agency conducted an immunization drive in Abbottabad, in the hope of acquiring DNA samples from bin Laden's children. (No one in the compound ultimately received any immunizations.)

In late 2010, Obama ordered Panetta to begin exploring options for a military strike on the compound. Panetta contacted Vice-Admiral Bill McRaven, the SEAL in charge of JSOC. Traditionally, the Army has dominated the special-operations community, but in recent years the SEALs have become a more prominent presence; McRaven's boss at the time of the raid, Eric Olson—the head of Special Operations Command, or SOCOM—is a Navy admiral who used to be a commander of DEVGRU. In January, 2011, McRaven

asked a JSOC official named Brian, who had previously been a DEVGRU deputy commander, to present a raid plan. The next month, Brian, who has the all-American look of a high-school quarterback, moved into an unmarked office on the first floor of the C.I.A.'s printing plant, in Langley, Virginia. Brian covered the walls of the office with topographical maps and satellite images of the Abbottabad compound. He and half a dozen JSOC officers were formally attached to the Pakistan/Afghanistan department of the C.I.A.'s Counterterrorism Center, but in practice they operated on their own. A senior counterterrorism official who visited the JSOC redoubt described it as an enclave of unusual secrecy and discretion. "Everything they were working on was closely held," the official said.

The relationship between special-operations units and the C.I.A. dates back to the Vietnam War. But the line between the two communities has increasingly blurred as C.I.A. officers and military personnel have encountered one another on multiple tours of Iraq and Afghanistan. "These people grew up together," a senior Defense Department official told me. "We are in each other's systems, we speak each other's languages." (Exemplifying this trend, General David H. Petraeus, the former commanding general in Iraq and Afghanistan, is now the incoming head of the C.I.A., and Panetta has taken over the Department of Defense.) The bin Laden mission—plotted at C.I.A. headquarters and authorized under C.I.A. legal statutes but conducted by Navy DEVGRU operators—brought the coöperation between the agency and the Pentagon to an even higher level. John Radsan, a former assistant general counsel at the C.I.A., said that the Abbottabad raid amounted to "a complete incorporation of JSOC into a C.I.A. operation."

On March 14th, Obama called his national-security advisers into the White House Situation Room and reviewed a spreadsheet listing possible courses of action against the Abbottabad compound. Most were variations of either a JSOC raid or an airstrike. Some versions included coöperating with the Pakistani military; some did not. Obama decided against informing or working with Pakistan. "There was a real lack of confidence that the Pakistanis could keep this secret for more than a nanosecond," a senior adviser to the President told me. At the end of the

meeting, Obama instructed McRaven to proceed with planning the raid.

Brian invited James, the commander of DEVGRU's Red Squadron, and Mark, the master chief petty officer, to join him at C.I.A. headquarters. They spent the next two and a half weeks considering ways to get inside bin Laden's house. One option entailed flying helicopters to a spot outside Abbottabad and letting the team sneak into the city on foot. The risk of detection was high, however, and the SEALs would be tired by a long run to the compound. The planners had contemplated tunnelling in—or, at least, the possibility that bin Laden might tunnel out. But images provided by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency showed that there was standing water in the vicinity, suggesting that the compound sat in a flood basin. The water table was probably just below the surface, making tunnels highly unlikely. Eventually, the planners agreed that it made the most sense to fly directly into the compound. "Special operations is about doing what's not expected, and probably the least expected thing here was that a helicopter would come in, drop guys on the roof, and land in the yard," the special-operations officer said.

On March 29th, McRaven brought the plan to Obama. The President's military advisers were divided. Some supported a raid, some an airstrike, and others wanted to hold off until the intelligence improved. Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, was one of the most outspoken opponents of a helicopter assault. Gates reminded his colleagues that he had been in the Situation Room of the Carter White House when military officials presented Eagle Claw—the 1980 Delta Force operation that aimed at rescuing American hostages in Tehran but resulted in a disastrous collision in the Iranian desert, killing eight American soldiers. "They said that was a pretty good idea, too," Gates warned. He and General James Cartwright, the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs, favored an airstrike by B-2 Spirit bombers. That option would avoid the risk of having American boots on the ground in Pakistan. But the Air Force then calculated that a payload of thirty-two smart bombs, each weighing two thousand pounds, would be required to penetrate thirty feet below ground, insuring that any bunkers would collapse. "That much ordnance going off would be the equivalent of an earthquake," Cartwright told

me. The prospect of flattening a Pakistani city made Obama pause. He shelved the B-2 option and directed McRaven to start rehearsing the raid.

Brian, James, and Mark selected a team of two dozen SEALs from Red Squadron and told them to report to a densely forested site in North Carolina for a training exercise on April 10th. (Red Squadron is one of four squadrons in DEVGRU, which has about three hundred operators in all.) None of the SEALs, besides James and Mark, were aware of the C.I.A. intelligence on bin Laden's compound until a lieutenant commander walked into an office at the site. He found a two-star Army general from JSOC headquarters seated at a conference table with Brian, James, Mark, and several analysts from the C.I.A. This obviously wasn't a training exercise. The lieutenant commander was promptly "read in." A replica of the compound had been built at the site, with walls and chain-link fencing marking the layout of the compound. The team spent the next five days practicing maneuvers.

On April 18th, the DEVGRU squad flew to Nevada for another week of rehearsals. The practice site was a large government-owned stretch of desert with an elevation equivalent to the area surrounding Abbottabad. An extant building served as bin Laden's house. Aircrews plotted out a path that paralleled the flight from Jalalabad to Abbottabad. Each night after sundown, drills commenced. Twelve SEALs, including Mark, boarded helo one. Eleven SEALs, Ahmed, and Cairo boarded helo two. The pilots flew in the dark, arrived at the simulated compound, and settled into a hover while the SEALs fast-roped down. Not everyone on the team was accustomed to helicopter assaults. Ahmed had been pulled from a desk job for the mission and had never descended a fast rope. He quickly learned the technique.

The assault plan was now honed. Helo one was to hover over the yard, drop two fast ropes, and let all twelve SEALs slide down into the yard. Helo two would fly to the northeast corner of the compound and let out Ahmed, Cairo, and four SEALs, who would monitor the perimeter of the building. The copter would then hover over the house, and James and the remaining six SEALs would shimmy down to the roof. As long as everything was cordial, Ahmed would hold curious neighbors at bay. The SEALs and the dog could assist more

aggressively, if needed. Then, if bin Laden was proving difficult to find, Cairo could be sent into the house to search for false walls or hidden doors. "This wasn't a hard op," the special-operations officer told me. "It would be like hitting a target in McLean"—the upscale Virginia suburb of Washington, D.C.

A planeload of guests arrived on the night of April 21st. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, along with Olson and McRaven, sat with C.I.A. personnel in a hangar as Brian, James, Mark, and the pilots presented a brief on the raid, which had been named Operation Neptune's Spear. Despite JSOC's lead role in Neptune's Spear, the mission officially remained a C.I.A. covert operation. The covert approach allowed the White House to hide its involvement, if necessary. As the counterterrorism official put it recently, "If you land and everybody is out on a milk run, then you get the hell out and no one knows." After describing the operation, the briefers fielded questions: What if a mob surrounded the compound? Were the SEALs prepared to shoot civilians? Olson, who received the Silver Star for valor during the 1993 "Black Hawk Down" episode, in Mogadishu, Somalia, worried that it could be politically catastrophic if a U.S. helicopter were shot down inside Pakistani territory. After an hour or so of questioning, the senior officers and intelligence analysts returned to Washington. Two days later, the SEALs flew back to Dam Neck, their base in Virginia.

On the night of Tuesday, April 26th, the SEAL team boarded a Boeing C-17 Globemaster at Naval Air Station Oceana, a few miles from Dam Neck. After a refuelling stop at Ramstein Air Base, in Germany, the C-17 continued to Bagram Airfield, north of Kabul. The SEALs spent a night in Bagram and moved to Jalalabad on Wednesday.

That day in Washington, Panetta convened more than a dozen senior C.I.A. officials and analysts for a final preparatory meeting. Panetta asked the participants, one by one, to declare how confident they were that bin Laden was inside the Abbottabad compound. The counterterrorism official told me that the percentages "ranged from forty per cent to ninety or ninety-five per cent," and added, "This was a circumstantial case."

Panetta was mindful of the analysts' doubts, but he believed that the intelligence was better than anything that the C.I.A. had gathered on bin Laden since his flight from Tora Bora. Late on Thursday afternoon, Panetta and the rest of the national-security team met with the President. For the next few nights, there would be virtually no moonlight over Abbottabad—the ideal condition for a raid. After that, it would be another month until the lunar cycle was in its darkest phase. Several analysts from the National Counterterrorism Center were invited to critique the C.I.A.'s analysis; their confidence in the intelligence ranged between forty and sixty per cent. The center's director, Michael Leiter, said that it would be preferable to wait for stronger confirmation of bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad. Yet, as Ben Rhodes, a deputy national-security adviser, put it to me recently, the longer things dragged on, the greater the risk of a leak, "which would have upended the thing." Obama adjourned the meeting just after 7 P.M. and said that he would sleep on it.

The next morning, the President met in the Map Room with Tom Donilon, his national-security adviser, Denis McDonough, a deputy adviser, and Brennan. Obama had decided to go with a DEVGRU assault, with McRaven choosing the night. It was too late for a Friday attack, and on Saturday there was excessive cloud cover. On Saturday afternoon, McRaven and Obama spoke on the phone, and McRaven said that the raid would occur on Sunday night. "Godspeed to you and your forces," Obama told him. "Please pass on to them my personal thanks for their service and the message that I personally will be following this mission very closely."

On the morning of Sunday, May 1st, White House officials cancelled scheduled visits, ordered sandwich platters from Costco, and transformed the Situation Room into a war room. At eleven o'clock, Obama's top advisers began gathering around a large conference table. A video link connected them to Panetta, at C.I.A. headquarters, and McRaven, in Afghanistan. (There were at least two other command centers, one inside the Pentagon and one inside the American Embassy in Islamabad.)

Brigadier General Marshall Webb, an assistant commander of JSOC, took a seat at the end of a lacquered table in a small adjoining office and turned on his laptop. He opened multiple chat windows that kept him, and the White House, connected with the other command teams. The office where Webb sat had the only

video feed in the White House showing real-time footage of the target, which was being shot by an unarmed RQ 170 drone flying more than fifteen thousand feet above Abbottabad. The JSOC planners, determined to keep the operation as secret as possible, had decided against using additional fighters or bombers. "It just wasn't worth it," the special-operations officer told me. The SEALs were on their own.

Obama returned to the White House at two o'clock, after playing nine holes of golf at Andrews Air Force Base. The Black Hawks departed from Jalalabad thirty minutes later. Just before four o'clock, Panetta announced to the group in the Situation Room that the helicopters were approaching Abbottabad. Obama stood up. "I need to watch this," he said, stepping across the hall into the small office and taking a seat alongside Webb. Vice-President Joseph Biden, Secretary Gates, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton followed him, as did anyone else who could fit into the office. On the office's modestly sized LCD screen, helo one—grainy and black-and-white—appeared above the compound, then promptly ran into trouble.

When the helicopter began getting away from the pilot, he pulled back on the cyclic, which controls the pitch of the rotor blades, only to find the aircraft unresponsive. The high walls of the compound and the warm temperatures had caused the Black Hawk to descend inside its own rotor wash—a hazardous aerodynamic situation known as "settling with power." In North Carolina, this potential problem had not become apparent, because the chain-link fencing used in rehearsals had allowed air to flow freely. A former helicopter pilot with extensive special-operations experience said of the pilot's situation, "It's pretty spooky—I've been in it myself. The only way to get out of it is to push the cyclic forward and fly out of this vertical silo you're dropping through. That solution requires altitude. If you're settling with power at two thousand feet, you've got plenty of time to recover. If you're settling with power at fifty feet, you're going to hit the ground."

The pilot scrapped the plan to fast-rope and focussed on getting the aircraft down. He aimed for an animal pen in the western section of the compound. The SEALs on board braced themselves as the tail rotor swung around, scraping the security wall. The pilot jammed the nose forward to drive it into the dirt and prevent his aircraft from rolling onto its side.

Cows, chickens, and rabbits scurried. With the Black Hawk pitched at a forty-five-degree angle astride the wall, the crew sent a distress call to the idling Chinooks.

James and the SEALs in helo two watched all this while hovering over the compound's northeast corner. The second pilot, unsure whether his colleagues were taking fire or experiencing mechanical problems, ditched his plan to hover over the roof. Instead, he landed in a grassy field across the street from the house.

No American was yet inside the residential part of the compound. Mark and his team were inside a downed helicopter at one corner, while James and his team were at the opposite end. The teams had barely been on target for a minute, and the mission was already veering off course.

> *"Eternity is defined as the time between when you see something go awry and that first voice report," the special-operations officer said. The officials in Washington viewed the aerial footage and waited anxiously to hear a military communication. The senior adviser to the President compared the experience to watching "the climax of a movie."*

After a few minutes, the twelve SEALs inside helo one recovered their bearings and calmly relayed on the radio that they were proceeding with the raid. They had conducted so many operations over the past nine years that few things caught them off guard. In the months after the raid, the media have frequently suggested that the Abbottabad operation was as challenging as Operation Eagle Claw and the "Black Hawk Down" incident, but the senior Defense Department official told me that "this was not one of three missions. This was one of almost two thousand missions that have been conducted over the last couple of years, night after night." He likened the routine of evening raids to "mowing the lawn." On the night of May 1st alone, special-operations forces based in Afghanistan conducted twelve other missions; according to the official, those operations captured or killed between fifteen and twenty targets. "Most of the missions take off and go left," he said. "This one took off and went right."

Minutes after hitting the ground, Mark and the other team members began streaming out the side doors of helo one. Mud sucked at their

boots as they ran alongside a ten-foot-high wall that enclosed the animal pen. A three-man demolition unit hustled ahead to the pen's closed metal gate, reached into bags containing explosives, and placed C-4 charges on the hinges. After a loud bang, the door fell open. The nine other SEALs rushed forward, ending up in an alleylike driveway with their backs to the house's main entrance. They moved down the alley, silenced rifles pressed against their shoulders. Mark hung toward the rear as he established radio communications with the other team. At the end of the driveway, the Americans blew through yet another locked gate and stepped into a courtyard facing the guesthouse, where Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, bin Laden's courier, lived with his wife and four children.

Three SEALs in front broke off to clear the guesthouse as the remaining nine blasted through another gate and entered an inner courtyard, which faced the main house. When the smaller unit rounded the corner to face the doors of the guesthouse, they spotted Kuwaiti running inside to warn his wife and children. The Americans' night-vision goggles cast the scene in pixellated shades of emerald green. Kuwaiti, wearing a white shalwar kameez, had grabbed a weapon and was coming back outside when the SEALs opened fire and killed him.

The nine other SEALs, including Mark, formed three-man units for clearing the inner courtyard. The Americans suspected that several more men were in the house: Kuwaiti's thirty-three-year-old brother, Abrar; bin Laden's sons Hamza and Khalid; and bin Laden himself. One SEAL unit had no sooner trod on the paved patio at the house's front entrance when Abrar—a stocky, mustachioed man in a cream-colored shalwar kameez—appeared with an AK-47. He was shot in the chest and killed, as was his wife, Bushra, who was standing, unarmed, beside him.

Outside the compound's walls, Ahmed, the translator, patrolled the dirt road in front of bin Laden's house, as if he were a plainclothes Pakistani police officer. He looked the part, wearing a shalwar kameez atop a flak jacket. He, the dog Cairo, and four SEALs were responsible for closing off the perimeter of the house while James and six other SEALs—the contingent that was supposed to have dropped onto the roof—moved inside. For the team patrolling the perimeter, the first fifteen minutes

passed without incident. Neighbors undoubtedly heard the low-flying helicopters, the sound of one crashing, and the sporadic explosions and gunfire that ensued, but nobody came outside. One local took note of the tumult in a Twitter post: "Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 1 AM (is a rare event)."

Eventually, a few curious Pakistanis approached to inquire about the commotion on the other side of the wall. "Go back to your houses," Ahmed said, in Pashto, as Cairo stood watch. "There is a security operation under way." The locals went home, none of them suspecting that they had talked to an American. When journalists descended on Bilal Town in the coming days, one resident told a reporter, "I saw soldiers emerging from the helicopters and advancing toward the house. Some of them instructed us in chaste Pashto to turn off the lights and stay inside."

Meanwhile, James, the squadron commander, had breached one wall, crossed a section of the yard covered with trellises, breached a second wall, and joined up with the SEALs from helo one, who were entering the ground floor of the house. What happened next is not precisely clear. "I can tell you that there was a time period of almost twenty to twenty-five minutes where we really didn't know just exactly what was going on," Panetta said later, on "PBS NewsHour."

Until this moment, the operation had been monitored by dozens of defense, intelligence, and Administration officials watching the drone's video feed. The SEALs were not wearing helmet cams, contrary to a widely cited report by CBS. None of them had any previous knowledge of the house's floor plan, and they were further jostled by the awareness that they were possibly minutes away from ending the costliest manhunt in American history; as a result, some of their recollections—on which this account is based—may be imprecise and, thus, subject to dispute.

As Abrar's children ran for cover, the SEALs began clearing the first floor of the main house, room by room. Though the Americans had thought that the house might be booby-trapped, the presence of kids at the compound suggested otherwise. "You can only be hyper-vigilant for so long," the special-operations officer said. "Did bin Laden go to sleep every night thinking, The next night they're coming? Of course not. Maybe for the first year or two. But not now." Nevertheless, security

precautions were in place. A locked metal gate blocked the base of the staircase leading to the second floor, making the downstairs room feel like a cage.

After blasting through the gate with C-4 charges, three SEALs marched up the stairs. Midway up, they saw bin Laden's twenty-three-year-old son, Khalid, craning his neck around the corner. He then appeared at the top of the staircase with an AK-47. Khalid, who wore a white T-shirt with an overstretched neckline and had short hair and a clipped beard, fired down at the Americans. (The counterterrorism official claims that Khalid was unarmed, though still a threat worth taking seriously. "You have an adult male, late at night, in the dark, coming down the stairs at you in an Al Qaeda house—your assumption is that you're encountering a hostile.") At least two of the SEALs shot back and killed Khalid. According to the booklets that the SEALs carried, up to five adult males were living inside the compound. Three of them were now dead; the fourth, bin Laden's son Hamza, was not on the premises. The final person was bin Laden.

Before the mission commenced, the SEALs had created a checklist of code words that had a Native American theme. Each code word represented a different stage of the mission: leaving Jalalabad, entering Pakistan, approaching the compound, and so on. "Geronimo" was to signify that bin Laden had been found.

Three SEALs shuttled past Khalid's body and blew open another metal cage, which obstructed the staircase leading to the third floor. Bounding up the unlit stairs, they scanned the railed landing. On the top stair, the lead SEAL swivelled right; with his night-vision goggles, he discerned that a tall, rangy man with a fist-length beard was peeking out from behind a bedroom door, ten feet away. The SEAL instantly sensed that it was Crankshaft. (The counterterrorism official asserts that the SEAL first saw bin Laden on the landing, and fired but missed.)

The Americans hurried toward the bedroom door. The first SEAL pushed it open. Two of bin Laden's wives had placed themselves in front of him. Amal al-Fatah, bin Laden's fifth wife, was screaming in Arabic. She motioned as if she were going to charge; the SEAL lowered his sights and shot her once, in the calf. Fearing that one or both women were wearing suicide jackets, he stepped forward, wrapped

them in a bear hug, and drove them aside. He would almost certainly have been killed had they blown themselves up, but by blanketing them he would have absorbed some of the blast and potentially saved the two SEALs behind him. In the end, neither woman was wearing an explosive vest.

A second SEAL stepped into the room and trained the infrared laser of his M4 on bin Laden's chest. The Al Qaeda chief, who was wearing a tan shalwar kameez and a prayer cap on his head, froze; he was unarmed. "There was never any question of detaining or capturing him—it wasn't a split-second decision. No one wanted detainees," the special-operations officer told me. (The Administration maintains that had bin Laden immediately surrendered he could have been taken alive.) Nine years, seven months, and twenty days after September 11th, an American was a trigger pull from ending bin Laden's life. The first round, a 5.56-mm. bullet, struck bin Laden in the chest. As he fell backward, the SEAL fired a second round into his head, just above his left eye. On his radio, he reported, "For God and country—Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo." After a pause, he added, "Geronimo E.K.I.A."—"enemy killed in action."

Hearing this at the White House, Obama pursed his lips, and said solemnly, to no one in particular, "We got him."

Relaxing his hold on bin Laden's two wives, the first SEAL placed the women in flex cuffs and led them downstairs. Two of his colleagues, meanwhile, ran upstairs with a nylon body bag. They unfurled it, knelt down on either side of bin Laden, and placed the body inside the bag. Eighteen minutes had elapsed since the DEVGRU team landed. For the next twenty minutes, the mission shifted to an intelligence-gathering operation.

Four men scoured the second floor, plastic bags in hand, collecting flash drives, CDs, DVDs, and computer hardware from the room, which had served, in part, as bin Laden's makeshift media studio. In the coming weeks, a C.I.A.-led task force examined the files and determined that bin Laden had remained far more involved in the operational activities of Al Qaeda than many American officials had thought. He had been developing plans to assassinate Obama and Petraeus, to pull off an extravagant September 11th anniversary attack, and to attack American trains. The

SEALs also found an archive of digital pornography. "We find it on all these guys, whether they're in Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan," the special-operations officer said. Bin Laden's gold-threaded robes, worn during his video addresses, hung behind a curtain in the media room.

Outside, the Americans corralled the women and children—each of them bound in flex cuffs—and had them sit against an exterior wall that faced the second, undamaged Black Hawk. The lone fluent Arabic speaker on the assault team questioned them. Nearly all the children were under the age of ten. They seemed to have no idea about the tenant upstairs, other than that he was "an old guy." None of the women confirmed that the man was bin Laden, though one of them kept referring to him as "the sheikh." When the rescue Chinook eventually arrived, a medic stepped out and knelt over the corpse. He injected a needle into bin Laden's body and extracted two bone-marrow samples. More DNA was taken with swabs. One of the bone-marrow samples went into the Black Hawk. The other went into the Chinook, along with bin Laden's body.

Next, the SEALs needed to destroy the damaged Black Hawk. The pilot, armed with a hammer that he kept for such situations, smashed the instrument panel, the radio, and the other classified fixtures inside the cockpit. Then the demolition unit took over. They placed explosives near the avionics system, the communications gear, the engine, and the rotor head. "You're not going to hide the fact that it's a helicopter," the special-operations officer said. "But you want to make it unusable." The SEALs placed extra C-4 charges under the carriage, rolled thermite grenades inside the copter's body, and then backed up. Helo one burst into flames while the demolition team boarded the Chinook. The women and children, who were being left behind for the Pakistani authorities, looked puzzled, scared, and shocked as they watched the SEALs board the helicopters. Amal, bin Laden's wife, continued her harangue. Then, as a giant fire burned inside the compound walls, the Americans flew away.

In the Situation Room, Obama said, "I'm not going to be happy until those guys get out safe." After thirty-eight minutes inside the compound, the two SEAL teams had to make the long flight back to Afghanistan. The Black Hawk was low on gas, and needed to rendezvous with the Chinook at the refuelling point that was near the Afghan border—but still inside Pakistan. Filling the gas tank took twenty-five minutes. At one point, Biden, who had been fingering a rosary, turned to Mullen, the Joint Chiefs chairman. "We should all go to Mass tonight," he said.

The helicopters landed back in Jalalabad around 3 A.M.; McRaven and the C.I.A. station chief met the team on the tarmac. A pair of SEALs unloaded the body bag and unzipped it so that McRaven and the C.I.A. officer could see bin Laden's corpse with their own eyes. Photographs were taken of bin Laden's face and then of his outstretched body. Bin Laden was believed to be about six feet four, but no one had a tape measure to confirm the body's length. So one SEAL, who was six feet tall, lay beside the corpse: it measured roughly four inches longer than the American. Minutes later, McRaven appeared on the teleconference screen in the Situation Room and confirmed that bin Laden's body was in the bag. The corpse was sent to Bagram.

All along, the SEALs had planned to dump bin Laden's corpse into the sea—a blunt way of ending the bin Laden myth. They had successfully pulled off a similar scheme before. During a DEVGRU helicopter raid inside Somalia in September, 2009, SEALs had killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of East Africa's top Al Qaeda leaders; Nabhan's corpse was then flown to a ship in the Indian Ocean, given proper Muslim rites, and thrown overboard. Before taking that step for bin Laden, however, John Brennan made a call. Brennan, who had been a C.I.A. station chief in Riyadh, phoned a former counterpart in Saudi intelligence. Brennan told the man what had occurred in Abbottabad and informed him of the plan to deposit bin Laden's remains at sea. As Brennan knew, bin Laden's relatives were still a prominent family in the Kingdom, and Osama had once been a Saudi citizen. Did the Saudi government have any interest in taking the body? "Your plan sounds like a good one," the Saudi replied.

At dawn, bin Laden was loaded into the belly of a flip-wing V-22 Osprey, accompanied by a JSOC liaison officer and a security detail of military police. The Osprey flew south, destined for the deck of the U.S.S. Carl Vinson—a thousand-foot-long nuclear-powered aircraft carrier sailing in the Arabian Sea, off the

Pakistani coast. The Americans, yet again, were about to traverse Pakistani airspace without permission. Some officials worried that the Pakistanis, stung by the humiliation of the unilateral raid in Abbottabad, might restrict the Osprey's access. The airplane ultimately landed on the Vinson without incident.

Bin Laden's body was washed, wrapped in a white burial shroud, weighted, and then slipped inside a bag. The process was done "in strict conformance with Islamic precepts and practices," Brennan later told reporters. The JSOC liaison, the military-police contingent, and several sailors placed the shrouded body on an open-air elevator, and rode down with it to the lower level, which functions as a hangar for airplanes. From a height of between twenty and twenty-five feet above the waves, they heaved the corpse into the water.

Back in Abbottabad, residents of Bilal Town and dozens of journalists converged on bin Laden's compound, and the morning light clarified some of the confusion from the previous night. Black soot from the detonated Black Hawk charred the wall of the animal pen. Part of the tail hung over the wall. It was clear that a military raid had taken place there. "I'm glad no one was hurt in the crash, but, on the other hand, I'm sort of glad we left the helicopter there," the special-operations officer said. "It quiets the conspiracy mongers out there and instantly lends credibility. You believe everything else instantly, because there's a helicopter sitting there."

After the raid, Pakistan's political leadership engaged in frantic damage control. In the Washington Post, President Asif Ali Zardari wrote that bin Laden "was not anywhere we had anticipated he would be, but now he is gone," adding that "a decade of cooperation and partnership between the United States and Pakistan led up to the elimination of Osama bin Laden."

Pakistani military officials reacted more cynically. They arrested at least five Pakistanis for helping the C.I.A., including the physician who ran the immunization drive in Abbottabad. And several Pakistani media outlets, including the Nation—a jingoistic English-language newspaper that is considered a mouthpiece for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or I.S.I.—published what they claimed was the name of the C.I.A.'s station chief in Islamabad. (Shireen Mazari, a former editor of the Nation, once told me, "Our interests and the Americans' interests don't coincide.") The published name was incorrect, and the C.I.A. officer opted to stay.

The proximity of bin Laden's house to the Pakistan Military Academy raised the possibility that the military, or the I.S.I., had helped protect bin Laden. How could Al Qaeda's chief live so close to the academy without at least some officers knowing about it? Suspicion grew after the Times reported that at least one cell phone recovered from bin Laden's house contained contacts for senior militants belonging to Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, a jihadi group that has had close ties to the I.S.I. Although American officials have stated that Pakistani officials must have helped bin Laden hide in Abbottabad, definitive evidence has not yet been presented.

Bin Laden's death provided the White House with the symbolic victory it needed to begin phasing troops out of Afghanistan. Seven weeks later, Obama announced a timetable for withdrawal. Even so, U.S. counterterrorism activities inside Pakistan—that is, covert operations conducted by the C.I.A. and JSOC—are not expected to diminish anytime soon. Since May 2nd, there have been more than twenty drone strikes in North and South Waziristan, including one that allegedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri, a top Al Qaeda leader, while he was sipping tea in an apple orchard.

The success of the bin Laden raid has sparked a conversation inside military and intelligence circles: Are there other terrorists worth the risk of another helicopter assault in a Pakistani city? "There are people out there that, if we could find them, we would go after them," Cartwright told me. He mentioned Ayman al-Zawahiri, the new leader of Al Qaeda, who is believed to be in Pakistan, and Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric in Yemen. Cartwright emphasized that "going after them" didn't necessarily mean another DEVGRU raid. The special-operations officer spoke more boldly. He believes that a precedent has been set for more unilateral raids in the future. "Folks now realize we can weather it," he said. The senior adviser to the President said that "penetrating other countries' sovereign airspace covertly is something that's always available for the right mission and the right gain." Brennan told me, "The confidence we have in the capabilities of the U.S. military is, without a doubt, even stronger after this operation."

On May 6th, Al Qaeda confirmed bin Laden's death and released a statement congratulating "the Islamic nation" on "the martyrdom of its good son Osama." The authors promised Americans that "their joy will turn to sorrow and their tears will mix with blood." That day, President Obama travelled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where the 160th is based, to meet the DEVGRU unit and the pilots who pulled off the raid. The SEALs, who had returned home from Afghanistan earlier in the week, flew in from Virginia. Biden, Tom Donilon, and a dozen other national-security advisers came along. McRaven greeted Obama on the tarmac. (They had met at the White House a few days earlier—the President had presented McRaven with a tape measure.) McRaven led the President and his team into a one-story building on the other side of the base. They walked into a windowless room with shabby carpets, fluorescent lights, and three rows of metal folding chairs. McRaven, Brian, the pilots from the 160th, and James took turns briefing the President. They had set up a three-dimensional model of bin Laden's compound on the floor and, waving a red laser pointer, traced their maneuvers inside. A satellite image of the compound was displayed on a wall, along with a map showing the flight routes into and out of Pakistan. The briefing lasted about thirty-five minutes. Obama wanted to know how Ahmed had kept locals at bay; he also inquired about the fallen Black Hawk and whether above-average temperatures in Abbottabad had contributed to the crash. (The Pentagon is conducting a formal investigation of the accident.)

When James, the squadron commander, spoke, he started by citing all the forward operating bases in eastern Afghanistan that had been named for SEALs killed in combat. "Everything we have done for the last ten years prepared us for this," he told Obama. The President was "in awe of these guys," Ben

Rhodes, the deputy national-security adviser, who travelled with Obama, said. "It was an extraordinary base visit," he added. "They knew he had staked his Presidency on this. He knew they staked their lives on it."

As James talked about the raid, he mentioned Cairo's role. "There was a dog?" Obama interrupted. James nodded and said that Cairo was in an adjoining room, muzzled, at the request of the Secret Service.

"I want to meet that dog," Obama said.

"If you want to meet the dog, Mr. President, I advise you to bring treats," James joked. Obama went over to pet Cairo, but the dog's muzzle was left on.

Afterward, Obama and his advisers went into a second room, down the hall, where others involved in the raid—including logisticians, crew chiefs, and SEAL alternates—had assembled. Obama presented the team with a Presidential Unit Citation and said, "Our intelligence professionals did some amazing work. I had fifty-fifty confidence that bin Laden was there, but I had one-hundred-per-cent confidence in you guys. You are, literally, the finest small-fighting force that has ever existed in the world." The raiding team then presented the President with an American flag that had been on board the rescue Chinook. Measuring three feet by five, the flag had been stretched, ironed, and framed. The SEALs and the pilots had signed it on the back; an inscription on the front read, "From the Joint Task Force Operation Neptune's Spear, 01 May 2011: 'For God and country. Geronimo.' " Obama promised to put the gift "somewhere private and meaningful to me." Before the President returned to Washington, he posed for photographs with each team member and spoke with many of them, but he left one thing unsaid. He never asked who fired the kill shot, and the SEALs never volunteered to tell him.

A Portrait of Abu Bakr bin Abdul Aziz al-Athri: Salafi-Jihad's Emerging Internet Ideologue
By Murad Batal al-Shishani
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

In mid-June 2010, the brother-in-law of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the late leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Qudama al-Hami, [1] posted a lengthy article on several jihadi web forums

stating that a London-based Jordanian jihadi called Muhammad Eid al-Rifai'i (a.k.a. Abu Hammam; Abu Essa) is using the pseudonym "Abu Hammam Bakar al-Athri" to defend senior

Salafi-jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. [2] Since 2008, al-Hami has launched a campaign accusing al-Maqdisi of deviating from the path of Salafi-jihadi ideology's core message. [3]

In the same article, al-Hami claimed that al-Rifai'i is the founder of the famous jihadi web forum Shmoukh al-Islam. He reminded readers of al-Rifai'i's jihadi history and described him as takfiri (empowered to excommunicate fellow Muslims) since the days when al-Rifai'i declared himself as a Caliph in Peshawar, Pakistan in the early 1990s. It is likely that al-Hami made these accusations due to his increasing enmity towards al-Maqdisi and his school of jihadi thought. Additionally, it seems that al-Hami confused as al-Rifai'i's kunya (an Arabic honorific taken on from one's child) with Abu Hammam. An informed source told Jamestown that al-Athri and al-Rifai'i are indeed different men and that al-Hami targeted his rage at the wrong man.

Muhammad Eid al-Rifai'i is a Jordanian from Zarqa in his early fifties. He was member of Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood) until he was expelled in the late 1980s, perhaps because of his espousal of a strain of jihadi ideology out of sync with the Ikhwan. During the Second Gulf War in 1991, he was very active in mobilizing Jordanian youth to fight alongside the Iraqis. When that effort failed to materialize, Rifai'i left for the greener jihadi pastures of Peshawar, Pakistan. He eventually relocated to London where he was imprisoned in Belmarsh. He was later released on health grounds. The case that resulted in his detention was unrelated to his jihadi activities but regarded a mundane immigration issue. [4]

Although his real identity remains obscured, the background of Abu Bakr bin Abdul Aziz al-Athri is not to be confused with veteran jihadi al-Rifai'i. Al-Athri's stature as a jihadi scholar is gaining momentum as his writings continue to spread across global jihadi websites. Al-Athri was recently announced as a member of the sharia committee of al-Maqdisi's Minbar al-Tawhid w'al-Jihad website. It is in this light that al-Athri appears to be a leading successor of Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi in terms of propagating fervent jihadi ideology.

What little is known about al-Athri's background stems from an autobiographical work. [5] It suggests that he is younger than al-Rifai'i. He has a Bachelor degree in Islamic law from a

university in the Levant-though he does not specify which one. He then relocated to Saudi Arabia –although he does not state that explicitly- as he became student for several Saudi sheikhs including Ibn Jbreen and the Sahwa scholar Salman al-Ouda—a moderate by comparison. Al-Athri then distanced himself from al-Ouda because he felt al-Ouda's message had grown too soft. He also became a student of many Salafi-jihadi scholars including al-Maqdisi, which suggests that al-Athri still spent a significant amount of time in Jordan.

Al-Athri describes al-Maqdisi thusly: "By Allah our sheikh al-Maqdisi is like a father [for me] among all sheikhs [who taught me] – either I mentioned them in this biography or not-the Sheikh was, after Allah, the main reason behind my steadfastness on this blessed [jihadi] way." [6] But al-Maqdisi's opinion on al-Athri suggests that the latter would be the successor of the former who wrote in an introduction of one of al-Athri's books: "if [a] Sheikh is entitled to show pride of some of his students, I am proud of this beloved brother." [7]

Perusing the books, articles, and fatwas disseminated by al-Athri, [8] one can observe that the appeal of his religious authority is widening. Most read or downloaded writings or fatwas about him as shown on the Minbar al-Tawhid w'al-jihad website indicate that his religious views on particular events and day-to-day minutiae appeal to more people rather than grand theorizing. He is not a jihadi strategist but a jihadi scholar in the same vein as al-Maqdisi who exerts grand influence on jihadis worldwide. Al-Athri currently receives fatwa-related queries from all over the world, which he readily addresses via the pro-al-Qaeda Minbar al-Tawhid w'al-Jihad forum while al-Maqdisi is imprisoned in Jordan.

