

Syrian CWAs – Are they under control?

Volume 45, 2012

CBRNE Newsletter Terrorism

Terror News



www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com

START's Violent Extremist Organisation (VEO) influencing interactive online tool

Source: <http://start.foxtrotdotdev.com>

A very interesting and useful development and provides a very good, research based location including

Hypothesis	Evidence	Mechanism	Audience	Implications			
1 Increased certainty of punishment for attacks deters VEOs from carrying out those attacks.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter	Coercion	Show Implications
2 The larger the size of a punishment, the less credible that it is.	1	Direct	Military	Military	Deter		Show Implications
3 Failure to follow through on a deterrent threat leads to loss of credibility and increased VEO activity.	1	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter	Coercion	Show Implications
4 VEOs are intimidated if state threats are executed or if states retaliate after a provocative terrorist attack.	1	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists	Show Implications
5 VEOs are emboldened by state passivity in the face of provocation, leading to escalation.	2	Direct			Deter	Leaders, Loyalists	Show Implications
6 Alternatively, VEOs are emboldened if states retaliate, thus commencing a cycle of violence and counter-violence.	3	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists	Show Implications
7 Repression last month increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks this month; conciliatory actions last month decrease the likelihood.	7	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Broader Audience	Show Implications
8 Repression last month increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks this month; conciliatory actions last month decrease the likelihood. and the correlation actually gets stronger when the actors in question are indiscriminate—i.e. when they target a population rather than a person.	7	Direct		Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Broader Audience	Show Implications
9 Increased severity of punishment for attacks deters VEOs from carrying out those attacks.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion		Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Show Implications
10 Harsh reprisals, including threats of death, severe sanctions, public humiliation, or the killing of family members, may deter VEOs from action.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Deter	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters	Show Implications
11 As hard incentives (punishment) and soft incentives (rewards) for members to exit a VEO become more balanced, the chance of members deradicalizing or disengaging increases.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Show Implications
12 When pressure from the state is high with no parallel inducements, Islamist VEOs will not deradicalize and vice versa.	3	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military		Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers, Ideological influencers, Material supporters, Broader audience	Show Implications
13 Law enforcement and intelligence are more effective than military operations in lowering VEO activity.	2	Direct	Military Deterrence/Coercion	Military	Defeat	Leaders, Loyalists, Active followers	Show Implications

hypothesis explanations. A good source for academic study of particular or general issues and recommended for those who want to learn and analyse, rather than just read the headlines.

'Islamist terrorism is the biggest threat in Europe'

Source: <http://rt.com/news/islam-radicalization-terrorism-europe-826/>



French members of the French National Police Intervention Group (GIPN) arrest a suspected radical Islamists group member, on April 4, 2012, in the French northern city of Roubaix, as part of dawn raids in several French cities. (AFP Photo/Denis Charlet)

Islamist terrorism and the radicalization of young Muslims has taken center stage in Europe. With schools, universities and even sport clubs becoming hotbeds of Islamism, experts argue that some European countries have willingly allowed it. Claude Monique, an expert on counterterrorism and extremism and the director of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, told RT that while European intelligence was engaged in battling a bigger threat – communism and the former Soviet Union – it ignored what has become a defining threat of the modern age.

RT: *Terrorism in Europe: We've seen acts of terror from Breivik in Norway to Mohamed Merah in Toulouse, and we have also seen riots based on ideology. Based on what you've seen so far, where is the biggest threat coming from?*

Claude Monique: I think that we have three different threats today in Europe. The biggest one clearly is still Islamist terrorism. Why it is the biggest? Because we have a large number, thousands of people involved – not in special interest actions but in extremist actions, and are



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

able to become terrorists in the future. We don't have thousands of such people on the right wing, for instance.

So we have thousands of people who have a very clear political and religious agenda. We have a radicalization process which is ongoing for years now, so I think clearly, Islamist terrorism is the biggest threat in Europe.

After this, we have two different threats. The first one is right-wing terrorism like Breivik, but if we accept the Breivik case, we didn't have real large-scale act of terrorism from the right wing for 20 years.

And the last threat would be the left-wing terrorism. Which for the moment doesn't exist in Europe, but it existed 20 years ago – we have clear signs that in Italy, in Greece, we have some anarcho-Marxist groups at work, but very small and on a very low scale

RT: *Different though their ideologies may be, these three groups are extremes. You mentioned the radicalization process, and how difficult it is to intercept. Where is the radicalization process actually happening? Are we talking about schools, universities, mosques, prisons? How do we identify it?*

CM: Radicalization is going on through different channels. First of all, it is going on in areas, in the cities, in municipalities, in the sports facilities, in the gym clubs, in the football clubs, of course in schools.

So that is the base. After this you have different ways or different places, like prison of course, and universities.

Most of the radicalization is done at a young age and it's done in the streets, it's done in the municipalities, in some schools. When people come to university for instance, those who are radicalized are already radicalized, and the others will probably not be radicalized. It's a minority, we must understand that clearly, radicalization could be a concern of maybe ten to 15 percent of the young Muslims in Europe.

RT: *In terms of the demographic grouping, is there a specific group in a society that is more susceptible to such radicalization?*

CM: It's difficult to say, because we would probably think that a poor young boy who feels excluded is more likely to be radicalized, because it's common sense. But we have also people who have university degrees. We have people who are fully integrated.

If you take for instance the perpetrators of the July 2005 terrorist attack in London, they were fully integrated. One of them was the son of a shop owner, he was working in education, he had a job, he was apparently fully integrated. And he was radicalized.

And if you are in a personal crisis, this crisis being social, being cultural, being familial – a family crisis, a crisis with your girlfriend – you are weak, and you could be radicalized exactly as you could be radicalized in a Christian extremist sect.

RT: *Going back to the biggest threat you mentioned – the Islamic extremism here in Europe. The justice minister of Belgium said that she has been told by the state security that Saudi Arabia is funding around 10 schools in Belgium that are teaching radical Islam. How would you assess this threat?*

CM: We must understand that in a part of Europe – in Belgium, in the Netherlands, in Germany – we have large Muslim communities today, but [those countries] didn't have Muslim colonies in the past. France had Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia. France has colonies, so most of the Muslims in France came from those ex-colonies

Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany did not have those colonies, so the majority of Muslims came in the 60s and the 70s because most of Europe was in need of workforce to build new infrastructure.

Those people came but everybody at the time thought they would just stay for two years, three years, just for work; after, they will return to their countries. Of course, they didn't.

The Belgians, as the Dutch, didn't understand the problem very well, and they were looking desperately for someone who could help them

And the Saudis told the Belgian authorities: "No problem, we'll take care of it," as they also said to the Netherlands. So they sent money, they sent people, and this was of course a hidden agenda. Their idea was of course to radicalize people.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Islam seems to be a unique thing. It is not a unique thing. You have an Islam of Asia, you have Islam of North Africa, Islam of the Gulf, Sunni, Shiites and so on. And clearly the Wahhabi Islam from Saudi Arabia has nothing to do with the Islam of the Moroccans, of the Turkish.

But this Islam was imposed on those people by the Saudi with the help of the Belgian and Dutch authorities, and this was imposed for 20 years, 25 years. And for 25 years, 30 years, the Saudis were funding, were sending people. For instance, in the Netherlands, in 2003 after the murder of Theo van Gogh, Dutch security monitored all Muslim clerics in the Netherlands and they found that 60 to 70 percent of them were unable to understand, read or speak Dutch.

So very clearly they cannot be a factor of integration. They cannot. They cannot understand the society in which they live, in which their followers live. They cannot help them with good advice, because they don't know. And most of them were coming from outside, from Saudi Arabia or Gulf States, with no knowledge of the language, no knowledge of the society.

RT: *You were in the French intelligence service. Did you or those in the authorities not see that was coming, the signs coming from the Saudi Arabia at the time?*

CM: At the time – this was true for the French intelligence, for the US, for all the Western intelligence – we were not very interested in those cases. The big enemy was the Soviet Union and communism. So, we had no real interest in monitoring Saudi Arabia. It was something going on, but invisible.

RT: *Well, you have, for example, the State Security in Belgium warning against the threat that Saudi Arabia poses in terms of imposing extreme ideology on people in Europe. But on the other hand, Saudi Arabia is painted as an ally of the West. How do you reconcile this?*

CM: The ambiguity of the situation is that the Saudi Arabia is clearly an ally of the West because it was against communism, it was against the former Soviet Union and so on, against Iran today for obvious reasons. So it is an ally, and at the same time, it could be considered an enemy because they have this hidden agenda.

But even inside Saudi society at the highest level, you have two tendencies. In the royal family in Saudi Arabia, you have people who are genuine and honest advocates of working with the West and modernizing Saudi Arabia, and we have other princes saying 'No!', we must keep, stand firmly in our beliefs, and we are still the Saudi and Wahhabi.

RT: *Looking at what some governments in Europe are doing, for example imposing a ban on the burqa, or minarets or other such laws, do you think they actually work? Or do they just create a backlash from the general Muslim community, who are not extremists?*

CM: Both, I think both. First of all, I think we must help and support the average Muslim guy or woman who is just trying to live a normal life and who wants to have a better future for his or her children. And clearly those people are demanding that we take a firm position against the extremists.

They are worried for their children. When you are a Muslim parent in Belgium or France, and you see Muhammed Merah and you see that a young boy of 21, 22 had bad connections, went to an extremist mosque, or wanted to go to Pakistan, I suppose you're afraid and you want the help of the state. And the help of the state is to set some limits.

At the same time, very clearly, it is a way of radicalization for some people. But these people would be radicalized anyway. It's just an occasion, it's just a pretext, but if it is not the burqa, it will be the obligation of Halal food in the school; if it is not this, it will be the mixing of boys and girls in school, or another subject. But a part of this community is moving to radicalization, the ten to 15 percent. The question is how to protect the rest, and of course how to contain the extremists.

The costs, benefits, and efficiency of aviation security measures

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120830-the-costs-benefits-and-efficiency-of-aviation-security-measures>

The threat of terrorist attack on American aviation has made the system the focus of

intense security efforts, but it is difficult to determine if the benefits



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

outweigh their cost. Efficient security policy — a focus on getting the most security for the least cost — should be the priority in an era of fiscal austerity, according to a new RAND Corporation report released last week.

A RAND release reports that the report details ways the federal Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Congress could better consider not only the risks posed by terrorists, but the cost effectiveness of security efforts to reduce those risks.

“Commercial aviation plays a central role in the national economy, and attacks on planes and airports have long been a threat by terrorists worldwide,” said Brian Jackson, a report co-author and a senior researcher at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “But it has also become clear that the public’s tolerance for inconvenience and other security costs is not inexhaustible. The benefits of aviation security must be weighed against the costs in providing that security.”

Among the key findings is that, while it is possible to add up how much money has been spent on scanners, screeners, and other security efforts, there are less-tangible economic costs resulting from the reality that a lot of security makes the aviation system more difficult to use.

“When the system being protected is as valuable economically as aviation, even a small reduction in its usefulness and value adds up quickly, making security potentially much more costly than might be assumed,” Jackson said.

The report explores ways to inform decision making despite uncertainties about the terrorist threat, security system performance and the costs of security measures. It also provides analysis that fills important gaps in the assessment of the costs, benefits and efficiency of aviation security measures and strategies.

Researchers write that America’s aviation system is protected by a layered security strategy that is sometimes, but not always, effective. Multiple types of security technology

and other measures provide several lines of defense that must be breached for an attack to be successful. This does not mean, however, more layers are always better than fewer.

In some cases, layers can reinforce each other and be more effective than the sum of the individual measures on their own. In others, they can interfere with one another and provide less security together than they would have separately. For example, efforts by security officers to detect suspicious behavior at checkpoints could be made less effective if passenger

agitation created by the experience of going through screening masks the indicators those officers attempt to detect. New layers on top of old are costly and can make the aviation system more difficult for passengers and other users.

The study also examines ways that the costs of security programs might be reduced over time. Researchers find that “trusted traveler programs” — including the current TSA PreCheck program — are an attractive strategy for making security more efficient and reducing security burdens on some travelers.

While there has been concern that terrorists could masquerade as a trusted traveler and exploit the program, it is possible to show that overall security can improve even if some attackers compromise the program. However, this requires that the resources saved by reducing screening for trusted travelers are used to improve screening of the remaining members of the public. The effectiveness of a trusted traveler program also depends on high participation rates.

The research was conducted within the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, which conducts analysis to prepare and protect communities and critical infrastructure from natural disasters and terrorism. The Center is a joint program of the RAND National Security Research Division and RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment.



— Read more in Brian A. Jackson et al., *Efficient Aviation Security: Strengthening the Analytic Foundation for Making Air Transportation Security Decisions* (RAND Corporation, 2012)



Dutch fly first ScanEagle mission off Somalia

Source: <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/dutch-fly-first-scanegale-mission-off-somalia-375990/>

The Dutch armed forces have performed their first surveillance mission in support of NATO's counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia using the Boeing/Insitu ScanEagle



unmanned air system. Launched from the Royal Netherlands Navy's landing platform dock the HNLMS *Rotterdam* on 8 August, the ScanEagle completed a flight

of more than 9h over the Gulf of Aden, the Dutch defence ministry says. Operations with the new UAS are being conducted by a detachment of 19 Royal Netherlands Army personnel deployed aboard the vessel, which has been assigned as the flagship for operation "Ocean Shield" since 4 August.

With a wingspan of more than 3m (9.8ft), the ScanEagle has a maximum endurance in excess of 16h. The aircraft relays live video images from an electro-optical/infrared sensor payload to system operators, and will be used to track the movement of suspected pirate ships.

Two Eurocopter AS532 Cougar transports from the Netherlands Defence Helicopter Command are also deployed aboard the *Rotterdam* to support the counter-piracy mission.

Somali Pirates kill hostage over delayed ransom

Source: http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i5_Qbd99RC15OECC4JBkU4-Mwrv?docId=95a2934c5be94821beb53f56859bd7fd

Somali pirates who have been holding a



This is believed to be the first time Somali pirates have killed a hostage because of a delay in ransom.



Hassan Abdi, a pirate commander in Haradhere town, a key pirate center, said Friday that the killing on Wednesday was a message to the owners of the ship MV *Oma* that was hijacked off Seychelles in 2010.

"The killing was a message to the owners of the ship who paid no heed to our ransom demands," Abdi said by telephone. "More killings will follow if they continue to lie to us — we have lost patience with them. Two years is enough," he said angrily.

hijacked ship for nearly two years killed a Syrian hostage crew member and wounded another to protest delayed ransom payment, a pirate leader said.

The MV *Oma* is a Panama-flagged, bulk cargo vessel owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates. The pirates operating along the Somali coastline of the Indian Ocean




CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

were once were believed to be disgruntled and financially motivated Somali fishermen, angry that international trawlers were illegally fishing Somalia's waters. But now criminal gangs are dominating the piracy trade and they have become increasingly violent as international navies attempt to crackdown on their activities. Somali pirates hijacked the MV Orna after firing rocket propelled grenades and small arms at the ship in December 2010, when it was about

The European Union Naval Force patrolling the Indian Ocean waters has not heard about the killing, said spokesperson Lt. Cmdr. Jacqueline Sherriff.

Since, 2008, the EU has maintained a flotilla consisting of between five and 10 warships off the Horn of Africa to fight piracy. It is part of a larger international fleet that includes U.S., NATO, Russian and other warships. The EU taskforce also includes non-EU countries such



400 miles (640 kilometers) northeast of the island nation of the Seychelles. In May last year an undisclosed number of pirates and hostages were forced to abandon the Orna after a fire broke out, said Abdi. It is believed the fire was caused by an electrical problem in the ship's kitchen, he said.

as Norway, Croatia, Montenegro and Ukraine. Pirate attacks off Somalia's coast plunged to 69 in the first six months this year from 163 a year earlier, according to the EU force. Somali pirates were able to seize 13 vessels, down from 21, according to piracy watchdog the International Maritime Bureau.

Convicted terrorist who paralysed himself after going on hunger strike in prison win swimming silver

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2196142/London-Paralympics-2012-Convicted-terrorist-paralysed-going-hunger-strike-prison-beats-Britons-win-silver-50m-freestyle.html>

A convicted terrorist who disabled himself after going on hunger strike in jail yesterday defeated two Britons to claim a swimming silver. Spanish athlete Sebastian Rodriguez Veloso, a former member of Communist terror group Grapo, finished second in the 50m freestyle sprint.

The 55-year-old was sentenced to 84 years in jail in 1984 for his part in the murder of a business leader and a bombing campaign. During his time behind bars, he staged a 432-day hunger strike and was only kept alive after being force fed.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

His extended protest damaged several of his



organs and left him paralyzed from the waist down.

After being released from jail early in 1996, he began swimming, and has since won 13 medals in the Sydney, Athens, Beijing Paralympic games.

Victory: (Left to right) Spain's silver medallist Sebastian Rodriguez, Brazil's gold medallist Daniel Dias and US bronze medallist Roy Perkins pose on the podium during the victory ceremony for the men's 50m freestyle

Yesterday he defeated Britons Anthony Stephens from Reading, who finished sixth, and Andrew Mullen from Glasgow who came eight in the final. Veloso, from Cadiz in southern Spain, rarely speaks of his crimes for which he received an

official pardon in 2007 from the Spanish cabinet following his great sporting success.

The father of a 19-year-old daughter has said he wants to be judged on his successes as a swimmer not for his past.

He has said: 'The past cannot be erased.' He also gives talks at schools on the values of solidarity, achievement and camaraderie that the sport provides.

Yesterday, he praised the atmosphere and welcoming he received at London 2012, saying: 'It's amazing.

'You are making us feel like what we aim to be,



like what we are, like what we hope in future will be increasingly accepted that we are, like 100 per cent sportspeople.'

ASIO warns of rise in home-grown terrorism

Source:<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-04/spy-chief-warns-of-growing-threat-of-home-grown-terrorism/4242596>

The nation's spy chief says Australia is increasingly at risk of home-grown terrorism.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) director-general David Irvine says there has been a rise in the efforts of some Australians to support violent jihad, although the number remains "very small" in absolute terms.

"It's a fact that we continue to have in Australia people who believe that violence is the way to fulfil perceived religious obligations," Mr Irvine told a security in government conference.

"They reject outright Australia's right to democratic self-governance and our separation of church and state."



Mr Irvine says a mixture of good work and good luck has prevented more large-scale attacks like those seen on September 11, 2001.

Though, he says it would be dangerous to assume all future terrorism plots will be detected.

"The threat will remain as long as the proponents of violent jihad stay committed to the promotion of their objectives by violent means," he said.

"The suicide bomber, with an absolute belief in martyrdom leading to a blessed eternity in another world, remains a particularly dangerous phenomenon."

Mr Irvine says the security issue is not so much their beliefs but that they



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

are prepared to use extremely violent measures to achieve their goals.

"We're seeing at the moment less importation of foreign terrorists... but of concern is a rise in efforts by Australians who wish to support acts of terrorism in Australia or travel overseas," he said.

He says ASIO is aware of a small but steady number of Australians seeking to travel overseas for terrorist training or to participate in armed conflict.

The ASIO boss says the intelligence agency is currently dealing with about 200 active counter-terrorism investigations.

Acts Of Terror Or Political Aggression May Be Predicted By Leaders' Emotional Cues

Source: <http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/249751.php>

Leaders often use rousing speeches to evoke powerful emotions, and those emotions may predict when a group will commit an act of violence or terrorism, according to new research published in the journal *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. Analysis of speeches delivered by government, activist and terrorist leaders found that leaders' expressions of anger, contempt and disgust spiked immediately before their group committed an act of violence. "When leaders express a combination of anger, contempt and disgust in their speeches, it seems to be instrumental in inciting a group to act violently," said David Matsumoto, professor of psychology at San Francisco State University.

As part of a five-year project funded by the U.S. Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative, Matsumoto and colleagues studied the transcripts of speeches delivered by the leaders of ideologically motivated groups over the past 100 years. The analysis included such speeches as Osama bin Laden's remarks leading up to the bombings of embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The researchers analyzed the pattern of emotions conveyed when leaders spoke about their rival group and examined speeches given at three points in time before a specific act of aggression. They compared the results with the content of speeches delivered by leaders whose groups engaged in nonviolent acts of resistance such as rallies and protests.

