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Interpol official: Armed citizens may be the best way to deter terrorism

Source: <http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/15396-interpol-official-armed-citizens-may-be-the-best-way-to-deter-terrorism>

In the aftermath of the terrible terrorist attack at the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, during which 67 people were killed, INTERPOL Secretary Ronald Noble is openly pondering the question of whether armed citizens are the best way to deter terrorism:



In an exclusive interview with ABC News, Noble said there are really only two choices for protecting open societies from attacks like the one on Westgate mall where so-called “soft targets” are hit: either create secure perimeters around the locations or allow civilians to carry their own guns to protect themselves.

“Societies have to think about how they’re going to approach the problem,” Noble said. “One is to say we want an armed citizenry; you can see the reason for that. Another is to say the enclaves are so secure that in order to get into the soft target you’re going to have to pass through extraordinary security.”
[...]

In the interview with ABC News, Noble was more blunt and directed his comments to his home country.

“Ask yourself: If that was Denver, Col., if that was Texas, would those guys have been able to spend hours, days, shooting people randomly?” Noble said, referring to states with pro-gun traditions. “What I’m saying is it makes

police around the world question their views on gun control. It makes citizens question their views on gun control. You have to ask yourself, ‘Is an armed citizenry more necessary now than it was in the past with an evolving threat of terrorism?’ This is something that has to be discussed.”

“For me it’s a profound question,” he continued. “People are quick to say ‘gun control, people shouldn’t be armed,’ etc., etc. I think they have to ask themselves: ‘Where would you have wanted to be? In a city where there was gun control and no citizens armed if you’re in a Westgate mall, or in a place

like Denver or Texas?’”

Now, this doesn’t mean that a society in which an armed citizenry is promoted is going to be able to prevent every terrorist attack. Similarly, intelligence agencies exist to examine information which may prevent attacks and police investigate crimes after they’re occurred to bring perpetrators to justice.

Armed citizens are often the last line of defense when it comes to preventing a crime, and it happened more frequently than gun control advocates want to admit. A recent Centers for Disease Control (CDC) study confirmed that guns are the best way to deter crime.

It may not be a panacea to solve the underlying causes of terrorism and it may not stop every attack, but promoting gun ownership — rather than discouraging it, which is what President Obama does — could go a long way toward mitigating threats while Americans go about their lives.





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Crime at sea: The world's most pirate-infested waters

By Ted Kemp (CNBC)

Source: http://www.nbcnews.com/business/crime-sea-worlds-most-pirate-infested-waters-1C9965574?goback=.gde_4962526_member_5799904178461495298#

Where are the most pirate-infested waters in the world? CNBC gives the rundown.

Like the Caribbean of old, the waters near Somalia used to be the most heavily pirated in the world. Now there's a new king of the pirates that's quickly become a headache for governments, shipping companies, cruise lines, energy firms, global conglomerates and—perhaps most immediately—for sailors trying to ply trade.

When CNBC first examined the world's most dangerous waters in 2008, Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden and coastal Somalia easily dominated as the globe's most prolific, according to data compiled by the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre. Somalia and the Gulf of Aden still have treacherous waters, but no longer the worst: Over the last five quarters, examined here, a new country's national waters have become the most heavily pirated on earth.

Also changed are the tactics used to combat piracy. National navies have become much more active in the fight against piracy, and commercial tankers and cargo vessels increasingly employ armed security—a concept that was rare and even discouraged in many maritime circles as recently as 2008.

As greater arms have come to bear against the pirates, the maritime brigands have honed their tactics and beefed up their armament as well. Below are the world's most pirate-infested waters, and an individual attack from each place.

Indonesia (43 Pirate Attacks)

Indonesia's 17,500 islands and their surrounding waters now take the title as the world's most heavily



pirated. Shortly before 11 p.m. at Belawan Anchorage, the docked Rudolf Schulte, was boarded by six pirates who climbed aboard using a long bamboo pole topped with a metal hook. A sailor on duty spotted the men, who were armed with guns and knives. The pirates noticed the sailor as well, and attacked him as he tried to contact the ship's bridge on a handheld radio. The robbers swiped his walkie-talkie, thrust him to the

deck and bound him. They then turned to the ship's stores and began to plunder. The raiding may have distracted the pirates, however, as the sailor managed to free himself and take off on foot toward the bridge. He raised a general alarm. The sound frightened the pirates, who fled. Indonesian authorities were informed, but as is often the case, their efforts were too little, too late. The six pirates, with their contraband, escaped into the night, free to attack again.



Somalia (31 Pirate Attacks)

Somalian piracy isn't as widespread as it was five years ago, but it's still a serious problem. The mostly Ukrainian crew of MSC Jasmine was underway in broad daylight when six pirates in a skiff began chasing their ship. Shortly afterward, the attackers opened fire with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. The master of MSC Jasmine raised an alert, sent most of his sailors to the ship's

citadel, and ordered his security team to return fire. The pirates retreated, but didn't get far.



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Two warships responding to MSC Jasmine's distress signal, the American USS Halyburton and French FS Surcouf, intercepted the skiff and caught its mother ship to boot. Twelve pirates were taken into custody.

Nigeria (22 Pirate Attacks)

PM Salem was underway about 25 nautical miles southwest of Bayelsa, Nigeria, when pirates in a boat



approached quickly from the rear of the vessel. The interlopers were armed with machine guns, and began firing on PM Salem, pictured, as they chased the Honduran vessel. The ship's master opened up his throttle, fired off a distress message and ordered all crew except for himself and the onboard security team to a safe room. The security team took positions on PM Salem's stern and returned fire. A vicious fight ensued and went on for 20 minutes before the security team finally drove off the attackers. Their successful efforts came at a horrific price, however: Three

security team members were shot, one of them losing his life.

Gulf of Aden (10 Pirate Attacks)

Sometimes, the pirates shoot back. Crewmembers aboard the North Sea were already on alert after



spotting a suspicious dhow—a wooden sailing vessel that pirates sometimes use as a “mother ship”—in the vicinity. Shortly after, the men saw a small skiff about 1.5 nautical miles away and closing in at 20 knots. The ship's master sent a distress signal to the UK Maritime Trade Operation, a Royal Navy fleet that runs anti-pirate patrols in the Gulf of Aden. The British, though far distant, replied that they would immediately dispatch a military helicopter. The skiff drew closer, and security personnel

aboard the North Sea saw that the pirates were armed with AK-47 assault rifles. Security fired warning shots, and the pirates immediately fired back. A ship-to-ship firefight broke out, with the pirates reeling off more than 50 rounds. Finally, they broke off the attack. Despite an extensive aerial search, the pirates were never located.



India (7 Pirate Attacks)

It doesn't take a speed boat to steal from a ship that's sitting still. The six pirates who attacked the Maersk Visual, seen here, arrived at the anchored tanker just before 7 a.m. in a long, wooden boat with a sail and oars. The Maersk Visual's officer of the watch spotted the boat alongside and ordered a sailor to investigate. The sailor spotted two strange men hauling ship property across



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the deck and gave chase. The pirates jumped into their wooden boat and started rowing. Crewmembers on Maersk Visual raised an alarm and called Visakhapatnam Anchorage port control, but amazingly, the back-to-basics pirates got away with their booty.

Red Sea (7 Pirate Attacks)

A white skiff that appeared to have two men on board rushed the Pacific Galaxy, seen here, in the early morning hours.



Two outboard motors pushed the skiff at more than 25 knots. As it closed in, crew members warily watching the small craft saw five more men rise up from where they had been lying flat on the floor of the vessel. The master of the Panamanian tanker gave his armed, on-board security team permission to fire warning shots. Other crew members retreated to a secure "citadel"—a fortified, secure room on board the ship. The security team let loose with a volley of bullets. The pirates

promptly called off the attack. About an hour and a half later, however, pirates returned, this time in two skiffs. When the pirates drew within 200 meters, the security team opened up with rifle fire and shot rocket flares. The pirates retreated—this time for good.

Bangladesh (7 Pirate Attacks)

Five men armed with long knives scrambled up the anchor chain of the Diana Bolten, seen here, at 3



a.m. as she sat docked in Chittagong Anchorage. The vessel's second mate noticed movement near the top of the chain and asked the deck watchman to investigate. Three of the pirates threatened the watchman as he approached through the darkness, and the second mate directed a spotlight onto the men. The pirates fled back down the anchor chain, taking as much ship property as they could carry with them. Calls went out to port control authorities and the Bangladeshi coast

guard, which scoured the area in search of the robbers. It was too late: They escaped.

Ivory Coast (6 Pirate Attacks)

The Gascogne, pictured, was underway 70 nautical miles south of Abidjan, Ivory Coast, when 12 pirates with firearms boarded the French-owned tanker just before 7 a.m. They overpowered Gascogne's 17 crew members, injuring two, and took control. The pirates sailed the hijacked ship to Nigeria, where they siphoned off its cargo of crude oil. After stealing the crew's personal belongings, the pirates released the men and the Gascogne. At the time, the



attack on the Gascogne was the third attack in Ivorian waters in just five days.



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Peru (4 Pirate Attacks)

Pirate attacks are actually much more common when vessels are docked than when they're at sea. The



stealthy pirates who attacked Overseas Pearlmar, seen here, provide a good example. The ship was berthed at Talara Port, Peru, when the crew noticed that some of the vessel's stores were missing. They inspected the ship, and found physical clues that told the story: Pirates had dismantled a metal guard on the anchor chain near water level and then climbed up the chain. Taking the deck, they forced their way into the forecabin store by breaking the hinge on a padlocked door. They took what they wanted and escaped unseen.

Singapore Straits (4 Pirate Attacks)

De Hui was steaming with its barge, Haiyangshiyou, under tow in the Singapore Straits, seen here,



when she was approached by a speed boat just after 5 p.m. Six pirates on the much swifter craft pulled alongside Haiyangshiyou, boarded her, grabbed various goods from the deck and quickly made their escape. But it wasn't over for De Hui. After night fell, another speedboat came alongside the tug itself. Two pirates in camouflage leaped aboard, overpowered De Hui's boatswain, threw him to the deck and held him at knifepoint. The ship's master, seeing the commotion, raised a general alarm. De Hui's crew mustered and the

pirates, seeing the men gathering against them, released the boatswain and fled. They managed to steal nothing.

NYPD Designates Mosques As Terrorism Organizations

Source: http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/08/28/nypd-designates-mosques-as-terrorism-organizations/?goback=.gde_1528217_member_5797050446879145987#!

The New York Police Department has secretly labeled entire mosques as terrorism organizations, a designation that allows police to use informants to record sermons and spy on imams, often without specific evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

Designating an entire mosque as a terrorism enterprise means that anyone who attends prayer services there is a potential subject of an investigation and fair game for surveillance.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD has opened at least a dozen "terrorism enterprise investigations" into mosques, according to

interviews and confidential police documents. The TEI, as it is known, is a police tool intended to help investigate terrorist cells and the like.

Many TEIs stretch for years, allowing surveillance to continue even though the NYPD has never criminally charged a mosque or Islamic organization with operating as a terrorism enterprise.

The documents show in detail how, in its hunt for terrorists, the NYPD investigated countless innocent New York Muslims and put information




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about them in secret police files. As a tactic, opening an enterprise investigation on a mosque is so potentially invasive that while the NYPD conducted at least a dozen, the FBI never did one, according to interviews with federal law enforcement officials.

The strategy has allowed the NYPD to send undercover officers into mosques and attempt

The disclosures come as the NYPD is fighting off lawsuits accusing it of engaging in racial profiling while combating crime. Earlier this month, a judge ruled that the department's use of the stop-and-frisk tactic was unconstitutional. The American Civil Liberties Union and two other groups have sued, saying the Muslim spying programs are unconstitutional and make



to plant informants on the boards of mosques and at least one prominent Arab-American group in Brooklyn, whose executive director has worked with city officials, including Bill de Blasio, a front-runner for mayor.

The revelations about the NYPD's massive spying operations are in documents recently obtained by The Associated Press and part of a new book, "Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit and bin Laden's Final Plot Against America." The book by AP reporters Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman is based on hundreds of previously unpublished police files and interviews with current and former NYPD, CIA and FBI officials.

"This is unprecedented in American law enforcement to target a house of worship as a criminal enterprise," Goldman told WCBS 880's Marla Diamond. "What they did is they would establish something called a terrorism enterprise investigation and we've actually seen the predicate for some of these investigations, which are very slim. Some of it's just guilt by association."

Muslims afraid to practice their faith without police scrutiny.

Both Mayor Mike Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly have denied those accusations. They say police do not unfairly target people; they only follow leads.

The NYPD released a statement to that effect Wednesday evening, defending its policies and emphasizing individuals are the focus of terrorism investigations.

"'Terrorism Enterprise Investigation' is a term used in the Federal Court-ordered Handschu Guidelines as a category of investigative activity. We strictly follow those guidelines, and we follow leads wherever they take us – including, at times, into a facility," the statement said. "Our investigative focus, though, is and always has been on individuals – not institutions – who have engaged in, are engaged in, or are planning to engage in unlawful conduct. Our investigations are supervised, ethical and constitutional. We have kept New York City safe from terrorism for over



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a decade, and have a responsibility to continue to do so.”

And in a television appearance on Wednesday, Kelly blasted the book.

“A fair amount of fiction. It’ll be half-truths, it’ll be lot of quotes from unnamed sources,” the police commissioner said.

He said the intelligence gathering in the wake of 9/11 has kept the city safe from another terror attack, adding that confidential informants do not enter a mosque unless they are following up on a lead.

“We don’t investigate locations,” Kelly said. “We investigate people.”

An NYPD spokesman declined to comment.

“We try to keep this city safe,” Bloomberg said Wednesday. The practice is “totally consistent with what the laws require.”

Malcolm Shabazz
Mosque, Harlem

Use of informants

The NYPD did not limit its operations to collecting information on those who attended the mosques or led prayers. The department sought also to put people on the boards of New York’s Islamic institutions to fill intelligence gaps.

One confidential NYPD document shows police wanted to put informants in leadership positions at mosques and other organizations, including the Arab American Association of New York in Brooklyn, a secular social-service organization.

Linda Sarsour, the executive director, said her group helps new immigrants adjust to life in the U.S. It was not clear whether the department was successful in its plans.

The document, which appears to have been created around 2009, was prepared for Kelly and distributed to the NYPD’s debriefing unit, which helped identify possible informants.

Around that time, Kelly was handing out medals to the Arab American Association’s soccer team, Brooklyn United, smiling and

congratulating its players for winning the NYPD’s soccer league.

Sarsour, a Muslim who has met with Kelly many times, said she felt betrayed.

Sarsour attended a rally Wednesday outside NYPD headquarters in Manhattan, where Muslims called for the Department of Justice to investigate what they believe is unwarranted surveillance of their community, WCBS 880’s Marla Diamond reported.



The Handschu case

Before the NYPD could target mosques as terrorist groups, it had to persuade a federal judge to rewrite rules governing how police can monitor speech protected by the First Amendment.

The rules stemmed from the the Handschu case mentioned in the NYPD statement — a 1971 lawsuit filed by lead plaintiff Barbara Handschu, over how the NYPD spied on protesters and liberals during the Vietnam War era.

David Cohen, a former CIA executive who became NYPD’s deputy commissioner for intelligence in 2002, said the old rules didn’t apply to fighting against terrorism.

Cohen told the judge that mosques could be used “to shield the work of terrorists from law enforcement scrutiny by taking advantage of restrictions on the investigation of First Amendment activity.”



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NYPD lawyers proposed a new tactic, the TEI, that allowed officers to monitor political or religious speech whenever the “facts or circumstances reasonably indicate” that groups of two or more people were involved in plotting terrorism or other violent crime.

The judge rewrote the Handschu rules in 2003. In the first eight months under the new rules, the NYPD's Intelligence Division opened at least 15 secret terrorism enterprise investigations, documents show. At least 10 targeted mosques.

Doing so allowed police, in effect, to treat anyone who attends prayer services as a potential suspect. Sermons, ordinarily protected by the First Amendment, could be monitored and recorded.

Among the mosques targeted as early as 2003 was the Islamic Society of Bay Ridge.

“I have never felt free in the United States. The documents tell me I am right,” Zein Rimawi, one of the Bay Ridge mosque's leaders, said after reviewing an NYPD document describing his mosque as a terrorist enterprise.

Rimawi, 59, came to the U.S. decades ago from Israel's West Bank.

“Ray Kelly, shame on him,” he said. “I am American.”

Surveillance of Masjid al Farooq

The NYPD believed the tactics were necessary to keep the city safe, a view that sometimes put



it at odds with the FBI.

In August 2003, Cohen asked the FBI to install eavesdropping equipment inside a mosque called Masjid al-Farooq, including its prayer room.

Al-Farooq had a long history of radical ties. Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian sheik

who was convicted of plotting to blow up New York City landmarks, once preached briefly at Al-Farooq. Invited preachers raged against Israel, the United States and the Bush administration's war on terror.

One of Cohen's informants said an imam from another mosque had delivered \$30,000 to an al-Farooq leader, and the NYPD suspected the money was for terrorism.

But Amy Jo Lyons, the FBI assistant special agent in charge for counterterrorism, refused to bug the mosque. She said the federal law wouldn't permit it.

The NYPD made other arrangements. Cohen's informants began to carry recording devices into mosques under investigation. They hid microphones in wristwatches and the electronic key fobs used to unlock car doors.

Even under a TEI, a prosecutor and a judge would have to approve bugging a mosque. But the informant taping was legal because New York law allows any party to record a conversation, even without consent from the others. Like the Islamic Society of Bay Ridge, the NYPD never demonstrated in court that al-Farooq was a terrorist enterprise but that didn't stop the police from spying on the mosques for years.

And under the new Handschu guidelines, no one outside the NYPD could question the secret practice.

Martin Stolar, one of the lawyers in the Handschu case, said it's clear the NYPD used enterprise investigations to justify open-ended surveillance. The NYPD should only tape conversations about building bombs or plotting attacks, he said.

“Every Muslim is a potential terrorist? It is completely unacceptable,” he said. “It really tarnishes all of us and tarnishes our system of values.”

Elshinawy surveillance

Al-Ansar Center, a windowless Sunni mosque, opened in Brooklyn several years ago, attracting young Arabs and South Asians. NYPD officers feared the

mosque was a breeding ground for terrorists, so informants kept tabs on it.

One NYPD report noted that members were fixing up the basement, turning it into a gym.

“They also want to start Jiu-jitsu classes,” it said.



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The NYPD was particularly alarmed about Mohammad Elshinawy, 26, an Islamic teacher at several New York mosques, including Al-Ansar. Elshinawy was a Salafist — a follower of a puritanical Islamic movement — whose father was an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center attacks, according to NYPD documents.

The FBI also investigated whether Elshinawy recruited people to wage violent jihad overseas. But the two agencies investigated him very differently.

The FBI closed the case after many months without any charges. Federal investigators never infiltrated Al-Ansar.

“Nobody had any information the mosque was engaged in terrorism activities,” a former federal law enforcement official recalled, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to discuss the investigation.

The NYPD wasn’t convinced. A 2008 surveillance document described Elshinawy as “a young spiritual leader (who) lectures and

gives speeches at dozens of venues” and noted, “He has orchestrated camping trips and paintball trips.”

The NYPD deemed him a threat in part because “he is so highly regarded by so many young and impressionable individuals.”

No part of Elshinawy’s life was out of bounds. His mosque was the target of a TEI. The NYPD conducted surveillance at his wedding. An informant recorded the wedding and police videotaped everyone who came and went.

“We have nothing on the lucky bride at this time but hopefully will learn about her at the service,” one lieutenant wrote.

Four years later, the NYPD was still watching Elshinawy without charging him. He is now a plaintiff in the ACLU lawsuit against the NYPD.

“These new NYPD spying disclosures confirm the experiences and worst fears of New York’s Muslims,” ACLU lawyer Hina Shamsi said.

“From houses of worship to a wedding, there’s no area of New York Muslim religious or personal life that the NYPD has not invaded through its bias-based surveillance policy.”

Jihad and Terrorism: What is the Difference?

Source: http://zubairqamar.com/2013/08/27/jihad-and-terrorism-what-is-the-difference/?goback=.gcl_1528217_member_5799972505498169344#

Jihad in Classical Sunni Islam – an Overview

Muslims define *jihad* in Arabic as “holy struggle.” An often neglected matter is the plurality of meanings of *jihad* in early Islam, which includes both combative *and* non-combative *jihad*. *Jihad* takes many forms, including controlling one’s anger, studying at school, supporting one’s family financially, and any other efforts in a Muslim’s life that contributes to good. Almost all manifestations of *jihad* are non-combative and far more numerous than the combative form, which consists of defensive and offensive *jihad*.

The Sunni View of Jihad

Scholars from the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali) differ in their views of combative *jihad*. According to author Ahmad al-Dawoody, the majority of religious scholars in the four Sunni schools view *jihad* as a defense against aggression:

“Qur’anic *casus belli* are restricted to aggression against Muslims and *fitrah*, that is, persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief (Qur’an 2:190; 2:193; 4:75; 22:39-40). War and coercion are not means by which religion may be propagated because belief in a religion is only a matter of the conviction of the heart (Qur’an 2:256; 10:99; 16:93; 18:29). Fighting non-Muslims solely

because they do not believe in Islam contradicts the Qur’anic injunction (Qur’an 2:256).”[[1]]

While defensive *jihad* was a personal obligation, offensive *jihad* was a communal obligation proclaimed by the ruler. The latter did not always mean perpetual warfare, but also meant, in certain situations, to be in a prepared state of battle. *Jihad* was a battle between armies and followed specific limits, including the non-targeting of civilians. According to author and scholar, Asma Afsaruddin, the plurality of meanings of *jihad* in Islam’s earlier years gradually narrowed in meaning to the combative form due to geo-political exigencies of the time:



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“By the early Abassid period – roughly the mid-to-late eighth-century CE, second century of Islam – the military aspect of *jihad* began to receive greater emphasis in certain official and juridical circles.”[[2]]

Religious jurists used the Islamic sources and resorted to abrogation, believing that Qur’anic verses calling for combat abrogated the peaceful verses. This view, however, was not shared by all scholars, and, contrary to Islamophobes, does not represent the view of the Muslim majority today.

War as Part of the Norm

Were only Muslims prone to war? Combative *jihad* was adopted through Islam’s history for various reasons, including spreading what Muslims believed was God’s word. War, however, was not unique to Islam and Muslims. The Muslim expansion in early Islam, as well as later wars, is to be understood in the context of the geo-political environment in those times. David Dakake says,

“When Islam spread out of Arabia in the seventh century...warfare and conflict were the normal state of affairs between nations and peoples. The state of nearly constant warfare was simply the ‘way of the world’ and peace was the extraordinary and occasional exception to the rule.”[[3]]

Justification for war found religious justification as *jihad* in Islam, just as “Just War” was formulated to justify war in Christianity.

Non-Muslims Under Muslim Rule

The promotion of combative *jihad* notwithstanding, this did not mean forced conversion. Mustafa Akyol says,

“with the exception of a few cases – such as the fanatic Almohavids in North Africa – forced conversion remained anathema to Islamdom.”[[4]]

Historian Ira Lapidus says,

“..the Arab-Muslims did not, contrary to reputation, attempt to convert people to Islam. Muhammad had set the precedent of permitting Jews and Christians in Arabia to keep their religions, if they paid tribute; the Caliphate extended the same privileges to Middle Eastern Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, whom they considered ‘People of the Book,’ the adherents of earlier written revelations [...]”[[5]]

Author Thomas Arnold says,

“These stupendous conquests which laid the foundations of the Arab empire, were certainly not the outcome of a holy war [...]”[[6]]

Similarly, historian Marshall Hodgson says,

“There was no attempt at converting the peoples of the imperial territories, who practically adhered to some form of confessional religion already.”[[7]]

Christians and Jews, and later followers of other religions, deemed “People of the Book” by Islam, were permitted to practice their religion in their places of worship while paying a tax to receive exemption from joining the army and full protection by the Muslim government in the event of an attack.

“The poll-tax or *jizya*,” Dakake says, “was required to be paid by the People of the Book to the Islamic state” and “unlike feudal taxation in Europe, did not constitute an economic hardship for non-Muslims living under Muslim rule.” He continues, “The tax was seen as the legitimate right of the Islamic state, given that all peoples – Muslim and non-Muslim – benefited from the military protection of the state, the freedom of the roads, and trade, etc.” Muslims also had to contribute. “Although the *jizya* was paid by non-Muslims, Muslims were also taxed through the *zakat*, a required religious tax not levied on other communities.”[[8]]

The Petering Out of Offensive Jihad

Offensive *jihad* or perpetual warfare was also not the preferred choice for rulers after a certain period. Author and scholar Khalid Blankenship says that wars became unsustainable over time, which was partially responsible for the demise of the Umayyad state during the reign of Hisham ibn ‘Abd al-Malik. This led to a “permanent restructuring of Muslim political praxis away from a scheme of permanent warfare against non-Muslims, to one which came, over time, to include protracted truces, formal diplomatic relations, and, in the modern world, membership in the international community of nation-states.”[[9]]

Non-Muslims Helped Muslims in Jihad

Islamophobes and “Muslim” terrorists portray a bipolar Muslim versus non-Muslim affair. However, Ian Almond, author of *Two Faiths One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds*, discusses the “under-reported phenomenon of



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Muslim-Christian military alliances,” including “the thousands of Arabs who fought for medieval Christian emperors outside the walls of Milan and Bologna, the Castilians and Catalans who regularly allied themselves with Muslims to fight their Christian neighbors, the extraordinary level of Turkish co-operation in the last century of the Byzantine empire, the equally extraordinary number of Christian soldiers in the Ottoman armies which occupied the Balkans, and the tens of thousands of Hungarian Protestants, not to mention disaffected Hungarian peasants, who marched with the armies of the Turk on Vienna.”[[10]]

Similarly, Akyol says,

“local Christians..actively helped the Muslim conquests. When Byzantine-ruled Damascus was besieged by the Arab army in 634, the city’s Monophysite bishop secretly informed the Muslim commander, Khalid, that the east gate of the city was weakly defended, and he supplied the Muslim troops with ladders for scaling the walls.”[[11]]

Moreover, “Christian Arabs from tribes such as the Banu Tayyi of Najd, the Banu al-Namir ibn Qasit of the upper Euphrates river valley, and the Banu Lakhm participated in the jihad with the Muslim armies.”[[12]] It is important to note that many wars did not necessarily count as *jihad*, while many wars waged by Muslims were against other Muslims.

Caliphs Were Tolerated More Than Supported

While reasons for offensive *jihad* are debated by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, it has been established earlier that most of the caliphs who undertook combative *jihad* were not necessarily supported by the masses, and more than a few were not in line with Islamic teachings.

The collective actions of caliphs, therefore, should not be understood as the genuine expression of Islam. Moreover, the delicate relationship between the caliphs and religious scholars demonstrates more tension than collaboration. The religious scholars had the unenviable role of keeping the ruler in check and risking life and limb in the process. Religious scholars generally did not agree with the power-hungry goals of certain caliphs, but made decisions based on what they believed to be in the collective interests of the wider Muslim community.

The Pseudo-“jihad” of Today: Contradicting Classical Sunni Tradition

Now that an overview of classical Sunni *jihad* has been provided, this section will compare the understanding and actions of militants today with combative *jihad* as understood and undertaken by classical Sunni Muslims of the past.

Advocacy of Peace Over War Today as the Norm

The geo-political context in the past hundreds of years has evolved. It is not the same as the time of Prophet Muhammad, or the time of the Crusades. Unlike most of the past 1,000-plus years, peace, not war, is generally the normal state of affairs today.

Even if offensive *jihad* occurred in Islam’s history, this does not mean most Muslims wish to promote combat today. Contrary to Islamophobes and “Muslim” terrorists, the Muslim majority is not interested in waging combat on others, but living peacefully like most of the world’s people. “Gallup’s polling of Muslims worldwide determined that the vast majority of respondents (93 percent) belong to the mainstream who believe the 9/11 attacks were not justified.”[[13]]

This is not just the opinion of the Muslim masses, but also of prominent contemporary Sunni scholars. Several such scholars in a Peace Conference in Turkey in 2010 discussed how Ibn Taymiyah’s Fatwa of Mardin was misunderstood and misused by militants to wage violence. Among the conclusions of the New Mardin Declaration was a declaration of peace:

“The classification of abodes in Islamic jurisprudence was a classification based on *ijtihad* (juristic reasoning) that was necessitated by the circumstances of the Muslim world, then and the nature of the international relations prevalent at that time. However, circumstances have changed now. The existence of recognized international treaties, which consider as crimes wars that do not involve repelling aggression or resisting occupation; the emergence of civil states which guarantee, on the whole, religious, ethnic and national rights, have necessitated declaring, instead, the entire world as a place of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between all religions, groups and factions in the context of establishing common good and justice amongst people,



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and wherein they enjoy safety and security with respect to their wealth, habitations and integrity. This is what the Shari'ah has been affirming and acknowledging, and to which it has been inviting humanity, ever since the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) migrated to Madina and concluded the first treaty/peace agreement that guaranteed mutual and harmonious co-existence between the factions and various ethnic/race groups in a framework of justice and common/shared interest. Shortcomings and breaches perpetrated by certain states that happen to scar and mar this process cannot and should not be used as a means for denying its validity and creating conflict between it and the Islamic Shari'ah.”[[14]]

These scholars did not advocate perpetual warfare against non-Muslims, but peace, in the current world of nation-states. Dakake reaffirms:

“Today, in the modern world, the situation is somewhat reversed: we might say that ‘peace’ is generally the norm and warfare, although not exactly extraordinary, is somewhat less of a constant that it was in ancient times. This fact has led the vast majority of Muslim scholars today to declare that continual, offensive *jihad* is no longer applicable to the contemporary situation and that *jihad* today is primarily *difa'i* or defensive, because the world is itself in a different state from what it was in the seventh century.”[[15]]

Conflicts today involving “Muslims” are usually against other Muslims – not non-Muslims. The majority of al-Qa'eda's victims have been Muslim, in spite of their rhetoric of attacking the “infidel.” A 2009 study, *Deadly Vanguard: A Study of al-Qa'ida's Violence Against Muslims*, by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, states:

“The results show that non-Westerners are much more likely to be killed in an al-Qa'ida attack. From 2004 to 2008, only 15% percent of the 3,010 victims were Western. During the most recent period studied the numbers skew even further. From 2006 to 2008, only 2% (12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remaining 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. During this period, a person of non-Western origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al-Qa'ida attack than an individual from the West. The overwhelming majority of al-Qa'ida victims are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are citizens of Iraq, which

suffered more al-Qa'ida attacks than any other country courtesy of the al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) affiliate.”[[16]]

Therefore, most “Muslim” countries today live peacefully with non-Muslim countries, and most casualties by Muslim attacks today – including al-Qa'eda attacks if they are even considered Muslim – are other Muslims.

This is contrary to the views of Islamophobes who allege that classical Sunni Muslims today support violent “jihad” in some form against non-Muslims, which they strangely consider a continuation of centuries of *jihad* of the past. To do so is to mix geo-political contexts, to fail to distinguish the nuances of both, and is analogous to judging Christians today by the geo-political context of Christians in the times of the Crusades.

Jihad versus Terrorism

Even if the political realm of classical Islam is understood as an ideology, does it necessarily mean that militants who wage violence *today* are following the *same* ideology? To assume so is to have an erroneous understanding. The following examples illustrate key differences between *jihad* and terrorism:

Jihad today is not proclaimed by rulers, but by “Muslim” vigilantes

The minority of violent Islamists (“jihadists”) do not follow the rules of combative *jihad* in classical Islam. A ruler is not necessary for them to declare *jihad*, and they are not members of armies. There is no leader of a nation-state in the world today calling for an offensive *jihad* against any government or follower of other religions.

Militants today do not protect places of worship
Militants today do not spare but target places of worship, including churches, Buddha statues, mosques, and even graves and tombs (especially of Muslim saints) that they see as places of “worship” by millions of Muslims worldwide. The Boko Haram and other radicals in Pakistan's tribal areas are examples.

Barring a few aberrations from the norm, this is in contrast to how Muslims preserved and protected the places of worship of non-Muslims throughout Islam's history. In this respect, militants are very unlike early Muslims and follow the historical aberration instead of the norm.



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For example, when an Umayyad ruler, Walid Abd al-Malik, claimed property that belonged to a church in Damascus and turned it into a mosque, Umar bin Abd al-Aziz instructed that the portion of the mosque be destroyed and returned to Christians. [[17]]

Commenting on the following Qur'anic verse, "And had God not repelled one group of people from another, the cloisters, synagogues, churches, and mosques in which God's name is mentioned in abundance would have been ruined" (Qur'an 22:40), Imam Abu Bakr al-Jassas quotes the famous Imam al-Hassan al-Basri:

"God uses the believers as a means of preventing the destruction of the places of worship belonging to the non-Muslim citizens." [[18]]

Regarding non-Muslim places of worship, even Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, the loyal student of Ibn Taymiyah, says,

"God uses the believers to defend their places of worship. . . Moreover, it is obligatory for him [the believer] to defend their objects of worship, even though he detests them." [[19]]

Militants today not only clash with classical Sunni tradition in this respect, but also oppose the words of controversial scholars whom they deceitfully claim to emulate.

Militants today kill innocent civilians

Militants today target armies and civilians, have described all of their violence as "defensive," have invented their own rules – for example, only combatants can speak on rules of combat – and discard or selectively and deceptively use Sunni tradition to achieve their aims. Therefore, expansion of Islam is not comparable to combat by al-Qa'eda and other terrorists groups today. Rather, in the absence of traditional Sunni rules of war, and an all-out war against the "enemy," with most of the dead being Muslim, they are guilty of violating and perverting, and not following, classical Sunni Islam.

Militants demean and target religious scholars and knowledge

Scholar and author, Joas Wagemakers, says, "There seems to be a growing trend among jihadis to view fighters as being the most credible Muslims to comment on jihad, in spite of their lack of scholarly credentials." [[20]]

The lack of respect of religious scholars has already been seen by their utmost

marginalization by even peaceful Islamists, as explained above.

The opposition by militants to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, well-known for his religious knowledge among extremist circles, illustrates the point. Scoffing at religious scholars, a central part of the militant outlook, elevates combat over belief, and ridicules Prophet Muhammad's sayings, including:

"Scholars [of religious knowledge] are the inheritors of the Prophets." [[21]]

He did not say that those who combat are the heirs of the prophets. Prophet Muhammad was also asked,

"What is the best deed?" He responded, 'Belief in Allah and His Messenger [...]' [[22]]

Likewise, Islamists scoff at Sunni tradition by prioritizing politics over religion.

Many militants understand combat experience as a prerequisite to speaking about creed and other religious knowledge – a complete reversal of Sunni Islam that requires correct creed as a first priority and prerequisite to other Islamic practices. Prophet Muhammad also forbade targeting religious figures in a legitimate *jihad*. Abd Allah ibn Abbas said, "When the Messenger of Allah... would dispatch his troops he would say [to them], "Do not act treacherously, do not steal the spoils of war, do not disfigure the dead bodies, and do not kill children and priests." [[23]] This partially explains why Pakistani scholars today find it difficult to speak against terrorism waged by the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa'eda. Their fate would be the same as Barelwi scholar, Sarfraz Na'eemi, and Deobandi scholar, Hassan Jan, who were killed by militants for speaking against terrorism, including suicide bombings.

Militants make combat a pillar of Islam

The first pillar of Islam, the Testification of Faith ("There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah") is replaced with so-called combative *jihad* as the first pillar, or is portrayed by militants as being a pillar of Islam. 'Abd-al-Salam al-Faraj, for example, in "The Neglected Duty" appeared to see combative *jihad* as the sixth pillar of Islam.

However, *jihad* is not a pillar of Sunni Islam and never has been. Asma Afsaruddin says that "the Medinan scholar 'Abdallah ibn 'Umar, son of the second caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, is on record as having challenged those who had wished to elevate combative jihad to



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the level of a religious obligation. An Iraqi man came to Ibn 'Umar and reproached him thus: "What is the matter with you that you perform the hajj and 'umra but have abandoned fighting in the path of God (al-ghazu fi sabil Allah)?" To which Ibn 'Umar responded, "Fie on you! Faith is founded on five pillars: that you worship God, perform the prayer, give zakat, perform the pilgrimage, and fast during Ramadan[...]"[[24]]

Militants kill ambassadors

Whereas militants target embassies, consulates, and foreign dignitaries, Abdallah bin Mas'ud said,

"It is an established Sunna that ambassadors are not to be killed."[[25]]

It is also recorded in classical Sunni sources that when representatives of Musaylima, who claimed prophethood, visited the Prophet Muhammad as diplomats, Prophet Muhammad did not kill them or instruct others to kill them.[[26]] Militants today do the opposite of what Prophet Muhammad did.

As illustrated above, to conflate the *jihad* of classical Sunni Islam with the violent actions of terrorists today, is have an erroneous understanding.

The Varieties of "Jihad" Today

It is interesting to note how the neo-conservatives and other Islamophobes supported an offensive – pre-emptive – war against Iraq under flawed pretexts, which killed more people than all of the offensive *jihads* in Islam's history. Like the militants they condemn, they also bipolarize the world into good and evil. Related to this matter, the issue of the division of the world divided into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Kufr* is important to understand.

The Bipolar View of "Jihadists" and Neo-conservatives

"Muslim" terrorists today do not have a sophisticated understanding of the Sunni categorization of the world and the political and related factors associated with it. Ironically and contrary to Sunni tradition, terrorists dichotomize the world simplistically just as neoconservatives do.

Indeed, the division of the world is not allegedly unique to Islam, or religion, in general. Price says,

"... the division of the world into an in-group and an out-group... is not unique to religion, as it is

also a characteristic of groups involved in ethnic conflict and secular conflicts."[[27]]

"Religion's dichotomizing tendency," he continues, "was certainly present in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, competing economic systems, capitalism, and communism, not faiths, were the ideological forces that stoked a 45-year global conflict that led to the brink of nuclear war with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the division of Europe into competing blocs, and wars by proxy throughout the developing world."[[28]] The analogy of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Kufr* can be applied to both opposing sides in the Cold War.

Similarly, scholar, author, and ex-CIA officer Graham Fuller says,

"Jihad in its more modern usage has been applied to many quite secular tasks, just as the term 'crusade' in English is casually applied to fighting crime or a campaign against drugs"[[29]]

Neo-conservative Islamophobes paradoxically counter Islamist ideology from an ideological perspective of their own that, some would argue, is just as extreme, and which has outlived its perceived usefulness. Their view of themselves as "good" and the Soviet Empire as "evil" (and now all Islamists as "evil") illustrates the division of the world as two opposite extremes, similar to the views of the "jihadis" they claim to oppose.

Summary Overview

As discussed in this section, the Islamophobes and their partners — the "Muslim" terrorists — are oblivious to the differences between classical *jihad* and today's terrorism, which is incorrectly described as "jihad." They fail to note the differences between the geo-political environments in classical Islam's time and contemporary times, omit the details of *jihad* and the differences with today's so-called "jihad" by radicals, and conflate both.

Sunni tradition is not upheld by radicals, but ridiculed, marginalized, and selectively used to deceptively portray loyalty to the tradition. Islamophobes and "Muslim" terrorists are unable to distinguish between the peaceful majority of Muslims and the violent minority that claims to act in Islam's name. Their understanding also reflects a Muslim-versus-non-Muslim conflict, whereas Muslims have battled each other and



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allied with non-Muslims in past and present conflicts.

Denying the Link between Islamist Ideology and Jihadist Terrorism: “Political Correctness” and the Undermining of Counterterrorism

By Jeffrey M. Bale

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/290/html>

“[I]f your enemy is a terrorist and he professes to be an Islamist, it may be wise to take him at his word.”
– Ralph Peters[1]

“Islamism is a reactionary ideology that kills equality, freedom and secularism wherever it is present...Its victory can only lead to a world of injustice and domination: men over women, fundamentalists over others...We refuse to renounce our critical spirit out of fear of being accused of ‘Islamophobia’, a wretched concept that confuses criticism of Islam as a religion [with the] stigmatisation of those who believe in it.”- ‘Together Facing the New Totalitarianism’ Writers’ Manifesto[2]

“Muslims need to become free of totalitarian Islam and the least the West can do in support is not concede an inch of its own hard-won freedom in quest of a false peace with Islamists.” - Salim Mansur [3]

“The jihadists appear to be right: we [in the West] are weak, self-indulgent, unsinewed by political correctness, in thrall to sentimental and utopian notions, ripe for the plucking. Too many years of soft living and even softer thinking.” - David Solway [4]

Abstract Ever since the jihadist terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Western policy-makers, mainstream media organisations, and even academicians have been perversely reluctant to highlight the crucial role played by Islamist ideology in motivating jihadist terrorist attacks. Indeed, the more acts of jihadist terrorism that are perpetrated, acts in which the perpetrators clearly reveal their ideological motivations, the more insistently key Western elites refuse to acknowledge those motivations. This article discusses several of the reasons for this peculiar disjuncture, and focuses in particular on the persistent efforts to whitewash certain features of Islam, demonize its critics, and even engage in apologetics for Islamism at a time when the latter, in both its violent and non-violent forms, poses a significant threat to Western democracies. One especially worrisome source and dimension of this problem is the continuing reliance of Western governments on members of Islamist advocacy organizations for advice. In order to illustrate the degree to which “politically correct” impulses can have both damaging analytical and potentially lethal consequences, three cases of jihadist terrorism are discussed herein – the Boston Marathon bombings, the gruesome assault on a British soldier in Woolwich, and the mass shootings at Fort Hood.

Introduction

Ever since the jihadist terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Western policy-makers, mainstream media organs, and even academicians have been reluctant to highlight the key role played by Islamist ideology in motivating jihadist terrorist attacks. This is all the more peculiar given that, as is typical of ideological extremists, the perpetrators of these attacks themselves openly and indeed proudly emphasize the central role played by their religious beliefs, specifically their strict, puritanical interpretations of Islamic scriptures (i.e., the *Qur’an*) and their supposed emulation of the exemplary words and deeds of Islam’s prophet Muhammad (as recorded in the six canonical *hadith* collections), in motivating their violent actions. One might imagine that the gap between the oft-professed motivations of the Islamist perpetrators and the assessment of their motivations by Western analysts would be closing with the passage of time, all the more so given that jihadists have since carried out thousands of acts of terrorism in various regions of the world. Yet in fact the exact opposite has occurred: the more acts of jihadist terrorism that are carried out, in which the perpetrators clearly reveal their ideological motivations, the more insistently key Western elites refuse to



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give credence to those motivations. It should be remembered, for example, that the official 9/11 *Report* prepared by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States did not avoid referring to the sponsors' and perpetrators' religious motivations, and indeed often used accurate descriptive terms like "radical Islam," "Islamic fundamentalism," "jihadists," "Islamists," and "Islamism" (even if the section on the apparent involvement of certain Saudi officials in the plot was almost completely redacted and details about the egregious failures of certain government agencies were suppressed).[5] Since then, however, various Western government officials and media outlets have instead repeatedly sought to banish the use of terms like "jihadist" and "Islamic terrorism" from public discourse, thereby effectively acting to conceal the core ideological motivations of our Islamist adversaries in an era characterized by explicitly ideological contestation and ideologically-motivated asymmetric warfare.[6]

The 2013 Jihadist Terrorist Attacks in Boston and Woolwich as Examples

These ongoing problems were illustrated yet again in the wake of the 2013 jihadist terrorist attacks in Boston (15 April) and Woolwich (22 May). Beginning with Boston, the refusal of many commentators to acknowledge the role of Islamist ideology in motivating the bombings reached new heights. As usual, most expressed unwarranted perplexity about the motives of the perpetrators, even as evidence increasingly mounted that their mother Zubeidat, Tamerlan, and eventually Dzhokar Tsarnaev had all adopted radical interpretations of Islam – i.e., Islamism – which had inspired the two sons to carry out the attacks.[7] Yet reporters and government officials kept publicly wondering, wringing their hands, and agonizing about "how" and "why" the Tsarnaev brothers, who appeared to be "normal" kids, were not mired in poverty, had seemingly become Westernized and integrated into American society, and, in the case of Dzhokar, had been an excellent student with many friends, could have been induced to carry out such a heinous act. The question itself reveals a shocking level of ignorance about the normal motives of insurgent terrorists, since it assumes that they must be either display clinical psychopathologies (i.e., be "crazy") or be poor, disadvantaged, and/or disenfranchised in order to perpetrate acts of terrorism, even though research has shown for more than a decade that most members of terrorist groups are no more prone to having such psychopathologies than non-terrorists and that there is no direct correlation, much less any primary causal link, between poverty and immiseration and a propensity for terrorism.[8] On the contrary, most insurgent terrorists (especially, but not exclusively, those in key leadership, ideological, and operational positions), like extremists in general and other self-styled revolutionaries, tend to be from relatively privileged strata of their own societies, tend to have above average intelligence, and tend to have benefitted from higher levels of education than most of their countrymen.

Even after it emerged that Tamerlan had become increasingly religious (along with his mother), had forced his converted American wife to wear a headscarf, had posted jihadist materials online, had argued with less radical (but by no means moderate) *imams* at a local mosque, and may have interacted with North Caucasus *mujahidin* during a recent visit to Dagestan, pundits and officials continued to profess ignorance about the bombers' motives. Note, for example, the comments of Secretary of State John Kerry: "I think the world has had enough of people *who have no belief system*...but who just want to kill people because they don't like what they see." [9] Since when, one might ask, is Islamism not a belief system? And even after the wounded and captured Dzhokar admitted to interrogators that the bombers had been motivated by their religious worldviews, three apparently uncomprehending journalists nonetheless wrote the following lines: "Based on preliminary written interviews with Dzhokar in his hospital bed, U.S. officials believe the brothers were motivated by their religious views. *It has not been clear, however, what those views were.*" [10] Perhaps the authors of this article suspected that the attacks had been inspired by Mormonism or Buddhism rather than by radical interpretations of Islam. Even President Barack Obama initially characterized the bombings, bizarrely, as a "tragedy," as if they had been the result of some sort of natural disaster rather than being the product of human ideological fanaticism.[11]

The legions of academic "Islam apologists" and "Islamist apologists" also immediately weighed in after the Boston bombings, as usual in a desperate effort to absolve Islam in general or Islamism in particular from bearing any moral, intellectual, or political responsibility for motivating the attacks.[12] Apart from their standard claims that Islam does not sanction and is therefore incompatible with terrorism, claims that are frankly absurd given that so many



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Islamists (and other Muslims) regularly cite well-known Qur'anic passages[13], Muhammad's own reported actions, and the military conquests of the "rightly-guided" Caliphs and their successors to justify ongoing acts of aggression, violence, and terrorism against "infidels," these self-styled experts also insisted that the Tsarnaevs were not really devout Muslims motivated by their interpretations of the Islamic religion. According to University of Michigan professor Juan Cole, for example, the Tsarnaevs were "secular ex-Soviets" rather than "observant Muslims," and were simply "on an adolescent homicidal (sic) power trip, dressed up like al-Qaeda, the way the Aurora [Colorado] shooter was wearing an arsenal and dressed up like Batman." [14] Actual evidence for this bizarre claim was, as one might expect, never forthcoming. Likewise, for University of North Carolina professor Omid Safi, the "few pieces [of information] we have do not exactly add up to a life of pious observance of Islam. Their high school friends talk about the two brothers getting together, drinking, and smoking pot... We have seen this before, in the case of the 9/11 hijackers who visited strip clubs and got loaded up on alcohol before committing their atrocities – again, not the action of Muslim role models." [15] These types of arguments are not only misleading but factually incorrect, in the same way as claiming that a neo-Nazi could not be "real" Nazi extremist if he turned out to be a homosexual, given that homosexuality is officially viewed as "degenerate" in Nazi ideology – is it really necessary to refer here, say, to gay SA leader Ernst Röhm or gay German neo-Nazi Michael Kühnen? – or that a devout Christian pastor could not really be a fanatical "true believer" if he was at some point discovered hiring prostitutes or snorting cocaine, since these are considered "sins" by both Catholics and Protestants. The reality is that ideological extremists, being characteristically flawed human beings, can rarely live up to the ostensibly "higher" moral standards that they try to impose on everyone else, that new "born again" converts to religions have often lived hedonistic or even criminal lifestyles before their conversions, that even the most devout jihadists operating in the West are often explicitly instructed by their trainers to behave just like "decadent" Westerners so as not to draw undue attention to themselves (as, e.g., is the case for members of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra [Excommunication and Migration] and Qa'idat al-Jihad [The Base, or Foundation, of the Jihad]), and that most Muslims believe that the worldly sins of believers who die as "martyrs" fighting on behalf of Islam will be instantly forgiven by Allah, who will then automatically grant them entry to the highest level (*firdaws*) of Paradise (*janna*). Hence the periodically "un-Islamic" moral behavior displayed by would-be or actual jihadist terrorists hardly signifies that they are not motivated to carry out their violent actions as a result of embracing extremist interpretations of Islam.[16]

Yet another example of the ongoing attempts by various left-of-center commentators to minimize, obscure, or deny the Islamist ideological motivations of the Tsarnaevs was the BBC's *Panorama* investigative report entitled "The Brothers Who Bombed Boston," wherein it was suggested that Tamerlan was merely a "Muslim of convenience" and instead emphasized that he had likewise possessed some American "right-wing extremist literature", specifically publications espousing white supremacy (one of which argued that "Hitler had a point"), anti-government conspiracy theories concerning the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 attacks, and warnings about the "rape of our gun rights"; also found were materials about U.S. drones killing civilians, the alleged plight of Muslims imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, and literature about what motivated mass killers and "how the perpetrators murdered and maimed calmly." [17] Alas, this information has already been exploited by certain political websites so as to imply that Tamerlan might not have really been an Islamist radical after all.[18]

However, there is no reason to suppose that these new discoveries have any bearing on the nature of Tamerlan's ideological beliefs. First of all, Islamists are themselves right-wing religious extremists, so it is hardly surprising that they would embrace certain ideas and tropes peddled by other types of anti-Western, anti-"New World Order," anti-democratic, and anti-Semitic extremists, including "infidel" right-wingers from the West. After all, ideological cross-fertilization between different extremist milieus is quite common, especially in the context of conspiratorial beliefs.[19] Second, Islamists have long avidly absorbed and disseminated Nazi and pro-Nazi anti-Semitic literature, which is in fact openly sold in Islamist bookstores and book stalls throughout the Muslim world (including those in certain mosques and Muslim enclaves in the West), which – together with the extensive and well-documented historical pattern of collaboration between influential Islamists and the Nazi regime – explains why they are so often enamored with Hitler and his anti-Jewish (and anti-gay) exterminatory policies.[20] Third, many Muslims are prone to embrace conspiracy theories of various types, in particular those that attribute sinister secret machinations to Jews, the U.S. government,



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various European powers, Russia, and India. Therefore, it is understandable why so many uncritically accept nonsensical 9/11, London, Madrid, Bali, and Mumbai conspiratorial scenarios regarding attacks that were actually perpetrated by jihadists, as well as no less bogus claims that other high profile acts of terrorism (such as the one carried out by Timothy McVeigh) were likewise “false flag” operations covertly conducted by the U.S. government or the Israeli secret services.[21] This is another of the many psychological defense mechanisms that all too many Muslims conveniently adopt in order to absolve themselves and/or Islam from shouldering any moral responsibility for jihadist terrorist crimes and atrocities, and that Islamists systematically promote in efforts to further demonize their principal “infidel” enemies. That is precisely why both Western right-wing extremists (e.g., Michael Collins Piper, Lyndon LaRouche, David Duke, Bradley R. Smith, and Gerald Fredrick Töben) and left-wing Western conspiracy theorists (e.g., Thierry Meyssan of the Réseau Voltaire [Voltaire Network] and former professor and Muslim convert Kevin Barrett) are typically welcomed with open arms at “Holocaust denial” or “9/11 Truth” fora organized by Islamists, whether private associations (e.g., the now defunct Arab League “think tank” formerly based in Abu Dhabi, the Zayid Center for Coordination and Follow-Up) or governments (such as that of Iran).[22] Finally, it is no mystery why Islamists like Tamerlan should possess partisan materials denouncing drone attacks and conditions at Gitmo, or literature on mass murders in cases where they are motivated to commit such acts themselves. Thus the exploitation of these “revelations” by the BBC and others only serves to illustrate the moral bankruptcy and distorted political priorities of many self-styled “progressives,” whose primary concern is never about the actual victims of acts of terrorism, protecting national security, or the ongoing threat posed by jihadist terrorists, but is rather to shift the blame away from the actual Islamist perpetrators of violence and/or their professed ideological motives and onto preferred villains like the domestic far right, “imperialist” Western governments, Israel, or “white males.”[23]

Turning now to the sadistic murder of an unarmed, off-duty British soldier named Lee Rigby by two jihadists in Woolwich, British Prime Minister David Cameron was quick to insist, without providing any actual evidence for these claims, that it constituted a “betrayal of Islam and of the Muslim communities who give so much to this country,” and that “[t]here is nothing in Islam that justifies this truly dreadful act.”[24] Similarly, fellow Conservative Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, hastened to state that “it is completely wrong to blame this killing on the religion of Islam...,”[25] although, like the PM, he studiously ignored the obvious fact that particular interpretations of Islam clearly inspired the attack. Similarly, British comedian Russell Brand opined that the killer was “a nut who happens to be Muslim”; hence “[b]laming Muslims for this is like blaming Hitler’s moustache for the Holocaust.”[26] Brand did not, however, explain why blaming Islamist ideology for inspiring the Woolwich attack would be any less accurate than blaming Nazi ideology for inspiring the Holocaust. Predictably, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an umbrella group reportedly dominated by pro-Mawdudist Islamists, also immediately claimed that this was “a barbaric attack that had *nothing to do with Islam*,”[27] and as per usual the MCB and several other UK Islamist organizations – like their American counterparts – immediately began focusing their energies, not on challenging or criticizing radical interpretations of Islam (which they themselves espouse in one form or another), but rather on sounding the alarm about a possible “wave” of “Islamophobic” retaliatory violence, as they invariably do in the wake of jihadist terrorist attacks.[28] Yet oddly enough, like tens of thousands of other Islamists throughout the world, the Woolwich perpetrators apparently never realized that waging “individual *jihad* terrorism” (to use the phrase coined anew by Syrian jihadist strategic thinker Abu Mus’ab al-Suri) was actually “un-Islamic,” since one of those two Nigerian Islamists yelled “Allahu akbar,” paraphrased a passage in the *Qur’an*, and declared that “[w]e swear by the almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone.”[29]

Indeed, one very inconvenient fact that Muslim and Western “Islam apologists” and “Islamist apologists” are never able to explain satisfactorily – if Islam really is the inherently tolerant, “progressive,” and peaceful religion that they insistently claim it is (which the historical record generally belies) – how and why all of the Islamists, as well as millions of other Muslims, invariably “mis”-interpret their core religious doctrines and scriptures in a similarly intolerant, bellicose, regressive, and imperialistic fashion. And why, for that matter, do so few ostensibly “moderate” Muslims openly, persistently, and genuinely denounce the Islamist interpretation of Islam, even in Western countries, where they have the freedom to do so?



