

Towards a Chemical War in Syria ?

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Emerging priorities in the war against terrorism

By S K Chatterji

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There are different models that nations have adopted to fight insurgencies. Sri Lanka used all the forces at its disposal. The results, humanitarian aspects set aside, led to the insurgent movement being defeated comprehensively.

In Kashmir, Indians have contained the insurgency by replacing firepower with boots, sealing the borders, and the now universal tactic of focussing on winning hearts and minds.

In Afghanistan, the Americans used technology to decimate the ruling Taliban, followed by counter-insurgency operations that veered towards the winning hearts and mind philosophy. The results are definitely not a success story.

Combating insurgencies by winning hearts and minds, simultaneously using force, is at the core of doctrines adopted by the free world in the war against terror. The counter-intelligence capacities of militaries have also been boosted exponentially by technology, but the battle against terror is nowhere near its last lap. The way ahead is undeniably in the area of strengthening non-military interventions.

The foremost priority is the denial of funds to terror outfits. Among the myriad methods adopted by terror groups, the most significant funding is from sponsor nations, religious groups, intelligence agencies and the unholy nexus of drugs and terror. The ultimate destination for Afghan opium is said to be Europe or the United States. The money generated is recycled back to Taliban and its ilk through loose international monetary mechanisms. Obviously, the issue requires global coordination.

In many third world countries, regimes, either ruling or attempting to usurp power, use terror

outfits for consolidation and expansion of influence zones. These countries have huge mineral resources. Developed and developing economies and multinational corporates need the resources and transact with regimes or

groups that can mobilise them, irrespective of the legitimacy of such groups. State-sponsored terror with terrorist groups as strategic partners is the most explosive threat. The attack on Mumbai in Nov. 2008 is a clear example.

Sanctions mandated by the United Nations

need to be enforced on nations providing safe havens, funding and logistics to terrorist groups.

The easy availability of weapons from sponsor states and sophisticated cartels that run the global weapons trade needs to be combated. As yet, terror groups have not been able to garner fissile material for crude bombs, but the possibility exists, especially in unstable nuclear nations where terrorist groups have substantial sway and patronage.

With most terror groups distorting religion to generate passion, liberal leaders from such communities being given support and, more importantly, security to propagate the correct tenets and undertake the task of alienating the community from the terrorists, is the most urgent requirement.

The mushrooming of schools that radicalise young impressionable minds needs to be stopped. States encouraging or being passive to the spread of fanatical institutions readying another generation to continue unleashing violence can surely be made accountable by a system of sanctions.

Corruption and governance remain the greater challenges. Terrorists thrive among have-nots. Afghanistan



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is a typical example where millions of dollars have been usurped. Accountability will have to be imposed in beneficiary states right at the beginning,

notwithstanding the fact that alliances with local power groups will evolve more gradually when their leaders are not bought by paying large sums

The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism on Iraq, 2003-2008

By Ilias Papadopoulos (International Relations Expert)

Source: <http://www.geostrategicforecasting.com/the-role-of-intelligence-in-countering-terrorism-on-iraq-2003-2008/>



ABSTRACT

In this article we will study the role of intelligence in combating terrorism, having Iraq as a case study. We will argue that the pursuit of the counter-terrorism agenda, solely based in the use of military force, doesn't produce positive results. On the other hand, results can be achieved by analyzing the counter-terrorism model in the use of intelligence and the application of military force, only when other avenues of action have been spent.

Defining Intelligence

Before we proceed any further, we need to define the term 'intelligence'. For that, we will use a definition firstly published by M. Werner and is:

"Intelligence is secret, state activity, to understand or influence foreign entities".[i]

Intelligence work is divided in five levels,[ii] all of which institute the "intelligence cycle". The "intelligence cycle" is the mechanic by which an intelligence agency works,[iii] thus it is imperative that a level of the cycle harmonically cooperates with the others.

In the beginning of the cycle is the "Planning & Direction" level. During that step, intelligence officials direct agency's assets towards the desired end.

In the next level is "Information Collection". Here the agency has already established what it wants to work on and tries to collect information on the matter in question. There are three ways that an agency can do that. The first is by the use of spies and informants (human intelligence – humint), the second is by the use of technical means e.g. satellites, interception of telephone calls or e-mails, etc (technical intelligence – techint) and the third is by open sources e.g. TV, radio, blogs etc (open source intelligence – osint).

In the third level of the cycle we find "Information Processing". During that level the

already acquired information from the collection level, is processed in a way that it makes sense to the analyst. At this level for example an intercepted phone call will be translated in a language that the analyst can understand, or troop concentrations will be identified in the acquired satellite photos.

The fourth level of the cycle is the "Analysis"



level. By now the analyst should have as much of the required information as he can get and should be able to compose an analysis on the matter in question. In that level, raw information is turned in intelligence and the final document produced is called "intelligence product".

The final level of the cycle is "Dissemination". This is when the final



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intelligence product leaves the agency and is handed in the appropriate policy makers/ decision makers.

Defining Terrorism

Having described how intelligence agencies work, now we will see what terrorism is and how its role has increased in modern warfare. Terrorism by itself should be considered a tactic which is employed either by itself, or in the context of a broader campaign. For an attack to qualify as “terrorism” it must comply with four criteria.[iv] These criteria are i) the action must use or threaten to use violence, ii) the incentives for that action must be political in the broader sense (political, religious, philosophical, etc), iii) the action must have far reaching psychological repercussions in the target (that might be the demoralization of a society and/or of the armed forces), iv) be

against the terrorists. Such was the nature of the Iraq War after the occupation of the country. Small armed groups set Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) causing casualties in both the civilian population and coalition forces.[vii] Other practices included attacks with RPGs and small arms, and abduction of civilians that subsequently were tortured and killed. The latter practice was especially favored by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which beheaded its hostages and subsequently posted the act in the internet to further terrorize the population.[viii]

This violence was perpetrated by a multitude of indigenous and foreign groups that were active in Iraq soon after the fall of the Ba’ath regime. These groups can be categorized in two ways the first is their ethnic/ religious composition and the second is the goals they seek to achieve.[ix]

	<i>Political Power</i>	<i>Religious Reasons</i>	<i>Separation from Iraq</i>
Kurds		Ansar al Sunna	Pash Merga
Sunni Arabs	Divided Groups of ex-Ba’ath Members		
Shi’a Arabs	SCIRI (Badr Organization)		Mahdi Army
Foreigners		Al Qaeda in Iraq	

conducted by a non-state actor.[v] The phenomenon, albeit not new at all has an increased impact in modern affairs mainly for two reasons. The first is the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This is the development of technology at a level that a small group of people could cause disproportionate damage with relatively cheap materials.[vi] The second reason is that RMA allows in even a small group of highly motivated people to press for their agenda by forcible means. While in the past a vast conscription pool was required for war to be conducted, a pool that only states could possess, this is not the case for today. Only one man with an explosive vest, could cause mass casualties and with only low cost materials. This new reality allows to non state actors to conduct war-like operations.

The Nature of War in Iraq and the Role of Intelligence in the War

While operations from this ‘new kind of war’ cannot defeat conventional forces in the field of battle, they can engage them in an asymmetric way that regular forces could not retaliate

For the first part we can identify: i) Kurds ii) Sunni Arabs iii) Shi’a Arabs iv) foreigners. For the second part we can identify the following goals: a) political power in the post-Saddam era, b) religious reasons in the context of fighting a Jihad, c) separation from Iraq. The following diagram categorizes the armed groups in the country by those two criteria.

The above depiction of the various terrorist groups show that soon after the invasion, many armed groups appeared with different ethnic composition, different goals and different methods. With the exception of Kurdish Pash Merga that took distance from the sectarian violence, all other groups turned one against the other, and all of them, turned against coalition forces. With Saddam gone, sectarian violence began to emerge all over the country, dragging Iraq in a de facto civil war.[x] But besides the civil war, these groups also turned against coalition forces which saw as an illegitimate occupation force or in the case of islamist extremists as “crusaders”.



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Against the formed situation coalition forces and particularly Americans that bore the main weight of the operations were unprepared. Their forces were trained and equipped to achieve a fast conventional victory, but not to engage in operations of the “new kind of war”. The last similar experience for the US army was Vietnam and since then, little had been done to fight such wars with success.[xi]

After the occupation, the position of administrator of the provisional authority in Iraq went on Ambassador Paul Bremmer III. His choice to demobilize Iraqi military impacted heavily in the amount of terrorism in the country, since the decision opened a large conscription pool for the illegitimate armed groups of the country. The Sunni element of the country was particularly affected, since the constituted the main body of officers in the pre-war army. Thus it was only logical for them to try to expel the Americans from the country and regain part of their former power. This notion became even clearer when all government officials of the Ba’ath government were expelled from the administration.[xii]

Besides political mistakes, the Americans also lacked the appropriate number of troops on the ground to ensure order in the country.[xiii] This allowed the terrorists greater freedom of movement and eventually the ability to control large areas in the country. But the greatest shortcoming in the counterterrorism strategy was the counterterrorism model itself. Ambassador Bremmer soon after he assumed command of the country decided that he would pursue his goal via the “war model”.[xiv]

This model meant that areas that were ‘suspect’ of harboring terrorists would be searched by the military in a forceful way. This practically lead to people be dragged from their beds in the middle of the night and their homes searched for weapon and explosives.[xv] This strategy particularly targeted Sunni elements of the society and fueled the cycle of violence in the country.

In that model, intelligence played a secondary role. The administration believed that these agencies were better suited to vet ex Ba’ath personnel than to run intelligence networks and identify the terrorists in the country[xvi]. That meant that flaws were in the very beginning of the cycle, in the ‘planning and direction’ level. Furthermore this model deterred Iraqis from cooperating with the intelligence communities practically severing the ‘collection’ level.

President Bush for example informs us that intelligence tips in the country were only 12.500 per month, while when the counterterrorism model changed this number doubled.[xvii]

In summary, the “war model” was responsible for the relegation of intelligence agencies in the counterterrorism work and for the increase in terrorist attacks in the country, since the civilians felt that their way of life and their position in the society was at jeopardy. That gave them the incentive to either join a terrorist cell, or to passively help the terrorists by not turning them in to the authorities.

The cycle of violence kept amounting until in 2007 when the Bush administration lost the midterm elections and politically was forced to do something in Iraq. What was decided was a troop increase of 28.500 troops.[xviii] The commander that would implement this “Surge”, as this came to be called, was general David H. Petraeus who took command of the Multi National Force I (MNF I) on February 10, 2007.[xix]

The new strategy that the general quickly implemented was twofold. For the first part, he turned the safety of the Iraqi population to be a priority of the coalition forces. The second part was that he gradually decreased the use of force against the local population and opened diplomatic conduits with them. Violence came to be coalition’s forces last resort and only when all other methods of approach had failed.[xx]

This strategy brought intelligence agencies back to the frontline against terrorism. The legitimization of the new administration in the eyes of most Iraqis meant that they believed coalition forces could better protect them than the terrorist cells did in the past. This in turn allowed the intelligence tips to increase and the intelligence agencies to sufficiently pursue the various terrorist organizations on the country. This resulted in a steep fall of terror attacks, both against civilian and military targets.[xxi]

What changed in intelligence thinking was primarily the ‘planning & direction’ level. While in the past intelligence worked on background checks for the ex-Ba’ath officials, from 2007 they started trying to identify terrorist cells in the country.

Their work was eased by the legitimization of the new doctrine in the eyes of Iraqi society. As we mentioned earlier the established counterterrorism model of the previous era, deterred



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Iraqi civilians from cooperating with the administration. The new doctrine allowed that to change. With the society convinced that it was in their interest to work with the new government of their country, they started supplying intelligence services with information. This in turn greatly improved the 'collection' level of intelligence agencies, and produced the final intelligence product.

Limits in Intelligence, the Case of Basra

Despite its successes, we also should identify the limits of intelligence in counterterrorism operations. When the terrorist's demands are extreme, and the concessions they demand cannot be given by the government, or when the support of violence is not limited to a few leaders that drive the society, intelligence fails to play a prominent role. This is because intelligence cannot identify and pursue select elements of the society that are responsible for the terror acts, leaving the rest of the population untouched.

Such was the case in Basra, safe haven for a radical shi'a organization called "Mahdi Army" (MA). MA had repeatedly attacked Iraqi and coalition forces, while it was also systematically killing Sunni civilians.[xxii] After the new Iraqi administration failed to bring the MA in the newly formed democratic process, president Maliki finally decided that a military solution was necessary. Despite the operation in March 2008 turning into a fiasco, it was largely legitimized in the eyes of Iraqi society. The operation was authorized by Iraqi Prime Minister Al Maliki and was conducted exclusively by Iraqi troops.

Notes

[i] See Michael Warner, "Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence' ", at *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002.

[ii] Some scholars believe that the "intelligence cycle" is comprised of 2 extra levels, adding one at the beginning and one at the end of the cycle. These levels connect the intelligence process to the political field (political requirements in the beginning of the cycle, political feedback in the end). In this article we want to study strictly the work of intelligence agencies and thus we will not consider political-intelligence relations. More for that view of intelligence see Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy*, 4th ed., CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009, p. 56-60 & p. 64-65.

[iii] For more on the "intelligence cycle", see Loch K. Johnson, "Sketches for a Theory of Strategic Intelligence", published in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates*, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 34-53.

[iv] There is a multitude of definitions on "terrorism". For example some of them believe that a terrorist attack must exclusively target civilians. See Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 p. 8. We find the civilian – non civilian qualification to be vague. For example an off duty officer is a civilian or not?

[v] Our definition of terrorism is based on the one by Bruce Hoffman. For more on that see Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 20-41.

Conclusion

Conclusively we believe that the role intelligence plays in counterterrorism work is directly connected with the counterterrorism model in effect. We showed that when the model employed was the 'war model', the role of intelligence was low, and the results poor. Subsequently when the model shifted, the role of intelligence became a major factor in counterterrorism work.

We also conclude that the amount of humint the agency has available, is the primary means to pursue a counter-terrorism agenda. In order for humint to be acquired, especially in cases when whole areas are controlled by the terrorists, the agency must have tips from the local community, and for the locals to provide those tips they must be persuaded that it is in their best interest to do so.

Thus it is imperative that the agency responsible for counterterrorism, to win the hearts and minds of the local population. What we see in Iraq is that when this principle was not adhered, terrorism flourished. When intelligence was allowed to play its role in identifying terrorist cells and persecute them in a socially, not necessarily legal, but legitimized context the results were far better.

Of course, we cannot claim that intelligence by itself can win the fight against terror, the case of Basra bears witness for that. But intelligence is the first and most delicate line of defense against the phenomenon and not to make the most out of its capabilities would be a waste that states can ill afford to make in their struggle for security.



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[vi] For more on that, see Tom Lansford and Jack Covarrubias, “The Limits of Military Power: The United States in Iraq” published in Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, Jack Covarrubias, *America’s War on Terror*, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2009, p. 169 – 181.

[vii] See Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 44 – 46.

[viii] See Gabriel Weimann, “How modern terrorism uses the internet”, στο *Special Report 116*, United States Institute of Peace, March, 2004, p. 5-6.

[ix] More information for the post-invasion armed groups, see Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 21-35.

[x] See David H. Naylor, *Al Qaeda in Iraq*, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009 David J. Kilcullen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 12-13.

[xi] See Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*, Praeger Security International, Westport, 2006, p 99-100.

[xii] More on Bremmer’s actions in Iraq, see L. Paul Bremmer III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, p.50-78.

[xiii] See Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 69-71.

[xiv] More on the counterterrorism model implemented in Iraq see Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, p. 31-35.

[xv] See Scilla Elworthy, *Learning from Fallujah: Lessons Identified, 2003-2005*, Oxford, 2005 p.7.

[xvi] See Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 70-72.

[xvii] See George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, Crown Publishers, New York, 2010, p. 380-381.

[xviii] See David H. Naylor, *Al Qaeda in Iraq*, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009, p. 72.

[xix] More on general Petraeus and his background see William A. Knowlton Jr., the *Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq*, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2010, p. 1-4.

[xx] For an overview of the new counterterrorism model, see William A. Knowlton Jr., the *Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq*, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2010, p. 7-9.

[xxi] For a quantitative depiction of security factors (attacks, victims etc), see *Charts to Accompany the Testimony of Gen. David H. Petraeus*, Multi National Force-Iraq, 2008.

[xxii] More for those incidents, See David H. Naylor, *Al Qaeda in Iraq*, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009 and David J. Kilcullen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 65-68.

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India: Terror Trails To Saudi Arabia – Analysis

By Sanchita Bhattacharya

Source: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/29102012-india-terror-trails-to-saudi-arabia-analysis/>

Over the past decades, an elaborate web of Islamist extremist terrorism, backed by Pakistan, has thrived under the benign neglect of the state on Saudi Arabian soil. Much of this terrorism has been directed against India, as extremist groupings used the Islamic kingdom as safe haven, recruiting ground and source of generous funding, even as a regime of official denial and collusion with Pakistan stonewalled Indian efforts to bring fugitives to justice and restrain terrorists operating from the security of

On June 21, 2012, the 26/11 (November 26, 2008) Mumbai (Maharashtra) terrorist attacks handler, Abu Hamza alias Sayeed Zabi ud Deen alias Zabi Ansari alias Riyasat Ali alias Abu Jundal, was arrested in Delhi after being extradited from Saudi Arabia. This was followed by the deportation and arrest of LeT terrorist A. Rayees on October 6, 2012. Rayees was named as the third accused in the case of the seizure of explosives in Malayalamkunnu under Chakkarakkal (Kannur District of Kerala) Police limits in 2009.

Another five terrorist fugitives, including Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) 'commander' Fayyaz Kagzi, accused in the Aurangabad arms haul case of May 9, 2006, are still holed up in the country. Fayyaz Kagzi had also given bomb-making training to February 13, 2010, German Bakery (Pune, Maharashtra) blast accused Mirza Himayat Baig in the Sri Lankan capital, Colombo, in 2008.

Saudi Arabia's nexus with Pakistan controlled LeT and IM has also been verified in a number of arrests

within India, including the arrest of five IM militants accused of the August 1, 2012, Pune (Maharashtra) serial blasts. On September 26, 2012, Asad Khan and Imran Khan were arrested by Delhi Police from Pul Prahladpur in Delhi. This was followed by the arrest of Sayed Feroz on October 1, from the Nizamuddin Railway Station in Delhi, and Langde Irfan, on October 10, from Jaipur in Rajasthan. According to Delhi Police, Feroz, Imran Khan and Asad Khan had gone to Saudi Arabia several times to meet Fayyaz Kagzi. Asad Khan had made several phone calls to Saudi Arabia and sent emails to Kagzi prior to these visits. Delhi Police arrested another suspected IM terrorist, identified as Sayed Maqbool alias Zuber, from Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) on October 23.

Between August 29 and September 2, 2012, 18 persons were arrested across Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, exposing further



Saudi soil.

There are tentative suggestions that this may now be changing – though the trends are far from dramatic. The absolute impunity with which Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorists operated against India from Saudi Arabia has now been diluted by the arrest and deportation to India, of a number of prominent terrorists, albeit under sustained pressure and with a number of hiccups. The most recent and significant of these developments was the deportation of Fasih Mohammad, an Indian Mujahideen (IM) operative, and his subsequent arrest at Delhi's Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGI) on October 22, 2012. Mohammad, a Computer Engineer who lived in Dammam (Saudi Arabia), is a suspect in the April 17, 2010, Chinnaswamy Stadium blast case in Bangalore and the September 19, 2010, Jama Masjid shooting case in Delhi.

Fasih was the third terrorist to be deported from Saudi Arabia over the past five months.



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trails to terrorist activities from Saudi Arabia. Subsequent interrogations revealed that terrorist modules in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra had been working on instructions of handlers located in Saudi Arabia and linked to LeT and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). Bangalore city Police Commissioner Jyothi Prakash Mirji confirmed, "Those arrested have links with Saudi Arabia-based LeT and HuJI and it is suspected that they have more supporters in other (Indian) States. The arrested were taking orders from their handlers in Saudi Arabia".

These recent arrests and revelations are not in isolation and only reconfirm Saudi Arabia's role as a terror hub, with a Saudi connection traced back from several other terrorist incidents in India, and with the accused in many cases still absconding in Saudi Arabia, though authorities in the Kingdom have inclined to a pretence of ignorance regarding these many linkages.

A case in point is that of C.A.M. Basheer, the 'president' of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in the 1980s, hailing from Aluva in the Ernakulam District of Kerala, and an accused in the March 13, 2003, Mulund (Mumbai) blast. Basheer takes the Saudi terror connection nearly two decades back, and has reportedly been coordinating his activities from the Kingdom.

Again, Abu Abdel Aziz, who spent a considerable length of time in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the early 1990s, and made an appearance at an LeT conference in Muridke in Pakistan's Punjab Province in November 1994, was introduced there as an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, who was helping Muslims to fight in Bosnia and Kashmir. The case of Aziz is still unresolved.

Further, on August 29, 2003, Police in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, arrested five terrorists of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and LeT in connection with Akshardham Temple attack case of September 24, 2002. Interrogations confirmed by the then Ahmedabad Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), P.P. Pandey revealed, "The temple attack was a joint operation conducted by several modules of JeM and LeT having their network from Riyadh in Saudi Arabia to Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh [UP], Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and other cities". An accused in the December 2, 2002, Ghatkopar (Mumbai) blast, identified as Taufiq alias Abdullah, was arrested from Morna in Noida in UP on November 22, 2011, by a team

of the UP Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Tamil Nadu Special Investigation Team (SIT) and Noida Police. Western UP ATS Chief Rajeev Narayan Misra said that Taufiq had travelled and stayed in Saudi Arabia as well as in Bangladesh, to avert arrest. Taufiq disclosed that he was earlier associated with LeT and the Muslim Defence Force (MDF).

Investigations into the July 11, 2006, Mumbai train blast case also exposed a Saudi connection. The then Mumbai Police Commissioner A.N. Roy stated, on September 30, 2006, that one of the main accused, Faizal Sheikh, had received large consignments of funds through Rizwan Devra, an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operative based in Saudi Arabia, to organize the attack. Police also recovered 26,000 Riyals from Faizal's house in Bandra, Mumbai.

Reports also indicate that Shahid Bilal, the key conspirator in the twin blasts in Lumbini Park and Gokul Chat, on August 25, 2007, in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, had also stayed in Saudi Arabia during 2002-2003 and recruited several Hyderabad expatriate youth there. Significantly, within a week of the blast, Shahid was reportedly shot dead in Karachi in Pakistan, in a turf war with rival Rasool Khan Parti.

A Saudi link was also established in the December 7, 2010, Varanasi (UP) blasts. One of the terrorists involved, Asadullah Akthar, was believed to have taken shelter in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi-Pak nexus is not a new phenomenon. Pakistan backed terrorist outfits receive detailed briefing for operations from their mentors in Saudi Arabia. The modus operandi allows Pakistani agents to brief their terrorist proxies, who then return to India without a Pakistani visa on their passports to avoid suspicion. Indians have also been facilitated by Pakistan to travel to Saudi Arabia under new identities and passports provided by Pakistani authorities. This was the case with Abu Jundal, who went to Saudi Arabia from Pakistan, on a Pakistani passport in the name of Riyasat Ali, a purported resident of Muridke. An October 24, 2012, report indicates that intelligence agencies believe that IM operatives Iqbal and Riyaz Bhatkal are also on the run and travel between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia under false identities, with Pakistani passports.



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Terror masterminds located in Saudi Arabia also control their 'foot soldiers' in India through cyberspace, and intelligence agencies find it difficult to keep a track on the numerous channels used. A senior Intelligence Bureau (IB) official commented, "It's a big headache for the intelligence agencies to detect the communications between them. It is impossible to monitor all the activities in the cyberspace".

The arrest of Abu Jundal exposed many of these dimensions. Jundal revealed that he had been tasked to move to Saudi Arabia from Pakistan in 2010, and was given the responsibility to recruit youth and take care of the India operations. Jundal further disclosed that he had recruited 50 persons during his nearly two-year stay in Saudi Arabia and was also instrumental in hawala (illegal money transfers) funding, through his contacts in Riyadh and Dubai, to LeT's sleeper cells in the Indian states of Kerala and Maharashtra.

Saudi Arabia is also a principal source of terrorist funding, both to groups based and operating out of Pakistan and the prominent 'indigenous' groupings within India. Steady funding from Saudi Arabia for SIMI and IM contributed directly to the growth of these groups. Most of the money lands in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, and is later distributed to SIMI-IM units elsewhere. According to security agencies, IM is worth an estimated INR 500 million, and its major donors are rich Sheikhs of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Regarding August 1, 2012 blasts, ATS is zeroing-in on hawala operations. For instance, Special Commissioner of Police (Special Cell) S.N. Srivastava, on October 18, 2012, observed, "He [Langde Irfan] received his ideological training in Saudi Arabia... Irfan was in touch with IM, founder member, Riyaz Bhatkal and also received and transported hawala transactions (sic)..." As reported on October 18, 2012 Irfan Mustafa, along with an accomplice went to Saudi Arabia to meet Kagzi and subsequently formed an "advance team".

Apart from hawala network, Saudi institutions have also used the cover of educational, welfare and religious funding to back terrorist activities. A November 2008 dispatch by Bryan Hunt, the then principal officer at the US consulate in Lahore (Pakistan), noted that Saudi Arabia was seen as funding some of Pakistan's hardline religious seminaries, or madrassas, which churn out young men eager

for "holy war", posing a threat to the stability of the South Asian region. Further, US diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks in December 2010 revealed that "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide" and that "Riyadh has taken only limited action" to interrupt the flow of money to Taliban and LeT linked outfits, which have launched attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Other countries in the Gulf are, of course, also involved in providing support and shelter to terrorists. Sarfaraz Nawaz, who financed the July 25, 2008, Bangalore (Karnataka) blasts, was later deported from Oman in 2009. During investigations, Nawaz revealed that a simultaneous bombing planned for Chennai (Tamil Nadu) was called off due to unforeseen contingencies. ATS sleuths are also on the lookout for Muzzafar Kola, the alleged financier of the 13/7 (July 13, 2011) blasts of Mumbai (Maharashtra), who currently resides in Bhatkal town in Karnataka, and his associates in Dubai. Kola and his associates, according to ATS, financed the 13/7 blasts through the hawala route using his firm Muzaffar Kola Enterprises LLC in Dubai as the front. In its chargesheet filed in the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) court on May 25, 2012, the Maharashtra ATS identified Kola as 'Wanted Accused Four' in 13/7 bombing, though he is yet to be chargesheeted. Police officers are said to have visited Kola's hometown in Bhatkal in June, but failed to find him at home.

Noticeably, Pakistan has taken a two way strategy of recruiting youth from Indian hinterland and then brainwashing them in extra-regional territories to neutralize any genuine international pressure to end the export of terror to India. Saudi Arabia, infamous for exporting its puritan Wahhabism to other regions of the world, including South Asia, has been particularly susceptible to cooption in this strategy. However, Saudi Arabia has, over the past years, also experienced repeated terrorist strikes on its own soil, including the suicide bombing targeting the then crown prince and interior minister, Muhammad bin Nayef, on August 27, 2009, in Jeddah. With the rising threat of Islamist extremist terrorism on their own soil, Saudi authorities appear to be diluting their hitherto unreserved and unqualified support to Pakistan's misadventures in the region, resulting



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in the recent deportations of terror accused to India.

Such ‘cooperation’ with Indian authorities, however, is still far from automatic or enthusiastic. Indeed, the deportation of Fasih Mohammad, as well as those who preceded him, came only after a number of obstacles had been overcome. India secured an Interpol Red Corner notice on May 31, 2012, against Fasih, but the Saudi Government demanded more evidence regarding his involvement in terrorism, and delayed his deportation. Moreover, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs had earlier taken the stance that those who were wanted in criminal cases in India could

not be deported if no offence had been committed by them within the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This had been disclosed to the Kerala High Court on July 16, 2012, by Assistant Solicitor General (ASG) P. Parameswaran Nair, based on a written communication from Faiz Ahabad Kidwaid, India’s Consul General in Jeddah.

Nevertheless, the recent developments give grounds for some optimism and, crucially, would undermine the complete impunity with which Pakistan backed Islamist terrorists had been using Saudi soil to mount their campaigns in India.

Sanchita Bhattacharya is a Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Boko Haram’s Growing Presence in Niger

By Jacob Zenn

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

The recent arrests of Boko Haram members in the Niger town of Zinder come at a time when the Islamist movement’s fighters are taking advantage of the porosity of the Nigeria-Niger border region to avoid security crackdowns in Yobe, Borno and other states of northeastern Nigeria. On September 27, a Nigerian security

Nigeria’s secular regime and “entrench a just Islamic government” (*Vanguard* [Lagos], September 27; AFP, May 29, 2010). The only similar case in Niger occurred last February, when 15 suspected Boko Haram members were arrested in Diffa, Niger’s easternmost city, allegedly planning to plant bombs in several of the city’s public places (IRIN, February 20).

Diffa and Zinder (the largest city in southern Niger) both border Nigeria’s Yobe State, where Boko Haram—then popularly known as “the Nigerian Taliban”—established a base nicknamed “Afghanistan” in a village three miles south of the border with Niger in 2003. Diffa is believed to be a principal refuge for Nigerian Boko Haram fighters.

On both sides of the Nigerian-Nigerien border, as well as in northern Cameroon and western Chad, Sunni Islam and the Hausa language are predominant. However, there are sizable minorities of Shuwa Arabic and Kanuri speakers in Diffa, western Chad and Nigeria’s far northeastern Borno State, which has been Boko Haram’s main area of operations since the start of the insurgency. These cross-border ties help unite the peoples of the border region.

The movement of Boko Haram members into Niger follows a series of blows inflicted on the movement by



official reported that five Boko Haram members were arrested in Zinder, one of the rare times that Boko Haram members have been arrested outside of Nigeria since Boko Haram launched an insurgency in September, 2010 to dismantle



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Nigerian security services in recent weeks:

- On September 24, Nigeria's Joint Task Force (JTF) killed 35 Boko Haram members and seized ammunition and weapons in house-to-house searches in Yobe;
- On October 15 the Joint Task Force in Borno State killed 24 Boko Haram members during a series of night raids in Maiduguri (*This Day*, October 17); and
- On October 20, security forces arrested a wanted Boko Haram leader, Shuaibu Muhammad Bama, in Maiduguri at a house owned by his uncle, Senator Ahmad Zanna, who represents Borno Central (*Vanguard* [Lagos], October 21).

Nigeria shares approximately 2,000 miles of border with Niger, Cameroon and Chad, but, according to the Nigerian Immigration Service, only 84 border points are staffed by immigration officials (Reporters 365.com [Lagos], August 9). Nigeria has previously closed the border after major Boko Haram attacks, such as the Christmas Day 2011 church bombings in Madalla, a city outside of Abuja. The Borno State National Service Immigration Comptroller said at the time that such measures were the only way to "prevent the entry and exit of suspected Boko Haram sect members and illegal aliens that have no travel or residence permit documents to remain in the country" (*Guardian* [Lagos], January 7).

Due to the linguistic and cultural ties along the 950-mile Nigerian-Nigerien border, Nigerien Muslims can easily cross the border and assimilate into Boko Haram's ranks. According to local reports in Niger, many Nigeriens have joined Boko Haram because of economic rather than religious or ideological motives (*Africa Review* [Nairobi], February 24). Unlike northern Nigeria, Niger does not have a legacy of religious extremism, but it is one of the world's least developed and most impoverished nations.

With an estimated 200,000 herdsmen and farmers in Niger subsisting on Red Cross food rations due to severe drought, the \$30 that Boko Haram offers its members for killing Nigerian security officers—or the \$60 it offers for also stealing the officer's weapon—can be an effective recruiting tool (*Vanguard* [Lagos], October 26). The hundreds of thousands of dollars that Boko Haram has acquired in several dozen bank robberies in the past two years, can provide additional economic motivation for the poor to join the insurgency,

whether or not they share the same motivations as Boko Haram leader Abu Shekau. If such reports are true, the poor Nigeriens who are taking up arms for Boko Haram may join other illicit economic activities such as selling black market gasoline and cigarettes. In February, captured Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa told interrogators that Nigeriens were among the groups commonly chosen by Boko Haram to carry out suicide bombings (*The Nation* [Abuja], February 9; for Abu Qaqa's interrogation, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, February 10).

Boko Haram's infiltration of the immigration service also facilitates its operations in the border region. Two days after the arrests of the five Boko Haram members in Zinder, the Nigerian Army announced it had arrested a Nigerian immigration official posing as an army officer. Under interrogation, the official confessed to having been trained along with 15 other Boko Haram members in weapons handling, assassinations and special operations in Niger, and named other officials who were conspiring with Boko Haram (*This Day*, September 29). The October 19 killing of a customs official and his son in Potiskum, Yobe State, by Boko Haram members was likely intended to coerce other officials to comply with – or at least not obstruct – Boko Haram's efforts to infiltrate the immigration service (*Daily Trust* [Ikeja, Lagos State], October 21). Boko Haram has similarly assassinated dozens of Islamic clerics, politicians and journalists who disagreed with Boko Haram's ideology and militant activities in order to deter other influential figures from speaking out.

Since April, there have been reports of several hundred Nigerian and Nigerien Boko Haram members helping al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Din and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) consolidate control of northern Mali after the three militias expelled the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the ethno-national secular Tuareg militia (*Vanguard* [Lagos] April 9). As a result, the territory of Niger separating northern Nigeria from northern Mali—only 300 miles across at its shortest point, Sokoto to Gao—is becoming an important area of transit for the insurgents. Niger is the one country of these three that has thus far avoided an Islamist



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insurgency on its territory, but Niger has a restive Tuareg population in the northern Agadez region bordering northern Mali and an increasing Boko Haram presence in its southern border cities—both representing potential sources of instability. Given this

pressure, Niger and Nigeria agreed on October 18—after four years of discussion—to deploy joint patrols along their border in order to prevent the Boko Haram presence in southern Niger from growing into a cross-border insurgency (*This Day*, October 18).

Jacob Zenn is a legal adviser and international affairs analyst who focuses on the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria.

What is Hezbollah's Role in the Syrian Crisis?

By Nicholas A. Heras

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

Recent reports of an increase in Hezbollah's involvement in Syria's civil war as combatants alongside the Syrian military represent a potentially sharp escalation in the regional impact of the ongoing conflict. Accusations

being funded and armed by anti-Assad international actors, including Hezbollah's Lebanese opponents in the March 14 political bloc (*Daily Star* [Beirut], October 15). On October 3, Free Syrian Army (FSA) chief



concerning Hezbollah's military support for the Assad government leveled by the party's Lebanese political opponents, the Syrian opposition and pro-opposition states have been persistent since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011. Hezbollah's leadership has replied that it is protecting Lebanese Shi'a villagers living along the Lebanese-Syrian border from attacks by Syrian rebels and that the Syrian opposition is actively

Colonel Riyad Musa al-As'ad stated that the FSA had killed a senior Hezbollah military commander named Ali Hussein Nassif (a.k.a. "Abu Abbas") and two of his bodyguards near the restive city of Qusayr on the Lebanese-Syrian border. Colonel al-As'ad further asserted that Nassif's activities in the area had been monitored for two weeks, and that his death was the result of a carefully planned FSA



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targeted assassination intended as part of a larger FSA offensive against Hezbollah in and around Qusayr (*The Daily Star*, October 3). Hezbollah officials simply stated that Nassif had died “performing his jihadi duties” (AP, October 2). Several weeks after Nassif’s death, the FSA claimed it had killed an additional 60 Hezbollah fighters and captured 13 in the vicinity of Qusayr (*al-Mustaqbal* [Beirut], October 12).

Lebanese newspapers (some of them antagonistic to Hezbollah) have recently begun publishing stories describing a deeper military commitment by Hezbollah to the Syrian regime. According to one such report, an agreement between the Syrian Defense Ministry and Hezbollah calls for the latter to provide over 2,000 “elite” fighters to Syria in the event of a foreign invasion. The report also claimed that Hassan Nasrallah offered the Assad government the full use of Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the event that “urgent assistance” was needed (*al-Jamhouria* [Beirut], July 26).