Among leaders of groups that committed aggressive acts, there was a significant

increase in expressions of anger, contempt and disgust from 3 to 6 months prior to the group committing an act of violence. For nonviolent groups, expressions of anger, contempt and disgust decreased from 3 to 6 months prior to the group staging an act of peaceful resistance.

Matsumoto says the findings suggest a leader's emotional tone may cause the rest of the group to share those emotions, which then motivates the group to take part in violent actions.


"For groups that committed acts of violence, there seemed to

be this saturation of anger, contempt and disgust. That combination seems to be a recipe for hatred that leads to violence," Matsumoto said.

Anger, contempt and disgust may be particularly important drivers of violent behavior because they are often expressed in response to moral violations, says Matsumoto, and when an individual feels these emotions about a person or group, they often feel that their opponent is unchangeable and inherently bad.

"Understanding the preceding factors that lead to terrorist attacks and violent events may help predict these incidents or prevent them occurring in the first place," Matsumoto said.

"Studying the emotions expressed by leaders is just one piece of the puzzle but it could be a helpful predictor of terrorist attacks."




State Department Blacklists Militant Haqqani Network

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/world/asia/state-department-blacklists-militant-haqqani-network.html?_r=1

In a report to Congress on Friday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton formally designated the militant Haqqani network — responsible for some of the deadliest attacks against American troops in Afghanistan — as a terrorist organization, two days before a Congressional deadline.

President Obama spoke at the Democratic National Convention.

Mrs. Clinton and others have already discussed the issue with their counterparts in Pakistan, and the administration’s special envoy, Marc Grossman, is expected to formally inform Pakistan’s leaders on Friday.



Mrs. Clinton signed the order in Brunei before departing to Vladivostok for the annual Asia Pacific Economic Conference, and State Department officials began notifying senior lawmakers. She issued the report after a last round of internal debate that took place in Washington on Thursday hours before

The decision is the culmination of nearly two years of spirited debate inside the administration that reached a peak in the past month under the pressure of Sunday’s reporting deadline. Several State Department and military officials had argued that



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

designating the organization would help strangle the group's fund-raising activities in countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and pressure Pakistan to open a long-expected military offensive against the militants.

Critics had contended that a designation by the Treasury Department or the United Nations could achieve largely the same result as adding the network to the much more prominent State Department list, with far fewer consequences.



Sirajuddin Haqqani (center), the son of the legendary Mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and now commander of the most ruthless insurgency militia. The United States has put a \$5 million reward on his head.

Many other senior officials, including several in the White House, expressed deep reservations that blacklisting the group could further damage badly frayed relations with Pakistan, undercut peace talks with the Taliban and possibly jeopardize the fate of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, the only American soldier known to be held by the militants.

But in the past few days, supporters of designating the group apparently eased most concerns or put forward contingencies to mitigate the risks and potential consequences.

"This shows that we are using everything we can to put the squeeze on these guys," said one administration official who was involved in the process, and who spoke on the condition of anonymity on Thursday because the decision had not yet been formally announced.

Another senior administration official said the designation "is a very strong signal of our resolve to combat the Haqqanis."

But many senior counterterrorism officials as well as top American military officers, including Gen. John R. Allen, commander of American and NATO troops in Afghanistan, had said designating the organization should be a top priority.

"F.T.O. designation could reduce a critical capability of the Haqqani network by increasing the cost of doing business, reducing access to capital, and constraining the network's financial resources, thereby limiting their freedom to operate in a local, regional, and international context," Jeffrey Dressler, senior Afghanistan analyst for the Institute for the Study of War, a research organization here, said in a paper issued this week, referring to foreign terrorist organizations.

Mr. Dressler said the Haqqani network's business interests stretched from Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Persian Gulf, and included car dealerships, money exchanges and construction companies, import-export operations and smuggling networks.

Since 2008, Haqqani suicide attackers have struck the American Embassy and Indian Embassy in



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as the headquarters of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and hotels and restaurants there.

American officials confirmed last week that a senior member of the Haqqani family leadership, Badruddin Haqqani, the network's operational commander, was killed recently in a drone strike in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Pressure in Congress to add the group to the terrorist list had grown this year. "The Haqqani network is engaged in a reign of terror," Representative Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican who is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said in July. "Now is the time for action, not simply paperwork and talk."

With virtually unanimous backing, Congress approved legislation that President Obama signed into law on Aug. 10 giving Mrs. Clinton 30 days to determine whether the Haqqani network was a terrorist group, and report her decision to lawmakers by Sunday, coincidentally three days after the end of the Democratic National Convention.

Critics of designating the group a terrorist organization say the action could drive a wedge between the United States and Pakistan, just as the countries are gingerly recovering from months of grueling negotiations to reopen NATO supply routes. Pakistan closed the routes through its territory after an allied airstrike near the Afghan border last November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

These same critics say such a move would appear to bring Pakistan a step closer to being designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. American officials say Pakistan's main spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, is secretly aiding the insurgents. Pakistani officials have said the agency maintains regular contact with the Haqqanis, but deny that it provides operational support.

Two Pakistani officials said last week that the decision was "an internal American issue." American analysts believe that Pakistan would be reluctant to publicly protest the designation, because to do so would substantiate American beliefs that Pakistan supports the Haqqanis.

Read more at: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_Network_0.pdf

Britain thwarted 30 Olympic terror plots targeting athletes like Bolt, Farah

Source: <http://www.bignetwork.com/index.php?sid/209017051/scat/c4cdc9be967f45f9>

Intelligence agencies in the UK foiled as many as 30 plots to attack the Olympic Games and target athletes like Mo Farah and Usain Bolt.

Suspects were arrested in Britain, across Europe and the Middle East after plans to attack the Olympics were intercepted.

A massive operation was prepared by top security experts from the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, based at MI5 headquarters, to foil the plots, with cyclist Victoria Pendleton and athlete Jessica Ennis also on the target list.

According to the Daily Star, the plotters are being believed to be Al-Qaeda extremists, including Somalians, who were angry that Mo Farah, who was born in their country, was turning out for Team GB.



Intelligence agents picked up 'chatters' that fanatics were planning a September 11-style plane hijack and runners Bolt and Farah were at the top of a terror list, the report said.

"It would have been a disaster if they had succeeded. We couldn't take any chances after picking up chatter about a plan to seize a plane and do a Twin Towers-style -attack, a British security source said.

"The big names, including Bolt and Farah, were also at risk as we heard them mentioned in the conversations we intercepted," the source added.

"These fanatics didn't even have to get into the stadium or get close to the royals. They would have been happy blowing up a car park as that would have caused enough chaos," the source said.



Muslim Terrorist Group Threatened Norway With 9-11 Type Attack Just Prior To Breivik Conviction

Source: <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/377249/20120824/norway-threat-911-ansar-al-sunna-muslim.htm>

Norwegian news portal VG Nett reported that last week Muslim extremist terrorist group *Ansar al-Sunna* has threatened the Norwegian government with an attack similar to 9-11 unless part of the capital city of Oslo is not transformed into a Muslim nation.

consider it necessary either to move away from Norway, because we were born and grew up here. And Allah's earth belongs to everybody." The development arose just one week before Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian gunman who killed 77 people in a massacre



"We do not wish to live together with dirty beasts like you," the extremist group wrote in a letter to Norwegian lawmakers and newspaper editors.

"We received the letter on Tuesday and have started an investigation on the letter," Police Security Service spokesman Siv Alsén told VG Nett. "We take it seriously, absolutely."

The terrorist group demanded that a section of Oslo, specifically the Greenland district, become independent from the current government so that they can form an Islamist state.

"We do not want to be a part of Norwegian society," the letter also noted. "And we do not

last summer, was sentenced to 21 years in prison. Breivik said he committed the murders to protest the "Islamization" of Norway.

The letter from Ansar al-Sunna also accused senior government officials - Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide -- of having given direct orders to "attack ... Muslims."

In addition, the group demanded that Norway pull its troops out of Muslim countries, adding the threat: "If Norwegian soldiers can take planes to Afghanistan, then Osama [bin Laden] and Mohammed can also take planes to Norway. Now, the government must wake up and assume responsibility,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

before this war spreads to Norway. Before the counterpart reacts.

"Before Muslims take the step necessary. Do not confuse the Muslims' silence with weakness. Do not profit from the Muslims' patience. Do not force us to do something that can be avoided. This is not a threat, only the words of truth. The words of justice."

The letter included a logo that resembles one used by al Qaeda in Iraq.

According to VG Nett, the Norwegian police had already been following a few members of this terrorist group before the letter was even sent.

A few days after that letter was sent, Norwegian-Pakistani imam Fayed Sarased Ali

Bukhari warned that any Muslim who doesn't fast during Ramadan should be beheaded.

NRK, a Norwegian broadcaster, showed a clip in which Bukhari stated: "If a person doesn't fast during Ramadan, he is mocking Islam. And if the person is in a Muslim state, the authorities must behead him.

"For a person who doesn't perform his daily prayers, and is of age and sound mind, the most lenient punishment in an Islamic state is incarceration," he added. "In certain schools of law, there would be grounds to kill them."

Norway's Muslim population is relatively small but has been increasing due to immigration. As of 2007, about 3.5 percent of the nation's people were Islamic.

9/11: ELEVEN YEARS AFTER...



Details, timeline of attack on Benghazi compound emerge

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120913-details-timeline-of-attack-on-benghazi-compound-emerge>

All the details about the attack Tuesday which killed four at the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi are not yet available, and also unknown is the identity of the attackers and the organization to which they belong. From press reports, however, it is possible to reconstruct the broad outline of the assault.

At 10 p.m. Benghazi time, which is 4 p.m. EST, the U.S. compound began to take fire from unidentified Libyans. That compound has a main building, several “ancillary” buildings, and an annex.



شبكة آخر خبر: ان تبول الحقيقة
 صورة المسؤول الأمريكي بسفارة الولايات المتحدة في بنغازي والذي قتل في هجوم على السفارة احتجاجا على فيلم مسيء للرسول

Fox News reports that at about 10:15 the attackers broke into the compound and began firing into the main building. The building was soon engulfed in flames.



There were three people inside the main building when the attack — Ambassador Stevens, department official Sean Smith, and a regional security officer. As the attackers shot their way into the building, and flames and smoke filled the hallways, the three men became separated.

The security officer managed to find his way out of the building, but soon returned to look for Stevens and Smith. He found Smith already dead, having been shot by the assailants. He

could not locate Stevens, though, and forced out of the building by the thickening smoke and the incessant shooting.



A few minutes later, at 10:45 p.m., more security personnel joined the regional security officer in an effort to enter the main building, but were repelled by the blazing fire. They returned to the annex.

At 11:20, accompanied military and police, they tried again to enter the main building to search for Stevens and other compound employees. They managed to get all the remaining Americans from the ancillary buildings into the annex, but could not find Stevens.

About half an hour later, around midnight, the annex too came under sustained fire from the assailants. The attack on the annex lasted for two hours, and resulted in two more Americans dead.

Finally, about 2 a.m., a large number of Libyan security forces managed to gain control of the compound and lead the Americans to safety.

At the same time, and without the knowledge of



شبكة آخر خبر: ان تبول الحقيقة
 السفير الأمريكي في ليبيا اثناء محاولات انقاذه بعد هجوم على قنصلية بلاده في بنغازي احتجاجا على فيلم مسيء للرسول

the American diplomatic personnel, the Libyan forces which entered the main building found Stevens and rushed him to hospital in Benghazi.

It is not clear what condition Stevens was in. “We do not have any information what his condition was at that time,” a U.S. official told Fox News.

U.S. officials did not see Stevens body until about 7:00 a.m., when it was returned to the Benghazi airport and flown to Tripoli with most of the other diplomats.

There are conflicting reports about the cause of his death, with some



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Libyans saying he died as a result of smoke inhalation, while others say he was in relatively good shape when he was found in the compound's main building, but was shot dead in the car that took him to the hospital by one of the assailants, who noticed the Libyan forces' attempt to whisk him out.

The attack raises questions about security arrangements at the compound. Any building can be damaged if fired upon by a RPGs, but the relative ease with which the assailants managed to enter the compound, and then shoot their way from building to building, suggests that there were not enough security guards to protect the compound, or that they

were not equipped to withstand and repel the assault.

A second question has to do with the security arrangements between the United States and Libya. It is not clear why it took the Libyan government – or the local police – nearly four hours to respond: the assault began at 10:00 p.m., but Libyan units did not arrive in force until 2:00 a.m.

When the Libyan security forces finally arrived, they easily regained control of the compound and chased the assailants away. Why these forces did not arrive within minutes of attack is a questions that should be addressed.

Innocence of Muslims

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innocence_of_Muslims

Innocence of Muslims, previously called *Innocence of Bin Laden* (working title *Desert Warrior*, YouTube titles *The Real Life of Muhammad* and *Muhammad Movie Trailer*), is a privately produced low-budget 2012 film that disparages Islam and its prophet, Muhammad. Months after its release, violent protests against Western institutions in several mostly Muslim countries around the world resulted in a number of deaths, and hundreds of injuries. Two film trailers were released on YouTube, on July 1 and 2, 2012. The clips were dubbed into Arabic, and then spread by Egyptian-American lawyer and Coptic Christian Morris Sadek.

The result: Turmoil in the Arabic world...



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

As maritime security rises, pirate attacks are down

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120913-as-maritime-security-rises-pirate-attacks-are-down>

In the past four years Somali pirates have attacked 800 ships and taken 3,400 people hostage. Now shipping companies which regularly go through the Indian Ocean are fighting back by hiring private security, and the scales have tipped.

In the past two years the number of successful pirate attacks has dropped from forty-nine ships in 2010 to twenty-nine ships in 2011. This year the number continues to fall. ABC reports that the number of incidents in the first six months of the year has dropped from 163 in 2011 to sixty-nine this year.

The drop in attacks is due to the increased presence of international naval ships as well as

rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and AK-47 machine guns, but “they’re getting better”

“They can terrorize the crew into complete submission,” Rothrauff told *ABC News*. “They are good at what they do. They are skilled and they’re getting trained so it’s not a cake walk. It’s not a joke.”

The pirates themselves have little else to do to earn money in an improvised land where job opportunities are nonexistent, but violence is high. One incarcerated pirate told *BBC* that pirating ships is just a form of taxation.

“We catch a ship, tax some taxes, and then release them without harming or killing them,” he said. “There’s nothing wrong with that.”



shipping companies hiring armed guards.

“To date not a single ship with privately contracted armed security personnel abroad has been pirated,” Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Shapiro told *ABC News*. “Not one.”

The shipping industry is now spending almost \$1 billion per year on private armed security. About 50 percent of commercial ships that go through the Indian Ocean have armed guards aboard them.

With that much money changing hands, many private security firms are now getting into the anti-piracy business, but the use of these companies, mostly American, is controversial, with critics questioning the addition of violence to a region already exclusively known for it.

Tom Rothrauff, president of Trident Group Inc. was a Navy SEAL, and so are all of his guards. Rothrauff has a training facility which simulates the conditions of being on a ship, and he takes his recruits out into the Atlantic Ocean to test their shooting skills.

Rothrauff said that not only are the Somali pirates’ arsenals “very sophisticated” with

The pirate’s claims are not true however, as many hostages are brutalized, starved, and some are killed.

“I want Americans to know that it’s out there, it’s real,” former Marine Joe Alvarado, now a team leader for ESPADA Logistics and Security Group, Inc told *ABC News*. “It’s not pirates of the Caribbean. It’s no longer guys with sabers. It’s real life. It’s a real threat.”

Members of the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea sent a letter to the UN Security Council in June about the threat of private companies potentially selling weapons in the region.

“The unmonitored and largely unregulated activities of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) off the coast of Somalia,” said the letter. “May represent a new potential channel for the flow of arms and ammunition into the region.”

The Monitoring Group says the firms are now leasing arms and have brought 7,000 new weapons into the region and should be subject to international regulation.



Homeland Security’s ‘narco sub’ PLUTO mimics the real thing

Source: <https://www.dhs.gov/st-snapshot-pluto>

With low profiles and low radar reflectivity, stealthy, drug-running semi-submersibles, "narco subs," built in southern jungles cut through the ocean at wave height and are nearly impossible to detect. DHS' semi-submersible mimics them so that a variety of sensors can be tested in the battle against illegal drug-running.

The erstwhile planet Pluto (now officially an asteroid) was known for decades as a small, dark planet—hidden, difficult to spot, and on a



quiet, determined course all its own. And so, when the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) needed a target semi-submersible to detect the hidden but determined maritime smuggling operations of the South American drug cartels, it created its own vessel and called it "PLUTO," after the planet that is so difficult to spot. S&T's PLUTO is a small, semi-submersible that is representative of what are popularly called "narco subs," and serves as a realistic practice target for the detection systems of DHS and its national security community partners. In the early 90's, South American drug cartels came up with a new tactic to transport narcotics destined for the United States: small, radar-dodging, self-propelled, semi-submersibles (SPSSs). Although clandestine semi-submersibles were rumored to exist in the mid-1990s, many believed them to be a myth, hence their name *Bigfoots*. Then in 2006, an actual Colombian semi-submersible was captured by the U.S. Coast Guard in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Today, drug cartels continue to build their "narco subs." With low profiles and low radar reflectivity, these illegal, stealthy, drug-running semi-submersibles cut through the water at wave height and are nearly impossible to detect. S&T built PLUTO in 2008 to serve as a surrogate SPSS with many of the same features as the vessels built by the cartels. It is used as a target by DHS and its national security community partners to help test the performance of detection systems and give operators of those systems real world experience under controlled conditions. This testing helps develop new concepts of operation for seaborne, airborne, and spaceborne technologies to spot illegal

quiet, determined course all its own. And so, when the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) needed a target semi-submersible to detect the hidden but determined maritime smuggling operations of the South American drug cartels, it created its own vessel and called it "PLUTO," after the planet that is so difficult to spot. S&T's PLUTO is a small, semi-submersible that is representative of what are popularly called "narco subs," and serves as a realistic practice target for the detection systems of DHS and its national security community partners.

In the early 90's, South American drug cartels came up with a new tactic to transport narcotics destined for the United States: small, radar-dodging, self-propelled, semi-submersibles (SPSSs). Although clandestine semi-submersibles were rumored to exist in the mid-1990s, many believed them to be a myth, hence their name *Bigfoots*. Then in 2006, an actual Colombian semi-submersible was captured by the U.S. Coast Guard in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Today, drug cartels



vessels. "Small surface vessels, self-propelled semi-submersibles, and now the most recent innovation of fully submerged vessels (FSVs), pose significant challenges to maritime security," says Tom Tomaiko of S&T's Borders and



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Maritime Security Division. “While some small boats sitting low in the water have legitimate purposes, there are many that are used for illicit purposes

Dozens of these boats have been captured by the U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies in the last few years, sometimes with their cargo still on board, sometimes after it has been thrown overboard. “When the crews

S&T’s PLUTO is home-ported at Eglin Air Force Base, near Fort Walton Beach, Florida, and is maintained by the Air Force’s 46th Test Squadron. Various civilian and military agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection/Air and Marine (CBP/OAM), U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and other national agencies have tested their remote sensing capabilities against PLUTO in



become aware they’ve been spotted, they will typically scuttle the boat immediately, knowing they’ll be rescued by us anyway,” says Tomaiko.

Meanwhile, cramped living conditions within the illegal SSPSs can be horrendous. There is generally only 3” of space above the waterline, meaning the ride can be very rough. The small crews of 3 or 4 have little to eat, poor air quality, no toilet facilities, operate with little rest until they reach their destination, and are sometimes watched over by an armed guard.

If the mission is undetected and the drugs successfully delivered, the vessel is typically scuttled and not reused. “Drug-running is lucrative. It is cheaper to simply build another vessel than to run the risk of trying to get a vessel and its crew home,” says Tomaiko.

In a typical operation, PLUTO will operate at SPSS cruising speeds of 4 to 8 knots while remote sensor platforms from sea to space attempt to detect and track it at various distances and observation angles.

the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic, and the Pacific.

In 2009, Customs and Border Protection tested its Dash 8 maritime surveillance aircraft against PLUTO at the Eglin range and near Key West, Florida. These results helped gauge the performance of the Dash 8’s SeaVue radar against PLUTO and helped determine detection distances and aspect angles for optimal mission performance. In addition, the U.S. Navy tested one of its P-3 aircraft equipped with maritime surveillance radar system against PLUTO. All such tests were instrumental in helping to verify the performance of sensor capabilities, and provided operators with real-world training which will help determine future tactics.