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Possible Reasons for Denying the Key Role of Islamist Ideology in Acts of Jihadist Terrorism

There are three possible explanations for the failure of so much of the Western intelligentsia to acknowledge the Islamist motivations of the perpetrators of acts of jihadist terrorism like those in Boston and Woolwich. The first is the belief that political ideologies and religious doctrines *do not* influence the behavior of terrorists at all, which would mean that other factors – psychological, narrowly political, economic, etc. – must invariably be responsible for that behavior. Such a view, which some “social scientists” actually seem to accept, is not only preposterous on its face but is completely contradicted by the historical record. The second is the supposition that political ideologies and religious doctrines *sometimes* influence the behavior of insurgent terrorists, but that unlike in other contexts this is *not* true in cases of Islamist terrorism. Those who assert that particular interpretations of Islam do not actually serve to motivate jihadist terrorists, in spite of the fact that the latter invariably proclaim that they are acting *fi sabil Allah* or “in the cause of Allah” (as, for example, Moroccan Islamist Muhammad Buyari repeatedly did after he brutally murdered Dutch film director Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004), have yet to provide any credible evidence to the contrary. The third is the conviction that, even though it is obvious that Islamist ideology *does* influence the behaviour of jihadist terrorists, it is simply better *not* to admit this publicly. Naturally, those who hold the latter view should be forced to explain how this ongoing denial of reality could possibly be helpful in terms of responding to the terrorist threat from this quarter.

Whatever the explanation in specific instances, the fact is that if either of the two aforementioned acts of jihadist terrorism had been high-profile attacks carried out by, say, domestic right-wing extremists, Western media and law enforcement officials would have not only immediately recognized, but also displayed no reluctance whatsoever to identify, the key motivational role played by the noxious ideological beliefs of the perpetrators.[30] Indeed, for months or even years afterwards they would be insistently hyping the real or imagined dangers posed by the homegrown radical right, as the examples of Timothy McVeigh, David Copeland, and Anders Behring Breivik all serve to illustrate.[31] In marked contrast, those same media and officials usually downplay or even conceal the much greater subversive and security threats presented by the Islamic radical right (i.e., Islamists), whether its cadres are operating at home or overseas. The very same pattern is unfortunately displayed by a myriad of private “watchdog” organizations whose stated purpose is to monitor the activities of the radical right, which typically exaggerate the threat posed by the domestic far right whilst systematically ignoring the more serious threat posed by Islamist networks, including terrorist cells, that are active in their own and other Western nations.[32] Thus, it is mainly in cases where radical interpretations of Islam are undeniably the inspiration for brutal acts of terrorism that Western media, academic, advocacy, and key policy-making elites continue to display a stubborn and perverse reluctance to acknowledge this publicly. Such a blatant display of hypocritical double standards is surely not coincidental.

This phenomenon of willfully ignoring or dismissing the importance of the ideologies motivating our primary enemies is arguably unprecedented in modern history. Apart from assorted naïve or dissimulating intellectual apologists for left-wing and right-wing totalitarianism, Western democratic elites did not hesitate to highlight the central role played by Marxist-Leninist, Fascist, and Nazi ideologies in motivating the systematic acts of state repression, persecution, and violence carried out by the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, or Nazi Germany, nor in fueling the brutality and violence carried out by those same extremist ideological movements before they had managed to seize state power. Indeed, recognizing, understanding, and countering the doctrinal tenets and appeal of those ideologies was a key factor that enabled the West to defend itself effectively and ultimately prevail in its struggles against these three would-be totalitarian movements and regimes. As Sun Tzu and innumerable other strategic thinkers throughout the centuries have rightly emphasized, it is virtually impossible to counter and defeat an adversary if one does not understand his underlying beliefs and motives, however bizarre or delusional those beliefs and motives may in fact be, since they greatly affect his strategic and even operational decisions. Why, then, do Western policy-makers and opinion-shapers still stubbornly persist in denying reality with respect to the baleful role played by Islamist ideology in influencing the observable behavior of Islamist organizations, including the jihadist groups and networks that constitute an ongoing terrorist threat?

There are several apparent reasons for this continued Western unwillingness to face reality. First, Westerners grow up and live in, and thus are unavoidably socialized within, relatively materialistic human societies, in multiple senses of that term. Therefore, they are naturally



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prone to ascribe similarly materialistic motivations to all of their adversaries from other cultures, including political or religious extremists from the Muslim world, instead of taking their ideological and religious beliefs seriously.[33] That is why Western analysts so often wrongly assume that ideological extremists are really motivated by narrowly material interests or a naked thirst for power rather than by their stated beliefs, which some falsely claim are nothing more than convenient rationalisations. It is also why they continue to argue, despite all of the evidence to the contrary, that really-existing problems like poverty or the lack of democracy are the actual underlying causes of Muslim radicalisation and violence. On the basis of this egregiously myopic and wrong-headed perspective, for which there is virtually no evidentiary support and a great deal of evidentiary disconfirmation (especially in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring,” which has thus far mainly degenerated into an “Islamist Winter,” just as more knowledgeable people had predicted from the outset),[34] it follows that the provision of more foreign aid and the introduction of democratic procedures like elections is the solution to that radicalisation and violence. Here, as in so many other cases, one can observe the phenomenon of “mirror imaging,” in which the analysts in question simply project their own characteristic motivations and modes of thinking uncritically and therefore naïvely onto others instead of carefully examining and trying to empathize – albeit not sympathize – with the actual beliefs, cultural values, and motivations of their adversaries.

Second, more than a decade after 9/11, there still remain shocking levels of ignorance in the West about the nature of Islam as a religion, about the basic outlines of Islamic history, about tribal social structures in the Muslim world, and about the doctrinal characteristics of Islamism, an extreme right-wing, intrinsically anti-democratic, and indeed totalitarian 20th-century political ideology deriving from an exceptionally strict and puritanical interpretation of core Islamic religious and legal doctrines.[35] Islamism is only one of many possible interpretations of such doctrines, of course, but it is by far the most intolerant, aggressive, belligerent, and imperialistic of all of those interpretations. Moreover, at the present time it appears to be growing exponentially in popularity at the expense of more moderate interpretations of Islam (as the electoral successes of Islamist parties in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, and regions of Pakistan have repeatedly demonstrated). Hence most Westerners, including influential policy-makers, journalists, and academicians, simply do not possess the requisite levels of expertise to comprehend the extremist ideological beliefs and thoroughly regressive cultural values of our Islamist adversaries, much less to distinguish between genuinely moderate Muslims and extremists employing deception and disinformation.

Worse still, following the reprehensible example set by various activist academicians (above all Palestinian literary critic Edward Said), a majority of the Western professoriate in the field of modern Middle East Studies – in contradistinction to the far more serious scholars of medieval Islam – appear to have avidly embraced overtly biased, hopelessly one-sided, and blatantly ideological (if not propagandistic) interpretations of Islam and Islamism, interpretations which have resulted not only in blaming the “imperialist” West for most if not all of the Muslim world’s problems and in the systematic whitewashing of Islam itself (for example, as a “religion of peace” or at least a religion that is no more prone to intolerance or violence than any other religion), but also in the patently absurd characterization of Islamist movements that have eschewed violence for purely tactical reasons as “moderate” and “democratic.”[36] These same *engagés* experts have also repeatedly argued that a tiny, fringe minority of violent jihadists has “perverted” or “hijacked” Islam in pursuit of agendas that are supposedly “un-Islamic,” when in fact the jihadists are Islamists whose interpretations of Islam are far more often orthodox than “heretical” in relation to the “classical” medieval Islamic jurisprudential tradition, above all in regard to conceptions of international relations between Muslims and “infidels.”[37] Last but not least, many of these academicians have systematically sought, together with dissimulating Islamist activists and clueless or dishonest members of self-styled anti-fascist groups, to demonize all those who have adopted a more critical perspective about Islam or Islamism as bigoted, hate-filled “Islamophobes,” no matter how justifiable and well-documented their criticisms of Islam and Islamism may be.[38] From this blinkered perspective, everyone who has concerns about various undeniably regressive aspects of Islam and/or is sounding the alarm about the threat posed by Islamism, no matter how legitimately, must ipso facto be afflicted with some sort of clinical psychopathology, i.e., an irrational “phobia” about Islam.[39] Alas, it is precisely these “Islam apologists” and “Islamist apologists” in academia who have been providing classroom instruction to future journalists and government officials in recent decades. It is therefore hardly surprising that the latter would so often internalize and then subsequently regurgitate the exact same misinterpretations.



Political Correctness

However, the main reason for the West's ongoing unwillingness to identify Islamist ideology as the primary source of the jihadist terrorist danger, other security threats, and a plethora of growing socio-cultural problems involving Muslims, has to do with the present era's ever-more pervasive climate of myopic, self-destructive "political correctness." This is a well-known term that has come to refer not only to the uncritical if not slavish following of political "party lines," but also to insistent displays of rigid moral self-righteousness and puritanism, humorlessness, and intolerance (if not outright hatred) directed against, as well as an undemocratic impulse to demonize and suppress, the opinions of anyone who does not share one's own biases and agendas. Such blatantly illiberal behavior is typically justified – as intolerance, fanaticism, and repressive attitudes and behavior almost invariably are – as being in the interests of the "greater good." Many different forms of "political correctness" exist, including those associated with ideologues on the political and religious right. But herein we are concerned with the now hegemonic self-styled "progressive" forms operating within academia, the media, and government, which emanate primarily from morally puritanical "liberals" (which once was a contradiction in terms), sectarian leftists, radical "feminists" (of the deluded sort who argue that the wearing of a *niqab* or a *burqa* by Muslim women should be viewed as a sign of "freedom of choice" rather than recognized as either an indication of coercive male Muslim misogyny or a sartorial expression of regressive Islamist beliefs), multiculturalist ideologues, and assorted anti-Western or anti-white minority group activists (including Islamists).

These self-appointed "guardians of public morality" have organised a multitude of advocacy groups which, much like the official and unofficial medieval "witch hunters" who systematically but falsely accused individuals of being "heretics" and "witches" in order to justify persecuting them, constantly smear all those who disagree with their social and political views, often equally falsely, as "sexists," "racists," "homophobes," "xenophobes," "bigots," "haters," and "Islamophobes." The goal of the former is to demonize the latter, delegitimise their opinions, and even provide a legal basis for prosecuting them under bogus "hate speech" or libel laws, thereby effectively endeavoring to criminalise dissenting opinions that they regard as beyond the pale. If these all too common impulses to generate "moral panics" and legal persecution were not bad enough, insofar as they represent a clear and present danger to freedom of speech and expression in Western democracies, "political correctness" is also typically characterized by blatant hypocrisy and double standards in that it systematically apologises for, or even seeks to justify, the very same or even worse behaviour, whenever it is manifested by supposed "victims," that it excoriates when it is manifested by alleged "oppressors."^[40]

In the context of Islam, Islamism, and jihadist terrorism, "politically correct" circles in academia, the media, and government have been insistently peddling the unsupportable view that neither Islam in general nor any conceivably "legitimate" interpretation of Islam can be blamed for acts of terrorism committed by Muslims, even though the perpetrators themselves haughtily declare otherwise.^[41] However, not everyone who is taking this position is doing so for the same reasons. On the contrary, the motives of the various "Islam apologists" and "Islamist apologists" are often fundamentally incompatible. Here are some illustrative examples:

- well-meaning but naïve political or religious liberals are doing so in the name of promoting greater tolerance and preventing discrimination against innocent Muslims (which are, in principle, worthy goals);
- multiculturalists are doing so in the name of promoting ethno-cultural "diversity" and justifying continuing high levels of Third World immigration or asylum;^[42]
- sectarian leftists, minority activists, and some radical neo-fascists in Europe are doing so in order to shift the blame from the actual terrorist perpetrators and onto Western "imperialism" or "Zionism" for supposedly "provoking" Muslim violence;
- self-styled "anti-fascist" groups are doing so in order to more easily justify denouncing their designated enemies from the supposedly "Islamophobic" domestic right;
- Islamists are doing so in order to mislead gullible "infidels" about their ongoing pursuit of anti-democratic, anti-Western, and Islamic supremacist agendas;
- other Muslims are doing so in order to shield certain features of Islam from any criticism or blame, no matter how well-deserved; and



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- Western governments are doing so in an ultimately futile effort to win Muslim “hearts and minds,” both at home (in large part for domestic electoral purposes) and abroad, by convincing conspiracy mongering Muslims that they are not waging a “war against Islam.”

Meanwhile, conspiracy theorists from most of these milieus – and many others as well – are busily insisting that Islamists, despite overwhelming evidence of their responsibility, are not even the real sponsors or perpetrators of acts of jihadist terrorism.[43] As a result, all of these milieus are increasingly prone, for their own respective and sometimes disingenuous reasons, to try and “protect” Islam and Muslims from criticism by abusively labeling all critics of Islam and Islamism as “Islamophobes.”[44] In practice, then, these diverse circles of Western “Islam apologists” and “Islamist apologists” are unwittingly functioning as “useful idiots” – or, as per the reformulation of Richard Landes, as no less idiotic “useful infidels”[45] – for radical right, totalitarian Islamists, who are mercilessly exploiting their abysmal ignorance, misplaced good will, or political myopia for their own sordid and sinister purposes.

The Impact of “Political Correctness” on Western Counterterrorism Policies and Actions

Alas, the concrete effects of all of this naïveté, self-delusion, and outright dissimulation are very dangerous indeed, especially in the context of counterterrorism. The West has now reached the point where the very elites entrusted with defending it are increasingly unwilling even to acknowledge the nature of the threat posed by Islamism, despite the fact that Islamists all over the world are openly and indeed continually denouncing the West as a mortal enemy that must be defeated, subjugated, and ultimately converted to their strict, puritanical version of Islam. The only debate among the Islamists is how this commonly shared objective can best be achieved, i.e., whether by means of armed *jihad*, the approach favored by terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida, or by means of gradual processes of infiltration, implantation, and subversion in which the Islamists establish ideological hegemony over Muslim migrant communities, are appointed as representatives of those communities (usually with the unwitting aid of Western governments), and carve out *shari’a*-compliant areas within the bosom of Western societies. The latter approach (which is already well underway, especially in certain areas of Europe[46]) has been favored by the Jam’iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of Muslim Brothers, better known as the Muslim Brotherhood), Saudi Wahhabis, and South Asian Mawdudists.[47] Indeed, instead of publicly identifying the Islamists as the implacable enemies of the democratic, pluralistic West, as in fact they are, key Western elites have increasingly adopted an “Islamist apologist” stance, deluded themselves that the “non-violent” Islamists can be our “allies” against terrorism, and therefore unwisely endeavored to collaborate or “partner” with them in Egypt and elsewhere.[48] (This policy is every bit as foolish and counterproductive as if we had opted to “partner” with the Nazis during the Weimar Republic or with Japanese ultranationalists in the 1930s rather than at least tacitly supporting their opponents, be they authoritarian, democratic, or quasi-democratic.) Indeed, such ill-conceived notions now constitute the basis of many U.S. and E.U. policies towards the Muslim world, especially in the wake of the “Arab Spring.”

The grim reality is that Western collaboration with Islamists is nothing new, given that the U.S., Britain, and several other Western or democratic countries (including Israel) covertly supported Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood against rival Arab nationalists and leftists throughout the Cold War era. The reason is that these religious reactionaries were simplistically and short-sightedly perceived through only one prism: as a useful bulwark against communism and Soviet influence within the Muslim world.[49] Even worse, some Western regimes periodically supported armed jihadist groups, as the U.S. did with the Afghan *mujahidin*, the British reportedly did with jihadist terrorist groups opposed to Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, and the Israelis initially did with the Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya (HAMAS: Islamic Resistance Movement), actions that in every case led to serious “blowback” that grievously harmed the West and its allies and mainly benefited the Islamists.[50] Yet unlike the Islamists, who have continued to cleverly exploit “infidel” gullibility so as to obtain various types of tangible aid, the West has seemingly not learned any lessons at all from its repeated foreign policy failures vis-à-vis the Muslim world.

However, “political correctness” has now apparently replaced *Realpolitik* as the driver of Western pro-Islamist domestic and foreign policies. In past decades, it was often geopolitical hardliners within the intelligence community who had advocated supporting the Islamists against secular anti-colonialist movements. Those hardliners naïvely believed that they could easily manipulate the Islamists into functioning as their de facto agents against common Cold War enemies, after which they could abandon or dispose of them as they wished. In reality, they themselves were



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often conned and played for fools by the Islamists. But unlike today's delusional policy-makers, these hubristic Cold War *Realpolitiker* rarely mistook the Islamists for genuine "moderates" or closet "democrats." Hence the post-Cold War adoption of inaccurate and egregiously sanitised "politically correct" attitudes about Islam and Islamism, which has all too often reflected a misguided bipartisan consensus in the United States, has resulted in even greater Western foreign policy blunders and has now reached the point where it is arguably undermining, if not compromising or sabotaging, the future security of the West.[51] Both neo-conservatives and liberal internationalists have fundamentally misconstrued the nature of Islam and Islamism, with the result that both have uncritically promoted simple procedural "democratisation," if necessary by force, as the solution to the multifaceted problems in the Muslim world, many of which are in fact mainly the product of the continuing debilitating influence of regressive social, cultural, and religious values.

Moreover, both the Bush and Obama administrations, and those of both Labour and the Conservatives in Britain, have foolishly allowed Islamist operatives and front groups, often portraying themselves – like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) – as Muslim "civil liberties" organizations, to exert a baleful influence on the development of Western security and military policies.[52] Illustrative contemporary examples in the U.S. include Islamists like Rashad Hussain (Obama's Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC] and a Deputy Associate White House Counsel working on "Muslim outreach" and national security), Dalia Mogahed [correct transliteration: Mujahid] (Obama's Muslim Affairs Advisor to the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and a member of the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Violent Extremism Working Group), and numerous other activists who are reportedly associated with Muslim Brotherhood front groups.[53] Islamist influence has especially manifested itself in three interrelated spheres, where it has predictably created both conceptual and policy problems.

The first problem, and by far the most serious manifestation of Islamist influence, is that Islamist activists have increasingly been allowed to vet the instructional materials related to Islam and Islamism that are being used to train Western intelligence and military personnel. This has progressed to the point where they have actually succeeded in having certain contract instructors fired who they claimed, at times falsely, were "anti-Islamic." [54] In reality, any criticisms at all of Islam or Islamism immediately make someone, in the eyes of such activists, "Islamophobic" or "anti-Islamic," even if those criticisms are partially, largely, or entirely warranted. Be that as it may, it is surely an unprecedented situation that our declared Islamist enemies, despite usually operating under the cover of barely-disguised front groups, are nowadays being allowed – with the witless and pernicious help of the "useful infidels" who uncritically accept their disingenuous talking points – to decide what official training materials can and cannot be used to describe and analyze fellow Islamists. Imagine, if you will, that the U.S. government had allowed members of the German-American Bund, a Nazi front organization, to vet its training materials related to Nazism or Nazi Germany prior to World War II, or if it had allowed members of Soviet-backed front organizations to vet its training materials related to communism or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That is essentially what is occurring at the present time with respect to non-state Islamism and jihadist terrorism, as certain documents released by the FBI in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by Judicial Watch clearly indicate.[55] Why would any responsible government allow its own enemies to exert any influence whatsoever over the selection of its training materials for security personnel, as the Islamists have been trying to do with considerable success ever since 9/11?[56] All the more so since the Islamists and the "Islamist apologists" they have hoodwinked are explicitly endeavouring to delegitimize any analytical approach or statement that raises Western awareness of what the former are up to by labeling them, a priori, as "conspiracy theories." [57] Only a government that is hopelessly blinkered by "political correctness" would adopt such a self-destructive and potentially suicidal course of action.

Indeed, the other two problems to be highlighted are in large part the predictable result of actively soliciting advice from Islamist activists about how to frame security issues involving Muslims. The second is the adoption and continued employment of euphemistic, misleading terminology to describe jihadist terrorism. As is well-known, after 9/11 the Bush administration adopted the pithy phrase "war against terrorism" to describe America's conflict with jihadist terrorists. Yet the "war against terrorism" formulation was problematic inasmuch as one cannot wage a war against an operational technique, just as one cannot wage a war (other than metaphorically) against an inanimate object like "drugs" or a social phenomenon like "poverty." As some have



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sardonically pointed out, the “war against terrorism” phrase would be equivalent to characterizing the war against Nazi Germany as a “war against *blitzkrieg* [operational techniques],” which would obviously have been risible. Nor is the post-9/11 conflict one between Western democracies and all of the world’s terrorists, i.e., non-state groups and states that frequently resort to the use of terrorist techniques. On the contrary, the conflict that has been going on since 9/11, and that in fact predated those attacks by more than two decades, is between “infidel” governments (including supposedly “apostate” Muslim governments) and Islamists, first and foremost those who rely primarily on armed *jihad* to achieve their goals. Yet Bush and his advisors, in an attempt to convince Muslims that they were not waging a war against Islam, generally promoted the notion that Islam itself was a “religion of peace” and, as a consequence, also refused to identify Islamism as the enemy in their public statements, in the way that U.S. presidents and officials had previously identified Communism and Fascism as the primary enemies of democracy.[58]

Under Obama the terminology for the Islamist enemy has again been changed, this time to “violent extremism,” which is certainly preferable to the ill-defined “terrorism.” Yet once again, the U.S. is not currently fighting against all forms of violent extremism in the world, but primarily against a certain type of violent Muslim radicalism (i.e., jihadism). Officials in the Obama administration have repeatedly acknowledged that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates are their enemy, thereby stating the obvious, but they have also increasingly endeavoured to eliminate references to “radical Islam” or “Islamism” in official national security and strategic documents and, as will become clearer below, have stubbornly refused to publicly label their enemies as “Islamists,” “jihadists,” or “Islamic terrorists.” This was ostensibly done to facilitate “outreach” to Muslim communities and to avoid giving “offense” to Muslims in general. However, there is no good reason to believe that non-Islamist and anti-Islamist Muslims would find such accurate descriptive terminology “offensive” in any way (since they themselves often use it), any more than non-Nazi and anti-Nazi Germans would have been “offended” by the Allies identifying National Socialists as their enemies. Nor is there any reason to suppose that criticising Islamists would in any way inhibit “outreach” efforts to genuinely moderate, pro-democratic Muslims who are themselves opposed to Islamism – on the contrary, it would likely embolden such Muslims to speak out publicly and contribute to the forging of a common ideological, social, and political bulwark against mutual enemies. In any case, referring to Islamists and jihadists euphemistically and misleadingly, and not acknowledging the motivational centrality of their interpretations of Islam, does not change their nature or behaviour one iota.

The third problem, which is directly linked to and indeed reinforced by the two aforementioned problems, is the persistent and otherwise inexplicable refusal of key Western officials to link terrorism carried out by religiously-inspired Muslims in any way to Islam, or even to Islamism, both in their public statements and in their intelligence assessments. John Brennan, then Senior Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, attempted to explain and justify this approach in a 6 August 2009 speech at the DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). On that occasion, he exclaimed that President Obama did not consider this struggle to be a “fight against jihadists” because “[d]escribing terrorists in this way, using the legitimate term ‘jihad,’ which means to purify oneself or to wage a holy struggle for a moral goal, risks giving these murderers the religious legitimacy they desperately seek but in no way deserve” as well as “reinforcing the idea that the United States is somehow at war with Islam itself.”[59]

Built into those remarks of Brennan, who currently serves as Director of the CIA, are two unwarranted assumptions. The first is that Muslims will be looking to “infidels” to determine what the term *jihad* signifies and whether al-Qa’ida and other Islamist terrorist organizations can be justly characterized as jihadists, which is an absurd proposition given that no terminology adopted by U.S. officials, negative or positive, is going to significantly affect Muslim perceptions of al-Qa’ida and other Islamist organizations. After all, even Muslims who are opposed to al-Qa’ida’s totalitarian goals and/or its brutal methods have not generally claimed that the group’s fighters are not really *mujahidin*, even if they view them as being misguided or dangerous. Furthermore, even the anti-Islamist and anti-jihadist themes and rhetoric disseminated by more or less autocratic Muslim governments (e.g., denigrating jihadists as *khawarij* or Kharijites, in reference to members of a puritanical Muslim sect who broke away from and later assassinated ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth “rightly-guided” Caliph), which were often formulated by regime-friendly Muslim clerics and therefore tended to be more relevant and have more resonance than anything Westerners might devise, have not appreciably



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affected general Muslim attitudes toward Islamism. (On the contrary, only the systematic targeting of innocent Muslim civilians – but not, alas, their no less innocent non-Muslim counterparts – and the rigid imposition of brutal *hudud* punishments has served to discredit the jihadists in the eyes of many Muslims.) The second assumption is that it is what U.S. officials say in public fora, rather than what tangible policies the U.S. actually ends up adopting, that will somehow matter most to Muslims, which is no less illogical. Indeed, given that the U.S. has never been waging a “war against Islam,” either prior to or in the wake of 9/11, any Muslims who believe that it has, as the Islamists clearly do, are in effect living in a conspiratorial fantasy world that has no correspondence with reality. Hence proclaiming this self-evident fact publicly is not likely to alter their distorted perceptions.

Nevertheless, Brennan’s speech set the tone for innumerable other pronouncements made thereafter by Obama administration officials. Indeed, even under oath, in the course of being subjected to direct questioning before congressional committees, several such officials have stubbornly continued to deny that which is patently obvious to everyone who has not willfully placed their heads in their sand. Rather than citing selected quotes from the transcripts, it is much more revealing to provide the URLs to their testimony so that readers can directly observe the extent to which these government officials have sought to evade the questions or engaged in bizarre verbal contortions in order to avoid acknowledging the obvious: that radical interpretations of Islam have motivated, and are continuing to motivate, acts of jihadist terrorism. Here, for example, is Attorney General Eric Holder, who, among other absurdities, claimed that Yemeni-American *imam* and al-Qa’ida operative Anwar al-Awlaqi espoused a doctrine that was “not consistent with the teachings of Islam”:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQQt_mP6Pgg

And here is Paul Stockton, Assistant Defense Secretary for Homeland Security, refusing to admit, and in fact stubbornly denying, that the U.S. is at war with “violent Islamist extremism” (not to mention insisting that he is not being “politically correct”):

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WU6n1mrpAGY>

One might therefore assume that it would be impossible even to satirize such behaviour, but somehow the notoriously biased Fox News channel managed to do so here:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpM8qk3t52A>

Sadly, this particular satirical skit is right on target.

The deleterious practical effects of willfully failing to recognise, or obstinately refusing to correctly identify, the Islamist motives of the jihadist perpetrators on the West’s counterterrorist efforts can easily be documented. For one thing, the motives of past plotters and perpetrators of jihadist terrorism, including “martyrdom operations,” have all too often been systematically mischaracterized.[60] In contrast to all other types of violent ideological extremists, when it comes to the acts of violence planned or carried out by Islamists, especially but not exclusively “lone wolf” actions, the tendency of journalists, academicians, and law enforcement spokesmen has almost invariably been to minimize or deny the crucially important and often publicly articulated religio-ideological motivations of the perpetrators and instead to claim, falsely, that the individuals in question were motivated solely by various idiosyncratic personal grievances deriving from their psychological alienation, social isolation, socio-political disgruntlement, and/or mental illness.

Perhaps the most egregious and illustrative example of this peculiar tendency can be observed in the official response in relation to the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Muslim U.S. Army major who on 5 November 2009 carried out a jihadist terrorist attack against fellow soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas, killing 13 and wounding 32. It soon became evident that Hasan had embraced al-Qa’ida’s “jihadist Salafist” ideology, had periodically espoused its tenets in both classroom oral presentations and private conversations with other soldiers, had established email contact in order to solicit advice from Anwar al-Awlaqi, had prepared a card identifying himself as a “Soldier of Islam,” had given away his possessions and engaged in Muslim purification rituals on the eve of the attack, and had shouted “Allahu akbar” while firing his weapon at nearby soldiers.[61] One might therefore assume that every honest and informed observer would conclude that his attack had been ideologically motivated, and indeed that it was clearly an act of “individual *jihad* terrorism” of the sort advocated by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and al-Qa’ida’s *Inspire* English-language magazine, which al-Awlaqi had played a very important role in creating and editing prior to his death in a 30 September 2011 drone strike.

However, high-ranking political and military officials at once hastened to present a radically different interpretation which essentially attributed Hasan’s murders to psychological problems



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and personal grievances, an absurdly distorted conclusion that was later slavishly echoed in the Department of Defense's "after action" report on the Fort Hood shootings. The main purpose of this distortion, as usual, was to minimise the crucial motivational role played by Hasan's Islamist interpretations of Islam. So it was that the President himself and other government spokespeople immediately endeavored to absolve Islam of any responsibility for the attacks. For example, in his eulogy for the shooting victims, Obama opined that although it "may be hard to understand the twisted logic that led to this tragedy...we do know [that] no faith justifies these murderous and craven acts..."[62] The President thereby conveniently ignored the many Medinan-era Qur'anic passages, the ones that are widely viewed as having "abrogated" the more tolerant Meccan-period *suras*, that urge Muslims to fight, slay, and subjugate "infidels." One might at least suspect that a reluctance to face facts would be much less likely to afflict the U.S. military than other components of the American government, but unfortunately "political correctness" has also increasingly been embraced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the 1990s. Indeed, in his own remarks, Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr. sounded more like a multiculturalist ideologue or a "diversity" bureaucrat than a commander worried primarily about protecting his troops from future jihadist attacks by radicalised Muslim soldiers: "I'm concerned that this increased speculation [about Hasan's Islamist motivations] could cause a backlash against some of our Muslim soldiers...As great a tragedy as this was, it would be a shame *if our diversity became a casualty as well.*"[63] Other military officers and "expert" witnesses in court also expressed doubts that Hasan was an extremist who had carried out a terrorist attack, albeit without presenting any reliable supporting evidence or enumerating any credible reasons.

Because of this systematic unwillingness to confront unpleasant but thoroughly documented realities, it should come as no surprise that the only oblique reference to Islam or Islamic extremism in the official Department of Defense report on the Fort Hood attack occurred within an extraordinarily narrow context: "Finding 2.7: DoD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization."[64] This seemingly willful blindness will likely continue to make the U.S. military ill-prepared to cope with, or respond effectively to, future jihadist terrorist threats emanating from within its own ranks or the ranks of its ostensible Muslim "allies" in Afghanistan. Muslim-American soldiers have already planned or carried out several attacks on their fellow soldiers, and there have also been increasing numbers of attacks by members of the Western-trained Afghan security forces on coalition troops in Afghanistan (so-called "green on blue" attacks). Unless Western governments are willing to publicly identify and confront the underlying motivations behind these attacks, there are bound to be more successful attacks of this nature in the future.[65]

Indeed, a seemingly growing inability or unwillingness even to recognise the ideological motivations of the perpetrators makes it all the more difficult for Western security services to interdict future jihadist attacks of any sort. Evidence of this ongoing problem of blindness to the dangers of radical Islamic beliefs can easily be deduced from the case of the Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Even before March 2011, when the Russian Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB: Federal Security Service) had alerted its American counterparts about the possibility that Tamerlan had adopted radical interpretations of Islam, he had already come to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In congressional testimony in June 2013, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III revealed that Tamerlan's "name had come up in two other cases" whose nature he did not explain, but acknowledged that those two cases, which were apparently not related to terrorism, had then been closed until the Russian warning "refocused" the Bureau's attention on him.[66] Yet he nevertheless insisted that the FBI agent(s) who conducted the subsequent investigation of Tamerlan had been thorough, and that there was nothing else that could have been done legally, which is doubtful given that Mueller also admitted before Congress that prior to the bombings the Bureau had visited Tamerlan's mosque, the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB), not in the context of investigating Tamerlan, but only in order to conduct "outreach" to Muslims.[67] And here is how the FBI officially characterized its investigation after receiving the information that Tamerlan "was a follower of radical Islam and a strong believer...[who] had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared to leave the United States...to join unspecified underground groups" in the Caucasus[68]:

"In response to this 2011 request, the FBI checked U.S. government databases and other information to look for such things as derogatory telephone communications, possible use of online sites associated with the promotion of radical [Islamist] activity, associations with other



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persons of interest, travel history and plans, and education history. The FBI also interviewed Tamerlan Tsarnaev and family members. The FBI did not find any terrorism activity, domestic or foreign, and those results were provided to the foreign government in the summer of 2011. The FBI requested but did not receive more specific or additional information from the foreign government.”

Even if one assumes that the FBI agent(s) in question followed these procedures diligently, which is entirely possible, it is nonetheless easy to postulate that anyone familiar with the nature of Islamism, the central role it plays in motivating acts of jihadist terrorism, and the various indicators of Islamist ideological radicalisation could have found ample evidence of such radicalisation in the case of Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Was it not already clear, as later became obvious, that his mother had also become radicalised, that he was espousing Islamist doctrinal tenets to certain family members, friends, and at the mosque, that he was no longer drinking and smoking for religious reasons, and that he had compelled his wife to wear a headscarf? Or did all of those telltale activities begin only after the FBI questioned and investigated him?

The answer to the latter question is unequivocally “no.” According to many diverse but convergent indications, it is now abundantly clear that Tamerlan had become increasingly radicalised from 2008 on, i.e., three years *before* the 2011 FBI investigation.[69] Indeed, growing forensic evidence suggests that Tamerlan may have been involved (along with Dzhokar and Ibragim Todashev, another Chechen who was later shot and killed while being questioned by FBI agents) in the brutal knife murders and near beheadings of three men (at least two of whom were Jewish) in Waltham, Massachusetts, on 11 September 2011, exactly ten years to the day after the 9/11 attacks.[70] Given that one of the murdered men had been a close acquaintance of Tamerlan, that there was no evidence of forced entry, and that marijuana and money were strewn all over the bodies, the police concluded that the victims had known their killers and that robbery was not the motive for the slaughter. Hence it increasingly looks as though this triple murder of hated “infidels” might have been carried out by the future Boston bombers in order to memorialize the 9/11 attacks, and that it might also have served as a kind of practice run to test the courage and religious faith of the perpetrators. Later, in early 2012, Tamerlan spent six months in Dagestan, where he definitely met twice with members of one radical Salafist group (the Soyuz Spravedlivykh [Union of the Just], with which his third cousin Magomed Kartashov was associated).[71] Moreover, given that he began posting many comments supportive of and videos produced by the Imarat Kavkaz (IK: Caucasus Emirate) on his You Tube and Facebook pages as soon as he returned to the U.S., he may likewise have made contact or interacted with IK-linked jihadist organizations during his visit to the Caucasus.[72] Such contacts may have further induced him, whether indirectly or directly, to carry out the 15 April 2013 bombing attacks with his younger brother.[73] Not only had the earlier FBI investigation missed all of these rather obvious indications of growing Islamist radicalisation, the Bureau inexplicably failed to keep track of the subjects of that investigation even after one of them became increasingly linked to known jihadists and had traveled overseas to a terrorist hot zone.[74] One can therefore conclude that the failure to give proper weight to and/or recognise the bombers’ Islamist ideological motivations, both before and after the bombings, contributed mightily to the failure of the American security services to prevent this particular attack, as well as to learn any valuable lessons from it that might help them interdict future jihadist acts of terrorism. If so, there is no doubt that “political correctness” in the counterterrorism sphere has deadly consequences. And, sadly, that the delusions it encourages will likely “kill” again.

Conclusion

This brings us to the real nub of the problem: the longer that key Western elites persist in mistakenly denying the central role played by Islamist interpretations of Islam in motivating jihadist terrorist attacks, the less likely they will be able to prevent future attacks from this quarter. Until Western intelligence, military, and law enforcement personnel are provided with accurate information about the history and core religious doctrines of Islam and the intrinsically extremist nature of Islamism, and until they are taught how to distinguish between Muslim moderates and Islamist extremists (including those who are posing as moderates) and learn how to recognise the many telltale signs of Islamist ideological radicalisation, they will generally be unable to identify prospective jihadist terrorists in advance.[75] Nor will they be able to respond effectively to the stealthy “civilization jihad” being waged by certain Islamist organizations that have abandoned violence for tactical reasons, albeit only to pursue their intrinsically anti-democratic agendas via seemingly legal



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means. It should also go without saying that relying on Islamist activists for “advice” about how to deal with the threat posed by Islamism is not only preposterous but utterly self-defeating.

Among the justifications for promoting these “politically correct” inanities about Islam and Islamism is a professed desire to “reach out” to rather than antagonise the Muslim world, as well as to avoid inadvertently encouraging Westerners to adopt a hostile, discriminatory, or persecutory attitude toward Muslims. While the latter goal of discouraging retaliation against innocent Muslims, especially in the wake of successful mass casualty terrorist attacks like 9/11, is perfectly justifiable, the fundamental question is whether ignoring or downplaying the role of Islamist ideology in motivating jihadist terrorists, or avoiding any and all legitimate criticism of Islam itself, will end up having these salutary effects. Quite possibly, they will have the exact opposite effects, since they are so at variance with observable realities. And even if they did have those desired effects, could this one social benefit possibly compensate for the innumerable other intellectual, political, social, cultural, and security problems that have already materialised, and that will no doubt become even more acute, as a consequence of systematically concealing troubling facts about Islam, certain Muslim communities in the West, and Islamism?

Perhaps the best short definition of reality is “that which exists irrespective of what one believes.” Hence persisting in promoting or even foolishly believing in falsehoods about Islam and Islamism cannot possibly be the solution to any real world problems, above all the threat of jihadist terrorism. On the contrary, it is only by honestly confronting the most regressive and otherwise problematic aspects of Islamic religious teachings and the destructive patterns of tribal solidarity (*‘asabiyya*) that exist throughout the Muslim world, as well as by highlighting the insidious anti-modernist and anti-democratic agenda of Islamism, that the West can morally encourage and empower secularists, liberal Muslim reformers, and other anti-Islamist Muslims who are resisting the most puritanical, intolerant, bellicose, and reactionary elements in their own societies. Surely this should be the primary goal of Western democracies in the current ideological and political struggle, just as in the past it had generally induced them to support, with successful outcomes, a vast and diverse array of anti-fascist and anti-communist forces during the other great ideological conflicts that characterized the 20th century. After all, it is a matter of vital importance, both for the non-Muslim world and for the Muslim world itself, that anti-Islamist forces ultimately triumph over the Islamists in their intellectual and moral struggle for the “soul” of Islam.[76] Hence the West should not be adopting policies of any kind, either domestic or foreign, that have the effect of tangibly aiding or morally legitimising the Islamists. Sadly, almost every policy option that the U.S. has embarked upon since 9/11, whether it be the misguided confrontational policies of the neo-conservatives during the Bush administration or the overly conciliatory but no less delusional policies of the Obama administration, has thus far only served to empower the West’s Islamist enemies at the expense of its friends in the Muslim world.[77]

Indeed, in the twelve years since the “global war on terrorism” was officially declared, the West seems to have learned no fundamental lessons about the essential nature and oft-professed aims of our Islamist enemies, jihadist or otherwise. There is absolutely no excuse for this ongoing, persistent, and seemingly willful blindness, given that certain analysts and officials have been sounding the alarm for many years. For example, on 1 December 2005 U.S. Marine Corps General Peter Pace, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a speech at the National Defense University in which he commented on the Bush administration’s recently-released *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* report.[78] In his remarks, Pace correctly emphasized the “need to understand the nature of the jihadist enemy.”[79] And despite the naïve and overly optimistic tone of the report itself, Pace made the following perfectly accurate comments:

“I say you need to get out and read what our [jihadist] enemies have said. Remember Hitler. Remember he wrote *Mein Kampf*. He said in writing exactly what his plan was, and we collectively ignored that to our great detriment. Now, our enemies have said publicly on film, on the Internet, [that] their goal is to destroy our way of life. No equivocation on their part. They’re not saying if you stay home, we will not come after you. They are saying their goal is to rid the Middle East of all foreigners. Then, overthrow all governments that are not friendly to them, which means every single one of those governments. Then, to use that base as a way to spread their terrorism and their oppression across the globe to include a map that shows 100 years from now that the entire globe will be under their domination.”[80]



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These statements, which can easily be documented on the basis of Islamist – not just jihadist – primary sources[81], should have been taken fully to heart by the American military and policy-making establishments, as well as by the Western political “commentariat.” Unfortunately, Pace’s admonitions were largely ignored rather than followed, with the result that the West’s understanding of the enemy’s motives and goals in 2013 seems actually to have deteriorated further, having become corrupted by even more Orwellian rhetoric and “magical thinking” thanks to the pernicious ongoing efforts of Islamist activists and their academic “apologists” to sanitise or conceal basic historical, political, and doctrinal facts about Islam and Islamism. Unless that situation changes dramatically, which means that a multitude of blatantly false but *au courant* “politically correct” notions will have to be jettisoned, the United States and its democratic allies will never be able to develop effective policies or strategies to cope with their extremist Muslim enemies, whether they are armed jihadists or subversive “stealth” Islamists who have concluded that resorting to violence is not the best way, at least at the moment, to pursue their Islamic supremacist objectives.

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NOTE: References and contact information are available at source URL

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Literature on Diasporas and Terrorism

Selected and compiled by Eric Price

Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 1999

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/302/html>

Eric Price is a professional Information Specialist working for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before he joined, upon retirement, the Editorial Board of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.

Terrorist attacks and deaths hit record high, report shows

By **Daniel Burke** (CNN Belief Blog co-editor)

Source: http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2013/10/28/terrorist-attacks-and-deaths-hit-record-high-report-shows/?goback=.gde_4709642_member_5800903862395088897#!

As terrorism increasingly becomes a tactic of warfare, the number of attacks and fatalities soared to a record high in 2012, according to a new report obtained exclusively by CNN.

More than 8,500 terrorist attacks killed nearly 15,500 people last year as violence tore

through Africa, Asia and the Middle East, according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

That’s a 69% rise in attacks and an 89% jump in fatalities from 2011, said



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START, one of the world's leading terrorism-trackers.


Six of the seven most deadly groups are affiliated with al Qaeda, according to START, and most of the violence was committed in Muslim-majority countries.

The previous record for attacks was set in 2011 with more than 5,000 incidents; for fatalities the

redundancies. Its 25-member staff then studies, categorizes and counts each attack.

START's definition of terrorism closely mirrors that of the State Department and other experts.

To be counted as an act of terror, an incident has to be an intentional act or threat by a "non-state actor" that meets two of these three criteria:



previous high was 2007 with more than 12,800 deaths.

Headquartered at the University of Maryland, START maintains the Global Terrorism Database, the most comprehensive source of unclassified information about terrorist attacks, with statistics dating to 1970.

START, one of 12 Centers for Excellence funded by the Department of Homeland Security, plans to release its full database in December but shared its early findings after a request by CNN.

This year is expected to outpace even 2012's record high. There were 5,100 attacks in the first six months of 2013, said Gary LaFree, START's director, and the wave of violence shows few signs of ebbing.

In recent weeks, Al-Shabaab, a militant group based in Somalia, attacked a mall in Nairobi, Kenya, leaving 67 dead; suicide bombers killed 81 at a church in Pakistan; and the Taliban took credit for killing two police officers with a car bomb in Afghanistan.

To find and tally attacks like those, START's computers comb through 1.2 million articles from 50,000 media outlets each month with an algorithm to help identify and eliminate

- It was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
- It was intended to coerce, intimidate or convey a message to a larger group.
- It violated international humanitarian law by targeting non-combatants.

Part of the observed increase in 2012 may be due to the fact that START has improved its data collection methods and is better than ever at finding and categorizing terrorism, LaFree said. But he said the dramatic rise is not just a matter of having better data.

"We are convinced that a big chunk of this is real change in the world," LaFree said. "We've seen a fairly steep upward trajectory in the total of terrorist attacks and fatalities worldwide."

Outside of small dips in 2004 and 2009, the number of attacks has steadily increased in the past decade, according to START. The upward trend increases the likelihood that 2012's numbers are not an aberration, LaFree said.

Counterterrorism experts not affiliated with START also said attacks appear to be occurring with increasing frequency.

"There's just a lot of killing going on along sectarian and religious lines," said Daniel Benjamin, coordinator for counterterrorism at the State



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Department from 2009 to 2012. “And that’s a worrisome thing.”


The reasons behind the rise are complex, experts say:

- Weak and unstable states and corrupt or ineffective governments.
- Poverty and high unemployment, particularly among young men.
- Access to more lethal weaponry and increasing use of tactics like suicide bombings

Brigade would try to keep casualties low by issuing warnings, LaFree said.

“If you’re a terrorist group now and you want to get your message out,” he said, “the more people you kill, the more ‘successful’ you’ll be.”

Sectarian attacks - such as the pitched battles between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan - tend to be disproportionately deadly, said Martha Crenshaw, an expert at Stanford University and



capable of killing scores of bystanders.

- A spike in sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, where ancient grudges give rise to modern massacres.
- The increasing use of terrorism as a tactic in war.

“The distinction between the front line and home front has largely been erased as terrorism has become a growing feature of contemporary warfare,” said Brian Michael Jenkins, a senior adviser at the RAND Corp. and the founder of its counterterrorism program.

But Jenkins also cautioned that “terrorism” is notoriously difficult to define, and the increase in attacks does not necessarily mean the United States is “losing the war on terror.” He said it could just reflect a shift in strategy among Syrian rebels and Afghani radicals, for example.

Still, experts say the apparent increase in civilian casualties is alarming.

Gone are the days when terrorist groups like the Irish Republican Army or Italy’s Red

a START board member.

“Sadly, it seems to be increasingly acceptable in certain belief systems to kill as many members of the other religious community as possible,” she said. “Moral restraints seem to be eroding.”

Bombings and explosions were used in 58% of terrorist attacks in 2012, but it wasn’t always this way. In fact, START’s data also show a dramatic global shift in terrorist tactics and hot spots.

In the 1970s, most attacks were committed with guns and occurred in Western Europe. In the 1980s, Latin America saw the most terrorist acts. Beginning with the 1990s, South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East has seen steadily rising number of attacks, a trend that has accelerated in recent years.

Although terrorism touched 85 countries last year, just three - Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan - suffered more than half of 2012’s attacks (55%) and fatalities (62%).



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In January, Sunni suicide bombers attacked scores of Shiite pilgrims in Iraq, killing at least 73. In February, a car bomb outside a café in Mogadishu, Somalia, left 15 dead. In March, a bombing in Thailand killed 14 and injured 340 in a commercial district.

Just eight private U.S. citizens died in attacks outside the United States in 2012, all in Afghanistan, according to the State Department. In the United States, seven people died in 11 terrorist attacks last year, six of them in a shooting at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.

Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and capture of other key al Qaeda leaders, the group has exported its brand of terrorism to other militant Muslims, according to START and other counterterrorism experts.

"We've had success in stopping al Qaeda central," LaFree said. "But we have been unsuccessful in stopping the message."

Afghanistan's Taliban was by far the deadliest group in 2012, when it launched 525 attacks that killed 1,842 people.

The second deadliest group was Nigeria's Boko Haram, a jihadist group that orchestrated 364 attacks last year that killed 1,132 people.

The next most deadly were al Qaeda in Iraq, the Communist Party of India-Maoist, Somalia's Al-Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan's branch of the Taliban.

Rhonda Shore, a spokesperson for the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism, said she hadn't seen START's latest numbers and couldn't comment on the report. But she offered a staunch defense of the Obama administration's approach to al Qaeda.

"We have made great progress in our efforts to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the larger al Qaeda organization in recent years," she said.

"However," she said, al Qaeda and its affiliates "continue to present a serious threat to the United States and its interests, and we must remain vigilant as we consider the range of tools and actions available to disrupt this threat."

In April, START compiled a separate report for the State Department that counts fewer attacks (6,771) and fatalities (11,098) in 2012 than its own report because the U.S. government uses slightly different criteria to define terrorism.

Those lower numbers still represent an all-time yearly high in the number of attacks, according to START's database.

Despite top terrorist groups' affiliation - sometimes tenuous - with al Qaeda, some do not fit the mold created by its former head, bin Laden, and current leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, said Benjamin, the former State Department counterterrorism coordinator.

Bin Laden was motivated by an apocalyptic vision, Benjamin said, and wanted to spark a global war between Christians and Muslims.

The power struggles in many Muslim countries, on the other hand, are driven as much by political as religious concerns, according to Benjamin and other terrorism experts.

"Al-Shabaab, for example, is a fractious and disorganized group," he said, "and the overwhelming majority of its foot soldiers don't care about al Qaeda. They are just fighting to stay alive."

And while most terrorism in 2012 was committed in Muslim-majority countries, LaFree and other experts cautioned against viewing Islam itself as inherently violent.

"Not so long ago, terrorism was centered in Western Europe and Latin America," LaFree said. "It moves. And, unfortunately, it has moved into the Muslim world right now."

Like Benjamin, Rizwan Jaka, a Muslim leader based in Northern Virginia, said that political - not religious - motivations lay behind many acts of terrorism.

"It isn't like they woke up and said 'I'm a Muslim; I'm going to go kill someone in a shopping mall,'" Jaka said. "In their twisted mind, this is political retaliation."

Still, American Muslims are working to reduce Sunni-Shiite tensions, said Jaka, a board member of the Islamic Society of North America.

The Fiqh Council of North America, an influential group that issues rulings based on Sharia, or Islamic law, released a fatwa endorsed by dozens of Muslims in 2005 categorically condemning terrorism.

More recently, the Islamic Society of North America has met with African and Middle Eastern leaders to urge them to protect the rights of religious minorities and discourage terrorism.

In September, Sunni and Shiite leaders meeting in Washington announced an agreement to set aside differences and address the "dire situation of unrest, destruction, genocide and refugees" in many predominantly Muslim countries.



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“All Muslims are one nation, even if the schools of thought are diverse,” the scholars’ declaration said. “Such diversity is a source of

intellectual enrichment and should not be the cause of accusations of disbelief, murder, and the desecration of sanctities.”

China suspects Tiananmen crash a suicide attack- sources

Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-china-tiananmen-idUSBRE99S02R20131029>



Chinese authorities investigating what could be Beijing's first major suicide attack were searching for two men from Muslim-dominated Xinjiang on Tuesday after three people suspected to be from the restive region drove a SUV into a crowd at Tiananmen Square and set it on fire.

They killed themselves and two tourists on Monday in the square, the heart of China's power structure and the focal point of the mass 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations brutally crushed the military.