Al-Athri being a central member of the sharia committee of al-Maqdisi's website and being a potential successor to al-Maqdisi arguably demonstrates that the religious expression of the Salafi-jihadi movement is becoming more institutionalized. Al-Athri, in the context of this gradual process, appears to be playing a major role in the transformation. The religious legitimization of Abu Bakr bin Abdul Aziz al-Althri will increase the recruitment capacity of the Salafi-jihadi movement to expand its ranks. The current online propaganda arm, of which al-Athri is now a primary actor, has proven to

be quite effective. This combination of al-Athri's popularity and newfound legitimacy will help further promulgate the religious edicts that he and his fellow travelers are producing to influence a new generation of jihadis.

Notes:
1. Abu Qudama al-Hami's real name is Sati Qasrawi. He is a Jordanian national who worked as Jihad Magazine's (a bi-monthly magazine founded by Abdullah Azzam in 1984) correspondent during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan where lost his leg to a landmine. He is married to al-Zarqawi's sister and currently lives in Jordan.
2. http://muslmnet.net/vb/showthread.php?t=391727, June 12, 2010.
3. Murad Batal al-Shishani, The Dangerous Ideas of the Neo-Zarqawist Movement, Sentinel, Competing Terrorism Center (West Point), September 2009, Vol 2, Issue 9, pp. 18-20.
4. http://www.alasr.ws/index.cfm?method=home.con&contentID=7463, February 16, 2006.
5. http://www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=3875, April 2011.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. See his writings: http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=bakraziz.

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Al-Qaeda Uses Pakistani Intelligence Course to Train International Operatives
By Abdul Hameed Bakier
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

Possibly recognizing that intelligence breakdowns played a major role in the elimination of Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, the al-Qaeda's Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) recently released a training tool entitled "The Security and Intelligence Course." Many jihadi internet forums posted the course's download links, ensuring widespread distribution (see ansar1.info, June 15).

According to its translator and editor, jihadi activist Obaida Abdullah al-Adam, the security and intelligence training material originally consisted of Urdu language documents obtained from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), known for its close ties to various jihadi movements. Al-Adam has previously contributed other jihadi training material in various jihadi internet forums. These works include Sinaat al-Irahab ("The Making of Terrorism") and Tariq al-Tamkeen ("The Road of Enabling") (as-ansar.com, March 3; muslm.net, June 22, 2010). The training course is broken down into four main parts.

Basic intelligence training
The course starts with basic security and intelligence definitions used by the internal and external security apparatus of a given state and the different responsibilities of various state security services. To emphasize the importance of external intelligence, al-Adam claims the ISI was able to deter a joint Israeli-Indian air assault on its nuclear installations after receiving intelligence from a Pakistani agent who had succeeded in penetrating the enemy's security structure. No further details are given by al-Adam on the alleged air attack plan but the claim could be an attempt to prove the training course was taken from Pakistani intelligence.

The next training block concentrates on mujahideen group operations and the criteria used to select group members. The mujahideen group members should be Muslims, enjoy a certain degree of education and be religiously motivated and "non-mundane," the latter meaning the jihadi's pure purpose must be the elevation of the Islamic nation. Al-Adam warns that intelligence services' attempts to penetrate mujahideen cells are serious as they use the same assets they use to penetrate other state intelligence agencies. Therefore, a jihadi on a mission should be fully briefed beforehand on the area of operation. The briefing must include pictures taken of the area during earlier jihadi reconnaissance operations. The photos should indicate the security measures employed

around sensitive buildings and any other security details implemented by the enemy.

Al-Adam says the most likely cover story for a state intelligence agent is posing as a journalist. Other cover stories vary from posing as taxi drivers to shop owners. Al-Adam gives the example of the late Daniel Pearl, claiming Pearl was a U.S. intelligence agent posing as a journalist (Pearl was the South Asia bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal when he was kidnapped and killed by the mujahedeen in 2002). The personal characteristics of a cell member and the security procedures of each cell are also discussed at length in the training course. Other training includes the secure exchange of classified documents between the mujahideen. Mujahideen are cautioned not to carry their original passports when going on a mission; instead, passports with false personal information must be used by travelling mujahideen.

On communications, the course suggests the internet and mobile phones are preferred for fast and frequent connections between the mujahideen. Earlier jihadi forums have posted technical material containing more detailed training on secure mobile phone communications (see Terrorism Monitor, September 8, 2006). Any exchange of highly classified information between mujahideen leaders should be done through handwritten letters conveyed by carriers trained in concealment methods. Some concealment methods are discussed in the course, as well as the personal security steps the travelling mujahideen should implement. Methods suggested to conceal a letter include hiding it inside a pen, a toothpaste tube, a book, or a child's milk bottle.

The course recommends going to a pre-designated area where the letter will be handed to the recipient after anti-surveillance procedures have been applied. The letter should be passed on through a handshake, inside a newspaper or in what is known as "brush contact" in intelligence parlance.

The course offers other basic and essential training for intelligence gathering operations such as conducting successful clandestine meetings in safe houses, different types of surveillance, communicating through dead drops and face-to-face intelligence gathering

techniques using proper elicitation, questioning and interrogation methods.

Propaganda

Although the counter-propaganda measures suggested in the course are basic, the course seeks to raise mujahideen awareness to the existence of such operations by counterterrorism forces to reduce the effectiveness of such efforts by security forces against the mujahideen. Suggested counter-measures to propaganda include:

☑ Keeping the group busy with operations and training.

☑ Immediately informing the mujahideen of any propaganda and refuting it.

☑ Punishing anyone spreading the propaganda among the mujahideen.

☑ Increasing the mujahideen's religious awareness.

☑ Ensuring full obedience to the group's Amir (leader).

The effectiveness of anti-extremism campaigns such as Saudi Arabia's assakina ("tranquility from God"), launched in 2003 to refute the Salafi-Jihadi ideology and deter possible al-Qaeda recruits, would be much reduced if the mujahideen can be made to believe that any religious argument against extremism made by moderate Islamic entities or individuals is a lie (see assakina.com, July 17, 2010).

Deep cover operations

Almost all training blocks in the course can be classed as conventional intelligence and security training except for the section on deep cover operations. Such operations are considered advanced intelligence and are practiced mostly by sophisticated intelligence agencies against priority targets in high risk areas. The training course implies that deep cover operations require more time and effort than conventional intelligence operations. Deep cover training enhances the ability of the mujahideen to plant sleeper cells in target countries that possess advanced intelligence and security forces. The fact that the mujahideen training course was translated from Urdu to English for the benefit of mujahideen in America and Europe, as al-Adam says at the prelude, is an indication of where the mujahideen are planning their future terror attacks.

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Sovereign Citizens: A Homegrown Threat?

By Noëlle MacKenzie
Source: http://www.wibw.com/internationalnews/headlines/125609063.html

The "sovereign citizen" extremist movement is one that many people haven't heard of, although the FBI considers its members one of the top threats to our nation. The FBI characterizes the movement as domestic terrorism: "Sovereign citizens are anti-government extremists who believe that even though they physically reside in this country,

they are separate or 'sovereign' from the United States. As a result, they believe they don't have to answer to any government authority, including courts, taxing entities, motor vehicle departments, or law enforcement. This causes all kinds of problems—and crimes. For example, many sovereign citizens don't pay their taxes. They hold illegal courts that issue warrants for judges and police officers. They clog up the court system with frivolous lawsuits and liens against public officials to harass them. And they use fake money orders, personal checks, and the like at government agencies, banks, and businesses."

CBS's 60 Minutes program featured the sovereign citizen movement in May and said that "there are as many as 300,000 sovereign citizens in the U.S. And with the sluggish economy and mortgage mess, their ranks are growing." The program showed examples of many sovereign citizen sites that feature ways to beat the system, and said, "But when those efforts to beat the system fail, a sovereign citizen will often seek retribution. The weapon of choice is paper. For example, when a sovereign has a

run-in with the law, they might file a lien or financial claim against the personal assets of the police officer or the judge involved. It's easy to file and you don't even need a lawyer. The sovereign never collects, but the target of the lien can have their credit ruined. The practice has been called 'paper terrorism.'"

The program also illustrated "the marked increase in violence associated with sovereign citizens, much of it directed at police and judges," reporting that "a South Carolina sovereign citizen awaits execution for killing two lawmen in a standoff; in Texas, a sovereign faces attempted capital murder charges in the shooting of three men, two of them sheriff's deputies. And an Alaska sovereign citizen and five others are charged with plotting to kill two judges, state troopers and an IRS agent."

The FBI says that "not every action taken in the name of the sovereign citizen ideology is a crime, but the list of illegal actions committed by these groups, cells, and individuals is

extensive," citing murder; physical assault; impersonating police officers and diplomats; using fake currency, passports, license plates, and driver's licenses; and white-collar scams, such as mortgage fraud and "redemption" schemes.

Piracy Spreads to the South

By Ben Coetzee

Source: http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1326

In recent times piracy has leapt to the forefront as a threat to the world economy; impacting the prices of commodities and raising concerns about the long term impact on energy prices. Southern Africa did not experience the initial brunt of the effects of piracy when the international community identified it as a threat to world wide economic growth. This respite can be attributed to the physical distance between Somalia and Southern African waters and the continued operation of the Suez Channel.

Shipping companies preferred to use the Suez Channel trading between the west (the Americas and Europa) and the east (the Middle East and Asia) because it eliminated the need to sail around the "Cape of Storms". However shipping companies are increasingly choosing to follow a longer route around the southern tip of Africa in an effort to avoid running the gauntlet through the Gulf of Aden and becoming victims of piracy. This diversion from normal practices is in effect slowly starting to starve the pirates from rich targets.

The lack of prey and the constant attention of the international fleet participating in Operation Atlanta are forcing pirates to move their operations south, towards areas outside the operational arena of the international fleet. Acts of piracy are also increasingly occurring further away from the mainland in international waters. This migration of pirate activity from Somalia is exerting pressure on coastal countries such as Tanzania to step up their efforts to protect vessels traversing their territorial waters.

Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete commented during his recent visit to South Africa that Tanzania has experienced almost 30 pirate attacks and that the increasing number of incidents is starting to affect the economy of Tanzania and by extension the whole of Eastern Africa. The impact is the result of ships preferring not to visit the ports in Tanzania due to the risk of becoming the victims of pirate attacks.

South Africa, in an effort to curb piracy before it reaches its doorstep, has committed its maritime resources to the fight against pirates. The main motivation for this approach seems to be to fight pirates in the waters of its neighbours whilst ensuring that the South African shipping lanes remain safe and open for business. Although the South African National Defence Force remains stoically silent

about their strategic plan to get involved in the fight against piracy, the actions of the Government support the conceptual properties of a plan of this nature.

The agreements signed between South Africa and other Eastern African countries concerned about the impact of piracy on their economies contributes to this understanding. These countries are Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, the Seychelles, the Comoros, Madagascar and Reunion. Agreements of this nature increase the area of responsibility for the South African Navy but it also provides refuelling points and safe harbours in the South Indian Ocean. Allowing the South African fleet to deploy fighting vessels such as frigates and aircraft without the additional expense of support vessels to ensure continued operational capability.

The general notion is that piracy is recognised as a serious threat to Southern Africa and South Africa in particular. The South African Government is seemingly willing to commit scarce resources in an effort to prevent the further incursion of pirates into the territorial waters of SADC. This strong reaction from South Africa and its neighbours should serve as a warning to prospective pirates and robbers that these acts would not be considered lightly.

A matter of concern however, is the legal component of the fight against piracy. This concern has not attracted much attention but is vital to SADC's efforts against piracy in the future. For example if suspected pirates are apprehended, what would the legal process entail? Do African coastal countries have the legislation and capacity to prosecute the suspected pirates and where will such prosecution take place? And above all, the question remains as to who will pay for the prosecution and the incarceration of the suspected pirates upon conviction?

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Mumbai Outraged Once Again: India Blinks, Blames Homegrown Terror

By Animesh Roul
Source: http://www.jamestownfoundation.com

Executive Summary

In the weeks following the July 13 bomb explosions in Mumbai, responsibility for the attacks has yet to be determined. Investigative agencies have not yet pinpointed a suspect nor has any terrorist group claimed the blasts as its own doing, perhaps in order to complicate the investigation or delay the process. The triple blasts, which killed 24 people and injured over one hundred, mark the first major terrorist attack in Mumbai since the November 2008 bombings orchestrated by Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Current indications point the finger toward the Indian Mujahedeen (IM), a terrorist group with connections to LeT, due to the use of IEDs made of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) as well as the remote-controlled detonation of the bombs, which were common characteristics of IM terrorist acts across India between 2007 and 2008. While responsibility for the blasts remains unclaimed, it is the Indian intelligence agency that is bearing the brunt of guilt and scrutiny, as it is clear that stepped-up security measures that were put in place following the November 2008 attack did little to avoid another deadly situation. And while the Indian government has, in the past, been quick to blame Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups, such rhetoric has been missing in the weeks since July 13. This could be a sign of the neighboring countries' new approach to combating terrorist organizations in the region.

Introduction

Weeks after the July 13 triple bomb blasts that stunned India's commercial capital, Mumbai, once again, investigating agencies have yet to pinpoint the terrorist group or organization behind these deadly blasts. Three bombs went off within minutes killing 24 people with over one hundred injured at Dada's Kabutarkhana, the Opera House and Zaveri Bazaar (Daily News and Analysis (Mumbai) July 25),

Forensic investigation confirms the use of IEDs made of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) and ball bearings (Economic Times/Indo Asian News Service, July 18). And it is evidently clear that the blasts were triggered by timer devices and not by remote-controlled devices.

India's intelligence apparatus came under severe scrutiny this time as terror modules have managed to strike again in the heart of Mumbai despite stepped up security measures that were put in place following the November 2008 Mumbai siege. Pakistani based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, were blamed for masterminding the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Surprisingly, no terrorist organizations have claimed responsibility so far, perhaps for the purpose of complicating investigation procedures and or to delay follow up actions by the agencies. For the first time, the Indian government and intelligence agencies have refrained from naming either any Pakistan based terror group or any homegrown groups so far. However, the direction of the ongoing investigation is moving toward Indian Mujahideen (IM), which is largely nurtured by the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and received explosives training from the Bangladesh based Harkat ul Jihadi Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B).

The Indian Mujahedeen, largely comprised of outlawed Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) cadres, had claimed responsibility for a number of similar terror acts across India between 2007 and 2008 in which they used mostly ANFO based IEDs and timer devices to trigger blasts in many Indian cities, a technique they learned from the HuJI-Bangladesh (Terrorism Monitor, January 21, 2010). Since the Pune Germany Bakery blast of February 2010, IM has claimed at least two terror attacks in Delhi and Varanasi. In September of last year, bike-borne gunmen attacked a tourist bus, injuring two Taiwanese men outside Delhi's historic Jama Masjid. Again in December of that year a bomb exploded on the banks of the Holy Ganges River in Varanasi. Now the National Investigating Agency (NIA) along with Mumbai police has been connecting the dots to determine whether or not those low intensity explosions have links to the July 13 Mumbai blasts.

Arguably, ANFO can be used by any fringe group with a subversive motive, as ammonium nitrate is readily available in India and mostly used for mining purposes. For this very reason, the involvement of right wing extremist groups such as Avinav Bharat and Sanatan Sanstha is also being investigated. Past experience, however, shows that these groups have limited and low intensity capability and have only perpetrated retaliatory attacks against Islamic religious places and symbols. Their involvement, therefore, could certainly be ruled out.

IM-LeT Handiwork?

The recent bombings have all the markings of Indian Mujahideen, as the explosives used and the tactic of synchronized bomb attacks in crowded places put the needle of suspicion squarely on the IM, whose top leadership is presently holed up in neighboring Pakistan. Two new offshoots of IM have been under intelligence radar for quite some time: 'Bullet 313 Brigade' and the Jama't Ansar-ul Muslimeen (Sakal Times (Pune) July 16; Rediff.com, July 18). These shadow organizations act as covers for IM, and more importantly, scout new talents and coordinate fund collections in Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and in Karnataka. If intelligence agencies are to be believed, these units are under the direct control of fugitive IM operatives in Pakistan who fled India after the countrywide crackdown on IM hideouts in 2008. Many IM operatives were arrested during that time from Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. As many as 15 top level operatives are still at large including Iqbal Shahbandari, Riyaz Shahbandari, Abdus Subhan Quresi and Mohsin Chaudhary.

The arrest of Danish Riyaz, IM's treasurer and recruiter, on June 21 in connection with the 2008 Ahmadabad blasts sheds light on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Taliban and IM's evil designs against India. The email communications of Riyaz with other arrested and absconding terrorists, including a man named Haroon, Mohammed Safikul and Abu Faisal, have revealed conspiracies hatched against India across international borders. Haroon, a suspect in the July 13 Mumbai blasts, is believed to have been in touch with Taliban leaders in Pakistan. The Gujarat crime branch police is presently investigating whether or not Haroon sent 10 new recruits, as planned, to the special Taliban training program (India Today, July 18). Another revelation came from Mohammed

Safikul, a LeT operative arrested in Malda (West Bengal) in January 2009, who told interrogators about LeT's new recruitment drives in the Eastern Indian states of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam and Tripura (Hindustan Times, July 18).

A Possible HuJI Link

Just before the July 13 blasts, Bihar state police had detained two Harkat ul Jihadi Islami (HuJI) suspects identified as Riyazul Sarkar and Mahtab Alam, along with multiple SIM cards, cell phones and documents written in the Marathi language (spoken in Mumbai [Maharashtra]). The two men are under investigation for their possible links with the Mumbai serial blasts (Times of India, July 18). Another HuJI operative Jalaluddin Mullah (a.k.a Babu Bhai) who has emerged as key linkman between HuJI and IM earlier and now in custody, is too under interrogation. It is believed that he might have some vital clues that can solve the Mumbai mystery (Hindustan Times, July 20). According to available information, Jalaluddin was in touch with one Khurram Khayyam, a key recruiter for HuJI-B and a key linkman between various terror groups operating out of Bangladesh, for example, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh.

Based on the investigations so far, especially following revelations from Haroon and Riaz, the Mumbai Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) and NIA have been working on specific leads and are now engaged in a massive search operation inside the Dangs forests on the Gujarat-Maharashtra border for six absconding IM operatives from West Bengal and Gujarat.

Reported sightings of IM's Riyaz Shahbandari, who fled to Pakistan long ago, on the outskirts of Mumbai days before the blast as well as the Nepal police arrest of a suspect named Mohammad Zaheer for alleged involvement in the July 13 Mumbai blasts added fresh leads in the ongoing investigations, but so far no definite link has been established (Mumbai Mirror, July 23).

Meanwhile, the ATS and NIA have unleashed a countrywide search and sweep operation to nab the culprit behind these deadly terrorist attacks.

India-Pakistan Ties Amid Terror

The latest Mumbai blasts took place on the even of the scheduled July 27 talks between the foreign ministers of the two countries in Delhi. Surprisingly, the usual blame game between India and Pakistan has been missing and war rhetoric has taken a backseat for now. India has in the past accused Pakistan of harboring violent terrorist groups and unleashing a proxy war. Following the November 2008 Mumbai siege, direct accusations emanated from India and there were talks of a surgical strike targeting terror infrastructures inside Pakistan. [1] This time, however, both political and media fraternities from each side have abstained from confrontation.

Despite this posturing, the Indian Home Minster made it clear during the fourth meeting of SAARC Home/Interior Ministers in Thimpu (Bhutan) recently that terrorist groups have flourished because of the support they have found from both state and non-state actors, and no country can escape its responsibility by blaming non-state actors for terrorist activities emanating from its soil, with an obvious reference to Pakistan (The Hindu, July 23). Raising the issue of "safe heavens" and "terror camps", he cautioned that Pakistan owes a "legal and moral responsibility to its neighbors" and to the world to suppress those non-state actors and bring them to justice.

By not blaming Pakistan for the latest terror strikes, it is amply clear that India is attempting to place psychological pressure on Pakistan to work toward dismantling terrorist infrastructures, to cooperate in solving the pending 2008 Mumbai case and, last but not least, to take serious action against those on the revised fugitive lists.

The inevitable question is now, if a LeT-IM nexus is be found to be behind the latest Mumbai blasts, then what would be India's response? Whether India should at all engage with Pakistan diplomatically in the future or go on a hot pursuit targeting Lashkar-e-Taiba and other anti-Indian terror organizations inside Pakistan is still unknown. Plausibly, India's response would remain calculated to keep the diplomatic channel open and to avoid any military confrontation at the Western borders.

Looking at the latest terror investigations it seems that homegrown terror is thriving despite the government's repeated denial that Indian Muslims are radicalized enough to perpetrate terror on their own. The Indian Home Minster himself admitted that these "indigenous terror groups" are no longer

fledgling outfits (Times of India, July 27). However, the complicity of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat ul Jihadi Islami in nurturing and directing these so called homegrown terror organizations should not be overlooked.

Note:
1. Read the Interview of External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, "India has right to protect its territorial integrity: Pranab," NDTV.com, December 02, 2008.

Animesh Roul is the Executive Director of Research at the New Delhi-based Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict (SSPC).

Report warns Amtrak vulnerable

Source:http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Amtrak-Remains-Vulnerable-to-Terrorism-126533783.html

A new report by the DHS Inspector General warns that Amtrak is vulnerable to terrorist

attacks, despite the $1 billion that has already been spent to bolster security; the inspector

A new report by the DHS Inspector General warns that Amtrak is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, despite the $1 billion that has already been spent to bolster security.

Beginning in 2005 the DHS Transit Security Grant Program awarded more than $1 billion in grant funding to help secure passenger rail lines and to protect critical transportation infrastructure. Yet the inspector general found that DHS officials did not ensure that the money was being spent efficiently securing Amtrak's most vulnerable stations. "As a result, some rail stations and the traveling public may be at a greater risk to a potential terrorist attack," the report said.

"We visited four high-risk rail stations and

general found that DHS officials did not ensure that the money was being spent efficiently securing Amtrak's most vulnerable stations resulting in security gaps

observed that Amtrak did not take actions to mitigate some of the more critical vulnerabilities…identified as early as 2006," the report said. "For example, at one station, we

observed that a terrorist could access…" The rest of the sentence had been redacted.

According to Pat Jordan, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Commander who helps oversees an Amtrak and several commuter rail lines, the biggest threats to passengers are bombers or gunmen.

"The most likely one is a small improvised explosive device, or an active shooter type situation. If you look across the country, those are the challenges we face," he said.

To help protect against these threats Jordan urges passengers to report any suspicious activities they see.

"If you look at a lot of the attempts to attack the transit systems and other attacks around the country, they've been really interdicted by people who saw something and said something".

Late last month an Amtrak train was evacuated in western Kansas (photo left), after a passenger found and reported a suspicious device on board. Local law enforcement officers were called in to investigate the package, but found no threat.

The inspector general's report warns that terrorists will likely continue to target trains as they are attractive targets.

"Since 2004, bombings of the Madrid and Mumbai rail systems and the London subway have demonstrated the critical need to protect rail infrastructure from terrorist attacks," the report said. "Passenger rail stations are especially attractive to terrorist targets because of the large number of people in a concentrated area."

The report went on to say, "The largest of

America's rail stations are inter-model transportation terminals with high passenger and cargo volumes. A terrorist attack at these facilities could lead to significant loss of life and economic disruption." **Each year more than twenty-seven million passengers ride Amtrak at more than 500 stations across the country.**

Newly formed South Sudan joins Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan at top of Maplecroft terrorism ranking – attacks up 15% globally

Top four countries sustain over 75% of world's fatalities from terrorism
Source: http://maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism_index_2011.html

New research has rated the fledgling state of South Sudan in the top five countries most at risk from terrorist attacks after Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan, whilst data also reveals that terrorist

attacks are on the increase globally.

The latest Terrorism Risk Index (TRI), released by risk analysis and mapping firm Maplecroft, rates 20 countries and territories as 'extreme risk,' with Somalia (1), Pakistan (2), Iraq (3), Afghanistan (4) once again topping the ranking. The 'extreme risk' category also includes: South Sudan (5), Yemen (6), Palestinian Occupied Territories (7), DR Congo (8) Central African Republic (9), Colombia (10), Algeria (11), Thailand (12), Philippines (13), Russia (14), Sudan (15), Iran (16), Burundi (17), India (18), Nigeria (19) and Israel (20).

The TRI has been developed by Maplecroft to enable business to identify and monitor the available to calculate the frequency and lethality of terrorist incidents over the 12 month period prior to April 1st 2011. The TRI also includes a historical component assessing the number of attacks over five years and assesses risks relating to countries' geographic proximity to terrorist hotspots.

Following the country's formal secession from Sudan in July 2011, South Sudan (5) makes its first appearance in the Terrorism Risk Index. The country is rated as 'extreme risk' primarily due to the intensity of terrorist attacks, with an average of 6.59 fatalities per terrorist incident, almost three times that of Somalia at 2.23.

Terrorism Risk Index

Legend	
Extreme Risk	🟥
High risk	🟧
Medium risk	🟨
Low risk	🟩
No Data	⬜

Rank	Country	Rating	Rank	Country	Rating
1	Somalia	Extreme	6	Yemen	Extreme
2	Pakistan	Extreme	7	P.O.T.	Extreme
3	Iraq	Extreme	8	DR Congo	Extreme
4	Afghanistan	Extreme	9	C.A.R.	Extreme
5	South Sudan	Extreme	10	Colombia	Extreme

© Maplecroft, 2011

risks posed by terrorism to employees and assets in 197 countries. The index draws on the latest and most comprehensive data

A number of terrorist groups operate in South Sudan including the Lord's Resistance Army, which has been responsible for mass-casualty

attacks. However, splinter groups that have broken away from the mainstream Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) use terrorist methods and pose the greatest threat. One such group, led by George Athor, was responsible for 111 deaths in an attack in Jonglei province in February 2011. This one incident accounts for over 50% of the 211 fatalities sustained by South Sudan from attacks between April 2010 and March 2011.

Despite ranking 5th in the index, South Sudan's death toll of 211 from terrorist attacks pales in comparison to the top four countries. Over the same period Somalia suffered 1,385 deaths, Pakistan 2,163 deaths, Iraq 3,456 deaths and Afghanistan 3,423 deaths, which together account for over 75% of the world's 13,492 fatalities.

Looking at the year on year data, Maplecroft's research also reveals that the number of terrorist attacks rose by approximately 15% globally, with 11,954 incidents between April 2010 and March 2011, compared to 10394 from April 2009 to March 31st 2010. However, there was a decrease in fatalities falling to 13,492 from 14,478.

Significantly the TRI also reveals that the number of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan increased by over 50% over the same period, rising from 2246 attacks in 2009/10 to 3,470 in 2010/11. The growing number of attacks will be a particular concern at a time when NATO allies are seeking to reduce troop numbers and increasingly hand over security to Afghan forces.

Aside from South Sudan, the latest index sees three more countries join the 'extreme risk' category: Iran (16), Burundi (17) and Nigeria (19). Iran continues to experience a relatively small, but lethal, number of mass-casualty attacks including a twin suicide bombing in Zahedan in July 2010, which collectively killed 27 and wounded approximately 300. These attacks, launched by Jundullah, a Sunni Islamist and Baluchi ethnic group, mean that Iran has one of the highest averages of fatalities per incident at 5.71.

Security conditions in Nigeria remain fragile and a source of concern for investors. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has launched attacks beyond the Delta, in the capital, Abuja. MEND is thought to be behind the 1 October 2010 car

bombings in the city that killed 12. These bombings took place during celebrations for the country's 50th anniversary of independence.

Somalia continues to be the highest risk country in the index, with the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab controlling much of the central and southern areas of the country. However, some of the most devastating attacks take place in the capital, Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab struggles with the Transitional Federal Government. Amongst the worst incidents in the city were armed attacks by al-Shabaab on 8 February and 15 March 2011, which killed 21 and 24 respectively. As the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continues to be unable to dislodge al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, mass-casualty attacks are likely to persist in the city.

None of the major Western economies fall within the 'high' or 'extreme risk' bracket. However, the UK (38) is rated 'medium risk,' and ranked highest out of these countries. This is due to the deteriorating security conditions in Northern Ireland, where there was a general increase in the number of terrorist attacks. In contrast, the US is ranked 61 and 'low risk.'

Western countries meanwhile remain concerned about the continued risk posed by radical Islam and the prospect of future attacks on Western interests at home and overseas. "The killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden by US navy SEALs in May has helped US intelligence target senior members and affiliates of the network," said Anthony Skinner, an Associate Director at Maplecroft. "Nonetheless, al-Qaeda has in the past proven its ability to adapt and poses a continuous threat to the West."

Maplecroft's Terrorism Risk Index is accompanied by subnational mapping of all reported terrorist incidents, which are charted globally down to 100m. "Although some countries are rated as 'extreme risk', terrorism attacks can be limited to a specific region or a relatively small number of areas. Thailand is a case in point, where the majority of attacks take place in the southern states," continued Skinner. "Subnational mapping of this kind enables organisations to pinpoint these hotspots and monitor risks to staff, as well as assets, such as factories, refineries and pipelines."

Fighting Grassroots Terrorism: How Local Vigilance Can Help

By Scott Stewart

In the wake of the July 22 Oslo attacks, as I have talked with people in the United States and Europe, I have noticed two themes in the conversations. The first is the claim that the attacks came from an unexpected source and were therefore impossible to stop. The second theme is that detecting such attacks is the sole province of dedicated counterterrorism authorities.

As discussed in last week's Security Weekly, even in so-called "unexpected" attacks there are specific operational tasks that must be executed in order to conduct an operation. Such tasks can be detected, and unexpected attacks emanating from lone wolf actors can indeed be thwarted if such indicators are being looked for. Alleged Oslo attack perpetrator Anders Breivik reportedly conducted several actions that would have made him vulnerable to detection had the authorities been vigilant and focused on those possible actions.

This is why it is critical to look at the mechanics of attacks in order to identify the steps that must be undertaken to complete them and then focus on identifying people taking such steps. Focusing on the "how" rather than the "who" is an effective way for authorities to get on the proactive side of the action/reaction continuum.

Considering this concept of focusing on the how, one quickly reaches a convergence with the second theme, which involves the role and capabilities of dedicated counterterrorism resources. The primary agency tasked with counterterrorism in most countries tends to have limited resources that are stretched thin trying to cover known or suspected threats. These agencies simply do not have the manpower to look for attack-planning indicators — especially in a world where militant actors are increasingly adopting the leaderless-resistance model, which is designed to avoid detection by counterterrorism forces.

When these factors are combined they highlight the fact that, as the threat posed by militants adhering to the leaderless-resistance model (whom we frequently refer to as "grassroots militants") increases, so does the need for grassroots defenders.

Grassroots Threats

As we noted last week, Breivik's concept of self-appointed and anonymous "Justiciar Knights" (photo) who operate as lone wolves or in small phantom cells is not a unique concept. Breivik was clearly influenced by the militant-group case studies he outlined in his manifesto. In recent decades, governments have become fairly efficient at identifying and gathering intelligence on known groups that pose a threat to conduct violent attacks. This is especially true in the realm of technical intelligence, where dramatic increases have been made in the ability to capture and process huge amounts of data from landline, cellphone and Internet communications, but governments have also become quite adept at penetrating militant groups and recruiting informants.

Even before 9/11, government successes against militant groups had led white supremacist groups and militant animal-rights and environmentalist groups to adopt a leaderless resistance model for their violent and illegal activities.

In the post-9/11 world, intelligence and security services have dramatically increased the resources dedicated to counterterrorism, and the efforts of these services have proved very effective when focused on known organizations and individuals. Indeed, in recent years we have seen a trend where jihadist groups like al

Qaeda and its franchises have encouraged aspiring militants to undertake lone wolf and small cell activities rather than travel to places like Pakistan and Yemen to link up with the groups and receive training in terrorist tradecraft. For several years now, STRATFOR has emphasized the nature of this decentralized threat.

We see no sign of this trend toward leaderless resistance reversing in the near future, and our forecast is that the grassroots threat will continue to grow, not only from the jihadist realm but also from far-right and far-left actors.

Stretched Thin

As noted above, most counterterrorism intelligence efforts have been designed to identify and track people with links to known militant groups, and in that regard they are fairly effective. However, they have been largely ineffective in identifying grassroots militants. The focus on identifying and monitoring the activities of someone connected to a known militant group is understandable given that operatives connected to groups such as Hezbollah or al Qaeda have access to much better training and far greater resources than their grassroots counterparts. In general, militants linked to organizations pose a more severe threat than do most grassroots militants, and thus counterterrorism agencies focus much of their attention on the more potent threat.

That said, grassroots operatives can and do kill people. Although they tend to focus on softer targets than operatives connected to larger groups, some grassroots attacks have been quite deadly. The July 2005 London bombings, for example, killed 52 people, and Breivik was able to kill 77 in his twin attacks in Norway.

One problem for most counterterrorism agencies is that counterterrorism is not their sole (and in some cases even primary) mission. Often, such as the case with MI5 in the United Kingdom, the primary counterterrorism agency also has substantial foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. In the case of the FBI, it has not only counterterrorism and foreign counterintelligence missions but also a host of other responsibilities such as investigating bank robberies, kidnappings, white-collar crime, cyber crimes and public corruption.

The resources of the primary counterterrorism agencies are also quite finite. For example, the FBI has fewer than 14,000 special agents to fulfill its many responsibilities, and while counterterrorism has become its top mission in the post-9/11 era, only a portion of its agents (estimated to be between 2,500 and 3,000) are assigned to counterterrorism investigations at any one time.

Counterterrorism investigations can also be very labor intensive. Even in a case where a subject is under electronic surveillance, it takes a great deal of manpower to file all the paperwork required for the court orders, monitor the surveillance equipment and, if necessary, translate conversations picked up from the surveillance efforts and run down and or task out additional investigative leads developed during the monitoring. Seemingly little things like conducting a "trash cover" on the subject (sifting through the trash a subject places out on the curb for evidence and intelligence) can add hours of investigative effort every week. If full physical and electronic surveillance is put in place on a subject, such a 24/7 operation can tie up as many as 100 special agents, surveillance operatives, technicians, photographers, analysts, interpreters and supervisors.

Again, given the potential threat posed by known or suspected al Qaeda, Hezbollah or, currently, Libyan government operatives, it is understandable why so many resources would be devoted to investigating and neutralizing that potential threat. However, the problem with this focus on known actors is that it leaves very little resources for proactive counterterrorism tasks such as looking for signs of potential operational activities such as preoperational surveillance or weapons acquisition conducted by previously unknown individuals. Indeed, this is a huge undertaking for agencies with limited resources.

Furthermore, in the case of a lone wolf or small cell, there simply may not be any clear-cut chain of command, a specific building to target or a communication network to compromise — the specialties of Western intelligence agencies. The leaderless-resistance organization is, by design, nebulous and hard to map and quantify. This lack of structure and communication poses a problem for Western counterterrorism agencies, as Breivik accurately noted in his manifesto. Also, since this grassroots threat emanates from a large variety of actors, it is impossible to profile potential militants based on race, religion or

ethnicity. Instead, their actions must be scrutinized.

Grassroots Defenders

All grassroots militants engage in activities that make their plots vulnerable to detection. Due to the limited number of dedicated counterterrorism practitioners, these mistakes are far more likely to be witnessed by someone other than an FBI or MI5 agent. This fact highlights the importance of what we call grassroots defenders, that is, a decentralized network of people practicing situational awareness who notice and report possible indications of terrorist behavior such as acquiring weapons, building bombs and conducting preoperational surveillance.