Another Lebanese publication claimed that Unit 901, an alleged elite Hezbollah military unit, had crossed into Syria to fight in the cities of Qusayr, al-Rastan, Talbiseh, and Homs, all near the Lebanese-Syrian border (*An-Nahar* [Beirut], July 27). This movement of Hezbollah troops into Syria was reported to be the result of the Syrian military’s need for assistance in the campaign to defeat rebels in Aleppo (*Majalla*, August 23). Hezbollah, along with the Iranian Quds Force, was also alleged to be training a 60,000-person Syrian military division modeled after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to protect the Alawite-majority Latakia Governorate of Syria (*Asharq Al-Awsat*, September 30).

Hezbollah’s soldiers were recently reported to have been participating as shock troops in several of the most intense battles of the conflict, including in and around Homs, Hama, suburbs of Damascus such as Zabadani and in the vital northern city of Aleppo (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 20). FSA units operating in Qusayr claim they have killed over 300 Hezbollah and Iranian fighters (AFP, October 7). A defected member of the powerful Syrian Air Force Intelligence Branch has asserted that Hezbollah has 1,500 fighters supporting the Syrian military inside the country (*Times UK*, October 6).

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, has refuted these allegations, stating that his party only supports the al-Assad government politically and that it was assisting 30,000 Lebanese Shi’a villagers living in 20 villages in Syria near the Lebanese border. [1] The villagers, in close vicinity to Qusayr and the city of Hermel in Lebanon, had, according to Nasrallah, been the victims of targeted assaults by the FSA and deserved the right to self-defense and support from the party (*Ahul Bayt News Agency*, October 12).

Shi’a refugees from the embattled villages claimed that over 5,000 armed men, the majority with ties to Hezbollah, were protecting the villages from attack (AFP, October 17). Hezbollah is alleged to have used Katyusha rockets against Sunni villages on the Syrian side of the border (*Independent*, October 26).

In spite of Hezbollah’s strong support for the al-Assad government, the presence of thousands of Hezbollah fighters actively participating in Syrian battlefields would be a significant departure from the established understanding of the party’s force capabilities. At present, the most consistent reports of direct Hezbollah military involvement in Syria occur in regions of the country that border Lebanon and have a significant Shi’a population, or in areas that are of strategic interest to Hezbollah because of their use as routes for moving weapons from Iran through Syria, such as the route through the Zabadan District of the Rif Dimashq Governorate.

Hezbollah’s active-duty military force is widely estimated to stand at between 2,000 and 4,000 fighters. These fighters are thought to be deployed mainly in southern Lebanon as a deterrent to Israeli invasion and throughout Hezbollah-controlled or monitored areas of Lebanon to guard the party’s exclusive “security zones” and weapons caches. Predominately Shi’a regions of Lebanon, such as in the southern suburbs of Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Beka’a Valley, are secured by a mix of Hezbollah full-time fighters, auxiliary village-level militias and armed members of the Lebanese Shi’a AMAL movement. [2]

A Lebanese Army source with extensive knowledge of Hezbollah’s war-fighting abilities states that any large-scale deployment of Hezbollah forces in Syria would most likely be the result of a severe strain being placed upon



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the Syrian military's ability to overcome rebel activity in the larger cities of Syria, such as Aleppo and Homs. [3] Hezbollah's specialization in reconnaissance and intelligence operations and doctrinal emphasis on the use of guerilla warfare would be of limited use in the current context of the Syrian theater of operations and its demand for mechanized capabilities that Hezbollah does not possess. Hezbollah Special Forces, such as the "Scorpions," could be used in limited engagements to disrupt the Syrian rebels' lines of support near the Turkish border or to perform rural ambush operations.

As a result of Hezbollah's limited resources and specialized doctrine of warfare, deploying a large force in active combat alongside the Syrian military would present an enormous strain on the party's ability to combat Israel and overcome its internal enemies inside of Lebanon. The presence of thousands of Hezbollah fighters in Syria would indicate either that the party has far more active-duty fighters than was previously believed, or that in order to execute a strategy of supplementing the Syrian military, Hezbollah is drawing significantly from its village-level reserves.

Potentially, Hezbollah could also convince its March 8-bloc allies in Lebanon, particularly AMAL, but also the Free Patriotic Movement, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and the Marada Movement, amongst others, to provide armed support for the Syrian military to supplement its efforts. Although this is a possibility, there is no convincing evidence at this time that Hezbollah's Lebanese allies are mobilizing for combat duties in support of the

Syrian military. This type of broad, March 8-bloc deployment would indicate that the parties in the bloc are confident in their ability to resist Israel in the event of another invasion of Lebanon and to overcome internal Lebanese rivals such as the Future Movement and Salafist militant groups in the event that an internal conflict were to erupt.

Further, the Syrian civil war presents anti-Hezbollah factions in Lebanon with a convenient opportunity to strike at the party and potentially minimize the risk of Hezbollah's retribution against them. Reports indicate that more than 300 Lebanese fighters, mainly Sunnis, have been actively supporting the Syrian rebels in Homs Governorate, including an all-Lebanese military unit (*Daily Star*, May 31). Some of these Lebanese fighters state that they have fought with veteran rebel units such as the "Standard of the Free Orontes," which claims to have faced Hezbollah soldiers in action in and around Homs (*NOW Lebanon*, October 19).

Areas of the Syrian governorates of Homs and Rif Dimashq that border Lebanon are now a battlefield where the Syrian military and Hezbollah are arrayed against fighters from the FSA and Lebanese anti-Hezbollah factions. The March 14 Bloc, frustrated in its ongoing efforts to reduce the political power of Hezbollah inside of Lebanon and to force the party to relinquish its heavy weapons, would benefit if the defeat of the Assad government forced Hezbollah to renegotiate its armed presence in Lebanon.

Notes

1. The United States Department of Treasury designated Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah as a sponsor of terrorism for "providing training, advice, and extensive logistical support to the government of Syria; directly trained Syrian military personnel and facilitated training efforts by the Iranian Quds Force; coordinating efforts with the Syrian military and the Quds Force to expel Syrian rebels" (U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 13, 2012, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1709.aspx>).
2. The author would like to thank Dr. Carl Anthony Wege, professor at the Coastal College of Georgia, for his insight into the structure of Hezbollah's military forces.
3. Interview conducted by the author with a Lebanese Army source with extensive operational experience throughout Lebanon who requested anonymity due to being on active duty. Interview conducted on October 24, 2012.

Nicholas A. Heras is an M.A. Candidate in International Communication at the American University (DC) and a former David L. Boren Fellow.



Americans Slip From Minnesota to Somali Terror Group

Source:<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/americans-slip-minnesota-somali-terror-group-fbi/story?id=17609306#.UJQKvGcUNEx>

Young American men continue to slip through a terrorist recruiting pipeline from the homeland to join the ranks of jihadists half a world away



group's fighters. A 2011 Congressional report put the number around 40.

"Minnesota represented!" writes American-born rapping jihadist Omar Hammami in an autobiography posted online in May, though he claimed most of the U.S. recruits were already dead. "Those Minnesota brother[s] have almost all left their mark on the [jihad] and most have received martyrdom, while the rest are still waiting."

Kyle Loven, chief division counsel for the FBI's Minneapolis field office, said recruits going to Somalia from Minnesota "continues to be a matter of grave concern and the FBI remains fully committed to resolving this situation."

The FBI said that in the recent case, two young Minnesota men, 19-year-old Mohamed Osman and 20-year-old Omar Ali Farah, left their homes for their trek to Somalia in mid-July. Osman's family told MPR he was religious, but they were stunned when he disappeared.

"It made me mad because he didn't speak to no relative about it," Osman's cousin, Jamal Salim, said. "We're heartbroken about it because he's like our sibling. Imagine not knowing what's going on with your own brother -- how he's been feeling, who he's been talking to, and what they're telling him. We lost a brother, and I don't know how to get him back."

Earlier this month some details about how exactly young men are recruited for jihad emerged during the federal trial of a man who was convicted of recruiting more than 20 fighters for al-Shabaab in America in 2007, according to The Associated Press.

At the trial of Mahamud Said Omar, three former recruits who had survived their trip to Somalia only to return to the U.S. testified that they were talked into fighting by charismatic, devout older men who

promised paradise for those who died in combat against "invaders."

in East Africa, with two going as recently as three months ago, according to federal officials. The FBI confirmed a report by Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) that in July two young men disappeared from their neighborhoods in Minneapolis and are believed to have traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab, the embattled al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group.

Under "Operation Rhino," for years the FBI has been investigating what has been described as a recruiting pipeline from the Twin Cities, which boast large Somali immigrant populations, to Somalia. Both top U.S. officials and at least



one prominent member of al-Shabaab said Americans account for dozens of the terror



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Al-Shabaab has suffered several recent defeats at the hands of African military forces and lost its final urban stronghold in Somalia earlier this month. But Western and Somali security experts told ABC News they are concerned such defeats may tempt the terror group into abandoning insurgency in Somalia for a renewed focus on international terrorism. An African Union official said there is worry that the same fighters driven out of Somalia could launch attacks abroad, from Kenya and Uganda to the U.S. During Congressional testimony in January, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper

listed al-Shabaab as one of the most significant terror threats to the homeland, in part due to a "foreign fighter cadre that includes U.S. passport holders... [who] may have aspirations to attack inside the United States."

U.S. Special Representative for Somalia James Swan told reporters last month that al-Shabaab's recent losses caused some of the terror group's foreign fighters to flee, but Swan did not know if that meant they were abandoning jihad or simply heading to a different al Qaeda-affiliated group in another country such as Yemen.

Discussion Point: Terrorism Studies is not a Sub-Discipline

What the Field Needs is to Become Truly Inter-Disciplinary

By Fernando Reinares

Source: <http://start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=433>

I think you can tell by reading the leading academic journals on Terrorism Studies that it is common place among terrorism scholars to take for granted the status of Terrorism Studies as an academic sub-discipline within the Social Sciences. Checking their footnotes and references suggest that many seem to bind the theoretical and empirical riches of Terrorism Studies within the scope of the intellectual production essentially made by fellow colleagues who share interest for the same topics, publish in the same periodicals or book series, and meet in the same conferences. No doubt, these initiatives have resulted in accumulation of vast, substantive and most valuable knowledge on the past and present of terrorist actors, scenarios and facets.

Yet, Terrorism Studies is not an academic sub-discipline within the Social Sciences. The more we think of Terrorism Studies in such a way, the more we, purposely or otherwise, lose sight of terrorism - not in terms of a violent tactic but of a sociopolitical phenomenon - as a social construct. The more we think of Terrorism Studies as a sub-discipline, the more we reify the phenomenon and contribute to the academic institutionalization of this reification. In my opinion, that is not a sound scholarly path to pursue. Ultimately, indulging in the



implicit or explicit consideration of Terrorism Studies as an academic sub-discipline, on the basis of an academic community which provides legitimation to such a notion, particularly after 9/11, introduces epistemological obstacles for the advancement of science.

I wrote science but, when affirming that Terrorism Studies is not a Social Science sub-discipline, I am certainly not advocating for an alternative Natural Sciences approach to the study of terrorism. Of course, there is a legitimate Natural Sciences approach to this phenomenon. Telling enough is the fact that, in the category subject of "International Relations," a journal titled *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism* currently enjoys a much higher impact factor than our long-revered and referential *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* or *Terrorism and Political Violence*, as calculated by the Journal Citations Report of the ISI Web of Knowledge. But my point just focuses on academic approaches to Terrorism and Counterterrorism from the perspective of the Social Sciences, predominant in these latter two periodicals.

Terrorism Studies should not be considered as a Social Science sub-discipline in itself, but rather an inter-disciplinary field where History, Anthropology, Sociology, Criminology, Political



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Science, Psychology, Economics and other academic disciplines with their own - at times overlapping - traditions, methodology and learned corpus, coalesce in a mutually enriching exchange on problems concerning terrorism and counterterrorism. This exchange is thus based on their different theoretical, analytical and empirical perspectives. However, something more than just having diverse undergraduate or graduate backgrounds is needed to harvest the benefits of this exchange in Terrorism Studies. A continuous update on themes and topics of such disciplines relevant to the field is also required.

At a *macro* level of analysis, for instance, scholars focusing on the preconditions and precipitants for terrorism should be very familiar with theories on social conflict and contentious politics, as well as with anthropological findings on cultures of violence. Similarly, research on correlations between regimen types and terrorism, more concretely on what types of democracies are more affected by terrorism, must begin with the comparative politics literature on regime types and models of democracy. Similarly, the effectiveness and results of counterterrorism policies are to be addressed within the framework of Public Policy studies. Likewise, how can one properly deal with issues of societal impact of terrorism or social resilience to terrorist attacks if uninformed by the tradition of studies on social order or even those more recent on social capital?

At a *meso* level of analysis, scholars in Terrorism Studies should go well beyond leaning against rational choice basics when investigating organizational decision making with respect to terrorist tactics. Insight from inter-disciplinary research on informal groups and formal organizations is indeed advisable to avoid the mistake, lately not uncommon in the field, of classifying as amorphous or disorganized the different, innovative ways used by transnational terrorist entities to articulate themselves. Network analysis and

the new institutionalism are providing some remedy to this. Also, the potentialities of social movement theory invite study on the mobilization strategies of terrorist organizations. Aspects of terrorist financing, in turn, are best dealt with from the outlook of authoritative research on topics ranging from ordinary crime to international finances.

At a *micro* level of analysis, scholars in the field should not be too quick to dismiss the exploration of socio-demographic characteristics of terrorists because initial findings suggest that terrorists have no single social profile. Rather, we should upgrade our skills to interpret how are these data interwoven with, and influenced by, socio-structural positioning and historical processes. Lacking support from psychological or social-psychological studies on human motivations, research on individual motivation driving some people to engage in terrorist activities tends to end in exercises of cataloguing and description. In addition, far more input from collective action theory and research is missed in the often repetitive efforts at understanding the processes of socialization into beliefs which justify violence and eventually steer certain individuals to actual involvement in terrorism.

To summarize, Terrorism Studies should be redirected from its sub-discipline pretensions to the synergy of a true inter-disciplinary field in the broad domain of the Social Sciences. In turn, the field has to remain closely connected to other relevant inter-disciplinary fields such as Public Policy, Organization Studies or Collective Action, just to mention three well developed fields at the *macro*, *meso* and *micro* levels of analysis, respectively. In a sense, scholars in the field of Terrorism Studies have to be more Criminologists, Sociologists, Anthropologists, Political Scientists, Psychologists, Economists, Historians and the like than *Terrorologists*. Ideally, Social Science scholars interested in terrorism and counterterrorism should be working only part time in the field, and not sub-discipline, of Terrorism Studies.

Fernando Reinares is Professor and Chair in Political Science and Security Studies at King Juan Carlos University in Madrid, as well as Senior Analyst on Global Terrorism at Elcano Royal Institute, Spain's leading think tank on international and strategic studies. Applying collective action theory and interviewing over seventy former ETA members, he wrote a book which became a national best-seller and is now entering its eighth edition. Served a term as Senior Advisor on Antiterrorist Policy to the Ministry of Interior in Spain, and has been awarded with both the Cross of Military Merit and



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the Cross of Police Merit, although his most precious public distinction is the Prize Excellence granted by fellow citizens in his native Rioja wine region. Last year he enjoyed an appointment as Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, to advance research on the Madrid train bombings. He is currently teaching a graduate course on Developments of Counterterrorism Policies and Programs at START.

Book – Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us

By Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskaleiko

New York: Oxford University Press, 2011

Source: <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=jss>


Friction takes a refreshingly newer look at radicalization, and it should be on the list of every reader who is interested

in studying and understanding radicalization. The organization of the book is simple, and the authors do an exceptional job of using specific historical examples relevant to each mechanism. *Friction* is academically researched and based on a historical analysis of the radicalization process, using case studies from the era of the People's Will (the first stated terrorist group) during Czarist Russia in the late 1880s, to more

contemporary profiles of terrorist organizations. From this historical examination, the authors extract twelve mechanisms of political radicalization that influence individuals to step into radical circles. The mechanisms are grouped into individual, group, and mass radicalization categories, and include personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, love, risk and status, unfreezing, group polarization, group competition, group isolation, jujitsu politics, hatred, and martyrdom. Previous literature addressing radicalization issues revolved around the identification of steps on how to *identify* or *convert* individuals who have become radicalized so they can become *normal* again. The main argument of *Friction* is that radicalized individuals are not abnormal. They are normal people who lead normal lives who have strong beliefs and passions and at a certain point in their lives (possibly in response to a trigger event) begin to act on those strong

beliefs in response to any number of internal and external influences. The authors also point out that sometimes, radicalization is good and radicalized persons motivate others to take action for the good of humanity. The authors use Doctors without Borders and the 2010 Haiti earthquake response as examples of radicalized behaviors and actions employed for the good of others. The argument about radicals being normal individuals and not evil, crazy persons is the key point introduced immediately to the reader. The authors state, "It is a

psychological trajectory that, given the right circumstances, can happen to any person, group, or nation. The trajectory is not right or wrong; it is amoral in the sense that radicalization can occur for causes both good and bad" (p. 4). Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskaleiko want their readers to understand that a mind shift is required to properly understand radicalization and that: "...those who enter must leave behind the orderly and comfortable world in which normal people do not do terrible things. Full admission requires examining how we are ourselves susceptible to radicalizing influences. (p.4)" While the majority of the book is a historical analysis of the mechanisms of radicalization, the most intriguing part is in Chapter 14, where the authors conduct an analysis of how the mechanisms of radicalization influenced Usama bin Ladin. The authors take the readers through



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each mechanism and explain how it did or did not influence ibn Ladin to become the terrorist icon he ultimately became. Both authors have an academic background in social psychology and have done extensive research into terrorist and political environments. They have a clear understanding of the psychology of the individual in concert with the influences of social groups and society in general.

Clark McCauley is a Rachel C. Hale Professor of Sciences and Mathematics and codirector of the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at Bryn Mawr College. His research and publications focus on political conflict.

Sophia Moskaleiko is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and a consultant with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN. Her research and publications focus on

group identification, political activism, radicalization, and terrorism.

Each author brings unique insight into understanding the radicalization problems in the world. Everyone who is fighting against radicalized individuals should read this book so they have a baseline understanding of what they are up against and how individuals who are radicalized can take a perceived wrongdoing from an event in their childhood or early adulthood and use that event as a foundation for radicalization later in life. On a positive note, if one wants to radicalize others for the good of humanity, reading this book will help him or her understand what is involved in motivating others to join cause and find passion for that cause. As the authors stated, "It seems likely that the same mechanisms that move a few to terrorism also move many to lower levels of commitment and risk taking for a political cause." (p. 215)

Reviewer Dr. Robin L. Thompson, NASA Counterintelligence Office

Terrorism in Greece

By Ioannis Michaletos

Source: <http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/1685>

Introduction

Domestic terrorism in Greece stretches back in the mid-70's when the infamous terrorist organization "November 17" was formed. Since then numerous groups have claimed dozens of victims either prominent Greek citizens, or foreign diplomats and military personnel. The following research focuses on some major attacks from the early 90's and onwards, along with supplementary data.

It has to be noted that the terrorist phenomenon in Greece has been evolved over the past 40 years and still continues to be a threat for domestic stability. Moreover, the various terror groups have changed their tactics and strategy and they have mutated from close-knit, paramilitary-like groups as the case of "November 17" to a variety of loosely connected cells that tend to operate in similar fashion like the "Nihilist- Anarchist groups" of the late 19th century, which at that period were responsible for campaigns of terror in major Western cities and carried out a large number of assassinations against state figures.

Lastly it should be noted that all available data so far, as well as, the analysis which derives from a multitude of open sources, points out that Greek domestic terrorist -especially its newer versions- have indeed connections with local and regional organized criminal networks and collaboration with other extremist groups in Europe.

Basic elements

1. Leftist Terrorist tradition – Greece has a long-standing tradition of Leftist terrorism.
2. Three waves of terrorism in Greece
 - a. "Cold War Era" groups (i.e. 17 N) - Tight-knit hierarchical group, paramilitary trained disciplined, ideologically compact, inward-domestic aims.
 - b. Post 2001 groups (i.e. Revolutionary Struggle) – Horizontal hierarchy, paramilitary trained, loose ideological substance, outward-international aims.
 - c. Post December 2008 groups (Conspiracy Cells of Fire) – Autonomous loose cells, poorly trained, obscure ideological substance, closely following international developments-global aims



Case Studies

1. Greek Finance Minister attacked in 1992 and a 22year old passerby was killed.

The Greek Finance Minister Yannis Palaiokrassas was attacked by members of the 17th November



terrorist group with a grenade launcher, on June the 14th in the center of Athens, while he was passing by with his ministerial car.

The attack didn't hurt the minister or his entourage, but it proved fatal for the 22year old Athanasios Axarlian (photo) who was accidentally passing by the pavement right across the car of the Minister. The busy Athenian road where the attack took place, named Voukourestiou was sealed off by the police but the culprits managed to

escape, presumably with the use of motor bikes that were safely stationed near the attack scene. (1)

The attack resulted in a wide range police operation with no avail and prompted Mitsotakis government to request by the Parliament to pass a Law prohibiting newspaper of presenting proclamations by terrorists in order to show the intolerance of the state towards the terrorists.

The death of Axarlain was also a turning point for the 17th November group since it was the first accidental civilian death and damaged the aura of the group to the sectors of the public that viewed domestic terrorism under a sympathetic point of view. (2)

The Attack

The terrorists launched a grenade launched from an apartment across the area where the ministerial car was passing by early in the morning of 14th of June. Due to a few seconds of delay the car was not destroyed and a young person passing by was fatally injured, since he was walking right beside where the grenade was exploded.

The terrorists managed to escape unnoticed and later on during the trail of the 17th November group in 2003, it was revealed that 2 persons took part in the attack who had extensively monitored the are days before and had rent an apartment so as to be able to launch the attack from an advantageous location for them. They had also made several rehearsals concerning the method of their operation. (3)

(1) Kathimerini Newspaper:

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_1_11/04/2003_28508

(2) In News: <http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=450484>

(3) ENET newspaper: http://archive.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=112,dt=16.10.2002,id=18561856



2. Greek Police officer killed in an attack in 1992

Policeman Yiannis Varis is killed and 6 other policemen are injured by a rocket and grenade attack on a police bus in Exarchia, Athens, on November the 2nd. Later on the terrorist group Revolutionary Organization 17 November assumed responsibility. (1)

The attack was staged by a nearby road where the terrorist remained hidden and waited for the bus to approach. The fired the rocked once they had a clear vision of it and the police officer died later on from his wounds.



The attack

The attack took place in one of the busiest areas in Athens early in the morning during a period of continuous bombing attacks by the November 17th group and several other terrorist groups. There were no valuable data collected from bystanders and passerby witnesses and the perpetrators managed to vanish amid the Athenian notice unnoticed by the Police forced that arrived in the scene and cordoned the area. (2)

- (1)wiki.phantis.com/index.../1991
(2)http://www.in.gr/news/reviews/article.asp?lngReviewID=441065&lngChapterID=441056&lngItemID=440437

3. Greek Ship owner is killed in Piraeus in 1997

The Greek ship owner Costas Peratikos was assassinated by the 17th of November group on the 25th of March in a street nearby the port of Piraeus. The assailants shoot him with a 0.45 mm automatic weapon which was the primary lethal emblem of the 17th of November group and was used in many attacks including that of the CIA chief of station in Athens, Wells, in 1975. (1)



Peratikos was entangled in a legal battle with the then Greek government concerning the mismanagement of a shipyard he previously owned and was re-nationalized previously of his

death. The attacked caused a stir in the Greek business world and the father of the diseased launched a nation-wide protest campaign in order to raise sensitivity to the public in issues concerning domestic terrorism. (2)

The attack

The terrorists operating as a couple approached Peratikos while he was walking to his office in Filonos street in Piraeus. They shot him several times and abandoned the scene of the crime using motorbikes that were stationed nearby and were stolen over the previous day having their license plates changed. Peraticos did not make it to the hospital and eye witnesses were not able to provide a clear description of the terrorists that were operating in a fast and decisive manner and were careful as not to disclose their facial characteristics or their voice pattern. (3)

- (1) HRI:https://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpa/1997/97-05-29.mpa.html
(2) BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/greek/local/020714_peratikos.shtml
(3) http://library.techlink.gr/4t/article.asp?mag=1&issue=311&article=8481



4. Murder of the British Defense Attaché Stephen Saunders

British Defense Attaché Stephen Saunders, 53, was gunned down in central Athens on Thursday 8 June at 7:40am. Saunders was stuck in traffic on Kifissias Avenue when he was shot through his closed car window by two persons on a motorcycle. He was taken to the local Red Cross hospital where he died just over three hours later. In a 13-page proclamation sent to the Greek daily Eleftherotypia, November 17 said



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Saunders was assassinated because he “actively participated in coordinating the NATO air raids and bombing of Serbia” in the spring of 1999. The British Embassy in Athens denied that Saunders had “any direct role” in NATO’s campaign.

The Greek government and opposition political parties alike denounced the British diplomat’s assassination as a barbarous act of terrorism. Prime Minister Costas Simitis said “we will not permit anyone to disturb the calm and progress being achieved, or to blacken the image of a modern, peaceful and democratic Greece.” He also promised to spare no effort in bringing the assassins to justice. (1)

The shooting occurred at almost the exact spot where an American naval attaché was gunned down in 1983 by the same group (2)

The days after the attack various theories were made available to the domestic media regarding the causes of the attack, that have been largely unknown even nowadays. It was made known later known that the Defense Attaché has never participated in the NATO air raids and the war in ex-Yugoslavia. According to Greek media commentary, there may have been a mistake by the terrorists regarding the identity of the Attaché. (3)

That was the last attack by the 17th November group that was finally disbanded in July 2002. The outcry against the attack on Brigadier Saunders along with heightened security measures and international police cooperation, lead finally to the arrest of the terrorists.

The attack

On May 17th, Stephen Saunders, the British Defense Attaché in Greece has been shot dead in his car in Athens.

Saunders was rushed to a local hospital in a serious condition, but died later of his injuries. The two gunmen opened fire on Brigadier Saunders as the British official drove a white Rover belonging to the embassy along Kifissias avenue in a northern suburb.

It appears that the car the Brigadier was driving was not bullet proofed. Ballistic tests revealed that the gun used had been used by the 17th November group in past attacks. (4). The gunner used a 0.45 Colt pistol, although confusing information, allegedly by Police sources, mentioned around the use of a G-3A3, 7.62 mm round automatic rifle.

The attack took place on Thursday morning 8th of June 2000, just a few days when in Washington on Monday June the 5th, the National Commission on Terrorism reported to Congress that Greece “has been disturbingly passive in response to terrorist activities.” (5)

(1) Central Europe Review: <http://www.ce-review.org/00/23/greecenews23.html>

(2) Association of Former Intelligence Officers: <http://www.afio.com/sections/wins/2000/2000-23.html>

(3) <http://www.in.gr/NEWS/article.asp?lngEntityID=395801>

(4) BBC World News: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/782245.stm>

(5) The Tech Online-Washington Post: http://tech.mit.edu/V120/N28/greece_28.28w.html

5. Attack against the American Embassy in Athens



A rocket-propelled grenade slammed into the American Embassy on January the 12th 2007, causing limited damage and no injuries. The shoulder-fired missile narrowly missed a large blue-and-white American seal on the embassy’s facade and damaged a third-floor bathroom near the ambassador’s office. U.S. Ambassador Charles Ries called the attack “very serious” and said no warning had been given (1).

Four fire engines rushed to the scene, amid reports that the

explosion struck the embassy and local residents called in to state television saying they had felt the explosion, which shattered some windows. (2)



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Panayiotis Stathis, spokesman for the Public Order Ministry, also said, “This was a violent act aimed to provoke Greek public opinion and disturb relations with the United States.” The strike against the embassy here was not unprecedented. On Feb. 15, 1996, another antitank rocket hit an outside wall of the embassy, damaging three diplomatic vehicles. (3)

The rocket, apparently fired from more than 300 yards away across a busy boulevard and over a ten-foot security wall, smashed the glass front of the building. The responsibility for the attack was borne by the “Revolutionary Struggle”, a shadowy extremist group with Marxist leanings and strong anti-American sentiments that emerged from obscurity in 2003 with the bombing of an Athens courthouse complex. (4)

Investigators found the device used to fire the rocket shell at a construction site near the embassy.

Police cordoned off streets around the embassy. Authorities were searching apartment buildings and a hospital nearby for evidence. Traffic came to a standstill across parts of the city’s downtown as police and emergency services scrambled to the embassy. (5)

The terrorist attack against the US Embassy in Athens, the location, and the way it was hit, indicated that it was performed by very well-trained terrorists capable of performing terrorist acts in the city center and in one of the busiest streets in the Greek capital. So far, there was no known eyewitness who saw the terrorists or the launch of the rocket. (6)

Greek Police sources have semi-officially confirmed that the weapon was never used in the country in another attack in the past. (7)

Moreover, concerning the timing of the terrorist attack, the Greek media have noted that it occurred the same day that the special UN envoy Mathew Nimitz was arriving in Athens in order to discuss the standing name issue between Greece and FYROM. In parallel on the 12th of January an appointment was arranged between the Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Public Order Minister Polydoros, in order to discuss issues concerning domestic terrorism and urban style extremism and ways to combat it. (8)

The American side sent a special FBI antiterrorist-team over the following days, in order to examine the visual material obtained by the CCTV’s across the Embassy compound and assist the research for the location of the terrorist group along with the Greek police. (9)

Local experts believed at that period that the attack by the revolutionary struggle would be the beginning of a new round of violence in the country and over the next years more attacks followed in several other targets.

Further detailed information & analysis:

On the private Greek TV stations MEGA Channel and Ant1 TV, which covered the events from the beginning, more than 10 people living behind the US Embassy building and near where the Ambassador’s house is located, stated that they heard “dense shots” in the back of the Embassy’s building two hours before the rocket blast.

For these public statements the Greek forces and the US Embassy made no formal comments, whilst from 10:00 hrs. local time (on January 12, 2007) none of the Greek media again mentioned such statements.

Also, after the attack a threatening telephone call was made, placing warning of a bomb in the Athens Olympic Stadium; the warning proved to be misleading.

Initial information mentioned that a rocket launcher was found on a construction site opposite of the US Embassy, and referred to an auto-launched rocket, 28.6 inches in length, similar to those used by the terrorist organization November 17.

The terrorists aimed to conduct an impressive and symbolic attack by targeting the US eagle emblem which hangs in the front of the building, but they missed as they hit some centimeters above the main target, and they actually hit offices located on the third floor of the building.

The official confirmation by the police authorities is that a Chinese-type Antitank Launcher, RPG-7 type, was used.

According to local analysts, the Revolutionary Struggle is most probably the follower of the older terrorist organization Revolutionary Cell which once operated close to the external cell of November 17. It cannot be excluded that members of the Revolutionary Cell founded the Revolutionary Struggle, along with November 17 members that have not yet been arrested.

Moreover, the terrorist act of the Revolutionary Struggle against a target like the US Embassy in Athens signaled its establishment as the successor of the November 17.



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This theory is supported by the fact that the same day, on January 12, 2007 — in the Court in Athens, the operational member and one of the leading figures of November 17th — Demitris Koufodinas, codenamed “Lukas” — testified in his appeal trial process. Lukas was supposed to testify on Monday, January 8, 2007, but he requested a hearing for the 12/01.

On the other hand, the use of the RPG-7 from a close distance, against a heavily guarded target, indicated good training, decisiveness, experience, and a willingness to “internationalize” their acts, with the aim of winning international exposure of their organization.

Undoubtedly, after the US Embassy strike in Athens, the Revolutionary Struggle was regarded as the number one domestic terrorist organization in Greece, attracting possibly the “followers” of November 17 and of the Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA).

November 17 had, on February 15, 1996, conducted a rocket attack against the US Ambassador’s house in Athens. At that time the rocket had hit the protection wall.

The weeks after the attack Greek daily papers tend to confirm the suspicion that the attack in the USA Embassy in Athens had an Albanian or Balkan connection in general. The Athenian newspaper “Eleftheros Typos” assumed that the rocket launcher was sold by the Albanian organized crime groups to the Greek culprits for the amount of some 2,500 Euro. Moreover the activity of these crime groups is to be found in Western FYROM which is mostly populated by Albanians and they regularly illegally export weaponry to Greek criminal groups.

Also the Greek newspaper “To Vima” revealed the strong connections of Albanian organized crime and the Greek illegal weapons market that has flourished since the 1997 uprising in Albania and the consequent “disappearance” of hundreds of thousands of weapons from that country.

Lastly the Global Information Service (GIS) of the American Defense & Foreign Affairs institute made an articulate research about the attack and published its estimations that supported the notion that a wider plan for destabilization in the Balkans at that period was underway.

The author of the present article was interviewed by the Greek radio station “Sky” just a few hours after the 12th of January attack and pointed out towards a wider Balkan nexus, according to the then available data. On the 14th of January on a second interview by the same media, as well as the Deutsche Welle in Greece and Athens International Radio- more commentary was provided in order to draw a clearer view of the modern-day correlation between terrorism and crime, a relationship that was formally acknowledged by a governmental minister in early 2009, when Mr. Markoyannakis head of the Public Order Ministry, admitted in an interview in the newspaper To Vima, that Greek terrorists have a definite bond with crime networks. Since then all successive Greek public order Ministers have stated along the same lines.

In parallel quite a few experts and security analysts supported the aforementioned hypothesis through public appearances in the media.

Lastly, the Greek daily Kathimerini revealed in early February 2007, that a team of Greek police officers ventured in several locations in the Southern Balkans in order to track possible contraband routes relating to the attack. Since then no other data of importance surfaced in the press, despite several arrests of arms trafficking groups in Greece and other organized crime related networks in the country, without any link to that particular attack.

The attack

One of the most expensively protected US embassies in the world – and the most heavily fortified in the Balkans – the Embassy building was attacked at 5:58am when security guards were changing shifts. Greek security officials said the grenade was fired from a street opposite by assailants probably riding a motorbike. (10) The rocket landed in a toilet on the third floor of the building, which also houses Ambassador Charles Ries’s office. No one was in the area of the building at the time, and no one was hurt, an embassy official said. (11)

Greek anti-terrorist officers arrived on the scene. The senior police official said Greece’s deputy police chief and Athens police chief had gone into the building together with officers of the national security and anti-terrorist squads. Dozens of police cars surrounded the embassy and police cordoned off all roads in the area, including a major boulevard in front of the mission.

The attack came just a day after President Bush announced he was sending 21,500 extra troops into Iraq to try and stem the rapidly-escalating sectarian violence. (12)



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- (1) New York Sun: <http://www.nysun.com/foreign/blast-at-american-embassy-in-athens-called/46604/>
- (2) Herald Sun: <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/us-embassy-in-rocket-attack/story-e6fr7lf-1111112822238>
- (3) New York Times: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/world/europe/12cnd-greece.html>
- (4) Time Magazine: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1577262,00.html>
- (5) CBC News: <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/01/12/blast-embassy.html>
- (6) World Security Network: http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=17951&topicID=34
- (7) In Greece: <http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?Ingentityid=769208>
- (8) Eleftherotypia newspaper: <http://archive.enet.gr/online/online?dt=11/01/2007>
- (9) ANT1 TV Station: <http://www.ant1online.gr/Society/PoliceBulletin/Pages/20071/fbae15a0-5cd8-4187-b01a-17026ee3422a.aspx>
- (10) The Guardian: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/13/usa.greece>
- (11) The Washington Post: <http://www.google.com/search?hl=el&rls=WZPA,WZPA:2006-23,WZPA:en&q=rocket+attack+against+the+US+embassy&start=10&sa=N>
- (12) Daily Mail: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-428307/Rocket-attack-U-S-embassy-Athens.html>

6. Antiterrorist Police Officer attacked

On June 17th, 2009, the Antiterrorist Police Officer Nektarios Savvas was killed by gunmen in the Athens district of Ano-Patissia.



Nektarios Savvas, 41, a member of the anti-terrorism branch, was hit at least a dozen times as he sat with a cup of coffee in an unmarked police car outside the flat of Sophia Kyriakidou in the inner-city Patissia quarter. The killers sped away on motorbikes. (1)

Police spokesman Panagiotis Stathis said between 15 and 20 shots were fired at officer Nektarios Savvas by at least two gunmen at about 6:20 a.m. local time in the residential district of Patisia. The officer had just taken over the morning guard duty shift outside the home of a person in a witness protection program after testifying at the trial of a member of the far-left Greek group Revolutionary Popular Struggle, known by its Greek acronym ELA. Only the officer was targeted in the attack, with no attempt apparently made to approach the home of the witness. (2)

Savvas had been in plain clothes and in an unmarked vehicle but locals claimed to have been aware of his role as a witness protection officer. The 41-year-old had been just 20 minutes into his shift, which began at 6 a.m., when the masked assailants appeared and started shooting him at nearly point blank range in the head and chest. The gunmen and a third man believed to have acted as a lookout, and then fled on two motorcycles, according to witnesses.