Police have spread a dragnet across the capital, checking hotels and vehicles, seeking two people suspected to be ethnic Uighurs, a Muslim minority from Xinjiang in China's far west, on the borders of ex-Soviet Central Asia. Two senior sources said on Tuesday (Oct 29) the crash, that also injured 38 bystanders at perhaps the most closely guarded location in China, was suspected of being a suicide attack carried out by people from Xinjiang. It was initially believed to be an accident.

The sources did not specifically say the occupants were Uighurs, many of whom chafe

at Chinese controls on their culture and religion.

"It looks like a pre-meditated suicide attack," said a source with direct knowledge of the matter, speaking on condition of anonymity to avoid repercussions for talking to the foreign media.

There have been suicide bombings before in China, and in Beijing, mostly by people with personal grievances, but none have targeted the very heart of China's government like this appears to have.

China has blamed Uighur separatists and religious extremists for a series of attacks in Xinjiang, saying they want to establish an independent state called East Turkestan. Rights groups and exiles say China massively over-states the threat.

In 2009, nearly 200 people were killed in clashes between Uighurs and ethnic Chinese in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang.

But the unrest has never before spilled over into the nation's capital, despite speculation in 1997 that Uighurs were to blame for a Beijing bus bomb in which at least two people died.



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Uighurs are also not known to have previously carried out any suicide attacks.

The government has given no official word whether it was an accident or an attack, and state media has mostly kept to reporting brief

"It was no accident. The jeep knocked down barricades and rammed into pedestrians. The three men had no plans to flee from the scene," said a source who has ties to the leadership.

A Reuters reporter at the scene at the time said

he did not hear any gunshots.

On Monday night, hours after the fire, Beijing police issued a notice asking local hotels about suspicious guests who had checked in since Oct 1 and named two suspects it said were from Xinjiang. Four hotels told Reuters they had received the notice.

Judging by their names, the suspects appeared to be ethnic Uighurs.



statements from the police and official Xinhua news agency giving a bare bones account of what happened, as is common for such sensitive events.

Police are still investigating and have yet to determine the identities of the three people in the sport utility vehicle but suspect they are from Xinjiang, according to the

sources. The other dead were a Chinese man and a Filipina woman, both tourists.

"IT WAS NO ACCIDENT"

However, Beijing police said late on Monday they were looking for two suspects from Xinjiang in connection with a "major incident", though it was unclear if these were the people who were in the vehicle or accomplices still at large.

The sources said that the occupants were suspected of lighting a flammable substance in the vehicle.



"To prevent the suspected persons and vehicles from committing further crimes ... please notify law enforcement of any discovery of clues regarding these suspects and the vehicles," said the notice, which was widely circulated on Chinese microblogs.

Beijing police, contacted by telephone, declined to comment. On Monday, the police said on their official microblog only that they were investigating the accident, and did not say if they thought it was an attack.



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Calls to the Xinjiang government went unanswered.

Barry Sautman, a political scientist at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology who has studied Xinjiang, said if it was confirmed that it was a suicide attack by Uighurs, it would be a first.

"Certainly there have been a lot of bombings carried out by Uighur groups, but none of them as far as I know have involved suicide," he said.

Ilham Tohti, a China-based ethnic Uighur economist and longtime critic of Chinese policy in Xinjiang, said Uighurs had been driven to take extreme measures by China's repression. "The use of violent means happens because all other outlets for expression are gone. Uighurs do not have any representation, they have no means of self-expression," he told Reuters.

IN FRONT OF MAO'S PORTRAIT

Police said on Monday the sport utility vehicle veered off the road at the north of the square, crossed the barriers and caught fire almost directly in front of the main entrance of the Forbidden City, in front of a huge portrait of the founder of Communist China, Mao Zedong.

Pictures seen by Reuters showed that the vehicle appeared to have driven several hundred meters (feet) along the pedestrian pavement in front of the Forbidden City entrance before bursting into flames, knocking down people as it went.

One eyewitness, who asked not to be identified due to the incident's sensitive nature, said she saw the vehicle knock down three or four

people, and that it had a white banner with black lettering on it streaming from the back.

"People started to panic, and all ran to hide in the toilet," she said. "Three or four minutes later I came out and could see black smoke, and the police had begun to clear people out."

While censors moved quickly to remove pictures of the incident from the popular Twitter-like service Sina Weibo, as often happens in stability-obsessed China, many images and accounts are still viewable a day after the event.

Beijing police stepped up checks on cars around the city in response to the incident, one police officer at a checkpoint on the border between Beijing and Hebei province told Reuters.

A state newspaper reported in July that the government suspected Syrian opposition forces were training extremists from Xinjiang to carry out attacks in China.

"They have been known to carry out attacks outside of Xinjiang," said Yang Shu, a terrorism expert at China's Lanzhou University.

"There have also been reports that East Turkestan elements have received training in Syria, so I would say the possibility does exist of a Xinjiang connection," he added.

China denies mistreating any of its minority groups, saying they are guaranteed wide-ranging religious and cultural freedoms.

Many rights groups say China has long overplayed the threat posed to justify its tough controls in energy-rich Xinjiang, which lies strategically on the borders of Central Asia, India and Pakistan.

Did Terrorists Test Airplane Security?

Source: http://i-hls.com/2013/10/did-terrorists-test-airplane-security/?utm_source=activetrail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=English%20Newsletter%2030/10/2013



A memo written by the U.S. Airways Pilot Association described a possible "dry-run" for a future terrorist attack that occurred on Flight 1880 on Sep. 2.

According to the memo, titled "9/11 Security Update", there was a "group of Middle-Eastern males" on the flight from Washington, D.C. to Orlando, Fla. The memo continued: Shortly after takeoff, one got up and ran from his seat in coach towards the flight

deck door. He made a hard left and entered the forward lav (Bathroom), where he stayed for a considerable length of time! While he was in there, the others got up and proceeded to move about the cabin, changing seats, opening overhead bins, and generally making a scene. They appeared to be trying to occupy and distract the flight attendants.

According to Examiner.com the memo said, "Islamic terrorists have a thing about significant dates, and it just so happens that the 12th



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anniversary of 9/11 is in a few days. Do you remember that day? You can bet The Enemy does. Remember Benghazi? That's when the US was attacked again on the 11th anniversary of 9/11. (And no, it was not about an anti-Muslim video.)"

The memo warned pilots, "As always, but especially now, keep the safety of your passengers and crew a top priority. Don't cut corners. Captains, brief your crew on security procedures."

It told pilots to have their flight attendants watch for suspicious passengers and to use

the beverage cart as a barrier when the cockpit is open. "ALWAYS, ALWAYS use the cart as a barrier when the flight deck door is opened in flight because, ladies and gentlemen, if a bad guy gets into the cockpit (it only takes 2 seconds!) and another 9/11 happens — its GAME, SET and MATCH in favor of the bad guys!"

Air Line Pilots Association, International's Aviation Security Committee Chairman Wolf Koch told 10 News, "What most security experts will tell you that if a dry-run is occurring, the attack will shortly follow."

Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe

Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4579&goback=gde_1528217_member_5801234191374901250#!

Mothertongue Name: n/a

Aliases: n/a

Bases of Operation: United Kingdom

Date Formed: July 7, 2005

Strength: Unknown number of members

Classifications: Religious

Financial Sources: Unknown

Founding Philosophy: The Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe claimed responsibility for the July 2005 London subway bombings, although it remains unclear whether they actually committed the attacks. Little is known about the group's size and structure, capabilities or leadership, which fosters the possibility that they may not be a legitimate organization at all. However, the group may consist of al-Qaeda-inspired individuals who have no direct ties to the organization, or a wing or an alias of a wing of al-Qaeda.

On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers coordinated an attack targeting the London public transit system. Bombs exploded on three subway trains and one double-decker bus, killing 53 people.

On the day of the attack, a claim was made on a well-known Islamist website forum, Al-Qal3ah or "the castle." The claim stated that the attack had been carried out in retaliation for the "massacres" committed by British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and warned of attacks against other countries, specifically Denmark and Italy, who also had troops fighting in those regions. Due to an error in one of the quoted Koran verses and the fact that the claim has never been independently verified, it is widely believed to be a hoax.

Speculation as to the nature and legitimacy of the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in



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Europe continues. It remains unclear how the four London suicide bombers are connected to the group, if at all. Two of the bombers are known to have visited Pakistan and studied at Islamic learning centers. In a video released a year after the attack, al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed the two men had trained at al-Qaeda camps; however, their presence at the training camps has never been verified.

The Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe was not the only group to claim responsibility for the London bombings. On July 9, 2005, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade also issued a statement claiming responsibility. The al-Masri Brigade is closely linked to al-Qaeda, though it is not clear if it is simply the European division of al-Qaeda or an alias for another existing organization. The Brigade has issued false claims of responsibility for previous events including the 2004 Madrid bombings and the summer 2003 blackouts in North America. On September 1, 2005, al-Qaeda released a video showing the London bombing mastermind, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, and al-Zawahiri separately addressing the London attack. The video was edited to suggest a direct link between the two men, but there is no indication that they had ever met or communicated. Many took the video as proof that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack while others saw it as merely an endorsement of the attack.

Current Goals: Based on the information available, it is unlikely that the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe is responsible for the July 2005 London bombings. It is far more plausible that the London bombers, inspired by al-Qaeda and espousing a similar ideology, acted independently while others sought recognition for the attack. Even though no evidence lends credence to the legitimacy of the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe, additional intelligence would aid in determining any future threat the group may pose to the region.

New research challenges conventional wisdom of intelligence and security

By Laura Walker

Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=607&utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=2373f03c14-START_Newsletter_September9_26_2013&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-2373f03c14-14081393

Despite conventional wisdom, intelligence failures are not a result of missed warning signs, poor collaboration or limited foresight, according to new research by START investigator Dr. Erik Dahl. Instead, his analysis shows that it is the lack of precise intelligence and receptive decision makers that leaves the United States vulnerable to surprise attacks.

In his new book, "Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond," Dahl compared the intelligence failures and intelligence successes found in case studies that included the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, the Korean War, the U.S. Embassy bombings in

east Africa and 9/11. Dahl's is the first major study to include an in-depth examination of intelligence success as part of its methodology, and the first of its kind to apply such a framework to both conventional enemies and terrorist threats.

"Most existing research is based on intelligence failures, but we don't understand what makes intelligence succeed," Dahl said. "By comparing cases of failure and success, I determined the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure is wrong."

The results of the comprehensive study showed that precise, targeted intelligence has been a vital




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component of past intelligence successes. However, current intelligence practices take a very broad, strategic approach to identify big-picture threats in accordance with guidelines set by leaders and policymakers, and that approach may be wrong, Dahl said.

Within the cases examined, another component equally vital to success is the presence of receptive decision makers who are willing to listen to and consider the available intelligence. Without one or both of these components, Dahl observed the outcomes resulted in the intelligence community's failure to anticipate surprise attacks.

Furthermore, his research found efforts by domestic law enforcement and members of the public are extremely important in counterterrorism efforts. In more than half of

the cases he studied, leads from those local sources proved to be the tip-off for successful intervention.



The book's focus is academic, but Dahl offered some broad application points: Primarily, the United States should aim to do a better job of "collecting the dots" rather than "connecting the dots," contrary to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report.

"It is my hope these findings will provide a foundation for a better-informed national discussion on the issues of homeland security, terrorism and domestic intelligence," Dahl said. "Intelligence is becoming an increasingly larger part of the

public discourse. It is important that policy makers and citizens make decisions and reforms based on accurate information, and on an accurate understanding of how intelligence can succeed to keep us safe."


Senior Homeland Security Advisor: America is an "Islamic Country"

By Ryan Mauro

Source: <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/senior-homeland-security-advisor-america-islamic-country>

Mohamed Elibiary, a senior Dept. of Homeland Security advisor tweeted that "America is an Islamic country."

A senior advisor to the Department of Homeland Security, Mohamed Elibiary, says that America is "an



Islamic country" and continues to argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is comparable to Christian evangelicals.

Elibiary is a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council and was promoted in September. He also served on the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Violent Extremism

Working Group and the Faith-based Security and Communications Advisory Committee.

He is also a long-time Texas Republican Party official and was a delegate for Senator John McCain in 2008.

On October 31, Elibiary tweeted that he believes the U.S. "is an Islamic country." You can see the screenshot below.



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The tweet was part of a conversation about whether Islam and the U.S. are compatible. Elibiary argued that America has an “Islamically compliant constitution.”

He also reiterated his view that the Muslim Brotherhood is comparable to Christian evangelicals and that not all Islamists should be lumped in with jihadists and terrorists.



Mohamed Elibiary @MohamedElibiary

13h

@luchadora41 'Islamist' not 4letter word & not into dehead. Read '04 Kerry elect speeches: defrintiate Islamists & Jihadists. Bush followed.

[View conversation](#)

[Reply](#) [Retweet](#) [Favorite](#) [More](#)



Mohamed Elibiary @MohamedElibiary

13h

@luchadora41 #WND doesn't advance understanding. Sociologically mainstream Islamist movements like MB r very similar2 American Evangelicals.

[View conversation](#)

[Reply](#) [Retweet](#) [Favorite](#) [More](#)



Mohamed Elibiary @MohamedElibiary

12h

In 2013 America leading into 2016 Pres elect only #RtWing still pushing inaccurate conflation msg of all Islamists as Jihadists& Terrorists.

[Expand](#)

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On October 30, the Clarion Project reported that Elibiary had tweeted that former Egyptian President and Brotherhood ideologue Mohamed Morsi "is Egypt's

Mandela" and that the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood is not a security concern.

Clarion also contributed to a 37-page report about Elibiary largely based on a lengthy interview with him. We have summarized the 15 most disturbing facts from the report.

One shocking finding is that Elibiary has been close friends with Shukri Abu Baker, the CEO of the Holy Land Foundation, since the age of 16. The Foundation was a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity that was shut down by the U.S. government in 2001. Abu Baker was convicted of financing the terrorist organization Hamas.

Elibiary opposes the prosecution of Abu Baker and the Holy Land Foundation and said that he has helped “safeguard” other Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations that faced possible prosecution.

Remarkably, not a single mainstream media outlet has covered this story. Few members of Congress have raised the matter. It's up to American citizens to educate them.

Ryan Mauro is the ClarionProject.org's National Security Analyst, a fellow with the Clarion Project and is frequently interviewed on top-tier TV stations as an expert on counterterrorism and Islamic extremism.

Disturbing Facts About a Senior Homeland Security Adviser

By Ryan Mauro

Source: <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/disturbing-facts-about-senior-homeland-security-adviser>

The Clarion Project, the Center for Security Policy and the Institute on Religion and Democracy have published a shocking interview with Mohamed Elibiary, a senior Department of Homeland Security adviser. The *Daily Caller* reported on it yesterday.

Elibiary is a member of the Secretary's Homeland Security Advisory Committee and founder of Lone Star Intelligence LLC. He served on the DHS Countering Violent Extremism Working Group and the DHS Faith-based Security and Communications Advisory Committee.

On September 12, he announced that he had been reappointed to the Committee and promoted to Senior Fellow. He was also a delegate for Republican presidential nominee John McCain in 2008.

The report is full of interesting material, but here are 15 important points to

focus on. If you feel that these facts are concerning, e-mail, mail and/or fax a copy of this article to the House Homeland Security Committee, the Senate Homeland Security Committee as well as your congressman whose job is to represent you.



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1. Elibiary says he knows the Muslim Brotherhood in a “personal manner.”

In 2007, Elibiary wrote, “[O]ur government is playing a post-9/11 script it played in the 1960s against the Mafia, but this time against a social network it calls the ‘International Muslim Brotherhood.’ People like me know of the brotherhood group in a much more personal manner than the Average White Guy, who has no more insight than what’s available in the media.”

2. Elibiary praises the Muslim Brotherhood and says the U.S. should support it.

In his interview with me, Elibiary said, “MB in Egypt is a pragmatic, non-violent and generally pluralistic socio-political movement by Egyptian cultural standards. It is not accurate to paint MB-Egypt as dogmatic, violent or autocratic, much less more sensationalized terms like dictatorial, totalitarian or *jihadist*.”

He continued: “I believe that MB and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, has by and large acted responsibly, if not always effectively, during the democratic transition period that Egypt is in the very early stages of.”

His Twitter photo has a pro-Muslim Brotherhood “R4BIA” logo that protests a violent crackdown on a Brotherhood protest in Egypt after the military toppled President Morsi by popular demand. He says it is a pro-freedom symbol that is “bigger than” the Brotherhood.

Elibiary says the U.S. should partner with the Muslim Brotherhood. In our interview, he said, “Our government needs to deepen our strategic engagement with MB.”

3. Elibiary compares the Muslim Brotherhood to Christian evangelicals.

In 2007, his organization made a presentation at a conference of the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America. It stated: “The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Jordan, Tunis, etc. is a social movement for religious revival that seeks to Islamicize the society through cultural changing Dawah and that includes the political system, sound familiar? Yup you’re right they are the Muslim world’s version of the Evangelical Christian Coalition/Moral Majority movement.”

He told the *Daily Caller* “Islamism is a multi-century, transnational, intellectually grounded movement with influential philosophical works from multiple continents . . . It has many subcultures and currents of thought. Some are no different than conservatives who ground their values in a Judeo-Christian worldview and it has its violent extremist strains.”

4. Elibiary has associated with the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America and pro-Khomeini groups.

As mentioned above, Elibiary spoke at a joint conference of the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America (AMJA) and the North American Imams Federation.

AMJA is a hardline Islamist group whose *fatwas* call for the gradual establishment of *sharia* law in America using deception; marital rape; *jihad* against Israel and ban Muslims from joining the FBI or serving the US military in a combat capacity.

AMJA opposes offensive *jihad* in the West because “the Islamic community does not possess the strength to engage in offensive *jihad* at this time.”

In our interview, Elibiary says he “spent a week with dozens of very senior Salafi scholars” from the group discussing Islamic jurisprudence.

He also speaks of when he brought a senior Salafi cleric “to give the first Friday Muslim congregational prayer literally inside the Texas State Capitol.” It is unclear if this Salafi cleric was from AMJA.

In 2004, Elibiary spoke at a pro-Khomeini conference. He said he did not know of the event’s extremist nature.

5. Elibiary says the U.S. should not oppose *sharia* law in Muslim countries.

In the same presentation, Elibiary’s group said, “We should remember that them [Islamists] ruling their countries with *sharia* law doesn’t mean them coming to our country and using our planes to destroy our buildings.”

“We must always resist the temptation to force one group such as Islamists to reform by adopting ‘liberalism’ for example. That would be denying them their self-determination to structure their societies according to their public will,” it also said.



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6. Elibiary is a long-time friend of the former head of the Holy Land Foundation, a convicted Brotherhood/Hamas fundraiser.

In 2007, Elibiary wrote that he was 16 years old when he met Shukri Abu Baker and his life was changed when Abu Baker told him about the alleged persecution of Palestinians by Israel. Elibiary took the first \$50 he ever deposited into a bank account and donated it to the Holy Land Foundation and donated monthly until it was shut down in 2001.

Abu Baker was the CEO of the Holy Land Foundation, a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity that was shut down for financing Hamas. He was convicted in the largest terrorism-financing trial in U.S. history. The FBI had wiretapped Abu Baker during a secret Brotherhood/Hamas meeting urging participants to engage in deception to further their Islamist goals.

The two were so close that they met for coffee the day before the verdict.

7. Elibiary depicts the Holy Land Foundation and U.S. Muslim Brotherhood network as a victim of political persecution by the U.S. government.

In 2010, Elibiary blasted the guilty verdict in the Holy Land Foundation trial in an editorial. He wrote, "Using the law to force compliance with unjust foreign policies by our government will simply trigger civil disobedience."

"This global war on terror needs a new strategy, because we're destroying ourselves more than al-Qaeda ever could," he wrote in another editorial in reaction to the prosecution.

In our interview, Elibiary said he was "warning against the strategy being deployed against the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and a broader Muslim Brotherhood network, in the eyes of the government, as if they were an organized criminal syndicate akin to the mafia. I viewed this strategy in 2007 as counterproductive to our national interest and instead called for an honest dialogue between the US and Islamists to find common ground and turn the page on the past."

8. Elibiary says he helped "safeguard" U.S. Muslim Brotherhood groups from prosecution.

In our interview, Elibiary made three statements about his role in protecting American Islamists:

- "I helped my community pick up the pieces and *safeguard* its nonprofit organizations, in order to protect its liberties, after the HLF's closure and eventual conviction."
- "But the corollary to my position was that if the Muslim community leadership and the government can mutually reconcile and turn a new page, *then the targeted national Muslim community organizations should be allowed to proceed anew.*"
- "As has been reported in multiple conservative media outlets over the past few years, the long-desired HLF 2.0 trial for the unindicted co-conspirators is *no longer going to happen.*"

The statements substantiate reports by counter-terrorism expert Patrick Poole in 2011 that the Justice Department cancelled planned prosecutions of senior U.S. Muslim Brotherhood figures, including a founder of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).

9. Elibiary likely helped craft Islamist-friendly counter-terrorism training guidelines.

In our interview, Elibiary said, "The area that has earned me the most amount of anti-Islamist media criticism has been my role assisting DHS and the broader administration craft a framework and later a strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)."

A *Clarion Project* analysis of the DHS Countering Violent Extremism training guidelines concluded that they prevent instruction about the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and non-violent Islamist tactics. Elibiary served on the DHS Countering Violent Extremism Working Group.

10. Elibiary is accused of trying to leak confidential documents for political purposes.

Patrick Poole reported in 2011 that Elibiary tried to leak confidential documents to a media outlet in an attempt to damage the presidential campaign of Texas Governor Rick Perry. Elibiary reportedly had his access to the database containing the files revoked.

Elibiary says he was exonerated by the Secretary of the DHS. Poole says, "At no time was I or my source ever contacted by anyone at DHS. How could they have done an investigation with only one side being heard?"



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11. Elibiary is hostile to anti-Islamist Muslims.

In our interview Elibiary said, “There are other Muslim advocates of reform who have instead publicly chosen to politically demonize, in conservative media outlets, mainstream Muslim community organizations as ‘Islamists.’ Labeling these or other Muslim community organizations as either ‘Muslim Brotherhood-associated’ or ‘Muslim Brotherhood-legacy’ in my opinion is counterproductive.”

Elibiary, though, used the term “Islamist” throughout the interview.

This same hostility was present in the DHS Countering Violent Extremism training guidelines. The new guidelines advise agencies that “trainers who are self-professed ‘Muslim reformers’ may further an interest group agenda instead of delivering generally accepted unbiased information.”

12. Elibiary said the West “routinely insults Muslim dignity.”

In 2004, Elibiary wrote, “Just because I listen to Osama bin Laden’s tapes and agree that the West routinely insults Muslim dignity, that doesn’t make me al-Qaeda. By listening I gain a better understanding of a philosophy I wish to counter.”

13. Elibiary says the U.S. government should not “touch” houses of worship.

On October 7, Elibiary tweeted, “US successfully prosecutes individuals 4 allkinds of criminal activity. That shd always b done w/o gov touching Churches, Mosques, etc.”

14. Elibiary repeats Brotherhood attacks on Coptic Christians.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regularly blasts its Coptic Christian opponents as being anti-Muslim. So does Elibiary.

On September 14, he tweeted, “Good read by @mwhanna1 on need to reform #Coptic activism in #US including stop promoting #Islamophobia.”

The next day, he tweeted, “For >decade since 9/11 attack extremist American #Coptic activists have nurtured anti #Islam & anti #Muslim sentiments among AMRT wing,”

15. Elibiary praises Sayyid Qutb, a Brotherhood cleric whose preaching inspired Bin Laden and Islamists around the world.

In 2006, Elibiary wrote, “I’d recommend everyone read Qutb, but read him with an eye to improving America not just to be jealous with malice in our hearts.”

Can the Sinai’s Bedouin Become a Counterterrorist Force?

By Nicholas A. Heras

Source:[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=41559&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=7&cHash=fcaee1812568752c008e53e0840d519#.UuMfCdZ11N](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41559&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=fcaee1812568752c008e53e0840d519#.UuMfCdZ11N)

Egypt’s North Sinai region is becoming an increasingly fierce site of conflict between the Egyptian military and local and Gaza-based militant Salafist organizations. The area’s most powerful Bedouin tribes, al-Tarabin, al-Sawarka and al-Tiyaha, form a majority of North Sinai’s population and are vital participants in the fighting. Egyptian security forces and Bedouin leaders have discussed, but not consummated, a framework through which Bedouin tribal forces could be mobilized and supported by the Egyptian state to confront the rise of militant Salafism amongst Bedouin tribal youth (Associated Press, October 8, 2012).

Sinai’s Bedouin population maintains several social, economic and political grievances

against the Egyptian state (for more information and analysis on insecurity caused by these grievances see Terrorism Monitor, May 18, 2012). One of the drivers of these grievances is the Egyptian state’s reported unwillingness to allow Sinai Bedouin to study in police and military colleges or become members of the Egyptian military (IRIN, June 16, 2011). As a result, there is not a significant local Bedouin presence in the Egyptian security forces that are posted in the Sinai, further emphasizing the divide between Egyptian security and military forces and the local population in issues pertaining to Sinai’s security (Ahran Online [Cairo], May 13).



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In spite of this state policy, the Egyptian state has consistently sought to enlist the support of local Bedouin tribes to provide security in the post-Mubarak period. Bedouin in North Sinai supplemented Egyptian Ministry of the Interior forces in protecting 75 polling stations during the 2012 Egyptian presidential election



cycle (McClatchy, May 20, 2012). After the launch of the August 2012 Operation Eagle campaign, North Sinai politicians called for then President Mursi and Defense Minister General Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi to approve the organization of a 500-person tribal militia under the supervision of the Interior Ministry, to protect roadways and government buildings (*al-Masry al-Youm* [Cairo], November 5, 2012; see *Terrorism Monitor*, September 27, 2012).

As a result of insecurity in North Sinai following the abdication of President Mubarak, al-Sawarka and al-Tarabin, tribal shaykhs agreed to resolve their inter-tribal disputes and begin to work together to provide security in the region (*al-Masrawy* [Cairo], February 19, 2012). Al-Sawarka shaykhs announced that they would mobilize "Popular Committee" militias composed of al-Sawarka tribesmen to patrol the Egypt-Gaza border as well as in the area in and around al-Arish to prevent the movement of HAMAS fighters from Gaza into Sinai (*al-Dustur* [Cairo], June 28).

One particular Bedouin leader, al-Sawarka Shaykh Ibrahim al-Manei, one of the most powerful leaders of the Sawarka Bedouin, has been a particularly vocal advocate for cooperation between the Egyptian military and Sinai Bedouin (*al-Ahram* [Cairo], May 29). Citing the example of Iraqi Kurdish *peshmerga* (armed Kurdish fighters) militias, Shaykh Ibrahim has called for the formation of a 1,000

fighter North Sinai inter-tribal defense force. This Bedouin security force would be mobilized under the command of Sinai tribal leaders and would be authorized by the Egyptian Interior Ministry to patrol public places and border areas, man checkpoints on roadways and keep the peace among feuding Bedouin tribesmen (*Ahram Online* [Cairo], May 13; AP, October 8, 2012).

Egyptian authorities in the Mubarak era sought to subvert the local authority of Sinai Bedouin shaykhs by attempting to co-opt them as active participants in intelligence gathering against their fellow tribesmen. Local Bedouin assert that 150-200 Bedouin shaykhs throughout Sinai, particularly in North Sinai, were co-opted by state security services, reportedly contributing to intra-tribal tension

(Associated Press, October 8, 2012).

Following President Mubarak's abdication in February 2011, inter-tribal North Sinai Bedouin youth created a popular civil society organization, the "Youth Revolution Council in Sinai," which petitioned and failed to convince Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to implement as state policy the direct election of Sinai Bedouin tribal shaykhs (*al-Akhbar* [Beirut], August 21, 2012).

The shaykhs of North Sinai have also become the targets of threats and violence directed against them by disgruntled fellow tribesmen and militant Salafist fighters, a number of whom are believed to be members of local Bedouin tribes. It is reported that eight North Sinai Bedouin shaykhs have been assassinated in the post-Mubarak era. These shaykhs are believed to have had strong ties to Egyptian state security or to have been vocal advocates of tribal mobilization against militant Salafist fighters based in the Sinai (*al-Masry al-Youm* [Cairo], September 5, 2013).

North Sinai Bedouin leaders are also constrained in their cooperation with the Egyptian state due to the membership of their tribesmen in local militant Salafist organizations and by popular anger against the state due to the more aggressive military operations launched by Egyptian security forces against militant Salafist groups in North Sinai since



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President Mursi was deposed on July 3 (see *Terrorism Monitor*, September 19, 2013; September 6, 2013). The recent Egyptian military offensive in North Sinai is reported to have caused a large amount of destruction of civilian property, the deaths of 52 Bedouin civilians, and the deaths of over 100 members of Egyptian security forces (*Slate*, October 7; Reuters, September 30).

Shaykh Ibrahim al-Manei, referring to the military's campaign, told Egyptian freelance journalist Nadine Marroushi that:

The Bedouin have never forgotten the random wars waged by [Egyptian Viceroy] Muhammad Ali against us over 100 years ago. Then came President Gamal Abd al-Nasser and President Hosni Mubarak's arrests and torture. Now al-Sisi has come to complete this scenario. There is a loss of trust that won't be regained for hundreds of years due to these barbaric acts. If we have to defend ourselves, we will (*Slate*, October 7).

Salafist militant fighters in North Sinai have directly challenged the authority of Bedouin leadership by openly calling for the imposition of Islamic law and the abolishment of the practice of Bedouin customary law (*al-Ahram* [Cairo], April 29, 2012). Two of the most powerful militant Salafist groups in the Sinai, Salafiya Jihadiya (Salafist Jihad) and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Partisans of Jerusalem), are reported to be composed primarily of radicalized Bedouin youth who are given protection by their fellow tribesmen as a result of blood ties. The protection is reportedly

provided under Bedouin customary law to the extent that militant Salafist Bedouin fighters do not attack their own kinsmen and instead target "outsiders," which usually refers to the Egyptian state security forces (*al-Akhabar* [Beirut], August 21, 2012; see *Terrorism Monitor*, February 22, 2013). Further threatening the position of those North Sinai shaykhs interested in cooperating with the Egyptian state, Salafiya Jihadiya recently issued a statement in which it threatened to execute Bedouin leaders or tribesmen that provided support to the Egyptian military (*al-Masry al-Youm* [Cairo], October 4).

The Egyptian military and North Sinai Bedouin tribes have not built sufficient trust in each other to organize a popularly-supported, cohesive and officially empowered local security force. Although there has been evidence of limited cooperation between the Egyptian military and North Sinai Bedouin tribes, core drivers of distrust between the Egyptian state and the tribes have yet to be resolved. This distrust appears to be made worse by the Egyptian military's more aggressive and destructive posture towards Bedouin communities since the military deposed President Mursi. Due to the lack of a local Bedouin presence in state security forces posted in the Sinai, the history of Sinai Bedouin disenfranchisement by the Egyptian state, current pan-tribal disunity, tenuous intra-tribal leadership and militant Salafist threats against Bedouin who cooperate with local security forces, a "Sinai Sahwa" is unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future.

Nicholas A. Heras is an independent analyst and consultant on Middle East issues and a former David L. Boren Fellow.

Some security guards at federal facilities not trained for 'shooter' incidents

By **Pete Williams** (Chief Justice Correspondent, NBC News)

Source: http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/30/21249467-gao-some-security-guards-at-federal-facilities-not-trained-for-shooter-incidents?goback=.gde_1528217_member_5801487417986797569#

Some of the 13,500 private security guards assigned to protect federal buildings lack training on how to respond to an active shooter, according to a government audit released Wednesday.

Since 2010, the Department of Homeland Security has required that its guards receive

active shooter training. But the Government Accountability Office informed Congress that a spot check of private contractors found five companies who say their guards received no such training.

"Without ensuring that all guards receive this training, the Federal



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Protective Service has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for such a threat," the report said.

Eleven other contractors surveyed said the guards they provide have received some active shooter training.

The Homeland Security Department's Federal Protective Service is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors at approximately 9,600 federal facilities managed by the General Services Administration. The service has its own sworn law enforcement officers, but also hires private security guards to help it accomplish its mission.

DHS officials testified on Wednesday before a House homeland security subcommittee that a guard's primary responsibility is to send an immediate notice – by phone and radio – of an active shooter attack, and to make certain employees can get out safely and that no other intruders get in.

In remote areas, where a quick law enforcement response is unlikely, they said, a


guard is expected to take further action. But the guard's response may be constrained, they said, because state laws limit what can be

done by someone who's not a sworn officer.

GAO also said the government must do more to ensure that guards assigned to checkpoints using metal detectors have received the proper training in using the machines. "An official at one contract guard company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards ... have never received their initial X-ray magnetometer training," the GAO

report said. "Some of these guards are working at screening posts."

Concern over the training of the FPS guards was heightened by the Sept. 16 shooting at the Washington Navy Yard. A former Navy reservist, Aaron Alexis, killed 12 people inside the building where he worked before being fatally shot by police.



Read the GAO Report at:

http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/Federal_Guards_GAO.pdf

EDITOR'S COMMENT: **What a surprise!** - in a series of surprises! Perhaps the word "some" should be replaced by "many"!

Why the world needs an agreed definition of terrorism

By Jerry Nockles

Source: <http://www.lowjinterpreter.org/post/2013/10/30/Defining-Terrorism-A-fundamental-counter-measure-%28part-1%29.aspx>

Are our efforts to establish an effective counter-terrorism framework hampered by an inability to define the subject?

At the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism held last month in Herzliya, Israel, Dr Boaz Ganor argued that the lack of a broadly-accepted definition of terrorism deprives us of a fundamental counter-terrorism measure.

Any discussion of a definition of terrorism relies on two key assumptions. Firstly, that terrorism

is sufficiently different in nature to warrant unique treatment under law (that is to say, that terrorism is not an ordinary criminal act but rather a political-military act necessitating special laws and more severe penalties). The second, and interrelated, assumption is that the existing legal framework pertaining to the conduct of warfare and politically-motivated violence does not sufficiently incorporate the types of



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Summit on Counter-Terrorism meets these requirements.

Part 2

In part one of this post, I referred to Professor Boaz Ganor's proposed definition of terrorism. That definition is:

Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilian targets in order to achieve political ends; nationalistic, socio-economic, ideological, religious-political.

I think Ganor's offering strikes the right balance of generality, specificity and objectivity to make it a most useful definition.

The definition contains three key elements: 1. the essence of the action (deliberate use of violence); 2. the underlying goal (achieving political ends); and 3. the object of the attack (civilian targets).

The first two elements are largely (though not entirely) accepted elements of most definitions of terrorism. Certainly one could make a case for the threat of violence to be added, though I would argue that the threat of terrorism is not terrorism itself. The threat of murder is not murder and the threat of arson is not arson, though each might be considered a crime.

The use of the term 'civilian' vice 'non-combatant' might be difficult to accept for countries such as the US and UK, which do the heavy lifting in international security and who find their service people in harms way more often. Colonel Richard Kemp, a leading counter-terrorism expert who commanded British Forces in Afghanistan made this very point at the recent World Summit on Counter-Terrorism where Ganor presented his definition. Kemp highlighted the murder of Gunner Lee Rigby in London, which involved the targeting of non-combatant military personnel and professed political-religious objectives.

As understandable and appealing as it is to use the term 'terrorism' to capture the horror we naturally feel at such heinous crimes, it does not advance the goal of achieving consensus on the nature of terrorism.

By limiting the definition to civilians, we immediately exclude incidents such as the 1982 Hyde Park and Regent's Park bombings in London, the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Dharan (pictured), all of which targeted non-combatant military personnel

(though civilians were killed and wounded in each incident).

This is a confronting issue. Let me make it very clear: excluding these outrageous crimes from the definition of terrorism in no way legitimises or justifies them. As Margaret Thatcher said in response to the Hyde and Regent's Park bombings: 'These callous and cowardly crimes have been committed by evil, brutal men who know nothing of democracy. We shall not rest until they are brought to justice.'

But we are trying to produce a definition and legal framework that targets a specific use of political violence, not produce a catch phrase that adequately expresses our horror at despicable crimes or hostile acts. The targeting of non-combatants is an act that has progressively fallen outside the norms of warfare and is consequently and explicitly prohibited in international law. We can regard it as a hostile act, an act deserving of a strong and immediate response, but not an act of terror.

The strongest aspect of Ganor's definition is that it removes any disclaimers or exclusions and disassociates specific motives from act. The deliberate use of violence on civilian targets is a tactic used by a number of disparate groups. Regardless of the subjective right or wrong of the cause, the legitimacy of the perpetrators, or the circumstances of the conflict, the deliberate use of violence against civilian targets is a terrorist act.

The common argument that 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist' becomes irrelevant. They are not mutually exclusive – one is a motive, the other is a tactic. 'Freedom fighters' can and do use violence against civilian targets. When they use this tactic they engage in the act of terrorism. The protection of civilian populations has been at the heart of international human rights law and international humanitarian law since their inception, so Ganor's definition fits in with the body of existing treaty-based and customary international law.

One of the most constructive functions of the UN is its unparalleled capacity to promote and expand international norms through the gradual acceptance of its conventions. Terrorism is neither senseless nor indiscriminate, but rather the deliberate and premeditated application of violence. We need to discover means to influence that calculus. The adoption



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of a definition of terrorism by the UN General Assembly would indeed be an effective –

perhaps the most effective – counter-terror measure.

Jerry Nockles is a research scholar with the Australian National University.

Russia Muslims Face DNA Tests Ahead Of Sochi

Source: <http://news.sky.com/story/1162050/russia-muslims-face-dna-tests-ahead-of-sochi>

Russia has reportedly been taking DNA samples from religiously conservative Muslim women in the North Caucasus as part of its security measures for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.



The DNA would be used to identify body parts should any of the women carry out suicide bomb attacks on Olympic targets.

Eight Dagestani women contacted by the Reuters news agency said they had been asked to provide swabs of saliva.

Locals said the DNA tests were part of a sweep after a suicide bombing in the capital Makhachkala in May.

The move coincides with a crackdown by President Vladimir Putin on an Islamist insurgency in Dagestan, which lies east of the Sochi Games sites.

Critics say the new hard line being taken by Mr Putin is feeding the resentment that lies behind insurgent attacks in the region.



The scene of May's bomb attack in Makhachkala

In July, Doku Umarov, the leader of the Islamist insurgency, urged his fighters to use "maximum force" to sabotage the Sochi Olympics.

A suicide bombing on October 21 that killed six people in Volgograd, a major city north of Sochi, was blamed on a woman from Dagestan.

Dubbed "black widows", some 49 female suicide bombers have carried out attacks in Russia in the past 13 years, according to the Caucasian Knot website.

In response, security forces have blown up the homes of militants' relatives, sealed off mountain villages and rounded up young men suspected of having ties to militants.



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Many madrassas, or religious schools, and charities run by traditional Salafi Muslims, have been closed. Earlier this month security forces shut down two madrassas in Novosaitli, photographing students and taking their fingerprints.

"I can't describe how terrified the girls were, how many tears were shed," said Abdurakhim Magomedov, a Salafi preacher.

Although the security crackdown has resulted in many Salafis fleeing abroad, others have stayed and taken up arms, their leaders say.

Mr Putin, who is spending \$50bn (£31bn) on the Games, has tightened security around Sochi, where Cossack militia patrol the streets.

Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev told the Russian parliament the authorities were receiving "alarming information" and were working to eliminate leaders and members of armed groups.

"There are simply no other ways to combat these inhuman monsters," he said.

Security analysts say militants are unlikely to penetrate the layers of protection around Sochi but attacks cannot be ruled out, especially in nearby cities like Volgograd.

"The special services can't prevent everything. There are many people who want to ruin the Sochi Olympics," said Sergey Goncharov, formerly a senior counter-insurgency official.

Dagestan, Russia's most southern province has Islamic roots dating back to a 7th Century Arab invasion and the majority of its 2.9 million inhabitants people are Muslim.

A growing number have become Salafis in recent years, influenced by scholars who studied in the Middle East.

Some have joined the Islamist insurgency that grew out of separatist wars in neighbouring Chechnya.

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, a suspect in the Boston Marathon bombing, spent the first half of 2012 in Dagestan.

FBI: 23-year-old L.A. man is suspect in airport shooting that kills TSA officer

Source: <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/01/us/lax-gunfire/index.html>

A man armed with what police say was an assault rifle and carrying materials expressing anti-government sentiment opened fire Friday

according to a federal law enforcement official. If they said "no," he would move on.

One of those questioned travelers was Leon Saryan. He told CNN's Anderson Cooper that the same man he'd just seen shoot a TSA officer "calmly" walked toward him and asked, "TSA?"

"I just shook my head," Saryan said. "And he kept going."

In the aftermath of the shooting, investigators found information on the suspect expressing not just anti-federal government sentiment but also anger at the TSA specifically, according to the federal law enforcement official.

By then, a TSA officer was dead -- the first employee of that relatively new agency to be killed in the line

of duty. The agency identified him as Gerardo Hernandez, who would have turned 40 next week. He was working as a travel document checker at the time of the shooting, according to TSA workers' union and federal sources.

morning at Los Angeles International Airport, killing one person before being chased down himself, authorities said.

Eyewitnesses said the suspect asked people, "Hey, are you TSA?" -- the acronym for the Transportation Security Administration --



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Two additional TSA officers were also shot, one in the leg, authorities said. The suspected gunman himself was detained after being shot in the chest multiple times, according to an intelligence source briefed by Los Angeles police. As of Friday evening, he was receiving medical attention at a hospital,

in Wilmington, Delaware, according to school President Brendan P. Kennealey. The intelligence source said Ciancia's family became concerned in recent days after he sent his brother and father "angry, rambling" texts venting about the government, living in Los Angeles and his unhappiness generally.



according to FBI Special Agent in Charge David Bowdich. He was identified later by the FBI as Paul

Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center said that it received three male victims – one in critical condition and two in fair condition. One of the



Anthony Ciancia, a 23-year-old from Los Angeles. He graduated in 2008 from Salesianum School, an all-boys Catholic school

two in fair condition suffered gunshot wounds, while another had an unspecified injury, said Dr. Lynne



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McCullough, an emergency physician at the Los Angeles hospital. One of them was released by Friday afternoon; one of the others who remained at the hospital was Ciancia, according to the intelligence source.

Two patients, meanwhile, were transported to Harbor-UCLA Medical Center in Torrance, said David Klurad, a trauma surgeon there.

One was what Klurad described as a "middle-aged" person with minor injuries from being shot in the shoulder. The other had no signs of life when he arrived at the hospital, the surgeon added. It wasn't known if this person was the slain TSA officer. The episode caused what airport police Chief Patrick Gannon, who had said the shooter used an "assault rifle," described as a "large amount of chaos." People ran for their lives and took shelter wherever they could as authorities pursued the gunman.

Chuck Ocheret was among those in the busy airport when he heard two "loud pops."

"Then I heard this mad rush of people, and there was a stampede of people coming from this direction," Ocheret told CNN. "Nobody

Passenger Saryan had just cleared the TSA



checkpoint and was reaching for his shoes and belt when shots rang out, prompting "everybody (to) hit the ground and .. run." A TSA officer grabbed Saryan's shoes and started running alongside him, before the gunman grazed the officer with a bullet.

"I went and covered in a corner," Saryan said. The suspect kept moving down Terminal 3, equipped with three magazines for his weapon, according to the intelligence source briefed by Los Angeles police, he began running down Terminal 3.

He had company. Gannon said two officers from his department responded "within seconds after the shooting started" and ran off in pursuit of the suspect.

Traveler Vernon Cardenas was sitting at one end of the terminal, when he heard noise and saw a mass of people running toward him. He and others bolted through a kicked-open exit door and ran onto the tarmac – believing then it was safer there – even with then still-



really knew what was going on."

Still, by Friday afternoon, authorities believe the worst was over. Gannon noted it is believed there was only one shooter.

An otherwise normal day in the airport's Terminal 3 turned upside down around 9:20 a.m. (12:20 p.m. ET), as the suspect approached a checkpoint.

There, he "pulled an assault rifle out of a bag and began to open fire," Gannon said.

arriving and departing jetliners – than in the terminal above.

The circular area where Cardenas had been is where the bloodshed finally ended with the gunman's shooting by law enforcement, according to the intelligence source. They didn't take any chances with the wounded suspect either, handcuffing him to a gurney as he was being carried out.



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Actor Tim Daly said that when he was eventually led out of the the Virgin America first-class lounge, he saw where the incident came to a head around Gates 35 and 36. After being told not to step on any blood or glass, Daly spotted a high-powered rifle on the ground along with a pair of black shoes and several bags strewn across the floor.

Also there was more than 100 rounds of unspent ammunition, Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti said, enough to "have literally killed everyone in that terminal today."

Los Angeles Police Chief Robert Beck credited the responding airport police officers with heroically saving lives with their efforts. It was a sentiment echoed by Mike Bonin, a city councilman whose district includes the airport and its surrounding neighborhoods.

"When shots rang out, members of the Los Angeles World Airport police department ran towards that gunfire, without regard to their own safety and well being," Bonin said. "... No doubt, without their efforts, the casualty count today would be significantly higher."

Even once the suspect was shot and detained, law enforcement officers roamed the airport with guns drawn looking for others who might have involved.

KCAL showed live video of three officers with rifles to their shoulders inspecting parked cars in an open-air parking lot. At one point, firefighters lay tarps on the street at the airport, apparently for triage.

The episode soon rendered one of the world's busiest airports a ghost town. Large portions were evacuated as authorities ordered a "ground stop" for arriving planes that lasted four hours.



About 750 flights were affected by the ordeal, including 46 would-be arriving aircraft that were diverted to other nearby airports, said Gina Marie Lindsay, executive director of Los Angeles World Airports. Some that did touch down were held on the ground in Los Angeles, while others didn't leave their originating airports.

[A photo of Paul Ciancia, a suspect in the LAX shooting on November 1, 2013.](#)

LAX, as it's known, was a mess.

The area around the airport was jammed with cars as police shut down access. Meanwhile, many who were in the terminals, waiting for flights to arrive or depart, were

pushed out.

Even as late as 4 p.m. -- some 6½ hours after the shooting occurred -- masses were still huddled on sidewalks outside the airport, because they had no place else to go.

Soon after that, people started moving back in as the airport operations kicked back into gear. Terminal 3, though, remained closed -- all flights that were supposed to go in and out of there were relocated elsewhere in the airport -- and will be "for a while," said Bowdich of the FBI.

"This has been a trying day for everyone, I know," Lindsay said.

That's especially true for members of the TSA, which lost one of its own Friday and had two others wounded.

The federal agency's chief, John Pistole, is heading to Los Angeles on Saturday. Before he left, he sent a message to his employees thanking them for their good work and support for each other.


"Together, we will get through this," Pistole wrote. "Our faith will guide us and our professionalism will ensure our ability to carry out our mission."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Perhaps now TSA will re-examine security in all airports nationwide. Same as with the Naval Yard; same as with US Embassies around the world; same as with security guards in government installations! Always **AFTER** a deadly incident! **NEVER** pro-active! What is wrong with you people? The whole world is following your security footsteps and reads your directives and theories! Perhaps now you will read your own documents and comply. Because next time could be something massive and usual excuses about existing gaps will not apply...



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Perhaps a single metal detector in the bridge connecting Parking Lot 3 with Terminal 3 would be enough to identify the intruder? (See photos – never been there.)
 On the other hand: the Control Tower is surrounded by multistory parking lots (2, 2A, 5 & 6). Is it clever enough? Neverheard about VBIEDs? (Unless they have explosive detectors at all entrances – never been there.)



CNN UPDATE (03 Nov 2013)

The accused Los Angeles International Airport gunman approached a TSA checkpoint, pulled a ".223-caliber M&P-15 assault rifle out of his bag and fired multiple rounds at point-blank range" at a uniformed TSA officer on Friday, U.S. Attorney Andre Birotte Jr. said.



The suspect, Paul Anthony Ciancia, 23, **went up an escalator, then came back down to "shoot the wounded officer again,"** Birotte added. The TSA officer, Gerardo Hernandez, 39, died of his wounds. Ciancia on Saturday was charged with murder of a federal officer and commission of violence in an international airport, both felonies, Birotte said.

Armed Assault at Los Angeles International Airport

Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/STARTFactSheet_ArmedAssaultatLAX_Nov2013.pdf?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=a675471356-START+Fact+Sheet+LAX&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-a675471356-14081393

On Nov. 1, 2013, a gunman opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), reportedly motivated by anti-government sentiment and targeting Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officers. To provide context for this attack, START has compiled relevant facts and figures from the Global Terrorism Database.

Since 1970 there have been four terrorist attacks at LAX:

- **07/04/2002:** Hesham Mohamed Hedayet, an Egyptian-born man, opened fire at the El Al Israeli Airlines ticket counter, killing two people and wounding four others before he was killed by security personnel.
- **05/30/1982:** The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) planted an explosive device at the Air Canada freight terminal. The device was defused and no casualties were reported.
- **01/22/1980:** Unknown perpetrators bombed the China Airlines luggage area. No casualties were reported.
- **08/06/1974:** Muharem Kurbegovic, also known as "Isak (Isaac) Rasim" or the "alphabet bomber," detonated explosives the Pan American terminal, killing three people, injuring 36 others, and causing considerable damage.

There have been more than 2,600 terrorist attacks in the United States between 1970 and 2012. More than half of these attacks took place in the 1970s.

Only 72 terrorist attacks in the United States (2.7%) targeted airports and airlines. The vast majority of the attacks targeting airports and airlines were bombings or attempted bombings (72.2%), 19.4 percent were hijackings or attempted hijackings, and only three of these attacks were classified as armed assaults like the one at LAX on Nov. 1.

Since 1970, relatively few terrorist attacks in the United States (13.0%) have involved firearms. However, of those attacks that involved firearms, 46 percent resulted in at least one fatality, compared to only 6.7 percent of attacks that did not involve firearms.

Worldwide, 74 terrorist attacks classified as armed assaults against airports and airlines were carried out between 1970 and 2012, 1.8 per year on average.



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Armed assaults against airports and airlines took place in 42 different countries, most commonly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Western Europe. The most lethal of these attacks took place on 02/17/2002 in Nepal, when Maoist rebels attacked an airport in Sanphebaga, killing 27 Nepalese policemen.

Airport security still vulnerable

Source: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/03/lax-los-angeles-airport-shooting-tsa-security/3419675/>

Despite expensive and inconvenient measures adopted after the 9/11 attacks to make airplanes safer, airports remain as vulnerable as any other public place to someone with a grudge, a weapon and a statement to make.

The Los Angeles International Airport shooting is unlikely to change that, many security experts agree.

Although it's almost impossible to get on a



plane with a bomb or gun, there's neither the will nor the funds to similarly protect airport parking lots, curbsides, lobbies, ticket counters and baggage claims.

Despite the shooting, "airport security is going to be pretty much what you've got now," predicts Joe King, a former Customs agent and Department of Homeland Security official who teaches at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York.

The issue was revived after a gunman opened fire inside LAX's Terminal 3 on Friday, killing one Transportation Security Administration officer and wounding four other people, two of them TSA workers.

The 23-year-old alleged gunman told authorities at the scene he acted alone and had been dropped off at the airport by a friend, a law enforcement official who has been

briefed on the investigation told The Associated Press on Sunday.

Authorities do not believe the friend knew that Paul Ciancia, the man charged in the attack, planned to open fire moments later, said the official, who is not authorized to speak publicly about the investigation and requested anonymity.

Ciancia was dropped off in a black Hyundai and was not a ticketed passenger. He was able to respond to investigators' questions at the scene Friday, the source said.

Ciancia, an unemployed motorcycle mechanic who grew up in the small, working-class town of Pennsville, N.J., was shot four times and was under 24-hour armed guard at a hospital, the official said.

Federal prosecutors charged Ciancia on Saturday with murder of a federal officer and committing violence at an international airport. The charges could qualify him for the death penalty.

The union representing TSA airport screeners says the shooting shows the need for armed security officers at every checkpoint. The TSA says it expects no immediate change in overall security policy but that "passengers may see an increased presence of local law enforcement officers throughout the country." For how long? King says that when it comes to airport security – especially the vast areas outside the TSA-protected secure perimeter – costs are huge and payoffs only occasionally visible – "and so it's hard to justify to the budget people."

Paul Ekman, a psychologist whose research in facial expressions helped shape the TSA program to spot potential offenders, has criticized the government's failure to extend the program to all feeder airports. Asked what impact the LAX shooting would have on security at



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other airports around the nation, he said, "I don't think it'll change a thing."



Security experts make these points:

- **Airport security is really designed for airplanes.** That's as it should be, says Stewart Baker, former Department of Homeland Security policy director, given al-Qaeda's fixation on attacking flights and the public's sensitivity to air travel disaster.

On the other hand, he says, an airport public area "is only one of 50 places where Americans congregate in numbers," including the main concourse of Grand Central Terminal in New York City, which people can enter and leave dozens of ways without passing through a detector or going past a police officer.