PLUTO is just over 45 feet long, can run roughly 10 knots at maximum speed and can hold a crew of 3 to 4, although it usually operates with only one for safety reasons. It has VHF and HF radios, and the 46th Test Squadron



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

can install other types of radios and maritime automated identification system (AIS) equipment to meet testing or safety requirements. Conditions onboard, however, were primarily influenced by the need for crew safety, so PLUTO's design does not exactly mimic that of illegal SSPSs.

Technical capabilities such as PLUTO are necessary to counter and stay ahead of threats to the country. Admiral James Stavridis, former Joint Commander for all US forces in the Caribbean, Central and South America,

wrote, "Criminals are never going to wait for law enforcement to catch up. They are always extending the boundaries of imagination, and likewise, we must strive to push forward technology and invest in systems designed specifically to counter the semi-submersible. We need to be able to rapidly detect and interdict this new type of threat, both for its current effects via the drug trade, and – more troublingly – for its potential as a weapon in the hands of terrorists."

Kazakhstan Struggles to Contain Salafist-Inspired Terrorism

By Jacob Zenn

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

Kazakhstan has experienced a rise in militant activity carried out by Salafist groups on its territory and periphery since late 2011. The Salafists' rejection of secularism and other types of Islam and their call for a return to the ways of the *Salaf*, or pious ancestors who lived at the time of Muhammad and the first four Caliphs, are regarded by the Kazakh government—and most Kazakhs—as incompatible with the country's political and social institutions and the native brand of Islam that is strongly flavored by Kazakh customs and traditions. [1] For this reason, Kazakhs often refer to Salafists as Wahhabis, denoting the puritanical form of Sunni Islam prevalent in Saudi Arabia that has made inroads into Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. In the words of Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, "radical and extremist elements" in Kazakhstan have "put enormous pressure on the state and on society as a whole" (Astana Times, July 13). This article tracks recent developments in Salafist militancy in Kazakhstan and the Central Asia region and reviews Kazakhstan's "counter-Salafism" strategy, the long-term impact of which will likely be diminished by forces beyond Kazakhstan's control.



Jund al-Khilafah and Domestic Militancy

In the last three months of 2011, three Jund al-Khilafah (Army of the Caliphate) cells carried out the first terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan's history, targeting government buildings and personnel in Atyrau, Taraz and Almaty. According to sources in Kazakhstan, one of Jund al-Khilafah's founders from Atyrau became a Salafist militant when he was arbitrarily denied permission by Kazakh authorities to study Islam in Saudi Arabia. With two companions from Atyrau, he then fled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, where they established Jund al-Khilafah while maintaining networks with Salafists in Kazakhstan who could carry out attacks on the home front. [2] Jund al-Khilafah also heightened its profile through posts on online jihadi forums, such as al-Qaeda's Ansar al-Mujahideen forum, claiming responsibility for each of the three attacks. The movement also issued video statements denouncing the 2011 "massacre" of striking oil workers in Zhanaozen and President Nursultan Nazarbayev's religious policies, which Jund al-Khilafah claims prohibits government officials from praying in state institutions, men from growing beards and women from wearing the *hijab*. [3]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Jund al-Khilafah has not carried out attacks in Kazakhstan in 2012, but another Salafist group in Kostanay (northern Kazakhstan) was uncovered facilitating the travel of Salafists to Afghanistan by providing them with fraudulent documents. Elsewhere, members of a group in Atyrau, possibly related to Jund al-Khilafah, were caught sending money to Kazakh militants abroad through bank transfers to



Pakistan (Interfax, July 3). In addition, a group in Tausamaly (a village outside of Almaty) set off a gas explosion in a safe-house on July 11, while creating a home-made bomb, killing 8 persons. A search of the premises uncovered guns, ammunition, religious literature and police and SWAT team uniforms (Kazakhstan Today [Almaty], July 17). In an August 17 follow-up operation to arrest the leaders of that cell, Kazakh security forces killed nine people who reportedly refused to surrender (Regnum.ru, August 17). During the investigation it was revealed the suspects kept their wives locked up in apartments to prevent them from communicating with the outside world. Most recently, on September 12, a special forces operation in Atyrau raided a flat where suspected terrorists who set off an accidental explosion that killed one person on September 5 were believed to be residing (Interfax [Atyrau], September 12).

Salafism on Kazakhstan's Periphery

The rise of militancy north of Kazakhstan, in the Russian republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, may be connected to the rise of militancy in Kazakhstan. Ravil Kusainov, one of the founders of Jund al-Khilafah, declared in an interview to the jihadi media outlet Minbar Media that Jund al-Khilafah consists of nationals from different countries

(www.vesti.kz, November 10). His name and the name of another founder, Rinat Habiulla, are also distinctly Tatar.

On July 19, a Salafist militant group injured Tatarstan's chief *mufti*, Idrus Faizov, in a car-bomb assassination attempt in Tatarstan's capital, Kazan. One hour before that attack, different members of that group succeeded in killing the chief of the education department of the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Tatarstan, Valiulla Yakupov, in a shooting outside his residence. Both religious leaders were known for their efforts to cleanse Salafism from Tatarstan's religious institutions. The "Mujahideen of Tatarstan" issued a pair of videos on YouTube, the first of which announced the formation of the group on the morning of the attacks. In this video, "Muhammad," the military *amir* of the group, said that the Tatarstan Mujahideen were

prepared to carry out attacks on the orders of Caucasus Emirate leader Dokku Umarov, who has sought to establish a front in Russia's Volga and Far East regions for nearly a decade (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 12). [4]

According to Russian officials, there is an entire generation prepared to carry out extremist activity in Tatarstan, with well over 100 people having been arrested for extremist activity there since 2006. These include the owner of a company that organizes pilgrimages, the head of a mosque in Tatarstan and an Uzbekistan national who are all suspects in the recent shootings of two religious leaders (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 3, 2011; *Kommersant*, July 20).

Tatarstan's neighbor Bashkortostan has also seen growing signs of militancy. Bashkortostan's southern border is only 300 kilometers from the northern Kazakhstan city of Aktobe, where four members of a Salafist militant cell were convicted in October 2011 for carrying out police shootings. In June 2012, five members of a Hizb ut-Tahrir cell were arrested in Bashkortostan for preparing and distributing leaflets, books, brochures and videos propagandizing "extremist views" (*Perviy Kanal*, May 25). In addition, an eight-person cell was arrested in late 2011 while preparing experimental explosions for an attack



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

on Bashkortostan's district headquarters. Like Jund al-Khilafah's founders, the suspects were alleged to have planned an escape to Afghanistan through Kazakhstan (MediaKorSet, December 16, 2011).

Other Regional Developments

To Kazakhstan's south, the Salafist-influenced group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) has taken advantage of Kyrgyzstan's weak internal security. HuT was founded by diaspora Palestinians in 1952 and believes it is obligatory for every Muslim to work toward the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate; that no other system of law but Sharia is permissible; and that it is *haram* (forbidden) for Muslim states to seek protection from America or other *kufr* (non-Islamic) states. [5] HuT has been repressed to near extinction in Uzbekistan, where it first gained popularity in Central Asia in the 1990s, and most of Kazakhstan, but in Kyrgyzstan HuT has reemerged with an estimated 20,000 to 100,000 members. [6] Moreover, after the ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010, HuT made inroads into northern Kyrgyzstan and areas near the Kazakhstan border, especially among the internally displaced people from the south now living near Bishkek, where Kazakhs have been among those arrested for proselytizing for HuT (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 16). Although HuT members profess non-violence, some of them have been radicalized by way of their increased contacts with Afghanistan. Notably, Kyrgyz fighters are believed to comprise the majority of fighters in Jund al-Khilafah. [7]

In the North Caucasus, where Dokku Umarov's Caucasus Emirate is based, Kazakhs have been found among captured or killed militants more frequently than any other Central Asian nationality, although it might be possible that many of these "Kazakhs" are ethnic Chechens who have returned to their homeland more than half-a-century after Stalin deported the entire Chechen population to Kazakhstan in the 1940s (RFE/RL, April 20, 2011). The proximity of the North Caucasus to Atyrau and Western Kazakhstan and the trade and transportations links that connect the two Caspian Sea coastal areas may also explain the rise of Salafism in Western Kazakhstan. Religious extremist groups were historically only found in southern Kazakhstan's Shymkent and Kentau regions,

which are home to Kazakhstan's more religiously conservative Uzbek minority, but the estimated 5,000 Salafists between the ages of 13 and 30 in Atyrau is a sign of Salafism's spread to ethnic Kazakh regions of the country (Tengrinews, November 17). In addition, Jund al-Khilafah and other Central Asian Salafist groups continue to propagate the militant ideas of Aleksandr Tikhomirov, an ethnic Buryat Russian who converted to Islam with an adopted name Said Buryatsky and was killed in battle in the North Caucasus in March 2009.

Further abroad, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the emergence of Salafist political parties in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia provide newfound legitimacy for political Islam—a challenge to the secular, Nazarbayev-centric regime in Kazakhstan. Salafists in the Middle East have shown strong opposition to the Kazakhstan government, including the radical Mauritanian Sheikh Abu-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, who issued a *fatwa* in March 2011 saying that it is legal for Muslims to attack police in Kazakhstan and that there is an obligation for the Muslims of Kazakhstan to not be patient, but rather to engage in jihad (Kavkaz Tsentri, March 19, 2011). The revolutions in the Arab world have also emboldened groups like Jund al-Khilafah, which has urged Kazakhs to "to draw lessons from the Arab Spring and get rid of their governments" and sent a message to President Nazarbayev in a video statement saying that his regime would follow the same path as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya because of its "anti-Muslim" policies (www.vesti.kz, November 10). Leading Kazakhstani political analysts who contributed to a report in late August 2012 called "Central Asia-2020: An Inside View" have estimated that the probability of Islamists coming to power in Central Asia through revolution or mass protests, such as those in the Arab World, is as high as 30% in the mid-to-long term (Interfax, August 20). Similarly, Maulen Ashimbayev, the chairman of the Committee for International Affairs, Defense and Security of the Majlis (the Kazakh Parliament's lower house) says that: Kazakhstan is probably interesting to [Salafists] by the fact that we are situated relatively not far from such complicated regions as the North Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Our territory is a transit one for movements between southern and northern 'hot spots.' Therefore, the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

radical forces have the wish to entrench themselves here. They are purposefully working on recruiting supporters from within the country, attracting, first of all, young people to their ranks (Kazakhstan Today [Almaty], September 10).

Countering Salafism

Although Kazakhstan has a reputation for dealing out harsh punishments with insufficient due process to terror suspects, the country has taken a more calibrated approach to countering Salafism. The Kazakh approach recognizes the role of the intelligentsia, religious leaders, NGOs, public organizations and the mass media in preventing isolated Salafist groups from becoming a large-scale problem in the country (Kazakhstan Today [Almaty], September 10).

One way in which Kazakhstan has sought to prevent youths from being recruited into extremist organizations is through educational initiatives. For example, the Astana mayor's Domestic Policy Department established a "Center for Research on Religious Problems and for Psychological Rehabilitation" in October 2011 to provide alternative religious education for youths whose parents or teachers believe they have been influenced or "brainwashed" by "non-traditional religiosity," such as Wahhabism (Central Asia Online [Almaty], October 13, 2011). Similarly, in southeastern Kazakhstan's Zhambyl province, the Department of Religious Affairs has begun holding roundtable discussions, debates, seminars and public opinion polls to help youths distinguish "between traditional religion and the harsh rules of destructive cults" (Central Asia Online [Taraz], May 12, 2011). The Zhambyl city of Taraz also unveiled a memorial depicting the famous Kazakh folk couple Kozy-Korpesh and Bayan-Sulu after the November 2011 terrorist attack in the city "to symbolize the struggle against terrorism and to promote love" (Central Asia Online [Taraz], February 15).

Other strategies to counter the Salafist ideology include:

- Opening the new Nur-Astana mosque, one of Asia's largest, in Astana in July 2012. The mosque can seat up to 5,000 worshippers and is designed to buttress the government's religious credentials.
- Efforts to shut down religious facilities where Salafists have been reported

preaching, including the Saudi Arabian cultural center in Almaty.

- Placing theologians and psychologists on the military draft boards to check for signs that indicate whether new recruits have been influenced by Salafism.
- Monitoring more than 10,000 websites for extremist content and blocking access to more than 100 such websites.

Conclusion

Some of Kazakhstan's approaches to addressing the spread of Salafism may be effective in preventing youths from falling into the trap of an inflexible ideology which has a tendency towards militancy. Nonetheless, with Salafism's success in winning recruits on Kazakhstan's periphery, it will be difficult for Kazakhstan to succeed in containing the ideology without the successful efforts of neighboring states such as Russia and Kyrgyzstan, both of which have seen Salafism spread in recent years. For this reason, Kazakhstan has hosted regional forums to address Salafism, including a conference in Astana where anti-extremism cooperation between Turkic-speaking countries was discussed on September 6 (Interfax [Astana], September 6).

However, one of the key domestic issues Kazakhstan will need to address is the country's political future and whether religious groups will be able to openly and freely partake in politics in a post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan as in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia now. If Salafist-influenced groups were allowed to participate in politics, the Kazakh government would have to develop a political model that is more attractive to the country's citizens than the religious model that has won Salafist political parties votes in formerly secular countries like Egypt and Tunisia. It is not yet clear what ideology will guide the next generation of Kazakh leaders who do not have the legitimacy of Nazarbayev, the country's first ever president

Finally, there is also the issue of the hundreds of Central Asians fighting in Afghanistan who may eventually return home and bring with them not only the ideology of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but also fighting expertise that could make the militancy of Jund al-Khilafah today seem small in comparison.



Notes

1. Andrew McGregor, "Ambivalence or Radicalism? The Direction of Political Islam in Kazakhstan," Modern Kazakhstan: Between East and West, Conference at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, December 5, 2003.
2. Author's discussion with Kazakhstani official, September 2012.
3. See Statement of Jund al-Khilafa regarding the events of Zhanaozen: "Overthrow the tyrant," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByOCBFKyxA>, December 18, 2011.
4. The two videos may be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH0_CVDy8cQ&feature=youtu.be, July 27, 2012; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4xEvysQZVw>, August 4, 2012 (summary of the latter at Umma News, August 4).
5. McGregor, *op cit*.
6. Statistics according to Saule Mikhmetrakhimova of the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). See Aleksandr Shustov, "Radical Islam Attacks Central Asia," Strategic Culture Foundation, <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2010/11/26/radical-islam-attacks-central-asia.html>
7. See endnote 2.

Jacob Zenn is a legal adviser and international affairs analyst based in Washington, D.C. with experience in all seven Central Asian "Stan" countries and Xinjiang. He is an honorary member of the Center of Shanghai Cooperation Studies (COSCOS) in Shanghai, China.

Dual Blows Imperil the Future of the Cross-Border Haqqani Network

By Arif Jamal

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

Two recent events seem to have shaken the Haqqani Network to its core—the death of Badruddin Haqqani and the group's designation as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" (FTO) by the United States. According to a Pakistani journalist based in the Tribal Areas, the death of Badruddin Haqqani was more of symbolic and psychological impact while the FTO designation by the United States hit the group's soft financial underbelly. "There is no shortage of people who can replace Badruddin Haqqani but there are no countries that can replace the lost [support from some] countries as a consequence of the FTO designation." [1] Though reports of Badruddin's death were initially denied by Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, they were later confirmed by Badruddin's family (Ansar1.info, August 26; Khaama Press [Kabul], August 27).

The cross-border Haqqani Network keeps its identity intact within the Taliban Movement. It also has independent ties with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba. According to Pakistani journalist Wajahat Khan: "The network is, literally, a bit like a crime family. Lots of cousins and uncles dominate the top tiers of leadership, specializing in different

roles, skills, regions and formations" (*Express Tribune* [Karachi], September 8).

Although Badruddin's brother Sirajuddin was considered senior to him in the network hierarchy, Badruddin was heavily involved in kidnappings, extortion and military operations in Afghanistan. According to a security official based in the tribal areas, Badruddin was in-charge of day-to-day operational details such as recruiting and training suicide bombers for southeastern Afghanistan (including Kabul). [2] The Haqqani Network is known to have a wide range of legitimate business interests in Pakistan as well as some Middle East countries. There is no immediate threat to their business interests in Pakistan as Islamabad is determined not to abandon them. Although it became quite clear more than a month ago that the United States was about to take action against the Haqqani Network, Pakistan did not take any action against the group itself. Neither were the Haqqanis worried. According to a Pakistani official, "They felt fairly assured about their business and financial interests in Pakistan. However, they have taken some preliminary steps to secure their interests and accounts in some Middle East countries." [3]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Pakistan believes that the FTO designation in the wake of Badruddin Haqqani's death is meant to send a clear message. It is commonly believed in Pakistan that high profile actions against the Haqqani Network are basically aimed at entrapping Pakistan. According to a civilian official working on terrorism-related matters, the United States "could have taken these steps a long time ago but did not." The reason for the delay was that the United States "wanted to work with Pakistan. Now, it makes it a lot easier for the United States to designate Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism." [4] Some officials predict that bad days are ahead for Pakistani-American relations in the wake of the FTO designation: "Frankly speaking, any decision by the U.S. to declare the Haqqani network a terror group will not be a good sign for future Pakistan-U.S. relations. Any such decision will take the relationship back to square one, ruining the improvement seen in ties between the two countries during the last couple of months" (AFP, September 7).

The FTO designation is likely to make any talks between the United States and the Haqqani Network more difficult, if not impossible.

Combined with the alleged killing of Badruddin, hopes have dimmed of any talks between the Haqqani Network and the United States. According to a Pakistani official, there was a section in the network which was supportive of the talks with the Americans and the Afghan government, but these hopes have now been dashed. [5] The public statements of the Haqqani Network also show that the group is ready to carry out reprisals. Haqqani Network commanders said that the FTO designation is likely to endanger a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict before the end of 2014 (Reuters, September 7).

The dual blows will shrink the space for the Haqqani Network as it will not be able to operate outside Pakistan with impunity as it does in some countries. The blows are likely to have a significant impact on its legitimate and illegitimate businesses, particularly in some Gulf countries. At the same time, it is also likely to harden its posture vis-à-vis America. At a time when some Taliban groups are reportedly ready to accept a limited US presence in Afghanistan in the post-2014 period, the Haqqani Network is more likely to oppose it.

Notes

1. Author's telephone interview with a FATA-based journalist who requested anonymity, September 7, 2012.
2. Author's telephone interview with a mid-ranking security official who requested anonymity, September 5, 2012.
3. Ibid
4. Author's interview with a civilian security official who requested anonymity, September 8, 2012.
5. Author's telephone interview with a security official in Peshawar who requested anonymity, September 8, 2012.

Arif Jamal is an independent security and terrorism expert and author of "Shadow War – The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir."

You've been designated a foreign terrorist organization. Now what?

By D.B. Grady

Source: <http://theweek.com/bullpen/column/233244/youve-been-designated-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-now-what>

Last week, the U.S. State Department placed the Haqqani network on its list of foreign terrorist organizations. This comes after years of violence by the group against American, NATO, and Afghan forces. The U.S. action is also one more jab at Pakistan; its military intelligence arm, the ISI, has notoriously close ties with the terrorist network. One can hardly think of a group more deserving of such special attention than Haqqani, and they have certainly lived up to their new title. The day after the designation was made public, a suicide bomber

in Kabul — suspected to be affiliated with Haqqani — detonated himself not far from NATO headquarters. "I saw about 12 bodies, all were civilians," *The New York Times* reported one witness as saying. "I saw a little girl whose legs were blown away in the back of the police truck." The bomber himself has been described as a "young boy," and at least six children are among the dead.

In the 1980s, the Haqqani family fought against the Soviet occupation



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

of Afghanistan, and forged close ties with the CIA and ISI. But relations worsened when Jalalludin Haqqani joined the wretched Taliban government in 1996 as its Minister of Tribal Affairs. After the U.S. invasion in 2001, the Haqqani network remained loyal to the Taliban. Today, it is at the heart of the insurgency in Afghanistan, and a major obstacle to post-NATO security in the war-torn country. With the State Department's action, it seems the decision has been made that the only way out is through. This is certainly a victory for David Petraeus, director of the CIA, who has long warned of the threat posed by the network.