The Revolutionary Sect terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the fatal shooting of the officer. The police had suspected from the start the involvement of Revolutionary Sect after finding 24 9mm cartridge cases at the scene matched to a weapon already used by the group which emerged in February. At the time, it had machine-gunned a police station and the headquarters of a private television channel in Athens and had warned of further indiscriminate attacks on police. (4)

The Police claimed that more than thirty witnesses have been questioned, with five testimonies being viewed as the most important ones.

Evidence has suggested that the assailants were more than four. Three men wearing helmets walked towards the police car of the officer, who was guarding a key witness for an ELA trial. Two of them assumed positions in front of the car and the third at its left side and opened fire, shooting the 41-year-old policeman, father to a toddler, in the chest and head. They then ran towards a nearby street, where at least one accomplice of them was waiting and they vanished into thin air. (5)

The attack

Nektarios Savvas, 41, was shot dead around daybreak in Athens yesterday while sitting in his unmarked vehicle outside the witness's home when three unknown assailants on motorbikes opened fire. He was hit by around 15 bullets and declared dead in hospital. Savvas, a married father of one child, was attacked at around 6.20am, outside the home of Sofia Kyriakidou, who was a state witness in the 2004 trial of four followers of the extremist People's Revolutionary Struggle



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(ELA). The four were sentenced to 25 years in jail but later released, mostly for health reasons. (6)

- (1) Times: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6517360.ece>
- (2) CBC News: <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/06/17/greece-athens-shooting-police-ela452.html>
- (3) Kathimerini newspaper: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_1_18/06/2009_108168
- (4) News 24: <http://www.news24.com/Content/World/News/1073/d486e16c979d40f6a391e7e4522ca7c4>
- (5) Express Newspaper: http://www.express.gr/news/news-in-english/182074oz_20090618182074.php3
- (6) The Star newspaper: <http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5040003>

7. Attack against the Greek Security Minister

The June 2010 attack against the Greek “Citizen’s Protection Ministry” in the Minister’s Chrysohoidis private office, revealed a tremendous breach of the Greek security system and an attack that has surpassed any other in the history of domestic terrorism.

The attack

The explosive mechanism was boxed in a postal parcel and was sent through the national post agency

Στις 20.10 ο αστυνομικός υποδιευθυντής Γιώργος Βασιλάκης, υπασπιστής του υπουργού Προστασίας του Πολίτη, ανοίγει το δέμα με τη βόμβα που του αφαιρεί τη ζωή.

ΥΠΑΣΠΙΤΗΣ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ

ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥ ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟΥ

ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΕΙΑ

ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ

ΔΩΜΑΤΙΟ

ΚΟΥζίνα

Φρουρός

ΥΠΟΔΟΧΗ

ΑΠΟΘΗΚΗ

WC

WC

Σε διπλανά γραφεία εργάζονταν οι συνεργάτες του υπουργού. Στο γραφείο του βρισκόταν ακόμη ο κ. Μιχάλης Χρυσοχοϊδής, λίγα μόλις μέτρα από το σημείο της έκρηξης.

Το γραφείο του υπουργού βρίσκεται στον 7ο όροφο του κτιρίου επί της λεωφόρου Κατεχάκη. Για να εισέλθει κανείς στο κτίριο πρέπει να περάσει από ειδικούς σαρωτές με ακτίνες X και αρκετούς ελέγχους.

Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες, η βόμβα είχε τοποθετηθεί σε κουτί παπουτσιών. Πιθανότατα μέσα σε μικρό πυροσώληνα, ο οποίος πυροδοτήθηκε όταν τον άνοιξε ο άτυχος αστυνομικός υποδιευθυντής. Ήταν από ζελατοδυναμίτιδα, όμοια με αυτή που σκότωσε τον άτυχο Άφγανό στα Πατήσια, στις 28 Μαρτίου 2010.

“ELTA” to the Minister’s office, through his political office in the center of Athens according to all available, verified and officially streamed information. Moreover, the mechanism according to the statements of the Police authorities was used for the first time in Greece, it is similar with bombs being sent by the IRA and ETA and it was composed by “Controlled” material that cannot be found in the Greek commercial market, but only through authorized merchants or enterprises dealing with explosives.



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Analysis

First of all, even if one speculates that the internal check points in the Ministry of Citizen's Protection were compromised, either by lack of duty by the guards or for any other reason, the same must have happened to the ELTA service that also has a security system and moreover all parcels pass through different pair of hands until they reach their final destination. Therefore the terrorists are either extremely lucky or they knew the exact route the parcel would reach from their hands until it reaches the Minister's office, so they would be sure that it would not explode by mistake or more probably be discovered by the security systems or plainly by an observant eye.

Second of all, quite a few pundits in Athens pointed out that the obscure terrorist group "Laiki Thelisi" may be involved, a group that has hit a few times since 2004, but seems to have quite a sophisticated method of operations. In 2004 for instance in their first attack they hit the Judicial offices in the city of Larissa, using a mobile phone that by its ring detonated the explosives, the exact same mechanism that the Al Qaeda terrorists used the same year in Madrid, albeit with a far bigger quantity of explosives causing the deaths of 200 people. This kind of technique is quite novel for any terrorist organization and was the first time it was used in Greece.

Further in another May 2009 attack, Laiki Thelisi, hit the offices of Mr. Trepekis, a Greek businessman that his name was at that period frequently related by the Greek press, as the main consultant for the procurement of the C4i system by the Greek government in the early 2000's for the Olympic Games, a system that never operated and was accused as a classic example of taxpayers money waste.

During that period the Ministry for Citizens Protection rejected the use of the C4i and stated that the system cannot be used. If Laiki Thelisi is involved in the attack against the Ministry, that means the only element that connects -on a visible level- both attacks, is the existence of significant news concerning the use of C4i by the Greek security system.

Lastly it has to be noted, that the parcel directed to the Minister, has as a sender, the name a "Karavellas", an ex-Siemens manager, who is now wanted by Interpol for economic crimes, involving the bribing of Greek officials in the late 90's and early 2000's, centered around the Olympic Games and also with the electronics system that the Greek Police had then procured by Siemens. Apart from the sarcasm that the perpetrators of the attack seemed to enjoy, a vital question arises. Why would anyone deliver a parcel to the Minister himself, stating on the back of the cover the name of the top Greek fugitive in the Interpol list for Greece and subsequently that would be delivered through many intervals to his Ministerial office and would be opened without taking into account that this could be just a farce?

For any terrorist group that would have as a single-minded purpose to cause a spectacular attack, this kind of preparation would seem absurd. That raises two possibilities, either the terrorists are very much influenced by the Aristophanean-yet tragic in its consequences- spirit or the whole truth is far from the official statements and the bits of information being handed out by the domestic media.

Since 2010, the Greek state managed though to seriously disrupt the operations of terrorist groups with more than 20 arrests being made and the discovery of arms caches in several locations across the country. In October 2012, the leading weekly political magazine in the country, "EPIKAIRA" claimed that domestic terrorism era is far from over, since both Greek and international authorities fear the continuation of terrorism by individuals that have evaded the Law and have re-grouped themselves in order to stage more attacks in light of the worst economic depression the country has witnessed since WW2.

8. Greek parcel bombing attempts in November 2010

The Greek parcel bombing attempts against Embassies in Athens, EU institutions and against the offices of the heads of government of Germany, France and Italy; caused a great deal of alertness and mobilization throughout the entire European security system.

Summary of the events as reported by international media:

<http://euobserver.com/22/31183>

<http://premium.edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/11/04/greece.suspicious.packages/index.html>

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6A31WL.htm>

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-01/greek-police-arrest-two-men-as-parcel-bomb-injures-courier-company-worker.html>



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Remarks

1) The attackers seemed not be professional enough in order to avoid police surveillance and arrest but they were able enough to place the bombs (Approximately 250 gr. of explosive material (Black powder connected with a 9volt battery) in each parcel. That shows that this particular group has started to “experiment” with know-how of “mail bombing” which is new to Greece and it seems that this know-how has been imported recently from abroad.

2) During the same period there was the case of “UPS air mail bombs”, and a terror attack in Istanbul. Although the attacks seem not to have any relation between them, this was quite of a coincidence.

3) The head of EUROPOL, Mr. Rob Wainright, in a visit in Athens in March 2010 stated in an interview in the newspaper “Kathimerini”, (http://news.kathimerini.gr/4Dcgi/4Dcgi/_w_articles_civ_11_21/03/2010_395045), claimed that Greek terrorism “Has connection and supporters abroad....the EUROPOL will supply a task force of 50 experts in order to assist the Greek security forces to combat terrorism in their country...EUROPOL has the technical means to support the Greek Police to investigate links between the domestic groups and the foreign ones, through the use of an intelligence gathering network and database across Europe...certainly there are links between Greek groups and other European ones”. EUROPOL was one of targets of the parcel bomb attempts, as it was discovered after the Greek Police checked all parcels that were to be exported by the Athens international airport on the 2nd of November.

4) There are several terrorist and/or radical groups in Athens composed of young people-university students that are training from what it seems to launch serious attacks. This probably is the case of the two young people that were arrested, and it may well prove to be a part of a training process in order for the terrorists to test the alertness of the police and the viability of such project.

Mail bombing is a rather low cost but also low affectivity, manner under which, a terrorist group could orchestrate a terrorist attack. Nevertheless the overall preparation level of the Greek security forces was undoubtedly tested by the culprits.

5) The two young people that were arrested were well-armed, but not trained to use their weaponry against the police force that captured them. That data further ads to the hypothesis that they were sent (not in their knowledge perhaps) to test the security forces in Greece and not to actually state a spectacular attack or resistance, because they did not have the proper paramilitary training to do that. Moreover the carried with them evidence such as telephone cards, bus tickets, that further supports the idea that they were not professionally trained to eliminate any clue that can unfold their connections after their arrest.

6) On a wider European level, it is likely for a truly “network-based” urban terrorism to emerge where radical anarchists, eco-terrorists-Islamic fighters and various criminal groups will cooperate in an “ad hoc” basis with each other for mutual gains and where the agenda of these groups will be mixed and far more complicated.

A kind of a “social media” networking between all kinds of extremists willing to use force will probably emerge, like a network that one can discover in “Facebook”, by replacing “friends” with criminal associates, and the various “applications” as the mechanisms used for criminal action.

The world is becoming increasingly mixed and globalized, and it is natural for terrorism to follow that trend. Those assumptions can be concluded by the rapid internationalization of the radical groups across the globe, the easiness in the exchange of information and training between them and the capabilities that new technologies provide to young people that take the crucial step from violent radical action into plain terrorist action. The overall economic climate across the Western countries greatly facilitates radicalization.

7) This was the first time in the history of Greek terrorism that foreign leaders were directly targeted, as well as, there was such a mass of foreign targets simultaneously attempted to be bombed. That certainly adds to the idea that one of the main aims of the Greek terrorists, was to “internationalize” their actions and by doing so they try to achieve two major gains:

a. Attract more supporters and collaborators to their aims from abroad

b. Upgrade themselves in the shady hierarchy of domestic terrorism in Greece, by proving to the other terrorist groups that they are capable of spectacular action, and the presence of international media, as well as the exposure that this entails, further increases their “prestige” amongst such criminal networks.



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8) Lastly it is quite probable that the Greek terrorist groups are becoming fused, meaning merging their operational and logistic capabilities, due to multiple arrests over the past 24 months by the local authorities, therefore that could explain how a group in which the two young people that were arrested participated into; could have achieved the know-how and preparation level to stage a well-coordinate terrorist project as the one being examined. For the record, the groups “Conspiracy cells of arsonists” that the two suspects presumably belong; was until now capable of staging only small scale bombing attacks mostly against unguarded public buildings or banks and all evidence showed it was composed by young people with no military training or international exposure in extremist action. In comparison two other Greek terrorist groups, the “Revolutionary Struggle” and the “Revolutionary Sect”, had through their actions revealed elements of the aforementioned, therefore a convergence of power between these three terrorists groups may be at hand.

Key points of parcel bomb attack attempts & the newer Greek Leftist terrorism generation:

- *Global Impact*
- *Poor execution*
- *European terrorist connection with the Greek group*
- *Aims to impress abroad (Strategic thought) rather to hit specific target (Tactical thought)*
- *Proliferation of terrorist methodology in exceptionally young individuals with no criminal record-connections*
- *Greek neo-terrorist groups are very active compared to the size of the country*
- *They have ease at recruiting people and gain access to weaponry*
- *Connections with domestic organized crime are becoming evident*
- *Should they gain solid Pan-European networking; potentially dangerous for Continental security*

Ioannis Michaletos is an independent Strategic Analyst. He was born in 1978 in Athens-Greece and pursued studies in the UK in the fields of Political Science and Human Resource Management. He is occupied as a South Eastern European Analyst of the Research Institute on European & American Studies, RIEAS, and as a South Eastern European Editor in the World Security Network Foundation, WSNF. Moreover he regularly publishes articles in www.Balkananalysis.com. Moreover he is a member of the international Security Research & Intelligence Agency, ISRIA, and he is an Associate Analyst on the thematic of security analysis. He is also a freelance journalist for a variety of Greek media relating to strategic Affairs. He speaks Greek, English, French and Italian and has served his national service as a Petty Officer in the Hellenic Navy.

Do "suicide bombers" really commit suicide?

By Israel Oron (Ostre), Ph.D. (Psychology)


Source: <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20415>

Abstract

This article applies a psychological approach to explore and to explain the behavior of Palestinian terrorists who blow themselves up in the light of their own words. It is shown that terrorists have no suicidal intent; hence their behavior is not an act of suicide. Psychological analysis point to a behavioral reaction to stress situations that are perceived as threatening to survival, which could account for the lethal activity of the Palestinian terrorists. These findings suggest that such terrorists could be deterred if an appropriate alternative for their lives was available to them.



Introduction



The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Israel Intelligence & Heritage Commemoration Center

October 29, 2012

Do "suicide bombers" really commit suicide?¹

Israel Oron (Ostre), Ph.D. (Psychology)²

Abstract

This article applies a psychological approach to explore and to explain the behavior of Palestinian terrorists who blow themselves up in the light of their own words. It is shown that terrorists have no suicidal intent; hence their behavior is not an act of suicide. Psychological analysis point to a behavioral reaction to stress situations that are perceived as threatening to survival, which could account for the lethal activity of the Palestinian terrorists. These findings suggest that such terrorists could be deterred if an appropriate alternative for their lives was available to them.

Introduction

The violent confrontations in Israel brought about by the Palestinians from 1992 to 2005 were epitomized by "suicide bombings" - the term given to terrorists who blow themselves up along with their intended victims³. This method was also employed

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² The Department for Psychology, Law and Ethics/ University of Haifa, Israel. National Program for Suicide Prevention, Ministry of Health, Israel. Formerly, Psychologist, Behavior Section/ The Department of Criminal Investigations & Intelligence, Israel Police HQ.

³ The author's definition of any act of political terror is the use, or threat of use, of violence by non-state individual actors or groups, acting in opposition to established authority in order to bring about desired political outcomes. (The definition draws partially on Wardlaw, 1982). This activity is not considered political-terror if it takes place as part of hostile activities between countries. The definition deliberately avoids a moral judgment and has no negative or pejorative connotations as regards the actors, because this would limit and even contradict the essence of any scientific research, especially involving social issues. Science by definition is a conceptual and technical framework for solving questions through an understanding of the factual data. A scientific definition does not deal with good and bad. It is only useful or not useful and these qualities are defined primarily in terms of how efficiently it can separate, predict, understand, control, create, inhibit, harm and be used. (The author's research)

American soldiers in the Marine Headquarters in Beirut. Of course, the outstanding example of these terrorist attacks was the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This method is employed today against American soldiers in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

This kind of terrorist attack primarily constitutes an operational problem for the armed forces and the intelligence services, and has also elicited academic interest. Without exception, researchers from different schools consider that this is a case of a suicide (To name only a few: Atran, 2003. Bloom, 2005. Kimhi & Even, 2004. Merari, 1990, 2006. Moghadam, 2003. Pape, 2003, 2005).

My point of view regarding this kind of terrorism is that of a psychologist who has dealt for many years with the subject of suicidal behavior (Oron, 2008, 2011, 2012). Based on knowledge gathered in the field of the psychology of suicide, this article analyzes verbal material produced by

Palestinian terrorists. The aim is to inquire, first and foremost, whether these self-exploding Palestinian terrorists are suicidal, and in any case to pinpoint the typical circumstances in which the act is devised and carried out. The main findings are discussed below.

The violent confrontations in Israel brought about by the Palestinians from 1992 to 2005 were epitomized by "suicide bombings" - the term given to terrorists who blow themselves up along with their intended victims². This method was also employed during the 1980s against the IDF in Lebanon, as well as against

► **Read full paper at:** http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20415/E_210_12_1543205940.pdf

Islamist terrorist group uses former Christians to bomb churches

Source: <http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=16149>

The Somali Islamist terrorist group Al-Shabaab has trained recent Christian converts to Islam to bomb Kenyan churches, according to the head of the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya.

"It is the recent converts who (are) being used to bomb churches," said Rev. Wellington Mutiso. "It is not members of the Somali, Boran, or Swahili communities, which have many Muslims, but the other tribes which have been known to follow Christianity."

"We feel those who are attacking us are 'our own' who have recently converted," added Rev. David Gathanju, head of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa. "That's why it is difficult for the security to identify them."



Kerala terrorists using dogs for target practice

Source:<http://www.dailypioneer.com/home/online-channel/360-todays-newspaper/107265-kerala-terrorists-using-dogs-for-target-practice.html>

Incidents of stray dogs getting hacked with sharp weapons have been recurring in Kerala's Kozhikode, Malappuram and Thrissur districts of late throwing law enforcers into a tizzy. Though the police have so far been unable to

Kerala Police and the Forest Force is now looking into such incidents, according to State Home Minister Thiruvanchoor Radhakrishnan. The IB report on the possibility of a terror angle has shocked the Kerala Police which so far has been considering these acts as anti-social mischief. For the same reason, inquiries were being done on the basis of cases registered under Section 419 of the IPC (mischief by maiming or killing of cattle, etc) and laws pertaining to cruelty towards animals. The report assumes further significance in the context of the recent NIA observation that Kerala is an important fountainhead of terrorism in the country. Also, most of the areas from where incidents of dog-hacking have been reported are also known for the presence of activists of certain alleged extremist groups. Most of the incidents of the mystery dog-hacking have been reported from Kalikavu, Perinthalmanna, Pandikkad, Changaramkulam Kottakkal police station limits in Muslim-majority Malappuram district. However, a few incidents have also been reported recently from Kozhikode and Palakkad districts.



make any inferences on the intention behind these cruel acts, reports suggest these could well be part of a terror training module. Dozens of dogs have been maimed — some killed — in the past few months in various places in Malappuram district alone. The police have already questioned over 100 persons and have registered six cases in connection with these incidents.

The Kerala Home Department is now considering the incidents seriously in the light of a report from the Intelligence Bureau that these could be the handiwork of certain religious extremist groups. A joint team of the



A report from Wayanad district said that over 30 dogs were found with injuries to their necks and heads in



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Cherambadi-Vaduvanchal area of the district bordering Tamil Nadu in the past few months amidst rumours that certain extremist groups had been organising physical training camps in many places under the garb of martial arts practice.

In most cases, the dogs had suffered hack injury in the head or neck, presumably by sharp weapons like swords, strengthening the suspicion that the act could be part of a terror training programme to let the “trainee” overcome the revulsion and fear of inflicting injuries on live flesh and the sight of oozing blood.

According to police officials, the depth and angle of wounds found on the ‘victims’ suggest

that the ‘assailants’ could be bike-mounted and were committing the offence while on the move. Though most of the cases of dog-hacking were reported a long while after the incident, officials say that it is not difficult to assume that weapons like swords are being used.

“We have heard of mafia and terror gangs using attacks on animals as a training scheme in several Western countries,” said a senior police official. “It is quite difficult for even the most hardcore criminals to thrust a sword into a living body and using this method is expected to help the trainee get over that fear factor,” he said. “Still, we’re not jumping to conclusions,” he added.

Al Qaeda, Taliban preparing women squads to target West

Source: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/al-qaeda-female-cadres-counter-terrorism-authorities-taliban/1/226844.html>

A video clip posted on the web by Al Qaeda has the security agencies across the globe worried. The short clip depicts burqa-clad



women wielding dangerous assault weapons, like machine guns, Kalashnikov rifles, snipers and rocket-propelled grenades during training sessions at an undisclosed location. Apparently, these female cadres are being trained by Al Qaeda and Taliban to infiltrate

and attack the enemy targets in the West as they were less likely to draw attention as compared to their male counterparts.

It appears that these women have been inducted into the squad from the volatile, conflict-ridden Russian republic of Chechnya, according to international media reports.

Counter-terrorism authorities believe that the rationale behind forming all-female squads by global terror outfits is that the women would be less likely to raise suspicion than men and it would be relatively easier for them to slip through security barricades.

The latest report raises concerns also because in recent times several women terrorists have been arrested in the West. In different countries there are increasing instances of female suicide bombers successfully hitting targets causing major destruction.

Reporter penetrates German airport

Source: http://www.focus.de/reisen/fliegen/sicherheitsluecken-am-flughafen-berlin-tegel-focus-reporter-dringt-auf-das-rollfeld-vor_aid_858016.html

A FOCUS reporter passed through the underground maze in which, in addition to the data lines and heating, air conditioning and water supply housed up to the runway.



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Accordingly, terrorists could also get thrown through the basement at Terminal A to the runway, the airport technically partially paralyze and even lead on ventilation systems may evolve toxic gases in the building. One employee said, in the basement, the exterior doors stood open for hours and there were no controls.



Tegel Airport is Germany's fourth-largest airport with 18 million passengers expected this year. Moreover, from here start the machinery of the federal government. Until repeatedly postponed the opening of the new capital airport Tegel remains indispensable as an airport location. But the old airport is actually too small for the passenger masses. Therefore, the airport will be expanded – almost a year before the closure.

Two Added to Most Wanted Terrorists List

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/two-added-to-most-wanted-terrorists-list?utm_campaign=email-lmmediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=extras&utm_content=153610



Omar Shafik Hammami (left) and Raddulan Sahiron have been added to the Most Wanted Terrorists list.

Two individuals—Omar Shafik Hammami, a United States citizen who allegedly provided support to a foreign terrorist organization; and Raddulan Sahiron, wanted for his alleged role in



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the overseas kidnapping of an American—have been added to the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list. A third man—Shaykh Aminullah, wanted for questioning in connection with providing material support to terrorists—has been added to our Seeking Information—Terrorism list.

Israel kills Hamas top military leader, destroys Hamas Fajar missiles

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bull20121114-israel-kills-hamas-top-military-leader-destroys-hamas-fajar-missiles>

In a precise targeted attack early today (Wednesday), the Israel Defense Force (IDF) killed Ahmad Jabari (far right in photo), the top



military leader of Hamas. Jabari ran the organization’s armed wing, called the Izz el-Deen Al-Qassam.

In a separate attack, Jabari’s deputy, Raed al-Atar, was also killed.

Half a dozen other top military leaders of Hamas were attacked, but there is no news about their fate.

Jabari was considered the most important strategist of Hamas, and he is credited with innovating the organization’s approach to its war with Israel.

Among other things, Jabari was behind the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was held prisoner for five years before being exchanged earlier this year for a few hundreds Palestinian terrorists in Israeli jails.

The Israeli early morning strikes also included attacks about twenty or so targets across the Gaza Strip. These attacks inflicted a heavy blow on Hamas’s military capabilities by destroying most of Hamas’s most threatening weapons – the mid-range Fajar missiles Hamas received from Iran and with which the organization could attack Tel Aviv and other cities in central Israel.

The IDF has begun to move armored and infantry units closer to the Gaza Strip in

preparation of a land invasion. Israeli sources indicated that a land invasion is not imminent — but will be launched if Hamas retaliated by attacking Israeli civilian targets.

The killing of Jabari should be considered a major intelligence coup. Jabari was famous for his secretive ways, and he led his life, both personal and professional, under a heavy blanket of secrecy and compartmentalization. The



attack this morning also killed his son, who was the driver of the car which was attacked by an Israeli missile.

Jabari is the most senior Hamas leader to be killed since the December 2008-January 2009 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Jabari has been at the top of Israel’s most-wanted list for the last six or seven years.

Jabari, a relative of one of the founders of Hamas, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi, who himself was killed by Israel on 17 April 2004.

The Israeli attack comes after two weeks of relentless missile and rocket attacks from Gaza against Israeli cities and villages in south Israel. Hamas took responsibility for these attacks, in which more than 200 missiles and rockets were launched.

The interesting question now is how Egypt would react. Egypt is lead by the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement with which the Hamas is ideologically affiliated.



Illuminating the Structure: Intelligence in the Development of CT Strategy**By David Segalini**Source: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/illuminating-the-structure-intelligence-in-the-development-of-ct-strategy>

John Arquilla's excellent piece in Foreign Policy called "Three Wars on Terror" recounts the strategic debate that took place during the Reagan Presidency about how best to counter terrorism, whether through a "guerilla war against guerillas" or through the application of overwhelming conventional military force. The article is well worth a read, not least because it demonstrates that there were (and are) serious strategic alternatives to the path generally adopted by the U.S. since 9/11. More than this, however, the article inspired an excellent response piece by Adam Elkus for the Abu Muqawama Blog at the Center for a New American Security. The response piece examines Clausewitz's concept of identifying a target's Center of Gravity (COG), i.e. that part of the target which causes it to topple when struck. Elkus writes accurately that the difficulty in determining a strategic course in counterterrorism operations is really a result of the difficulty of clearly identifying a terrorist COG. How do terrorist organizations hang together? How do they make their plans and formulate their intentions? And how can knowing this help us to strike them most effectively? Elkus puts it thus:

Today, there is still a rigorous debate over the structure and dynamics of al-Qaeda. That debate is complicated by the fact that al-Qaeda, like most violent non-state actors seeking to survive, exists in a murky realm. Intelligence--closed or open source--shines a light into the cave but cannot illuminate the entire structure. The main problem with the targeted killing program is precisely uncertainty over who the targets really are and how their deaths lead to strategic effect. Much of the structure was more visible after the September 11 attacks, and it became clear that the COG was al-Qaeda's base system in Afghanistan. Destroying this system in a military assault and aggressively targeting its financial links complicated our understanding of the COG. Moreover, al-Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide today may not have a single COG, just as the

Axis lacked a common connectivity that gave them order and purpose.

Of course, what the above passage brings to mind is that identifying Al Qaeda's COG is precisely what the U.S. has a strategic intelligence apparatus for. It is not merely the case that intelligence can "shine a light into the cave". Rather, it can, and should be, aimed at "illuminating the entire structure". That Elkus is right, and a decade later, much that is fundamental about Al Qaeda and similar organizations remains unknown, suggests that such understanding was never the primary objective for the CIA. In other words, the CIA never really sought to find Al Qaeda's COG. Instead, from the very beginning of the post 9/11 world, they were following a predetermined strategy relying primarily on the exercise of conventional military forms of force. This fact is worth exploring.

The two Garys--Schroen and Berntsen—writing about the CIA's Alpha and Jawbreaker teams, or pseudonym Dalton Fury's work "Kill Bin Laden" on the battle of Tora Bora, really highlight this reality. The underlying strategy for a response to 9/11 was a military strategy, and the CIA approached its role in CT assuming that premise and with the objective of supporting military operations. Berntsen, in "Jawbreaker," writes that virtually all the men in the Jawbreaker team had extensive prior military experience and that for most of them this was their first Agency assignment. Being fresh out of combat infantry units, is easy to imagine that they would not approach their mission from a strategic intelligence optic, but would instead rely on their frame of reference as soldiers and marines. Indeed, what did the CIA do in Afghanistan? It bought support from various tribal groups to allow the safe deployment of U.S. forces. It embedded with certain factions to conduct Terminal Guidance Operations--ie calling in airstrikes. And once more Special Operations Forces came into the theatre, the CIA largely fed units from JSOC and Special Forces locational intelligence to fix and finish AQ fighters.



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In other words, from the outset, the U.S. took the approach of treating Al Qaeda as a group of individuals to be killed or captured through surrender—a military objective—instead of an organization to be thoroughly understood and penetrated for the purposes of systematically dismantling it permanently. As Paul Pillar has noted in several places, the Intelligence Community more often than not follows policy rather than informs it. This was certainly the case here, where case the CIA's role was to support the actions which flowed from the U.S. strategic supposition, and little about the CIA's actions in Afghanistan called into question the legitimacy of this working assumption, or offered a viable strategic alternative.

Arquilla says as much in his original article, characterizing the Bush administration's approach as a decision "to attack other nations in [an] attempt to create a less permissive international environment for terrorist networks" and succumbing to the "impulse to send large numbers of troops" into Iraq, incurring a stalemate there at great cost. Both of these quotes imply the primacy of a large forces response.

Of course, confirmation bias comes into play when gauging the effects of a campaign, and Afghanistan, at least after its initial actions, was viewed as a categorical success. Elkus submits that Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity was its base system in Afghanistan during the invasion of 2001, which the military actions there effectively swept away. This is a tempting assertion, and certainly this view seems to have been shared by large parts of the U.S. government. But ultimately this is an erroneous assertion. It is true that U.S. forces' biggest success, measured against its military strategy, was in removing Al Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan, but it does not follow that those bases constituted Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity. In fact, Al Qaeda's build up of the Afghan bases in the years prior to 9/11 actually represented a divergence both from its original structure, and from the structure it has adopted in the years since.

Al Qaeda was founded as an organization that coordinated, trained, inspired and funded other

disparate groups of Islamic terrorist groups operating throughout the world. This is what it did from its founding until the late 1990's and this is what it has done since late 2001. It was only in the late 1990's that Al Qaeda began planning and executing its own terrorist operations from a central command structure. In other words, far from being Al Qaeda's COG, the bases in Afghanistan that supported this central command system really stands as something as an aberration in Al Qaeda's history.

If the working assumption underlying a strategy fails to take in that larger context, it is bound to leave us with a less effective strategy. In the case of the war on terror, this failure to properly identify Al Qaeda's COG served to reinforce a strategy that lead with conventional military force augmented by a targeted kill/capture program lacking in clearly demonstrable strategic effects.

It is unclear, however, that this was an inevitable outcome. As Arquilla notes in his article, a covert action campaign of deception and subversion achieved considerable success against difficult enemies in the eighties such as Abu Nidal. The fact that the Secretary of Defense at the time felt such a strategy smacked too much "of the dark side" should not have suddenly disqualified it from future consideration. The senior official in charge of the military is bound to suggest, and even prefer, strategies that reflect military capabilities and military power. It does not follow, however, that the Intelligence Community cannot offer a second strategy of attacking a target based on its unique capabilities. These include illuminating the structure and dynamics of an organization, identifying a target's center of gravity, and then subverting it with the goal of inducing self destruction and a permanent dismantling. Doing both simultaneously is certainly possible, and both can strengthen and focus each other. After all, knowing Al Qaeda's true Center of Gravity might have saved the U.S. a great deal of the several years, billions of dollars and thousands of lives it has spent fighting to eliminate the enemy.

David Segalini is a former Operations Officer in CIA's National Clandestine Service. He currently works for a risk management and intelligence consultancy in New York. The views in this article are strictly his own.



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New database offers insights into terrorism countermeasures

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121114-new-database-offers-insights-into-terrorism-countermeasures>

START ➔

NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY BASED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), located at the university of Maryland, recently published a report which discusses the development of the **Countermeasures against Extremism and Terrorism (CoMET) Database**, which catalogues government and non-government countermeasures taken in response to terrorist and extremist activities.

START says that the database specifically includes countermeasures taken against the activities of Homegrown Islamic Violent Extremists in the United Kingdom (HIVE-UK), al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Anti-Abortion Extremists (AAE) in the United States.

“CoMET is important because it is one of the first large-scale datasets to systematically catalogue counterterrorism events,” said Jonathan Kennedy, author of the CoMET report. “Perhaps the biggest contribution of CoMET is that it can enhance our understanding of the variety of counter-

measures employed against a variety of threats and across different contexts.”

Within the report, several descriptive statistics are available for HIVE-UK, AQIM, and AAE in the U.S., including:

- the total number of countermeasures taken against each group
- the distribution of countermeasures taken against each group type, which includes countermeasures taken by police and within the prison system, among others.

The new report also outlines the challenges researchers faced in compiling CoMET.


“Another contribution of CoMET is that it has helped to shed light on a range of conceptual and empirical challenges that have received relatively little attention in this line of research,” Kennedy said.

He noted that comparing countermeasures taken by different governments in three very different social, political and economic environments, presented a significant methodological challenge, as they pertain to three very different types of terrorist threats.

To request a copy of the Countermeasures against Extremism and Terrorism (CoMET) Database report, e-mail <infostart@start.umd.edu>

‘Home-grown western terrorists are new threat to India’

Source: <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/homegrown-western-terrorists-are-new-threat-to-india/article4088157.ece>



*The French Interior Ministry has released a report pointing to massive intelligence failures in the handling of Mohamed Merah, the young Pakistani-trained terrorist from Toulouse, south-western France, who killed seven people including three Jewish children last March and who, according to his conversations with the police, planned to attack the Indian Embassy in Paris. **Vaiju Naravane** talks to **Mathieu Guidère**, Professor of Islamic Studies and Culture at the University of Toulouse. Mr. Guidère is also the author of *The New Terrorists* (in French) and *The Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Scarecrow 2012). He led the Strategic*



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Information Centre at the French Defence Ministry from 2003 to 2007. Excerpts.

According to you there appears to have been a shift in the type of persons attracted by terrorist activity. If Mohamed Atta and the 9/11 attackers were all well-educated, sophisticated young men, the new terrorists come from deprived and often criminal backgrounds. Could you explore that thesis?

The emergence of “new terrorists” can be traced to the aftermath of the death of Osama bin Laden, leader of the al-Qaeda, when the ideologues of al-Qaeda along with the leaders of some radical Pakistani Islamic movements, reflected on a new strategy that could keep them active, relevant and at the centre of the international scene. They viewed the Arab Spring as a development that could marginalise them and they argued that the best way to remain at the forefront of the Islamic and world stages was to promote what they called “global proxy terrorism” as against the “global terrorism” they had practised earlier. Simply put, this means that organisations such as theirs that are unable to carry out attacks far away from home territory use outsiders to perpetrate such attacks for them. These individuals are not an integral part of such terrorist outfits (they could be monitored and traced back to the parent body and therefore pose a risk) but they are given designated targets so that the terrorist organisation can then claim responsibility for the attacks. So the new trend is towards “global proxy terrorism” of implanted urban terrorists who are remote-controlled by distant terrorist outfits, mostly in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan or between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir front. The other aspect of this trend is that many of these “home-grown” terrorists come from deprived backgrounds and have a history of early criminal activity. So the violence linked to criminal activity is then converted into terrorist activity.

Coming to the recent arrest of terrorists in France, were you surprised that these cells were located in cities as far flung as Strasbourg in the north east, Cannes in the south, Toulouse in the south west or the Paris region in northern France? Do you find this disquieting?

This is not a new phenomenon at all. The United States has experienced similar

developments since 2009 with terrorists there having similar profiles. You might recall the cases of Nidal Hassan, Shazad from Pakistan and most recently the Bangladeshi terrorist Quazi Mohammad Rezwanaul Ahsan Nafis arrested in the U.S. All these persons were remote-controlled by handlers in Asian countries. What is new in France is the shift from criminal activities to terrorist activities. Also new is French citizens moving against targets in France (whether French or otherwise), for the benefit of terrorist organisations located outside France.

How does someone who is reasonably low on the social scale, a petty delinquent or a criminal get transformed into a terrorist? What is the radicalisation process? What, for example, happened to Mohamed Merah?

In this process we should distinguish between the triggers and the motives. These are two different things. The trigger is mostly an international geopolitical event such as a drone attack in Pakistan or Israeli acts in Gaza or French action in Mali or elsewhere. This is the trigger that makes a person shift from being a normal person or a delinquent or criminal to being a terrorist.