Clearly, the most important pool of grassroots defenders is ordinary police officers on patrol. While there are fewer than 14,000 FBI agents in the entire United States, there are some 34,000 officers in the New York City Police Department alone and an estimated 800,000 local and state police officers across the United States. While the vast majority of these officers are not assigned primarily to investigate terrorism, they often find themselves in a position to encounter grassroots militants who make operational security errors or are in the process of committing crimes in advance of an attack, such as document fraud, illegally obtaining weapons or illegally raising funds for an attack.

In July 2005, police in Torrance, Calif., thwarted a grassroots plot that came to light during an investigation of a string of armed robberies. After arresting one suspect, Levar Haney Washington, police searching his apartment uncovered material indicating that Washington was part of a small jihadist cell that was planning to attack a number of targets. Hezbollah's multimillion-dollar cigarette-smuggling network was uncovered when a sharp North Carolina sheriff's deputy found the group's activities suspicious and tipped off the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives, thus launching the massive "Operation Smokescreen" investigation.

Traffic stops by regular cops also have identified several potential grassroots jihadists. In August 2007, two Middle Eastern men stopped by a sheriff's deputy for speeding near Goose Creek, S.C., were charged with possession of a destructive device. Likewise, a traffic stop by a police officer in September

2001 in Alexandria, Va., led to an investigation that uncovered the so-called Virginia Jihad Network. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the operation's leader, Mohamed Atta, was the subject of an outstanding bench warrant for failing to appear in court after being stopped for driving without a license. More recently, in May 2011 we saw the New York Police Department disrupt an alleged jihadist plot. Then in June, the Seattle Police Department detected a plot that it thwarted with the cooperation of the FBI. Both of these plots were disrupted during the weapons-acquisition phase.

In some countries, networks have been established to promote this concept of heightened local-police vigilance and to provide training for officers and crime analysts. The U.S. government has established something it calls the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which is an attempt to provide local police with training to optimize their situational awareness and to help them collect and analyze information pertaining to potential terrorist-planning activity and then to share that information with other agencies enrolled in the program. However, the initiative has only a handful of state and local law enforcement agencies participating at the present time.

But police are not the only grassroots defenders. Other people such as neighbors, store clerks, landlords and motel managers can also find themselves in a position to notice operational planning activities. Such activities can include purchasing bombmaking components and firearms, creating improvised explosive mixtures and conducting preoperational surveillance. On July 27, 2011, an alert clerk at a gun store in Killeen, Texas, called the local police after a man who came into the store to buy smokeless powder exhibited an unusual demeanor. They located the individual and after questioning him learned he was planning to detonate an improvised explosive device and conduct an armed assault against a local Killeen restaurant popular with soldiers from nearby Fort Hood. The clerk's situational awareness and his decision to call the police likely saved many lives.

And it's important to remember than an alert street vendor was the first person to sound the alarm in the failed May 2010 Times Square bombing attempt, and it was a concerned family member who provided authorities with the information to thwart a planned November

2010 attack against a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon.

Ordinary citizens exercising situational awareness can and have saved lives. This reality has been the driving force behind programs like the New York Police Department's "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign. This program was subsequently adopted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as a means of encouraging citizens to report potential terrorist behavior.

There is one other factor to consider. As we have previously discussed, counterterrorism spending comes in a perceptible boom-and-bust cycle. Next month will mark the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Since those attacks there has not been a successful large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil. This, along with the budget problems the United States is facing, will increase the current downward trend of counterterrorism funding in the United States and accentuate the need for more grassroots defenders.

"Christian Terrorism"?

By Raymond Ibrahim

Source: http://www.meforum.org/2999/christian-terrorism

In light of the Norway terrorist attack, and as expected, the hail of religious relativism has begun—the idea that, if a "Christian," such as Breivik, commits terrorism, then it is folly to assert that certain Muslim doctrines inspire violence and terror: all becomes relative. A recent AP report titled "'Christian terrorist'? Norway case strikes debate," makes this clear:

As westerners wrestle with such characterizations of the Oslo mass murder suspect, the question arises: Nearly a decade after 9/11 created a widespread suspicion of Muslims based on the actions of a fanatical few, is this what it's like to walk a mile in the shoes of stereotype? "Absolutely," said Mark Kelly Tyler, pastor of Mother Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Philadelphia. "It clearly puts us in a position where we can't simply say that extreme and violent behavior associated with a religious belief is somehow restricted to Muslim extremists." "It speaks to cultural assumptions, how we are able to understand something when it (comes from) us," Tyler said. "When one of us does something terrible, we know that's not how we all think, yet we can't see that with other people." Psychologists say stereotypes come from a deeply human impulse to categorize other people, usually into groups of "us" and "them."

The report goes on to give the opinions of an array of sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, who regurgitate the same aforementioned themes on "a fanatical few," "extreme and violent behavior," "cultural assumptions," and "stereotypes." Not once do any of these soft-scientists bother investigating,

let alone pointing out, what Christianity and Islam actually teach regarding violence.

Nor do they seem cognizant that there is a major difference between what people do in the name of religion and what the religion itself commands—just as there is a major difference between historical descriptions of war in the Bible and timeless prescriptions to wage war in the Koran.

Nor are these important differences limited to theory, but rather manifest themselves in reality: when jihadists attack in the name of Islam, such as on 9/11, high-ranking Muslim clerics praise them and Muslims celebrate in the streets; conversely, no Christian preacher has praised Breivik's terrorism, nor are Christians dancing.

The report continues:

> *"Breivik is not a Christian. That's impossible. No one believing in Jesus commits mass murder," Bill O'Reilly said on his Fox News show. That makes sense to Joyce Dubensky, CEO of the Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding. She said it also makes sense that "millions of Muslims say Osama bin Laden is not a Muslim, that no one who believes in the prophet Muhammad commits mass murder."*

Note again how the stress is entirely on what people "believe" and "say"—not what Christian and Muslim doctrines so unequivocally teach. Worse, that "millions of Muslims say Osama bin Laden is not a Muslim" is a curious

assertion, considering that the Obama administration saw that he was given an Islamic burial so as not to anger the Muslim world (jihadists who go down in sea receive double the brownie points that land-dying jihadists receive—which are already considerable, a la 72 celestial concubines, etc.).

The one rare mention in the report of actual teachings comes from another psychology professor: "If you're a Christian and you see this Norway murderer, you say, I have these teachings and I haven't murdered anyone, so the teachings can't be the problem. But if you're talking about the 'other,' it's different. And if you don't know what the actual Muslim

teachings are, it seems like a plausible explanation."

Quite the contrary, if you know what Islam teaches concerning the jihad and the non-Muslim—tellingly known as the "infidel"—violence becomes a very "plausible explanation."

If lamentable, none of this is surprising: because Western secularists cannot fathom the importance of doctrine to believers; cannot take religion seriously—seeing all scriptures as little better than poetry to be interpreted any which way—they project their indecisive worldview onto the decisive other, much, ironically, to secularism's own detriment.

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Haqqani Network Growing Stronger at the Expense of the Tehrik-e-Taliban

By Arif Jamal
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seems to be slowly disintegrating as various commanders try to pull it in different directions. A clear indication of this process came when the TTP Commander in the Kurram Agency, Fazal Saeed Haqqani, announced that his group had seceded from the TTP (for Fazal Saeed Haqqani, see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 2011). Fazal Saeed Haqqani also announced the formation of a new group called Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP) (Dawn [Karachi] June 28). Haqqani said his group was not happy with the TTP's policy of attacking civilian targets, a major reason for the split. However, Haqqani and his group have been involved in the murders of innocent Shi'a Muslims. In the very first statement to dissociate his new group from the TTP, Haqqani announced that his group would not carry out any attacks on the Pakistani security forces (The News [Karachi] June 28). He also announced that the United States is the TTIP's "main enemy" (Daily Times [Lahore] June 28).

The action of Fazal Saeed Haqqani has completely eliminated the TTP from the Kurram agency, as Haqqani vowed that he would not allow the TTP to operate there: "It is my area and I will ensure that no locals or outsiders oppose our policies and create problems for us

in Kurram Valley" (The News, June 30). Like Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Fazal Saeed Haqqani is closely allied with the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan (Dawn, July 5). The Haqqani Network desperately needed a foothold in the Kurram agency, which only Fazal Saeed Haqqani could provide. According to Mansur Khan Mehsud of the FATA Research Center, Fazal Saeed Haqqani is occupying a portion of the main road, the Thall-Parachinar road, connecting Kurram Agency with the rest of the country. While still a TTP commander, Fazal Saeed Haqqani did not allow Shi'a Muslim residents to use that road. Consequently, they had to go to Afghanistan first to go to other parts of Pakistan. [1] With Fazal Saeed Haqqani in charge of that road, the Haqqani Network and other Taliban militants can use the Kurram Agency as their base to carry out attacks inside Afghanistan or to provide sanctuary. [2]

NATO forces in Afghanistan identified the Haqqani Network as the group responsible for a brazen attack using nine suicide bombers against Kabul's luxury Intercontinental Hotel on June 28 that killed 20 people, including the suicide bombers (AP, June 30). Shortly afterward, the Haqqani Network suffered a major blow when NATO troops and Afghan

Special Forces mounted a raid on a Haqqani Network training camp in Afghanistan's Paktika Province. The July 20-22 operation killed more than 50 insurgents in a base said to be used as a staging point for Haqqani Network and foreign fighters. A large stockpile of arms was seized in the operation, which NATO sources said was based on intelligence provided by disenchanted insurgents (Daily Times, July 23; AFP July 22; Reuters July 22).

Nevertheless, Fazal Saeed Haqqani's rebellion against the TTP has immensely strengthened the Haqqani Network while weakening the TTP. According to one report, TTP commander Hakimullah Mehsud has become more and more isolated over the last year (Express Tribune [Karachi], July 5). On June 27, Hakimullah suffered a setback when unknown persons killed Shakirullah Shakir, a spokesman for the Fidayeen-e-Islam [suicide-bombing] wing of the TTP. Shakirullah was to replace Qari Hussain Mehsud, who was killed in an October 2010 drone strike and was known as Ustad-e-Fidayeen (master [or teacher] of the suicide bombers) (Daily Times [Lahore] June 28). Commander Tariq Afridi's Taliban group in Darra Adamkhel and Khalid Omar's Mohmand group are already operating independently of the TTP. Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber Agency, led by Mangal Bagh, is pro-Army and does not accept TTP patronage. The TTP breakup is a great success for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which has been working for some months to deliver Kurram Agency to the Haqqani Network so that it could operate more freely in view of the emerging regional scenario

(see Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2010). Distrust among the TTP militants seems to be growing. According to another report, Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman rarely meet; when they do, they do not meet alone and only after making sure neither of them is carrying arms (Dawn, July 5). Fazal Saeed rebelled against the TTP on the eve of the military operation that started on July 3. Army troops moved into the central Kurram agency from the town of Sadda and Tal area in Hangu District, backed by helicopters, tanks, and artillery. The aim of the operation was to destroy the militants still loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud (The News, July 4). Although this military operation was ostensibly initiated against the militants, Shi'a Muslim residents believe it is equally directed against them. A knowledgeable Pakistani columnist, Dr. Mohammad Taqi, says that the operation is aimed at opening the Thall-Parachinar road for the Haqqani Network and other pro-Army jihadi groups (Daily Times, July 7). More importantly, it is aimed at punishing those people in the Kurram Agency who have resisted the Haqqani Network and the Pakistan Army's support for the Taliban. The balance of power has shifted in favor of the Haqqani Network for the first time with Fazal Saeed Haqqani openly on their side. Although several local Shi'a leaders in Upper Kurram vow to fight back, it is safe to say that they are losing the battle, at least for now. [3]

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Notes:

1. Mansur Khan Mehsud, "TTP Divided in Kurram Agency," FATA Research Center, n.d., http://www.frc.com.pk/linkc/articlecont/41.

2. For the strategic importance of this road for the Pakistan army and the Haqqani Network, see Dr. Mohammad Taqi, "Comment: The Sham operation in Kurram," Daily Times, Lahore, July 7. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C07%5C07%5Cstory_7-7-2011_pg3_2.

3. Telephone interviews with some local leaders through research assistant, July 2011.

U.S. mulls terror list for Haqqani network

Source:http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/09/28/US-mulls-terror-list-for-Haqqani-network/UPI-37541317185545/#ixzz1ZK5yeAPH

The United States is reviewing (Sept 28, 2011), whether to place the entire Haqqani network on the terror list, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said.

France: 100-150 mosques in progress

Source:http://www.20minutes.fr/article/765248/entre-100-150-mosquees-construction-france

100-150 mosques are currently being built in France, the president of the French Council of the Muslim Faith, Mohammed Moussaoui, told RTL. Moussaoui said that most are financed by the worshipers and very few from abroad. The interior minister, Claude Guéant, said three months ago that in the past decade the number of mosques increased from 1000 to 2000. Guéant wants to stop Friday prayers in

the streets. According to Moussaoui, 17-23% of French Muslims go to Friday prayers, which he says distinguishes between the practicing and non-practicing Muslims. He repeated that prayers in the streets were outrageous, but stemmed from lack of places in mosques. According to a senior official, there are 17 mosques in Paris, all filled up, and they can't accommodate more than 13,000 people, which is clearly insufficient.

Mumbai bombings tied to homegrown group

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/mumbai-bombings-tied-homegrown-group

Indian government officials have focused on domestic terror, indicating that last month's triple-bombing in Mumbai was the work of a homegrown group, the Indian Mujahideen.

The three bombs, detonated during rush hour, killed twenty-six and wounded more than 130, were the first attacks in Mumbai since the November, 2008 attack that riveted the world.

No one has claimed responsibility for the attacks three weeks ago. A police investigation is still ongoing, and according to Home minister P. Chidambaram, all indications are that a homegrown group is responsible.

Investigators' suspicion has fallen on the Indian Mujahideen, a shadowy group with ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani terror group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Those attacks resulted in accusations by India of Pakistani involvement, and the subsequent suspension of peace talks between the two

sides. The peace talks were resumed earlier this year.

The Indian Mujahideen is also held responsible for three smaller attacks, including a bombing in the capital, New Delhi.

The recent coordinated triple-bombing made use of ammonium nitrate-based explosives, the same formulation used by Indian Mujahideen in its previous attacks.

The Indian Mujahideen sprouted from the outlawed Students' Islamic Movement of India, a group described in a WikiLeaks-released cable from the U.S Embassy as "a radical fringe of technically savvy disaffected Indian Muslims who embrace Islamic extremism in response to perceived injustices by the Hindu majority."

The Indian Mujahideen made contact with Lashkar-e-Taiba after 2002, and were provided by them with with weapons and bomb

production training. For their part, Lashkar-e-Taiba denies any links to the Indian terror group.

Indian officials are also scrupulously avoiding any mention of Pakistani influence of any kind with the Indian Mujahideen attacks, since there are continued peace talks between Indian and Pakistani officials currently underway. Pakistani officials did not comment on the attacks.

The official line is that there have been no demands made or responsibility claimed in the recent attacks, that they are just general, undirected mayhem. However, the breakdown of peace talks between India and Pakistan is likely a goal shared by both Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Indian Mujahideen.

Conspiracy of fire - The Globalization Of Anarcho-Terrorism
Source: http://iacsp.com/latest_article.php

Origins - Ancient and Modern
The term "anarchy" is rooted in ancient Greek; meaning "without a leader". As a philosophical worldview, "anarchism" began thousands of years ago with the founder of Stoicism: Zeno of Crete. Zeno "repudiated the omnipotence of the state, its intervention and regimentation, and proclaimed sovereignty of the moral law of the individual", according to the renown Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin.

in the arena of ideas and actions against the state. Any rebel can make brash statements, but the Greeks back it up with action, and thus have won the respect and admiration of their comrades throughout the world.

The Greek anarchists even enjoy some degree of autonomy in their urban sanctuary called Exarcheia - a neighborhood of Athens notorious for its counter-cultural and radical demographic. Even the police don't enter

Today, Greece maintains that anarchist pedigree. In the eyes of their comrades around the world, the modern Greek anarchist embodies the ideal anti-authoritarian. The Greek anarchists have become the gladiators

Exarcheia unless necessary, lest they provoke a riot.

But far from satisfied, Greek anarchists are radical as ever, incited by economic crisis and austerity measures that have followed.

Memories of state oppression when Greece was ruled by a dictatorship persist among the masses, providing an authentic backdrop to their special brand of anarchism.

The fact that Greece is currently a democracy, however, is not sufficient to pacify the wrath of Greek insurrectionary anarchists, who threaten to oppose authority in whatever form it takes, as a matter of principle.

Embassy Bombings: Athens

On 1-2 November 2010, anonymous adversaries sent parcel-bombs to various targets in Athens and other cities in Europe.

The targets included the embassies of Belgium, Mexico, Chile, Germany, France, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Russia; the International Court of Justice in The Hague; the offices of

speculations that Al-Qaeda might have been behind the plot.

Theories of jihad however were soon replaced by the sinking realization that this was a case of domestic terrorism, as an obscure Greek anarchist group calling itself "The Conspiracy of Fire Cells" issued a communique claiming responsibility and declaring its intention to continue attacks, especially citing the ongoing social welfare austerity measures as motivation:

"Today it is imperative to launch a new phase in the development of revolutionary thought and action. A quantum leap that will bring common ends, which are hundreds of miles away, one step closer. Our goal is to create a unified anti-authoritarian international network of guerrilla groups and autonomous

President Nicholas Sarkozy of France, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and German Chancellor Angela Merkel; the European Law Enforcement Organization of the European Union (Europol); and Eurojust, the EU legal organization dedicated to combating organized crime.

With one exception, all these bombs were either intercepted or exploded without casualties (the bomb sent to the Mexican embassy exploded en route and injured the courier employee, causing minor injures). But the coordinated attack effectively terrorized Greece during an election week, and raised

individuals.....[This will involve] coordinating subversive activities and attacks at the international level. [Such global coordination will facilitate the exchange of] knowledge in the field of sabotage [and] collective solidarity" [with] imprisoned comrades, [and] an infrastructure to support wanted rebels."

The Conspiracy of Fire's statement continued in declaring solidarity with eco-terror groups such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), as well the Italian anarchist group FAI (Federation Anarchy Informal), the anarchist Mexican group Praxedis G. Guerrero Autonomous Cells, for

Immediate Revolution; and the armed Argentinean insurgents (the Luciano Arruga Brigades).

Furthermore, the Conspiracy of Fire's communique glorified and encouraged the terror-tactics used by these groups which include:

- The placement or delivery of explosive devices targeting politicians, security forces and police barracks, court houses, and other "symbols of power";
- Attacks on tourist offices and embassies;
- IEDs and firebombs targeting police vehicles;
- IEDs and firebombs targeting construction equipment;
- Sabotage of construction equipment;
- Arson, specifically targeting banks;
- Vandalism;
- Theft of weapons from police;
- Robbery from targeted entities

The Conspiracy of Fire then presented a timeframe for the start of its "new phase", stating that they hoped to be "presenting

integrated international calls" in coming months. This theme of internationalization would increasingly become a motivating factor for the group.

On 4 December 2010, Greek authorities responded by carrying out a major counter-terrorism operation targeting the Conspiracy and other anarchist-insurgency groups such as the Revolutionary Struggle. In addition to arrests, authorities confiscated weapons

including AK-47 assault rifles, semi-automatic firearms, grenades, TNT, and ammonium nitrate explosives.

But the arrests only served to empower the reputation of the Conspiracy of Fire Cells around the world. Anarchists from America to Russia carried out acts of solidarity to honor the imprisoned comrades in Greece.

Embassy Bombings: Rome

On 23 December 2010, parcel-bombs were sent to the Chilean and Swiss embassies in Rome, only a month after the similar attack in Athens.

The packages exploded in the hands of the two embassy employees who opened them. Two days later, a letter-bomb arrived at the Greek embassy in Rome, but was neutralized. The claim of responsibility came from a militant anarchist group called the Federation Anarchy Informal - in Italian; Federazione Anarchica Informal (FAI):

"We attacked again and we did it in response to the appeal of Greek comrades from "Conspiracy of Fire Cells". For this reason we attacked, anew, one of the structures representing the Greek state and its servants in support to the comrades who were arrested in Athens and for the "Conspiracy"-plan which, like ours, is based on the practices and the method of revolutionary violence. We have decided to make our voice heard again through words and actions. Destroy the system of domination. Long live FAI, long live Anarchy. Federazione Anarchica Informal revolutionary cell Lambros Fountas".

A Shared Legacy of Terror
Modern anarchist theories spread through Greece and southern Europe in the 19th century with the influence of revolutionaries like Mikhail Bakunin.

Anarchists in Italy and Greece have long and Greek Emmanouel Dadaoglou. The two later took leading roles in the insurrection against King Otto of Greece in 1862.

This tradition of cooperation between Greek and Italian revolutionaries survives today in the relationship between the Conspiracy of Fire

shared close ties. The "Democrats Club", perhaps the first anarchist group in Greece, was co-founded by Italian Amilcare Cipriani Cells and the FAI. Not only do the two groups emulate each others' tactics, but they have even named units in honor of each other.

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SAS scouts shopping centres as fears of London 2012 terror attack grow

Source:http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2011/04/11/sas-scouts-shopping-centres-as-fears-of-london-2012 -terror-attack-grow-115875-23052564/#ixzz1UGcSlgIT

THE SAS is secretly scouting major shopping centres amid fears of an attack by Islamic extremists during the 2012 Games.

An insider confirmed the news as a report claimed that terrorists could be planning a Mumbai-style raid during the Olympics.

Risk consultants Exclusive Analysis said "soft targets" such as pubs were most likely to be hit but singled out the Westfield Stratford City shopping centre, in East London, as being at high risk.

The group also warned against focusing on Islamists, saying Irish republican dissidents were plotting to disrupt the Olympic torch route. The Association of Chief Police Officers dismissed the study as "inaccurate".

Westfield Stratford City shopping centre

How to Forecast and Preempt al-Qaeda's Catastrophic Terrorist Warfare

By Joshua Sinai, Ph.D.
Source: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/sinaiforecast.htm

The aim of this article is to provoke consideration of a new way to conceptualize al-Qaeda's intentions and plans to conduct catastrophic warfare against the United States, its allies, and other threatened nations around the world. In response to the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001, follow-on attacks in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and several thwarted plots in Europe, anticipating and preventing future attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groupings have become first-order national security priorities for many of the world's intelligence and law enforcement communities. Such analysis is also required in the nongovernmental, open-source communities as well. Although it is difficult to predict the likelihood of every major attack by a group such as al-Qaeda, because terrorist groups have the advantage of striking at a time and location of their choosing, there already exists a wealth of diagnostically predictive indicators pointing to the next waves of catastrophic attacks by a group such as al-Qaeda and its network of terrorist allies.

This article outlines seven predictive attack indicators to forecast catastrophic terrorism. Political leaders, policy planners, and military, intelligence, and law enforcement operators at all levels will greatly improve their capabilities to respond to the terrorist challenge if they operationalize these predictive indicators against al-Qaeda's historic and potential strategies, tactics, and targeting. Such "red-teaming" of a terrorist group's warfare potential is similar to the way military commanders play adversary forces (the "red teams") against their own forces (the "blue teams").

Building a robust predictive capability to anticipate and preemptively prevent attacks by groups such as al-Qaeda now is more important than ever because of their determination to inflict catastrophic damage upon their adversaries. As demonstrated by the suicide attacks against Australian and British tourists in Bali, Indonesia; Israeli tourists in Mombassa, Kenya (where an additional 250 Israeli lives could have been lost had the Arkia airliner been hit by the shoulder-fired rocket); and the large residential complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, housing American and other foreign families; as well as a suicide attack by two British al-Qaeda operatives on a popular seaside bar in Tel Aviv; al-Qaeda is as determined as ever to demonstrate its viability as the world's most lethal terrorist group.

The catastrophic attacks of 11 September and the follow-on poisonous anthrax letter campaign (which reportedly was not carried out by al-Qaeda) have ushered in a new terrorist warfare paradigm in which attacks against the United States and its allies have vastly escalated in the lethality of their weaponry and targeting. The threshold from "conventional" low-impact terrorist warfare has been crossed, as demonstrated by the horrific attacks against the World Trade Center and news reports about interest in acquiring or actual experimentation by al-Qaeda in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices and weapons—however crude and low tech. As a consequence of these factors, the new means of terrorist attacks we are likely to face will involve not only such weapons of mass destruction and disruption but conventional means to attack critical infrastructural targets such as nuclear and chemical plants, agricultural nodes such as livestock feeding centers, and the heart of the American and world economy—such as the New York Stock Exchange—with catastrophic human and economic consequences. Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network and its satellite affiliates are the most likely groups to carry out such catastrophic attacks because of their intent—a virulent hatred of their adversaries—capability, and resources.

As the top leaders, members of sleeper and active cells, and other operatives of al-Qaeda and its allies are being arrested or killed in their former centers of gravity in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other parts of the world (reportedly, some 3,000 operatives, forming one-third to one-half of the group's upper and lower echelons, have been eliminated as active

terrorists), there still undoubtedly remain hundreds of new leaders, operatives, and sleeper cells armed with target folders for the next waves of catastrophic terrorist operations. The U.S.-led overthrow of al-Qaeda's Taliban allies in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, as well as holding Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in detention centers such as Guantanamo Bay, cumulatively are likely to serve as major triggers for their remaining operatives to seek catastrophic revenge on behalf of their fallen, retreating, or arrested comrades.

To forecast the next waves of likely catastrophic terrorist attacks, this analysis uses a methodology based on seven predictive attack indicators, generated from al-Qaeda's mindset, modus operandi, and target selection based on its training handbook (available on the Department of Justice website); public statements by bin Laden and his associates that have been broadcast on television news programs; and the extensive media reporting of the group's previous failed attacks and plots (as outlined in captured documents), which often serve as blueprints for its future targeting.

To anticipate, preempt, and deter future catastrophic attacks, the following methodology employing seven predictive attack indicators can be operationalized to forecast the next waves of al-Qaeda terrorist operations, as outlined in the following threat matrix.

Methodology to Forecast Catastrophic Terrorism Against the U.S. Homeland

Indications and Warning Indicators and Observables Preceding the 11 September 2001 Attacks

Terrorist Group	Al-Qaeda	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Previous Attacks or Plots	1993 World Trade Center bombing 1993 plots against Holland Tunnel, Empire State Building, UN headquarters Mid-1990s plot to bomb CIA headquarters December 1999 plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport October 2000 bombing of USS *Cole* September 2001 plot to crash aircraft into U.S. Capitol and White House	Dec. 1994 attempt to plunge airliner into Eiffel Tower
Modus Operandi	Meticulous planning as outlined in captured al-Qaeda training manual Innovative operationally and tactically • Training to fly commercial aircraft at U.S. and other flight schools • Seek highly visible and symbolic targets	
Weapons and Devices	Interest and training in using commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction	

State Sponsor Ties	Afghanistan's Taliban rulers provided safe haven and logistical support State sponsor Iraq seeks vengeance against United States	
Geography	Worldwide operational cells, including cells in the United States	
Significant Historical Dates	12 September date of sentencing of African embassy bombing conspirators	
Triggers	12 September sentencing date of conspirators held in lower Manhattan triggered attack on 11 September	
= Terror Attacks	**11 September simultaneous suicide bombing attacks against World Trade Center and Pentagon**	

Attack indicator #1: Previous terrorist attacks, failed attacks, or plots not yet executed, which serve as blueprints for intentions and future targeting

Al-Qaeda and its allies have carried out numerous successful attacks since the early 1990s; however, they also have experienced quite a few significant failed attacks. In other cases, some plots have never been executed. Synthesizing the lessons learned from a group's successful attacks, failed attacks, and plots can generate insight into its future intentions and capabilities. Plots, for example, can be uncovered by covertly penetrating a group, capturing its documents, or interrogating its apprehended operatives. In the case of al-Qaeda, much insight into its warfare proclivity can be gained by examining its training manual, which spells out missions that include destroying a nation's foreign embassies, critical infrastructure nodes (such as vital economic sectors and bridges), and even places of amusement (because they are considered sinful).

Underlying the first predictive indicator are some of the following historical observables and actions:

- The February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center towers. This attack resulted in extensive property damage and some loss of life but failed to bring down the towers. The bombing was intended to be accompanied by the bombing of several other targets in New York City, such as the Empire State Building, the Holland Tunnel, and United Nations headquarters.
- In December 1994, an al-Qaeda affiliate, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, hijacked an Air France Airbus with 171 passengers aboard, intending to plunge it into the Eiffel Tower. None of the hijackers could fly the aircraft to its intended target, so, instead, the plane landed in Marseilles, where French police stormed it.
- In the mid-1990s, Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, while in the Philippines, plotted to blow up 11 U.S. airliners and, in a separate plot, fly planes filled with explosives into the CIA headquarters in Langley, VA, and nuclear facilities elsewhere in the United States.
- In December 1999, an al-Qaeda affiliate was involved in a foiled plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. At the same time, al-Qaeda operatives were foiled by Jordanian security authorities in their attempt to blow up tourist sites in Jordan, and internal hurdles prevented them from bombing the U.S.S. *Sullivans* in the Yemeni port of Aden.

- On 8 September 2001, two al-Qaeda operatives pretending to be journalists assassinated Northern Alliance commander General Ahmed Shah Masoud at his Afghanistan base by detonating a bomb concealed in their video camera.
- The airplane that ultimately crashed into the Pentagon during the 11 September hijackings reportedly also targeted the U.S. Capitol and the White House. The fourth airplane, which crashed in a Pennsylvania field, reportedly was unable to crash into the U.S. Capitol or the White House, or, in another published although unconfirmed scenario, was en route to crash into a nuclear facility.
- Al-Qaeda operatives had planned to hijack airplanes in Britain and crash them into the Houses of Parliament and London's Tower Bridge.

Operationalizing attack indicator #1 yields this forecasting assessment: the 11 September bombing of the World Trade Center signifies that when al-Qaeda fails in its initial mission (in this case, the abortive 1993 attack), it is likely to return—whatever length of time is required to prepare for the next mission—to complete that objective. It can be surmised, therefore, that al-Qaeda operatives are likely to persist in their objective of attacking the following that are part of their target folder (all information is entirely speculative): the Holland Tunnel, the Empire State Building, United Nations headquarters, the Eiffel Tower, the CIA headquarters, the U.S. Capitol, the White House, and nuclear power facilities. In addition, Disney World amusement parks are likely targets. In Britain, the Houses of Parliament and the Tower Bridge, which reportedly were contemplated by al-Qaeda as part of their 11 September worldwide attack repertoire, are still likely to remain at the top of al-Qaeda's ranking of trophy targets.

In addition, the September 2001 assassination of General Masoud by operatives in disguise and several attempts since then to assassinate members of the current Afghan leadership portend continuous efforts by al-Qaeda operatives and their allies to assassinate leaders of their adversaries. Of particular concern are likely efforts by these terrorist operatives to carry out their assassination attempts in disguise or to use operatives who do not fit regular profile attributes in order to evade possible detection.

Attack indicator #2: A terrorist group's modus operandi, especially tactics

Al-Qaeda's modus operandi, as demonstrated by the 11 September attacks and outlined in its training manual, involves meticulous planning, training, and precisely timed simultaneous execution. Such warfare capability is attained through extensive training and operational and tactical innovations.

Based on its modus operandi, publicly announced intentions, and previous actions, al-Qaeda's future attacks will likely involve some of the following tactics:

- Truck bomb attacks on the ground or using aerial or maritime delivery means, such as miniature submarines or shipborne containers, to transport chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices to a targeted site.
- Driving a truck loaded with a hazardous-material explosives against a prominent target, such as a tunnel, bridge, or busy downtown area.
- Detonating a radioactive dispersal device (a "dirty" bomb) near a nuclear power facility or a major financial center, such as the New York Stock Exchange.

Attack indicator #3: Use of particular types of weapons and devices that a terrorist group perceives will achieve its objectives

The simultaneous suicide bombing attacks of 11 September portend that the next phase will likely involve even more catastrophic assaults, with each successive plot employing highly innovative and deadlier weapons and devices to inflict maximum casualties and physical damage.

Current news reporting is filled with discussions of possible chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks by al-Qaeda operatives. Such speculation is not without foundation. Bin Laden's Afghan training camps taught skills for using weapons of mass destruction—such as feeding poison gas through the air vents of office buildings. Other reports claimed that bin Laden's operatives tried to obtain uranium from the former Soviet republics but instead were given low-grade reactor fuel and radioactive garbage. Also possible, in this catastrophic scenario, are attacks that would use conventional or unconventional explosives against a nuclear power plant or chemical facility.

A chemical attack could be carried out by a crop-dusting plane spraying sections of a city. One of al-Qaeda's operatives who was involved in the 11 September attacks reportedly had in his possession a manual for operating crop-dusting equipment, so such an attack should not be discounted.

Another worst-case scenario might involve al-Qaeda operatives crashing a truck into the New York Stock Exchange building (which reportedly has inadequate perimeter defenses) to detonate a dirty bomb mixed with conventional and radioactive materials. Such an attack would render the stock exchange and its immediate surroundings inactive for weeks, setting off temporary worldwide economic turmoil—although this might be offset by the backup computer data storage systems located elsewhere.

The London Stock Exchange, which has already been contemplated as a target by al-Qaeda, represents another likely trophy target, also with potentially devastating economic consequences worldwide.

Based on al-Qaeda's intention to inflict maximum economic damage, another worst-case scenario involves a biological agent attack against a U.S. agricultural sector, which would produce an impact similar to that of the foot-and-mouth outbreak that devastated British agriculture. Such an attack would also severely impact the U.S. and worldwide commodities trading market. Similarly, a terrorist-induced outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome would devastate a region's tourism or export industries.

Attack indicator #4: The objectives of a group's state sponsor

State sponsors are crucial to terrorist groups engaging in catastrophic warfare because the resources of a state can be helpful in so many ways. Afghanistan's Taliban rulers provided bin Laden and al-Qaeda with a safe haven. Saddam's regime in Iraq, until its overthrow, may have provided the group with some degree of support because of the convergence of their objectives, particularly in taking revenge against the United States. According to press reports, terrorists have been trained at Iraqi camps in chemical and biological warfare and in flying commercial aircraft. Press reports also indicated that an al-Qaeda operative, Muhammad Ataf, met an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague several times. Iran now is reported to provide al-Qaeda with logistical and other forms of support, including collaboration with Iran's terrorist proxy, the Lebanese Hizballah.

Although there may be few apparent smoking guns, it is reasonable to assume that al-Qaeda is interested in obtaining the support of Iran's radical clerical leaders in mounting its catastrophic warfare against their common adversaries. Such state support would provide al-Qaeda with access to certain types of weapons of mass destruction that would be difficult for the group to obtain on its own.

Attack indicator #5: The geographic factor

The geographic factor is a crucial predictive indicator because it pinpoints a group's operational center of gravity and logistical capability to reach, conduct surveillance of, and attack its adversary. Al Qaeda is the umbrella organization of an international network of like-minded groups with hundreds of cells around the world. These groups operate as planets in al-Qaeda's solar system, which makes them highly dangerous because they already possess the infrastructure to carry out terrorist attacks in any part of the world, as demonstrated by their capability to carry out attacks with relative ease in dispersed countries such the Philippines, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, and Kenya, with

reported sleeper cells in Western countries such as Britain, Spain, and the United States. Already, al-Qaeda operatives have carried out or attempted to carry out attacks against American targets in these countries, including a thwarted attempt by an al-Qaeda cell to attack American and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Moreover, al-Qaeda has expanded its geographic target folder to include Israel, as demonstrated by its successful attack in Kenya against Israeli tourists and the near-miss attack against the Israeli airliner. In fact, in May 2003, two British nationals allegedly affiliated with al-Qaeda traveled to Israel to carry out a suicide bombing of a popular bar in Tel Aviv.

Based on this predictive indicator, potential regions to be targeted by al-Qaeda are likely to range from the United States to foreign lands, especially those where the United States maintains facilities that represent significant trophy targets, such as military bases or symbols of America's economy—a fast food restaurant chain, a hotel chain, a cruise liner, or car dealerships.

