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Terror News

The Few and The Brave!

Terror News

Inspire X "Open Source Jihad" Calls To Assassinate Top U.S., British, And French Heads Of State And Politicians

Source: http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7034.htm

On February 28, 2013, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released issue X of its English-language online magazine, Inspire. *The "Open Source Jihad" section of the magazine features a new segment titled "You Ask, We Answer" in which an Al-Qaeda "consultant" answers queries pertaining to lone-wolf attacks.*
Following are segments from the open source jihad "consultancy" section:[1]

Question: "I Want To Assassinate The U.S. President, The French President, The British PM, Or Their Ministers."
Answer: "...It is easy, if you ask Allah and be true to Him. These people have many weak points, especially during ceremonies, parties, and election campaigns. Bare in mind, they come to and leave from these parties. Therefore, there must be some means of transport, which is a chance for surveillance or even action.
"If you think you are unable, then you have easy targets like [G.W.] Bush, Bill Clinton, Colin Powell, or

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...ns complete each other in our way to attain victory.
...by the enemy's time. Hitting him in his backyard drives
...all operations of today, are the stepping stone of
...the Grace of Allah. Rely on Allah, and answer His call:

crusaders' prisons.
- Remember you are a servant of Allah.

WHOM DO I WORK WITH?

In these small operations, work alone. Let it be a secret between Allah and you. Make it impossible for any one to point a finger at you. This is for your safety. It is also interesting, sitting in your living room watching the news you made and how the kuffar are suffering, a tit-for-tat.

QUESTION: Who can use OSJ tools and ideas?
AQ CONSULTANT: Inspire Magazine seeks to free the oppressed nations from the Western Hegemony. These tools are for muslims in particular, but others could also use them **in their war against the present oppressors, America and its allies.**

QUESTION: I hate the leaders of kufr, I want to assassinate the US president, the French president, the British PM or their ministers?
AQ CONSULTANT: Bidhnillah it is easy, if you ask Allah and be true to Him. These people have many weak points, especially during ceremonies, parties and election campaigns. Bare in mind, they come to and leave from these parties, therefore, there must be some means of transport which is a chance for surveillance or even action.
If you think you are unable, then you have easy targets like Bush, Bill Clinton, Colin Powell or Condoleezza Rice. Of course you can also kill Sarkozy and Tony Blair. It is now easy to reach these guys, especially that they aren't in office anymore.

Son of Islam, delight the ummah of Islam

TIP

For lower profile figures assassination, ninjutsu is an important method as you don't have the worry of hiding your weapon. Brother muslim, utilize your time well and prepare your self physically. You are the soldier the muslim ummah waits for.

■ Do not miss your copy of Lone Mujahid Pocket book.

CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – April 2013

Condoleezza Rice. Of course, you can also kill Sarkozy and Tony Blair. It is now easy to reach these guys, especially [now] that they aren't in office anymore."

Inspire continues by providing "tips" to those seeking to assassinate VIPs. For example, it recommends that the martial arts fighting style ninjutsu be used "for lower profile figure assassination." It also calls upon Muslim men to better utilize their time and undergo the necessary physical preparations to become the soldiers the Muslim ummah needs.

Question: "I Want To Carry Out A Big Jihad Operation To Support The Religion. Guide Me."

In its answer, *Inspire* congratulates the inquirer on his great determination, and reiterates that jihad is a form of *'ibadah* (worship), like any other type of worship. It also emphasizes the importance of preoccupying the enemy by conducting such operations in his own "backyard," and thereby "driving him crazy". Therefore, it says: "These small operations of today are the stepping stone of tomorrow's victory... Rely on Allah, and answer His call: Jihad."

Inspire Calls On Experienced Doctors To "Create A Lethal Poison... [And] Manufacture Anthrax"; Asks Journalists To Act As AQAP's Eyes In The Field By Spying On The Enemy

Answering one query from an "experienced doctor" who asks for advice on how he can wage jihad, *Inspire* writes: "Create a lethal poison (gaseous), manufacture anthrax, and give the mujahideen medical advice in their blogs – or you can contact us directly."

Answering a similar query from "an active journalist," *Inspire* says that journalism is a "useful profession to the mujahideen," as journalists' wide knowledge of current affairs, along with

CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – **April 2013**

their "access to many areas as a media personnel," can provide AQAP with valuable intelligence about the enemy, adding that journalists themselves can exploit their positions to execute attacks themselves.

Corfu Island welcomes First Responders for an unforgettable weekend !

SPECIAL OFFER

Read more details at Editor's Corner

Brussels $55 M diamond robbery - why we should care

"Armed robbers have made off with a "gigantic" haul of diamonds after a rapid raid at Brussels Airport.

Disguised as police, they broke through a fence on Monday evening (Feb 18th) and broke into the cargo of a Swiss-bound plane to take the gems, estimated to be worth $50m (£32m; 37m euros).

The thieves were heavily armed, and approached the aircraft in two stolen police vans, just as it was ready to take off. They forced the pilots to open the cargo bay, where 120 packages of diamonds were offloaded into the vans within minutes. No apprehensions have been made, police are looking for 8 men. One purpose of this blog is to identify global issues that seemingly don't affect our national security...and then examine how they might. Diamonds are one such issue. For instance, the diamond trade in African countries such as Zimbabwe provides the best export commodity and source of cash flow for the country. With a corrupt, unstable government and weak rule of law, there naturally is rampant smuggling and trade of illegally mined diamonds to countries such as Israel, Belgium and South Africa. The moniker "blood diamonds" is used throughout Africa when a country smuggles or illegally trades their diamonds for cash, which is then used to fuel internal conflicts. The Kimberley Process (KP) was

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

designed to try and stop this activity. As the KP and other international sanctions and laws impact the ability to illegally move diamonds out of these countries, thieves are turning to other methods - in this case, targeted the transportation line between Antwerp and Zurich.

Diamonds as a way for terrorist groups to launder, store and move money

Diamonds are not traceable. Diamonds are not detected by dogs, chemicals or xrays. Diamonds hold their value. Diamonds are small, light and easier to move than bulk cash or precious metals such as gold. It is quite

or similar certificate. However, professional jewelry thieves know that a re-polish of the stone can eliminate the engraved number and they have cutters on the payroll.

Al Qaeda was rumored to be in the diamond trade in Africa prior to 9/11. In late 2002, intelligence indicated bin Laden bought $20 million in diamonds from 3 rogue smugglers in Africa. The diamonds were untraceable and have never been recovered. Hezbollah has also dabbled in diamonds, notably in the Sierra Leone city of Koidu, where Lebanese diamond buyers are intermingled with locals in the most unlikely location, a long strip mall of diamond dealers in a burned out section of the city.

likely that if these 8 men are never caught, the diamonds will simply disappear into the billion dollar precious gem smuggling business in Europe and Africa. Some diamonds are now laser engraved with a serial number on the girdle, to match the serial number on the GIA

Protecting cross border transit of diamonds is now a critical step to stopping the flow of money to terrorist groups, and the Kimberley Process must expand its focus beyond Africa.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Five years after 26/11, India faces intelligence famine

Source:http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/five-years-after-2611-india-faces-intelligence-famine/article4456325.ece

Even as the Ministry of Home Affairs has renewed efforts to set up a new Rs. 3,400-crore National Counter-Terrorism Centre, highly placed government sources told *The Hindu* that little effort had been made to address crippling shortages of capacity in the domestic intelligence service, the Intelligence Bureau, or in State police intelligence services.

often been committed to other forms of intelligence work.

In 2009, then Home Minister P. Chidambaram authorised the Intelligence Bureau to hire 6,000 new personnel, part-meeting long-standing human resource deficits in the organisation. The IB's training facility, however, trains an estimated 600 staff each year. This barely

The Ministry's renewed push to set up a NCTC, driven by last week's terror attacks in Hyderabad, is being criticised within the Intelligence Bureau as a wasteful effort.

"It's plain silly," a senior Intelligence Bureau officer said. "Instead of fixing the problems of the institutions we have, we're committing to spend a fortune on creating yet another bureaucracy."

Five years after the 26/11 attacks, the headquarters of the IB's operations directorate in New Delhi — the cutting edge of the organisation's counter-jihadist operations — makes do with just 30-odd analysts and field personnel, a tenth or less of the numbers employed at similar organisations across the world. Personnel shortages have also meant that small groups of counter-terrorism specialists set up at the IB's State offices have

covers the numbers of personnel who retire each year from the estimated 28,000-strong organisation.

A senior intelligence official said: "In all, I would estimate that our manpower has grown by just about 5% since 2009."

Electronic intelligence gathering capacities, which have received massive investments since 26/11, are also less than optimal. The super-secret National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), intended to meet the technological needs of the intelligence services, has become a communications-intelligence empire in its own right. In addition, the NTRO has been beset by successive financial scandals "The IB desperately needs better technology for Internet monitoring," an officer said. "The NTRO has it, but doesn't use it in the ways operators on the ground need."

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Last year, the IB launched a large-scale effort to recruit personnel from the regions most affected by political violence and terrorism. New its chief, Asif Ibrahim, sources said, would be placing emphasis on improving human intelligence skills — in essence, focussing on penetrating terrorist groups rather than relying on technology alone.

Part of the problem, some IB officials also concede is the organisation's staggering mandate — spanning intelligence-gathering on everything from the state of play in elections, industrial relations and even food security. Five of the 28 Joint Directors in New Delhi deal directly with counter-terrorism issues.

Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde's decision to push forward with setting up the NCTC — resisted by several States, which believe it will encroach on their powers — has come amid media claims that better sharing of intelligence might have prevented last week's attacks. In fact, police sources in Hyderabad argue that the real problem is a famine of actionable intelligence — the consequence of deficits in intelligence-gathering capacities — not the sharing of information on prospective threats.

None of the three warnings issued to State police forces ahead of last week's bombing, highly placed government sources said, however contained information that might have enabled the attack to be pre-empted.

The first warning, on February 16, raised the prospect of terror strikes as retaliation against the hanging of Parliament attacker Afzal Guru. The second, issued on February 18, noted that terrorists were likely to hit areas where reconnaissance or strikes had earlier taken place. The third, issued on February 19, meticulously listed targets where arrested terrorist had conducted reconnaissance in preparation for attacks — but had no information on possible perpetrators.

Police sources in Andhra Pradesh dispute the utility of this information. The State police's own intelligence services, they noted, had listed six potential targets in a warning issued on November 15, 2012, soon after the interrogation of Nanded residents Sayyed Maqbool and Imran Khan.

The two men, charged with terrorism-related crimes earlier this week, were reported to have told interrogators they scouted potential locations for a bombing in Hyderabad's Dilsukhnagar, Begum Bazar and Abids in July

2012, on instructions from fugitive jihadist commander Riyaz Shahbandri.

"We knew this — but the fact is it's next to useless to know this," a police officer connected with the investigation told The Hindu. "We couldn't just have kept hundreds of constables hanging around the streets indefinitely after that, looking for potential bombers. Firstly, we don't have those kinds of resources, and secondly, the terrorists could just find another target."

"Let me tell you a story about these intelligence alerts," another senior Andhra Pradesh police officer said. "In August, 2005, a Member of the Legislative Assembly was assassinated by a Maoist death squad. Now, on that occasion, there was hard intelligence that an assassination was planned, but we didn't have the resources to enhance protection for every vulnerable person. Now, though, every August 15, I get a warning that legislators may be assassinated."

Experts have, for the most part, reacted to Mr. Shinde's NCTC push with scepticism, noting it will only be useful if accompanied by system-wide investments in intelligence-gathering capacities, as well as a clear mandate. "We have eviscerated our intelligence and police institutions over the decades," said Ajai Sahni, director of the Institute of Conflict Management in New Delhi, "and now want to create layer upon layer of meta-institutions to 'monitor', 'coordinate' and 'oversee' this largely dysfunctional apparatus. It makes no sense at all."

In a speech delivered at the end of 2009, Mr. Chidambaram had promised to set up the NCTC "by the end of 2010"— a third of the time it had taken the United States to create a similar institution. He argued: "India cannot afford to wait 36 months."

Mr. Chidambaram's NCTC would have provided real-time intelligence sharing using multiple databases, including those maintained by the National Intelligence Grid, NATGRID, the Crimes and Criminal Tracking Network and System, CCTNS, and the Intelligence Bureau-run intelligence sharing hub, the Multi-Agency Centre, MAC.

Few elements of this architecture, though, have actually been set up. NATGRID, according to a source close to the project, remained "several months to several years" away from being able to provide fluid real-time access to

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

existing government databases, a tool to take on suspicious financial transactions.

Mr. Shinde inaugurated the central architecture of the CCTNS in January, but police sources say the national rollout of the system is years away.

The most likely form the NCTC will take, MHA sources said, will be in essence to strip away the existing MAC from the Intelligence Bureau.

MAC currently holds two meetings between all intelligence-gathering services each day, and passes on information on threats nationwide. It also sucks up intelligence from State police forces, through regional hubs.

"I'm not sure what purpose having an NCTC which is essentially MAC would serve," an intelligence officer said, "but I guess it will look like the government is doing something."

Now Al-Qaida Wants to Torch Your Car and Snarl Your Commute

Source:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/qaida-cars/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+WiredDangerRoom+%28Wired%3A+Blog+-+Danger+Room%29

Once they turned hijacked airplanes into missiles. Now al-Qaida is encouraging jihadist wannabes to set your car on fire and blow out

knowing they're up for a TORCHING," Irhab writes. His helpful tips: avoid CCTV cameras; hide the gas in an apple juice bottle; and,

your tires on the highway.

That's the advice from the DIY jihad section in the latest issue of al-Qaida's English-language web magazine, *Inspire*. The new "Open Source Jihad" is all about vehicular vandalism.

One suggestion, penned by "Ibnul Irhab" in the new issue of *Inspire*, is to run up on parked cars with gas cans and a matchstick. "How safe will the West feel when parking their cars,

importantly, "don't get petrol on yourself." This is what Open Source Jihad bills as "America's worst nightmare."

Nor is it safe to drive to the store or the office. *Inspire* encourages the inspired to smear "lubricative oil" on roadways right before sharp blind turns to cause a traffic accident. ("Demolition Derby Style," it promises.) If that doesn't

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

sound terrorist-y enough, another tip is to hammer nails into a pegboard painted black so oncoming cars blow out their tires. There's even a chart explaining the physics behind car crashes for *Inspire's* slower readers.

Once again, Open Source Jihad is lowering its standards. Earlier issues of *Inspire*'s "Jihad Kitchen" gave *Anarchist Cookbook*-style tips about cooking up explosives and instructions on blowing up apartment buildings. Its last foray into vehicular assaults involved tricking out the grille of an F-150 with knives to create

an "ultimate mowing machine." (Even Osama bin Laden rolled his eyes at that one.) The apparent calculation behind the half-assed car torchings and unsafe driving conditions is that they need to lower the barriers to entry for jihad, since pretty much no American Muslims bother with it.

On the other hand, road accidents kill way more Americans than al-Qaida ever has, so its junior-varsity squad might as well try to take credit for them.

North Ireland police seize van with mortars, arrest 3

Source:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/International/2013/Mar-04/208753-north-ireland-police-seize-van-with-mortars-arrest-3.ashx#axzz2MdVJG7TH

Forensic officers examine a van during a police operation on the Letterkenny road in Londonderry, Northern Ireland March 4, 2013. REUTERS/Cathal McNaughton

Northern Ireland police say they have seized a van containing four mortars and arrested three men in a security operation that stopped an attack on a police station in the city of Londonderry.

About 100 homes were evacuated overnight after police stopped the van Sunday night as it drove into the city. Police arrested the driver of the van, a man riding a motorcycle behind the van and a third man during a follow-up search.

No group claimed responsibility, but Irish Republican Army splinter groups are active in the predominantly Irish Catholic city.

During its failed 1970-1997 campaign to force Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom, the Provisional IRA developed vehicle-mounted mortar systems capable of lobbing shells into Northern Ireland's fortified police and army bases.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

EDITOR'S COMMENT: This might be a very interesting case study for further exploitation and lessons learned. It might be an "old" methodology but it is back again. It can be improved (regarding detonation gasses escape from the bottom of the car – do not forget how Afghans modified RPGs in order to fire against Russian attack helicopters) or modernized (remote firing or even – movie inspired - loading). It also shows the parallel (?) thinking between terrorist group distant from each other (Hezbollah is also using modified vehicles for rocket launchers or mortars; not to mention the modification of house roofs; FARC used to add feaces or common chemicals in mortar fillings when attacked police stations in Colombia). This case also shows that area surveillance and screening should move to the next step by incorporating gained knowledge to daily practice. If not it would be no surprise that terrorists around the globe will continue to be a half (?) step ahead!

BOOK REVIEW: The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers

By Adam Lankford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013, 272 pp)
Reviewed by Zubair Qamar
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/249/html

Introduction and Overview

In his book, Adam Lankford, a criminal justice professor at the University of Alabama, sheds light on an often neglected dimension of suicide terrorists – the psychological/suicidal dimension. He does this by providing specific examples of terrorists who were suicidal and asks for the debate to go beyond religious radicalism and political ideology. Lankford goes through "case studies, suicide notes, love letters, diary entries, and martyrdom videos" (pp. 17, 18) to make his case. The first chapter is an Introduction to the book, which explains how, according to Lankford, the experts did not understand the 9/11 hijackers correctly, and how he embarked on research for his book. Chapter-2 extends the discussion from Chapter-1 on how, according to Lankford, the experts have been wrong on understanding suicide terrorists. Chapter-3 discusses Lankford's sample of some 130 suicide terrorists and his claim that they exhibit suicidal traits. Chapter-4 illustrates Lankford's "psychological

autopsy" of Mohamed Atta, the alleged ringleader of the 9/11 attacks. Chapter-5 explores Lankford's thoughts on differences between genuine heroes and suicide terrorists. Chapter-6 compares suicide terrorists with perpetrators of murder-suicide, including workplace killers and rampage shooters. Chapter-7 discusses Lankford's four categories of suicide terrorists (conventional, coerced, escapist, and indirect). Finally, Chapter-8 presents recommendations to predict where suicide terrorism is more likely to happen. This book review essay touches upon key aspects of the book, including the intentions of suicide terrorists, the suicide traits to suicide connection, Lankford's psychological autopsy of Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 suicide terrorists, Lankford's convenience sample, Lankford's accusation against certain scholars of being incorrect, demonstration of some of Lankford's subjective and dubious reasoning, followed by the conclusion.

Words that Mask the Truth

Lankford advises the reader not to listen to what comes out of the mouths of suicide terrorists to understand their true motives, adding, "… you can't believe everything you hear" (p. 20). Indeed, believing everything you hear from a suicide attacker, or his/her family, can lead to incorrect understandings and conclusions. Lankford tells us that because suicide bombers claim to be self-sacrificing for a claimed cause does not necessarily make it so. However, using Lankford's approach, one can also ask: Why believe that they are suicidal if they may have the capacity to make rational decisions to kill themselves for non-suicidal, perceived noble causes? Intentions behind actions are difficult to ascertain, and words and actions do not always allow one to be absolutely certain about root causes of one's self-killing. Moreover, Lankford's assessment is limited to the psychiatric realm without offering an equally substantial treatment of other possible causes of suicide. The "situational" factors are mentioned in passing by Lankford without seriously considering and elaborating on the influences and effects they have on

suicide terrorists. (See, for example, pages 13, 32, 116, 131, and 148). It is surprising that the effects of military occupation, befriending of regimes with poor human rights records, and poor economic growth and prosperity in certain majority Muslim regions have little to no consideration in Lankford's analysis of suicide terrorism. Neither does religion and ideology. A more detailed analysis of social-cultural factors is also missing. According to Lankford, mental illness seems to be the main driving force that makes suicide terrorists do what they do, which makes his analysis incomplete.

Suicidal Traits to Suicide

In addressing the issue of words by suicide terrorists that may mask the truth, Lankford expresses confidence in the "suicidal traits-to-suicide" link at the level of mainly soft indicators. Yet these are common to millions, if not more, people. Predicting suicide from such an assessment is highly prone to false positives. Lankford appears to approach these complex matters in a simplistic way. James Christopher Fowler (2012) from the Baylor College of Medicine found that

"…despite decades of research, accurate prediction of suicide and suicide attempts remains elusive. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) Guidelines on Suicidal Behavior (APA, 2003) concluded that predicting suicide appears impossible in large part due to the rarity of suicide, even among high-risk individuals such as psychiatric inpatients. Beyond statistical challenges posed by low base rates, longitudinal prediction using relatively distal variables such as psychiatric diagnoses, demographics, and self reported psychological states consistently yield high false-positive prediction rates, limiting their predictive value (Goldsmith et al., 2002; Rudd et al., 2006; Oquendo, Halberstam, & Mann, 2003). Complicating the assessment strategy is the fact that most studies assess single risk

factors, leaving clinicians and expert panels to estimate how risk factors interact to influence outcomes."[1]
Fowler (2012) also states
"Assessment of psychological vulnerabilities…seemed a logical approach, yet a review of empirical literature yielded mixed results for the most consistently studied psychological constructs of impulsivity/aggression, depression, anxiety, hopelessness, and self consciousness/social disengagement (Conner, Duberstien, Conwell, Seidlitz & Caine, 2001)."[2]
While no assessment is immune to false positives, a less meticulous assessment like Lankford's is certainly more prone to false positives, especially when emphasis on psychological vulnerabilities has achieved mixed results in other studies. A more careful risk assessment is therefore necessary to differentiate and target those who are at substantial risk of suicide over the masses who possess similar soft traits. For example, past suicide attempt, which is the "[s]trongest consistent predictor for both suicide attempts and completed suicide across many studies"[3] should be examined. When the reviewer asked Lankford how many individuals in his sample of 130 suicide terrorists attempted suicide in the past, he responded: "That's a good question, but I don't have the answer on hand."[4]

Lankford's "Psychological Autopsy" of Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 Hijackers
Lankford's "psychological autopsy" of Mohamed Atta demonstrates the weakness described above. Lankford tells us that the
"psychological autopsy has revealed that Atta's struggles with social isolation, depression, guilt and shame, and hopelessness were very similar to the struggles of those who commit conventional suicide and murder-suicide" (p.83).
What can be concluded from similarities between Atta and those who commit conventional and murder suicides at the level of such indicators? Not much, especially when Atta, according to Lankford himself, never considered "hanging himself, slitting his wrists, or putting a bullet through his brain" (p.75). In other words, Atta had no known past suicide attempts. The implication from Lankford that those traits led Atta to commit suicide is

unsubstantiated. Furthermore, Lankford writes that Atta's individual psychology, and the traits that form it,
"explain why Atta behaved so differently from the millions of Islamic fundamentalists and tens of thousands of terrorists and terrorist leaders who have not carried out suicide attacks – and never will" (p.85).
On the contrary, it is more convincing to believe that many non-suicidal terrorists *do* possess such traits because the traits are not necessarily factors required for suicide to take effect, and are traits common to millions of people. In addition, Lankford's "psychological autopsy" is also based on certain misunderstandings and unverified assumptions, which further compromise its quality. For example, in discussing depression, Lankford zeroes in on the symptom of *appetite and/or weight changes*. He writes that
"…Atta would complain when other members of his group would bring home delicious food, which seems odd considering the lack of a true religious justification for this stance" (p.74).
While Sunni Islam does not prohibit healthy eating, and while Atta exaggerated in expressing displeasure with the act of eating, Islam does teach Muslims to eat in moderation and avoid gluttony. The Qur'an states, "And eat and drink and be not extravagant; surely He does not love the extravagant" (Al-A`raf 7:31). It is probable that Atta had a twisted understanding of Islam, as extremists do, including with the stated verse of the Qur'an and sayings of Prophet Muhammad on eating. If this is true, then contrary to Lankford's understanding, Atta was displaying extremist religious behavior and was not necessarily depressed. It is odd that Lankford did not entertain this interpretation as a possibility.
Lankford also fails to explain that depression may not always be an important risk factor for suicide according to certain scholars. For example, Matthew Nock, the same 2011 MacArthur Fellow who Lankford uses for support in Chapter-8 when explaining his computer test with "predictive powers", had a different understanding. Nock says: "But what our data show is depression isn't a strong predictor of suicide"…[5]. Lankford should mention that suicide scholars have different conclusions from data on predictors of suicide. His book

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

makes it appear as if his explanation is the only way to understand the matter, which is clearly not the case. Similarly, Lankford's psychological analyses of a few other 9/11 hijackers were based on cursory details, weak suicide risk assessment, and overly ambitious conclusions that they were mentally impaired. Lankford's "psychological autopsies" lack the required strength to support his opposition to scholars who held the view that the 9/11 hijackers were by and large normal.

Lankford's Convenience Sample
On pages 49 to 51, Lankford cites the research of Ariel Merari (an Israeli clinical psychologist) on suicide bombings and supports his sample.[6] However, Merari's sample was a convenience sample that presents a host of problems. Some problems in a convenience sample include sampling bias and the sample being unrepresentative of the population. In other words, there are limits to making inferences and generalizations of the population from such a sample that can be contradicted by results from a more representative sample. The same problems are associated with Lankford's convenience sample of 130 suicide terrorists (STs). Lankford said,

"The 130 STs described in Ch3 and Appendix A are probably more of an opportunity sample than a geographically representative sample. I just tried to find every case I could."[7]

Lankford's sample of 130 suicide terrorists, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. In footnote-61 in Chapter-3, Lankford writes,

"All efforts have been made to reduce the chances of redundancy. However, since some of these individuals are not identified by name, it is possible that a few cases appear on this list more than once*" (emphasis added) (pg.208).*

In other words, Lankford admits the possibility that his sample could be different in number than the 130 suicide terrorists. When the reviewer read the list of suicide terrorists in Appendix-A, the following was noted:

- Unidentified Males: 10
- Unidentified Females: 8
- Unidentified sixteen-year-old boy: 1
- Multiple unidentified attackers: Stated 5 times, each with multiple attackers
- Multiple teenage boys: Stated 1 time (Appendix-A, p.177)

How does one know if the unidentified individuals really existed or not, or if there could be repeats in counting them, as Lankford considered above? While some researchers wish to keep certain names anonymous to protect the identities of attempted suicide terrorists and their families, it also provides leeway to incorporate manufactured "evidence." Even if the evidence is genuine, the anonymity of the data makes it less convincing to be taken seriously. (As a side note, it is curious why Lankford lists Mir Aimal Kasi as a suicide terrorist. After killing CIA staff in 1993, he fled to Pakistan, was later found, and legally executed in 2002 by the US government. He never attempted suicide, but committed terrorism. After he fled the crime scene, he was in hiding and still did not attempt suicide in any form (Appendix-A, p.180).

An "opportunity" or convenience sample, as explained above, limits inferences and generalizations of the population. Robert Brym, a Canadian political sociologist, expressed this concern with Lankford's sample as he did with Merari's sample:

"Are the thousands of suicide attackers who are not in his sample different from those who are included? Could they perhaps have been driven by political conditions and social factors that have nothing to do with their psychological predispositions? We don't know, and therefore we don't know whether any of the inferences Dr. Lankford draws from his sample are valid."[8]

Lankford's optimism and expectations give him reason to believe that a more representative sample of suicide terrorists would corroborate his findings. Lankford says,

"The broader question is whether or not my findings are representative of what we'd expect to find in STs around the world, and I think they are*" (emphasis added).[9]*

But to "think" what further research might (or might not) illustrate is not the same as what it *would* illustrate. While Lankford's optimism is admirable, it is based on faith rather than hard data. The results of more research need not support Lankford's expectations. This can only be known once a representative sample is taken and analyzed. Until then, Lankford's optimism that most suicide terrorists worldwide are

suicidal is premature. Lankford is eager to push the cart before the horse, and seems to use evidence to support what he already assumed to be true.

Did Lankford keep an open mind? The discussion so far appears to indicate that he probably had a biased outlook from the outset. This may partially explain why he used a convenience sample. When this reviewer asked Prof. Lankford why he did not use a random sample, he replied that:

"…random sampling could be valuable. But random sampling also inevitably limits the amount of evidence you're considering, because you'll be ignoring certain important cases because a random number generator has not selected them. Given the scarcity of evidence currently available, I am hesitant to take any approach which limits the evidence further. In an ideal world, we'd have evidence on thousands of cases, and could then randomly sample and still be analyzing a sample large enough to be valid."[10]

But random samples address both the known and unknown variables and are likely to give a less biased and more accurate representation of the population. When the reviewer asked Prof. Brym to comment on Lankford's thoughts, he responded:

"Of course *random sampling ignores some cases – the whole point of random sampling is to be able to generalize reliably from some cases to the relevant population. We don't have to have data on the entire population to make reliable estimates about its characteristics precisely because the sample has been drawn randomly."[11]*

Adam Lankford may have had fewer cases through a random sample, but his research would have been taken more seriously in the view of this reviewer.

Accusing Experts of Being Wrong

Lankford is also critical with studies and statements of many other scholars in the field. He impugns Robert Brym (pp. 5, 35, 50), Scott Atran (pp. 5, 58),[12] Robert Pape (pp. 5, 6, 29, 30, 65), Jerold Post (pp. 5, 35, 66, 109), Ellen Townsend (pp. 5, 27), Riaz Hassan (pp. 5, 29),[13] Adel Sadeq (p. 5), Larry Pastor (pp. 6, 110), and Mohammed Hafez (pp. 6, 109).

For example, he criticizes Ron Paul who used Robert Pape's research for saying that 95% of

suicide attacks are caused by foreign occupation. Lankford writes, "Paul is confusing an indirect cause with a direct cause" (p.161). When the reviewer asked Prof. Lankford what his evidence was that 95% of suicide attacks in the areas/regions Paul referred to refer to suicidal terrorism, he responded:

"As to what I argue is actually going on, I think that's pretty clear throughout the book. [Zero]/130 who I've examined are motivated purely by ideology, including anti-occupation ideology."[14]

Lankford uses his sample of 130 suicide terrorists to conclude that Pape's conclusion is incorrect. However, as stated earlier, nobody can confidently use a small convenience sample and speak for the general population of suicide terrorists. A clear limitation of a convenience sample is that it may not at all be representative of the total population of suicide attackers. Also, even *if* Pape is incorrect in his conclusion, does it make Lankford correct in *his* conclusion? No. While accusing Pape of not conducting extensive studies of the biographies of suicide attackers in his (Pape's) study, Lankford did not either. Therefore, how can Lankford know if Pape is wrong or not? He cannot. It is another example of Lankford's rush to judge a matter without being fully cognizant of the facts.

While portraying Pape as being oblivious of the psychological/suicidal dimension of suicide attackers, Lankford neglects to mention that, according to Pape's research,

"the data shows less than 5 percent of suicide attackers experience major depression associated with ordinary suicide."[15]

This is no superficial study. Robert Pape's groundbreaking study in *Cutting the Fuse* "surveys and analyzes over 2,200 suicide attacks and 2,500 suicide attackers around the world since 1980, based on over 10,000 documents in English and native languages and nearly every available martyr video in existence."[16] Lankford either did not understand Pape's research results or chose to ignore most of it.

Lankford has also been unable to respond to Pape's excellent point that

"while mental illness and ordinary suicides occur in every country at fairly constant rates, suicide attacks are highly concentrated in specific areas of foreign

occupation – typically starting when the occupation begins and sharply declining when it ends – patterns that strongly refute mental illness as a major cause as they confirm the main findings of Cutting the Fuse.*"[17]*

When Israel left Lebanon in 2000 and suicide attacks by the Lebanese ceased, was it because their "psychological instability" and "suicidal" tendencies also ceased?[18] Lankford's views are difficult to square with such facts and with common sense.

Subjective Views and Dubious Reasoning

Adam Lankford also forms his own subjective understandings of terms from which he bases his analyses.[19] Regarding *heroism*, for example, he writes that

"...some suicide terrorists may have legitimately done heroic things during their lives" (p.106)

He then continues,

"But...carrying out a suicide attack wasn't one of them. Even if you believe in their God, their cause, and their right to fight, the act of killing itself is not heroic – for any reason" (p.106).

However, Lankford's statement is controversial in light of other definitions of *heroism*. For example, David Lester, former President of the International Association for Suicide Prevention, said,

"It all depends on your definition of a hero. In my note, I use Zimbardo's, and I reckon that some suicide bombers could fit his definition*" (emphasis added).[20]*

Lester further said that

"Restricting the venue to the conflict(s) in the Middle East, it is clear that suicide bombing is part of a war. *The acts may, therefore, fit into the military hero category proposed by Zimbardo, but the agents may also be viewed as martyrs since they are working for a clear political and religious cause*" (emphasis added).[21]

Lankford fails to mention that being a hero and martyr are not straightforward matters as he portrays. Using the definitions and understandings of other scholars, there would not necessarily be a "myth of martyrdom." When Lankford is subjective, he sounds more like a propagandist than an objective scholar. Lankford also violates his own approach by using the statements of suicide terrorists arbitrarily. He writes, "By definition,

this...means that their attacks cannot be considered a true 'sacrifice,' because the suicide terrorists are not forfeiting 'something highly valued.' *Even according to their own statements*, they are trading something they put low value on (their lives in this transient, unhappy, and corrupt world) for something they value highly (heaven and paradise). There is nothing noble or brave about that kind of bargain" (italics added) (p.8).

Lankford admonishes us not to take the words of suicide terrorists at face value, yet has no problem doing so in their claims of what they attribute high and low value to. Lankford also classifies "conventional," "coerced," "escapist," and "indirect" people who kill themselves as "suicide terrorists" (p.130). This is a subjective definition of "terrorist" that is not shared by most, or many, terrorism experts who relate such violent acts to mainly political goals. Lankford needs to define these terms before using them. Otherwise, many suicidal people would receive the "terrorist" label.

Lankford's book includes a discussion of social stigmas associated with suicide, but this is mainly in reference to Arab culture (see, for example, p.26, p.60, p.152, p.160, p.173). However, Lankford exaggerates the link between the social and religious stigmas of suicide with a suicide attack as an escape route. While this is true in some cases, it is not true in most Arab regions. In addition, Lankford fails to consider how family and religion act as social *support* rather than social *pressure*. Ziad Kronfol, a psychiatrist at Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar, says

"I already mentioned stigma and ignorance and their negative impact on mental health. However, factors such as family and religion could have a positive impact. Family ties are strong in the Middle East and this can play a positive role to the extent that they are used as social support rather than social pressure. Similarly, the impact of religion could be positive to the extent that it induces good deeds and protects the person from harm, including self-inflicted harm. *In other words, religion can be a protective factor against suicide"* (italics added).[22]

By overlooking the positive potential of family and religion in Arab regions as protective factors against suicide, Lankford portrays Arabs in a distorted and negative manner. He also seems

to convey that Arabs who do suicide attacks are doing it solely due to negative social stigma without entertaining other possible causes adequately.

Some of Lankford's statements are, in this reviewer's opinion, bordering on the absurd. For example, Lankford writes,

"The raw materials for prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns are virtually all here. In the United States, approximately thirty-four thousand people commit suicide each year. So there is plenty of suicidal intent to harness, along with tens of thousands of people who could be coerced into becoming suicidal" (p.166).

This is unrealistic alarmism. Lankford does not provide any evidence to substantiate his claim that "tens of thousands of people…could be coerced into becoming suicidal" in the United States. Furthermore, while explaining that Mohamed Atta was not fully obedient to Osama bin Laden's orders, as he had prioritized his own preferences instead, Lankford concludes:

"He was not so blindly committed to the cause, so in awe of bin Laden, or so brainwashed by terrorist teachings that he simply did what he was told" (p.66).

Because Atta differed on key matters with bin Laden does not necessarily mean Atta was not committed to the cause. Two or more people can differ in certain respects and still be committed to the same cause. Even more bizarre is Lankford's allusion that Atta's cause stemmed from his supposedly psychologically abnormal mind without any convincing evidence to substantiate the claim:

"No – the truth is that Atta had his own agenda. Like many suicidal people, he was not willing to take his own life until he was ready: he wouldn't be rushed into it, and it needed to be on his terms. In fact, unlike a professional soldier or ideologically committed Green Beret, he was willing to jeopardize the mission's success in order to meet his own objectives" (p.67).

As discussed earlier, Lankford's portrayal of Atta as one who had suicidal tendencies is unconvincing. Lankford also misrepresents his sources. For example, he writes,

"Pew Research Center surveys indicate that more than two hundred thousand Americans believe that suicide attacks are "often" or "sometimes" justified" (p.163).

He means *Muslim* Americans, not "Americans" in general, as his statement appears to imply.

Lankford is also unaware of other polls that illustrate what Americans, in general, think about violence against civilians. When Americans were asked if violence against civilian targets, such as bombings, are justified, "an astounding 24% said they believe that bomb attacks aimed at civilians are 'often or sometimes justified' and 6% feel they are 'completely justified.' *In other words, American Muslims are between four and six times less likely than other Americans to endorse violent acts against civilians"* (italics added).[23]

Being fixated on suicide terrorism over terrorism against civilians in general is to prioritize the lesser threat over the greater threat. Mentioning a poll that illustrates the views of Muslim Americans on violence without explaining the polls of Americans in general is to portray Muslim Americans in a skewed manner.

Conclusion

While Lankford's recommendations in the end of the book are important, most have already been stated by countless scholars before him, and can be included in recommendations to counter terrorism in general. This includes keeping an eye on the Internet and interviewing family members of suicide terrorists. Lankford could have included more recommendations in his last chapter, including Alex Schmid's recommendations on countering terrorism.[24] Lankford's recommendation to authorities to monitor psychologically compromised individuals and deduce the probability of suicide terrorism using "every resource they can" (p.167) seems to be a shot in the dark and a terrible waste of valuable resources considering the very low probability of suicide terrorism in the United States, and the difficulties associated with predicting suicide terrorism. Along similar lines, Lankford places too much hope in Matthew Nock's five-minute computer test, which can detect individuals who have attempted suicide in the past, and predict which individuals are likely to commit suicide within six months (p.171). While praising this technology, Lankford stretches its utility by saying,

"This could be an incredibly powerful security screening tool for identifying anyone who is contemplating a suicide attack" (p.172).