But practically, what does it mean to formally designate a group as a terrorist organization? As a legal matter, it prevents U.S. citizens from providing any type of "material support" or "expert advice" to organization elements. There's a good chance that if the National Security Agency catches your phone number pinging a known member of the group, you're going to have trouble boarding airplanes for a very long time. Likewise, U.S. financial institutions are obligated to freeze and report any assets belonging to the terrorist network. Perhaps more consequentially, the international community is put on notice that the United States can mobilize any or all of its forces, agencies, and capabilities to do whatever it wants in the fight against the group in question.

Being put on the list of foreign terrorist organizations is probably the easiest way to meet an actual member of Delta Force. But other than a deadly nighttime raid, is there any way to get off of the list? Supposing, of course, you change your ways and allegiances. The answer is yes, but it's a lever that's almost never pulled. Two years after designation, leaders of the network in question can file an appeal with the U.S. State Department and provide proof of some newfound enlightenment. Absent that, every five years the Secretary of State is obliged to reevaluate the designation. Congress can step in, but given the criminal negligence of lawmakers to express even an atom of interest in serious oversight in the war on terrorism, don't expect anything anytime soon.

And why would anyone take to the floor and defend a terrorist group, anyway? In the case of Haqqani, not everyone agrees with the decision to blacklist. According to Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, the

designation will "play into the hands of those opposed to a conciliatory approach." They noted that the assumption that Haqqani is "an irreconcilable, rigidly ideological enemy should be questioned." To be sure, in Afghanistan, switching sides during conflicts is routine and often based on pragmatism and basic survival. This is why U.S. and Afghan officials have conducted high-level talks with so-called "moderate" elements of the Taliban. In 2001, such meetings would have been unthinkable and appalling; we've learned a lot since then.

But just as Afghans are pragmatic about choosing the more advantageous sides in a conflict, so too are defense and intelligence officials about applying serious force to problems that have a timetable. In this case, the date is December 2014, when the last U.S. forces in the region are slated to depart. (Special Operations Forces will remain as part of the cleanup crew, helping to take out particularly noxious terrorist leaders.) At present, the idea that the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police can pacify and secure their country without international assistance at or above present levels is, at best, inconsistent with reality. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to look a lot more like South Vietnam than Iraq. Gone, then, is a comprehensive, comprehensible counter-insurgency strategy; the plan now seems to be to wipe out as many enemy fighters as possible as quickly as possible. The foreign terrorist organization designation will help make that happen.

Is anyone convinced this new strategy will work? Afghans certainly aren't. *The Associated Press* reports that requests for asylum are up 34 percent in the last year. The real estate market is in a free-fall. Optimism has become an endangered species, and many expect the government — already corrupt and ineffective — to collapse following our exit. In the United States, during the rare moments that Americans give any thought to our continued presence in Afghanistan at all, the mood is grim: Only 27 percent favor the war. Worse still, and perhaps more disheartening: Only 31 percent believe we're even doing *the right thing* by being there. But we are there, adrift, our service members working diligently and dying at a rate of one every day, to say nothing of debilitating injuries and disfigurement. The president conspicuously avoids



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

uttering the goal of "winning" the war, but merely ending it, and this White House seems to treat Afghanistan more as a political inconvenience than a problem in need of a solution, essentially condemning men and women in uniform to early deaths — but for what, exactly?

When Obama was elected, he took ownership of the war in Afghanistan, not reluctantly, as in the case of Iraq, but enthusiastically, pinning a fourth star on the capable General Stanley McChrystal and embracing a bold policy of counterinsurgency. Tens of thousands of troops were infused into the war effort.

Counterproductive airstrikes were dialed back, and for the first time, conventional forces were embedded with villagers, and learned how best to win this thing. But at the first sign of trouble, all that went away.

Now we have a new name on the list of foreign terrorist organizations. I place great faith in Director Petraeus at CIA, General Mattis at CENTCOM, and Admiral William McRaven at Special Operations Command. And if January 2015 brings a human rights catastrophe, it won't be a result of their actions, but of their commander-in-chief.

D.B. Grady is co-author of [The Command: Deep Inside the President's Secret Army](#). He is a correspondent for [The Atlantic](#), and lives in Baton Rouge, La.



Intelligence is the best weapon in the war on terror

Quite simply, the United States is losing the war on terror. The attacks against US embassies in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere tragically demonstrate that the United States has failed to bolster our intelligence corps sufficiently to fight the terrorist threat. While killing Osama bin Laden was an undeniable victory, it...

[READ FULL ARTICLE](#)

The CIA's Islamist Terrorist Network

By Wayne Madsen

Source: <http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-CIA-s-Islamist-Terrori-by-Wayne-Madsen-120916-525.html>

The Central Intelligence Agency cobbled together the forerunner of the present Muslim jihadist terrorist network in the late 1970s to battle Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Throughout the next three decades, the CIA continued to maintain links with the jihadist groups, using them as allies for certain operations and attacking them when America's "commitment" to the "war on terrorism" required a propaganda boost in the world's media.

An example of the CIA's flip-flopping between using its mujaheddin and jihadist allies and then declaring them "terrorists" and putting a price on their heads is the recent declaration by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan, Pakistan is a "foreign terrorist organization."

The Haqqani network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, was cobbled together by the CIA and

the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the 1980s.

The Haqqani network is the latest former CIA ally to be branded a terrorist group. The Haqqanis are the latest in a long line of so-called terrorist groups that were organized and funded by the CIA, only later to be thrown to the side of the road and branded "terrorists." Others include Al Qaeda, led by CIA Afghan war veteran Osama bin Laden and *Hezb-Islami* leader Gulbuddin Hekmatayar. With the designation of the Haqqani network as a terrorist organization, after the demise of Bin Laden and the designation of Hekmatayar as a terrorist, the CIA has run the table on its old mujaheddin allies. Only those Al Qaeda operatives who have allied themselves with the CIA in the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Western-backed insurgencies in Libya and Syria.

Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were the convenient scapegoats for the CIA and its Mossad allies to provide a "logical" perpetrator for the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the 11th anniversary of which is now being observed across America. Hekmatayar's falling out with the CIA appears to be over his attempt to cut into the opium smuggling in Afghanistan run by intelligence cut-outs for the CIA, as well as the

U.S. Coast Guard. The CIA used various Afghan warlords and operatives like Bin Laden, Hekmatayar, and Haqqani to smuggle drugs into Kabul, Kandahar, and other areas where Soviet troops were concentrated. The proceeds from the drug smuggling were split between the Afghan warlords and the CIA's off-shore slush funds.

No less an expert on "Al Qaeda" than the late British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, in an article for The Guardian newspaper published



family opium harvesting and smuggling business of the family of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

In his book on America's dalliance with Islamist terrorists, the late ABC News Middle East correspondent John Cooley reveals the nature of the CIA's involvement with Afghan opium smuggling in his book *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*. Getting the idea from French intelligence, the CIA launched Operation Mosquito, a program that pumped heroin and hashish into Soviet-occupied Afghanistan in order to "hook" Red Army troops on drugs and decimate their fighting potential. When supplies of narcotics from Pakistan were depleted, the drugs shipped into Afghanistan came from stockpiles of Colombian cocaine and heroin impounded by the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs Service, and

on July 8, 2005, wrote...

"Throughout the 80s he [Bin Laden] was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally 'the database,' was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians."

Cook, who, as Foreign Secretary, would have had access to most of the files of two agencies subservient to him -- Britain's MI-6 Secret Intelligence Service and Britain's U.S. National Security Agency counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) -- was revealing some of the most hidden secrets about Western



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

intelligence agency involvement in crafting and exploiting the 9/11 attacks.

Former French military intelligence officer Pierre-Henri Bunel, who tracked Islamist terrorist networks in the Balkans and discovered their CIA origins, said Al Qaeda was not merely a database, but an Intranet the CIA used to call up reserves of mujaheddin to engage in specified terrorist actions, much like those seen during the past few years in the remote-controlled bombing of civilians in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, various Libyan and Pakistani cities, Aden, and other locales – all carried out by Al Qaeda or its off-shoots.

Echoing Cook's statement, Bunel, a graduate of the elite St. Cyr military academy in France, wrote:

"The truth is, there is no Islamic army or terrorist group called Al Qaida. And any informed intelligence officer knows this. But there is a propaganda campaign to make the public believe in the presence of an identified entity representing the 'devil' only in order to drive the 'TV watcher' to accept a unified international leadership for a war against terrorism. The country behind this propaganda is the U.S. and the lobbyists for the U.S. war on terrorism are only interested in making money."

Bunel described in great detail how Al Qaeda operated. He revealed that the Al Qaeda "Intranet" was established under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which is based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Users, including OIC member governments and their embassies around the world, could access the database by telephone: an Intranet, in modern language.

A major in Pakistan's military told Bunel that the Al Qaeda database was...

"...divided into two parts, the information file where the participants in the meetings could pick up and send information they needed, and the decision file where the decisions made during the previous sessions were recorded and stored. In Arabic, the files were called, Q'eidat il-Maaloomaat and Q'eidat i-Taaleemaat. Those two files were kept in one file called in Arabic Q'eidat ilmu'ti'aat, which is the exact translation of the English word 'database.' But the Arabs commonly used the short word Al Qaida which is the Arabic word for 'base.'"

Among the countries using the Al Qaeda Intranet to conduct terrorist operations was Saudi Arabia. And the Al Qaeda Intranet had been around for quite some time before 9/11. Bunel stated: "When Osama Bin Laden was an American agent in Afghanistan, the Al Qaida Intranet was a good communication system through coded or covert messages."

Cook died suddenly from a heart attack a month after he wrote the Guardian article. Bunel was charged, convicted, and imprisoned for a dubious claim that he spied for Serbia.

Today, the OIC is at the vanguard of providing covert support to Al Qaeda and affiliated rebels fighting against Bashar al Assad's government in Syria. It is likely that the Al Qaeda Intranet is working overtime sending coded messages between Jeddah, Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi and Al Qaeda field units in Syria and on the Turkish side of the Syrian border. The OIC has suspended Syria from OIC membership and the only reason for such a decision was to sever Syria from the OIC Qaeda Intranet intelligence link to Syrian rebel forces and CIA covert channel terminals in Langley, Virginia.

Hekmatayar and Haqqani are arms of the ISI and when their services were needed the most by the United States, they served the interests of the CIA. There is now an attempt by the CIA to rewrite the recent history of South Asia and eliminate all the insurgents and guerrillas and their organizations that did the bidding of the CIA. Bin Laden was accused of carrying out 9/11, Hekmatayar of killing U.S. troops in Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and now the Haqqani network, still an arm of ISI, of attacking U.S. targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

America's love affair with Islamist radical terrorists goes back to the days of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, and even earlier, when journalist-turned-CIA agent Archibald Roosevelt, the grandson of U.S. uber-imperialist-turned-progressive Theodore Roosevelt, concocted a plan to bring the Soviets to their knees by stoking anti-Communist Islamists against the Soviets in places like Egypt, where the CIA supported the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt to assassinate Egyptian pan-Arab socialist Gamal Abdel Nasser. Archibald's cousin, Kermit Roosevelt, was in charge of the 1953 CIA coup that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

restored the hated Shah to power. Both decisions were monumental disasters for U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world. Bin Laden, Hekmatayar, and Haqqani -- all one time allies of the CIA -- became "problems" in

CIA parlance. And like all CIA "problems," they have all possessed one ultimate destiny -- termination with extreme prejudice...

Wayne Madsen is an investigative journalist, nationally distributed columnist, and author who has covered Washington, DC, politics, national security, and intelligence issues since 1994. He has written for The Village Voice, The Progressive, CAQ, Counterpunch, and the Intelligence Newsletter (based in Paris). Look for his new book, Overthrow a Fascist Regime on \$15 a Day: The Internet Irregulars vs. The Powers That Be!, in the fall.

Jakarta - Indonesian soldiers from the Armed Special Forces descend from a helicopter by rope with their dogs during an antiterrorism drill. BAY ISMOYO / AFP / GETTY IMAGES



Domestic terror: Are we doing enough to combat the threat from within?

Source: http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/16/us/domestic-terrorism/index.html?hpt=hp_c2

Americans watched this week as U.S. interests abroad became targets of Muslims enraged over a film mocking their religion. It was a storyline featuring familiar characters in the so-called war on terror, but some experts say the narrative may be overplayed. Though radical Islam and Western interests are commonly the primary subjects of stateside conversation when it comes to terror, domestic terrorists pose significant threats to the

homeland, experts say, and the U.S. needs to do more to safeguard itself from the threat within. A handful of recent events -- including the deadly rampages at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and an Aurora, Colorado, theater -- have left communities in grief and raised additional questions about whether we're paying enough attention to domestic terrorism



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

[Bergen: Who incites violent protests?](#)

"9/11 has set the threshold for what terrorism is in the minds of many Americans, and if domestic terrorism lacks the magnitude, it must not be terrorism," said Daryl Johnson, a former counterterrorism expert at the Department of Homeland Security. Johnson says he left DHS in 2010 out of frustration.

According to Johnson, many in the government

efforts have been shaped largely in response to acts of foreign terrorism. The emphasis of counterterrorism policy since 9/11 has been on jihadist terrorism, despite the fact that domestic terrorists have been responsible for more than two-dozen incidents since 9/11, the report states.

The congressional report points to data collected by the National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking System,



have taken a myopic view based on the severity and magnitude of 9/11, leaving them unable to move beyond the threat posed by jihadist groups.

Heidi Beirich, director of the intelligence project at the Southern Poverty Law Center, a civil rights group, claims the domestic threat cannot be overlooked after the shootings at the Sikh temple.

"Domestic terrorism is as much a threat as foreign terrorism. The government needs to get serious about this," she said.

While the feds have said that the Aurora incident was not a terrorist act and the FBI continues to investigate whether the shooting at the Sikh temple was an act of domestic terrorism, these incidents have drawn attention to domestic threats.

The FBI's shorthand definition of domestic terrorism is "Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies."

[Far right domestic terrorism on par with foreign threat, experts say](#)

According to a May 2012 congressional research service report, counterterrorism

which publicly lists 35 terrorist incidents occurring in the United States between the beginning of 2004 and September 2011. Of those, 25 were linked to domestic terrorists.

Experts say the domestic threat can no longer be pushed to the background.

A September 2011 survey by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Public Policy examined 114 cases of non-jihadist terrorist acts in the 10 years following 9/11. In comparison, they found 188 cases of Islamist terrorism in the U.S. for the same period. Some of the cases examined involved plots that were foiled and unsuccessful.

Examples of domestic terror cases since 9/11 include a 2001 plot by Earl Krugel, a member of the Jewish Defense League, to blow up the office of Arab-American congressman Darrell Issa and the King Fahd mosque in Culver City, California and the February 2010 suicide attack by Andrew Joseph Stack III, where he flew his airplane into the IRS building in Austin, Texas killing one other person and injuring many more.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

According to the survey, the 114 cases of domestic terrorism do not represent a complete survey of non-Islamist terrorist cases. Keeping track of domestic terrorism incidents is far more difficult than tracking incidents of jihadist terrorism. Jihadist terror cases are nearly all tried under anti-terrorism laws or statutes dealing with "material support" to terrorist groups. Domestic terrorism cases on the other hand are often tried under an array of other statutes, from weapons and explosives violations, property destruction and arson to "seditious conspiracy," the survey stated.

These ideologies behind the domestic attacks encompass a wide range of groups. On the left, you have anarchists and some Communist factions. On the right, there are white supremacists and sovereign citizens, participants of which do not recognize U.S. currency, taxation or city, state or federal laws. There are also more single-minded groups that include some animal rights, environmental and anti-abortion outfits.

While left-wing groups have frequently vandalized property and committed arson, right-wing groups present a more deadly threat given their affinity for hoarding weapons and explosives, according to Johnson, who now runs a private security consulting firm.

[Understanding America's domestic extremist threat](#)

"What worries me is the fact that our country is under attack from within, from our own radical citizenry," Johnson said. "Yet our leaders don't appear too concerned about this. So, my greatest fear is that domestic extremists in this country will somehow become emboldened to the point of carrying out a mass-casualty attack because they perceive that no one is being vigilant about the threat from within."

Despite the threat right-wing groups pose, intelligence-collection efforts have not received the same attention as foreign threats, according to the congressional report.

The Southern Poverty Law Center has documented a dramatic growth in the number of militias and hate groups operating in the U.S. over the past decade. Currently, there are more than 1,000 hate groups in the United States, according to the center, which says it was monitoring the alleged Sikh temple gunman for years before the attack.

"They are like little sitting time bombs," Johnson said.

In the aftermath of the Wisconsin shooting, online forums among radical right-wing hate groups have ignited with vitriolic messages.

"Take your dead and go back to India and dump their ashes in the Ganges, Sikhs," Alex Linder, a neo-Nazi who operates the racist website Vanguard News Network, wrote on his forum. "You don't belong here in the country my ancestors fought to found, and deeded to me and mine, their posterity. Even if you came here legally, and even if you haven't done anything wrong personally. Go home, Sikhs. Go home to India where you belong. This is not your country, it belongs to white men."

According to Johnson, there are certain poisonous belief systems in this country that have a history of violence.

"They have the capability and the intent. All they're lacking is the catalyst. And there lies the problem," he explained, adding he believes the government needs to look closer at whether a group is on a trajectory to violence.

Any counterterrorism efforts should be proactive rather than reactive. But Johnson claims the current approach is a hands-off one unless the group is engaging in some criminal activity.

"These groups proliferate like mushrooms after the spring rain," he said. "Criminal activity will certainly follow."

He explained that the election of President Barack Obama has been a huge factor in the proliferation of extremist groups at home.

"It's their worst nightmare come true," he said.

The election of the first black president sent shockwaves through many of these right-wing groups who feel threatened by the changing demographics of the nation. Johnson predicts that if Obama wins a second term, there will be more violent attacks by these domestic groups.

Yet there remain massive gaps in domestic counterterrorism efforts, according to Johnson.

Following a 2009 Department of Homeland Security report authored by Johnson on the growing threat posed by right-wing extremist groups, the domestic terrorism unit under the DHS was disbanded because of pressure from the political right-wing, claims Johnson.

[Bergen: Right-wing extremist terrorism as deadly a threat as al Qaeda?](#)

Conservative media political analysts like Michelle Malkin, Sean Hannity, Lou Dobbs and Rush Limbaugh criticized the report as an attempt to



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

demonize the right. It also drew criticism from some members of the military because the report claimed right-wing extremist groups recruited veterans and soldiers.

After the release of the report, a number of draft reports were put on hold or canceled entirely, according to Johnson. Products that concerned domestic terror were subject to greater scrutiny and stalled in an effort to kill the work, said Johnson.

"These restrictions were selectively applied to work on domestic terrorism than to jihadi

information to investigate, according to Johnson.

"They didn't even appear aware of the resurgence of militias and extremist groups," Johnson said.

['Swimming upstream,' white supremacist groups still strong](#)

DHS spokesman Peter Boogaard said he could not comment on these assertions as they involve classified information. But in a written statement he said the DHS "protects our



terrorism," he said, adding that his frustration led him to quit a year later.

Resources devoted to domestic counter-terrorism have been cut, and there is now only one intelligence analyst at the DHS looking at domestic terrorism. That's compared to five after 9/11, according to Johnson.

There is also a void in training officials to recognize these threats, Johnson claims. While the DHS has implemented some training in the last year -- nine sessions so far -- they have not been sufficient, Johnson explained.

In his time there, the DHS ran up to 10 sessions per month. Training sessions by other agencies remain limited in scope, Johnson explained. The FBI, for example, focuses mainly on the sovereign citizens groups, he said.

In a 2008 meeting between the counter-terrorism units of the FBI and DHS, it was apparent the FBI did not have the proper

country from all threats, whether foreign or homegrown, and we know that violent extremism is neither constrained by international borders, nor limited to any single ideology.

"As such, DHS continues to work with its state, local, tribal and territorial partners to prevent violence that is motivated by any extreme ideological beliefs. This includes training law enforcement to recognize behaviors and other indicators associated with violent criminal activity as well as briefings, products, case studies, and information sharing on violent extremist threats," the statement said.

In an April 2005 report titled "10 Years After the Oklahoma City Bombing: the Department of Homeland Security Must Do More to Fight Right-Wing Terrorists," Rep. Bennie Thompson, then-head of the House Committee on Homeland Security, called for a renewed effort to catalog



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

the risks posed by right-wing domestic terrorists. In the report, he slammed the DHS for omitting the threat of right-wing terror threats in a long-range planning document.