Attack indicator #6: Historical dates of particular significance to terrorist groups

Terrorist groups, particularly religious groups, place a high premium on historical dates that are significant to their religion or their religio-ethnic community. Other types of historical dates, such as politically or militarily traumatic events, are also significant. 11 September may have been especially significant because the conspirators who carried out the 1998 African embassy bombings were to be sentenced the following day for their crimes. During that period, the conspirators were in a holding cell at a courthouse in downtown Manhattan near the World Trade Center, which fact may have propelled the terrorists to attack on the preceding day.

Other significant historical dates that are likely to trigger future al-Qaeda attacks are

- 17 January (the commencement of Operation Desert Storm)
- 19 March (Jerusalem Day proclaimed by Ayatollah Khomeini to demand the "liberation" of Jerusalem)
- 30 March (referred to by Israeli Arabs as "Land Day," it features protests against alleged expropriation of Arab property)
- 7 May (Israeli independence day)
- 31 May (the annual pilgrimage in Mecca begins)
- 5 June (the beginning of the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and her Arab neighbors)
- 4 July (U.S. Independence Day)
- 31 December–1 January (New Year's Day)

Attack indicator #7: Triggers that propel a group to launch attacks in a revenge mode as quickly as possible ahead of a previous timeline

A spectrum of triggers propels terrorist groups to hasten the timing of terrorist attacks, usually resulting from sudden developments, such as a severe military setback. For example, al-Qaeda's conspiracy for the 11 September attacks began some two years prior to the attacks, but 12 September may have served as a trigger for the attacks to occur on the previous day.

New and devastating al-Qaeda attacks are likely to be triggered in response to its recent military defeats, particularly in Afghanistan, the detention of their captured operatives in centers at Guantanamo Bay and other areas, the overthrow of their previous state sponsors in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other factors.

Conclusions

The 11 September attacks and follow-on operations are part of al-Qaeda's asymmetric warfare against the United States and its allies, in which small, fanatically dedicated teams are employed to inflict maximum psychological and physical damage on their much more powerful adversaries.

Terrorist attacks by groups such as al-Qaeda are intended to be catastrophic in terms of human and physical damage in order to punish and send a strong political message to the targeted adversary and to the group's constituents that the group is a world-class destroyer and political force to be reckoned with. In response, the United States, Britain, and their allies have greatly upgraded their intelligence, situational awareness, and defensive, preemptive, and deterrence postures.

Failing to anticipate the 11 September horrific attacks represented more than a failure of intelligence—it was a failure of imagination. Previously, such attacks were viewed as too grandiose and farfetched to be taken serious by intelligence and law enforcement authorities. Now these attacks, the attacks that have been thwarted, and other plots are perceived as likely blueprints for future catastrophic terrorist operations against the United States and its allies.

Security and risk assessment professionals must always adopt proactive measures to anticipate, defend against, and preempt new types of terrorist threats. Moreover, one should not expect past trends to necessarily reveal future attack patterns because terrorists, especially al-Qaeda planners, always seek to exploit new vulnerabilities and new and innovative modes of warfare in order to evade detection and inflict maximum damage. Therefore, to avert catastrophic attacks that previously were considered beyond the imagination of those responsible for security, we need to begin thinking like the terrorist enemy—always anticipating and preparing to counteract new types of attacks and targeting potentialities. Continuous red-teaming is required, using outside-the-box threat and risk assessments and the most advanced (yet user-friendly) computerized predictive analytic tool kits. Such red-teaming must focus on multidimensional, not unidimensional, baskets of potential threats. Above all, emphasis must be placed on intelligence tracking of suspected terrorist networks, cells, and operatives; detection; and, above all, preemption during the earliest possible pre-attack incubatory phases.

Within this context, this threat assessment is intended to provide some of the initial conceptual means to anticipate and prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks, such as those that occurred on 11 September, from occurring again.

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Piracy's Emerging Market: The Gulf of Guinea
By David Rider
Source: http://gcaptain.com/piracys-emerging-market-gulf?29024

Despite the best efforts of the world's navies and EU NAVFOR in particular, piracy in the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden and Red Sea areas shows no sign of abating. Quite the contrary,

according to a report released by the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre in July this year. Of the incidents reported, over sixty percent

were conducted by pirate gangs operating off the coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea. Indeed, the attacks were becoming more violent and pirates were taking much greater risks, the IMB stated.

The success of Somali pirates has not gone unnoticed by criminals in other parts of the African continent. Since May this year, there have been increasing reports of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and off the coast of West Africa. The incidents prompted the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre to issue a specific warning in June, citing eight attacks off Cotonou, Benin. Since then, the number of attacks has increased

particular.

According to a Reuters report*, the Gulf of Guinea produces more than 3 million barrels of oil a day, equivalent to 4% of the global total. This oil is ultimately destined for Europe and the USA, while some sources suggest that the USA will be receiving up to 25% of its oil supplies from the region by 2015.

With so much potentially at stake it is perhaps remarkable that little is being done on the international stage to combat piracy in the region. Local coastal defences are seen as weak, while the coastline itself is craggy and offers a variety of hiding places for potential attackers. Although thus far, only 27 or so attacks on vessels in the area have been reported by the IMB, the actual number incidents may be far higher, thanks primarily to the definition of 'piracy'.

Somali pirates operate a 'blue ocean' form of piracy, attacking vessels in international waters, which in turn means their crimes are legally recognised as "acts of piracy". The attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Nigeria occur in national or coastal waters, and therefore do not legally qualify as "acts of piracy". Semantics aside, if armed men board your vessel and threaten your crew and cargo, it is hard to not call it an act of piracy. However, the law is the law.

At its most basic, piracy off the coast of Somalia can be seen as having a clear root in economics and the inevitable outcome of a failed nation state dating back 20 years. Piracy or, more correctly, criminal attacks upon vessels in the Gulf of Guinea region is simply that: maritime banditry in an area insufficiently protected by the world's navies. Intelligence

significantly, although it's virtually impossible to accurately gauge the amount of pirate activity due to insufficient reporting from the region. One security analyst told Reuters that, "In Nigeria it is estimated that approximately 60 percent of pirate attacks go unreported"*.

The Gulf of Guinea is regarded as an important, emerging trade hub, spanning a dozen countries from the tip of Northwest Africa to Angola in the South. It is a valuable source of oil, and pirates in the region are currently targeting diesel and oil tankers in

sources on the ground are now seemingly acknowledging that the attacks in West Africa are very different in tone to their Somali counterparts. A report carried by the Associated Press quoted Bergen Risk Solutions, a Norway-based consultancy:

"Our investigations indicate that the organised group responsible is based in Nigeria and has high-level patronage in that country," it said, with prominent Nigerians having often been accused of involvement in the lucrative black market for oil and fuel. This cargo, Bergen suggests, has been sold in: "several West African ports, possibly including Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire and Port Gentil in Gabon."

What the experts cannot say with any certainty, however, is why there has been such a surge in attacks in recent months. For instance, the international community has not seen a significant, proportionate fall in such incidents in Nigeria. With no international naval presence at the ready, it falls upon local agencies, such as the Benin Navy, to provide assistance. It has further been suggested that a number of shipping companies won't even call them in, for fear of increasing their insurance premiums. A report on businessday.co.za suggested that, 'insurance items due to piracy have doubled the costs of transporting goods past the Horn of Africa,' and there is no reason to believe that West Africa and the GoG should be any different in terms of insurance risk.

In response to the recent spate of activity, Bloomberg carried a report on August 5, stating that The Joint War Committee, which represents Lloyd's of London underwriters and other insurers, extended a war-risk zone for Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer, and included waters off neighbouring Benin and listed the areas as higher-risk for shipping. The Nigerian risk zone now extends to 200 nautical miles (230 miles) offshore.

While the entire region is experiencing significant mineral wealth, it falls upon governments to ensure that this wealth is redistributed amongst the population or, to quote Reuters, "...the temptation to take a slice of the goods passing under their noses on the way to the richer world may prove irresistible for some."

It would seem clear that the world's governments, and particularly those countries whose energy usage relies upon imports from the area, could make a significant difference to piracy in this region. At present, the area to police is significantly smaller than that in the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean, which EU NAVFOR vessels regularly patrol, but the level of violence being used by pirates in their attacks in the GoG region is causing deep concern amongst international bodies such as the IMB. A concerted effort by the world's navies, in league with countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin could nip the problem in the bud, long before it escalates to proportions rivalling Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.

On August 5th, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced that plans had been tabled for maritime administrations in Togo, Republic of Benin and Nigeria to meet with relevant stakeholders to deliberate on ways of enhancing maritime safety in the region. A spokesperson for Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Lami Tumaka, stated that the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Centre (RMAC) is equipped with the Automatic Identification System (AIS), Radar and video cameras.

The spokesperson said that the AIS identifies all vessels with the AIS transponders onboard, while those without the AIS are tracked with Radar while video cameras provide live pictures of all vessels along the Nigerian coastal waters. While the statement may reassure some ship owners, it is also true that many vessels turn their AIS transponders off to reduce the threat of attack from pirates in the Indian Ocean*, and there is no reason to expect vessels in fear of attack by bandits in the GoG will behave differently.

An immediate solution to the problems being experienced by seafarers in the area would not appear to be on the horizon. This, however, is a work in progress. In the meantime, the job of securing cargoes, crews and corporate reputations will likely fall upon the private security provider, meaning insurance discounts and a significant sense of relief in both boardrooms and bridges.

amphibious counter-terrorism, Neptune Maritime Security's team of highly trained, highly motivated specialists are supremely qualified in the area that concerns shipping companies most: safeguarding crew, cargo and corporate reputations

How Jihad Influenced the Norway Massacre

By Raymond Ibrahim
Source: http://www.meforum.org/3007/norway-massacre-jihad

In his manifesto, Anders Breivik, the perpetrator of the Norway massacre, in which 80 people were killed and many wounded, mentioned the Crusades and aspects of it as they had been an inspirational factor to him. Predictably, Western elites—especially through the mainstream media—have begun a new round of moral, cultural, and historical relativism, some even conflating the terrorist with former President Bush, who once used the word "crusade."

The fact is, there are important parallels between the Crusades and Breivik's actions—but hardly the way portrayed by the media. Ironically, this terrorist attack, like the historic Crusades, was influenced by the doctrine of jihad.

While many are aware that historically the Crusades were a retaliation to centuries of Muslim aggression (see Rodney Stark's God's Battalions: The Case for the Crusades), few are aware that the idea of Christian "holy war"—notably the use of violence in the name of Christianity and the notion that Crusaders who die are martyrs forgiven their sins—finds its ideological origins in Muslim jihad.

As historian Bernard Lewis puts it, "Even the Christian crusade, often compared with the Muslim jihad, was itself a delayed and limited response to the jihad and in part also an imitation." How? The popes offered

forgiveness for sins to those who fought in defense of the holy Church of God and the Christian religion and polity, and eternal life for those fighting the infidel. These ideas … clearly reflect the Muslim notion of jihad, and are precursors of the Western Christian Crusade.

Still, Lewis makes clear some fundamental differences:

But unlike the jihad, it [the Crusade] was concerned primarily with the defense or reconquest of threatened or lost Christian territory. … The Muslim jihad, in contrast, was perceived as unlimited, as a religious obligation that would continue until all the world had either adopted the Muslim faith or submitted to Muslim rule. … The object of jihad is to bring the whole world under Islamic law.

If the Crusades arguably find their ideological origins in jihad, so too does much of modern day terrorism. The medieval Hashashin—archetypal terrorists who gave us the word "assassin"—were, for example, a Muslim sect that pioneered the use of fear and terrorism for political gain during the Crusader era, around the eleventh-thirteenth centuries.

Because much of this background is missed by the media, more ironies abound. Many point, for instance, to Breivik's fascination with the Knights Templar, a Crusading order, as proof that he was motivated by the Crusades. Yet, as one AP report indicates, "The Knights Templar was a medieval order created to protect Christian pilgrims in the Holy Land after the First Crusade in the 11th century."

How exactly a military order devoted to protecting Christians inspired someone to kill innocent children in Norway is left unanswered. As one historian put it, the original Knights Templar, a "very devout people," would be "horrified" to find themselves compared to Breivik.

Even more ironic, the Knights and Crusaders in general were frequently on the receiving end of the Assassins' terror; far from being inspirations for terrorism, they bore the brunt of one of the earliest manifestations of Islamic terrorism.

In reality, Breivik's actions are more inspired by the Jihad than by the Crusades, by the Assassins rather than the Templars, and by al-Qaeda—"which he cherishes great admiration for"—than the IRA. As CNN's Fareed Zakaria correctly asserts that in Breivik's view, "the Knights Templar resembles nothing as much as al Qaeda."

The parallels are evident: Medieval Europe, in an effort to retaliate against an expansionist Islam, articulated a means influenced by jihad, or "holy war": the Crusades. Today, modern Europeans like Breivik, in an effort to retaliate against an expansionist Islam, have articulated a means influenced by al-Qaeda: jihadi-style terrorism.

Some may argue that there are non-Muslim terror groups from which Breivik can draw inspiration. Even so, in a globalized world where Islam has by far the lion's share of terrorism—where nonstop images of jihadi terror have metastasized in the media, and thus the culture—it is not hard to see from where Breivik got his inspiration.

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Fort Hood Plots: Answering the Call of Individual Jihad

By Clare M. Lopez
Source: http://www.radicalislam.org/content/fthood-jihad

"Muslims are being commanded…to strike out against the U.S, Israel, and "corrupt" Muslim rulers and take up the cause of jihad as an

individual responsibility."

The recent arrest of Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo for plotting to attack Fort Hood should be a real wake-up call to all Americans. As we know, Pfc. Abdo is the second Muslim member of the U.S. Armed Forces to target Ft. Hood; Major Nidal Hassan, tragically, was not stopped before he opened fire on his fellow soldiers at Ft. Hood in November 2009, killing 13.

The lessons to be learned from the actions of these two men are, or should be, plainly visible for all of us to see. Both of them announced their violent intentions openly and clearly long before they moved to actually carry out their threats. And both of them grounded their beliefs and their attack plans firmly on citations from the Qur'an.

Maj. Hasan told his colleagues that he considered himself "a Muslim first and an American second." He also gave a graphic Power-Point presentation ("The Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S.

Military") on his jihadist beliefs many times in front of U.S. military audiences. In this presentation, Maj. Hasan quoted the Qur'an with verses on fighting the infidel and included many slides about the rewards of Paradise for those who fight and kill and die in the way of Allah.

He also foreshadowed the later actions of Pfc. Abdo when he concluded his Power-Point with this warning to the U.S. military:

"[The] Department of Defense should allow Muslim soldiers the option of being released as 'conscientious objectors' to increase troop morale and decrease adverse events."

[Hasan's whole slide show can be seen here.]

So, it can be seen from these two examples that the jihadist leaderships of both al-Qa'eda and the Muslim Brotherhood have called for Muslims everywhere to turn the page as it were from the more moderate Meccan period to the more violent Medinan period. Muslims are being commanded by both of them to strike out against the U.S, Israel, and "corrupt" Muslim rulers and take up the cause of jihad as an individual responsibility.

We should note that those Muslims who obey and follow the call of jihad as stipulated in the sharia (Islamic law) do not hide their intentions but rather speak out openly about them - for this, too, is a command of Islamic law, that warning be given before an attack. It is for us to heed the warnings, and as our national security forces did in the case of Pfc. Abdo, take steps to stop their attack plans before they can be carried out.

Clare M. Lopez, a senior fellow at the Clarion Fund, is a strategic policy and intelligence expert with a focus on Middle East, national defense, and counterterrorism issues.

Obsession – The movie

Using images from Arab TV, rarely seen in the West, Obsession reveals an 'insider's view' of the hatred the Radicals are teaching domination.

Bin Laden movie has King worried

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bin-laden-movie-has-king-worried

Representative King, the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, requested the Pentagon and the CIA to determine whether the Obama administration had leaked any classified information about the raid to Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal, the creative team behind the Oscar-winning movie "The Hurt Locker".

Director Katheryn Bigelow // Source: womenandhollywood.com

The clandestine Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden is a compelling story that movie makers have been clamoring to try to obtain more details, which has Representative Pete King (R – New York) worried.

On Wednesday, Representative King, the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, requested the Pentagon and the CIA to determine if the Obama administration had leaked any classified information about the raid to Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal, the

creative team behind the Oscar-winning movie "**The Hurt Locker**."

The two are currently working on making a move about the military's Special Forces who have sought for to capture or kill bin Laden for the past decade. "The Administration's first duty in declassifying material is to provide full reporting to Congress and the American people in an effort to build public trust through transparency of government," Representative King said in a statement. "In contrast, this alleged collaboration belies a desire of transparency in favor of a cinematographic view of history."

Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said King's claims were "ridiculous." "When people working on articles, books, documentaries or movies that involve the president ask to speak to administration officials, we do our best to accommodate them to make sure the facts are correct. That's hardly a novel approach to the media," Vietor said. "We do not discuss classified information. I'd hope that as we face a continued threat from terrorism, the House Committee on Homeland Security would have more important topics to discuss."

King's comments come after a series of several high-profile reports detailing the raid on bin Laden. Most recently, the New Yorker published a highly detailed account of the raid. The military and intelligence officials have tried to keep details of the raid confidential, but King says that the administration has not had a good record of maintaining confidentiality. "To find there's a movie coming out and there's been cooperation with Hollywood ... considering the track record of the last 90 days, I'm concerned," King said.

Work on the bin Laden movie was scheduled to begin later this summer and is expected to hit theaters before the November 2012 elections.

10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt Thousands

By Anemona Hartocollis
Source:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/nyregion/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-from-911still-haunts.html?_r=1

Dr. Margaret Dessau heard the crash of a plane into the World Trade Center from her apartment; the things she saw out her window changed her life.

In the safety of her therapist's office in late 2001, Dr. Margaret Dessau made a tape reliving what it was like to look out her living room window after she heard the boom of a hijacked plane eight blocks away.

Running naked from her bath, she saw pigeons and paper flying through the air. "It's kind of beautiful in a way," she recalls on the recording she made and listened to over and over as part of her treatment. "There's these silver pieces just floating in the air." Her gaze met the hole in the tower. "The flames get worse, and then I start seeing all these people hanging out there. The guy with this white towel, and he's waving it." He jumps. Children at a nearby school scream. "How are you feeling?" her therapist, David Bricker, is heard asking on the tape. "I start crying," she replies. Dr. Dessau's husband yells at her, "Stop looking at it, stop looking at it." But, she says, "I can't tear myself away from it."

One measure of the psychological impact of 9/11 is this: At least 10,000 firefighters, police officers and civilians exposed to the terrorist

have yet to recover, according to figures compiled by New York City's three 9/11 health programs.

In interviews over the last several months, Dr. Dessau and others revealed a wide-ranging but consistent body of symptoms. They cannot sleep. They replay the disaster in their minds, or in their nightmares. They have trouble concentrating. They are jittery and overreact to alarms or loud noises. They feel helpless, hopeless, guilty and cut off from the people who are close to them. They avoid anything that reminds them of that terrible day.

Millions of dollars will be spent treating them over the next few years through the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, passed by Congress in December, which provides $4.3 billion to compensate and treat people with 9/11-related illnesses.

Some are emergency responders and others who vainly searched the debris for survivors. But some were residents, commuters and office workers caught in the dust cloud. And others were passive witnesses with no direct

attack on the World Trade Center have been found to have post-traumatic stress disorder, and in a kind of mass grieving, many of them

connection to the attack other than proximity.

Because of lingering questions about the bounds of the PTSD diagnosis, which is only

three decades old, people with mental problems are eligible only for treatment assistance, whereas people with physical ailments, in most cases breathing difficulties, qualify for both treatment and compensation. And money available to treat patients with the stress disorder might decline if the government concludes there is a link between certain cancers and 9/11, which would give cancer patients access to the same pool of money. Doctors are expecting a surge in PTSD patients with the coming 10th anniversary, as they have on each Sept. 11.

Charles Figley, professor of disaster mental health at Tulane University's School of Social Work and a former Marine, advanced the concept of PTSD in a 1978 book on Vietnam War veterans. He said one reason the trauma had been so hard to shake was that it ripped at the most ordinary fabric of daily life.

The landmark is not a distant hill in Afghanistan that one will never see again. "It's the places you see every day, where you proposed to your wife, where you remember getting the news that you got promoted, where your young children played," Dr. Figley said.

"You go into a combat zone and then you leave," he added. "You don't leave home. You return all the time."

Ancient but Evolving Illness

"The Iliad" described warriors consumed by feelings of guilt, rage and grief. World War I had "shell shock," and World War II had "combat fatigue." PTSD has been found in survivors of Nazi concentration camps, fires and railway accidents. But it was not until 1980, after the Vietnam War, that post-traumatic stress disorder was added to the psychiatric bible, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

The current manual, the DSM-IV, says PTSD can develop through a range of exposures to death or injury: direct personal involvement, witnessing it or, if it concerns someone close, just learning about it. Almost no other psychiatric diagnosis has generated as much controversy, according to Dr. Robert L. Spitzer, a retired psychiatry professor from Columbia University and an expert in mental disorder classifications. It has become so vague that stressed-out college students and people who watched horror movies could fit the profile, he and two other experts wrote in a professional journal article.

"It's a way of saying something terrible has happened to me and I've been damaged in some way, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's an illness," Dr. Spitzer, who advocates tightening the criteria, said in an interview.

Some experts have been skeptical of studies finding that people suffered the disorder from watching television coverage of the Sept. 11 attacks. (Congress effectively excluded TV watchers from its treatment program by requiring that victims had lived or worked within certain

geographic boundaries.)

Amy Cushing-Savvi, a social worker at Mount Sinai Medical Center, which runs the largest program, said a frequent topic at staff meetings was, "What's 9/11 and what isn't?" — in other words, the exquisitely vexing question of how to separate the effects of 9/11 from the traumas of everyday life.

"Taxpayers could end up paying for psychotherapy for Woody Allen and half of Manhattan," Theodore H. Frank, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute, testified before the House Judiciary Committee in April 2008, when he was a fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.

Ultimately, federal financing for PTSD treatment was limited to firefighters, police officers, employees of the New York City medical examiner's office who handled body parts, and other rescue, recovery, cleanup and support workers at ground zero, on the barges that carried debris and at the Staten Island landfill where the twin towers rubble was entombed; responders at the attack sites at the Pentagon and Shanksville, Pa.; and people exposed to 9/11 dust when the buildings collapsed or who lived, worked or attended

school south of Houston Street in Manhattan and in parts of Downtown Brooklyn where the dust may have extended.

Family members of New York City firefighters who died are covered as a continuation of an existing Fire Department counseling program, but family members of other victims are not. Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Democrat of New York and the lead sponsor of the Zadroga Act in the House, said that since victims' families had been covered by the original 9/11 compensation fund, which paid an average of $2.1 million to each family, the goal was to look after others who suffered. "We were focusing on covering the people who did not die on 9/11, but those who were dying and sick because of 9/11," she said.

The law was named after a New York police detective who took part in the rescue efforts and later developed breathing complications. The cause of his death in 2006 became a source of debate.

Dr. John Howard, who oversees 9/11 programs as the director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, said in an interview that he was willing to give people the benefit of the doubt about PTSD, even if they had other stresses. "Collapsing 220 stories of a lot of material in one of the most densely populated cities in the world is a very unique event," Dr. Howard said. "In mental health you have to treat the whole person, and you can't really separate out some of these other influences, personal stressors, economic issues. People are living their lives." "It sounds squishy," he added, "but it really isn't squishy."

Her World Collapses

For Dr. Dessau, who is now 64, listening to the tapes she made during therapy conquered her fears for a while, "like cod liver oil," she said. But in 2009, her sense of tragedy was compounded when her husband, Bob Wheeler, died just four months after being told he had lung cancer.

Dr. Dessau, a youthful, athletic blonde with blue-rimmed green eyes, still lives in the same airy loft on Greenwich Street, decorated with souvenirs of 35 years of travel with Mr. Wheeler — shells arranged in bowls, a child-size winged Hermes, a many-limb stone goddess, a terra cotta Chinese statue of a man. There is also a green plastic box containing her husband's ashes.

Mr. Wheeler, a lawyer, never smoked, so Dr. Dessau, a pulmonologist, suspected that his disease was related to his exposure to the falling buildings. His quick death revived the sense of helplessness she had felt watching people jump from the towers. "As a doctor you always think you can fix it," she said.

She lost 20 pounds. She stopped seeing friends. She was "on red alert," sure that something bad would happen at any second. She avoids looking at the skyline outside her window, though her reaction is not as bad since buildings have begun to fill in the space where the World Trade Center used to be.

A city fund set up before the Zadroga Act was enacted provided $9,000 to Dr. Dessau to cover therapy expenses not handled by her insurance. The city sent a letter encouraging her to seek further treatment through a public program that would allow the Zadroga money to cover her out-of-pocket expenses, but she prefers her own therapist.

She sees 9/11 and her husband's death as part of a continuum, along with her parents' escape from Nazi Germany, the suicide of a close relative and her time preparing bandages as a student in Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. "It confirms my sense of pessimism," she said. "It's corroboration of the evil of human beings."

That sense of 9/11 as a catalyst is common. In June, Stanley Mieses, 58, a freelance writer and editor, lined up with other psychiatric patients at the city-run Elmhurst Hospital Center under a sign that said, as if atient Registratin. testing his sanity: New

During a screening, he circled the maximum, "nearly every day," to a question about how often he had been "feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down."

Mr. Mieses, who is receiving treatment under the Zadroga Act, lived six and a half blocks from the trade center and watched the buildings collapse. The police evacuated him, but he returned every few days to feed his cats. "Dead people were blowing into my apartment off the windowsills," he said, remembering the ash, "because the landlord was too cheap to clean it."

For a while he sublimated his anxiety, filing reports for NPR from his stunned neighborhood. But in short order, his mother, a World War II German refugee with what he said were her own PTSD issues, died; his girlfriend left him; work dried up; and he was

forced by his finances to move to Jackson Heights, Queens.

These psychic blows led, he said, to "a change in my attitude, a change in my — I don't know — joie de vivre."

His pulmonologist at Elmhurst says his shortness of breath could be from the dust, or the 20 years he smoked. The origins of his mental wounds are also ambiguous. "I tend to think of 9/11 as the trapdoor that opened up," Mr. Mieses said. "Whatever else I'm doing past that, is climbing back up."

along with panic disorder, substance abuse and a few other conditions.

Extrapolating from a registry of people exposed to the attack, the city's health department has estimated that 61,000 of the 409,000 in the disaster area experienced "probable" PTSD within six years of 9/11. But these numbers were produced by institutions and a city government with two main goals: to make as many people as possible feel better, and to try to persuade Congress to provide a steady stream of treatment money. The city's 9/11

A Number Unknown

It is impossible to say how many people have 9/11-related PTSD. The city's three official programs do not count people, like Dr. Dessau, who use private physicians — or those who have not been treated at all.

According to figures provided by the programs, run by the Fire Department, which treats its own employees; a consortium of hospitals led by Mount Sinai Medical Center, which treats police officers and other rescue and recovery workers; and the city's public hospital system, which treats civilians, at least 10,000 patients have met the criteria over the last decade, and at least 3,600 of them still have symptoms. But even those rounded numbers have an asterisk: 3,000 of the 10,000 patients were treated by the public hospitals, whose statistics do not differentiate among PTSD, depression and anxiety. The Zadroga program covers all three,

health programs have created a huge intake system that screens every patient for mental as well as physical illness, and the public hospitals reached out to New Yorkers with subway advertisements that said: "Lived there? Worked there? You deserve care."

No one can say exactly how many people were exposed to the attack, and how many will eventually become physically or mentally sick. The federal government will allow the Mount Sinai and public hospitals programs to grow by 25,000 patients each over the next five years. It will be up to each program to decide who qualifies for treatment, but they will have to use uniform criteria approved by the government. Therapy can cost $135 for a 45-minute weekly session with a psychologist or $165 with a psychiatrist.

If the government finds a link between 9/11 dust and cancer, there is some concern about

running out of money, though the Zadroga fund is to be a secondary payment source, covering

what insurance and workers' compensation do not.

Dr. Howard, the federal 9/11 health administrator, said the government "will treat people as they come in to the extent possible."

Alarms, Over and Over

Patients at Mount Sinai find a busy warren of rooms where they are divided into three categories: green (no further assessment needed), yellow (potentially symptomatic) and red (symptoms so severe that they might be suicidal). They begin the screening at home, filling out an 11-page questionnaire that asks about their level of energy, how often they feel "calm and peaceful," and about recent life experiences like losing a job or having a relationship break up. In a section called "Reminders of 9/11," they are asked whether they have recurring thoughts of the disaster and whether they feel emotionally cut off from those close to them.

In an interview with a clinician, they are asked whether "you often believe it would be better if you were dead," "you feel worthless" or "you

feel guilty even though you didn't deserve to feel that way."

If they have PTSD, patients are usually given a combination of psychotherapy and pills, typically antidepressants, and sometimes sleeping pills. Many patients are encouraged to make recordings of their memories, as Dr. Dessau did, or to write about them until the memories lose their power. This is called exposure therapy.

Once a month, Earl Holland drives from his home in Flatlands, Brooklyn, to Mount Sinai for meditation classes. "You get in a room, the chimes are going, it's fantastic," Mr. Holland said. He also takes Wellbutrin, an antidepressant, and Ambien, a sleeping pill.

Mr. Holland, 48, was a paramedic supervisor for North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System when he responded to the disaster after the second tower collapsed. In his dreams, he still hears the alarms — attached to each firefighter's mask — that signal that a firefighter has stopped moving. "There were hundreds of alarms going off," he said, grabbing a tissue to wipe away the tears as he sat in his kitchen, remembering.

"I kept the list" of the missing, he said.

Two months after the attacks, he responded to the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in Belle Harbor, Queens.

He started shutting himself in his bedroom, refusing to talk to his wife and children. He spent hours staring at photographs of the burning rubble and had flashbacks of responding to murders during the 1980s crack epidemic.

"Toward the end, I didn't want to do my calls," he said. "It was like, enough. I actually thought it was burnout, but it wasn't burnout."
Mr. Holland's diagnosis of PTSD was made in 2009 through a Mount Sinai outreach program, and his costs will be covered by the Zadroga Act.

He has recovered enough that he hopes to return to work, but not on the front lines. "I don't know if I'll go to the memorial any time soon," he said. "I look at that kind of as closure, if I'm able to do that."

Alain Delaquérière contributed research.

Indonesia's "Ghost Birds" Tackle Islamist Terrorists: A Profile of Densus 88
By Jacob Zenn
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

After the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia

Among the terrorists were many former Afghan jihadis as well as Abu Bakr Ba'asyir and the

recognized that the main threat to national security came from regional terrorist networks whose leaders returned to Indonesia after Suharto fell from power in 1998. An elite counterterrorism unit, Densus 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88, or Special Detachment 88), was Indonesia's answer to the terrorists who exploited the country's weakened security environment.

late Abdullah Sungkar – the duo that founded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) while in exile in Malaysia between 1985 and 1998.
Densus 88 is an all-Indonesian force with 400-500 personnel led by Brigadier General M. Syafii. The unit is equipped primarily with U.S.-made Colt M4 carbines (which were effectively employed in the siege of Dr. Azahari Husin's hideout in Batu in

2005), Armalite AR-10 sniper rifles, Remington 870 shotguns, and Austrian-made Steyr AUG assault rifles. Training is provided by American security services and Australian Special Forces. There is some debate about the origin of the "88" designation, though most likely it represents the number of Australians who died in the Bali bombings and the image "88" is reminiscent of two handcuffs [1].

From 1999 until 2002 – the year Densus 88 was created – JI attacks included a bombing at the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, an assassination attempt on the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta, and church bombings in Jakarta, Sumatra, Lombok, Java, and Batam. The JI-affiliated Lashkar Jihad also sent thousands of students from five JI-linked *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) in Java to the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and Papua to fight against Christians (see *Terrorism Monitor*, May 5, 2005). JI's

terror offensive culminated with the bombings at Kuta Beach in Bali, which killed eight Americans, 88 Australians and more than 100 others.

Following the Bali attack, the U.S. State Department's Diplomatic Security Services identified Indonesia as a frontline in the global war on terror and provided funds under the Anti-Terror Assistance Program to establish Densus 88 and pay for salaries, weapons, high-level training in communications interception, close combat warfare and forensic sciences, and surveillance and intelligence gathering and analysis. The budget included start-up costs of $130 million in the second half of 2003, followed by annual funding which increased from $1.3 million in 2004, to more than $13 million in 2005, to more than $40 million in 2006 [2].

Currently, Australia funds Densus 88 with $16 million annually and in 2004 Australia pledged $35 million over five years to build a training center at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co-operation, where the Australian Federal Police (AFP) runs seminars for Densus 88. [3]

In November 2005, Densus 88 turned the tide in Indonesia's war against JI. A Densus 88 sniper shot Dr. Azahari Husin, the JI mastermind behind the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and the JW Marriot and Australian Embassy bombings, during a raid on Husin's hideout in Batu, East Java. An accomplice set off a suicide explosive killing himself and a third man who had joined Husin in engaging the counterterrorism force in an intense gun battle. After Husin, Densus 88

eliminated JI's other top operatives in near succession:

- In 2007 Densus 88 captured Abu Dujana in Central Java with the help of U.S satellites operated by Australian Police which tracked his cellphone activites.(*Tempo Interaktif* [Jakarta], June 20, 2007; for a profile of Abu Dujana, see *Terrorism Monitor*, April 4, 2006).
- In 2009 Densus 88, acting on tips and surveillance, surrounded a house that Noordin Mohammed Top was renting in Solo. Noordin blew himself up along with his wife and two children to save himself from being killed or captured by Densus 88 (for a profile of Noordin Top, see *Terrorism Monitor*, July 25, 2006).
- In 2010, Densus 88 tracked down and killed Dulmatin, who had a $10 million bounty on his head, in an internet café in Jakarta. Indonesian President Yudhoyono confirmed Dulamtin's death while giving a speech to the Australian Parliament (for a profile of Dulmatin, see *Terrorism Monitor*, July 9, 2006).
- In May 2011 Abu Bakr Ba'asyir received a 15-year sentence after his conviction for sponsoring a terrorist camp in Aceh that Densus 88 raided in 2010.

Densus 88's collaboration with the U.S. and Australia has not gone unnoticed by the terrorists it hunts down. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir said during his trial that allegations of terrorism were "deliberately spread by God's enemy - the Zionists and their allies America and Australia, and followed by Densus 88" (*The Age* [Melbourne], February 23). Radical Islamic groups in the country, such as the Islamic Peoples' Forums (FUI) and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), see Densus 88 as a U.S. and Australian-backed paramilitary unit that systematically arrests and kills Islamic activists under the pretense of terrorism. They cite Densus 88's start-up and operational funding as proof (*Jakarta Globe*, August 31, 2010).

Densus 88 has also come under scrutiny from human rights groups because of its reputation for torture, especially when it comes to suppressing separatists, and its use of American and Australian wire-tapping technologies to track suspects. In 2007, Densus 88 tortured many of the 22 people responsible for unfurling the South Mouccan independence movement flag in front of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during his visit to Ambon. In 2010, their leader died in prison three years into his 12-year sentence for treason after having been denied medical access for kidney problems he attributed to beatings and being forced to drink hot water infused with carbon paper (Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2010). In August 2010 Densus 88 allegedly tortured 12 Mouccan separatist suspects for a week, suffocating them with plastic bags, stabbing them with nails, and forcing them to eat raw chili peppers.

Densus 88's reputation was tainted again in October 2010 one month before President Obama's visit to Indonesia when a video showed Indonesian security forces pressing a stick smoldering from fire against a Papuan separatist suspect's genitals, a plastic bag wrapped around the suspect's head, and one

Members of Densus 88, an elite anti-terrorist unit of the Indonesian police

officer holding a large knife next to the suspect as he pleads, "I'm just an ordinary civilian." [3] This was only months after the Obama administration announced it would resume aid to Kopassus in July 2010. Congress had prohibited relations with Kopassus in 1999 due to allegations that Kopassus aided militias in East Timor that carried committed human rights abuses.