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Yet predicting suicide and predicting suicidal attacks is not the same matter, and the link between suicide and a suicide attack is more complex. Furthermore, Lankford acknowledges that "false positives" are still possible:

"Of course, there would be some false positives. Some suicidal individuals who have no terrorist inclinations whatsoever would also be flagged. But encouraging them to get help wouldn't be a bad thing either." (p.172).

Lankford is to be reminded that predicting suicidal individuals is already a very difficult task, predicting suicide attackers is even more challenging, and making our security officials turn into mental health specialists may not be such a great idea.

While focusing on the psychological dimension is urgent, Lankford makes the same mistake as those whom he accuses. While he blames suicide terrorism experts of over-emphasizing the political/ideological dimension, Lankford overemphasizes the psychological/behavior dimension over other variables that are just as, if not more, important. While the book makes some interesting points, understanding suicide terrorists as mainly mentally unstable individuals, if followed, may channel the efforts of national security professionals away from more relevant causes and triggers of suicide terrorism, and terrorism in general. This can be dangerous for a country's national security.

Lankford's study does allow readers to understand the lives of some terrorists more fully. While useful, extrapolating premature generalizations from an unrepresentative sample can lead to an incorrect understanding of the motivations of most suicide terrorists, as well as of the effective ways to counter them. Moreover, it can also absolve those terrorists who commit premeditated acts of violence to maim and murder by labeling them psychologically unstable. It may be more important to stop the leaders who motivate both psychologically stable and unstable individuals to commit suicide terrorism, and to focus on the nationalist, political, and extremist religious interpretations, motivations, and triggers that Lankford spends only few words discussing in his book.

Martyrdom by suicide terrorists may be a "myth" according to Lankford, but not to many suicide terrorists themselves. Academic scholars too might recall the Thomas theorem ("If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" [25]) and define and understand such attacks differently, based on other criteria and contexts. Overall, the book's conclusions are based on certain unverified assumptions that require further study alongside the many studies that have already been undertaken beyond the psychological/behavior aspects. It is therefore recommended that Lankford's conclusions not be accepted at this time until further research determines the way forward.

Notes

[1] James Christopher Fowler (2012). 'Practice Review: Suicide Risk Assessment in Clinical Practice: Pragmatic Guidelines for Imperfect Assessments.' *Psychotherapy*. Vol. 49, No. 1, 81–90. Available: http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/pst-49-1-81.pdf
In this paragraph, Fowler (2012) cites:
American Psychiatric Association. (2003). *American Psychiatric Association Practice Guideline for the assessment and treatment of suicidal behaviors.* Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Goldsmith, S. K., Pellmar, T. C., Kleinman, A. M., & Bunney, W. E. (2002). *Reducing suicide: A national imperative (Committee on Patho- physiology and Prevention of Adolescent and Adult Suicide, Board on Neuroscience and Behavioral Health, Institute of Medicine of the National Academies).* Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
Rudd, M. D., Berman, A. L., Joiner, T. E., Nock MK, Silverman MM, Mandrusiak M, . . . Witte T. (2006). Warning signs for suicide: Theory, research, and clinical applications. *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 36,* 255–262. doi:10.1521/suli.2006.36.3.255
Oquendo, M. A., Halberstam, B., & Mann, J. J. (2003). Risk factors for suicidal behavior: Utility and limitations of research instruments. In M. B. First (Ed.), *Standardized evaluation in clinical practice* (Vol. 22, pp. 103–130). Washington, DC: APPI Press.
[2] Ibid. Fowler. pg. 83. In this paragraph, Fowler (2012) cites:
Conner, K. R., Duberstein, P. R., Conwell, Y., Seidlitz, L., & Caine, E. D. (2001). Psychological vulnerability to completed suicide: A review of empirical studies. *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 31,* 367–385. doi:10.1521/suli.31.4.367.22048
[3] Ibid. Fowler. p. 83, Table-2.

[4] Adam Lankford. Personal communication, Feb.15, 2013.
[5] Shari Roan (Sept. 20, 2011). 'MacArthur fellow will focus on suicide prevention.' *Los Angeles Times.* Available: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/20/news/la-heb-macarthur-suicide-20110920
[6] Lankford defends Merari's sample:
"For instance, sociologists Robert Brym and Bader Araj have claimed that Merari's sample may not be representative of the larger population of suicide bombers. However, this is a wholly unsubstantiated critique, and Brym and Araj admit that if Merari's sample is somehow not representative, it is likely in ways that are still 'unknown'." (Adam Lankford. The Myth of Martyrdom. pp. 49-50)
 Brym comments on Lankford's criticism of his and Araj's criticism of Merari's sample:
"Even Professor Merari acknowledges that he drew a convenience sample (in which cases are chosen based on their accessibility) rather than a representative sample (in which cases are chosen so their characteristics match the characteristics of the population of interest). Our criticism is therefore a matter of fact. To say it is "unsubstantiated" suggests that Dr. Lankford lacks even an elementary understanding of sampling, including the fact that all convenience samples are *necessarily* unrepresentative in ways that are unknown.'" (Robert Brym. Personal communication, Feb.11, 2013)
Robert Brym says, "Ariel Merari developed the same idea as Lankford in *Driven to Death* (Oxford University Press, 2010)." (Robert Brym. Personal communication, Feb. 11, 2013)
Even if Merari's sample was somehow valid, it is interesting to note that Lankford remained silent in his book about the other weaknesses Brym and Bader Araj expressed with regard to Merari's study:
"First, the interviewers may have sought out signs of depression, leading to overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis of depression is an increasingly common problem in psychology and psychiatry, and as Merari notes, the view that depression and suicidality lead to suicide bombing in certain contexts has been a pet theory of his for more than 20 years, well before he had any evidence to support the hypothesis…."
"A second potential source of bias resides in the fact that the respondents were political prisoners serving life sentences in Israeli jails. That circumstance may have led them to exhibit a higher rate of depression and suicidality than one would find outside the prison system…."
"Third, it may be relevant that at least six and perhaps more of Merari's fifteen respondents failed to complete their suicide mission because they lacked the resolve to do so. Some depressive and suicidal tendencies may have resulted not from a preexisting condition so much as the respondents' failure to execute their plan, thereby disappointing their organizational sponsor, the Palestinian public, and themselves, resulting in a depressed state…."
"Fourth, the interviews and tests were conducted by authority figures who[m] respondents likely viewed as part of the coercive apparatus of an Israeli penal institution. This situation may have led prisoners to respond less than candidly. The present authors find evidence of lack of candour in one of the tests Merari and his associates conducted…." (Robert J. Brym & Bader Araj. (2012). "Are suicide bombers suicidal?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35:432-443. Available: http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/suicidal.pdf.
See also: Brym and Araj's Rejoinder to Merari: Robert J. Brym & Bader Araj. (2012). "Suicidality and suicide bombers: a rejoinder to Merari." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35:733-739. Available: http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/merari%20rejoinder.pdf
[7] Adam Lankford. Personal communication, Feb.13, 2013.
[8] Robert Brym. Personal communication, Feb.11, 2013.
[9] Ibid. Lankford. Personal communication, Feb.13, 2013.
[10] Ibid. Lankford. Personal communication. Feb.13, 2013.
[11] Robert Brym. Personal communication, Feb.17, 2013.
[12] Scott Atran had responded to Lankford in response to his Op-Ed on Dec. 18, 2012:
"Mr. Lankford argues that suicide terrorists like the 9/11 attackers or other jihadis share a triad of psychological peculiarities: mental health problems, sense of personal victimization, desire for glory. I've interviewed failed and would-be suicide terrorists, their families, and friends across Eurasia and North Africa. Apart from desire for glory, highly developed among jihadis and their ilk but less so among lone-wolf killers like the Newton murderer, there is little similarity. Field interviews and controlled psychological experiments by my research teams and others indicate that members of violent extremist groups are parochial altruists whose personal identity is fused with that of their primary reference group, often a small network of action-oriented friends. They are motivated by a cause (but so are millions of others who fail to act), yet kill and die for and with their friends and fellow travelers (which is why only a very few act, and always together, even if only via internet). They show no reliable history of psychopathy, suicidal tendencies, sociopathy or any of the other psycho-social problems frequently associated with lone-wolf killers. Our research also shows that personal humiliation and victimization are negative predictors of martyrdom. Rather, moral outrage over perceived threats and injustice by an outgroup toward family, friends and ingroup drives violence. We must make every effort to understand what motivates mass murder in order to stop it, but simple and superficial comparisons will not assist."
     (Scott Atran. Personal communication, Feb.10, 2013).

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

[13] When this reviewer asked Riaz Hassan for his thoughts on Lankford's criticism, he responded, "I don't know much of Dr Lankford's work. But his contention that suicide bombers are suicidal goes against…the evidence about the phenomenon" (Riaz Hassan. Personal communication, Feb.11, 2013).

[14] Ibid. Lankford. Personal communication, Feb.13, 2013.

[15] Ibid. Pape.

[16] The quote is from Robert Pape's response to Lankford in the *Huffington Post*:

"It is unfortunate that Adam Lankford has gone ad hominem in criticizing my work, but readers should not doubt the commitment and credibility of the scholarship behind *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How To Stop It* published by the University of Chicago Press. The research represents years of work by a research team at the University of Chicago, was funded by the Department of Defense and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, has been endorsed by the both heads of the 9/11 Commission, the current Chief of the U.S. Navy and numerous other prominent policy makers and scholars, and published by one of the leading university presses in the country after a lengthy peer-review process.

"Cutting the Fuse surveys and analyzes over 2,200 suicide attacks and 2,500 suicide attackers around the world since 1980, based on over 10,000 documents in English and native languages and nearly every available martyr video in existence. The analysis examines the data as a whole and conducts detailed studies of every important suicide terrorist campaign and numerous studies of the specific motives of individuals (eg, the 9/11 Hamburg cell, July 2005 London bombers, and Moroccans who carried out suicide attacks in Iraq).

"The overwhelming picture that emerges is that foreign occupation is the main cause of suicide terrorism, accounting for over 95 percent of the thousands of attacks since 1980. Of course, this finding is startling. It would be much easier to come to terms with the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, which produces devastating attacks like 9/11, if it could be explained as the result of psychological illness carried out by emotionally disturbed individuals as Dr. Adam Lankford would have us believe. We do like our villains to be monsters and it may be true that mental illness is responsible for some suicide attacks. However, the percentage is low; the data shows less than 5 percent of suicide attackers experience major depression associated with ordinary suicide. And, while mental illness and ordinary suicides occur in every country at fairly constant rates, suicide attacks are highly concentrated in specific areas of foreign occupation -- typically starting when the occupation begins and sharply declining when it ends -- patterns that strongly refute mental illness as a major cause as they confirm the main findings of *Cutting the Fuse*.

"The strength of this scholarship and the transparent basis for its conclusions has led many in Washington and around the world to take the findings seriously. If, as we believe, the evidence shows that foreign occupation is the main cause of suicide terrorism, than Americans and other policy makers should take this seriously into account and pursue future courses of action accordingly.

"Ultimately, readers should judge for themselves, either by turning to *Cutting the Fuse* or looking at the extensive documentation available at the website of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism." (Robert Pape. (Sept.23, 2011). 'Response to Adam Lankford.' *The Huffington Post.* Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-a-pape/suicide-terrorism-_b_977688.html)

[17] Ibid (Pape).

[18] This question is asked by the author, based on Pape's following point: "But since Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000, there has not been a single Lebanese suicide attack." Robert Pape. (2010). 'It's the Occupation, Stupid.' *Foreign Policy.* Available: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/it_s_the_occupation_stupid

[19] Of Chapter-5 of Lankford's book (What Real Heroes Are Made Of), Lankford says, it "is certainly the most subjective section" of his book. (Ibid. Lankford. Personal communication, Feb.13, 2013).

[20] David Lester. Personal communication, Feb. 8, 2013.

[21] David Lester. (2010). 'Are Suicide Bombers Heroes?' *Psychological Reports*, 106, 2, pp. 499-500.

[22] Mohammed Yahia. (July 24, 2012). 'Dealing with Mental Illness in the Middle East.' *Nature Middle East*. Available: http://www.nature.com/nmiddleeast/2012/120724/full/nmiddleeast.2012.103.html

[23] Doug Saunders. (2012). *The Myth of the Muslim Tide*. Vintage Books. New York, NY. pp. 86-87.

[24] Alex P. Schmid. (2012). 'Twelve Rules for Preventing and Countering Terrorism.' *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vol.6. Issue 3. p.77.

[25] W.I. Thomas and D.S. Thomas. The Child in America. New York: Knopf, 1928, pp.571-572.

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CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent Offenders: a Comparison of Assassins and School Attackers
By Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko and Benjamin Van Son
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/240/html

Abstract
This article is based on the idea that lone-wolf terrorists may have characteristics in common with two other types of lone-actor violent offenders: assassins and school attackers. We used data from U.S. Government-sponsored reports to compare the characteristics of these two groups. Despite obvious demographic differences, results indicate four characteristics common for both school attackers and assassins: perceived grievance, depression, a personal crisis ('unfreezing'),and history of weapons use outside the military. These characteristics may be useful in distinguishing lone-wolfs from group-based terrorists.

Introduction

Since 9/11 the success of the U.S. and its allies in tracking and disabling Al Qaida and other major terrorist networks around the world has been accompanied by a new concern about home-grown terrorism. Of particular concern is the phenomenon of *lone-wolf terrorism* – political violence committed by individuals acting alone. The threat of lone-wolf attacks was voiced by President Obama [1] as follows: "….the risk that we're especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently. You know, when you've got one person who is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it's a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators."

One of the most notorious lone-wolf terrorists was Ted Kaczynski, who gave up a position as Assistant Professor of Mathematics at the University of California Berkeley to live in a remote area of Montana. There he felt he could escape the threat of technological progress that he had come to fear and detest. Such progress is made, he believed, only by denying human nature -especially the need for meaningful work - and by crushing individual freedom. He emerged occasionally from his wilderness cabin to hand-carry or mail bombs to people he saw as forwarding the industrial-technological progress he feared.

A very different example is John Allen Muhammad, who, with his young protégé Lee Boyd Malvo, killed ten people and wounded two more in 47 days of sniper attacks carried out in and around Washington, D.C. in 2002. Muhammad was a veteran of seven years in the Louisiana National Guard and served nine years in the U.S. Army; he was discharged after the Gulf War as a sergeant. He became a convert to Islam and favoured black separatism and, according to Malvo, hoped to extort several million dollars from the U.S. government and use the money to found a pure black community in Canada. Muhammad has not been forthcoming about the origins of this plan, but it appears that he reacted to what he saw as the victimization of black people in the U.S.

In recent years, lone wolf terrorism seems to have become more frequent.[2] A spate of such attacks demonstrates the breadth of lone-wolf terrorists' causes and targets. On May 31, 2009, anti-abortion activist Scott Roeder shot and killed abortion doctor George Tiller. On June 1, 2009, African-American Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (formerly Carlos Bledsoe) shot two soldiers - killing one, wounding the other - at a U.S. Army Recruiting Station in Little Rock, Arkansas. On June 10, 2009, James Wenneker von Brunn shot and killed a guard at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. . On November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, leaving 12 dead and 31 wounded. On March 2, 2011 two U.S. soldiers died after a lone gunman, Arid Uka, opened fire on them at Frankfurt airport, also wounding two others. On July 22, 2011, Anders Breivik killed 77 people in and around Oslo.

In each case the perpetrator seems to have acted alone for motives that are at least in part political; but beyond this similarity are striking differences in age, background, and motivation. Ted Kaczynski was a mathematician disturbed by the pace of technological progress. John Allen Muhammad, age 42 at the time of his sniper attacks, was an ex-soldier convert to

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Islam, in the midst of a bitter divorce and custody battle, and aggrieved about the U.S. treatment of African Americans. Scott Roeder, age 51, held blue-collar jobs, participated in anti-abortion activism, and, according to his brother, had a history of mental illness. Muhammad-Bledsoe, age 23, converted to Islam as a teenager, studied Arabic in Yemen, and was reportedly angry about the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. James von Brunn, age 88, was a university graduate, WWII naval officer, and in his later years a loner who alienated many with the fury of his racist rants.

Although highly salient, lone-wolf attacks remain rare and, like any rare event, difficult to study. Spaaij has identified only 88 lone-wolf terrorism cases across fifteen countries, including the U.S.[3] Of course it is possible that lone-wolf characteristics differ by country or region; Nesser suggests for instance that his 15 European lone-wolf terrorists differ from American cases.[4] Looking just at the U.S., Eby has identified 53 lone-wolf terrorists between 2001 and 2011, while Jasparro has identified 14 specifically jihadist lone-wolf U.S. terrorists.[5] Given the relatively small number of cases available for study, we aim in this paper to learn more about lone-wolf terrorists by looking at two other kinds of violent offender: assassins and school attackers.

Our inquiry may seem at first a surprising stretch; assassins and school attackers are not usually called terrorists. But assassins and school attackers resemble like lone-wolf terrorists in three important ways: they plan and perpetrate violence, the great majority act alone, and, as described below when we discuss our results, the great majority act out of some perceived grievance rather than for material self-interest. Thus we examine two kinds of lone-actor perpetrators of grievance-fueled violence - assassins and school attackers - in order to develop hypotheses about lone-wolf terrorists who are also lone-actor perpetrators of grievance-fueled violence.

One way to conduct our study would be pure bottom-up empiricism, seeking every possible common characteristic of assassins and school attackers. Instead we bring into our study existing ideas about lone-wolf terrorists, using these ideas to give more focus to our comparison of assassins and school attackers. We assume here that bringing ideas about

lone-wolf terrorists into our examination of assassins and school attackers can enrich our understanding of all three kinds of perpetrators. Either all three are part of a single phenomenon of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence, or we will learn more about all three by establishing how they differ.

Thus we begin with a brief review of several ideas about the origins of lone-wolf terrorists and subsequently use these ideas in our examination of assassins and school attackers.

What Makes a Lone-Wolf Terrorist?

A lone-wolf terrorist plans and carries out an attack without assistance or organisational support. Most analyses of terrorism emphasize the power of group dynamics that can move normal individuals to commit horrific violence [6], but the distinctive aspect of lone-wolf terrorists is that they are moved to violent action without group or organisational support.[7] In this section we consider two possibilities for understanding the actions of lone-wolf terrorists without invoking group dynamics: that they suffer from some form of psychopathology, and that they are moved by the same mechanisms of radicalisation that have been identified for individuals joining a terrorist group.

Are Lone-Wolf Terrorists Suffering from Mental Disorders?

Victims of terrorism and mass media accounts of terrorism often see terrorists as suffering from some kind of psychopathology. "Terrorists appear to be insane, because they kill, destroy, and injure for motives that seem utterly incomprehensible to the rest of us."[8] It is plausible that abnormal crimes, including killing and maiming civilians, must be the work of abnormal individuals, people suffering some kind of mental disorder. Perhaps the best known version of this idea was advanced by Jerrold Post, who suggested that terrorists suffer from *narcissistic personality disorder,* a diagnosis associated with lack of empathy and paranoia.[9]

Decades of research, however, have made clear - and Post has agreed - that terrorists are no more likely to suffer from psychopathology than non-terrorists from the same backgrounds.[10] Nor are terrorists more economically deprived or disadvantaged.[11] Thus research has turned most analysts away from

the idea that there is some profile of individual characteristics that can be used to identify potential terrorists.[12]

It is important to recognize, however, that this research has been predominantly focused on group-based terrorists. This is not surprising because most terrorists operate in groups and lone-wolf terrorists are relatively rare. But given that almost all of the pertinent research has focused on group-based terrorists, it is possible that common characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists may have been overlooked. That is, it may yet be possible to develop a profile for lone-wolf terrorists despite the evidence against such a profile for group-based terrorists. In particular, it might be that some kind of mental disorder is a risk factor for lone-wolf terrorists.

Several well-known examples of political violence make this possibility salient, especially in mass media accounts. Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, killed 3 and injured 23 between 1984 and 1995 with bombs targeting those he saw responsible for an industrial society that crushes human freedom. At least one psychiatrist found that Kaczynski suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.[13]

On January 8, 2011, Jared Loughner shot and killed 6 people and wounded 13 others, including U.S. Congress Representative Gabrielle Giffords, in Tuscon, Arizona. Loughner saw Giffords as a 'fake' and his hostility toward her apparently increased when she did not take seriously a question he asked her in an open forum.[14] He had a history of depression, was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, pled guilty after medication made him able to stand trial, and was sentenced to life in prison.[15]

Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people in and around Oslo on July 22, 2011, was at first declared schizophrenic and psychotic, then found to suffer from narcissistic personality disorder.[16] He was declared fit for trial and sentenced to preventive detention for a minimum of ten years. Kaczynski, Loughner, and Breivik are all lone-actor perpetrators of violence with some degree of political grievance. These examples raise at least the possibility that mental disorder is a risk factor for lone-actor violence, including lone-wolf terrorists as well as lone-actor assassins and school attackers. Here we ask whether signs of mental disorder can be identified among assassins and school shooters.

Are Lone-Wolf Terrorists Moved by the same Mechanisms of Radicalisation that Bring Individuals to Join Terrorist Groups?

McCauley and Moskalenko have recently brought together case history material and social science research to identify twelve mechanisms of radicalisation that can lead individuals, groups and mass publics to political violence.[17] The mechanisms were drawn from, and illustrated in, case studies of terrorism spanning one hundred years and three continents. Relevant to lone-wolf terrorism, the authors identified six individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation. Three group-level and three mass-level mechanisms of radicalisation were also identified; these are not represented here because we are focusing on motives of individuals acting without group or organisational support. We recognize that every individual acts in a larger social context that includes mass sentiments and mass beliefs, but the influence of mass psychology on lone actors is beyond the scope of our study.

In brief, the six individual-level mechanisms are *personal grievance, political grievance, slippery slope, risk and status seeking,* and *unfreezing*.

Individuals can resort to political violence as a result of *personal grievance*, such as perceived mistreatment by the government of self or loved ones. Individuals may also be radicalized by *political grievance*, a perceived mistreatment of people the individual identifies with but does not know personally. Another mechanism of radicalisation is *slippery slope*, a gradual desensitization to the idea and experience of violence through slow escalation of illegal and violent acts. Paradoxically, *love* can move an individual to violence if a loved one - friend, relative, or romantic partner - becomes part of a radical group and asks for help.

Risk and status seeking is perhaps especially common among young males for whom violence may seem the best path to money and respect. Finally, *unfreezing* occurs when an individual loses the everyday reassurance of relationships and routines: a parent dies, a romantic partner leaves, a job lost, a major illness strikes, or the individual moves far from home. Unfreezing is a personal crisis of disconnection that

leaves an individual with less to lose and in search of new directions.

These individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation, derived from the study of terrorism and terrorists, are extended here to ask whether any of these can be identified in the histories of school attackers and assassins.

Reports on Assassins and School Attackers

We have described two possibilities for understanding how individuals can undertake political violence without organisational support or the power of group dynamics. Lone-wolf terrorists may have a mental disorder that interferes with self-interest and rational choice, preservation. Alternatively, they may be moved by some of the same mechanisms of radicalisation that have been identified for group-based terrorists. In this article we look for these possibilities in relation to assassins and school attackers, and we turn now to examine the two authoritative reports on which our study is based.

School Attackers

The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative (hereafter *School Report*) was completed in 2002 with funding provided by the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Education.[18] This report examined 37 incidents of targeted school attacks between 1974 and 2000, with a total of 41 attackers. The authors coded 30 of the 41 school attackers as having attacked alone (81%). Not counted among the 30, four attackers carried out their violence alone but were reported to have had some kind of assistance planning the attack.

Nearly all attackers (39 or 95%) were current students of the targeted school, while two were former students. Over half (59%) of the school attacks occurred during the school day; most attackers used a firearm. These attacks were carried out with a high level of violence, with at least one fatality in 73% of attacks.

Assassins

*Assassination in the United States (*hereafter *Assassination Report)* was published in 1999 with support from The National Institute of Justice and the U.S. Secret Service.[19] The report aimed to study "all people who attacked, or approached to attack, a *prominent person of public status* in the United States since 1949."(p. 322) Persons of public status were defined as persons protected by the Secret Service, other major federal officials and office holders, important state and local public officials, and celebrities such as sports figures and movie, television, radio, and entertainment notables.

The *Assassination Report* presents results for 74 incidents between 1949 and 1996 in which 83 people had either attacked (46%), or tried to attack (54%), a prominent person in the United States. Of the 83 assassins, 63 (76%) acted alone. Assassins used a variety of weapons including handguns (the most common weapon), rifles and shotguns, knives, explosives, and, in three cases, airplanes. Most of the completed attacks did not produce a fatality or an injury.

The Logic of Comparing School Attackers and Assassins

Our study sought to identify characteristics and motives that are associated with these two forms of mostly lone-actor violence: assassins and school attackers. The two types of crime are tracked over largely overlapping time periods: 1974-2000 for school attackers and 1949-1996 for assassins. Both forms of violence are extreme in a statistical sense: there are few assassins or school attackers in each decade.

Another similarity is that the violence perpetrated by both school attackers and assassins is planned rather than impulsive. In this they are like terrorists, who plan their attacks, and unlike most perpetrators of homicide, at least in the U.S., where homicide is most often linked with argument and impulse (brawls due to the influence of narcotics or alcohol, disagreements about money or property).[20]

Finally, school attackers and assassins are like terrorists in that both kinds of perpetrators act out of a sense of grievance rather than for material profit. The political purposes of terrorist violence are many, but almost always include representing some larger group or cause, which is seen as unfairly harmed, humiliated, or endangered. In other words, terrorism is fueled by a sense of outrage and desperation - a sense of grievance.[21] As will be shown in our results, outrage and grievance are also salient in the motivations of assassins and school attackers.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Thus the logic of our study is to compare two groups that are like lone-wolf terrorists in perpetrating planned lone-actor violence fueled by grievance. To the extent that assassins and school attackers share common characteristics, these characteristics may be risk factors for lone-wolf terrorism as well. Of course school attackers are almost all high school age or less, whereas almost all assassins are adults. But the obvious demographic differences between the two groups are actually a strength of our comparison: any commonalities uncovered are the more striking and unlikely to be a reflection of life status or demographic factors.

We acknowledge immediately that, as a study of lone-actor violence, our analysis has an important limitation. Most but not all of the assassins and school attackers were lone actors. Ideally we would examine only the lone actors, setting aside the minority of offenders who acted with some kind of assistance or support. With this goal in mind, we tried to get access to the original files on which the reports were based, but response to our inquiry indicated that the authors of these reports did not have the original files of individual offenders and did not know where or if these files may exist. Thus we compare groups that are predominantly lone-actors, but our comparison is made coarser by the inclusion of a minority of group actors whose characteristics cannot be separated from the characteristics of lone actors.

Methods

Despite overlap in the authors of the two reports, the wording of perpetrator characteristics was not always consistent (e.g. one report categorized substance abuse as *history of substance abuse*, one categorized it as *alcohol or substance abuse*). We believe that these small differences in wording do not substantially affect the meaning of the category labels used in our tables, but, in order that readers may judge for themselves, we present for each of the categories used in our results the corresponding category labels from the original reports.

Of the six individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation identified in the introduction of this article, two (love and slippery slope) require more detailed personal histories than the *Assassins Report* and the *School Report* provide. Thus we focus here on four

mechanisms: personal grievance, political grievance, status and risk seeking, and unfreezing.

Personal grievance is perception of unjust injury to self or loved ones, whereas *political grievance* is perception of unjust injury to a larger group or cause. The two reports did not provide sufficient detail to distinguish individual from political grievances, and we combine these as simply *grievance* in our analysis.

Status and risk seeking is a motivation typical of young males. The combination makes sense because, especially for younger males, risk-taking is a means to increased status. Status seeking can be seen in efforts to gain attention and fame; risk seeking can be seen in fascination with guns and violence.

Unfreezing is a change in circumstances, especially a sudden change, that leaves an individual in some kind of personal crisis. Examples include financial problems, physical threat, and loss of connection with loved ones. When predictability and control are threatened, individuals become open to new relationships, new behaviours, and new values in trying to regain control. Unfreezing is thus an opening in an individual's life that decreases the perceived cost of acting on a grievance and increases the value of acting to gain or regain status and respect.

Although neither the *School Report* nor the *Assassins Report* refers directly to these three mechanisms, we were able to translate reported motives into grievance, status and risk seeking, and unfreezing. As already noted, the reports differed in the wording of categories of motives. More judgment was required in translating reported motives into mechanisms than was required for translating demographics and history into common categories. We invite readers to examine our translation of report categories into mechanisms in the *Appendix* before reading the Results.

It is important to note that the percentage of school attackers categorized as suffering from depression and despair, 78% in our Table 1, is not the same as the percentage given in the *School Report* (p. 22). According to the report, 61% of school attackers suffered from depression or despair. However, the report notes that 78% "exhibited a history of suicide attempts or suicidal thoughts at some point prior to the attack" (p. 22). Since it seems more likely that individuals considering suicide were

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

depressed than that individuals not depressed considered suicide, we represent the percentage of depressed in the *School Report* as 78%. Also, the *School Report* did not give any information about marital status or military service. Given that the school attackers were students ranging in age from 11 to 18 (except

common to assassins and school attackers. As expected, the demographics of these two groups of offenders are very different—school attackers younger and in school, assassins older and employed.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of School Attackers and Assassins (percentages)

	School Attackers	Assassins
	N=41	N= 83
Lone Actor	81	70
Male	100	86
Caucasian	76	77
Age range	11-21	16-73 (M=35)
Served in military	0 [1]	55
Never married	100 [1]	49 [2]
High School education or less	100 [1]	54
Ever arrested	27	66
History of substance abuse	24	39
History of depression or despair	78 [3]	44

[1] Percentage assumed, not explicit in *School Report*

[2] Corrected percentage, 41/83=49% where *Assassins Report* gives 51%

[3] Percentage reported having suicidal thoughts or suicidal attempts

for two very recent high school graduates) we assume that none was married and none had military service.

Finally, it is worth remarking on the issue of statistical significance in comparing percentages between the two reports. Inferential statistics are not appropriate for these comparisons, because the individuals in each report are not a sample of some larger population. They are, rather, two total populations for particular time periods. Still, it is clear that small differences between the two populations—in percent female, for instance-- would be relatively uninteresting and substantively unimportant. Thus, we remark on group differences only when the difference amounts to twenty percentage points or more.

Results

As indicated above, the logic of our inquiry is to look for characteristics and motives that are

Demographic Characteristics

Table 1 shows that both groups of offenders are predominantly male and Caucasian. Unsurprisingly, the school attackers, almost all of them students, are much younger than assassins, who show wide variation in age. The relative youth of school attackers is reflected in several other demographic characteristics. No school attacker served in the military, whereas about half of assassins had served. Also, no school attacker had married, whereas half of assassins had married. The two groups differ greatly in arrest record, with two thirds of assassins having been arrested but only about a quarter of school attackers. It is difficult to interpret this difference without knowing how many assassins had been arrested as teenagers. Last we come to the issue of mental health. Both school

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

attackers (78%) and assassins (44%) show substantial percentages with a history of depression, despair, and suicidal ideation. The higher rate for school attackers is the more striking because assassins had, on average, twice as many years of life in which to develop such a history.

Mechanisms of Radicalisation

For our second analysis, we coded motivations from the two reports into three mechanisms of radicalisation: grievance, unfreezing, and status and risk seeking.

Table 2. Mechanisms of Radicalisation Identified for School Attackers and Assassins (percentages)

	School Attackers (N = 41)	Assassins (N = 83)
Grievance	81	67 [1]
Unfreezing	98	"almost half"
Status and risk seeking	24	38
History of weapons use (excluding military service)	63	71
History of interest in violence	44	59

[1] N= 73 in *Assassins Report* were coded in relation to grievance

Table 2 shows that the incidence of *grievance* was high for both groups of violent offenders, with school attackers (81%) tending even more than assassins (67%) to have a grievance against their targets. The kind of personal crisis we have called *unfreezing* was also common for both groups of perpetrators and more likely for school attackers (98%) than for assassins ("nearly half"). *Status and risk seeking* shows a different pattern. Only a minority of assassins (38%) and school attackers (24%) were coded for this motive. However, fascination with violence can be an expression of risk and status seeking, and about half of both assassins and school attackers have a history of interest in violence (59% and 44%). Perhaps related to fascination with violence is

a history of using weapons outside the military. About two thirds of both assassins and school shooters (71% and 63%) have this kind of history.

Discussion

In the post-9/11 world, operations of violent groups such as Al-Qaeda have been greatly impeded by the successes of the war on terrorism. Lone-wolf attacks, on the other hand, have become more salient and have attracted more attention from policymakers and security officials. In order to learn more about lone-actor violence, we used U.S. Government-sponsored reports to examine two types of predominantly lone-actor grievance-fueled violent offenders: school attackers and assassins.

Personal and Background Characteristics

Both assassins and school attackers were predominantly white males, and both groups of offenders were preponderantly lone actors (81% and 70%). Beyond that, the two groups were, as expected, very different demographically. Assassins differed from school attackers in education, marriage, service in the military, and history of substance abuse and arrest. These differences are likely attributable to the fact that most assassins are adults who, compared with school attackers, have had more years of opportunity to serve in the military, get higher education, and get married. Despite the expected differences in

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

demographic characteristics, both school attackers and assassins showed high rates of mental health problems. The great majority of school attackers (78%) had histories of depression, despair, or suicidal ideation, and nearly half of assassins (44%) had this history. Indeed the preponderance of lone actors for both groups may be associated with mental health problems. Perhaps their isolation contributed to depression, or perhaps their depression made them unable to connect with others.

Mechanisms of Radicalisation in School Attackers and Assassins
The data compiled in the two reports allowed for coding three individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation: grievance, risk-and-status seeking, and unfreezing. Although it is possible that other mechanisms of radicalisation may have been important in the radicalisation of school attackers and assassins, our analysis was limited by the scope of the reported data.
Grievance was coded from perception of *having been persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked, or injured* (school attackers) and *any grievance at the time of the Principal Incident* (assassins). For assassins no abstract definition of grievance was given, but cited motives included avenging perceived wrong, bringing national attention to a perceived problem (e.g. plight of the working man), and saving the country or the world (e.g. the President is the devil).[22]
The prevalence of grievance was high for both school attackers (81%) and assassins (67%). It appears that feelings of grievance may be common in lone-actor violence, although it is important to recognize immediately that feelings of grievance are common whereas violence is rare. Polls indicate, for instance, that tens of thousands of U.K. Muslims believe that the war on terrorism is actually a war on Islam, but at most hundreds of U.K. Muslims have turned to terrorist violence.[23] It is impossible to tease out from the reports whether the perceived grievances of school attackers and assassins were personal or political, although it seems likely that the great majority of school attackers had some personal grievance against targets seen to have bullied or otherwise maltreated them.[24] Assassins more likely had a mix of personal and political grievances.

As noted in the introduction, grievance is prominent among notorious lone wolf terrorists. Thus Ted Kaczynski laid out his grievance with technological progress and those behind it in his famous manifesto. Anders Brevik also wrote a tediously long manifesto to lay out his grievance with the rate of integration of foreigners into the European culture. John Allen Muhammad's grievance was with the U.S. government treatment of African Americans. Major Hasan was aggrieved with the Army for deploying him to a Muslim country where he would have to fight against fellow Muslims. Scott Roeder was guided by his deep commitment to the pro-life message and political movement. Von Brunn expressed his grievance against the Jews in his many postings to right-wing websites. Muhammad-Bledsoe was upset about the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Unfreezing was coded from report of *experienced or perceived major loss* (school attackers) and *accident/illness, loss of relationship, or failure/loss of status* (assassins). The crises and losses were not specified in the report, and offenders' perceptions of them are unclear. Nevertheless, the prevalence of unfreezing was high for both groups of offenders: Almost all school attackers (98%) were coded for unfreezing, and "almost half" (the best summary figure available) of assassins showed unfreezing. Unfreezing appears to be more characteristic of school attackers than assassins, but we emphasize that unfreezing is common for both groups of offenders.
Unfreezing also appears as a motivating factor among lone-wolf terrorists mentioned in the introduction. Thus, John Allen Mohammad was unemployed and going through a bitter divorce and a custody battle. Major Hasan had been transferred far from his family to an Army post where he had few connections outside of work. Ted Kaczynski caused his own isolation, cutting himself off from family, friends and his former life.
Risk and status-seeking was coded from report categories of *efforts to gain attention or recognition* (school attackers) and *attention/notoriety as a goal* (assassins). Risk-and-status seeking was reported for only a minority of assassins and school attackers (38 percent and 24 percent). More common for both groups of perpetrators is a *history of*

interest in violence and *experience with weapons excluding military service.* Over half of assassins and school attackers showed a history of weapons use (71% and 63%) and about half of both groups showed a history of interest in violence (59% and 44%).

The percentages with a history of weapons use are higher than would be expected from national U.S. polling data. Legault used data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to assess gun ownership in U.S. households from 1976-2008.[25] Averaging over years he found that about 43% of respondents reported a gun in the house and 27% reported owning a gun. These statistics give a general baseline for use of guns outside the military. We assume that anyone owning a gun has used it, and that some individuals have used the gun in their house without owning it. Thus between 27% and 43% of Americans have used a gun; whereas weapons use for both assassins and school attackers was substantially higher at 71% and 63%.