As for the motives, they are both psychological and ideological. The psychological motive is linked to the notion of revenge for something or someone. The dynamics of revenge is either for oneself or for lost family members or acts against the Umma. There is a feeling of resentment, of being wronged.

The ideological motives are articulated against the concept of hegemony. This is based on the terrorists’ perception that there is a hegemonic power or state that is keeping them down and in a state of subjection — India versus Pakistan, U.S. towards Egypt, France towards Algeria. The hegemonic power in their minds can change. Until 9/11 it was almost always the U.S.

If one looks at the “new terrorists” such as Mohamed Merah and their profile, these are people who come from deprived backgrounds, with low schooling, a history of delinquency and living on the margins of society. Do they reason in terms of intellectual concepts such as hegemonic



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power or do they simply have a grouse against society, which finds its outlet in terrorism?

I do not agree with the notion of social determinism as an explanation for terrorism. Many studies, including my own, show that many very poor and marginalised people, whether in France, India, the U.S. or elsewhere, have not shifted to terrorism. Social determinism can be used as an alibi, an excuse for terrorism but it's not convincing as an argument. If this was true, it would lead millions of people to radicalism and that has not happened. I also do not agree that these people are intellectually poor, incapable of conceptualising. Police transcripts in the case of Merah show us that although he was marginal, and poorly educated, his level of understanding was very sophisticated. People might not have degrees or formal education, but they read a lot, especially on the internet and the web plays a major role in how the radicalisation process takes place.

How worried are you about this phenomenon in France? How big is it? After all, France with some five million Muslims has the largest Muslim population in Europe.

In France the problem is probably huge. It's a new phenomenon, we have little knowledge of it and it is growing because the geopolitical environment is not under control. By that I mean that on the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea you have countries like Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya where weak, pro-Islamic governments have come to power after the Arab Spring. They are no longer in control of society and more importantly, they are not in control over the internet propaganda machine.

This uncontrolled terrorist, Islamic fundamentalist internet propaganda is spreading across the world and given the proximity between the two banks of the Mediterranean, this propaganda has begun infecting French society. That is why the influence of this trend is growing and could lead to more radicalisation in the near future.

Given the fact that Mohamed Merah told the police he had wanted to target the Indian embassy, do you think that India could become a target in France or is already a target because of the Pakistan-Afghanistan link? Merah visited both these countries and received terrorist training there.

The security services know that India is already a target here just as it is a target in the U.S. because of the conflict between Pakistan and India on Kashmir. This is not new. What is new is that Indian interests in the West are being targeted by western people. In the past the perpetrators were either Pakistani/Afghan or Bangladeshi. Now the problem is that certain westerners are joining hands with them to target Indian interests in the West.

How would you describe the cooperation on counterterrorism between India and France? Are the Indians aware of this new emerging threat?

I think the Indian government is not fully aware of the new threat. It knows that Indian interests abroad are targeted by Pakistani services and people but they are not fully aware of the kind of threat posed by western forces here — home-grown terrorism in the West. The cooperation on counterterrorism is good. It's really good.

Fighting 'Terrorism' or Repressing Democracy? Britain's System of Mass Surveillance

By Dr. Paul Anderson

Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/fighting-terrorism-or-repressing-democracy-britains-system-of-mass-surveillance/5311802>

The focus of critiques of authoritarianism today lies increasingly in the use by liberal governments of 'exceptional' powers. These are powers in which an imminent threat to national security is judged to be of such importance as to warrant the restriction of liberties and other socially repressive measures in order to protect national security. 'Terrorism' has offered a particularly salient source of justification for a level of social repression that would be intolerable in normal times. A



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dominant line of criticism is that the use of exceptional powers to this end has gone too far. Critics emphasise the need to curtail such power by bringing it into line with basic human rights standards.[1]



As pertinent as this critique may be, focus on the proper extent of the social repression tends to assume, Scheuerman, Herman and Peterson point out, that there is a real threat (e.g., terrorism) and that repression by an expansion of executive authority is itself an appropriate response to that threat.[2] A less noticed yet critical feature of governments' use of anti-terror power is the prior erosion of democratic oversight and control which has enabled repression to appear a plausible response to what is, in many respects, an as yet unspecified threat.[3]

The erosion is essentially three-pronged. The first aspect of democratic control to have been eroded is the power to define what constitutes a threat. In the absence of meaningful control, governments are able, Clive Walker explains, to ascribe to whatever political violence is being encountered, attributes of novelty and extraordinary seriousness so as to justify correspondingly alarming incursions into individuals rights and democratic accountability.[4]

Governments are able to do so in no small part because of the semantic fog that surrounds the core concepts of national security, threat and terrorism by which exceptional powers are usually evoked. Terrorism, for instance, is a concept that resists consistent definition.[5] Commonly understood by governments as the use or threat of use of serious violence to advance a cause, the term elides legitimate resistance to occupation and oppression with 'senseless destruction'. Furthermore, by relegating all terrorists to the criminal sphere, the term delegitimises any political content that acts regarded by authorities as terrorist may have. This helps to obscure from the public the reasons why people resort to such acts.[6] It also enables the police character of the proper response to be presumed.

This brings us to the second aspect of democratic control to have been eroded, namely, the power to determine proper responses to threats. Responses are deemed automatically to require a dramatic expansion in the scope of executive authority, a requirement that is heightened the more an atmosphere of fear can be created such as by declaring a 'war on terror'.[7] This response is alarming, Walker suggests, because governments may assume repressive powers unimaginable outwith dictatorial states. In Britain, for example, these now include powers to curtail critical liberties (e.g., speech, movement, assembly, protest, work, privacy), suspend habeas corpus and use armed forces to deal with domestic disturbances – all on the basis of 'threats' which the government assumes the power to define.[8]

The third aspect of the erosion concerns the capacity to review the use of both powers. Incursions into democratic accountability include, Walker continues, growing immunity from parliamentary and judicial control in the exercise of these powers.[9] It goes without saying, Girvan LJ points out, that the "dangers to the integrity of society and of citizens' lives" of undermining accountability in the use of exceptional powers were "amply demonstrated in the Fascist and totalitarian regimes of Europe".[10] In short, the reported terrorism crisis is also part of an ongoing actual crisis of democracy.

A case in point is the **British government's plans to monitor the entire population's electronic communication** on grounds that this is 'necessary to fight serious crime and terrorism'.[11] Criticism of the plans is various and detailed, and has centred on the invasion of privacy.[12] Many regard plans for intensified surveillance as a 'snooper's charter'.

This is because they mandate a shift from monitoring communications on the basis of individual suspicion to the indiscriminate

stockpiling of individual data – essentially blanket surveillance of the population – for a future unspecified purpose.

As pertinent as the objection may be, limiting criticism to the extent of the government's response leaves unquestioned the plausibility of the alleged threat and the merits of expanding executive power as a proper response to that threat. It would be useful to broaden criticism to take account of how the threat has



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been defined, and the proper response to it determined. To do so, it must look deeper into the extent to which democratic control has been eroded, as this is an obstacle to any viable opposition to mass surveillance and related socially repressive measures. Doing so would enable criticism to cast into sharp relief some of the most pressing questions concerning democracy and liberty in our times. As part of a more precise characterisation of the erosion of democratic control, it would also be useful to see outlined some legally relevant aspects of this process, particularly given that legal challenge is likely if the government's surveillance plans become law. Three aspects stand out. They follow from the fact that because mass surveillance would breach of peoples' right to privacy guaranteed *inter alia* under the European Convention on Human Rights, the onus will be on the government to demonstrate that this breach is nonetheless justifiable. To do so, the government must show that mass surveillance is (a) necessary in a democratic society for (b) the achievement of a legitimate end and (c) is proportionate to that end. The more any legal challenge takes account of the wider decline of democratic control, the less likely it is that the government should be able to show, in each of these three respects, that mass surveillance is justified.

Legitimate end?

An example of a significant end that could justify breaching the right to privacy may be reasons of national security. Since fighting terrorism is such a reason, mass surveillance could, according to official views in Britain and the EU, be justified as a way of preventing acts or threats intended to influence the government or intimidate the public which, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, are violent, damaging or disrupting and which include those that seriously destabilise the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country.[13]

Two difficulties undermine the idea that 'fighting terrorism' might serve as a legitimate end by which to justify mass surveillance.

Repressing democracy

The first difficulty is a growing tendency to expand the use of anti-terror powers from suspects to the public, especially certain non-violent social movements.[14] This problem is made possible by the breadth of official

definitions of terrorism: the very purpose of many social movements is to 'influence governments' by means such as protest which is by definition 'disruptive'. Particularly targeted are movements from environmental to social movements such as Occupy which are unified by resistance to the kind of 'destabilisation of basic political, constitutional, economic and social structures' that, it is claimed, follows from re-organisation of society around the market, in particular, financial markets.[15] The problem for government lies in showing how repressing popular democratic expression in this way – a litmus test for the democratic constitutional state, according to Jürgen Habermas[16] – could possibly be a legitimate end in a democratic society. This problem turns not only on a definition of terrorism that is sufficiently broad to permit authorities to generalise suspicion, criminalise certain behaviour and sanction surveillance and preventative detention. The problem also turns, more fundamentally, as is explained below, on a basic incoherence in the government's view of democracy itself.

Involvement in terrorism

Even if it can be somehow shown that repressing democratic expression is legitimate in a democracy, a second difficulty lies in the government's involvement in terrorism, as defined. The definition preferred by government is sufficiently broad to capture two forms of terrorism with which it has involvement. For the sake of simplicity, these may be regarded, following Edward Herman, as 'retail' and 'wholesale' forms.[17]

'Retail terrorism' refers to individuals and small groups which are typically responsible for several hundred to several thousand casualties per year worldwide.[18] Recent analysis reveals involvement by successive British governments in financing, the training of, and logistical support and component supply for many groups.[19] Analysis suggests that involvement is motivated chiefly by ideological causes (a) of maintaining influence in world affairs, which helps explain why involvement centres on resource-rich and strategically useful countries, and (b) of protecting that influence from threats, which helps explain why support is given to groups in those countries unified by a common hostility to popular democracy, socialism and national secularism.[20]



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'Wholesale terrorism' refers to the activities of major institutions capable of far greater harm such as states which, Mark Curtis explains, are "responsible for far more deaths in many more countries than [retail] terrorism".[21] Government involvement in wholesale terrorism is widespread.[22] Two areas stand out. The first is repressive geo-strategic foreign policy. Motivated by similar ideological aims of maintaining influence and of enabling concentrations of private power to shape foreign economic affairs, repressive foreign policy from Malaya, Kenya and Iran to more recent examples such as Chechnya and Iraq has ranged from illegal sanctions and covert operations to active support for other government's violence.[23] Since World War II, it is possible to attribute, Curtis continues, several million deaths to such policies.[24] It is also possible to attribute to them an appreciable if unsurprising escalation in the risk of (retail) terrorism – a risk heightened where local resistance is criminalised and denied restitution.[25]

The second area in which the government has involvement lies in domestic policies which permit, rather than (say) criminalise, wholesale harms from private power itself. Permitted for similar ideological reasons, harms include (a) the 'destabilisation of the basic structures' of entire countries by financial institutions such as by means of induced crises forcing 'austerity' onto sovereign nations; (b) the 'intimidation' of governments by multinational corporations in order to drive political change to provide suitable investment climates by means of capital flight, investment strike and attacks on currencies; and (c) various kinds of direct 'violence and damage' to people, property and planet.[26]

Taken together, the problem the government would face is to justify mass surveillance as means of fighting terrorism in light of mounting evidence that certain forms are permitted, supported, created and perpetrated.

Proportionate?

Even if a legitimate end can be established, doubts arise about whether surveillance is proportionate to that end.

A selective response?

It is unclear why, when appeasement characterises government policy to (much) wholesale terrorism in ways indicated above,

the comparatively limited effects of retail terrorism – in the range of up to several thousand casualties per annum worldwide – should warrant such pervasive and repressive domestic measures as mass surveillance.

A crude comparison with resources devoted to public survival elsewhere may be instructive. The current expenditure on counter-terrorism measures of some £3 billion per annum[27] and an annualised average death rate in Britain attributed to terrorism of five – a number that compares with those killed by wasp and bee stings and is one-sixth of the number of people who drown in the bath each year, – amounts roughly to £60 million per fatality.[28] In contrast, at £18.2 billion government spending on cardiovascular disease healthcare and research, which kills some 250,000 people annually, works out roughly at £7-10,000 per fatality.[29] Similar figures are found for annual deaths from cancer (150,000), air pollution (39,000; much of it from traffic) and traffic accidents (3,000).[30] Although the comparison is crude, it follows at least that even a small increase in efforts to combat these and other serious non-terrorist threats would, Thomas Pogge explains, do much more to protect public survival, at lower cost, than would escalating a fight against an unspecified, perhaps unspecifiable, threat.[31]

Advancing the goals of terrorism?

A further problem lies in ways in which mass surveillance advances the apparent aims of certain retail terrorists. These aims, as former Home Office secretary, Charles Clarke declared to the European Parliament, are to destroy "many hard-fought rights [such] as the right to privacy [and] the right to free speech". Mass surveillance undermines these rights – and thus appears disproportionate – because it obliterates any distinction between law-abiding and law-breaking citizens: every citizen is to be treated like a potential criminal to be monitored without warrant or reason.

The suspicion of disproportionality deepens in light of two wider, disturbing incursions into individual rights and democratic accountability with which surveillance plans are linked. The first concerns wider surveillance measures developed by the EU to create a database on all European citizens.[32] The aim, as an EU Council Presidency paper makes plain, is to create a detailed digital record...[of] every



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object the individual uses, every transaction they make and almost everywhere they go.[33] The second incursion follows from the ever-increasing scope of executive power. Incursions, to expand upon some already indicated, follow from the executive's

- power to curtail critical liberties, suspend habeas corpus and use armed forces to deal with domestic disturbances;
- growing immunity from parliamentary and judicial control in the exercise of these powers; and
- power, reminiscent of the German Enabling Act 1933, to amend and repeal almost any legislation, subject to vague and entirely subjective restraints, by decree and without recourse to Parliament – such as might render legal the government's involvement with the US in abduction, torture and assassination.[34]

Such is the extent of these incursions into 'hard-fought' individual rights and democratic accountability that former MI5 chief, Stella Rimington, concedes that, unbeknown to much of the public, Britain appears to have been turned into a police state.[35] If one adds to these incursions the proposed surveillance, then it is difficult to escape the conclusion, Curtis continues, that the greater threat to the public, to its liberty and to what remains of democracy lies in "the policies of our own government". This outcome appears a qualified victory for certain terrorists. For they have, Jean Baudrillard notes, induced in the West a climate of fear and obsession with security, which is itself a veiled form of permanent terror.[36]

A proportionate response

This idea of 'fighting terrorism' by means which actually advance its alleged aims should be contrasted with more mature responses such as that of Norway. Barely five days after Anders Breivik murdered 77 people, the Norwegian prime minister responded not by cracking down on civil liberties but by a pledge not to allow a fanatic to succeed in eroding Norway's democracy:

the Norwegian response to violence is more democracy, more openness and greater political participation.[37]

Necessary in a democratic society?

Even if mass surveillance might be proportionate to a legitimate end, it must also

be shown to be necessary in a democratic society. Problems here are both specific and general in nature.

Specific difficulties

While mass surveillance may well help fight serious crime and terrorism, this does not mean that it is necessary to that end. It merely means that it is expedient to that end. To claim that mass surveillance is necessary implies that these problems could not be resolved unless it were imposed. This assumes that the police would be ineffective without it. The assumption is difficult to sustain for two reasons. First, mass surveillance is proposed at time when killings and related serious crime are fewer than at any time in almost thirty years[38] and when, according to the Home Office, "counter-terrorism work has made significant progress over the last ten years" to such an extent that "al Qaeda", for instance "is weaker than at any time since 9/11".[39] Second, it is already quite possible with proper permission and oversight to monitor people suspected of terrorism and serious crimes. Consequently, the claim to be unable to deal with serious crime and terrorism except by removing what remains of personal privacy seems at best an admission of incompetence. In any case, the government's involvement in terrorism undermines the argument for necessity. It is actively preventing the achievement of the declared legitimate end (fighting terrorism) for which surveillance is supposedly necessary means. If the government were at all serious about fighting terrorism then it should, as Chomsky remarks, first stop participating in it.

General difficulties

Proving the necessity of mass surveillance requires, Keith Ewing explains, a "theory of democracy by which to determine whether a restriction on a [European] Convention [on Human Rights] right can be justified".[40] A problem lies in the fact that, as Girvan LJ suggests, mass surveillance, while acceptable with totalitarian regimes, is antithetical to a democratic society. It is antithetical because, as the House of Lords Constitution Committee explains, since privacy is an essential pre-requisite to the exercise of individual freedom, its erosion weakens the constitutional foundations on which democracy... ha[s] traditionally



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been based.[41]

The difficulty of formulating a theory of democracy by which the breach of privacy may be justified deepens in light of incoherence in the government's view of democracy. The incoherence may be observed in the argument for exceptional powers in general and for mass surveillance in particular. It is an argument, Tony Bunyan notes, that assumes that "everyone accepts that the 'threats'" which the government proclaims are real and that addressing them requires incursions into civil liberty and democratic accountability.[42] It follows that if national security requires, Bunyan continues, that the state sets the limits, boundaries and sanctions of all peoples' actions [including peoples' telecommunication, then] there can be no individual freedom, except that sanctioned by the state.[43]

This is to say that when the state assumes exclusive power to define the nature of a threat, and the appropriate means to deal with that threat, it may also define the extent of individual liberty. Individual freedom becomes at most little more than a discretionary grant subject to executive will; at worst, national 'security' becomes code for social repression. In a framework in which the state determines which liberties to grant to which individuals, political liberty is effectively possessed by the state. The source of sovereignty resides in the state, much as it did for Hobbes, rather than in the individual. As Karma Nabulsi explains, this kind of 'social contract' affirms a theory of state, but it is far from a democratic one.[44]

Elementary to a nominally democratic social contract (or similar democratic model) such as those expressed by the likes of J.S. Mill, Kant and Rousseau is the view that protection of citizens' liberty, particularly political liberty, is a supreme good. In this contract, the sovereign citizen does not surrender sovereignty, but instead delegates specific powers and functions to the state. Because political sovereignty is not transferred to the state, both civil rights and political liberties are inalienable. These include the right to define the public good and threats to it, the right to deliberate and determine laws including those which address threats, and the right to adequately review both.

Genuine democratic governance would by definition structure political power toward the public good. It would do so in part by encouraging, rather than excluding, considered public participation in the definition and determination of the public good. An essential preliminary to this would be to prevent those who benefit from social repression from exerting undue influence on the exercise of that power. A particular priority would therefore be to dismantle the growing union of state and private power – some harmful consequences of which have been observed (see 'legitimate end'). In their place would appear viable and legitimate ways and means of addressing violence, of which Norway's response appears one example.[45] In short, such governance would mean that the reported crisis of terrorism would no longer automatically mean an actual crisis of democracy.

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Dr Paul Anderson is a philosopher, lawyer and ecologist with interests in contemporary public and environmental concerns. His book, Critical Thought for Turbulent Times: Reforming Law and Economy for a Sustainable Earth (Routledge), is forthcoming.

Economic Security at Risk as Pirates Adapt Tactics in the Gulf of Guinea

By William S. van der Veen

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>



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The stunning reports of oil tankers hijacked by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea have helped shift attention from the dramatic rise of Somali piracy to West Africa. The figures are not quite as eye-popping as in East Africa. The effects are. Lloyd's of London designated the Gulf, like Somalia, a "war risk" zone in August 2011, boosting insurance rates. The pirates' inclination to violence has helped persuade some oil super-majors that investing in exploration in the region is too risky (*This Day* [Lagos], July 3). With a quarter of U.S. imports projected to come from the Gulf of Guinea by 2015, the dynamics driving West African piracy are too important to ignore.

As of October 26, there were 49 acts of piracy or armed robbery reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) this year. However, this number understates the prevalence of maritime crime in the Gulf as attacks often go unreported. Indeed, a comprehensive look at the reported incidents reinforces this assertion. Despite reports of attacks on local fishing trawlers, as well as previous piracy-induced fishing industry work stoppages, the IMB has not reported a single attack on a trawler this year (al-Jazeera, June 12). Whether this is indicative of locals' fear of reprisals for reporting or due to a lack of resources to connect to the proper reporting channels, it certainly skews figures and makes it more difficult for regional officials to find solutions.

Of the attacks reported to date this year, there is a clear dichotomy in levels of complexity. Many of the attacks against vessels docked or close to shore are simply thieves looking for an easy target. The lack of security in local ports and inadequate maritime security forces throughout the region make ships an easy target. Such unsophisticated attacks have been seen from Guinea-Conakry to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (<http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map>). Violence as intimidation is frequent in these attacks, especially if the crew offers resistance.

While this type of piracy is certainly a threat to trade in the region, it is less virulent than its more sophisticated cousin, a more dangerous brand of piracy that has focused attacks on oil and gas industry vessels, including product tankers. These pirate gangs, unlike their smash-and-grab brethren, are resourceful, flexible and show a willingness to adapt new tactics. When Nigeria and Benin launched

Operation Prosperity in 2011, Nigerian pirates demonstrated dangerous tactical agility. As Nigerian and Beninese waters have become better patrolled, pirates have expanded their operations down the coast, into Togolese, Ghanaian and Ivorian Coast waters. Pirate gangs in the Gulf have also adopted the "mother-ship" tactic used by Somali pirates (Breakbulk.com, April 13). By hijacking local fishing vessels and developing blue water capabilities, pirates decreased the likelihood of being spotted by national naval forces. After finishing with the hijacked ships, pirate gangs often take the opportunity to ransack them, snatching equipment such as radar, echo sounder, SSB and VHF radios (*This Day* [Lagos], Aug 9, 2011).

Once a tanker is hijacked, pirates coordinate a rendezvous with a second ship to transfer a portion of the oil. From here, the oil returns to port, where it can either be refined locally and sold within the region or internationally (News24 Nigeria, October 23). Selling the oil requires connections to international criminal networks to be able to find a buyer. This, as well as the intelligence it takes to coordinate such hijackings—ship names, courses, cargo value, etc.—lead analysts to believe that such operations are actually being financed by international criminal enterprises (REDFour Security Group, March 4). The recent closure of a crude storage facility in the Lagos port of Apapa, alleged to have housed the stolen product from the August 19 MT *Anuket Emerald* hijacking confirms the depth of these connections (*Vanguard* [Lagos], September 30).

Fortunately, Nigerian military forces have shown a willingness to confront sea piracy. In September, a tanker was hijacked over 90 miles off the coast of Benin. Previously sailing into the waters of a neighboring country has proven an effective means of escape. In this instance, thanks to the call to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre and a renewed sense of purpose in the Nigerian Navy, the tanker was intercepted with the crew unharmed (<http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy>). In a land operation, the Joint Task Force (JTF - a military/police group created specifically to combat illegal oil bunkering) spearheaded a multi-agency raid in Ondo State, in the northern Delta region (*PM News* [Lagos], September 26). Fourteen piracy suspects connected to a large



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“syndicate” were arrested. Unfortunately, even if the Nigerian military is making strides in combating piracy (though the JTF has been accused of sponsoring illegal oil theft, or “bunkering”), the criminal justice system has not been as effective. From the details released about the piracy gangs as well as previous statements from the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), it becomes clear that pirates are enjoying a degree of cover from government officials. NIMASA’s mission to curb piracy is frustrated by the continual early release of piracy suspects from prison prior to full investigation, according to NIMASA Director General, Ziakede Akpobolokemi (*This Day* [Lagos], October 19). Analysts surmise oil bunkering and arms trafficking networks, with

well-known ties to state governors and federal officers, are behind the complicity (*Africa Confidential*, October 21, 2011).

While regional naval coordination is being stepped up, there are no near-term solutions to stop piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In the short-term, operators are mostly on their own. It will take time for adequate security forces to be developed. Adhering to the Best Management Practices created for protecting vessels traversing the Somali Basin could help protect against high seas piracy in the Gulf. In reality, though, sustainable solutions to curb piracy and armed robbery will only come through the economic development of the region. Until that happens, piracy will continue to appear to some as an attractive occupation.

William van der Veen previously worked for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Counter-Piracy Program in Nairobi, Kenya. He obtained his masters at the American University in Cairo and currently resides in Arlington, VA.

‘Local Planning for Terror and Disaster’: One of the most important books of the year

Source: <http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/style/local-planning-for-terror-and-disaster-one-of-the-most-important-books-of-the-year>

Hurricane Sandy was far worse than most people expected, but that should have been no surprise. One of the key lessons we’ve learned from natural disasters, as well as terrorist attacks, is that you should “expect the unexpected.” Anticipate the unusual. Black swans are rare, but they exist.

That’s one message of a fine new book, “Local Planning for Terror and Disaster: From Bioterrorism to Earthquakes,” edited by Leonard A. Cole and Nancy D. Connell (Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken, 2012).


Cole, a Ph.D. and DDS, is an adjunct professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark and director of the program on terror medicine and security at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of the New Jersey Center for Biodefense. He resides in Ridgewood. Connell,

a Ph.D., is a professor of infectious disease at the Medical School of UMDNJ.

Disasters don’t necessarily follow old scripts. No terrorists had flown airplanes into office buildings before 9/11. In Great Britain, before 2005, terrorists had mainly planted individual explosives and only rarely a series of explosives, as they did on three London underground trains and a bus in that year. In Japan, a 25-foot coastal wall had been built for protection

against tsunamis. The 2011 earthquake unleashed a 30-foot wave that poured over the walls.

Before the 2001 anthrax attacks in this country, bio-attack scenarios had



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been created—but no one had considered the possibility of spreading microbes through mailed letters. “Creative thinking, whether about the known or the unknown, is a necessary part of preparedness,” writes Cole.

“Anticipate the unusual” is another way of saying: Be prepared for black swans, as Cole has pointed out.

“Local Planning” may be among the most important books published this year, although its readership may unfortunately be confined to people involved in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. Certainly more terrorist attacks are coming, along with natural disasters — fires, snowfalls, hurricanes, earthquakes, train wrecks.

How complicated the subject can be is suggested by the fact that 32 people contributed to this book, and that it deals with such seemingly specialized subjects as finding a useful role for volunteers who rush to a disaster site to help. (Their cars just may clog up the roadways, and they themselves may inadvertently contribute to the number of injured.)

Or just consider triage, the method by which the injured are supposedly treated in accordance with the severity of their wounds. Actually, those who seem fatally wounded might justifiably be neglected in favor of those who seem likely to recover. Soldiers who might quickly return to action might be given priority over ordinary civilians; so might an injured physician who had been treating the wounded. And should medical people treat a suspected terrorist exactly the same as a firefighter in need of help?

Besides thinking in terms of black swans, we have learned the importance of swift and accurate communication. Professionals dealing with a disaster, as well as the general public, need good advice on what to do. There’s a phrase, “the golden hour,” referring to the small window of time after an injury when medical help may mean the difference between life and death. And the record has not been reassuring. Because of confusion, during the London attacks of 2005, fire and ambulance teams sometimes stood by idly while victims lay dying. Only half the 201 London ambulances available were even sent to the attack scenes.

When the first case of anthrax was confirmed in this country during the 2001 bio-attack, Florida Governor Jeb Bush announced: “People don’t have any reason to be

concerned.” The U.S. Postmaster General, John Potter, visited the Brentwood postal center in Washington, D.C., and told the employees they were in no danger. (They were.) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, usually an exemplary organization, counseled against giving New Jersey postal workers Cipro. The state’s acting health commissioner, Dr. George DiFerdinando, against the CDC’s advice, saw to it that the workers received the medication — possibly saving lives and thus emerging as “an unsung medical hero,” Cole has written.

In India in 1984, after the escape of 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, because of the darkness some victims moved toward the source of the contamination. Absent advice not to drink milk from cows that had eaten contaminated grass after the Chernobyl disaster, many Russian children came down with thyroid cancer.

In 2001, after Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower, 911 operators told occupants of the tower to stay put and await rescue workers. The deputy fire director also told people in the South Tower that the building was safe and they should remain in their offices. When the South Tower was hit by Flight 175, 911 operators again told occupants to stay put — even though the fire department five minutes before had issued an order for everyone to leave the building.

Cooperation between agencies is also a goal. But different branches of government may compete against each other, even in a time of emergency. The 9/11 Commission report showed that New York police and firefighters continued to operate as independent agencies — their radios could not even talk to each other, and the firefighters and the police did not even WANT to talk to each other.

Still another lesson to be learned: Prepare not just for black swans but for loathsome birds of prey. During the 20,000 Arab terrorist attacks against Israel from 2000 to 2006, some Palestinians on their way to Israeli hospitals were found to have explosives hidden under their clothing. And several Palestinian ambulances were found to be carrying weapons and gunmen.

One of the last chapters in the book focuses on cyber-conflict. One of the chapter’s conclusion is that “time is short before malicious actors in cyberspace reach a stage when they



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track a hurricane and launch cyber attacks” to

impede the efforts of rescue workers.

The five-year-old terrorists

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2234840/The-year-old-terrorists-Youngsters-trained-kill-pistols-assault-rifles-shocking-pictures-al-Qaedas-heartland.html>

These terrifying pictures show children as young as five being trained to kill with pistols and deadly AK-47 assault rifles.

They were taken from footage of an al Qaeda terror camp in north Waziristan, near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Many of the children are orphans of the terrorist organisation's 'martyrs' following the same deadly route as their fathers.

They are brainwashed into waging Jihad on the West and becoming suicide bombers, the **Sunday Mirror** reported.

It was posted on an underground al Qaeda website and issued by the Turkistan Islamic Party, which trains fighters to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.

It is believed the armed group is responsible for more than 200 acts of terrorism worldwide in



Child soldiers: Children as young as five are being trained to become soldiers for al Qaeda. This image shows them being drilled in the use of firearms

the past 20 years, the paper reported. Terrorism expert Neil Doyle said: 'The video is part of disturbing trend.

'This is the fourth Islamist insurgent group in recent weeks that has been linked to training children for the battlefield.



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'Groups in Syria and Somalia have also claimed to be coaching children.

'These children are living a very bleak existence. There is growing evidence that many are forced into it.'

The Pakistani Taliban is one of many loosely allied extremist groups that operate in Pakistan's tribal region.

It wants to impose the same kind of hardline interpretation of Islamic law as the Afghan Taliban that ruled Afghanistan until the 2001 U.S.-led invasion ousted the hardline regime for sheltering al Qaeda's leaders.

The militant hideouts along the Afghan-Pakistan border have long been a source of tension for Kabul, Islamabad and the international coalition.

Pakistan wants NATO and Afghan forces to crack down on Pakistani militants launching attacks from hideouts on the Afghan side of the border.

Meanwhile, American military commanders have been pressuring Islamabad to launch military strikes on terrorists in North Waziristan.

Pakistani Taliban threaten to target India after execution of Mumbai attacker

Source: <http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/22/world/asia/pakistan-taliban-india/index.html>

The Pakistani Taliban vowed Thursday to carry out attacks against India to avenge the death of a man executed by Indian authorities for his role in the 2008 terrorist assault on Mumbai.

Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, a Pakistani, was hanged Wednesday in Pune, a city southeast

said J.P. Singh, an official at India's Ministry of External Affairs.

He said the ministry had no immediate comment on the threat from the Taliban.

The Taliban spokesman said they are demanding that Kasab's body be returned to

Pakistan for an Islamic burial. He criticized the Pakistani government, saying it had failed by not requesting the return of the body.

Indian authorities said Wednesday that Kasab had been buried in the "surrounding area" of the jail where he was hanged. They didn't say what kind of burial rites had been performed.

The Pakistani government has so far barely

commented on the execution. The foreign ministry declined to give an immediate reaction Thursday to the Taliban's criticism.

India blamed Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a Pakistani-based terror group allied with al Qaeda, for the Mumbai siege.

Indian authorities said Kasab was trained by the organization, which was banned in Pakistan in 2002 after an attack on the Indian parliament. The group has denied responsibility.

The Mumbai attacks destabilized peace talks between the Indian and Pakistani governments, which remain



of Mumbai. He was the lone surviving gunman from the attacks in India's financial capital in November 2008 that killed more than 160 people.

Ihsanullah Ihsan, the spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, said the militant group would conduct various attacks in India in response to the execution. He didn't provide further details.

The Pakistani Taliban, who are closely linked with their namesake in Afghanistan and with al Qaeda, operate in the ungoverned area that sits on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. India has requested extra protection for its diplomats in Pakistan following the execution,



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bitterly opposed over issues such as the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir. Since then, the two nuclear-armed nations have resumed the high-level meetings and relations have improved. In April, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari met

Pakistan were using social-networking sites to stir religious unrest in India amid ethnic clashes between Muslim migrants and native tribal groups in the northeastern state of Assam.

News of Kasab's death was positively received Wednesday by many Indians. The conservative Bharatiya Janata Party, the country's main opposition party, expressed support for the government's decision to go ahead with the execution.


"It's a strong message that India does not and will not tolerate terrorism," said Prakash Javadekar, a party spokesman.

But human rights activists criticized the move.

"The hanging of Ajmal Kasab marks a distressing

end to India's moratorium on executions and is a step backwards for India's justice system," said Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch, an advocacy group. "The government should take prompt and decisive action toward a total abolition of capital punishment."

The last state execution in the country was in 2004, when a man was hanged for the rape and murder of a teenage girl.



with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi during a brief private trip. It was the first visit to India by a Pakistani head of state in seven years.

Indian sporting authorities also this year announced the resumption of bilateral cricket tournaments with Pakistan. The sport has often been used as a platform to ease relations.

But tensions remain close to the surface. In August, New Delhi alleged that "elements" in

“Nnew IRA” group claims it murdered prison officer

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/nov/12/david-black-new-ira-prison-officer>Source:



David Black's hat and gloves rest on his coffin during the funeral service at Molesworth Presbyterian church in Cookstown, Northern Ireland. Photograph: Peter Morrison/AP

A republican terror alliance styling itself as a new IRA has claimed it murdered Northern Ireland prison officer David Black.

The group issued a statement to the Belfast paper the Irish News on Monday linking the killing to conditions inside the top-security Maghaberry prison.

The faction comprises members of the Real IRA, independent dissident republican units in areas such as East Tyrone and the Derry-based Republican Action Against Drugs.

In a statement to the Guardian during the summer the grouping of paramilitary organisations said it was uniting to form a new IRA.

Black, 52, died after his car was riddled with bullets during an ambush along the M1 motorway near Portadown on 1 November. He had been driving to work at Maghaberry prison.

During his funeral last week, near his home in Cookstown, County Tyrone, a Presbyterian minister said the prison officer had been a "man of peace".



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At the time of the murder republican sources indicated that the new IRA was responsible for the fatal shooting.

Beyond al-Qa'ida

By Bill Braniff

Source:http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=450&utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=08c3ba80c2-START+November+Newsletter&utm_medium=email

The following is a special first look at an article that will appear in a publication by the Institute for Economics and Peace and online at www.visionofhumanity.org. It will be published as part of the release of the inaugural Global Terrorism Index, which will be launched in Washington, D.C., at 3 p.m. Wednesday, Dec. 5.

Data found in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and conveyed in the Institute for Economics and Peace Terrorism Index demonstrate the breadth of violence emanating from violent jihadist groups globally. The Global Terrorism Index lists Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia as experiencing the greatest increase in “impact of terrorism” between 2002 and 2011. The ten most lethal organizations in that timeframe include the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and its two precursor organizations (al-Qa’ida in Iraq and Tawhid wal Jihad - which make the top ten on their own record), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and Boko Haram. Four of the five most lethal-single attacks of 2011 were conducted by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (110 killed), the Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan (80 killed), al-Shabaab (70 killed), and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (65 killed). According to GTD data for 2011, 11 of the most 20 active groups globally were al-Qa’ida linked. The same year, however, the al-Qa’ida organization itself was responsible for only one incident, a kidnapping, out of the 5,000 terrorist incidents conducted globally.