The key is not controlling such spaces, but observing them, Ekman says. At airports in Israel and the United Kingdom, surveillance starts as soon as the traveler steps from the car, the bus or the train.

- **Extending airport security outside TSA-manned checkpoints is very expensive and rarely necessary.** The commander's dilemma: Assigning officers to checkpoints leaves the rest of the terminal more vulnerable. The TSA approves each airport's security plan, which is then executed by the airport, either through its own force or with local police.

King says airport police forces are designed primarily "to move traffic." As such, "they're a traveling police force, rather than based at fixed posts" such as security checkpoints, he says. When there's an emergency, officers usually must be called to the scene, a process that can take several minutes.

Even if TSA checkpoints were protected by armed officers and public areas outside the perimeter more tightly controlled, patrolled or observed, "then it becomes, 'Where are they going to hit instead?'" he says of potential attackers.

- **Arming TSA checkpoints, whatever its effectiveness in stopping or deterring attacks, would be expensive and contentious.** The TSA workers' union has not requested they be armed. If they were, King says, they'd expect to be paid like police officers, with bigger salaries and pensions. A more likely outcome, he says, might be arming some TSA supervisors at a limited number of airports.

That and a range of other moves might encounter resistance in Congress, where some members have criticized TSA techniques for searching travelers.

U.S. Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., chairman of a House committee with broad scope and subpoena power, favors returning airport screening to private companies. But J. David Cox Sr., president of the American Federation of Government Employees, the union that represents TSA workers, says the LAX shooting proves the need for a federal force to screen travelers.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: One of the most stupid articles I have ever read! It would be OK if we had 7 lives but with current availability of only one life, authorities must rethink what is important or not...



Greece: Two Golden Dawn members shot dead in terrorist attack

Source: <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/361350>



Armed gunmen shot dead two young members of Greece's far-right party Golden Dawn in cold blood, leaving a third man critically injured. The attack happened outside party offices in Neo Iraklio, Athens.

Police and counter terrorism officers are investigating the cold blooded murder of the two young men which

took place early Friday evening.


The victims were Manolis Kapelonis, 22, and George Fountoylis, 26 (photo: left). Newsit reported two armed terrorists wearing crash helmets fired automatic weapons from motorcycles. Even as the victims lay dead on the ground the gunmen continued to empty their 9mm sub-machine guns into the bodies.

The murders have been condemned by politicians from all parties. To Vima reported the government

issued a statement saying: "The killers will be treated mercilessly by the judiciary, state and united Greek society."

Golden Dawn issued a statement blaming the government for removing police protection from party offices despite chrysafgites being at risk of terrorist attacks in the current climate.

Golden Dawn is currently under judicial investigation over allegations that it is a criminal organization.



Three killed in Norway bus hijacking

04 Nov 2013

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/10426272/Three-killed-in-Norway-bus-hijacking.html>

Two men and a woman have been killed in Western Norway after a man wielding a knife hijacked the express bus they were travelling on.

The man in his 30s, from South Sudan, was arrested at just before 7pm Norwegian time. He was flown to hospital in Bergen where he was being treated for injuries sustained during the hijack.

Trine Erdal, a spokesperson for Norwegian police said that she could not yet give details on the hijacker's state of mind or his likely motive.

Police said that there were only three people on the bus at the time of the attack – the 50-year old driver, a Swedish citizen also in his 50s and a 19 year old Norwegian girl – and that the hijacker killed all of them.



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The 31-year-old killer is from southern Sudan but is currently living in Årdal, the small



Norwegian town where the hijack took place. Oslo police also confirmed they called off the deployment of an anti-terror unit after the

According to police, the man gave himself up to firemen without a fight, having thrown the knife into the bus behind him.

"The person came out voluntarily from the bus and was arrested by firefighters. He had already thrown down the knife from inside the bus," Magne Knutsen from the Årdal police told VG.

The hijacked bus, the Valdres Express, was making its four-hour journey the mountainous Valdres region, which is popular for skiing, back to Oslo.

Police sealed off the surrounding area and are searching it to make certain that the man they have arrested operated alone.

The attack marks the second time the



suspect had been arrested.

The emergency services were notified at 5.30pm when they received reports of a traffic accident involving a bus.

Shortly after the fire services arrived, though, they realised there was a man inside the overturned bus brandishing a weapon.

"It was impossible to open the door, but then we saw that there was a dark-skinned person moving around inside the bus," the first fireman on the scene told Norway's TV2 channel.

"We initially thought he trying to get out. Then we noticed that he was brandishing a knife and realised that the situation was quite different."

express bus between the towns of Årdal and Tyn has been hijacked. In 2003, a mentally disturbed 26-year-old Ethiopian man seized the bus and stabbed the driver to death.

"This is terrible. It is the second time such a tragedy has happened to the Valdres Express," said Bjørn Ragnar Ostbye, chief executive of Nor-Way Express Buses, which operated the bus.

"It is cruel that such things can happen," Arild Ingar Laegreid, the mayor of the local town of Årdal said. "The most important thing now is to take care of the families."



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Shooter on the loose at New Jersey mall

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/new-jersey-mall-shooting/>

A shooter opened fire at a New Jersey mall late Monday (Nov 4), sending panic through the shopping center and igniting a massive police response.

At least one gunman is said to have fired shots at security cameras, the state police said. A single shell casing has been found, a Bergen County emergency management official said.



The gunman inside Westfield Garden State Plaza Mall in Paramus, New Jersey, has not

Eddie Kahmann, who works inside the mall, told CNN he heard 6 or 7 gunshots around



yet been found during a sweep of the shopping center by Bergen County SWAT, said county Chief of Staff Jeanne Baratta. Mayor Rich LaBarbiera said there have been no injuries, and authorities believe the gunman is no longer in the mall. The store-by-store sweep is ongoing.

9:20 p.m. ET. "There was just people running like crazy, so I quickly just closed my doors, ran to the back, turned off all the lights, music and everything, just to stay hidden," he said.



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Kahmann spoke from inside the mall, one of the largest shopping centers in the New York City area.

Allie Cozic, another mall employee, said she saw "someone dressed in all black, carrying a large gun, walk past our store."

She said she heard loud bangs about 10 minutes before her store was set to close for the night.

"It was just chaos. Everyone was just kind of running to wherever they could," Cozic said.

"It was almost like when you're watching a horror movie and the killer is walking slowly – that's what it seemed like. He was wearing all black, it almost looked like body armor of some kind. As soon as I saw the gun, I just turned and ran," she said.

There is a large police presence at the mall, which was set to close at 9:30 p.m. ET. There are about 20 vehicles both marked and unmarked.

Police are putting on flak jackets and bringing out assault weapons. People have been pushed away from the mall and are telling CNN that they've been told the shopping center is on lockdown.

Westfield Garden State Plaza is located some 12 miles from Manhattan. It boasts of being home to nearly 300 specialty shops and boutiques.

EDITOR'S CORNER: With all floor plans available on the Internet planning an attack is quite easy. Same for airports and mass gathering areas. All you need is paranoia and guns (lots of them both)!

UPDATE 5 Nov 2013 (CNN): The gunman in the New Jersey mall shooting was found dead inside the mall, police said.

Perspectives on terrorism and responses to it

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131104-perspectives-on-terrorism-and-responses-to-it>

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense has published a new white paper, in *Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on Terrorism and Responses to It Strategic Multi-layer Assessment*, which offers discussions of different perspectives of terrorism and approaches to understanding the phenomenon. The papers cover topics ranging from strategic and adaptive considerations of terrorism to analytical considerations.

Researchers from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) contributed articles to a recent white paper covering different perspectives of terrorism and approaches to understanding the phenomenon. The papers cover topics ranging from strategic and adaptive considerations of terrorism to analytical considerations.

The new white paper expands on a previous paper that sought better to refine and address the "disease" (preconditions, perceptions, and underlying drivers) and not just the "symptoms" (terrorist attacks) of terrorism.

A START release reports that START researchers' contributions include:



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“Two Possible Profiles of Lone-actor Terrorists,” by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. In the paper, the authors argue that lone-actor terrorists may share common characteristics that could help identify high-risk individuals. Specifically, they examine the profile types: disconnected-disordered, in which individuals are loners with a history of mental disorder; and caring-compelled individuals who feel personal responsibility to bring to justice those responsible for making innocent others suffer.

“Leveraging Advances in Qualitative Methodology to Analyze Radicalization,” by Peter Henne, Jonathan Kennedy, John Sawyer, and Gary Ackerman. In the paper, the authors discuss radicalization research’s shortcomings, several aspects of the study of radicalization that complicate attempts to understand the phenomenon, and how qualitative methods can, at least partly, address those issues.

The white paper was written and published by the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

— [Read more in *Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on Terrorism and Responses to It Strategic Multi-layer Assessment, Occasional White Paper \(September 2013\)*; and *Over a Decade Later...What Now? What Next? A Multi-Layer Assessment of Terrorism in its Current and Future Manifestation Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment \(SMA\)\(July 2013\)*](#)

Are terrorists targeting the Suez Canal?

Source: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/04/suez-canal-terrorism/3285881/>



Attacks on vessels using Egypt’s Suez Canal and increased terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula are opening up a new front in the war on terror, posing a serious threat to a crucial international trade route and with it global shipping, warn analysts.

Egyptian authorities have tightened security measures around the Suez Canal following

intelligence suggesting Muslim Brotherhood supporters intend to target the key waterway today to coincide with the first day of trial for former president Mohamed Morsi.

Already terrorists have been probing the canal for weaknesses, say authorities.



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On Aug. 31, an rocker-propelled grenade attack targeted the COSCO Asia container ship as it passed through the Suez Canal, while a separate attack on another vessel occurred July 29. Both attacks have been claimed by the Furkan Brigades, a new militant jihadist group operating in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, though no significant damage was recorded in either incident.

"We can target the international water passage morning and night, along the entire length of the waterway," the group said in a video statement uploaded to YouTube shortly after the Aug. 31 attack. The Furqan Brigades has vowed more attacks.

The Egyptian military in early September launched one of the largest military operations in decades against militants to combat growing lawlessness and militant activity in the Sinai. Security forces found mortars and defused explosives in areas around the Suez Canal, and have been locked in fighting with Islamist militants in Sinai for almost two months.

The New York-based Soufan Group, a security consultancy warns that attacks by al-Qaeda-linked groups are likely to continue to target ships along the Suez Canal.

"The disruption and chaos that would result from disabling a large commercial vessel crossing the canal would be a significant propaganda victory for the perpetrators," a report by the group this month said.

The Suez Canal is a key shipping route for global trade with about seven percent of the world's oil and 13% of the international gas supply passing through the Suez Canal last year, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Nationalized in 1956, dozens of ships use the 120-mile canal every day, including the Maersk Mc-Kinney Moller, a massive new vessel launched by Maersk from South Korea in July that can transport the exceptionally large 18,000 20-foot (TEU) containers at a time. Maersk has 19 more 18,000 TEU ships on order and are expected to be sailing by 2015.

Other major shipping companies including China Shipping and United Arab Shipping Co. have also ordered the 18,000 TEU vessels built by South Korea's Daewoo shipbuilding company, according to Lloyds List Intelligence. The emergence of a new generation of giant container ships, too big to pass through the

world's other vital waterway – the Panama Canal – means that for the Asia-Europe and the Asia-eastern Americas shipping routes, the Suez Canal is poised to grow in importance in the coming years.

Such massive, slow-moving leviathans are easy targets for the Islamic militants that have been operating with general impunity in the Sinai Peninsula in recent years, say analysts.

"The sinking of a vessel in the Suez Canal would effectively shut the entire canal for several days, if not weeks, while the wreckage was broken up and removed," said a report published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies last month.

"(But) more likely is a spill ... which may shut down the canal depending on the Suez Canal Authority's response and policy toward it," Christian Le Miere, the author of the IISS report, told USA Today, adding that it is still difficult to actually sink a ship. "Alternative routes do not exist other than round the southern Cape (of Africa), a much longer journey."

However, shipping giants Maersk are playing down the threat.

"We monitor the situation according to normal procedures and see a stable, unchanged situation in the Suez – therefore we have no special plans drawn up," said Mikkel Elbek Linnet, spokesperson for Danish shipping giant, Maersk.

The Suez Canal sees 800,000 barrels of oil and 1.4 million barrels of other petrochemicals pass through it every day. Containerized cargo made up over 70% of all non-energy cargo traffic during the first six months of this year, while over 13,000 vessels have passed through in 2013, according to the Suez Canal Authority. Analysts believe about 80% of container ships in operation today have armed security on board, highlighting the increasing threat to vessels.

"It would only take one successful attack on a large vessel traveling along the Suez to have the desired financial effect on both Egypt and the wider spheres of shipping and trade," said Charles Lister of IHS Jane's, an international security watchdog. "The August double RPG attack was carried out in broad daylight, which definitely demonstrates the ease with which potential militant threats could operate."



The Last Ever Interview with the Leaders of Peru's Shining Path Guerrilla Army

Source: <http://www.vice.com/read/the-last-ever-interview-with-the-leaders-of-the-shining-path>



This August, newspapers in Peru splashed headlines across their front pages about the huge blow the government had dealt to what is left of the infamous Shining Path—a brutal Maoist guerrilla group that has spent the past 20 years hanging out in the jungle slaughtering peasants and smuggling coke. The headlines announced to the world that **Comrade Alipio**, the group's military leader, had been killed. Alipio's death was as cartoonish as it was dramatic. A cocaine trafficker who had links to Shining Path, but who'd turned informant for the police, lured an armed column of rebels towards a hut that he owned. Most of the fighters stayed outside, guarding the building while Comrade Alipio and two other Shining Path bigwigs, Comrades Gabriel and Alfonso, went into what was meant to be a safe house, expecting to meet some ladies of the night, all organized by the drug trafficker.

Crucially, what Alipio and company didn't know was that the army had rigged the house with ANFO explosives. As soon as the three rebels had made themselves comfortable, the whole hut went up in one big blast. The charred bodies had to be identified through DNA tests.

As soon as news of the killing came out, my phone wouldn't stop ringing: I have the arguable privilege of being the only journalist to have met Comrade Alipio, and the local media were desperate for a soundbite.

Back in September 2010, I received a call on behalf of the leadership of the Shining Path, who had agreed to meet me if I travelled, unaccompanied, to Peru's Valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers, known by the acronym VRAEM. It's a jungle region that routinely serves as the battleground between armed forces and drug lords. The Shining Path contacted me after I sent them a message while I was reporting in the area, tailing some anti-narcotics police patrols a few months prior.

The offer was exciting, yet terrifying. In 1980, the Shining Path took up arms vowing not just to defend the peasantry, but to defeat the country's rulers and hand it over to a proletariat that for generations had struggled beneath the yoke of a tiny, European-descended elite. However, what characterized the Shining Path from the onset were their bloody tactics. Within a few



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years they had annihilated thousands of Peruvians—most of their victims being the same peasants they were supposed to be going to war for.

The government's response was no less brutal. After 20 years of conflict, the death toll neared 70,000. In 1992 the conflict was all but finished, after the police finally captured Abimael Guzman, the messiah-styled and deranged Shining Path leader. What was left of the movement retreated to the heart of the VRAEM, where they kept a low profile for a number of years.



One of the helicopters taken down by the rejuvenated Shining Path in 2010

But, since the mid-2000s, a reinvented version of the group has been stirring up trouble. By 2010, despite their small numbers (they are alleged to have around 300 members in total), they had managed to kill dozens of soldiers and policemen, and even downed three Air Force helicopters.

The Peruvian government blamed its incompetence at fighting the rebels on the inhospitable terrain and, more often than not, on the group's links with the cocaine drug lords, who are said to back the Shining Path financially. The government spoke of "narcoterrorism," a phrase that was picked up by mainstream media. The government seemed keen to characterize the enemy they were struggling to defeat as a force big enough to deserve its own sinister metanarrative—that it was some despicable new fusion of commerce and ideology akin to Colombia's FARC—rather than just 300 peasants living in the countryside.

This alleged involvement in the drug trade prompted the US to step into the conflict and in 2009 Shining Path leader, Comrade Jose (real name Victor Quispe Palomino), was added to the DEA's list of drug kingpins. The US State Department quickly followed suit and offered a \$5 million for the Shining Path's leader. Could Jose and his followers really be as rich as the drug kingpins from Mexico or Colombia? Could they really be as well-armed as the cocaine-funded Colombian guerrillas, FARC? Something didn't add up. So I went to find out.

After a few bumpy rides across the rugged tracks of the VRAEM, I reached a riverbed, where a boatman came to meet me and, without uttering a single word, sailed me down the river until we reached a tiny settlement. On arrival a wrinkly and chirpy coca farmer greeted me: "So you are the journalist? Come, follow me."

Four hours later we reached a hut where I was met by four guys armed with automatic rifles. They told me I was their guest and that I should address them as "*compañeros*" (*comrades*). I



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was to spend the night at the shelter, while they waited for further instructions in order to continue the march to meet the Shining Path leadership.



Fernando Lucena, Comrade Alfonso and the captured Galil rifle

The next morning, as we waited for orders to come via walkie-talkie, I chatted with Comrade Alfonso, a rather small guy with a peaceful face, who didn't fit in with any preconceptions that I had about what a killer ought to look like. I asked Alfonso about his rifle, an Israeli Galil. He told me it had been captured from a soldier they killed at an ambush. Then he nonchalantly passed me the weapon, so that I could have a feel of it.

After a couple more hours of walking, which included hiding in some foliage as an Air Force helicopter passed, we turned a bend and arrived at a clearing in the middle of the jungle, where a column of about 40 armed rebels were standing to greet me. After my initial shock I quickly scanned their faces, hoping



to find that of Comrade Jose, the \$5 million man. Jose wasn't there but at the end of the line stood someone I did recognize from newspaper pictures: Comrade Raul, Jose's brother. It was obvious that the man standing next to him was someone important too, but I couldn't place him.

I was offered some food. Raul and the other important-looking guy sat with me. It then became clear who this other guy actually

was. It was Comrade Alipio, the military leader of the Shining Path, the man behind the most of the armed actions the group carried out in the decade before his death and, at the time, pretty much the most feared man in Peru. Besides a rather outdated picture of him that the newspapers still publish regularly, there were no other images of Alipio in circulation, so it was little wonder I wasn't able to recognize him from the outset.



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Raul started by telling me that this meeting was for us to get to know each other, and that they would grant me the interview at a future opportunity. What followed was an exhausting debate about Marxism, Maoism, and several other isms. Raul displayed very rusty arguments, reminiscent of the Cold War. I guess it's difficult to keep up to date with politics when you're holed up in a remote jungle for 20 years. After we had chatted for a while, Raul told me to get some sleep, though a symphony of jungle noises and a slipped disc in my neck barely let me. The presence of a teenager with a MAG 7.62 heavy machine gun guarding my bedside didn't help much either.



Comrades Raul and Alipio

To my delight, the next morning Raul said we should get on with the interview proper. He told me they had close to no links with the drug lords but that, in the areas under their control, farmers were allowed to cultivate coca. Despite my skepticism, I thought there was some truth to what he said. After all, it was

more than clear that they were not a wealthy bunch. I was allowed to look at every weapon they had—they were all labeled “Peruvian Army” or “Peruvian Police.” This ragtag army of men averaging 5'3” in height had actually ambushed the army and police enough times to stock themselves with dozens of automatic rifles.

Raul then went on to make an admission of guilt that the group had never before conceded: “We behaved like criminals; we



behaved like terrorists.” He blamed Abimael Guzman, the imprisoned Shining Path founder, for all the barbaric acts they had inflicted on civilians in the past: “We call for the execution of [Abimael Guzman], for the crimes he committed against humanity,” he said. But, despite his current loathing of the psychopathic Guzman and his heinous crimes, Raul and his older brother are known to have participated in several massacres of civilians. I asked him about an



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infamous one, which took place in the small Andean village of Lucanamarca in 1983. “I participated, and so did Comrade Jose... if we committed excesses in Lucanamarca, if we annihilated children and women, it was because those were the party’s orders.”

Sixty-nine people, including 29 women and children, were slaughtered in Lucanamarca, most of them with machetes, in order to save bullets. How could he justify a people’s movement that routinely killed soldiers, the vast majority of whom came from the impoverished classes?

“The soldiers are our class brothers, but it’s these enslaving laws that make these sons of the people fight for the State. Why aren’t the sons of the rich serving in the army?” It seemed that Raul had an answer for everything.

Probably the most controversial of the many issues that surround the Shining Path is the presence of several dozen young children within their ranks. “Raul” had proudly given me a USB stick with footage of the Shining Path children shouting Marxist-Maoist slogans they clearly didn’t understand. I questioned him about the origin of these kids, as some reports state that they had been abducted.

“No one will ever prove that we have kidnapped a single child. Our children are not involved in combat, they are the sons and daughters of our combatants and there isn’t a single one of them who cannot



read and write.”

Suddenly our interview was cut short by a rebel whispering something in Comrade Raul’s ear. Raul asked me to switch off the camera while whispers between him and Alipio went back and forth. I switched the camera off and then switched it on again. And that’s when the striking question from Raul came: “We’ve

just received news that an 80-strong military detachment is heading in our direction, and you have to understand that we want to raise a concern from our part. We wanted to ask if this is because of a plot between you and the enemy?”

Before I could answer, Raul and Alipio began to plan what actions to take. Armed columns of fighters were being sent in different directions. Raul looked as if he had suddenly lost all trust in me, so I tried to make some chitchat with Alipio.

“So, Comrade Alipio, what’s happening?”

“The enemy is on the move, but we’ve got a unit on standby to proceed with an ambush at any moment.”

Due to what seemed to be an imminent confrontation, Alipio told me to spend a further night at their camp, for my own safety. Fortunately, the next day I learnt that the armed forces’ detachment had headed in a different direction and the Shining Path had called their ambush off.

Just before I was to leave, a shy and inarticulate Comrade Alipio approached me. He coyly told me that he also wanted to say something to the camera. Immediately, I started recording. Unlike Raul, Alipio didn’t have a way with words; his terms were quite simple, bordering on the infantile. He was only interested in talking about one thing. He and his troops had recently attacked an army base, as a result of which three soldiers were killed and a helicopter was downed. To the indignation of Alipio, he and his followers had not received the media exposure they expected after their feat, so he was after some publicity.

After saying goodbye, I was escorted by four rebels on a long walk out of the emergency zone (one of them was actually carrying a loaded RPG launcher). I was then handed over to



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another coca farmer, with whom I walked through the night. Thirteen hours later, I had been bitten by more types of insects than I knew existed, had poison-ivy rashes all over my arms, two toes infected, and a slipped disk that was hurting like hell, but, finally, I was out of that jungle.

That was back in late 2010. Hundreds of army operatives after that, the forces of law and order still couldn't get hold of any Shining Path member until August 2013, when Alipio, Gabriel, and Alfonso (the one who lent me his rifle) were lured into a hut and blown to smithereens. That was the end of Alipio: a hardened warrior, murderer and intellectually deficient individual, whose operatives managed to take on the US-backed Peruvian Armed Forces for over a decade.

Detecting threats in a crowd

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131105-detecting-threats-in-a-crowd>

Around a military camp situated close to a built-up area there are always people moving about. Scientists at FOI, the Swedish Defense Research Agency, have therefore created a multi-sensor system designed to be able to detect threats by identifying unusual patterns of movement involving individuals or groups.

The technology is based on a number of sensors that detect human movement patterns which are then interpreted in a signal processing system. When the patterns deviate from what might be expected, the system triggers an alarm.

For example, it might be that one or more individuals in a crowd are moving more quickly, or in a different direction, compared to the general flow, which could mean that something irregular is going on. Or perhaps a group is loitering by the side of a road, which could indicate that a roadside bomb is being planted.

A FOI release reports that an important part of this research is about optimizing combinations of sensors and their positioning."

"All sensors have their advantages and disadvantages. A visual sensor is fine during daylight but not at night. An infrared sensor is good when it is dark but not when it is too hot. An acoustic sensor captures all sounds and cannot be blocked out, but different sounds can be difficult to separate," says Maria Andersson, senior research scientist at FOI.

She adds: "If one knows what one is looking for, then it is not too difficult, a fight can be converted into known algorithms. It is more difficult when the system has to interpret what a gathering of people means, or the way in which groups form or disperse."

Andersson tells how the system is now being developed to enable it to find groups who are

on the move and to recognize an individual person's movement patterns and how these relate to one another. The aim is to produce a system demonstrator during the course of 2014, the test results of which can then be



commercialized by partners in industry.

"In the future we would like to develop the detection element to enable it to follow individual persons in a crowd. This is difficult, not least because people block each other's sightlines. What we have to do, therefore, is to create methods of finding stable distinctive features," Andersson says.

The closer we get to personal identification systems, the more important questions of data integrity become.

"We are working on this particular aspect in various EU projects. Provided that detection is taking place in order to tell whether something unusual is taking place, the question of personal data is not so sensitive. If individual persons are being tracked we can save the information in the system for a while in case something happens but we must then delete it. We are also looking at the possibility of finding forms of detection that do not identify human features but rather focus on the color of clothing or some other characteristic," says Andersson.




Heroin trade joins terrorists, organised crime figures, experts say

Source: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2013/11/04/reporange-01

Smuggling heroin through the Balkan Route has led to a new concept in which organised crime and terrorism are working together, experts said, noting that this is only a part of a

directors of the International Narcotics Enforcement Officers Association, told *SETimes*.

Some say this shows a new collaboration



much bigger scheme in which criminals and terrorists are making tens of billions of euros. According to research presented by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol and think tanks including the Adriatic Institute in Croatia, the **Balkan Route's origination in Afghanistan/Pakistan via Iran into Europe is a 15 billion-euro annual market in heroin smuggling.**

"About 90 percent of the heroin in Europe comes via the Balkans. It's a huge amount of money and the Islamists in the Middle East, from where the whole story starts, are taking most of that money for themselves," Marko Nicovic, a member of the board of

between organised crime and terrorism, in which each has its own interest – one to make money, and the other to finance its radical practice.

"This is a brand new safety aspect in which organised crime and terrorism are working together. This area is unexplored and law enforcement should pay attention to this compound. For example, people from Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH] who are fighting in Syria or in other battlegrounds can serve as couriers to transmit messages and arrange heroin transfers," Predrag Ceranic, a professor of law with the Police College in Banja Luka, told *SETimes*.



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"Reports show that heroin smuggling finances terrorist groups including Hamas, Hezbollah and even al-Qaeda. Extremist groups and radical Islamists in the Balkans are beneficiaries of the Balkan Route's illicit trade," Natasha Srdoc, executive director of the Adriatic Institute, told *SETimes*.

She added that corruption in state institutions throughout the Balkans has created an environment that aids the heroin trade.

"Organised crime co-exists with corruption and politically influenced judiciary in the Balkans. Hence, corrupt diplomats, politicians and judges in the Balkans are the major barriers and thus certainly complicit in evil. According to Global Financial Integrity, the treasuries of the countries in the region haemorrhaged (86 billion euros) in illicit financial outflows via crime, corruption and tax evasion for the years 2001-2010," Srdoc said.

Earlier this year, while in BiH, UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov said the UN will join the countries to fight this trend.

"UNODC is building a coherent response to drugs, crime and terrorism, which views them as global phenomena needing global solutions. To achieve this, we are introducing integrated programmes that deliver effective assistance," Fedotov said.

"Our goal in Southeast Europe is to counter transnational organised crime, corruption, money laundering, terrorism and drug abuse," he added.

The case of Darko Saric, a drug lord who is accused of trying to smuggle more than 5 tonnes of cocaine from South America to Montenegro, showed that fighting drug smuggling needs to reach to a global level of co-operation.

The Belgrade Prosecutor for Organised Crime recently reported that Saric laundered more than 3 billion euros in Serbia by providing loans to 600 firms. Saric, who is Montenegrin, remains at large, but dozens of his associates have been arrested.

At the border crossing between Turkey and Bulgaria in mid-August, border police seized more than 700 kilos of heroin found in a truck driven by a Croatian citizen.

"For land routes, dealers use roads in Albania and Kosovo which then lead to Belgrade and Sarajevo. Major players in the Balkans are the people who are identified as businessmen," Dzevad Galijasevic, a former member of the expert team for battling terrorism and organised crime in Southeast Europe and the author of several books about mujahedins and terrorism in BiH and the region, told *SETimes*.

Read also this very good report on opium trafficking:

<http://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-and-policy/5255/afghan-opium-heroin-tracking-europe>

Holder fears 'lone wolf' terrorist attack, doesn't want TSA armed

Source: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/05/politics/holder-terror-snowden-interview/index.html>

Attorney General Eric Holder is most afraid of a terrorist attack on the United States from a so-



called "lone wolf," such as the attackers involved in the Washington Navy Yard and Los Angeles International Airport shootings.

"I'm very concerned about individuals who get radicalized in a variety of ways, sometimes

self-radicalized," the nation's top law enforcement officer told CNN's Justice reporter Evan Perez in an exclusive interview.

Just days after a shooter entered LAX airport and killed one Transportation Security Administration worker, Holder rejected the idea to arm those officers.

"Now, that doesn't mean that we shouldn't review the measures that are in place to keep people safe from the time that they get out of

their cars and go into the terminals," he said.

In the wide-ranging conversation Tuesday, he also said that he rejected demands from supporters



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that NSA leaker Edward Snowden be offered clemency.

As President Barack Obama's top legal expert, the attorney general deflected a question about whether he has gotten a free pass for approving many of the surveillance tactics at the National Security Agency.

He responded: "We have to ask some very legitimate questions."

Holder spoke to CNN during a visit to a federal courthouse Tuesday to highlight a program that helps ex-offenders reintegrate into their communities.

Holder said he didn't support clemency for Snowden, the national security contractor who leaked the classified information about surveillance programs.

He said "the mechanisms that he used" to publicize his concerns with the government's surveillance aren't "worthy of clemency."

"I think that he has clearly broken the law and harmed the nation that he claims to have loved," Holder said.

While Holder said Snowden deserved to be punished for his crime, in nearly the same breath he said that Snowden sparked a necessary conversation.

"The conversation that we are engaged in is one that I think is certainly worthwhile, to try to determine how do we safeguard privacy and keep the American people safe," Holder said.

Holder says the administration needs to ask itself if the surveillance net had "gone to far," but it wouldn't go as far as saying if it was a concern he had before the Snowden incident.

"I didn't say that," Holder responded, adding that the administration was already having "conversations" about the collection of metadata.

"It was a conversation that, frankly, was going on, certainly within the administration," Holder said. "Now the conversation is a .. is a more public one."

The reach of the NSA's surveillance has caused a fiery response overseas and domestically since Snowden leaked documents to The Washington Post and The Guardian newspapers.

Holder said Snowden could have addressed his concerns with government surveillance in other ways, such as through the court system.

Throughout his tenure, Holder has come under fire from Republican critics who held him in contempt of Congress. He has been under investigation, and subsequently cleared by the inspector general, in the botched gun-trafficking program "Fast and Furious." He has also taken fire for his role in defending the Voting Rights Act and reviewing cases of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

Despite the turmoil, Holder has refused calls for his resignation.

As instances of mass gun violence continue to spark conversations about gun control, Holder said Tuesday that politicians in Washington failed to pass meaningful gun safety legislation.

"Yes, we've failed. We've failed," Holder said, referring to Congress' refusal to pass stricter background checks of gun purchasers after the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, last year.

"It can't be the new normal. It cannot be something that we accept. Uh, there is too much gun violence," he added.

As two states have legalized marijuana and voters in one of those state, Colorado, head to the polls today to vote on a marijuana tax, Holder said he doesn't anticipate any change to federal laws outlawing the drug.

Instead, he said he is looking at how marijuana laws are enforced.

While Holder plans to stay on the job, he admits that times haven't always been easy.

"I've had some days that have been better than others," he said.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: "Yes, we've failed" – You cannot imagine how many times I have heard this phrase – at least in Greece! It seems that opinion makers around the globe have a new "copy & paste" strategy to cover their insufficiencies. The fact that "we are only humans!"; that "we also make mistakes!" When somebody fails in Naval Yard, in Sany Hook, in LAX airport, in US Embassy in Tripoli or in Long Island shopping mall then he should go home or change policy. The new incident is about to happen "tomorrow" and a new "Yes, we've failed" will follow accompanied by the same dose of mass media surprise about the unexpected that unfortunately happened to "them"!



Hyping the number of deaths from terrorism

By Glenn Kessler

Source: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/06/hyping-the-number-of-deaths-from-terrorism/>



"We've got al-Qaeda spreading around the world in a way that is frightening. Think about it. Last year alone, some 15,000 terrorist-related deaths."

— Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, on CBS's "Face the Nation," Nov. 3, 2013

Rogers, in making the case for robust intelligence gathering, cited a figure for terrorist deaths at the hands of al-Qaeda that seemed a bit high. (He also mentioned a historical analogy, but got the history wrong, according to our colleagues at PolitiFact.)

The Facts

At first, it sounded as though Rogers said that al-Qaeda was responsible for 15,000 deaths in 2012. That's absurdly high, so we will give Rogers a break and assume he just meant that there were 15,000 terrorist-related deaths.

Kelsey Knight, a Rogers spokesman, said that his number was derived from the Global Terrorism Database, housed at the University of Maryland and managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Though the database currently only includes data until 2011, a leaked 2012 report to CNN says it

counted more than 8,500 terrorist attacks that killed nearly 15,500 people.

Case closed? Not so fast.

START also collects the terrorism data for the State Department, and its 2012 report says that terrorists killed about 11,000 people that year in nearly 6,800 attacks.

How can the same data collector come up with such different figures? That's because the

Global
Terrorism
Database

counts attacks

against soldiers (such as deaths during a Taliban offensive against U.S. troops) whereas the State Department defines terrorism as attacks against noncombatants.

START uses the broader criteria in order to remain consistent with a database originally collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services that was acquired by University of Maryland

The Washington Post



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researchers. Funding from the Department of Homeland Security has helped extend the database.

But the State Department uses its definition — that terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” — because of a law passed by Congress. The definition is enshrined in Title 22 of the U.S. Code.

As for al-Qaeda, the organization or its affiliates killed a little over 1,000 people in 2012, unless you also include the Taliban and its Pakistani offshoot. That would get the figure to about 3,500.

“The START numbers are a credible estimate and that they are doing it under a government contract, so it’s not a non-government estimate,” Knight said.

The Pinocchio Test

We understand politicians’ desire to use the most dramatic number possible when making a point, and certainly the Global Terrorism Database is a respected trove of information.

But a chairman of a congressional committee really should rely on the official government numbers released by the State Department, especially because those numbers are guided by a definition required by Congress. The difference in the numbers is too great to ignore.

Two Pinocchios



The Pinocchio Test

Source: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/about-the-fact-checker/#pinocchio>

Where possible, we will adopt the following standard in fact-checking the claims of a politician, political candidate, diplomat or interest group.



One Pinocchio

Some shading of the facts. Selective telling of the truth. Some omissions and exaggerations, but no outright falsehoods.




Two Pinocchios

Significant omissions and/or exaggerations. Some factual error may be involved but not necessarily. A politician can create a false, misleading impression by playing with words and using legalistic language that means little to ordinary people.



Three Pinocchios

Significant factual error and/or obvious contradictions.



Four Pinocchios

Whoppers.





The Geppetto Checkmark

Statements and claims that contain “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” will be recognized with our prized Geppetto checkmark.



An Upside-Down Pinocchio

A statement that represents a clear but unacknowledged “flip-flop” from a previously-held position.



Withholding Judgment

There will be many occasions when it is impossible to render a snap judgment because the issue is very complex or there are good arguments on both sides. In this case, we will withhold our judgment until we can gather more facts. We will use this website to shed as much light as possible on factual controversies that are not easily resolved.

Al Shabaab and the New Threat We Face

By James P. Farwell and Darby Arakelian

Source: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/al-shabaab-the-new-threat-we-face-9359?goback=.gde_4709642_member_5795099194410704896

The shocked and terrified faces of the survivors standing in a smoke-filled mall in Nairobi's



upscale shopping complex dramatized the high emotion in a shaken nation. Women clutched small children as gunshots had broken out. Some were crying. The perplexed expression of a boy, perhaps ten years old, resting in the arms of his stunned father, shocked by the mayhem, defined the reaction of Kenya and the world to the murderous September 2013 attack. The sixty-seven victims included President Uhuru Kenyatta's nephew and Ghanaian poet Kofi Awoonor, shot dead in his car while preparing to leave.

A well-trained, disciplined, heavily armed team of Al Shabaab assailants sporting black bandanas with Arabic script showed discretion. Shouting, as *Guardian* reporter Daniel Howden has recounted, “Muslims, get out of here;” the terrorists targeted Christians. Howden exposed Kenya's dysfunctional command-and-control structure, whose infighting between military and police prolonged the attack. Kenyans later learned the terrorists weren't the only blight: store owners accused Kenya's military of looting.

Al Shabaab's attack came even as some had argued that African Union forces supported by four thousand Kenyan troops had the terrorist group on the run. French intelligence reportedly helped to interdict Somali crossborder incursions into Kenya. But the Westgate attackers were not all Somalis. That challenges optimists to reassess.

Al Shabaab suffered setbacks. In dislodging the group from the southern port city of Kismayo, Kenya's military deprived it an important source of funding. One important diplomat in Africa said that this has left Al Shabaab desperate for




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funds and that may account for new intensity in the slaughter of African elephants and rhinos—a tragedy that U.S. Government neither comprehends nor shows sufficient will to stop. Criminal-terrorist networks are funding it to raise money through the sale of tusks and horns.

Plus internal strife has divided Al Shabaab. A dangerous extremist with close ties to Al Qaeda, Ahmed Abdi Godane, aka Sheik Mukhtar “Abu Zubeir,” has put himself in

society. For Westgate, he compensated by tapping into Al Qaeda networks for well-trained foreign fighters, including a Norwegian and possibly Britons. Kenyan authorities believe the attack was planned in Norway and Somalia. The organizational discipline was impressive. It indicated training, sound bases within Kenya, and local aiding and abetting.

Westgate yielded important lessons. First, global partnerships matter in defeating evolving terror networks. Besting the assailants required



charge through his control of the Amniyat, Al Shabaab's intelligence wing, commanded by a thug nicknamed Karate. Godane used it to jail Hassan Dahir Aweys (who escaped), and murder internal Al Shabaab rivals, including Ibrahim Haji Jama al Afghani and Omar Hammami, aka Abu Mansur al Amriki. Hammami gained international visibility in messaging to Western audiences through his YouTube rap music videos conducted in English. Godane advocates global jihad. In February 2012, Godane had the group declare itself an affiliate to Al Qaeda and pledged formal allegiance to Ayman Zawahiri.

Godane, a poetry enthusiast, is impaired by cultural handicaps in Somalia. He lacks clan and tribal ties integral to flourishing in that

support from thirty or so vigilantes of Indian extraction who rushed to the scene from the surrounding neighborhood, British SAS, and Israeli commandos. Western myopia may dismiss groups like Al Shabaab as marginal. Ask how marginal its victims view its sting.

And Islamists are hardly the only actors who should worry us. The Mexican drug wars have taken perhaps 80,000 Mexican civilian lives since 2006. Former General Barry McCaffery has rightly called this a general war, as prior distinctions between terror and criminal networks blur and grow obsolete.

These developments suggest profound implications for the U.S., now conducting its latest Quadrennial Defense Review to define the



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requirements and capabilities for our military. As stated by David Barno and Nora Bensahel: “Given the 2014 QDR’s charter to look out 20 years, how should the United States balance investments in military capabilities today to position the nation to fully deal with less clear threats of tomorrow.” The White House must integrate the conclusions this review reaches into a holistic approach towards confronting the

Godane is infusing his ranks with a new generation of volunteers from around the world. Al Shabaab has produced glossy videos to recruit American and Brits. *NBC News* reports that Al Shabaab has more Americans than any other Al Qaeda offshoot. Godane is threatening strikes against Britain and other Western targets. No one can dismiss the possibility that he’ll send Western militants home to wreak more violence.



Second, Westgate is a poster child for the kind of engagements and conflicts we should anticipate seeing over the next 20 years. We’re unlikely to see another Waterloo, Desert Storm (1991) or Iraqi Freedom (2003). These conflicts postured opposing traditional armies against one another on defined battlefields.

Retired British General Sir Rupert Smith rightly terms likely future engagements and conflicts as “war amongst the people.” In the new battle-space, combatants operate among noncombatants. Political, diplomatic, military and law enforcement personnel must operate as one team. Not all threats lead to armed fighting. As Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui acutely observed in their book, *Unrestricted Warfare*, financial, trade, psychological, cyber and other forms of unrestricted warfare will more likely provide the currency of confrontation.

engagements and conflicts that pose the most significant global risks anticipated in the next two decades. The U.S. cross-government effort being mounted in countering terrorist and transnational crime offers a promising illustration of a smart approach, despite a too narrow focus on law enforcement where special operations may prove sometimes more appropriate.

For now, Al Shabaab has grabbed top visibility for violent Islamic criminals. Yes, criminals is the correct term. Terming them political actors elevates them to an unmerited status. And despite ties to Al Qaeda, it operates on its own, making its own decisions, pursuing its own agenda. It is not Al Qaeda. Al Shabaab presents a global, not merely regional African risk.

The new global risk environment requires new thinking. That applies to corporations operating globally as well as to the U.S. government. Aircraft carriers costing \$13 billion and \$300 million dollar fighter jets are not the answer. Champions of these over-priced luxuries worry about a war with China. They can relax. China is too busy looting our technology and acquiring companies and energy resources all over the world to bog itself down in a shooting war.

The new global risks mandate, to use Christian Whiton’s term in his excellent new book, *Smart Power*, is just that—smart power. The U.S. must develop and enhance key core capabilities like Special Operations Forces and rethink plans to reduce the size of rather than



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make the U.S. Marines a more robust strike force. (Actually, what makes more sense is making the Marines more robust, with all the firepower and support that it needs as a strike force.) The challenge demands vastly enhanced cyber capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; maneuver, command and control (at Westgate, all sides used Twitter to message); influencing opinion and other variables that may determine success or failure. It requires a multinational approach and globally integrated capabilities. It requires emphasizing political or diplomatic over kinetic tactics where appropriate, and the ability to mesh these seamlessly.

The new global risk requires enabling rapid responses to unexpected crises where deployment of general purpose forces or heavy firepower is the wrong strategy. Recent

examples include potential operations to eliminate or control Syrian VMDs, the Benghazi tragedy, and the kidnapping of Americans off the coast of Nigeria, which somehow caught shipowners unprepared despite piracy off of East Africa that got choked off only once ships began to carry properly trained and armed guards.

Bottom line: Westgate was a wake-up call. Expect future attacks, in the West and places from aligned terror/criminal networks. Effective response requires well-resourced, highly trained professionals and the will to do what it takes to prevail. We won't eliminate such threats. But we can manage them. Let's put our resources to the best use, giving priority to what it takes to address the risks that truly threaten our security and prosperity.

James Farwell is a national security expert and author of THE PAKISTAN CAULDRON: CONSPIRACY, ASSASSINATION & INSTABILITY (Washington: Potomac Books, 2011) and PERSUASION & POWER (Washington: Georgetown University press, 2012).

Darby Arakelian is a former CIA Officer and national security expert. The views expressed are their own and do not represent that of the U.S. Government, its departments, agencies, or COCOM.

Your personal \$849 underwater 'drone'

By Ryan Bergeron (CNN)

Source: <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/tech/innovation/underwater-drones/>

"Live every week like it's Shark Week." Those immortal words come not from the Discovery Channel's marketing department but from Tracy Morgan on "30 Rock."

Believe it or not, there once was a time when there was no Shark Week. It wasn't until famed oceanographer Jacques Cousteau's 1956 documentary, "The Silent World," that people began to see what the world under the sea was really like.

"Jacques Cousteau changed the way ocean exploration was done," said Eric Stackpole, who along with partner David Lang is behind a submersible robotic watercraft – sort of an underwater drone – that could open a whole new world of undersea exploration.

Cousteau "invited people to explore along with him, and so for us it's the same thing," said Lang.

Their invention, called an OpenROV, is a submarine-like robot that you control with your laptop. It gives scientists, explorers and other

users a glimpse of what lies below the surface, without them getting wet.

"R-O-



V stands for remotely operated vehicle" Stackpole said. "It's got a video camera on it, so you can see what it sees live. So I can put this in the water, fly it around and see what it sees."



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The OpenROV is about the size of a toaster and is engineered to go to depths of up to 100 meters.

Underwater ROVs have been used for research for years. But the biggest difference

people were truly interested in taking the plunge.

"We set a goal for \$20,000 and ended up raising that in about two hours, which is really exciting," Lang said. "It's fun to watch the kind



between the OpenROV and the one, say, James Cameron uses, is the price.

The OpenROV sells for \$849. It's not what everyone would call cheap, but you don't need a grant to get your hands on one. This affordability is how Stackpole and Lang hope to bring OpenROV to the masses, turning average people into Cousteau-like undersea adventurers.

"If you think about ocean exploration right now, it's something that a lot of people think, 'Oh, well, you know, what that's something that professional scientists do, that National Geographic explorers do. That's not something that I get to do,'" Lang said, "I think that's what we're trying to instill back in everyone."

The two met when Stackpole was interning with NASA and Lang was between jobs, and both immediately bonded over the idea of a new way to explore the ocean.

"When we first met almost three years ago ... within 10 minutes Eric told me a story about this underwater cave," Lang said. "Within a half an hour we were talking about, 'Well, what if we could build an underwater robot that could go and roam the ocean and anyone could go on and control it from the Internet?'"

The project started in their garage in Cupertino, California -- home to some other famous tech innovators: Apple. But once they turned to Kickstarter last year, they saw how many

of dollar amounts go up, but then you quickly realize, 'Oh my God, we have to build all these things.'"

There are over 500 OpenROVs in use now around the globe. Even though the project is growing, Stackpole and Lang are sticking with their do-it-yourself ethos.

The OpenROVs are an open-source project, meaning that anyone can hack them to create new features or uses for the devices. Lang and Stackpole sell the ROVs as kits, and customers put them together themselves.

It's a process that helps get everyone involved in the production and design aspect.

"We have people from well over 50 countries in our community who can all contribute to how to make the design better and how to use it better," Stackpole said.

Among those interested in OpenROVs are conservation groups who want to check on invasive fish species and teachers who want to use them in the classroom, Lang said.

Building a community of users to provide input is another way the OpenROV is unique. It also explains the first half of the name.

"OpenROV is an open-source community," Stackpole said. "If the ROV is having some sort of a problem and we can't figure out how to handle it, I can go onto the forums and post, 'Hey, this is a problem I'm having,' and as I sleep, the problem is going across Europe



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and people who are experts are answering it because they find it interesting.

"By the time I wake up, it's going to cross the U.S., and by lunch I can have five or six good solutions."

With a flow of new ideas coming in from all over the world, Stackpole and Lang have decided not to get a patent for the OpenROV -- at least not yet. This makes it easier for them to upgrade with new tech and designs.

"For us, we want to innovate as quickly as possible. We want to come up with new designs and revolutionize how underwater exploration is done rather than committing to

one design," said Stackpole. "We've been designing the ROV around parts that are not even in existence yet, but that we know are emerging."

As the OpenROV evolves and improves, this approach may allow for more exploration in uncharted waters.

"People often ask, 'Is it something that's just kind of a toy that's fun to build and play with, or is it something that you expect to be used by real researchers?' And our answer certainly is, 'both,'" Stackpole said.

Jacques Cousteau would certainly be proud.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Cousteau might be proud but "sharks" might like the idea and use it accordingly. See also the article below with the new "fashion" of 3D-printing!

Proliferation of Cheap 3-D Printers Raises Security Concerns

Source:<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/November/pages/ProliferationofCheap3-DPrintersRaisesSecurityConcerns.aspx>



The Liberator 3-D Printed Gun

When a man in May demonstrated that he could build a plastic gun from a 3-D printer and fire at least one shot from the homemade device, the story sent off alarm bells on Capitol Hill.

Such a weapon could be used to thwart metal detectors designed to keep weapons out of certain facilities, it was postulated.

While the technology to create items made of plastic, ceramics or other materials in a desktop-sized machine has been around for decades, lower prices have brought them into the consumer market. A 3-D printer can be bought for as little as \$1,600, which is in the price range of hobbyists, do-it-yourself types and



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those who like to invent things in their garages. “Banning a technology, which is your typical standard and knee-jerk reaction when something comes up, does not work,” said Michael Hopmeier, president of Unconventional Concepts Inc., a consulting firm specializing in counterterrorism, preparedness response and national security.

Three-D printing is rapidly proliferating throughout the world, experts said at a Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy panel discussion.

But it is only a small part of the larger, advanced additive manufacturing movement, which is using cutting edge computing, materials and equipment to change the way goods are made. The printers are being used to rapidly make prototypes or models.

As for the plastic gun threat, improvised and non-metallic firearms have been around a long time. The prospect of 3-D printed guns gets Congress “excited,” but it doesn’t change the security landscape in any way, Hopmeier said.

Similarly, a part to convert an AR-15 assault weapon from semi-automatic to fully automatic can be done using 3-D printing. A person can make it from plastic, build a mold around it and pour the metal. That’s not unique, Hopmeier noted. It can be done with a mill and a lathe and basic machining skills as well. Three-D printing just lowers the barrier to doing the work “a little bit,” he said.

More nefariously, advanced additive manufacturing and 3-D printers could be used to design and make precise, high-speed centrifuges to separate uranium compounds for nuclear weapons, he said. Again, it is not as if this can’t be done by other means, advanced manufacturing only lowers the barriers to entry to allow that to be done, Hopmeier said.

“It doesn’t mean it’s easy. It just means it’s easier,” he said.

Advanced manufacturing and 3-D printing could also be used to make fake parts. Counterfeiting has two purposes: one is to make money. Or there could be an intent to cause failure. Shoddy parts could cause a machine to explode, Hopmeier said.

The threat for the advanced manufacturing industry is that if action isn’t taken to mitigate security concerns brought on by 3-D printing “someone will,” he said, referring to Congress.

It is more than likely that action will probably be “pretty stupid,” he said. Policymakers must have alternatives. “Can we at least raise the barrier for entry for people to do bad things?” he asked.

Robert Schouwenburg, co-founder of Shapeways, an online site that uses the technology to manufacture custom-made objects made from glass, ceramics, metals or different kinds of plastics for customers who don’t have their own 3-D printers, said his start-up is now selling 50,000 products every month online.

The company now has more than 1 million files for objects it has made. “There are things that probably are illegal,” he said. Once designs are online, it is hard to stop them from proliferating around the world, he said.

Three-D printing, which is in its infancy, will fundamentally change the way products are distributed, just as MP3 files changed the way people consume music. These products could be guns or other illegal objects, Schouwenburg said.

“We need to be able to control that somehow. And that is a challenge,” he said.

Whether it is something as simple as jewelry, or a part for an unmanned aerial vehicle, “at Shapeways, we have no clue what we are printing. We have no clue what we are making for the customer. No clue on how the customer is going to use it,” he said.

One Killed in Explosion in China’s Shanxi Province

By Josh Chin

Source:<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304391204579180583567153914>

Investigators attributed a series of blasts outside a Communist Party building in central China to homemade bombs, state media reported, in an incident (Nov 6) that comes just a week after a suicide attack in the heart of Beijing.

The explosions at 7:40 a.m. Wednesday left one dead and at least eight others injured outside the Shanxi province party headquarters in the provincial capital of Taiyuan, police said. State media said car windows shattered 100 meters away, and photos posted online showed



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cars pockmarked from shrapnel-like debris. Authorities haven't identified perpetrators or

and government advisers on terrorism. "Obviously it was well plotted."



ascribed motivations. But the explosions came at a time when security forces are already on alert. Last week, a car crashed and burst into flames at the gates of the Forbidden City in what authorities called a terrorist attack. This Saturday, Chinese leaders open a much-anticipated policy conclave in Beijing, and ahead of that, the normally high police presence in the capital was already being beefed up.

Though homemade explosives are sometimes used in crimes and revenge attacks in China, Wednesday's blasts seemed more sophisticated. State media said seven or eight explosions were heard. Authorities later found steel balls and circuit boards scattered around the scene, leading police to believe that improvised explosive devices were used, according to the official Xinhua news agency.

Xinhua quoted two bystanders who said they were driving along a bridge near the Communist Party headquarters on Wednesday morning when they heard the blast. Twenty seconds later, Xinhua said, they saw smoke and fire coming out from underneath the bridge, and twenty seconds after that, they saw a small minivan explode near the entrance the building.

Unconfirmed reports in some state media said another explosion took place outside the Shanxi Letters and Calls Bureau, an office where people go to file grievances against officials and the justice system.