Experience with weapons may be common among lone-wolf terrorists as well. Thus, John Allen Muhammad was an ex-soldier who apparently enjoyed the thrill of a hunt as he terrorized the Washington DC population with his sniper attacks. Breivik developed his skill with firearms by joining a gun club. Roeder was convicted of transporting explosives, and von Brunn was a war veteran with a history of fighting and a weapons charge to his record.

Looking back over the results, there are four characteristics that are common for both school attackers and assassins. Nearly half or more of both school attackers and assassins were reported as showing *depression, grievance, unfreezing*, and *history of weapons use outside the military*.

The concatenation of these characteristics makes some sense. Depression makes life a pain that can be escaped in action. Grievance highlights and justifies a target of violence. Unfreezing is not itself a motive for violence, but opens an individual to radical change in belief and behaviour. Indeed depression may contribute to unfreezing in breaking old relations and making normal life feel impossible. The combination of depression and unfreezing is likely to leave an individual who sees him or herself—and is seen by others—as a 'loner.' Disconnection means that the 'loner' feels reduced restraint in reacting to grievance with violence.

Experience with weapons outside the military may be associated with violence for two different reasons: as an indicator of fascination with violence and as a means of attack. In particular it is a history of using firearms that is important: most assassins and school shooters wielded firearms in attempting or committing violence.[26] An individual without weapons experience may have the motive for violence but not the means.

It is tempting to read the concatenation of the four characteristics as a kind of 'violence profile' of mutually reinforcing factors that together push an individual toward violent action. Unfortunately the correlation or overlap of these characteristics is not available in either the *Assassins Report* or the *School Report*. The extent to which the four characteristics occur separately or together in individual perpetrators cannot be investigated without data at the individual level, whereas the two reports provide only overall percentages for characteristics reported on.

As an illustration of research at the individual level, we return briefly to the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan.[27] Major Hasan who turned to the Qu'ran after the death of his parents, appears to have had no close relationships after he was transferred to Fort Hood, and was about to be transferred to Afghanistan (*unfreezing*). He saw himself discriminated against as a Muslim (*personal grievance*) and saw the war on terrorism as a war on Islam (*political grievance*). He brought two weapons to his attack, one a sophisticated 'cop-killer' pistol for which he purchased a laser sight – suggesting *experience with weapons* beyond whatever slight weapons training the U.S. Army provides for physician-psychiatrists. So far as we can ascertain, Major Hasan showed no signs of depression. Thus Major Hasan had three of the four characteristics common to assassins and school attackers: unfreezing, grievance, and weapons experience.

It is important to be clear that we do not claim that the common characteristics of assassins and school attackers—depression, grievance, unfreezing, weapons experience—provide a reliable predictor of violent behaviour. Nor do we claim that three of these characteristics together caused Major Hasan to attack fellow soldiers. Rather the four characteristics identified are hypotheses for future studies of lone-

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

actor perpetrators of rare and extreme forms of violent crime.

Another limitation of our study is that not all of the offenders in the two reports were lone-actor perpetrators. About a quarter of assassins and school attackers had some kind of help, either in planning an attack or in conducting it. Thus our comparison across reports of mostly lone-actor perpetrators can point toward common characteristics but these need to be tested in future research that focuses more precisely on lone-actor perpetrators of violence.

Despite these limitations, results for assassins and school attackers show at least some convergence with results of recent studies of lone-wolf terrorists. We put connections with our results in italics in the brief summaries of these studies in the next two paragraphs.

Looking at his international list of 88 lone-wolf terrorists, Spaaij observed that they tend to interpret personal problems [*depression, unfreezing*] in terms of some larger political problem or cause [*grievance*]. He notes that they are often loners [*unfreezing*] with mental problems [*depression*].[28] Nesser examined 15 European lone wolf jihadist terrorists and suggests that four had some mental problems [only one case called *depression*].[29] Eby found some indication of mental disorder [*depression?*] for ten of his 53 U.S. lone-wolf terrorists.[30]

Looking more narrowly at only jihadist terrorists in the U.S. since 1977, Jasparro identified 14 lone-wolf perpetrators.[31] "In all cases, religion does not appear to have been an initial driver of the suspects' anger and radicalisation, but helped to shape and direct their thinking and individual struggles" [*personal and group grievance*]. "At least nine of the suspected lone wolves have been described by investigators or friends and family as loners. Ten had experienced significant life crises, including marital problems, deaths of parents, unemployment or job issues, financial troubles and drug abuse" [*unfreezing*]. "At least six appear to have suffered from mental illnesses, ranging from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia to depression" [*depression*].

In sum, recent studies of lone-wolf terrorists—especially Jasparro's results—indicate disproportionate levels of grievance, unfreezing, and mental disorder. We believe that this emerging convergence, in which lone-wolf-terrorist characteristics are common also for assassins and school attackers, warrants

further research linking these three kinds of violent offender. Experience with weapons has not yet been given much attention in reports of lone-wolf terrorists, but the high levels of such experience for assassins and school attackers suggest that further attention to this characteristic may be warranted.

Conclusion

The logic of our study was to find common characteristics of assassins and school attackers that may also be characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists. Depression, grievance, unfreezing, and weapons experience are the common characteristics uncovered, and these deserve attention in future terrorism research.

As far as we are aware, there has been no study that directly compared lone-wolf and group-based terrorists. One might compare for instance, home-grown U.S. lone-wolf terrorists with home-grown U.S. group-based terrorists. Our results suggest that this kind of research might usefully seek information about depression, grievance, unfreezing and weapons experience for both the lone-wolf and group-based perpetrators.

If the characteristics that distinguish lone-wolf from group-based terrorists are the same characteristics that are common for assassins and school attackers, the implication would be that lone-wolf terrorism is part of a larger phenomenon of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence. In this case the specific characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists, if any, would remain to be identified. On the other hand, to the extent that the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists differ from those of assassins and school attackers, a more specific profile of lone-wolf terrorists may be uncovered.

If confirmed with additional research, the common characteristics of assassins and school attackers identified in our results might serve as a useful guide for channeling resources to minimize the threat of future violence from these types of perpetrators. For instance, school psychologists as well as Veteran Administration (VA) psychological services may be a first line of defense in identifying 'loners' who have a mental health problem, a grievance, and experience with weapons. These individuals might then be offered help with counseling, pharmacological treatment, or family assistance.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Most generally, our results suggest that the mechanisms of radicalisation identified by McCauley and Moskalenko in case histories of terrorists [32] may be useful for understanding other kinds of violent crime. At least three of the individual-level mechanisms of radicalisation—grievance, unfreezing, and status-seeking—can be coded from the kind of information available in news reports and trial transcripts. Indeed these were the sources of data for the *Assassins Report* and the *School Report*. Thus mechanisms of radicalisation to terrorist violence may also be important in moving individuals to other kinds of violent crime, and these mechanisms might be studied in the broader context of criminology.

Notes

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[3] R. Spaaij, op cit.

[4] P. Nesser, op cit.

[5] C. Eby, op cit; Chris Jasparro, "Lone wolf: The threat from independent jihadists." Naval War College. 2010. See also *Jane's Intelligence Review,* December 9, 2010. URL: http://www.wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/168/168290_Osac-jir1209.pdf

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[10] Jerrold M. Post, *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; C. McCauley & M. Segal, op cit; M. Sageman, op cit.

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Terrorism and the Media (including the Internet): an Extensive Bibliography

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/247/html

This bibliography is intended to serve as an extensive up-to-date resource for studying and researching the multi-faceted relationships between terrorism and the media, including the Internet. It contains over 2.200 records covering academic or professional journal articles (most of them peer-reviewed), book chapters,

reports, conference contributions, books, theses and other text publications, mainly in English and German. To keep the bibliography manageable, smaller, more informal publications, e.g., blog posts, research briefs, commentaries, newspaper articles, or newsletters, were not considered – with a few exceptions of contributions containing ideas or subjects that were underrepresented in long-form academic or professional literature.

The vast majority of resources included date from the 21st century, as after 9/11 – the biggest single media event in history – the amount of publications on the relationship between terrorism and the media has increased considerably. However, terrorist use of the media is as old as terrorism itself and has been researched since the beginning of terrorism studies. Therefore, this bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to early February 2013.

Thematically, the bibliography covers many aspects of the relationship between terrorism and the media, including these:

- terrorist use of the traditional media (TV, radio, newspapers);
- terrorist use of the new media, especially the Internet (E-Jihad, Cyberterrorism);
- online radicalization;
- 9/11 as a media event;
- media-oriented counter-terrorism measures;
- the psychological impact of media exposure to terrorist attacks;
- the portrayal of Islam and Muslims after 9/11;
- the depiction of terrorism in literature, movies and the arts;
- media-oriented hostage-takings.

Formally, the bibliography has been subdivided into two main sections: "Books and Theses" and "Articles"; the titles in each section are alphabetically arranged, usually by authors. The Articles section has been structured by sub-sections for each alphabetic letter, starting with a heading consisting of the particular letter preceded by a hash key to enable readers to quickly access it (e.g., when searching for the letter C, open the search window of your text processing software by hitting <control> + <f> (on a Mac: <command> + <f>), then enter #C). A third short section at the end of the bibliography lists websites and blogs that regularly publish analyses of primary source

materials (especially jihadist online publications). All websites were last visited on 18 February 2013.

To provide readers with reliable information to locate the references, a detailed citation style (including full author first names, journal issue numbers, book series titles, and full URL paths to resources) was used. Where available, DOIs have been added. A DOI (Digital Object Identifier) is a unique and permanent identifier for electronic entities. It takes the form of a two-part character string (e.g. 10.1080/10304310302733): The first part identifies the registrant (in our example 10.1080 for Taylor & Francis), the second part identifies the particular electronic object (here: 10304310302733 for the journal article "September 11 and the Logistics of Communication" by Michael Galvin). In the bibliography, all DOIs were provided in a clickable format to enable readers to directly access the landing page associated with them. DOIs secure a more stable linking than traditional web addresses (URLs), which often alter or disappear, causing so-called 404 error messages. Nevertheless, it might happen that a DOI is defunct. In this case, the user of this bibliography should insert the title of an article – enclosed with quotation marks – into a search engine like Google to retrieve the publication's landing page.

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints) it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

To provide a balanced pool of references, a broad scope of resources and different search strategies were used to retrieve the bibliographic content. 23 free or subscription-based terrorism research journals were searched for articles by browsing their tables of contents manually in order not to miss

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

important content. This core journal list was extended by 71 multi- or interdisciplinary journals of significant importance for terrorism researchers. These journals were identified by using keyword searches on publisher homepages, scanning journal lists, bibliographies, reference lists as well as citation analyses. For these journals, the tables of contents for the last decade were browsed manually; older back files were checked by using the automatic keyword search function on the journal's or publisher's homepages.

Furthermore, 136 websites, blogs, and publication lists of governmental, and non-governmental institutions, private companies, academic, professional, or individual experts were identified and manually browsed for relevant content (especially to retrieve gray literature such as reports or working papers, but also other literature types), or to get alerted with regard to new publications. As terrorism research is an interdisciplinary field with relevant publications scattered over a large scope of publication outlets, the compiler of this bibliography used cross-searches to extend the body of resources. 10 homepages of commercial academic publishers (amongst them Taylor & Francis, SAGE, and Wiley) were automatically searched for relevant content by using the advanced search features offered at their company websites. To keep the amount of results manageable, the keyword search was restricted to the abstract, title, and keywords fields (instead of full-text search).

The scope of the search was further extended by using 13 abstracting and indexing services (including Google Scholar, the Directory of Open Access Journals, and EBSCO) for publisher-independent, multi-disciplinary cross-searches. Results were filtered by employing advanced search functions. In addition, the compiler conducted searches with Google Books and WorldCat to retrieve books, edited volumes, and theses.

Due to the large amount of publications and the decentralisation of information resources in the modern publishing world, this bibliography, while extensive, cannot be totally comprehensive. Due to its length, it is only available in PDF format, not, as usual for contributions of *Perspectives on Terrorism,* in both HTML and PDF format.

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM   Volume 7, Issue 1, Supplement

- All websites were last visited on February 18, 2013 -

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S4   February 2013

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▶ All quoted websites were last visited on February 18, 2013 -

The supplementary bibliography can be downloaded from [here](#)

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Al Qaeda in the United States – A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses

By Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer
Source: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2013/02/27/al-qaeda-in-the-united-states-a-complete-analysis-of-terrorism-offenses/

The most in-depth study of Al-Qaeda terrorism in the United States ever to be published launched on Feb. 26, 2013 in Washington, D.C. The Henry Jackson Society report, entitled *Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses*, features a foreword by former CIA Director General Michael Hayden. The study provides a comprehensive overview of those who have carried out or sought to conduct terrorist attacks in the United States, along with a statistical breakdown and analysis of key trends.

Executive Summary

For over a decade, al-Qaeda (AQ) and al-Qaeda inspired terrorism has posed the most significant threat to U.S. national security. This manifested itself most devastatingly on September 11, 2001. Since then, a number of AQ's key leaders have been either killed or captured. However, the group is adaptable, and its threat has diversified. AQ and its various franchises still aspire to attack U.S. interests and, significantly, are still able to recruit U.S. citizens to its cause.

Al-Qaeda in the United States shows how the terrorist threat within the U.S. has developed, by profiling all AQ or AQ-inspired terrorists who were convicted in U.S. courts (federal and military) or who participated in suicide attacks against the U.S. homeland between 1997 and 2011.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Al-Qaeda in the United States profiles 171 individuals who were convicted for al-Qaeda related offenses (AQROs) or committed suicide attacks between 1997 and 2011. It provides statistical analysis on their background (such as age, nationality, occupation, education and whether they were a religious convert); data relating to types of offenses, type of charge and their subsequent sentence; outlines individual connections to other known terrorists or designated terrorist organizations; and studies whether these individuals had received terrorist training or had combat experience.

One individual was convicted of offenses on two separate occasions; another individual was convicted on three separate occasions.

In each of these cases, the convictions have been counted separately. As a result, there was a combined total of 174 convictions and attacks.

Year on year threat

The date of charge (or attack), rather than date of conviction has been used as a standard measure of the year of offense. The year with the highest number of AQROs was 2009.

There was a clear rise in AQROs in 2001 – largely caused by the attacks of September 11. This number then declined until a slight rise in 2005. There was a significant drop in AQROs in 2008 (with AQRO levels dropping to the pre-9/11 period), followed by a spike in 2009 – the year when the highest number of AQROs (13% of the total) occurred.

Age and gender

AQROs are primarily – though not exclusively – committed by young men.

- The overwhelming majority (95%) of terrorist offenses were committed by men.
- Eight women have been convicted. Two of these were convicted for their roles in supporting their partners commit AQROs. The remaining six women were convicted of charges that included; Attempted

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

- identity theft; Attempted Murder; Armed Assault; Conspiracy to kill; discharge of a Firearm; Conspiring to Provide and Providing Material Support to Terrorists or a Terrorist Organization (specifically al-Shabaab); and False statements.
- Over half (57%) of AQROs were committed by those aged under 30. One third of AQROs were committed by those aged 20 to 24.
- The mean average was 29.6 years, and the modal age was 24.
- The age at time of charge ranged from 19 to 63.

Nationality, origin and place of residence
AQRO analysis shows that the majority of the AQ and AQ-inspired threat to the U.S. homeland comes from 'home-grown' terrorism, with U.S. citizens, including U.S. born citizens, featuring prominently among AQRO perpetrators.

Nationality
- Over half (54%) of AQROs were committed by U.S. citizens. The second most common nationality of AQRO perpetrators was Saudi Arabian (9%); with Pakistanis the third most common (6%).
- Over a third (36%) of the total number of individuals who committed an AQRO was born in the U.S.
- In total, individuals of twenty eight different nationalities committed AQROs.
- As a proportion of their overall involvement, U.S. citizens committed more AQROs than foreign nationals in eight of the fifteen years studied. These were: 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

Origin
- Over a third (36%) of individuals who committed AQROs had some kind of American ancestry, either by ethnicity of birth. The most frequent ancestry category was African American (10% of AQROs) followed by American white Caucasians (8%).
- Individuals of Western Asian ancestry comprise a quarter (25%) of those who committed AQROs. Those of Saudi Arabian ancestry account for 11% of this total.

Place of residence
- 82% of AQROs were committed by individuals residing in the U.S. (including three individuals already incarcerated at time of charge) at the time of charge or attack. The individuals resided in 26 different states, spread among all four regions in the U.S.
- Among those residing in the U.S., the state of New York featured most prominently, with 14% of individuals living there. Outside of New York, the two most common states of residence were Florida (11%) and New Jersey (9%).
- The most common region of residence was the South, where over one third (36%) of AQROs perpetrators resided. The Northeast followed with 30%.
- The most common place of residence of AQROs committed by those born in the U.S. was New York
- (20%), followed by California and Virginia (9%).
- Two of the three most common states – Florida and New Jersey – were the place of residence for a significantly high amount of non-U.S. born individuals (18% and 14% respectively). Conversely, the most common state, New York, had a higher proportion of U.S. born AQRO perpetrators residing there than non-U.S. born individuals.

Education and employment
Those who committed AQROs were mainly well educated. A small majority were in employment or education at the time of charge or attack.
- Over half (52%) of the individuals who committed an AQRO had attended some form of college.
- Nearly a quarter (23%) of AQRO perpetrators had been educated to between college graduate and
- doctorate level.
- 44% of AQRO perpetrators were in employment at the time of charge or attack. A further 13% were full time students. Therefore, 57% of AQRO perpetrators were in employment or education.
- Over a quarter (28%) of AQRO perpetrators were unemployed.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

- 60% of U.S. citizens who committed AQROs had received a college education.
- Of U.S. born offenders, 49% were employed and 18% were students. Therefore, 67% of all U.S. born individuals were in employment or education.

Religious converts
- While AQROs are mainly carried out by those raised as Muslim, a significant proportion of the AQ and AQ-inspired threat comes from religious converts.
- Nearly a quarter (24%) of all AQROs was committed by converts to Islam.
- Where known, all were converts from Christianity.
- The most common (modal) age at time of charge amongst religious converts (32 years) was significantly higher than among non-converts and among all AQROs (both 24 years).
- 41% of U.S. citizens were religious converts.
- Over half (54%) of individuals born in the U.S. were religious converts.
- Converts were most likely to reside in the South (36%), and most commonly resided in Virginia at time
- of charge (12%).
- 83% of religious converts had some kind of American ancestry. 40% of religious converts had African
- American ancestry; and a quarter were of American white Caucasian ancestry.
- As a proportion of their overall involvement, religious converts committed more AQROs than non-converts in eight of the fifteen years studied. These were: 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011.
- The years 2003, 2007 and 2010 saw the joint highest levels of AQROs committed by converts (17% in both years).

Diversity of threat and type of activity
The AQ and AQ-inspired terrorism threat to the U.S. can be placed into five distinct categories of offenders: Active Participants, Aspirants, Trained Aspirants, Facilitators and Ideologues.
- The total of 174 AQROs vary in the type of offense, immediacy of the threat and intent of the perpetrator, and are divided into five distinct categories.
  - o Active Participants –Individuals who committed or were imminently about to commit acts of terrorism – were responsible for 37% of AQROs.
  - o Aspirants – Individuals who demonstrated an interest in terrorism but whose plans were not advanced enough to pose an imminent threat or whose role was limited – were responsible for 25% of AQROs.
  - o Facilitators –Individuals involved in the preparation for acts of terrorism, either operationally; by fundraising; or by transferring documentation, material goods or finances – were responsible for 21% of AQROs.
  - o Trained Aspirants –Individuals who demonstrated an interest in terrorism whose plans were not advanced enough to pose an imminent threat or whose role was limited, but who had received terrorist training at camps abroad – were responsible for 15% of AQROs.
  - o Ideologues – Individuals involved in the preparation for acts of terrorism by incitement or by encouraging terrorist acts – were responsible for 2% of AQROs.
- Over two thirds of Active Participant AQROs (68%) were committed by those aged under 30. Furthermore, between 62% and 67% of Aspirant, Trained Aspirant and Ideologue AQROs were aged under 30. In contrast, only 25% of Facilitator AQROs were under 30.
- Almost half (48%) of non-U.S. born individuals were Active Participants – over double the proportion of U.S. born Active Participants (21%).
- U.S. born individuals were much more likely to be Aspirants (43% of all U.S. born) than non-U.S. born (16%).
- When combining both trained and non-trained, 62% of all U.S. born AQROs are committed by some type of Aspirant – compared to only 28% of non-U.S. born citizens.
- A third (33%) of religious converts were Aspirants, and just under a third (31%) were Active Participants (31%).

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

- The numbers of Active Participants, Facilitators, trained Aspirants and Aspirants charged rose sharply in 2009, before levelling off to numbers consistent with 2002 – 2007 in 2010.

Charges, sentences and undercover investigations

19 AQROs were committed by suicide attackers. Analysis of the remaining 155 separate AQRO convictions reveals a spread of severity of charges and length of sentence. Almost all convictions were gained in federal courts, with Material Support charges most commonly used.

- The vast majority (97%) of the 155 AQROs resulting in successful convictions were prosecuted in federal courts. Just 3% of all convictions took place in a military court.
- 65% of defendants pleaded guilty.
- A total of 415 separate charges were successfully prosecuted between 1997 and 2011.
- In this report, charges have been split into ten separate categories. Offenses are categorised as follows: Material support; Mass Casualty; kill, kidnap, Maim or injure; Firearms; False information; General Conspiracy; Aiding the enemy; Financial; Facilitation; and Rhetoric.
- Material support was the largest category, comprising nearly a quarter of the overall total (24%). The two most common individual charges from any category are in Material support: Conspiracy to Provide Material support to terrorists (8% of the total charges) and Providing Material support to terrorists (6%).
- The second most common category was Mass Casualty, which contained nearly a quarter (22%) of all successful charges. The most common charge in this category was Conspiracy to damage or destroy Buildings, Property or Public transport of the United States (4%).
- The most common sentence received for an AQRO, given 24 times, was between 10 – 14 years (16% of all sentences). The second most common sentence length was life imprisonment (14%). One individual was sentenced to death (a sentence that has, at time of writing, not been carried out).18% of all AQRO convictions are still awaiting sentence.
- An undercover investigation – the state placing informants or undercover officers into an AQRO case – took place in over a quarter (29%) of AQROs.
- The majority of undercover investigations (64%) were against Aspirants, who make up 25% of all AQROs. Therefore, undercover investigations were disproportionately focused on Aspirants.
- Of the 44 Aspirant AQROs, nearly three quarters (73%), were the subject of an undercover investigation. This is over four times as high as the next most common offender role: Active Participant AQROs, 17% of which were the subject of an undercover investigation.
- Undercover investigations have tended to focus on slightly younger AQRO perpetrators. The mean average age of those subject to undercover investigations is 28.6 (compared to 30 for AQROs not involving an undercover investigation), and the median age is 26 (as opposed to 28).

Links to Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTOs)

Those who committed AQROs were usually linked to a DTO, the most popular of which was AQ. The majority of those who were linked to a DTO were non-U.S. citizens, not religious converts and not the subject of an undercover investigation.

- The majority of individuals (57%) were directly linked to a DTO.
- The most prevalent group was AQ , with 38% of individuals directly linked to either AQ or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 9% were linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and 5% to al-Shabaab.
- 43% of those linked to a DTO were U.S. citizens, a lower proportion than U.S. citizens overall (54%).
- 70% of those with no known links to a DTO were U.S. citizens.
- Only 10% of those AQROs subject to undercover investigations were committed by individuals linked to a DTO.
- Two thirds of converts were not linked to a DTO.
- There were nine individual actors whose offenses were not reliant or connected to any kind of network, cell or DTO. Overall, individual actors comprised 4% of all AQRO perpetrators.

Terrorist training

Nearly half of AQRO perpetrators had attended training camps for terrorist purposes. Of those who did, Afghanistan was the most popular location.

- 47% of individuals attended training camps for terrorist purposes.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

- Of those who received terrorist training, 68% attended camps in Afghanistan; 29% in Pakistan and 5% in Somalia. Therefore, the overwhelming majority (97%) of trained individuals had trained in either Afghanistan or Pakistan or both
- The most popular camp was al-Qaeda's al-Farouq, responsible for nearly a third of all incidences of training (30%). Al-Matar followed with 19%, and the third most common was Khalden (9%). All three camps were based in Afghanistan.
- A third of U.S. citizens had attended a training camp for terrorist purposes.
- Over a third (39%) of those who had received terrorist training was U.S. citizens.
- Of those AQROs subject to undercover investigations, 10% were committed by individuals who had received terrorist training. In comparison, of those AQROs not subject to an undercover investigation,
- 63% were committed by individuals who had received training.

Combat experience

A high percentage of AQRO perpetrators had no experience of combat in warzones. Of those who did, Afghanistan was the most popular location.

- The majority (82%) of individuals who committed AQROs had no combat experience.
- Of the 30 individuals who had fought abroad, Afghanistan was the most common location, responsible for 63% of incidences of training. The next two most common countries were Bosnia and Somalia, with 10% each.
- All but one (97%) of those with combat experience had also received terrorist training.
- One third of individuals with combat experience were U.S. citizens.
- 87% of those who had combat experience were linked to a DTO.

Mass Casualty Operatives (MCOs)

Mass casualty operatives refer to those individuals who were also part of a major plot. There have been ten major plots against the U.S. since 2000, involving 36 individuals. The MCOs were primarily terrorist trained, college educated individuals from Western Asia.

- The majority of MCOs are Western Asian (56%), mainly from Saudi Arabia (44% of all MCOs). 17% of MCOs are American, the second most common nationality.
- 58%of MCOs were educated to college level or above.
- One third of MCOs were in employment or education at the time of charge or attack, a significantly lower proportion than among all AQRO perpetrators (57%).
- While 89% of MCOs had terrorist training (of which 78% occurred in Afghanistan), only 17% had known combat experience.
- Of those with combat experience, 83% of the incidences of combat experience occurred in Afghanistan. The remaining 17% took place in Bosnia.
- The vast majority (94%) of MCOs were linked to DTOs. Only two MCOs had no links to DTOs.
- 11% of MCOs were religious converts.

Suicide attacks

19 hijackers launched a series of four co-ordinated suicide attacks upon New York City and Washington, D.C., the only AQ or AQ-inspired suicide attacks that have occurred on the U.S. homeland. These attackers were primarily young, Saudi Arabian nationals with a college education and terrorist training.

- 11% of all AQROs were the suicide attacks of September 11, 2001.
- 95% of suicide attackers were Western Asian, with Saudi Arabians comprising 79% of this number.
- 58% of suicide attackers had been educated up to college level or above.
- The mean average age of the suicide attackers (23.9) was significantly younger than that of those convicted in federal or military courts (30.3).
- All of the suicide attackers had received terrorist training, yet only one (5%) had known combat experience.

"Myth and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism"

By Houriya Ahmed
Source: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2012/06/07/myth-and-realities-of-female-perpetrated-terrorism/

A 2012 study examining over 200 female terrorists has found that the majority of the women are young, single and employed. They have been educated to at least secondary level and were rarely involved in criminal behaviour. Analysing a dataset of 222 female terrorists and 269 male terrorists associated with a range of terrorist networks, from animal rights, nationalist, communist and religious groups, i.e. al-Qaeda, the study also found that while the men and women were of a similar age and immigration profile, female terrorists were more

likely to have a higher education, less likely to be employed, and less likely to have prior activist connections with terrorism in familial networks. Of the four female religious converts analysed, three were affiliated with al-Qaeda.

There is a dearth of studies on female perpetrated terrorism. This new analysis, Myth and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, is an insightful contribution to this under-studied subject area.

Houriya Ahmed is a Non-Resident Associate Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

BOOK REVIEW: Al Qaeda

By Paul Cruickhank (New York: Routledge, 2012. Five Volumes, 2,304 pages)
**Reviewed by Joshua Sinai**
Source: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/248/html

Compiled by Paul Cruickshank, a New York-based investigative journalist and one of CNN's

AL QAEDA

Edited by
Paul Cruickshank

CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

ROUTLEDGE

top correspondents on terrorism, this monumental 5-volume collection of scholarly research and journalistic articles that were previously published in various publications by

leading experts on Al-Qaeda is, to date, the most comprehensive resource published on the terrorist organization and its worldwide affiliates. Chronicled here are the acts of warfare against their own Muslim societies and the non-Muslim countries of Western Europe, America, and elsewhere.

Mr. Cruickshank introduces each of the five volumes with a 20-page editorial overview designed to place events in their historical and political context. On their own, his 100 pages of text constitute an invaluable information resource about these subjects. The collection's 108 chapters were written by more than 80 individual authors, with several of them contributing several articles each. Notable authors include Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Michael Jenkins, and Marc Sageman.

The five volumes cover Al-Qaida's evolving threat, Al-Qaeda before and after 9/11, the spread of Al-Qaeda's affiliates (or "franchises") around the world, the root causes underlying its insurgency, the organization's aims and strategies as well as its administrative organization. Also included are analyses as to how it raises funds, how its ideology was influenced by extremist interpretations of Islam, and an analysis of its influential ideologues, led by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (who

also greatly influenced the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, currently governing Egypt).

Of particular note are articles that address the means Al-Qaeda uses to disseminate its propaganda via the Internet, how it radicalizes its supporters and recruits them into terrorist activities, the new trend of "homegrown" extremists in Western societies (many of whom have a loose affiliation with Al-Qaeda), the role of safe havens in maintaining Al-Qaeda's viability, and how it trains its recruits. Interestingly, as Mr. Cruickshank points out, with Al-Qaeda's safe havens under constant bombardment, its training programs in Pakistan and Yemen have become compressed, resulting in less capable operatives; many of whom (such as Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and Faisal Shahzad) subsequently failed to successfully execute attacks.

Numerous insights presented by the volume's contributors help us understand the magnitude of the threats posed by Al-Qaeda. First and foremost, the Al-Qaeda threat is defined as "the danger posed by Al-Qaeda, the Jihadist-terrorist groups affiliated with it, and individuals inspired by its ideology." (Vol. I, p. 1) Here, it is important to understand how Al-Qaeda has attempted since its inception, as explained by Vahid Brown's chapter on "Al-Qa'ida Central and Local Affiliates," "to position itself as a vanguard within the broader milieu of violent Sunni Islamism." (Vol. III, p. 27) As he writes:

"Defining itself as the forefront standard-bearer of global jihad, al-Qa'ida has worked for over two decades to rally disparate groups and individuals from throughout the Muslim world behind its vision of inter-civilizational conflict. Given this self-definition, al-Qa'ida's core organizational objectives have as much – or more – to do with influencing processes of violence as they do with initiating them. Since the early 1990s, al-Qa'ida has pursued this quest for influence through an aggregation strategy, an ongoing effort to enlist a variety of jihadist groups operating in different parts of the world under the al-Qa'ida banner and in pursuit of al-Qa'ida's global aims." (Vol. III, p. 27)

However, as Brown points out, this strategy of aggregating with other Islamist militant groups to form a unified vanguard under its leadership failed in the 1990s, with most of the groups with which it had a relationship choosing to go their own way and pursue their own localized agendas. Only one group, Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), moved "ever closer to al-Qa'ida's global jihad..." (Vol. III, p. 33)

While Al-Qaeda may have failed to achieve the "elite vanguard status it sought" prior to 9/11, as Brown and the other contributors to the volumes discuss, an important theme running throughout the volumes is that following the expulsion of Al-Qaeda from its safe haven in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and additional setbacks, such as the killings of many of its top leaders, including Usama bin Laden, it nevertheless has succeeded in reconstituting itself as a viable transnational terrorist "corporation." One of the ways it has achieved this revival has been by franchising its "brand" to local organizations that act on its behalf in disparate places such as Iraq (AQI), Saudi Arabia and Yemen (AQAP), Somalia (al Shabaab), and the Maghreb (AQIM).

Its "franchises," in fact, even have succeeded in re-asserting its global "brand" by exploiting the revolutionary upheavals and weakening of the security apparatuses of previously autocratic "secular" regimes created by the Arab Spring in countries such as Egypt, where their fighters have reconstituted themselves in the Sinai Peninsula, and Libya, where they maintain strongholds in the ungoverned eastern parts of the country. In fact, according to Mr. Cruickshank, Al-Qaeda fighters have succeeded in moving weapons from Libya to their brethren in the anarchic Sinai Peninsula, in order to conduct warfare against Israel, one of Al-Qaeda's primary enemies, although their likelihood of mounting major attacks against Israel is considered minimal.

Finally, the fall of former Libyan ruler Muammar Qadhafi also resulted in the well-armed Tuareg mercenaries previously employed by the Libyan government fleeing to Mali, where they ignited a Tuareg rebellion. The resulting upheaval was subsequently exploited by Ansar Dine, an Al-Qaeda-linked group, which took control of much of northern Mali by the summer of 2012, and poses a major threat to regional stability. Although this occurred after the compendium was published, in late January 2013 Ansar Dine's growing insurgency in Mali forced France to

deploy troops against, with the United States reportedly providing logistical and other support.

In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq, together with other foreign elements, has succeeded in joining – and even spearheading – the wider Sunni insurgency against Bashar Assad's regime, leaving many to wonder how they will be contained in the new government that might be formed once the Alawite-dominated regime is toppled.

At its initial center of gravity in the aftermath of 9/11, Al-Qaeda has succeeded in reconstituting itself in Pakistan's tribal regions (where the central governments exerts little control) where its primary affiliate, the Taliban in its various configurations, are conducting a terrorist insurgency against the Afghanistan government and the U.S.-led military coalition. However, with the U.S.-led coalition scheduled to depart most of its forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Mr. Cruickshank writes that "The prospect of the Taliban entering a power-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan or it again seizing control of southern provinces could offer Al-Qaeda greater opportunity to once again operate in the country and strengthen its position in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region." (Vol. V, p. 22)

Despite its ability to reconstitute itself in these parts of the world, however, Mr. Cruickshank and his contributors point out that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are still subject to critique by fellow Salafists and suffer from a popular backlash. In the Middle East, for example, the revolutionary forces unleashed by the Arab Spring may not "move their way" with their tactics not necessarily "winning the hearts and minds" of young Muslims, who may opt for other, more responsible, movements to lead them. Nevertheless, their operatives and supporters are still present in these societies, where internal disorder provides them space to operate with relative ease in which to launch their attacks, as demonstrated by the latest events in Libya, Mali, Syria, and Yemen.

At a time when multi-volume printed reference sets are disappearing slowly with the rise of e-books and at a time when younger generations are accustomed to finding content for free via online encyclopedias such as Wikipedia, where the content is uneven at best, there still is no substitute to reading reference sets such as Mr. Cruickshank's "Al Qaeda." With its carefully selected and definitive chapters, readers who crave comprehensiveness and accuracy and are willing to pay for it will not be disappointed.

This is a revised and expanded version of a review that initially appeared in The Washington Times on January 4, 2013. Reprinted with permission.

Joshua Sinai is a Washington-based consultant and educator, specializing in counterterrorism studies. His latest monograph is "Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention" (Alexandria, Virginia: ASIS International, 2013). Since January 2013, J. Sinai also serves as Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

Terrorism in India: Demand and Supply Dynamics

Source:http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/india-terrorism/terrorism-in-india:-demand-and-supply-dynamics-1829.html

India has made remarkable progress in countering terrorism and insurgency in the country over the past six decades plus after independence. Contrary to popular perception the Indian state's response to what is known variously as low intensity conflict, asymmetrical wars and so on has been effective in containing conflicts ranging from Jammu and Kashmir in the North West to Nagaland, Manipur and Assam in the North East. Most significantly the redux of Naxalism has been

limited to the jungles of Central India. In some cases the spectre of terrorism and militancy has been neutralized be it Punjab or Mizoram through some deft political initiatives that followed containment of violence. Post Mumbai 26/11 an attempt to create credible counter terror architecture has resulted in admirable results the debate over National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) notwithstanding.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Yet serial bomb blasts in Hyderabad on 21 February which saw the loss of 16 lives is a grim reminder that India has failed to imbibe the lessons from past successes and build on the same to combat new challenges in the post modern nontraditional security spectrum in real time. A demand and supply dynamics is one way at looking at the challenges, responses and the way ahead.

The demand for terrorism as a political tool for overcoming grievances or attaining aspirations has been reasonably contained be it in Kashmir, the North East or Naxal affected states, with some enlightened development initiatives though implementation is poor as the peripatetic Rural Development Minister Mr Jairam Ramesh has never tired of accepting publicly. There is extremely low demand for religious extremist terror in the country which is largely a tribute to inter communal harmony which is ingrained in the pluralist ethos. The fatwa issued against terrorism by our Muslim clergy from Deoband, the base from which the Afghan Taliban also draws their ideology is laudable.

Yet terrorists do not require mass support for their acts and the tenets of Foco and Detonator theories of insurrection denote that societal rebellions can be triggered by through a narrative of imagined grievances. When there is a state in the neighbourhood namely Pakistan which follows a policy of active support to terrorism, in which terrorist groups and leaders can openly hold meetings and make public speeches even though some of them as Hafeez Saeed are banned by the sole super power the United States, demand for terrorism will continue to be generated in India in the near future.