As a result, the al-Qa’ida organization no longer captures media attention, except when another important cadre member is killed or captured. Instead, observers now ponder the meaning of the continuous or frequently increasing levels of violence from other jihadist groups in the context of a post Arab-Spring world. This is despite the fact that the various narratives of the Arab Spring seem to undermine al-Qa’ida’s reliance on violence and its call to reestablish the caliphate as the governing structure for the Muslim nation. Additionally, individuals continue to join jihadist groups or plot violent attacks of their own volition. What should we take from the seemingly contradictory developments of a

popular rejection of al-Qa’ida on the world stage, and heightened levels of jihadist violence? Did al-Qa’ida succeed by inspiring widespread jihadism, or has it lost to a variety of more popular, parochial actors? To address these questions, it is essential to understand al-Qa’ida’s origins and its place in the broader Islamist landscape; only in context can the decline of the al-Qa’ida organization and the persistence of violent jihadism be understood and can governments formulate policy for a threat environment beyond al-Qa’ida.

Historical Context

The al-Qa’ida organization gained centrality among militant organizations as a result of the role played by key members during the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Through their participation in a logistical organization known as the Maktab al-Khidamat, or the “Service Bureau,” Usama bin Ladin and his key associates networked extensively with individual recruits and organizations that traveled to support the defensive jihad of the Afghan mujahidin. The Services Bureau created mobilization infrastructure largely in the safe-haven provided by the Haqqani network, which promulgated local and global jihadist sentiment prior to the conflict with the Soviet Union. Tens of thousands of volunteers, many veterans of previous or on-going local and regional conflicts, socialized together in the intake and training camps preparing them to fight an imperial superpower. Militants from Southeast Asia met those from North Africa, South Asia, China, and the Middle East, and in this peculiar historical moment the seeds of global jihadism were sewn.

Al-Qa’ida, a small organization that emerged from the Services Bureau in 1988, has spent the last 24 years



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arguing that the grievances vexing each of these militant communities were not unrelated, but instead were the result of a global conspiracy against “true” Islam led by the West and enabled by apostate Muslim rulers.

The failure of local jihadist groups to successfully topple corrupt Muslim rulers, the “near enemy,” and regionally oriented jihadist groups to reclaim political control of occupied territory has been a source of frustration since the 1970s. Upon Bin Ladin’s failure to convince the Saudi government to allow this community of jihadist veterans to protect the Arabian Peninsula from Saddam Hussein’s Bathist military, al-Qa’ida formulated the master narrative that would underpin the next 20 years of ideological and operational output. The reason that the Royal Family would not allow the mujahidin to defend Mecca and Medina from Iraq’s advance was the same reason that local and irredentist jihadist groups elsewhere had failed in their parochial contests. The regimes were illegitimate proxies of foreign powers, and behind each of these puppet regimes was the military and economic aid of the “far-enemy.” Led by the United States, the far enemy pulled the strings across the Muslim world for their own imperial purposes and to undermine Islam.

Al-Qa’ida’s grand strategy would emerge from this diagnosis; al-Qa’ida would enable and repurpose the violence of other militant actors to erode the political, economic, and military will of the United States to remain engaged in the Muslim world. If al-Qa’ida’s geographically distributed attrition warfare could sever the ties between the puppet-master and the puppets, revolutionary local and regional campaigns could reestablish Islamic governance for the Muslim nation.

To realize this grand-strategy, al-Qa’ida exploited relationships created during the anti-Soviet jihad and inserted itself into extant violent campaigns. It provided training, financing, and propaganda support when it did not also engage directly in the violence. The increasingly intertwined histories of local, regional and global jihadist actors had multiple consequences. Most significantly, the global jihadist cause often benefited from resources mobilized for the purpose of defensive or classical jihad – a concept far easier to justify politically and religiously than the offensive jihad practiced by global jihadists. Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia,

the five fastest rising nations of the last decade in the Global Terrorism Index, illustrate this volatile relationship between military occupations or aerial strikes into sovereign territory and violent mobilization. In addition, the multiplicity of grievances espoused by local, regional and global actors created numerous radicalization pathways, and the harmonization of parochial and cosmic narratives by al-Qa’ida’s propaganda organ helped conflate actions on the ground.

In many cases, money, arms, and individual recruits were syphoned off from relatively robust resource pipelines and reoriented towards al-Qa’ida’s global cause. The perceived legitimacy of the conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Somalia drew foreign fighters who did not necessarily act in the best interests of the local communities in which they found themselves. This often created tensions among the jihadist factions, or between the local populace and the militant actors. As a result, al-Qa’ida rarely succeeded in retaining popular support among the populace or reorienting jihadist groups en toto to their tactical and targeting preferences. However, they frequently achieved partial successes that amplified al-Qa’ida’s operational reach far beyond their organizational safe haven along the Durand line. In several instances, the key leaders of militant organizations were persuaded to adopt fully al-Qa’ida’s operational paradigm, even changing their name to reflect a formal affiliation with al-Qa’ida.

Ideological context

The al-Qa’ida organization is a reincarnation - the latest manifestation of a militant idea that has surfaced at moments of crisis throughout Sunni Islamic history. The grand-strategy formulated by al-Qa’ida in the context of the first Gulf War embodies a logic previously articulated but not widely accepted. Scholars such as Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya argued that the reason the seat of the caliphate, Baghdad, had been sacked by the Mongols in the middle of the 13th century was that Muslims had turned their back on the proper, archetypal modality of Islam realized during the time of the Prophet Mohammad and his contemporaries - the establishment of a theocracy in which Islam served as the organizing principle of society.



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Of particular importance to contemporary violence, Ibn Taymiyya not only diagnosed the problem through the lens of political Islam, but provided the justification for revolutionary violence that jihadists cite today. In the anti-Mongul fatwas, written half a century after the Monguls had conquered the Abbasid Caliphate and after many had converted to Islam, Ibn Taymiyya excommunicated them and their proxy rulers for not governing by an unadulterated interpretation of Islamic law. For this sin, he declared that they were no longer Muslim and could be violently overthrown, upending the Sunni convention of non-violence towards Muslim (even tyrannical or incompetent) rulers.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the ravages of colonialism, the failures of nationalism, monarchism, Marxism, and pan-Arabism in the post-colonial Middle East and North Africa, similar failures in South Asia, and the creation of the states of Israel and Pakistan, all contributed to the rise of militant Islamism. In this latest incarnation, an imprisoned Egyptian named Sayyid Qutb called for a vanguard to act upon the ideas put forward by ideologues like Ibn Taymiyya when faced with insufficiently Islamic governance from within the Muslim world, and toxic foreign ideological and physical incursions from outside of the Muslim world. These thought-leaders, hand-picked from moments of crisis, remain foundational thought leaders of jihadist movements today.

The vocabulary of this narrative is supplied by revivalist interpretations of Islam. Maximalist notions of tawhid, absolute monotheism, and taqlid, emulation of the actions of the Prophet Muhammad and a literalist interpretation of the Qur'an, provide a universally accessible and seemingly unassailable haven for Sunni Muslims looking for alternatives to the oppressive realities provided by their current regimes. Faced with persecution by a morally bankrupt ruling class, the Prophet emigrated from Mecca to Medina in 622 where he established the first Islamic city-state. In this archetypal moment the Prophet Muhammad reorganized society around Islam as opposed to the bonds of kinship and tribal custom, after which he successfully defended his new Muslim nation and expanded the political boundaries of the Muslim empire.

For many Islamists, violent organizations like al-Qa'ida among them, this pre-Westphalian modality of Islam is instructional. "True" Islam

only exists when it is the primary source of governance, manifest today by the implementation of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law. It supersedes tribe, or nationality today, it is to be defended everywhere it exists, and when it exists it is an ascendant force. According to this logic, in the current moment of extended crisis Muslims are duty-bound to follow the example of the Prophet and emigrate from places of persecution to a place where they can fight on behalf of true Islam. If they cannot make that journey, they are to fight where they live.

This ideological context helps to explain jihadism's appeal beyond its embodiment in al-Qa'ida. In any current political climate where national leaders fail to deliver economic prosperity, just governance and security, and foreign powers prey on this internal weakness, the argument can gain traction. By describing an alternative political order in a religious lexicon, jihadist ideologues disassociate themselves from the corruption and incompetence demonstrated since the post-Colonial era. Because al-Qa'ida inherited a resonant argument and spent decades propagating it in training camps and online, and because modern jihadist ideologues continue to interpret this argument for current political conditions, al-Qa'ida's continued salience as an organization is not required for this narrative to remain compelling.

Bin Ladin is dead; long live jihadism

Jihadism persists because it predates al-Qa'ida and is not dependent upon al-Qa'ida. Ibn Taymiyya's revolutionary narrative, inherited and amplified by al-Qa'ida, can gain traction among other aggrieved Sunni militant groups. Al-Qa'ida sought footholds where extant local or regional groups already existed and often propagandized on their behalves, creating the perception that these conflicts existed because of al-Qa'ida. While this interpretation is untrue, it is true that al-Qa'ida had varying success enabling the violence of others and reorienting that violence against the West. Even without a robust al-Qa'ida presence, members of local and regional groups may continue to see Western targets as legitimate. As al-Qa'ida currently discourages foreign fighters to travel to Pakistan, globally minded individuals are more likely to target far enemy targets in their own locale. If nothing else, al-Qa'ida demonstrated



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that small groups can attack successfully powerful nation-states, potentially emboldening disparate groups and cells to take action.

In addition, jihadism persists because al-Qa'ida delegates operational decision-making to varying degrees in varying contexts, to include empowering lone-actors with no formal connection to the organization to take direct action. Following Nidal Hasan's terrorist attack at Fort Hood, for example, al-Qa'ida did not claim the attack but endorsed the behavior. This is in large part because al-Qa'ida is a pragmatic vanguard with an expansive definition of itself. When operationally constrained it has stuck to the strategic principle of enabling the violence of others, as opposed to privileging absolute command and control.

Conclusion

The death of the 21st century's first super-empowered individual, Usama bin Ladin, led to broad reflection about the viability of his organization and its place in a changing political landscape. Underscoring al-Qa'ida's failure to generate widespread support for both the ends (severing of ties between the West and the Muslim world and reestablishment of the caliphate) and means (violence) of its campaign, protestors acted largely peaceably and entirely within the parameters of the international system that al-Qa'ida sought to overthrow. Control of the nation-state, not its dissolution, remained the prize of popular protests even for the Islamist political parties that have benefited from the instability.

Within the context of this political turmoil, extant violent groups persist and some have found new safe-haven. While many coalesced around a local agenda without any impetus from the al-Qa'ida organization, al-Qa'ida's long-running propagation of global jihadism and its vilification of the West has influenced

these militant organizations to varying degrees. As a result, in contested regions far from al-Qa'ida's geographic center of gravity, violence targeting both local Muslim populations and far-enemy targets persists. Making this mix of violence more difficult to disentangle, it often occurs in places where anti-American sentiment is paramount creating the very real risk that American audiences will conflate the two.

It is essential, therefore, that policy-makers understand the differing motivations and goals among violent and non-violent Islamist actors in a given region. Many of these actors choose to act within the international system with the goal of winning a seat at the table. Others act outside of the system in the medium term, but for the same prize; the ability to govern within the international system. Foreign policy should endeavor to influence the behaviors of these organizations with the understanding that Western nation states retain the advantage in this arena, even if policy options are less attractive now than they were prior to the Arab Spring. There is a new political reality at play.

At the same time, the interplay of local, regional and global actors presents a parallel reality that counterterrorism professionals continue to address. This condition will persist to varying degrees even if the al-Qa'ida organization fails to recover from the withering attacks made against it in recent years. Sophisticated counterterrorism policy must minimize the effects of global jihadism without inciting local and regional groups to take up its cause. This requires an understanding of the jihadist narrative and the ability to distinguish it from political Islam and anti-American sentiment, as well as an understanding of the specific history that allows al-Qa'ida to enable the violence of others in so many regions of the world.

Bill Braniff is Executive Director, START Consortium, University of Maryland

Supo chief: Terrorism growing in Finland

Source: http://yle.fi/uutiset/supo_chief_terrorism_growing_in_finland/6392166



The number of people in Finland with links to terrorist organisations has multiplied over the past decade, Supo chief Antti Peltari told Yle's A-Studio discussion programme on Monday night.

"There are people in this country who have been to



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
foreign training camps and have fought alongside terrorist groups," he explained. According to Pelttari, Finland is currently home to **more than one hundred people** who could pose a potential threat. But he said there's no proof of Finland being a terrorist target. Most terrorist activities are aimed abroad. More worryingly, foreign states are increasingly engaged in spying on their nationals resident in Finland, according to Supo. "Today threats to Finland relate to illicit foreign surveillance," he said. Supo says that so-called 'refugee espionage' is practiced in Finland and is being conducted by non-democratic states. Information obtained by spying may be used against a target's family or friends in their homeland.

Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram – The Prize in al-Qaeda's Africa Strategy

By Jacob Zenn

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/books/bookpaypalorder/>

The Occasional Paper, entitled "Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram: The Prize in Al-Qaeda's Africa Strategy" is now available for purchase on our website. This Occasional Paper examines the evolution of al-Qaeda's Africa strategy from its focus on East Africa in the 1990s to the entire African continent by the mid-2000s. It then analyzes al-Qaeda's efforts to establish a relationship with Boko Haram's predecessor, the Nigerian Taliban, from 2003 to 2009; the evolution of the Boko Haram threat to Nigeria and its neighbors from 2009 to late 2012; and the extent to which al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which now controls the separatist state in northern Mali called "Azawad" with two allied Islamist militias, has interacted with Boko Haram and other militants in northern Nigeria.



The paper argues that al-Qaeda has been interested in expanding its anti-American and transnational militant agenda to Nigeria through local Nigerian militants, but that the Nigerian Taliban largely pursued its own socio-political agenda in Nigeria. As a result, a partnership between al-Qaeda and Nigerian militants was never forged in the 2000s. However, since the rise of Boko Haram in 2009, which evolved from the Nigerian Taliban, the group's ideology has become much more anti-American, largely due to a change in leadership from the late Mohammed Yusuf to his former second-in-command Abubakr Shekau. AQIM's rise in northern Mali, which is only 300 miles from northern Nigeria, will facilitate an al-Qaeda and Boko Haram alliance. As AQIM and Boko Haram's areas of operations begin to overlap in northern Mali, Niger and northern Nigeria, so will their interests. This will have a significant impact on the stability of Nigeria, U.S. interests in Nigeria, and West African regional security.

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Jacob Zenn is an analyst of West African affairs for The Jamestown Foundation and works as a legal advisor specializing in international law and best practices related to the freedom of association. He earned a J.D. from Georgetown Law in 2011, where he was a Global Law Scholar and a graduate degree in International Affairs from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Center for Chinese-American Studies in 2007.



Terrorism suspects may have trained at Chino paintball facility featuring simulated Middle Eastern cities

Source: http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/mpggogreen/ci_22042947/paintball-course-where-terror-suspects-may-have-trained



The entrance to SC Village in Chino. The field was used for training by four Inland Empire men who were arrested on suspicion of plotting to join Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan in hopes of killing Americans.

Two of the four Inland Empire men arrested on terrorism-related charges this week may have trained at a paintball park featuring a simulation of the Pakistani town where al-Qaeda leader

paintball/airsoft facility with a confidential informant on Sept. 23.

There, the pair reportedly "selected and rented paintball guns that resembled assault rifles.

Santana told the (informant) that he chose that type of weapon so that he could get used to the weight," the FBI criminal complaint reads in part.

The closest paintball and airsoft (replica guns that fire non-metallic pellets) course is SC Village Paintball Park, which has a Corona mailing address despite being located in southern Chino, and is



Osama bin Laden was killed. According to FBI documents released this week, Ralph Deleon, 23, of Ontario, and Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidrales, 21, of Upland, went to an as-yet-unidentified Corona-area

owned by Hollywood Sports in Bellflower. The park has a strong U.S. military flavor, with surplus Army trucks, camouflage netting and replica Army checkpoints decorating the park.



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In May 2011, SC Village Paintball Park briefly made headlines when, after bin Laden was killed by Navy SEALs, the company spent \$250,000 adding SC Viper Field. The airsoft gaming field is designed to look like Abbottabad, the city in Pakistan where bin Laden's compound was located.

"Our philosophy for the last 30 years, when there's a conflict around the world, we make a playing map that simulates that just like (video game) 'Call of Duty'," Hollywood Sports co-owner Giovanni D'Egidio said Friday. "We wanted a video game come to life."

The town features replica buildings, Arabic language signage (including an ad for McDonald's), and other details intended to allow players to re-create the raid on bin Laden's compound.

The paintball park also features courses built to resemble Baghdad, Beirut, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait and other warzones, according its website.

"Right now, the Middle East is popular, so we do the Middle East ones," D'Egidio said.

Army combat trainer Sgt. 1st Class Daniel Addams decried Hollywood Sports' simulation of real-world battlefields.

"We train as we fight, and if our war was with Hitler's army then we would train in German scenarios," he said. "Places like this are a breeding ground for hatred, which is something we don't believe in."

Such simulation is not universal at paintball and airsoft courses.

"Our whole purpose is to have a safe place for kids to paintball," said Wayne Woodruff, who owns Action Star Games in Colton. His maps don't resemble real-world battlegrounds. "We want to show kids that war is the stupidest thing in the world and that when you're done paintballing you can still hang out with your friends. In real war you may not be able to."

As of Friday afternoon, FBI officials had not yet confirmed the name of the paintball park visited by DeLeon and Santana. But Hollywood Sports owns many of the paintball and airsoft parks in the region, according to D'Egidio, making it likely that DeLeon, Santana and the FBI informant they played with, were at one of his company's parks.

"We've been doing this for 30 years. If they looked out of the ordinary, we'd report it" to the police, he said.

Jihad in Syria: A Profile of Jabhat al-Nusra

By Murad Batal al-Shishani

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

The jihadists that began to emerge in Syria several months after peaceful protests against the Bashar al-Assad regime began in March 2011 can be broadly categorized into two groups: al-Qaeda-style groups and local jihadist groups. The latter type is represented by locally-formed jihadist groups, the largest of which is Ahrar al-Sham. The local type adopts the basic components of jihadist rhetoric but insists that their major goal is the toppling of the Bashar al-Assad regime.

The al-Qaeda-style trend is represented by several jihadist groups, such as the Lebanon-based Fatah al-Islam group that clashed with Lebanese authorities in 2007, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which have claimed responsibility for several attacks against Israel from south Lebanon. However, the largest group in this category is Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (Front for the Support of the Syrian People, commonly known as "al-Nusra").

Al-Nusra announced its formation in late January, 2012 and their statements have found their way into major jihadist web forums ever since. The leader of the group, using the *nom de guerre* of Abu Muhammad al-Golani, stated in the audio message in which he proclaimed the formation of the group, that he and his colleagues came to Syria "a few months after the revolution, from one of the jihadi battlefields to help the people of Levant against the [Assad] regime." Citing the refusal of Western countries to help topple Assad's rule, al-Golani declared a jihad against the Syrian regime (muslm.net, January 24). On June 20, Ansar al-Mujahdeen web forum released a booklet explaining



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their ideology entitled *Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham: Who are they? What are their Aims?* The booklet introduces the group as:

A blessed front that has the best mujahideen from various parts of the earth in a sole group on the land of Levant, [aiming] to clean the abomination of Bashar and his gang and to establish the rule of *Allah* in the Levant and not just implementing a phony change of people and names, as happened in Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya! But the front aims by its jihad to change the whole governance system and bring justice, freedom and equality in the country, as it is ordered by Allah, not as promoted by the West! (As-Ansar.com, June 20).

Clearly the Nusra front adopts the jihadist ideology and since it emerged in Syria it has taken an active part in attacks against Syrian government troops. Its attacks, according to the group's frequent statements on jihadist web

clashes with locals and to avoid disagreements with other groups in Syria while expanding their zone of operations to Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Darra and Dier al-Zour.

Al-Nusra coordinates with other factions of the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA), however, the tactics used by jihadists in Syria are similar to those used by jihadists in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003. The group carries out ambushes, kidnappings, assassinations, IED attacks and suicide bombings. Implementing such tactics made al-Nusra attractive to young people who want to join the fight against regime troops. According to the Syrian activist cited earlier, "al-Nusra front is more capable in using non-conventional tactics than the FSA," most of whose members are deserters from the regular army and lack training in such tactics. [2]

Al-Nusra Front publishes its statements through its media company, al-Manara al-Baida (White Beacon). The group focuses in its media releases on its attacks and avoids debates with other groups. However, it is gradually gaining legitimacy among jihadist scholars.

Al-Nusra has been criticized by Salafi-Jihadist ideologue Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa Halima (a.k.a. Abu Basir al-Tartusi) as well as by Salafi cleric Adnan al-

Arour, a strong supporter of the FSA and the revolution against the Syrian regime. Though Tartusi was more explicit in his remarks, al-Arour criticized the role played by foreign fighters in the movement, rejected suicide bombings as a tactic and denounced the *takfiri* orientation of the group. [3]

This criticism has not stopped al-Nusra from receiving the endorsement of a number of leading jihadist clerics. Jordanian Salafi-Jihadist Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi has urged Muslim youth to join al-Nusra front to fight against "the Sharon of the Levant" [i.e. Bashar al-Assad] (As-Ansar.com, November 8; for al-Tahawi, see Militant Leadership Monitor, May 31, 2011). Abu al-Mundhir al-Shanqiti, a prominent Mauritanian jihadist scholar, wrote an



جبهة النصرة/ اعدام 20 من جنود الطاغية الجرد شاركوا في قتل المسلمين

forums, have increased dramatically since March 2011. According to a Syrian activist working in an area where furious fighting is ongoing, this is due to an increasing acceptance among locals of the Nusra Front, "which shows high military capabilities and strong organizational skills." [1] In the same context, the Ansar al-Mujahideen booklet states that locals gave help and assistance to al-Nusra members "after they saw the sincerity of al-Nusra's commanders and soldiers in defending their lives and their towns, and in revenge for the blood of their children and the dignity of their women. That is at a time when they were abandoned by the hypocritical governments of the West, and the cowards and traitorous Arab rulers!" (As-Ansar.com, June 20). Al-Nusra seems very keen to avoid



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article endorsing the group and later issued a *fatwa* urging anyone who wants to go to the jihadi battlefield in Syria to join Jabhat al-Nusra (Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad, March 9; June 3). Jihadist internet ideologue Abu Sa'ad al-Amili has also expressed his opinion that the righteous banner of jihad in Syria belongs to al-Nusra (Aljihad.com, March 6).

There are three factors playing major roles in increasing the influence of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria:

- The effect on the Syrian people of the regime's atrocities
- The movement's military capabilities and avoidance of clashes with locals

- Endorsements by jihadist clerics that raise the credentials of the group in the Salafi-Jihadist community.

These factors will play a major role in attracting foreign fighters who are aiming to join jihad in Syria. All these factors indicate that the role of Jabhat al-Nusra will increase in Syria, but at the same time future relations with other armed groups and local communities inside Syria could be different if the Assad regime was toppled. In this situation, al-Nusra's continued presence in Syria could be open to question if there is no longer any place in Syria's political evolution for a jihadist ideology.

Notes


1. Interview via Skype with a Syrian activist who preferred to remain anonymous, November 1, 2012.
2. Ibid, November 17, 2012.
3. For Tartusi's remarks, see muslim.net, January 27, 2012. For al-Arour's comments, see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbIX0IlywsU> and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvLmoT9IETU>.

Murad Batal al-Shishani is an Islamic groups and terrorism issues analyst based in London. He is a specialist on Islamic Movements in Chechnya and in the Middle East.

Global Terrorism Index

Source: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/terrorismindex/about-the-gti/>

Released December 04, 2012



The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is the first index to systematically rank and compare 158 countries according to the impact of terrorism. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the GTI maps and analyses trends in terrorism over the last 10 years. The index is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.


Key Findings

- From 2002 to 2011, North America was the region least likely to suffer from terrorism
- While more terrorist attacks are being recorded, the number of fatalities has declined by 25% since 2007.
- Only 31 out of 158 countries ranked have not experienced a terrorist attack since 2002
- Most terrorist attacks occur in the context of a wider conflict situation
- Since the start of the Iraq invasion the number of terrorist incidents occurring each year has increased fourfold, globally
- In 2011 Iraq was the country that was most impacted by terrorism, followed by Pakistan and Afghanistan



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Top 15 countries



Turkey – Greece – Norway – United Kingdom

Rank	Name	Terrorism Index	Incidents	Fatalities	Injuries	Property
18	Kenya	5.27	40	40	111	8
19	Turkey	5.24	50	25	110	23
20	Israel	5.15	48	21	77	33
21	Norway	5.03	2	75	75	2
22	Nepal	5.02	29	5	73	14
23	China	4.99	4	19	32	2
24	Burundi	4.90	8	47	30	3
25	Central African Republic	4.84	3	35	3	1
26	Greece	4.60	10	0	5	4
27	Egypt	4.58	16	26	107	9
28	United Kingdom	4.51	46	1	3	19
29	Indonesia	4.51	21	20	70	5
30	Uganda	4.49	0	0	0	0
31	Lebanon	4.48	10	1	23	5
32	Belarus	4.26	1	13	161	1
33	Myanmar	4.09	2	0	0	0



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Al Qaeda 3.0: Terrorism's Emergent New Power Bases

Source: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/03/al-qaeda-3-0-terrorism-s-emergent-new-power-bases.html>

While Pentagon lawyers claim al Qaeda's tipping into defeat, in fact we are seeing the emergence of the third generation of the terrorist movement.



Iraqi security forces survey the scene outside the Sayidat al-Nejat Catholic Cathedral, or Syrian Catholic Church, in central Baghdad on November 1, 2010, the morning after seven security force members and 37 Christians were killed when US and Iraqi forces stormed the cathedral to free dozens of hostages in an attack claimed by an Al-Qaeda group. (Sabah Arar / Getty Images)

Under siege by drones in Pakistan and Yemen, al Qaeda 3.0 has exploited the Arab Awakening to create its largest safe havens and operational bases in more than a decade across the Arab world. This may prove to be the most deadly al Qaeda yet.

The first generation was the original band in Afghanistan created by Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. The second emerged after 9/11 when the group resurfaced in Pakistan and then across the Muslim world. Now a third iteration can be discerned in the wake of bin Laden's death and the Arab Awakening.

The fastest-growing new al Qaeda is in Syria. Using the cover name Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda has become perhaps the most lethal element of the opposition to Bashar al Assad's brutal dictatorship. Al Qaeda's amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called for jihadists across the world to flock to Syria this spring to join the uprising

against the Assad regime and the Alawite minority that supports it. For al Qaeda, Assad and the Alawis are a perfect target; many Sunnis believe Alawis to be a deviationist sect of Islam that should be suppressed. While al Qaeda is a small part of the opposition in Syria, it nonetheless brings unique skills in bomb-making and suicide operations.

Now jihadist websites are reporting every day that new al Qaeda "martyrs" have died in the fighting in Damascus and Aleppo from Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Egypt. Reliable reports speak of bands of jihadists operating in the country with a loose affiliation to al Qaeda and composed of Muslim fanatics from as far away as Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The Syrian al Qaeda franchise has sought to learn from the mistakes of its predecessors. It avoids open association with the brand name and seeks to work with other Sunni



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groups. It is well armed, uses bases in Iraq for support and supply, and benefits from the arms supplied by Qatar and Saudi Arabia to the opposition. Its leader uses the nom de guerre of Abu Mohammad al Golani, a reference to the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights and a signal that the top leader is a Syrian, not a foreign fighter.

The longer the civil war in Syria goes on, the more al Qaeda will benefit from the chaos and the sectarian polarization. It will also benefit from the spill over of violence from Syria into Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan that is now inevitable.

Like the rest of the world, al Qaeda was surprised by the revolutions that toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Its ideology of violence and jihad was initially challenged by the largely nonviolent revolutionary movements that swept across North Africa and the Middle East. But al Qaeda is an adaptive organization, and it has exploited the chaos and turmoil of revolutionary change to create operational bases and new strongholds.

Al Qaeda is an adaptive organization, and it has exploited the chaos and turmoil of revolutionary change to create operational bases and new stronghold.

In North Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, originally an Algerian franchise of the al Qaeda global terror organization, has successfully aligned itself with a local extremist group in Mali named Ansar al Dine, or Defenders of the Faith; together, they have effectively taken control of the northern two thirds of Mali. Now AQIM controls the fabled city of Timbuktu.

For most of its existence, AQIM had been confined to kidnapping Westerners traveling in the remote deserts of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and other criminal enterprises. Sources in the U.K. say it raised 50 million euros this way. This spring, after a military coup in Mali, AQIM found a partner in Ansar al Dine; together, they swept out government forces from the north of Mali, and now they control a vast Saharan stronghold the size of Texas. AQIM is also at work in Libya, especially around Benghazi. Spanish and French leaders are now labeling the new AQIM strongholds in Mali and Libya the gravest threats to regional stability in more than a decade.

Eco-Terrorist Surrenders

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/december/eco-terrorist-surrenders-two-fugitives-still-at-large/eco-terrorist-surrenders-two-fugitives-still-at-large?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=159736

After a decade as an international fugitive, Canadian citizen Rebecca Rubin gave up life on the run last week when she turned herself over to the FBI at the international border in Washington state.

The 39-year-old alleged member of the

domestic terrorist cell called “The Family” will face federal arson charges for her role in the largest eco-terrorism case in U.S. history, known as Operation Backfire. With Rubin in custody, only two Family members remain at large.



The 1998 arson at a Vail, Colorado ski resort caused more than \$24 million in damages.

Along with a dozen other conspirators, Rubin is charged with multiple crimes from 1996 through 2001 in the West and Pacific Northwest, including in Oregon, Colorado, and California. The Family committed an estimated \$48 million worth of arson and vandalism under the



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names of the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front.

The cell's most notorious crime was the 1998 arson of a Vail, Colorado ski resort that caused more than \$24 million in damages and drew international attention to eco-terrorists—those who break the law in the misguided attempt to protect the environment and animal rights. The FBI took the lead in the Vail investigation, working closely with local, state, and federal law enforcement partners, and in 2004, multiple eco-terrorism investigations were condensed into Operation Backfire.

In July 2011, one of Rubin's conspirators, Justin Solondz, was turned over to U.S. authorities by the Chinese government.

Solondz had been imprisoned in China on drug charges. That leaves two Operation Backfire fugitives still at large, and there is a reward for information leading to their arrest.

"Two years ago we had four fugitives. Now we have two—so we are halfway there," said Special Agent Tim Suttles, who works in our Portland Division and has been investigating the eco-terrorist group since 2005.

Although Suttles said it is "very satisfying" to see Rubin surrender and submit herself to the judicial process, the Operation Backfire investigation will not be closed until the last two fugitives—Joseph Dibee and Josephine Overaker—are in custody.



A reward of up to \$50,000 each is being offered for information leading to the arrest of Dibee and Overaker, both of whom are believed to be living abroad.

Here is what we know about the two:

- Dibee was indicted in 2006 on charges of arson, conspiracy, and animal enterprise terrorism. He was believed to be living in Syria with family members but may have fled the country due to the recent violence and upheaval there.
- Overaker was indicted in 2004 and 2006 for her involvement with the 1998 Vail arson and other crimes. She is believed to have spent time in Germany and may have settled in Spain. She speaks fluent Spanish.

Suttles believes Rubin may have surrendered because she was tired of life

on the run. "She may have realized that being a fugitive meant she could never go home or could never have contact with her mom, who she is very close to." Like many long-term fugitives, he added, "she may have come to the realization that coming in, admitting what you did, and taking your punishment will allow you to move on with your life."

To date, Operation Backfire investigators have solved more than 40 criminal acts ranging from vandalism to arson. Seventeen individuals have been indicted, 15 of whom pled guilty and were sentenced in 2007 to jail time ranging from more than three years to 15 years.



Swiss Spooks Warn Of Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Breach

Source: <http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/swiss-spoops-warn-of-counter-terrorism-i/240143979>

In September, Swiss attorney general Michael Lauber and a senior prosecutor, Carolo Bulletti, held a press conference to disclose the alleged data theft, and said that they had a suspect in custody. "The intention was to sell the data to other countries," said Bulletti, but authorities didn't know whether that had happened.

Earlier this week, Reuters reported that unnamed European intelligence sources with knowledge of the investigation said that Swiss authorities still haven't ascertained whether the suspect sold the data. That led Swiss authorities to warn all intelligence agencies that share counter-terrorism information with

Switzerland -- including the CIA and Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6 -- that the information may have been sold to foreign intelligence agencies or commercial buyers.

The suspect worked for the NDB, Switzerland's federal intelligence service, which is part of its defense ministry, for eight years. He reportedly had administrator-level rights to most of the spy agency's networks, including ones storing highly secret information, and became disgruntled after feeling that higher-level managers were ignoring his recommendations. Reportedly, the quantity of breached data involves terabytes of secret information and was stolen when the suspect copied it onto a portable hard drive and walked out of government premises with the drive stored in a backpack. Swiss authorities arrested the suspect -- who under Swiss laws can't be named -- in May, and said they recovered numerous portable devices containing the surreptitiously copied intelligence data. Authorities were tipped off by Swiss bank UBS, which had traced an attempt to open a new, numbered bank account to the IT technician.



The suspect has been released on bail while the related investigation continues.

According to the European intelligence sources, the employee began displaying some of the classic warning signs that precede insider attacks, such as manifesting a disgruntled attitude and regularly failing to show up for work. The signs, however, were apparently ignored.

The Swiss case is far from the first time that a disgruntled IT-savvy employee with access to sensitive information has been accused of stealing it. In 2009, for example, MI6 caught Daniel Houghton, one of its computer programmers,

trying to sell cutting-edge email interception technology, as well as staff lists containing cell phone numbers and home addresses for MI6 and Britain's MI5 domestic intelligence service. Houghton had downloaded at least 7,000 files onto a secure digital memory card and offered it for sale to the Dutch intelligence service, or AIVD. Dutch officials tipped off MI6, who busted Houghton in a sting operation.

Arguably, that data breach could have been prevented if proper controls been in place to monitor for unusual network behavior, such as copying 7,000 files to a removable memory card. The same, of course, could be said for the NDB in Switzerland, or for that matter, the Department of Defense, which saw 251,000 sensitive diplomatic cables get leaked to WikiLeaks. The alleged perpetrator, Private First Class Bradley Manning, an intelligence analyst, allegedly copied the data onto rewritable CDs, which he stored in a Lady Gaga CD case. According to psychologists, Manning's superiors ignored obvious insider-attack warning signs indicated in his emotional and mental state.



Death by Algorithm: West Point Code Shows Which Terrorists Should Disappear First

Source: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/12/paulos-algorithm/>

Paulo Shakarian has an algorithm that might one day help dismantle al-Qaida — or at least one of its lesser affiliates. It's an algorithm that identifies which people in a terror network really matter, like the mid-level players, who connect smaller cells with the larger militant group. Remove those people, either by drone or by capture, and it concentrates power and authority in the hands of one man. Remove that man, and you've broken the organization. The U.S. military and intelligence communities like to congratulate themselves whenever they've taken out a terrorist leader, whether it's Osama bin Laden or Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, the bloodthirsty chief of al-Qaida in Iraq. Shakarian, a professor at West Point's Network Science Center who served two tours as an intelligence officer in Iraq, saw first-hand just how quickly those militant networks regrew new heads when the old ones were chopped off. It became one of the inspirations for him and his colleagues at West Point to craft an algorithm that could truly target a terror group's weak points.

"I remember these special forces guys used to brag about how great they were at targeting leaders. And I thought, 'Oh yeah, targeting leaders of a decentralized organization. Real helpful,'"

Shakarian tells Danger Room. Zarqawi's group, for instance, only grew more lethal after his death. "So I thought: Maybe we shouldn't be so interested in individual leaders, but in how whole organizations regenerate their leadership."


These days, American counterterror policy is even more reliant on taking out individual militants. How exactly those individuals are picked for drone

elimination is the matter of intense debate and speculation. The White House reportedly maintains a "matrix" of the most dangerous militants. Social-network analysis — the science of determining the connections between people — almost certainly plays a role where those militants appear on that matrix.

It's clearly an imperfect process. Hundreds of civilians have been killed in the drone strikes, along with thousands of militants. And while the core of al-Qaida is clearly weakened, Obama administration officials will only talk in the vaguest terms about when the war against the terror group might some day come to an end.

In a paper to be presented later this month before the Academy of Science and Engineering's International Conference on Social Informatics, Shakarian and his West Point colleagues argue for a new way of using social-network analysis to target militants. Forget going after the leader of an extremist group, they say. At least right away.

"If you arrest that guy, the number of connections everyone else has becomes more similar. They all become leaders. You force that terror group to become more decentralized. You might be making it




harder to defeat these organizations," Shakarian says.