"Democratic members of the House Committee on Homeland Security are very concerned that this oversight demonstrates DHS administrators are not adequately considering right-wing domestic terrorist groups that are focused on attacking America in order to further their political beliefs," he wrote.

The government is also inconsistent in how it categorizes domestic extremist groups. While the federal government lists groups such as al Qaeda and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, there is no such practice of designating any domestic groups as terrorist organizations.

According to the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism, the secretary of state had designated 49 foreign terrorist organizations as of January 2012. The FBI and Department of Justice do not generate an official list of domestic terrorist organizations.

The lack of such a list may make it difficult to assess the scope of domestic terrorism and evaluate trends and counterterrorism efforts. It also creates the misconception that terrorism comes only from abroad.

However, advocacy groups like the American Civil Liberties Union object to such

categorizations, arguing that labeling some domestic groups as such would discourage free speech and expression.

Michael German, an expert at the ACLU who has also worked as an FBI agent for 16 years, argued that any characterization of groups that are not engaged in criminal activity is problematic.

The listing of foreign terrorists has already been problematic, and the replication of such a methodology would not be the correct approach. A sound approach should target individuals, not groups, he explained.

"It's not about the label," German said.

Regardless of whether extremists groups are put on watch lists, the need for certain data is critical for effective counterterrorism efforts. The congressional research service report claims that until 2005, the FBI used to regularly release a report that cataloged annual terrorist plots and in Mafrq, Jordan, incidents in the United States.

Arguably, the discontinuation of such reporting makes it difficult for policymakers to forge effective policies because it becomes more difficult to compare the levels of domestic terrorist activity against jihadist activity.

Experts including Johnson and Beirich say it may be time to take a more informed approach and look more closely at current security gaps.

The Taliban Attack On Camp Bastion Sends An Unmistakable Signal

Source: <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-taliban-attack-on-camp-bastion-2012-9>

The implications of the recent attack on the biggest bases in Helmand, Afghanistan, are bigger than a stab at Harry or two dead Marines.

As many as 15 Taliban fighters, armed with small-arms, rocket-propelled grenades and suicide vests, breached the perimeter of an airfield at Camp Bastion in Helmand and engaged U.S. Marines and British forces in a "sustained fight."

The Taliban fighters were dressed in U.S. Army uniforms, and once they penetrated at one portion of the outer perimeter, broke into three separate teams to mount the assault.

In total, according to the ISAF press release: *"the insurgents attacked Coalition fixed and rotary wing aircraft parked on the flight line, aircraft hangars and other*

buildings. Six Coalition AV-8B Harrier jets were destroyed and two were significantly damaged. Three Coalition refueling stations were also destroyed. Six soft-skin aircraft hangars were damaged to some degree."

In the words of the ISAF press release, the fighters were "well equipped, trained, and rehearsed."

The attack began at 10 p.m. local time. The fight ended with all but one of the Taliban killed by Coalition forces. There were two U.S. Marines killed, and many more Coalition troops injured.

The Taliban released a statement saying that they were attempting to kill Prince Harry, but also engaging in the attack to get retribution for the



recently viral video about Muhammed and Islam.

of an attack of this scale on the biggest base in Helmand go deeper than a mere assassination

Helicopter base

- Helicopters take off from section close to the main runways, flying transport and combat missions
- RAF aircraft include Chinooks and Merlins; Army Air Corps has Apaches
- US aircraft include Chinook, Blackhawk, night Apaches and Ospreys

Runways

- Camp Bastion has two runways: the first is 2,569 yards long; the second is 3,827 yards
- The second runway can accommodate the RAF's C-17 Globemaster, its largest transport aircraft
- Camp Bastion air-traffic control handles 600 flights a day, making it Britain's fifth-busiest airport

Security

- The base is ringed by 30ft fences topped with triple concertina wire
- 6ft-high coils of razor wire sit between the fences and the inner concrete blast wall, which is 24 miles long
- The blast walls are 30ft high and have watch towers, pictured left and right, manned by heavily armed soldiers
- Radar, cameras and motion sensors can monitor movement on the ground and in the air

Camp leatherneck

- 1,600-acre base is home to the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade and personnel of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
- The camp was built in 2008. Marines are nicknamed "Leathernecks" because their uniform had a leather collar for much of the 1800s

Camp Bastion

- One of the world's largest military bases, below
- 28,000 people work on site, including troops, contractors and civilians
- Divided into four areas — Bastion 0,1,2 and 3
- British, US, Danish and Estonian troops live in tented accommodation

The aircraft attacked

- US Marine Corps uses Harrier jump jets, below, for ground attacks. Similar to former Royal Navy version
- Maximum speed is 585 knots and weapons include 25mm five-barrelled Gatling cannon, four rocket pods carrying 19 rockets (70mm) and up to four laser-guided 500lb bombs

Point of attack

- Insurgent detonates suicide vest against outer perimeter fence creating a 5ft hole
- Taliban with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and possibly mortars are believed to arrive in Toyota pick-up trucks
- 19 Taliban gunmen swarm towards main Camp Bastion runway
- Five aircraft destroyed or damaged, including US Marine Corps Harrier jet and helicopters
- Two US marines killed, several injured
- British troops from 5 RAF Force Protection Wing are first to respond in firefight; some are lightly injured
- 18 Taliban fighters killed in ensuing battle, one is captured

In a phone interview with the Associated Press, Taliban Spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi said:

"We attacked that base because Prince Harry was also on it and so they can know our anger. Thousands more suicide attackers are ready to give up their lives for the sake of the Prophet."

Camp Bastion is attached to Camp Leatherneck, and is not only the most heavily fortified and heavily defended base in Helmand, and it carries the most troops from the widest array of countries. An attack on the base is surely suicide; indeed all but one of the attackers was killed.

The focus of most of the reports seem to be more about Prince Harry, but the implications

attempt. In terms of morale, the assault comes close to taking on shades of the infamous "Tet Offensive" in Vietnam.

Helmand Province is considered to be the heart of Taliban territory, and renewed interest in the province by the then-eager Obama administration in 2009 sent thousands more Marines and British forces into the area. Camp Leatherneck was built in a matter of months, attached to Bastion (essentially a giant air strip), and Marines struck out in force in the Battle for Marjah.

Many coalition and Afghan Security Force outposts popped up, especially in the province's capital of Lashkar Gah.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

But after three years of increased effort, at a cost of doubling the casualty rate, insurgents

To get such a sizeable element of well equipped fighters that far into Coalition



still find it possible to strike out at the heart of coalition forces in the area, making a highly

territory, to strike at the heart of Coalition operations, at the most well-defended base in



publicized assault on Camp Bastion. Strategically, Bastion and Leatherneck lie in the middle of a giant, sparsely populated area of Helmand—what one might even call a desert. The bases are far from any of the main populated areas inside the province.

the province, speaks more than to an assassination attempt or vitriol over a satirical film. It shows that much of the so-called progress in the past three years may be a wasted effort.



Sept. 11 terrorist attacks awakened us to a ‘battle for the soul of Islam’

By M. Zuhdi Jasser

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/guest-voices/post/sept-11-terrorist-attacks-awakened-us-to-a-battle-for-the-soul-of-islam/2012/09/18/6acf2a7a-01dc-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_blog.html



The Tribute in Light illuminates the sky over Lower Manhattan in remembrance of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the 11-year anniversary in New York Sept. 11, 2012.

For Americans, the iconic face of terrorism has become the devastation of the Twin Towers. For many American Muslims the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 were an awakening to the

components. “Violent extremism”, as some like to call it, is only one terminal end point of an insidious ideology that provides a conveyor belt with many other endpoints. Liberal Muslims know that none end in genuine liberty, and all end in some form of theocratic supremacy.



Enjoying a deep love of God and the role which Islam plays in my own soul and conscience, I have long known this central conflict to be a deeper more nuanced one between political Islam (Islamism) and liberty (liberal democracy). Many of us had already long begun to confront the deep seeded elements within various Muslim mindsets and institutions of political

urgency of the long festering struggles deep within our faith communities. Radicalism does not spontaneously arise out of thin air. Al-Qaeda, Hamas, the Taliban, or Hezbollah are but symptoms of a far more pervasive ideology that has both violent and non-violent

Islam (Islamism) and its incompatibilities with modernity and American freedom. But Sept. 11 shook me and many of us to the core, out of our old complacency to defer change to future generations. It catapulted me



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

into the realization that we had a unique responsibility or calling both as Americans and as Muslims to lead that change now.

The U.S. gives us a unique laboratory to engage in the debates within Islam that only we as Muslims can wage. And we should not squander that opportunity. After all, American Muslims are uniquely positioned to counter Islamism globally and thus turn the tide against radicalism. In fact, devout, God-fearing Muslims are the only ones with the credibility and the inherent self-interest in the faith legacy we leave our children and country necessary to effectively take on the root cause of Islamist inspired terrorism.

In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks we established the American Islamic Forum for Democracy with a mission of lifting up the ideas of liberty within the Muslim consciousness and identity.

We have an obligation to the families that lost loved ones in the Sept. 11 attacks to speak truth to power. While many Muslims living comfortably in the U.S. may have reformed and brought our personal practice in line with modernity, the theological power structures in our faith community are generally still far from needed reform and critique against Islamism and its progeny.

The obstacles to this work have been too numerous to count. We have sadly since found our nation for the most part generally unwilling to engage with Muslims in a “tough love” toward open reform.

In a post-Sept. 11 world predominant beltway politicians and news media who only see the world through partisan polarity have simply reserved discussion of Muslims to a convenient minority checkbox that is invoked when politically expedient. Both sides have been complicit at times. One using Muslims to falsely paint the other as “bigots”, and the other using Muslims to highlight their mastery of national security. Both are losing site of the core problems and solutions that the attacks highlighted for us.

Meanwhile, many Muslim groups claiming to speak for Muslims in America, most notably the

Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups (CAIR, ISNA, MPAC, or MAS, i.e.) derive their fuel from those very forces that insist upon looking at us Muslims as one collective. That has given them all the room they need to deny reformists ideological diversity, to deny the need for reform, and to deny the link of Islamism to radicalization. These groups have thrived in the victimization mantra, fear mongering, and pigeon-holing of Muslims in order to circle the wagons, stifle debate, and perpetuate denial within.

The strategy of Islamist groups in America has only stoked the flames. Deference to political correctness has also suppressed debate.

In the end, there can be no better way to ebb the tide of fear of Muslims in the West than for Muslims to demonstrate that we are the most important asset in defeating the very ideologies that attacked us 11 years ago. This requires an embrace of a public critique of our faith leaders and institutions. All other approaches have been proven failures. The deep seeded reform needed against the idea of the “Islamic state”, the political ummah and its inherent public instruments of shariah (not the personal pietistic shariah but that in government) will do more to normalize relations with Muslims than any other strategy.

The massacre at Fort Hood on Nov. 5, 2009 steeled my resolve more than ever that we needed to trace back and publicly dissect every component of the separatist ideas that drove Maj. Nidal Hasan to hate his nation and commit his act of terror and kill 13 of our fellow soldiers. We can no longer compartmentalize domestic threats from foreign ones. We need a *Liberty Doctrine* in our approach to Muslims.

The central problem remains the same whether it's Sept. 11 or Hasan or “Green on Blue” attacks in Afghanistan. Until American Muslims can lead the long overdue journey away from Islamism and towards modernity and actually begin to wage A Battle for the Soul of Islam through the separation of mosque and state, the threats we all face at home and abroad will only grow.

M. Zuhrdi Jasser is the author of the recently released book, “A Battle for the Soul of Islam” and is president and founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy based in Phoenix. He is also a commissioner on the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom (opinions posted here are his own).



Terrorism: Never what you think

By Gordon Duff

Source: <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/09/19/262406/terrorism-never-what-you-think/>

The recent demonstrations across the Islamic world aren't so simple to understand. As an American, Terry Jones, the former CIA asset and his billionaire backers at Google, the CATO Institute and other groups that, when real investigation is done, at the root of this crisis, are not American at all.

America is an idea, or so I was told as a child, established by men like Jefferson and Adams, Washington, a Statue of Liberty in New York harbor welcoming the poor and hungry of the world, not a handful of what are mistaken for bigots.

The world is being torn apart as part of a plan, once originating among the powerful of the world, New York, Washington, Tel Aviv and Zurich, a plan to set nation on nation, religion on religion and set Mitt Romney, a sociopath in the garb of a hapless buffoon, who was chosen to assume the mantle of "Conqueror in Thief," reassuming the crown left vacant after the departure of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Court Jester, Tony Blair.

Americans don't think they are responsible for the wave of hatred across the world, focused on a blasphemous Google/YouTube video, meant to be spread like a virus through nation after nation though similar offensive material attacking any other group would be removed under "terms of service" or blocked immediately as a violation of law.

Nations, Canada, Britain, Australia, France, Austria, Germany, Italy and more have warmed to Islamophobia though they have imprisoned critics of Israeli persecution of Palestinians as "hate mongers."

Though the US government has requested that Google review its "rules," the United States has failed to use existing laws against corporations, and it is corporations we are discussing, being involved in supporting terrorism, interference in other nations and openly advocating violent acts against the United States.

Laws on the books in the United States would allow the immediate arrests without warrant of the Reverend Terry Jones, the entire management of Google and YouTube would allow the detention of all members of the CATO foundation along with others under legitimate suspicion of what are clearly criminal

activities. That list includes about a third of the "dual passport" Israelis billionaires that are, at times, "Americans of convenience."

No, the protestors are more right than many of them know, that hatred and bigotry are not "protected free speech" when their actions are designed to foster violence, threaten rule of law and bring about killings.

Then others laws come to plan and the mantle of "free speech" is subjected to laws that limit the use of the media as a weapon.

The adage use most often by the Supreme Court is that of the individual who yells; "Fire!" in a crowded theatre. Those killed during the rush to the exits are murder victims.

As of now we have identified some of the corporations responsible but there has yet to be a real investigation. The techniques used against tens of thousands of Muslims, accepted techniques, "American" techniques of sexual humiliation, waterboarding, "stress" positions, sleep deprivation, starvation and thirst, the standard conditions at, let's say, Bagram Air Force Base's prison, these things can be used.

They are legal, they are in accordance with legal decisions from two US Attorney Generals, Ashcroft and Gonzales, they were done with the full approval of 5 Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States and with 85% approval of the Evangelical Christian community of the United States.

I want to so much to believe I am part of a nation innocent and wronged but truthfully I have made my bed with a pack of thugs.

A majority of Americans feel they no longer can be held responsible for their own government though most will vote this November, they feel the candidates were chosen for them and real freedom is like a dream.

There is reason for followers of Islam to be angry at America. Two years ago, President Obama promised to make things different, to balance American policy. Those who envisioned a real change instead saw only paralysis in America.

I could lecture on American politics and perhaps should. I would start by stating what few are willing to admit and most in their hearts know, the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

world is ruled by international cartels and the US government is incapable of free action when those who make up much of the legislature are paid stooges of what can only be described as an international criminal conspiracy.

When Americans learned of their government's complicity in crime, most Americans remained silent. When our news and media demonstrated enthusiastic complicity in criminality, we again remained silent. Then 2007 came and it was time for Americans to pay, banks emptied, wars no longer seemed so amusing and all of it took on an unavoidable aspect of Israeli involvement. America's undercurrent of distrust of those who set themselves separate, be they Catholic or Mormon or Jewish or, too often those of "color" reentered the public's notice.

Did America regress to "anti-semitism" as some claim or reach awareness that a few thousand of America's 14 million Jewish citizens may well have plotted to destroy the American economy?

Historians can dissect each of these eras and the prejudices of each, the reasons and rationales for years. A favorite author, Gilad Atzmon, who writes on Jewish identity, already has a wonderful treatise in print, "The Wandering Who." Gilad has made many evil people very angry. Such acts are the works of heroes today, Atzmon or Mark Siljander and his "A Deadly Misunderstanding," those who turn the mirror on those who most need to take responsibility.

Atzmon is hounded but fighting back, Siljander is in prison for "criminal truthfulness."

There have been great changes in the people. Many fell into the trap of "9/11," willing to see Islam as a threat and everyone with a "Middle Eastern look" as someone waiting to break into your home and kill everyone inside. It was a sick time to be an American, one mostly gone, even in entertainment with some exceptions.

American television, for years, showed little else, insane rambling and childish propaganda orchestrated by Israeli Americans and poisoning the minds of a nation looking for others to blame for its own problems.

You see, America had begun to die economically under President Reagan, his misguided ideas that only the rich can rule and the poor should starve and pay led to a landslide of disaster.

Tens of millions of real jobs left America from then on, moving to China, while the wealth of America's highly paid workers was surgically removed through a series of manufactured economic crises, the Reagan "Savings and Loan scandal" and the Bush 43 "total collapse" which we are seeing the continuing momentum of today.

So much debt was created by Reagan and the Bush family that the interest on that debt has destroyed the world's currencies. Not only did the world enter a period of economic hysteria driven by financial institutions allowed to operate as "pirate potentates" under "financial deregulation," but the US went "unilateral." "Unilateral" to Bush meant doing the will of Israel without restraint or legal pretense. I would award him an Israeli passport.

The decision was made, I believe tied to those who actually planned and executed the 9/11 attacks, to spent the remaining borrowing capability of the United States to seize control of the world's resources through a phony "Global War on Terror."

The real war, when seen by military and intelligence analysts, was a "deception and cover" operation for a return to colonialism around the world and "feudalism" in the "homeland."

"Homeland." That is what "they" began calling America, a translation from the German term, "Reich."

A nation told, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, that "evil Arabs" are planning to steal your baby will willingly give up its rights, pass laws eliminating political guarantees of legal due process, equality and freedom of expression and quickly become a police state.

Critical to this was the exploitation of America's most backward areas. America had to be driven to the edge of civil war through a form of radicalization and extremism. Thus, America may well have a second civil war someday; one based on heavily armed extremist with low intelligence against what may someday be an informed and responsible citizenry.

"Occupy" is the first sign of such a return to sanity and self-realization. The "dark side" is there too.

The "Tea Party" is one of those organizations, owned and controlled by extremist billionaires tied to Israel. Even with no viable candidates, their willingness to



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

engage in false flag terrorism for political gain requires continual watchfulness.

Israel. This is another bizarre issue. At one point, the world's most powerful nation could pressure Israel to act with some restraint and civility. That ended, Israeli politics became the most extreme in the world and her current regime, under Netanyahu, among the most brutal since Pol Pot in Cambodia.

All of this was, of course, repackaged by a press under Israeli control. Any American Jew who stood for traditional values of freedom of expression, an American Jews have a long history of such, was ostracized, called "self-hating."

"Jewish" began to mean something negative, rather than educated or progressive, "Jewish" began to mean pretty much what the ignorant stereotypes of the past had always said, some things too unpleasant to put in print.

America's Christian community became equally "infected," willing to support oligarchical economic policies, to throw away long earned freedoms, to support kidnapping and torture, to blindly push for war after war.

Even the rural and highly independent Americans, gun owners, the generations that settled the frontier, became mindless stooges addicted to propaganda from Rupert Murdoch, master manipulator of the weak minded and perverse.

By "weak minded and perverse," I am referring to "government."

Thus, we face disaster, Muslims by the millions demanding America be removed from their lives.

Or is this disaster? I know millions of Americans who ask the same thing. What if they were to go to the streets also?

Gordon Duff is a Marine Vietnam veteran, a combat infantryman, and Senior Editor at Veterans Today. His career has included extensive experience in international banking along with such diverse areas as consulting on counter insurgency, defense technologies or acting as diplomatic representative for UN humanitarian and economic development efforts. Gordon Duff has traveled to over 80 nations. His articles are published around the world and translated into a number of languages. He is regularly on TV and radio, a popular and sometimes controversial guest.

Al Zawahri personally ordered Al Qaeda to murder US Ambassador Stevens

Source: <http://www.debka.com/article/22353/Al-Zawahri-personally-ordered-Al-Qaeda-to-murder-US-Ambassador-Stevens->



US Ambassador Chris Stevens vehicle on fire

The US Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens and three staff members at the US consulate in Benghazi

were deliberately murdered Tuesday night Sept 11 just after memorial ceremonies were held in America for the victims of the 9/11 outrage. debkafile's counter-terror sources report exclusively that far from being a spontaneous raid by angry Islamists, it was a professionally executed terrorist operation by a professional Al Qaeda assassination team, whose 20 members acted under the orders of their leader Ayman al Zawahri after special training. They were all Libyans, freed last year from prisons

where they were serving sentences for terrorism passed during the late Muammar Qaddafi's rule.