The accident site is shown Wednesday after explosions in Taiyuan, the capital of north China's Shanxi province. Zuma Press Multiple photos posted to China's Twitter-like Sina Weibo microblogging site showed marble-



The site of deadly blasts is cordoned off in Taiyuan, China, on Wednesday, days after an attack in Beijing. Chine Nouvelle/Sipa Press "Based on the details, personally I think this incident features characteristics of a terrorist attack," said Li Wei, one of China's top experts

sized ball bearings, nails and other debris purportedly collected at the scene. Other photos posted online suggest the Communist Party building in Taiyuan didn't sustain visible damage as a result of the explosions.



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Last week's incident in Beijing also took place in a highly symbolic area. A car plowed through crowds of tourists just off Tiananmen Square and ignited after slamming into a marble pillar in front of the Forbidden City gate, where the large portrait of Mao Zedong hangs. A top security official later said the attack was the work of a terrorist group that has been waging a violent separatist campaign in the restive far-western Xinjiang region.

With China's tight controls on guns, people with grievances have at times resorted to homemade bombs and other improvised devices to exact revenge on government agencies and other institutions.

In May 2011, 49 people were injured as a fire tore through a rural bank office in northwest China's Gansu province in what the government later described as a case of arson

the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

The bombing in Shanxi lit up social media, where it was the most discussed topic on Sina Corp.'s Weibo microblogging service. Some users debated whether such incidents qualify as terrorism since they often are rooted in personal grievances.

"It doesn't seem like a terrorist attack. More likely social inequality, high housing prices and inflation robbed this person of their conscience," wrote one user. "But the government has to consider carefully why there's been so much violence these past couple years. It seems like there are real problems in society that require serious attention, otherwise these recent incidents will just be the beginning."

A damaged taxi in Taiyuan, in northern China,



perpetrated by a former employee of the bank who had been fired for embezzlement. Two weeks later, a series of blasts at a prosecutor's office and two government buildings killed three and injured nine others in the city of Fuzhou, in southern Jiangxi province. Authorities identified the culprit, who died in one of the explosions, as a man angry over property seizure.

Commenting on Wednesday's blasts, Li Wei, the terrorism expert, said that bomb-making materials have historically been relatively easy to access in Shanxi, a top coal-producing province.

"Many areas in China have been tightening management and supervision over explosives, but the Taiyuan incident illustrates there are still flaws in that system," said Li, who works at

where authorities blamed a series of explosions Wednesday outside the provincial Communist Party headquarters on homemade bombs. The blasts killed at least one person only days after a deadly attack in Beijing. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Asked whether Wednesday's bombing and last week's Tiananmen Square attacks were signs of social unrest ahead the coming party conclave, China Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei said police were investigating the bombing and had already identified last week's attackers.

He added, "The Chinese Communist Party is going to hold an important meeting soon. It is of great significance to the deepening of reform and China's opening up. We wish this conference full success."



Josh Chin is editor of China Real Time Report, The Wall Street Journal's China blog. He also covers Chinese social media, law and the environment for the Journal and WSJ.com.

Spy chiefs reveal 34 terror plots since 7/7

Heads of M5, M6 and GCHQ gave evidence to MPs in public for first time

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10434393/Spy-chiefs-reveal-34-terror-plots-since-77.html>



The most striking new fact to be divulged was that the intelligence agencies and police have foiled 34 terrorist plots against the UK since the July 7 suicide bombings of 2005.

Mr Parker, however, warned that there are still “thousands” of violent extremists living in the UK who are known to M5.

He said: “The vast majority of plots come from people who live here.” He added that some plots aimed to be at least as big as 7/7, and: “Spectaculars are still in the minds of terrorists.”

One or two plots discovered each year were “aimed at mass casualties”, he said, the majority of which were thwarted by the actions of the intelligence and security agencies.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: The above text is kind of verification of a past IRA spokesman statement after the unsuccessful attempt to murder late former UK PM Margaret Thatcher: **“They have to be lucky all the time. We have to be lucky only once!”**

Terrorists exploiting Kolkata's security gaps

Source: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Terrorists-exploiting-Kolkatas-security-gaps/articleshow/25339864.cms>

In 2009, Kolkata Police arrested 'Bulla Mullick' and released him without verifying his identity. Four years later, they learnt it was Yasin Bhatkal - the founder of Indian Mujahideen. That was the first hint that Kolkata may be turning a hub of the terror network.

Indian Mujahideen operative Abdullah alias Nata, who was involved in the Mumbai blast, lived in Beniapukur but fled before the police realized who he was. He is now operating from Bangladesh.

And soon after the Patna blast on October 27, Kolkata Police arrested Md Ali with fake currency and a foreign passport. He is now suspected to have helped get the funds for Patna IEDs.

The January 2001 American Center shooting may be the only terrorist attack in Kolkata but that doesn't mean the city is not on the terror

radar. Insurgents are using Kolkata as a conduit for weapons, explosives and money and

even as a recruiting base, say security sources. The fact that Special Task Force has seized more than Rs 15 crore fake currency since its inception indicates Kolkata is a crucial stopover in the terror map.

Kolkata is hemmed by four districts - Howrah, Hooghly, North and South 24-Parganas - that have a common border with Bangladesh. Bengal shares its borders with three states and three countries. There are so many porous areas and it is not possible to set up a foolproof security cover for the city, say officers. Police have identified at least eight vulnerable points, particularly in North and South 24-Parganas, which give easy access to the city without using



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the main entry points like Howrah bridge, Vidyasagar Setu and Howrah and Seladah station that are under watch. Terrorists use Achipur, Budge Budge, Batanagar and Garden Reach as alternative routes to bypass police.

"Porous border areas are a serious problem. We have had several meetings with BSF to sort it out. Anyone who crosses the border unchecked will get easy access to the city without even boarding a train. We need to plug the gaps," North 24-Parganas SP Tanmoy Roychowdhury said.

"There have been instances when arms and explosives were smuggled in and used in subversive activities. Unless we can stop this we cannot control terrorism. Our commandant and the North 24-Parganas SP will have


regular meetings and we will follow up on the arrests made by us. We met the DGP and he has assured all assistance," said ADG-BSF (South Bengal) B D Sharma.

"Indian Mujahideen and some Bangladeshi outfits like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) use Kolkata for logistics, transport, funding and shelter. Bangladeshi outfits use this route to sneak into Nepal," an officer said.

"There are certain areas where checking is stringent but due to the large population it is not possible to plug all entry and exit points. If there is a specific intelligence input then checking is intensified," said joint commissioner (intelligence) Dilip Banerjee.

ShotSpotter detection system documents 39,000 shooting incidents in the District

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/shotspotter-detection-system-documents-39000-shooting-incidents-in-the-district/2013/11/02/055f8e9c-2ab1-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html



A very interesting article!


The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research

Edited by Alex P. Schmid

Source: <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415411578/>

This major new Handbook synthesises more than two decades of scholarly research, and provides a comprehensive overview of the field of terrorism studies.





The content of the Handbook is based on the responses to a questionnaire by nearly 100 experts from more than 20 countries as well as the specific expertise and experience of the volume editor and the various contributors. Together, they guide the reader through the voluminous literature on terrorism, and propose a new consensus definition of terrorism, based on an extensive review of existing conceptualisations. The work also features a large collection of typologies and surveys a wide range of theories of terrorism. Additional chapters survey terrorist databases and provide a guide to available resources on terrorism in libraries and on the Internet. It also includes the most comprehensive World Directory of Extremist, Terrorist and other Organizations associated with Guerrilla Warfare, Political Violence, Protest and Organized- and Cyber-Crime.

The *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* will be an essential work of reference for students and researchers of terrorism and political violence, security studies, criminology, political science and international relations, and of great interest

to policymakers and professionals in the field of counter-terrorism.

Alex P. Schmid is a Visiting Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague, and Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an international network of scholars who seek to enhance human security through collaborative research. He was co-editor of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence and is currently editor-in-chief of Perspectives on Terrorism, the online journal of TRI. Dr. Schmid held a chair in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews (Scotland) where he was, until 2009, also Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV). From 1999 to 2005 he was Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention Branch at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the rank of a Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer. From 1994 to 1999, Dr. Schmid was an elected member of the Executive Board of ISPAC (International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council) of the United Nations' Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme. Until 1999 he held the position of Extraordinary Professor for the Empirical Study of Conflict and Conflict Resolution (Synthesis Chair) at the Department of Sociology, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, and the position of Research Coordinator of PIOOM (Interdisciplinary Research Projects on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations, Centre for the Study of Social Conflict) at Leiden University. In 2003, Dr. Schmid was appointed Corresponding Member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), which was followed by an appointment as Fellow-in-Residence at the KNAW's Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS) in 2011. Currently, Alex Schmid serves on a number of boards, including Europol's TE-SAT, the Genocide Prevention Advisory Network (GPAN), the Asia-Pacific Foundation and the Global Terrorism Database of START, a Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security at the University of Maryland. He is also a Senior Fellow of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma.



ICT Study: Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World


Source: <http://i-hls.com/2013/11/ict-study-lone-wolf-terrorism-in-the-western-world/>

This study analyzed current trends and developments in lone wolf terrorism. Starting with a literature review, this paper analyzed the dataset to add information to the previous research, and analyzed case studies to examine previously researched trends in-depth.

Analysis of the dataset revealed a number of developments. The United States has the highest level of lone wolf terrorism. The total number of incidents in the United States – and in the Western world in general – is increasing. Second most-targeted countries are the United Kingdom and Germany. Over the past three decades, these three countries remained the

harder to trace, their attacks are preventable. It is most difficult to prevent when the attacker has no contact whatsoever with other extremists – Pantucci's loners were seen to be the most successful at carrying out terrorist attacks.

The increased level of military personnel targeted has increased in the last three decades – possibly due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Islamic terrorists no longer need to blame the West in general; concrete wars can be used to condone violence. This is just an idea, not a research finding, so research would be needed to link the increase in guerilla warfare to the American occupations.



Analysis of the five case studies revealed consistency with previous research themes. Previous research discusses the prevalence of psychopathology and social ineptitude in lone wolf



terrorists. The case studies likewise show instances of psychopathology and social ineptitude. This additionally fits with the data analysis from the dataset: loners were seen to be the most prevalent – and successful – type of lone wolf terrorist. Since the case studies were chosen due to

most targeted; however, the number of countries targeted by Islamic lone wolves has increased. In the 1990's, only the United States was targeted; from 2010 to 2013, the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Spain have also been attacked.

The United States have improved their ability to stop lone wolf attacks before they are implemented – dispelling the common notion that lone wolves are impossible to prevent. Even though they are unaffiliated and thus

their high fatality or injury rate, they represented successful cases. In this way, since loners are most likely to be successful, it is unsurprising that the case studies showed high prevalence of social ineptitude.

Another congruency with previous research was the influence of the Internet. In many of the case studies, the Internet influenced their radicalization. Some specifically were radicalized by Al-Awlaki's YouTube sermons. The



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Boston Bombers' success was additionally credited to the Internet, where they found their bomb-making recipe that injured 264 people. Lastly, the case studies supported the previously researched trend that lone wolves are motivated by a combination of personal grievances and broader goals. Almost all of the perpetrators analyzed had immense personal grievances: divorce, custody issues regarding children, job loss, mental illness, harassment, and more. In all the cases, the perpetrators were not religiously devout all their lives – in most of the cases, radical Islam was used as a comfort after the suffering of personal

grievances. Radical Islam was an attractive narrative for these people: it removed the blame from the individual, and externalized their personal problems and blamed Western society. Additionally, it condoned violence, and these people with personal frustrations used that to blame and to vent all of their problems out onto the world that had wronged them.

This study represented an overview of current trends and developments, linked to previous research themes. Future research is needed to look in-depth into each trend, and link the data to Islamic radicalization and, most importantly, prevention techniques.

Read the full paper at:

<http://i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Lone-Wolf-Sarah-Teich-2013.pdf>

Danish flagged ship attacked by pirates off Somalia coast

Source: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000097582&story_title=danish-flagged-ship-attacked-by-pirates

A Danish flagged vessel was attacked by pirates on Saturday off Somalia's coast. This is the latest in a series of increased pirating activities in the region.



The vessel, MV Torm Kansas, laden with 35,000 tonnes of oil products was attacked by pirates while enroute from Sikka, India to Mossel Bay in South Africa. The attack comes barely five days after two other vessels came under attack from pirates in the Indian ocean, according to a statement from counter-piracy NATO forces, sent to newsrooms Tuesday.

Reported incidents

Figures from the International Maritime Bureau indicate that as of October 22, this year, there have been eleven reported incidents of piracy off Somalia this year, including two hijackings.

Shipping stakeholders in the country say this indicates the piracy menace along the Gulf of Aden was far from being eliminated and shipping lines may not remove the levies introduced in 2009 because of piracy.

"The problem is that the threat is still there and shipping lines do not want to take a chance. They are still levying surcharges on freight rates to cater for security," said Kenya Ships Agents Association Chief Executive, Mr Juma Tellah.

Risk area

In May 2008, the Gulf of Aden was classified as a war risk area by Lloyds Market Association Joint War Committee, a move that led shipping lines to introduce risk premiums. The premiums have since increased 300 fold from \$500 (Sh43, 500) per ship, per voyage; to up to \$150,000



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(Sh13,050,000) per ship, per voyage, in 2010. The shipping lines also charge kidnap and ransom fees that cover the crew against ransom demands, but not the vessel or cargo. An insurance premium that covers goods transported along the Somali coast is also levied by the liners.

"Vigilance cannot be abandoned just because piracy seems to have fallen. The pirates can adapt and change their modus operandi," said the Seafarers Union of Kenya Secretary General, Mr Andrew Mwangura.

2 Nigerian groups added to U.S. list of terrorist organizations

Source: <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-boko-haram-20131114,0,3591553.story#axzz2kbl5Jkku>



An image taken from video shows a man claiming to be the leader of the Nigerian Islamist militant group Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau. (AFP/Getty Images / November 14, 2013)

Two Islamist groups in Nigeria have been added to the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations for killing thousands of people and threatening Westerners in West Africa, U.S. officials said Wednesday.

Boko Haram and a splinter group, Ansaru, were named to the federal roster of terrorist groups after U.S. officials determined that they had received training and some financing from the Al Qaeda affiliate in North Africa.

The designations "demonstrate our strong support for Nigeria's fight against terrorism and its efforts to address security challenges in the north," Lisa Monaco, President Obama's counter-terrorism advisor, said in a statement.

The listing makes it a federal crime to knowingly provide support to the groups. It also blocks them from the U.S. financial system and enables banks to freeze their U.S. assets. The State Department previously had named three

of Boko Haram's leaders to its global terrorism sanctions list.

Experts don't believe either group has strong enough U.S. links to be greatly harmed by the financial penalties. Both are focused on Nigeria and have their roots in economic and political grievances among the country's mainly Muslim north.

Boko Haram, whose name means "Western education is a sin," has attacked schools, churches, security forces and journalists in its campaign to impose *sharia*, or Islamic law, in northern Nigeria.

The group has said it wants to "eradicate Christians" from certain parts of Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation. Roughly half the people in Nigeria identify themselves as Christian.

Boko Haram is blamed for a suicide bombing at the United Nations office in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, that



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killed 21 people in 2011, and the kidnapping of seven French citizens in neighboring Cameroon in February. In September, it was suspected in an attack on a college dormitory in northern Nigeria in which at least 40 people were killed.

Ansaru has repeatedly attacked Nigerian troops and kidnapped foreigners working in Nigeria, one of the world's major oil producers. U.S. officials acknowledged that Boko Haram "remains primarily a Nigerian organization" but said the groups pose a sufficient enough threat to the United States that the terrorist designations were warranted.

"There is a very large American population in Nigeria and a lot of U.S. investment in Nigeria," said an official who briefed reporters on condition he not be identified. "Threats to Nigeria automatically impact the U.S. economy and American citizen interests."

The designation also was influenced by Nigeria's status as the economic engine of

West Africa, and a burgeoning power that contributes nearly 5,000 soldiers and police to international peacekeeping operations. The Pentagon has conducted training missions with Nigerian forces and occasionally has sent vessels to patrol the Gulf of Guinea, through which nearly 30% of U.S. oil imports pass.

But Nigerian security forces also have been blamed for widespread abuses as they battle the northern insurgency.

Last month, Amnesty International said that more than 950 people died in Nigerian military custody in the first half of 2013, and that most of the deaths took place in prisons where suspected Boko Haram members are held. The human rights group cited interviews with former prisoners that suggested many detainees may have been shot to death.

U.S. officials say they have raised concerns about possible abuses in meetings with Nigerian leaders.

GAO Report: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection Activities

Source: <http://publicintelligence.net/gao-behavior-detection/>

Available evidence does not support whether



behavioral indicators, which are used in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques

(SPOT) program, can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. GAO reviewed four meta-analyses (reviews that analyze other studies and synthesize their findings) that included over 400 studies from the past 60 years and found that the human ability to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance. Further, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) April 2011 study conducted to validate SPOT's behavioral indicators did not demonstrate their effectiveness because of study limitations, including the use of unreliable data. Twenty-one of the 25 behavior detection officers (BDO) GAO interviewed at four airports said that some behavioral indicators are subjective. TSA officials agree, and said they are working to better define them. GAO analyzed data from fiscal years 2011 and 2012 on the rates at which BDOs referred passengers for additional screening based on behavioral indicators and found that BDOs' referral rates varied significantly across airports, raising questions about the use of behavioral indicators by BDOs. To help ensure



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consistency, TSA officials said they deployed teams nationally to verify compliance with SPOT procedures in August 2013. However, these teams are not designed to help ensure BDOs consistently interpret SPOT indicators.

TSA has limited information to evaluate SPOT's effectiveness, but plans to collect additional performance data. The April 2011 study found that SPOT was more likely to correctly identify outcomes representing a high-risk passenger—such as possession of a fraudulent document—than through a random selection process. However, the study results are inconclusive because of limitations in the design and data collection and cannot be used to demonstrate the effectiveness of SPOT. For example, TSA collected the study data unevenly. In December 2009, TSA began collecting data from 24 airports, added 1 airport after 3 months, and an additional 18 airports more than 7 months later when it determined that the airports were not collecting enough data to reach the study's required sample size. Since aviation activity and passenger demographics are not constant throughout the year, this uneven data collection may have conflated the effect of random versus SPOT selection methods. Further, BDOs knew if passengers they screened were selected using the random selection protocol or SPOT procedures, a fact that may have introduced bias into the study. TSA completed a performance metrics plan in November 2012 that details the performance measures required for TSA to determine whether its behavior detection activities are effective, as GAO recommended in May 2010. However, the plan notes that it will be 3 years before TSA can begin to report on the effectiveness of its behavior detection activities. Until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security, the agency risks funding activities that have not been determined to be effective. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2013. Information that TSA deemed sensitive has been redacted.


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The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation's civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passengers and property transported by commercial passenger aircraft. At the more than 450 TSA-regulated airports in the United States, all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft or entering the sterile area of an airport pursuant to statutory and regulatory requirements and TSA-established standard operating procedures. BDA, and more specifically, the SPOT program, constitutes one of multiple layers of security implemented within TSA-regulated airports. According to TSA's strategic plan and other program guidance for the BDA program released in December 2012, the goal of the agency's behavior detection activities, including the SPOT program, is to identify high-risk passengers based on behavioral indicators that indicate "mal-intent." For example, the strategic plan notes that in concert with other security measures, behavior detection activities "must be dedicated to finding individuals with the intent to do harm, as well as individuals with connections to terrorist networks that may be involved in criminal activity supporting terrorism."

TSA developed its primary behavior detection activity, the SPOT program, in 2003 as an added layer of security to identify potentially high-risk passengers through behavior observation and analysis techniques. The SPOT program's standard operating procedures state that BDOs are to observe and visually assess passengers, primarily at passenger screening checkpoints, and identify those who display clusters of behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception. The SPOT procedures list a point system BDOs are to use to identify potentially high-risk passengers on the basis of behavioral and appearance indicators, as compared with baseline conditions where SPOT is being conducted. A team of two BDOs is to observe passengers as they proceed through the screening process. This process is depicted in figure 1.



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According to TSA, it takes a BDO less than 30 seconds to meaningfully observe an average passenger. If one or both BDOs observe that a passenger reaches a predetermined point threshold, the BDOs are to direct the passenger and any traveling companions to the second step of the SPOT process—SPOT referral screening. During SPOT referral screening, BDOs are to engage the passenger in casual conversation—a voluntary informal interview—in the checkpoint area or a predetermined operational area in an attempt to determine the reason for the passenger's behaviors and either confirm or dispel the observed behaviors. SPOT referral screening also involves a physical search of the passenger and his or her belongings. According to TSA, an average SPOT referral takes 13 minutes to complete. If the BDOs concur that a passenger's behavior escalates further during the referral screening or if other events occur, such as the discovery of fraudulent identification documents or

suspected serious prohibited or illegal items, they are to call a LEO to conduct additional screening—known as a LEO referral—who then may allow the passenger to proceed on the flight, or may question, detain, or arrest the passenger. The federal security director or designee, regardless of whether a LEO responds, is responsible for reviewing the circumstances surrounding a LEO referral and making the determination about whether the passenger can proceed into the sterile area of the airport.

...

Available Evidence Does Not Support Whether Behavioral Indicators Can Be Used to Identify Aviation Security Threats

Meta-analyses and other published research studies we reviewed do not support whether nonverbal behavioral indicators can be used to reliably identify deception. While the April 2011 SPOT validation study was a useful initial step and, in part, addressed issues raised in our May 2010 report, it does not demonstrate



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the effectiveness of the SPOT indicators because of methodological weaknesses in the study. Further, TSA program officials and BDOs we interviewed agree that some of the behavioral indicators used to identify passengers for additional screening are

subjective. TSA has plans to study whether behavioral indicators can be reliably interpreted, and variation in referral rates raises questions about the use of the indicators by BDOs.

Read the full GAO report at: <http://info.publicintelligence.net/GAO-BehaviorDetection.pdf>

Director Comey Testifies on Threats to the Homeland, FBI Response

Source: <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/homeland-threats-and-the-fbis-response>



- **James B. Comey**
- **Director**
- **Federal Bureau of Investigation**
- Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
- Washington, D.C.
- November 14, 2013

Good morning, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and for your continued support of the men and women of the FBI.

Today's FBI is a threat-focused, intelligence-driven organization. Every FBI professional understands that preventing the key threats facing our nation means constantly striving to be more efficient and more effective.

Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and to our communities. These diverse threats illustrate the complexity and breadth of the FBI's mission and make clear the importance of its partnerships. We cannot do it alone. To accomplish its mission, the FBI relies heavily upon its partners around the globe.

In fact, our national Headquarters and local field offices have built partnerships with just about every federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agency in the nation. Our agents and professional staff also work closely with law enforcement, intelligence, and security services in foreign countries, as well as international organizations like Interpol.

By combining our resources and leveraging our collective expertise, we are able to investigate national security threats that cross both geographical and jurisdictional boundaries.

It is important to emphasize that the FBI carries out this broad mission with rigorous obedience to the rule of law and protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of the citizens we serve.

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism remains our top priority. The FBI works with our law enforcement and intelligence community (IC) partners to integrate intelligence and operations and to detect and disrupt terrorists and their organizations.

As the Boston bombings this past April illustrate, the terrorist threat against the United States remains very real. We face a continuing threat from homegrown extremists, especially those who act alone or in small cells. Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) present unique challenges because they do not share a typical profile and their experiences and motives are often distinct, which makes them difficult to identify and their plots difficult to disrupt. Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to encourage extremists in the West to follow this model by engaging in individual violent attacks and have already incorporated the Boston bombings in their propaganda. The Boston Marathon bombing suspects are from the North Caucasus, but the links, if any, between the



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bombing and that region remain unclear. We currently assess the threat from North Caucasus-based militants to the homeland to be minimal as they remain focused on fighting against Russian security forces in the North Caucasus.

The Boston bombing also demonstrated the devastating potential of an improvised explosive device (IED) crafted from simple components, which could inspire other extremists to use such tactics. The devices used in Boston were similar in design to instructions widely available online. In addition to the Boston attack, over the past two years we have also seen extremists attempt to detonate IEDs or bombs at such high-profile targets as the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, the U.S. Capitol, and commercial establishments in downtown Chicago, Tampa, and Oakland. Fortunately, these attempts, as well as many other plots, were thwarted. Yet the threat remains.

Overseas, the terrorist threat is similarly complex and ever-changing. We are seeing more groups engaged in terrorism, a wider array of terrorist targets, greater cooperation among terrorist groups, and continued evolution and adaptation in tactics and communication. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, especially al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), continue to represent a top terrorist threat to the nation. These groups have attempted several attacks on the United States, including the failed Christmas Day airline bombing in 2009, the attempted bombing of U.S.-bound cargo planes in October of 2010, and a disrupted plot to conduct a suicide bomb attack on a U.S.-bound airliner in April 2012.

Beyond the Middle East, threats emanating from Africa remain a concern to the FBI. Al Shabaab, based in Somalia, recently attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The FBI continues to assess that al Shabaab lacks the intent to conduct or directly support attacks in the United States, as doing so would not be consistent with the group's strategic aims of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia and defeating the Somali and foreign troops obstructing their efforts to do so. We expect Kenya to remain the primary focus of the group's external attacks, though other nearby countries participating in military offensives against the group, such as Ethiopia and Uganda, remain at risk as well. Nonetheless, the FBI remains concerned that externally focused elements affiliated with the group are likely to aspire to attack the West and the U.S. Additionally, domestic extremists could draw inspiration from the group's propaganda and the Westgate Mall attack to employ similar tactics in the Homeland.

In North Africa, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to grow its operational reach and safe haven into Libya and Mali, threatening U.S. and Western interests in the region. The FBI assesses AQIM, its affiliates and allies, and aspirant groups in the region pose a low threat to the homeland in the short- to mid-term, but pose a high threat to U.S. and Western interests in the region, especially at embassies, hotels, and diplomatic facilities in Tunisia and Libya. Since 2009, AQIM has a demonstrated capability to target Western interests, most notably through kidnap for ransom techniques. Since 2011, AQIM splinter groups, along with Libya- and Tunisia-based Ansar al Sharia extremists, have increasingly proven their anti-Western ideologies through high-profile attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya; the U.S. Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia; British oil facilities in Algeria; and a French-owned mine in Arlit, Niger. Such attacks against U.S. interests will likely continue, especially as extremists continue to fight for autonomy and control against governments which they perceive are receiving assistance from the United States.

With respect to West Africa, the FBI assesses that Nigeria-based Boko Haram does not currently pose a threat to the homeland. Boko Haram does, however, aspire to attack U.S. or Western interests in the region. Boko Haram demonstrated its capability for such attacks in its 2011 vehicle-borne IED attack on the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. Current counterterrorism pressure from Nigerian military and police forces has limited Boko Haram's ability to execute various operational plans against Western targets; however, communications, training, and weapons links between Boko Haram and AQIM, al Shabaab, and AQAP may strengthen Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. or Western targets in the future.

To combat these threats, the FBI relies upon its 103 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) across the nation and 63 legal attaché (legat) offices around the world. The FBI has added approximately 70 JTTFs since 9/11. Investigators, analysts, linguists, and SWAT experts from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies comprise the JTTFs. The JTTFs serve as critical force multipliers that follow up on all terrorism leads, develop and investigate cases, and proactively identify threats and trends that may impact the region, the nation, and the world.

Since 9/11, JTTFs have been instrumental in breaking up cells like the Portland Seven, the Northern Virginia Jihad group, and the Daniel Patrick Boyd cell in North Carolina. They've



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foiled attacks against military institutions and personnel in New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Washington, Texas, and Virginia. They have disrupted plots against government and civilian targets across the country, including the al Qaeda plot against the New York City subway in 2009. They have traced sources of terrorist funding, responded to anthrax and other suspected weapons of mass destruction threats, halted the use of fake IDs, and arrested subjects who possessed deadly weapons and explosives.

To better address the evolving threat, the FBI has also established the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Office. This office leverages FBI resources and works with federal counterparts to empower our local partners to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence. The FBI is leading efforts to conduct outreach and raise community awareness while upholding civil rights and liberties.

Cyber Threats

The diverse threats we face are increasingly cyber-based. Much of America's most sensitive data is stored on computers. We are losing data, money, and ideas through cyber intrusions. This threatens innovation and, as citizens, we are also increasingly vulnerable to losing our personal information. That is why we anticipate that in the future, resources devoted to cyber-based threats will equal or even eclipse the resources devoted to non-cyber based terrorist threats.

The FBI has built up substantial expertise to address cyber threats, both in the homeland and overseas. Here at home, the FBI serves as the executive agent for the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) which joins together 19 intelligence, law enforcement, and military agencies to coordinate cyber threat investigations. The FBI works closely with our all our partners in the NCIJTF, including the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We have different responsibilities, but we must work together on cyber threat investigations to the extent of our authorities and share information among the three of us, following the principle that notification of an intrusion to one agency will be notification to all.

While national-level coordination is important to securing the nation, teamwork at the local level is also essential. After more than a decade of combating cyber crime through a nationwide network of interagency task forces, the FBI has evolved its Cyber Task Forces (CTFs) in all 56 field offices to focus exclusively on cyber security threats. In addition to key law enforcement and homeland security agencies at the state and local level, each CTF partners with many of the federal agencies that participate in the NCIJTF at the Headquarters level. This promotes effective collaboration and deconfliction of efforts at both the local and national level.

Through the FBI's legal attaché offices around the globe and partnerships with our international counterparts, we are sharing information and coordinating cyber investigations more than ever. We have special agents working alongside our foreign police department partners; they work to identify emerging trends and key players in the cyber crime arena.

It is important to note that we are also coordinating closely with our federal partners on the policy that drives our investigative efforts. Although our agencies have different roles, we also understand that we must work together on every significant intrusion and to share information among the three of us, following the principle that notification of an intrusion to one agency will be notification to all.

In addition to cooperation within the government, there must be cooperation with the private sector. The private sector is the key player in cyber security. Private sector companies are the primary victims of cyber intrusions. And they also possess the information, the expertise, and the knowledge to address cyber intrusions and cyber crime in general. In February 2013, the Bureau held the first session of our National Cyber Executive Institute, a three-day seminar to train leading industry executives on cyber threat awareness and information sharing.

One example of an effective public-private partnership is the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance, a proven model for sharing private sector information in collaboration with law enforcement. Located in Pittsburgh, the alliance includes more than 80 industry partners from a range of sectors, including financial services, telecommunications, retail and manufacturing. The members of the alliance work together with federal and international partners to provide real-time threat intelligence, every day.

Another initiative the FBI participates in, the Enduring Security Framework, includes top leaders from the private sector and the federal government. This partnership illustrates that



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the way forward on cyber security is not just about sharing information, but also about solving problems together.

We intend to build more bridges to the private sector in the cyber security realm. We must fuse private-sector information with information from the intelligence community and develop channels for sharing information and intelligence quickly and effectively.

In the last several years, the distribution of malicious software through networks of infected computers, or botnets, by online criminals has emerged as a global cyber security threat. As a response, the FBI developed Operation Clean Slate, a broad team effort to address this significant threat. Operation Clean Slate is the FBI's comprehensive public-private approach to eliminate the most significant botnet activity and increase the practical consequences for those who use botnets for intellectual property theft or other criminal activities.

In April 2013, the FBI implemented this plan and identified the Citadel botnet as the highest priority botnet threat. Citadel is a type of malware known as a banking trojan. This type of malicious software is designed to facilitate unauthorized access to computers to steal online banking credentials, credit card information, and other personally identifiable information (PII).

Focusing on the Citadel malware, Operation Clean Slate identified the specific actors: the coders who create the botnet, the herders who aggregate victim computers, and the users who utilize the botnet. We also identified intended or actual victims of the botnet.

The FBI and its global partners then took action against Citadel. Through court-ordered authorizations and leveraging industry partnerships, more than 1,400 controlling components of the botnet were disrupted, essentially ceasing its operations. Once these controlling components were rendered inoperable, it is estimated Operation Clean Slate freed more than 2.1 million robot computers from this malicious network.

The FBI must continue to develop and deploy creative solutions in order to defeat today's complex cyber threat actors. Instead of just building better defenses, we must also build better relationships, overcoming the obstacles that prevent us from sharing information and, most importantly, collaborating.

Active Shooter Threats

The recent shootings at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., the Los Angeles Airport, and the Westfield Garden State Plaza Mall demonstrate that communities across America continue to face active shooter and mass casualty incidents. Since the Sandy Hook tragedy last December, the FBI has been working with the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance to provide tactical active shooter training to law enforcement agencies across the country. In conjunction with this training, the FBI and DOJ, working with our HHS, Education, and DHS partners, have developed an active shooter brochure and planning guides to complement this effort.

Over the past year, 100 FBI agents have attended the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) school and trained other officers in life-saving tactics. The 16-hour basic active shooter course prepares first responders to isolate a threat, distract the threat actors, and end the threat. In addition, during the month of April, the FBI conducted two-day conferences and table top exercises with state, local, tribal, and campus law enforcement executives. The purpose of these conferences was to ensure that the ALERRT brought FBI field offices and law enforcement command staff together to discuss best practices and lessons learned from mass shooting incidents. We have hosted two-day conferences on active shooter situations at most of our 56 field offices nationwide followed by tabletop exercises based on real-life incidents.

These incidents have also given rise to collaboration among behavioral experts, victim assistance specialists, and other personnel to work through best practices, including how to best react to active shooter and mass casualty incidents. We are continuing our efforts with a new tabletop exercise specifically designed for campus law enforcement. This is an issue that impacts all of us, and the FBI is committed to working with our partners to protect our communities.


Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, I thank you for this opportunity to testify concerning the diverse threats facing the nation and the FBI's ongoing efforts to combat them.



Portable scanner to detect concealed weapons

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-24941084>

Prototype radar scanners that can detect weapons concealed on people in public spaces



is set to undergo real-world testing next year.

The device, developed by a team at Manchester Metropolitan University, could boost security at airports, transport hubs and major events.

It is designed to scan individuals in a crowd at a distance of up to 25m.

The scanner uses low-power, millimetre-wave radar signals that reflect off a weapon and back to the scanner.

The designers say their system should help security officials combat a wide range of threats, from hidden handguns and knives through to people wearing explosive vests.

An in-built computer determines the presence of dangerous objects and alerts the operator within seconds of detection.

Built-in artificial intelligence (AI) differentiates between common items such as keys, belt buckles or mobile telephones and those that present an immediate threat to safety.

The devices come in two forms. The first is as a mobile system that could be carried in a public space; it has a range of 7-10m.

The second is a larger, static version that has an extended range of 20-25m and could be deployed at checkpoints or be mounted on vehicles.

The team behind the prototypes stresses that the scans will neither compromise people's privacy nor their health. Unlike airport scanners, the devices do not produce an image of the subject but only analyse radar signals reflected from an individual.

Prof Nick Bowring, head of the centre for sensing and imaging at MMU, said: "The beam of millimetre-waves are reflected back from the target, containing information about the target. Those waves are interpreted by a computer, which looks at the pattern of the returns and compares them against previous detections, such as a person carrying a threat item.

The portable version is designed to be used in public spaces, such as a street or major event

"It's really a combination of a radar system and an AI-based computer system. It would have been unthinkable to make it just five years ago because the computing power and hardware were just not there."

He added that the radar waves were harmless:



"Typically we use a thousandth of the power of a mobile phone," Prof Bowring explained.



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The prototypes, nicknamed MIRTLE and MIRLIN, are being turned into commercial versions and will be ready for use in Spring 2014. The university said that customers were already lined up to test the scanners.

"We have significant interest around the world, in particular from the US, UK and the Middle East," said Douglas Dundonald, from Radio Physics Solutions, which has signed a commercial agreement with MMU.

Civil liberties groups have previously called for scrutiny of such technology, whilst urging policy makers to focus on the causes of violence.

Prof Bowring started to develop the system in 2004 and the MMU team refined the technique after initial funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office Scientific Development Branch.

Balkan Militants Join Syria's Rebel Cause

By Teodorovic Milos and Ron Synovitz

Source: <http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-balkan-militants-join-rebel-cause/25011213.html#/>

Eldar Kundakovic was fighting to free Syrian rebels from prison in May when he was killed by a hand grenade.

rebels is small -- no more than several hundred.

In most cases, Balkan militants in Syria first



Unlike most militants battling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, he was not from Syria or a nearby Arab country.

Kundakovic came from Novi Pazar in Serbia's mainly Bosniak Muslim region of Sandzak.

His death notice, posted on the Internet by Syrian rebels, calls attention to a growing trend: young Muslims from the Balkans are traveling to Syria to join the rebel cause.

RFE/RL has received confirmation that the journey from the Balkans to the Middle East has been made by Muslims from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Kosovo, and Albania.

Compared to thousands of Lebanese Shi'ite Hezbollah militants bolstering Assad's forces, the number of Balkan fighters with Syrian

embraced Salafism -- the Islamic fundamentalist movement that includes Al-Qaeda jihadists.

Salafist leaders in the Balkans deny recruiting or transporting Balkan militants to Syria. They say those who join Syrian rebels do so as individuals.

But Resad Plojovic, deputy leader of Sandzak's muftiate, told RFE/RL he thinks "some organizations and individuals" are recruiting Balkan Muslims.

"There are centers or individuals who probably have connections with certain organizations, and they are motivating people," he says. "They also may know ways to transport them to the war zone. Let's be frank. Many here do not even



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know where Syria is. They cannot know how to go there and get involved in all that is happening there."

'Radicalized Before Going To Syria'

Kundakovic's father told RFE/RL that he last spoke with his son by telephone when he crossed into Syria from Turkey in late March.

Esad Kundakovic says his son immediately joined a rebel unit with about 30 fighters from Sandzak.

According to Mina Jovicic, a friend of Kundakovic in Novi Pazar, the young man was radicalized before going to Syria.

"He entered religion abruptly and then he started attending lectures and hanging out with people who talked about it often," she said.

Anel Grbovic is a journalist from Novi Pazar who was Kundakovic's high-school classmate.

He maintains that most jihadists from Sandzak distanced themselves from Serbia's two official Islamic communities before traveling to Syria.

"The fact is, there are illegal organizations recruiting people here," he says. "The fact is, there are houses where they come together.

The fact is, there are facilities where they conduct their religious rituals – which mean they exclude themselves from the mosque.

That means they exclude themselves from the system of the Islamic community and are more easily influenced by some individuals or organizations."

In Kosovo and FYROM, militants who have fought alongside Syrian rebels told RFE/RL that they wanted to help "Sunni brothers" fight Assad's regime.

One fighter from FYROM said he hooked up with Syrian rebels via an intermediary in Vienna.

Written in Prague by Ron Synovitz based on reporting by RFE/RL Balkan Service correspondents Milos Teodorovic in Novi Pazar, Dzenana Halimovic in Sarajevo, Fatmir Aliu in Pristina, and Blagojce Kuzmanovski in Skopje.

How malls plan to keep shoppers safe this holiday

Source: <http://www.cnn.com/id/101172176>

This is the time of year that retailers want you thinking about Santa Claus and presents, but two recent mall shootings may be fresh on consumers' minds as the critical holiday season kicks off.

On Monday, a gunman opened fire at New Jersey's Garden State Plaza. The suspected

Strong Salafist Presence

Suspicion falls upon Salafists as recruiters because Salafism is the root-ideology of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates – including the rebel Al-Nusra Front in Syria, which is considered a terrorist group by Washington. Bosnia-Herzegovina has the strongest Salafist presence in the Balkans due to aid and investments by Saudi Arabians who are members of the fundamentalist sect.

Tellingly, many Bosnian fighters in Syria have joined the Al-Nusra Front.

Relatives of those Bosnians claim that Nusret Imamovic, the leader of the predominantly Salafist Bosnian village of Gornja Macca, was their recruiter. Imamovic refuses to be interviewed about the allegations. Salafists established themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 Balkan conflict when foreign jihadists arrived to help Bosnian Muslims fight against Serb and Bosnian-Serb forces.

Some foreign Salafist fighters stayed in Bosnia after the war. Financial support for reconstruction also poured in from Saudi Salafists, strengthening their Balkan foothold.

Goran Zubac, director of the Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency, claims his office has questioned at least eight men linked to the organized transport of Bosnians to Syria and insists his office is closely monitoring Salafists.

"If our priority is to fight against terrorism and these activities are a part of this sector, then you can rest assured that nobody in the State Investigation and Protection Agency is sleeping," he said.

shooter killed himself before anyone else was hurt. That incident, coupled with the September terrorist attacks in Nairobi that left more than 60 people dead, may have stirred up questions among shoppers about how safe it is to head to a shopping center.



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People are taking fewer trips to the mall as it is. Overall retail traffic has been trending lower over the past decade, as more shoppers go online. Analytics firm ShopperTrak predicts retail traffic will decline 1.4 percent this holiday, though founder Bill Martin said it's important to

more than \$2 million a year on security, Kavanagh said.

"It's a constant evolution as the situation dictates, and you have to train for the inevitable," he said.

Kavanagh said retailers' overall training has



note that the number of unique shoppers has remained relatively flat over the past 14 months.

Retailers will need to perform the delicate task of calming concerns without fanning any fears.

Shopping centers take a number of measures to prevent and handle attacks, according to Malachy Kavanagh, vice president of communications and external relations at the International Council of Shopping Centers.

Major centers practice evacuation and training drills throughout the year, and perform shooter training drills with police officers, Kavanagh said.

Local police have become more active in creating informational materials, including videos and posters. They also work with private security teams and often have centers located within the malls. Police presence is increased during the holidays, he said.

Further, camera systems have been updated and in many cases let police remotely access security feeds and get live pictures from the scene of a crisis. The largest malls often spend

been evolving in the past 12 years. After Sept. 11, ICSC spent \$2 million to develop a training course on how to respond to a terrorist attack.

The National Retail Federation has also taken steps to promote safety within the industry. In 2011 the group produced an information packet with the Department of Homeland Security detailing emergency response protocols and guidelines when dealing with an active shooter. Information includes the profile of a typical shooter, basic guidelines and considerations, and how retailers can prepare. It also features a risk assessment form to identify the best response plan for a particular retailer, and whether it is better to evacuate or seek shelter in a certain situation.

Paul Viollis, CEO of Risk Control Strategies, told CNBC that retailers' response to shooting incidents must be measured. While more aggressive tactics—such as installing metal detectors—could have avoided Monday's attack, he said, they could also discourage people from going shopping in the first place.



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"The last thing we want to do is have a knee-jerk reaction and start throwing money at a situation that could actually deter shoppers and hurt retail," he said.


Martin at ShopperTrak said that, just as with past incidents, the Garden State Plaza shooting probably will not affect sales or traffic on a national level.

Americans are "hearing the same story repeated day in and day out," he said, referring to other shootings. He predicted that the impact would be short term even locally.

Kavanagh at ICSC also predicted the incident would not move the national needle.

"People recognize that these things can happen," he said. "Unfortunately it's something

that we're beginning to live with in this country."



Security Management Magazine

Source: <http://www.securitymanagement.com/magazine/2013/11>

The situation Monday was handled "extremely well," Kavanagh said. As soon as a person was identified with a weapon, security followed procedure. Shoppers evacuated the mall, the police department arrived quickly and the building was locked down. Separately, a senior law enforcement official told CNBC that the response was "textbook."

Eyewitness Joel Castaneda told CNBC, "When I noticed people running and screaming, that's when I was like 'Oh, what's going on?' And then we heard another gunshot. That's when everybody panicked." He and 12 others locked themselves in the back of a store for about two hours.

In a statement, Garden State Plaza's owner Westfield Group said, "Clearly, yesterday's event heightens everyone's state of awareness and concern. Our security precautions reflect that heightened state."

U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What By Michael B. Kraft and Edward Marks; Reviewed by Paul D. Barnard, CPP

Source: <http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/us-government-counterterrorism-a-guide-who-does-what-0012871>


This comprehensive book can help readers understand the vast and complex counterterrorism structure within the U.S. government. The authors discuss how the fight against terrorism has evolved from what was primarily a matter of diplomacy and law enforcement to an issue to be tackled with military solutions. Many interesting and pertinent topics are included in this effort and should be beneficial to various different audiences.

The book is separated into two sections. Section I, Programs, describes various counterterrorism programs by functions.

The legislative foundation and available tools for counterterrorism efforts as well as the challenge of actually defining terrorism are presented. Other topics include violent extremism, training programs, terrorism financing, research and development, cyber terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

Section II, Agencies, is a guide to the many government agencies with varied responsibilities that develop and implement counterterrorism policies and programs. It includes a discussion of the intelligence community and its members,

both primary and supporting, down to individual offices, bureaus, directorates, and departments along with the programs they administer.



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The book concludes with a discussion of future issues and remaining questions for pursuit by academics and policy makers. The authors have gathered material from open sources, interviews, and personal experience. Their intent is to describe the programs and the responsibilities of the various agencies; no attempt is made to evaluate them.

This book is recommended for the security practitioner and general reader desiring an overview of the many aspects of the counterterrorism complex within the U.S. government. It could be extremely useful to anyone concerned with terrorism and the resources available to address the problem. It could also serve as text for courses in counterterrorism or homeland security programs.


Reviewer: *Paul D. Barnard, CPP, CISM (Certified Information Security Manager), is a security manager for the Department of Defense. He is a member of ASIS International. The opinion expressed is solely that of the reviewer and does not imply a view of the U.S. government or any other organization.*

Against Security: How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger

By Harvey Molotch; Reviewed by Ben Rothke

Source: <http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/against-security-how-we-go-wrong-airports-subways-and-other-sites-ambiguous-danger-0012734>

In this book, Professor Harvey Molotch argues that the government is worrying about the wrong things, and wasting huge amounts of money in the process. With a focus on post 9-11 events, he suggests that while significantly more security measures are in place, most people do not feel safer, and it is even arguable whether we are indeed safer.



The book takes on a number of very different subjects, including public health via the availability of public restrooms, the 9-11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and more. When it comes to post 9-11 airport security, Molotch shows how the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's reactive security programs have done very little to enhance airport and aviation security.

The book provides a fascinating look at the New York subway system and how it dealt with the disaster of 9-11. It also provides a detailed overview of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Not really a fluke, the disaster was expected and predicted. The book notes that numerous water projects, including the creation of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal, meant as a way to provide shipping with a shorter route to the Gulf of Mexico, created a scenario that exacerbated the flooding of New Orleans.

For the most part, Dr. Molotch's recommendations for better design and safety are pragmatic. While many make sense, some may be far too radical for Congress or public safety officials. Nonetheless, this contrarian look at many of the security measures we have in place today gives the reader plenty to think about. Perhaps if planners took these ideas to heart, we would be safer and would have spent a lot less on security.

Reviewer: *Ben Rothke, CISSP (Certified Information Systems Security Professional), is an information security manager with Wyndham Worldwide Corp. The views expressed are his own.*




START Background Report: Patterns of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram and Ansaru

Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaram_Nov2013.pdf

On Wednesday, Nov. 13, 2013, the United States Department of State announced the designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).^[1] Boko Haram first carried out terrorist attacks in 2009, and Ansaru splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. The Department of State's announcement of the official designation notes several highly lethal recent attacks carried out by Boko Haram and Ansaru against both domestic and international targets in Nigeria. START has compiled the following background information on patterns of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram and Ansaru.

Patterns of Boko Haram Attacks, 2009-2012

Boko Haram, also known as "Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad" (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), was founded in Maiduguri in the northeastern




Nigerian state of Borno by Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2000s. The aim of Boko Haram, which translates to "Western education is forbidden," is to establish and enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic law in the northern Nigerian states. Initially, Boko Haram operated in a nonviolent manner. This changed in 2009 when the sect clashed with Nigerian authorities, whom it regarded as corrupt and Christian-influenced. Government suppression of Boko Haram's recruitment efforts as well as the use of force by police in response to the sect's refusal to adhere to national laws also contributed to the onset of violence in 2009.^[2]

During an uprising in July 2009, Boko Haram carried out 10 attacks against targets including a customs office, a number of churches, police headquarters and two other police stations, a primary school, a prison, and a state unemployment bureau in various cities. These attacks and the police response that followed resulted in more than 300 deaths, including nearly 100 perpetrators. The Nigerian army was deployed and reports indicate that by the end of the ensuing confrontation more than 800 people were killed, many of them Boko Haram members. Mohammed Yusuf and other members of Boko Haram were captured and publicly executed and Abubakar Shekau became the new leader of the group.^[3] Following the July 2009 uprising, Boko Haram carried out no additional terrorist attacks until September 2010. The group's activity gradually increased in late 2010 and continued through 2011, when attacks became more frequent, though less lethal than the initial 2009 attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the group was responsible for 17 attacks and 70



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fatalities in 2010, primarily targeting private citizens and property, Boko Haram began integrating bombings into its tactics, including a series of bombings carried out on Christmas Eve targeting




churches and a marketplace.

In 2011, violence escalated with more than 120 attacks and more than 320 fatalities, including a wide variety of targets such as police, private citizens and property, religious figures and institutions, and government entities. In 2012, violence carried out by Boko Haram increased to include more than 400 attacks and 1,200 fatalities, peaking in January with nearly 70 attacks and more than 300 fatalities.^[4]

TACTICS AND TARGETING

TARGET TYPES

Boko Haram most commonly targets police (24% of attacks; 29% of fatalities), private citizens and property (17% of attacks; 19% of fatalities), religious figures and institutions (13% of attacks; 21% of fatalities), government targets (12% of attacks; 7% of fatalities), and the military (9% of attacks; 7% of fatalities). Boko Haram's major attacks on churches and religious figures have at times been followed by rioting and retaliatory attacks against Muslim targets, exacerbating religious polarization of the



Nigerian population.

Coordinated Attacks

One hallmark of Boko Haram's terrorist activity is the use of coordinated attacks against a series of targets on a particular day, either geographically concentrated or spread across several states. More than 40 percent of its attacks between 2009 and 2011 were part of multi-part attacks, compared to less than 10 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide during this



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
time period.^[5] Attacks against businesses and religious figures and institutions were the most likely to be part of coordinated, multi-part events. Approximately 60 percent of attacks against these types of targets followed this pattern while approximately 40 percent of attacks against these types of targets were isolated events. Attacks that are part of coordinated events carried out by Boko Haram were on average 3.8 times as lethal as attacks that the group carried out in isolation.

Suicide Attacks

Boko Haram first began using suicide tactics on June 16, 2011 when an assailant detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device in front of the police headquarters building in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. The group has most frequently targeted churches (41% of its suicide attacks) with this method. Of 34 total suicide attacks, approximately 82 percent involved vehicle borne explosives while approximately 18 percent involved explosives that were worn on a person's body. On Aug. 26, 2011, Boko Haram operatives carried out a suicide attack targeting the United Nations building in Abuja, killing 23 and wounding 81. In 2012, Boko Haram carried out nearly 30 suicide attacks.

GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION

In 2009, Boko Haram operated only in northeastern Borno state (shaded in black on the map). In 2010, operations expanded to include Plateau state, Bauchi state, and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. By



2011, operations expanded southward to Yobe, Kaduna, Niger, Adamawa, Benue, Delta, and Gombe States. In 2012, attacks reached as far west as Sokoto state in the Northwest, the original location of the Sokoto Caliphate established in the early 19th century. This is a strategic move by Boko Haram as Sokoto is home to the Sultan of Sokoto, Nigeria's highest Islamic authority.^[6]

The map above shows this expansion based on the number of attacks per state. Borno state (shaded in black) and the city of Maiduguri has been a Boko Haram stronghold since the group's founding and has always been within its range of operations. There have been nearly 270 attacks in Borno state. The states shaded in dark red, Kano (north central) and Yobe (northeast) have experienced 86 and 64 attacks, respectively. The states shaded in pink (from west to east: Kaduna, Bauchi, Adamawa) have each been attacked between 21-25 times. In gold, Gombe (south of Yobe) and Plateau (south of Bauchi) states have been attacked 16 and 14 times, respectively. The other states in light yellow have been attacked between 1-10 times each, and the unshaded states have experienced zero attacks.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – December 2013**BOKO HARAM IN CONTEXT**

More than 440 perpetrator groups committed terrorist attacks during the time period that Boko Haram has been active. From 2009-2012, Boko Haram was responsible for 2.4 percent of more than 23,000 terrorist attacks that took place worldwide. Additionally, Boko Haram was responsible for 4.8 percent of fatalities from terrorist attacks during this same period. The group is now among the deadliest in the world.

Most Lethal Perpetrator Groups (2009-2012)	# of Attacks	# of Fatalities
Taliban	1771	5082
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	333	2403
Boko Haram	552	1932
Al-Qa'ida in Iraq	279	1565
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	1277	1554
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	197	1539
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	321	1494
Al-Shabaab	516	1405
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	74	453
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	391	339

In Nigeria, Boko Haram was responsible for nearly 80 percent of all terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2012 for which a perpetrator group was identified, despite their relatively recent onset of violence in 2009. Likewise, deaths from Boko Haram's attacks represented 70 percent of all fatalities from terrorist attacks in Nigeria during this time period. The next most active group in Nigeria was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which carried out nearly 70 attacks and killed more than 270, beginning in 2006.