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This chart shows how West Point’s “GREEDY_FRAGILE” algorithm renders a network brittle by removing relatively few nodes.



The second illustration depicts a terror network, as the algorithm centralizes it — and makes it easier to break. Photos: West Point

Instead, counterterrorists should work to remove militant lieutenants in such a way that terror leaders actually become *more* central to their organizations. That’s because a more centralized network is a more fragile one. And a fragile network can ultimately be smashed, once and for all.

The West Point team — which includes professors Devon Callahan, Jeff Nielsen, and Tony Johnson — wrote up a simple (less than 30-line) algorithm in Python they named GREEDY_FRAGILE. It looks for nodes that can be taken out to “maximize network-wide centrality” — concentrate connectivity in the terror leader, in other words. The professors tested GREEDY_FRAGILE against five data sets. The first is the social network of the al-Qaida members involved in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam; the other four are derived from real-world terror groups, but anonymized for academic use.

“In each of the five real-world terrorist networks that we examined, removal of only 12% of nodes can increase the network-wide centrality between 17% and 45%,” the West Point authors note in their paper. In other words, taking out just a few mid-level players make the whole organization much, much more fragile.

Interestingly, GREEDY_FRAGILE works even when the exact shape of the network is unknown — or when certain nodes can’t be targeted, for political or intelligence reasons. In other words, it takes into account some real-world complications that counterterrorists might face.

Now, this is just a lab experiment. No actual terrorists were harmed in the writing of this paper. The algorithm only looks at “degree” centrality — the number of ties a node has. It doesn’t examine metrics like network “closeness,” which finds the shortest possible path between two nodes. Nor

does it take into account the different roles played by different nodes — financier, propagandist, bomb-maker. That’s why the work is funded by the Army Research Office, which handles the service’s most basic R&D efforts.

What’s more, the authors stress that their network-breaking techniques might not be a good fit for every counterterror plan. “It may be desirable to keep certain terrorist or insurgent leaders in place to restrain certain, more radical elements of their organization,” they write.

In fact, the authors strongly hint that they’re not necessarily on board with the Obama administration’s kill-don’t-capture approach to handling terror networks.

“We would like to note that the targeting of individuals in a terrorist or insurgent network does not necessarily mean to that they should be killed,” Shakarian and his colleagues write. “In fact, for ‘shaping operations’ as the ones described in this paper, the killing of certain individuals in the network may be counter-productive. This is due to the fact that the capture of individuals who are likely emergent leaders may provide further intelligence on the organization in question.”

That sort of intelligence may suddenly be at a premium again. From the Pentagon chief on down, the U.S. is increasingly worried about al-Qaida’s spread into unfamiliar regions like



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Mali and its association with new, shadowy militant groups in Libya. GREEDY_FRAGILE, if it works like Shakarian hopes, might show the

counterterrorists which militants to target — and which so-called leaders to leave alone. For now.

Piracy plunges as more ships start carrying armed guards

Source: <http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/business/piracy-plunges-as-more-ships-start-carrying-armed-guards-181652531.html>



Pirate attacks on merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean fell 81 per cent this year as the use of armed security guards on ships acted as a "game-changer," according to the European Union's naval force.

There were 34 attacks by Somali pirates, with five vessels hijacked so far in 2012, compared to a record 176 assaults in the whole of last year that resulted in 25 ships seized for ransom, according to Peter Olive, the EU Naval Force's chief of staff.

Ransom payments to Somali pirates totaled \$36 million so far this year, compared with \$147 million last year, he said Thursday at a briefing at the EU's naval force headquarters at Northwood, England. As well as more aggressive military operations, the increasing deployment of private guards over the last 18 months on vessels transiting high-risk areas contributed to the declines, Olive said.

"In 2011, the numbers of private armed security teams went up significantly and that has been a big game-changer as well, though not the only factor," Olive said. "If that pressure is taken off it can all start to be unpicked relatively

rapidly," he added, referring to industry and military measures to combat piracy.

Naval forces from three missions are deploying as many as 20 ships at a time, patrolling an area larger than Europe, to disrupt pirates who threaten international trade. The cost of piracy last year was estimated at \$6.9 billion, including \$1.3 billion spent on military operations and \$1.16 billion on armed guards and vessel security, according to a report in February by One Earth Future Foundation. About 42,450 vessels transit the region each year, with as many as half using armed guards by the end of 2011, the Broomfield, Colo.-based nonprofit said.

"The fact there is private armed security employed in the region, there's nobody who's happy with that," said Hank Ort, chief of staff for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's counter-piracy mission. "From a NATO point of view, it's not something we take a position on. Having said that, it does help; ships that get attacked that have security have always been able to get away."

Trade through the region is valued at \$1 trillion, according to the EU naval




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force, known as EU Navfor. About 35 per cent of crude oil shipped by sea and 20 per cent of oil traded worldwide transits through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf

with the Gulf of Oman, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Twenty per cent of the world's liquefied natural gas from Qatar also passed through the strait, it said.

Technique used to nab serial killers helps in controlling pests and disease and in counter-terrorism

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121212-technique-used-to-nab-serial-killers-helps-in-controlling-pests-and-disease-and-in-counterterrorism>



Geoprofiling image shows most likely points of origin of criminal // Source: ncjrs.gov

A technique designed to help criminologists catch serial killers is being used by scientists to locate sources of disease, control pests, and study animal behavior. Locating a serial killer's home is similar to finding the nests of animals or centers of disease outbreaks, explains an article in the forthcoming December edition of the Society of Biology's magazine *The Biologist*.

Author of the article, Mark Stevenson, a Ph.D. researcher at Queen Mary, University of London, explains:

"What do serial killers have in common with great white sharks, invasive species and malaria-transmitting mosquitoes? It sounds like the sort of question Sherlock Holmes might ask his faithful companion. The answer to our riddle is relatively simple — dare I say elementary? They are all travelling from a central location in some kind of predictable pattern. If we can work out the pattern, it is possible to estimate where they live based on where we know they have been."

A Society of Biology release reports that the technique is called geographic profiling (GP) and has been used in many high profile cases, and helped catch the Yorkshire Ripper.

Imagine a situation where the police have found five bodies and linked the killings, and now need to locate the killer. GP uses the locations of the bodies and predictions of the killer's movement patterns to calculate where the serial killer's home is likely to be. This approach has been shown to be much more effective than starting at the center of the kills and searching outwards.

In biology, GP was first used to study animal foraging, specifically bats, bees and sharks. Mark Stevenson says: "We have discovered a lot about the patterns animals move in. What we're not so good at is predicting the central points they are

moving from. These points might be the breeding sites of malaria-transmitting mosquitoes or the place that an invasive species (such as the harlequin ladybird or ash die back) first arrived. The efficient identification of the sources of invasive species can be used to target disease and pest-control programs."

In epidemiology, GP has been used to re-analyze Snow's classic study of the 1854 London cholera outbreak, using the location of 321 disease sites.* Of the 13 neighborhood water pumps, the Broad Street pump — the outbreak's source — ranked as the most likely culprit. The same study analyzed cases of malaria in Cairo, Egypt, using 139 locations of disease cases. Scientists ranked fifty-nine local water sources in order of how likely they were to be responsible, and of the seven which tested positive for



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the mosquito vector, six were ranked 1-6. “Development of geographic profiling is by no means complete, and the two fields of biology and criminology still have much to teach each other. Ecological approaches have applications in counter-terrorism work, as terrorist cells tend to have more than one anchor point within the area in which they operate, exactly so they can avoid detection.”

Dr. Mark Downs, chief executive of the Society of Biology, says: “When we talk about the

importance of collaboration between the sciences we might think about chemists and physicists working with biologists to discover the mechanisms within cells or to turn plants grown for bioenergy into fuel. This is a fantastic example of how much even the most unlikely collaborations can achieve. It shows how impossible it is to predict the spinout benefits from a piece of research.”

* See Steven C. Le Comber et al., “Geographic profiling as a novel spatial tool for targeting infectious disease control,” *International Journal of Health Geographics* 10, no. 35 (18 May 2011) (doi:10.1186/1476-072X-10-35)

Modeling terrorism risk to the air transportation system

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121212-modeling-terrorism-risk-to-the-air-transportation-system>

RAND recently evaluated a terrorism risk modeling tool developed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Boeing to help guide program planning for aviation security.

The Risk Management Analysis Tool, or RMAT, simulates terrorist behavior and success in attacking vulnerabilities in the domestic commercial air transportation system, drawing on estimates of terrorist resources, capabilities, preferences, decision processes, intelligence collection, and operational planning. It describes how the layers of security protecting the air transportation system are likely to perform when confronted by more than sixty types of attacks, drawing on detailed blast and other physical modeling to understand the damage produced by different weapons and attacks, and calculating expected loss of life and the direct and indirect economic consequences of that damage.

RAND says its researchers found that parts of the model provide credible and useful estimates of the performance of components of the aviation security system, for instance the probability that specific weapon types will be detected by TSA’s passenger checkpoints. The tool has also proven to be valuable to the TSA in driving a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism risks to the air transportation system.

The authors find the model has some gaps, however, including:

- Even if the conceptual models on which RMAT is built were sound and comprehensive, the input data requirements exceed what subject matter experts or science can estimate with precision, and the imprecision of those estimates is subject to unknown sources and ranges of error.
- RMAT may not be well suited for the kinds of exploratory analysis required for high-stakes decision support, because of its reliance on a large number of uncertain parameters and conceptual models.
- RMAT does not provide a sufficiently broad depiction of the range of threats, vulnerabilities, attack pathways, and consequences to correctly describe terrorism risk to the U.S. commercial aviation system.

The authors conclude that TSA should not treat RMAT results as credible estimates of terrorism risk to the aviation system but can use those results to better understand some characteristics of terrorism risk and to explore possible influences of system changes on that risk.



— Read more in *Modeling Terrorism Risk to the Air Transportation System: An Independent Assessment of TSA’s Risk Management Analysis Tool and Associated Methods* (RAND, 2012)



ABSTRACT

RAND evaluated a terrorism risk modeling tool developed by the Transportation Security Administration and Boeing to help guide program planning for aviation security. This tool — the Risk Management Analysis Tool, or RMAT — is used by TSA to estimate the terrorism risk-reduction benefits attributable to new and existing security programs, technologies, and procedures. RMAT simulates terrorist behavior and success in attacking vulnerabilities in the domestic commercial air transportation system, drawing on estimates of terrorist resources, capabilities, preferences, decision processes, intelligence collection, and operational planning. It describes how the layers of security protecting the air transportation system are likely to perform when confronted by more than 60 types of attacks, drawing on detailed blast and other physical modeling to understand the damage produced by different weapons and attacks, and calculating expected loss of life and the direct and indirect economic consequences of that damage. This report describes RAND's conclusions about the validity of RMAT for TSA's intended uses and its recommendations for how TSA should perform cost-benefit analyses of its security programs.

U.S. Intelligence Report Says Islamist Terrorism ‘Could End by 2030’

Source: <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/us-intelligence-report-says-islamist-terrorism-could-end-2030>



Hamis gunmen and a Palestinian boy armed with a toy gun photographed at a funeral of Hamas militants killed in an Israeli air strike in the Gaza Strip in November 2012. A new report by the U.S. intelligence community projects that Islamist terrorism “could end by 2030.” (AP Photo)

The wave of Islamist terrorism is receding and “could end by 2030,” according to a new long-term assessment by the U.S. intelligence community.

In support of that projection, the study released on Monday said the view of America as the “great enemy” was becoming less appealing, resulting in part from the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.

It also cited political upheavals in the Arab world, and said that a new generation of young Muslims may be less interested in the narrative of a “conflict between fundamental values.”

“Several circumstances are ending the current Islamist phase of terrorism, which suggest that as with other terrorist waves – the Anarchists in the 1880s and 90s, the postwar anti-colonial terrorist movements, the New Left in 1970s – the recent religious wave is receding and could end by 2030,” said the National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2030* report.

“The Arab uprisings have demonstrated the moral and strategic legitimacy of nonviolent struggle,” it argued.

“Protesters acted in the name of democratic values, not in the name of religion.”

“The impending withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and decreases in U.S. forces in Afghanistan help to reduce the extent to which terrorists can draw on the United States as a lightning rod for anger,” it said. “Soon, U.S. support for Israel could be the last remaining major focus of Muslim anger.”

Since 1996 the NIC, which reports to the director of national intelligence, has prepared a trends analysis roughly every four years for the incoming president. This time it discussed the draft with experts in almost 20 countries, and the views of those “interlocutors” are reflected in the final 166-page document.

Despite the upbeat assessment on the likelihood of an end to Islamist terrorism, the report conceded that terror would probably not die out altogether.



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Some al-Qaeda affiliates and groups like Hezbollah may continue to pose threats, and states like Iran and Pakistan could continue to use terror groups as proxies, it said.

“Taking a global perspective, future terrorists could come from many different religions, including Christianity and Hinduism. Right-wing and left-wing ideological groups – some of the oldest users of terrorist tactics – also will pose threats.”

In the years to come, the study said, terrorists may focus less on trying to inflict mass casualties and more on causing widespread economic chaos by targeting critical cyber systems.

A headline projection in *Global Trends 2030* is an end to the post-Cold War “unipolar” order, with power shifting away from a single “hegemonic power” towards “networks and coalitions in a multipolar world.”

“By 2030, no country – whether the U.S., China, or any other large country – will be a hegemonic power,” it said, but predicted the U.S. would probably remain “first among equals.”

Optimism, pessimism in the Middle East, South Asia

Concerning the enduringly unstable parts of the world where most Muslims live – South Asia and the Middle East – the report offered a mix of upbeat and gloomy assessments for the period up to 2030.

In South Asia, the report put forward three possible scenarios – the most promising of which it also deemed the least likely:

The “turn-the-corner” scenario envisaged gradual normalization of Pakistan-India trade, a building of regional trust, with growing economic opportunities lessening the attractiveness of militancy. Pakistan would over several decades become a relatively stable economy, and the nuclear-armed rivals would find ways to coexist in protect deepening economic ties.

However, “[m]any of our interlocutors saw this scenario as unlikely. Critical to the scenario would be the establishment of a more capable civilian government in Pakistan and improved governance,” the report stated.

“A collapse in neighboring Afghanistan would probably set back any such civilian-led agenda, reinforcing security fears and retrenchment.”

Two other scenarios for South Asia were far more pessimistic. One envisaged escalating

Islamization in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with extreme interpretations of *shari’a*, a proliferation of jihadist bases, and deepening ties between jihadists and the military.

Its third scenario for the region in the coming decades was one of “unraveling” – social and political fracturing in Pakistan and Afghanistan, dragging India down with them.

The report also identified Pakistan and Afghanistan among a group of 15 countries “at high risk of state failure” by 2030. Others included Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the Middle East, the report identified a number of key determinants for the future, with the possibilities ranging widely “from fragile growth and development to chronic instability and potential regional conflicts.”

--If the Islamic regime retained power in Iran and acquired nuclear weapons, “the Middle East will face a highly unstable future.” A more liberal regime by contrast could abandon nuclear weapons aspirations, negotiate an end to isolation and focus on economic modernization.

--Instability in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni monarchies could spark widespread political and economic uncertainty. Any future political transition in Saudi Arabia could, like Egypt, be “messy and complicated.”

--The future of political Islam, and whether Islamists will moderate once in power, was another key determinant.

“Over time political pragmatism could trump ideology helped by a growing civil society that will begin to produce a new cadre of pragmatic, entrepreneurial and social leaders – something that authoritarian regimes consistently stifled,” the report said.

But if corruption and severe unemployment persisted that could benefit “hardline” Islamists offering a clear alternative to Western capitalism and democracy.

--Civil and sectarian strife was another factor, particularly in countries like Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, where ongoing violence could increase the risk of “strongmen dictators” emerging.

--An Israeli-Palestinian settlement “would have dramatic consequences for the region over the next two decades,” the report said. It envisaged incremental steps towards Palestinian statehood, but said the thorniest outstanding issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the “right




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of return” of Palestinian refugees, would not likely be resolved by 2030.

NOTE: Read full report at Newsletter’s website – “CBRNE-CT Papers” section. Read also relevant article at Editor’s Corner.

Bomb found in Bonn train station, Islamist extremist suspected

Source: <http://thecomingcrisis.blogspot.gr/2012/12/bomb-found-in-bonn-train-station.html>



German authorities suspect Islamist extremists were responsible for planting an explosive device Monday (Dec 10, 2012) beside a track at the main railway station in Bonn, a German intelligence official tells CNN.

The explosives were found after a 14-year-old reported the bag to police, according to the official, who said the device was "not sophisticated" in design.

The official said whoever left the bag remains at large. Initially, German police arrested two Bonn residents soon after recovering the explosive components, the official said. The official identified them as Omar D., who's long been on German security services' radar because of his alleged links to Islamist extremists, and Abdifatah W.

Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever?

By Scott Stewart (*Vice President of Analysis*)

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/boko-haram-more-dangerous-ever?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20121213&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=8d2d77d1d8b344728740d888233248b4

On Nov. 25, Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group from northern Nigeria, attacked a church in Jaji, Kaduna state, using two suicide bombers during the church's weekly religious service. The first bomb detonated in a vehicle driven into the church, and the second detonated approximately 10 minutes later, when a crowd of first responders gathered at the scene. About 30 people were killed in the attacks; the second blast caused the majority of the deaths. The incident was particularly symbolic because Jaji is the home of Nigeria's Armed Forces Command and Staff College, and many of the churchgoers were senior military officers.

In the wake of the Jaji attacks, media reports quoted human rights groups saying that Boko Haram has killed more people in 2012 than ever before. The group has killed roughly 770 people this year, leading many to conclude that Boko Haram has become more dangerous. However, it is important to look beyond the sheer number of fatalities when drawing such conclusions about a group like Boko Haram. Indeed, a less cursory look at the group reveals that while 2012 has been a particularly deadly

year, the Nigerian government has curtailed the group's capabilities. In terms of operational planning, the group has been limited to simple attacks against soft targets in or near its core territory. In other words, Boko Haram remains deadly, but it is actually less capable than it used to be, relegating the group to a limited, regional threat unless this dynamic is somehow altered.

Boko Haram's Rise

Boko Haram, Hausa for "Western Education is Sinful," was established in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria's Borno state. It has since spread to several other northern and central Nigerian states. Its official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, Arabic for "Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad." While Boko Haram is a relatively new phenomenon, Nigeria has struggled with militant Islamism for decades. For example, the Maitatsine sect, led by Mohammed Marwa, fomented violence in the early 1980s in the very same cities that Boko Haram is presently active.



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
Initially, Boko Haram incited sectarian violence and attacked Christians with clubs, machetes and small arms. But by 2010, the group had added Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices to its arsenal. In 2011, Boko Haram made a major operational leap when it unexpectedly began to use large suicide vehicle bombs. They were used first in the botched attack against the national police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011, and they were later used in the more successful attack against a U.N. compound in Abuja in August 2011.

The leap from simple attacks in Boko Haram's core areas to sophisticated attacks using large

This rapid progression, which came in the wake of a Nigerian operative being involved in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's plot to bomb a Detroit-bound airliner, led to a concern that Boko Haram had the capability and the intent to become the next transnational jihadist franchise capable of threatening the United States and Europe. These fears were further stoked by warnings from the U.S. government in November 2011 that Boko Haram was planning to attack Western hotels in Abuja.

Dynamic Changes

To counter the perceived growing Boko Haram threat, the Nigerian government, aided by



vehicle bombs in the nation's capital skipped several steps in the normal progression of militant operations. The group's progression suggested that it had received outside training or assistance. The sudden increase in operational capacity appeared to have corroborated reports circulating at that time of Boko Haram militants attending training camps run by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

intelligence and training provided by the United States and its European allies, launched a major offensive against the group. Since January, the government has arrested or killed several leaders of Boko Haram, disrupted a number of cells and dismantled numerous bombmaking facilities. In addition to government efforts, there has been a grassroots backlash against Boko Haram, as evidenced by the formation



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of anti-Boko Haram militant group Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, or "Supporters of Muslims in the Lands of Sudan," commonly known as Ansaru.

Boko Haram has lashed out viciously against these countermeasures. From June to August, the group conducted nine suicide bombings, mostly directed against churches and police or military targets in its home territory. Since August, the operational tempo of its suicide bombings has slowed to about one attack a month. Boko Haram operatives have also



conducted a number of armed attacks and non-suicide bombing attacks. Many of these were directed against churches and police or military targets, but several of them were also directed against mosques that denounced Boko Haram. Despite warnings that Boko Haram would target Western hotels in Abuja, the group has not attacked an international target since the U.N. building in August 2011.

Boko Haram activity has remained heavily concentrated in its core areas with occasional operations in Abuja. There have been only two Boko Haram attacks in Abuja in 2012: a large suicide vehicle bombing attack against a newspaper office in April and a small bombing attack against a nightclub in June. It appears that the group's ability to conduct large attacks in Abuja has been constrained by government operations.

Tactically, Boko Haram's attacks in 2012 have focused almost exclusively on soft targets. Even its attacks against military and police targets have been directed against police on

patrol or isolated police stations with little security or have been a target like the church at the military base in Jaji.

So while Boko Haram progressed rapidly in terms of operational ability in 2011, it is still struggling to conduct sustained operations outside its core geographic territory, and it has yet to successfully strike a hardened target. Even the August 2011 attack against the United Nations, while demonstrating some geographic reach and a focus on an international target, was directed against a relatively soft target instead of a harder target

like a government ministry building or a foreign embassy. It is also notable that the group has not conducted an attack in Lagos, Nigeria's most populous city, or in Niger, Chad or Cameroon, which are all closer to the Boko Haram home territories than Lagos.

However, in Nigeria, the use of militant proxies has long been part of the political process. Just as Niger Delta politicians have used groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta for their own purposes,

politicians in Nigeria's northeast have supported and used Boko Haram. In fact, an alleged senior member of the group was arrested at the home of a Nigerian senator in Maiduguri in October 2012, and a previous governor of Borno state is allegedly a sponsor of the group.

This type of political and financial support means that despite the efforts of the central government, the group will not be easily or quickly eradicated. Any serious attempt to curtail the group will require a political solution, which will be highly unlikely during the next two years due to the usefulness of such proxies in the lead-up to Nigerian national elections in early 2015. Therefore, the central government's options will be limited. The best it can hope for is to continue to pursue the group to contain it and limit its reach and lethality.

Certainly, Boko Haram retains the capability to kill people, especially in attacks against vulnerable targets on its home turf. But as long as the



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Nigerian government maintains pressure on the group and as long as the group remains on the defensive, Boko Haram is unlikely to be able to further develop its operational


capabilities and pose an existential threat to the Nigerian government -- let alone become a transnational terrorist threat.

Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram – The Prize in al-Qaeda's Africa Strategy

By Jacob Zenn

Source:http://app.bronto.com/public/?q=preview_message&fn=Link&t=1&ssid=500&id=e59et963ehregpnrpjfi0gg3u2xmf&id2=do8wq27sv2b5d5rkef5c38oqa6cdd&subscriber_id=bhuhzevrvpcumonhxrjjsucxtabkd&messageversion_id=abqghcnywsvqzwdmvzemvnskbvbjd&delivery_id=abfvbymcfiguifkeodipifrqjiiqwbod&tid=3.AfQ.T44Z.CWt5.AQ19LQ..AI3aWg.b..I.AxTj.a.UMdmkA.UMdmkA.K7Sbag

The Occasional Paper, entitled “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The Prize in Al-Qaeda’s Africa Strategy” is now available for purchase on our website. This Occasional Paper examines the evolution



of al-Qaeda’s Africa strategy from its focus on East Africa in the 1990s to the entire African continent by the mid-2000s. It then analyzes al-Qaeda’s efforts to establish a relationship with Boko Haram’s predecessor, the Nigerian Taliban, from 2003 to 2009; the evolution of the Boko Haram threat to Nigeria and its neighbors from 2009 to late 2012; and the extent to which al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which now controls the separatist state in northern Mali called “Azawad” with two allied Islamist militias, has interacted with Boko Haram and other militants in northern Nigeria. The paper argues that al-Qaeda has been interested in expanding its anti-American and transnational militant agenda to Nigeria through local Nigerian militants, but that the Nigerian Taliban largely pursued its own socio-political agenda in Nigeria. As a result, a partnership between al-Qaeda and Nigerian militants was never forged in the 2000s. However,

since the rise of Boko Haram in 2009, which evolved from the Nigerian Taliban, the group’s ideology has become much more anti-American, largely due to a change in leadership from the late Mohammed Yusuf to his former second-in-command Abubakr Shekau. AQIM’s rise in northern Mali, which is only 300 miles from northern Nigeria, will facilitate an al-Qaeda and Boko Haram alliance. As AQIM and Boko Haram’s areas of operations begin to overlap in northern Mali, Niger and northern Nigeria, so will their interests. This will have a significant impact on the stability of Nigeria, U.S. interests in Nigeria, and West African regional security.

Jacob Zenn is an analyst of West African affairs for The Jamestown Foundation and works as a legal advisor specializing in international law and best practices related to the freedom of association. He earned a J.D. from Georgetown Law in 2011, where he was a Global Law Scholar and a graduate degree in International Affairs



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from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Center for Chinese-American Studies in 2007.

U.A.E. Arrests Members of Terror Cell Planning Gulf Attacks

Source: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-26/u-a-e-arrests-terror-cell-planning-gulf-attacks-wam-says.html>

The United Arab Emirates, in coordination with Saudi Arabian officials, said it arrested members of a terror cell that was planning to carry out attacks in the two oil exporting nations and the broader region.

U.A.E. authorities said members of the group had obtained equipment and materials to carry out their attacks, the official WAM news agency said today.



Officials arrested “a cell from the deviant group, comprising citizens from both countries, that was planning on carrying out actions that infringe on the national security of both countries and sisterly nations,” the official news agency said.

Oil rose on concern about security in Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest crude exporter, and the U.A.E., which holds 6 percent of global proven crude reserves. Saudi Arabia intensified a crackdown on al-Qaeda in 2004 after militants struck an oil installation and stormed a housing complex in the city of al-Khobar, killing 22 foreign workers.

“This is something quite new,” Khalid al-Dakhil, a politics professor at King Saud University in Riyadh, said in a phone interview. “The collaboration between Saudi and U.A.E. militants is unusual. Also, the fact that this was going to happen in the U.A.E. -- it isn’t a country where terrorism attacks are usual. Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt are more known for terrorism, not the U.A.E.”

Oil Rises

Saudi Arabia commonly refers to al-Qaeda affiliated militants as being part the so-called deviant group. The suspects will be tried in court, WAM said.

Crude oil for February delivery climbed \$2.13, or 2.4 percent, to \$90.74 a barrel at 9:20 a.m. on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Trading volume for West Texas Intermediate futures contracts was down 42 percent from the 100-day average.

Saudi security forces detained more than 100 terror suspects in March 2010, and some were accused of plotting attacks on energy installations and military sites in the east of the country.

The kingdom’s security forces in August arrested members of a terrorist cell in Riyadh planning to target security forces, residents and public facilities, the Saudi Press Agency reported at the time.

Six Yemeni nationals, with connections to terrorist groups outside the country, were arrested after preparing and testing explosives near the kingdom’s capital, the official Saudi agency said Aug. 26.

‘External Elements’

U.A.E. authorities said in September they have arrested more than 50 Islamists who were conspiring against the state and allegedly had links to “external elements.”

Most of those detained belong to a domestic Islamic group known as al-Islah. Al-Qaeda has no known



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affiliations with local Islamist groups in the Persian Gulf that are politically active. Anwar Gargash, the minister for foreign affairs, said on Aug. 26 that the so-called Arab Spring has emboldened Islamist groups in the region. "The arrest of various Islamist activists in the U.A.E. is not an event to celebrate," Gargash wrote in a column posted on the website of the

Abu Dhabi-based The National newspaper. "The dynamics of the Arab spring have created various challenges in different societies. The political success of Islamic parties in many Arab lands has emboldened their protégés." Some Islamists have attacked the U.A.E. because of its religious tolerance, Gargash said at the time.

'Criminal Minds' approach could help nab terrorists

By Allison Barrie

Source:<http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/12/18/criminal-minds-episodes-could-help-nab-terrorists/?intcmp=features>

The techniques criminologists use to hunt serial killers may help to track terrorists, take

numerous cells or the release of a biological weapon.



control of a biological attack and even manage outbreaks of disease.

More than three decades ago, geographic profiling helped police catch the Yorkshire Ripper, who was jailed in England for murdering 13 women and attempting to murder seven more. After five years terrorizing women, he was apprehended in 1981 and given a life sentence.

Today in the U.S., there are several software programs regularly used by police agencies for geographic profiling, including Rigel, CrimeStat and Dragnet. They identify the most likely "anchor points" of a criminal -- such as their home or girlfriend's apartment -- a technique that could also be applied to locate those points for a terrorist organization with

"What do serial killers have in common with great white sharks, invasive species and malaria-transmitting mosquitoes?"

- Mark Stevenson, a University of London researcher

The same techniques help scientists studying sharks, bees and bats to construct profiles of their movements and foraging patterns. That research could also be useful in counterterrorism.

"What do serial killers have in common with great white sharks, invasive species and malaria-transmitting mosquitoes?" asked Mark Stevenson, a University of London researcher.

"It sounds like the sort of question Sherlock Holmes might ask his faithful companion. The answer to our riddle is relatively simple — dare I say



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elementary? They are all traveling from a central location in some kind of predictable pattern.”

An article to be published in the Society of Biology's magazine *The Biologist* explores the similarities.

“If we can work out the pattern, it is possible to estimate where they live based on where we know they have been.”

Anthrax and armed killers

Take the classic “Criminal Minds” or “CSI” setup: The team is looking at several victims of a serial killer. The map-covered whiteboard is wheeled out. The team marks each victim's locations, visualizes his movements, seeks clues.

These patterns are then used to calculate the most likely point of origin -- the serial killer's home. Research has suggested that this approach is more effective than starting in the center of the murders and searching outward.

A biological attack is the intentional release of a pathogen that have been grown and weaponized for use against humans, plants or animals. But detecting one is difficult, in part because it may go undetected for weeks before symptoms appear.

Once detected, epidemiologists will work to trace the infection back to its source whether it is a person, vector or vehicle, for example.

Now take an outbreak of infectious disease, such as swine flu (H1N1) or West Nile, a threat

to global health. Though researchers have learned a great deal about animal movement patterns over the years, it's not as easy to anticipate the key points of origin -- the breeding sites of virus-bearing mosquitoes.

Geographic profiling may solve the challenge, proving useful in re-evaluating key outbreak case studies. Last year, research published in the *International Journal of Health Geographics* looked at historical infectious disease outbreaks through this new lens.

In that paper, researchers tested the technique against a classic 1854 study of a cholera outbreak in London, looking at the 321 disease sites and the 13 neighborhood water pumps in the city. Geographic profiling correctly identified the Broad Street pump -- the source of the waterborne disease.

When this study reviewed a malaria outbreak in Cairo, the 139 disease locations were taken and then the researchers ranked the 59 water sources in terms of most likely to be driving the malaria. Seven eventually tested positive for the mosquito vector and, using geographic profiling, all top six had been correctly identified.

Time is a critical factor in controlling outbreaks, so looking across disciplines for methods, like this criminology approach, that could usefully transfer to help locate sources only makes good sense.

Ballet dancer turned defense specialist Allison Barrie has traveled around the world covering the military, terrorism, weapons advancements and life on the front line.

Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization

Source: <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20436>

Overview

1. Since its establishment in Lebanon 30 years ago, Hezbollah has, without interruption, carried out or planned a variety of **terrorist attacks** around the globe, using different methods. Those terrorist attacks are part of **Iranian policy**, which uses Hezbollah as its main proxy through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force and other governmental institutions. **The targets and emphases change from time to time according to Iranian and Hezbollah considerations and interests.** The targets include **Israel and the Jewish people, the United States and other Western countries, Hezbollah and Syria's opponents in Lebanon, and Arab regimes hostile to Iran** and the "resistance camp" it leads.
2. In **recent years** Hezbollah has been involved in terrorist (an occasionally guerilla) activities in different arenas using various methods against its targets. At the same time, with Iranian and Syrian support, it has been upgrading its military-terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon, which far surpasses those of other terrorist organizations in the Middle East and beyond.
3. A short summary of Hezbollah's terrorist and guerilla activity and its military buildup follows.



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- 1) In **Lebanon** Iran and Syria have enlarged and upgraded **Hezbollah's military-terrorist infrastructure** since the Second Lebanon War. Its main military asset is an arsenal of an **estimated 60,000 rockets and missiles** which **threaten Israel's civilians**. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, boasted that **he had precise rockets and a bank of targets, and could turn the lives of hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians into a living hell**. Hezbollah also carries out **personal terrorism** against its opponents in Lebanon, mainly senior figures. The objective is to scare and deter Hezbollah's opponents, mainly after the erosion of its status following its support for the Syrian regime.
- 2) In the **international arena**, Hezbollah participates in the global terrorist campaign carried out by the **Iranian Quds Force**, whose **main targets are Israeli diplomats and tourists**. Hezbollah's most recent attack was on **an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria**, considered successful (by Iran and Hezbollah), after a series of failed attacks abroad in previous years.
- 3) In the **Palestinian arena**, Hezbollah helped Iran upgrade the military-terrorist infrastructure of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip after Operation Cast Lead, mainly Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. **On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense the terrorist organizations had many thousands of rockets, among them long-range Fajr-5 rockets manufactured in Iran** (eight of which hit or were intercepted in the greater Tel Aviv area). In addition, Hezbollah encourages terrorist attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. During the Palestinian terrorist campaign known as the second intifada, Iran and Hezbollah provided the Palestinian terrorist organizations with financial and military support and handled terrorist squads in the Palestinian territories.
- 4) **Insidelsrael** Hezbollah carries out intelligence and subversive activities. Hezbollah, with Iranian aid, recently sent an **unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)** to collect intelligence and to send Israel **a deterrent message (UAVs could also be used for offensive purposes)**. Hezbollah also attempts to smuggle IEDs and weapons into for terrorist attacks (exploiting its ties to criminal networks) and to use Israeli Arabs for intelligence missions supporting its terrorist activities.
- 5) **In Syria** Hezbollah is part of the Iranian effort (led by the Quds Force) to prevent the topple of the Syrian regime, the central member of the so-called "resistance camp." Hezbollah provides the Assad regime with guidance, military training, intelligence and weapons, and **hundreds of its operatives are present in Syria**. In recent months several Hezbollah operatives died in the battles and others were taken prisoner by the rebels. However, Hezbollah does not admit to its military involvement in Syria and claimed that its operatives died while "fulfilling their commitment to jihad."
- 6) In the **Arab states** Iran uses Hezbollah for subversion, terrorism and guerilla activities: in **Iraq** Hezbollah operatives trained and handled the Shi'ite militias operated by the Quds Force against the United States and its allies (until America withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011). In **Yemen** Hezbollah helped train the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels; and in **Bahrain** Hezbollah was recently publicly accused by Bahraini authorities of involvement in a series of explosions in the capital city of Manama. Its objective was to destabilize the Bahraini regime, against which Iran is waging a years-long campaign of terrorism and subversion. Hezbollah does not admit to involvement in terrorism and subversion in Arab countries.

The Structure of This Study

4. This study is the **second part** of comprehensive research into the terrorist and subversive activities Iran carries out around the globe directly, and though its main proxy, Hezbollah. **The first part**, which can be accessed on the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center website,^[1] deals with the **Quds Force** as spearheading Iran's global terrorism and subversion campaign during the last decade. Two additional parts, which will be issued in the future, will deal with **the distribution** (according to continent and country) **of Iran's global terrorist activity** and **an analysis of the methods used by Iranian and terrorism and subversion**.
5. The three appendices of this study provide a **chronological analysis of Hezbollah's most glaring terrorist activities in the 30 years since its founding, integral to Iran's overall policies.**^[2] In addition to terrorist attacks on civilians, Hezbollah has engaged in guerilla warfare in **Lebanon** and **Iraq**, against the IDF and against the United States and other Western armies. The targets have changed from time to time depending on Iranian policy, the constraints Hezbollah has had to deal with in Lebanon and the changing regional and international strategic circumstances during Hezbollah's 30 years of terrorist activity.