The internal dynamics of demand for terror rests in the narrow political gains which overlook the fact that no organization operating overtly much less a political party, community or religion can be blamed for actions of deviants who form the smallest fraction of its constituents. These on the other hand create a sense of grievance in the section on both sides of the social divide to create demand for terror. The moot point is that the so called, "Islamic and Hindu," terrorism much like, "Sikh," or, "Kashmiri," terror has no basis and any labeling has to be considered with due caution most importantly by those who hold high positions of power be it ministers or political leaders. Blame the deviants not their mother organization unless it is an active sponsor of terror as the Jamaat ud Dawa in Pakistan and its violent arm Lashkar e Taiyabba.

Supply side dynamics factors which contribute to operational capabilities is also of great concern for India. The Pakistan factor has been outlined and it is well understood that unless there is a fundamental shift in state policy in that country to stop the use of terror as a strategic tool, continued support to groups acting against India can be anticipated for only limited resources have to be employed and it is also completely deniable, apprehension of Ajmal Kasab notwithstanding. This would imply that terrorist groups as the Indian Mujahideen will have continuous supply of funds, sanctuaries, training and motivational support to conduct acts as the Hyderabad serial blasts. Continued diplomacy bilateral, regional and global is one tool that will have to be applied.

Curbing the supply side also involves a strong counter terrorism posture in the country, an area in which despite some remarkable results there are many deficiencies. While the core focus has to be in building capacity at the local level through an ability of continuous surveillance, monitoring and proactive intervention through human and technical means there is far too much attention devoted to organizations as National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC).

There is no doubt that NCTC is required but only after there is adequate capacity at the city level not before it. For instance placing a network of CCTV cameras at vulnerable locations should have been a priority but there is limited

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

progress in major cities more over use of these for proactive spotting of terrorist activity as planting of bombs is lacking and there is more focus on use during investigation. Thus there are fundamental issues of prioritization which will have to be addressed and the local given more important than the state and the state over national. Creating a Hyderabad or Andhra Counter Terrorism Centre or Mumbai and Delhi Counter Terrorism Centre should be priority which can be linked to the NCTC. A bottom up approach may pay greater dividends including lesser political resistance than a top down one. State police in India are capable as the Andhra Greyhounds have demonstrated in meeting the challenge of Naxalism, however it is apparent that the same force has completely failed on the front of urban terror.

Intelligence and investigation are other key areas where there have been major deficiencies thus the same names of Bhatkal brothers et al keep cropping up after every serial blasts in the country. Obviously successful penetration of the Indian Mujahideen has been lacking and while

occasionally cells have been unraveled the top tier remains oblivious given that these may be operating from outside India using modern media tools to advantage. Turf wars is also a bane and formation of the National Investigation Agency has not resulted in corresponding benefits to counter terrorism in the hinterland. Containing the flow of money, arms, movement and so on are other issues that are needed to curb the supply. Most importantly a comprehensive counter radicalization programme in the core areas from where religious terror is seen to emanate to include Maharashtra, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and so on needs to be carried out so that the exposure to even the miniscule minority to fundamental violent ideology is curbed.

Today's terror is striking at the very roots of progress in India, the economy and exploiting the fault lines in society be it ethnic or communal. Curbing demand and supply is one way at looking at counter terrorism, whatever model is used urgency in action is underlined.

Digital Jihad: Inside Al-Qaeda's Social Networks

Source: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/digital-jihad-inside-al-qaedas-social-networks/273761/

Protesters wave a black jihadi flag as they demonstrate to denounce air strikes by U.S. drones, outside of the house of Yemen's President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi in Sanaa, on January 28, 2013. (Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi/Reuters)

Almost a decade after their emergence, Al-Qaeda's password-protected online forums continue to remain popular. Government officials in the U.S and elsewhere have spoken out against the message boards, which are used by jihadis to converse and distribute information, saying they serve as a recruiting tool for terrorists and have been used to incite violence against the West. But some U.S. intelligence officials have argued against their removal, saying they rely on them for intelligence gathering. Deana Kjuka talks to Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and author of "The State Of Global Jihad Online."

In your report you say that jihadi online forums provide a certain sense of authenticity and exclusivity to their users. What kind of content is available on these forums?

Aaron Zelin: Their biggest section is related to plain old news. They post

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

news articles about events going on in the world, specifically in the Arab world or the West most of the time. And then individuals talk to each other about the news stories and then there are other sections related to new releases such as statements, video messages, books, essays, audio messages, and whatever else that they release for official organizations like Al-Qaeda and their branches, as well as other organizations such as the Tehreek-e Taliban from Pakistan or Jabhat Al-Nusra [operating in Syria], the main jihadist groups essentially. And then they have other sections related to Koranic study or issues related to women or issues about security on the Internet and software for that. But the largest section has to do with news stories.

Last summer on one of its more prominent forums, the Shumukh al-Islam forum, Al-Qaeda ran an advertisement seeking jihadis to carry out suicide attacks. The forums have also been used by Al-Qaeda affiliates to claim responsibility for attacks. Are forum users recruited to commit terrorist acts?

Zelin: There are different components of the online forums. There are some individuals who are writing on the forums who are actually off in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, or Iraq and they are posting updates from the field. Then you have individuals who are sitting at home on their computers in their countries, and in Western countries, and they are just following what is going on and they are online grassroots cheerleaders in many respects. And then there are some individuals who decide that they don't want to just be talking to a keyboard anymore and they decide to connect up with a group in the world and pick up an AK-47 and then go off and fight. So it just depends who the individual is. There have definitely been cases where online jihadis have turned into fighters but I wouldn't necessarily say it's the complete norm but it's also hard to say who is who. Most of these guys are anonymous online so you don't know who the individuals are.

In your report you outline that Al-Qaeda's accredited online media operations are coordinated by Al-Fajr Media, its official distribution network. What does Al-Qaeda

look like online? How is the organization's hierarchy reinforced online?

Zelin: Al-Qaeda and their branches, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Each organization has their own media outlet -- for example Al-Qaeda in Pakistan has As-Sahab Media, in Yemen Al-Malahim, in Iraq Al-Furqan, and in North Africa it's Al-Andalus -- and so these media outlets help produce the videos or statements from these organizations and then once they complete it they then send it off to Al-Fajr media which is a distribution network online that connects with organizations on the ground.... Then from there the administrators on the forum post the content into threads and then it goes live and then people are able to see it.

In April last year, Al-Qaeda's websites were offline for more than a week in what experts say was the longest sustained outage of their websites since their formation almost a decade ago. How often do these forums experience cyberattacks? What strategy do they use for handling these sorts of obstacles?

Zelin: There is probably usually one or two major ones a year. But in the last year they have become stronger and longer -- longer in terms of time. For example, in March and April 2012 it was for two weeks and then in December 2012 and January 2013 there were ones where it was for six or seven weeks. The previous record before that had been only like nine or 10 days, so the last two major outages have been far-reaching and it has accelerated the process of individuals going onto places like Twitter and Facebook. Beforehand individuals were also using these but it was on a small level and it was usually only at the individual level. You didn't see organizations or media outlets or key ideologues being on Twitter and Facebook but now you see media outlets, organizations, and ideologues on Facebook and Twitter a lot more and it has created this hybrid architecture online in these social-media platforms which opens the rest of the world but also still using the forums, to an extent, which are closed, which allow them this private conversation.

U.S. intelligence officials have

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

argued against the removal of these forums, as they rely on them for intelligence gathering. What is the upside to keeping the forums functioning? How useful are they for intelligence gathering by outsiders?

Zelin: I think that it's good for intelligence and you also know where everybody is. It's a lot easier to track what's going on. Everybody is in one spot. It's sort of like a beehive and all the bees are inside, you know what's going on. But once they start going to more decentralized platforms like Twitter and Facebook, it's a lot more spread out and you can't see it as much. Therefore it's like shaking the beehive and you have a bunch of bees flying everywhere all over the place and you might not be able to necessarily control things or be able to track things as easily. So people could be in isolated pockets from one another and not necessarily be all connected in one spot.

The Growing Alliance between Uzbek Extremists and the Pakistani Taliban

By Jacob Zenn
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

The U.S. drone strike that killed Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan on January 2 eliminated a key local leader who resisted the presence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in South Waziristan. From a U.S. perspective, Nazir was a target because he provided safe havens and training camps in the South

Waziristan capital of Wana from which militants could launch cross-border raids against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Nazir, however, was also an enemy of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP, or Pakistani Taliban, had opposed Nazir since the summer of 2009, when Nazir agreed to a non-aggression pact with the Pakistani government before the Pakistani army launched an offensive against the TTP in South Waziristan. Islamabad thus considered Nazir a "good Taliban," even as he ordered his fighters to attack U.S. forces in Afghanistan (*Dawn* [Karachi], January 4).

Like the TTP, the IMU also opposed Nazir, and only five weeks before the drone strike that killed Nazir on January 2, a teenage suicide bomber sent by the IMU (likely with TTP backing) failed in an attempt to kill Nazir in Wana (*The News* [Islamabad], November 29, 2012). The IMU rivalry with Nazir began in 2007, when Nazir ordered an estimated 3,000 of his fighters to expel the IMU from Wana (see Terrorism Monitor, January 14, 2008). In the fighting, between 50 and 200 IMU militants were killed, while hundreds of other Uzbeks fled to other areas of South Waziristan and North Waziristan and possibly even to Afghanistan to join the Afghan Taliban in Helmand Province (Newsline [Karachi], June 10, 2007).

The Uzbeks in the IMU first arrived in South Waziristan *en masse* in 2002 to escape the U.S. rout of the IMU from its bases in northern Afghanistan. However, Nazir disliked the Uzbeks because they were reluctant to carry out attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, focusing instead on carrying out joint attacks with the TTP against the Pakistani government. In addition, the Uzbeks who settled in South Waziristan increasingly interfered with local tribal and religious affairs, which angered Nazir.

With Nazir eliminated, it falls upon his successor, Bahawal Khan, to

maintain the truce with the Pakistani army. However, if Khan is unable to do so, or if Nazir's fighters seek revenge against the Pakistan government for allegedly aiding the U.S. drone program, then the truce between Nazir's fighters and Pakistan may not hold. This would allow the IMU to reassert itself in Wana and carry out more attacks in Peshawar and the tribal areas, where the IMU has been increasingly active in recent months.

IMU militants participated in a TTP attack on the Peshawar air force base on December 16, 2012 that killed five people. This attack conformed to the TTP's recent strategy of avoiding large-scale attacks in cities that kill a large number of civilians in favor of targeting military installations (*The Nation* [Islamabad], December 17, 2012). According to Pakistani security officers, IMU militants are known for their "ferocity, alacrity and training" and willingness to participate in high-risk operations (*Dawn*, December 18, 2012). Such operations include the attack on Mehran Naval base in Karachi on May 22, 2011, which was launched in retaliation for Osama bin Laden's death, and the August 2012 attack on the Kamra Air base of the Pakistan Air Force in the Punjab region (*The News* [Islamabad], December 18, 2012; *Dawn* [Karachi], December 18, 2012). In Afghanistan, major IMU attacks include an attack on Bagram airbase in 2010 and an October 2011 attack on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) base in Panjshir (*Der Spiegel*, January 18, 2011; AP, October 16, 2011).

The IMU also played a key role in the Bannu prison break in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province that freed Adnan Rashid and nearly 400 other prisoners, including an estimated 200 Taliban fighters, on April 15, 2012. Rashid was in the Pakistani air force when in 2003 he was found guilty and placed on death row for plotting to assassinate then President Musharraf—a charge which Rashid confessed to after the escape.

A TTP Uzbek language video released in May 2012 shows the IMU preparing for the prison break and says that the plan was devised after Rashid wrote a message seeking help to Abu Ibrahim al-Almani (a.k.a Yassin Chouka), a German of Moroccan descent who was designated a "global terrorist" by the United States for serving as a "fighter, recruiter, facilitator and propagandist" of the IMU. [1] According to the video, the operation to free Rashid was ordered by Hakimullah Mahsud, the overall leader of the TTP, and Waliur Rahman Mahsud, the leader of the TTP in South Waziristan (Online News [Islamabad], May 16, 2012).

In August 2012, a German-subtitled video released by the IMU's JundAllah media wing featured Rashid speaking in Arabic and English about his time in prison. He described the night of the prison break, saying: "I saw my release in a dream about 20 days ago before the operation… I saw in the dream that some Uzbek mujahideen will come and will take me out of the prison." Months later, on January 31, 2013, both the IMU's JundAllah studio and the TTP's Umar studio issued a "joint video message in support of the prisoners," featuring Rashid, Abu Ibrahim al-Almani and Abdul Hakim, a Russian commander in the IMU. They declared that the IMU and the TTP have created a special unit called Ansar al-Asir (Supporters of Prisoners), whose aim is to free other imprisoned militants in Pakistan and target Pakistani intelligence agents, army personnel and prison staff (*The News* [Islamabad], February 7).

The integration of the IMU and the TTP has been displayed openly since September 2010, when the IMU's JundAllah media agency posted a video online showing the successor of IMU founder Tahir Yuldash, the late Osman Adil, meeting with TTP leader Hakimullah Mahsud and his second-in-command, Waliur Rahman Mahsud (Furqon.com, January 15). These joint IMU-TTP videos are now commonplace. In December 2012 the IMU *mufti*, Abu Zar al-Burmi, even released a statement through the TTP's Umar Studios in which he accused the West of hypocrisy for condemning the TTP's attempted assassination of 13-year old Malala Yousufzal, while "having killed hundreds of innocent Pakistanis" themselves (As-ansar.com, December 27, 2012).

The IMU and TTP alliance in South Waziristan is likely to be strengthened by Maulvi Nazir's death. For the TTP, this means that the IMU can continue to assist the TTP in attacking targets in Pakistan. For the soon to be departed U.S. forces in Afghanistan, this also means that the attacks from South Waziristan are likely to continue in an effort to hasten the withdrawal and portray the Taliban, the IMU and other allied militant groups as victors.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

For the IMU, Nazir's elimination will help the movement secure the safe havens it needs in Pakistan's tribal areas to pursue its long-term goal of establishing an Islamic State in Uzbekistan and the entire Central Asian region.

Note
1. U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Designations of Yassin Chouka, Monir Chouka and Mevlut Kar," January 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/182550.htm.

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No End in Sight: Violence in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea
By Mark McNamee
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

A string of high-profile kidnapping incidents in recent months in combination with an increase and geographic expansion of pipeline attacks in the Lagos region (outside the traditional zone of militant activity in the Niger Delta) has raised questions about stability in Nigeria's south and, by proxy, the effectiveness of the 2009 amnesty for militants affiliated with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). While no specific group is claiming responsibility for the attacks, the activity appears to be related to the same underlying socio-economic problems in the area that spurred the ascension of MEND, which at one point in the late 2000s shut down half of Nigeria's over 2 million-barrels-per-day oil production. As the country receives some 80% of its earnings from oil production, the trends are particularly threatening as no substantive reason exists that any of this activity should abate in the near future. More realistically, such incidents are only likely to continue to worsen and expand.

Several incidents in February 2013 highlight this worsening trend. On February 7, pirates off the coast of Nigeria and Cameroon, in the Gulf of Guinea's east, attacked a U.K.-flagged ship and kidnapped three sailors, all foreign nationals (AP, February 8). Days earlier, a French-owned diesel tanker was seized by Nigerian pirates in international waters in the Gulf of Guinea's west, over 300 kilometers off of the coast of Côte d'Ivoire, from where the hijackers sailed the tanker back into Nigerian waters to unload its fuel (*This Day* [Lagos], February 4). The following day, back in the traditional area of maritime criminal activity, two soldiers guarding a vessel operated by an oil company were killed by unknown gunmen in a shootout in Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta (AP, February 5). Thus, in the course of a week, suspected disgruntled actors from the Niger Delta demonstrated their increased ability to disrupt economic activity across the region, conducting operations not only in their own backyard, but as far east as the Cameroonian border and as far west as Côte d'Ivoire.

The Kidnapping Industry
Perhaps more worrying, a recent spate of kidnapping incidents involving wealthy Nigerians and foreigners (a favorite MEND pastime) highlights the increase in criminal activity in the region. On December 10, 2012, the wife of retired Brigadier General Oluwole Rotimi, a former Nigerian ambassador to the United States (2007-2009), was kidnapped in Ibadan, the capital of southwestern Oyo state (*Vanguard* [Lagos], December 12, 2012). Less than a week later, a Nigerian actress-turned-government official, Nkiru Sylvanus, was kidnapped by unknown gunmen in broad daylight in southeastern Imo State (*Vanguard*, December 17, 2012). On December 17, 2012, gunmen in Bayelsa State kidnapped four South Koreans and two Nigerians employed by a South Korean construction firm (AP, December 18, 2012). In early January 2013, a senior executive of an energy marketing company was abducted on the outskirts of Port Harcourt in

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Rivers State (PM News [Lagos], January 4, 2013).

In the most high-profile of these incidents, Kamene Okonjo, the mother of Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, was abducted from her home in Delta State on December 9, 2012. In response, soldiers arrested 63 people (including two policemen) during raids aimed at finding Okonjo in Delta State. Finance Minister Okonjo-Iweala is a former leading candidate to head the World Bank and is known in Nigeria for her campaign to end the controversial fuel subsidy program. Okonjo-Iweala blamed her mother's kidnapping on those angered by the government's decision to discontinue the controversial fuel subsidy program. The subsidy has benefited impoverished locals who enjoy artificially low prices on gas, but has also constituted a major drain on the government's resources, leading Okonjo-Iweala to end the program. However, since Nigeria lacks adequate refining capacity and must export its oil abroad to be refined, the subsidy has also been a cash cow for smugglers and corrupt politicians who import refined fuel at inflated prices and then collect on the subsidy (*This Day*, December 12, 2012). While it remains unknown whether Niger Delta militants were directly involved in the kidnapping (Okonjo-Iweala blamed only the corrupt political elite of the ruling People's Democratic Party for her mother's abduction), the matter nonetheless demonstrates the growing instability of a region in which security and political officials are complicit in energy-related criminal activity, whether in alliance with administrators in Abuja, rebels in the Delta creeks, or both.

Bunkering in the Niger Delta

Pipeline attacks have likewise increased in frequency. While the 2009 amnesty helped end the general violence against the oil industry and its personnel in the Niger Delta, oil bunkering (oil theft by means of tapping pipelines) has reportedly doubled since the amnesty, costing the government some $7 billion annually in lost revenue and another $5 billion for pipeline repairs (Legaloil.com, April 28, 2012; *This Day*, January 14). [3] Oil thieves reportedly steal up to 20% (or some 400,000 barrels per day) of the nation's fuel in this dangerous practice (Reuters, January 15). Theft has become so pervasive that, in November 2012, Royal Dutch Shell, which produces roughly 40% of Nigeria's oil, shut

down a pipeline in the Niger Delta after finding six theft points on its Imo River trunk line. The firm claimed that sabotage was responsible for 25 of the 26 spills on the Imo River in 2012, which released nearly 3,000 barrels into the river and other waterways, destroying large swathes of the local environment (AP, November 11, 2012).

In light of the deteriorating situation, Mutin Sunmonu, the managing director of Shell operations in Nigeria, has threatened to shut down the entire Nembe Creek Trunk Line, one of the most important in the delta. According to Sunmonu, the bunkering activities have overwhelmed the Joint Task Force (JTF), a multi-agency formation responsible for restoring security in areas of Nigeria plagued by militants:

The volume being stolen is the highest in the last three years; over 60,000 barrels per day from Shell alone. So, that for me is a great concern. The other important point for me is the fact that over time, this whole crime has gotten a lot more sophisticated and you could see that the perpetrators are now setting up barge building yards, they are setting up storage facilities, they are setting up tank farms for storing the crude, prior to shipping out. So, if you look at all of these, it is very clear to me that this is not just an act by desperate

individuals trying to make a living. This certainly is a well-funded criminal activity, probably involving international syndicates. I really want to put it to you that we are in a crisis. We are in a crisis as a country because this is something which I worry is beyond the capacity

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

of any individual company or beyond the capacity of a country to solve. We really need concerted efforts nationally, locally and internationally to actually get this under control (*This Day*, March 4).

A recent string of events further illustrates the gravity of the issue. On September 5th, a pipeline in the city of Arepo, Ogun State, near Lagos, was vandalized by suspected Ijaw youth from the Niger Delta; at least 30 people were killed in the fire that ensued when the thieves were drawing fuel illegally from the pipeline. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) sent three engineers to repair the ruptured line, all of whom were murdered by Delta youth pilfering the fuel. Later, in early January 2013, after the line was fixed, the vandals caused another explosion while tapping into the line. On January 23, another bunkering fire and gun-battle with the thieves was reported on the Arepo line. With these events in mind, a leading Nigerian newspaper called the unceasing pipeline vandalism a "national threat" and further called the government "helpless" in finding a long-term solution (*Leadership* [Abuja], January 31).

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Meanwhile, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has continued unabated.

- Some 62 attacks were recorded in the Gulf in 2012, including 10 hijackings and 207 kidnappings.
- While Nigeria accounted for 27 of these incidents, up from 10 in 2011, Togo saw an increase from 5 attacks in 2011 to 15 in 2012.
- Côte d'Ivoire, which had just one attack in 2011, suffered five in 2012, including the first-ever hijacking of a tanker off its shores in October 2012. [2]
- Armed hijackers from the Niger Delta also seized an oil tanker near Abidjan on January 16, 2013, stealing its 5,000 tons of oil (AP [Abidjan], January 21, 2013).
- Back in the Niger Delta, three oil supply vessels were attacked and two hijacked in December 2012 alone.
- In the first two weeks of February 2013, pirates attacked four vessels off Nigeria's coast and one in the Delta, killing four and kidnapping eight.

- In a separate attack days later, robbers boarded a ship anchored at the Lagos port and stole its cargo (Reuters, February 19).

Much of the problem of piracy in the Gulf can be attributed to the absence of any significant coast guard fleet operating between Lagos and the Togo border, thus allowing pirates to act with impunity in the Bight of Benin and farther west (Thinkafricapress; March 20, 2012).

Corruption and Poverty Fuel Insecurity

Exacerbating the matter are continued reports from Abuja of extreme levels of corruption in the oil industry. Mismanagement and corruption costs billions of dollars annually, according to a leaked investigative report into Nigeria's oil and gas industry by the Chairman of the Petroleum Revenue Task Force, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. Among numerous other allegations, nearly $30 billion was lost in the last decade in an apparent gas price-fixing scam involving government officials and foreign energy firms. Oil and gas companies owe the Nigerian treasury $3 billion in royalties. Between 2005 and 2011, another $566 million was owed by companies for the right to exploit an oil block, known as signature bonuses (*This Day*, October 25, 2012). In August 2012, the former World Bank Vice-President for Africa, Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, said that an estimated $400 billion of Nigeria's oil revenue had been stolen or misspent since the country's independence in 1960. She further claimed that while oil accounted for roughly 90% of the value of the nation's exports, more than 80% of that money went to the pockets of the top 1% of the population (*This Day*, August 29, 2012). $6.8 billion was drained from Nigeria between 2009 and 2012 in the fuel subsidy scam, which ultimately benefited corrupt officials in Abuja; in 2011 alone, the government paid 900 times more in the subsidy than was budgeted, suggesting the complicity of the finance ministry and the central bank in the arrangement (Reuters, April 19, 2012). Likewise, much evidence exists confirming the collusion of oil thieves in the creeks of the Delta with members of the JTF security force and top government officials (Legaloil.com, April 28, 2012).

At the other end of the spectrum, poverty in the Delta and across the country continues to be endemic. Despite general economic growth, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

reported in February, 2012 that poverty had risen for the nation as a whole, with nearly 100 million people living on less than a dollar a day—a trend that is predicted to continue. Nearly 61% of Nigerians were living in "absolute poverty" in 2010, an increase from 54% in 2004; moreover, in 2010, more than 93% of respondents felt themselves to be poor compared to 75% six years earlier. In absolute terms, more than 112 million Nigerians were considered to be living in poverty in 2010, compared to 68.7 million in 2004. [3] Yet while these alarming trends have burgeoned, the government has made over $1.6 trillion (as of 2009) since the discovery of oil in the country in 1956 (BBC, March 17, 2009). Adding insult to injury, President Goodluck Jonathan recently removed $1 billion from the nation's oil savings to distribute to Nigeria's three dozen state governors in response to their demands (Reuters, January 30). With the lack of economic opportunity in the Niger Delta and constant reminders of the high-level fleecing of the region's natural wealth by lawmakers, locals are left feeling they are not only forced into criminal activities such as bunkering or piracy, but morally justified in committing them.

The poverty, corruption, and violence in the region can be traced back to the general failure of the amnesty of 2009, which was ostensibly intended to resolve these issues. Legitimate questions can be raised as to its actual objectives. Locals have long felt that the government was never genuinely interested in tackling the complicated task of addressing the poverty and corruption in the region and energy industry, but instead sought only to diminish

the violence in order to increase oil production (*Vanguard*, December 19, 2012). In this way, the amnesty can be said to have been at least a short-term success, as oil production has returned to over two million barrels per day since 2009. However, the long-term situation was left in question by the amnesty. The training program for ex-militants, one of the central components of the amnesty meant to address the enduring issue of youth unemployment, has been widely criticized for its corruption, selection processes and the failure of its graduates to find employment (*Daily Trust*, February 8; *Vanguard*, December 19, 2012).

Conclusion
As all forms of violence and criminal activity in relation to the energy industry have experienced an upward trajectory since the 2009 amnesty, there is little reason to suspect that the situation will improve itself naturally. Ordinary citizens in the Delta creeks repeatedly attest to the implausibility of achieving any material improvements in their livelihoods through licit means as compared to oil bunkering and other energy-related criminal activity (Reuters, January 15). As long as this remains the case and the government continues to fail to address the underlying grievances behind the lawlessness in the area, instability and illegal activity in the form of kidnappings, piracy and pipeline vandalism will degenerate further to a point eerily similar to that witnessed during the MEND insurgency only a few years ago.

Notes
1. International Energy Agency (IEA) Oil Monthly Report for October 2012, released November 13, 2012, http://omrpublic.iea.org/omrarchive/13nov12full.pdf.
2. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Global Piracy Report, January 16, 2013, http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb.
3. Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics, "The Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report," released February 13, 2012, http://www.nigerdeltabudget.org/National%20Bureau%20of%20Statistics%20Poverty%20Profile%20of%20Nigeria%202012%20%281%29.pdf.

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CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Nigerian Islamic militants execute seven Western hostages

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130311-nigerian-islamic-militants-execute-seven-western-hostages

Ansaru, a Nigerian Islamist militant group which is an off-shoot of Boko Haram, said it has killed seven hostages it captured in the northern Nigeria province of Bauchi last month. The hostages are from Italy, Britain, Greece, and Lebanon.

Ansaru made the announcement in an on-line statement. U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague said on Sunday that a British construction worker, named as Brendan Vaughan, was "likely to have been killed at the hands of his captors, along with six other foreign nationals".

"This is an unforgivable act of pure, cold-blooded murder, for which there can be no excuse or justification," he added.

The BBC reports that Ansaru's online message included grainy pictures supposedly showing the bodies of the seven.

The militant group said they hostages were killed because of an attempt by British and Nigerian forces to rescue them. The governments concerned, however, say there was no such attempt.

The British military said that British warplanes were recently flying in and out of Abuja airport as part of the effort to transport troops and supplies related to the French campaign in Mali, not as part of an effort to rescue the hostages.

The seven hostages worked for Setraco construction company.

Ansaru was formed in January 2012, and is listed by the U.K. government as a "terrorist organization" aligned with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Ansaru abducted French national Francis Colump in December, and killed two Nigerian soldiers in January.

Source:https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/CFC_Afghanistan_Update_Rise%20of%20Afghan%20Rails%20%281%29.pdf

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

EDITOR'S COMMENT: There is no doubt that if/when completed the new railway network will highly contribute to the development of Afghanistan. At the same time, a new target maight emerge resulting in hecatombs of victims. Is it wise to proceed in such ambitious plans when normal routs are not safe enough yet?

Changes to TSA's prohibited items list

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/travel/slideshow/2013/03/05/changes-to-tsa-prohibited-items-list/#slide=1

The Transportation Security Administration announced Tuesday changes to what can and cannot be brought on board an aircraft. Amid a flurry of criticism, U.S. airline passengers will soon be allowed to carry small knives in their carry-on bags, but there are other changes tp the prohibited item list.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Knives Not Allowed

A knife is prohibited if:

- The blade is longer than 2.36 inches or 6 centimeters in length
- The blade width is more than ½ inch at its widest point
- The knife has a fixed blade or locks firmly when in use
- The knife has a molded grip

Knives prohibited, showing an assortment of kitchen knives, large tactical knives, and small knives with blade lengths wider than 1/2 inch, molded grips, fixed and locking blades.

Novelty Bats Allowed

- Bats that are more than 24 inches and more than 24 ounces are prohibited in carry-on.
- Bats more than 24 inches in length and less than 24 ounces are permitted in carry-on luggage.

24"

Measures less than 24 inches

Sports Equipment Allowed

- Lacrosse Sticks
- Pool Sticks/Cues
- Golf Clubs (limited to 2)
- Hockey Sticks
- Ski Poles

Depicts items allowed in carry-on luggage, including lacrosse sticks, pool sticks/cues, golf clubs (limited to 2), hockey sticks and ski poles.

Sharp Objects Not Allowed

🚫 Razor blades and box cutters are not allowed

Growing tensions in Iran-al Qaeda relationship

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130314-growing-tensions-in-iranal-qaeda-relationship

Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, expelled by Iran //
Source: al-shorfa.com

The civil war in Syria has claimed another victim: the cordial relationship between Iran and al Qaeda.

What began two years ago in Syria as one more manifestation of the Arab Spring, has soon deteriorated into an inter-communal conflict between Sunnis and Shi'as. This change in the nature of the Syrian conflict found the Shi'a forces in the Muslim world – Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah – siding with the beleaguered Alawite regime of President Assad, at the same time that the Sunni forces in the Muslim world, including al Qaeda, were offering increasing political and material support to the Sunni-based anti-regime insurgency.

The *Washington Post* reports that the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda, always not much more than a marriage of convenience, began a decade ago with Iran quietly offering refuge to al Qaeda members who escaped Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban government in late fall 2001.

At one point, one of Bin Laden's wives and several of children were allowed to live in eastern Iran.

Initially, al Qaeda members moved more or less freely in Iran, but before too long the regime, while allowing them to stay in the county, began to restrict their freedom of movement so it could keep a closer eye on them.

The more restrictive Iranian approach to hosting al Qaeda members was the result of both growing Western pressure, but also Iran's own desire to make sure the Sunni militants would not be in a position to engage in activities inimical to the interests of the Iranian regime.

In the last two years, as the Syrian conflict deepened, Iran began to take more active measures against some of its al Qaeda guests, including expulsion of some of them. The most prominent case was that of Bin Laden's son in law, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, who ended up in a U.S. court last Friday, charged with committing acts of terrorism.

Dan Byman, a counterterrorism expert at the Brookings Institution,

told the *Post* that the manner in which Abu Ghaith was expelled appeared calculated to result in his capture, thus suggesting that Iran was signaling a shift in the relationship.

"It was a big move to send him not to Pakistan but in the opposite direction," Byman said. "What we're seeing is a slightly more confrontational al Qaeda policy, suggesting that Iran is becoming more uncomfortable in hosting these guys."

Abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti native, was told by the Iran that he had to leave Iran and go back to Kuwait. Kuwait, however, refused to accept him, so he flew to Turkey. The Turkish police arrested him, and arranged for him, on 28 February, to board a plane to Kuwait which, by that time, agreed to accept him He never made it to Kuwait, though: Turkey informed the United States that the flight would have a lay-over in Amman, Jordan, and when the plane landed there, Abu Ghaith was arrested by the Jordanian police and handed over to U.S. intelligence officers.

Even though Iran has expelled several al Qaeda operatives, and those remaining in Iran are kept on a tighter leash, some cooperation between the two sides remains." We believe that Iran continues to allow al Qaeda to operate a network that moves al Qaeda money and fighters through Iran to support al Qaeda activities in South Asia," David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, told the *Post*.

Cohen pointed to the sometimes contradictory nature of the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda, saying that the same transit networks send "funding and fighters to Syria," where militant Islamists linked to al Qaeda are battling pro-government forces supported by Iran.

"It is a partnership of convenience, with some really rough edges," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and counterterrorism adviser to the Obama administration.

There is no evidence suggesting that Iran has supported al Qaeda's terrorist activities in the United States or Western Europe, but experts say that this may change under certain circumstances.

"You can envision a situation in which the Iranians very carefully assisted al-Qaeda in an attack on the United States, as long as the attack is seen as al Qaeda's, with no Iranian fingerprints," Riedel told the *Post*. "There is much that Iran could do, simply by facilitating travel."

US To Release Terrorist Who Planted Airline Bomb From Federal Prison

Source: http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/03/16/us-to-release-terrorist-who-planted-airline-bomb-from-federal-prison/

Mohammed Rashed slipped a bomb beneath the jetliner seat cushion, set the timer and disembarked with his wife and child when the plane touched down in Tokyo. The device exploded as Pan Am Flight 830 continued on to Honolulu, killing a Japanese teenager in a 1982 attack that investigators linked to a terrorist organization known for making sophisticated bombs.

It would be 20 years before the bomber — and one-time apprentice to Abu Ibrahim, currently featured on the FBI list of most wanted terrorists — would admit guilt in an American courtroom.

Now, credited for his cooperation against associates, Rashed will be released from federal prison within days after more than two decades in custody in Greece and the United States.

The release does more than spring loose a convicted terrorist. It also could deprive the government of a star witness in the event that Ibrahim, a Palestinian master bomb-maker who authorities say orchestrated the Pan Am attack and similar strikes around the world, is ever captured. A former top lieutenant, Rashed would be able to implicate Ibrahim as the architect of the attack and help establish his identity in case prosecutors ever had a chance to bring him to the U.S. to face justice. Once freed, it's not clear that he would continue cooperating, though the Justice Department says it has enough other evidence for a conviction.

"They certainly could teach people coming along. Whether they would or not, of course, I don't know. Their ability to make bombs go off is quite extraordinary," said Bob Baer, a

former top CIA officer who worked clandestinely in the Middle East.

Justice Department spokesman Dean Boyd said the charges against Ibrahim, who was

indicted in 1987 along with Rashed and Rashed's Austrian-born wife, remain active and that the government still seeks his prosecution. He wouldn't comment on the potential impact of Rashed's release, but noted that prosecutors indicted Ibrahim long before Rashed was in custody or had begun cooperating.

"The Justice Department does not bring charges against a defendant unless it believes it has sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law," he said in a statement.

Rashed's 2002 guilty plea required him to cough up information on other terror plots in exchange for a release date of March 20, 2013. The agreement also stipulated that Rashed, a Jordanian-born Palestinian from Bethlehem, would be deported to a country of his choice upon his release. His lawyer wouldn't comment on Rashed's plans. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons, which lists Rashed as 63 years old, also declined to comment.

The plea deal reflects the balancing of two government interests that are sometimes in conflict: securing lengthy prison sentences for dangerous felons while also incentivizing their

cooperation against higher-value targets through the prospect of an early release. Though Ibrahim remains at large, Rashed's cooperation has already been extensive by

some accounts, including providing information about a 1986 airplane explosion that killed four Americans and a 1982 Berlin restaurant bombing that killed a child, former Assistant U.S. Attorney General David Kris wrote in a 2011 article for the Journal of National Security Law & Policy.

U.S. authorities have long seen Rashed as a critical link to Ibrahim, who in 1979 formed his own terrorist faction named "15 May" — named after the date of Israel's founding. Ibrahim lived in Iraq for a time under the protection of Saddam Hussein, and former intelligence officials have said he was closely aligned with the Iraqi intelligence service, with 15 May receiving monthly "support funds." A devout Sunni with an engineering background, Ibrahim — whose real name is Husayn Muhammad Al-Umari — was known for crafting sophisticated plastic explosives that could be smuggled in bags and suitcases and that relied on a unique delayed-timing device.

The indictment links the group to five bombing missions, including a bomb that malfunctioned aboard a Pan Am flight in Rio De Janeiro, but the FBI

believes the organization was responsible for many more attacks in cities around the world.

"Simply stated, they were involved in a worldwide bombing escapade, if you will," said retired FBI explosives expert Denny Kline, who investigated the Pan Am bombing. He says the FBI was able to connect at least 21 devices to Ibrahim.

A 2009 Associated Press investigation revealed Ibrahim was still alive, and law enforcement officials say he's believed to be in Lebanon. Now in his mid-70s, he's faded from the spotlight as authorities have poured resources into dismantling al-Qaeda. But he's enough of a concern that the State Department has offered a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to his capture. He's also on the FBI's most wanted terrorists list.

After the investigation was published, Rashed wrote AP from prison — even though his plea agreement prohibited media interviews — saying he and Ibrahim met in Iraq in the 1970s and bonded "over the Palestinian cause and other politics topics." Rashed emerged as a top lieutenant and bomb courier as Ibrahim prepared explosives intended for American and Israeli targets. He was, prosecutors say, a "cold-blooded killer" with a criminal history that included drug smuggling, escaping from a Turkish prison and traveling the world under fake passports and bogus identities.

The August 11, 1982, bombing of Pan Am 830 was set in motion when Rashed, wife Christine Pinter and their son traveled to Tokyo with fraudulent identification documents. Rashed tucked the bomb beneath window seat 47K, pulled the pin, engaged the timer and got off in Japan. Toru Ozawa, a 16-year-old vacationing with his family, occupied the same seat on the next leg.

The bomb exploded as the plane crossed the Pacific Ocean, filling the rear passenger cabin with smoke, screams and blood. Passenger Tom Stanton, seated several rows away while returning home from a business trip, said it sounded like a shotgun blast and smelled of gun powder. Amid the pandemonium, the flight crew ushered rear passengers to the front, but Stanton tried to stay behind to help others who appeared in shock. He thought fireworks had perhaps gone off, but didn't suspect a bomb.