In a video tape released a few hours before the attack, Zawahri called on the faithful to take revenge on the United States for liquidating one of the organization's top operatives, Libyan-born Abu Yahya al-Libi in June by a US drone in northwestern Pakistan.

Its release was the "go" signal for the hit team to attack the US diplomats in Benghazi. To mask their mission, they stormed the consulate on the back of a violent protest by hundreds of Islamists against a film said to insult Prophet Muhammed produced by a Florida real estate agent called Sam Bacile, who has been described as of Israeli origin.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

The operation is rated by terror experts as the most ambitious outrage al Qaeda has pulled off in the last decade. According to our sources, the gunmen split into two groups of 10 each and struck in two stages:

1. They first fired rockets at the consulate building on the assumption that the ambassador's bodyguards would grab him, race him out of the building and drive him to a safe place under the protection of the US secret service;
2. The second group was able to identify the getaway vehicle and the ambassador's armed

escort and lay in wait to ambush them. The gunmen then closed in and killed the ambassador and his bodyguards at point blank range.

debkafle's intelligence sources report that the investigation launched by US counter-terror and clandestine services is focusing on finding out why no clue was picked up of the coming attack by any intelligence body and how al Qaeda's preparations for the attack which took place inside Libya went unnoticed by any surveillance authority.

Aspiring Jihadist Arrested in Chicago

By Ben West

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/aspiring-jihadist-arrested-chicago?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120920&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=5a2c5c3484a242f8b21040448994697b

On the evening of Sept. 15, Adel Daoud (photo) parked a Jeep Cherokee loaded with a large explosive device outside a bar in

agencies perfect their sting operations to identify aspiring jihadists and prevent attacks, jihadists, too, can be expected to innovate and evolve alternate means of communication and vetting of those with whom they collaborate.



Details of Daoud's Case

Daoud was a typical aspirational jihadist. He read Inspire magazine (an online jihadist publication), watched jihadist training videos, cited arguments from the late Anwar al-Awlaki, participated in jihadist forums

downtown Chicago. As he walked down the street away from the vehicle, he activated a trigger to detonate the bomb. The bomb, however, was inert, and FBI agents positioned nearby immediately took Daoud, an 18-year-old from the Chicago suburbs, into custody.

Daoud had been the subject of a four-month FBI investigation and sting operation, during which undercover agents had been communicating with Daoud and recording his statements. Sting operations have become the tactic of choice for the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement organizations when investigating would-be jihadists. As U.S. law enforcement

denouncing U.S. policy and justified attacks against U.S. citizens. He was not shy in voicing his intent to kill Americans in retaliation for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Daoud tried to recruit at least six people over the span of seven months to help plot an attack against the United States before he crossed paths with an undercover agent on the Internet around May 2012. Based on records later obtained by investigators, Daoud did not appear to have any hard skills to conduct a bombing attack. He downloaded several instructional documents and videos on how to



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

make explosives and build bombs, but there is no indication that Daoud attempted to make any weapons himself. Instead, he talked about going to Saudi Arabia or fighting in Yemen, although he expressed a desire to conduct attacks in the United States before going

Daoud's planning, he saw it necessary to reach out for help, which helped to tip off law enforcement agents.

Rather than immediately arresting Daoud and making a weak case to a federal judge based on an 18-year-old's online rants, investigators continued to monitor Daoud, seeking more evidence to make a stronger case and get a more severe sentence. The FBI set up a sting operation, during which authorities recorded Daoud plotting an attack with an undercover law enforcement agent. The FBI also watched Daoud conduct surveillance on the bar he intended to attack. In a textbook sting operation targeting an aspiring jihadist, an undercover agent offers



abroad.

By himself, Daoud was still a long way from posing a direct threat to the United States, but he was bent on conducting an attack. Along the way, he made a number of mistakes. For one, it is apparent from Daoud's conversations with the undercover agent, documented in the Sept. 15 criminal complaint, that Daoud did not heed all of the advice that he read in Inspire magazine. Over the years, Inspire has emphasized that big, elaborate attacks are risky, expensive and hard to put together. One of the magazine's main contributors, Nasir al-Wahayshi, has argued that small, simpler attacks such as the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 are much easier to execute, are more effective than bombings and do not open up aspiring jihadists to discovery by the authorities during the planning stage.

Daoud unequivocally rejected the idea of a shooting attack, even mocking the July 20 shooting that killed 12 people at a movie theater in Aurora, Colo. Daoud insisted on carrying out a spectacular attack, killing "a lot of enemies" and making headlines worldwide. One of the characteristics of dramatic attacks of the sort Daoud envisioned, however, is that they are difficult to execute alone – especially if the individual doesn't know how to make explosives or a bomb. Early in

the suspect an explosive device (or other deadly weapon). As soon as the suspect attempts to use the inert explosive device, authorities have all the evidence they need to charge the suspect with attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction. The FBI has conducted dozens of these sting operations, where it finds an individual who self-identifies as an aspiring jihadist and then uses informants or undercover agents to collect more evidence against the suspect. Many of those put on trial have received 20- to 30-year sentences.

While the government's pursuit of an incompetent, would-be jihadist may seem extreme, individuals like Daoud (known in some law enforcement circles as "Kramer jihadists," after the bumbling character from *Seinfeld*) have posed a threat before when they have linked up with competent jihadist operatives. For example, the FBI conducted surveillance on the group that would conduct the 1993 World Trade Center attack but dropped the investigation when the informant turned out to be problematic and when it was determined that the group did not possess the skills to pose a threat. Later, the group met Omar Abdel-Rahman (also known as the Blind Sheikh), who arranged for competent jihadist



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

operatives -- Abdul Basit (also known as Ramzi Yousef) and his partner, Ahmed Ajaj -- to come in and lead the group of amateur jihadists. Under the leadership of Basit, the group transformed into the terrorist cell that successfully attacked the World Trade Center. Other jihadist operatives, such as Richard Reid and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, were similarly incompetent but became dangerous when competent bombmakers and operatives exploited their willingness to conduct jihad. Given these past failures, U.S. counterterrorism officials have no appetite for letting aspiring jihadists slip through the cracks just because they appear incompetent on the surface.

Pre-Empting Entrapment

With the investigation under way, the FBI initiated its efforts to dispel any inklings of coercion. Defense attorneys, civil rights groups and some in the media have alleged that FBI sting operations targeting aspiring jihadists are entrapment -- where law enforcement agents coerce an individual who would not otherwise have posed a threat into an illegal act. The FBI's handling of Daoud's case shows that it is taking steps to combat these charges.

Several times during recorded conversations, the FBI undercover agent gave Daoud opportunities to back away from his planned attack. The agent cited Ramadan as a reason to delay the attack and further delayed by fabricating excuses, such as needing to wait for approval from his sheikh. On at least two occasions, the undercover agent directly asked Daoud if he was sure he wanted to carry out his attack. The agent emphasized that Daoud had to have jihad in his heart in order to carry out a justified attack. He stressed that Daoud couldn't be pressured into the attack, that he had to be completely self-motivated to execute it. Any outside help would be just that -- help, not coercion.

As stated above, this step was likely included deliberately. Entrapment has been raised as a possible defense in the upcoming trial of Mohamed Mohamud, the 21-year-old Somali-born American accused of attempting to bomb a Christmas ceremony in Portland,

Ore., in November 2010. Even though the entrapment defense hasn't proved to be successful, to avoid a recurrence of this defense in Daoud's case, the undercover agent cleverly used jihadist principles to get Daoud to emphatically show that he wanted to commit an attack himself and that nobody was forcing him to do it. Recordings of these conversations will make for a more solid case when prosecutors put Daoud on trial in the coming weeks or months.

The Effectiveness of the Sting

U.S. law enforcement agencies have been extremely active with these types of jihadist sting operations, especially in the past three years. While most of the suspects that the stings involve do not appear to pose a serious threat at the outset, aspiring jihadists can be dangerous if they encounter the right people with the right tradecraft.

In addition to being an effective law enforcement tactic, sting operations also threaten the integrity of jihadists' communication channels. Such operations will increasingly make aspiring jihadists skeptical of the person to whom they are speaking. In Daoud's case, he told the undercover agent that one of his contacts thought he was talking to a spy. Daoud's sheikh, who was not aware of the planned attack, also repeatedly discouraged him from talking about jihad and violence. Others around him knew the risk of discussing plans of attack, but Daoud persisted due to his inexperience.

U.S. law enforcement's struggle with aspiring jihadists will be a drawn-out affair, punctuated by action and counteraction. The FBI and other U.S. agencies are refining their skills in sting operations, which have proved to be an effective tool for pre-empting terrorist attacks. The success of these stings will plant doubts in aspiring jihadists' minds about who they can trust, further complicating their efforts to conduct dramatic attacks. Now the onus is on the jihadists to adjust. They can be expected to implement alternate methods of communication and to step up efforts to verify one another's identities to avoid detection and arrest.

"Aspiring Jihadist Arrested in Chicago is republished with permission of Stratfor."



New issues of the Journal of Homeland Security Education is available online

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120920-new-issues-of-the-journal-of-homeland-security-education-is-available-online>

The latest issue of the [Journal of Homeland Security Education](#) is out. It contains a number of articles relevant to the teaching of homeland security practices, which is now one of the top ten majors for undergraduates in the United States.

JHSE

Among the articles in the current issue:

- Steve Recca, director of Partnership Programs for the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center for Homeland Defense and Security, comments on the state of homeland security education, in his "Homeland Security Education: Reading the Tea Leaves."
- Linda Kiltz, assistant professor of public administration in the Master of Public Administration Program at Texas A&M, argues that higher education homeland security and emergency management programs should be collaborative, integrated, and should involve multiple disciplines. In "The Benefits and Challenges of Integrating Emergency Management and Homeland Security into a New Program," Kiltz highlights the benefits and challenges of an interdisciplinary approach to EM-HS education.
- In "Training and Education for First Response Emergency Personnel: An Examination of Physical Fitness Requirements for the State of California and the Federal Government," Lita Megan Grace, adjunct professor at Chabot Community College, examines physical fitness requirements for first responder agencies within California and for the Federal government.
- There are also reviews of two new textbooks: Introduction to Homeland Security Education by Logan and Ramsay, and Business Continuity and Homeland Security by McIntyre and Hancock

Intelligence shows LeT, Hizbul joining forces

Source: http://khabarsouthasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2012/09/22/feature-01

Lack of money and personnel may be pushing Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen to pool their resources in order to carry out acts of terrorism.

With terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen suffering from empty coffers and a decline of personnel, they may have joined forces in order to pool resources, Indian security experts warn.

"Nowadays we are seeing the collapse of the old ethnic biases of the terrorist groups. So many have been caught or killed, and the replacement rate has not been favourable," former Intelligence Bureau additional secretary Pradyot Dutta, who is now consultant to several state governments, told Khabar South Asia.



"For some time they encroached into each other's traditional support bases, but now we see them collaborating. This has taken

Kashmir militancy to a new phase," he said.

Terror groups in general are short of funds and experiencing a "manpower shortage", he added. LeT appears to have been hit particularly hard.

The membership of Hizbul is almost 100% Kashmiri, while LeT is made up primarily of Punjabis from Pakistan. But the distinction may be blurring as the two groups seek to recover momentum.

Minister of State for Home Affairs Ramachandran Mullappally told Khabar that the

government received firm intelligence in July that LeT was conspiring to hijack a flight between New Delhi and Srinagar, most likely with Hizbul's assistance.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

"Their plan was to use the passengers as hostages for securing the release of their comrades in jail," he said. "We feel that this sort of operation would not have been conceived without express involvement of the Hizb, which is the home-grown terrorist group of Kashmir. The hijackers planned to ask for the release of militants belonging to the Hizb."

Sahaya Ranjit, a senior officer of the Anti-Hijack Squad of the Central Reserve Police Force, agreed that the indicators pointed to collaboration between the two extremist groups. Moreover, he added, the potential risk extends beyond Kashmir.

"We have reviewed the security arrangements at all Indian airports because there is no guarantee that only a Srinagar-bound flight was their target," he said.

The government is keen to nip the threat in the bud and prevent it from affecting economic prospects in Kashmir, which has seen a revival in tourism following months of relative peace and stability.


"Between May and the end of August, the number of tourist arrivals in Jammu and Kashmir was 1.2 million, which is a record figure," Minister of State for Tourism Sultan Ahmed told Khabar.

"Last year, about 1 million came in this period. This summer there has not been a single successful terrorist strike, thanks to the extraordinary measures put in place by the government. However, there is no room for complacency."

Arvind Roy, an officer with Life Insurance Corporation, recently returned to Delhi from a five-day break in Srinagar with his wife, Mrinalini and two daughters, Snigdha and Sneha. Roy told Khabar, "Though we went with some trepidation, we forgot about the threat of terrorism within hours of arriving in Kashmir. It was a truly memorable holiday. We had the time of our lives. The local people were very hospitable. It seemed unbelievable that Kashmir has seen so much terrorism in the recent past."

Robot tuna joins Homeland Security arsenal

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/09/21/robot-tuna-joins-homeland-security-arsenal/>



Speedy tuna capable of swimming tirelessly in the Earth's oceans have inspired the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to fund a lookalike robot for underwater patrols.

The "BIOSwimmer" robot features faithfully replicated fins and a flexible tail to pull off quick maneuvers like the real-life fish. Homeland

Security made the choice to fund the robot made by the Boston Engineering Corporation in Waltham, Mass., with an eye toward missions such as exploring the flooded areas of ships, inspecting oil tankers or patrolling U.S. harbors to watch out for suspicious activity.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

"It's called 'biomimetics,'" said David Taylor, program manager for the BIOSwimmer at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "We're using nature as a basis for design and engineering a system that works exceedingly well."

'It's called biomimetics. We're using nature as a basis for design and engineering.'

- David Taylor, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

The robot, which is based on the tuna's sleek, flexible shape, would be able to squeeze into tight spaces such as the flooded bilges and tanks of ship interiors — not to mention fit in well with surrounding marine life. Humans can control BIOSwimmer's activities through a

laptop, but the unmanned underwater vehicle also carries its own computer for navigation, processing sensor data and communications with the home base.

BIOSwimmer represents just one of the new generation of robots that take their design inspiration from nature. Animals such as flying cockroaches to slithering snakes have given rise to robotic imitators that try to harness nature's lessons for moving around during natural disasters or on battlefields.

Marine animals beyond tuna have much to teach human engineers. Even squirmy starfish, worms and octopuses have inspired squishy, color-changing robots capable of both camouflage and squeezing into tight spaces.

LAPD wants to know why you are taking these photos

Source:<http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120921-lapd-wants-to-know-why-you-are-taking-these-photos>

If you live in Los Angeles and decide to take some pictures of a few monuments or public places to send to friends and family or for your

Launched in 2008, aims to identify a number of "suspicious activities" which officers should report to the department's counterterrorism



own private collection, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) may see you as a potential threat to public safety.

That is the message the LAPD is reinforcing to its officers and the general public through its Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) program. The *Huffington Post* reports that the program,

division. Depending on the context and the situation, the LAPD may consider taking video, making notes, and drawing diagrams as "suspicious activities."

SAR reports are reviewed not only by the LAPD counterterrorism squad, but they are also sent to the Joint



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Regional Intelligence Center in Norwalk. The reports can be uploaded to a national database accessible by law enforcement agencies across the country.

A recent study from George Washington University, co-authored by the LAPD's deputy chief Michael Downing, the head of Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau,

While this could potentially protect against a terrorist attack, it also impinges on the rights of citizens, especially people that do not have arrest records or who are taking pictures or video for personal reasons. The harassment of photographers has been documented in this video on the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) Web site



found that suspicious activity reporting has “flooded fusion-centers, law enforcement, and other security entities with white-noise. The profusion of SAR reports “complicates the intelligence process and distorts resource allocation and deployment decisions.”

The *Post* notes that in addition to flooding databases with profiles of people taking pictures and notes, not knowing their intent, it also subjects people who are doing nothing wrong to police encounters and questioning. The information that is shared through these databases and fusion-centers can make it hard for those traveling, trying to get government jobs, or security clearances.

The ACLU of Southern California has repeatedly advocated for SARs to have safeguards that would make them focus only on criminal activity. Tourists or people who want to take photographs of their communities should not be harassed and have personal information in databases when they have done nothing wrong and police have no reason to suspect criminal activity.

The SAR's standard to interrogate a potential suspect is very loose; it only requires that officers be able to articulate a reason to suspect criminal activity, and that



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

standard is all police need to need to detain an individual temporarily or pat someone down. When it came to proposing changes to the system at an LAPD commission meeting earlier this month, the LAPD refused to include that guarantee and the civilian Police Commission did not press the issue. The battle is not quite over yet; the LAPD's Inspector General is currently auditing the SAR program, and is

planning on issuing a report back to the Police Commission within the next couple of months. The report could shed light on the success of the program and whether it would hurt the department's efforts to require reasonable suspicion before people snapping photographs on the streets of Lo Angeles are stopped and asked to explain why they do what they do.

Fewest Numbers of Americans Concerned about Terrorism since 9/11

Source: <http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/fewest-numbers-of-americans-concerned-about-terrorism-since-911/f3476a354487886aeab524c109641794.html>

Despite the explosion in Islamist extremism throughout the Middle East, North Africa and SE Asia – some clearly exploited by Al Qaeda and its network of franchises in these regions – in which masses of extremist Muslims have been calling for “death to America” and American officials in Muslim countries, the day before the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attack the 2012 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy disturbingly reported that “fewer Americans are concerned about international terrorism as a ‘critical’ threat to the United States than at any point since September 11, 2001.”

“While a majority is still worried,” the survey of more than 1,800 Americans found that “the intensity of concern about terrorism has steadily declined.”

Furthermore, the survey found that “most Americans do not credit the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan with reducing the threat,” even though US and Western counterterrorists – especially those who’ve long been working to counter the terrorist activities of Al Qaeda, its affiliates and other allied Islamist jihadist terror groups – the numerous thwarted plots during the preceeding decade since 9/11 (the details of which remain classified), the many “lone wolf” Islamist jihadists who’ve tried to carry out attacks and the explosion of radical Islamism in the Middle East targeting American and Western interests is a clear indication that the


threat of terrorism is as serious as it’s ever been.

Furthermore, America’s war on terrorism in Afghanistan – and Pakistan – also clearly played a significant role in diminishing the 9/11-type capabilities of Al Qaeda by denying the terror group safe sanctuary in these countries; especially Afghanistan where an entrenched Taliban overtly provided support and cover for Al Qaeda.

Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS), the ranking member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, said in a statement commemorating the eleventh anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks that

“We must ... never forget that although Al Qaeda has been dismantled, there is more we must do. We must continue to work together, in a bipartisan manner, to ensure that the nation is secure for years to come.”

The **2012 Chicago Council’s Foreign Policy in the new Millennium survey report**, written by Project Director, Dina Smeltz, said, “while Americans consider the Middle East as the greatest source of future threats, they are gradually shifting their foreign policy focus towards Asia and a rising China, viewed as important more for their economic dynamism than as a potential threat. For the first time since the Council first asked the question in 1994, a majority of Americans (52 percent) see Asia as more important to the United States than Europe (47 percent).



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

The survey found that “the views of ‘Millennials’ - those between the ages of 18 and 29 - are shifting in a more pronounced way than those of older Americans. They see the world as less threatening, and show less concern than other age groups about international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and the development of China as a world power. Millennials also favor a less activist approach to foreign policy, with a slight majority (52 percent) saying the United States should ‘stay out’ of world affairs, compared to just 35 percent among older age groups.”

However, given last week’s potentially Al Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorism in Libya in which the US Ambassador and other US employees were killed and a renewed uprising in the so-called “Arab Spring” states calling for “death to America,” these attitudes may change.

“When looking at partisan differences, the 2012 Chicago Council Survey found that political polarization on many aspects of US foreign policy is overstated. Opinions in “red” and “blue” districts overall are similar. While the parties often differ in degree, there is generally consensus among the majorities,” the survey report said, adding that “Independents, however, distance themselves from both Republicans and Democrats. They are less likely than both to support an active US role in global affairs and less likely to view US leadership as ‘very’ desirable.