6. This study includes the following sections:

- 1) Hezbollah's place in the current global terrorist campaign against Israel.
- 2) Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime in Syria – update.
- 3) Summary of Hezbollah's record as a terrorist organization during the 30 years of its existence (1982-2012).
- 4) The issue of Hezbollah as a designated terrorist organization.
- 5) Three appendices dealing with the chronological distribution of Hezbollah's terrorist activities:

1) Appendix I: Hezbollah's terrorist activity, 2000-2012**A. Overview****B. The Lebanese arena**

- i) Building Hezbollah's rocket arsenal after the IDF left south Lebanon (2000-2006).
- ii) Using the rocket arsenal to attack civilian targets in Israel during the Second Lebanon War.
- iii) Updating the rocket arsenal after the Second Lebanon War (2006-2012)
- iv) Employing terrorism and violence against Hezbollah's political opposition in Lebanon.

C. The Israeli arena

- i) Overview.
- ii) Sending a UAV into Israeli airspace.
- iii) Using Israeli Arabs to collect intelligence.
- iv) Using drug dealers to smuggle explosive devices into Israel territory.

D. The Palestinian arena

- i) Iranian and Hezbollah (as a subcontractor) support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip (2006-2012).
- ii) Iranian and Hezbollah encouragement for Palestinian terrorism during the second intifada (2000-2005).
- iii) Hezbollah's involvement in smuggling weapons from Iran for the Palestinian terrorist organizations during the second intifada.

E. The global arena

- i) Hezbollah participation in the global wave of anti-Israel terrorism (2008-2012).
- ii) Exposure of a Hezbollah network in Egypt which planned to carry out terrorist attacks (2008)

F. The Iraqi arena

- i) The Quds Force's use of Hezbollah to support the Shi'ite militias against the United States and its allies (2006-2011)
- ii) The affair of Ali Musa Daqduq

2) Appendix II: Hezbollah's terrorist activities during the 1990s**A. Overview****B. The global arena**

- i) Hezbollah's terrorist attacks in Argentina (1992, 1994).
- ii) The failure of the attempted bombing of the Israeli embassy in Thailand (1994)

C. The Israeli arena

- i) Terrorist attacks in Israel as well as in Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria carried out through Europe.
- ii) Terrorism and drugs: the abduction of Elhahan Tannenbaum (2000)

3) Appendix III: Hezbollah's terrorist activities during the 1980s**A. Overview****B. The Lebanese arena**

- i) Bombing the American embassy and American and French military barracks in Beirut(1983).



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- ii) Severe blow to the Lebanese branch of the CIA.
- iii) Abduction of Western nationals.
- iv) Assassination of Western and Jewish figures.
- v) Epilogue

C. The international arena

- i) Attacks on the American and French diplomatic missions in Kuwait (1983).
- ii) Attempted assassination of the Kuwaiti emir (1985)
- iii) Hijacking planes
 - a) TWA (1985)
 - b) Kuwaiti airplanes (1984, 1988)
 - c) Air France (1987)
 - d) Air Afrique (1987)
- iv) Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the wave of killings in Paris (1986-1987)
- v) Prevention of terrorist activity in Germany (1987, 1989)
- vi) Hezbollah network exposed in Spain (1989)

Hezbollah's Role in the Current Global Terrorist Campaign against Israel

7. For the past four years Hezbollah has participated actively in **Iran's global terrorist campaign against Israel**. The recent attack on an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and their local bus driver, was the first "successful" attack in the current terrorist campaign, after a series of attempted attacks were foiled. In the terrorist campaign conducted abroad, **Hezbollah serves as an Iranian proxy handled by the Qods Force**, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRG), which spearheads Iran's foreign terrorism.^[3] Even before the founding of the Qods Force, in the summer of 1982 the IRG established Hezbollah in Lebanon, and has provided it with massive military and financial support in the 30 years since.

8. Hezbollah's current **targets** for terrorist attacks are primarily **Israeli diplomatic missions abroad and groups of Israelis on vacation throughout the Mediterranean basin** and other tourist destinations. Some of the attacks and attempted attacks were carried out by Hezbollah, directed and supported by the Qods Force (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Azerbaijan and Turkey) and some were carried out by the Qods Force without Hezbollah involvement (Azerbaijan, India, Georgia, Thailand and Kenya).

9. The terrorist campaign, from the Iranian perspective, is a Iranian response to the "soft war"^[4] being waged against Iran and the "resistance camp," and is also intended to **strengthen Iran's strategic bargaining capabilities** and show the United States, the West and Israel that **it can harm their interests around the globe**. As far as Iran and Hezbollah are concerned, the terrorist campaign is also a way of getting revenge for the death of senior Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh and the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists (for both of which Iran and Hezbollah blame Israel), thus **deterring Israel from taking other actions, especially in its war against terrorism and the Iranian nuclear program**.^[5]

10. During the past four years (2008-2012) **Hezbollah attempted to carry out six terrorist attacks, some of them in Mediterranean countries popular with Israeli tourists**. One proceeded according to Hezbollah's plans and the others were either prevented or failed. In our assessment, they were carried out by **Hezbollah's foreign operations unit** (See below). The attacks were the following:

1) **Blowing up an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria** (July 18, 2012): An IED weighing about 3 kilos, or about 6.6 lbs, blew up the back of a tourist bus about to take Israeli tourists from the airport to their hotel in the Black Sea resort of Burgas. According to the Bulgarian minister of the interior, the IED had been **assembled in Bulgaria**. The terrorist attack was carried out by a **Hezbollah operative** who, according to information from the Bulgarian authorities, had a local supporter who has not yet been detained. The terrorist was killed by a technical fault which caused the IED to explode prematurely. **The blast killed five Israeli tourists, the Bulgarian bus driver and the terrorist. In addition, 36 Israeli civilians were wounded, three of them seriously.**

2) **Attack targeting Israeli tourists in Cyprus, prevented** (July 7, 2012): The local authorities in Limassol detained a **24-year old Lebanese Hezbollah operative** who was collecting information about Israeli tourists arriving on the island by air; he was carrying a Swedish passport (the Hezbollah terrorist operative involved in the attack in



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Thailand also carried a Swedish passport; see below). In our assessment, he was collecting information in preparation for **an attack on Israeli tourists visiting the island**, possibly the same sort of attack carried out in Bulgaria.

3) **A terrorist attack on Israelis at a tourist center in Bangkok, Thailand** (middle of January, 2012): Hezbollah, instructed by the Qods Force, **attempted to attack sites visited by Israelis using IEDs**. A Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist operative named **Hussein Atris**, carrying a **Swedish and Lebanese passports**, was detained at the Bangkok airport.^[6] Another Hezbollah operative, also carrying a Swedish passport, managed to escape. Hussein Atris' interrogation led the police to a commercial building in Bangkok where they found **a large quantity of chemicals** used in the manufacture of explosives (about 4,400 kilograms, or 4.85 tons, of nitrogen and about 40 liters, or 10.5 gallons, of ammonium nitrate). In our assessment, the presence of such a large stock of potentially dangerous chemicals indicates **the existence of a long-standing, well-established Hezbollah network in Thailand**. A month later, on February 14, 2012, the Qods Force attempted another attack in Bangkok, this time using a magnet to attach an IED to the car of an Israeli diplomat. **The attempt, like the Qods Force attacks in India and Georgia in the former Soviet Union, was prevented by the local authorities.**

4) On January 5, 2012, the Israeli media reported that **Hezbollah was planning to carry out terrorist attacks on Israeli tourists** in Europe, **especially Bulgaria**. The Bulgarian news agencies also reported concerns about attacks on Israeli and/or Jewish targets in **Bulgaria or Greece**. On January 8 the Israeli media reported that a suspicious object had been found on a bus that entered Bulgaria from Turkey and was going to be **used to transport Israeli tourists**.

5) **An unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Israeli consul in Istanbul using an IED** (May 26, 2011): The blast injured eight Turkish citizens. In July 2011 the Italian Corriere della Sera reported that **three Hezbollah operatives from Beirut had often followed the Israeli consul from his home to the consulate**. According to Sky News (April 2012), **the Qods Force's Unit 400**, responsible for attacks beyond the borders of Iran, was behind the attack. The attack was preceded, in 2009, by a joint Iran-Hezbollah attack on an Israeli target, and in 2010 by an Iranian attempt to attack an Israeli target, indicating **Turkey as a favored location** for Iran and Hezbollah's terrorist campaign.

6) **An attempted attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan** (May 2008): The attack was carried out by Hezbollah, in our assessment with support from the Qods Force. The terrorist cell was composed of two Hezbollah operatives, **Ali Karaki, from Hezbollah's foreign operations unit, and Ali Najem al-Din**, an explosives expert. The two underwent training in **Iran** before they were sent to Baku. They carried **Iranian passports**, and the Iranians also furnished them with a **translator**. Preparations for the attack, which had almost reached the final stage, were exposed when the Azeri security forces stopped a car carrying the two Hezbollah operatives. In the car they found **guns with silencers, explosives, cameras, binoculars and pictures of the Israeli embassy**. The two Hezbollah operatives were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years in prison (October 2009). During the first half of 2012 an **attempted Qods Force assassination of two prominent Jewish figures in Baku** was prevented. The attack was planned to be carried out during the Eurovision, without Hezbollah participation.

11. It is therefore evident that in recent years Hezbollah has been a close partner in Iran's global terrorist campaign, accelerating since May 2011. **The campaign directly threatens all tourism, but its main targets are groups of Israeli tourists and Israel's diplomatic representatives around the globe.** In our assessment, it reflects Iran and Hezbollah's readiness to expose themselves to risks, even at the price of a possible escalation with Israel.

Al-Qaeda's Response to the Arab Spring

By Donald Holbrook

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/228/html>



Abstract

The Arab revolutions, often referred to collectively as the 'Arab Spring', posed, and continue to present, a considerable challenge for Al-Qaeda. This article assesses how Al-Qaeda's senior leadership, as well as affiliates and associates, have responded to the Arab Spring, by analysing media material and public communiqués issued in the aftermath of the uprisings. The first section discusses the impact of the Arab Spring on Al-Qaeda. The second section explores the Al-Qaeda core leadership response to the revolutions, especially the ways in which Ayman Al-Zawahiri has chosen to frame the events. The third section examines the way Al-Qaeda's affiliates and associates have responded to the revolutions, including contributions to the English-language Inspire magazine. Overall, The article describes how Al-Qaeda has sought to interpret the events in its favour and how it hopes to exploit the current turmoil in the wake of the Arab revolutions.

The Arab Spring and Al-Qaeda

On 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor from Sidi Bouzid, a city in central Tunisia, set himself alight to protest against police brutality and the widespread corruption that prevailed under the presidency of Zine El Abidine. Ben Ali. Bouazizi's self-immolation initially triggered local protests that quickly turned to national upheaval against decades of misrule, abuses of power and corruption. This uprising inspired scores of protesters elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East to rise up against their authoritarian rulers.

These seminal events are often referred to as the 'Arab Spring'. To date, they have resulted in the overthrow of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Yemeni and Libyan regimes. A bloody civil war has broken out in Syria as the Assad regime struggles to quell a rebel uprising, whilst further protests continue to take place elsewhere in the region. Meanwhile, the post-revolution countries are undergoing a volatile period of transition from the old system.

The Arab Spring appears in many ways to be bad news for Al-Qaeda. The foundational core of the group consists of Arab Islamist extremists, many of whom had dedicated most of their adult lives to fighting against the secular 'tyrants' of the Middle East and North Africa. Yet, as many observers have noted, the events did not unfold as Al-Qaeda had envisaged and appeared to undermine core tenets of the Al-Qaeda doctrine. Five key points seem particularly significant.

Firstly, the regimes fell without Al-Qaeda playing its envisaged leadership role for the *ummah*. The groups of youths that took to the streets in Tunisia and Egypt did not do so in response to any initiative from Al-Qaeda. The anti-Gaddafi rebels, moreover, were not fighting an Al-Qaeda-inspired jihad, and even accepted help from Al-Qaeda's arch rivals in the North Atlantic Alliance. [1] "A core

argument of Al-Qaeda", James Forest argued, "has been that corrupt, Western-backed regimes can only be changed through the use of terrorist attacks to mobilize the *ummah*. But in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, change has taken place without any meaningful involvement whatsoever by Al-Qaeda." [2]

Second, the chosen form of activism – including popular mass uprisings that were largely peaceful in Egypt and Tunisia and a NATO-supported armed revolt in Libya – clearly contradicted Al-Qaeda's assertion that violent jihad led by a righteous vanguard was the only appropriate method for change. "That change has finally come to Egypt and Tunisia [...]", Alex Wilner noted, "as a result of popular and generally peaceful movements is an embarrassment to Al-Qaeda, whose entire script has been predicated on the idea that violent overthrow is the only way forward." [3]

Third, as Wilner, N. Lahoud and others have noted, the removal of the secular dictatorships left a large gap in the rhetoric of the Al-Qaeda leadership, which has relied on the unpopularity of these regimes to promote alternative forms of governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law. With the Arab Spring, therefore, Al-Qaeda lost a powerful component of its rallying call to disenfranchised Arab publics. [4].

Fourth, some argued Al-Qaeda, particularly its central leadership, had been slow in reacting publicly to such seminal events affecting the core of its potential 'constituents.' Weeks passed from the initial Tunisian uprising, and even after the protests spread further, before the Al-Qaeda leadership addressed those living in the region through statements distributed online [5]. The rapidity with which images, footage and accounts from the unfolding events surrounding the Arab Spring were distributed via social networks and online forums



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appeared to accentuate Al-Qaeda's slow response.

Fifth, the ideas that appeared to drive many of the activists at the heart of the Arab Spring, and the essence of subsequent political developments following successful revolutions, contradicted the fundamental values of the Al-Qaeda doctrine. This relates in particular to the importance of democratic self-determination and symbols of nationalism that have been the focus of attention in academic and journalistic discourse concerning the events. These are anathema to the Al-Qaeda leadership. [6]

However, despite all these challenges that seem to expose the weakness and marginalisation of Al-Qaeda, the Arab uprisings presented opportunities that some elements of Al-Qaeda may be able to exploit.

Many commentators have observed that great upheaval is inevitably followed by great disappointment and disillusionment. Juan Zarate, for instance, has warned:

The chaos and disappointment that follow revolutions will inevitably provide many opportunities for Al-Qaeda to spread its influence. Demographic pressures, economic woes and corruption will continue to bedevil even the best-run governments in the region. Divisions will beset the protest movements, and vestiges of the old regimes may re-emerge. [7]

"The greater the level of post-revolution optimism is among Arabs and Muslims," Wilner observes, "the greater the risk of exceptionally high levels of disillusionment, resentment, and anger if and when things go sour on the ground." [8]

The current turmoil may, in some regions, develop into more prolonged ethnic or civil strife and violent clashes between opposing forces seeking to fill the vacuum left by the toppled dictators. This is something Al-Qaeda could exploit rhetorically, as well as more directly, through affiliates. Indeed, the removal of dictators and their apparatuses of control and subjugation, has also ushered in a period of lawlessness in some parts, which makes trafficking arms and moving fighters easier. [9] Recently, for example, the director of the British Security Service warned that as a result of the disorder, parts of the Middle East and North Africa might "once more become a permissive environment for Al-Qaeda." [10]

Of particular concern, at the moment, is the increasingly bloody civil war in Syria, where

militant Islamists are playing some role in the fighting. Proportionately, the number of jihadi fighters and Al-Qaeda sympathizers in Syria appears to be very small. Yet, a recent article in the *New York Times* warned that "Syrians involved in the armed struggle say it is becoming more radicalized: home-grown Muslim jihadists, as well as small groups of fighters from Al Qaeda, are taking a more prominent role and demanding a say in running the resistance." Islamist extremist web forums now frequently distribute images showing armed '*mujahideen*' taking part in fighting in Aleppo and elsewhere, displaying the black 'Prophet's banner', which has been used by Al-Qaeda in Iraq. [11] Some, of course, may use the label without being sympathetic towards the jihadi cause. For others, however, "jihad has become a distinctive rallying cry." [12] A particularly prominent jihadi group to emerge out of the current turmoil in Syria is *Jabhat An-Nusra*, which has been active in key areas of the conflict and particularly prolific in disseminating communiqués. These messages, in turn, have been translated into several languages, including Russian and English, in what could be seen as an attempt to recruit 'foreign fighters' from abroad. [13].

Aside from the on-going war in Syria, moreover, Islamist militants are increasingly prominent in other domestic conflicts, especially in northern Mali. Series of attacks have taken place in the Sinai on the Egyptian-Israeli border, which authorities have blamed on 'jihadists'. [14] Meanwhile, clashes with Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militants continue in Yemen, especially in the Abyan Governorate, where in August 2012 a suicide bomber killed 45 members of a tribe loyal to the regime. [15] Not all of these militants will be Al-Qaeda loyalists, of course, but it would be wrong to suggest the Arab Spring has ushered in the demise of Islamist-inspired violent extremism in the region.

The Arab revolutions, therefore, presented Al-Qaeda with significant problems but also potential opportunities. This article will explore the nature of Al-Qaeda's response to these events through analysing media communiqués distributed online. The focus is on material available in English, including most of Ayman Al-Zawahiri's output dedicated to the topic, much of which has been translated by Al-Qaeda activists and sympathisers themselves. The



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analysis is divided into two sections: the first explores the nature of the core leadership's response (this relates primarily to Zawahiri's statements on the matter) and the second discusses some additional media efforts by Al-Qaeda's affiliates and sympathisers.

The Core Leadership's Media Response

The core leadership of Al-Qaeda always valued the importance of engaging with the media or disseminating indigenous media output. In the post-9/11 period, this activity has become a central preoccupation of (what is left of) this core group. This review of the leadership's media response to the Arab Spring focuses in particular on the timing and nature of statements addressing these developments, but also on their content. In terms of the latter, emphasis is placed on exploring the way in which the Al-Qaeda leaders (primarily Zawahiri) presented the Arab revolutions to their audiences in the Middle East and elsewhere. In this regard, four major features emerged. First, Muslims were urged to see the revolutions as merely the first step in an on-going struggle for greater social justice. Second, the leaders purported to have a clear understanding of what the Arab publics genuinely wanted. Third, the masses were warned of the dangers that lay ahead if they strayed off the path prescribed by Al-Qaeda. Fourth, the messages reiterated Al-Qaeda's vision for the future as an alternative to whatever other forces might tempt or influence the Arab masses.

The Nature of the Al-Qaeda Leadership's Media Response

As noted above, the Al-Qaeda leadership's response to the initial events of the Arab Spring has been described as surprisingly slow. Although the Al-Qaeda leadership never came close to matching the almost instantaneous flow of information from the grassroots protests, As-Sahab, Al-Qaeda's chief media network, did publish a message from Ayman Al-Zawahiri less than a month after the Egyptian uprising began, which formed part of his on-going series of statements to the participants of the Arab revolutions. This series, which the Global Islamic Media Front translated as 'A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to Our Fellow Muslims in Egypt' (even though Zawahiri does not only address Egyptians) reached its tenth instalment in July

2012 and constitutes, what Lahoud called, "the most comprehensive response to the events in the Middle East by a leading jihadist figure." [16] Leaders of Al-Qaeda affiliates and other Al-Qaeda leaders, such as Abu Yahya Al-Liby, also eventually responded to the revolutions, addressing Arab publics in specific geographic locations.

Perhaps aware of the criticism concerning the time it took the Al-Qaeda leadership to address the Arab masses, Zawahiri – in the fifth instalment of his 'Hope and Glad Tidings' series – struck an unusually humble tone in his appeal to Muslims in the region, asking them to be patient and appreciate the pressures the Al-Qaeda leadership was under from America and its allies:

My Muslim brothers, I ask your permission today to continue my talk, which might be long, because the events are occurring and changing rapidly, and I hope that our Muslim brothers realize that our speeches might be delayed a little or have longer intervals between them because of the fierce war in which the Mujahideen are clashing with the Americans. [17]

Overall, therefore, the delay in Al-Qaeda's response to the Arab Spring does not appear to be particularly problematic, especially when justified in light of the on-going struggle against America. When compared to the Al-Qaeda leadership's response to other seminal events affecting the *ummah*, its reaction to the Arab revolutions appears relatively quick. For example, the leadership's initial response to the publication of the Muhammad caricatures, which sparked widespread protests throughout the Muslim world, came six months after the cartoons were originally published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in September 2005 and three months after they were printed elsewhere, by which time the issue had become well known. Eventually, the Al-Qaeda leadership called for economic boycott of goods from Denmark and elsewhere, long after such initiatives had already been launched by others. [18]

The Revolutions are Only the First Step

Osama Bin Laden had issued only one public communiqué concerning the Arab Spring, before he was killed in Pakistan on 2 May 2011. His message, apparently written in April that year, was repackaged and published three



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weeks after his death. In the statement, Bin Laden congratulated those who had participated in the uprisings on their achievement, but warned them to “beware of dialogue”. The revolutions were merely an “opportunity for advancing the Ummah and becoming liberated from serving the whims of the rulers, manmade laws, and Western domination”. “The revolution was not one of food and clothing”, bin Laden argued, “but one of dignity and defiance, a revolution of sacrifice and giving”. Failure to grasp this opportunity and “establish justice and faith” after the revolution would be a great sin. [19]

Zawahiri has sought to frame the revolutions in the same way. He has emphasized that the work is far from complete. The *ummah* may have managed to topple the unjust rulers, but it must now ensure that a proper form of governance takes their place. Otherwise, everything will be lost. “The Egyptian people’s revolution succeeded in removing the tyrant”, Zawahiri remarked, “and then what? And this is the dangerous question and the big challenge”. [20] In a more recent instalment of the ‘Hope and Glad Tidings Series’, Zawahiri appealed to Egyptian Muslims:

My Muslim brothers in Egypt, a corrupt ruler has been overthrown, but the corrupt governance is still ruling. The desired goal is not to come to power either with a free, strong government or a limited, weak one, but the aim is to rule by Islam. And wasting efforts by coming to power without ruling by Islam is disaster, but the greatest disaster is coming to power and then ruling by anything except Islam. [21]

So far, therefore, Egyptians had achieved only “partial gains” but risked “losing the basics.” [22] The same applied to the other “noble and freeborn Muslims”. They “must not suffice with merely removing the tyrant whose removal is an obligation, but rather they must continue their Jihad and struggle until an Islamic government is established which guarantees justice, freedom, and independence.” [23] At this crucial juncture for the *ummah*, therefore, Zawahiri has made the case that further guidance is needed – which Al-Qaeda will provide – in order to steer the Muslim publics in the right direction.

What Prompted the Events according to Al-Qaeda?

Furthermore, like bin Laden, Zawahiri identified a set of grievances and prompters that he insists motivated those who took to the streets. Unsurprisingly, the issues mentioned reflect the core values of Al-Qaeda. “The hopes of the Muslim ummah”, Zawahiri argued, were to establish an Islamic state that would liberate Palestine, “guard morality” and end corruption. [24] Zawahiri further insisted “the removal of the Israeli embassy is the main goal in the Egyptian revolution” [25] and that:

The popular Arab uprisings proved to have an Islamic orientation in its greater part, and they rose up and raged against America’s agents who wasted their lives in suppressing the Islamic orientation of their people under the guidance, support, and planning of America and those who have turned their countries into stations of torture, detention, and persecution within the Zionist-Crusader system. [26]

Whatever the facts on the ground, therefore, the Al-Qaeda leadership has identified a set of issues it argues contributed to the Arab revolutions that thus constitute the benchmarks of its success. An important component of this narrative is a complete rejection of alternative forms of governance and society to the version espoused by the Al-Qaeda leadership. As Nelly Lahoud noted in her analysis of the first five ‘Hope and Glad Tidings’ statements, there is a particular focus on the ills of democratic rule and secular governance. [27] References to the fallacy of democracy are, of course, an ever-present feature in the discourse of the Al-Qaeda leadership. These allusions, however, became particularly acute in the aftermath of the initial Arab uprisings.

Warnings of the Dangers that Lie Ahead

Zawahiri’s warnings against democracy, moreover, appear to have evolved in his statements regarding the Arab Spring. Initially, he appeared to seek to nip any grassroots enthusiasm for democracy in the bud. Zawahiri then took to condemning some of the election results following successful revolutions and the course the new government appeared to be taking.

Although the Al-Qaeda leaders always voiced their animosity against democracy, the issue became particularly prominent in the leadership statements at the dawn of the Arab revolutions. Arabs were warned democracy was necessarily a *secular* form of governance [28] that



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“worships one idol, which is the wishes of the majority, without abiding by any religion, standards or ethics”. [29] Any concessions towards a democratic form of government or consultation in this regard were also directly tied to the sacrificing of Islamic cultural prescriptions and proliferation of vice and degradation. “It is inconceivable for a fair and above board state to be established in Egypt”, Zawahiri argued, “and yet accept the continuation of the use of impermissible wealth to freely trade the dignity and honour of Egyptians and turn Muslim and Arab Egypt to dissolute satellite channels, night clubs, gambling casinos, and nude beaches”. [30] After all, “the truth about democracy [is that] it allows everything regardless of it being degrading or contradictory, as long as the majority agrees with it.” [31]

In more recent communiqués, after successful elections, particularly in Tunisia, Zawahiri has reiterated his warnings against democracy and expressed his dissatisfaction with the results. The victory of *Ennahda* in Tunisia, appears to be of particular concern. Zawahiri condemned the mildly Islamist party as a “symptom of a modern day disease”, accusing its leaders of “inventing” a version of Islam that would please the US Department of State, the European Union and the Gulf elite. This was “an Islam according to demand” which would allow “gambling, nude beaches, usurious banks, secular laws, and submission to international legitimacy”. It was an Islam “without jihad”. [32] In the message, entitled ‘Oh People of Tunisia, Support Your Sharia’, Zawahiri expressed his dismay over seeing “the leadership of a group that relates itself to Islam and then says it does not advocate ruling by it”. [33]

Zawahiri’s response to *Ennahda*’s victory in Tunisia may, perhaps, be indicative of how he plans to approach further consolidation of power by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, whose leadership he once accused of having “abandoned pursuing legitimate Muslim government in place of the current [secular] governments”. [34]

As well as delivering warnings of the ‘dangers’ Islam supposedly faces in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, Zawahiri placed emphasis in his communiqués concerning these developments on elucidating the pious alternatives he felt the *ummah* should embrace. These conveyed the same bedrock principles the Al-Qaeda leaders have

communicated in the past, but perhaps with a greater sense of urgency.

Al-Qaeda’s Agenda for Change

“Be extremely cautious,” Zawahiri warned, “that your sacrifices are not stolen, that your suffering is not used by others, and that outer appearances change, but injustice and servitude continues to exist.” [35] Egyptians, in particular, would have to “restore to Egypt its leading role” as a “fortress of Islam”, [36] lest all their efforts be for nothing. There were internal and external challenges, Zawahiri argued, that the *ummah* would have to address in order to ensure the uprisings ultimately brought positive benefits. Internally, there would have to be “legislative and judicial reforms,” [37] with the Egyptian constitution for example being amended with the clause: “Islamic Shariah is the sole source of legislation, and all the articles of the constitution and the law which opposed it are null and void.” [38] The amendments would also ensure only men could become heads of state. Furthermore, these legislative reforms would rid the region of what Zawahiri saw as a sinful society that permitted the production of alcohol and the running of nightclubs. [39] To respond to external challenges, Muslims were urged to embark upon a jihad against Israel and support the *mujahideen* fighting elsewhere in order to “free every inch of Palestine” and all the other Muslim lands. [40]

By citing these ‘external challenges’, Zawahiri sought to establish a connection between the localized Arab uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa with wider efforts involving Islamist insurgencies elsewhere and ultimately the United States and Western alliance. The Arab Spring, according to this interpretation, thus formed part of the global jihad being led by Al-Qaeda. In his message confirming the death of bin Laden, Zawahiri announced:

We confirm to all the Muslim people that we are their soldiers, and we will not spare any effort, Allah willing, to liberate them from the occupiers in Kashmir, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and Palestine. And we support their blessed uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. We are fighting a single battle with them against America and its servants. [41]

Seemingly conscious of the general consensus that the Arab Spring did not conform to Al-Qaeda’s agenda,



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Zawahiri emphasized in his forth message of 'Hope and Glad Tidings' that "your brother Mujahideen are with you [the participants of the Arab uprisings], confronting the same enemy." [42] During the revolutions, Zawahiri felt compelled to remind Muslims that the *mujahideen* were part of the *ummah* and "were not alienated from its suffering." [43] In a more recent instalment of 'Hope and Glad Tidings', Zawahiri even seemed to revisit the notion that Al-Qaeda was indeed the *ummah's* pioneering vanguard, despite its absence during the Arab Spring: "Your sons, the mujahideen, are paving the way for the heralded change with their blessed strikes against the Global Crusader Alliance that has started to stagger due to their impact." [44]

The internal and external challenges that Zawahiri mentioned, therefore, could only be met if the *ummah*, under the leadership of Al-Qaeda and the *mujahideen*, continued to fight "until we see the land of Islam all freed from the outer invasion and inner corruption, and united under the shadow [of] one Khilafa." [caliphate] [45] Focusing on Egypt, Zawahiri mentioned particular 'milestones' that needed to be fulfilled on the path towards holistic reform. These involved, first, the establishment of "shari'ah governance" since rule by shari'ah was key to "reforming politics, society and the economy". Second, Egyptians needed "freedom from foreign domination" and particularly from US and Western political and military subordination, to repudiate the peace treaty with Israel and help Palestinians by establishing "official offices in Egypt for all the jihadi movements whose activities are directed against Israel". Third, Egyptians needed to solve the "problem of poverty and social injustice", eliminate pay discrepancy and respect minimum wage. [46]

How could Al-Qaeda's supporters fight to see through these changes? Zawahiri, of course, used his 'Arab Spring' messages to reiterate the perceived importance and efficacy of Islamist militancy and terrorism in neutralizing enemies and disrupting the status quo. In addition, however, he urged further street gatherings and popular protests in order to confront obstacles to change.

Thus, Zawahiri urged Tunisians to take to the streets once more: "rise up to support your Shariah. Incite your people on a popular uprising to support the Shariah and affirm Islam and rule with the Qur'an". [47] Dissatisfied with

Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi, Ali Abdullah Saleh's former vice president, taking over as president of Yemen, Zawahiri appealed to Yemenis: "Oh, free Yemeni people and its honourable youth: there must be a popular, rising, aware, continuous movement against corruption which remains ruling." [48] Others, meanwhile, were urged to follow the example of the Arab revolutionaries and rise up against the government in a popular protest. Zawahiri appealed to Pakistanis, asking them to "rise up as did your brothers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Shake off the dust of humiliation, and cast off those who sold you in the slave market to America". [49] The people of Saudi Arabia were criticized for "not moving" in the wake of the Arab uprisings and asked: "why don't you follow the example of your brothers in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Ash-Sham?" [Syria] [50]

What is interesting here is Zawahiri's clear endorsement of popular uprising rather than an exclusive focus on armed jihadi groups as a force for change. Indeed, in the past, Zawahiri had dismissed popular protests as being useless.

In his 2006 statement "Realities of Conflict Between Islam and Unbelievers", for instance, Zawahiri insisted the only way to topple the ruling hierarchy would be violent jihad, anything less would be like "treating cancer with aspirin." [51] Addressing the situation in Egypt specifically, Zawahiri argued in a book he published in 2008 that there could be no peaceful solution to the problems of Egypt, especially after the authorities banned public protests after demonstrations by the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo in February 2007. Instead, Muslims would have to focus on carefully planned attacks, seek funding and weapons in order to orchestrate coordinated strikes and prepare martyrdom operations. Mere public protests were useless. [52] In a 2009 message to Palestinians, Zawahiri warned that "protests do no good in the face of bombs," Muslims must therefore take more "effective steps". [53] Revisiting the situation in Egypt that same year, Zawahiri insisted, "the system in Egypt and in most of the Arabic and Islamic countries cannot be removed except by force." [54]

Thus there exists a sharp contrast between Zawahiri's support for public protest in his most recent messages and his prior rhetoric where he dismissed such methods as futile. This



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inconsistency could seriously undermine the impact of this message from the Al-Qaeda leadership. Indeed, as James Forest discussed, efforts have already been made to compare the events during the Arab Spring with Zawahiri's denunciation of street protests. The Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, situated within the US Department of State, for instance, produced a video, which it posted on YouTube, showing footage of Egyptian protesters celebrating Mubarak's resignation which was edited together with excerpts from one of Zawahiri's addresses where he stated "there is no hope to remove the corrupt regimes in Muslim countries except by force" and that no examples could be cited to prove him wrong. [55]

Interestingly, the wider network of Al-Qaeda sympathizers appears to have been engaging in its own damage control efforts in order to represent Al-Qaeda's stance as having always been supportive of public uprising and protests and presenting Al-Qaeda as a noble and righteous defensive vanguard protecting the interests of the Muslim *ummah*. These affiliates and media outlets have effectively been trying to catch up with events whilst presenting the way in which they unfolded as conforming to Al-Qaeda's worldview and agenda.

The next section discusses some of the efforts made by Al-Qaeda affiliates, associates and sympathizers to respond to the Arab Spring.

Damage Control: Broader Media Efforts by Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates

One prominent example of these efforts by the wider community of Al-Qaeda loyalists is the fifth issue of Al-Malahem's *Inspire* magazine, which became available in spring 2011. The issue is largely dedicated to the Arab Spring, but also to efforts designed to dispel some of the criticism and 'counter-narratives' against Al-Qaeda that emerged after the Arab uprisings. [56]

For instance, the 'Letter from the Editor' by 'Yahya Ibrahim' sought to counter notions that "the revolts are bad for al Qaeda". "This is not the case," the editor insisted. "Why would the freedoms being granted to the people be bad for al Qaeda? If freedom is so bad for al Qaeda," he asked, "how come the West has been practicing a restriction on the freedoms of expression when it comes to the message of the mujahidin?" Responding to accusations Al-

Qaeda had previously dismissed the efficacy of public protests and the ability of the Arab public to force through change peacefully, the letter argued: "Another line that is being pushed by Western leaders is that because the protests in Egypt and Tunisia were peaceful, they proved al Qaeda – which calls for armed struggle – to be wrong. That is another fallacy." Al-Qaeda is "not against regime changes through protests but it is against the idea that change should be only through peaceful means to the exclusion of force", the editor argued. To support his case, he cited both the conflict that ensued in Libya (ignoring the support rebels received from NATO) and Zawahiri's support for "the protests that swept Egypt back in 2007" where the latter "alluded to the fact that even if the protests were peaceful, the people need to prepare themselves militarily." [57]

As if in an attempt to rewrite its own history, perhaps hoping not many remembered Zawahiri's prior denunciation of public protests as a method for regime change, *Inspire* republished an excerpt from one of his communiqués from 2007 (entitled 'The Advice of One Concerned' at the time) under the heading 'The Short & Long-term Plans after Protests'. In the statement, Zawahiri urged Egyptians to "rise up and demonstrate" against police brutality and unlawful arrests, suggesting people could "besiege the police station" in question or "take to the streets in mass protests" to force the government to give in. [58]

Although clearly endorsing public protests, the context for Zawahiri was an immediate grassroots response to a specific grievance, not regime change. For the latter, even in this statement, Zawahiri still called for groups to attack "Crusader-Jewish interests", asking – in the long term – for greater public support for the "Islamic mujahid movement", lead by Al-Qaeda, as a force for change. [59] The inclusion of this statement thus appears to be part of an effort by the editors of *Inspire* to gloss over Zawahiri's unequivocal dismissal of public protests as a force for fundamental change and removal of regimes.