"Going through my mind — terrorism, whatever — you never thought of that," he said.

Ozawa was killed as he cried out for his parents, and more than a dozen others were injured. The pilot managed to land the plane despite a gaping hole in the cabin floor and bulge in its exterior.

"The sad thing about this is Toru Ozawa is dead. He'd be a man with a family, and it was heartbreaking," said Dan Bent, then Hawaii's U.S. Attorney. "He was killed right in the presence of his family. He was eviscerated by this bomb."

A piece of gold-plated nickel located inside Ozawa's body helped link that explosion to others by Ibrahim. Another big break came after a 15 May defector FBI betrayed Rashed to the FBI.

Rashed flew back to Baghdad after the bombing, and though at large for years, was arrested in Athens in 1988 with a phony Syrian passport. The Greek government refused to extradite Rashed and insisted on prosecuting him, a decision that rankled U.S. officials who feared he'd escape justice under that country's legal system.

"It was disappointing and it put some serious strain on the bilateral relations with the Greeks, as we told them it would," said L. Paul Bremer, then the ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism. "Basically, it was a political decision. They gave it no real legal cover as I recall. They simply said we're not going to turn him over to you, but we'll figure out how to try him."

In Greek court, Rashed delivered long, rambling monologues that veered between didactic and combative. He denied being a terrorist and called the charge a "frame-up," insisting his real name was Mohammed Hamdan — the name on his passport — and that he was a PLO fighter in Beirut at the time of the Pan Am explosion. But he also said the Palestinians, as victims of the "Zionist establishment," were justified in using "violence against their conquerors in any way they deem appropriate."

"I want to say to those who consider a forged passport illegal, the Palestinian revolution started because there was no identity and we are fighting for this passport so that the Palestinians don't remain just numbers in the files of the United States," Rashed said.

Greek police said he was identified as Rashed through fingerprints taken after he was jailed for smuggling hashish into the country in 1973, and a three-judge panel convicted Rashed of the bombing and sentenced him 18 years

in prison — a punishment later reduced to 15 years. He was released for good behavior in 1996, after just eight years. The FBI whisked him out of Egypt in 1998 and returned him to the U.S. for prosecution. After years of legal wrangling, he struck a deal that allowed for his release in 2013, after less than 25 years in custody, provided he continues cooperating.

Wherever Rashed goes, he may not be done talking: He told AP in the letter that he planned to "write all in two or three books." And

Australian media reports say Rashed has been interviewed in prison about the 1982 bombing of the Israeli consulate in Sydney.

Roy Hawk, the Pan Am 830 pilot, said he's never forgotten the carnage inside the plane. He was dismayed to learn of Rashed's pending release.

"To tell you the truth, I never figured he'd be released," Hawk said. "I just figured he'd be in prison the rest of his life, and that was it."

Commercial Airline Bombing istory

Source: http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0283.shtml

How dangerous would a bomb be to a commercial airliner? Have many airliners been attacked before?

- question from Kenji Patel

This question is particularly appropriate in the wake of 10 August 2006 when several terrorist suspects were arrested because of a plot to sneak explosives aboard commercial airliners. These individuals arrested in the United Kingdom and Pakistan planned to carry seemingly harmless household chemicals and liquids in their carry-on luggage and mix them aboard the plane to make small bombs. The bombs would have been powerful enough to create an explosive decompression aboard an aircraft causing the plane to disintegrate while flying at high altitude over the ocean. The suicide bombers reportedly planned to target nine commercial airliners and would have likely killed between 2,500 and 5,000 people if successful.

Bombings aboard commercial airliners are unfortunately nothing new. These attacks have plagued airline travel almost since its beginning. While most of the early bombings were suicide attempts or schemes for insurance money, terrorism became a dominant motive for increasingly deadly attacks since the 1960s. The following list describes 88 cases related to airliner bombings, 56 of them resulting in deaths.

10 October 1933 - United Airlines
A Boeing 247 airliner flying from Cleveland to Chicago exploded in mid-air over Chesterton, Indiana. Ten people (7 passengers, 3 crew) were killed in the crash, and the cause was determined to be a nitroglycerin bomb. No suspects or motive were ever found.

7 May 1949 - Philippine Air Lines
A flight from Daet to Manila carrying 13 people (10 passengers, 3 crew) disappeared over the Sibuyan Sea. The Douglas DC-3 crashed, killing all aboard, after suffering a violent explosion in its tail. Two ex-convicts later confessed to planting a time bomb on the aircraft. The plot was intended to kill a male passenger so his wife could marry another man she was involved with.

9 September 1949 - Canadian Pacific Airlines Flight 108
A Canadian Pacific Douglas DC-3 left Montreal for a suburb of Quebec City. The plane was then to continue on to Baie-Comeau. Shortly after takeoff on the second leg of the journey, however, the aircraft disintegrated killing all 23 aboard (19 passengers, 4 crew). The disaster was caused by a dynamite bomb placed in the forward baggage compartment by Albert Guay. His wife, Rita Morel, had boarded the plane at Quebec City. The marriage was

troubled and Guay had taken a mistress. Since divorce laws in Quebec were very strict at the time, Guay plotted to kill his wife and collect $15,000 in life insurance. Guay assembled the bomb with help from Généreux Ruest, a clockmaker who constructed the timing mechanism. Another accomplice was Ruest's sister, Marguerite Pitre, who air expressed the device on the DC-3. All three conspirators were hanged for the crime.

13 April 1950 - British European Airways
A Vickers Viking operated by BEA was over the English Channel on a flight from Northolt, England, to Paris when a bomb exploded in the aft lavatory. Though the blast created a hole 8 x 4 ft (2.4 x 1.2 m) across, the pilot was able to return to the airport for an emergency landing. The case was never solved but the leading theory is a French passenger planted the device in a failed suicide-for-insurance attempt. The passenger and a flight attendant were injured in the incident.

12 August 1952 - Transportes Aéreos Nacionales
A Douglas DC-3 operated by the Brazilian airline TAN left Rio Verde headed for Goiania with 24 people aboard (20 passengers, 4 crew). The aircraft never reached its destination after suffering a mid-air explosion caused by a bomb.

11 April 1955 - Air India
A Lockheed L-749 airliner called the Kashmir Princess was on a charter flight from Bombay, India, to Hong Kong to Jakarta, Indonesia. The Air India plane carried 19 people including delegates from China and Vietnam as well as several journalists from Asia and Europe bound for the Asia-Afro Bandung Conference. About five hours after departing Hong Kong while flying over the Natuna Islands, an explosion started a fire behind the inboard engine on the right wing. Smoke quickly spread through the cabin and cockpit as the aircraft lost pressure. While attempting to ditch at sea, the right wing struck the water and the plane broke apart. Three members of the crew escaped and were rescued but the other 16 aboard were killed. Investigators concluded the explosion was caused by a bomb most likely planted to assassinate the premier of China, Zhou Enlai, who was to be on the flight. Zhou cancelled at the last minute, and there is evidence he may have known about the plot in advance. Kuomintang agents from Taiwan were believed responsible for the bombing and investigators suspected the explosive was placed by Chow Tse-ming, a janitor with Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company who had access to the plane. Chow fled to Taiwan whose government refused to extradite him while also denying he was a Kuomintang operative. Evidence also suggests the American CIA played a role in the assassination attempt and may have provided the bomb.

1 November 1955 - United Airlines Flight 629
United 629 was a Douglas DC-6B en route from Denver to Portland, Oregon. Nine minutes after takeoff, the aircraft was destroyed by a bomb composed of 25 sticks of dynamite. The explosive detonated in the number 4 baggage compartment causing the plane's tail to disintegrate and sending it out of control. All 44 passengers and crew were killed in the crash. A man named Jack Graham was arrested for the act. Graham's mother, Daisie King, was on the plane and he hoped to claim

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

$37,500 of life insurance policies he had bought from vending machines at the airport just before departure. Ironically, the life insurance policies were invalid since his mother had not signed them. Graham apparently had a long grudge against his mother as well as a criminal history. He was arrested for forgery in 1951 and had also collected insurance on one of his mother's restaurants that mysteriously exploded. Graham was put to death in the gas chamber a year after the bombing.

25 July 1957 - Western Air Lines Flight 39
Western 39 was a multi-stage flight on a route from Minneapolis to Salt Lake City to Cedar City to Las Vegas to Los Angeles. A passenger named Saul Binstock flew from Burbank, California, to Las Vegas and never left the airport terminal prior to boarding the Western Air Lines flight back to Los Angeles. The Convair CV-240 had just taken off carrying 16 people (13 passengers, 3 crew) when Binstock locked himself in the aft lavatory and set off a dynamite bomb. Though he was killed and the blast created a 6 x 7 ft (1.8 x 2.1 m) hole in the fuselage, the plane managed to land safely with no further injuries. Binstock had purchased two life insurance policies totaling $125,000 shortly before his suicide, and his body was found the next day with several fingers on his left hand missing.

17 April 1959 - Tigres Voladores
Flying between the Mexican cities of Mexicale and Guaymas, a Curtiss C-46 carrying 26 people (21 passengers, 5 crew) crashed near Puerto Kino. The plane had exploded and caught fire in mid-air, and it is believed a bomb was the cause.

8 September 1959 - Mexicana
A Douglas DC-3 carrying 16 people (13 passengers, 3 crew) took off from Mexico City bound for Merida, Mexico. A detonation in the passenger cabin started a fire and forced an emergency landing at Poza Rica. A male passenger was suspected of carrying a bomb aboard, and he was the only fatality after he was blown from the plane at an altitude of 11,000 ft (3,350 m).

16 November 1959 - National Airlines Flight 967
A Douglas DC-7B carrying 42 people (36 passengers, 6 crew) was en route from Tampa, Florida, to New Orleans when it crashed into the Gulf of Mexico. The investigation took a bizarre turn when a mystery was uncovered involving passenger William Taylor. Taylor disappeared the day before the flight after telephoning his employer that he would be late for work. He next turned up at the airport just before National 967 departed and purchased a $37,500 flight insurance policy. Though it appears Taylor was killed on the flight and his ex-wife received the insurance money, the peculiar fact is the airline had no record of anyone by that name being aboard. The ticket Taylor used was instead issued to Robert Spears. Spears lived in Texas but was in Tampa visiting his friend Taylor at the time of the crash. The two men knew each other well and both had long criminal backgrounds. Spears is suspected of tricking Taylor into taking the flight and carrying a piece of luggage with a bomb inside. When the plane was destroyed killing all aboard, it would be assumed Spears had perished and his wife could collect $100,000 in life insurance. Spears vanished after the crash until he was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, for unlawful possession of Taylor's automobile. Despite finding dynamite and blasting caps in the vehicle, investigators were unable to conclusively link Spears to the plane's loss. The lack of physical evidence made sabotage impossible to prove and no charges were ever brought.

6 January 1960 - National Airlines Flight 2511
A Douglas DC-6B flying from New York City to Miami disintegrated in mid-air and crashed in North Carolina, killing all 34 aboard (29 passengers, 5 crew). The aircraft crashed due to the detonation of a dynamite bomb in the vicinity of row 7. It is believed a passenger named Julian Frank committed suicide when he set off the bomb in his lap or under his seat.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Frank was under investigation for fraud and embezzlement and had purchased life insurance policies worth $1 million before the crash. Given the similarities to the National 967 crash two months earlier, however, others suspect Frank may have been innocent and was unaware he was carrying a bomb. No one was charged in either case and the two crashes remain mysterious to this day.

10 May 1961 - Air France Flight 406
A Lockheed 1649A Starliner operated by Air France was carrying 78 people (69 passengers, 9 crew) on a flight from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris. During a leg from Chad to Marseilles, the aircraft crashed into the Sahara Desert in Libya killing all aboard. The cause of the crash was traced to a nitrocellulose bomb that detonated in flight.

22 May 1962 - Continental Airlines Flight 11
The first commercial jet flight to be sabotaged was Continental 11 en route from Chicago to Kansas City to Los Angeles. The Boeing 707 carried 45 people (37 passengers, 8 crew) when a dynamite bomb

hidden in a towel container under the washbasin in the right rear lavatory detonated. The blast caused the plane's tail to break away and the aircraft went out of control, crashing near Unionville, Missouri, and taking the lives of everyone aboard. Responsibility was blamed on a passenger named Thomas Doty who had a criminal record and purchased $300,000 in life insurance shortly before the flight.

8 December 1964 - Aerolineas Abaroa
A Douglas DC-3 was carrying 17 people (13 passengers, 4 crew) between the Bolivian cities of Tipuani and La Paz when the plane crashed in the Andes Mountains. The impact resulted from a bomb blast in the aft passenger cabin that blew off the plane's tail. It is believed a passenger used the bomb to commit suicide for insurance money, and no one survived.

8 July 1965 - Canadian Pacific Airlines Flight 21
Canadian Pacific 21 departed Vancouver for Whitehorse. The Douglas DC-6B crashed in British Columbia after the plane's tail section broke away from the rest of the fuselage. Investigators suspect a passenger mixed acid and gunpowder in the aft lavatory setting off an explosion. The crash killed all 52 aboard (46 passengers, 6 crew). The motive for the bombing is believed to be a suicide-for-insurance scheme.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

22 November 1966 - Aden Airways
All 30 passengers and crew aboard a Douglas DC-3 were killed when the aircraft crashed at Aden, Yemen. An in-flight bomb detonation was determined to be the cause.

9 May 1967 - Cubana de Aviación
A Cubana flight from Havana to Mexico City crashed shortly before landing. All 10 people (6 passengers, 4 crew) aboard the Antonov An-12 were killed in the impact that was blamed on a bomb blast.

12 October 1967 - British European Airways Flight 284
BEA CY284 was a de Havilland Comet 4 that departed Athens, Greece, bound for Cyprus. While flying at 29,000 ft (8,840 m), a bomb located under seat 4A or 5A in the rear of the tourist cabin detonated. The aircraft descended as the pilots struggled to maintain control, but the plane began breaking up at 15,000 ft (4,570 m) and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. All 66 people (59 passengers, 7 crew) aboard were killed. It is believed the bomb was placed by terrorists hoping to kill the general in command of the Cyprus army who was to be aboard but cancelled shortly before departure.

11 December 1967 - American Airlines
An American Airlines Boeing 727 had departed Chicago when a small explosion occurred one hour and 42 minutes after takeoff. The blast was caused by a crude homemade bomb located in the aft baggage hold. None of the 78 passengers and crew were injured and the plane landed safely.

19 November 1968 - Continental Airlines
A Boeing 707 carrying 70 people was preparing to land at Denver when an explosion occurred in one of the lavatories. Though the blast started a small fire, the pilots were able to make an emergency landing with no injuries. A passenger seen leaving the lavatory just before the explosion was arrested by the FBI.

26 December 1968 - El Al Flight 253
El Al 253 was a Boeing 707 flying from Tel Aviv, Israel, to New York. During a layover in Athens, two terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine fired a submachine gun and threw grenades at the plane while it was on the runway prior to takeoff. The attack killed one passenger and seriously injured a crew member before the two assailants were captured by Greek police.

11 March 1969 - Ethiopian Airlines
While sitting on the ground at Frankfurt, West Germany, with no one aboard, two explosions in the passenger cabin rocked a Boeing 707 doing considerable damage.

22 December 1969 - Air Vietnam
During final approach at Nha Trang, Vietnam, a bomb exploded aboard a Douglas DC-6B blasting a 5 ft (1.5 m) hole in the fuselage near the port cabin washroom. The plane's hydraulic system failed so the landing gear had to be lowered manually and the flaps would not deploy. As the stricken plane touched down, it overran the end of the runway striking several houses and a school. The impact killed 10 of the 77 people aboard as well as 24 victims on the ground.

21 February 1970 - Swissair Flight 330

Swissair SR330 left Zurich, Switzerland, for Tel Aviv, Israel, carrying 47 people (38 passengers, 9 crew). The Convair CV-990 suffered an explosion about nine minutes after takeoff due to a bomb triggered by change in atmospheric pressure carried in the aft cargo hold. As the crew attempted to turn back towards the airport for an emergency landing, smoke clouded the

cockpit and electrical power was lost. The aircraft crashed shortly thereafter with no survivors. The militant group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the bombing.

21 February 1970 - Austrian Airlines
On the same day as the Swissair attack, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine detonated a second bomb aboard an Austrian Airlines Caravelle airliner traveling from Frankfurt, Germany, to Vienna. The bomb, located inside a mailbag due to be carried to Israel on a later flight, exploded about 20 minutes after takeoff. Though a 6 ft^2 (0.6 m^2) hole was torn in the bottom of the fuselage, the aircraft landed safely at Frankfurt and none of the 38 people (33 passengers, 5 crew) aboard were injured.

21 April 1970 - Philippine Air Lines
A Hawker Siddeley HS-748 crashed near Manila, Philippines, after a bomb exploded in the aft cargo hold. The crash killed all 36 passengers and crew.

24 August 1971 - Alia Jordanian Airlines
An empty Boeing 707 was parked at Madrid, Spain, when a bomb in an aft lavatory exploded. The blast tore a 3 ft (1 m) long hole in the top of the fuselage but no one was harmed.

21 November 1971 - China Airlines
A Caravelle III airliner operated by the Taiwan carrier China Airlines was on a flight from Taipei to Hong Kong when the plane mysteriously vanished. The jet crashed into the sea off the coast of Penghu Island killing all 25 passengers and crew. Though never proven, a bomb is considered the most probable cause of the crash.

26 January 1972 - JAT Yugoslav Airlines Flight JU 367
JU 367 departed Stockholm, Sweden, for Belgrade, Yugoslavia, carrying 23 passengers and 5 crew. While flying over Czechoslovakia, the Douglas DC-9 suffered a blast in the forward cargo hold. The resulting explosive decompression ripped the plane apart. The cause was a homemade bomb believed

to have been planted by a Croatian extremist group called Ustasji. Although the bombing killed 27 people, a 22 year old flight attendant named Vesna Vulovic miraculously survived. Vulovic fell some 33,330 ft (10,150 m) while strapped to a section of the plane that cushioned her impact. Though she had broken both legs, was temporarily paralyzed from the waist down, and took 27 days to come out of a coma, she eventually recovered from her injuries after 16 months of treatment.

Since this article was originally written, new evidence has brought the circumstances of this case into question. Outside observers had long questioned the speed with which investigators determined an extremist bomb was responsible for the crash even though no one took responsibility for the act and no arrests were ever made. Others noted the debris field was too small for a plane disintegrating at high altitude. In 2009, a pair of investigative journalists published new information suggesting JU 367 was accidentally shot down by a Czech fighter and broke up at an altitude closer to 2,600 ft (800 m). The authors contend the DC-9 was attacked after being mistaken for a threat to a nearby plane containing Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev who had just left a conference in

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Prague. Because of her injuries, survivor Vesna Vulovic has no memory of the flight, and the story of a terrorist bombing and her miraculous survival was reportedly created to cover up the incident.

7 March 1972 - Trans World Airlines Flight 7
Following labor disputes at TWA, an extortion plot against the airline was organized by an unknown person calling himself Gomez. Gomez warned that four bombs had been planted aboard TWA aircraft and would go off over an 18-hour period, but he would provide the bomb's locations if paid $2 million. He said the first was aboard TWA Flight 7, a Boeing 707 that had just departed New York for Los Angeles with 52 people aboard. The aircraft quickly returned to the airport and a bomb containing 5 lb of C4 explosive was discovered in a briefcase in the cockpit. The device would have exploded midflight and was diffused by police just 12 minutes before detonation.

8 March 1972 - Trans World Airlines Flight 57
The extortion plot against TWA continued when a bomb exploded aboard a Boeing 707 that was parked at Las Vegas, Nevada, with no one aboard. The plane had arrived from New York seven hours earlier

and was searched before departure, in flight, and after arrival. Even though under guard, someone managed to sneak a C4 bomb into the aft portion of the cockpit or the forward lavatory. The 707 was so badly damaged by the blast that it had to be written off. TWA apparently never paid the $2 million ransom, but a company private plane possibly carrying the money flew from New York to Atlanta and returned four hours later after the extortionists failed to arrive for a meeting. A spokesman for the airline subsequently reported Gomez had not been heard from again.

Additional explosives, probably planted by copycat bombers, were also found on two United planes before they were set to go off. Dynamite was discovered aboard a flight into Seattle and plastique explosives were found concealed in two spray cans on a Boeing 727.

25 May 1972 - LAN Chile
A LAN Chile flight from Panama City, Panama, to Miami suffered an explosion about one hour and 18 minutes after takeoff. The Boeing 727 was carrying 50 people (40 passengers, 10 crew). The blast was caused by a crude pipe bomb planted in the ice water fountain service compartment. Though the plane experienced a rapid decompression, no one was harmed and the pilots made an emergency landing at Montego Bay, Jamaica.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

15 June 1972 - Cathay Pacific Airways Flight 700Z
A total of 81 people (71 passengers, 10 crew) were killed when Cathay Pacific CX700Z crashed in Vietnam. The Convair CV-880 had departed Bangkok for Singapore and on to Hong Kong. During the second leg of the journey, an explosive device hidden in a suitcase under a seat on the right side of the cabin detonated. A Thai police officer was accused of planting the bomb to kill his daughter and her fiance, but he was acquitted due to lack of evidence.

16 August 1972 - El Al Israel Airlines
A Boeing 707 of Israel's El Al had just taken off from Rome bound for Tel Aviv when a bomb hidden in a portable record player exploded in the aft baggage compartment. The airline had adopted reinforced cargo containers that reduced the bomb's effectiveness. Though the 200 grams of explosive blew a hole through the baggage hold, the aircraft landed safely at Rome and none of the 148 people aboard were injured.

8 December 1972 - Ethiopian Airlines Flight 708
Ethiopian Flight 708 was a Boeing 720 carrying 94 passengers and crew. About 13 minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, seven hijackers from the Eritrean Liberation Front pulled out guns and tried to take control of the plane. The attempt was thwarted by six armed security guards. As the two sides traded gun fire, one of the terrorists activated a gand grenade. A passenger grabbed the live explosive and lobbed it into the aft fuselage since this portion of the cabin was unoccupied. The grenade detonated, damaged both the inboard engine and rudder controls, and filled the cabin with smoke. Nevertheless, the pilots were able to return to the airport for an emergency landing. Six of the terrorists were killed aboard the plane and the seventh died later in a hospital. The other 87 aboard survived, and the plane was repaired and returned to service.

19 March 1973 - Vietnam Airlines
All 62 passengers and crew aboard a Douglas C-54D were killed when a bomb exploded in the plane's forward cargo hold. The aircraft crashed at Ben Me Thuot, South Vietnam.

21 April 1973 - Philippine Air Lines
A Hawker Siddeley HS-748 carrying 33 people crashed near Patabangan, Philippines, after a bomb exploded aboard.

18 May 1973 - Aeroflot
An Aeroflot flight from Moscow to Chita in Siberia was hijacked with 100 passengers and crew aboard. When the hijacker's demands were not met, he set off a bomb in the passenger cabin. The Tu-104A broke up at 30,000 ft (9,145 m) and crashed near Chita with no survivors.

17 December 1973 - Pan American World Airways Flight 110
Pan Am 110 was a Boeing 707 preparing to leave Rome for Beirut with 177 people aboard. Departure

was delayed when a group of Palestinian gunmen stormed through the terminal and across the tarmac towards the aircraft. The men threw two phosphorous bombs onto the plane killing 30 and injuring 41 passengers. The attackers went on to take five hostages, kill a customs agent, and hijack a Lufthansa Boeing 737. The plane flew to Damascus and then Kuwait before one of the hostages was killed and the terrorists escaped. The hijackers were eventually arrested and convicted, and the

attack was traced to Abu Nidal's Fatah group.

22 March 1974 - Air Inter
A Caravelle III airliner on the ground at Bastia, France, was heavily damaged when an explosion occurred in the forward landing gear compartment. No one was injured.

26 August 1974 - Trans World Airlines
Shortly after landing in Rome, a fire broke out in the aft baggage compartment of a TWA flight. The fire was caused by a bomb that had malfunctioned. No one was injured. The failed bombing may have led to the attack on TWA 841 the following month.

8 September 1974 - Trans World Airlines Flight 841
TWA 841 was a Boeing 707 that left Tel Aviv, Israel, for New York City. The flight made a scheduled stopover in Athens before heading on its second leg to Rome. Just 18 minutes after takeoff, however, the plane crashed into the Ionian Sea killing 88 people (79 passengers, 9 crew). Subsequent investigation concluded the plane was brought down by a bomb hidden in the aft cargo hold that resulted in structural failure. A group in Lebanon claimed responsibility for the bombing, and the Abu Nidal terrorist organization is believed to have been behind the attack.

15 September 1974 - Air Vietnam Flight 706
Air Vietnam 706 was a Boeing 727 carrying 75 people (67 passengers, 8 crew) between the South Vietnam cities of Danang and Saigon. The plane was hijacked by a soldier named Le Duc Tan who was distraught over a recent demotion. The hijacker threatened the crew with two hand grenades and demanded the plane divert to Hanoi, North Vietnam. The pilots instead tried landing at the Phan Rang Air Base but aborted shortly before the plane plunged into the ground killing all aboard. Investigators believe the hijacker was angered by the landing attempt, forced the abort, and then set off his grenades resulting in the fatal crash.

3 June 1975 - Philippine Air Lines
A BAC One-Eleven departed Legaspi carrying 64 people (59 passengers, 5 crew) bound for Manila. As the plane descended for landing, a bomb detonated in the right lavatory in the aft passenger cabin. The blast created a large hole 4.3 x 13 ft (1.3 x 4 m) across and killed one passenger, but the plane landed safely.

5 July 1975 - Pakistan International Airlines
A Boeing 707 was on the ground in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, following a flight from Karachi. After the passengers had disembarked, a bomb exploded under a seat in the cabin ripping a 3 x 4 ft (0.9 x 1.2 m) hole in the fuselage. No one was hurt in the blast.

1 January 1976 - Middle East Airlines Flight 438
MEA 438 was a Boeing 720 en route from Beirut to Dubai. While flying over northeastern Saudi Arabia at 37,000 ft (11,275 m), a bomb detonated in the forward baggage hold. The plane broke up and the crash killed all 81 people aboard. The identity of the bombers has never been determined.

2 July 1976 - Eastern Airlines
An unoccupied Eastern Airlines L-188 Electra parked at Boston Logan Airport was destroyed by a bomb planted in the landing gear compartment. No one was injured.

7 September 1976 - Air France
Seven masked men planted dynamite explosives aboard a Boeing 707 parked at Ajaccio, France. No one was injured in the subsequent blast but the plane was destroyed.

6 October 1976 - Cubana de Aviacion Flight 455
Cubana 455 was headed from Barbados, via Trinidad, to Havana. The Douglas DC-8 carrying 73 people (48 passengers, 25 crew) exploded and spun downward crashing off the coast of Bridgetown, Barbados. The aircraft is believed to have been destroyed by two time bombs using dynamite or C-4 explosives that set off an uncontrollable fire in the aft cabin. The plot was traced to anti-Castro Cuban exiles and Venezuelan secret police who reportedly had links to the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States.

17 August 1978 - Philippine Air Lines
With 84 aboard (78 passengers, 6 crew), a BAC One-Eleven left Cebu for Manilla. One passenger was killed when a bomb blast in the left rear lavatory blew a hole in the fuselage. The aircraft landed safely with no additional injuries. Like a cat with nine lives, the plane involved was the same PAL airliner that survived a bombing in June 1975.

19 February 1979 - Ethiopian Airlines
A Douglas DC-3 crashed at Barentu, Ethiopia, after a bomb exploded on board. All five passengers and crew were killed.

26 April 1979 - Indian Airlines
An Indian Airlines flight from Trivandrum was descending to land at Madras (now Chennai) when an explosion went off in the forward lavatory. The detonation caused a complete instrument and electrical failure aboard the Boeing 737. The plane was forced to make a high speed landing because the flaps could not be extended. With thrust reversers and anti-skid systems also disabled, the aircraft overran the end of the runway. Though the right side of the plane caught fire, all 67 occupants (61 passengers, 6 crew) evacuated safely. All survived but the 737 was written off due to the damage.

15 November 1979 - American Airlines Flight 444
American 444 was a Boeing 727 carrying 78 people (72 passengers, 6 crew) and headed from Chicago to Washington DC. Thirty minutes into flight, a mail bomb hidden in a wooden box in the cargo hold ignited. The device produced large amounts of smoke but failed to detonate, though investigators found only a faulty timer prevented the bomb from obliterating the plane. The pilot made a successful emergency landing at Washington-Dulles but several passengers had to be treated for smoke inhalation. The bomb was built by Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, and this was his first attack to be investigated by the FBI. Kaczynski's bombing attempts spread over 18 years before he was finally caught in 1996, and he has since been sentenced to life imprisonment.

9 September 1980 - United Airlines
Passengers were disembarking a Boeing 727 in Sacramento, California, when a small cardboard box in the cargo hold detonated. The explosion injured two cargo handlers but none of the 44 passengers and crew were harmed.

21 December 1980 - Transportes Aereos del Caribe
A Caravelle of TAC left Rio Hacha, Colombia, on its first scheduled flight following 17 months of maintenance. The flight was bound for Medellin with 70 people aboard (63 passengers, 7 crew). Five minutes after takeoff, an explosion set off a fire on the right side of the tail causing the plane to lose control and crash. A bomb is suspected, but not proven, to have caused the crash.

31 August 1981 - Middle East Airlines
No one remained aboard a Boeing 720 that had arrived in Beirut, Lebanon, following a flight from Tripoli, Libya, when a large bomb exploded. The 5000 grams of dynamite destroyed the plane.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

13 October 1981 - Air Malta
A Boeing 737 was being unloaded at Cairo, Egypt, following a flight from Malta when a porter and three security guards were injured by bomb blasts. Two explosive devices hidden in parcels exploded about 15 minutes apart. A third bomb was located later but did not detonate. None of the passengers and crew were harmed.

12 December 1981 - Aeronica
A Boeing 727 of the Nicaraguan airline Aeronica was about to board for a flight from Mexico City to San Salvador, El Salvador. As passengers were preparing to embark, a bomb hidden between the cabin wall and the furthest aft passenger seat on the left aisle exploded. The blast injured the captain, two stewardesses, and an airport mechanic. The plane was also seriously damaged with a 3 ft (0.9 m) hole torn in the fuselage.

11 August 1982 - Pan American World Airways Flight 830
A Boeing 747 of Pan Am was on a flight from Tokyo to Honolulu, Hawaii, when a bomb hidden under a seat cushion detonated. The explosion killed a 16 year old Japanese boy, injured 15 more passengers,

tore a hole in the floor, and also damaged the cabin ceiling and overhead luggage bins. Despite the damage, the aircraft made a safe emergency landing at Honolulu with no further injuries. A terrorist named Mohammed Rashed who belonged to the 15 May group, an offshoot of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was blamed for the attack. Rashed was finally arrested in Greece in 1988 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was released in 1996 after serving only eight years, but the United States convicted Rashed for another seven year sentence in 2006.

19 August 1983 - Syrian Arab Airlines
While boarding passengers at Rome for a flight to Damascus, Syria, a fire started aboard a Boeing 727. The blaze was set off by a glass bottle containing flammable liquid that had been placed under a seat near the right overwing emergency exit. The fire consumed the interior of the plane doing considerable damage, but no one was hurt.

23 September 1983 - Gulf Air Flight 771
Gulf Air 771 left Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, for Karachi, Pakistan, aboard a Boeing 737 carrying 117 people (111 passengers, 6 crew). The aircraft exploded shortly after takeoff and crashed in the desert near Mina Jebel Ali in the UAE. A bomb in the baggage compartment caused the fatal crash. The terrorist Abu Nidal took responsibility demanding that nations in

the region pay him protection money to avoid future attacks. Both the UAE and Kuwait paid Nidal off shortly thereafter.

18 January 1984 - Air France
An Air France Boeing 747 was carrying 261 passengers and crew when an explosion rocked the aircraft shortly after leaving Karachi, Pakistan. The blast created a hole in the right aft cargo compartment causing rapid decompression. The pilots made an emergency descent and landed at the airport with no injuries.

10 March 1984 - Union des Transportes Aeriens
A Douglas DC-8 was traveling from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris. While the aircraft was parked on the apron during a stopover in N'Djamena, Chad, a small explosive device went off in the baggage compartment. The 23 people (18 passengers, 5 crew) aboard at the time were evacuated without injury. Twenty minutes later, a second bomb detonated in the central baggage hold destroying the aircraft.

23 January 1985 - Lloyd Aereo Boliviano
The LAB flight left La Paz, Mexico, for Santa Cruz, Bolivia. While en route with 127 occupants (120 passengers, 7 crew), a passenger entered the forward lavatory carrying a suitcase. Inside the suitcase was dynamite that exploded, killing the passenger. The Boeing 727 landed safely at Santa Cruz with no additional fatalities.

9 March 1985 - Royal Jordanian Airlines
A Lockheed L-1011 TriStar was on the ground at Dubai following a flight from Karachi, Pakistan, when a bomb exploded in one of the baggage holds. No one was harmed in the blast.

23 June 1985 - Air India Flight 182
The deadliest terror attack of any kind prior to September 11 was Air India 182, a flight from Montreal to London to Delhi to Bombay. The Boeing 747 carried a total of 329 (307 passengers, 22 crew) when it

disappeared over the Atlantic Ocean south of Ireland. A bomb located in the forward cargo hold had detonated at an altitude of 31,000 feet (9,500 m) causing rapid decompression and break-up of the plane. A second bomb was also to be transferred aboard Air India Flight 301, scheduled to carry 177 passengers from Tokyo to Bangkok. However, this bomb exploded at the Tokyo airport killing two baggage handlers and injuring four others. The attacks were blamed on a Sikh separatist group called Babbar Khalsa, but only one person was convicted for the attack

after almost 20 years of investigation and prosecution by Canadian authorities. Bomber Inderjit Singh Reyat had his prison term reduced to just five years in exchange for testimony against other alleged plotters, but he was later sentenced to another nine years for perjury.

30 October 1985 - American Airlines
A bomb hidden in a vinyl tote bag exploded aboard a Boeing 727. The blast occurred in the forward baggage hold while being unloaded and there were no fatalities.

2 April 1986 - Trans World Airlines Flight 840
A Boeing 727 preparing to land at Athens, Greece, was badly damaged by a bomb explosion. The device consisted of 1 lb of plastic explosive placed under a seat cushion. The detonation blew a 24 ft (2.25 m) hole in the fuselage resulting in a rapid decompression of the cabin that sucked four people out to their deaths, including an infant. Another five people suffered injuries but 110 passengers and crew survived when the plane landed safely. A Lebanese woman was suspected of planting the bomb during a previous flight. She was arrested and believed to work for the Abu Nidal organization, but the woman was not convicted for lack of evidence. A group called the Arab Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility for the attack in retaliation for America's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and skirmishes between the US and Libya the previous week.

17 April 1986 - El Al Israel Airlines
An Irish woman named Anne Marie Murphy was preparing to board an El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv, Israel. The Boeing 747 was due to carry 375 passengers plus crew. Murphy was pregnant and had been sent on the flight by her Palestinian fiance, Nezar Hindawi, ostensibly to meet Hindawi's parents and receive their blessing to marry. Hindawi also gave Murphy a bag that supposedly contained gifts for his parents. As security agents searched Murphy's luggage, they instead discovered 3.25 lb of semtex explosives and a timer triggering device hidden beneath a false bottom in the bag. Once told about the bomb, Murphy reportedly exclaimed, "the bastard tried to kill me!" Had the plot succeeded, the bomb would have detonated while the aircraft was flying over Austria. Nezar Hindawi was arrested the next day. He claimed he had acted on behalf of Syrian intelligence officers who provided money, the explosive device, and Syrian documentation that would allow him to escape after the attack. Abu Nidal was later implicated for recommending Hindawi to the Syrians and providing the bomb. Hindawi was sentenced to 45 years in prison.

3 May 1986 - Air Lanka Flight 512
Air Lanka UL512 left London with stops in Zurich, Switzerland, and Dubai before reaching Colombo, Sri Lanka. The Lockheed L-1011, carrying 148 (128 passengers, 20 crew), was parked at the terminal preparing to continue on to the Maldives Islands when an explosive concealed in an onboard cargo crate exploded. The blast ripped the plane in half killing 21 and injuring 41 people. The bomb was most likely planted by Tamil rebels to sabotage peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.

26 October 1986 - Thai Airways International Flight 620
Flight 620 left Bangkok, Thailand, for Manila, Philippines, where it continued on to Osaka, Japan. The Airbus A300 carried 239 people (223 passengers, 16 crew) on the second leg of the trip. While cruising at 33,000 ft (10,060 m) over Tosa Bay off the coast of Japan, an explosion occurred in the aft lavatory on the left of the cabin. The blast caused a rapid decompression and damaged two of the plane's hydraulic systems. The captain and co-pilot initiated an emergency descent but fought to keep the plane under control. Though exceeding the plane's maximum descent rate by nearly 20%, the pilots managed to recover after pulling off a +2.6g maneuver. The heavily damaged aircraft managed to land safely at Osaka with no fatalities. The cause of the blast was a hand grenade a passenger was attempting to smuggle into Japan that exploded in the lavatory.