Ansaru splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. Since then, the group has carried out a number of attacks in Nigeria, including targeted kidnappings of international figures. According to statements made by Ansaru following several of their attacks, the group acts in retaliation for military intervention by Western nations in places like Afghanistan and Mali. Examples of these attacks include the kidnapping of a French national in December 2012 and seven foreign nationals kidnapped in an attack on a Lebanese construction company in February 2013.

NOTABLE BOKO HARAM ATTACKS, 2009-2012**July 27, 2009**

During an uprising in July 2009, Boko Haram carried out 10 attacks against a variety of targets including a customs office, police headquarters and a number of police stations, a primary school, a prison, a state unemployment bureau, an unspecified number of churches, and local residences in several cities. These attacks and the police response that followed resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people, including nearly 100 perpetrators.

December 24, 2010

On Friday night, in Jos, Plateau, Nigeria, in one of four related attacks, 38 people were killed and 74 others were injured when militants detonated four improvised explosive devices made with dynamite in the Kabong shopping market just minutes apart from one another. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks.

June 16, 2011

At approximately 11 a.m. Thursday, in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria, a suicide car bomb detonated at the Nigerian police headquarters. The Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim, may have been the intended target of the attack. The perpetrator, a traffic warden, and one other person were killed and at least five people were injured. The attack completely



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destroyed at least 33 vehicles and slightly damaged at least 40 vehicles. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 26, 2011

On Sunday afternoon in Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria, between 8 and 10 suspected Boko Haram members



threw bombs and fired gun shots in the Dala Kabompi neighborhood at a beer garden. The assailants attacked from the back of seven motorcycles. They set fire to a local bar, and shot anyone trying to escape. At least 25 civilians were killed and approximately 30 more were injured. Military sources suspect that three sets of explosives

were used in the attack. The attack caused an unknown amount of property damage. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

August 26, 2011

On Friday, in Abuja, Abuja Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria, 23 people were killed and 81 people were injured when a Boko Haram operative detonated a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device that had been concealed inside a Honda Accord at the United Nations (UN) headquarters building. The militant rammed the exit gate and drove the vehicle into the parking garage before detonating. The attack caused a tremendous amount of material damage to the UN building. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack through a spokesman. This was Boko Haram's first recorded attack on an international target.

November 4, 2011

In a series of coordinated attacks across Yobe and Borno state, Boko Haram attacked at least six churches, four police stations as well as the military Joint Task Force Office, the State Security Services building, a college, and local businesses. At the end of the attacks, more than 60 people were dead. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for all of the attacks.

December 25, 2011

Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack on St. Teresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Nigeria. This attack was one of four that day. A bomb exploded while the church was full of people attending Christmas mass. The explosion destroyed cars in the area and did substantial damage to the church itself. In total, 37 people were killed and 57 were wounded. A man named Kabiru Soko was arrested for his role in the bombing.

January 20, 2012

In a series of coordinated attacks primarily in Kano state, Boko Haram militants attacked police stations and barracks as well as state security services and other government buildings. The violence left more than 180 people dead.

February 20, 2012

Armed members of Boko Haram stormed a market in Maiduguri and opened fire on civilians. Joint Task Force (JTF) forces at the market noticed the group planted bombs and a gunfight ensued. At least 38 people were killed in the attack, including eight assailants. The bombs were detonated, either by Boko Haram or in controlled detonations carried out by JTF.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – December 2013**April 8, 2012**

In one of two bombings in Nigeria on Easter Sunday, a suicide car bomb exploded outside of All Nations Christian Assembly Church in Kaduna, killing at least 40 and wounding at least 10. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but Boko Haram was suspected.

July 7, 2012

In six coordinated attacks, Boko Haram operatives attacked six villages across Plateau state near the city of Jos. This series of armed assaults left 56 people dead.

**September 5, 2012**

In at least 21 coordinated attacks, members of Boko Haram attacked cell towers with explosives. In total, approximately 31 towers were attacked across four states late Tuesday and early Wednesday, killing approximately 15 people. Boko Haram claimed that the towers were targeted because the cell companies were assisting the government in their counterterrorism efforts.

September 6, 2012

In a series of six coordinated attacks in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state, Boko Haram militants attacked the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Pilgrims Welfare Commission building, two primary schools, a fire station, and an electoral office. The attacks killed approximately 15 people.

October 18, 2012

In a series of coordinated attacks, Boko Haram members attacked an Islamic seminary school and two primary schools in Potiskum in Yobe state killing approximately 23 people.

November 25, 2012

In two coordinated attacks in the city of Jaji, Kaduna state, assailants crashed an explosive laden bus into St. Andrew Military Protestant Church. After the bus crash, a car bomb parked outside the church exploded, targeting first responders. Thirty-two people were killed and 11 wounded across both attacks.

References are available at source's URL



LAX shooting: paramedics were delayed 33 minutes by police – official

Source: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/lax-shooting-paramedics-were-delayed-33-minutes-by-police-official>

An airport security officer lay helplessly bleeding after a gunman opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport as paramedics waited 150 yards away because police had not declared the terminal safe to enter, according to two law enforcement officials.

It would be 33 minutes before Transportation Security Administration officer Gerardo Hernandez, who was about 20 feet from an



exit, would be wheeled out by airport police to an ambulance, said the officials, who were briefed on the investigation and spoke on condition of anonymity because the probe was still ongoing into the November 1 shooting.

For all but five of those minutes, there was no threat from the suspected gunman — he had been shot and was in custody, they said.

While it's not known when Hernandez died or if immediate medical attention could have saved his life, officials are examining what conversations took place between police and fire commanders to determine when it was safe enough to enter and whether paramedics could have gone into the terminal earlier, one of the officials said.

The head of the TSA union on Friday said he was appalled at the news. American Federation of Government Employees president J David Cox Sr. called the situation "very concerning" and said there should be a serious reexamination of TSA security policies.

Formal conclusions could take months, but what's known raises the possibility that a lack of coordination between police and fire officials prevented speedy treatment for Hernandez and other victims.

TSA workers at LAX have been wondering the same thing, said Victor Payes, who works at the airport and is president of the local union.

"I basically think there's a lack of coordination between entities at this airport. That lack of coordination may have led to something that shouldn't have happened," Payes said. "We may be talking about Officer Hernandez as a survivor."



Marshall McClain, president of the Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers Association, agreed that the incident highlights a failure in co-ordination and a power struggle between policing agencies. He said there were four command posts set up during the incident and no sense of who had command once the LAPD rolled in. Representatives of the Los Angeles police department, Los Angeles fire department and Los Angeles airport police said they couldn't comment on the ongoing investigation until extensive reports are finished.

Authorities say that Paul Ciancia entered Terminal 3 with a duffel bag, pulled out an assault rifle and started shooting. They said he had a note in his bag that said he wanted to "kill TSA" and that he wanted to stir fear in them, criticizing their searches as unconstitutional.

He was shot by airport police officers four times, in the mouth and leg, before being taken into custody. He remains in fair condition at a hospital and his doctors will determine when he's fit to appear in court.

In the chaotic moments after the gunfire began, as travelers dove to the ground or scrambled for cover in restaurants and stores, officials



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worried there could be bombs in the terminal and tried to determine whether the gunman had any accomplices. In the first 30 minutes, there was also an unfounded report of two suspicious people on an adjacent parking garage roof, one of the officials said.

Officers from multiple agencies bent down to check on Hernandez before moving on, officials said.

Police broadcast over their radios that Ciancia was in custody at 9.25am, five minutes after Hernandez was shot in the chest. That's when a nearly 26-year veteran LAPD officer checked on Hernandez several times, repeatedly telling officers who came by from various agencies that he was dead, according to one of the law enforcement officials.

It's unclear how that determination was made and whether the officer was qualified to make it. The LAPD officer declined to comment. No officers rendered first aid on scene, according to surveillance video reviewed by the officials.

McClain said he corroborated those details after speaking with the airport police officers involved. McClain said the LAPD officer was standing in front of Hernandez, obscuring him from view as he lay bleeding, telling other responding officers that Hernandez was dead.

Airport police returned from helping other wounded people to see Hernandez still there.

According to McClain, when the LAPD officer told the airport officer, "he's dead", the airport officer responded: "What do you mean he's dead? If he's dead, whatever, we can't make that determination."

Unless a person is decapitated, a doctor must declare someone is dead, McClain added.

The airport police officer thought he detected a light pulse for Hernandez and immediately put him in a wheelchair and ran him to an ambulance, McClain said.

Trauma surgeon David Plurad said Hernandez had no signs of life when he arrived at Harbor-

UCLA Medical Center. Doctors worked for about an hour to revive him despite significant blood loss.

Responding to a situation with a shooter on the loose has changed since the 1999 Columbine school massacre, when officials huddled outside to formulate a plan while shooters continued firing inside and a teacher bled to death without timely treatment. Now police immediately charge in to stop the shooting as quickly as possible; officers are trained to step over the wounded and stop the gunman first, then tend to victims.

During active shooter training last month with the LAX police and LAPD, Los Angeles city firefighters wearing ballistic vests and helmets dragged survivors to areas where they could provide treatment.

Because police are often the first at the scene where there are injuries, **California law requires officers receive first aid and CPR training in the academy and regular refreshers afterward.**

A recent audit by Los Angeles Police Commission Inspector General Alex Bustamante found that the LAPD had a zero percent compliance rate. Only 250-sworn officers in the Metropolitan Division out of the department's more than 9,900 sworn officers received the refresher training, it states. The LAPD officer is not in Metropolitan Division. Airport police have the training.

On day-to-day crime scenes, firefighters wait down the street until police clear the scene, usually in minutes, and allow them in, Los Angeles County fire battalion chief Larry Collins, who's a member of a Los Angeles interagency working group creating best practices for mass casualty incidents.

"When we have an active shooter, we can't hold back a block away, we've got to go in" because clearing the scene could take hours.


EDITOR'S COMMENT: It is so frustrating to read all these after the incidents commentaries from those who should have done things BEFORE the incident... In the combat fields, soldiers evacuate their wounded colleagues under HEAVY FIRE and this was NOT the case in LAX. If TSA personnel had a minimum training in First Aids (as stated in the article) along with modern saving materials (i.e. Quikdot, CAT tourniquets, Asherman chest seals etc) a life might have been saved! Impressive ceremonies will not bring him back to his family...



New Strains of Terrorism

By Richard Lourie

Source: http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2013/11/new-strains-of-terrorism.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+terrorismwatch%2FJTvk+%28Terrorism+Watch%29&utm_content=Yahoo!+Mail



Like bacteria seeking to avoid destruction by antibiotics, terrorism evolves. For that reason, the New York marathon of early November, though admirably secured, was probably the least likely target around.

It is also probably true that terrorists have been poring over the Snowden revelations, but what specifically they will learn from them remains unclear, despite all the huffing and puffing of current and former security officials declaring it a disaster. Osama bin Laden was clearly aware that any of his telephone or electronic communications would be bugged. And so he used messengers. Ironically, it was the tracking of one of those messengers he used to avoid electronic eavesdropping that cost him his life. Taking similar precautions, the Saudi jihadi known as Khattab who fought with the Chechens was supposedly killed by a letter poisoned by Russian security agents.

Islamists may be fanatics, but they are not fools. They learn from past mistakes and work constantly to create new means of eluding existing security measures. Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, the master bomber, who came up with

the underwear bomb, and, more chillingly, the explosives that were disguised as part of a shipment of printers, is reported to be working on nonmetallic, essentially undetectable explosive devices that can be surgically implanted within the human body. This is an idea that comes first from science fiction having figured in the 1975 film "Death Race 2000" and a 1990 Star Trek film.

Terrorists no doubt also scrutinize the world media to gauge which actions generate the most coverage. The Tsarnaev brothers proved two things with their attack on the Boston Marathon. The **first** is that a terrorist can gain more coverage by attacking an event where the cameras are already rolling. That way the event becomes part of everyone's present tense. The **second** thing is that this initial momentum will often continue for longer than an event that occurred off camera. The evening news will revisit the victims or tie their story into another story.

Terrorists in Russia seem to be testing new methods. On Oct. 21, a Dagestani woman blew herself up



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on a local bus in the city of Volgograd killing herself and six others, wounding 37. The city is quite far from Moscow, St. Petersburg or Sochi. It is possible that she had another target in mind but detonated the device by accident or out of desperation. **But it might also be a sign that terrorists have learned another lesson: strike out-of-the-way places so that people will not feel safe anywhere.**

This principle is one that may be applied in Russia during the Winter Olympics since Sochi itself will presumably be locked down very tightly. But then again, the same presumption could have been made about Tiananmen Square until a van full of suicide bombers made it through to the very heart of the Chinese capital. Doku Umarov, leader of the Chechen Islamist insurgency, has called on his followers to use "maximum force" and "any methods" to disrupt the Winter Games, which he calls "satanic dances to be held on the bones of our ancestors."

But that does not necessarily mean by direct attack on the site, events or spectators. Significant terrorist attacks happening all over the country could disrupt the games simply by overshadowing them. On Oct. 15, a terrorist attack on a chemical weapons facility in the Kirov region was thwarted by local law enforcement officials. Kirov is a 1,000 kilometers east of Moscow. The woman bomber in Volgograd is reported to have had a bus ticket for Moscow on her person, and the capital may have been her original target.

In the Kirov incident, there cannot be any such ambiguity. The two attackers, young men from the North Caucasus where the insurgents' aim has morphed from independence to creating an Islamic caliphate, had specifically travelled to a site far from major population centers or targets of symbolic significance. The plant is currently engaged in destroying soman, a chemical nerve agent

more lethal than sarin. **Authorities state that a successful attack would have resulted in large loss of life.**

There are eight such facilities in Russia, where chemical weapons are stored and destroyed. Was the Kirov attack a failure or a feint? Now security at the chemical weapons sites will be beefed up, possibly leaving other targets more vulnerable.

There is also the question as to whether the Chechens and other Islamist rebels already have chemical weapons seized during the Syrian civil war? It is only a 800-kilometer drive from Aleppo to Sochi, or 1 1/2 hours by plane. Possessing chemical weapons and being able to accurately deliver them are, of course, two quite different things.

But there is a way around that as well. Sometimes merely demonstrating that you possess weapons of mass destruction is enough to sow fear. In November 1995, **Chechen rebels alerted the Russia media that they had buried a dirty bomb constructed from dynamite and radioactive Cesium 137 in Izmailovsky Park in central Moscow.** This has been called the first act of nuclear terrorism in history. It was organized by Shamil Basayev, then the leader of the Chechen insurgents, who had been trained in Osama bin Laden's camp in Afghanistan, the same one struck by U.S. cruise missiles in 1998. The dirty bomb in the park did not explode, but there was plenty of live coverage to spread the word — and fear.

After 9/11, it was reported that the Pentagon and the security agencies were conferring with science fiction writers to attempt to thwart future attacks. The real problem with the 9/11 attack was that no one had the imagination to see it coming. Maybe Russia could try that as well — if the country's best sci-fi writers are not living abroad in freer lands or awaiting trial for protesting the current regime.

Richard Lourie is the author of "The Autobiography of Joseph Stalin" and "Sakharov: A Biography."

Lebanon blasts hit Iran's embassy in Beirut

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24997876>

At least 22 people are reported to have been killed in two explosions which hit the Iranian embassy in the Lebanese capital Beirut in quick succession (19 Nov 2013).

The Iranian cultural attache Ebrahim Ansari was among the dead. Officials said the death toll could rise.



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TV images showed burning cars, bodies on the street and damaged buildings.

Iran is a major backer of the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah, which has sent fighters to Syria to back the government of Bashar al-Assad.



Reports said one of the blasts was caused by a suicide bomber, while the second was a car bomb.

This has not been officially confirmed.

The Iranian ambassador to Beirut confirmed Mr Ansari's death to Hezbollah's al-Manar TV, but said it was not clear if

he had been in the embassy itself or one of the residential buildings nearby. Mr Ansari had only taken up his post a month ago, he said. The ambassador blamed Israel for the attack - an accusation Israel swiftly rejected. Syria condemned the explosion.



The Syrian conflict has increased sectarian tensions in Lebanon.

South Beirut, including the area around the Iranian embassy, is considered a Hezbollah stronghold. It has been hit by several attacks in recent months.



Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati called the attack "a cowardly terrorist act", Lebanese state news agency NNA reported.

"The aim of the blast is to stir up the situation in Lebanon and use the Lebanese arena to convey messages," he said.

Security forces were quickly on the scene

A BBC correspondent in Beirut says those responsible wanted to send a

clear message to Iran and Hezbollah.

Tehran and the Shia militant group are key backers of the Syrian government, which is currently trying to cut off one of the Syrian rebels' last remaining supply routes across the Lebanese border.

On 15 August, 27 people were killed in a car bomb in south Beirut believed to have been targeting a Sunni Muslim cleric opposed to Hezbollah. The cleric was unhurt.

Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in a strategic victory by Syrian government forces in Qusair, close to the border with Lebanon, in early June.



26/11 Mumbai terror attacks were aimed at provoking India-Pakistan war, says ex-CIA analyst

Source: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/26-11-attack-intended-to-provoke-indo-pak-war-ex-cia-men/1/325437.html>

The 26/11 Mumbai terror attack was intended to change dramatically the future of South Asia, perhaps even by provoking a war between rising nuclear powers India and Pakistan, according to a top counter-terrorism expert.

Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, who has advised four US

jihads started by Al Qaeda in the late 1990s," Riedel wrote.

Describing the November 2008 attack as "the most important terror attack since 9/11" he pointed out that the "10 terrorists' tactics have been copied by others since - for example, just weeks ago in Nairobi."

But "perhaps the most shocking element of the Mumbai attack was the role played by David Coleman Headley, an American citizen of Pakistani descent, in the intelligence collection that preceded the attack," Riedel wrote.

Born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington, DC, in 1960, Headley changed his name at the behest of LeT to hide his Pakistani identity when travelling abroad. In his guilty confession, Headley, Riedel noted, acknowledged "the raid also was planned with active ISI involvement at every stage. At each of his meetings in Pakistan, he said he met with ISI officers as well as the LeT terror leaders."

"Sometimes the ISI gave him particular assignments separate from what the LeT asked; for example, tasking him with taking photos of an Indian nuclear facility near Mumbai," Riedel said.

Yet "the Pakistani mastermind of the Mumbai plot, LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, remains free in Pakistan, where he continues to be a darling of the ISI and regularly calls for more attacks on India and America," Riedel wrote noting "Five years after Mumbai, justice has yet to be served."



presidents on South Asian issues, says he had pointed this out to then President-elect Barack Obama and his transition team at the time in several briefings. Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba group (LeT) had carefully chosen the targets and meticulously researched them over several years, he wrote in The Daily Beast, an American news reporting and opinion website.

"They received considerable assistance in doing so from two sources—the Pakistani intelligence service, called the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate or ISI, and Al Qaeda."

"Each had its own agenda for the operation. But the targets were the same - Indians, Americans, and Jews - the targets of the global

Potential German soccer star joins list of players-turned-jihadists

By James M. Dorsey

Source: http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.gr/2013/11/potential-german-soccer-star-joins-list.html?utm_source=Al+Qaeda+Luring+Jihadis+to+Syria+&utm_campaign=ACD+BLOG&utm_medium=email

When Burak Karan, an up and coming German-Turkish soccer star, was killed last month during a Syrian military raid on anti-Bashar al Assad rebels near the Turkish

border, he joined a list of football players turned militants who were in the Middle East and North Africa or had roots in the region or in Islam.



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In contrast to Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel a decade ago who were rooted in a West Bank soccer team, the 2004 Madrid train



bombers who played the beautiful game together or several Saudi players who joined the anti-American jihad in Iraq following a fatwa or religious ruling by conservative Muslim preachers denouncing football as a game of the infidels, it was not immediately clear whether Mr. Karan was driven to give up his promising soccer career by a radical interpretation of Islam or a deep-seated humanitarian concern for the victims of brutal wars like that in Syria.

What Mr. Karan shared with players-turned-jihadists as well as various jihadist leaders including Osama Bin Laden, Hamas Gaza foreman Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah was a deep-seated passion for the sport and that their road towards militancy often involved an action-oriented activity, soccer. Mr. Karan's case is nevertheless more similar to that of Yann Nsaku or Nizar ben Abdelaziz Trabelsi, individuals who radicalized, rather than the Hamas or Madrid bombers or the Saudi players who turned militant in the context of a group.

Mr. Nsaku, a Congolese born convert to Islam and former Portsmouth FC youth center back, was one of 11 converts arrested in France a year ago on suspicion of being violent jihadists and for "suspected Islamic terrorist plotting of anti-Semitic attacks," according to French police. Police said the group aimed to spark a "war across France" with the intention of imposing Islamic law.

A 19-year old, 6ft 2ins player, Mr. Nsaku was signed in 1998 by Portsmouth from Cannes FC but never made it into the troubled 2008 FA Cup winners' first team. His promising career ended in 2011 when he suffered a knee injury.

Mr. Trabelsi, a Tunisian who played for Germany's Fortuna Düsseldorf and FC Wuppertal, was arrested and convicted in Belgium a decade ago on charges of illegal arms possession and being a member of a private militia. Mr. Trabelsi was sentenced to ten years in prison.

In all cases, soccer proved to be a fruitful grooming if not recruiting ground. Mr. Karan may not have been recruited off the pitch and instead have reached out to individuals or groups who could help him join a militant cause. However, men like assassinated Bin Laden and Messrs. Haniyeh and Nasrallah recognized the game's useful bonding and recruitment qualities. It brings recruits into the fold, encourages camaraderie and reinforces militancy among those who have already joined.

Unlike Mr. Nsaku, 26-year old Mr. Karan, who adopted the nom du guerre Abu Abdullah at-Turki, appeared to be destined for stardom, before he opted out at age 20 in favor of the Syrian struggle. He had played internationally seven times for Germany alongside soccer giants as Sami Khedira, Kevin-Prince Boateng and Dennis Aogo.

Mr. Karan's death by a bomb dropped by the



Syrian air forces in the village of Azaz, near the Turkish border became public in an almost seven-minute YouTube video believed to have been posted by an unidentified Islamist group. Amid ideological justifications of jihad and pictures of him with children whose faces are unidentifiable but are believed to be his sons who together with his 23-year old wife travelled with



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him to Syria as well a Kalashnikov rifle, Mr. Karan asks his mother in Arabic not to bemoan his death. Speaking to German media, Mr. Karan's brother Mustafa cast doubt on the video saying Burak struggled to speak Arabic.

A text in Arabic and German cautioned "not to assume that those who died on Allah's way are dead. No. They are alive with their Lord and being taken care of... Those that listened to Allah and the Messenger (Prophet Mohammed) after they suffered a wound – for those among them who do good and are fearful of God, there will a fabulous reward."

Mr. Karan's jihadist history appears to suggest that he prepared for his engagement in Syria alongside an estimated 200 other Germans mostly of Turkish origin, while in an Al Qaida training camp in Pakistan. German intelligence sources said Mr. Karan had first appeared on their radar because of his contacts with Emrah Erdogan, a German Turk, who was arrested a year ago in Tanzania on suspicion of involvement in the bombing of a Kenyan shopping center and extradited to Germany,

and according to German news magazine Der Spiegel, with Austrian-Egyptian imam Mohamed Mahmoud.

Mr. Emrah is on trial in Frankfurt on charges of being a member of Al Qaida in Pakistan and of the Al Shabab in Somalia. He is alleged to have been in the Pakistan-Afghan border region in 2010 and to have then joined Al-Shabab.

Mr. Mahmoud was an imam at a mosque in the western German town of Solingen and leader of an Islamist group called Millatu-Ibrahim that was banned in Germany last year for "efforts against the constitutional order and against the concept of international understanding." He evaded arrest at the time but has since been detained in Turkey where he is believed to be in prison.

Mr. Karan joined the rebels after collecting relief donations and sending food and drugs to Syria. "If he armed himself it was to protect transports. Was he supposed to throw stones? He always told me he doesn't want to fight," Mustafa told Germany's Bild Zeitung.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg's Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog and a forthcoming book with the same title.

More Than 300 Terrorists To Be Released From Indonesian Jails In The Next Year

Source: <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/more-than-300-terrorists-to-be-released-from-indonesian-jails-in-the-next-year-report-2013-11>

More than 300 convicted terrorists will finish their prison sentences in Indonesia over the next 12 months, according to a report in The Australian.

Yesterday, Indonesia said it would halt some intelligence sharing as well as anti-terrorism co-operation and joint activities to combat people smugglers.

The release of the terrorists highlights why intelligence co-operation is important to both countries. Reportedly, the Australian Signals Directorate was essential to the investigations which followed the Bali bombings.

According to ASIO's most recent annual report, the release of terrorists in Indonesia presents a threat to Australia's domestic security.

"The impending release of terrorist detainees from Indonesian prisons, a spike of which is

expected to occur in 2014 is likely to increase this (terror) threat," Australia's domestic spy agency warned.

"Many of the individuals scheduled to be released in this period have undertaken terrorist training or have been linked to, or involved in, bombings against either Western or local targets.

"Their release is likely to inject significant capability into extremist networks. The expertise and anti-Western credentials of some individuals have the potential to refocus and reinvigorate currently diffuse and relatively unsophisticated extremist networks."

Relations between Australia and Indonesia have reached their lowest point in recent years after it was revealed Australian spies at the ASD (then known as the Defence Signals



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Directorate) tapped Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's mobile phone.

They also monitored his wife's phone, as well as those belonging to senior cabinet members and individuals in the President's inner circle.

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has declined requests for an apology, explaining in parliament that all countries spy and that intelligence gathering operations were in the national interest.

5 Companies That Make Money By Keeping Americans Terrified of Terror Attacks

By Alen Kane

Source: <http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/5-companies-make-money-keeping-americans-terrified-terror-attacks?paging=off#bookmark>

Michael Hayden (photo), the former director of the National Security Agency, has invaded America's television sets in recent



weeks to warn about Edward Snowden's leaks and the continuing terrorist threat to America.

But what often goes unmentioned, as the Guardian's Glenn Greenwald pointed out, is that Hayden has a financial stake in keeping Americans scared and on a permanent war footing against Islamist militants. And the private firm he works for, called the Chertoff Group, is not the only one making money by scaring Americans.

Post-9/11 America has witnessed a boom in private firms dedicated to the hyped-up threat of terrorism. The drive to privatize America's national security apparatus accelerated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, and it's gotten to the point where 70 percent of the national intelligence budget is now spent on private contractors, as author Tim Shorrock reported. The private intelligence contractors have profited to the tune of at least \$6 billion a year. In 2010, the Washington Post revealed that there are 1,931 private firms across the country dedicated to fighting terrorism.

What it all adds up to is a massive industry profiting off government-induced fear of terrorism, even though Americans are more

likely to be killed by a car crash or their own furniture than a terror attack.

Here are five private companies cashing in on keeping you afraid.

1. The Chertoff Group

On August 11, former NSA head Michael Hayden, the man at the center of the Bush administration's 2005 surveillance scandal, was defending his former agency on CBS News in the



wake of the latest NSA spying scandal. Commenting on President Obama's half-hearted promises to reform some NSA practices, Hayden told host Bob Schieffer that "the President is trying to take some steps to make the American people more comfortable about what it is we're doing. That's going to be hard because, frankly, Bob, some steps to make Americans more comfortable will actually make Americans less safe."

Former Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff had a similar message when he appeared on ABC News August 4. Speaking about the purported threat from an Al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen that led to the closure of 19 U.S. embassies, Chertoff said that "the collection of this warning information [about Al Qaeda] came from the kinds of programs we've been discussing about, the ability to capture communications overseas."

CBS and ABC did not see fit to inform viewers that both Hayden and Chertoff are employees of the Chertoff Group, a private firm created in 2009 that companies hire to consult on best practices for security and combatting terrorism. Some of the companies the firm advises go on to win government contracts. Chertoff is the founder and chairman of the group, while Hayden



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serves as a principal. So they profit off a war on terror they say is crucial to keeping Americans safe.

Though it's unclear how much in total exactly the firm makes, there are some known numbers. After the failed attempt in 2010 to blow up an airliner on Christmas Day with a bomb hidden in underwear, Chertoff pushed for better airport security procedures. One of the suggestions Chertoff made was for the Transportation Security Agency to use full-body scanners like the ones Rapiscan, one of the Chertoff Group's clients, made. And sure enough, after the Christmas Day plot, the TSA ordered 300 Rapiscan machines. The Huffington Post reported that Rapiscan made \$118 million from the government between 2009-2010.

2. Booz Allen Hamilton

This private intelligence contractor has become a household name in the wake of the NSA scandal. Edward Snowden, the man responsible for leaking secret documents that exposed the breadth of NSA surveillance, was working for Booz Allen when he downloaded the documents he handed off to media outlets. As the New York Times reported in June, the company parlay its technology expertise for intelligence uses into massive government contracts. Thousands of employees of the company provide services to the NSA, like analyzing the massive amounts of data the government agency collects every day. The company is also the shining symbol of the government-private security complex's revolving door: its vice president is the former director of national intelligence, while the current director of national intelligence is a former employee of Booz Allen.

Despite the Snowden security breach, Booz Allen continues to work with the government. And they're making a lot of money from the U.S. In the last fiscal year, the company made \$1.3 billion from working in U.S. intelligence. In total, Booz Allen Hamilton made over \$5 billion last fiscal year. And the cash keeps coming: in January, the company announced that it had won a contract with the Defense Department to provide intelligence services. The amount of money it could make from the deal is up to \$5.6 billion.

And like Hayden and Chertoff, Booz Allen's vice president Mike McConnell has publicly hyped up the threat of terrorism to blast Snowden's leaks. McConnell told a government contracting conference in July 2013 that Snowden's leaks have done "irrevocable damage" to the U.S.'s ability to stop terrorism. "It's going to inhibit our ability to understand nuclear activity in North Korea, what's going on in Syria, what might be happening with the Taliban in Afghanistan," said McConnell.

3. Science Applications International Corporation

Sometimes referred to as "NSA West" because so many former NSA employees go on to work for the formerly California-based Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), this firm makes a ton of cash off government contracts. And they do so by hawking their expertise in combatting the terrorist threat.

Browse through SAIC's website and you're constantly greeted with the words "terrorist threat" and information on how the SAIC can help the government and others battle it. SAIC developed a "Terrorism Protection Manual" for Florida law enforcement that was developed to fight "today's national terrorist threat and implement recommended security best practices." They boast of their "experience meeting the terrorism incident response training needs of a wide variety of customers, from training for a national Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenario, applicable at agency response levels, to lesser levels of incidents affecting a city, a military installation or a special facility."

Back when John P. Jumper, the current CEO of SAIC, was an Air Force general, he said the threat of terrorism is "greater than Nazism, greater than communism. This threat that we have of terrorist zealots is the most dangerous because these are people who care nothing about life. They care nothing about our lives, for sure, and they care nothing about their own lives." And Larry Prior, a U.S. intelligence veteran who used to run the company's Intelligence and Security Group, said in an internal newsletter that "the future of the



Booz | Allen | Hamilton

strategy and technology consultants



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nation rests on their backs,” referring to employees in his group.

SAIC is an immensely lucrative and large company. It boasts 42,000 employees—20,000 of whom hold U.S. government security clearances. It is the NSA’s largest contractor, according to CorpWatch, and is deeply involved in the NSA’s collection of intelligence. Last year it reported a net income of \$525 million.

4. Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies

U.S. intelligence agencies aren’t the only sectors of government where the private sector has cashed in on the fear of terrorism. The post-9/11 world has seen the blossoming of a cottage industry of self-styled “experts” on Islam from private companies that market their supposedly ironclad analysis of the threat from Islamists to other federal agencies and state and local law enforcement. These companies have profited from law enforcement taking part in the “war on terror.”



Through Homeland Security grant programs like the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the federal government has doled out over billions of dollars to these private companies to provide Islamophobic training. One of these companies is called the Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

Based in Virginia, the center “posits radical Islam as a new global ideological menace on the order of the old communist threat from the Soviet Union,” as Political Research Associates (PRA) noted in a 2011 report on private firms doing counter-terror training. Staff members include former FBI, CIA and Defense Department personnel.

Their claim to fame is providing education and training to members of the U.S. national security community—including law enforcement agencies, according to their website. They say they have trained over 67,000 people over the past decade.

It’s unclear exactly how much this firm makes per year. But according to the PRA report, a five-day course for government employees on the “Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine” costs \$39,280. The firm also lists the costs of

individual courses on their website. For a 30-person class titled “Dying to Kill Us: Understanding the Mindset of Suicide Operations,” the cost is \$7,856. For a three-day course for 30 people on “Informant Development for Law Enforcement to Fight Terrorism,” the cost is \$23,568.

The training pushes anti-Muslim ideology. On the section of their website where they list feedback from participants of the courses, one wrote: “An eye-opener. Especially how many Muslim Brotherhood front organizations there are and that the government doesn’t get it.”

5. Security Solutions International

Security Solutions International is yet another private firm hawking anti-Muslim training to law enforcement. This Miami-based company founded in 2004 uses its Israeli security connections to boost its standing in the market. They use Israeli security trainers in their courses and their president, Henry Morgenstern, is a dual Israeli-U.S. citizen who says he “developed excellent high level contacts with the Security Establishment [in Israel], making SSI the premiere training company for counter-terror related subjects.”

The company has trained over 700 law enforcement agencies since 2004. Officials from law enforcement agencies like the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority and the Department of Homeland Security have participated in the conferences they put on for profit. While SSI claims that they don’t cast aspersions on the whole of Islam, an examination of their trainings, conferences and the speakers they use indicate otherwise.

At a 2009 conference sponsored by Police magazine, an SSI instructor who is the company’s “expert” on Islam used a video that showed a terrorist beheading a hostage. After the course was met with criticism, the company’s CEO said “their religion got linked to terrorism a long time ago.”

The conferences they hold are usually well-attended, and this year SSI is putting on a conference in Orlando, Florida for three days. The cost for each attendee is \$400. The keynote speaker this year is Steve Emerson, a well-known member of what’s been termed the “Islamophobia industry.” SSI also makes money off its Counter Terrorist



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magazine. A yearly subscription is \$35, and the company

says it has 15,000 subscribers.

Alex Kane is AlterNet's New York-based World editor, and an assistant editor for Mondoweiss.

US May Have Let 'Dozens' of Terrorists Into Country As Refugees

Source: <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-kentucky-us-dozens-terrorists-country-refugees/story?id=20931131>



Several dozen suspected terrorist bombmakers, including some believed to have targeted American troops, may have mistakenly been allowed to move to the United States as war refugees, according to FBI agents investigating the remnants of roadside bombs recovered from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The discovery in 2009 of two al Qaeda-Iraq terrorists living as refugees in Bowling Green, Kentucky – who later admitted in court that they'd attacked U.S. soldiers in Iraq – prompted the bureau to assign hundreds of specialists to an around-the-clock effort aimed at checking its archive of 100,000 improvised explosive devices collected in the war zones, known as IEDs, for other suspected terrorists' fingerprints.

"We are currently supporting dozens of current counter-terrorism investigations like that," FBI Agent Gregory Carl, director of the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), said in an ABC News interview to be broadcast

tonight on ABC News' "World News with Diane Sawyer" and "Nightline".

"I wouldn't be surprised if there were many more than that," said House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul. "And these are trained terrorists in the art of bombmaking that are inside the United States; and quite frankly, from a homeland security perspective, that really concerns me."

As a result of the Kentucky case, the State Department stopped processing Iraq refugees for six months in 2011, federal officials told ABC News – even for many who had heroically helped U.S. forces as interpreters and intelligence assets. One Iraqi who had aided American troops was assassinated before his refugee application could be processed, because of the immigration delays, two U.S. officials said. In 2011, fewer than 10,000 Iraqis were resettled as



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refugees in the U.S., half the number from the year before, State Department statistics show.

Suspect in Kentucky Discovered to Have Insurgent Past

An intelligence tip initially led the FBI to Waad Ramadan Alwan, 32, in 2009. The Iraqi had claimed to be a refugee who faced persecution back home – a story that shattered when the FBI found his fingerprints on a cordless phone base that U.S. soldiers dug up in a gravel pile south of Baiji, Iraq on Sept. 1, 2005. The phone base had been wired to unexploded bombs buried in a nearby road.

An ABC News investigation of the flawed U.S. refugee screening system, which was overhauled two years ago, showed that Alwan was mistakenly allowed into the U.S. and resettled in the leafy southern town of Bowling Green, Kentucky, a city of 60,000 which is

Shareef Hammadi, 26, were resettled in Bowling Green even though both had been detained during the war by Iraqi authorities, according to federal prosecutors.

Most of the more than 70,000 Iraqi war refugees in the U.S. are law-abiding immigrants eager to start a new life in America, state and federal officials say.

But the FBI discovered that Alwan had been arrested in Kirkuk, Iraq, in 2006 and confessed on video made of his interrogation then that he was an insurgent, according to the U.S. military and FBI, which obtained the tape a year into their Kentucky probe. In 2007, Alwan went through a border crossing to Syria and his fingerprints were entered into a biometric database maintained by U.S. military intelligence in Iraq, a Directorate of National Intelligence official said. Another U.S. official insisted that fingerprints of Iraqis were routinely



home to Western Kentucky University and near the Army's Fort Knox and Fort Campbell. Alwan and another Iraqi refugee, Mohanad

collected and that Alwan's fingerprint file was not associated with the insurgency.

How Zawahiri Lost al Qaeda

By William McCants

Source: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140273/william-mccants/how-zawahiri-lost-al-qaeda?sp_mid=44421508&sp_rid=aV6thbGF0YXNAeWFob28uY29tS0

Like any sprawling organization, al Qaeda has seen its fair share of bureaucratic infighting. But the squabbling has reached fever pitch since Ayman al-Zawahiri began his tenure as head of the organization two years ago. Two of al Qaeda's four main affiliates, al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are

bitterly, and sometimes violently, feuding for supremacy in North and West Africa. Another affiliate, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), has openly defied Zawahiri's will in Syria. If Zawahiri wants to assign blame for the lack of order, he should look no further than himself: the squabbling is



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largely a result of his decision to expand al Qaeda too broadly.

Paradoxically, one major reason that al Qaeda affiliates are not getting along is the great many opportunities before them. The turmoil in the Arab world has created security vacuums that Zawahiri has sought to exploit by calling on his local affiliates to set up shop. As they move in, they often disagree about who should be in charge.



Syria is a case in point. On April 9, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, a front group for AQI, declared that his group was changing its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), indicating his desire to play a greater role in the Syrian civil war. ("Al Sham" refers to Syria and its surrounding area.) The emir also claimed that AQI had already been fighting in Syria in the form of the Nusra Front, which he said was subordinate to him. Yet Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the Nusra Front's leader, refused to acknowledge Baghdadi as his leader; instead he pledged a direct oath of allegiance to Zawahiri. In response to the spat, Zawahiri sent a private message ruling that both men had erred: Baghdadi by not consulting Jawlani, and Jawlani by refusing to join ISIS and giving his direct allegiance to Zawahiri without permission from al Qaeda central. Zawahiri also decreed that ISIS should revert to its old name -- and to its more limited focus. The Nusra Front would remain al Qaeda's main affiliate in Syria, an "independent branch" subordinate to the "general leadership."

Had the scuffle ended there, Zawahiri would have been slightly embarrassed by the public perception that he was not kept in the loop, but at least he would have successfully staved off a conflict. Baghdadi, however, had other plans.

In a public message to Zawahiri after receiving the memo, he rejected Zawahiri's message on religious and methodological grounds, saying that he had "chosen the command of my Lord over the command in the letter that contradicts it." In the 25-year history of al Qaeda, no affiliate had ever publicly disagreed with the boss so brazenly.

Zawahiri's poor management is not necessarily a boon to the United States and its allies.

The dispute between the Nusra Front and ISIS is not just about bureaucratic power; it is also about strategy and the future of al Qaeda's global jihad. The Nusra Front, which wants to maintain its popular support among the Syrian people, has tried to make nice with the other opposition groups in the country. By contrast, ISIS has attacked fellow rebels -- including the Nusra Front -- and implemented

draconian Islamic law in the towns that it has captured, both of which have alienated Syrians. In this regard, the squabble resembles a similar debate that took place within al Qaeda during the Iraq war. In 2005, when Zawahiri was al Qaeda's number two, he chastised AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi for alienating Iraq's Sunni masses through AQI's brutal campaign of beheadings and bombings. Instead, he argued, al Qaeda should temper its violent excesses and work with the other Sunni insurgent groups to expel the Americans. The Nusra Front is taking an approach similar to the one recommended by Zawahiri in its fight against the Syrian regime. By contrast, ISIS is largely following the disastrous Zarqawi strategy. Previously in these pages, I speculated that AQI would turn away Sunnis in Syria if it failed to learn from its mistakes in Iraq; I never anticipated that the organization would split because one half, the Nusra Front, learned from those mistakes and the other, ISIS, did not.

Melee in the Maghreb

A similar struggle has unfolded in al Qaeda's North African franchise, AQIM, albeit in private. As in Syria, many of the conflicts there have to do with who should call the shots in the



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new fronts for jihad.

In 2011, Zawahiri publicly called on Muslims to travel to Libya to join the rebel coalition fighting the Qaddafi regime. But the leaders of various AQIM brigades did not see eye-to-eye about how to answer the boss's call. The leader of one brigade, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, decided to send fighters under his control into Libya in direct defiance of AQIM's emir, who had given that duty to someone else. In an October 2012 memo, AQIM's leaders chastised Belmokhtar for attempting to strike out on his own, claiming that they alone were responsible for the decision to bring jihad to Libya. The note read, "The leadership of the organization was the first to push for taking advantage of the events in Libya. It didn't just push and urge, it went further and made decisions and instructions for the forming of teams and bands that were sent into the heart of Libyan territory."

Like a business executive who feels that he would do better answering directly to the CEO rather than endure the small minds of his middle management, Belmokhtar pledged allegiance directly to Zawahiri. This was too much for AQIM. "Do you consider it loyalty," its leadership scoffed, "to revolt against [the] emirs and threaten to tear apart the organization with no acceptable legal justification?" Belmokhtar shrugged and went his own way.

Buyer's remorse

Zawahiri could be excused for failing to anticipate the organizational disputes that would arise from his call for jihad in the Arab countries undergoing violent transitions. But he should have known better than to publicly acknowledge al Qaeda's merger with the badly run al Shabaab organization in Somalia. When the merger was announced in early 2012, it looked good on paper, because al Shabaab controlled most of Somalia. It also stood out among al Qaeda affiliates for attracting Western fighters who could be sent on missions into Europe.

But Zawahiri should have heeded the warnings of his predecessor, bin Laden. In 2010, bin Laden made clear that he thought it would be a mistake to publicly announce a merger with al Shabaab because its leaders were bad at governing and because they harshly implemented Islamic law in the territory they controlled, which did them no favors with the local Somali population. Bin Laden did not want to own the mistakes of his subordinates.

Zawahiri urged his boss to reconsider -- to no avail -- and tried to blunt the advice that bin Laden received from other lieutenants who wanted to limit the size of al Qaeda, lest it get out of control. Zawahiri ultimately got his way: nine months after bin Laden's death, al Qaeda publicly accepted a pledge of loyalty from Ahmed Abdi Godane, al Shabaab's leader.

Soon after, however, al Shabaab lost its grip on most of Somalia. According to an exposé written by an American jihadi who had been fighting under al Shabaab's banner, Godane used the merger with al Qaeda to silence his critics within his group's ranks. As a result, al Qaeda affiliation, rather than unify the various jihadist elements in Somalia, ended up dividing them. The infighting has become so heated that a former close confidant of Godane's wrote a letter to Zawahiri calling on him to do something before the Shabaab leader entirely ruined the organization. Either Zawahiri has not listened or he is unable to do anything about it.

Spread thin

As the political scientist Jacob Shapiro observes in his new book, *The Terrorist's Dilemma*, all terrorist groups suffer from infighting for one basic reason. If they want to achieve their goals and to avoid being captured or killed, leaders of secretive violent organizations have to give their commanders in the field some measure of autonomy. When the field commanders become too independent, the leadership attempts to rein them in through various bureaucratic measures.

Without a doubt, Zawahiri is trying to rein in his unruly affiliates. What is striking is that Zawahiri created much of the problem himself by trying to expand al Qaeda too broadly. The one affiliate that Zawahiri did not push into a new arena of jihad, the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has, unsurprisingly, avoided infighting. Zawahiri has now allegedly appointed AQAP's leader, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, as al Qaeda's "general manager" and thus his eventual successor. Zawahiri had little choice but to promote from the ranks of AQAP, given the current disarray across the rest of al Qaeda.

Zawahiri could still pare back his organization. He could amicably part company with al Shabaab in Somalia and sever ties with AQI. The open defiance of the latter would certainly merit such a response. But al Qaeda's leadership



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has historically preferred to admonish wayward affiliates rather than cut them loose. During the Iraq war, Zarqawi severely damaged al Qaeda's global reputation by mismanaging his organization. Yet al Qaeda's leadership preferred to privately scold him rather than cut him loose. Better to have an affiliate behaving badly, al Qaeda central figured, than to have no affiliate at all. As the case of al Shabaab shows, bin Laden at least learned to publicly deny al Qaeda's ties to unruly affiliates when he could, despite Zawahiri's objections. Zawahiri's knack for creating factions and his unwillingness to part with them when they misbehave could help al Qaeda's opponents

blame the entire organization for the atrocities committed in its name. Over time, perhaps the bloody collage will dampen enthusiasm for joining al Qaeda and even horrify its members. But in the near term, Zawahiri's poor management is not necessarily a boon to the United States and its allies. The various factions of a once-unified al Qaeda could compete with one another over which group can mount the biggest attack on the West. Whatever the case may be, Zawahiri's inability to manage al Qaeda's sprawling organization offers a preview of the infighting to come after his inevitable death.

William McCantis is director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution and a fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Johns Hopkins University.

US Attitudes Before, After Boston Bombings Pose Policy Implications

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/us-attitudes-before-after-boston-bombings-pose-policy-implications/8bfbb2c3275619a98e65c167ea848a5c.html>

The results of a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funded study by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) pose important policy considerations for law enforcement.

The results of the study "suggest that public attitudes toward terrorism and government responses to it are fairly stable, even in the face of a highly publicized terrorist event." At the same time, however, "a highly publicized event appears to increase the willingness of the American public to help the authorities prevent future attacks."

The policy implications for these two principal findings indicate the need for supporting "increased levels of community engagement between DHS, local law enforcement and local communities, especially following highly publicized terrorist events."

"A highly publicized event appears to increase the willingness of the American public to help authorities prevent future attacks," said Gary

LaFree, START director and lead author of the study. "The results of the study also underscore a long understood characteristic of policing in general: that to be effective, policing requires direct citizen engagement and cooperation."

Both before and after the Boston Marathon bombings, START found about 60 percent of respondents expressed a willingness to meet with DHS officials or local police about terrorism. Furthermore, the study found that "the proportion of respondents who said they had heard about DHS's 'See Something, Say Something' campaign remained consistent before (26.3 percent) and after (27.6 percent) the bombings. Of these people, roughly 4 out of 5 thought the campaign would be somewhat or very

effective."

A START survey that was released only hours before the Boston Marathon bombings had found that



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more than 56 percent of Americans said they'd never heard anything about DHS's If You See Something, Say Something campaign.

And while an additional 20 percent said they were not sure whether they had heard anything about it, "clear majorities of respondents said they would be willing to meet with DHS (57 percent) or local police (58 percent) to talk about terrorism," the study found.

Referring to START's latest study, LaFree said it was not surprising that after the bombings Americans were less likely to say the government was effective in preventing terrorism in the United States. The survey showed that before the bombings, 86.9 percent of respondents viewed the government as very or somewhat effective, compared with 78.5 percent after.

Both before and after, roughly 3 out of 4 people said that "terrorists will always find a way to carry out major domestic attacks," while 1 in 4 said that "the government can eventually prevent all major attacks in the United States," START said.

By comparing survey responses of American adults before and after the Boston Marathon Bombings, START researchers evaluated how US attitudes about terrorism and counterterrorism changed.

"After the bombings, Americans perceived higher probabilities of a terrorist attack occurring in the United States – 26 percent saying they viewed an attack as somewhat, very, or extremely likely after the bombings compared with about 13 percent before the bombings," START said. "However, there was no change in respondents' views regarding the probability of a terrorist attack happening in their community."

START also found that there was no difference in the proportion of respondents who said they had thought about the possibility of a terrorist attack during the previous week, and no difference in the proportion of people who said they had changed their behaviors due to the possibility of attack.

"After the bombings, there was an increase in the proportion of respondents saying they would be very or somewhat likely to call the police if they became aware of various terrorism-related scenarios," START said.

According to a national poll that was conducted in September by the University of Massachusetts-Lowell (UMass Lowell), not

only do more Americans believe that the threat of terrorism has increased over the last decade, but since the Boston Marathon bombings in April, nearly two-thirds of Americans said they are more concerned about a terrorist attack on US soil.

"Opinions about security and terrorism have been deeply impacted by the events of 2013," but "despite the belief by a majority of Americans that the threat of terrorism has grown in the last ten years, they are conflicted over how much of their privacy they are willing to give up to fight the war on terror, an issue brought to the forefront by the revelation the National Security Agency [NSA] collects data on telephone and Internet activity," said Associate Prof. Joshua Dyck, co-director of UMass Lowell's Center for Public Opinion, who presented the results of the poll.

Similarly, A March 2013 Duke University Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS) survey of public attitudes, *Evaluating Welfare Improvements from Changes in Homeland Security*, found Americans are cautious about infringements on their civil rights, but understand that the federal government must take steps to keep the US safe and protected with invasive action at home.

Counterterrorism and law enforcement authorities have repeatedly told Homeland Security Today that local intelligence is critical to connecting the dots in terrorism investigations.

"Fifty percent of the 'dots' that prevent the next 9/11 will come from bottom-up [local] level observation" and unconventional intelligence from "private sector parties," said veteran intelligence officer Robert David Steele.

IHSS stated in its April 2011 research report, *Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activity*, that 80 percent of foiled terrorist plots were discovered as a result of tips and clues from law enforcement or the general public, and documented the key role that state and local law enforcement play in preventing terrorist attacks.

"The terrorist and criminal alike are constrained by the laws of physics that we all are ... they both operate in the city streets and towns, committing non-terrorist crimes that if caught by a trained officer could lead to a much bigger crime picture," said Oklahoma City-



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based Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Executive Director David Cid, a former FBI counterterrorism specialist. MIPT has developed a DHS-funded training program for law enforcement called Information Collection on Patrol (InCOP), the goal of which is to improve the quantity and detail of observation and reporting of suspicious activity by street cops. InCOP suggests that “all crime is local” and improves the quantity and quality of reporting by the line officer, a methodology that is supported by the IHSS report that examined

open-source material on foiled and executed plots against US targets to determine the types of information and activities that led to or could have led to their discovery.

The IHSS study concluded “that law enforcement, assisted by the public, is generally the first line of defense in detecting terrorist plots. In over 80 percent of the foiled plots in our dataset, the initial clue came from law enforcement (20 federal cases and 15 state/local cases) or from public reporting (20 cases).”

Dozens of lawsuits used to hide 'Islamic realities'

By Michael Carl

Source: <http://mobile.wnd.com/2013/11/dozens-of-lawsuits-used-to-hide-islamic-realities/#0ejVKc55t5MsvTkr.99>

The Council on American-Islamic Relations, which according to FBI evidence was founded by the Egyptian-based, Saudi-funded Muslim Brotherhood, has filed more than 150 lawsuits over a two-year period that have been aimed at stifling speech – all with the goal of hiding “Islamic realities,” according to a think tank’s report.

CAIR has been described by authorities as a front group for Hamas to promote Islam in the U.S.

It was the Florida-based national security think tank Citizens for National Security that released the report, “Council on American-Islamic Relations: Its Use of Lawfare and Intimidation” to every member of Congress.

CFNS co-founder William Saxton said the study focuses on CAIR’s practice of “lawfare” to silence critics and force corporations, private citizens and charitable organizations to pay large sums of money to settle lawsuits out of court.

Saxton said the two-year task force project found CAIR has filed more than 150 lawsuits with the intention of silencing critics.

“CAIR has a pattern of behavior and a specific campaign of intimidation to stifle free speech. By stifling free speech, they’re hoping to prevent the public from seeing Islamic realities,” Saxton said.

Peter Leitner, also a co-founder for CFNS, confirmed other Islam analysts’ findings that

the Muslim Brotherhood established CAIR to engage in “misinformation.”



“CAIR is the operational part of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States. As such, and as part of Hamas, they’re the domestic side of an international terrorist group. What they’re doing is psychological operations,” Leitner said.