Other key findings of the 2012 Chicago Council Survey include:

- **Just over half (54 percent) support an attack by US ground troops against terrorist training camps and facilities, down from 82 percent in 2002;**

A Profile of Iqbal Bhatkal: The First Indian Mujahideen Leader Added to India’s Most Wanted List

By Arif Jamal

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

Iqbal Bhatkal is a co-founder of the Indian Mujahideen (IM). The IM is the first Indian terrorist group which has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States. [1] Iqbal Bhatkal became the first IM leader whose name the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) added to the list of most wanted by the Indian government (*Times of*

- **Majorities oppose the UN authorizing a strike on Iran (51 percent opposed), oppose a unilateral US strike on Iran (70 percent opposed), and do not want to get involved in a potential Iran-Israel war (59 percent opposed); and**
- **To deal with the crisis in Syria, majorities of Americans support diplomatic and economic sanctions (63 percent) as well as a no-fly zone in Syria (58 percent).**

A non-scientific *Homeland Security Today* poll also found an apparent complacency about the threat the current explosion in Islamic extremism poses to national and homeland security.

Asked whether the recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey that found fewer Americans are concerned that international terrorism poses a “critical” threat to the US than at any time since 9/11 reflects a serious complacency on the part of Americans, 63 percent of those who responded to the *Homeland Security Today* poll had said no as of this writing, in spite of the terrorist attacks on the US embassy in Libya, subsequent attacks on US embassies throughout Muslim nations and the rise in jihadist-style sentiment towards the US and the West in general.

Veteran counterterrorism officials and authorities told *Homeland Security Today* that, in their opinion, these survey findings are an indication that either the government has done an inadequate job of explaining the nature of the Islamist threat, or that the public has become “terrorism fatigued,” as one put it. The official added he hopes what “is happening globally right now opens a lot of eyes to the seriousness and widespread nature of the jihadist terrorism threat.”

India, September 20, 2011). Because of his religious background, Iqbal Bhatkal, 42, has emerged as the top ideologue of the IM. He is known to have masterminded some of the terrorist attacks in India that resulted in heavy casualties including the Mumbai train blasts as well as the Hyderabad, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Delhi serial blasts (Hindustan Times, April 8). Iqbal Bhatkal was born in the South Indian fishing town of Bhatkal in the Uttara Kannada district of the Indian state of Karnataka, which is where he spent his early life.

The name of the town of his birth later became part of his name.

Unlike his younger brother, Iqbal Bhatkal was not a bright student. He failed to get a diploma in Construction Technology although he made 18 attempts (Times of India [India] July 17, 2011).

Iqbal Bhatkal changed his field and began studying *Unani*

(Greek) medicine, also known as Islamic medicine. However, he became interested in religious studies at an early age. [2] He started taking part in the activities of the Islamic movement Tablighi Jamaat as a young man. Iqbal used the Tablighi Jamaat to network among Islamists (*Deccan Herald*, February 15, 2010). Later he started attending lectures by Dr. Zakir Naik, a leading Muslim who founded the Islamic Research Foundation (IRF), [3] a Muslim NGO, which shares ideology with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It was listed as an approved resource for theological knowledge on the LeT website. Dr. Zakir Naik's video lectures seem to have had a deep impact on Iqbal Bhatkal and led him to violence. The IM carried a series of bombs blasts from across India that killed hundreds of people in 2005. [4] The Indian Mujahideen sent their manifesto by email to the Indian media minutes before they carried out terrorist attacks outside the court buildings in the Indian cities of Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad on November 23, 2007. That was the first time the group emerged on the Indian jihadi scene. [5] It is generally



believed that Iqbal wrote the manifesto that was sent to the media (Hindustan Times, April 8). The IM's manifesto clearly reflects the Pakistani military's thinking on India, as is evident from the following paragraph in the manifesto:

We call you, O Hindus, O enemies of Allah, to take an honest stance with yourselves lest another attack of Ibn-e-Qasim sends shivers down your spines, lest another Ghauri shakes your foundations, and lest another Ghaznawi massacres

you, proving your blood to be the cheapest of all mankind! Have you forgotten your history full of subjugation, humiliation, and insult? Or do you want us to repeat it again? Take heed before it is too late! [6]

According to some reports, Iqbal Bhatkal and Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri (a.k.a. Riyaz Bhatkal) are now based in Karachi and run the "Karachi project" in close collaboration with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the LeT. [7] The IM are currently focusing on India, but they have a Pan-Islamist world view. The IM is closely linked with LeT of Pakistan and other Pan-Islamic Islamist groups. With the passage of time, they are likely to shift their focus beyond India. The IM could not have developed into a robust terrorist group without support from the LeT and the ISI. Thus, the Indian terrorism problem is part of the Pakistan problem. The Indian terrorism issue cannot be resolved without Pakistan stopping the use of jihad as an instrument of its defense policy. As long as Pakistan remains the epicenter of jihad, groups like IM and terrorists like Bhatkal will keep springing up.

Notes:

[1] Sanchita Bhattacharya, "Indian Mujahideen: Mutating Threat," *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 10, Issue 45, May 14, 2012. Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_45.htm.

[2] Praveen Swami, "Riyaz Bhatkal and the origins of the Indian Mujahideen" in CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2010. Available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/riyaz-bhatkal-and-the-origins-of-the-indian-mujahidin>.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Swami, *op cit*.

[6] "The Rise of Jihad, Revenge of Gujarat," *Islamic Terrorism in India*, August 7, 2008. Available at <http://islamicterrorism.wordpress.com/2008/08/07/full-text-of-indian-mujahideen-14-pages-email-on-terror-attacks/>.

[7] Samruti Koppikar, "IM-Printed," *Outlook India*, August 1, 2011. Available at <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?277757>.



Arif Jamal is an independent security and terrorism expert and author of “Shadow War – The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir.”

National Terrorism Threat Level: Color-Coded System Not Missed

By Jessica Zuckerman

Source: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/national-terrorism-threat-level-color-coded-system-not-missed>

Last week (Sept, 2012), the FBI foiled the 52nd thwarted Islamist-inspired terrorist plot against the United States since 9/11. The thwarting of this plot came as the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued warnings to religious organizations and other groups within the U.S. of the potential for heightened violence in connection with recent unrest in Egypt and Libya. Yet while U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and other communities increased their vigilance, the national threat level was not raised to red, orange, yellow, or even blue.

This was because in May 2011, DHS did away with the oft-criticized, color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). In its place, the Department created the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) in an effort to better communicate clear, timely, and specific information about the nature of the terrorist threat to the American people.

Overall, this system, coupled with other sensible efforts at effective risk communication, has served to enhance national preparedness, but more should be done. DHS should work to build on these efforts by merging terrorist alerts into an “all hazards” alert system, enhancing information sharing, and building human capital and professional development among the next generation of homeland security professionals and leaders.

Ending the Color-Coded Chaos

Most Americans are familiar with the once-common announcements that the national threat level was orange. Once heard throughout U.S. airports, the color-coded threat level announcements have not been missed. While the system was designed to convey a wide range of threat levels, elevated and high (yellow and orange) threat warnings became the norm, desensitizing the public and causing HSAS to lose its credibility. Over the eight-year life of the old system, the threat level changed 17 times; however, it was never reduced to low

or guarded (green or blue), and only once was the threat level ever raised to red.

Not only did the perpetually heightened threat level undermine the credibility of the system, creating apathy and complacency among the American public, but the alerts ignored the basic principles of effective risk communication by offering no actionable steps for citizens to follow. The system also failed to convey any meaningful difference between its non-specific alert levels. The differences between yellow and orange, for instance, had little to no difference in meaning for the public.

New System, Better Alerts

Abolishing HSAS in May 2011, DHS created the National Terrorism Advisory System in its place. Unlike its predecessor, NTAS offers only two alerts:

- **Imminent Threat Alert.** Warns of a credible, specific, and impending threat against the United States.
- **Elevated Threat Alert.** Warns of a credible threat against the United States.

With each alert, the streamlined system also offers a brief summary of the threat, steps for public preparedness, information on the affected areas, and expiration date of the alert, as well as further details on the nature of the threat and actions being taken by authorities. Once activated, alerts are disseminated to state and local partners, as well as through the media, e-mail alerts, Facebook, and Twitter.

Not only a warning system for the public, NTAS also provides a tool for information sharing across the government and the private sector. This allows the federal government to communicate details about the nature and location of a terrorist threat to state, local, and private-sector leaders.

What may be most notable is that since the creation of NTAS more than a year ago, no alerts have been issued. Unlike HSAS, NTAS alerts are



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

issued only when credible information is available about specific threats to the U.S. As one prominent example, vigilance was heightened across the nation immediately following the death of Osama bin Laden last May, yet no NTAS alert was issued indicating a credible or imminent terrorist threat to the U.S. Instead, both non-specific and specific threat and intelligence information may be communicated to law enforcement and public and private officials through such important and sensible tools as the FBI–DHS Joint Intelligence Bulletins.

Ensuring Effective Risk Communication and Preparedness

Building on the experience of the HSAS system and the principles of effective risk communication—ensuring that information is credible, specific, actionable, and understandable—the NTAS system has made extensive strides in enhancing the federal government’s threat communication. While NTAS offers a vast improvement over the now-defunct color-coded warning system, more should be done to improve risk communication and national preparedness. Accordingly, Congress and the Administration should:

- **Merge terrorist alerts into an “all hazards” alert system.** The NTAS only provides alerts and information on potential terrorist threats. In further developing the NTAS system, DHS should look to expand current risk-communication frameworks for other homeland security–related threats and activities. By integrating existing terrorist alerts into an “all hazards” alert and warning system for both man-made and natural disasters, DHS could better disseminate varied threat information and foster national preparedness.
- **Improve homeland security information sharing.** All too often, information sharing does not make for truly crosscutting communication, but simply entails state and local law enforcement sending information up to the federal government. Detailed and

specific threat information is critical to ensuring that state and local leaders are able to make informed decisions for preparedness and response. While the NTAS and the FBI–DHS Joint Intelligence Bulletins both seek to share intelligence and threat information with state and local leaders and law enforcement, more should be done to ensure that counterterrorism and threat information flows both ways.

- **Build human capital and professional development.** Effective risk communication is nothing without the people to lead the nation through a disaster. Today, however, too few individuals in government have all the skills necessary to lead the national homeland security enterprise. In 1986, the Goldwater–Nichols Act mandated that U.S. officers have a mix of joint education, assignments, and accreditation by a board of professionals in order to be eligible for promotion to general officer rank. The lessons learned from Goldwater–Nichols should now be applied to the homeland security enterprise to develop professionals capable of leading in critical national security activities, including homeland security preparedness and response.

Great Strides Forward, but More Left to Do

Last year, DHS wisely replaced its colorful but ultimately unhelpful and oft-ignored Homeland Security Advisory System in favor of the more specific and useful National Terrorism Advisory System. The NTAS provides actionable and understandable warning when a credible terrorist threat against the United States exists. While this system and other tools (such as the FBI–DHS Joint Intelligence Bulletins) provide actionable intelligence to U.S. law enforcement and the public, there is more work to be done. The U.S. should pursue an “all-hazards” alert system, as well as greater information sharing and professional development for homeland security officials, to further enhance risk communication and the nation’s overall preparedness.

Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.



Radical Muslim cleric Abu Hamza, 4 others to be extradited to US

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/09/25/radical-muslim-cleric-abu-hamza-4-others-to-be-extradited-to-us/?test=latestnews>

A European court ruled Monday that radical Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri can be extradited to the United States to face terrorism charges, including allegedly trying to set up an Al Qaeda training camp in rural Oregon.

The decision ends a long-running legal battle and means that al-Masri, considered one of Britain's most notorious extremists, could be deported within weeks along with four other



terrorism suspects in Britain.

Authorities in the U.S. have for years asked for Al-Masri and the others to be handed over, but the process had been delayed because the men raised human rights objections.

The men had argued before the European Court of Human Rights that they could face prison conditions and jail terms in the U.S. that would expose them to "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" in breach of the European human rights code.

In April, the Strasbourg, France-based court rejected those claims. Al-Masri and the four others lodged an appeal to the court's highest judges, but on Monday the court said it refused to hear it. "Today the Grand Chamber Panel decided to reject the request," the court said in a brief statement. It did not give a reason for refusing the appeal.

Britain's Home Office and the U.S. Department of Justice welcomed the decision.

"We will work to ensure that the individuals are handed over to the U.S. authorities as quickly as possible," said the Home Office.

The suspects, who are accused of crimes such as raising funds for terrorists, could face life sentences in a maximum-security prison.

Al-Masri was arrested in Britain in 2004 at the request of U.S. authorities, who have called him "a terrorist facilitator with a global reach."

They accuse him of assisting the taking of 16 hostages — including two American tourists — in Yemen in 1998 and of conspiring to set up a

terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon, between 2000 and 2001.

He also is accused of conspiring with a U.S. citizen to facilitate a jihad — or holy war — in Afghanistan and providing material support to Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The cleric, who is blind in one eye and wears a hook for a hand, lost several British court cases

in his fight against extradition before taking the case to the European court in 2008.

Known for his fiery anti-Western and anti-Semitic outbursts, he claims he has lost his Egyptian nationality, but Britain considers him an Egyptian citizen. He is currently serving a seven-year prison term in Britain for separate charges of inciting hatred.

The other four suspects due to be extradited to the U.S. are Babar Ahmad, Syed Tahla Ahsan, Khaled al-Fawwaz and Adel Abdul Bary.

Ahmad and Ahsan are charged in U.S. federal court in Connecticut with running a terrorist website in London, providing material support to terrorists, conspiring to kill U.S. nationals, and money laundering. Supporters of Ahmad, who was arrested in 2004 and has been held in a British jail since then without charge, are trying to help him get a trial in Britain because his alleged offense happened in London.

Al-Fawwaz and Bary, accused of being key aides to Usama bin Laden in London, are wanted in a New York federal court for the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

that killed 224 people. Al-Fawwaz faces many counts of murder.

The human rights court said that it has not decided on the case of a sixth suspect, Haroon Rashid Aswat, who was accused of being Al-Masri's co-conspirator in attempting to set up the camp in Oregon. The court said it needed to consider more information about his case.

In Washington, Dean Boyd, spokesman for the National Security Division of the U.S. justice department, said: "We are pleased that the litigation before the European Court of Human Rights in these cases has come to an end, and we will be working with the U.K. authorities on the arrangements to bring these subjects to the United States for prosecution."

India: The Next Terrorist Insurgency

By S.K. Bhattacharya


Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3373/india-terrorism-naxalites>

Because terrorism works: The death of a U.S. Ambassador in Libya, after all, seemed sufficient to convince many Americans that they should flee the entire Islamic world.

Although so far India's Maoists have shown little interest in attracting global attention by

attacking international targets, journalists who study their insurgency reckon that they need only be patient: The Naxals will figure it out soon enough. Then the journalists' careers as International Naxal Experts will be assured.

Why do the journalists reckon this? Because



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

terrorism works: The death of a U.S. Ambassador in Libya, after all, seemed sufficient to convince many Americans that they should flee the entire Islamic world.

The problem is not that America has insufficient intelligence; America has insufficient patience and insufficient curiosity. One look at the map below should be sufficient to suggest to you that a Maoist insurgency covering a third of the territory of the world's second-most populated country should receive attention from the media. Why doesn't it? Because it is far away. The insurgency is very well-covered in India – in the English-language press, at that – but Americans do not read the Indian press. The Indian government is not keen to encourage foreign journalists to report on the insurgency; no one can blame them: the antidote to the insurgency is to gain state control over the Naxal-infested areas. To do this, India needs foreign investment – a lot of it, fast. Investors would not like the sound of this insurgency if they knew about it.

That many Americans have never heard of a story so manifestly important is evidence that America is, if it continues to slide-line itself, in the terminal phase of imperial decline, which, one is tempted to conclude, seems exactly what the current administration wants: to deliver the world to despots.

Britain lost its empire because it was obsessed with preventing the 1857 mutiny – which had already happened, so there was no point in preventing it. Focusing on the threat of violent seditious activity, colonial authorities underestimated the threat of non-violent sedition. They thus lost access to Indian society precisely when they needed it most. As Britain's intelligence bureaucracy grew ever more elaborate, the scope of its security efforts narrowed – even as the scale of the

secessionist threat grew. Britain's imperial policy suffered from a chronically poor sense of timing. Moderate nationalist leaders were marginalized, militant ones strengthened. Over time, the militants gained respectability. The British authorities had detailed knowledge of secessionist plans, but failed to prevent them from being realized. They did not understand these plans, and relied upon analytical models that were out of date. Crucially, British India lost the ability to recognize gaps in its own coverage. Precisely as the need for information about secessionist activities increased, its interest in this information decreased. As militant nationalism made inroads, sources of intelligence to the colonial Government dried up. As the popular base of the secessionist movement widened, the Government's response narrowed – it focused only on containing the violence. The information in its possession was evaluated from an excessively narrow, binary perspective: Did it suggest an imminent threat to British life and property? Authorities were incapable of asking themselves the larger question – was the entire British empire at threat?

British authorities failed to grasp the larger picture. Cultural barriers distorted threat perception and led to misdirected countering action. This distortion did not occur for want of information: Britain's vast bureaucratic apparatus ensured an abundance of it. But the British did not recognize its strategic value until it was too late. Information was plentiful; insight was scarce.

Brave posturing and stentorian denunciations in the wake of the latest terrorist outrage are no substitute for insight. For insight, look at that map.

S.K. Bhattacharya is a private defense and security analyst, working to help democratic governments.

Rise of kidnapping by terror groups is urgent threat

Source: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/02/kidnapping-terror-groups-urgent-threat>

Islamist militants are increasingly funding themselves through kidnapping, with al-Qaida's north African wing likely to have brought in tens of millions of dollars in ransoms in the past few years, a US treasury official has said.

The US estimated that **militant groups including al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) received \$120m (£75m) in ransoms over the past decade**, said David Cohen, undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Kidnapping for ransom was an urgent threat, particularly in the Sahel, a belt of land spanning nearly a dozen of the world's poorest nations on the Sahara's southern rim, Cohen said in Berlin. "It is what has become perhaps the most challenging and fastest-growing technique that terrorist organisations, in particular the affiliates of al-Qaida in north Africa and in Yemen, have been using to fund themselves over the last couple of years."

Cohen said the average ransom had gone up consistently and was in the range of \$5m a payment. "So it is a growing and really quite urgent threat, particularly in north Africa, in the Sahel and in Mali in particular, where Aqim has now managed to claim dominion over a large territory."

Aqim emerged out of Algeria's civil conflict and has expanded south into the Sahara, raising its profile in recent years with hit-and-run attacks and kidnappings of westerners. Militant groups have benefited from lapses in security across the region as countries move from years of dictatorship to more democratic government.

Cohen, on a week-long trip that includes stops in Britain, France, Germany and Italy, said he

was talking with other governments in the hope of developing a unified approach to the kidnapping problem. The US government has a policy of not paying ransoms, but some European governments do so.

Talks were centred on steps to prevent kidnappings happening in the first place, the handling of hostage situations when they occurred, and the tracing of financial flows when ransoms were paid, Cohen said.


Iran and Syria were the other main topics of discussion with his European counterparts, he said.

Sanctions against Syria over the past 18 months had taken a "significant bite" out of the government's finances, he said, declining to give figures. "You have a situation where the Syrian government is spending at a greater rate. They are spending on security needs, on providing subsidies to their citizens, at the same time that the revenue side of the ledger is being significantly restrained. The natural impact of that is that their reserves are depleting."

Hezbollah drone shot down over Israel

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121008-hezbollah-drone-shot-down-over-israel>

The Israel Air Force (IAF) planes on Saturday shot down a UAV over the north Negev. The



UAV entered Israeli air space from the west, but Israeli intelligence says the drone was launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon, then made its way south over the Mediterranean, then turned east when it reached the water off the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah used drones in the past. The Shi'a organizations launched two drones from south Lebanon into Israel before the summer the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. During the war, the IAF shot down two Hezbollah explosives-laden drones before they reached their target – Tel Aviv.

Israeli surveillance tracked the drone as it made its way south over the Mediterranean and as it turned east over Gaza. Although the drone was spotted before it entered Israeli air space, the IAF did not want to shoot it down over water or over the Gaza Strip because the Israeli military would then have no access to the wreckage. Such access is important to learn more about the drone's origin and capabilities. Even when the drone was inside Israeli air space, the IAF allowed it to roam for about fifteen minutes in order to make sure it was not brought down over a populated area.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Haaretz reports that Iran has given Hezbollah

points and to learn more about the IAF's interception procedures.