29 November 1987 - Korean Air Flight 858
KAL 858 was a Boeing 707 departing Abu Dhabi via Bangkok for Seoul, South Korea. The plane mysteriously vanished over the Andaman Sea near Thailand while carrying 115 people (104 passengers, 11 crew). South Korean officials claim a pair of North Korean agents who

disembarked from the aircraft at Abu Dhabi left a radio and a liquor bottle in the overhead luggage bin at row 7. Contained within the radio was C-4 while the liquor bottle held PLX explosives. The two agents were arrested shortly after the bombing but one committed suicide. The second claimed the attack had been ordered by Kim Jong-il, the current leader of North Korea, but firm evidence has remained elusive.

1 March 1988 - Commercial Airways Flight 206
An EMBRAER EMB-110 crashed near Johannesburg, South Africa, killing all 17 aboard (15 passengers, 2 crew). The plane had been preparing to land when a nitroglycerine and ammonium nitrate bomb exploded. The crash was blamed on one of the passengers, a mineworker with large life insurance policies, who is suspected of committing suicide.

Cockpit section of Pan Am 103 wreckage following a mid-air explosion

21 December 1988 - Pan American World Airways Flight 103
Pan Am 103 departed London bound for New York City when the Boeing 747 was destroyed over Lockerbie, Scotland. The plane was brought down by 340 to 450 grams of plastic explosives hidden in a

radio cassette player that was detonated in the forward cargo hold. The bombing killed 270 people including 243 passengers, 16 crewmembers, and 11 victims on the ground. A three-year joint investigation by the UK and US concluded two Libyan intelligence officers were behind the plot, and both men were finally turned over by the Libyan government in 1999. One was convicted in 2001 while the second was acquitted, and Libya agreed to pay compensation for the attack.

19 September 1989 - Union des Transports Aeriens Flight 772
UTA 772 left Brazzaville, Congo, for N'Djamena, Chad aboard a Douglas DC-10. The flight then departed for Paris carrying 170 people (156 passengers, 14 crew). About 45 minutes after takeoff, the plane broke up over the Sahara Desert and crashed in Niger following the explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold. The terror group Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, and a rebel group called the Secret Chadian Resistance was also suspected. However, explosive residue and part of a timing device were traced to Libya. A Congolese terrorist confessed he had recruited a fellow dissident to unknowingly smuggle the bomb aboard on behalf of Libyan secret service

agents. Six Libyans were convicted, and the attack is believed to have been in retaliation for France's support of Chad during conflicts between the two African nations. Libya agreed to pay compensation to

families of the victims in 2003.

27 November 1989 - Avianca Airlines Flight 203

Avianca 203 was a Boeing 727 that departed Bogota, Colombia, bound for Cali. Just five minutes after takeoff, a bomb on the floor of the starboard side of the passenger cabin at seat 15F detonated. The blast ignited vapors in an empty fuel tank causing a massive explosion that ripped the plane apart. The crash killed all 107 aboard (101 passengers, 6 crew) as well as 3 people on the ground. The Medellín drug cartel claimed responsibility for the attack as an attempt to kill presidential candidate Cesare Gaviria. Gaviria was not aboard but the group's chief assassin was convicted for the bombing.

18 March 1991 - Aeroflot

An Ilyushin 86 airliner was traveling from Moscow to Novokuznetsk with 360 passengers and crew. One of the passengers was a psychiatric patient who had snuck an explosive aboard. After throwing the petrol bomb, a fire ensued forcing an emergency landing at Sverdlovsk. No one aboard was harmed.

19 July 1994 - Alas Chiricanas Flight 00901

An EMBRAER EMB-110 left Colón, Panama, for Panama City when the plane exploded over the Santa Rita Mountains killing 21 people (18 passengers, 3 crew). Investigators concluded a bomb, probably carried aboard by a suicide bomber, caused the crash. Twelve of the passengers were Jewish, and an anti-Israeli group claimed responsibility for the blast. The attack also occurred one day after the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires that targeted Argentinian Jews and eight days before a car bombing at the Israeli Embassy in London. All three attacks are believed to have been orchestrated by Hezbollah, but no arrests have ever been made in connection to the Flight 00901 bombing.

11 December 1994 - Philippine Air Lines Flight 434

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

PAL434 was a multi-stage flight that first left Manila, Philippines, for Cebu aboard a Boeing 747. After takeoff, a Middle Eastern passenger disappeared into the lavatory where he assembled the components of a small bomb. The device was placed in the life vest under his seat 26K before the man disembarked

the aircraft. The second leg of the flight departed for Narita, Japan, carrying 293 people (273 passengers, 20 crew) and a Japanese businessman named Haruki Ikegami occupied seat 26K. The

device detonated four hours after it was planted, killing Ikegami and injuring ten others. The blast blew a hole through the floor to the cargo compartment below and also severed cables to the plane's control surfaces. Though steering was crippled, the pilots made an emergency landing in Okinawa and no further lives were lost. Had the bomb been placed two rows further back over the center fuel tank or turned to the side so its blast wave struck the fuselage walls, the aircraft most likely would not have survived.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

The man responsible for building and placing the bomb was Ramzi Yousef who had also masterminded the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Yousef conducted the Philippine Air Lines bombing as a test of a much larger plot called Oplan Bojinka during which bombs ten times as powerful would have been smuggled aboard 11 or 12 transpacific flights bound for the United States. The attack was to occur on 21 and 22 January 1995 when five al-Qaeda operatives would sneak bombs aboard Northwest, Delta, and United Airlines flights in the same way Yousef had tested. Each bomb was to go off at about the same time causing the planes to fall into the Pacific Ocean or the South China Sea. It is estimated that some 4,000 people would have been killed if successful.

The elaborate plot also grew to include an assassination attempt on the Pope and hijacking airliners to crash into targets in the United States. An initial attack on CIA headquarters would later be followed by suicide crashes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Capitol Building, the White House, the Sears Tower in Chicago, and the Transamerica Tower in San Francisco. However, the ambitious plan quickly unraveled after a chemical fire arroused police suspicion. Within a matter of days, several of the conspirators were captured and confessed eventually leading to the arrest of Yousef himself. He has since been sentenced to life imprisonment for the plot plus another 240 years for his involvement in the World Trade Center bombing. Elements of Oplan Bojinka inspired both the September 11 attack and the August 2006 plot to bomb transatlantic flights that was foiled in the United Kingdom.

9 July 1997 - TAM Flight 283

A Fokker 100 operated by the Brazilian airline TAM was en route from Sao Jose dos Campos to Congonhas carrying 60 people (55 passengers, 5 crew). The plane was climbing through 7,875 ft (2,400 m) after takeoff when a bomb exploded underneath seat 18D. The small device contained just seven ounces of explosive but the blast and decompression blew a 6.5 ft (2 m) hole in the fuselage. The passenger in seat 18E was pulled from the plane and died, but the remainder of the occupants survived after an emergency landing at Sao Paulo. A suicide attempt was blamed as the motive.

22 December 2001 - American Airlines Flight 63

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, a radical Islamic terrorist named Richard Reid boarded a Boeing 767 headed from Paris to Miami. As the plane flew across the Atlantic Ocean, Reid attempted to detonate a bomb he had carried aboard in his shoes. His shoes were later found to contain 100 grams of plasticized TATP and PETN explosives strong enough to blow a large hole in the fuselage that most likely would have doomed the aircraft. A flight attendant first noticed Reid's actions and tried to stop him, but a group of flight attendants and passengers was ultimately needed to subdue the suicide bomber. The flight diverted to Boston where Reid was arrested, and he has since been sentenced to life in prison. A second terrorist named Saajid Badat was also arrested and convicted as Reid's conspirator. Badat was to carry a similar shoe bomb on a flight from Amsterdam to the US but backed out before the attempt.

7 May 2002 - China Northern Airlines Flight 6136

China Northern 6136 was a MD-82 carrying 112 (103 passengers, 9 crew) from Beijing to Dalian. All appeared normal until the flight neared its destination and the pilot reported a fire while requesting an emergency landing. Shortly thereafter, the plane crashed into the sea near Dalian with no survivors. Investigators ultimately concluded a passenger named Zhang Pilin smuggled water bottles filled with gasoline aboard and set them afire at his seat. The motive was most likely suicide for insurance since Pilin had purchased seven policies shortly before the flight.

24 August 2004 - Volga-AviaExpress Flight 1303

A wave of terror attacks on Russia began with a pair of bombings aboard two airliners. The first was Volga-AviaExpress 1303, a Tu-134 flying from Moscow to Volgograd. Contact with the plane was lost about 26 minutes after takeoff when witnesses on the

ground reported seeing a large explosion. All 43 occupants (34 passengers, 9 crew) were killed. Later investigation found the crash was caused by a female suicide bomber named Amanta Nagayeva who was from the separatist region of Chechnya.

24 August 2004 - Siberia Airlines Flight 1047
Minutes after the Volga-AviaExpress crash, a Siberia Airlines flight from Moscow to Sochi also disappeared. The Tu-154 was carrying 46 people (38 passengers, 8 crew) and reportedly broadcast a

hijack warning shortly before crashing. There were no survivors. This attack was also made by a female Chechen suicide bomber named Satsita Dzhebirkhanova. A group called Islambouli Brigade initially claimed responsibility for the two bombings, but leading Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev denied this and said he organized the attack. A week after the two airline crashes, a bomb at the Moscow subway station killed 10 people. Shortly thereafter, the Beslan hostage crisis in September resulted in 335 deaths.

Summary
These cases graphically demonstrate the dangers explosives have posed to commercial aviation in over 70 years of recorded incidents. The full extent of these airline bombings can be appreciated when considering them in total. The 88 criminal acts detailed above destroyed 50 aircraft and damaged 32 more resulting in 2,790 deaths and 129 injuries. At least 33 of the bombings are known or strongly suspected to be terrorist attacks while 14 were a combination of suicide or murder attempts often coupled with insurance schemes. Four bombings were due to miscellaneous or accidental causes while the motive behind the remaining 37 is undetermined.
These statistics are summarized below by year. Bombings were worst during the 1970s and 1980s and at least one incident occurred every year from 1964 through 1989 with the lone exception of 1977. The single worst year was 1985 when five attacks resulted in 332 deaths, nearly all of these aboard Air India 182 alone. Airline bombings became less common through the 1990s and into the 21st century, but terrorism remains a grave threat to commercial air travel as shown by the hijackings and suicide attacks of 11 September 2001.

Airline Bombing Incident Statistics by Year

Airline bombing totals

The UK terror arrests make it clear that bombings of commercial aircraft are likely to continue and will be even deadlier given the increasing size of modern planes. In part two of this article, we will describe new technologies developed to detect explosives before they make it aboard aircraft as well as methods of limiting their damage when they do detonate.

Update!

Additional cases of airline bombings since this article was originally written are described below.

7 March 2008 - China Southern Airlines

A Boeing 757 operated by China Southern departed Urumqi in western China. The flight carried a 19 year old female passenger who smuggled gasoline aboard by draining soda cans of their contents and injecting them full of fuel with a syringe. The woman was a frequent traveler who exploited her familiarity with airport personnel to bypass rules banning liquids on planes. She also used fragrances to disguise the distinctive smell of the gasoline. About 40 minutes after takeoff, the woman took the cans into a bathroom near the wing fuel tanks and tried to start a fire. She was discovered by members of the flight crew who prevented her attempt and made an emergency landing in Lanzhou with no injuries. The

woman was reportedly a member of China's Uighur Muslim minority and the motivation for the attack is believed to be jihadist terrorism.

25 December 2009 - Northwest Airlines Flight 253

Northwest 253 departed Amsterdam for Detroit, Michigan, aboard an Airbus A330 carrying 289 people (278 passengers, 11 crew). Shortly before landing, a young Nigerian passenger named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to set off 80 grams of PETN and TATP plastic explosives he had smuggled aboard in his underwear. The bomb malfunctioned creating only a small fire and popping noises instead of detonating. Dutch passenger Jasper Schuringa tackled and subdued Abdulmutallab while other passengers and flight attendants put out the fire. The pilots made an emergency landing at Detroit where the bomber was arrested. Aside from Abdulmutallab who suffered burns to his legs, Schuringa and another passenger were injured. Investigation indicated Abdulmutallab was recruited, trained, and funded by the Yemeni group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula hoping to perpetrate a terrorist attack over a US city.

21 March 2010 - Kingfisher Airlines Flight IT-4731

After all 27 passengers had disembarked from a Kingfisher ATR 72 arriving at the Indian city of Thiruvananthapuram from Bangalore, a crude bomb was found in the cargo section. The plane was moved to a remote part of the airport where the device was inspected by a bomb squad. The explosive consisted of a 15 gram firecracker designed to be lit manually. The crime was traced to a baggage handler named Rajasekharan Nair who first reported discovering the bomb. He had previously worked for the Indian security force and is believed to have been trying to embarrass former coworkers he was angry with.

October 2010 - Cargo Bombing Attempt

On 29 October 2010, officials discovered two packages addressed to Jewish organizations in Chicago that contained explosive material. The sophisticated bombs contained approximately one pound of the explosive PETN and were found aboard cargo planes, although each had also been carried on passenger flights before their discovery. The first was found on a UPS plane in the United Kingdom while the second was discovered aboard a FedEx aircraft at Dubai. Each bomb was packaged within a printer toner cartridge and "the explosives discovered were of a sophisticated nature whereby they could not be detected by X-ray screening or trained sniffer dogs." The devices were to be triggered by cell phone alarms set to detonate while the planes were estimated to be over the Atlantic Ocean. Investigators believe the bombs were intended to destroy planes in flight, although it is unclear whether the perpetrators could have known whether they would be carried aboard passenger or freight aircraft. Both packages originated in Yemen and the organization al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is believed responsible.

Gas Refinery Attack in Algeria: The Lessons Learned

By Joseph Trindal
Source:http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Infrastructure/Building_Protection/Gas_Refinery_Attack_in_Algeria:_The_Lessons_Learned/

In the early morning hours of 16 January 2013, a coordinated band of terrorists attacked a convoy of gas refinery workers as they departed the housing area of the In Amenas Gas Refinery in eastern Algeria. The attack was described in a 25 January 2013 article – in *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture* – as the "most elaborate" to date on the African continent. Targeting critical infrastructure, the In Amenas attack is considered to be equivalent to India's energy-sector incident in November 2008, which included a coordinated attack, hostage-taking, and three-day siege in Mumbai. The Algerian incident led to a four-day siege resulting in the deaths of 38 hostages.

The Situational Environment

The In Amenas Gas Project is a multinational joint venture and the largest production wet gas facility in Algeria. The Tiguentourine facility, which is only 50 miles from the Libyan border,

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

processes over nine billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. The desolate In Amenas area of Illizi province is also 717 miles from the population center of Algiers. According to Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned petrochemical company, more than 700 workers are assigned to the facility.

Among the workers present on 16 January were over 130 foreign nationals and expatriates from Norway, Japan, England, the United States, and several other countries. The site's geographic isolation, which delayed response forces, coupled with the presence of large numbers of western workers, favored the terrorists' objectives.

The region has experienced decades of terrorist activity as part of the Islamic Maghreb effort to establish an Islamic caliphate across northwestern Africa. Struggles with Islamic radicals in Algeria, often referred to as the "gateway between Europe and Africa," boiled into civil war in the 1990s. In 2006, after a period of deescalating tension, al-Qaida formally joined forces with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, also known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC).

In 2007, the solidified group became known as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to Algerian government sources, Algeria, a former French colony, experienced nearly 200 attacks each year in 2011 and 2012, the majority of which targeted military and police as well as western workers and tourists with bombings, ambushes, and kidnappings. Algerian counterterrorism efforts produced encouraging results in 2012, and helped to foster the expansion of foreign investment in energy production. That same year, though, Mali – a small country southwest of Algeria – cascaded into civil war as insurgent forces swept toward the country's capital of Bamako resulting in French military intervention.

An Attack "Signed in Blood"

Late in 2012, plans and preparations were underway for an AQIM attack in Algeria targeting multinational-owned, critical infrastructure with easy access from safe-haven terrorist bases in Libya. According to a 21 January 2013 article in *MacLean's* magazine, Algerian sources reported that at least one of the attackers had been a driver at the facility; an indication of insider-sourced pre-

attack intelligence used in planning. The "Signed in Blood Battalion" – a self-named sub-group of the AQIM that is commanded by and

The condition of the In Amenas Gas Refinery at the time of the attack.

under the operational command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar – launched the attack with a heavily armed team of 33-40 terrorists.

Two Canadian citizens were members of the attack team, according to Algerian sources. In addition, the terrorists convoyed from Libya, under the cover of darkness, in as many as nine Toyota vehicles disguised with markings resembling those on Sonatrach company vehicles. The terrorists, who were armed with AK-47 rifles, PKM variant machine guns, RPG-7 grenade launchers, and an array of explosives, first ambushed an escorted convoy of buses carrying workers departing along the single access road from the gas plant's Al-Hayat housing complex, which is about 1.5 miles from the main plant. The terrorists then proceeded to neutralize the plant's security checkpoint with small arms fire – but not before Mohamed Lamine Lahmar, a security guard later killed in the engagement, had activated the plant's distress alarm. The terrorists then divided into several assault teams, executing coordinated operations against the Al-Hayat

complex and the Tiguentourine processing facility.

At both locations, word spread quickly as workers responded to the piercing alarm, coupled with the information that they were under attack. Thanks to the early warning and to the quick thinking of many workers who adhered to the site protocols governing responses to terrorist attacks, some were able to escape or hide. Other workers in the plant's process control room began shutting down processing units and gas feed valves; these actions also were consistent with the plant's protocols for responding to alarms. As the terrorist assault continued, survivors later reported, electricity was being shut down throughout the site.

The survivors also reported that the terrorists started to collect and segregate the hostages into small groups. Unlike the relatively compressed ground areas in other hostage takeovers – the 2002 Beslan school attack in Ingushetia, Russia, for example, and the Dubrovka theater attack in Moscow that same year – the In Amenas Gas Refinery is a sprawling complex covering slightly over five square miles. The plant's workers, supported by a modest security force, are scattered throughout the entire area.

In addition to the elements of surprise and overwhelming force, the survivors also reported that the terrorists used both ruse and deception – coercing some hostages, for example, to lure hiding workers into the open. Some of the hostages were summarily executed, regardless of their compliance with terrorist instructions. Most of the Algerian workers and Muslims were released, but some non-Muslim foreigners were not only retained but also were fitted with collar and belt bombs.

As the terrorists consolidated their control over the facility, the hostages were dispersed to various holding locations throughout the complex. According to at least some reports, the terrorists also rigged: (a) victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs) and/or other booby traps at key access points; and (b) various other explosives at key processing locations (in an apparent effort to ultimately detonate the entire site).

The Response
Algerian forces started their response within a couple hours after the attack started, but the remote location of the plant delayed the arrival

of any sizable counterterrorist force during most of the first day. The remote location of the plant and complexity of the attack also made a situational size-up and the collection of ground truth intelligence more difficult. During the first night, however, the first Algerian forces arriving started to contain the site.

Very early on the morning of the second day, a group of about 45 survivors escaped on foot from the Al-Hayat complex into the desert. According to Alan Wright, a 37-year-old health and safety advisor at the In Amenas refinery, he and the other survivors were intercepted in the desert by armed personnel, but were not sure if the latter were terrorists or government response personnel. They were relieved to learn that they were government forces, who were themselves not sure of the identities of the people running toward them in the desert. Also early on the second day, Algerian helicopter gunships engaged and neutralized two vehicles travelling along the only access road away from the Al-Hayat complex. It was later reported that the vehicles were carrying both terrorists and hostages. Other workers escaped in various ways during the siege.

As the world's attention became increasingly focused on the In Amenas hostage crisis, Algerian forces cleared and secured the Al-Hayat complex and security checkpoint, consolidating the government's containment of the Tiguentourine processing facility. Communications between the hostage takers and government forces were unproductive and the terrorists escalated the situation by threatening to detonate the plant if a rescue operation were attempted. During the siege, AQIM announced two demands: (a) The cessation of French operations in Mali; and (b) the release of two prisoners being held in the United States: Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman and Pakistani scientist Aafia Siddiqui.

Finally, on the fourth day of the siege, amid sporadic exchanges of gunfire with the terrorists, Algerian forces reported that, because of information about hostages being executed, government troops had started a rescue assault to regain control of the Tiguentourine facility. Participating in the counter-attack were a coordinated force of ground and air units – some of them in Russian-built T-72 battle tanks and armored personnel carriers – and special forces personnel on foot.

According to Algerian government officials, an unspecified number of the 38 hostages killed were found to have died of a single shot to the head, supporting government and survivor reports of hostage executions. In addition, an explosive was detonated next to one of the processing units, but failed to cause much damage, thanks to the early mitigation measures taken by plant workers on the first day of the siege. Other explosives also were found at various locations throughout the site, indicating that a major sabotage effort was

The Algerian forces closing in on the kidnappers - 19 January 2013

planned but not fully carried out.

Lessons Learned

The Refinery attack was in many respects a true watershed event because it demonstrates the will and ability of terrorist groups to plan and execute attacks on very difficult and even remote critical-infrastructure targets. Following, based on the lessons learned from this incident, are some important actions that should be considered to help strengthen risk awareness and also to reassess current response capabilities:

1. *Improve Predictive Intelligence Analysis Capabilities* – It has been reported that intelligence analysis of the regional, national, and site-specific

threat dynamics of eastern Algeria led experts to warn of possible attacks on the multinational oil and gas assets in the region on at least two occasions in 2012. Despite those clear warnings, the composition of the plant's security force was not changed. The security forces at high-risk and high-value sites should be prepared to act quickly and effectively on the changing threat dynamics developed by predictive intelligence. Preparations should include objective analytics directly linked to the actionable procedures needed to improve measurable security enhancements. For example, accepting the In Amenas incident as a form of predictive intelligence, other sites should now:

Reassess their relevant vulnerabilities and incorporate assault team attack response and mitigation measures in the site's emergency plans and exercise regimen;

Enhance employee awareness of assault situational dynamics together with the reporting and response action protocols according to individual position and collateral position responsibilities; and

Correlate situational awareness value and response expectations to other likely incident scenarios – for example, discovering an armed intruder on the site.

2. *Reassess "Hardened" and "Remote" Target Analyses* – The remote geographic location of a critical infrastructure asset is often considered an attack deterrence. In the In Amenas incident, though, the remote location, combined with what seems to have been a lower local response capacity, may well have been viewed by the terrorists as an important operational advantage. Considering the planning, command, and control coordination necessary to seize such a large complex – and to wrest control from over 700 workers – the remote location gave the terrorists the critical time

needed to subdue and dominate the site with little if any interference from external response forces. Positioning high-value and high-risk sites in remote locations may in fact result in greater vulnerabilities and greater reliance on internal and self-sustained capabilities.

3. *Prepare and Practice for Extreme Scenarios* – Although the probability of multiple terrorist assault teams descending on a site seems to be remote, the adverse consequences to the site, its corporate assets, and the local community, coupled with broader cascading impacts, could be widespread. Therefore, developing, training, and exercising response procedures for such remote risks are prudent in preparing for more routine disruptive events. In that context, functional and capabilities-based preparations should include multidimensional threat scenarios including the relevant cascading complexities. Advance planning and the development of mandatory capabilities also should include the positioning of response elements beyond the site's property line – thereby integrating local and regional response assets of diverse emergency response disciplines into preparedness plans and activities. Vital response partners include off-site corporate assets and even multicorporate stakeholders having vested interests in the site.

The In Amenas Gas Refinery did have a number of procedures in place to cope with a terrorist assault – including the actions assigned to workers in housing areas, other support sites, and the processing control rooms. The site procedures included alarm announcements and follow-on duty and responsibility assignments. Official reports show that the efforts of one security guard, Mohamed Lamine Lahmar, saved numerous lives by the prompt and effective actions he took in the opening moments of the attack – actions that cost him his own life. Only through practice and scenario-based exercises can site personnel perform in predictable ways when faced with real-world contingencies.

4. *Prepare Responders for Special Site Hazards* – Counterterrorism and police response preparedness to sites containing particular internal hazards require specialized awareness, analysis, and skills unique to responder disciplines and properly aligned with their own individual and team capabilities. Unfortunately, the Algerian response forces at the In Amenas Gas Refinery lacked the preparatory experience needed to cope with the hazards posed by engaging in live-fire interdiction in the areas around pressurized flammable gas processing units at the site. It is still not known, in the open-source reports currently available, what plans the Algerian forces involved might have had in place for deploying T-72 battle tank main guns and/or firing helicopter gunship rockets in the final assault on the Tiguentourine processing facility. These heavy-gun assets do not seem to have been fired, but the question of consequence analysis as a part of any decisional criteria is relevant nonetheless.

Site preparedness planning, careful coordination, and analysis of on-site hazards with law enforcement response teams are all of critical importance *well in advance* of an incident. Law enforcement response teams must prepare for alternative solutions and/or determine acceptable-risk thresholds for engaging live-fire, pyrotechnic diversionary, and other interdiction assets at or in areas containing special hazards such as volatile and flammable materials and/or toxic-release chemicals. Law enforcement should therefore assess such dangers and consider shifting to the use of frangible ("soft") ammunition for operations on certain sites. Such operational decisions should be predicated with analysis, training, and decisional procedures well in advance of active operations on relevant sites. The members of law enforcement interdiction units also should be prepared to operate effectively and to use the full ensemble of personal

protective equipment needed to cope with the site's inherent hazards.

5. *Compartmentalize the Site* – In addition to establishing security layers, concentric rings of ever-increasing monitoring and barriers to access include interior compartmentalization of critical assets and safe rooms for the staff in the area. Most modern chemical facilities compartmentalize their process control rooms with access controls. In many cases, though, very little is done to harden the access point and other areas within the facility by the use of simple doorstop wedges, shades over windows, robust locks and hinges, and interior solid-core doors. Using these relatively simple assets would significantly delay armed intruders from accessing areas and entering off-limits rooms as they search for potential victims to shoot or hostages to seize.

At In Amenas, many workers used improvised hides such as under desks after locking and securing the doors. As terrorists searched the site, they attempted to kick in doors but, if the door withstood a few kicks, they moved on with their search. Despite possessing explosives that could have easily blown in locked unyielding doors, the terrorists chose to leave those rooms unchecked, which saved a number of potential hostages the fate of their less fortunate colleagues.

6. *Strengthen Staff Self-Reliance and Critical-Incident Decision Making Capabilities* – Staff preparedness extends well beyond employees to include contractors and even visitors. Building preparedness also includes developing prudent self-reliance – to the point that staff skills and capabilities are sufficient for empowering critical incident decision making (commensurate, of course, with the positional duties and responsibilities of each employee). The analysis of numerous survivor reports suggests that most workers at the In Amenas Gas Refinery were in fact prepared to respond appropriately to an alarm and/or the receipt of information of a terrorist assault in ways appropriate to their locations and to their collective as well as individual positional duties and responsibilities. Even workers still in the Al-Hayat complex were well aware of the need to take the personal protective measures of hiding when faced with an assault on the site.

As mentioned earlier, security officials and process engineers seem to have performed their duties as best they could under the extremely difficult circumstances involved. Each worker's individual response efforts, adapted to the rapidly changing situational dynamics, posed an opportunity to save lives and at least mitigate other harmful consequences. After hiding for a full day, 45 workers escaped to safety because of the early warning provided by a security guard and their own adaptive ingenuity. Here, the lesson learned is that responsible and prudent staff empowerment can and should be an important preparatory measure that is likely to yield an exponentially greater return on investment in mitigation, to prevent undesirable consequences, and to greatly enhance a broad spectrum of recovery efforts as well.

Joseph Trindal is managing director at Defense Group Inc., where he leads the company's risk management services. He also serves as executive vice president of InfraGard Nation's Capital Member Alliance. He retired in 2008 from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, where he had served as director for the National Capital Region, Federal Protective Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In that post, he was responsible for the physical security, law enforcement operations, emergency preparedness, and criminal investigations of almost 800 federal facilities throughout the District of Columbia, Northern Virginia, and suburban Maryland. He previously served, for 20 years, with the U.S. Marshals Service, attaining the position of chief deputy U.S. marshal and incident commander of an emergency response team. A veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps, he holds degrees in both police science and criminal justice.

Staggering Numbers of Women Converting to Islam

By Abigail R. Esman
Source: http://www.radicalislam.org/analysis/staggering-numbers-women-converting-islam/#fm

Abigail R. Esman, an award-winning writer based in New York and the Netherlands, is the author, most recently, of Radical State: How Jihad Is Winning Over Democracy in the West.

Assessing Inspire Magazine's 10th Edition

By Scott Stewart (Stratfor, *Vice President of Analysis)*
Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/assessing-inspire-magazines-10th-edition?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20130321&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=a0948531ad894b5d9f30f6d3db9944a8

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released the 10th edition of its English-

language magazine, Inspire, on March 1. After discussing its contents with our analytical team, initially I decided not to write about it. I concluded that Inspire 10 conformed closely to the previous nine editions and that our analysis of the magazine, from its inception to its re-emergence after the death of editor Samir Khan, was more than adequate.

Since making that decision, however, I have been very surprised at how the media and

other analysts have received the magazine. Some have overhyped the magazine even as others have downplayed -- even ridiculed -- its content. I have heard others say the magazine revealed nothing about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. All these reactions are misguided. So in response, I've endeavored to provide a more balanced assessment that can be placed in a more appropriate perspective.

A Balanced Assessment

I am certainly not among those who want to sensationalize the threat the magazine poses. Inspire 10 is not going to launch the grassroots jihadist apocalypse al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula seeks to foment any more successfully than the magazine's previous nine editions. The fact that a photograph of Austin, Texas, appears in the magazine does not mean that the city is somehow being secretly targeted for attack by jihadist sleeper cells.

But laughing at the magazine or dismissing it as irrelevant would be imprudent. The magazine has in fact inspired several terrorist plots. In some cases, the connections to the magazine have been obvious, as in cases where plotters have attempted to assemble improvised explosive devices using instructions provided in Inspire magazine's first edition. This happened in July 2011, when U.S. Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo was arrested as he attempted

to assemble explosive devices he planned to use in an attack against a restaurant in Killeen, Texas, that was popular with soldiers from nearby Fort Hood.

digital copies of the magazine on a memory card.

There are several other recent and notable cases connected to Inspire magazine.

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IN THIS ISSUE

Note the change in our public key

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WE ARE ALL USAMA

42 "Obama! We are all Usama" The slogan which echoed like thunderstorm during the Anti-Islam US film protests.

36 EXCLUSIVE An extract from the promised interview 'The Arab *Intifada*'. Brother Adam sends three messages to the world.

Latest & Opinion
3 Letter from the Editor
4 AQAP Statements
6 Hear the World
8 News Flash
9 Inspire Reactions
10 Inspire Responses
11 The Corner: The Untold Story
18 Jihadisphere

Jihadi Stories
21 Brother 'Askar, Abu Yazeed Al-Qatary
Abu Ziyad Al-Muhajir
28 From the US Prisons
Sheikh Omar Abdur-Rahman's letter

New: For Ukhtys
30 My Wish: If Only I Was A Mujahid
Tarel Haya
31 Women of the Glorious Ummah
Umm Yahya

Manhaj Review
34 Why did I choose Al-Qaeda?
Shaykh Abu Mus'ab Al-Awlaki
35 What is Al-Qaeda?
Fazul Abdullah
40 O Who Sits Behind
Abu 'Ubaydah Al-Hadhrary
46 To the Knights of Lone Jihad
Extracted from 'Sheikh An-Nadhary's lecture

History & Strategy
16 France, the Imbecile Invader
Abu Abdillah Almoravid
22 The Jihadi Experiences:
The Strategy of Deterring with Terrorism
Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri
26 The American Army & War Ethics
Sheikh Abu Yahya Al-Libi
41 America will never profit from the
assassination of Imam Anwar Awlaki
Adapted from Salafi Media

Open Source Jihad
51 Torching Parked Vehicles
Ibnul Irhab
52 Causing Road Accidents
AQ Chef
56 You Ask, We Answer
AQ Consultant

The Dust will never Settle Down
12 Defending the Prophet
Sheikh Dr. Ayman Adhuwahry
12 The Dust will never Settle Down
Samir Khan

Cover Story
42 We are all Usama
Yahya Ibrahim

NO PARKING! 51
Are there any safe parking lots out there?
To know the answer, read OSJ school!
Ibnul Irhab presents new ideas for Lone Mujahid.

ARE YOU READY FOR AN AMBUSH? 52
Following simple instructions, you can carry out a lethal ambush. There is no retaliation to face, just place and vanish.

Voluntary Contributions:
The editor welcomes correspondence, contributions, photographs and illustrations.

Al-Malahem Media

Crusaders, you will never enjoy tranquility. Your nations will never enjoy security as long as we have pulsing veins and pumping hearts. We are coming by the will of Allah! O lions of Tawheed, be determined when you hear this call that no night will fall except your swords are dripping off the enemies' blood.

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
YAHYA IBRAHIM

In the Name of Allah the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

All praise due to Allah. We thank Him for giving us *Tawfeeq* to complete the tenth issue of this blessed magazine. The past issues were a success, we ask the Almighty to accept the deeds of all who contributed.

{So fight in the cause of Allah, you are not held responsible except for yourself. And inspire the believers} [4: 84]

In this holy verse, Allah orders the Prophet and his followers to fight in His way and to inspire the believers. Therefore, fighting in the way of Allah is an obligation, so is inspiring to jihad. *Alhamdulillah*, three members of the Inspire team have given us wonderful examples of sincerity. They fought as they inspired Muslims to fight and gained martyrdom in the process. The three are Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaqi, Brother Samir Khan and Brother Abu Yazeed Al-Qatari.

Thus, this magazine is written by the blood of *Shuhadaa*. I urge Muslims to distribute all issues of this magazine so as to spread the word of truth and not to waste the blood of our beloved *Shuhadaa* writers.

Finally I call my Muslim brothers in the West:

You have a responsibility towards this *Ummah*. The infidel West has once again insulted our Prophet. Those who insult our prophets should be taught a lesson, and Brother Muslim, you can do it, *inshallah*.

DID YOU KNOW?
- That the number of mosques in US has grown by 74% since 9/11?
- That the national Muslim population in Britain has doubled since 9/11?

In November 2011, the New York Police Department arrested Jose Pimentel, also known as Muhammad Yusuf, a 27-year-old Dominican-American. Pimentel was arrested at an apartment in Manhattan as he was allegedly constructing homemade improvised explosive devices, again following the instructions provided in Inspire.

Other cases have not been as blatant as those involving Abdo and Pimentel. However, they have involved individuals who were radicalized or motivated by Inspire. As recently as March 15, three men in the United Kingdom pleaded guilty to terrorism charges related to attending terrorism training camps in Pakistan. The men allegedly were motivated by Inspire. They had discussed attack ideas from the magazine, and the wife of one of the men was convicted in December 2012 on charges of possessing two

- On Nov. 29, 2012, two brothers from Florida, Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, were arrested and charged with plotting attacks in New York. Prosecutors noted that the pair had been motivated by Inspire magazine.
- On Oct. 17, 2012, Bangladeshi national Quazi Nafis was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation after he attempted to detonate a vehicle bomb outside New York's Federal Reserve Bank. Nafis reportedly was an avid reader of Inspire magazine.
- On Sept. 15, 2012, Adel Daoud, another avid Inspire reader, was arrested after he parked a Jeep Cherokee outside a Chicago bar and

attempted to detonate the bomb he thought it contained. His was also an FBI sting operation.

• On April 25, 2012, four men were arrested in the British town of Luton and charged with plotting attacks against a British army base. The four were also charged with downloading and possessing six editions of Inspire magazine. They pleaded guilty March 1, 2013.

Target Audience

Some commentators have noted that most of the suspects arrested in connection with these plots were fairly hapless and clueless -- the type of individuals we have long referred to as "Kramer jihadists." Though partly incompetent, these grassroots operatives are exactly the demographic al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is targeting for radicalization and mobilization.

Inspire seeks to reach amateur terrorists living in the West; professional terrorists already know how to create pipe bombs. For this reason, the magazine urges amateurs to undertake simple attacks rather than the complex attacks. Too often they find assistance from an FBI informant.

It is a grave error to dismiss Kramer jihadists and assume they pose no threat. They can indeed kill people if they heed the advice of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and conduct simple attacks that are within their capability. That is what Maj. Nidal Hasan did in Fort Hood in November 2009 and what Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, also known as Carlos Bledsoe, did in June 2009. Both men were inspired to action by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Kramer jihadists can also be deadly if they actually find a real terrorist, rather than a government informant, to assist or equip them. It is very important to remember that amateur, committed jihadists such as shoe bomber Richard Reid and underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab nearly succeeded in destroying an airliner.

Twenty years ago last month, I witnessed firsthand the dangers of discounting Kramer jihadists when I peered into a massive crater in the floor of the World Trade Center parking garage. The FBI had deemed those responsible for the attack too hapless to do much more than assassinate the leader of the Jewish Defense League in a midtown Manhattan hotel. And they were -- until a trained terrorist operative traveled to New York and organized their efforts, enabling them to construct, deliver and detonate a massive 590-kilogram (1,300-pound) truck bomb.

I also take umbrage at those who snicker at the thought of grassroots jihadists lighting fires. As noted last month, I believe that fire is an underappreciated threat. Many people simply do not realize how deadly a weapon it can be, even though starting fires does not require sophisticated terrorist tradecraft.

Some Revelations

Despite claims to the contrary, Inspire 10 reveals much about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Like all propaganda and political rhetoric, its assertions must not be taken at face value. But to claim that the magazine tells us nothing about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is simply lazy analysis.

Clearly, the concept of reaching out and attempting to radicalize and equip English-speaking jihadists was not something promoted only by Anwar al-Awlaki and Khan. English-speaking outreach has continued after their deaths. The group maintains that traveling to places such as Yemen for training is too dangerous.