“Their mission to do misinformation and psy-ops is for the purpose of supporting jihadist movements in the United States and Canada,” Leitner said.

Contacted by WND, CAIR declined to respond to a request for comment.

Some of CAIR’s activities came to light during the Holy Land Foundation terrorism funding trial.

Leitner says CAIR hopes to stay one step ahead of the public.

“More people in the U. S. know about CAIR and their connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. But they’re hoping that not enough people will recognize who they are until the Muslim population in the U. S. can grow big enough to be politically powerful enough,” Leitner said.

Leitner said CAIR’s “masquerade is to divert attention from the Islamic threat in the U. S. by oversensitizing law enforcement and intelligence officials.”

“To make that happen, they’ve infiltrated their agents into the various



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national security agencies,” Leitner said.

CAIR intimidates the government agencies into providing “trainers” for law enforcement, he pointed out.

“They want to provide sensitivity training to misdirect people’s attention away from the real threat,” he said, and “stifle free speech among critics of Islam via lawsuits and further threats of legal action.”

Leitner explained that the Muslim Brotherhood began infiltrating universities and colleges in the U.S. in 1962 through the Muslim Students Association, beginning with Palestinians and later through Pakistanis.

A significant portion of Muslim Brotherhood funding comes from outside the U.S., Leitner noted.

The money, Leitner says, is used to fund an entire network of Islamic groups tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. Along with stifling free speech, Leitner points to a second major purpose.

Groups such as the Muslim American Society, Muslims of the Americas and Jamiat al-Fuqua, which began in 1980, have infiltrated the culture enough that American converts to Islam have formed their own groups.

“John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban, is an example of one of their converts. We all know he ended up in Afghanistan fighting against U. S. troops,” Leitner said.

Leitner added that the method employed once influence has been gained is disinformation.

“Their greatest work is to create a grand illusion of a peaceful religion to distract attention from what their real plan is,” Leitner said.

He also says the lawfare tactics are fundraising mechanism.

He cited a fight with Nike.

“They threatened to boycott if Nike didn’t change their logo because ‘it looked like’ the Arabic name for Allah at a great distance,” Leitner said.

CAIR forced Nike to apologize to the Islamic community, globally recalled the shoes in question, cooperated with CAIR in a redesign

of logos and images and donated \$50,000 to the Dar al-Hijra mosque in Washington, D.C., for playground equipment.

The report has details on CAIR’s 150 lawsuits or cases against government agencies, corporations and private foundations.

“CAIR even went after the producers of ‘South Park’ for how they portrayed Muhammad. They’ve gone after cartoonists, TV producers and tea party groups,” Leitner said.

Leitner said the sheer volume of CAIR’s legal actions prompted U. S. law enforcement agencies to dig into CAIR’s extended relationships and connections. Once the FBI and city police departments began to investigate, they found CAIR had connections to the network of the “blind sheik,” Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Leitner said CAIR takes advantage of constitutional freedoms “to deny us our freedoms.”

Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., a frequent advocate for persecuted Christians, affirmed that his committee research shows that CAIR and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated terrorist organizations pose a real security threat.

“The threat is real and I serve on the committee that has jurisdiction of the FBI. We’ve put language in a bill that will completely prevent the FBI from involving themselves with CAIR,” Wolf said.

“An example of the depth of the threat comes from the Somali al-Qaida-affiliate al-Shabaab. Imams recruit for al-Shabaab from Somali groups in Minneapolis. Not only that, they’re telling Somalis not to cooperate with federal authorities who are investigating the Somali mosques,” Wolf said.

The FBI has become more cautious in its dealings with CAIR, he said, as has his committee.

“I know we’ve been very careful interacting with any group that is involved with CAIR,” Wolf said. “I refused to go to any group that has connections to CAIR.”

Michael Carl is a veteran journalist with overseas military experience and experience as a political consultant. He also has two Master’s Degrees, is a bi-vocational pastor and lives with his family in the Northeast United States.



Car bomb partially explodes in Belfast city centre

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-25085035>

A bomb has partially exploded inside a car in Belfast city centre, the police have said.

The alert began at 21:30 GMT on Sunday **when a masked gang hijacked a car, placed a bomb on board and ordered the driver to take it to a shopping centre.**

The device exploded as army bomb experts prepared to examine the car that had been left at the entrance to a car park at Victoria Square.

There were no reports of injuries. The size of the device is not yet known.

Detective Chief Inspector Karen Baxter told the BBC it was a "viable device which partially exploded".

"The only people that are going to lose out on this are the general public in the advance to Christmas," said

"We would be looking for anybody with information in relation to that device to come forward."



The car was left at the entrance to the Victoria Square car park after being hijacked

The police said a silver Renault Laguna car, registration number CJZ 4697 car, had been hijacked in Jamaica Street, in the Ardoyne area of north Belfast.

It was then left at Victoria Square, opposite the city's main police station, and not far from Belfast's court complex.

A security operation began and premises were evacuated. The bomb partly exploded at about 23:15 GMT.

Commuters on Monday face traffic disruption.

Both Victoria Street and Chichester Street were closed overnight but reopened just before 08:30 GMT on Monday.

Hundreds of people were caught up in the overnight security alert.

People living close to the scene at Victoria Square had to leave their homes overnight, but have now been allowed to return.

Traffic in the city centre was severely disrupted



Some of those caught up in the alert were moved from a nearby cinema.

Eddie Sheppard, a police officer from County Monaghan, was among 40 people who took shelter at the Ulster Hall overnight.

"We were just coming out and the alarms went off in the shopping centre, so we were more or less told by security staff to vacate or leave the area.

"Our car is parked underground and we are told we can't get out until the morning," he said.

"We've to get back to work in the morning, so it is out of the way a wee bit, but sure what can be done about it, the police are doing their best."

The car, which was located at street level at the top of a ramp to an underground car park, was believed to have been left there at about 21:30 GMT.

BBC NI reporter Rick Faragher, who lives in the Victoria Square apartments, was among those who had to leave their home.

He said at about 22:00 GMT police told him there had been a suspect car and he could not go back inside.



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"I had my coat on, my phone with me, but the lights were still on in my flat, they told us to wait outside. They said they were not sure how long it could last for," he said.

"People were confused; they were not quite sure what was going on.


"There was a tremendous sense of frustration, it was particularly cold last night and there was quite a few of us out on the street.

"They let us back in just after five o'clock this morning."

The Backstory of Somali Pirates Does Not Fit Neatly on the Big Screen

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-abdulkadir-ali/the-backstory-of-somali-p_b_4339940.html

Captain Phillips is a cinematic feat of suspense: masterfully directed, superbly acted and beautifully executed. It is a thrilling and compelling ride into a harrowing journey through the pirate infested waters of Somalia. It



also happens to be a superficial exercise. The tragic story of Somali piracy is turned into a pantomime.

The pirates of Captain Phillips are cruel, maniacal, murderous and fueled by uncompromising greed. Dark-skinned, emaciated, hollow-cheeked and garbed in rags and AK47s, they are modernized, Africanized caricatures of the stereotypical pirates of lore. When we first see Muse, played by Somali newcomer Barkhad Ali, the leader of the pirateband, standing before a frightened Phillips, played to everyman perfection by Tom Hanks, you can't help but think that this gaunt,

menacing creature is the embodiment of the modern pirate.

The film puts up a façade of contextualizing the motivations and origin of these pirates. Muse at one-point laments that Somalia's fish had been stolen, that he could no longer be a fisherman. As we watch a hysterical and sobbing Tom Hanks pushed to breaking point, it is hard to sympathize. Other fleeting scenes and throwaway dialogue meant to humanize them, ring hollow.

What if the film had spent more than a fleeting two minutes in the village of the Somali pirates? What if we had met this group of pirates a year before they had taken a skiff to sea on that fated day?

In squalid huts in villages along coastal Somalia, young women give birth to deformed babies, with missing limbs, malformed heads, and tumors. Healthy young men and women develop abdominal hemorrhages, mouth bleeding, and cancer. For over twenty years, Somalia's coastal waters have been the world's largest dumping ground for toxic waste and chemicals. EU firms have taken advantage of the country's descent into chaos to cheaply remove hazards, including nuclear waste, from Europe.

Along the blue waters of the Indian Ocean, once home to thousand of species of fish, fishermen and their families die of malnutrition. There are no fish. European, Chinese and South Asian trawlers plunder Somalia's unprotected coastal waters, dramatically decreasing fish stock.

Over two-thirds of young men and women in these villages have no jobs and live in abject poverty. Only a few miles away, cargo ships laden with hundreds of millions of dollars of goods and produce slowly slide by. This was the origin of piracy.



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Of course this is not the story of Somali Robin Hoods taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Piracy has had a devastating impact in these communities, creating a culture of violence, alcohol abuse, drug dependence and prostitution. High inflation rates from the influx of piracy cash has made it impossible for those living in poverty to make a living. Fishermen are threatened and their fishing equipment confiscated by pirates.

But the biggest victims of piracy are Somali youth. If the film had spent a few months with these pirates, the story they would see would not be that of simple fishermen turned criminals, but that of child soldiers. In one conversation between Phillips and Muse, when Muse mentions he has a boss he has to answer to, Phillips retorts "We all got bosses." Muse's boss, however, happens to be a warlord, one who uses youth as the foot soldiers in a multi-million dollar criminal enterprise. Young men are coerced and threatened into piracy by these ruthless warlords. They are child soldiers of the Indian Ocean with very few options. The unemployment rate for youth is 67 percent, poverty is still rampant and cancer cases continue to pop up in coastal towns.

In 2011, piracy attacks cost the world \$7 billion. Today, successful piracy attacks have been cut down to practically zero. NATO forces have begun patrolling the coast waters of Somalia.

The pirates, however, are not gone. A few months ago, in Mogadishu, a Swedish diplomat was attacked and her translator and guards killed. The attackers were not terrorists. They were pirates. Unable to earn income from ransoming off hijacked ships, they are now targeting prominent businessmen and foreigners in Mogadishu for kidnapping and ransom.

Other former pirates in Northern Somalia are now working for illegal fishing trawlers, who hire them to protect their ships. Artisanal fishermen are attacked if they are caught near these trawlers.

In the last moments of the film, as I watched a small lifeboat helmed by three gaunt pirates, face-off with two US warships of gargantuan size, I could not help but think that the scene was symbolic of how the greatest security threats in this era are no longer superpowers locked in mutual deterrence due to the strength of their militaries and arsenals.

Rather, the greatest challenge facing the world today is driven by the poverty, insecurity and desperation of youth in the developing world. The child soldiers of piracy need to be rehabilitated. Youth living in poverty need opportunities and livelihoods. Communities devastated by the effects of hazardous waste need help. This is the true tragic story of piracy in Somalia, and it needs to be answered with more than military might and epic movies.

Armed Assault at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)

Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/STARTFactSheet_ArmedAssaultatLAX_Nov2013.pdf?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=1ea2456ee1-START_Newsletter_September9_26_2013&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-1ea2456ee1-14081393

On Nov. 1, 2013, a gunman opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), reportedly motivated by anti-government sentiment and targeting Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officers. To provide context for this attack, START has compiled relevant facts and figures from the Global Terrorism Database.

- ☑ **07/04/2002:** Hesham Mohamed Hedayet, an Egyptian-born man, opened fire at the El Al Israeli Airlines ticket counter, killing two people and wounding four others before he was killed by security personnel.
- ☑ **05/30/1982:** The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) planted an explosive device at the Air Canada freight terminal. The device was defused and no casualties were reported.
- ☑ **01/22/1980:** Unknown perpetrators bombed the China Airlines luggage area. No casualties were reported.
- ☑ **08/06/1974:** Muharem Kurbegovic, also known as "Isak (Isaac) Rasim" or the "alphabet bomber," detonated explosives at the Pan American terminal, killing three people, injuring 36 others, and causing considerable damage.



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
- There have been more than 2,600 terrorist attacks in the United States between 1970 and 2012. More than half of these attacks took place in the 1970s.
- **Only 72 terrorist attacks in the United States (2.7%) targeted airports and airlines.** The vast majority of the attacks targeting airports and airlines were bombings or attempted bombings (72.2%), 19.4 percent were hijackings or attempted hijackings, and only three of these attacks were classified as armed assaults like the one at LAX on Nov. 1.
- Since 1970, relatively few terrorist attacks in the United States (13.0%) have involved firearms. However, of those attacks that involved firearms, 46 percent resulted in at least one fatality, compared to only 6.7 percent of attacks that did not involve firearms.
- **Worldwide, 74 terrorist attacks classified as armed assaults against airports and airlines were carried out between 1970 and 2012, 1.8 per year on average.**
- Armed assaults against airports and airlines took place in 42 different countries, most commonly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Western Europe. **The most lethal of these attacks took place on 02/17/2002 in Nepal, when Maoist rebels attacked an airport in Sanphebaga, killing 27 Nepalese policemen.**



The Long Island Jihadist

Source: <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/11/justin-kaliebe-long-island-jihadist.html>

In January, Justin Kaliebe, an eighteen-year-old high-school senior, walked out of his grandparents' house, in Bay Shore, Long



Island, without leaving a note. Departing the neighborhood of multi-family homes, pizza parlors, and a pawn shop, he set off for John F. Kennedy International Airport with only a passport.

Boyish and skinny, with short auburn hair and a round face, Kaliebe was an American teenager who favored jeans, T-shirts, and basketball sneakers. His father was a commercial fisherman with Norwegian and Irish roots. His mother was an office manager of Italian-Jewish descent. At Terminal 8, Kaliebe presented his airline ticket, and he was issued a boarding pass. He went through airport security. Kaliebe was soft-spoken, and he liked Harry Potter books, the rapper Eminem, and swimming in his mother's pool, friends and family say. He was six months away from graduating from an alternative public high school, his third school in four years.

Kaliebe heard his flight called and got up to board the plane to begin his journey: J.F.K. to L.H.R. to B.A.H. to M.C.T. He was heading to Muscat, Oman—a port town on the Arabian Sea, seven thousand miles away.

But he never made it onto the plane. Kaliebe was surrounded by F.B.I. Joint Terrorism Task Force officers and members of the N.Y.P.D. They arrested him on the suspicion that he was travelling to Yemen to join Ansar al-Sharia, a terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden's former secretary. The F.B.I. suspected him of trying to wage jihad.



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Online, Kaliebe went by an alias: Umar Abdur-Rahman. For the previous eighteen months, in person and electronically, he had been corresponding with two undercover F.B.I. agents as he made plans to join Ansar al-Sharia, which is also known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP in American counter-terrorism parlance. AQAP has claimed responsibility for planning a number of attacks against the United States, including the attempted Christmas Day, 2009, bombing of a Detroit-bound plane from Europe, and a plot in October of 2010 to send packages filled with explosives on U.S.-bound cargo flights.

So now, as his classmates complete their first semesters of college, Kaliebe sits in a two-person cell at the Metropolitan Detention

The custody arrangement seemed to create a kind of socioeconomic whiplash. After a downturn in the fishing industry when Kaliebe was in junior high, both his father and aunt moved back to their parents' home. Everyone shared a vinyl-sided, one-story ranch house on a third of an acre. "We fight," Robert Kaliebe told me. "We live in the house because economics force us to. But we all get along. We're tight."

Justin Kaliebe didn't participate in sports or other activities, and by all accounts had few friends. At a young age, he was diagnosed with autism, according to his father. By age fourteen, he struggled to get out of bed, and regularly cut school. According to his mother, when Justin was a small child he and his sister were home alone when their family's house was robbed. He hid under the bed during the robbery, and then slept with a baseball bat until he was sixteen.

He was always slower than other kids his age. "He wasn't allowed to cross the street without a crossing guard because he'd get hit by a car," his mother told me in an e-mail.

His parents took him to a psychiatrist, who began treating him for depression. The medication didn't work, and a year later he was diagnosed with Kallmann syndrome, a genetic condition that delays puberty. He began taking testosterone, which his father says improved his mood.

Kaliebe was raised Catholic, but when he was fifteen he started exploring Islam. There are about three hundred Muslims in Bay Shore, and, according to Bilal Hito, a friend, Kaliebe came across a book on Islam that Hito had distributed through a youth program at the Muslim Center of Long Island (Masjid Darul Quran), a local mosque. Hito's phone number was in the book, and, out of the blue, Kaliebe called him one day with questions. "In the beginning it was more 'This is good? This is bad?,'" says Hito, twenty-eight, a medical-diagnostics technician. "He was looking at things in terms of morality: God wants me to do this and not that."

Home was a tough place for Kaliebe, friends say. "He would call me at like 3 A.M.," Hito says, and say that the cops had showed up and he didn't know what to do. (Robert Kaliebe



Center, in Brooklyn. In February, he pleaded guilty in federal court to attempting to provide material support to terrorists and faces up to thirty years in prison. He is scheduled to be sentenced on December 6th, though his attorney expresses confidence that he will be able to delay the sentencing for several months.

Bay Shore, where Kaliebe grew up, is a middle-class suburb across the bay from Fire Island, a popular summer retreat for Manhattanites. His parents divorced when he was six—he also has a sister—and his mother remarried. Today she lives in a waterfront house with her new husband and their nine-year-old twins. (She requested that I not use her name, out of concerns for her children's safety.) Kaliebe's parents had joint custody, but by high school he was spending five nights a week with his father, Robert, who, along with being a commercial fisherman, worked as a first mate on party boats off Captree State Park.



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says that the police came to his house four or five years ago for an incident that didn't involve his son; Kaliebe's lawyer, Anthony LaPinta, declined to make Kaliebe available for this article.)

School wasn't much better, and the mosque became a form of escape. Kaliebe had questions about his own faith, Hito says, and Islam provided answers. And because he wasn't naturally athletic or social, he avoided other activities that many teen-agers enjoy. After school and on weekends, he would take a bus or his bike to the mosque, or catch a ride from Muslim neighbors. Kaliebe would often miss school to attend Friday prayers. "They had strong family units so he felt very safe within this culture, plus they didn't judge him," Kaliebe's mother wrote in an e-mail. "They didn't make fun of him like everyone else so he wanted to be with them all the time."

Kaliebe picked up a few phrases in Arabic, and memorized certain prayers in the Koran. "I'd see him walking here or there," Hito says. "He needed to not be home. He'd come to the mosque for a program. It would let out and people would go home, but he didn't want to go home."

For Kaliebe, it seems, Islam filled a life that didn't include much else. He worked one day a week at a dollar store in Wyandanch. According to his father and friends, he drank a bit and smoked some pot before becoming religious. He surfed MySpace alone in his room using the screen name "pvtpotatohead." According to his grandfather and father, Kaliebe was observant, wearing a traditional Muslim robe and eating halal food that his Norwegian grandmother would buy for him. "When he got into this thing"—practicing Islam—"he sort of was happy," says his grandfather, an electronics-store owner. "He followed the prayers. They didn't look down on him, from what I could tell."

Initially, Kaliebe's mother disapproved of her son's new interest. But after a year she became more receptive. "Nothing bad was happening and Justin seemed happier than he ever was, so I was layed off the issue," she wrote in an e-mail. At some point, according to the indictment, Kaliebe began to self-radicalize, watching lectures by the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and reading articles by Samir Khan, a U.S. citizen who became an influential member of Ansar al-Sharia and helped edit its English-language magazine, *Inspire*, which Kaliebe

also read. The imam at the Long Island mosque, Muhammad Abdul Jabbar, says that he was unaware of this behavior. "He initially went on in a normal way," Jabbar says. "He was a serious student of knowledge."

In June, 2011—when Kaliebe was sixteen—he met the first of two undercover agents. The N.Y.P.D. was paying close attention to Muslim converts, whom it saw as "particularly vulnerable" to radicalization, according to a 2007 report. Converts are the most zealous members of terrorist groups, the report states, because of their "need to prove their religious convictions to their companions."

Initially, Kaliebe met the agent, who claimed to be of Yemeni descent, socially at the mosque. Once the agent learned of Kaliebe's desire to support Ansar al-Sharia, they met more frequently and in private. According to the indictment, some of the meetings took place at the agent's home, where Kaliebe used the agent's computer. Others occurred at a restaurant in Ronkonkoma, a nearby town. "He was looking for whomever would tell him not to get a job, not be with his family," Hito says. "He was looking for an escape."

That fall, in meetings and online, Kaliebe started to speak of his desire to join the mujahideen, and of his admiration for Anwar al-Awlaki. In a July, 2012, conversation, according to the indictment, Kaliebe said that he was inspired by several sheikhs, including "Sheik Usama," a reference to bin Laden, "who showed how he could bring an entire nation to its knees." Kaliebe asked the agent whether he could contact an overseas "brother" who could help with his travel plans to Yemen. Kaliebe then began e-mailing with a second undercover agent, whom he believed was located in Yemen.

Throughout, Kaliebe expressed his devotion to the cause. When one of the undercover agents asked Kaliebe whom he expected to fight in Yemen, he responded, "I would say, those who are fighting against the Sharia of Allah...whether it's the U.S. drones or the, their puppets, in the Yemeni army...or, who knows, if American agents or whatever, U.S. Special Forces who they got over there." When the agent asked Kaliebe whether he was afraid to die, he said, "I wanna... It's what anyone would want, any believer would want." At another point, he



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wrote in an e-mail, “there are no limits to what I’m willing to do when I get there.”

According to the U.S. Attorney’s office, Kaliebe got the money for his trip from Marcos Alonso Zea, a friend from the Masjid Darul Quran. Zea, twenty-five, is a Hispanic, Catholic-raised son of immigrants—a mother from Guatemala and a father from Colombia. In January, 2012, he flew from J.F.K. to London, en route to Yemen. Zea didn’t have a visa to travel to Yemen, and in London customs officials stopped him and returned him to the United States. The trip raised a red flag for the F.B.I. and N.Y.P.D., but they had no grounds on which to charge him with a crime.

Trapped on Long Island and unable to get to Yemen, Zea, according to his indictment, was determined to help others who could. In 2012 and early 2013, he allegedly helped Kaliebe plan his trip. F.B.I. agents were able to record conversations between the two young men, and in October, Zea was arrested on multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and attempting to provide material support to terrorists. He pleaded not guilty. He is awaiting trial and is being held, like Kaliebe, at the Metropolitan Detention Center.

Friends from the mosque say that they can’t imagine Kaliebe fighting overseas. “If he ever told us he was going to do this, he knew we would try to talk him out of it,” Hito says.

Kaliebe is among a hundred and seventy-six Americans who were indicted, arrested, or otherwise identified as jihadist terrorists or supporters between 2001 and 2010, according to a RAND Corporation report by the terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins. Most were considered “lone wolves,” individuals who act alone. They include Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army major who killed thirteen soldiers at Fort Hood; and Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, who planted an explosive device in a Nissan Pathfinder that he parked near Times Square.

The F.B.I, it seems, is getting better at finding homegrown terrorists. “A lot of these are sting-type operations,” says Mark Randol, a specialist in domestic intelligence and counterterrorism. “In the five years after 9/11 you didn’t see a lot of them. But as the F.B.I’s intelligence collection abilities were beefed up, you suddenly started running into people who

were crossing over the line and being willing to conduct violence.”

So far, none of the alleged terrorists have been able to successfully claim that they were entrapped. According to the N.Y.U. Center on Law and Security, in the decade after September 11th, ten defendants charged with terrorism-related crimes in six trials argued the entrapment defense, but none prevailed. Among the most noteworthy is the “Newburgh Four” case, where an F.B.I. informant offered the defendants two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, a B.M.W., and other incentives to help him carry out plans to fire a Stinger missile at U.S. planes, as well as plant bombs outside synagogues in the Bronx. The entrapment defense was rejected, in part because prosecutors had tapes of one defendant making anti-Semitic remarks and expressing his desire to “do something to America.”

Entrapment is a difficult defense. The defendant must prove that he was induced to commit the crime. If he meets that burden, the prosecution must then prove that he was *predisposed* to commit the crime, which it can do in any number of ways. In terrorist cases, “predisposition” can take the form of watching jihadist videos or speaking favorably about a radical cleric. According to the indictment, Kaliebe did both these things.

Even so, Kaliebe’s case is unusual. He’s almost a decade younger than the median age of the homegrown radicals and supporters at the time of their arrest—twenty-seven. And he’s a native-born Caucasian, which is also rare within this group. Kaliebe, like many other homegrown extremists, had never committed a prior crime.

Kaliebe’s family says they had no idea he had become interested in radical Islam, or that he was planning a trip to Yemen. His grandfather first learned of the arrest at 9 P.M. that evening, when the F.B.I. arrived at his home. “They showed a search warrant and then we were told to move out of the way,” he says.

Two court-appointed public defenders negotiated Kaliebe’s plea deal. In April, he obtained a new lawyer, LaPinta, who told me that he will “make sure autism will be a central issue” when Kaliebe is sentenced.

December will be a busy time in Bay Shore. During the week of Kaliebe’s



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sentencing, there will be a winter festival on Main Street, a holiday fair at the elementary school, and a tree lighting at the Southside Hospital. The modest homes on Brookdale

Avenue, where Kaliebe grew up, will be covered in lights. Kaliebe, however, might not be back for thirty years.

U.K. Criminalizing Khat Risks Inciting Terrorism

Source: <http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-29/u-k-criminalizing-khat-risks-inciting-terrorism.html>

Home Secretary Theresa May's plan to outlaw khat risks alienating communities in the U.K. where the herbal stimulant is widely used, and increasing recruitment to terrorist network al-Shabab, lawmakers said.




May announced in July she would criminalize the stimulant, which is taken from a flowering plant and gives users mild euphoria, to prevent the U.K. becoming a hub for trafficking. It is used by Somali, Kenyan and Yemeni communities in Britain.

A conviction for dealing a Class C drug carries a penalty of as much as 14 years in jail. Today lawmakers from Parliament's cross-party Home Affairs Committee called on May to abandon her plans and license importers of the stimulant instead, saying her decision was "not based on evidence of medical or social harm."

"It is baffling that potential friction between already disadvantaged communities and the police has not been fully considered," the panel's chairman, opposition Labour Party lawmaker Keith Vaz, said in an e-mail. "We cannot afford for those who are already marginalized to be pushed towards criminality or extremism. It is vital that prohibition in the U.K. does not result in an increase in recruitment of al-Shabab abroad." Al-Shabab is the Somalia-based wing of al-Qaeda.

"Banning khat in the U.K. will protect the public from risks associated with its misuse," the Home Office said in a statement. "It will also prevent Britain from becoming a single regional hub for criminals trying to make a profit as countries across Europe have implemented the same ban."



The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death

Source: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=163497#>

This paper is an analysis of over 900 biographies of the deceased militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. It aims to provide baseline data about LeT's local recruits, the nature of the time they spend with the group and how these dynamics have changed over time. The analysis is based on the assumption that LeT's local activity and infrastructure are and will remain the key



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source of its strength, even if the group decides it is in its interest to become more active in the international arena.




Figure 6: Distribution of LeT militants by district.

You can download the paper from source's URL

Terrorism: A threat to regional economies

Source: <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/649794-terrorism-a-threat-to-regional-economies.html>

The solar eclipse raked in a whopping sh 10b, according to media reports. It could have been more. Just months before the November 3 hybrid eclipse, many local tour operators had



registered whopping bookings from foreign tourists, eager to jet in for the historic, once in a life time occurrence to catch the best view in Pakwach, Nebbi district. The import of this would be colossal amounts in foreign exchange

earnings.

Then came the grisly September 21 terror attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, with its ripple effects. Uganda was not spared. Concerned about their safety many intending tourists canceled their bookings, almost halving the number, drastically reducing financial inflows.

"We had up to 180 bookings but now we are expecting 80 tourists, following the terror attack in Kenya. Many tourists canceled their bookings fearing for their safety," Stella Rugunda, the proprietor Stebar Safaris said in an interview in the run up to the eclipse. Such is the horrific effect/impact that terrorism can have to the Uganda's economy and that of the region per se.

Travel and Tourism continues to be one of the world's largest industries, with tourism contributing US\$1.5b (about sh---) to Uganda's GDP and in



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Kenya about Ksh 167.6bn (5.7% of GDP) in 2011 while Tanzania was expecting to rake in US\$ 1.7b ((about TSh2.7 trillion) in revenue in 2011 from the industry that that supports 27,000 jobs.

This primarily reflects the economic activity generated by industries such as hotels, travel agents, airlines and other passenger transportation services (excluding commuter services) but also includes, for example, the activities of the restaurant and leisure industries directly supported by tourists.

Foreign Direct Inflows (FDI's) to East Africa region continued to grow in the last one year, rising by 50 percent in 2012 to US \$4 billion (about Shs10 trillion) compared with \$3 billion (about Shs7.7 trillion) in 2011, with Uganda topping the region, according to the UNCTAD World Investment Report. According to the UIA statement, FDI inflows to Uganda alone rose for the third year running by 92 percent, hitting a record high of \$1.72 billion (about sh 4 trillion).

The growing role of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations (MNCs) in developing countries in the age of globalization can not be disputed. But these profound figures, which can spur economic growth for Uganda and other countries in the region, can be reversed with a single terror attack or attacks, the more reason for vigilance to stem any such occurrence.

An attack could endanger the regions growth by deterring foreign investment and discouraging tourism, which supports hundreds of thousands of jobs and contributes significantly to the annual GDP's of the three EAC countries.

Other than hurting the economy terror attacks leave death and destruction in their wake, leaving communities shaken and traumatized, forcing them to alter their ways of life, raking up

costs in terms of losses. Losses accruing from the September 11 terror attack in the US are said to have hit US \$2t.

Then there is the cost of first combating and investigating the vice. This alone consumes colossal amounts of money which could have been channeled to provision of other requisite social services and development of infrastructure. Terrorism and other security threats if not addressed have the potential to greatly undermine regional integration.

Charles Njoroge, the EAC Deputy Secretary General in charge of Political Federation said that the EAC secretariat cognizant of the threat that terrorism possess and is considering developing a short curriculum on integration for basic police training programmes.

"I believe these interventions will empower the Police to adequately facilitate the implementation of the Common Market imperatives in particular," Njoroge said at a recent meeting for EAC police chiefs held in Kampala.

Njoroge called for more joint operations, saying that it's through such efforts that partner states can test their capacity to effectively work towards eliminating crime networks. This is in line with the establishment by the EAC of a Sectoral Council on Inter States Security to oversee the implementation of ever increasing areas of cooperation in inter state security as elaborated in the EAC regional Strategy for Peace and Security.

From the above it is clear that imposes a higher degree of responsibility and an onerous task on our governments, the public inclusive to stem any further attacks if we are to move forward in terms of federation. This responsibility entails that we (members of public) be each others brothers keeper and watch over the other. Talk of effective neighbourhood watch.

Feinstein, Rogers: Terror threat against U.S. has grown as al-Qaeda's dynamic shifts

Dec 2, 2013

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/feinstein-rogers-terror-threat-against-us-has-grown-as-al-qaedas-dynamic-shifts/2013/12/01/cd6a32cc-5ac5-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story.html

The terrorism threat against the United States is increasing and Americans are not as safe as they were a year or two ago, the leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees said Sunday.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said there are **more terrorist groups than ever, with more sophisticated and hard-to-detect bombs.**



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"There is huge malevolence out there," she said.



Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) said there is enormous pressure on U.S. intelligence services "to get it right, to prevent an attack." Rogers said that job is getting more difficult because al-Qaeda is changing, with more affiliates around the world — groups that once operated independently but have now joined with al-Qaeda.

He also said terrorists are adopting the idea that "maybe smaller events are okay" and still might achieve their goals.

"That makes it exponentially harder for our intelligence services to stop an event like that from happening," he said in a joint interview on CNN's "State of the Union" that aired Sunday. Although the lawmakers offered no specifics about what led them to their conclusions, Feinstein spoke generally of "a real displaced aggression in this very fundamentalist jihadist Islamic community, and that is that the West is responsible for everything that goes wrong and that the only thing that's going to solve this is Islamic sharia law and the concept of the caliphate."

The caliphate is an Islamic state led by a religious and political leader, or caliph, who is

considered a successor of the prophet Mohammad and who governs by sharia law.



Rogers said al-Qaeda groups have changed their means of communication as a result of leaks about U.S. surveillance programs, making it harder to detect potential plots in the early planning stages.

"We're fighting amongst ourselves here in this country about the role of our intelligence community," Rogers said. "That is having an impact on our ability to stop what is a growing number of threats. And so we've got to shake ourselves out of this pretty soon and understand that our intelligence services are not the bad guys."

EDITOR'S COMMENT: A worrying sad combination of truth and terror-lust

Indian Navy sounds alarm on 'floating armouries'

Source: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Navy-sounds-alarm-on-floating-armouries/articleshow/26815225.cms>

The surge in "private floating armouries" on the western seaboard, triggered by piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, has grave security implications for India since inimical forces could conceivably use them to unleash 26/11-style terror attacks.

Calling for a proper framework by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to

regulate such floating armouries, Navy chief Admiral D K Joshi on Tuesday stressed the "very serious concerns" emanating from this "totally unregulated activity" close to Indian shores.

"It has very serious security implications for us, which could include infiltration of terrorists," he



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said, in the backdrop of the recent seizure of the US-owned ship "MV Seaman Guard Ohio" with 25 armed guards from four nationalities for allegedly transporting weapons and ammunition off Tuticorin.

"There are close to 140 private security companies operating in North Indian Ocean, which hire out privately contracted armed security personnel. These personnel shift between vessels at sea, without entering any port or coastal state regulated maritime territory," said Admiral Joshi.

Holding that the government had also received reports about the presence of "uniformed combatants from some countries" on the floating armouries, the Navy chief said the lack of an international framework to deal with such vessels or armed personnel hampered legal action.

"We need to know about such ships near our Exclusive Economic Zone, how many guards they have, what arms they are carrying...international regulation is needed for

this. In fact, all littoral states must be aware of the identity of such ships," he said.

The Navy chief also underlined the need for reverting the IMO-promulgated "high risk area" to its original limits, with the current one virtually touching India's west coast. "We have also sought support of other littorals in this regard," he said.

"The merchant traffic has been navigating close to our west coast to clear the current limits of the high risk area. This apart from raising insurance and freight costs has also resulted in interference of the shipping and fishing fleets, leading to avoidable unpleasant incidents," he said.


Admiral Joshi said **no pirate attack had been reported within 450 nautical miles of the Indian coast** for the last two years after the Navy's "robust action" in sinking four pirate mother ships near the Lakshadweep and Minicoy islands. "There is no reason for these merchant vessels to operate close to our coast," he said.

NEW BOOK – Nancy Hartveld Kobrin, *Penetrating the Terrorist Psyche*

Source: <http://simmsdownunder.blogspot.co.nz/2013/12/review-of-nancy-kobrin-latest-book.html>

Reviewer: Norman Simms

Kobrin's latest book on the psychological discovery and preparedness to confront terrorists takes the game to a whole new dimension. She develops her thesis on the relationship between the mind of the terrorist and the domestic politics of abusive child-rearing practices along three lines that grow and develop around one another, making the book both a narrative of her scientific discoveries and history of her freeing of herself from a mad family and then an abusive husband. Growing up with a father who rejects his own Judaism for Christian Science and a mother who seems to project her own vulnerability and confusions on to the daughter, and haunted by the painful



memories of a brother who died before she was born but who is taken as the child who ought to have lived, as well as the ordeal of another brother who regularly rapes her and twists her attempts to report his actions at home and school into an allegation of her manipulative and fantasizing personality, Kobrin gradually comes to realize she herself lived in a virtual next of terrorism, her bizarre family a version of Palestinian-Islamicist dysfunctions, and her inability to disentangle herself from this mess—even her compounding of the victimhood through a poor

marriage choice, acceptance of academic and later professional bullying—as the plight of modern society. Yet in heroic terms, though



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much too late in her life for comfort, she overcomes these problems, emerges with intelligence, strength of character, and deep psychoanalytical insight into the means of profiling and treating terrorists and terrorism, without, naturally, making the whole phenomenon disappear.

Using her own childhood experiences with an abusive father and mother and analyzing her own struggle to overcome the trauma, she not only sees terrorists as dysfunctional individuals who are caught in a culture that exacerbates rather than ameliorates the pain and provides an ideological cover for the public projection of their rage, frustration and shame. As a psychohistorian, she discusses the organic trajectory of incomplete and distorted personality development: frightened, raging mother who seeks to draw from her male child the strength she does not have but in the process aborts full nerve reticulation and hormonal connectivities, leading to great deficits in the imagination, capacity to articulate in words and rational thoughts what then can only be expressed unconsciously in violent actions.

Like Freud himself who gained most of his pertinent insights through self-analysis rather than only through the talking-cure with his patients—and indeed that style of treatment

with patients worked best when he listened rather than talked down or at them—Kobrin's confessional mode turns her book into an epic of self-treatment. Each turning point in her life and career is seen as a powerful revealing mental image—such as her near-death accident in India; and her parsing of such images as midrashic conceits to make them yield layer upon layer of information about the ontology of mental illness and domestic breakdown, social malfunction and political violence. Each step along the way, too, is marked by those in authority or trust who refuse to listen or understand, who deny and turn the charges against her—the replacement child who does not fit the bill, the daughter who is not a son, the Jew who is out of place in a mishmash Christian cult, the awkward and shy student whose attempts to articulate important questions and perceptions are brushed aside, the colleagues who turn into rivals and tormenters, the husband who lacks empathy, the friends who walk away in times of crisis—only to find eventually that she has beaten them all by her success.

Her argument is perceptive, vivid and convincing. This is a remarkable and valuable achievement. **It is a book I highly recommend to all lay and professional readers.**

Norman Simms is the author of Alfred Dreyfus: Man, Milieu, Mentality and Midrash (Academic Studies Press, 2011). The second volume in the series, Alfred Dreyfus: In the Context of His Times: Alfred Dreyfus as Lover, Intellectual, Poet and Jew (also by Academic Studies Press) was published in July 2013; and the third Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus in the Phantasmagoria (Cambridge Scholars Publisher, UK) in September 2013.

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Nancy was kind enough to email me an e-copy of the book! **What an amazing experience!** A unique book and an innovating approach of terrorism and terrorists around the globe through her life diary and personal experience. For me it is the **"Book of the Year 2013"**!

Did the 26/11 terror strike cost ONLY Rs 25 lakh?

Source: <http://www.rediff.com/news/report/did-the-2611-terror-strike-cost-only-rs-25-lakh/20131202.htm>

The terror strike on Mumbai, carried out by ten suicidal terrorists and planned by Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Tayiba, had cost less than Rs 25 lakh (~30,000€).

This claim is made in the book *The Siege*, a narrative about the worst terror strike on India, by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott.

But the National Investigation Agency, which was set up in the wake of the attack on

November 26, 2008, is not ready to accept this figure.

An official of the NIA argues that the terrorists and their handlers would have had to cough up no less than Rs 25 lakh for the various reconnaissance trips undertaken by Lashkar terrorists in the run-up the actual strike.

Incarcerated LeT operative David Headley, who played a crucial role in



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planning the terror strike, has earlier revealed that Rs 25 lakh was given to the Lashkar leadership by Pakistani spy agency Inter Services Intelligence to cover the cost of travel of its operatives.

Nearly 30 people are believed to have worked to fine-tune the terror plan at various points. Apart from the hefty payments made to the ten terrorists who attacked Mumbai, a considerable amount of money was spent in the procurement of arms and ammunition and



shelling out fees to other operatives.

Headley and the ten terrorists got the biggest piece of the terror fund pie.

While the Pakistani-American double agent was handsomely reimbursed for his frequent trips to India, each of the ten terrorists was promised Rs 10 lakh for the murderous rampage. They were assured that the money would be handed over to their family members on the completion of the attack.

But top operatives of the Lashkar like Abu Jundal, who worked as handlers during the

terror strike, were paid a measly sum of Rs 5,000 per month.

Indian investigators estimate that the 26/11 terror strike would have cost anywhere between Rs 2 crore and Rs 2.5 crore.

Lashkar is known for sparing no expense while undertaking major terror missions.

Investigations have revealed that the outfit had spent Rs 50 lakh on the attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore in 2005.

The terror outfit is funded on the sly by the ISI and, ironically, openly by the Pakistan government.

In 2013, the government of Pakistan's Punjab province had allotted Rs 61.35 million for the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, widely believed to be a front for the Lashkar. The generous government of Punjab also granted an additional Rs 350 million to the JuD to set up an ambitious 'knowledge park'.

The NIA official pointed out that terror outfits often use bogus charity organisations as a proxy method to raise funds.

While probing the activities of the Hizbul Mujahideen, security agencies found that the terror outfit banked heavily on funds raised by a charity organisation, to carry out terror strikes in Kashmir.

The Hizbul had raised nearly Rs 13 crore through donations made to the Jammu and Kashmir Affectees Relief Trust. The money was subsequently distributed among Hizbul leaders and other terror groups via hawala networks and spurious bank accounts.

Phone App Tests Users' Ability to Find Weapons in Virtual Screened Luggage

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/phone-app-tests-users-ability-to-find-weapons-in-virtual-screened-luggage/6a58de6fd254d718082b1135a469f7c1.html>

A smartphone app that turns gamers into airport baggage screeners is showing that finding weapons and other illegal items isn't all that easy, even when you're looking for them.

Duke University researchers have analyzed data from searches of 20 million virtual suitcases in the game, Airport Scanner, created by Kedlin Company, and found that users failed in most cases to identify objects that occurred only rarely.

"We're seeing that people are really bad at finding items that are not likely to appear," said

Stephen Mitroff, Ph.D., associate professor of psychology and neuroscience and member of the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences.

The potential is also there, Mitroff said, for the Airport Scanner game to play a role in Transportation Security Administration training and standard operating procedures. The research team now has access to more than 1.5 billion trials from the smartphone app for analysis.

In the game, players scan images that look like X-rays of carry-on



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luggage, trying to find hundreds of possible items, including guns and dynamite sticks, as well as over-sized bottles and scissors.

For this study -- which appears online in *Psychological Science* -- researchers evaluated gameplay data from December 2012 to March 2013 to determine how often the players found 78 different illegal items in light of how often the items appeared. Investigators used target frequencies (the appearance rate of a specific illegal object) to understand a player's success at identifying targets when they appear.

Thirty items were "ultra-rare," appearing in the game less than 0.15 percent of the time -- a rate that is comparable to the presence of cancerous markers in real-life radiological screenings, according to Mitroff. Yet, the study results revealed players correctly identified those 30 targets only 27 percent of the time. Targets that appeared with more than 1 percent frequency were pinpointed 92 percent of the time.



Screen shot from the smartphone game *Airport Scanner* shows simulated baggage screening. There's part of a handgun in this bag. Duke researchers used more than 20 million bag searches from the game to discover that very rare items often go undetected. Credit: *Airport Scanner* by Kedlin

"This isn't a matter of overall vigilance or how frequently players responded, since half of the searches had a to-be-found item present," Mitroff said. "This effect is about

being able to detect specific items and how

likely you are to miss them when they occur infrequently."

For example, airport screeners are more likely to encounter pocket knives or incorrectly-packed prescription medications than they are to see a gun in a carry-on bag. So, they might become conditioned to catch the illegal, though relatively harmless, items that appear more frequently than a rarely-seen weapon.

"With the very large array of potential targets, the searchers seem to be highly sensitive to how frequently each individual target appeared, and they adjusted the focus of their searches so that targets that appeared rarely were a low priority," Mitroff said. "This situation may be what occurs in many real-world searches."

This research is important, Mitroff said, because it explores how rare objects slip past us no matter how hard we're looking for them or how critical finding them might be, something he and co-author Adam Biggs, a post-doctoral researcher from the psychology and neuroscience department in the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, have termed the "ultra-rare item effect."

The strong relationship between the frequencies and associated detection rates surprised Mitroff's team even though they anticipated a connection. Based on these results, Mitroff said, the door is open to further research into how behaviors can be modified to catch more ultra-rare items.

"We want to better understand why this happens," he said. "Are you attuned to more frequent items at the cost of others? If you don't see something very often, it makes sense that you don't want to waste energy looking for it, but at the end of the day you still want to detect some of these ultra-rare items."

The anonymous game data were shared in accordance with the Standard Apple User agreement, and Duke University approved the analysis of the data. This research received no external funding support.

Terror threat highest in 5 U.S. metros, including San Francisco

By Chris Rauber

Source: <http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2013/12/terror-threat-highest-in-5-us-metros.html?page=all>

The threat of a large-scale terrorist attack in the United States is still high, and is concentrated in five high-profile metropolitan areas, according to a report by catastrophe modeling

specialist Risk Management Solutions Inc., including New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco (photo) and Washington, D.C., in that order.



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In its "Quantifying U.S. Terrorism Risk" white paper, distributed Tuesday, the Newark-based company said the risk of a major attack is still high "and will remain so for the foreseeable future," as evidenced by 30 major plots that have led to convictions since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

Certain types of attacks could cause almost unfathomable destruction, the study reported.

Detonation of a five-kiloton nuclear device in downtown San Francisco, for example, could kill nearly 150,000 people and cause more than a quarter trillion dollars in losses.


(Five kilotons is relatively small for a nuclear device. A submarine-based Trident missile

profile targets in those five metropolitan areas, led by New York City.

Car bomb and truck bomb attacks, if successful, could cause damages comparable to severe winter storms and "convective storms" such as tornado, hail or wind storms, the report's executive summary states. Damages from a potential chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological attack are harder to estimate but could result in insured damages "that approach the surplus level of the entire U.S. insurance industry."

Such an attack could bankrupt the entire industry, the report indicated.

The U.S. government under the Terrorism Risk and Insurance Act or TRIA provides a \$100



contains up to 12 warheads, each with 100 kilotons. The largest ever detonated, the former Soviet Union's Tsar Bomba, was 50,000 kilotons.)

RMS used terrorism-modeling software to simulate 90,000 large-scale attacks on 9,800 global targets using 35 different methods. Unlike tornadoes or hurricanes, it noted, terrorists intentionally focus on hitting centers of financial and political power.

The company estimates that 75 percent of the nation's "expected annual loss" from terrorist attacks is concentrated near high-

billions federal backstop in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack, but the law is set to expire at the end of 2014.

The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks caused insured losses of more than \$40 billion according to RMS, most of which occurred at the World Trade Center.

RMS, founded in 1988, is a highly private 1,200-employee enterprise. Its catastrophe modeling software is used by 85 percent of the

world's top reinsurance companies,



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
90 percent of top U.S. commercial property/casualty companies, and 72 percent of Lloyd's of London's managing agents, according to its web site, along with other insurance, investment bank and governmental customers.

Chris Rauber's beats include health care, insurance and the wine industry for the San Francisco Business Times.

(Air defense forces deployed in Sochi)

Source: <http://www.yaplakal.com/forum2/topic696200.html>

Russian government continues to actively preparing for the 2014 Olympics in Sochi. Around town spetsgruppirovka deployed air defense forces, which have an important task of protecting peaceful sky Olympics. It is assumed that the composition of the group will be included missile complexes S-300V4, S-300PS, S-300PM, "Buk-M1" M-22 "Hurricane" and that she will be given a corresponding air support.



EDITOR'S COMMENT: The Olympic Joke must end! Either demand Olympics to return back to their home in Greece (Olympia) or end them for good. This military/business game is not consistent with the Spirit of Olympic Games and history. They are sports events not an opportunity for new security systems show off and politics. The latter is so evident in Rio 2016: out of 50 most violent cities in the world, fourteen (14) are located in Brazil! If this proposal is not practical then shall we call them "Olympic Security Games"???

Airport scanner vendor failed to disclose use of Chinese components

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131210-airport-scanner-vendor-failed-to-disclose-use-of-chinese-components>

Members of the House Homeland Security Committee have expressed concerns about the Transportation Security Administration's purchase of 250 baggage-screening systems

containing Chinese-manufactured parts – parts which could facilitate spying or sabotage.

The vendor, Rapiscan Systems, is known for supplying the TSA with the



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now-banned body scanners which revealed passengers in nude form. Rapiscan is a major TSA and defense department supplier. *NextGov* reports that the U.S. Army secured a \$42,024 deal on 27 September 2013 with Rapiscan for two baggage and parcel X-ray machines. On the same day, Rapiscan secured a \$217,200 deal for undescribed “hazard-detecting instrument” technology with the Defense Logistics Agency. Most recently, the TSA withdrew a \$60 million order with Rapiscan for an additional 550 X-ray inspection machines, after the TSA discovered the machines contained unapproved and untested components.

The House committee has asked TSA administrator John Pistole and acting Homeland Security Department secretary Rand Beers to submit by Friday, 13 December 2013, documents detailing system risks. In a 6 December 2013 letter written to Pistole and Beers, the committee’s Republican and Democratic leaders wrote, “Questions remain about how the situation will be rectified and the potential for unmitigated threats posed by the failure to remove the machinery. It is our understanding that these new


components — inappropriately labeled with the same part number as the originally approved component — were entirely manufactured and assembled in the People’s Republic of China.” Committee members have requested the TSA to submit all documents related to risk assessments of the baggage scanners’ “potential for sabotage or espionage attempts.” The request includes a parts list and description of the parts outsourced to China. Lawmakers also request a TSA 20 November 2013 “show cause notice” sent to Rapiscan asserting that the company violated contractual obligations.

Rapiscan claims the TSA knew the baggage scanners would contain Chinese parts before placing the order. “Rapiscan proposed to TSA

that it was our intention to use X-ray generators manufactured in China, and TSA awarded the delivery order to Rapiscan,” Brad Buswell, president of Rapiscan aviation products, said in a statement. “The referenced component is the X-ray generator, a simple electrical item with no moving parts or software.”

Buswell described the part as “effectively, an X-ray light bulb.” On the topic of outsourcing security components to China-based company, Shanghai Advanced Non-Destructive Testing, Buswell noted that the same vendor sells generators to Rapiscan’s competitors. Buswell believes that Rapiscan lost the order because the firm had failed to inform the TSA before using an upgraded component. “While the component change was vetted by internal quality assurance, Rapiscan did not meet the contractual requirement of notifying TSA in advance,” Buswell said.

“In line with the federal acquisition regulations,



TSA has terminated an order with Rapiscan for X-ray equipment used for screening carry-on baggage, due to a violation of contractual requirements,” TSA officials said in a written statement. “TSA has strict requirements that all vendors must meet for security effectiveness and efficiency.”

The questions raised by the House Homeland Security Committee come at a time when federal security and defense agencies are concerned about security within their supply chain. A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee two-year investigation identified more than one million suspect electronic parts, mostly from China, in U.S. military technologies.

Prolonged viewing of terrorist incident media coverage tied to acute stress

Source: <http://news.uci.edu/press-releases/prolonged-viewing-of-boston-marathon-bombings-media-coverage-tied-to-acute-stress/>

Stepping away from the television, computer screen or smartphone in the aftermath of terrorist attacks or mass shootings may be

beneficial to your mental health. This is the takeaway from a new study by UC Irvine researchers showing that



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six or more daily hours of exposure to media coverage of the Boston Marathon bombings in the week afterward was linked to more acute stress than having been at or near the marathon. A UC Irvine release reports that acute stress symptoms increased with each additional hour of bombing-related media exposure via television, social media, videos, print, or radio.

“We were very surprised that repeated media exposure was so strongly associated with acute stress symptoms,” said E. Alison Holman, associate professor of nursing science at UC Irvine and the study’s lead author. “We suspect that there’s something about repeated exposure to violent images or sounds that keeps traumatic events alive and can prolong the stress response in vulnerable people. There is mounting evidence that live and video images of traumatic events can trigger flashbacks and encourage fear conditioning. If repeatedly viewing traumatic images reactivates fear or threat responses in the brain and promotes rumination, there could be serious health consequences.”

The study challenges key assumptions about how people react to collective traumas, such as

Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which specifically excludes media-based exposure as a potential trigger for trauma response among nonprofessionals.

“In our prior work, we found that early and repeated exposure to violent images from the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 and the Iraq War may have led to an increase in physical and psychological ailments up to three years [later],” said Roxane Cohen Silver, professor of psychology & social behavior, medicine and public health at UC Irvine and the study’s co-author. “Our new findings contribute to the growing body of research suggesting that there is no psychological benefit to repeated exposure to graphic images of horror.”

Researchers surveyed a national sample of 4,675 adults two to four weeks after the 2013 Boston Marathon to assess acute stress responses to the bombings, the degree of direct exposure to the bombings, indirect exposure through media and prior exposure to other recent community-based traumas. People exposed to six or more hours per day of bombing-related media coverage were nine times more likely to report high acute stress than those with minimal media exposure (less



the idea that individuals must be directly exposed to an event to be at risk for stress-related disorders. It also raises questions about the latest edition of the Diagnostic & Statistical

than one hour daily). Symptoms of acute stress include intrusive thoughts, feeling on edge or



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hypervigilant, avoiding reminders of the event and feeling detached from it.