Cutting off funds to Densus 88 is still unlikely since Densus 88's record of more than 500 militant arrests and decapitating the

leadership has drawn as much, if not more, international attention and praise. Since its last major attack in July 2009 – the bombings of the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, allegedly planned by Noordin – JI has not been able to orchestrate sophisticated large-scale attacks.

Although Densus 88 has dismantled and decapitated the JI network, small cells of former JI fighters and other separatist movements have attacked Ahmadiyah Muslims, churches, moderate mosques and various Islamic organizations to create religious divides in the normally tolerant country. [3] These terrorists have employed letter bombs, suicide-bombings, and drive-by shootings in their campaign, which typically targets Indonesians rather than Westerners.

A look at Densus 88's recent operations shows the effectiveness of Densus 88 in detecting new cells, connecting suspects from one cell to related cells and tracking down long-time terrorists:

- On June 9, Densus 88 arrested Heri Kuncoro, a brother-in-law of Dulmatin, and Sugeng Setiaji, in Central Java. Interrogation of Heri and Sugeng led to the arrest of two of the 18 suspects in police shootings in Palu, Sulawesi in May 2011 (Antara News [Jakarta], June 16).

- On June 10, acting on reports from local residents, Densus 88 found three bombs tied with yellow tape behind a church in Poso, Central Sulawesi (*Jakarta Post*, June 10).

- On June 11, the police arrested Muhammad Sibghotulloh and Yuwardi in East Kalimantan Province. The pair supplied weapons from the Philippines that were used in drive-by shootings that killed two police officers in Palu, Central Sulawesi, in May. They were also suspected of being involved in planning last April's suicide-bombing of the Adz Zikra mosque in Cirebon, West Java

(Antara News, June 16; Reuters, June 15).

- On June 15, Densus 88 confiscated bomb components, detonators, and notes on bomb-making and arrested a terror suspect at a sports store in Pemalang, Central Java. The 42-year old suspect, Sudirman, was believed to have been involved in the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings as Dulmatin's right-hand man (*Jakarta Post*, June 17, 2011).

- On July 19, Densus 88 arrested seven people in Yogyakarta and 5 people in Central Java allegedly linked with the network of Upik Lawanga (a.k.a. Taufik Bulaga). Lawanga was a student of Azahari Husin and is now JI's bomb making expert (*Tempo Interaktif*, July 20).

Densus 88 is living up to the local reputation of its emblem, the *burung hantu* ("ghost bird," or owl). Having come into its own since 2005, Densus 88 has turned JI into the prey, disrupted the terrorist infrastructure in

Indonesia, and protected its citizens as well as the facilities and citizens of its American and Australian allies.

Densus 88's operational capabilities are proven, but Densus 88's leadership still has to find a way to eliminate rogue members from the unit and abolish the heavy-handed tactics that provide a source of propaganda for Islamist and separatist groups as well as justification for unsympathetic members in the U.S. Congress and Australian parliament calling for a reduction or halt in funding.

Note:

1. See "Indonesia's Elite Forces Detasemen 88," http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id37.html
2. See Muradi Clark, Densus 88 AT: "Peran dan Koordinasi Dalam Pemberantasan Terorisme di Indonesia" [Densus 88 AT: The Role and Coordination in Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia], May 12, 2009, http://muradi.wordpress.com/2009/05/12/densus-88-at-peran-dan-koordinasi-dalam-pemberantasan-terorisme-di-indonesia/ .
3. See http://video.ahrchk.net/AHRC-VID-012-2010-Indonesia.html
4. The Ahmadiyah are a Muslim movement founded in India by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), who declared himself the expected Mahdi. The movement is considered unorthodox by orthodox Muslims and heretical by Salafists.

Jacob Zenn graduated from Georgetown Law as a Global Law Scholar in 2011 and works as an international security consultant. He is currently based in East Java, Indonesia.

Contemporary Maritime Piracy

International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea
By James Kraska (Author)
Source: http://www.bokklubben.no/SamboWeb/produkt.do?produktId=5915530

The threat of maritime piracy has exploded in the last decade, causing insurance costs to skyrocket and incurring losses estimated to be in the billions of dollars each year. Pirates operating off the Horn of Africa repeatedly disrupt the oil supply from the Persian Gulf as well as shipping traffic through the Suez Canal and the western Indian Ocean. The problem of piracy is a common topic of discussion within the shipping industry as well as among insurance companies, government officials, media, and academia. "Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea" comprises three sections, the first of which contains chapters on historical and contemporary piracy, international law and diplomacy, and coalition strategies for combating future piracy. The second and third parts provide collections of historic profiles and relevant documents.

"James Kraska is a brilliant and forthright commentator on maritime security and legal issues relating to oceans governance. He brings to the subject an acute legal brain and clarity of exposition rare in both fields. These qualities are exemplified in this fine book in which he elucidates the detail surrounding emerging counter-piracy practices. It is a model exposition which will benefit anyone from the interested amateur to the pressured professional. It is a book that will never be far from my desk."
Martin M. Murphy, Visiting Fellow Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London and author of Somalia, the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa

James Kraska, JSD, is Howard S. Levie Professor of Operational Law and Senior Associate in the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Group at the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, RI. Kraska also serves as guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and as senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A commander and judge advocate in the U.S. Navy, Kraska served as the Oceans Policy Adviser for the Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he developed global counter-piracy policy for the U.S. armed forces and represented the Pentagon in counter-piracy policy at the National Security Council and the International Maritime Organization. Kraska earned a professional doctorate in law from Indiana University, Bloomington, IN; a research doctorate in law from the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA; and a master's degree in foreign affairs from the School of Politics & Economics

at Claremont Colleges, Claremont, CA. His published works include Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea and numerous scholarly articles.

Counterstrike: The Untold Story Of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda
Authors: Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States waged a "war on terror" that sought to defeat Al Qaeda through brute force. But it soon became clear that this strategy was not working, and by 2005 the Pentagon began looking for a new way.

In Counterstrike, a Henry Holt and Company book, former CNAS Writers in Residence, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker of The New York Times, tell the story of how a group of analysts within the military, at spy agencies, and in law enforcement has fashioned an innovative and effective new strategy to fight terrorism, unbeknownst to most Americans and in sharp contrast to the cowboy slogans that characterized the U.S. government's public posture.

Eric Schmitt is a terrorism correspondent for The New York Times and has embedded with troops in Iraq, Somalia, and Pakistan. Schmitt has twice been a member of Times reporting teams that were awarded the Pulitzer Prize.

Thom Shanker, a Pentagon correspondent for The New York Times, routinely spends time embedded with troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shanker was formerly a foreign editor and correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, based in Moscow, Berlin, and Sarajevo.

Review
"*A remarkable detective story by two of the nation's best reporters. With meticulous research and fine storytelling, Counterstrike reveals who, what, when, where, and why in describing the long campaign by the United States government to demolish Al Qaeda and ultimately to kill Osama bin Laden.*"--**Rick Atkinson, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of An Army at Dawn**

"*Counterstrike lays bare the provocative new ideas that are driving the war on terrorism. Generals often talk about changing the hearts and minds of people in faraway lands, but Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker reveal the importance of changing the hearts and minds of America's defense strategists. This is a groundbreaking intellectual history that is also a great read.*"--**Jessica Stern, author of Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill**

"*Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker dig deep to tell the story of the covert campaign to defeat Al Qaeda, from the CIA to the Pentagon. Counterstrike is a richly reported work that is a seminal account of the battle between America and Al Qaeda since 9/11.*"--**Peter Bergen, author of The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda**

"*Filled with amazing characters and details, Counterstrike traces the evolution of America's strategy for stopping the next attack. It's a fascinating story and a great read, too.*"--**Dexter Filkins, author of The Forever War**

"*Counterstrike scores a direct hit. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, two of America's most respected national security correspondents, provide pathbreaking reporting on and incisive analysis of the secret war against Al Qaeda after 9/11. This cogent history of America's elusive search for a strategy – essential reading for specialists and concerned citizens alike –*

should inform our national debate on how best to counter this most urgent threat."-- **Lee H. Hamilton, former congressman and co-chair of the 9/11 Commission**

"*Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker have written a brilliant and important account of America's battle with Al Qaeda. It is an exceptional work in that it truly addresses strategic issues and not just the tactical fight. There are critical insights and recommendations provided in this book that make it a must-read for all those who want to understand how we must deal with this complex threat.*"--**General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (retired)**

How to Hijack an Airplane in 3 Seconds
By Abraham Tekippe
Source:http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/08/how-to-hijack-an-airplane-in-3-seconds/243631/

Ten years after 9/11, airline cockpits are vulnerable every time a pilot takes a bathroom break. So why isn't the FAA making secondary barriers a requirement?

One-one thousand. Two-one thousand. Three-one thousand.
And just like that, it can happen: From the front row of a passenger airplane, a group of hijackers leap from their seats and race toward the cockpit, leaving flight attendants, galley carts, and other improvisational means of defense in their wake. The reinforced cockpit door, opened just a few moments earlier to allow one of the pilots to use the lavatory, slams shut behind them, sealing off all hopes of regaining control of the aircraft.
All in a matter of three seconds.
It's a scenario the Federal Aviation Administration has been aware of for years and one that has prompted many in the airline industry to push for installed physical secondary barriers (IPSBs) -- retractable, fence-like devices set up between the cabin and the cockpit -- as well as more comprehensive, industry-wide security procedures on all passenger aircraft.
"We're in a race against time, frankly, because there is going to be another attack," said Capt. Ed Folsom, a United Airlines pilot who has played an active role in the development of the secondary barrier system since 2002. "I'm no rocket scientist, so if I can see the vulnerability, so can everyone else."
The primary concern: door transitions, or times when the cockpit door is opened and closed during a flight. Although most transitions are over before passengers even realize they're happening, Folsom and others, including Capt. Rob Powers, said they believe airplanes are

not as secure as they can and should be during these brief exchanges.
"Just like in medieval times, the castle is secure until you open the drawbridge," said Powers, a commercial airline pilot and former

chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association's National Security Committee. "If you don't have a moat or something else around to add a second layer of security, then you have some vulnerabilities. When the door's open, it's just a hole."
Post-9/11 FAA regulations do permit flight crews to open and close cockpit doors during flights, but only when it is necessary to do so. Typically, this means meeting pilots' physiological needs -- for example, lavatory use and food and beverage service -- though airline officials said pilots may need to exit the cockpit if mechanical problems arise during a flight.
Currently, each airline has its own FAA-approved procedures that specify how crews should go about opening and closing the cockpit door mid-flight. While the FAA doesn't specify how long or how many times the door can be opened per flight, FAA officials said it is assumed crews will do it as quickly and minimally as possible, usually for under five seconds.

But numerous passenger complaints, obtained from the Transportation Security Administration through a Freedom of Information Act request, suggest this isn't always the case.

On April 28, 2007, a passenger flying from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport to San Diego filed a complaint saying that the cockpit door was open for five minutes mid-flight, according to TSA records.

More recently, on May 3, 2010, a passenger flying between Columbus, Ohio, and St. Louis said the cockpit door was opened a minimum of five times during the flight.

"Once that door comes open, you're vulnerable to another attack like 9/11," said Capt. Paul Onorato, a commercial airline pilot and former president of the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations.

In recent years, according to Onorato, the coalition has set up scenarios where a handful of would-be terrorists are seated in the first few rows of an airplane. These scenarios have shown that terrorists are able to "blow past" both a flight attendant and galley cart and get into the cockpit within three seconds.

What's more, Folsom added that the drills, while grim, likely offer a best-case scenario.

"We looked at some highly trained individuals playing the role of flight attendants and crew members and even they couldn't prevent a breach of the flight deck," Folsom said. "If they can't do it, then little 57-year-old, 40 percent body fat Susie isn't going to do it."

Secondary barriers, supporters say, would give crews more time -- approximately five seconds -- to react to threats. Prior to opening the cockpit door, flight crews would deploy the barrier, temporarily securing the space directly in front of the cockpit door.

"It's not an impenetrable barrier," Powers said of the device. "If somebody attempted to breach it, that would, one, give everyone an indication of that individual's intent and, two, delay them long enough so one of the flight attendants could shut the flight deck door."

Despite the barriers' perceived benefits, the FAA has yet to mandate them, largely because of the cost of the devices -- about $5,000 to $10,000 per barrier.

"Right now, we don't see a need for it," FAA spokeswoman Alison Duquette said, adding that the post-9/11 security measures the FAA and TSA currently have in place, such as improved screening technologies and increased air marshals, have been sufficient.

This doesn't mean the FAA has dismissed the barriers altogether. In 2008, the administration petitioned to establish a committee that includes representatives from the FAA, airlines, and airline trade associations. Folsom, a co-chairman of the committee, said the group is currently working on a report that will outline minimum performance criteria, installation instructions, and other issues for secondary barriers. Folsom said the committee is on track to complete the report this September, around the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

Although a federal mandate for secondary barriers is nowhere in sight, United Airlines, which designed the devices in-house in 2002, has continued to develop and install them on its fleet voluntarily, a move Duquette says the FAA fully supports.

Meanwhile, in 2007, Northwest (now Delta) began a one-year test program of the barriers on the airline's 747s. But after receiving negative feedback from crews, the airline decided not to move forward with widespread installation. According to Wolfgang Koch, a Northwest pilot at the time, the barriers created noise in pilots' sleeping quarters and made meal and beverage service to the cockpit difficult, as flight attendants were expected to close the barrier while their hands were full. Additionally, the airline estimated that the cost of the barrier would be closer to $100,000 over the life of the airplane.

As a result, Northwest decided not to move forward with the barriers. But Koch maintains that while that particular design wasn't ideal for the 747, the value of the device was clear.

"Some things are feel-good products and other things are substantial products. A secondary barrier is a substantial product," he said, adding that he believes Northwest gave up on the devices too quickly.

In the meantime, U.S. Rep. Steve Israel (D-NY), a longtime advocate of secondary barriers, reintroduced a bill in April calling for mandatory installation of the devices on commercial aircraft.

"Ten years ago terrorists exploited airline security vulnerabilities to murder thousands of people on 9/11. Since then we've made significant improvements, but there is still more we must do," Israel said in an e-mail. "Without secondary cockpit barriers, the door is literally wide-open whenever the crew members leave the cockpit to use the restroom, change positions during a long flight, or conduct visual

inspections. A secondary barrier protects pilots and passengers for a fraction of the installation costs of an in-flight entertainment center," which costs around $1 million.

While Folsom said he supports Israel's bill, he stressed that he is not pushing for mandated barriers -- at least not yet. He said it is far more important that airlines see the necessity of the barriers, opting to install them voluntarily as United has done.

Also important, Folsom said, is getting airlines to understand that the secondary barrier devices themselves are only a part of the larger combination of equipment, people, and procedures that, collectively, protect the cockpit.

"If we put the barriers on and the companies are reluctant, you're not going to have ongoing training, and without proper training, it's not going to be effective," Folsom said. "This system requires active participation, so it's really important that we lead and educate and sell the industry on the value of this."

Eventually, Folsom said he hopes to show airlines that barriers, while more expensive initially, are actually more cost effective than other equivalent means of protecting the cockpit, such as extensive defense training for flight crews.

Currently, the FAA does not mandate flight attendants' defense training. Instead, the training is optional, and flight attendants must go to training facilities on their own time, paying all of the expenses incurred, said Candace Kolander of the Association of Flight Attendants.

A 2007 survey revealed that, on average, flight attendants receive between five minutes and one hour of defense training per year, according to Kolander.

"We don't believe that we're at a level yet that is sufficient for us," she said.

Folsom said that after 9/11, defending the plane essentially became part of flight crews' job description. But he stressed that training alone won't protect the cockpit.

"It's absurd to think that flight attendants are going to be able to defend against multiple highly trained attackers," he said. "They're going to roll right past them into the flight deck. There is no level of training they could receive that's going to be effective in and of itself."

If terrorists do get inside the flight deck, the reinforced cockpit door, which Folsom called a "kneejerk reaction" on the part of the government after 9/11, could end up working against the flight crew, making it impossible to regain control of the aircraft.

Despite the threats, not everyone in the aviation industry believes secondary barriers are essential to airline security.

The International Air Transport Association (IATA), an industry trade group representing 230 airlines in 115 countries, said it is confident in current security measures but supports further research on the topic of airline security.

"What we don't want to do is rush toward any measure based on a 'one size fits all' paradigm," said Anthony Concil, IATA's director of corporate communications. "Aircraft differ in type, construction, and use and to suggest that any single measure is the answer would be incorrect."

Recently, IATA has drawn criticism from some members of the secondary barrier committee. From the beginning, said Folsom, IATA "has made it clear to us that they do not think secondary barriers are a necessary enhancement to aviation sector security." Folsom called IATA's support of further research on the barriers "a politically correct way to say they want to kill the initiative." At a recent meeting, says Folsom, IATA pulled out of the committee altogether and asked that all reference to its participation be deleted. (IATA declined to comment when asked about its withdrawal from the committee.)

Ultimately, Folsom said he believes any pushback on secondary barriers stems from denial. "People don't want to admit that there's a threat out there. They have forgotten the horror of 9/11. It's like a coping mechanism," he said.

Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?
By Andrew McGregor
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

Executive Summary:
In the absence of police and government security forces, al-Qaeda-sympathetic movements, including al-Shabaab al-Islam (The Youth of Islam), have formed in the Sinai Peninsula. The demands of the

Salafi-Jihadist groups reflect both local and regional concerns. Among their demands are calls for a full implementation of Shari'a, the revocation of Egypt's treaties with Israel, the establishment of an Islamic Emirate in the Sinai and Egyptian military intervention against Israel on behalf of the Palestinians in Gaza. Despite a statement proclaiming the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, core al-Qaeda has not yet acknowledged this new chapter of the movement. Sinai-based militants have repeatedly targeted a natural gas pipeline to Israel in a show of distaste for Arab-Israeli relations and to strike a symbol of the corruption of Mubarak's regime. These attacks and the recent storming of a police station by armed militants in the regional capital of al-Arish have alarmed Cairo, which has lost control of the region since security forces fled Bedouin attacks in the January revolution. In response to these developments, Egyptian security forces have returned to the Sinai, though there are conflicting accounts of whether their mission will be solely defensive or directed at eliminating the militant threat. The size and armament of the deployment is limited by restrictions imposed by the Camp David Accords signed with Israel. The long standing alienation of the Sinai Bedouin from the rest of Egypt and the growth of a radical Salafist movement influenced by like-minded groups in Gaza have combined to pose a serious challenge to a regime that is handcuffed in its response.

Introduction

The one area of Egypt that appeared ready to explode into violence during last January's revolution was the Sinai. Unlike the unarmed, peaceful demonstrators that filled the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, the Bedouin tribesmen of the Sinai were well armed and already engaged in a low-level conflict with Egyptian authorities over a number of issues, including Bedouin smuggling activities, a traditional occupation that has lately become politicized through Bedouin interaction with radical Islamists in Gaza, the end-user of the weapons the desert dwellers are shipping to Sinai's eastern border. Possibly the only reason a large-scale conflict did not break out in Sinai at the time was the flight or desertion of nearly all the police and security forces based in Sinai after a number of attacks on police stations. Now, however, after a growing number of acts of militancy and the release of an alarming video allegedly depicting the formation of an al-Qaeda-sympathetic movement in Sinai known as al-Shabaab al-Islam (The Youth of Islam), Egypt's security forces are back, this time accompanied by a significant military presence. [1] The release of the video and a subsequent statement followed an attack on an al-Arish police station in northeast Sinai and the fifth attack this year on a pipeline supplying natural gas to Israel.

Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula

An August 2 pamphlet distributed in al-Arish entitled "A Statement from al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula" displayed a mix of local and regional concerns, demanding an Islamic Emirate in the Sinai, an end to the exploitation

August 2; *Bikya Masr* [Cairo], August 2). Though the video was carried on jihadi websites before being taken down by its host, the declaration of a new branch of al-Qaeda in this highly sensitive and strategic region has

Egypt
Sinai Peninsula

of Sinai's wealth by non-residents, the full implementation of Shari'a, an end to discrimination against the Bedouin, the revocation of Egypt's treaties with Israel and Egyptian military intervention on behalf of the Palestinians in Gaza. It also questioned the military government's efforts to halt drug-smuggling in the region (Youm7.com [Cairo],

yet to be supported by a statement from any of al-Qaeda's known media outlets.

Despite the influx of Egyptian security forces into the Sinai, the military-run interim government is reluctant to acknowledge the emergence of an al-Qaeda chapter in the Sinai. One state-controlled Egyptian daily described

the group's declaration as "a fabrication" (*al-Jumhuriyah* [Cairo], August 4).

The latest disturbances began on July 29 when tribesmen in Land Cruisers or on motorcycles attacked a police station in al-Arish, killing three civilians and two security officers as well as wounding 19 others (MENA Online, July 30). The attack occurred the same day as an estimated one million Islamists gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square to demand an Islamic state in Egypt. Tribal sources indicated that most of the attackers came from a single village that had become a stronghold of Salafi-Jihadis who "raise the black flags of al-Qaeda" (*al-Ahram* [Cairo], August 1). A later statement by police said that 15 suspects had been arrested in connection with the attack, ten of them Palestinians (*al-Ahram*, July 31).

On July 30, an Egyptian National Gas Company (Gasco**)** pipeline carrying natural gas to Israel was attacked for the third time in a month, and the fifth time this year. The attackers punched a hole through the pipeline with rocket-propelled grenades. The pipeline was still out of operation following an earlier attack on July 12 (*Jerusalem Post*, July 31). Israeli sources indicate that a second attack on the pipeline in the early hours of July 30 was beaten off by private security forces working for Israel's East Mediterranean Gas Company (Globes Online [Rishon LeZion], July 31).

Beside the militants' distaste for Israel, the pipeline also symbolizes the corruption of the Hosni Mubarak regime, which is believed to have offered a contract at below-market prices to Israel in return for kickbacks. The loss in revenue to the Egyptian state is estimated at roughly $700 million. One tribal leader insisted that locals viewed such attacks by militants as little more than a nuisance: "The most they do is torch the pipeline that transfers gas to Israel and we couldn't care less about whether Israel has gas or not" (Daily News Egypt, August 12). The steady series of attacks on the $500 million al-Arish to Ashkelon pipeline have placed the future of the project in

jeopardy and Israel is already looking for alternative supplies.

Further unrest spread to the main border crossing with Gaza at Rafah, a key smuggling site, where Egyptian police turned back hundreds of people (Ma'an News Agency [Bethlehem], July 31).

The Bedouin Struggle with the State

As the meeting point of Asia and Africa, the Sinai has always been important to Egypt's security. Though the Sinai has been, with brief interruptions, a part of Egypt in one form or another since the time of the First Egyptian Dynasty (c. 3100 – 2890 B.C.E.), it has also been regarded as something apart from the Egypt of the Nile and Delta, a remote wasteland useful for mineral exploitation and strategic reasons but otherwise best left (outside of Egyptian security outposts) to the unruly Semitic and **Bedouin tribes** (*left*) that have called the Sinai home since ancient

times. The effect of these policies is that the Sinai Bedouin form only a tiny minority of Egypt's total population, but retain an absolute majority in the Sinai.

In recent decades, however, Cairo has attempted to impose the deeply infiltrated security regime that existed in the rest of the country up until last January's revolution. Many Bedouin involved in traditional smuggling activities found themselves in Egyptian prisons serving long sentences in often brutal conditions. The attempt to impose a security regime on the freedom-minded Bedouin led to a greater alienation of the tribesmen from the state, and the Egyptian uprising presented an opportunity to quickly roll back decades of attempts to impose state control on life in the Sinai. Most importantly, it opened the door for those influenced by the Salafist movements of neighboring Gaza to begin operations.

There are roughly 15 Bedouin tribes in the Sinai. In the politically sensitive northeast region (including al-Arish and the border area) the most important are the Sawarka and Rumaylat. There are also significant Palestinian populations in al-Arish and the border towns of Rafah and Zuwaid.

Local Bedouin took the opportunity of storming the Sinai's prisons, freeing an unknown number of Bedouin smugglers and Palestinian militants. In nearly all cases they were unopposed by prison staff. One of the escapees was Ali Abu Faris, who was convicted for involvement in the Sharm al-Shaykh bombings that killed 88 people in 2005. Others freed included Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners convicted more recently of planning terrorist operations in Egypt (see *Terrorism Monitor*, June 12, 2009). Since emptying the prisons the tribesmen have warned the police to stay out of the main smuggling centers on penalty of death and the region has been effectively operating without any type of government. Police stationed in the north Sinai have tended to be drawn from Egypt's Nile and Delta population rather than local sources, giving the impression of an occupation force to some of the Sinai's more-independent minded Bedouin.

One unintended consequence of sealing the border between Gaza and Egypt has been growing cooperation between Bedouin and Gazan smugglers. While goods and arms have passed into Gaza, Salafi-Jihadi ideology has crossed into Sinai in return. A new and volatile combination of Bedouin dissatisfaction, Palestinian radicalism and Salafist-Jihadi ideology erupted in 2004 with the emergence of the Tawhid wa'l-Jihad (Monotheism and Struggle) – a mixed Bedouin-Palestinian group that opposed the presence of Egyptian security forces and sought to end tourism in the region, especially visits to historical or archaeological sites, which the group regarded as idolatry. The new group carried out a series of bombings in 2004-2005 that targeted tourist resorts in Sinai (well used by Israelis) and international peacekeepers belonging to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) (see *Terrorism Monitor*, May 2, 2006). The government security operations that followed cast a very wide net, killing dozens of suspects and sweeping thousands of Bedouin into detention, creating an ever more hostile relationship between the Bedouin and Egyptian administrators and security forces.

Cairo's Military Response

Cairo addressed the emerging threat on August 12 by sending over 2000 troops from the Egyptian Second Division backed by police and border guards to al-Arish, along with a number of armored vehicles stripped of their main armaments to meet security obligations under Egypt's treaty with Israel. Authorities were emphatic that the deployment was for defensive purposes only and that none of the troops would be "chasing anyone in Sinai's mountains" (*al-Masry al-Youm*, August 12). The deployment marks the largest Egyptian military presence in the Sinai since the signing of the 1979 Camp David Accords.

The military response is hampered by Camp David Accord restrictions on the deployment of Egyptian military forces in parts of the Sinai, especially in the sensitive "Zone C" near the Israeli border, where only international peacekeepers and Egyptian civilian police were allowed to carry arms before a 2005 agreement with Israel permitted the deployment of 750 soldiers to secure the border. Al-Arish is located in Zone B, where Egypt is permitted to maintain four border security battalions, but Rafah and Zuwaid are within Zone C.

Despite attempts to downplay the extent of the deployment in Sinai, the inclusion of two brigades of Special Forces (1,000 men) would indicate significant operations are planned. Security sources claim the deployment is called "Operation Eagle" and is designed to restore security in the Sinai in three phases:

- Supported by armored vehicles and warplanes, the troops will restore security in northern Sinai and crack

down on organized crime and smuggling rings in al-Arish.

- Security forces will then deploy in the border towns of Rafah and Zuwaid, where they anticipate strong resistance. Salafists have already destroyed the shrine of Shaykh Zuwaid in the town that bears his name, an action typical of Salafist ideology.

- The last phase of the operation will be a coordinated ground-air offensive in the mountains of central Sinai, particularly the Mount Halal area, which is believed to be a haven for militants (*al-Masry al-Youm* [Cairo], August 13; *Egyptian Gazette*, August 13).

So far, the deployment has not impressed many tribesmen. Of the disarmed armored vehicles, tribal leader Shaykh Hassan Khalaf remarked: "They look stupid and are completely useless in facing Islamist groups who carry machine guns and heavy artillery. Israel has tied the army's hands." North Sinai governor al-Sa'id Abd al-Wahab Mabruk has denied the existence of "Operation Eagle," insisting that the newly arrived security forces will be limited to protecting individuals and buildings (Daily News Egypt, August 12).

The return of the Egyptian military to sensitive areas of the Sinai has been encouraged in some quarters of Egypt as a necessary step to allay fears of Israeli military action designed to protect Israel's security in the border region (*al-Ahram* [Cairo], August 12). Typical of the suspicion regarding Israeli intentions is a report in a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily that said Egyptian security sources claimed to have intelligence regarding contacts between the militants and Israel's Mossad in relation to obtaining material support for further terrorist operations that would give Israel an excuse to stop the opening of the Rafah border crossing with Gaza (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, August 12).

The Salafist Denial
Reports are circulating that claim Sinai's Salafist community intends to replace traditional Bedouin councils with courts run by Salafist shaykhs, their writ enforced by 6,000 armed men. According to a leading local Salafist, Shaykh Sulayman Abu Ayyub, the Salafists "will work to serve justice between

people, even if we have to use force through youth members" (*al-Misri al-Youm* [Cairo], August 10). Local Salafist leader Shaykh As'ad al-Beek has denied the reports, however, maintaining that the Salafists do not conduct any armed activities (Daily News Egypt, August 12).

The leader of the Salafist movement in al-Arish, As'as Bey al-Arish, denied that the Salafis had entered into any confrontations with police in Sinai, claiming that such rumors originate with Israel's Mossad, which "propagates such rumors to foster instability in Sinai" (Youm7.com [Cairo], August 12; *Bikya Masr* [Cairo], August 12). Other Salafist leaders have denied that the movement had any part in the attack on the al-Arish police station (MENA Online, August 2).

Conclusion
The near collapse of Egypt's internal security forces has opened Egypt to a resurgence of Islamist violence that would have been inconceivable a year ago. There are now concerns within Egypt that the nation's sizeable but divided Islamist community intends to usurp the secular revolution to impose an Islamic state in Egypt.

Aside from suspicions of Israeli involvement in instigating the unrest, some Egyptian commentators see the hand of HAMAS behind the disturbances in the Sinai (*al-Akhbar* [Cairo], August 10). However, there seems to be a general reluctance to discuss the specific grievances of the Sinai Bedouin or their place in Egyptian society. Thousands of years of Egyptian occupation have failed to integrate the native peoples of the Sinai Peninsula into Egypt, whether socially, politically or even economically. The persisting sense of alienation provides fertile ground for the growth of militancy, conditions easily exploited by Salafist-Jihadi groups that see themselves as fighting two enemies in the region – the apostate regime in Cairo and the Zionist regime in Israel. While the enhanced security force now in the Sinai may be able to restore some semblance of security in the urban areas of the northeast, it will almost certainly be insufficient to tackle the militants should they decamp to the wild, cave-ridden mountain region of central Sinai.

Note:

1. The video was posted to YouTube (www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYuKeeIVFzM) on July 27, but has since been removed "as a violation of YouTube's policy on depiction of harmful activities."

Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world.

Egypt's 5,000 troops take on 2,000 al Qaeda in Sinai
Source: http://www.debka.com/article/21209/

Egyptian troops enter Sinai in force

Egyptian forces descended on the Sinai Peninsula Sunday, Aug. 14, for their first post-Mubarak operation to retake control of the territory from lawless and terrorist elements rampant there since the Egyptian revolution and responsible for sabotaging the Egyptian gas pipeline to Israel, Jordan and Syria.

Monday, three Egyptian army brigades of 1,700 men backed by tanks, an equal number of special policemen and 3,400 security personnel drove into the northern towns of El Arish, Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah, which is divided between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. In their first clashes with Islamic Liberation Army gunmen, they killed one and detained 11, four of them Palestinians, he Egyptian military communiqué reported.

debkafile's military sources add that three Egyptian officers were kidnapped in the clash – whether they were killed or held as hostages is unknown.

For two years, debkafile's counter-terror sources have been reporting on the burgeoning concentration of al Qaeda cells and affiliates in Sinai and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. The 2,200 Egyptian troops maintained there after Feb. 14 to maintain order and guard the Egyptian natural gas pipeline to Israel, Jordan and Syria were easily overpowered The facility was sabotaged five times and supplies remain cut off. Restoring a semblance of law and order to northern Sinai will be the easy part of the Egyptian military mission – for which Cairo obtained prior Israeli permission as mandated

under their peace accord. The hard part is ahead when in the coming weeks the units head south to flush out the Islamist invaders holed up in the central Sinai Mountains to which they withdrew last week after being tipped off that large-scale Egyptian forces were coming.

On the narrow mountain trails, the soldiers will have their work cut out to contend with 2,000 well-organized and heavily armed Islamist gunmen. The forbidding central Sinai range of precipitous peaks, from 1,000 to 2,642 meters tall, covers 21,000 square kilometers. The terrain has deep wadis, dense shrubbery, abundant natural water and plenty of animals for food. Judged in terms of the war in Afghanistan, a Taliban force this size in control of a region twice the area of the Taliban stronghold of North Waziristan would pose a prohibitive challenge even to a full-scale NATO army.

Egyptian forces have fought for control of these mountains several times but failed, ending up with accommodations of sorts with the 350,000

Bedouin tribes sheltering the Islamists and sharing in their smuggling trade. The tribes always came out of these deals in control of the region.

Our military sources therefore expect this first wave of Egyptian armored forces into Sinai to be followed by more - if Cairo's rulers seriously

intend to recapture the strategic peninsula and expunge the al Qaeda presence. There is no way this can be accomplished, according to our military experts, without air might. The terrorists' hideouts will have to be bombed from the air and combat helicopters provide cover for armored units moving along the isolated Sinai trails; drones will be needed to gather intelligence on enemy movements.

Cairo will have to apply to Jerusalem for permission to deploy air might in Sinai for the first time since the territory was demilitarized under their peace accord. debkafile's military sources report that the Islamic Liberation Army - which has declared its objective as the seizure of all of Sinai and its transformation into a Muslim Caliphate - is a conglomerate of five terrorist groups:

- ☑ Indigenous Bedouin tribes who have a score to settle with the Egyptian army;
- ☑ Palestinians from the Gaza Strip drawn into extremist Salafi sects which are integral parts of al Qaeda.
- ☑ Hundreds of adherents of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the murderous Jamaa

al-Islamiya who escaped Egyptian prisons on January 29 at the peak of the popular revolution which overthrew Hosni Mubarak. The former jailbirds made a beeline for Sinai and today constitute the hard operational core of the movement.

- ☑ Al Qaeda adherents, who made their way to Sinai after violent careers in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
- ☑ Followers of various Egyptian Sufi and dervish orders.

Innovative disaster communication tech developed

Source: http://www.gatech.edu/newsroom/release.html?nid=69356

Communication networks typically collapse when they are needed most -- during and in the immediate aftermath of massive disasters; researchers have developed a -- an innovative wireless system called LifeNet designed to help

first responders communicate after disasters; LifeNet is a mobile ad-hoc network designed for use in highly transient environments that requires no infrastructure such as Internet, cell towers or traditional landlines.

LifeNet ad-hoc network will work with cellphones and laptops // Source: smartphonewell.com

In the aftermath of most disasters — from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to this year's earthquake in Japan — communication systems have been overwhelmed, leaving people without phones and Internet when they need these tools the most.

Georgia Tech College of Computing researchers have developed a possible solution. It is an innovative wireless system called LifeNet designed to help first responders communicate after disasters. LifeNet is a mobile ad-hoc network designed for use in highly transient environments that requires no infrastructure such as Internet, cell towers or traditional landlines.

"It's an independent network you can join," said Santosh Vempala, Georgia Tech distinguished professor of computer science in the College of Computing.

"It doesn't need wires, antennas, cell towers and so on, and it works across platforms like laptops and smart phones. We imagine reli

agencies would be able to set up a network right away and communicate about what's needed."

A Georgia Tech release reports that Vempala and his graduate student, Hrushikesh Mehendale, demonstrated the LifeNet system at the ACM SIGCOM conference in Toronto, Canada, on Monday.

The standard for post-disaster communications is the satellite phone, which, at $600 or more per unit, can be expensive to own, and, at 50 cents per text, costly to use.