That al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to publish Inspire, which takes time and resources to produce, is also revelatory. The group has been under increased pressure over the past 18 months. The jihadists have been pushed back to their desert hideouts from much of the territory they conquered in southern Yemen. Yet despite these setbacks, they continue to devote resources to publishing Inspire, they have people with access to computers and the Internet, and they remain in contact with jihadists in other parts of the world, such as Pakistan and Mali.

The copyediting in Inspire 10 was also cleaner than the previous edition, which had a major typo on the front cover. The new editor, who uses the nom de guerre Yahya Ibrahim, has worked with Khan since the first edition of the magazine. He is a native English speaker who is familiar with Western culture and idioms. Ibrahim was clearly influenced by Khan and has attempted to continue Khan's work, but he lacks Khan's acerbic wit and irreverence. In Inspire 10, for example, Ibrahim attempts to replicate the insulting one-page

"advertisements" that Khan included in earlier editions of the magazine -- one in particular racially derided U.S. President Barack Obama -- but they lack the bite and general snark of Khan. Inspire seems to be more serious and less edgy than when Khan was in charge. This may dull its appeal to its targeted audience.

Another thing we can ascertain from Inspire 10 is that, despite al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's continued commitment to foment grassroots terrorism in the West, the group is clearly disappointed by the response it has gotten. The magazine has mobilized some jihadists but probably not as many as the group would like. Those who have been inspired have not been very successful in their attacks.

The Open Source Jihad section also continues to show the low view that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's professional terrorist cadre has for grassroots operatives. They see them as not-so-exceptional individuals incapable of much more than simple attacks. Yet, since al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula lacks the ability to attack the West, the group must depend on these less than ideal individuals to do so for them.

In addition to what it reveals about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Inspire 10 can also tell us some important things about what tactics we can expect the group to use and what locations we can expect it to target. Clearly the magazine continues to focus on targets in the West that have insulted the Prophet Mohammed. It revives the "the dust has not settled" theme from the first edition of the magazine and provides an updated hit list of individuals who have insulted Mohammed, including Terry Jones, the controversial Koran-burning pastor; Morris Sadek, who made a controversial film that disparaged Islam; and Stephane Charbonnier of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo.

We have seen several attacks and thwarted plots directed against these individuals in the past. In fact, in November 2011, Charlie Hebdo's office was completely destroyed by fire, which was started by the very type of accelerant and match attack promoted in Inspire 10. We believe we will continue to see grassroots plots against these targets.

Despite the weakening of the al Qaeda core group and the serious blows that regional franchises such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab have suffered in recent months, jihadism continues to attract new adherents. And Inspire hopes to motivate and equip them to conduct attacks in the West.

Shock waves continue from mysterious suicide blast at US Embassy in Ankara

Source: http://www.jamestown.org

In terms of scale alone, the February 1 suicide bombing that killed a Turkish security guard and injured a Turkish journalist outside the U.S. Embassy in Ankara was a relatively minor event that did not succeed in causing any significant damage to the embassy itself. Nonetheless, the attack carried out by left-wing militant Ecevit Sanli has created political and diplomatic reverberations throughout Europe and the Middle East.

Though suicide bombings are most commonly associated with Islamist groups, Sanli was a long-term member of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group that adopted the tactic of suicide-bombing in 2001, the Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP/C - Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front). After several years of inactivity following the death of founder Dursun Karatas in 2008, the Marxist-Leninist group suddenly renewed activities in September, 2012.

In the embassy attack, Sanli is reported to have used an electric detonator to set off six kilograms of TNT strapped to his body. The suicide bomber had previously been imprisoned for an attack on an Istanbul barracks in 1997. After three years in pre-trial detention, Sanli engaged in hunger strikes with dozens of other prisoners in Istanbul's Umraniye Prison in 2000 to prevent their transfer to one of Turkey's feared F-Type prisons, which emphasize social isolation in modern, sterile institutions, an environment that prisoners refer to as "white torture."

Mass hunger strikes have been common in Turkey's high-security F-Type prisons. Scores of prisoners have died in these events, while Sanli and hundreds of others subsequently

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

suffered from Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, a degenerative brain disease better known as "Wet Brain." Caused by thiamine deficiency, the syndrome is common in chronic alcoholics and individuals who have engaged in extended hunger strikes. F-Type Prisons are reserved for terrorists, political prisoners and organized crime leaders. The DHKP/C has been prominent in leading prison hunger strikes. Turkish intelligence has suggested that the DHKP/C used militants suffering from terminal illnesses in a number of suicide attacks carried out in the last seven months (*Today's Zaman*, February 4).

Released on parole after an eight month hunger strike, Sanli eventually disappeared and was sentenced to death *in absentia* in June, 2002 (later reduced to life in prison). Sanli next appeared in Germany in September, 2002, where his application for political asylum was denied after his record of terrorist acts came to light. Germany, however, refused to deport him to Turkey for fear he might be tortured. By 2011 he had lost the right to reside in Germany and was ordered not to leave Cologne (*Der Spiegel* [Hamburg], February 11). German intelligence continued to track Sanli's whereabouts in Germany but lost sight of him last October. It is believed that Sanli planned the Ankara attack while still in Germany.

Anger is growing in Turkey over the alleged failure of various EU states, particularly Germany, to cooperate with Ankara in bringing an end to the use of European nations as bases for extremist groups carrying out terrorist operations in Turkey (*Today's Zaman*, February 5). Germany's reluctance to extradite suspected Turkish extremists was brought up only days after the bombing in talks between Turkish Interior Minister Muammer Guler and his German counterpart, Hans-Peter Friedrich (*Hurriyet Daily News*, February 14).

According to the DHKP/C claim of responsibility that followed the embassy attack, "Our warrior [Sanli] carried out an act of self-sacrifice by entering the Ankara embassy of the United States, murderer of the peoples of the world" (*Today's Zaman*, February 4). The statement went on to condemn Turkey's close security relationship with the United States, citing issues such as the installation of Patriot missiles and NATO's creation of a radar base at Kurecik that Iran claims is intended to

defend Israel, not Turkey (*Milliyet*, February 10).

Shortly after the attack, President Abdullah Gul revealed that Turkey's security services had information in January that the DHKP/C was planning an attack, but "unfortunately it could not be prevented and the attack against the embassy took place" (*Hurriyet Daily News*, February 6). Turkish police are searching for two other DHKP/C members who entered Turkey alongside Sanli from a training camp in Greece. There are fears the two may be planning further suicide attacks (Zaman Online, February 17). A statement issued earlier this month by the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT – Turkey's national intelligence organization) warned Istanbul policemen that the DHKP/C was using internet search engines, Facebook and Twitter to obtain the photographs and addresses of police officers (*Milliyet*, March 4).

The Police Intelligence Department revealed at a recent parliamentary hearing that a 2008 DHKP/C plot to attack the home of Prime Minister Erdogan and a 2009 plan to assassinate former justice minister Hikmet Sami Turk had been foiled by electronic surveillance. The information was given during a hearing in which the police defended their use of wiretaps by claiming 284 terrorist attacks had been stopped and 138 "bombers" arrested in the last three years (*Hurriyet Daily News*, February 24). Many Turks are puzzled by the persistence of what one local columnist called "rogue groups with absolutely no foundation in society," and tend to see the hand of Turkey's "deep state" structure behind the resiliency of Turkey's terrorist groups, including movements that appear to be still fighting the Cold War, such as the DHKP/C (*Today's Zaman*, February 4).

The prior knowledge of an impending DHKP/C attack mentioned by President Gul may have been the reason why Turkish security forces cracked down on the group in the weeks before the bombing, arresting over 80 suspects. After the attack, the crackdown intensified. 167 people were detained in country-wide raids on suspected DHKP/C members on February 18. Many of the detainees were identified as professionals or public servants belonging to the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (KESK), whose offices were also raided. The raids uncovered documents containing the license numbers and identity information of

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Ankara judges and prosecutors who have worked on DHKP/C-related cases (*Hurriyet Daily News*, February 19, February 20; *Today's Zaman*, March 11).

A March 14 raid in the Okmeydani neighborhood of Istanbul was resisted by the occupants of a fortified DHKP/C safe-house, who endured tear gas while trying to burn documents. Twelve people were detained, six of whom were reported to be under 18. The occupants of the safe-house were said to have illegally tapped into electricity, water and

natural gas supplies. A gathering of socialists protested the arrest later that day and were dispersed by Istanbul police using pepper spray (*Today's Zaman*, March 14, March 15).

Greece, which has usually refused to extradite suspects to Turkey, appears to have re-examined its approach in the wake of a March 4 meeting between Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After the meeting, Samaras was reported to have ordered the closing of two DHKP/C training camps in the Lavrion and Oropo regions. The movement is now said to have moved its headquarters to an apartment in Thessaloniki (*Daily Star* [Beirut], March 9; *Hurriyet Daily News*, March 9). Greece has also promised to extradite the elusive Zeki Gurbuz, leader of the Marksist Leninist Komunist Parti Turkiye (MLKP) and a DHKP/C member identified only as "S.E." (*Today's Zaman*, March 15).

- Various theories have been advanced to explain the motivation behind the attack on the U.S. embassy, some based on the belief that the DHKP/C is a "deep-state" legacy working as a subcontractor for other extremist groups or intelligence agencies in order to raise funds for their own operations. If this is the case, there are three possible clients for the embassy attack:

- Syria, as a covert effort to harm the United States, but with a message attached for Ankara regarding its pro-rebel position on Syria. Turkish security analyst and Jamestown contributor Nihat Ali Ozcan pointed to a possible connection between the bombing and the development of a proxy war between Turkey and Syria: "It is no secret that during the Cold War, Syria hosted Marxist-Leninist movements. When Turkey changed its stance against Iran and Syria, everybody started to look at the old files to see 'what kind of networks we had'" (*Hurriyet Daily News*, February 18).

- Iran, as part of a larger proxy war against American interests. The attack would also convey Tehran's dissatisfaction with Turkish policies in Syria.

- Kurdish rebel commanders belonging to the Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (PKK), as a message to Ankara that they will continue operations even as the government enters talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

The DHKP/C is rooted in Turkey's Alevi community, a sectarian affiliation including Turks, Kurds and Arabs and comprising approximately 10 percent of Turkey's population of 75 million

people. Alevism is a syncretic faith that, like Alawism, combines elements of Shi'ism, Christianity and pre-Islamic rites and beliefs. Alevis, who are generally strong supporters of Turkish secularism, have been under pressure from the AKP government for several years to conform to Sunni orthodoxy (EDM, October 12, 2007).

Analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan has suggested that the DHKP/C's Marxist allegiance is of less importance than its "ethnic-sectarian identity"; "There are some homegrown organizations in which most members share a common allegiance to the Alevi faith beneath the cloak of Marxism… Accordingly, with the end of the Cold War, the true colors of the DHKP/C were derived not from Marxism, but from this kind of sectarian identity" (*Hurriyet Daily News*, February 7).

## Croatian counter-terrorism strategy challenges, prevention and response system

By Anita Perešin
Source: http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas160.pdf

Abstract
The Republic of Croatia is a transitional as well as a post-conflict country, building its international and security strategy on the principals of cooperative security and partnership

in international relations. After the September 11, 2001, Croatia has accepted the goals of antiterrorist coalition and the global anti-terrorism engagement.
Considering its geographical position in the region that is stil l not entirely stable, and the estimates of the terrorism threat, Croatia has developed its own strategy to combat terrorism. The main characteristics of the global efforts, as well as the NATO and EU models are comprised in the Croatian strategy, which was used as an important pointer in the formation of the counter-terrorism system. Such efforts stipulated modifications in the security sector and its adaptation to the new requirements. The set goals were not entirely met in the planned time frame, meaning that the strengthening of the system

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

in Croatia is ongoing. In the paper, the focus will be towards the strategy analysis, mapping of the key institutions and their obligations, and the definitions of the reasons of the slower realization of the set strategic goals in the fight against terrorism.

▶ **Read full paper** by clicking at the source link.

Syrian with ties to 9/11 hijackers still in US, virtually immune from deportation

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/24/exclusive-syrian-with-ties-to-11-hijackers-still-in-us-virtually-immune-from/

Daoud Chehazeh, left, and Eyad al Rababah

Free to do as he pleases, living out his days in the suburbs of northern New Jersey, a Syrian national who is a known associate of the 9/11 hijackers never has to worry about deportation by the U.S. government, according to an investigation by Fox Files.

With nearly 400,000 people waiting for U.S. citizenship, Daoud Chehazeh last November received political asylum for a third time after a series of bureaucratic screw ups at the federal level, according to a review of court documents and interviews with former federal and state investigators.

"It's a slap in the face to Americans, especially the victims of 9/11 and the families," said Jim Bush, who as a New Jersey state criminal investigator was part of the 9/11 investigation code-named PENTTBOMB. His partner in the investigation was Bob Bukowski, a now-retired FBI special agent.

"Three thousand people were murdered," Bukowski said. "(Chehazeh) was definitely part of that conspiracy. ... He facilitated the moves and protection up to the whole flight, basically, of Flight 77. Could we prove that in a court of law? No. But there are other remedies. Deport him. That's what should have been done in this case."

"This is an example of our national security policy gone mad," Debra Burlingame, the co-founder of 9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America, said. Fox Files' findings and the connection between Chehazeh and the Flight 77 hijackers were especially disheartening because Burlingame's brother, Charles, was the pilot of Flight 77, which was hijacked and slammed into the Pentagon.

"This is what comes of demilitarizing the 'War on Terror' and political correctness, treating enemies with the rights of ordinary people," she said.

"We owe a person like this absolutely nothing. His confederates were summarily executed by drone. This is an utterly incoherent national security policy."

Chehazeh arrived in the U.S. in July 2000 from Saudi Arabia and quickly settled into Paterson, N.J.'s Middle Eastern community. Paterson was the launching pad for the plot, where 11 of the 19 hijackers passed through before the attacks.

In Paterson, Chehazeh met up and lived with another key facilitator of the hijackers, a Jordanian named Eyad al Rababah. The significance of the Chehazeh-Rababah support network for the hijackers in Virginia and New Jersey was first reported by Fox News in May 2011. Law enforcement sources told Fox News that revelations Chehazeh was still living in the U.S. went to the most senior levels of the FBI.

Seven months before the attacks, Chehazeh, who had no job and no known source of income, suddenly decided to leave Paterson. Along with his roommate, Rababah, the two men moved to suburban Washington, D.C., and almost immediately made contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, who was the imam at the mosque in Falls Church, Va.

Fox Files' exclusive reporting showed al-Awlaki, killed in September 2011 by a CIA drone strike in Yemen, was a guest speaker at the Pentagon five months after the 2001 attacks and that there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence suggesting the cleric was an overlooked key player in the plot.

By April 2001, beside al-Awlaki, Chehazeh's new circle of friends and neighbors included future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjour, a pilot. Chehazeh made a point to tell Rababah, even though both men later admitted to investigators they were not religious men, to go to the mosque and ask Imam al-Awlaki for work.

"Al-Rababah returns home with two of the hijackers," Bush explained. "And that's the first time, that we know of, that Daoud Chehazeh met the hijackers."

Rababah got the hijackers an apartment in Virginia. He helped them get settled. And in May 2001, Rababah drove al-Hazmi, Hanjour and two of the newly arrived muscle hijackers to Connecticut and New Jersey. The 9/11 Commission Report said that within a few weeks seven of the hijackers were living in New Jersey in a one-room apartment.

Bukowski and Bush are still haunted by a piece of evidence.

"When (Chehazeh) was arrested, in his car we found booklets, flight information from (New Jersey's) Teterboro Airport, where we know Hani Hanjour, again the pilot, practiced out of," Bush said. Chehazeh "didn't know how the hell they got there."

Bukowski and Bush say they still believe there was an unknown relationship between al-Awlaki, Chehazeh and Rababah. At least five of the hijackers were tied to these men. And it is striking that the 9/11 Commission report makes no reference to Chehazeh.

"Chehazeh was still being a little bit investigated at the time when we were interviewed by the 9/11 Commission.," Bukowski explained. "I guess they believe that Al-Rababah played, uh, was more of the leader, but we found out, no, he was more of the one that was just being told what to do."

For more than a decade, the U.S. government has spent more than half a million dollars trying to deport Chehazeh. Bush and Bukowski said Chehazeh knew how to play the system. While the FBI was on his trail after 9/11, the immigration judge was apparently in the dark about his hijacker connections. It is unknown who or what government agency dropped the ball.

In 2001, court documents show U.S. immigration judge Annie Garcy helped Chehazeh fill out his asylum application. She would eventually rule that he belonged to a social group of "people who are hopelessly in debt."

"I think it was unusual for a federal judge to grant him asylum based upon his being a member of a social group called hopeless debtors," said Andrew Napolitano, a superior court judge in New Jersey for eight years who now is a senior judicial analyst for Fox News. "The federal judge concluded that he would be tortured or killed in Syria."

Chehazeh was free to live in this country. But the case was reopened in 2007 when the FBI claimed Chehazeh was a danger to national security. Bukowski said the basis was "his connection to the hijackers."

In 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals reopened Chehazeh's case. And this time, Chehazeh had high-powered pro bono attorneys from the New York City law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. Fox Files contacted

Chehazeh and his attorneys numerous times, but they declined to provide a written statement or otherwise comment.

For now it looks like Chehazeh is never leaving the United States. Last November, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed its decision to reopen Chehazeh's case. And on Feb. 13, the case was officially closed and entered into court records of the United States District Court District of New Jersey.

Napolitano described the Chehazeh case as closed with "clarity and finality."

But others suspected of 9/11 connections faced very different outcomes. Rababah was deported to Jordan in 2003. And al-Awlaki was killed by drone in Yemen in 2011.

Understanding Islamist Terrorism in Western Countries

By Sam Mullins

Source: http://extremisproject.org/2013/02/understanding-islamist-terrorism-in-western-countries/

We are now all-too-familiar with the fact that residents and citizens of Western countries are becoming radicalised and actively participating in Islamist militant activities, including taking up arms with terrorist-insurgencies abroad in places such as Somalia, and plotting to attack civilian targets at home in the West. Yet despite the fact that 'home-grown' Islamist terrorism (HGIT) is no longer as shocking as it once was, it remains a topic of much debate that is still poorly understood. In order to clarify our understanding of this issue, the first step is to try and disentangle the various motivational factors involved. Here I will briefly examine nine factors of interest before proposing a composite model of motivation for Islamist terrorism in Western countries.

#1: Socioeconomic backgrounds

It is now widely acknowledged that Islamist terrorists do not conform to a single profile in terms of their background characteristics that might help differentiate them from the population at large, or which might be useful from an investigative point of view. The vast majority are young males, generally ranging from their late teens to their early thirties, but there is a great deal of diversity in socioeconomic standing, educational achievement, ethnicity and marital status. In short, people living in Western countries do not generally get involved in Islamist terrorism because they are impoverished, uneducated or incapable of finding a wife.

#2: Psychological abnormality

Likewise, the idea that terrorists must be suffering from some kind of mental disorder has been generally discredited. A very small minority of individuals involved in Islamist terrorism do suffer from a variety of psychological problems, but the vast majority appear to be psychologically 'normal'.

#3: Individual adversity

Although not clearly disadvantaged on the whole, people who become involved in Islamist terrorism in Western countries quite often seem to suffer from social and/or spiritual alienation and find it difficult to 'fit in'. A number of individuals have also experienced personal adversity such as loss of family members or difficulties with drugs. Experience of adversity (regardless of the precise nature) can create 'cognitive openings' which prime individuals to be more open to alternative worldviews and increase the chances that violent ideology might be accepted.

#4: Conditions in the West

Although not deprived in absolute terms, Muslim populations in the West (in particular in Europe) are often disadvantaged in comparison with the general population, as reflected, for example, in lower average earnings and higher rates of unemployment and imprisonment. The perception that counter-terrorism (CT) measures unfairly single out Muslim communities may also add to the sense of grievance. Such experiences of *relative* deprivation and discrimination may then conceivably result in frustration and aggression, which for some individuals find expression in acts of terrorism. However, this does not explain why certain individuals get involved in Islamist terrorism while others experiencing the same broad conditions do not (and it likewise fails to provide a comprehensive explanation for differential rates of Islamist terrorism between different countries).

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

#5: 'Crises' of identity

Closely related to issues of individual adversity and conditions in the West, it has been suggested that psychologically, Islamist terrorists may be experiencing a 'crisis' of identity. Such crises may arise from social alienation, tension between Muslim and Western identities, or a sense of marginalisation among converts to Islam who then pursue their new-found religion with a combination of excessive zeal and lack of knowledge. Issues of individual and collective identity indeed permeate almost every aspect of terrorism and by invoking these concepts we gain a more nuanced understanding of individual experiences. Yet the discussion so far has essentially revolved around the same factors- namely disillusionment and dissatisfaction with life in the West.

#6: Foreign policy

Western foreign policy has been the most consistently and explicitly voiced grievance of Islamist terrorists over time, in particular support for Israel and military interventions in Muslim countries. The invasion of Iraq is thought to have been especially significant for seemingly confirming perceptions that Islam is under attack by the West and fuelling recruitment to militancy. Whether it is direct Western involvement (e.g. Mali) or lack thereof (e.g. Syria) each new conflict involving Muslims is interpreted as further evidence of a grand Western conspiracy against Islam. Just as importantly, footage of Muslim women and children being raped and killed is utilised within visually and emotionally powerful recruitment videos which instil a sense of 'moral shock' and an altruistic desire to take up arms, or to inflict revenge.

#7: The influence of the Islamic world

Radicalization in the West is not solely an outcome of what Western nations do, and does not occur in a vacuum. Political machinations in the Islamic world facilitated the spread of Salafi Islam, which many Islamist terrorists claim to adhere to. They also directly contributed to the influx of veteran mujahideen to the West after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, further enabling militant networks to expand. In addition, diaspora populations pay close attention to developments in their countries of origin and Islamic governments have been instrumental in whipping up anti-Western

sentiment in response to a range of incidents, from the Salman Rushdie affair to the publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons. In a practical sense, Western recruits also continue to seek out connections with Islamist terrorists in Asia, Africa and the Middle East in order to gain training and combat experience.

#8: The role of religion

Statistically, the number of people involved in Islamist terrorism in Western countries represents less than 1% of the Muslim population and most of these recruits have led secular lives up until the point of radicalization. It would thus be ill-informed to equate involvement in terrorism with Islam in general. Yet religious beliefs are clearly an important part of the Islamist terrorist identity and just because individual militants may be lacking in religious knowledge does not preclude the fact that they might still feel very strongly about the beliefs they hold. What is important then, is to understand the *particular interpretation* of Islam that terrorists adhere to, how it shapes their identity and behaviour, and how it appeals to new recruits.

#9: Social motives

Friends and family often act as important facilitators for initial radicalisation and recruitment to Islamist terrorism. The majority of research on the subject suggests that although leaders, 'recruiters' or 'entrepreneurs' sometimes play a central role, increasing radicalisation is often driven by small group dynamics. Gradual absorption of violent ideology is thus frequently driven by social interaction, and feelings of loyalty, friendship, belonging and excitement may be just as important as ideological beliefs.

Bringing it all together: A composite model of motivation

Taking into consideration the range of possible motives and the diversity of individuals involved, it seems likely that different people will exhibit different motivational patterns. However, by classifying the different motives we can gain an appreciation of how they combine to ultimately drive someone to commit acts of terrorism in the name of Islam. This furthermore enables us to identify necessary conditions for involvement in HGIT.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Pre-disposing risk: General

Factors such as varying life 'crises', disillusionment or dissatisfaction with life in the West and any pre-existing desire for adventure or violence all fall under the heading of general pre-disposing risk. They may increase susceptibility to the Islamist terrorist narrative but they are not by themselves determining factors and are very widely experienced without often leading to involvement in terrorism.

Pre-disposing risk: Specific

Specific pre-disposing risk factors are very similar to general factors, except that they involve a natural alignment with specific elements of Islamist ideology. Self-identification with Muslims around the world, anger at Western foreign policy and feelings of empathy and moral shock at the suffering of Muslims in conflict zones, although still widely experienced, thus represent more specific motivational risk factors.

Direct motivators: Process drivers and social goals

Direct motivators drive and sustain involvement in Islamist terrorist activity. Process drivers and social goals are non-ideological factors that do this. Among them are motives of belonging, acceptance and loyalty; group dynamics; the development of an identity as a *mujahid*, or Islamic fighter; the desire to maintain a positive *collective* identity; and the desire to maintain the existence of one's specific militant group, once established.

Direct motivators: Ideological goals

Finally, there are goals prescribed by jihadi ideology, which groups and individuals are actually trying to achieve to varying extents. These include to do God's (perceived) will; to help other Muslims; to pursue revenge and violence against the perceived oppressors of Islam; to end Western interference in the Islamic world; and to establish 'true' Islamic states.

Necessary conditions

The above factors help us to appreciate individual susceptibility and reasons for continued involvement in Islamist terrorism in the West. They do not, however, tell us how people get involved in the first place. There may well be no sufficient conditions, but with very few exceptions the *necessary* conditions for involvement in Islamist terrorism are a combination of exposure to the ideology, social exposure to similar individuals and practical opportunity. A very small number of genuinely *lone* actor terrorists may get involved without even an online social component, but these cases are the exception to the rule.

Implications

The themes of identity that apparently lie at the core of involvement in Islamist terrorism suggest that for the purposes of theory-building, there may be potential in further utilising and combining Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory (SIT). These can help us tie together various elements such as identity crises, moral shocks, empathy and group dynamics to give a more coherent theory of involvement in terrorism. In particular, suicide terrorism likely involves what is referred to in SIT as *depersonalisation*, whereby a person's individual identity is essentially relegated in favour of their collective identity to the point that they are willing to sacrifice their life for the 'greater good'. There is certainly value in exploring such possibilities, including possible implications for CT, in further research.

In a more practical sense, if we accept the argument here that experiences of dissatisfaction or adversity in the West are in fact pre-disposing risk factors, rather than direct motivators for involvement in HGIT, the implication is that efforts to improve the socioeconomic situation of Western Muslim populations are unlikely to be particularly effective for CT. This is because the relationship with individual involvement in terrorism is seemingly indirect. On the other hand, although we might ideally remove direct motivators for terrorism by addressing political and religious grievances, such factors do not lend themselves to easy manipulation. The most effective means of reducing HGIT in the West will thus be to target the necessary conditions, which most directly drive individual recruitment and are potentially accessible for intervention- namely ideology, social exposure and opportunity. This may include a variety of different approaches by both governmental and non-governmental agencies, but at the core these will involve a combination of efforts to counter terrorist ideology, identify and disrupt

specific militant networks and measures to reduce practical opportunities.

Space here does not permit further discussion of these issues; however it is hoped that this brief summary article has helped to clarify the motivational factors underpinning Islamist terrorist activity in Western countries, and that it serves to inspire further research and theoretical development.

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Counterterrorism, public support & violence levels

By Bart Schuurman

Source: http://extremisproject.org/2013/03/counterterrorism-public-support-violence-levels/

There are no one-size-fits-all policy recommendations to be made when it comes to counterterrorism. Despite many states' decades of experience fighting terrorism in a wide variety of conflicts and notwithstanding the considerable research efforts that have gone into assessing the efficacy of counterterrorism approaches, there is still considerable uncertainty over how best to deal with this form of warfare. The 'holy grail' of a counterterrorism approach that works well irrespective of the type of terrorism being faced has not yet been found and it probably never will be.

Of course, this is hardly surprising. Terrorism is not only a very complex and multifaceted subject, incorporating groups and individuals from widely differing backgrounds fighting for disparate goals set against complex historical, social and political backgrounds, but the very definition remains contested and controversial to this day. How do you develop the best practices to counter a phenomenon that cannot yet be accurately defined, let alone is fully understood? But despite these obstacles, there is no dearth of ideas about how to effectively wage counterterrorism campaigns. Arguably, some of them have even become part of our accepted conventional wisdom. One such precept is the thought that acquiring and maintaining public support forms the essential basis for counterterrorism success.

The idea of acquiring and maintaining popular support as a prerequisite for effectively defeating an 'irregular' opponent, that is someone who uses terrorism or guerrilla warfare-esque tactics, is by no means particularly new. Mao Tse Tung likened guerrillas to fish swimming in a sea composed of the people, underlining that for such combatants it is of vital importance to maintain affable relations with the populace. In more recent times, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to the resurgence of the idea that the key to victory when fighting insurgents and terrorists lies in winning the local populations' 'hearts and minds', rather than focusing on so-called kinetic solutions. Many publications on terrorism seem to echo these assumptions, arguing that terrorists are dependent on public support for recruits, shelter, money and intelligence. But for a resource of such avowedly pivotal importance, few accounts actually explain just how public support influences the effectiveness of (counter)terrorism campaigns.

In order to learn more about how levels of public support affected the outcome of (counter)terrorism campaigns, I decided to study three classic examples of Western democracies fighting terrorist groups. As cases, I chose to look at Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' (1968-1998), the Italian government's struggle against left-wing terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s and the Canadian province of Quebec's experience with the separatist *Front de Libération du Québec* (FLQ, 1963-1972). By focusing on conspicuous high- and low-points in conflict-related violence

levels, I hoped to ascertain the extent to which government countermeasures had been successful and what role public support had played in bringing about the success or failure of these policies. Because I did not want to limit myself to investigating one particular kind of counterterrorism approach, I surveyed a broad range of measures from 'doing nothing' to negotiations, legal reforms, the use of the police, the deliberate use of violence and even measures that could be considered to go 'beyond democracy'.

One of the difficulties with this research was finding quantifiable information on levels of public support for both state and terrorist. While many accounts mention that the state or its opponents enjoyed 'high' or 'low' support, this does not actually tell us that much. How many people supported the Red Brigades, for example? Did support for the IRA's cause increase or decrease over the years? In order to answer such questions, surveys and opinion polls had to be found. In all fairness, relevant data pertaining to these conflicts is quite scarce and the few polls that are around do not always lend themselves for a straightforward comparison with each other. Nevertheless, the available data did allow me to provide some much-needed empirical substantiation for several interesting findings.

In short, I argue that public support can provide a mandate for action but that it can also set boundaries for the measures governments and their non-state adversaries can legitimately use. Fluctuations in the quantity and quality of public support for either side can expand or contract these boundaries, potentially instigating marked changes in conflict-related violence levels and affecting the efficacy of government countermeasures.

Interestingly enough, it appears that it is not so much the type of counterterrorism measure used as the degree to which it falls within the scope of what a state's citizens see as legitimate and justified, that plays a large role in determining a certain policy's effectiveness. Finally, both states and terrorist organizations face grave dangers when they overstep the 'popular mandate' awarded to them by their backers, making them respectively risk a sharp rise in violence levels or rapid defeat.

It would be extremely interesting to expand this research to incorporate a larger number of case studies, especially those where extensive polling data is available. Public support appears to be a variable with an above-average explanatory power when it comes to understanding not only the development of terrorism-related conflicts over time, but also the efficacy of government countermeasures meant to address this particular form of political violence. As such, it is an area of research that could be of considerable interest to policy makers and academics alike.

Bart Schuurman MA is a researcher at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, part of Leiden University's Campus The Hague in the Netherlands. In 2009 he graduated with a degree in the History of International Relations from Utrecht University. Since that time he has been involved in a variety of research projects aimed at generating a better understanding of issues related to contemporary armed conflicts and terrorism. His research interests include the causes, forms and effectiveness of contemporary terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as asymmetric conflicts and Clausewitzian strategic theory. www.bartschuurman.com Recent publications include: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Bart Schuurman, 'The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorist and Insurgent Organisations', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39:4 (November 2011) 677-692. Bart Schuurman, 'Trinitarian Troubles: Governmental, Military and Societal Explanations for Post-1945 Western Failures in Asymmetric Conflicts', Small Wars & Insurgencies 22:1 (March 2011) 32-54. Bart Schuurman, 'Clausewitz and the "New Wars" Scholars', Parameters 40:1 (Spring 2010) 89-100.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Eyropean citizens' main concerns

Public opinion in Europe: Citizens' main concerns

Results based on responses of 26 622 citizens in the EU-27

Concern	%
Economic Situation	53%
Unemployment	36%
The state of Member States public finances	32%
Rising prices/inflation	16%
Immigration	8%
EU's influence in the world	7%
Taxation	6%
Crime	6%
Energy supply	4%
Terrorism	4%
The environment	3%
Climate change	3%
Pensions	3%
Other	1%
Don't know	4%

Source: Eurobarometer, Autumn 2012

Examining Willingness to Attack Critical Infrastructure On and Off-line

By Tom Holt
Source: http://extremisproject.org/2013/01/examining-willingness-to-attack-critical-infrastructure-on-and-off-line/

The global adoption of technology over the last two decades has radically altered the way individuals, businesses, and governments communicate. Access to high speed wireless connectivity, tablet PCs, and smart phones enable individuals to be in constant contact with others in near-real time and access nearly any data source of interest. As a consequence, cyberspace has substantive value as a target for either political expression or ideologically motivated attacks and social conflict. The Internet and computer-mediated communications, like Facebook, provide individuals with an outlet to express dissent with policies and practices of their own government or those of foreign nations. These technologies also allow nation states' most vulnerable and critical systems to be attacked with greater secrecy and fewer resources than might otherwise be required off-line.

Policy-makers have increasingly focused on deterring cyber-attacks performed by state-sponsored actors, though there has been less emphasis placed on the role of actors with no ties or sponsorship from a nation or military group. Non-nation-state sponsored actors can leverage technological resources as a force multiplier to engage in non-violent actions like protest, or serious forms of violence such as targeted attacks against infrastructure with a greater magnitude than what may otherwise be possible through real world protest and political action. These conditions have given rise to what Dorothy Denning called the "civilian cyber-warrior" who can operate with no state-sponsorship to attack various resources within their own government or a foreign nation due to the power differential provided by the Internet and CMCs.

Few researchers have considered what individual factors may predict participation as a cyber-warrior against either their home country or another nation. Furthermore, it is unclear what relationships may be evident in the predictors of both non-violent and violent activities in physical and virtual action. Thus, Max Kilger and I explored these issues. We used a survey administered to a sample of 353 undergraduate and graduate students

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

at a large Midwestern university in the spring of 2010 to assess these issues. The respondents were 60% male, 89% domestic/US born students with an average age of 22.

We asked respondents about their willingness to engage in politically motivated behaviors in the real world and on-line as well as against their home government and a fictitious foreign nation titled Bagaria. The behaviors ranged from writing letters to participation in political protests to serious acts of violence such as damaging a building with an explosive device. Similarly, respondents were given options for on-line behavior involving posting messages on Facebook or Twitter, defacing websites, to compromising government servers and even compromising power grids and nuclear plants. The majority of respondents reported a willingness to write letters in the real world or post messages on Facebook or Twitter. A very small proportion of respondents were willing to engage in serious acts of violence in the real world or critical infrastructure in cyberspace regardless of the target. In fact, less than two percent of the sample would utilize explosives to engage in an act of violence in the real world. Less than two percent would also attack critical infrastructure on-line against domestic targets in keeping with the generally small number of individuals who appear willing to perform acts of terror or serious political violence.

We developed logistic regression models to identify what behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic factors were associated with individual willingness to engage in multiple forms of cyberattack. In the model for attacks against a person's home government, those who reported antagonistic attitudes toward minority groups and the belief that those groups should be held down were more likely to engage in multiple forms of attack. In addition, those who engaged in media and software piracy, and were willing to engage in multiple forms of physical protest behaviors were more likely to engage in cyberattacks. Respondents from foreign nations were also more likely to take virtual action in the domestic model. Within the model for attacks against the foreign government of Bagaria, those who engaged in piracy, were willing to engage in physical attacks, and males were more likely to engage in multiple forms of cyberattack.

The preliminary results suggest that there may be generally few predictors to help identify willingness to engage in political attacks. Specifically, the relationship identified between willingness to engage in cyberattacks and physical attacks suggests that there is a closer link between on and off-line acts of terrorism than originally thought. The significance of participation in digital piracy may provide support for the argument that individuals need not have high degrees of technical skill in order to have an interest in politically motivated cyberattacks. For instance, members of Anonymous commonly use the simple point-and-click Denial of Service Attack tool called the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) in attacks against various targets. Thus, individuals must simply have a desire to express themselves on-line and be willing to break the law in support of their goal.

These findings are extremely preliminary and require substantive additional study in order to clarify the relationships identified. For instance, developing diverse samples culled from the general population of various countries would greatly improve the generalizability of these findings. Administering the survey in countries with different political systems would also improve our understanding of any differences in the perception of the value of physical attacks relative to virtual attacks where anonymity may help to mask the risk of detection from restrictive governments.

► The research discussed in this blog post appeared in the work below:

Holt, Thomas J., and Max Kilger. 2012. Examining Willingness to Attack Critical Infrastructure On and Off-line." *Crime & Delinquency*, 58(5): 798-822.

Dr. Thomas J. Holt is an Associate Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University specializing in cybercrime, cyberterror, and technology. His research focuses on computer hacking, malware, and the role that technology and the Internet play in facilitating all manner of crime and deviance. Dr. Holt has been published in a variety of academic journals, including Crime and Delinquency, Deviant Behavior and the Journal of Criminal Justice. He is also the editor of the book Crime On-line: Correlates, Causes, and Context (Carolina Academic Press), co-editor of Corporate

Hacking and Technology Driven Crime (IGI-Global), and a co-author of the book Digital Crime and Digital Terror (Pearson). He is the project lead for the Spartan Devils Honeynet Project, a joint project of Michigan State University, Arizona State University, and private industry, and a member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Cyber Criminology. He received his Ph. D. in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Missouri-Saint Louis in 2005.