The study authors noted that while six or more hours a day of media exposure was above average, it was not deviant. “Someone can have streaming news on their computer screen while they’re working, they can have the radio on in the background, they can be checking Facebook or Twitter on and off, and watch a few hours of television at the end of the day,” Silver said. “We do not believe that people who engage in such behavior are more likely to have a pre-existing mental health condition or necessarily have a predisposition for experiencing negative psychological responses — they’re merely unaware of the impact of this media exposure.”

The researchers stress that they do not want to minimize the trauma of experiencing violent events in person but instead caution that

repeated viewing of grisly images can do great emotional harm. Previous exposure to collective traumas (such as the 9/11 attacks or the Sandy Hook school shooting), a pre-existing mental health condition or a lifetime history of continual exposure to traumatic events places individuals at even greater risk of developing acute stress, according to Silver and Holman.

“When you repeatedly see images of a person with gruesome injuries after an event is over, it’s like the event continues and has its own presence in your life,” Holman said. “Prolonged media exposure can turn what was an acute experience into a chronic form of stress. People may not realize how stressful these media-based exposures are. Looking at these images over and over again is not productive and may be harmful.”

— Read more in E. Alison Holman et al., “Media’s role in broadcasting acute stress following the Boston Marathon bombings,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (9 December 2013)



Source: <http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894248/the-terrorist-threat-to-nyc-since-2009.pdf>



NYPD Commissioner Kelly warns of copycat terrorist attacks on 'soft' targets like malls

Source: <http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/kelly-warns-copycat-terrorist-attacks-malls-article-1.1544046>

Stressing a spike in global terrorism, outgoing NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly warned Tuesday that another attack — on a “soft target” like a mall — could happen here if crimefighters let their guard down.

Kelly, speaking at the 30th annual NYPD Shield conference with private security leaders, noted that in 2012 alone, terrorists carried out 8,500 attacks worldwide, a 69% increase from 2011.

He said the bloodshed resulted in 15,500 deaths, an 89% jump in a single year.

“More than ever this is a time for vigilance, not complacency,” said Kelly.

With 16 terror plots targeting New York City foiled since the Sept. 11,

2001, attacks, including six since 2009, Kelly said the city remains “squarely in the cross hairs of the terrorists.”

NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly tells the NYPD Shield conference attendees that terrorists carried out 8,500 attacks worldwide — a 69% increase from 2011 — and another Westgate attack could happen.

To underscore the threat, NYPD brass dissected the Sept. 21 terrorist attack in Kenya, in which 67 people were slaughtered in a shopping mall.

An NYPD analysis of the carnage at the Westgate mall in Nairobi served as a cautionary tale, particularly at a time when holiday shoppers are filling New York stores.

“It . . . clearly illustrates that armed assaults by terrorists on ‘soft’ targets such as a shopping mall are a simple, effective and easy-to-copy tactic,” stated the report, which was shared with conferencegoers Tuesday.

At least four members of the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabab terror group, armed with hand grenades, AK-47 assault rifles and each


carrying 240 rounds of ammunition, seized the mall with little resistance.

The report pointed out miscommunication by cops and military resulted in one friendly-fire death and likely aided the terrorists’ escape. Bodies of the attackers have not been recovered, the report said.

“Poor coordination and lack of effective communication between police and military commanders resulted in the military troops firing on members of the police tactical team, killing one officer and wounding the team commander,” according to the report.

Much of the chaos resulted from plainclothes cops and armed civilians making “identification as ‘friend or foe’ extremely difficult for other armed first responders,” the report said.

“This attack also illustrates the need for early aggressive engagement,” said Lt. Kevin Yorke of the NYPD Intelligence Division. Yorke was sent to Nairobi to glean information from the



attack.

“Uniformed cops waited over two hours before the police tactical team entered the building,” he said.

Coordination and communication is key to help thwart terrorist groups like Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabab, Kelly reminds a conference of private security leaders.

The Somalia-based Al Shabab group claimed responsibility, saying the



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attack was prompted by Kenya's decision to send troops into Somalia.

The NYPD is so concerned about a copycat attack in New York that it held a simulation drill last month at the Kings Plaza Mall in Brooklyn. Rebecca Weiner, a top intelligence analyst for the NYPD, said another big concern is home-grown terrorism.

"This means that New Yorkers who seek to play a role in the global jihadi conflict now have a wide range of destinations of choice that they're taking advantage of," Weiner said. "At the same time, they don't have to leave their neighborhoods. Al Qaeda's message, its messengers and its instructions to mobilize to violence are readily available and being graciously consumed online."


Inspire Magazine: The Most Dangerous Download on Earth

By James Bamford

Photography by Adam Voorhes

Source: <http://www.gq.com/news-politics/newsmakers/201312/inspire-magazine-al-qaeda-boston-bombing?printable=true>

Inside Brooklyn's federal courthouse, a curving cylinder of greenish glass and gray steel, Lawal Babafemi sat silently with his attorney at the defense table as prosecutors got ready to



present their case. It was September 27, 2013, a warm Friday in New York, and Babafemi, a 33-year-old Nigerian man with a neatly trimmed goatee, was dressed casually in a blue-and-white-striped polo shirt. It's safe to say that he was the first magazine employee in the history of publishing to ever face a possible life sentence for trying to recruit writers.

Inspire, the magazine Babafemi allegedly worked for, is not your typical glossy. It's published by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and its special issue on "the Blessed Boston Bombings" contained twenty-two pages of glory and praise to Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. "They crossed their own

finish line at 2:50 P.M.," read one article in the English-language digital magazine. "The real worthy winners of the Boston Marathon were the Tsarnaev mujahideen brothers." The issue hit its emotional crescendo on page 26 with a luminescent photo illustration of Tamerlan the martyr against a vision of heaven, a scarf tied loosely around his neck, designer sunglasses on his face, a pair of doves aloft in the sun-dappled clouds behind him.

"The brothers have been inspired by Inspire," wrote Yahya Ibrahim, the editor-in-chief. American investigators concurred. After the attack, they searched Dzhokhar's computer and, according to the indictment, found the first issue of Inspire, published in July 2010. The issue included an article entitled "Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom," by "the AQ Chef." "Glue the shrapnel to the inside of the pressurized cooker, then fill in the cooker with the inflammable material," he wrote. "Place the device in a crowded area. Camouflage the device with something that would not hinder the shrapnel."

The Tsarnaev brothers, as we now know, were careful and obedient readers. They have also become the poster boys for the new breed of grassroots and "lone wolf" jihadists who are changing the nature of the terrorism we're fighting. In recent years, as it has become more and more difficult for Al Qaeda's dwindling leadership to plan and execute the kinds of grand attacks that made it famous, the group has focused on radicalizing would-be terrorists who live in North America and Europe and have no formal ties to known organizations. Just two months ago, on the twelfth anniversary of September 11, Ayman al-Zawahiri,




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the Egyptian doctor who succeeded Osama bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda, released a video in which he praised the Boston bombings and rallied lone wolves in America to carry out similar operations. "These dispersed strikes can be carried out by one brother, or a small number of brothers," he said. Such tactics, he added, will "bleed America economically by provoking it to continue in its massive expenditure on its security."

These "brothers" won't train in the wilds of Yemen; they'll never scan the sky for drones above the tribal areas of Pakistan. But what they lack in sophistication and experience, they make up for in rage and the will to act. And they take their cues from Inspire. As Peter Neumann, director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King's College London, has said, "In almost all the homegrown cases that we've seen over the past three years in Britain and in America, it turned out that Inspire was on the hard drives of these people."

...



For years the U.S. intelligence community has wanted to capture and interrogate anyone associated with the magazine. Now, with the arrest of Lawal Babafemi, they may have succeeded. If the charges are true and if he cooperates, Babafemi could offer insight into the magazine, including how it functions, who is involved with it, and whether any Americans are connected to it. Babafemi has pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial.

According to the prosecution, the defendant went to Yemen in January 2010, six months

before the first issue of Inspire was published. In the early days of the magazine, Anwar al-Awlaki, a top leader of AQAP, was a frequent contributor, and the editor was a man named Samir Khan. Both were American-born Muslims who had traveled to Yemen to wage jihad. At Babafemi's arraignment, the prosecutor said Awlaki arranged for Babafemi to be paid nearly \$9,000 "to recruit other English-speaking individuals from Nigeria to train and work on behalf of [AQAP]. He worked with the media branch...to publish Inspire magazine." He is also accused of receiving weapons training from AQAP in Yemen.

Babafemi worked for the magazine until August 2011, the government says, at which point he returned to Nigeria and was arrested for unknown reasons. A month later, the CIA discovered the whereabouts of his AQAP bosses. On September 30, a drone killed Awlaki and Khan as they were traveling together in remote southern Yemen.

"One of the reasons Awlaki was targeted in particular," says Greg Markham, a former clandestine CIA officer posted to Yemen, "was because Inspire was so dangerous."

Markham (a pseudonym to protect his identity) and I were sitting at a corner table in a hotel lobby in a distant foreign city, and he was quietly telling me about the covert war the CIA has been waging against AQAP in Yemen since 2009. For years, until he changed assignments, Markham watched the buildup of the group from the CIA's station in the heavily protected U.S. embassy in Yemen's capital of Sana'a. The most active and dangerous Al Qaeda organization on earth, AQAP picked up where Bin Laden left off, with a focus on attacking the U.S. mainland, and President Obama responded with a long and bloody drone campaign that has killed hundreds of suspected militants. At this point, Markham says, the list of AQAP core leaders posing the greatest threat to the U.S. is down to three: the Yemeni emir Nasir al-Wuhayshi, leader of AQAP and onetime personal secretary of Bin Laden; the Saudi Arabian bombmaker Ibrahim al-Asiri, an endlessly inventive tactician who masterminded the failed Christmas Day bombing on a Detroit-bound flight in 2009, among other plots; and Inspire's current editor, Yahya Ibrahim, whose nationality is unknown.

If the CIA thought wiping out Awlaki and his editor, Samir Khan, would



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wipe out the magazine, they were quickly disabused of that notion. Stepping in for Khan was Yahya Ibrahim, a man who, to judge from his editorial output, possesses a fertile imagination for the many ways to kill. Seven months after the killing of his colleagues, he published two new issues of Inspire (at the same time) and delivered an explicit message that the deaths of his predecessors would not destroy the magazine. “To the disappointment of our enemies, issue 9 of Inspire magazine is out against all odds,” he wrote. “The Zionists and the crusaders thought that the magazine was gone with the martyrdom of Shaykh Anwar and brother Samir.... As for this blessed magazine, it is here to stay.”

The problem isn't merely finding Ibrahim; it's identifying him. “His name is almost certainly a nom de guerre,” says Scott Stewart, a former counterterrorism special agent at the State Department. Now with Stratfor, a global intelligence consultancy, Stewart still follows the magazine and Ibrahim closely. “He's been with Inspire since the beginning, and he worked very closely with Khan,” Stewart said. “From his writing, some people think he sounds British, but I think it sounds more Americanized English. I believe he has a very similar background to Khan, and I believe he probably lived in the U.S. or Canada, due to word usage. I think he was here and then fled to Yemen, like Khan.”

Because of the tribal nature of Yemeni society, which makes it extremely difficult for intelligence agents to develop contacts, gather information, or even travel to the regions, or “governorates,” where AQAP members hide out, the likeliest way to locate and kill Ibrahim would be for him to make an error—to use a phone or send an e-mail that somehow tips his whereabouts. In November 2012 a similar mistake killed Said Ali al-Shihri, AQAP's number two official. While in the northern province of Sa'dah, he used a cell phone to make some inquiries. That was all it took. As soon as he turned the phone on, U.S. intelligence detected its signal, and a CIA drone in the area fired a missile at the car in which he was


riding,
killing
Shihri
and

others. Later, in an AQAP video of the memorial service for Shihri, a spokesman referred to his breach of security procedures: “This enabled the enemy to kill him.”

It's unlikely that Ibrahim or his colleagues will commit the same breach. “It's when you're communicating that you're most vulnerable,” says Robert Grenier, who has been monitoring AQAP for years, especially while serving as director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center from 2004 to 2006. “With Inspire, you can do most of that on a laptop in a remote location, completely unconnected to the Internet. Then it's just a matter of getting your file on a thumb drive, then getting it to a location where it can be rapidly uploaded onto the Internet, and it's gone. So if you're disciplined about it and in as anonymous a fashion as possible—say, from an Internet café—you can do it in a way that provides very little window for U.S. intelligence to strike on a real-time basis.”

Ibrahim exercises great caution in cultivating recruits via Inspire, providing readers a means to communicate secretly with him and others at the magazine (and thus an opportunity to discuss, in greater detail, ways to carry out attacks). The method makes use of an encryption system in which multiple e-mail addresses are listed alongside a public key, a long series of random characters. The addresses are typically on free e-mail providers such as Gmail and Yahoo that, in light of the Edward Snowden affair, appear to have cooperated with the NSA. Apparently aware of this likelihood, Inspire sets out page after page of additional security instructions on top of the key, intended to allow readers to get in touch with the magazine without raising any flags. Readers who fail to observe these protocols—or do so but somehow attract attention anyway—do so at great risk. In two cases—one in England, one in Australia—people have been arrested, tried, and in one instance jailed for having Inspire on their hard drives.

Fortunately I was in America when I downloaded all eleven issues of the magazine, over 600 pages, while researching this article. It's a reading experience I can't say I recommend, but it was morbidly fascinating nonetheless. What's consistent about Inspire from its inception is the effort to be accessible, slick, and visually appealing, with pop graphics and colorful layouts. “It's the branding of Al Qaeda,” said Markham. “It's



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glamorous. And many wannabes don't speak Arabic. The Boston bombers didn't speak Arabic." The magazine is also "aspirational," to borrow a term from commercial magazine publishing, in that the editors make it clear on almost every page that you, the reader, are very much needed for the cause. "There is a series called 'Open Source Jihad,' with articles like 'Qualities of an Urban Assassin' and 'Torching Parked Vehicles,'" Markham said. "So if someone said, 'What do I do?' it's right here."

As I studied the evolution of the magazine, I noticed a clear shift in tone. Awlaki, a forceful and constant editorial presence in the early issues, comes off as much more of a scholar than a firebrand. Rather than writing about making bombs, he uses reason and history to argue for the underlying ideas behind jihad. According to Markham, the CIA considered him a great danger not because of his violent rhetoric but because of his persuasive message. "That's why Awlaki was such a threat," Markham told me. "He could deliver his arguments in such beautiful English."

remote"). Above, the un-spell-checked cover of the Winter 2012 issue.

If Awlaki was the professor, Samir Khan, the editor-in-chief, was the geek, the digital-magazine expert, with critical experience putting together a similar publication in the basement of his home in North Carolina before moving to Yemen. Thus, he was also the perfect person to design Inspire, on the laptop he always carried with him. On the pages of the magazine, Khan was a thoughtful but accessible voice, his language stripped of the Koranic references and stiff didactic pronouncements common to Awlaki's prose. He wrote in a colloquial American vernacular, and his articles were also up-to-the-minute and peppered with references to Western media: Fareed Zakaria on CNN, Tony Blair being interviewed on the BBC. "Khan was always very cheeky, very snarky, very sarcastic," says Stewart, who adds that when Ibrahim took over, that tone disappeared. "Ibrahim doesn't seem to have it. The magazine is less edgy than it was under Khan. He had a sense of humor that appealed to their target audience."



If it didn't lead to tragedy, it could almost be parody: Inspire, the magazine for terror enthusiasts. Here, a few pages that reflect its typical mix of incitement to violence ("Get out to your enemy, he is just next door") and instruction ("Make sure to leave the antenna intact since it is the wireless signal to your

Ironically, by assassinating Awlaki and Khan, who had a moderating effect on the magazine, the Obama administration may have helped make Inspire even more incendiary by increasing the influence of Ibrahim, whose writings



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are anything but moderate. In one particularly gruesome article, Ibrahim suggests making your own “mowing machine, not to mow grass but to mow down the enemies of Allah. You would need a 4WD pickup truck... Weld on steel blades on the front of the truck. Even a blunter edge would slice through bone very easily. Go for the most crowded locations. Narrower spots are better because it gives less chance for the people to run away.” If that sounds ridiculous, bordering on parody, recall the case of Lee Rigby, the English soldier who was brutally murdered in broad daylight by a pair of lone-wolf jihadists last spring. At about 2:20 p.m. on May 22, on a quiet street in the London district of Woolwich, two British men of Nigerian descent ran Rigby down with their car, then stabbed and hacked him to death with a knife and a cleaver.


Barely a week later, in the same issue that hero-worshipped the Tsarnaevs, Inspire celebrated the Woolwich attack with a two-page spread. On the left-hand page: a stock photo of a serrated butcher knife dripping with what appears to be fake blood. On the right: a screen grab of one of the lone wolves, from a

video shot by a bystander moments after the attack. The blood on his

hands couldn't be more real.

Whether or not the CIA is closing in on Ibrahim and the other remaining leaders of AQAP, the agency has certainly been stepping up the killing. In late July and early August, after several months of relatively little activity, the CIA launched a series of deadly drone attacks, killing at least thirty people in Yemen over a period of fifteen days. In the midst of all this, the Obama administration shut down U.S. diplomatic facilities throughout the Middle East after warning of a serious threat from a group suspected to be AQAP. Was the suspected plot retaliation for the drone killings? Did those killings take out a senior leader? Like much about the secret war in Yemen, there is far more behind the shroud than in front of it.

But now, with one of the alleged recruiters for AQAP and Inspire on U.S. soil and in their custody, federal prosecutors are hoping to finally get a peek at what, and who, is there. Babafemi “trained with Al Qaeda, assisted in its propaganda efforts, and actively recruited others to join its demented cause,” said George Venizelos, the assistant director-in-charge of the FBI's New York field office, in a statement. “We will continue to work with our international partners to mitigate the global terrorist threat.” But in the age of the Internet, it will take more than an arrest or two to put an end to Inspire—no matter who's editing it.



James Bamford is author of The Shadow Factory

The Three Versions of Al Qaeda: A Primer

By Clint Watts

Source: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/12/three-versions-al-qaeda-primer?goback=.gde_1528217_member_5816536373020094464#

This essay is based on a lecture for FPRI's Butcher History Institute conference for teachers on “The Invention of the Middle East, Post-World War One, and the Reinvention of the Middle East, Post-Arab Spring,” part of a series of a weekend-long professional development programs developed by the Foreign Policy Research Institute for the benefit of high school teachers. Held at the Heinz History Center in Pittsburgh on November 2 – 3, 2013, the conference was supported by a contribution from Robert A. Fox and was cosponsored by the Senator John Heinz History Center and the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh.

Al Qaeda today only slightly resembles the al Qaeda of yesteryear. Al Qaeda operatives or “al Qaeda-like” organizations stretch throughout North Africa, across the Middle East and into South Asia. This disparate string of organizations hosts a handful of al Qaeda's original Afghanistan and Pakistan veterans but mostly consist of newcomers inspired by al Qaeda's message – disenfranchised young men seeking an adventurous fight in the wake of a



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tumultuous Arab Spring. Al Qaeda, or more appropriately jihadism pursued under al Qaeda's banner, has morphed in several waves over the course of more than two decades.

Over twenty years, Al Qaeda has harnessed the collective energy of various conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and now Africa to perpetuate an enduring conflict against the West and specifically the United States. Each Muslim country conflict attracted its own set of foreign fighters ensconced in al Qaeda's ideology and operational umbrella. But each conflict and al Qaeda affiliate varies in shape, size and capability. Evaluating al Qaeda through three incarnations may help us fully understand the group's evolution into the present day and what it may become in the future. Al Qaeda may be examined in three periods: al Qaeda 1.0 (1988 – 2001), al Qaeda 2.0 (2002 – 2011) and al Qaeda 3.0 (2011 – present). Note, these periods are not distinct entities. Al Qaeda has transformed slowly through each phase. Some affiliates carrying al Qaeda's name have rapidly morphed based on changing local conditions while others have adjusted more pragmatically. However, two significant events, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011 provide natural turning points for tracing al Qaeda's evolution.

AL QAEDA 1.0: FINDING THEIR WAY

The Beginning – August 1988

For a decade spanning from 1979 to 1989, Pakistan and Afghanistan became the destination for an unprecedented global migration of young Muslim men seeking to wage jihad against the Soviet Union in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Men from the United States to Southeast Asia, although predominantly from the Middle East, descended on Pakistan to join forces with Afghan resistance fighters. A Palestinian Sunni Islamic scholar named Abdallah Azzam played an essential role in fomenting this global migration. Azzam's preaching and advocacy of jihad to defend Afghan Muslims persecuted by the Soviets reached audiences throughout the world via audio broadcasts, magazines and flyers. Advocating that jihad was a personal obligation of all Muslims, Azzam became an essential fundraiser soliciting donations from the international Islamic community while establishing the Maktab al Khadamat in Peshawar, a guesthouse and staging base for transitioning Arabs into his training camps in Afghanistan. One of Azzam's followers that traveled to Pakistan was a young college graduate named Osama Bin Laden. Under the tutelage of Azzam, Bin Laden spent a brief period fighting alongside other Arab volunteers in Afghanistan, but more importantly copied Azzam's model, establishing and helping to finance his own guesthouse in Peshawar to support Azzam's system.

In 1988, the Soviet Union commenced its withdrawal from Afghanistan providing the Afghan mujahideen a triumphant victory, while leaving behind legions of Muslim foreign fighters. For the most part, Arab foreign fighters were not welcome in their home countries and were thus left without direction. Bin Laden's respect amongst Arab mujahideen combined with his personal wealth placed him in a unique position to harness the energies of fighters as the Soviets completed their withdrawal. While Azzam and others considered re-directing these foreign fighters to fight in Palestine, Bin Laden instead created a separate organization known as "The Base" – al Qaeda. Al Qaeda sought to be a training base and integration center to help Arab fighters support other jihads around the world. Not long after, Azzam, Bin Laden's mentor-turned-potential rival, was assassinated in Peshawar by unknown assailants, paving the way for al Qaeda's ascendance.

Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia just as Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened the Kingdom. Freshly returning from his success in Afghanistan, Bin Laden offered his foreign fighter force of al Qaeda to the Saudi government as a defense against Iraqi aggression. Instead, Saudi Arabia sought the protection of the United States, insulting bin Laden and introducing what Bin Laden referred to as non-believers into Muslim holy lands. Bin Laden vocally condemned this action, bringing upon himself the ire of the Saudi government, which banished him from the country.

The Transition - 1992

In 1992, Bin Laden was exiled to Sudan setting the trajectory for al Qaeda's development and operations against the U.S. Al Qaeda's headquarters shifted to Khartoum where Bin Laden established licit businesses while secretly turning his organization's violence onto the West. Al Qaeda's first attack can be traced to the December 1992 bombing at the al Gidor hotel in Yemen. Reflecting the terrorist organization's infancy, this botched attempt to kill U.S. soldiers



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en route to a humanitarian mission in Somalia resulted instead in the murder of two Austrian tourists. During these early days in Sudan, al Qaeda dispatched teams to integrate with Islamist clans in southern Somalia. From 1992 -1994, al Qaeda unsuccessfully attempted to train and indoctrinate Somali militias while goading them to attack Western and United Nations forces.[1] More than five years from its inception in Afghanistan, al Qaeda had failed to mount an attack of consequence or to gain significant traction in resisting the West. Bin Laden continued to pressure the Saudi government into expelling Americans from Saudi Arabia. International pressure led the Sudanese government to expel a frustrated Bin Laden, who then sought safe haven in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.

The Two Fatwas – 1996 & 1998

Bin Laden's retreat to Afghanistan quickly led to a strong partnership with the Taliban. Al Qaeda established training camps in eastern Afghanistan, trained fighters for combat against the Indians in Kashmir, and deployed operatives to support Taliban efforts to further secure Afghanistan. More importantly, 1996 brought Bin Laden and al Qaeda's first declaration of war against the United States. In August 1996, Bin Laden's fatwa, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," appeared in the London newspaper *al Quds al Arabi*. [2] While met with little attention, the announcement represented al Qaeda's first official declaration of war against the United States.

Bin Laden's second fatwa, issued in February 1998, suggested a further expansion of al Qaeda's objectives and the growing strength of its network.[3] This fatwa, entitled "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," was co-signed by several other leaders of Islamic terrorist groups, most notably Ayman al Zawahiri, leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt. The fatwa, similar to the preaching of Bin Laden's mentor Abdallah Azzam, stated jihad was a duty of every Muslim and that jihad should target the U.S. and Israel. These two fatwas, along with the strategic writings of Zawahiri,[4] make the case for the creation of a global caliphate governed by Sharia law. The offenses committed against Muslims, as the fatwas and Zawahiri recount them, include the US presence on the Arabian peninsula; the harm to the Iraqi people caused by Western sanctions (during the period between the two Iraq wars); the occupation of Muslim lands in Palestine, Kashmir and elsewhere; and the propping up of corrupt dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (i.e., the "near enemy"). The means to secure the global caliphate would be attacks on the "far enemy" -- the US and its allies -- and the eventual toppling of the "near enemy."

The Buildup – 1998, 2000

Having officially declared war on the United States through public declarations and protected by the Taliban in a distant safe haven, al Qaeda initiated several plans to directly target the United States. Using their networks and experience from the early 1990's foray into Somalia, al Qaeda plotted and executed its first spectacular attack simultaneously bombing the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The twin attacks killed hundreds and signaled a significant shift in al Qaeda's capabilities and intentions. The U.S. responded with cruise missile strikes in both Sudan and Afghanistan, but these counterattacks did nothing to slow down al Qaeda.

In October 2000, al Qaeda attacked the USS Cole outside the Port of Aden, Yemen. This attack killed 17 U.S. sailors and evoked no response from the U.S. Al Qaeda continued to plot more elaborate attacks on the U.S. through their training camps and network operatives spread throughout the Middle East, Africa and Europe. In either 1998 or 1999, Bin Laden gave approval to Khalid Sheikh Muhammed to prepare and execute attacks on the U.S. on 9/11/2001.

The first version of al Qaeda (aka, 1.0) represented a continuation of the reception and training model originally developed by Azzam & Bin Laden for Arab volunteers joining the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980's. Bin Laden used operational safe havens in Sudan and Afghanistan to train, indoctrinate and integrate foreign fighters into Islamic conflicts around the world while also developing increasingly sophisticated plots against the U.S. Bin Laden and his first deputy Zawahiri designed the ideological principles for al Qaeda's pursuit of violence while operating in a centralized manner; hosting a specified structure with a supporting chain of command as well as funding mechanisms. More notably, al Qaeda operated quite freely meeting little counterterrorism resistance. Many of these factors, which enabled Al Qaeda's rise, would quickly vanish after



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the 9/11 attacks.

AL QAEDA 2.0: A TRANSFORMATION – CORE, AFFILIATES, AND INSPIRED*Al Qaeda Core On the Run – 2001 & 2002*

From al Qaeda's perspective, the 9/11 attacks were successful beyond their wildest dreams. During the terror groups' buildup to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. had shown only a limited response to attacks on their embassies and even U.S. Navy ships. The 9/11 attacks awakened an unprecedented U.S. and international response. By October 2001, U.S. airstrikes and Special Forces deployments began in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and al Qaeda's core members were on the run and the Taliban, al Qaeda's hosts in Afghanistan, faced annihilation.

Tora Bora became al Qaeda's hideout while U.S. forces circled Afghanistan, destroying Taliban enclaves. By February 2002, Bin Laden and his core cadre were surrounded in Tora Bora by U.S. forces integrated with local militias. However, Bin Laden's long relationships in Afghanistan saved him and his force. Late one night, Bin Laden and some of his associates slipped out of Tora Bora and into Pakistan. Once in Pakistan, U.S. forces could no longer pursue him militarily. Some key al Qaeda operatives were caught in Pakistan during this period, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah. But Bin Laden, Zawahiri and many other key members integrated themselves into Pakistan to begin leading al Qaeda globally from a distance. Rather than hosting training camps in protected safe havens, Bin Laden and his deputies began commanding their operatives tucked away in several different countries. Attacks in Kenya, Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia and later the 2005 bombing of the London metro system demonstrated al Qaeda's reach during its containment in Pakistan. Bin Laden became what is often referred to as al Qaeda Central – a global headquarters providing ideological direction, propaganda, attack guidance, and resource distribution. Amidst their retreat into Pakistan, two fortuitous events revived al Qaeda at a time of retreat: the emergence of the Internet and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The Affiliates: Into Iraq – 2003 – 2009 and Yemen – 2009 – 2011

Bin Laden and al Qaeda's leadership were likely quite surprised when only a year after being chased from Tora Bora, the U.S. invaded Iraq. The invasion shifted the U.S. focus from pursuing the 9/11 attackers to removing the regime of Saddam Hussein – a character and country with few links to al Qaeda and no role in the 9/11 attacks. Hussein's Iraq regime fell quickly but this rapid success created a security vacuum ripe for al Qaeda's narrative of far-enemy aggression. A jihadist group founded in Iraq in 2003, officially swore allegiance to Bin Laden in 2004, becoming al Qaeda in Iraq. Abu Musab al Zarqawi led this affiliate, conducting a series of attacks against American and Shiite targets. Zarqawi reinvigorated an al Qaeda in retreat, inspiring a second round of foreign fighters to travel to and fight in Iraq. As an insurgency raged against U.S. forces, al Qaeda in Iraq grew stronger, more violent and concerning for both the U.S. and al Qaeda. In 2006, a letter from Zawahiri in Pakistan intended for Zarqawi in Iraq was intercepted.[5] The letter instructed Zarqawi to control his violence against Shia and civilians as it was creating backlash against al Qaeda.

Meanwhile, the Internet became a rising opportunity for al Qaeda. Unable to communicate directly with their supporters via traditional media and means, al Qaeda websites began popping up providing ideological guidance, references, training manuals, targeting guidance and video footage of al Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. At a time when maintaining their operational security was a must, al Qaeda benefited from the Internet, for it allowed them to continue to connect with disaffected men who found purpose in pursuing jihad in Iraq.

U.S. forces killed Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2006, and al Qaeda in Iraq turned ever more violent and sectarian, fully alienating their popular support. Foreign fighter supply lines to Iraq continued strong through 2007 but al Qaeda in Iraq's excessive violence combined with the decimation of the group by U.S. Special Forces resulted in the group's decline amongst Iraqi Sunni tribes fed up with their indiscriminate killing.

As al Qaeda Central's operational control waned, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula began to fill the void. By 2005, al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia were launching or preparing attacks against Saudi government and oil sector targets. Adjacent conflict in Iraq inspired droves of Saudi men who traveled north to fight Americans before coming back home. Veteran Saudi members of al Qaeda and recent returnees from Iraq joined in Saudi Arabia to initiate an insurgency. The



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Saudi government cracked down hard on these al Qaeda cells, killing or detaining many key members and sending survivors fleeing the country, many of whom found refuge in Yemen.

By 2003, most al Qaeda elements in Yemen had been destroyed or imprisoned. Yemenis captured on other al Qaeda battlefields were repatriated to the country. However, Saudi Arabia's purge of al Qaeda fighters combined with prison breaks in Yemen breathed new life into al Qaeda's Yemen affiliate. In 2009, former al Qaeda members from Saudi Arabia combined with al Qaeda veterans in Yemen to form al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Increased drone strikes in Pakistan and disinterest in Iraq pushed al Qaeda veterans and new recruits to Yemen where Nasir al Wuhayshi, Bin Laden's one time personal secretary, and Said Ali al Shihri, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, consolidated al Qaeda's regional resources and began a string of attacks. AQAP also attracted the Yemeni American cleric Anwar al Awlaki, who accelerated the group's global appeal through online preaching. AQAP undertook the lead in external attacks in the West, orchestrating sophisticated attack attempts trying to take down an airliner over the U.S. on Christmas day 2009 and installing bombs in printer cartridges shipped via airliners. AQAP's rise was marked by an uptick in U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, signaling the perceived shift in threat to the U.S. homeland.

Enduring Battle in Afghanistan – 2008 – 2011

While Iraq took center stage, war with al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan endured. A steady trickle of foreign fighters continued traveling to Pakistan to fight the U.S. in eastern Afghanistan. Meanwhile, al Qaeda became further ingrained in the Pakistani conflict, helping support the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) battle the central government. The union of TTP and al Qaeda helped sustain al Qaeda Central as the global headquarters of terrorism until the introduction of targeted drone strikes. Increasing substantially in 2008, drone strikes on Pakistani Taliban sanctuaries began inflicting a significant toll on al Qaeda's and the TTP's leadership. For the first time, al Qaeda's key leaders, while not defeated, were pinned down in Pakistan and the leadership losses started to slow al Qaeda's global coordination.

Al Qaeda-Inspired Attacks and Attempts in the U.S.: 2001 – 2011

Throughout the decade, Westerners and immigrants to the West either joined ranks with al Qaeda or undertook plots in the West on behalf of al Qaeda. In both Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, al Qaeda recruits or wannabes conducted massive bomb attacks on transportation systems, killing hundreds. In the U.S., a string of loosely affiliated groups were interdicted by law enforcement. The least serious were bungled aspirational plots of al Qaeda wannabes lacking any coordination with al Qaeda itself. More serious plots, such as the Najibullah Zazi attempt to attack the New York City subway system, showed al Qaeda's ability to train individuals to execute attacks in their home countries. In its entirety, the decade after 9/11 showed the weaknesses of al Qaeda-inspired terrorism in achieving any enduring objectives or lasting recruitment.

After nearly being destroyed at Tora Bora, al Qaeda endured by empowering its global network of affiliates and inspired supporters. Rather than planning and executing attacks, al Qaeda's central leadership morphed to inspire, guide, and provide resources for a global al Qaeda network spread across many affiliates. Slightly less than ten years after the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda would undertake another transformation – one that remains to be completed.

AL QAEDA 3.0: AFFILIATES RISING POST-BIN LADEN AND THE ARAB SPRING

U.S. forces killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan on May 1, 2011, ending a nearly decade-long manhunt. By this point, al Qaeda's central headquarters already faced challenges controlling its array of affiliates and operatives. Drone strikes and years of counterterrorism pressure limited the group's appeal. Shortly after Bin Laden's death, Anwar al Awlaki, an inspiring emerging AQAP leader, was also killed in a drone strike in Yemen. Throughout the Arab Spring, the deaths of al Qaeda leaders were largely overshadowed by the revolutions of the Arab Spring. Al Qaeda, who vowed to topple near enemy dictators by attacking the far enemy of the U.S., watched as mostly peaceful popular uprisings sacked dictators across North Africa and the Middle East.

Initially, these revolutions posed a direct challenge to al Qaeda's message of violence. However, the weakened state of governance that accompanied each conflict has provided ample opportunity for al Qaeda affiliates to chart a course for their own rise.



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
Ansar al Sharia, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen – 2011 - 2012

AQAP in Yemen, which had already become al Qaeda's top affiliate prior to Bin Laden's death, quickly became the first to attempt to develop its own caliphate in Yemen. Through the winter of 2011 and into the spring of 2012, AQAP built a sister militia, Ansar al Sharia, to better focus on winning over local support. Ansar al Sharia seized large portions of Yemen and began governing as a caliphate, instituting Sharia law. However, their harsh tactics combined with U.S. drone strikes and Yemeni military advances eroded this caliphate and safe haven.

Al Shabaab in Somalia – 2011-2013

From the ashes of the Islamic Courts Union rose al Shabaab. After Ethiopia's invasion in 2007, Shabaab took control of the resistance and, over time, gained control of central and south Somalia. Provided operational space, Shabaab established the beginnings of an Islamic State, implementing an extremely harsh version of Sharia law. In February 2012, Shabaab officially merged with a Zawahiri-led al Qaeda. The merger, instead of demonstrating the group's strength, signaled a downward spiral for Shabaab. Since the fall of 2012, Shabaab has been fraught with internal fractures and pushed from most major cities by the Somali National Army and their allies. However, the September 2013 Westgate Mall attacks in Kenya demonstrated Shabaab is still a threat despite its setbacks.

Visualisation of Al Qaeda's network (not exhaustive)



(Source: <http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894248/the-terrorist-threat-to-nyc-since-2009.pdf>)

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali – 2012 - 2013

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb along with several local affiliates seized control of Northern Mali in the spring of 2012. Successfully timed amidst a Tuareg rebellion and Malian government coup, AQIM gained control of Timbuktu and pushed south threatening the nation's capital. Like Shabaab, AQIM implemented a harsh form of Sharia law over those they conquered and, for a time, the affiliate created the largest geographical caliphate of any al Qaeda branch in the terror network's history. Similar to their sister affiliate in Yemen, AQIM's gains were short-lived, curbed by a French counterattack into Northern Mali in January 2013 that put AQIM on the run across the Sahara.

Ansar al Sharia in Libya: 2012 - 2013



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In the wake of Muammar al Gaddafi's fall, the security vacuum in Libya not only enabled the rise of AQIM in the Sahel but also freed previously suppressed extremist elements in the country. Ansar al Sharia, a grassroots extremist group sharing the name of AQAP's insurgent organization in Yemen, emerged in the former bastions of eastern Libya previously home to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and known for supplying numerous foreign fighters to Iraq. The group rose to international prominence after being connected to the 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, killing a U.S. ambassador, among others. The group has been challenged locally but appears a natural conduit for al Qaeda activities in Libya.

Al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula – 2012 – 2013

The Mubarak regime's collapse amidst the Arab Spring brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power and created a long sought opportunity for the Egyptian Zawahiri to re-enter Egypt. Starting in 2012, al Qaeda cells were disrupted in Cairo and operatives continue to be interdicted in the Sinai Peninsula. The 2013 overthrow of the Morsi regime by the Egyptian military further supported al Qaeda's rhetoric that only violence, not democracy, will bring about Islamic governance. Today, Egypt provides a ripe opportunity for a resurgent al Qaeda.

Boko Haram: 2012 – 2013

Boko Haram, a Nigerian Islamic extremist group, accelerated its violence in Nigeria around 2011. While not an official al Qaeda affiliate, open source reporting suggests the group maintains connections with African al Qaeda affiliates and benefits from al Qaeda trainers and facilitators. The country's ethnic conflict provides potential fuel for a future al Qaeda safe haven.

Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham in Syria: 2011 – 2013

No battlefield presents a greater opportunity to al Qaeda than Syria. Syria's revolution has endured for two years allowing a small group of al Qaeda-connected extremists to emerge as a dominant force against the Assad regime. To date, the Syrian jihad has likely produced the largest migration of foreign fighters in history, edipsing the supplies of both Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s. Jabhat al Nusra initiated the first jihadist effort in Syria but has since been matched by a creeping al Qaeda in Iraq that has challenged both Nusra and al Qaeda's leader Zawahiri by creating the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in an attempt to take control of the jihad in Syria. This public rift provides the only buffer to a jihadist movement unmet by Western counterterrorism efforts.

CLOSING THOUGHTS: THREE INCARNATIONS OF AL QAEDA

What should we think of al Qaeda moving forward? Al Qaeda has evolved in many ways since the attacks of 9/11/2001. Moving forward, one can expect lots of "al Qaeda-like" terror groups but there are several factors that should be observed and analyzed to understand what the threat will be to the U.S. Here are some factors that might be considered:

- Resources: A key difference of today's al Qaeda 3.0, when compared to that of previous generations (1.0 & 2.0), is independent resourcing. Bin Laden largely managed al Qaeda's funding and support during the group's inception, which compelled loyalty to his leadership. Today, al Qaeda affiliates maintain their own resource support and funding mechanisms, likely changing the leadership dynamic in the organization.
- Coordination or Competition: During al Qaeda versions 1.0 and 2.0, affiliates appeared to coordinate in their pursuit of al Qaeda's objectives. As witnessed in the conflict between Nusra and ISIS in Syria, affiliates of the third generation may be competing to meet their own objectives first before following al Qaeda's global objectives.
- Leadership: Most Western media focuses coverage on al Qaeda's global leaders. Aside from Zawahiri, these leaders are in short supply and of lesser clout than during al Qaeda's early years. For al Qaeda to endure as a global movement, new jihadi leaders must emerge that can inspire future focus on attacking the West.
- Africa as an opportunity for al Qaeda: Al Qaeda's early forays into Sudan and Somalia were largely failures, but since bin Laden's death, Africa's instability has provided many new opportunities for al Qaeda. Generation 3.0 of al Qaeda will likely see renewed and



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expanded activity in Africa, a frontier that may shift al Qaeda affiliate targeting and even ideological goals.

- **Syria:** The future of al Qaeda will likely be determined by the outcome of the Syrian jihad. The latest incarnation and direction of al Qaeda will be undertaken by the legions of foreign fighters today battling in Syria. Where they choose to go at the end of the Syrian conflict is where al Qaeda, if there is a singular version of the group, will likely go.
- **Trajectory:** Up to bin Laden's death, al Qaeda's focus pointed directly at the U.S. Today, al Qaeda affiliates primarily focus on developing local operational space and bases of support. Will these affiliates automatically focus their strategic objectives on attacking the U.S.? Will they shift focus to Israel? Might they be re-directed to attacking those supporting the Assad regime such as Russia, Iran, or the Shia in general? Or will they ultimately be content to hold their own fiefdoms? Moving forward, al Qaeda's focus is likely to be less U.S.-focused and instead, more distributed to a number of "far enemies."

Sources:

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- [2] For a translation of Bin Laden's fatwa, see "Bin Laden's Fatwa," PBS, August 23, 1996 available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/july-dec96/fatwa_1996.html.
- [3] For a translated copy of Bin Laden's second fatwa, see "Al Qaeda's Second Fatwa," PBS, February 23, 1998 available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/jan-june98/fatwa_1998.html.
- [4] Zawahiri's strategic writing that correlates with Bin Laden's fatwas might be best observed through his 2001 work, "Knights Under the Prophets Banner." See Yousef H Aboul-Enein, "Ayman al-Zawahiri's Knights Under the Prophet's Banner: The al Qaeda Manifesto," *Military Review*, January – February 2005. Available at: <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/english/JanFeb05/Bbobjan.pdf>.
- [5] For a translated copy of the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, see the Combating Terrorism Center at this link: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2>.

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Kansas man arrested in terror bomb plot at Mid-Continent Airport in Wichita, wanted to be 'martyr': prosecutor

Source: <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/kansas-man-arrested-airport-bomb-plot-article-1.1547082>

Terry Loewen, a 58-year-old aviation technician, is seen after being arrested for attempting to use a weapon of mass



destruction, attempting to damage property and

attempting to provide support to terrorist group al-Qaida.

A Kansas man has been arrested while attempting to drive explosives into the state's largest and busiest airport early Friday morning in a mass casualty bombing, authorities said.

Terry Loewen, a former employee of Mid-Continent Airport in Wichita, "spent months developing a plan to use his access card to the airport to drive explosive devices into the terminal" on behalf of terror group Al Qaida, U.S. Attorney Barry Grissom said at a press conference.

The 58-year-old identified as a former aviation technician and U.S. citizen



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planned to "die in the explosion as a martyr" said Grissom.

Loewen allegedly studied the airport's layout, took photos of various access points and researched flight schedules to determine when there would be the most passengers.

"Loewen further expressed his desire to kill as many people as possible and he explained where to park a vehicle full of explosives to accomplish that goal," according to the criminal complaint obtained by The News.

"Loewen also provided a diagram of the terminal and tarmac including distances between the gate areas. Finally, Loewen agreed to purchase a component that would be used to detonate the explosive."

All of the explosives were inert, said Grissom, who assured that no one was ever in danger.

The arrest around 5:50 a.m. is the result of a

up everything (like they did) to truly feel like a obedient slave of Allah (swt)," Loewen, a U.S. citizen, allegedly wrote in one email dated in early August.

"As time goes on I care less and less about what other people think of me, or my views of Islam. I have been studying subjects like jihad, martyrdom operations, and Sharia law," he allegedly wrote.

According to the criminal complaint, "Loewen stated that he could get access to bring a vehicle onto the tarmac, which would then have access to the runways, but not until January."

That selected January date was when his badge was scheduled to be renewed, according to the complaint.

He's charged with one count each of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, attempting to damage property and

attempting to provide support to terrorist group al-Qaida.

In one email sent he writes that the possibly of spending life behind bars for jihad is no big deal.

"I'm 58 years old and spending my remaining years behind bars for a good reason is not out of the question for me," he allegedly wrote.

If convicted of those



six-month investigation into the former employee as documented with emails sent to an undercover FBI agent.

Loewen's plans to "to engage in violent jihad on behalf of al Qaeda" were discovered during online conversations with that agent who posed as a like-minded extremist, according to the complaint.

"Brothers like Osama bin Laden and Anwar alAwakle are a great inspiration to me, but I must be willing to give



charges, that's the exact punishment that he'll face.



Terrorism wave in Kenya

Dec 12, 2013

British tourists targeted in grenade attack in Kenya

Manhunt launched for unknown attacker who hurled a grenade that failed to explode at a four-wheel-drive taking two Britons on safari in Kenya. No casualties reported.

Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10513000/British-tourists-targeted-in-grenade-attack-in-Kenya.html>



Dec 14, 2013

Suspected grenade attack on Kenyan bus kills four

A suspected grenade attack on a minibus in Kenya's capital on Saturday killed six people near a Somali-dominated area of the city, police said, an incident that mirrors explosions last year that were blamed on Somali militants.

Source: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/14/uk-kenya-blast-idUKBRE9BD09N20131214>



London bomber's widow behind Westgate attack?

Britain's most wanted woman Samantha Lewthwaite - a 29-year-old Muslim who is often referred to as the 'White Widow' is the prime suspect behind the gruesome Mumbai-style Nairobi shopping mall massacre. Daughter of a former British soldier, Samantha, widow of 7/7 suicide bomber Jermaine Lindsay who blew up a bus and three tube trains killing 52 people, is one of al Qaeda's primary recruiters in East Africa besides being the spokesperson for the banned

al-Shabaab.

Source: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/London-bombers-widow-behind-attack/articleshow/22962813.cms>

Al-Qaeda finds new home in Kosovo

Source: http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/14-11-2013/126142-al_qaeda_kosovo-0/#

The police of Kosovo arrested six Albanians in Pristina and Gnjilane suspected of preparing terrorist attacks. Reportedly, the detainees were preparing an explosion of one of the man-made lakes to flood several villages. There are reports saying that Kosovo is being converted into a base for training terrorists. In general, the boomerang, launched by the West, is back.

Al-Qaeda has established itself firmly in the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, where the order is supported by NATO forces, consisting, inter alia, of U.S. troops. The police had been keeping tabs on an immigrant from Syria, Abu Hafis al-Albani for quite a time. In his house, a large quantity of arms and remote-controlled explosives were found after his arrest, the Serbian website *novosti.rs* said with reference to a spokesman for the Kosovo police. The

official said that the group of Albani, acting on behalf of Syrian group An-Nusra (that sworn to the head of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri) planned terrorist attacks on religious grounds in the entire territory of Kosovo. The second detainee is suspected of attacking Mormons at the end of last week, U.S. citizens, who were distributing religious literature in Pristina.

The special mission of the European Union in Kosovo (EULEX) investigates eight cases of terrorism in the breakaway republic. Four of them are in their preliminary stage; charges were brought down against two individuals. Albani is an ethnic Albanian, who went to Syria a year ago, where he fought with hundreds of other Albanians on the side of jihadists. On his return home, he began to prepare terrorist acts.



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Serbian media, referring to Iranian news agency FARS, reported that it was a Turkish humanitarian organization that recruited Albanians for Syria in Kosovo. The last group

Kosovo. The group informed via email that the police of the region would become the target of a "terrible attack, unless the arrested individuals were released.



consisted of 90 people.

One of them, known as Abu Abdullah al-Kosovo of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (or the Levant, ISIS), in a video message released on the Internet called on European Muslims to put aside their European comfort and go to fight in Syria. Employees of Western intelligence agencies are concerned that Western Muslims will be radicalized in Syria. "Security agencies believe that about 1,000 volunteering jihadists from all over Europe are now fighting in Syria, compared to only 250 at the end of 2012," says *Der Spiegel*. "About 90 of them are from the UK, 120 - from Belgium, 50 - from Denmark and 150 - from Kosovo."

"The Syrian jihad raises particular concerns, given how easier it is to reach Europe from Syria than, let's say, from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen or Somalia," a German security officer said. Moreover, Western intelligence services fail to monitor the spread of this infection. "The reality is that we can not keep track of all those coming from Syria," the German newspaper wrote. In the wake of the above-mentioned arrests, a previously unknown terrorist group appeared, Jihad

In April, it was reported that representatives of the Syrian opposition were establishing contacts with the authorities of Kosovo. The story was about the training of Syrian rebels, with the approval of the authorities of Kosovo that can not make a step without the approval of the Americans.

According to Serbian military analyst Milovan Dretsun, Syrian opposition members receive military training in Eastern Europe, in Kosovo in particular. "The center of the Kosovo Police Service in Vucitrn is under direct patronage of certain Western intelligence agencies, primarily British and American ones. They converted the Kosovo Police Academy into a training camp for the Syrian opposition, primarily

radical Islamists, some of whom are members of al-Qaeda from different countries, from the countries of the region in the first place. After training, they will be sent to Syria to organize sabotage and terrorist acts," Dretsun told the *Voice of Russia*.

The Associated Press also reported that on April 26, a delegation of the Syrian opposition, on the way from the United States, made a stop in Pristina to negotiate the use of the experience of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Syria. Well, history repeats itself, and it is far from farce. Kosovo-trained rebels turned their weapons against their teachers and patrons. The United States and Britain, fueling the training of terrorists in Kosovo, reap the fruits of their irresponsible policy. "Returnees" may appear in the cities of Europe and the United States any moment. Thus, according to the *AP*, ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and neighboring Macedonia were associated with the preparation of the thwarted terrorist attack in Tampa, Fla. and in 2007, they attacked Fort Dix in New Jersey.



Notorious Russian terrorist could target Westerners at 'satanic' Olympic games: Canadian intelligence document

Source: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/12/15/notorious-russian-terrorist-could-target-westerners-at-satanic-olympic-games-canadian-intelligence-document/>

A notorious Russian terrorist may try to stage attacks during the Sochi Winter Olympics that begin in Russia in less than two months, de-classified Canadian intelligence



documents are warning.

A confidential intelligence report obtained by the *National Post* says Doku Umarov is a "fervent Islamist" who subscribes to al-Qaeda doctrine that legitimizes the killing of Western civilians.

The Chechen warlord leads Imirat Kavkaz (IK), an armed Islamist group fighting to impose Islamic rule in Russia's North Caucasus, the mountainous region that borders Sochi.

Umarov has called for attacks on what he calls the "satanic games," says a second report. Both Threat Assessments were circulated within government earlier this year by the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre.

Copies of the documents, titled "Potential Terrorist Threats to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games," and "Imirat Kavkaz Calls for Attacks to Stop 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics," were released under the Access to Information Act.

His view that Israeli, U.S. and U.K. interests are legitimate targets raises concerns any Westerners could be targeted


"IK leader Doku Khamatovich Umarov is a fervent Islamist who espouses AQ's [Al-Qaeda's] ideology of global jihad," wrote ITAC, a joint agency comprised of members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, RCMP and other security agencies. "His view that Israeli, U.S. and U.K. interests are legitimate

targets raises concerns any Westerners could be targeted."

The Russian government has said it is trying to guarantee the games will be safe, and plans to use CCTV cameras and drones to keep watch on Sochi, but the Canadian report shows the security challenges it faces.

The threat of terrorism has loomed over the Olympics since 1972, when the Palestinian Black September faction murdered 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich summer games.

During the 1996 summer games, two people died and 111 were injured in a bombing at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta. Eric Rudolph said he did it to embarrass the U.S.



government for allowing "abortion on demand." But while some terrorist groups view the Olympics as an opportunity to gain world attention for their causes, the events tend to have blanket security, making it less likely an attack will succeed.

Security is a particular concern for Sochi, a city on the Black Sea close to a region of Southern Russia where a bloody Islamist insurgency with its roots in the Chechnya war has been waged. In addition to attacking Russian security forces, the IK is blamed for the bombing of Moscow's Domodedovo airport in 2011, the 2010 bombing of the Moscow subway and a 2009 train bombing that killed 27. One of the Canadian intelligence



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reports says the IK was also behind the 2004 massacre of 186 children at a school in Beslan, about 400 kilometres east of Sochi.

While he had called off the targeting of civilians in February 2012 amid bad publicity, Umarov lifted his moratorium six months ago and called for attacks on the Sochi Olympics, urging “maximum force ... to disrupt these satanic games.”

According to a summary of the video in one of the intelligence reports, he said: “They plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors, on the bones of many, many dead

Muslims buried on our land by the Black Sea. We as mujahedin [soldiers of God] are required not to allow that, using any methods that Allah allows us.”

The report said Russia’s Federal Security Service was “implementing security measures” and that local press had reported there would be increased security checks at major train stations. A “Safe Sochi” program, involving “a coordination centre channeling information from around the region,” was also reportedly being set up, it said.