LifeNet, however, bridges connectivity between a satellite phone or other Internet gateway and a WiFi-based network on the ground. It extends the coverage of a satellite phone or a service such as SMS from one computer with access to the entire independent network in the field. Essentially, that means several people in the field who may not have satellite phones but have smart phones or laptops with WiFi capability can connect to the LifeNet network, communicate with each other with no other infrastructure and use the Internet as long as any one of them has access.

"Currently available options such as satellite communication are expensive and have limited functionality," Mehendale said. "If you use LifeNet, the cost savings per text message is 100 times less than a satellite phone."

LifeNet is also easy to set up. The network starts as soon as a node is put in place. Each LifeNet-enabled computer acts as both a host client and a router, able to directly route data to and from any other available wireless device. Nodes can be moved from location to location as needed, and the network remains intact.

The software developed by Vempala and Mehendale for LifeNet provides basic communications that are low bandwidth and reliable. It does not allow users to stream video, for example, but it can send text messages for basic communication needs.

"It's a trade-off of performance for reliability," Vempala said. "Reliability is really what you need the most in these situations."

During the demo at SIGCOMM, conference attendees could see the Atlanta-based LifeNet network via a Web-based interface in Toronto. They were able to log into the network, send messages, move nodes, and see how communication is affected.

Georgia Tech researchers are currently ready to deploy LifeNet for field testing and are looking to expand beyond crisis communications.

The release notes that Vempala's team recently partnered with Tata Institute of Social Sciences India, which has a disaster management center. Together, the researchers identified cyclone-affected areas without communications infrastructure that could benefit most from LifeNet. As a result, researchers will be deploying LifeNet in the Mohali region of India over the next several months.

"In an area without any other connectivity, we will establish a set up that could be used daily and could also be specifically helpful during a disaster," Mehendale said. "We need to make the solution a part of their daily lives since people cannot afford costly equipment like satellite phones in third-world regions."

The researchers also hope to pitch LifeNet as a package to FEMA, the Red Cross, and other U.S. relief agencies soon.

"There are many recent situations, like the Mississippi floods this summer, where this would have been valuable," Vempala said. "People were trapped. Cell phones were not working, the Internet is down and people don't have a way to communicate… . LifeNet can be the solution."

The Lone Wolf Jihad

By Raymond Ibrahim

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3017/lone-wolf-jihad

As we near the ten-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001 strikes, the Obama administration is stressing that the threat remains, but in a different form. In a speech at a Chamber of Commerce event yesterday, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said:

> [T]he U.S. has a "layered system of security that would give us multiple ways to deter" an attack like the one a decade ago in which airplanes were weaponized.

"What we see now is smaller plots," she said. "We are also seeing a rise of activities by individuals who are actually in the country, and they are acting by themselves and that kind of attack is the most difficult to prevent because there is nothing to intercept." Napolitano's comments echoed what President Obama said in an interview Tuesday in discussing the 10-year anniversary of Sept. 11.... With the nation preparing to observe the 10th anniversary of hijacked airliners crashing in New York and Washington and in the Pennsylvania countryside, Obama said the government is in a state of heightened awareness. "The biggest concern we have right now is not the launching of a major terrorist operation, although that risk is always there," the president said. "The risk that we're especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently," he said. "You know, when you've got one person who is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it's a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators."

While it is nice that the administration is able to acknowledge that jihadis are going lone wolf—that the jihad has metastasized—this report is a reminder of the administration's failed policies, policies which in many ways led to the current situation, where it is no surprise that, a decade after the strikes of 9/11, "the government is [still] in a state of heightened awareness."

For starters, rather than once attempting to understand the ideology of jihad itself and its place in Islamic history and tradition—not to malign, but for proper context, to understand what one is up against—the administration, like the one before it, preferred to take the easy, politically-correct, way out: focus on formal organizations and people—al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, as the root source of the problem—while ignoring the jihadi elephant in the room.

Indeed, all evidence indicates that the focus remains on the tangible, the quantifiable—al-Qaeda—without wanting to look at the surrounding context which produces groups like it and even jihadi lone wolfs. In the CNN interview, "Obama said the government continues to monitor and gather information about potential terror plots, even though Al Qaeda's capabilities have been degraded." Note the ingrained "even though," as if the very demise of al-Qaeda, its total eradication, is naturally supposed to equate the demise of jihad, which is some 1400 years older than al-Qaeda.

And if ever there was talk on the context that fuels the jihad, it was always the idea that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was to blame (regurgitating what the jihadis themselves were saying). Likewise, it was believed that terrorism was a "foreign" problem that could never infect American Muslims, as it has nothing to do with Islam.

Yet here is Napolitano saying that "We are also seeing a rise of activities by individuals who are actually in the country." More to the point, months earlier, Attorney General Eric Holder said that "the threat has changed ... to worrying about people in the United States, American citizens — raised here, born here, and who for whatever reason, have decided

that they are going to become radicalized and take up arms against the nation in which they were born."

None of this is surprising, considering that the Obama administration went out of its way to ban the use of accurate words—such as jihad and Islam from national security documents—thereby epistemologically undermining American discourse on the nature of the threat. In short, Fort Hood style attacks—both the successful one of 2009 and the unsuccessful one from weeks ago—should have been expected. Expect more to come as the lone wolf jihad runs loose.

Raymond Ibrahim, an Islam-specialist, is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Implication of the Negev terrorist incident

By Jeffrey White and Ehud Yaari
Source: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3394

The August 18 Palestinian terrorist attack in Israel's southern Negev Desert is the most serious such incident since 2008. The Israeli casualty toll was nearly forty, including eight dead. Seven of the terrorists were killed as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) responded and the fighting extended into the night.

The violence represents a major break in the relative calm on Israel's southern border, with major implications for both the situation in Gaza and Israel's relationship with Egypt. The focus of military action has now shifted to the

aggravating Israeli-Egyptian relations, with Cairo claiming Israel killed and wounded Egyptian soldiers in the course of the incident.

THE INCIDENT

The terrorist attack was conducted by elements of the Gaza-based Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), an organization with close operational ties to Hamas. It was controlled from Gaza and mounted via the so-called "U-route," by which Palestinian operatives attempt to move from Gaza to the Sinai and then into

Gaza area, and another Gaza escalation cycle may be underway, with an uncertain outcome. Furthermore, the incident is seriously

Israel. The attack itself was carried out along a strip of the Israel-Egypt border north of Eilat along Israeli Route 12, where the road runs

very close to the boundary in an area frequently used for illegal immigration and smuggling.

As many as twenty terrorists were involved, apparently divided into several groups acting in concert. They used various weapons, including at least one rocket-propelled grenade, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive vests, and a mortar. Their targets included two civilian buses and several cars, and they used IEDs against IDF units responding to the action. The scope and complexity of the operation suggests careful planning and intelligence collection, significant logistics preparation, and determined execution.

The Israeli death toll included one IDF soldier and one counterterrorism police commando. Six Egyptian soldiers were also reportedly killed, and although the circumstances of their deaths are unclear, Egypt is claiming that some of them were killed by Israeli fire.

IDF RESPONSE

The IDF reportedly had general warning of a potential Sinai-based terrorist attack some days before the event, but not specifics regarding time and place. Special combat forces from the Golani Infantry Brigade and the police counterterrorism unit were deployed as a result of the warning and responded quickly to the incident. Some Israeli troops reportedly crossed the border briefly and shallowly to engage terrorists there.

After identifying the PRC as the group responsible, Israel retaliated directly against its leadership in Rafah with airstrikes. PRC leader Kamal Nairab (alias Abu Awad) and four of his lieutenants were killed, including military commander Imad Hamad, who Israeli intelligence believes planned the attack.

More broadly, the incident highlights the challenge Israel faces in responding to threats from the Sinai. Because of the peace treaty with Egypt, Israeli forces cannot operate in the area and must rely on Egyptian authorities to control criminal and terrorist activity there. Even if the IDF has warning of an attack, it cannot do much more than increase its state of alert, reinforce its side of the border, and pass the warning to Egypt. In 2010, Israel began construction of a security barrier along the Sinai border and is reportedly about 20 percent finished. Completion of this project will help but not eliminate the problem.

THE EGYPTIAN DIMENSION

The attack also highlights Cairo's growing Sinai problem. The vast Sinai Peninsula and 170-mile border with Israel have always proven difficult for Egyptian governments to control, including the Mubarak regime. But the situation has become more chaotic since the revolution, with smuggling, crime, and violence increasing significantly, including several attacks on gas pipelines and a recent assault by some 200 jihadists and Bedouins on an Egyptian police station at al-Arish in the northern Sinai.

Indeed, conditions in the area have been exacerbated by the government's traditionally poor relationship with the Bedouin population. Cairo has put most of its effort into policing the Sinai's northeast corner, where its ongoing "Operation Eagle" aims to disrupt criminal and jihadist activity. Yet this focus has left the central area more vulnerable to such problems.

WHY NOW?

The attack was most likely spurred by internal pressures among Gaza-based Palestinian terrorist groups to strike at Israel. Some group leaders may have believed that such an operation could relieve the pressure while avoiding full-scale Israeli retaliation, given that the attack was not conducted directly from Gaza.

Israeli sources indicate that the operation was also intended as a kidnapping action based on the Hizballah model: that is, a border attack coupled with the seizure of military personnel or civilians. Israeli civilian vehicles using this road are certainly vulnerable to such tactics, though no Israelis were taken in this instance. Moreover, Hamas has never really given up on kidnapping as a strategy, and the PRC aided the group in the 2006 seizure of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

IMPLICATIONS

The incident, which became a prolonged engagement, has very serious implications. Most immediate is the potential for escalation. Rocket fire from Gaza has already resumed in earnest, with more than twenty launches into southern Israel, several of them hitting populated areas. For its part, the Israeli Air Force has struck multiple PRC and other terrorist-associated facilities in Gaza, in response to both yesterday's attack and the rocket strikes.

Israel did not immediately strike Hamas-associated targets, however, and the group has not joined directly in the attacks on Israel. Should those conditions change, the cycle of retaliation could expand in intensity and scope.

In addition, the incident has seriously aggravated Israeli-Egyptian tensions. Cairo has officially protested what it claims was the killing of its forces by Israeli troops, demanded an investigation of the incident, and closed the Nitzana cargo border crossing with Israel. The Egyptian chief of staff has gone to the Sinai, and anti-Israel demonstrations have occurred in Cairo and Alexandria. Contacts between the IDF and the Egyptian military continue, however.

Looking ahead, the IDF will need to focus more attention on the Sinai. This is not to say that Israel has done nothing up to now: the barrier project, changes in southern force structure, the issuing of periodic Sinai terrorist warnings, and the agreement to allow Egypt to deploy 2,000 additional troops into the peninsula for Operation Eagle all show that Israel has not been ignoring the problems. But it will now likely devote even more attention to the area. That means more money, more intelligence assets, more rapid construction of the barrier, and probably more forces in the south.

Yesterday's attack has triggered a strong reaction from Israel, as its perpetrators undoubtedly expected. The situation now threatens to escalate into both a wider Israel-Gaza conflict and an Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic crisis. Controlling this escalation will require careful responses from Hamas, Egypt, and Israel.

Specifically, Hamas must curb any surge in rocket fire by its own military wing and other armed elements. This will not be easy even if the organization actually wishes to do so. Egypt needs to prevent the emotions of the moment from producing a breach in relations with Israel and demonstrate that it is capable of maintaining security in the Sinai. And Israel must weigh carefully the scope and nature of its response. An overly harsh or broad Israeli retaliation could spur further escalation both in Gaza and in tensions with Egypt.

CONCLUSION

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Attacks in Israel and New Militant Opportunities in Egypt

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/regions/middle_east

A series of coordinated attacks took place on Thursday (Aug 18, 2011) along Israel's border with Egypt. While each attack was relatively small, the incidents indicate some degree of coordination among the attackers. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak attributed the attacks to elements emanating from the Gaza Strip, while Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tactical reports stated that the attacks had been launched from across Israel's border with Egypt along the Sinai peninsula. No one has yet claimed responsibility.

Israel has plenty of experience in dealing with threats from militants

Gaza. In response, Israel often conducts preemptive as well as retaliatory airstrikes using real-time intelligence. In addition, whenever things appear to be getting out of control, the IDF conducts a major ground offensive.

Attacks inside Israel have become a rare occurrence. Weakened capability and shifting strategic imperatives have caused Hamas and other militant groups to largely refrain from such attacks. Most attacks usually consist of the firing of rockets from Gaza, a practice Hamas has an interest in both limiting as well as calibrating to enhance its control over the Strip.

In light of recent unrest in the Arab world and the new political and security reality in Egypt, these latest attacks in Israel potentially represent a new kind of threat — one posed by transnational jihadists who have long wanted to undermine Egypt without operational success. It is quite possible that al Qaeda is trying to exploit the post-Mubarak political environment to mobilize its Sinai- and Gaza-based assets in order to create an Egyptian-Israeli crisis that can (potentially) undermine Cairo's stability.

Egypt After Mubarak

Under the police state run by ousted President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt successfully kept political Islamists restrained, neutralizing the threat from jihadist groups. The unrest that broke out in the Arab world earlier this year has altered the domestic political reality in Egypt. Mubarak's fall from power in the wake of popular agitation and the Egyptian military regime's obligated engagement in political reforms have created a new environment — one in which autocratic measures have become largely obsolete.

Egypt's rolling back of the police state and subsequent political reforms have made it difficult to maintain domestic security and keep militants under control. Indeed, militants are already taking advantage of the political opening. They have stepped up their operations, as evidenced by attacks against energy infrastructure and other targets in the Sinai Peninsula.

The new era of Egyptian multiparty politics has also allowed a variety of Islamist actors to emerge as legitimate political entities. At the same time, Egyptian national sentiment is emerging as a major factor in the foreign policymaking process. This change alone

constitutes a threat to Israel's national security, though it is a more of a long-term issue.

The rise of different types of Islamist actors (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists and Sufists, among others) as legitimate political entities who pursue constitutional means to come to power makes it difficult for jihadists to directly threaten the stability of the Egyptian regime. With even Salafists and former jihadist groups such as Gamaah al-Islamiyah and Tandheem al-Jihad embracing the political mainstream, the jihadists will have a hard time gaining support for an armed insurrection against the Egyptian state. Realizing that they are not able to directly confront the Egyptian state (despite the Arab unrest), the jihadists are trying to indirectly undermine the regime by exploiting the Israeli-Gaza situation and the renewed militancy in the Sinai.

A New Threat To Israel?

Even before today's attacks, the Israelis responded to increasing attacks in the Sinai by allowing Cairo to deploy an additional 1,000 troops to the peninsula. That concession indicated that Israel is likely skeptical of the Egyptian military's ability to effectively deal with this problem, considering current political and security circumstances. Cairo is under a lot of stress domestically and regionally. Egypt is in the early stages of trying to manage political and militant opposition in a tense political climate and it is unable to maintain internal security as effectively as it once did.

Israel, therefore, will likely see today's attacks as a new kind of threat. The Israeli leadership realizes that the problem is no longer strictly confined to Gaza but has now spread to Egypt itself. However, Israel doesn't have any good way to control the situation unfolding within the borders of its Arab neighbor. That said, Israeli officials have already begun pointing fingers at the deteriorating security situation in Egypt, a response which likely going to cause tensions between Jerusalem and Cairo — exactly what the jihadists hope to achieve.

The latest video statement from al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, in which he speaks of an "intellectual" effort in addition to the armed one, is noteworthy. Al-Zawahiri's comments are part of al Qaeda's response to the so-called "Arab Spring" — a development in which the jihadists have largely been marginalized. Al-Zawahiri has long been frustrated by the fact that many former jihadists in Egypt (his home country)

have renounced violence, attacking al Qaeda and him personally.

For decades, the al Qaeda leader has longed to be capable of undermining the Egyptian state, and now the Arab unrest provides an opportunity (albeit not without challenges of its own). Al-Zawahiri's status as al Qaeda chief after the death of Osama bin Laden boosts the viability of this endeavor. In this new role, he is more or less free to steer the movement toward his preferred direction. His ascension to the top of the jihadist hierarchy also signals a rise of

Egyptians (who have long held a disproportionate amount of influence) within the global jihadist network.

The result is that al Qaeda can be expected to focus heavily on the Egyptian-Gaza-Israeli fault line. This fixation will not only complicate matters for Israel and its efforts to deal with the Gaza Strip, it could also begin to unravel the Egyptian-Israeli relationship that has existed since the signing of the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords.

New training facility features simulated bus, air, and rail stations

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/new-training-facility-features-simulated-bus-air-and-rail-stations

On Tuesday DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano was in Brunswick, Georgia for the grand opening of a sophisticated new $5.3 million counter-terrorism training center for law enforcement officials; the 22,000 square-foot

and an airport terminal replete with security checkpoints, baggage claim, food court, and even a boarding bridge to a 727 jet.

"Anything they can find out there, they can find in here," said Jennifer Ranger, the branch chief of FLETC's Counterterrorism Division. "This facility is designed to create real-world training not just for counterterrorism but for all law enforcement."

Ranger added that the simulated environments will better teach officers what to look for and how to respond in real-life situations.

FLETC's new facility is the latest component of DHS's counter-terrorism training program for law enforcement officials and Secretary Napolitano said the facility played a critical role in preventing another 9/11.

facility features several simulation areas including a mock bus terminal, subway station, and an airport terminal

Training in simulated airliner // Source: publicradio.org

The new Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) site is designed to give local, state, and federal law enforcement officials an opportunity to conduct realistic hands-on training. The 22,000 square-foot facility features several simulation areas including a mock bus terminal, subway station,

"The whole idea is to make sure that we have the best training bar for those who are charged with the mission of protecting the American

homeland and all which that entails," said Napolitano. "I'm confident in saying now, almost 10 years later, we're a stronger nation, a better prepared nation when it comes to detecting and preventing terrorism and a better trained law enforcement nation."

On her tour of the facility, Napolitano watched a hazardous materials team conduct a demonstration at the facility's rail yard.

"The American public is increasingly going to be satisfied that they have and will maintain the safest transportation systems in the world and that we will not have another 9/11 on our watch," Napolitano said. "It's not going to happen."

The new center is dedicated in memory of Christine Lee Hanson (photo), who at two years-old, was the youngest victim killed in the 9/11 attacks when United Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Her photo hangs in the new facility, and Lee Hanson, Christine's grandfather who was on hand for the ceremony, said the portrait is a reminder of the innocent lives lost that day.

An Emerging Threat: Al-Qaeda In The Sinai Peninsula

By Robin Simcox (The Henry Jackson Society)
Source:http://www.eurasiareview.com/an-emerging-threat-al-qaeda-in-the-sinai-peninsula-analysis-31082011/

This month's attacks in Israel were staged from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt. Recent terrorist acts there have led the US to conclude that an al-Qaeda presence has emerged. This will

propelled grenades and suicide belts were used to target passing civilian vehicles, military transport and personnel, killing six civilians and two Israeli soldiers.

Zone A
Zone B
Zone C
Zone D
Egypt
Israel
Palestinian Territories

The attacks were launched from the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, after the militants tunnelled from Gaza into the Sinai, travelled down the Peninsula and entered Israeli territory. While it is still unclear which group they are aligned to, Israel's military response has largely been focused on Gaza's Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) (who praised the attacks but denied involvement).

However, US intelligence officials believe the PRC only scouted locations, and are increasingly focused on the development of terrorist groups loosely aligned to al-

have a significant impact on the entire region, and could further strain relations between Egypt and Israel.

At 12pm on 18 August, twelve militants launched a series of attacks near Eilat, Israel. Automatic weapons, roadside bombs, rocket

Qaeda (AQ) in the region. A new group, al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP), has been identified as a potential key participant in the attacks on Israel.

Background: The Sinai Peninsula

The Sinai Peninsula borders both Israel and Gaza, bridging Africa and Asia. The region was previously under Israeli control following the Six Day War of 1967, but was returned to Egypt as part of the 1978 Camp David accords. The Sinai is divided into north and south governorates, and comprises four military zones. Zone A (territory to the east of the Suez Canal running north-south) is Egyptian, and possesses a 22,000 man infantry division. Zone B (central Sinai) has four battalions in support of the Egyptian police. Zone C (to the west of the border with Gaza and Israel) is a demilitarised zone under joint control between the Egyptian police and Multinational Force Observers. Zone D (a narrow strip on the east side of the Egypt-Israel border) has four Israeli infantry battalions, including along the Gaza border.

Historically, the Sinai has been beset by tribal disputes. It possesses a large native Bedouin population of approximately 360,000. The Bedouin are a mainly desert based, ethnically Arab group which have long term grievances with the government. The Bedouins have not shared in the economic windfall brought about in the region from tourism and mineral resources, with the tourist industry in the Sinai mainly run by Egyptians from Cairo and other major cities. According to Dr Ely Karmon, a Senior Research Scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzlyia, the Bedouins have taken to smuggling in response. This has including weapons to Hamas, narcotics, foreign workers and prostitutes, and has especially increased since 2006.

An increasingly lawless region
Since the popular uprisings against Hosni Mubarak began, the Sinai has become an increasingly lawless area. Dr Karmon told HJS that he believes the security situation has 'collapsed' and the Sinai is 'on the way to becoming a failed region'.
The US assessed that 200-300 prisoners were freed from Egyptian jails opened or abandoned in the wake of the uprisings, some of whom subsequently settled in the Sinai, bolstering extremist movements. Joint Palestinian-Egyptian terrorist cells went to the Sinai, seemingly assisted by local Bedouins. Salafist groups have now formed armed committees to settle tribal disputes and police stations have been attacked on multiple occasions. One attack involved militants armed with rocket propelled grenades. Another led to a fire fight in which three civilians died. In response, the Egyptian government – with Israeli consent – deployed military forces into previously demilitarised zones in the Northern governorate.
The situation remains unstable. A Bedouin sheikh told the BBC that the area could be exploited by external actors such as Iran, Hezbollah and AQ. It is possible that such actors (along with Somalia) have now begun to establish training centres and hide weapons caches in the Sinai. Dr Karmon goes as far as to say that the Sinai could become 'a breeding ground for future al-Qaeda activity'.

The emergence of a new AQ franchise?
Following a recent attack on a police station in the Sinai, a pamphlet and video were produced containing a 'Statement from Al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula.' The statement called for:

• An Islamic emirate in the Sinai
• The introduction of Sharia law
• The abolition of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty
• Egyptian military intervention on behalf of Hamas in Gaza
• An end to discrimination against the Bedouin population

This mix of jihadist ambitions and Bedouin grievances suggests that either segments of the Bedouin population have either been radicalised by AQ or sympathise with their goals; or, alternatively, AQ activists are deliberately courting the Bedouin, and highlighting issues that concern them for strategic reasons. Either way, following the operation against the police station, a US official commented that there is 'no longer any doubt that AQ had some kind of potent presence in the peninsula.' The US believes they have begun to establish basic training facilities and gain strategic control of some towns.
Recently, there have also been bombings on the pipeline that transports gas to Israel, Jordan and Syria. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and current Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, told HJS that it was possible that these were the 'first steps' of a group (possibly working with Bedouins)

aspiring to become part of the AQ franchise and wanting to display their terrorist credentials. This assessment is shared by US officials in relation to the Eilat attacks.

If this is the case, such acts are not going unnoticed. The pipeline bombings were publicly praised by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the new head of AQ, who called for further operations against Israel to take place. (However, there is no consensus that these attacks were linked to AQ. For example, Dr Karmon believes that they were carried out by Palestinians financed by Hizbullah and Iran.)

AQ's central shura, or committee, has yet to give their formal approval of a franchise operating in the Sinai Peninsula. Yet this does not mean that such a situation could not occur in the coming months. As Riedel explains, negotiations between AQ central and aspirant groups can be protracted as there are certain criteria such aspirant cells must meet. There must be consensus on their enemies; for example, AQ does not want groups focussed solely on local issues at the expense of global goals. More importantly, according to Riedel, they must be operationally capable of violence. He states that there have been many groups in Gaza, for example, that have aspired to be part of the AQ network but have not been approved because they lacked the capacity.

US counterterrorism officials recently briefed the Washington Post that the core AQ leadership was on the verge of collapse. As such, it is possible that AQ may lower the bar in how effective groups have to be in order to get their official branding. Furthermore, their weakness highlights their need to show they are still a relevant organisation. As Riedel asks, 'what better way is there of doing so than announcing that they have a new franchise, and it is in the heart of the Arab world?' This being the case, the core leadership may want to officially endorse AQSP sooner rather than later.

What strategic impact could AQ in the Sinai Peninsula have?

The development of an official AQ branch in the Sinai Peninsula threatens the stability of an already chaotic region.

Attacks against Israel and Israeli interests could become commonplace. However, bombing gas pipelines affects not only Israel but also Syria and Jordan, both of whom import gas from Egypt. AQ could also target the Multinational Force Organization present in the Sinai as part of the Camp David accords.

Relations between Egypt and Israel would likely become fractured by AQ militancy in the Sinai. A glimpse of this came in the aftermath of the Eilat attacks. After the terrorists launched their operations, Israeli troops pursued them into the Sinai. One Egyptian officer and two policemen died in the crossfire, as did two Egyptian soldiers in a later incident.

Israel was forced to issue an apology – which may have placated the Egyptian government but has had little effect on the general Egyptian population. Riedel believes popular opinion in Egypt supports renegotiating the current peace treaty with Israel and regards the restrictions placed on their movement in the Sinai as humiliating.

Israel feared such a scenario following Mubarak's departure. Retention of peace with Egypt is a key goal in Tel Aviv, yet there is uncertainty within the Israeli government over the extent that a post-Mubarak Egypt will be willing to commit to its treaty obligations.

Conclusion

While the situation is bleak in the Sinai, it is not irretrievable. It is too early to describe the Sinai as a failed region in the way parts of Yemen and Somalia are. It will be virtually impossible for AQ to coordinate a takeover in the Sinai. The group does not have the manpower; it has been weakened by bin Laden's assassination; and they are pinned back in the face of sustained US drone attacks in Pakistan.

There is a risk that the lawless situation could deteriorate further if Israel and Egypt do not work together to prevent it. If AQ was to launch a sustained bombing campaign, it could push Israeli-Egyptian relations to breaking point. Israel would increasingly doubt the willingness of Egypt to restore law and order in Sinai and rein in militant groups, a perception which would only increase were the Muslim Brotherhood to strengthen its presence in the Egyptian Parliament following the upcoming elections.

In order to restore order and achieve their strategic objectives, the three main actors must establish their short and long term goals.

Egypt

A fledgling democratic Egypt cannot allow the Sinai Peninsula to descend into further chaos analogous to Somalia or Yemen. Failure to do

so will only allow AQ to embed itself deeper in the region. It should therefore:

- Seek permission from Israel to increase its military presence in particularly lawless areas in the Northern governorate.
- Make steps to resolve the grievances of the Bedouins. The mistrust between the state and the Bedouins cannot be resolved overnight, but the state needs to foster the support of tribal elements in order to isolate terrorist groups.

Israel

Israel's immediate concern is the threat that an AQ presence on its border poses. It is also reticent about the direction that a post-Mubarak Egypt will take: allowing Egypt to break the terms of the 1979 treaty gives an insight to the strategic importance with which it views the Sinai Peninsula. Israel should therefore:

- Allow Egypt access to the lawless parts of the Sinai which terrorists are seeking refuge in, while seeking assurances concerning their dedication to the Camp of David accords.
- Ensure it hits its target of completing the Israel-Egypt security fence by next year.

US

The US is currently making significant progress against the AQ core in Pakistan. However, it is struggling to contain AQ in Yemen and other affiliates, and does not want a new franchise to develop in the Sinai. To this end, Riedel believes that the CIA has almost certainly already established an intelligence gathering presence in the Sinai. Separately, good Egypt-Israeli relations are a pre-requisite to furthering the Middle East peace process. The US should therefore:

- Encourage Egypt behind the scenes to crack down on terrorist groups in the Sinai.
- Stress to Israel the importance of temporarily accepting an increased Egyptian military presence in the region.
- Lead a concerted international effort to ensure Egypt agrees to respect the Camp of David accords
- The CIA should continue intelligence-gathering on the ground. It needs a flexible approach: as extremist groups grow more entrenched, it will be more dangerous to collect sound data.

The Henry Jackson Society: Project for Democratic Geopolitics is a cross-partisan, British-based think-tank. Its founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British and European commitment towards freedom, liberty, constitutional democracy, human rights, governmental and institutional reform and a robust foreign, security and defence policy and transatlantic alliance.

Iran's Quds Force: Supporting Terrorism Worldwide

Source:http://www.realite-eu.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=1203021

Recently the European Union announced that it was introducing sanctions against Iran's elite Quds Force on the grounds of its technical and material support to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in his repression of the five-month-old uprising against his regime. [1]

On the same day, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey S. Buchanan, the top US military spokesman in Iraq, declared that Iranian-backed militias

represent the greatest threat to Iraq's security, outpacing al-Qaida-linked terrorists. Maj. Gen. Buchanan pointed out that the Quds Force "is providing direct support to the militias in terms of manning, equipping, provision of intelligence." [2]

Global reach

According to the US State Department, the Quds Force, "the external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is the regime's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad." [3]

On October 25, 2007, the US Department of the Treasury named the Quds Force a "specially designated global terrorist organization," freezing its assets under US jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with US parties. Measures were also taken against several senior Quds officers, including the force's commander Qassem Suleimani. [4]

The Quds Force's activities are global: it has directorates for Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan; Afghanistan, Pakistan and India; Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula; Asian countries of the former USSR, Western nations (Europe and North America), and North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Morocco). [5]

Its global reach was clearly stated by the unit's commander Suleimani, who reportedly said in early 2008: "General Petraeus (then the top US commander in Iraq), you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who's going to replace him is a Quds Force member." [6]

The Middle-East

Iraq

In January 2007, Iran's Supreme National Security Council decided to place all Iranian operations in Iraq under the command of the Quds Force. At the same time, it increased its personnel strength to 15,000. [7] The last eight years have witnessed a proxy war between the Quds Force and the US military. In 2007, Gen. David Petraeus testified to the US Congress on the growing role of the Quds Force. He noted that the US had found Quds operatives in Iraq

and seized computers with hard drives that included a 22-page document that had details about the planning and conduct of an attack

packed with explosives and propelled by rockets. IRAMS along with armor-piercing grenades are believed responsible for the

that killed five US soldiers in Karbala. [8] The same year, Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner, a US military spokesman, asserted that Iran's Quds Force was providing armor-piercing weapons

to extremist groups in Iraq, funneling as much as $3 million a month and training Iraqi militiamen at three camps near Tehran. [9] In June 2011, 15 US servicemen died in Iraq, the highest monthly casualty figure there in more than two years. The US attributed these attacks to Shiite militias trained and armed by the Quds Force. [10] Recent evidence indicates that these militias are using Iranian materials in "Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions" attacks against US troops. The munitions, or IRAMS, are metal canisters

majority of US deaths in recent months, an American official said. [11]

Afghanistan

According to the US Department of the Treasury, the Quds Force "provides select members of the Taliban with weapons, funding, logistics and training." [12] In December 2010, a member of the Quds Force was captured supplying weapons to the Taliban in Afghanistan for attacks on British and American troops. [13] In recent months, the Pentagon has traced to Iran the Taliban's acquisition of rockets that give its fighters roughly double the range to attack NATO and US targets. [14]

Syria

The European Union sanctions announced last Wednesday against the Quds Force represent a direct international accusation that Iran is helping Syria in carrying out a brutal crackdown, which the United Nations says has killed 2,200 since March. [15] The European Union said in a statement published in its official journal that the Quds Force "provided technical assistance, equipment and support to

the Syrian security services to repress civilian protest movements." [16]

Hezbollah and Hamas

The US Treasury has stated that the Quds Force "continues to support designated terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry; and Iran's senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. Iran also provides training, weapons, and money to Hamas, bolstering the group's ability to maintain its armed resistance and opposition to Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations." [17]

Latin America

According to a US Department of Defense report released in April 2010, recent years have witnessed an increased presence of the Quds Force in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela. [18] "If US involvement in conflicts in these regions deepens, contact with the IRGC-QF (Quds Force), directly or through extremist groups it supports, will be more frequent and consequential," the report said. Iran's terrorist infrastructure in Latin America has already been used in the past to launch terrorist attacks, such as the 1992 Israeli Embassy attack and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires (Amia). According to the Argentinian prosecutor, Iran's Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, then the head of the Quds Force, "participated in and approved of the decision to attack Amia during a meeting in Iran on August 14, 1993". [19] Vahidi is wanted by the Interpol for his involvement in the bombing that killed 85 people and wounded hundreds.

Africa

In October 2010, Nigerian security forces seized an Iranian weapons shipment in the port of Lagos. The arms seizure led to the arrest of a Quds Force officer in Nigeria suspected of facilitating the shipment. [20] Nigeria reported the incident to the UN last November, as Iran is barred from shipping weapons internationally. [21] Gambia [22] and Senegal [23] cut ties with Tehran over the incident.

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BOOK: Beyond Bin Laden: Global Terrorism Scenarios

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Relevant Excerpts from the Preface

2011 is an exceptional year in contemporary history. The tectonic shifts in the Arab world, fears of European economic melt down, American debt crisis and riots in Britain are events which have frenetically followed in quick succession hammered in our mind by 24/7 virtual and electronic media. These have to an extent overshadowed one of the seminal occurrence in countering terrorism. This was assassination of Osama Bin Laden, head of the al Qaeda, the Worlds most wanted terrorist for a decade in a cantonment town in Pakistan by United States Special Forces in a midnight raid on 2 May 2011.

For over a decade Osama has been the symbol of defiance of America, the West and the liberal world. Chased out of Afghanistan into tribal areas of Af Pak after 9/11, the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States on 11 September 2011, he succeeded in surviving what can now be seen as a mix of ingenuity, improvisation and luck. His group in the meanwhile expanded mainly due to the aura of invincibility that it acquired through 9/11 and Osama's capability to endure. Thus from Al Qaeda spawned, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic Maghreb even as the principal wing, al Qaeda Central was being systematically decimated in successful counter terrorism operations from the air in tribal areas of Pakistan and on the ground in Afghanistan.

The elimination of Osama Bin Laden was a remarkable success for American intelligence and Special Forces. To track down a rebel leader who had cut himself off from communications with the World and operated from an isolated compound in an affluent locality where none would really suspect his presence requires diligence, patience and perseverance of the highest order. The intelligence techniques both human and technical that can literally find a pin in a global haystack are also extraordinary. The raid by US Special Operations Forces was also unique. Launched after careful preparation, using stealth helicopters, the deadly strike force known as the Seals swooped down on the target and in half an hour plus succeeded in achieving the mission and getting away, before local forces had even stirred.

While there was jubilation around the World, most countries in the Middle East and North Africa did not display a favourable response. In some regions there were gatherings mourning the death of Osama. Pakistan decried violation of sovereignty and the fact that the United States despite sharing special strategic relations had not provided information of the strike.

The al Qaeda and its cohorts the Taliban launched a series of deadly raids in Af Pak region targeting a number of military and non military assets including a naval base in Karachi. Soon Ayman al Zawahiri, an Egyptian

doctor who was known to be the so called second in command to Osama was anointed leader of the Al Qaeda by consensus of its Majlis. In an incident on 6 August 2011 some members of the Seal team which had raided Bin Laden's compound were reportedly killed in a helicopter ambush in Maidan Wardak in Afghanistan. The, "affiliates and adherents," as the US Counter Terrorism Strategy June 2011 calls Al Qaeda's support groups as Lashkar e Taiyyaba and increasingly today individual lone rangers represent a new form of threat.

The wheel as it appears seems to have turned a full circle as the international community chasing one crisis after another could not capitalise on the deadly blow rendered to the al Qaeda in removal of its Sheikh. The surge of violence in Af Pak denotes that despite many claims by counter terror protagonists, it is apparent that while Osama has gone away terrorism may haunt us in the months and years ahead.

Will the World be a better place without Osama or will it sink to the doom that he had predicted continues to be a dilemma? There are many prognostications, some represent plain hope, others are borne out of historical experience while some spring from disparaging cynicism which see the ebb and flow of terrorism either receding or expanding as the years go on.