Captured terror suspect reveals al Qaeda plans

Source: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57576242/captured-terror-suspect-tells-all-about-al-qaeda-plans/

The U.S. government unsealed papers Monday detailing the arrest and interrogation of a senior terror leader, a development one official called

"an intelligence watershed."

For the past two years, Ahmed Warsame has been cooperating with U.S. interrogators, revealing inside details about training, operatives and potential plots.

Warsame was a key commander for al Shabaab, the al Qaeda-linked terrorist group based in Somalia. Al Shabaab has attracted dozens of American recruits, including Omar Hammami, a propagandist born in Alabama.

Court papers unsealed Monday reveal Warsame pleaded guilty to being an operational link between two terror groups -- al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen.

The 25-year-old Somali was captured by the U.S. military in April 2011 in the Gulf of Aden as he was traveling from Yemen to Somalia. He was carrying extensive files and handwritten notes about how to build bombs.

It was all part of a terror-exchange program, and Warsame was a broker. He funneled money and communications gear from Somalia to Yemen in exchange for weapons and explosives for his Somali fighters.

After his capture, Warsame was held aboard a U.S. ship and secretly interrogated for two months.

In July 2011, he was flown to New York and appeared before a judge. He continued to talk to interrogators, repeatedly waiving his rights, as he laid out more details about al Qaeda operations.

Officials will only describe the intelligence he provided as "enormously valuable," but he does understand how terrorists move money and people. Most importantly, he knows how the affiliated terror groups are connected and what their joint capabilities might be.

The U.S. brought him into the civilian court system instead of sending him to Guantanamo Bay, because the Obama administration is trying to

make a point: Terrorist prisoners can be prosecuted in U.S. civilian courts. But it's also true the government took its time to exploit all

of the potential intelligence, questioning him for two months at sea -- outside the criminal justice system.

Saudi Arabia Uses A Big Broom

Source:http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2013/03/saudi-arabia-uses-big-broom.html?utm_source= feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+terrorismwatch%2FJTvK+%28Terrorism+ Watch%29&utm_content=Yahoo!+Mail

March 27, 2013: Saudi Arabia currently has about 3,200 people in prison on terrorism charges, 17 percent of them foreigners. In addition, 342 foreign workers were deported over the last four months because they were suspected of terrorism activities. In the same time several thousand Saudis were charged with similar activities but were released after warnings.

The problem here is that the Saudi definition of terrorism includes more than the Islamic variety. The Saudis actually defeated al Qaeda five years ago, after a five year battle. Most al Qaeda survivors fled to Yemen, and elsewhere. But the Saudi government kept arresting people. The Saudis claim they have arrested over 7,000 terrorist suspects since 2003. But Saudi pro-reform groups claim that it may be more than twice that. This is because Saudi Arabia is ruled by Sharia (Islamic) law, which allows the police and courts to do pretty much whatever they want. They are accountable only to God, and the king.

Those arrested in the last five years are increasingly pro-democracy activists. Not criminals at all, except to royalists and Islamic conservatives (who believe democracy is un-Islamic.) And to the royal family and the clerics, these reformers are terrorists. But at least the royal family realizes that their popularity is in decline, and that some accommodation will have to be made, eventually. But in the meantime, democracy activists are arrested, and held for months, or years, without being charged. Under Sharia law, the accused have none of the protections taken for granted in the West.

All this has been done very quietly. There have been few "Arab Spring" demonstrations in Saudi Arabia. Not for want of trying, but anyone

who tries to get such things going gets turned in, arrested, and disappears. Most Saudis are quiet, having been silenced by the tried-and-true "stuff their mouths with gold" technique. The Saudi royals are not stupid, and they spread the oil wealth around to prove it. But many Saudis want more. They want what is forbidden, a say in how the country is run.

The royals also know how to fight, and see these pro-democracy activists as just another competitor to be put down by any means necessary. The Saud family has been doing this for centuries. Al Qaeda and the Saudi government went head-to-head with each other from 2003 to 2008. The terrorists lost. After three years of terrorist violence, and police operations, which left over 200 dead, there was two years of relative quiet, with al Qaeda unable to carry out any attacks. But during those two years, the Saudi government kept coming after the Saudi Al Qaeda members, and broke the organization in the kingdom. The survivors fled.

The al Qaeda defeat was not a sure thing. The fighting between the government and al Qaeda was triggered by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Before that, the Saudi government and al Qaeda had what amounted to a truce. Despite the events of September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia did not tear the country apart to root out all al Qaeda supporters. The problem was that there were so many al Qaeda supporters in the country, and the majority of the population supported al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism. On September 11, 2001 there were spontaneous pro-terrorist demonstrations all over the country as the twin towers collapsed. American diplomats reported this to the American government. The American media played down the real mood of the Saudi population.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

The Saudi government, and a significant minority of the population, realized that Islamic terrorism was a dead end, and were desperately seeking a way to stem the growing popularity of the Islamic radicals. This has been a problem for centuries in Arabia, but with the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Saudis feared that the anger in the Western nations could get out of control, and bring down a catastrophe on Saudi Arabia and the Arab world. This fear even percolated down to most of the Saudi Islamic radicals, and there developed an informal truce, where the terrorists did not launch attacks in Saudi Arabia, while the government did not press their search for al Qaeda supporters, particularly if those pro-terrorist Saudis were discreet and not too open in their activities. But this meant that al Qaeda fund raisers still quietly circulated and took care of business. Pro-terrorist preachers continued to exhort Moslems to support the violence. Islamic terror groups could still recruit young Saudis for overseas adventures.

Then the U.S. went into Iraq. This was too much for the Islamic radicals in Saudi Arabia. The truce was tossed aside and al Qaeda began carrying out attacks. The Islamic terrorists misjudged the resources of the government, and the depth of public support for Islamic violence. The al Qaeda attacks turned public opinion against the terrorists, and the police proved capable of using this shift to obtain tips and chase down the active terrorists. The government went even further than that over the next three years. Needed personnel changes were made in the government, especially in the security forces, replacing "family favorites" with more competent officials. Because Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, members of the large royal family are favored for key jobs. That custom was suspended for a while.

The government had other resources that the terrorists underestimated. Since Islam is the state religion, the government closely supervises the vast clerical bureaucracy. The king and his key aides spend a lot of time maintaining close personal relationships with key clerics. When the king called on the clergy to preach against Islamic terrorism, most complied. And those who did not were coerced to comply, remain silent or retire. The clergy were also recognizing the shift in public opinion. Basically, a lot of Saudis were OK with Islamic terrorism as long as it happened somewhere else. But when the bombs began going off nearby, attitudes changed.

Still, it took three years for al Qaeda to be shut down in the kingdom, and then energetic counter-terror operations continued for two more years, with police arresting hundreds of al Qaeda fans each year. The Saudi counter-terror effort has also benefitted from the thousands of young Saudis who went off to Iraq to join the fight, and get killed, or come back disillusioned. Very few came back as "hardened terrorists." Despite all this, Islamic terrorism remains popular among many young Saudis. They have to operate covertly, otherwise they will get arrested and sent off to a rehabilitation facility (endless hours of lectures from anti-terrorism clerics and interminable discussions with counselors until there is convincing evidence of a change in attitude.) The rehabilitation often works, but it fails frequently enough to maintain the population of potential terrorists.

The police, and particularly the intelligence specialists, have changed their methods greatly in the last seven years. The cops are quicker and more effective when they have to carry out raids. The intel people have developed elaborate informant networks, as well as Internet monitoring systems. Many Saudis fear that these new capabilities will make it even more difficult to introduce reforms in the kingdom. It's a lot harder now, to do anything the government does not approve up. Meanwhile, five years of few terror attacks has allowed pro-terrorism attitudes to return. Many Saudis still approve of Islamic radicals killing "infidels" (non-Moslems), and don't care if al Qaeda is doing it. What remain unpopular is Islamic radicals attacking fellow Moslems. Al Qaeda tries to justify this by asserting that any Moslem that does not agree with them is actually not a Moslem (and is thus an infidel). Many Moslems disagree with this logic, but not so much in Saudi Arabia. So while al Qaeda may be down in Saudi Arabia, it is not out. In the meantime, the pro-democracy "terrorists" are becoming the main target of government police.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

New report examines relationship between county characteristics and incidents of terrorism

Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_IUSSD_CountylevelCorrelatesofTerrorismintheUS_March2013.pdf.

START ➤➤ NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE **STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM**
A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE OF THE U.S.DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY BASED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

With a quarter of all terrorist attacks in the U.S. from 1990 to 2010 occurring in just 10 counties, researchers from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) aim to understand that clustering by examining the relationship between counties' characteristics and incidents of terrorism.

In a new report, "County-level Correlates of Terrorism in the United States, 1990 to 2010," START Director Gary LaFree and START Researcher Bianca Bersani analyze the reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks in the United States. The vast majority of counties – 92 percent -- did not experience any terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2010.

County-level Correlates of Terrorism in the United States, 1990 to 2010

Final Report to the Resilient Systems Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

March 2013

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Based at the University of Maryland

8400 Baltimore Ave, Suite 250 • College Park,MD 20740 • 301.405.6600
www.start.umd.edu

While there was a significant reduction in the frequency of terrorism in the first decade of the 21st century compared to the previous decade – nearly 350 attacks in 1990s to just more than 230 from 2001-2010 – the reduction was felt differentially across U.S. counties.

Counties characterized by high levels of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability saw the greatest reduction in the rate of terrorism in the last decade. Counties characterized by high levels of foreign-born population and language diversity saw less reduction in the rate of terrorism between 2001 and 2010. It should be noted that the data used in this report don't speak to the profiles of individuals who committed attacks but rather the profiles of

Global Terrorism Database 1990 - 2010

Just more than half of the remaining counties experienced just one terrorist attack.

counties that were the targets of attacks.

The new report builds on the authors' previous report, "Hot Spots of Terrorism and Other Crimes in the United States: 1970 to 2008," that brought to light substantial evidence that over the course of nearly four decades, nearly a third of all terrorist attacks occurred within just five U.S. counties.

The data for this report come from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census. This research was supported by the Resilient Systems Division of the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Organized Crime & Terrorism: Making Room for New Friends

By Regina Paulose

Source:http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/03/22/organized-crime-terrorism-making-room-for-new-friends/
?goback=.gmp_4125332.gde_4125332_member_225545977%3E&utm_source=The+Narco-
Terrorism+Nexus+%26+the+Obama+Administration&utm_campaign=ACD%2FEWI+BLOG&utm_mediu
m=email

The bond between organized criminals and terrorists appear to be growing in the status quo. This connection should be worrisome as these networks have found common interests. Considering the different objectives of each group, some may question whether they truly have anything in common. Terrorists are generally motivated by politics, whereas organized enterprises are motivated by money. Despite this philosophical difference in the bottom line, some examples prove that this connection is strong. "In some cases terrorists and criminals appear to be deeply intertwined in ways that go well beyond fleeting alliances of convenience. The Dubai-based Indian criminal Aftab Ansari is believed to have used ransom money he earned from kidnappings to help fund the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. And some people, like the Pakistan-based Indian crime boss Dawood Ibrahim, even go on to pursue dual careers as both criminal and terrorist leaders."[1]

Despite the different goals of the two illicit groups, differentiating between the two – sometimes – can be challenging. Terrorists are involved in the black market in order to generate needed revenue.[2] This revenue is what allows them to pursue their political or religious agendas.[3] Organized criminals have resorted to modeling violent techniques which are used by terrorists to advance their monetary agendas.[4] "Criminal organizations can become ideological over time, following the path of terrorist groups."[5] Many famous mafia stories highlight how monetary gain is closely tied with political power. The more power the illicit group yields, the easier it becomes to allow the black market to flourish. Who these

groups are and who they can turn into poses a challenge for the rule of law everywhere.

So how do the international conventions address this particular bond?[6] The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which entered into force in 2003, is the main international legal instrument which deals with organized crime.[7] The Convention is accompanied by three Protocols which deal with human trafficking, smuggling, and arms trafficking. The Convention aims to criminalize participation in organized crime, increase cooperation among state parties, and protect human rights. Given its mandate, naturally, UNTOC does not address the issue of the organized crime – terrorism nexus. With a very broad reading, one could infer that the UNTOC may address this issue. For instance, Article 5 of the Convention calls for *criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group.* The language of Article 5(ii) states:

Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in:

a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group;

b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim.

An argument could be made that a terrorist who purchases a weapon from or supplies weapons to an organized group is taking "active part" in the "criminal activities" of the group. Or

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

even the language of section (b) makes it clear that if the terrorist has "knowledge" that his participation will "contribute" to the criminal aim, he could be penalized for his association. This example should serve as a cautionary tale. We must avoid conflating the two groups because it could pose its own set of legal challenges, especially considering that terrorism is mainly viewed via the law of war. If terrorists are engaging in the same activity as organized criminals, it is probably safe to assume that these operations are a *means to an end.*

Another international instrument to consider is the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism. This particular Convention expressly deals with punishing perpetrators who finance terrorism. Under Article 2, *any person* could be held culpable for directly or indirectly facilitating, participating in, or aiding or abetting in the commission of various offenses as listed in the annex of the Convention.[8] Some of the offenses listed are: unlawful seizure of an aircraft, taking of hostages, terrorist bombings, endangering the safety of civilian aircrafts, and endangering maritime vessels. This particular Convention could provide relief against this particular nexus, depending on how it is enacted domestically.

The international community has recognized that terrorists do use different resources to accomplish their aims. In 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Specifically one of the aims of the "holistic" strategy is:

"to strengthen coordination and cooperation among States in combating crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking in all its aspects, illicit arms trade, in particular of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, money laundering and smuggling of nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological and other potentially deadly materials."[9]

While many scholars still argue that the link between these villains is "nebulous"[10] and that the empirical data to support that the groups are working together is little, there still appears to be a small link, at the very least, that should be acknowledged by the rule of law. It is probably time to address the importance of these issues and make the necessary changes required to have states implement more robust language in their national laws. The state parties to these conventions may not have envisioned a world where the underbelly of society forms alliances (however brief) to achieve their various goals. Unfortunately that is the current reality and it seems as though it is far more than a passing trend.

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Latin America's Narco-Terrorism Nexus & the Obama Administration

Source: http://econwarfare.org

"Terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit acts of murder," said President George W. Bush, on December 14, 2001. "It's so important for Americans to know that the traffic in drugs finances the work of terror, sustaining terrorists."

On March 19, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft went on to say: "Terrorism and drugs go together like rats and the bubonic plague.... They thrive in the same conditions, support each other, and feed off each other."

Alas, the water flowing through the Potomac seems to have swept this acknowledgement down to Chesapeake Bay, off to the Atlantic Ocean.

Incredibly, twenty-one years later, on March 20, 2013, Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command, gave a press conference at the Pentagonto voice his concern about "A potential connection between crime syndicates and terrorists in Latin America." (Emphasis added.)

Contradicting himself, Kelly added, "We do know that some terrorist organizations are able to skim off fairly substantial sums of money from the drug profits.... And so there has to be kind of a network for that to happen."

Kelly explained, "Drugs are the basis for this wealth and the drug-related money coming out of the United States." A criminal network (which one?) "transports tons of drugs into the United States and Europe and moves bales of money back out."

The sums are "astronomical.... I mean palettes of money," he said. "For a buck, anything can get on the [drug transport] network." Kelly concluded, "The point of it all is the network is a very dangerous thing to have working as effectively as it does, because anything can get on it."

Already in 2002, twelve of the thirty-six groups on the U.S. Department of State's ForeignTerrorist Organizations List were identified as being involvedin drug trafficking.In October 2002, a Colombian courier for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), which is funded mostly by drug trafficking, was arrested in the U.S. for having attempted to transport €182,000 (Euros) into the country. The money was confiscated.

In another case, U.S. law enforcement derailed an al-Qaeda plot to exchange "9,000 assault weapons, such as AK-47 rifles, submachine guns and sniper rifles; 300 pistols; rocket-propelled grenade launchers; 300,000 grenades; shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and 60 million rounds of ammunition,"for $25 million dollars in cash and cocaine.

Since then, the cooperation between international drug trafficking has been cemented to share the "astronomical" amounts of money generated by drug trafficking, arms and people smuggling the worldover.

If Kelly's worry about such a "potential" link strikes you as odd, it should.

At the same press conference Kelly was arguing that "The reality on the ground [Latin America] is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning."

He went on to explain that Iran have increased its "attempt to evade international sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment," Iran succeeded in establishing relations with "Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina."

However, he noted, "This outreach has only been marginally successful...and the region as a whole has not been receptive to

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Iranian efforts."

Kelly seemed oblivious to Iranian proxy Hezbollah's longstanding involvement in drug trafficking and many other criminal activities criminal fundraising efforts in Latin America.

What to think of this? It was surely an example of both the current administration's humoring of Iran (Kelly paraphrased: I'm not saying that Iran is sponsoring terrorism in Latin America. I'm only talking about 'potential') and an expression of just how far behind the curve the U.S. military will be when it comes to handling future events.

The fact that Hezbollah is Iran's principal agent both in Latin America and a good number of other places worldwide was established decades ago. Since 9/11

AREAS OF CARTEL INFLUENCES

Hezbollah's activities and partnership with drug cartels in pursuing criminal activity of all sorts in the tri-border region have been documented in "Funding Evil; How terrorism is Financed - and How to Stop it," and in many congressional hearings, by the Congressional Research Service, reports by the Drug Enforcement Administration, and many studies, reports and media accounts.

On March 17, 2009,a former commander of U.S. Southern Command, Navy Adm. James

G. Stavridis testified before the House Armed Services Committee

"He noted the direct link between the illicit drug trade and the terrorist groups it bankrolls, noting the threat posed by Islamic radical terrorism, and emphasized that "Identifying, monitoring and dismantling the financial, logistical and communication linkages between illicit trafficking groups and terrorist sponsors are critical to not only ensuring early indications and warnings of potential terrorist attacks directed at the United States and our partners, but also in generating a global appreciation and acceptance of this tremendous threat to security." Strangely, Gen. Kelly knows nothing about this.

Former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs Roger Noriega recently testified before Congress on the Iran/Hezbollah/ Venezuela nexus. Noriega noted the Iran has laundered billions of dollars through the Venezuelan financial sector and is currently stashing "hundreds of millions" in "virtually every Venezuelan bank," some of which have corresponding branches in the U.S.

In addition to Venezuela, where Hezbollah has close ties to Chavez's likely successor, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, there are credible reports of Hezbollah's presence in Nicaragua, Belize and Mexico.

In April 2010, U.S. defense officials were cited by the U.S. Boarder Control website, saying that "Hezbollah is working with Mexican narcotics syndicates that control access to transit routes into the U.S, [and] ...to smuggle drugs and people into the United States." Moreover, he "warned that al Qaeda also could use trafficking routes to infiltrate operatives into the U.S." (see the **map** above).

One can only wonder why the Administration is considering Iran's penetration of Latin America, as well as Hezbollah's and other terrorist groups involvement in the narco-terrorism nexus, a matter of "potential." It has long been a fait accompli.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

Drone birds – Are they alive?

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=6_-wy-OeTKU

Guess what? Suicide Bombers are Suicidal!

Book Review: Adam Lankford (2013): The Myth of Martyrdom
By Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin
Source: Personal communication

Breaking News: Adam Lankford has finally debunked and demystified the idiocy, the claim that suicide bombers are martyrs for the greater cause. My colleague Joan Lachkar and I have for years been trying to show how early childhood development and its cultural child rearing practices directly influence the psychopathology and dynamic operative in the making of suicide bombers, mass murders and rampage shootings. While Lankford touches on some of the early childhood experiences of

these cold blooded murderers, he masterfully critiques many of the proffered ridiculous, "out of touch" theories concerning these kinds of disavowed, enactments of highly dissociated aggression and rage.

Unfortunately in the case of Islamic suicide terrorism (although the book is not limited just to this crucial subject) what we have had is the naked emperor riding on top of the elephant which could hitherto-fore only be identified in bits and pieces, lumbering around the room destroying everything in its path for far too long a time.

I have always held that Adrian Raine's classic text, *The Psychopathology of Crime*, published in 1993 is key to the argument because if you consider suicide bombing a crime, than you have psychopathology and it is not just a benign case of agoraphobia. It is hard core psychopathology – malignant narcissism, malignant borderline psychopathology with

psychotic self states, severe problems in attachment etc.

Lankford stresses the important point that Islam is not exactly a religious culture in which one can talk about being unhappy, let alone suicidal because of shame, that most painful emotion. Ironically there is a stigma attached to committing suicide. The cultures of a large segment of the religious believers who are extremists have not modernized. Yet we also know that suicide bombing is more than just suicide as it involves the murder of the innocent other. Lankford does not buy into Pape's idea that the problem arises from the alleged occupation. Instead he shows how cases in these instances were carried out by people who had significant mental problems. For example Wafa, the Palestinian suicide bomber, was completely abused by her father.

Few academics and policy makers have been willing to risk looking at the stark reality of the Islamic suicide attack which has been cloaked in the pseudo myth of martyrdom. Could it be that this is part of our counter transference to the seduction of suicide and murderous rage and a denied fascination with its sadomasochism? I think so.

Lankford relates his uphill battle and puts the truth on the table that these bombers, mass murderers and rampage shooters have significant psychopathology. He writes of his struggle:

[I] began with no grant funding no research assistants, no government connections, no security clearance, and no privileged access [...]. The fact that it's played out this way seems like a frightening condemnation of the systems we depend upon for knowledge. After all, these are the leaders we count on to keep us safe so we can sleep at night. I never anticipated that they could be so wrong, or worse yet, so closed-minded to the seemingly obvious possibility that suicide terrorists are suicidal."

In deference to many experts and their theories as well as political leaders who blindly and willingly bought hook, line and sinker such espoused skewed findings whom Lankford debunks, I will not name names. However, the list is long so more importantly – buy the book, read it, tell others to buy it as well, invite Professor Lankford to be a scholar in residence for an evening and support his outstanding, brave much needed research. These alleged experts wanted a quick fix rather than thinking

critically about what has been going on and they have taken the masses to be fools.

Ironically, academics and policy makers also operate in an unrecognized miniature shame honor culture which parallels Arab Muslim culture. This causes a series of blind spots. As an outsider, he was able to effectively deal with such a toxic environment. As a criminologist he conducted a labor intensive investigation of these crimes and found many patterns that others had failed to see.

Lankford's exceptional writing style keeps us intrigued and the reader engaged along with a dry sense of humor while tearing down each argument and obstacle that has hindered seeing the stark reality of these murderers, be they suicide bombers, rampage shooters or mass murderers.

It was a relief to read of Lankford's position concerning the short comings on the subject of prison interviews and interviews of others which counter terrorism venerates to a fault and upon which it has too heavily relied. Having conducted prison interviews myself, I completely concur with him. Many who conduct them are poorly trained in critical thinking and depth psychology. Lankford writes that you can't believe everything you hear and even though:

Respondents [the interviewees] may give consistently unreliable answers for many reasons. They may be influenced by social and cultural biases. They may be lying, with ulterior motives. They may be in psychological denial [emphasis mine] because admitting the truth, even to themselves would be far too painful. Or they may simply lack the knowledge or information to provide accurate answers. If you asked 'everyone' in the 1400s whether the Earth orbited the Sun, or the Sun orbited the Earth, you would get a very consistent answer. And much like the answer researchers often receive when they simply ask about the motives of suicide terrorists, it would be consistently wrong."

And then Lankford hits the nail on the head: "Sometimes the truth does not simply jump from the tips of respondents' tongues to the pages of our articles and books, sometimes we have to dig for it." And he does just that. He has put together a narrative which is coherently consistent and parses out the facts.

In his Appendix A Lankford offers a long list yet stresses it remains partial

of suicide terrorists with risk factors for suicide. Here the obvious is apparent. I see Lankford putting the pseudo hysterical borderline bravado aside of the suicide bombers and their nefarious cronies. He proceeds to demonstrate how they are actually terrified of death. Elsewhere I have written that suicide bombers function like a death anxiety emollient for those who send them. They are all actually terrified of death and yet seek it because they cannot conceive of maturely facing their emotional problems.

Appendix B presents a list of different types of suicide attackers in the United States, 1990-2010 with appendix C noting the breakdown of types of suicide terrorists: conventional, coerced, escapist and indirect (the latter being suicide by cop which reminds me of the Filipino Moro, fight to the death in the tradition of classic jihad.)

The Myth of Martyrdom has entered the canon of studies in suicide terrorism at the top of the list. Anyone who comes close to dealing with the subject of terrorism must read it. It is crucial if we are to get a handle on the problem and stop suicide bombings insidious mushrooming which in turn also influences other types of mass murderer and rampage murders. These kinds of massacres do not occur in a vacuum – one influences the other. The next step that needs to be taken is factoring in the critical importance of early childhood development, the time frame during which children learn to hate and the time when the brain of the baby is made by his or her devalued female horribly abused mother with help from the father.

Lankford's final caveat is that we must save them from themselves for the sake of our own selves. I agree. There is no question that they have degraded their own cultures. We must stop them before it further erodes ours. Aggression breeds aggression. Limits must be sent and boundaries observed. Education, education, education remains the key. This book makes a major contribution toward that end.

Guess what? Suicide bombers are actually suicidal. They are the elephants in the room with sheikhs riding on top yet cleverly disguised as alleged martyrs. Thanks to Lankford we can see what and whom we are dealing with and we come to know their "true colors."

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

The Acute Jihadist Threat in Europe

By Scott Stewart and Sidney Brown

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/acute-jihadist-threat-europe?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium
=email&utm_campaign=20130404&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=32bc639ebe444f4
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On March 26, the Belgian federal police's counterterrorism force, or Special Units, conducted a felony car stop on Hakim Benladghem, a 39-year-old French citizen of Algerian extraction. When Benladghem reacted

Additional intelligence showed that Benladghem had traveled extensively and that, through his travels and email and cellphone communications, he appeared to be connected to the international jihadist movement. Rather

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ESTIMATED MUSLIM POPULATION

aggressively, he was shot and killed by the police attempting to arrest him. The Special Units chose to take Benladghem down in a car stop rather than arrest him at his home because it had intelligence indicating that he was heavily armed. The authorities also knew from their French counterparts that Benladghem had been trained as a paratrooper in the French Foreign Legion.

than risk a confrontation at Benladghem's apartment, where he had access to an arsenal of weapons as well as a ballistic vest and helmet, the police decided to arrest him while he was away from home and more vulnerable. The Belgian authorities did not want to risk a prolonged, bloody siege like the one that occurred in April 2012 in Toulouse, France, when French

police attempted to arrest shooter Mohammed Merah.

The intelligence regarding Benladghem's arsenal was confirmed when a search of his apartment revealed several weapons, including an assault rifle, a submachine gun and a tactical shotgun. He also possessed a large collection of tactical equipment, including a ballistic vest, a Kevlar helmet, a ballistic shield and two gas masks. With such equipment and training, Benladghem would have been well-equipped to not only handle an assault on his apartment but also to conduct an armed assault -- intelligence indicating that he was preparing to conduct such an attack March 27 is reportedly what led the police to try to arrest him. Authorities are still closely guarding the identities of Benladghem's targets, but given France's involvement in the case, it is likely they were transnational in nature; there are a number of such targets in Brussels, which houses NATO and EU headquarters.

Belgian authorities are now undoubtedly working with their European and other allies to investigate Benladghem's contacts in order to determine the scope of the network he was a part of and what threat his associates still pose. This potential threat is a reminder of the challenges that radicalized European Muslims present for European authorities.

The Roots of the Problem

There are long, historical ties between the Muslim world and Europe. From the earliest days of Islam and the Umayyads' invasion of Spain and France in the early 700s, through the Crusades and the European colonization of North Africa and South Asia in the 1700s and 1800s, to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I and the European colonization of the Middle East, the threads of Europe and the Muslim world have been tightly woven together by geopolitics into a vivid tapestry of conflict and cooperation.

The proximity of North Africa to southern Europe and the Europeans' colonization efforts, combined with the many people in the Muslim world seeking education and employment in Europe, have resulted in large populations of Muslims living on the Continent.

But this close relationship has not been without friction. Though a large portion of Muslims in Europe come from families who have lived there for four or five generations, many have not become integrated into European society and frequently live in isolated, Muslim-dominated areas. Moreover, while Europe as a whole is suffering from the economic crisis, the Muslim population has been hit particularly hard and the unemployment rate for young Muslims is alarmingly high in many parts of Europe. This, in addition to the frequent discrimination against Muslims in the job market, leaves many Muslims feeling alienated, disenfranchised and resentful. When this resentment is combined with the European welfare state, in which working is not necessary to survival, many of these Muslims have the opportunity to be exposed to radical discourse and to become involved in radical political or even militant activity.

Europe's immigration and asylum laws, which granted refuge to many jihadist ideologues who were persecuted in their home countries, have exacerbated this situation. Men like Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza al-Masri and Mullah Krekar, among many others, were allowed to set up shop on the Continent, and Europe's Muslim areas provided target-rich environments for the jihadist preachers, who were looking to recruit disaffected young Muslims to their cause.

Although European countries have taken steps to expel or extradite many of these jihadist theologians since the 9/11 attacks, they have been replaced by a second generation of preachers and the issue of disaffected Muslim populations has persisted and grown. Large numbers of vocal Islamist fundamentalists currently attend European universities. Incidents such as the French burqa ban and anti-Islamic rhetoric of politicians like Geert Wilders reinforce the narrative put forward by jihadist recruiters that Islam is under attack from Europeans and help the preachers' efforts to recruit new followers.

There is a great deal of variety in the way Muslims are radicalized, but recruiters have consistently used mosques, gyms and university Islamic associations as places to spot potential recruits. The recruits usually are then taken aside, away from the view of the community, and radicalized in a one-on-one or small-group setting. These recruiters often have contacts with other radical cells inside Europe, as well as links to jihadist and militant groups overseas, and use these links to facilitate travel to training camps and war zones.

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It is important to recognize that while young Muslim men can become radicalized and are often sought for the purpose of recruitment, there have been thousands over the past decades. Not all are jihadists; many who have traveled to Libya and Syria are nationalists or

TIMELINE OF MAJOR JIHADIST TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN EUROPE

— Attack
— Attempted Attack
— Plotted Attack Discovered

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they are not the only demographic group susceptible to radicalization. We have also seen older adults become radicalized -- men like 39-year-old Benladghem or the 37-year-old French particle physicist, Adlene Hicheur. Such individuals with degrees, practical career experience and clean criminal backgrounds can more easily travel between Europe and other foreign countries if necessary and are less likely to raise suspicions than the younger men. Women can also become radicalized and can serve as important conduits for funds and intelligence or as recruiters and propagandists. There are no accurate counts of European Muslims currently fighting or training abroad, but there are at least several hundred, and

non-jihadist Islamists. Nevertheless, there are many jihadists among them, along with other Muslims who become heavily influenced by the jihadists after fighting with them.

Taken together, these conditions have made it very difficult to mitigate the jihadist threat in Europe. If anything, based on the tempo of attacks, plots and arrests, the threat is growing more acute.

The Outlook for Europe
A timeline of attacks and thwarted plots in Europe shows that the pace of jihadist activity on the Continent is increasing. As was the case in the United States, major attacks like the

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

March 2004 Madrid train bombings and the July 2005 London subway bombings have caused European authorities to become far more focused on this threat, and consequently they have become more proactive in their approach to combating it.

However, the nature of the jihadist threat is slightly different in Europe than it is in the United States due to differences in the Muslim communities. In the United States, where the Muslim community is more integrated and less likely to be isolated in their own districts, plotters tend to be more self-radicalized and aspirational. Once they become radicalized -- frequently via the Internet -- it is quite common for them to be arrested as they seek assistance with their plots from individuals who are FBI agents or police informants working on sting operations. The Oct. 17, 2012, arrest of Qazi Nafis, who tried to bomb the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, and the Sept. 15, 2012, arrest of Adel Daoud, who thought he was bombing a Chicago bar, are recent examples of this trend. Aspiring terrorists in the United States also tend to be younger and have less experience than their European counterparts, though there have been some notable exceptions, such as U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Hasan. In addition, there are fewer cases of radicalized females in the United States.

Due to Europe's concentrated and disenfranchised Muslim population, it is not difficult for radicalized European Muslims to find confederates who are not police informants. Even more aspirational and inept groups -- such as the four men who were arrested in April 2012, in Luton, United Kingdom, and who pled guilty to plotting to attack a British army base on March 1, 2013 -- can be part of a larger radicalized community and have friends and relatives who have been involved in prior plots or who have traveled overseas to fight jihad. This was true for Toulouse shooter Merah: Although he conducted his shooting attacks alone, Merah had long been part of a larger militant community and had traveled to places like Pakistan and Afghanistan to train and fight. French authorities also reportedly investigated Merah's older brother, Abdelkader, in 2007 for helping European Muslims travel to Iraq to fight.

The portrait of Benladghem that is beginning to emerge is somewhat similar to that of Merah.

Benladghem maintained contact with a number of people associated with jihadist networks in France and Belgium as well as with jihadists overseas. According to news reports, he came to the attention of the French government after being denied entry to Gaza from Egypt while carrying ballistic vests and gas masks. Pressure by the French government after his return from Egypt may have caused his immigration to Belgium. Stratfor sources have said that French authorities alerted their Belgian counterparts about Benladghem when he moved to Belgium and that he was under close scrutiny due to his history.

Nevertheless, Benladghem does appear to have been able to participate in some illegal activity while in Belgium. He was reportedly involved in the March 21 armed robbery of a restaurant outside Brussels as he attempted to steal weapons from the restaurant's owner. According to news reports, two accomplices accompanying Benladghem during the armed robbery were arrested, and both implicated Benladghem during the police interrogation.

It is not clear if Benladghem was aware of his colleagues' arrest. He apparently did not attempt to cache or otherwise dispose of his weapons and equipment, nor did he flee the country, as he might have done if he had feared arrest.

Like Merah, Benladghem had armed himself and was competent with the weapons he had acquired. He did not have to reach out to a police informant to obtain the weapons. He also somehow had managed to support himself and acquire an expensive four-wheel drive vehicle, though he reportedly had not worked for years. It is not yet clear if he received outside support or if he supported himself through armed robberies like the one he conducted March 21.

Trained, dedicated and armed operatives with international connections, such as Merah and Benladghem, pose a very different threat than the aspiring and incompetent jihadists frequently seen in the United States. This means that European authorities will have their work cut out for them. But this is not only bad news for Europeans; it could also portend more anti-American attacks in Europe or even attacks outside Europe, as militants with European passports travel elsewhere.

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – April 2013

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Editor's Note: In the map please correct the country name "Macedonia" with the officially UN-recognized name "FYROM" (A/RES/47/225; 98th plenary meeting; 8 April 1993 – UNSC resolution 817; 7 April 1993)

Activation of Islamist terrorism in Europe: should there be a limit to tolerance?

Source:http://www.terrorismwatch.org/2013/04/activation-of-islamist-terrorism-in.html?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+terrorismwatch%2FJTvK+%28Terrorism+
Watch%29&utm_content=Yahoo!+Mail

Recently, police in Belgium, while pursuing a 39-year-old Algerian who had supplied weapons to terrorists, had to kill him. The once calm life in Europe is turning more and more into a nightmare. The activation of Islamist terrorism in Muslim countries has already nearly turned into a routine. But Islamist terrorists are also becoming more and more active in Europe, and the authorities of European countries seem to be at loss about what to do about this.

Moreover, the UK's Foreign Ministry is predicting that very soon, the number of people who confess radical Islamism in Europe will be counted in the hundreds.

Islamists in Europe are obviously inspired by the so-called "Arab Spring". However, if Islamists in Arab countries overthrow totalitarian, although secular, regimes, in Europe, they may soon start overthrowing democratic secular regimes.

Analysts say that, as a rule, the current antiterrorist laws and the current state of antiterrorist services in European countries are not effective enough to fight against the challenge that radical Islamism is presenting now.

An expert in security in Europe Dmitry Danilov says: "At present, a large-scale war against terrorism is taking place in Mali. At the first glance, it may look quite successful – Mali's government army, together with forces from several other African countries and from France, have already freed a considerable part of the country's territories that were earlier controlled by Islamists. However, it would be probably too early to celebrate a victory. Many of these Islamists have not been killed – they have fled to other countries, including European ones."

"A lesson that the world should draw from this is that fighting against Islamist terrorism in one separate country is of little help," Mr. Danilov concludes. "A worldwide program of fighting against this evil is needed."

Experts have also noticed another alarming threat. Ideas of radical Islamism are gaining more and more popularity even among young Muslims who were born and have always lived in Europe, who grew up in secular and well-educated

families, and who seem to have no reasons to become radical Islamists. A question arises – why so?

Some experts explain this by mistakes that certain European leaders made several decades ago. After the end of WWII, European leaders decided to do everything not to let the misanthropic ideas of Nazism revive again. In their striving for tolerance towards any nation, religion or ideology, European authorities have become tolerant even to those who, in their turn, do not want to be tolerant towards other people.

"Of course, this policy presents a large amount of risk," Dmitry Danilov says.

"The mistake of European authorities is that they, if it can be said like that, adhere to double standards. They fight against terrorism in other countries – and, at the same time, they are tolerant towards Islamists in their own countries (or, at least, they had been tolerant towards them until recent). However, as practice shows, Islamist terrorism recognizes no borders."

Tragic as it may sound, to a certain extent, Europe is itself to blame for its problems. **Tolerance is good, but it also should have some limits. Tolerance towards those who, in their turn, don't want to be tolerant to other people can hardly be justified.**