Other contributions to the 'special' section on the Arab Spring in the fifth issue of *Inspire* reiterated the point made by Zawahiri in his 'Hope and Glad Tidings' messages, insisting Arabs had only completed the first stage of a long process towards holistic reform. The essential



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next step would be to sever links with the West and Israel, counter their influence through force and implement shari'ah law as the governing principle of state and society. The late Samir Khan, for instance, who created *Inspire*, warned Egyptians that the revolutions were not the "end goal" [60] whilst Ibrahim Al-Rubaish (of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) thought the revolutions would bring "slight reforms like some aspects of freedom and increases of income" but that all would be lost if man-made laws were not abrogated and rule by *shari'ah* not implemented. [61] Interestingly, the excerpt from Al-Rubaish's address (which was first published February 2011 under the title 'Ben Ali and Ibn Saud') that featured in *Inspire*, left out the part of his statement where he endorsed Al-Qaeda affiliates and allies as leaders in the Arab uprisings. Al-Rubaish, in his original address, asked that power be handed to "the likes of the Mujahid, [Afghan-Taliban leader] Mullah Muhammad Umar, [Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader] Abu Umar Al Bahghdadi and other similar Muslim leaders" who could implement God's law. In this respect, he suggested Al-Qaeda's affiliate Al-Shabaab in Somalia was the correct example for Arabs to follow in the post-revolution societies. [62]

Other Al-Qaeda affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), followed this common thread that various components of Al-Qaeda developed in reaction to the Arab Spring. A communiqué from AQIM addressing Tunisians issued in February 2011, for instance, reminded them that they "should not think that they have won the battle with Kufr [infidelity] and transgression. The battle is a long one and is still in its early stages. Whatever they have gained is only the first round. There are many rounds left. This included tackling, what AQIM argued was the "root cause" of their problems, the pervasive influence of the Crusader West. [63]

As well as seeking to convince Muslims and Arabs that the uprisings were only the first step, *Inspire 5* contains some remarkable attempts to re-write history by suggesting that Al-Qaeda was not caught off guard during these seminal events and that the group was, in fact, at the helm of the broader revolutionary movement. Abu Suhail suggested that: "If this Egyptian revolution has taught us anything, it has taught us that sitting and waiting for tyrants to fall is not practical; mobilization of the people is necessary for the tyrants to give in." "This,"

Suhail insisted, "is what your brothers in the al Qaeda Organization and other jihadi organizations have been working for." The Arab Spring had, in fact, "proved that al Qaeda's rage is shared by the millions of Muslims across the world whether they are in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Yemen or elsewhere." [64]

Anwar Al-Awlaki's attempts to present the Arab uprisings in a positive light for Al-Qaeda were more sophisticated. His essay, titled 'The Tsunami of Change', reminded readers of the close relationship the West had had with the toppled dictatorships and how quickly Western leaders had abandoned their former allies once they appreciated the scale of the protests. Rejecting suggestions the events were bad for Al-Qaeda, Awlaki insisted: "We do not know yet what the outcome would be, and we do not have to. The outcome doesn't have to be an Islamic government for us to consider what is occurring to be a step in the right direction." To begin with, the system of total oppression and control had been dismantled, giving the *mujahideen* more space to manoeuvre. [65] Indeed, as noted at the beginning of this article, some areas in the region have seen heightened jihadi activity as a result of turmoil and reduced levels of government surveillance and control.

Whereas *Inspire* and other Al-Qaeda-linked outlets have sought to convince its public that the Arab Spring fully conformed with Al-Qaeda's strategy and that the group remains at the pinnacle of resistance against corruption, subjugation and vice, other Al-Qaeda 'spokespersons' have adopted a different approach, recognizing the challenges the uprisings present for Al-Qaeda, almost excusing the group's absence during these events. For example, 'Sheikh Atiyyatullah' (Jamal Ibrahim Ishtaywi al-Misrati), a veteran of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, issued a communiqué on behalf of Al-Qaeda in March 2011 in response to the on-going events of the Arab Spring where he admitted: "It is true that it [the Arab Spring] is not the best and not exactly as we had hoped, but the removal of some evil or much evil is something which pleases to all people. We hope that this is a good step ahead for even more good in the future".

Regarding criticism of Al-Qaeda's inability to see through change as envisaged in its rhetoric, Atiyyatullah reminded people that "Al-Qaeda



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does not have a “magic wand” as they say.” “Al-Qaeda is only a small part of this striving and Mujahid Ummah,” Atiyyatullah continued. “Do not overestimate it. We should all know our abilities, and let us aid each other in piety, righteousness and in making Jihad in the way of Allah.” [66]

Looking towards the future, a publication by ‘Abdullah bin Mohammed’, entitled *Valuable Collection for the Strategic Memorandum Series*, sought to assess the impact of the Arab Spring on the region and on Al-Qaeda. This collection of essays was published in the spring of 2011 by Al-Ma’sada Media Publications. Touching upon a number of issues, the author argued the Arab uprisings presented tremendous opportunities that Al-Qaeda could exploit. He compared the events to the Battle of Bu’ath in 617, when two Arab tribes from Yathrib (Medina) fought each other, resulting in heightened tensions and mutual animosity that preceded the prophet Mohammed’s *hijrah* to the city and the advent of Islam. [67] After the Battle of Bu’ath, Abdullah bin Mohammed argued, “the balance of power in Medina was upset to open the way for any young power that could lead and would be able to fill the vacuum.” The same was happening in the Middle East and North Africa today. The “exceptional state of solidarity” that emerged during the uprisings themselves was dissipating and anarchy was looming. The “small and scattered” jihadist movement had to become united, Mohammed argued, in order to exploit this period and pursue a “common purpose”. [68]

What was needed, therefore, was a comprehensive alliance of jihadi movements in order to exploit the vacuum and turmoil in the wake of the Arab Spring. For Al-Qaeda to be successful in this endeavour, however, Mohammed argued the group would have to alter its image, in part due to its association with excessive targeting and killing of Muslims (from which Zawahiri himself has sought to disassociate Al-Qaeda in his recent messages). Mohammed wrote in one of his essays in the series:

Since the discussion has led us to alliances that could serve us during the upcoming phase, I have been wondering since the outbreak of the Arab revolutions if it is good for us to continue with the name al-Qaeda or will the next phase require a new name? The answer came from al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula

when it entered into tribal alliances and changed its name to Ansar al-Shariah in order to acclimate and benefit from the new circumstances. For the sake of any expansion we want to achieve, we must forsake any cloak that others cannot wear. I add to that, if we don’t want to avoid reality, we should acknowledge that this name has been tarnished by unprecedented disinformation campaigns through all these years alongside the gains and support that it had accomplished in the Islamic street. In order for us not to gamble the chances of our success in the coming phase because of the existence of old ideas in the minds of some, and in order to cut off the means of those who want to exploit these old ideas to turn the masses of people away from us, we must enter this phase under a new inclusive name. [69]

Conclusions

The Arab Spring presented immense challenges for Al-Qaeda, to which it has sought to respond in various communiqués and media initiatives. These initiatives have attempted to present a version of the events that conforms to Al-Qaeda’s strategy and broader agenda, whilst leaving plenty of scope for further strategic direction from Al-Qaeda leaders in the future. Desperate to seem relevant to those who took to the streets in protest against the ruling regimes and eager to exploit inevitable disillusionment following the Arab Spring, the Al-Qaeda leadership and affiliates continue to issue communiqués appealing to Arab publics. Both the leadership and various affiliates and sympathisers have argued that the revolutions merely constitute the first step in a long process towards reform. Dismissing notions that the uprisings proved Al-Qaeda’s tactical prescriptions to be irrelevant, Al-Qaeda has tried to present guidelines to the post-revolution societies regarding the next steps. Conscious of the current turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, various components of Al-Qaeda hope to be able to consolidate amid the lawlessness and power vacuums that have emerged in some regions following successful revolutions and in areas experiencing on-going conflict. Equally aware, however, of Al-Qaeda’s increasing marginalisation, the group’s media publications continue to strive to present jihadism as the most appropriate way to protect collective interests, eliminate adversaries,



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eradicate vice and establish a zealously pious social order.

Notes

- [1] See e.g. Jason Burke (2011) *The 9/11 Wars*, Allen Lane, London, p. 485.
- [2] James J.F. Forest (2012) 'Perception Challenges Faced by Al-Qaeda on the Battlefield of Influence Warfare' in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, March, p.18.
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Donald Holbrook (MPhil Cantab, M.Litt and PhD St Andrews) is a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews. His research focus is primarily on the discourses of militant Islamist and far right movements. Publications include academic articles and reports for US/UK practitioners.

Single Actor Terrorism: Scope, Characteristics and Explanations

By Petter Nesser

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/231/html>

Abstract

This Research Note does three things. First, it takes a critical look at definitions, conceptualizations and empirical observations within the field of individual terrorism. Second, it presents and problematizes empirical surveys of so-called "lone wolf terrorists" and individual jihadist terrorists in Europe. Third, it discusses alternative theoretical arguments regarding the scope, characteristics and possible increase of single actor terrorism. Existing research indicates that single actor terrorism is likely to remain a relatively marginal phenomenon, but that attacks may become more sophisticated and deadly due to contagion and tactical diffusion via the Internet, mass media and social networks. Regardless, the analysis presented in the following reveals an acute need for clearer operationalizations and better data in the study of individualized terrorism.

Introduction

The attacks by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway and Mohammed Merah in France demonstrated that single terrorists may cause devastating effects. The attacks also taught us that it is highly difficult for law enforcement to prevent such attacks. What is single actor terrorism? What is the scope of single actor terrorism? What drives single actor terrorism? Is single actor terrorism more dangerous than other types of terrorism? Is the phenomenon a growing trend? While individual terrorist attackers have received considerable media attentions over the last couple of years, academic research on the topic remains relatively sparse.

Background

Terrorism is usually defined and understood as a group phenomenon. Organisation and group dynamics are seen as important conditions for violent radicalisation and features distinguishing political terrorists from lunatic killers. In the terrorism research literature, terrorist attacks by single actors are usually portrayed as "lone wolf terrorism" (Spaaij

2012), "leaderless resistance" (Kaplan 1997) or "solo terrorism" (CTA 2011).[1] There is no consensus regarding the definition of these concepts, something that constitutes an analytical obstacle. Leaderless resistance is perceived as a military strategy by terrorist organisations under pressure. The strategy is characterized by asymmetric warfare and terrorist attacks by horizontal networks of small cells, or individuals who minimize interaction with organisational entities and a central command. Lone wolf terrorism is usually understood as terrorist attacks undertaken by individuals operating independently from organised groups. We will get back to the term solo terrorism.

The strategy of leaderless resistance is usually traced back to 19th century anarchists who staged political assassinations and bombings under the slogan "propaganda by deed" (Woodcock 1962).[2] Many of these terrorist attacks were perpetrated by single individuals. After World War II, ideas about leaderless resistance gained ground among American anti-Communists as a means of fighting



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Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and Latin America.[3] Then, during the 1980s and 1990s American white supremacists revived ideas of leaderless resistance, when the U.S. government cracked down on domestic racist movements. For example, Ku Klux Klan leader Louis Beam (1992) prescribed a strategy of small “phantom cells” or individuals guided by a common ideology and operating without any form of central command, as the only way for American “patriots” to prevail against the Federal Government’s “tyranny”. [4] Under the pseudonym Andrew McDonald, the American Neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce (1978, 1989) wrote fictional books portraying future terrorist campaigns by ideologically driven terrorist cells and individual terrorists against foreigners, pro-immigration spokespersons, and government targets.[5] In the same vein white supremacist Tom Metzger introduced the term “lone wolfism” to popularize the image of the lonesome, “patriotic” warrior.[6]

In the late 1990s, one of Al-Qaeda’s strategic thinkers, Abu Musab al-Suri, presented a military theory for the jihadist movements bearing striking similarities to the concepts developed among anti-Communists and white racists. Al-Suri called upon jihadist movements under pressure and not controlling territories to engage in leaderless guerrilla warfare and “individual terrorism jihad” while awaiting conditions in which “open front” insurgency and military campaigns could succeed.[7] For al-Suri such a strategy was suboptimal, but necessary, and implied shadowy “cell builders” representing the movement and preparing small cells or individuals for operations, but disappearing before attacks were launched.[8] In recent times, an Al-Qaeda organisation facing tremendous pressures has called for individual attacks by sympathizers worldwide in statements by its leadership as well as in the *Inspire* magazine issued by its Yemen branch. This magazine has led a campaign recommending solo terrorism and providing operational advice.[9] Coinciding with a renewed focus on “individual terrorism jihad” among Al-Qaeda and affiliates, from around 2008 onwards there has been a marked increase in international terrorist attacks by individual jihadists.

While a number of studies have addressed the ideational and strategic foundations of leaderless resistance by anarchists, right-wing racists, jihadists and other extremist camps

(Kaplan 1997, Borum 2005, Sageman 2008) [10], there is a small but growing body of research (Spaaij 2010 and 2012, Bakker & de Graaf 2010, Pantucci 2011) focusing more on operational and motivational aspects of terrorism by single individuals or lone wolves.[11] However, there is considerable confusion with regards to definitions and operationalizations.

Lone wolves are mostly defined as individual terrorists operating in isolation from organised networks (Spaaij 2012; COT 2007). Yet, at other times lone wolves are defined more widely as terrorists executing attacks on their own, but having various types of contacts with organised extremists during the radicalisation process. The nature of such contacts is poorly specified, as is the level of organisation required for there to be an organisational link.

The analysis unit of the Danish Police Intelligence service, CTA, introduces a distinction between lone wolves and solo terrorists, the former operating in isolation and the latter having ties to violent extremist or terrorist networks. CTA further differentiates between bottom-up and top-down solo terrorists, the former implying self-recruited individuals connecting with organised networks for assistance and inspiration, and the latter implying individuals recruited, trained and controlled by terrorist networks. The CTA does provide some, albeit vague clues on how to distinguish true single actors from those operating in group contexts. Pantucci (2011) offers the widest definition of lone wolves, even including small terrorist cells consisting of two or more persons acting independently from organisations.[12]

Below is an attempt to illustrate the relationship between categories of individualized terrorism:

This lack of mutually exclusive categories and clear operationalizations makes it hard to draw firm conclusions from empirical research on single actors; are we talking about a distinct phenomenon or a variant of group terrorism? The lack of coherent coding to produce reliable micro-level data further complicates the matter. The author will exemplify.

Scope and characteristics

We now turn to empirical patterns of single actor terrorism. A 2012 study by Ramon Spaaij offers the most comprehensive empirical survey of



lone wolf terrorism to date. He collects data from the Terrorism Knowledge Database (TKB)

attacks in the selected countries, constituting a marginal trend. He identifies a marked

Leaderless resistance
Single actors and independent cells

Solo terrorism
Single terrorist with network ties

Lone wolf terrorism
Acting in isolation

Top-down solo terrorism
Single terrorist controlled by organization/network

Bottom-up solo terrorism
Single terrorist acting on behalf of network on his own

prevalence of the phenomenon in America compared to Canada, European countries and Australia. [15] The study further identifies an overall, gradual increase in lone wolf attacks. The increase is more

and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) on single actor terrorist attacks in selected Western countries between 1968 and 2010.[13] Spaaij identifies 88 lone wolves responsible for 198 attacks. The study presents general statistics based on 88 cases and five in-depth case studies of well-known cases.[14] Spaaij acknowledges that GTD and TKB data imply methodological pitfalls. The study employs a strict definition of lone wolf terrorism and excludes individuals linked to organised networks. Spaaij admits that, given the data, the distinction is difficult to draw in practice. He mentions Timothy McVeigh who bombed a government building in Oklahoma in 1995 and Richard Reid who tried to down a trans-Atlantic airliner in 2001 as examples on cases left out. McVeigh received assistance from his comrade Terry Nichols and had ties to organised white supremacists, whereas Reid was acting on orders from Al-Qaeda. Spaaij also acknowledges that many of the cases included in his survey involve obscure circumstances, and that closer investigations could reveal types of interaction with organised actors that could affect his incident count. According to Spaaij's statistics, lone wolves are behind 1.8 % of the total number of 11.235 terrorist

pronounced in Europe than America, and there were spikes in the overall occurrence of attacks during the early 1980s, early to mid-1990s and early 2000s.

With regards to ideological motivation, the survey attributes 17% of lone wolf attacks to right-wing racists, 15% to Islamists, 8% to anti-abortion extremists, and 7% to national-separatists.[16] More than 30% of the cases were categorized as "other" or "unknown" in terms of motivational drivers. The prevalence of right-wing militancy and Islamism stands in contrast to longitudinal surveys of terrorist trends, in which nationalist-separatist terrorist groups dominate the picture.[17] Spaaij's survey further finds that lone wolves typically attack soft civilian targets (58%), officials and politicians (13%), health personnel (10%), and that they (just like group terrorists) seek to maximize symbolism. As for weapons, most employed firearms (43%), 28% utilized explosives, 16% conducted armed hijackings and 6% committed arson.

The use of firearms was more prevalent in the United States and Spaaij indicates U.S. gun laws and the popularity of the leaderless resistance strategy among American racists as



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possible explanations. He compares lone wolves' use of firearms to terrorist groups, who employ explosives in 65-75% of cases registered in databases. According to Spaaij's statistics lone wolf terrorism is not very lethal, only resulting in 0, 6 deaths per incident. The lethality does not increase significantly in the time period surveyed. Of the five in-depth case studies undertaken by Spaaij, three utilized bomb devices and two used guns. Two targeted politicians whereas three attacked specified groups of civilians such as immigrants or random victims.

Based on micro-level analysis of well-known cases, Spaaij observes that lone wolves' radicalisation processes tend to involve interaction with broader ideologies and movements, and a particular mix of personal frustrations and ideology, in which subjects use the latter to explain the former.[18] He also emphasizes how mental problems and social inabilities appear to be overrepresented among lone wolves, showing how they struggle with fitting to group environments and tend to isolate themselves.[19] Sociologically, Spaaij finds that lone wolves come from a variety of backgrounds, but tend to be well-educated and self-taught with regards to extremist ideology and terrorist tactics.

While Spaaij's lone wolf study is an important contribution, some comments are in order. First, the databases used almost exclusively register successfully committed attacks. Given the fact that terrorist plots often fail or get thwarted, and that this may apply disproportionately to single actors, failed plots should also be taken into consideration. Furthermore, as acknowledged by Spaaij, several of the cases in the study may appear as lone wolf terrorism while in fact having substantial network ties. Also, the inclusion of failed and thwarted terrorist plans, as well as the recent attacks in Norway could seriously affect prognoses regarding lethality of lone wolf attacks and reveal greater variance in operational patterns. Moreover, the study does not compare the level of lone wolf terrorism to variations in the totality of incidents across time. Last, the observations regarding psychological and social profile seem to rest profoundly on five out of 88 cases, - cases that appear to involve more clear-cut lone wolves than the other sample cases, something that raises questions about validity.

For comparison, this author conducted a survey of single actor jihadists in Western Europe between 1995 and present. [20] The following outlines the main findings from that survey before discussing alternative explanations for the occurrence of single actor terrorism. Incidents were drawn from an open source chronology of planned, prepared and executed terrorist attacks by jihadists in Western Europe, which has been maintained by the author since 2003.[21]

Out of a total of 105 of planned, prepared and executed terrorist plots by jihadist actors between 1995 and 2012 (based on the latest count), as much as 15 (14%) cases involved individual attackers. The cases included:

1. "Shoe-bomber" Richard Reid's attempt to down a trans-Atlantic jet in 2001.
2. An Iraqi sending toxic letters to the prime minister's office and the U.S. and Saudi embassies in Belgium, 2003.
3. Dutch-Moroccan Mohammed Bouyeri's assassination of Theo Van Gogh in 2004.
4. "Wannabe" jihadist Nicholas Roddis' 2007 bomb plans and hoax in the UK.
5. British convert Andrew Ibrahim's 2008 plan to bomb a shopping center in Bristol.
6. British convert Nicky Reilly's 2008 attempt to bomb a restaurant in Exeter.
7. Libyan Mohammed Game's 2009 attack on a U.S. military base in Milan.
8. Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempt to down a trans-Atlantic jet in 2009.
9. Danish-Somali Mohammed Geele's attempt to assassinate Kurt Westergaard in Denmark, 2010.
10. Bengali Rajib Karim's plot to down a trans-Atlantic jet in 2010.
11. British-Pakistani Roshonara Choudry's 2010 attempt to assassinate British MP Stephen Timms.
12. Chechen Lora Doukaiev's 2010 plan to bomb Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Denmark.
13. Swedish-Iraqi Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly who launched an unsuccessful suicide bombing in Stockholm, 2010.
14. Kosovar Arid Uka who shot and killed two U.S. soldiers at Frankfurt airport in 2011.
15. French-Algerian Mohammed Merah who killed French soldiers and attacked a Jewish children's school in France, 2012.

My survey did not distinguish between lone wolves and solo



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terrorists, but I found that four out of the 15 cases appeared to be disconnected from organisations and identifiable networks of extremists. [22]

Furthermore, I found that only three of the 15 cases preceded 2008, making the phenomenon almost non-existent before that time, and the relative increase compared to the total number of terrorist plots between 2008-2012 significant (2008: 2/8 incidents, 2009: 2/5 incidents, 2010: 5/13 incidents, 2011: 1/3 incidents, 2012: 1/4 incidents). [23]

In terms of operational patterns, approximately 50% of the cases involved mass casualty bomb attacks against civilians, three of them suicide missions against airplanes. Three cases involved assassinations of public figures (such as the Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, British MP Stephen Timms and Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh) with handgun, knife and axe. Three cases involved attacks on soft military targets using handguns or explosives. [24]

My survey thus found that there was a higher occurrence of single actor attacks among jihadists than in the broader population surveyed by Spaaij, and that jihadist loner attacks were potentially more deadly. Although most of the jihadists in my sample seemed connected to extremist environments and received assistance, encouragement or instructions, I found some support for Spaaij's observations about motivations and socio-psychological profiles. In my sample, one person was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome and several had mental health issues or behavioral disorders. [25]

Also people like the shoe bomber Richard Reid and the Chechen Lers Doukaiev who tried to launch a bomb attack in Denmark avenging the Mohammed caricatures came from troubled family backgrounds and had dropped out of the educational system. Furthermore, in several cases, personal frustrations appear to have been an important factor behind the ideological radicalisation as suggested by Spaaij's lone wolf research. For example, it has been alleged that Mohammed Bouyeri's failure to fulfill the dream of establishing a youth club for immigrants played a central part in his radicalisation process. [26]

The author's survey of individual jihadists encountered the same definitional challenges as the lone wolf study, but due to the limited scope of the study (one type of actor, limited

time period), and the magnitude of updated press information about jihadist terrorism, the survey is based on more, and more reliable data, and may, with a relatively high level of precision, determine the relationship between single actor and group terrorism by jihadists in Europe.

Whether my findings have validity beyond the jihadism in Europe case is another question. To reach more valid and generalizable knowledge about single actor terrorism, there is definitively a need for better data sets which include both successful and foiled terrorist plots by diverse ideological trends. We also need to find better ways to distinguish clearly between those few true lone wolves who operate in total isolation and single actors operating on behalf of organised groups. Despite definitional obstacles and weaknesses of empirical data, the existing research does provide a sound basis for discussing alternative hypotheses regarding the scope and nature of single actor terrorism, which we will turn to now.

Explanations

Ideology

Studies of lone wolf terrorism hypothesize that the occurrence of the phenomenon varies according to trends in ideologies and strategic thinking. Spaaij identified peaks in the occurrence of lone wolf terrorism in the 80s when American right-wing thinkers focused on leaderless resistance and "lone wolfism," and in the early 2000s after jihadists picked upon similar ideas during the late 1990s, as exemplified by Abu Musab al-Suri's strategic writings.

The thesis is backed by anecdotal evidence that Timothy McVeigh and several other right-wing terrorists possessed writings by William Pierce's and acted according to advice in American rightwing fanzines. [27] Similarly several jihadists who plotted individual attacks in Europe and the U.S. appear to have been influenced by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki and the group's propaganda outlet *Inspire* magazine (e.g. aforementioned Roshonara Choudry and Jose Pimentel, a Dominican American jihadist involved in a New York bomb plot during 2011).

Repression and Counter-terrorism

An alternative or supplementary explanation offered is state repression



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and counter-terrorism. It is important to bear in mind that ideological and strategic thinking on leaderless resistance emerged as responses to intensified crackdowns or disruption of extremist movements and terrorist groups; in particular the U.S. government's crackdown of the white supremacy movement and the targeting of Al-Qaeda's central organisation in the Af-Pak region and other Al-Qaeda strongholds - especially the increased use of drones against training camps and leading figures. Therefore, in terms of establishing causality one must ask what comes first, ideology and strategy, or tactical adaptation to a dire security environment. In this respect it is important to note that the afore-mentioned Al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri started writing about leaderless resistance in the 1990s, but that the popularization of his texts and the increase in individual jihadist attacks emerged only after Al-Qaeda came under severe pressures. As mentioned, a similar dynamic was seen among American white racists.

Psychological and societal factors

Besides ideology and adjustment to counter-terrorism regimes, other explanatory models emphasize psychological and societal factors. Whereas, generally, terrorists tend to be psychologically normal (Crenshaw 1981), mental difficulties seem to be over-represented among single actors.[28] Spaaij found lone wolves to have "greater propensity to suffer mental health issues", and I found most jihadist loners to be either mentally or socially troubled, or both.[29] Another important observation by Spaaij is that lone wolves tend to mix personal frustrations and extremist ideologies, externalizing their own problems, blaming them on the hostile "Other," be it immigrants, multiculturalism, or the Jewish-Crusader imperialist alliance.

Broader societal tendencies towards individualization and social fragmentation and alienation may intensify such radicalisation processes. Alienated and socially isolated persons could drift into a world of online extremism and violent computer games, and in rare instances they could end up being exploited by terrorist organisations, or radicalise and embark on violent rampage on their own, a case in point being school massacres. However, while there have been observed similarities between perpetrators of

school massacres and terrorists[30], and while there is evidence that many lone terrorists have radicalised online, explanations emphasizing the Internet and social changes do not account for historical patterns of single actor terrorism (such as the 19th century anarchists). In addition, the fact that most single actor terrorists had, or wanted to have ties to group environments largely invalidates individualism as a driver in its own right.

Tactical Diffusion/Contagion

A more general explanation for terrorist violence is the effect of contagion (Midlarsky et al 1980; Schmid & de Graaf 1982).[31] Terrorism research has solidly documented that terrorists tend to emulate each other's operational methods. Globalisation and Internet-based mass media and social media accelerate and intensify such processes (Nacos 2009).[32]

It was the Lebanese Shia-militia Hizbullah that introduced suicide bombings that later were employed by Palestinian terrorists, Tamil Tigers and Al-Qaeda; IED expertise from Iraq spread to other theaters of war and insurgency, and the Dutch-Moroccan jihadist Mohammed Bouyeri killed and tried to decapitate filmmaker Theo Van Gogh on the streets of Amsterdam, shortly after a kidnapping and decapitation campaign executed by Al-Qaeda in Iraq during 2004.

The Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik explained in detail how he gained tactical inspiration from Al-Qaeda when aiming to launch a martyrdom solo terrorist attack in Oslo, and now security services worry that other terrorists in turn could learn from Breivik. While both strategic-tactical considerations and socio-psychological factors apparently influence the occurrence single actor terrorism, in the Internet age it is important not to underestimate the contagious nature of extreme violence, and the potential for spread among terrorist networks and copycat killers.

Conclusion

Existing research indicates that single actor terrorism is a marginal phenomenon and less dangerous than group terrorism. However, worldwide attacks over the last couple of years suggest that single actor terrorism is on the rise and becoming more deadly. Available studies of terrorist attacks by individual



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perpetrators suffer from a lack of coherent definitions and sound operationalizations, while utilizing poor data. Although studies have produced well-founded knowledge about single cases or clusters of cases, there are serious questions regarding the validity of findings and generalization. Because the research does not distinguish accurately between lone terrorists and network agents it is difficult to know when and how we may perceive single actor terrorist attacks as a distinct phenomenon or as a tactical variant of group terrorism.

At the end of the day it is crucial to make this distinction in order to understand variations in the occurrence of individual terrorist attacks. Do single actor attacks occur when terrorist groups face troubles and adapt their tactics, or do broader societal changes account for a recent increase in this type of terrorism, or both? A main challenge ahead for the research community is to operationalize connections and affinity between a lone attacker, networks and ideological communities. How much and what types of contacts between a lone attacker and a broader social entity is needed to distinguish between political terrorists and lunatic killers?

Also, how 'political' must a violent attacker be to qualify as a single actor terrorist? When social grievances and psychological problems overshadow political messages there is indeed a fine line between terroristic violence and other types of random violence, such as school massacres.

Several studies of single actor terrorism are currently in the pipeline. Hopefully they will rely on more complete and accurate data than is

currently available. For example, recent observations concerning the scope and lethality of the phenomenon could be altered substantially if well-documented thwarted and failed terrorist attacks were included in the databases. Also there is a need for cross-comparison between single actor attacks within different ideological camps. Closer investigations could, for example, reveal important differences between actors, methods and motivational drivers within the right-wing, jihadist or anarchist realms. Despite data problems and analytical pitfalls, what seems to be a robust finding in the existing research is that single actor terrorism appeals to a special kind of person - people of unusual psychological complexity.

Another feature worth noticing is the relatively low lethality in Spaaij's historical data material. Moreover, my survey of jihadist loner attacks in Europe showed a low success rate in terms of destruction and fatalities, indicating that single actors face substantial operational challenges compared to groups and that they tend to make mistakes. However, the terrorist attacks in Oslo, the shootings at Fort Hood and Mohammed Merah's terrorist campaign in France constitute a worrisome trend of successful attacks, which could be linked to contagion and diffusion of tactical advice via Internet outlets and social media. The recent massacres in America, the Batman shootings by a schizophrenic madman and the Nazi attack on a Sikh-temple further demonstrated the operational effectiveness of lone attackers armed with handguns.

Notes

[1] Ramon Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (Melbourne: Springer, 2012); Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 9:3, 80-95; Center for Terroranalyse (CTA) "The threat from solo terrorism and lone wolf terrorism," 5 April, 2011, URL: https://www.pet.dk/~media/Engelsk/the_threat_from_solo_terrorism_and_lone_wolf_terrorism_-_engelsk_version_pdf.ashx

[2] George Woodcock, *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements*. Cleveland & New York: Meridian Books, 1962.

[3] See e.g. COT - Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement, "Lone Wolf Terrorism," Report, The Hague: COT, 6 July 2007 <http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf> and Martin Durham, *White Rage*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

[4] Louis Beam, "Leaderless Resistance," *The Seditonist*, Issue 12, February 1992, URL: <http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm>

[5] Andrew McDonald "The Turner Diaries," 1978; -----, "Hunter," 1989, accessed via *JR's Rare Books and Commentary*, URL: <http://www.jrbooksonline.com/>

[6] Tom Metzger, "Begin With Lone Wolves," URL: <http://www.resist.com/Articles/literature/BeginWithLoneWolvesByTomMetzger.htm>

[7] Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

[8] Ibid.



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[9] Inspire magazine is available on a number of jihadist websites, and may also be accessed via the blog *Jihadology*, URL: <http://jihadology.net/>

[10] Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 80-95, 1997; Randy Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism* Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004; Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

[11] Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, Edwin Bakker and Beatrice De Graaf, "Lone Wolves: How to Prevent This Phenomenon?," report, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, November 2010; Raffaello Pantucci, "A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists", report, *International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)*, 2011).

[12] He suggests a typology distinguishing between the loner (individual acting on his own inspired by ideology), the lone wolf (individual acting on his own inspired by ideology and linked to extremist networks), something he calls lone wolf pack (small group acting on its own inspired by ideology), and the lone attacker (individual dispatched by terrorist group); see Pantucci, "A Typology of Lone Wolves".

[13] The 15 countries surveyed include UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Croatia, Portugal, Russia, Australia, Canada and the U.S.

[14] Cases include the "Una-bomber" Ted Kaczynski (operating between 1978 and 1995), Austrian xenophobic serial killer Franz Fuchs (operating between 1993 and 1997), Jewish extremist Yigal Amir who killed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, right-wing terrorist David Copeland who attacked foreigners and gay people in the UK during 1999 and the Dutch environmental extremist Volkert Van der Graaf who killed the liberal politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002.

[15] 45 % of the 198 attacks took place in the U.S.. Germany was the second most exposed country in the data material, having experienced eight lone wolf attacks in the period surveyed.

[16] Remaining categories include black militancy terrorism, left-wing terrorism, Eco-terrorism, animal liberation terrorism, Spaaij (2012).

[17] See for example Jan Oskar Engene's study, *Terrorism In Western Europe: Explaining The Trends Since 1950*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004; he shows that separatists have been behind the vast majority of terrorist attacks in European countries since World War II. See also statistics presented in Brynjar Lia with Katja Skjøberg, "Causes of terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature," FFI Research Report No.2004/04307, p 14, URL: <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/04307.pdf> , showing a similar tendency based on RAND-MIPT terrorism incident data.

[18] For example, Franz Fuchs' racism and xenophobia seemed to involve considerable levels of self-hate and Yigal Amir's radicalisation process appeared to accelerate in connection with a broken relationship with his girlfriend.

[19] For example, only one out of the archetypical lone wolves studied by Spaaij was in a relationship.

[20] For a preliminary analysis, see Petter Nesser, Petter Nesser, "Individual Jihadist Operations in Europe: Patterns and Challenges," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 5, Issue 1, January 2012, URL: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol5-Iss13.pdf>. For the purpose of the current analysis several additional cases were included, see full list in body text.

[21] Petter Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 10 (2008), and Nesser "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Update 2008-2010," FFI (2010), available on URL: <http://www.ffi.no> and further updates for 2011 and 2012 with author.

[22] These cases included: the Kosovar Arid Uka who killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded two others at Frankfurt airport in 2011; the Pakistani female student Roshonara Choudry who stabbed a British MP during 2010; an Iraqi behind toxic letter attacks in Belgium during 2003 (see e.g. BBC News, "Belgium holds Iraqi over toxic letters," 5 June 2003, URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2967376.stm>), and the mentally unstable Dutch-British jihadist "wannabe" Nicholas Roddis, who gathered bomb-materials and staged a bomb hoax in the UK during 2008. The circumstances of all these cases were vague, but clear links to well-known networks seem to be absent - at least to this author's knowledge.

[23] The three cases that preceded 2008 included: "shoe-bomber" Richard Reid, Mohammed Bouyeri, who killed the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, - and the toxic letters' case in Belgium.

[24] Attacks on soft military targets included: Arid Uka's shooting of U.S. soldiers in Frankfurt, the Libyan Mohammed Game's explosives attack at the gate of a U.S. military base in Milan, and Mohammed Merah's assaults on French soldiers before attacking a Jewish school.

[25] Young Nicky Reilly who tried to bomb a restaurant in Exeter suffered from Asperger and "Emo-kid" Andrew Ibrahim who planned to bomb a shopping center in Bristol struggled with behavioral transgressions, as did Theo Van Gogh's murderer Mohammed Bouyeri. 23-year-old Nicholas Roddis who was fascinated with jihadism and staged a bomb-hoax in Britain also suffered from mental problems.



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[26] Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands," online report, University of Amsterdam, 2005.

[27] Such as Tom Metzger's call for "Lone Wolfism" in "Begin With Lone Wolves," URL: <http://www.resist.com/Articles/literature/BeginWithLoneWolvesByTomMetzger.htm>

[28] Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 379-399, 1981.

[29] Ramón Spaaij (2012), p 50.

[30] Adam Lankford and Nayab Hakimb, "From Columbine to Palestine: A comparative analysis of rampage shooters in the United States and volunteer suicide bombers in the Middle East," *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, Volume 16, Issue 2, March–April 2011, pp. 98–107.

[31] Midlarsky et al, "Why Violence Spreads," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 262-298; Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf. *Violence and Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* London: Sage, 1982.

[32] Brigitte L Nacos, "Revisiting the Contagion Hypothesis: Terrorism, News Coverage, and Copycat Attacks," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 3, No 3 (2009), URL: <http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/73/html> ; Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, op. cit.

Petter Nesser (M.A., PhD) is a Senior Research Fellow with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). He is trained in the areas of Social Science, Middle Eastern Studies and Arabic. Nesser's specialisation is within the field of Islamist militancy and terrorist networks in Western Europe. He currently heads FFI's Terrorism Research Group.

NATO: Somali pirates seized no ships for 6 months

Source:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g_fZbb8NWJfr-zb5QN4GiGVXZELA?docId=2dc249bb80cd49579524215d5efdbeb3

NATO officials say no ships have been hijacked off the Somali coast in the second half of this year, reflecting a sharp decrease in piracy along one of the world's busiest shipping routes.

Commodore Ben Bekkering attributed the success to the continuing efforts of an international fleet along the coastline, combined with better security measures by merchant ships and increased pressure on the pirates within Somalia itself.

About 20 vessels from NATO, the European Union, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, India and other countries regularly patrol Somalia's 1,900-mile-long (3,100-kilometer) coastline.

Bekkering, who until recently commanded NATO's four-warship flotilla in the area, says "This has been the first clean slate for a long time."

Still, he noted, pirates continue to hold five ships and 136 hostages seized in previous years.

Thematic Reports on Africa

Source: https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/MB_Reports.aspx