This Book is an attempt to work through this maze of uncertainty by examining key vectors related to the rise and fall of Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda to envisage four possible scenarios ranging from the collapse of the state order [seen as unlikely] to containment of terror threat [equally challenged] in three dimensions globally, regionally and locally over the next decade or so.

The most significant impact of terrorism is likely to be in South Asia, where Af Pak region remains the centre of gravity so to say of the present genre of religious Islamic extremism. Thus the Book will mainly trace possible trajectory of terrorism in South Asia covering Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. Other streams of the Al Qaeda have received due attention however given significance of the region and impact of its spread in some of the most densely populated, under developed regions of the World the bias remains South Asia.

The evaluation of trajectory of terror is carried out by examining studies of how terrorism ends thereby providing a sound analytical footing supported by scenario building technique. Given contemporary nature of research the main resources used are statements and interviews of principal actors and primary news articles on Operation Neptune Spear that led to the death of Osama. For Al Qaeda and South Asia a series of works by a host of counter terrorism specialists across the globe have been used and mainly those who have attempted to link the past with the demise of Bin Laden and extrapolated it to the future. Given the reach of the Book to the lay reader and policy planner alike referencing has been simplified.

Why Al Qaeda is Unlikely to Execute Another 9/11

By Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110831-why-al-qaeda-unlikely-execute-another-911?utm_ source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20110901&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content =readmore&elq=a443620731ca40c1a82a5444bd357dee

It is Sept. 1, and that means we are once again approaching the anniversary of al Qaeda's Sept. 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. In the 10 years that have passed since the attacks, a lot has happened and much has changed in the world, but many people can still vividly recall the sense of fear, uncertainty and helplessness they felt on that September morning. Millions of people watched United Airlines flight 175 smash into the south tower of the World Trade Center on live television. A short while later they heard that another plane had struck the Pentagon. Then they watched in horror as the World Trade Center's twin towers buckled and collapsed to the ground.

It was, by any measure, a stunning, cataclysmic scene, a kind of terrorist theater that transformed millions of television viewers into vicarious victims. Excerpts of the just-released memoir of then-Vice President Dick Cheney demonstrate that it was not just ordinary people who were affected by the attacks; America's leaders where shocked and shaken, too. And judging from the statements of foreign citizens and leaders in the wake of 9/11, those who proclaimed, "We are all Americans," it was also apparent that the

on vicarious victims did not stop at the U.S. border.

One result of this vicarious victimization and the fear and helplessness it produced was that many people became fixated on the next attack and began anxiously "waiting for the other shoe to drop." This spawned an entire industry of fear as dire warnings were propagated by the Internet of the impending "American Hiroshima" that was certain to result when al Qaeda detonated all the nuclear devices it had hidden in major U.S. cities. Chain emails were widely circulated and recirculated quoting a dubious Israeli "security expert" who promised simultaneous catastrophic terrorist attacks against a number of American cities — attacks that never materialized outside of Hollywood productions.

Fast forward a decade and we are now commemorating 9/11's 10th anniversary, which seems more significant somehow because it is a round number. Perhaps of more meaningful significance is that this anniversary closely follows the death of al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011. Indeed, the buzz regarding this coincidence has caused many of our clients and readers to ask for our assessment of the terrorist threat inside the United States on this 10th anniversary of 9/11. While we believe that today holds some degree of symbolism for many, the threat of an attack on Sept. 11, 2011, is no higher than it was on Aug. 11 or than it will be on Sept. 12, and below we explain why.

The State of Al Qaeda and the Jihad

All threats have two basic components: intent and capability. Al Qaeda's leaders have threatened to conduct an attack more terrible than 9/11 for nearly a decade now, and the threats continue. Here's what Ayman al-Zawahiri, now al Qaeda's No. 1, said to his followers on Aug. 15, 2011, in a message released on the internet via as-Sahab media:

"Seek to attack America that has killed the Imam of the Mujahideen and threw his corpse in the sea and then imprisoned his women and children. Seek to attack her so history can say that a criminal state had spread corruption on earth and Allah sent her his servants who made her a lesson for others and left her as a memory."

The stated intent of al Qaeda and the rest of the jihadist movement is, and has been, to strike the United States as hard and as often as possible. It logically follows, then, that al Qaeda would strike the United States on Sept. 11 — or any other day — if possible. With intent thus established, now we need to focus on capability.

One of the primary considerations regarding al Qaeda's capability to strike the United States is the state of the jihadist movement itself. The efforts of the U.S. government and its allies against the core al Qaeda group, which is based in Pakistan, have left it badly damaged and have greatly curtailed its operational ability, especially its ability to conduct transnational attacks. In January we forecast that we believed the al Qaeda core was going to be marginalized on the physical battlefield in 2011 and that it would also struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. Indeed, it has been our assessment for several years now that al Qaeda does not pose a strategic threat to the United States.

Since we published our 2011 forecast, bin Laden has been killed as well as senior al Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who reportedly died in a strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle Aug. 22 in Pakistan's North Waziristan region. We continue to believe that the al Qaeda core group is off balance and concerned for its security — especially in light of the intelligence gathered in the raid on bin Laden's hideout. The core group simply does not enjoy the operational freedom it did prior to September 2001. We also believe the group no longer has the same operational capability in terms of international travel and the ability to transfer money that it had prior to 9/11.

Some people believe there is a greater chance of an attack on this year's 9/11 anniversary because of the killing of bin Laden, while others note that al-Zawahiri may feel pressure to conduct an attack in order to prove his credibility as al Qaeda's new leader.

Our belief, as noted above, is that al Qaeda has been doing its utmost to attack the United States and has not pulled any punches. Because of this, we do not believe it possesses the ability to increase this effort beyond where it was prior to bin Laden's death. As to the pressure on al-Zawahiri, we noted in December 2007 that the al Qaeda core had been under considerable pressure to prove itself relevant for several years and that, despite this pressure, had yet to deliver. Because of this, we do not believe that the pressure to conduct a successful attack is any heavier on al

Zawahiri today than it was prior to bin Laden's death.

Finally, we believe that if al Qaeda possessed the capability to conduct a spectacular attack it would launch the attack as soon as it was operationally ready, rather than wait for some specific date. The risk of discovery is simply too great.

There are also some who still believe that al Qaeda maintains a network of "sleeper operatives" inside the United States that can be called upon to conduct a spectacular terrorist attack. We do not believe this for two reasons. First, because the pressure on the core al Qaeda leadership to conduct an attack in the United States has been so high for several years there is no reason that it would not have activated any sleepers by now. It would certainly not be in the group's best interest to keep any such operatives idle for a decade, especially since U.S. intelligence has made such headway in rolling up the organization. Al Qaeda has been faced with a use-it-or-lose-it scenario.

Second, while there is a long history of al Qaeda and other jihadist groups employing covert operatives and inspiring jihadist grassroots operatives or lone wolves like Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan, there is no history of al Qaeda employing true sleeper operatives, that is, operatives who burrow undetected into a society and then remain dormant until called upon to act. Because of this, we remain extremely skeptical that al Qaeda has ever had a sleeper network in the United States. If it had, it would have used it by now.

Would the al Qaeda core leadership like to conduct a spectacular terror attack on the 9/11 anniversary? Absolutely. Does it have the capability? It is unlikely.

A Grassroots Focus

As we noted in our annual jihadist forecast, we believe the greatest threat to the United States and the rest of the West in 2011 emanates from grassroots jihadists and regional franchises. However, the civil war in Yemen and developments in Somalia have preoccupied the attention of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Shabaab — the two regional jihadist franchises that have shown the intent and capability to conduct transnational attacks — leaving them very little opportunity to do so. Therefore, we believe the

greatest threat of an attack on the 9/11 anniversary will come from the grass roots.

The bad news is that grassroots operatives can be hard to identify, especially if they operate alone; the good news is that they tend to be far less capable than well-trained, more "professional" terrorist operatives. And this means they are more likely to make critical mistakes that will allow their attacks to be detected and thwarted.

As the past few years has demonstrated, there are almost certainly grassroots jihadists operating in small cells or as lone wolves who are presently planning attacks. In fact, we know that since at least 1990 there has not been a time when some group of grassroots jihadists somewhere in the United States has not been planning some kind of attack.

Is it possible, then, that such individuals could be inspired to try to conduct an attack on the 9/11 anniversary if they can coordinate their attack cycle in order to be ready on that date. However, given the increased law enforcement vigilance that will be in place at hard targets on that day and the capabilities of most grassroots operatives, we can anticipate that such an attempt would be conducted against a soft target rather than some more difficult target such as the 9/11 Memorial or the White House. We also believe that any such attack would likely continue the trend we have seen away from bombing attacks toward more simple (and effective) armed assaults.

It must be remembered that simple terrorist attacks are relatively easy to conduct, especially if the assailant is not concerned about escaping after the attack. As jihadist groups such as AQAP have noted in their online propaganda, a determined person can conduct attacks using a variety of simple weapons, from a pickup truck to a knife, axe or gun. Jihadist ideologues have repeatedly praised Nidal Hassan and have pointed out that jihadists operating with modest expectations and acting within the scope of their training and capability can do far more damage than operatives who try to conduct big, ambitious attacks that they lack the basic skills to complete.

And while the authorities in the United States and elsewhere have been quite successful in foiling attacks over the past couple of years, there are a large number of vulnerable targets in the open societies of the West, and Western governments simply do not have the resources

to protect everything. Indeed, as long as the ideology of jihadism survives, its adherents will pose a threat.

All this means that some terrorist attacks will invariably succeed, but in the current context, it is our assessment that a simple attack in the United States or some other Western country is far more likely than a complex and spectacular 9/11-style operation. In their primary areas of operation, jihadists have the capability to do more than they do transnationally.

Indeed, despite the concept of a "war on terrorism," the phenomenon of terrorism can never be completely eliminated, and terrorist attacks can and will be conducted by a wide variety of actors (recently illustrated by the July 22 attacks in Norway). However, as we've previously noted, if the public will recognize that terrorist attacks are part of the human condition like cancer or hurricanes, it can take steps to deny the practitioners of terrorism the ability to terrorize.

NEW Edition of Inspire
Source: Homeland Security-FBI Joint Intelligence Bulletin

On 18 July 2011, AQAP released the sixth edition of its English-language magazine, *Inspire*, which provides detailed instructions for the production of the peroxide-based explosive acetone peroxide—better known as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) — but lacks explicit target

The magazine also describes AQAP's activities related to ongoing political unrest in Yemen, with a special tribute to the recent deaths of several AQAP members. Unlike all previous editions of *Inspire*, the magazine does not include any articles written by Anwar al-Aulaqi; however, the magazine provides an advertisement — included in the previous edition—inviting readers to e-mail questions to be answered in an up-coming video interview with Aulaqi.

The sixth edition of *Inspire* provides a one page article encouraging individual violent acts; however, the magazine lacks specific operational guidance, such as target suggestions and operational security measures. Additionally, *Inspire's* latest "Open Source Jihad" section — featuring a picture of the Sydney Opera House — provides readers with step-by-step instructions for producing the explosive TATP, which is highly volatile and dangerous to make and store.

The "Open Source Jihad" instructions for making TATP include suggested locations for purchasing the ingredients, photographs illustrating each step of production, and safety precautions.

In its third installment of "Training with the AK," *Inspire* offers illustrations of individual firing stances for use in assaults.

suggestions. AQAP memorializes the death of Usama bin Ladin, including an article by former Charlotte, North Carolina resident Samir Khan.

Study finds Somali piracy could cost global economy $12 billion

By Jeffrey Gettleman
Source:http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Study+finds+Somali+piracy+could+cost+global+economy++
12+billion/-/539546/1217320/-/jrq8qt/-/

A pirate at the coastline of Somalia. Political instability and civil strife in the country have spurred piracy in the Indian Ocean into a global problem. AFP

Twenty years ago, when the government of Somalia collapsed, few imagined that the country's ongoing state of lawlessness would eventually spawn piracy on such a scale that the security of the western Indian Ocean region could be threatened.

At first, many assumed that pirate attacks on passing ships could be quickly stifled. But the problem has grown into a global malady that so far has warranted seven United Nations resolutions, one of which authorised "all necessary means to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea".

According to the UN's International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the problem is a global one, with 276 acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships reported worldwide in 2010. With failed attempts added, the total climbed to 489, a 20 per cent increase from 2009. Although the South China Sea suffered the most attacks, piracy off East Africa, much of it carried out from Somalia, came in second.

Looking only at attacks in international waters, East Africa was well in the lead in 2010, reports the IMO. The only lives lost that year were during East African attacks, while the number of crew members taken hostage there, usually for ransom, reached 629, far higher than anywhere else. According to the International Maritime Bureau, a piracy reporting centre based in Malaysia, 54 crew and passengers have been killed worldwide since 2006.

The economic losses are also enormous. The US-based NGO One Earth Future Foundation, in a recent study on naval piracy, estimated that Somali pirates extorted some $177 million in ransom in 2009 and $238 million the following year. Including the costs of higher insurance premiums, re-routing ships, anti-piracy security and the impact on regional economies, the total annual costs may range between $7 billion and $12 billion, the study finds.

Some arrested Somali pirates and senior officials have sought to justify the explosion of piracy off East Africa by citing illicit activities by foreign vessels off the Somali coast. Somali fishermen have long complained that foreign ships have been hurting their livelihoods by over fishing nearby waters, often with large illegal nets. Some have also claimed that toxic wastes have been dumped in the Indian

Ocean. In 2008, the UN Secretary-General's then special representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdalla, said: "I am convinced there is dumping of solid waste, chemicals and probably nuclear waste. There is no government (in Somalia) and there are few people with high moral ground." Others argue, however, that there is little evidence to substantiate such views.

In any case, key figures within Somalia's Transitional Federal Government strongly believe there is a connection. "If the international community wants to limit acts of piracy," says Deputy Premier Abdulrahman Adan Ibrahim Ibbi, "it has to help Somalis keep illegal foreign fishing and toxic waste dumping away from their coasts."

British Royal Marines intercept a Somali pirate vessel in the Gulf of Aden on June 2, 2009. Alex Cave—Royal Navy/AP

Whatever the factors that have contributed to Somali piracy, prompt action is needed to counter pirate activities, argue regional government officials, fishing industry executives and shippers.

President James Alix Michel of the Seychelles declared in November 2010 that piracy is "the greatest threat that currently exists to fisheries, trade and development in our region. The scourge of piracy is hijacking not only our economy — but the whole of the Indian Ocean."

Two months later, East African transport ministers urged insurance firms to discourage the payment of ransoms, so as to reduce one of the main incentives for piracy and slow down the steady rise in shipping insurance costs.

Courts in Kenya and the Seychelles are actively prosecuting pirates who have been captured. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Kenya, the Seychelles and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in Somalia have the highest number of convicted pirates in the world. As of April, Kenya and the Seychelles were holding 177 pirates.

"Kenya has had a strong tradition of a solid Commonwealth legal system," notes Prof David Crane of Syracuse University in the US. "There is a capacity and certainly they have an ability to try pirates."

Yet governments in the region have very limited resources, whether for prosecuting suspected pirates or trying to safeguard regional waters with tiny national navies. "We are doing more than our part," notes President Michel. "Piracy is exploiting the weaknesses that exist in global governance. It exists, not only because of the dire state of Somalia, but also because of the inaction of the international community."

Sharing the burden

Andrew J Shapiro, the US assistant secretary for political and military affairs, agrees that African countries need more support, given the complexity of the challenge. "Prosecuting pirates can be an incredibly complex proposition in today's globalised world," he said in a paper on anti-piracy policy presented last year to an American Law Review symposium. "The realities of international shipping and global commerce are such that in any given piracy case you could have suspected Somali pirates intercepted and apprehended by a British naval vessel after trying to attack a Liberian-flagged ship, owned by a Canadian company, crewed by Ukrainians, Indians, and Filipinos, with a Russian captain and carrying cargo owned by a Turkish company, en route for delivery to a company in Dubai. And the case could be taking place in a courtroom in yet another country, like Kenya or the Seychelles, which are both currently prosecuting piracy cases. The logistic and diplomatic challenges presented by such a scenario are immense."

Referring specifically to Kenya and the Seychelles, Mr Shapiro continued, "The burden currently shouldered by these countries must be shared more broadly both within and beyond the piracy-affected region. The cost of this crime is borne globally. The cost of combating and defeating it should likewise be borne by many states in all corners of the world." Both Kenya and the Seychelles have signed pacts with the European Union (EU) and the US to try suspected Somali pirates captured elsewhere in return for financial and security assistance.

The US, EU and others have also stepped forward with aggressive counter-piracy naval operations. These include the US-led Combined Task Force and the EU Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR). "My orders are clear," says Rear Admiral Juan Rodriguez, the EUNAVFOR force commander, "to protect vulnerable shipping, deter and prevent acts of piracy, protect vessels of the World Food Programme . . . and the African Union Mission in Somalia."

To better co-ordinate these and other initiatives, a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia has also been established. It brings together some 60 countries, as well as the UN, IMO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and African Union.

Ultimately, whatever measures are taken to contain Somali piracy, long-term solutions must address the source of the problem: the political instability and ongoing warfare within Somalia itself.

1000 potential terrorists in Germany

Source: http://www.thelocal.de/national/20110905-37393.html

"We have almost 1,000 people who could be described as possible Islamist terrorists," he told the *Bild* daily, adding that 128 could be considered 'dangerous" and capable of committing attacks.

He said that around 20 of those had received training in camps associated with terror groups and that these individuals were under surveillance by the country's security services. Friedrich added that he thought there was little chance of a repetition of the scale of the terror attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 that brought down the twin towers of New York's World Trade Center. "We dispose of a wide range of modern

security methods and we are investigating at the very heart of extremist networks," he said. The al-Qaida network, blamed for the New York attacks, has been diminished by

Das Schießtraining der Deutschen Taliban Mujahidin.

the recent death of its leader Osama bin Laden but it still represented a threat, he added.

However, Friedrich estimated that the major danger was posed by individuals acting alone because they are more difficult to identify and track. He was speaking after the opening in Germany last week of the trial of a 21-year-old man from Kosovo who said he was acting alone under the influence of Islamist propaganda when he killed two US soldiers who were heading to Afghanistan by way of Germany in March.

In her weekly address on Saturday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that the fight against terrorism has still to be won a decade on from the 9/11 attacks and defended Germany's unpopular participation in the Afghan conflict Saturday. "Osama bin Laden is dead, but terrorism has not yet been defeated," Merkel said.

She also defended Germany's military role in the conflict in Afghanistan where bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders were based at the time of the organization's attacks on September 11. 2001. "We must be prepared to fight" to defend democracy, Merkel said, adding that Germany would continue the fight against terrorism alongside its allies.

Germany forms the third-largest contingent of foreign troops in Afghanistan, with some 5,400 soldiers in the north under NATO command, despite polls showing a strong majority of the public opposed to its participation.

The German parliament approved a 12-month extension of the unpopular Afghanistan mission in January, but with the proviso for the first time that troops start coming home from the end of 2011 if security allows. erkel also welcomed the wave of popular revolts against Arab regimes and said they were proof that "throughout the world people are fighting for freedom and want to build democracy". "Freedom and democracy are the best answers to terrorism and threats," she said.

Jihadists in Syria: Myth or Reality?
By Murad Batal al-Shishani
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

In a speech on June 20, Syrian president Bashir al-Assad identified three components of the unrest in his country: citizens with legitimate grievances and needs that must be addressed; criminal elements; and "radicals" seeking to destabilise the country. He accused external forces, outlaws, and radicals of exploiting the "movement seeking legitimate reforms" (BBC Arabic, June 20).

Since February 2011, Syria has witnessed a series of demonstrations and protests demanding the ouster of the president Bashir al-Assad and his family and an end to the rule of the Ba'ath party. The protestors insist on the peaceful nature of their political movement, but in order to justify its violent reaction against them the Syrian regime claims that they are confronting "Takfiri-Salafi armed groups" and "outlaw gangsters."

When Bashir's father Hafiz Assad (1930-2000) clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood during his four-decade rule, he applied similar descriptions for his opponents. In a speech aired on Damascus Radio on June 30, 1979, the late Syrian president said:

"They [the Muslim Brotherhood] have exploited the atmosphere of freedom in order to tempt some

young people into committing crimes and to cause [them] to become enemies of Islam. We cannot be lenient with this group, which has committed various acts of murder and one of the most odious massacres ever known in the history of Islam." [1]

Democratic Protests

Both presidents accused "extremism", but the historical contexts are different; in the late 1970s and the early 1980s there was an armed opposition to Syrian regime and the latter responded by using disproportionate measures of violence, causing the death of tens of thousands of people, most of them civilians. Currently, although the Syrian regime is confronted by peaceful demonstrations inspired by the success of revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, it has responded in a fashion similar to the Hafiz Assad's crackdown on Islamists in the early 1980s, killing more than 2000 civilians since the uprising began six months ago (*Guardian*, August 8).

According to a report based on the testimony of Syrian opposition figures and prepared by the Henry Jackson Society (a London-based association devoted to democratization), the Syrian opposition is a democratic-leaning movement in which "the Islamist quotient among the opposition is very low." [2] Al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri indirectly confirmed the absence of jihadis from the Syrian scene when he addressed a video message to Syrian protestors saying:

"Our brothers and fellow Muslims of the Sham [Levant], the land of Ribat [steeds of war] and jihad, Allah knows that if it weren't for the raging war with the New Crusades in which we are engaged, and were it not for these borders restrictions penned by Sykes and Picot and sanctified by our rulers, my brothers and I would be at your side today, in your midst defending you with our necks and chests... but we are consoled by the fact that Sham, the land of Islam and martyrdom, has enough mujahideen for themselves as well as others." [3]

While all indicators show that no "Takfiri-Salafi armed groups" are leading the democratic protests in Syria, it seems that the Syrian

regime seeking to tailor a message to the West, which seems to be willing to listen to Arab regimes once the spectre of "Jihadism" is raised. However, the violence that the regime is using against protestors might inadvertently lead to radicalization and the emergence of new jihadists as well as provoking existing Syrian jihadists, pushing them out into the streets in revolt.

Syrian Jihadists

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 played a major role in increasing the numbers of Syrian jihadis. With the Syrian government turning a blind eye, regions bordering Iraq, like the Bou Kamal area, became hubs for facilitating the entry of jihadis to Iraq to fight the Americans. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, then the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was also very keen to create the Levant branch of al-Qaeda, hence he was relying on jihadists from the region.

Since then the number of Syrian jihadists has increased. For instance, according to figures compiled by the author, Syrians formed a high proportion of the Salafi-Jihadists in Iraq, coming in second place by nationality with 13% of the Arab volunteers in Iraq. [4]

It seems that the activity of the Syrian Salafi-Jihadists was not limited to Iraq and Syria. They also formed a high proportion of jihadists acting on Lebanese soil before and during the confrontations at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp between the Lebanese authorities and militant Islamists in 2007. Syrians formed about 13% of those jihadists, after the Saudis with 16%, Palestinians from the refugee camps with 31%, and Lebanese with 33%. Seven per cent came from other sources. [5]

The increasing number of Syrian jihadists is also combined with the production of thousands of pages of literature theorizing a confrontation with the Syrian Alawite regime. The most well-known writings in this context are those of Abu Musa'b al-Suri (a.k.a. Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasr, currently believed to be imprisoned in Syria after rendition by the United States).

Al-Suri wrote several books on jihad in Syria and his vision of the Levant region, and Syria in particular, based on two levels: first, an intellectual theorizing, and at the second level, a focus on strategies for a revolution or confrontation with the Syrian regime, which he sees as a *kafir* regime representing "Nusayris"

(a pejorative term for Alawites) and Ba'athists. [6]

Following the death of Hafiz al-Assad, al-Suri wrote a book entitled *Ahl as-Sunna fi'l-Sham fi Muwajihat al-Nusayria wa'l-Salibeen wa'l-Yahoud* (The Sunni People in the Levant in the Face of Nasiriyah, Crusaders and Jews." Al-Suri focuses on two fundamental issues in this work: the "Nusayri" sect and its unjust dominion in Syria and the Syrian state apparatus in its entirety, which, according to al-Suri, is supported by the West to establish peace with Israel. Al-Suri sees a Sunni revolution in Syria as a strategic solution: "We must highlight the basic identity of this confrontation with the Alawi Nusayris, focusing the axis of confrontation towards the correct key to this jihadi conflict between truth and falsehood, [which] is the Sunnis in the face of the Alawi Nasiriyah."

Another well-known jihadi writer, Husain Bin Mahmoud, wrote a March 26 article entitled "Demashq: Qa'dat a-Jihad fi al-Ard" (Damascus: the Jihad Base on the Earth), in which he presented several *hadiths* of the Prophet Muhammad that emphasize the qualities of the Levant for jihadists, being the "land of faith and science," the home of "the best soldiers on earth," and "the best place to migrate to." [7]

Stressing the sectarian understanding of the situation in Syria according to the jihadists' perspective, Bin Mahmoud claims 80% of the people in Syria are Muslims who are being repressed by a "non-Muslim" Alawite minority and asks how a "despicable, humiliated minority became superiors of the best soldiers on the earth?" In answering himself, Bin Mahmoud says that the people of the Levant were humiliated when "they replaced the banner of jihad with [the banner of] national resistance, and replaced the identity of Islam with nationalism, and the doctrine of Islam with Ba'athism and socialism."

Like most jihadists tackling the Syrian issue, Bin Mahmoud expects the people of Syria to have a role in jihad:

"When the people of the Levant come back to the righteous, and the sound of bullets [is] exalted, and young people shout in the squares, 'God is great,' and the voices of minarets start to call for jihad, then I [will] preach the gospel of Muslims in the East and the West [that] infidels will be destroyed…and then woe to the infidels and its people from the soldiers of al-Sham."

Conclusion

Obviously, al-Qaeda and affiliated Salafi-Jihadist groups have an ideological and geopolitical perspective towards Syria, but their project is based on promoting a sectarian division inside Syria that is at odds with the Syrian protestors' ambition of having a post-Assad democratic state. This has prevented the jihadists from exerting political influence during the on-going crisis despite the allegations of the regime.

However, the violence that the regime is using to deal with protestors could serve as a source of radicalization that could activate the jihadists inside the country. If this happened, the Assad regime would face a political and security catastrophe by having to deal with "real" jihadists ready to engage the regime with violence.

By their peaceful political activity, the young protestors in Syria are building a barrier to prevent Salafi-Jihadists from making inroads into the Arab Spring. Meanwhile, the government is paving a way for their entry by its violent repression of a peaceful opposition movement.

Notes:

1. Quoted in Nikolaos van Dam, *The Struggle For Power in Syrian: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party*, I. B. Tauris, 1996, p.95.
2. Michael Weiss, Hannah Stuart and Samuel Hunter, *The Syrian Opposition: Political analysis with original testimony from key figures*, Henry Jackson Society, London, 2011 http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems /SyrianOpposition.pdf.
3. Al-Zawahri video message entitled *Ei'zul Shariq Awaloh Demashq* (the Glory of the East Begins with Damascus), disseminated on jihadist web forums on July 27. Downloaded from: http://aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=9054
4. The Saudis came in first with 53%. See *Terrorism Monitor*, December 2, 2005.
5. Figures compiled by the author from open sources.

6. The term "Nusayri" refers to followers of Abu Shu'ayb Muhammad ibn Nusayr (d. 863 AD).
7. http://muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=446295

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Inside the world of piracy

By J. Peter Pham

Source:http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/08/21/2366368/inside-the-world-of-piracy.html#ixzz1XfQvGdHu

In the two decades since the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre ignominiously fled Mogadishu in 1991, leaving behind a ruined capital in the throes of uncontrolled street violence, Somalia has topped lists of the world's failed states, stubbornly resisting no fewer than 14 attempts to reconstitute a central government. The latest effort is limping to the expiration of its mandate next month, its senior officials having accomplished little more than stealing an astonishing 96 percent of the $76 million they received in direct assistance from foreign donors.


The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World. Jay Bahadur. Pantheon. 300 pages. $26.95.

The only sector in the country that has flourished has been the maritime piracy for which Somalia has become a byword. Despite the deployment of naval vessels from about two dozen nations, the first six months of 2011 saw the number of attacks by Somali pirates more than triple compared with the same period last year.

Motivated by rapidly escalating amounts being paid for the release of captured ships — in 2010, the average ransom was $5.4 million, up from $150,000 just five years earlier — the marauders have extended their reach well beyond the coasts of Somalia. They have attacked everything from supertankers to small pleasure craft like the yacht belonging to Scott and Jean Adam of Southern California, who, with two of their friends, earlier this year became the first Americans to be killed by the pirates since the attacks began in the late 1990s.

Canadian journalist Jay Bahadur's The Pirates of Somalia is the fruit of the research trips that he took between 2009 and 2010 to the northeastern Somali region of Puntland, center of the piracy phenomenon. His choice of Mohamad Farole, son of Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, president of the self-proclaimed Puntland state of Somalia, as his sponsor had significant impacts, positive and negative, on his investigation.

Endowed with a perseverance that augurs well for his career, Bahadur secured extended interviews with some of the most notorious kingpins of Somali piracy, including Abdullahi Abshir Boyah and Mohammed Garaad. Chewing khat, the mildly narcotic leaves that are ubiquitous in the region, to fit in — he notes that it is "an incredible interviewing tool

rendered my interviewees relaxed and talkative, with a compelling urge to express themselves" — he also engaged with other actors in what has emerged as the dominant local enterprise.

The result is the most creative of the book's 15 chapters, in which he employs the methodology developed by Sudhir Venkatesh and popularized by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner in Freakanomics to examine in detail the costs, risks and returns from the hijacking of the MV Victoria, a German-owned freighter captured in May 2009 while transporting rice to the Saudi Arabian port of Jeddah and held for over two months before a ransom of $3.2 million was paid.

Unfortunately, Bahadur's gratitude to the Faroles may have also gotten the better of his journalistic instincts. While foreign fishing trawlers moved aggressively in the early 1990s into territorial waters left unguarded in the absence of any government of Somalia, the story of Somali piracy as a "justified" response by poor artisanal communities against poaching and toxic-waste dumping by

foreigners simply does not hold water. Few of the pirates' targets have been fishing boats, and the mere threat of pirate attacks has for years kept all but a handful of intrepid vessels bearing humanitarian aid away from anywhere near the country's coasts.

Equally unsettling is his rather contradictory defense of Abdirahman Farole, whom Bahadur professes to have "genuinely admired," against credible charges by the U.N. Monitoring Group for Somalia and other authorities that the Puntland president is a beneficiary of the pirates' largesse. The piracy problem cannot be resolved without the cooperation of the regional administration, but such engagement does not mean turning a blind eye to its faults. Bahadur's work would have benefited had he taken the time to study the pioneering work of such internationally recognized authorities as I.M. Lewis and Martin Murphy. Nonetheless, there is no denying that what he lacks in broad perspective or analytical rigor, he makes up with a fascinating narrative that opens a hitherto largely unknown world to a wider audience.

J. Peter Pham reviewed this book for The San Francisco Chronicle.

Combating the financing of terrorism
Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/combating-financing-terrorism

Terrorist organizations rely on financing and support networks to sustain operations and launch attacks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has developed a sophisticated and comprehensive approach to identify, disrupt, and deter the funding networks of terrorist organizations

Terrorist organizations rely on financing and support networks to sustain operations and launch attacks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) says it has developed a sophisticated and comprehensive approach — including intelligence analysis, sanctions administration and enforcement, financial regulatory action, policy expertise, and outreach to the international community and financial sector — aggressively to identify, disrupt, and deter the funding networks of terrorist organizations. Since 9/11, efforts to counter terrorist financing have played an increasingly critical role in our broader

counterterrorism strategy. The establishment and growth of TFI since 2004 has strengthened and integrated various authorities in their pursuit of a comprehensive approach to countering terrorist financing.

Among TFI's activities, programs, and capabilities:

— *Intelligence analysis*: Established in 2004, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) remains the only full-fledged intelligence office in any finance ministry in the world. OIA serves Treasury's specialized intelligence needs, providing analytic products tailored to TFI's mission and Treasury's authorities.

OIA makes intelligence actionable by supporting designations of terrorists, weapons proliferators, and drug traffickers and by providing information to support Treasury's outreach to foreign partners. OIA also serves as a unique and valuable source of information to the Intelligence Community (IC), providing

economic analysis, intelligence analysis, and Treasury intelligence information reports to support the IC's needs.

— *Targeted actions*: Treasury has numerous authorities to take targeted action against terrorists, weapons proliferators, narcotics traffickers and their supporters, and isolate them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. These domestic authorities include Executive Order 13224 (terrorism), Executive Order 13382 (proliferators) and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (narcotics traffickers), among others.

— *Bilateral engagement*: Treasury continues to engage with key foreign governments to disrupt and dismantle external funding sources to extremists, including through information sharing and coordinated enforcement actions. Enhanced bilateral engagement with Saudi Arabia and other partners in the region, along with comprehensive private sector outreach has yielded real action, including arrests and prosecutions of terrorist financiers and facilitators and more robust controls on funding streams emanating from those countries to extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

— *Attacking the finances of terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan*: Denying the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan access to funds has long been a priority within TFI. Treasury has intensified its efforts in this arena over the past year as part of the President's enhanced strategic focus in this critical region. Our approach is grounded in efforts to disrupt and dismantle illicit financial networks and to build domestic capacities within Afghanistan, all designed to undermine the financial networks of illicit actors and safeguard the nascent, but growing Afghan financial sector. Treasury staff in Washington and on the ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gulf are working with others to aggressively attack the finances of the Taliban, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups operating in the region.

— *Threat Finance Cells*: Treasury has helped pioneer a novel approach to attacking illicit financial networks – the Threat Finance Cell – by providing threat finance expertise and actionable intelligence to U.S. civilian and military leaders. First developed in Iraq under Treasury and Defense Department co-leadership, the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) seeks to identify and disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, the Taliban,

narcotics trafficking and corruption. Led by the Drug Enforcement Agency with Treasury serving as co-deputy, nearly sixty ATFC personnel are embedded with military commands across Afghanistan to improve the targeting of the insurgents' financial structure. Specially-vetted Afghan authorities have also partnered with the ATFC on raids of hawalas suspected of illicit financial activities, including insurgent finance, narcotics trafficking and corruption. This cooperation has resulted in the collection of tens of thousands of financial documents.

— *Expanded Treasury footprint in key regions*: Since 2005, Treasury has established Treasury Attaché offices in Abu Dhabi, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Islamabad, and Kabul.

Combating the financing of terrorism and illicit finance

— *Enhancing transparency in the financial system*:TFI oversees the administration of regulations requiring financial services providers to collect, maintain and report information that supports law enforcement investigations and helps to deter the financing of terrorism and other illicit activities. Treasury's efforts, including at the 36-member Financial Action Task Force, promote international standards that enhance the transparency of the international financial system so that illicit financing networks are more susceptible to detection and disruption.

— *Developing and applying targeted economic and financial measures*: TFI works in collaboration with other federal agencies and the international community to develop and apply a range of targeted economic sanctions and financial measures to identify and disrupt financing networks of organizations including al Qaeda core, al Qaeda affiliates, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.

— *Fostering a global approach to combat terrorist financing*: Bilateral and multilateral engagement amplifies Treasury's efforts by ensuring a collaborative and cooperative approach in achieving two key objectives: combating the sources of terrorist financing and building the systemic capacities of countries around the world to protect against illicit finance.

— *Engaging in comprehensive private sector outreach*: The private sector is an ally in combating terrorist financing. TFI's outreach aims to help facilitate a better understanding of

terrorist financing activities and risks, promote the development and implementation of terrorist financing risk mitigation and enhance financial institutions' compliance with efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

— *Interagency coordination*: Implementing an effective counterterrorist financing strategy requires the involvement of different USG agencies, each of which brings specific expertise to the effort. Agencies involved include those charged with collecting information, analyzing information, engaging with foreign counterparts, developing international standards, and implementing financial sanctions against targets unique to each agency's national security role. The USG has a strong infrastructure in place to coordinate these efforts, with a variety of mechanisms to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism financing initiatives.

Parking attendants part of U.S. anti-terrorism effort

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/parking-attendants-part-us-anti-terrorism-effort

More than 7,000 parking professionals have been trained in the First Observer parking-specific program developed by the International Parking Institute with the DHS and the Transportation Security Administration.

The parking attendant who waves you into the parking garage or hands you a parking stub is increasingly likely to be a foot soldier in the war on terrorism thanks to a program launched just over one year ago by the International Parking Institute (IPI), the world's largest association of parking professionals and the parking industry.

"Terrorists can use parked cars or trucks to carry, conceal or serve as bombs. Parked vehicles were involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center terrorist attack, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the more recent attempted bombing in Times Square," explains Shawn Conrad, IPI's executive director. "Parking professionals are truly on the front lines of counter-terrorism and we take that role very seriously."

To date, more than 7,000 parking First Observers have been certified as part of a parking-specific program developed by the International Parking Institute with DHS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

According to Conrad, that number is growing rapidly as more local government officials, universities, airports, sports venues, commercial parking companies and other public and private organizations mandate that their parking personnel be certified in counter-terrorism awareness.

The parking-specific module of the First Observer arms parking professionals with the skills they need to address five critical security areas: on-street, surface lots, garages/decks, special events, and shuttle operations. It enables them to identify a potential threat, provides background on different terrorist groups and their patterns of operation, gives an overview of weapons, and details case studies of terror situations.

IPI says that First Observers build the skills to report potential situations using a concise, accurate and simple communications process.

First Observer is a national security and safety awareness program operated under a cooperative agreement with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration. Its mission is to enhance and promote through awareness our ability to protect our infrastructure from risks associated with terrorism.

William Arrington, general manager, Highway and Motor Carrier Division at TSA agrees: "Training thousands of parking professionals to serve as 'eyes and ears' within parking facilities is helping to keep our communities safe."

America's Next 12 Terror Threats

Source: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/12/9-11-anniversary-america-s-next-12-terror-threats.html

With solemn grandeur, Americans celebrated a decade of resilience and resolve since the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. And while the celebration of the anniversary—the first since Osama bin Laden's death—may have helped bring closure to some, it can't obscure the looming threat of new attacks as the United States enters its second decade in the war against terror.

Al Qaeda's attacks a decade ago exposed what the 9/11 commission concluded was "failures of imagination" in the security posture of the United States, the inability to envision the tactics that a determined, crafty enemy might use against Americans.

After hundreds of billions of dollars spent on

But just as few imagined using jetliners as missiles before 9/11, today there are new and evolving threats to guard against. A Daily Beast review of recent intelligence warnings and federal safety assessments shows the United States isn't fully prepared for some attacks on targets deemed to be high risk—from cyberterror to offshore energy assets.

"This array of threats underscores to me the key question posed by bin Laden's death. Does his killing represent the beginning of the end of the 'war on terrorism,' or is it simply the end of the beginning?" says Clark Ervin, a terrorism expert at the Aspen Institute and the former inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security.

homeland security, America clearly is safer and more aware of the threats surrounding it. Likewise, the U.S. military, the CIA, and the FBI have thinned out much of al Qaeda's leadership in recent years, diminishing its operational capacity through relentless drone strikes and captures.

The 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks was an obvious date for al Qaeda to strike, but other upcoming dates would provide symbolic significance for the terror group and its sympathizers.

"It is, of course, a very good thing that there's not been a major terror attack in the U.S. since 9/11. But it would as much a 'failure of imagination' to suggest that we cannot be attacked again as it was for pre-9/11 policymakers to assume that we would not be attacked ever."

With little fanfare, FBI and Homeland Security officials have identified in recent bulletins several harrowing tactics that al Qaeda, its spinoff group in Yemen, or other affinity terrorists might use in coming months.

Gleaned from law-enforcement bulletins and terrorism experts, here are some of the threats, tactics, and players that Americans will have to be vigilant against at the dawn of the second decade of the war against terror.

1. Biochemical Attacks

An intelligence report this summer warned that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was seeking castor beans, the simple but deadly ingredient needed to make a quick and lethal dose of the poison ricin. One concern was that ricin might be used in a subway attack, combined with an explosion to disperse the deadly toxin through the closed tunnels of a subway system. This is a scenario the U.S. military has long feared, going back to the 1960s and 1970s, and the sarin gas attack in Japan's subways in the 1990s showed its lethality.

2. Radiological Bombs

The so-called dirty bomb has been an obsession of U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials for years, dating to 2002, when the FBI suspected an Illinois man named Jose Padilla of plotting such an attack. Padilla was ultimately convicted of other crimes. Still, officials recognize it would be fairly easy for a terror group to collect radiological waste from hospital machines overseas and package it with an explosive.

3. Backpack Bombs in Shopping Malls

FBI Director Robert Mueller once said in an interview that this was a scenario that kept him up at night. It's a low-scale but tried-and-true approach in other countries, such as Israel and Afghanistan. But it would be new to the United States. And if unleashed in shopping malls, it could create the sort of panic that would shake consumer confidence in an already weak economy.

4. Vehicle Bombs

This is one of the oldest forms of terrorism, but it's still a major threat. In the last few months alone, U.S. intelligence has picked up significant signs that al Qaeda and its allies have been plotting attacks with explosive-laden cars, trucks, and boats. The attack in June on a hotel in Afghanistan frequented by Westerners relied on a fertilizer bomb embedded in a vehicle similar to that used by Timothy McVeigh in 1995 in Oklahoma City. The Yemen arm of al Qaeda tried such an attack in Times Square less than two years ago, and threat information last week warned of a possible car or truck bomb targeting bridges and tunnels in New York or Washington.

5. Cyberterrorism

This may be one of our Achilles' heels. In the last year, cyberattackers have disrupted or accessed some of the Pentagon's most sensitive documents and computer systems while exposing private information of customers in the business world. Despite billions spent, the country still has relatively few defenses. A Government Accountability Office report last year warned that the U.S. government's efforts to ward off a cyberattack suffered from "overlapping and uncoordinated responsibilities" and a lack of clarity about who is in charge. With the help of a state sponsor well versed in cyberwarfare, a terror group could shut down parts of the U.S. electric grid, cause havoc with financial trades, or disable or hack into sensitive government computer systems at great cost to American security.

6. Small Aircraft Loaded With Explosives

In the days immediately after 9/11, fighter jets roared through the American skies on constant patrol. But those are now a distant memory, and safeguards at rural and small airports are not the same as with major airliners and airports. U.S. officials have long worried about terrorists loading a small airplane with explosives and flying it into a major event with crowds, such as sporting events, concerts, amusement parks, or political debates.

7. Train Bombs

While Amtrak has beefed up security and resources since 9/11, the 7/7 attacks in Britain in 2005 showed how devastating and easy train bombs can be as a tool of terror and death. And unlike the U.S. airlines, trains have fewer security precautions and far more access points for terrorists. Just two years ago, authorities thwarted a suspected bombing plot aimed at New York's subway trains.

8. Energy Assets

When Pakistani officials working with the CIA captured Younis al-Mauritani, al Qaeda's No. 2, earlier this month, they were reminded anew that the terror network has plotted to blow up oil and energy assets ranging from nuclear-power plants and hydroelectric dams to oil-drilling rigs and tankers. Mauritani "was planning to target United States economic interests including gas [and] oil pipelines, power generating dams, and strike [oil tankers] through explosive laden speed boats in international waters," the Pakistani Army reported. Documents found in bin Laden's hideout also affirmed an interest in attacking offshore energy interests. Despite the repeated warning signs, a GAO expert in maritime safety told Congress last month that the government lacks a fully coordinated plan for stopping or responding to such an attack.

9. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

This is considered the most dangerous of the regional arms of al Qaeda. Based in Yemen, the group is responsible for two of the biggest foiled attempts at terror attacks: a Nigerian man with a bomb sewn into his underwear who tried to blow up a commercial airliner to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, and packages with powerful explosives in cargo bound for Chicago in late 2010.

10. Homegrown Terrorists

In the last year the Obama administration has placed a greater emphasis on preventing attacks from Americans inspired by al Qaeda's English-language propaganda on the Internet. In June, John Brennan, the deputy national-security adviser for counterterrorism and homeland security, said his new plan was the "first counterterrorism strategy that focuses on the ability of al Qaeda and its network to inspire people in the United States to attack us from within." One example was the November 2009 rampage of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood military base. Such small-arms attacks are less lethal than 9/11 by orders of magnitude but are also much harder to prevent—and rely on an alert citizenry. The Department of Homeland Security launched a campaign this year called "See Something, Say Something" to encourage Americans to alert law enforcement when they observe suspicious activity.

11. Symbolic Dates

The 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks was an obvious date for al Qaeda to strike, but other upcoming dates would provide symbolic significance for the terror group and its sympathizers. They include Oct. 7, the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan; Dec. 9, the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Taliban government to coalition forces; and May 2, the one-year anniversary of bin Laden's death.

12. Unfinished Business

Al Qaeda has a patience and determination to strike the same targets, a point made clear when the terror group targeted the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 after a less spectacular attack in 1993. There is evidence that al Qaeda has had its eyes on Los Angeles (a target of the failed millennium bomb plot of 1999 and recently mentioned in documents recovered from bin Laden's hideout), Las Vegas (which the 9/11 hijackers once visited), the Sears Tower in Chicago, and the U.S. Capitol building in Washington (supposed to be the target of the 9/11 jetliner that crashed in Pennsylvania).

John Solomon is the editor of news and investigations for **Newsweek** *and The Daily Beast.*

9/11 legacy: more resilient skyscrapers

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/911-legacy-more-resilient-skyscrapers

Following the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, many predicted that the age of the skyscraper was over; there has been no slowdown in skyscraper orders, however -- but the skyscrapers being built today are much stronger than the Twin Towers were; new materials, innovative designs, and attention to safety make today's skyscraper much more resilient to man-made and natural disasters.

square inch. There are now concretes that resist 25 thousand pounds per square inch

- Very high-strength cement can help a building resist the type of impacts caused on 9/11 by protecting the steel that holds skyscrapers together — the weak point in the attacked towers. In 7 World Trade Center — the first of the destroyed buildings to be rebuilt, in 2006 — three feet of concrete now surround the steel core.

Skybridge linking two significant buildings in Detroit // Source: m1dtw.com

The reason architects continue to design skyscrapers, and that builders continue to build them, is the engineers have devised many ways, and are now using many new materials, to bolster the strength of these tall buildings and make them more resilient to man-made or natural disasters.

Fox News reports that among these innovations and improvements are:
- The typical cement sidewalk used to be able to resist a couple thousand pounds per

- Steel has also been getting stronger as scientists have gradually found better alloys.
- Modern skyscrapers are also more likely to use explosion-resistant windows, which are made by using several panes of glass and putting a layer of chemicals in between each. The chemicals bond sheets of glass together, making shattering less likely.
- Bridges linking two or more skyscrapers would allow more avenue for evacuation. Fox News notes that skybridges have been used in many post-9/11 skyscrapers, including the 88-story Petronas Towers in Malaysia. It was also considered among designs for the new World Trade Center.

- Sensitive measuring devices in the building that would take into account the strength of the elements holding it up at any given time. If there were a sudden change, the sensors would communicate that to a computer, and the building could physically shift its weight accordingly.

- Modern skyscrapers include more emergency escapes, protect these escapes with more concrete, and place them strategically.

"The past decade has been the most productive 10 years ever when it comes to tall buildings," a report from the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat concluded.

The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant Network

By Sean Noonan and Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110914-evolution-pakistans-militant-networks?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20110915&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=44df083a5d1a4c1eae8edc9bfd6b39a0

For many years now, STRATFOR has been carefully following the evolution of "Lashkar-e-Taiba" (LeT), the name of a Pakistan-based jihadist group that was formed in 1990 and existed until about 2001, when it was officially abolished. In subsequent years, however, several major attacks were attributed to LeT, including the November 2008 coordinated assault in Mumbai, India. Two years before that attack we wrote that the group, or at least its remnant networks, were nebulous but still dangerous. This nebulous nature was highlighted in November 2008 when the "Deccan Mujahideen," a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility for the Mumbai attacks.

While the most famous leaders of the LeT networks, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, are under house arrest and in jail awaiting trial, respectively, LeT still poses a significant threat. It's a threat that comes not so much from LeT as a single jihadist force but LeT as a concept, a banner under which various groups and individuals can gather, coordinate and successfully conduct attacks.

Such is the ongoing evolution of the jihadist movement. And as this movement becomes more diffuse, it is important to look at brand-name jihadist groups like LeT, al Qaeda, the Haqqani network and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as loosely affiliated networks more than monolithic entities. With a debate under way between and within these groups over who to target and with major disruptions of their operations by various military and security forces, the need for these groups to work together in order to carry out sensational attacks has become clear. The result is a new, ad hoc template for jihadist operations that is not easily defined and even harder for government leaders to explain to their constituents and reporters to explain to their readers.

Thus, brand names like Lashkar-e-Taiba (which means Army of the Pure) will continue to be used in public discourse while the planning and execution of high-profile attacks grows ever more complex. While the threat posed by these networks to the West and to India may not be strategic, the possibility of disparate though well-trained militants working together and even with organized-crime elements does suggest a continuing tactical threat that is worth examining in more detail.

The Network Formerly Known as Lashkar-e-Taiba

The history of the group of militants and preachers who created LeT and their connections with other groups helps us understand how militant groups develop and work together. Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) and its militant wing, LeT, was founded with the help of transnational militants based in Afghanistan and aided by the Pakistani government. This allowed it to become a financially-independent social-service organization that was able to divert a significant portion of its funding to its militant wing.

The first stirrings of militancy within this network began in 1982, when Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi traveled from Punjab, Pakistan, to Paktia, Afghanistan, to fight with Deobandi militant groups. Lakhvi, who is considered to have been the military commander of what was known as LeT and is awaiting trial for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, adheres to an extreme version of the Ahl-e-

Hadith (AeH) interpretation of Islam, which is the South Asian version of the Salafist-Wahhabist trend in the Arab world. In the simplest of terms, AeH is more conservative and traditional than the doctrines of most militant groups operating along the Durand Line. Militants there tend to follow an extreme brand of the Deobandi branch of South Asian Sunni Islam, similar to the extreme ideology of al Qaeda's Salafist jihadists.

Lakhvi created his own AeH-inspired militant group in 1984, and a year later two academics, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, created Jamaat ul-Dawa, an Islamist AeH social organization. Before these groups were formed there was already a major AeH political organization called Jamaat AeH, led by the most well-known Pakistani AeH scholar, the late Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, who was assassinated in Lahore in 1987. His death allowed Saeed and Lakhvi's movement to take off. It is important to note that AeH adherents comprise a very small percentage of Pakistanis and that those following the movement launched by Saeed and Lakhvi represent only a portion of those who ascribe to AeH's ideology.

In 1986, Saeed and Lakhvi joined forces, creating Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) in Muridke, near Lahore, Pakistan. MDI had 17 founders, including Saeed and Lakhvi as well as transnational militants originally from places like Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories. While building facilities in Muridke for social services, MDI also established its first militant training camp in Paktia, then another in Kunar, Afghanistan, in 1987. Throughout the next three decades, these camps often were operated in cooperation with other militant groups, including al Qaeda.

MDI was established to accomplish two related missions. The first involved peaceful, above-board activities like medical care, education, charitable work and proselytizing. Its second and equally important mission was military jihad, which the group considered obligatory for all Muslims. The group first fought in Afghanistan along with Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Suna, a hardline Salafist group that shared MDI's ideology. Jamil al-Rahman, the group's leader at the time, provided support to MDI's first militant group and continued to work with MDI until his death in 1987.

The deaths of al-Rahman and Jamaat AeH leader Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer in 1987 gave the leaders of the nascent MDI the opportunity to supplant Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Suna and Jamaat AeH and grow quickly.

In 1990, the growing MDI officially launched LeT as its militant wing under the command of Lakhvi, while Saeed remained emir of the overall organization. This was when LeT first began to work with other groups operating in Kashmir, since the Soviets had left Afghanistan and many of the foreign mujahideen there were winding down their operations. In 1992, when the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was finally defeated, many foreign militants who had fought in Afghanistan left to fight in other places like Kashmir. LeT is also known to have sent fighters to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, but Kashmir became the group's primary focus.

MDI/LeT explained its concentration on Kashmir by arguing that it was the closest Muslim territory that was occupied by non-believers. Since MDI/LeT was a Punjabi entity, Kashmir was also the most accessible theater of jihad for the group. Due to the group's origin and the history of the region, Saeed and other members also bore personal grudges against India. In the 1990s, MDI/LeT also received substantial support from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) and military, which had its own interest in supporting operations in Kashmir. At this point, MDI/LeT developed relations with other groups operating in Kashmir, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Unlike these groups, however, MDI/LeT was considered easier to control because its AeH sect of Islam was not very large and did not have the support of the main AeH groups. With Pakistan's support came certain restraints, and many LeT trainees said that as part of their indoctrination into the group they were made to promise never to attack Pakistan.

LeT expanded its targeting beyond Kashmir to the rest of India in 1992, after the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque during communal rioting in Uttar Pradesh state, and similar unrest in Mumbai and Gujarat. LeT sent Azam Cheema, who Saeed and Iqbal knew from their university days, to recruit fighters in India. Indian militants from a group called Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen were recruited into LeT, which staged its first major attack with five coordinated improvised explosive devices

(IEDs) on trains in Mumbai and Hyderabad on Dec. 5-6, 1993, the first anniversary of the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque. These are the first attacks in non-Kashmir India that can be linked to LeT. The group used Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen networks in the 1990s and later developed contacts with the Student Islamic Movement of India and its offshoot militant group the Indian Mujahideen.

The Student Islamic Movement of India/Indian Mujahideen network was useful in recruiting and co-opting operatives, but it is a misconception to think these indigenous Indian groups worked directly for LeT. In some cases, Pakistanis from LeT provided IED training and other expertise to Indian militants who carried out attacks, but these groups, while linked to the LeT network, maintained their autonomy. The most recent attacks in India — Sept. 7 in Delhi and July 13 in Mumbai — probably have direct ties to these networks.

Between 1993 and 1995, LeT received its most substantial state support from Pakistan, which helped build up LeT's military capability by organizing and training its militants and providing weapons, equipment, campaign guidance and border-crossing support in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. LeT operated camps on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border as well as in Kashmir, in places like Muzaffarabad.

At the same time, MDI built up a major social-services network, building schools and hospitals and setting up charitable foundations throughout Pakistan, though centered in Punjab. Its large complex in Muridke included schools, a major hospital and a mosque. Some of its funding came through official Saudi channels while other funding came through non-official channels via Saudi members of MDI such as Abdul Rahman al-Surayhi and Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq, who reportedly facilitated much of the funding to establish the original Muridke complex.

As MDI focused on dawah, or the preaching of Islam, it simultaneously developed an infrastructure that was financially self-sustaining. For example, it established Al-Dawah schools throughout Pakistan that charged fees to those who could afford it and it began taxing its adherents. It also became well-known for its charitable activities, placing donation boxes throughout Pakistan. The group developed a reputation as an efficient organization that provides quality social services, and this positive public perception has made it difficult for the Pakistani government to crack down on it.

On July 12, 1999, LeT carried out its first fidayeen, or suicide commando, attack in Kashmir. Such attacks focus on inflicting as much damage as possible before the attackers are killed. Their goal also was to engender as much fear as possible and introduce a new intensity to the conflict there. This attack occurred during the Kargil war, when Pakistani soldiers along with its sponsored militants fought a pitched battle against Indian troops in the Kargil district of Kashmir. This was the height of Pakistani state support for the various militant groups operating in Kashmir, and it was a critical, defining period for the LeT, which shifted its campaign from one focused exclusively on Kashmir to one focused on India as a whole.

State support for LeT and other militant groups declined after the Kargil war but fidayeen attacks continued and began to occur outside of Kashmir. In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, there was much debate within LeT about its targeting. When LeT was constrained operationally in Kashmir by its ISI handlers, some members of the group wanted to conduct attacks in other places. It's unclear at this point which attacks had Pakistani state support and which did not, but the timing of many in relation to the ebb and flow of the Pakistani-Indian political situation indicates Pakistani support and control, even if it came only from factions within the ISI or military. The first LeT attack outside of Kashmir took place on Dec. 22, 2000, against the Red Fort in Delhi.

The Post-9/11 Name Game
In the months following 9/11, many Pakistan-based jihadist groups were "banned" by the Pakistani government. They were warned beforehand and moved their funds into physical assets or under different names. LeT claimed that it split with MDI, with new LeT leader Maula Abdul Wahid al-Kashmiri saying the group now was strictly a Kashmiri militant organization. Despite these claims, however, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi was still considered supreme commander. MDI was dissolved and replaced by Jamaat-ul-Dawa, the original name used by Saeed and Iqbal's group. Notably, both al-Kashmiri and Lakhvi were also part of the Jamaat-ul-Dawa executive board,

indicating that close ties remained between the two groups.

In January 2002, LeT was declared illegal, and the Pakistani government began to use the word "defunct" to describe it. In reality it wasn't defunct; it had begun merely operating under different names. The group's capability to carry out attacks was temporarily limited, probably on orders from the Pakistani government through Jamaat-ul-Dawa's leadership.

At this point, LeT's various factions began to split and re-network in various ways. For example, Abdur Rehman Syed, a senior operational planner involved in David Headley's surveillance of Mumbai targets, left LeT around 2004. As a major in the Pakistani army he had been ordered to fight fleeing Taliban on the Durand Line in 2001. He refused and joined LeT. In 2004 he began working with Ilyas Kashmiri and Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami. Two other senior LeT leaders, former Pakistani Maj. Haroon Ashiq and his brother Capt. Kurram Ashiq, had left Pakistan's Special Services Group to join LeT around 2001. By 2003 they had exited the group and were criticizing Lakhvi, the former LeT military commander.

Despite leaving the larger organization, former members of the MDI/LeT still often use the name "Lashkar-e-Taiba" in their public rhetoric when describing their various affiliations, even though they do not consider their new organizations to be offshoots of LeT. The same difficulties observers face in trying to keep track of these spun-off factions has come to haunt the factions themselves, which have a branding problem as they try to raise money or recruit fighters. New names don't have the same power as the well-established LeT brand, and many of the newer organizations continue to use the LeT moniker in some form.

Operating Outside of South Asia

Organizations and networks that were once part of LeT have demonstrated the capability to carry out insurgent attacks in Afghanistan, small-unit attacks in Kashmir, fidayeen assaults in Kashmir and India and small IED attacks throughout the region. Mumbai in 2008 was the most spectacular attack by an LeT offshoot on an international scale, but to date the network has not demonstrated the capability to conduct complex attacks outside the region. That said, David Headley's surveillance efforts in Denmark and other plots linked to LeT training camps and factions do seem to have been inspired by al Qaeda's transnational jihadist influence.

To date, these operations have failed, but they are worth noting. These transnational LeT-linked plotters include the following:

- The Virginia Jihad Network.
- Dhiren Barot (aka Abu Eisa al-Hind), a Muslim convert of Indian origin who grew up in the United Kingdom, was arrested there in 2004 and was accused of a 2004 plot to detonate vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in underground parking lots and surveilling targets in the United States in 2000-2001 for al Qaeda. He originally learned his craft in LeT training camps in Pakistan.
- David Hicks, an Australian who was in LeT camps in 1999 and studied at one of their madrassas. LeT provided a letter of introduction to al Qaeda, which he joined in January 2001. He was captured in Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion.
- Omar Khyam of the United Kingdom, who attended LeT training camps in 2000 before his family brought him home.
- The so-called "Crevice Network," members of which were arrested in 2004 and charged with attempting to build fertilizer-based IEDs in the United Kingdom under the auspices of al Qaeda.
- Willie Brigette, who had been connected to LeT networks in France and was trying to contact a bombmaker in Australia in order to carry out attacks there when he was arrested in October 2003.

While these cases suggest that the LeT threat persists, they also indicate that the transnational threat posed by those portions of the network focused on attacks outside of South Asia does not appear to be as potent as the attack in Mumbai in 2008. One reason is the Pakistani support offered to those who focus on operations in South Asia and particularly those who target India. Investigations of the Mumbai attack revealed that current or former ISI officers provided a considerable amount of training, operational support and even real-time guidance to the Mumbai attack team.

It is unclear how far up the Pakistani command structure this support goes. The most important point, though, is that Pakistani support in the Mumbai attack provided the group responsible with capabilities that have not been demonstrated by other parts of the network in other plots. In fact, without this element of state support, many transnational plots linked to the LeT network have been forced to rely on the same kind of "Kramer jihadists" in the West that the al Qaeda core has employed in recent years.

However, while these networks have not shown the capability to conduct a spectacular attack since Mumbai, they continue to plan. With both the capability and intention in place, it is probably only a matter of time before they conduct additional attacks in India. The historical signature of LeT attacks has been the use of armed assault tactics — taught originally by the ISI and institutionalized by LeT doctrine — so attacks of this sort can be expected. An attack of this sort outside of South Asia would be a stretch for the groups that make up the post-LeT networks, but the cross-pollination that is occurring among the various jihadist actors in Pakistan could help facilitate planning and even operations if they pool resources. Faced with the full attention of global counterterrorism efforts, such cooperation may be one of the only ways that the transnational jihad can hope to gain any traction, especially as its efforts to foster independent grassroots jihadists have been largely ineffective.

SGT. DAKOTA L. MEYER, USMC

Source: http://www.marines.mil/community/pages/MedalofHonorSgtDakotaMeyer-Profile.aspx

Sgt. Meyer has been nominated to receive the Medal of Honor for his acts of extraordinary heroism in Afghanistan on 8 September 2009. He was born and raised in Columbia, Kentucky, attended local public schools, and graduated from Green County High School.

In 2006, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps at a recruiting station in Louisville, Kentucky, and completed his basic training at Parris Island Recruit Training Depot later that year. In 2010, Sgt Meyer completed his active duty commitment and he currently serves in the Individual Ready Reserve of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

He is a school trained sniper and highly skilled Marine infantryman. At the time of his deployment to combat duty in Afghanistan he was serving as a Turret Gunner and Driver. His unit assignment at the time of his heroic acts was with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7 operating in Kunar Province, Afghanistan.

Sgt. Meyer has deployed twice to combat duty, serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, he deployed to Iraq for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, and during 2009-10, he deployed to Afghanistan for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

In his civilian professional life, he has completed undergraduate college coursework and he currently works for McDan, Inc. in Kentucky's construction industry.

Sgt. Meyer is a highly decorated Marine combat veteran. His personal awards include a Purple Heart Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat "V" device for valor, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and a Combat Action Ribbon. His other awards and decorations include a Good Conduct Medal, National Defense Service

Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two bronze campaign stars, Iraq Campaign Medal with one bronze campaign star, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Medal ISAF Afghanistan, and a Rifle Expert Badge (3rd Award) and Pistol Expert Badge (2nd Award).

Official Citation

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

CORPORAL DAKOTA L. MEYER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

For service as set forth in the following

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7, in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009. Corporal Meyer maintained security at a patrol rally point while other members of his team moved on foot with two platoons of Afghan National Army and Border Police into the village of Ganjgal for a pre-dawn meeting with village elders. Moving into the village, the patrol was ambushed by

more than 50 enemy fighters firing rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns from houses and fortified positions on the slopes above. Hearing over the radio that four U.S. team members were cut off, Corporal Meyer seized the initiative. With a fellow Marine driving, Corporal Meyer took the exposed gunner's position in a gun-truck as they drove down the steeply terraced terrain in a daring attempt to disrupt the enemy attack and locate the trapped U.S. team. Disregarding intense enemy fire now

concentrated on their lone vehicle, Corporal Meyer killed a number of enemy fighters with the mounted machine guns and his rifle, some at near point blank range, as he and his driver made three solo trips into the ambush area. During the first two trips, he and his driver evacuated two dozen Afghan soldiers, many of whom were wounded. When one machine gun became inoperable, he directed a return to the rally point to switch to another gun-truck for a third trip into the ambush area where his accurate fire directly supported the remaining U.S. personnel and Afghan soldiers fighting their way out of the ambush. Despite a shrapnel wound to his arm, Corporal Meyer made two more trips into the ambush area in a third gun-truck accompanied by four other Afghan vehicles to recover more wounded Afghan soldiers and search for the missing U.S. team members. Still under heavy enemy fire, he dismounted the vehicle on the fifth trip and moved on foot to locate and recover the bodies of his team members. Corporal Meyer's daring initiative and bold fighting spirit throughout the 6-hour battle significantly disrupted the enemy's attack and inspired the members of the combined force to fight on. His unwavering courage and steadfast devotion to his U.S. and Afghan comrades in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Hamas May Resume Suicide Bombings

Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/147859#.TnLf3ezCnld

A senior counter-terrorism expert warned Tuesday that Hamas is weighing a resumption of suicide bomb attacks against Israeli civilians. Col. Jonathan Fighel (Ret.), a researcher with the Interdisciplinary Center's Institute for Counter-Terrorism, spoke at the Institute's eleventh annual terrorism conference.

"We're seeing more and more Hamas flags in

Hebron. The public atmosphere to Hamas is much more lenient. This allows the creation of operational terror cells. Hamas is taking into consideration the renewal of suicide bomb attacks," Fighel said.

Fighel, who served in various operational and field posts of intelligence and research at the IDF Intelligence Corps, and who has held several command positions in Judea and Samaria, added that Hamas is "gaining influence in the West Bank and acting more freely. "

Hamas was using the so-called Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement as a vehicle to raise its profile in the West Bank, he added. "Hamas's strategy is to replace the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," Fighel said.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is also "looking for duality, to govern while keeping its charter. This is the flexibility it enjoys," it added.

Fighel said Hamas was not deterred by Israel, adding that Israeli government and public opinion had become accustomed to Hamas' shelling of more and more cities with rockets.

At the same time, he noted, Hamas suffered a resounding failure when it tried to cause the Palestinians to enter a third intifada in recent months.

Col. Ronen Cohen, a research associate with the ICT, and a former head of the Terrorism Section of IDF Military Intelligence, said the main goal of Hamas and Hizbullah now is ensuring their own survivability amid regional turbulence.

To that end, both have developed arsenals of rockets to pound the Israeli home front, and defensive asymmetrical fighting forces to target IDF forces, he added.

But analysts note tactical flexibility does not indicate strategic or ideological flexibility – or a change in either organization's long-term agenda.

India has its own indigenous Islamist terrorist threat: US report

Source: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-14/india/30153983 _1_crs-bombings-simi

There is an dangerous growth of indigenous

Islamist terrorism in India despite New Delhi's reluctance to openly acknowledge it, a Congressional report has said, adding leading such group is Indian Mujahideen. "Despite New Delhi's reluctance to openly acknowledge the

fact, India also has its own indigenous Islamist terrorism threat," the report said.

"The newly emergent 'Indian Mujahideen'(IM) group, widely believed to be an offshoot or pseudonym of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), has been found complicit in a number of recent bombings, even as government leaders continue to name Pakistan as an abettor of such episodes," the Congressional Research Service (CRS) said.

Threats and claims

The Indian Mujahideen have sent several emails claiming responsibility for several bombings.

Such an e-mail sent 4 minutes before Ahmedabad blasts refers to Islamic conquerors of India -Ibn-e-Qasim, Ghauri, Ghaznawi.

It warns about havoc about to happen in five minutes:

"... Here we are back - the Mujahideen of India - the terrorists on the disbelievers - the radicals of Islam - after our triumphant and successful assault at Jaipur, once again calling you all, who disbelieve in Allah and His Messenger Muhammad to accept Islam and bear witness that there is none to be worshipped except Allah, and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. Accept Islam and save yourselves.

O Hindus! O disbelieving faithless Indians! Haven't you still realized

proving your blood to be the cheapest of all mankind! Have you forgotten your history full of subjugation, humiliation, and insult? Or do you want us to repeat it again? Take heed before it is too late!

So wait! .... Await now…..:…..! Wait only for five minutes from now! .... Wait for the Mujahideen and Fidayeen of Islam and stop them if you can - who will make you feel the terror of Jihad. Feel the havoc cast into your hearts by Allah, the Almighty, face His Dreadful Punishment, and suffer the results of fighting the Muslims and the Mujahideen. Await the anguish, agony, sorrow and pain. Await, only for 5 minutes, to feel the fear of death...".

The email was in the form of a pdf document that included several Arabic quotes from the Quran with translation.

Terrorism deaths in Mumbai and India 1993-2011

that the falsehood of your 33 crore dirty mud idols and the blasphemy of your deaf, dumb, mute idols are not at all going to save your necks, Insha-Allah, from being slaughtered?

We call you, O Hindus, O enemies of Allah, to take an honest stance with yourselves lest another attack of Ibn-e-Qasim sends shivers down your spines, lest another Ghauri shakes your foundations, and lest another Ghaznawi massacres you,

The past emails by Indian Mujahideen include the following:

- Serial blasts in three towns of Uttar Pradesh in November 2007
- 13 May 2008, after the Jaipur blasts email, traced to a Ghaziabad cyber cafe.
- 26 July 2008, four minues before Ahmedabad blasts, email traced Kenneth Haywood's WiFi IP address in Sanpada, Navi Mumbai.
- August 2008, after the press conference held by the Gujarat Police, IP address

traced to WiFi network of Khalsa college in Matunga, central Mumbai.
- 13 September 2008, during the Delhi serial blast, IP address traced to WiFi network of

Kamran Power Control Pvt Ltd, at 201-202 Eric House, 16th Road, Chembur.
They did not send any e-mail messages claiming responsibility for the serial blasts in Bangalore on 25 July 2008.

Indians urged to buy terrorism insurance

Source: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-09-14/news/30154352_1_health-insurance-sanjay-datta-mahavir-chopra

India's Economic Times is urging citizens to consider protecting their interests and purchasing insurance in light of recent terrorist attacks in the country; while there is no terrorism insurance policy, individuals can purchase health insurance as well as life insurance to ensure that family members are protected in the event that a catastrophic accident were to occur; "A terror attack can cause disability or dismemberment or loss of life in addition to the medical expenses that may be incurred for treating the same. A person needs to have both personal accident cover for death and disability and medical expenses cover to provide for both the eventualities," said Sanjay Datta, head of ICICI Lombard's customer service

St. Andrews University promoting its certificate in terrorism studies

Source:http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/st-andrews-university-promoting-its-certificate-terrorism-studies

The University of St. Andrews is promoting a program leading to a certificate in it terrorism studies. The Scottish university says that individuals whose responsibility it is to protect people, infrastructure, organizations or international and domestic terrorist threats. For many — including police authorities, close protection operatives, the military, government and private sector bodies — the subject of terrorism is so vast and complex that

investments, need to understand the threats, then prepare and implement best practice strategies to reduce the risk and counter educational insight is rarely available to the majority.

The university says that terrorists have grown their ability to target the military and civilians, and security risks are at their highest, so knowledge of this important subject will help prepare any company or organization to counteract and protect against the variety of threats posed by today's multi-faceted terrorist organizations.

This terrorism studies course fills a knowledge gap, enabling participants and organizations to prepare to meet the counter terrorism challenges and risks of evolving anti-terrorist techniques and counter the terrorist threat.

"Knowing how and why terrorists are radicalized and plot against civilians, governments, corporations, commercial operations, transport or IT networks makes an unmistakable difference to a nation's or organization's anti terrorist and security strategies," the university says. "The knowledge you will gain from this unique terrorism course will prove invaluable in countering the ever present threat to security."

The Certificate in Terrorism Studies is accessible globally through online e-learning, and can be studied from anywhere — all the student needs is an Internet connection.

The Certificate in Terrorism Studies was established in September 2006 in partnership with IBC Global Academy (part of Informa Plc). The university says that the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews was the first transnational counter terrorism online course to provide individuals, military, and police, as well as public and private sector organizations with an understanding of the latest thinking on terrorism and homeland security.