IAF F-16B jet

Haaretz notes that six years after the heavy damage inflicted on it during the 2006 war, Hezbollah, having been re-armed by Iran and Syria and now to dominant force in Lebanon, may be assuming a more confrontational posture vis-à-vis Israel (note that a Hezbollah operative was

several drones, and has trained members of the organization in their operation. Drones can carry more explosives than most of the rockets Hezbollah has in its arsenal, and the drone could also be targeted with greater accuracy. The downed drone did not carry any explosives, and it is also not likely that it was taking pictures for possible future attack as it was too far for a line-of-sight communication with its operatives in Lebanon. It may have been sent into Israel to assess future entry

behind the suicide bombing which killed five Israeli tourists in Bulgaria a few months ago). With one of Hezbollah two patrons, Bashar al-Assad, steadily weakening, the organization may also have fewer constraints on its operational freedom. In response to the drone's launching, and as a reminder to Hezbollah of the aerial superiority of the IAF, the Israeli military sent a few fighter jets to buzz several Shi'a villages and small towns in south Lebanon.

Al-Qaeda Affiliates Getting Stronger, Says U.S. Official

Source:<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-05/al-qaeda-affiliates-getting-stronger-says-u-s-official.html>

Terrorist groups in Mali and Yemen that are



affiliated with al-Qaeda are "gaining strength," in large part by taking hostages for ransom, a senior U.S. Treasury official said today. "The U.S. government estimates that terrorist organizations have collected approximately \$120 million in ransom payments over the past eight years," said David Cohen, the Treasury

Department's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London.

U.S. intelligence officials are investigating whether the two main groups Cohen cited, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, may have played a role in the Sept. 11 attack on a U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya, that killed Christopher Stevens, the American ambassador to Libya, and three other Americans.

"Al-Qaeda's core is not in the position to provide generous funding to its affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, 'AQIM,' operating in the Sahel, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 'AQAP,' operating primarily in Yemen," Cohen said. "Instead, these al-Qaeda offshoots are self-sufficient,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

raising their own funds and themselves providing support to the next generation of violent groups.”

“AQIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate that has likely profited most from kidnapping for ransom, has collected tens of millions of dollars through KFR operations since 2008,” he said. “It raised significant funds from kidnapping for ransom operations in early 2012, and was holding nine hostages as of the middle of last month.”

Expanding Reach

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, he said, is using ransom money to expand its reach and influence, and as of earlier this year was expected to provide hundreds of thousands of dollars to other extremist groups in Africa.

Cohen said the two, as well as other terrorist groups in the Philippines, Pakistan and elsewhere use ransom money to help finance all their activities, “including recruiting and indoctrinating new members, paying salaries, establishing training camps, acquiring weapons and communications gear, staging deadly attacks,” and “helping to support the next generation of violent extremist groups.”

“What’s worse,” he added, “the size of the average ransom payment is increasing. In 2010, the average ransom payment per hostage to AQIM was \$4.5 million; in 2011, that figure was \$5.4 million.

“It is therefore not surprising that the size of ransom demands appears to be increasing, too, with AQIM reportedly demanding £70 million (\$113.3 million) for the release of four French citizens taken hostage in Niger in September 2010,” he said.

Attractive Targets

Terrorist groups distinguish between nations that pay ransom and those such as the U.K. and the U.S. that don’t, Cohen said. “Recent kidnapping for ransom trends appear to indicate that hostage takers prefer not to take U.S. or U.K. hostages – almost certainly because they understand that they will not receive ransoms,” and because they fear a military response if they do, he said.

“Indeed, our information reveals that in 2011, AQIM was planning to target mainly Europeans, not Americans, for kidnapping operations because AQIM believed that some European governments would pay ransoms while the U.S. government would not,” Cohen said.

A second U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue, said French and German citizens and companies are two of the prime targets for kidnapers.

Protection Money

The groups’ tactics, Cohen said, are expanding to include demands that companies pay protection money, which the second official said is already a routine practice in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mexico.

“One al-Qaeda affiliate was planning to extort substantial annual payments, amounting to millions of euros a year, from a European-based company, in exchange for a promise not to target that company’s interests in Africa,” Cohen said.

He said the U.S. and other governments are cooperating in efforts to combat terrorist financing, and more than 160 countries, including all members of the European Union, are obligated to cooperate against hostage-taking under the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.

U.S. intelligence officials have said that, while the U.S. and its allies have curbed the flow of money from the Persian Gulf states to al-Qaeda’s remaining leaders in Pakistan, groups such as those in Mali and Yemen have become self-sufficient and independent. The way the terrorist threat has metastasized has made it harder to combat, the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence issues, said.

Best Management Practices

Companies that do business in risky areas can assist in efforts to combat hostage-taking, he said.

Shipping industry organizations and navies from around the world, he said, have collaborated to produce a set of “Best Management Practices” to help prevent hijackings off Somalia. He cited a 2009 Chatham House paper which found that ships that have implemented practices such as tracking and avoiding pirate skiffs, increasing speed near suspicious vessels, and equipping themselves with razor wire or high-pressure sprays to prevent unauthorized boarding may be four times less likely to be hijacked than those that haven’t.

“More generally, Cohen said, “international organizations, corporations, and non-profits should



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

train their employees to spot and evade danger, and insurance companies should

continue to work with their clients to identify new avenues for mitigating risk.”

Suspect Killed During Anti-Terrorism Police Operation In France

Source:http://www.rttnews.com/1978526/suspect-killed-during-anti-terrorism-police-operation-in-france.aspx?type=msgn&utm_source=google&utm_campaign=sitemap

A suspected Islamic radical has been killed in a shootout during an anti-terrorism police operation in north-eastern France, media reports citing local officials said Saturday. The incident happened in the city of Strasbourg on Saturday. The suspect, believed to be radical Islamist linked to a Salafist group, is said to have opened fire on police officers who were attempting to arrest him at his house in

It is understood that Saturday's raids were part of a nationwide counter-terrorist operation aimed at capturing suspects in a bomb attack on a kosher food shop in the northern Paris suburb of Sarcelles on September September 19.

Although the September attack resulted only in minor injuries to one person, the incident had triggered widespread outrage after it emerged that radical Islamists were targeting the Jewish community in Sarcelles. Incidentally, France's Socialist government had tabled a new anti-terrorism bill on Wednesday in the country's Parliament. The measure is intended to tighten existing anti-terrorism laws in wake of the killing of seven people by an al-Qaeda-inspired Islamist gunman in the south of the



the French city. The suspect, who is yet to be identified by name, was reportedly fatally wounded in the ensuing shootout with police officers. He is said to have died at the scene, despite being treated by medics for his injuries. Local media reports indicated that some of police officers received direct hits to their bullet proof jackets and helmets during the shootout. They said at least three police officers were injured in the incident. Similar raids, coordinated by the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DCRI) and the terrorism sub-directorate (SDAT) of the Judicial Police, took place in Nice, Cannes and Paris. Police officials were quoted as saying that about a dozen people were arrested in the operation.

country in March. The new measure seeks to prosecute people who undergo combat training at overseas extremist camps, and stipulates up to ten years' imprisonment for such persons. It also allows authorities to monitor those suspected of running extremist websites. If approved by the parliament, the proposed legislation would allow French police to question people suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity outside France. Incidentally, present laws allow the cops to act only when such offenses are suspected or committed inside France. The development comes six months after Mohamed Merah, the Islamist gunman who carried out the shooting spree in southern France, was killed



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

on March 22 following a 32-hour police siege of his flat in the southern city of Toulouse.

Before his death, Merah admitted shooting seven people to death – three soldiers and four civilians – in three separate attacks. He also told police officers during the siege that he was affiliated to the al-Qaeda and claimed that the killings were to "avenge Palestinian children" as well as French "crimes" in Afghanistan.

The deadly shootings by Merah had prompted the French government at the time to raise the

national terror alert to its highest level and ban French soldiers from wearing uniforms outside military bases in the country.

Incidentally, French authorities faced widespread criticism for failing to act sooner after it emerged that they had intelligence about Merah's links with foreign Islamists since 2009. Nevertheless, authorities defended their actions by pointing out that existing laws prevented them from arresting a person who had not committed an offense on French soil.

European Cash Keeps Al Qaeda Going

Source: <http://www.strategypage.com/htm/w/hterr/articles/20121010.aspx>

American intelligence agencies estimate that Islamic terrorists in North Africa have obtained at least \$120 million in ransoms, mostly from European nations, in the last decade. The terrorists have demanded ransoms of over \$20 million for each for some of their European captives. They always settle for less, although the average in the last few years has been about \$5 million per European captive. In a pinch, the terrorists will grab a wealthy local, but usually only get a few thousand for these, and risk starting a blood feud with a powerful tribe or clan. Westerners are preferred. While most of the tourists now stay away, there are still business people and aid workers.

While there is public pressure in Europe to pay ransoms, the governments don't want to because they recognize that the money supports Islamic terrorism and encourages more kidnappings. The African governments oppose paying big ransoms as well, because the terrorists do most of their damage locally. To make matters worse, there are multiple Islamic terrorist groups competing to see who can raise the most cash from European captives. Too often, the European nations pay, because of the intense political and media pressure to "do something" to rescue the widely publicized captives. This is nothing new in Europe, especially the south, where there have often been informal deals with Islamic terrorists to provide sanctuary or lenient prosecution and early release in return for immunity from terrorist attacks.

All this ransom money has enabled Islamic terrorist organizations to survive, and even thrive in North Africa. While driven out of Algeria in the 1990s, the Islamic terrorists have found that money will buy them sanctuary in the dry Sahel (the semi-desert belt below the Sahara Desert). The tribes in this thinly populated region are frequently willing to take in fugitives for a price, and are often in rebellion against the local government. This is especially true of the Tuareg tribes who are prominent throughout most of the Sahel. This has led to many alliances between al Qaeda and Tuareg tribes. The ransom money not only bought sanctuary, it bought friendship with many of these tribes and lots of eager young tribesmen joining the terrorists.

In addition to the ransoms, the terrorists have also been handling security and transportation for cocaine (flown in from South America) and other drugs smuggled north to the Mediterranean and then into Europe. The drug gangs pay well for these labor intensive services, but not as well as the ransoms. Sometimes Europeans are spotted by the drug smugglers, who call in other Islamic terrorists to make the grab. The Western hostages are the prize, not the pay received for guarding drug shipments.

While the Islamic terrorists talk about religion and righteous indignation, they really keep going with cash. Take away the money and the terrorist organizations shrink to a few armed and angry cranks. Still dangerous, but more nuisance than threat.



Philippines Will Regret Terrorist Treaty

Source: <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/10/09/philippines-will-regret-terrorist-treaty/>

After almost four decades of battling the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an Islamist insurgent



group best known in the West for beheading captives, the government of the Philippines has



reached a peace accord which will grant the Muslim and ethnic Bangsamoro people an autonomous Islamic entity on Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines.

While diplomats and academics will always applaud deals purporting to end bloodshed, this agreement both legitimizes the terrorists' often bloody tactics and signals to Islamists in other states that they should not accept living as a minority but rather should always push to

succeed. Manila's concession strikes a blow at the notion of multi-confessional democracy in Asia. Should Islamist insurgents in southern Thailand now get their own autonomous state? Should Burmese Muslims secede? Is there space for a healthy Muslim minority in India?

Nor will the deal bring peace to the Philippines. Not only is the Abu Sayyaf Group (a related Islamist organization) not party to the agreement, but precedent also shows that Islamist terrorists will simply interpret treaties as truces during which they can regroup or expand their ambitions. The Moro partisans can pursue politics on one hand, while using Abu Sayyaf terrorism

to pressure for greater concessions. When the Pakistani government famously

signed the Malakand Accords, the result was a doubling of the Taliban in nearby Swat and a renewed Islamist offensive deep into Pakistani territory, catching Islamabad off guard. Diplomats can applaud today, but they are condemning not only Philippine citizens, but others around the world to renewed insurgency and terrorism down the road.



Decade after Bali, Indonesian terror aims at gov't

Source:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g2X6p4Gdhq8QVY8oEERIdlsLk_zQ?docId=d80aa89e490c4be5acd2401ceba59fcb

Ten years after terrorist attacks at two Bali nightclubs killed more than 200 people, mostly foreign tourists, Indonesia has won



international praise for its counterterrorism efforts. Militant organizations have been fractured and many of their charismatic leaders have been killed or jailed.

But an Associated Press analysis shows the number of strikes within the country has actually risen, especially since 2010, when radical imams called on their followers to focus on domestic targets rather than Westerners. The more recent attacks have been conducted with less expertise, and the vast majority of victims have been Indonesians.

"It turns out that the terrorism problem in Indonesia is not finished yet," said Maj. Gen. Tito Karnavian, a former counterterrorism official recently appointed police chief of Papua province. "The quality of their attacks has decreased, but the quantity has increased."

Since Oct. 12, 2002, when the Bali attacks killed 202 people — including 88 Australians and seven Americans — four major terror strikes were targeted at Westerners in Indonesia, causing 45 deaths. The last was in 2009, when attacks on the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta killed seven people.

That compares to 15 attacks against security forces, local authorities, Christians and some moderate Muslims in just the past two years. Those attacks have killed a total of 11 people — all police officers — and wounded dozens of civilians.

Although the targets may have shifted, the recruitment methods are the same. Young men are indoctrinated to believe that as jihadist "grooms" they will reap God's rewards for martyrdom — paradise for the bomber and 70 family members and the gift of 72 virgin angels. It's a belief shunned by most Muslims.

Fadlan, a convicted militant who goes by a single alias name, was trained to be a suicide bomber in 2001 by Jemaah Islamiyah, the al-Qaida-linked group that sent two other bombers to the Bali nightclubs on a busy Saturday night. He told AP that his mentor, Imam Samudra, one of the plot masterminds, deemed it too risky to use him in the attacks because he was already wanted for an earlier botched bombing.

Today, Fadlan believes he would be in paradise if he had been picked.

"I still believe it ... because it's not promised by my recruiter, but God," Fadlan said softly in a mosque near his house in central Jakarta.

Fadlan was jailed for four years in 2006 after being found guilty of harboring terrorists, including Nordin M. Top, who was Southeast Asia's most wanted militant before police killed him in 2009. Fadlan was released on good behavior that same year and is now part of the government's deradicalization program, designed to reform convicted extremists.

He told AP he also was involved in two 2001 bombings at churches in eastern Jakarta that injured more than 70 worshippers. He was never convicted in those attacks due to a lack of evidence.

Now 36, Fadlan says he's not actively involved with any militant groups in Indonesia and no longer interested in becoming a groom there because the country is not seen as a battle ground for holy war. But he smiles broadly when asked if he would still be willing to serve as a suicide bomber on another front if called.

"Nobody refuses a reward in heaven, right?" he says. "But I live like I'm in a large aquarium now ... authorities are



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

watching me everywhere I go, and I could not go abroad."

A turning point for Indonesian terrorist groups came in 2010, when police raided a paramilitary jihadi camp hidden in the mountains of Aceh province. An anti-terrorism crackdown followed that left more than 100 suspected militants either dead or arrested.

10 years, including 84 last year. Dozens more have been killed since the Bali bombings.

Though the number of domestic terrorist attacks has risen, suicide bombers are more likely to act alone or in smaller groups than they did in years past.

"I don't think there is any one person who is the current face of terrorism in Indonesia," said



Memorial Wall of the 2002 Bali bombing. 2008-02-28, Kuta, Indonesia

Another alleged Bali bombings mastermind, Dulmatin, was shot to death in a raid. Radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir was arrested; last year he was sentenced to 15 years in jail.

That led Indonesian extremist religious leaders to order militants to change their mission. Instead of going after Westerners and American symbols they were directed to target Indonesian 'infidels' such as police, anti-terrorism squads, lawmakers and others deemed as obstacles to transforming the secular country into an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.

Most of Indonesia, a country of 240 million, practices a moderate style of Islam that condemns violence, and its government is keeping up pressure against extremists. Data from the National Police revealed more than 700 militants have been arrested over the past

Ken Conboy, a Jakarta-based expert on Southeast Asian terrorism. "Rather, the terrorists have splintered into small cells that have only fleeting contact, if that, with one another."

That lack of organization makes it more difficult to pull off devastating attacks.

Last year, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a mosque packed with police, injuring 30 people, and another detonated his explosives in a church in Central Java's Solo town, dying instantly and wounding 22 worshippers.

Just last month, police arrested 10 Islamist militants and seized a dozen homemade bombs from a group suspected of planning suicide attacks against security forces and plotting to blow up the parliament building.

The alleged bomb maker, Muhammad Toriq, turned himself in to police while wearing an empty suicide vest.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

The explosives seized were pipe bombs, dangerous but much less powerful than those used in Bali 10 years ago. But other would-be suicide bombers remain at large.

In March, authorities received an intelligence tip that at least one jihadist "groom" had arrived in Bali. They found a note he wrote to his family, saying he would carry out a suicide mission with God's blessing and that the family

would be reunited in paradise, said Ansyaad Mbai, who heads the country's anti-terrorism agency.

Security forces killed five suspects who were believed to be plotting several armed robberies in Bali to fund their terrorist activities. But the groom got away, and it's unclear what attack he had planned or whether he will still attempt it.

Bali bombings: 'I sealed my brother's coffin'

By Frank Gardner (BBC security correspondent)

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19917230>

This Friday, 12 October 2012, will be a tough day for a lot of people. It marks exactly 10 years since a double bombing in Bali killed 202 people, 27 of them British.

Tobias Ellwood MP, now parliamentary private



secretary to a Foreign Office minister, lost his brother Jon that day.

Jon was a teacher, in Bali for a conference.

When he was killed in the second of two blasts that tore through the night club area of Kuta in Bali, it took three days for his family to find out he had been killed.

Tobias and his sister flew out to bring home their brother's body, but he describes a shambolic scene where the tiny local morgue was overflowing into the street and where Foreign Office staff were unprepared for a disaster on this scale.

"We just wanted to bring my brother's body back to Britain, as simple as that. But it's not that simple.

"You need death certificates in both languages, embalming certificates, sealing certificates.

"All these processes require time and people to participate. None of that happened.

"I had to do many of those things myself to the point where I ended up screwing the lid down on the coffin myself. That can't be right."

Mr Ellwood says some extra staff drafted in by the British embassy were themselves unable to cope and had to be repatriated; he calls the embassy response "horrific".

After that, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary at the time, invited Mr Ellwood to contribute ideas on how to improve Foreign Office emergency response.

System set up

Following a thorough review there are now emergency response teams in every major British embassy across the world.

A system called Rapid Deployment Teams (RDTs) has been set up, based in London, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia, to provide

immediate help.

A Foreign Office spokesman said this week that since the Bali bombings of 2002, it has been used over 50 times - including during the recent Japanese tsunami.

But Mr Ellwood also believes that his brother's death could have been avoided if MI5, the security service, had given sufficient warning to British citizens.

"There was intelligence that said attacks on tourists at nightclubs was expected and indeed there was a (grenade) attack on 23 September.

"With all that in mind the threat levels should have been raised higher," says Mr Ellwood.

"It wasn't - and consequently my brother's official conference went ahead. Had it been raised to high, his conference would have been cancelled and he'd be alive today."

MI5's failure to raise the alarm in time was widely criticised in a subsequent special report by parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Some in the intelligence community privately complained that, given the imprecise nature of where and when an attack might come, it was not possible to raise the threat level any further.

It may be small comfort to the victims and their relatives, but something positive has since come out of the Bali bombings.

Britain now has a small but effective cross-government team that constantly monitors the terrorist threat to UK citizens, at home and abroad.

'Substantial' risk

Housed inside the security service but independent from it, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) comprises around 100 specialists drawn from the military, the Foreign Office, intelligence agencies, Cabinet Office and government departments like Transport.

Sifting through large numbers of leads, many of which turn out to be false, JTAC advises the government what the threat level should be, and that in turn is announced to the public on

the M15 website where it gets picked up by the newswires.

The current threat from international terrorism to mainland Britain is assessed as "substantial", meaning that "an attack is a strong possibility", while in Northern Ireland it is rated higher as "severe", meaning that "a terrorist attack is highly likely".

But predicting where and when the next threat is coming from is not always a precise art.

Mr Ellwood reflects that 10 years after Bali there is still no effective diplomatic or military answer to the violent ideology that killed his brother.

"Those terrorists that did the Bali bombing were trained in Afghanistan and that saw the invasion in 2001," he says.

"But 10 years later it is difficult to see what the mission is.

"It's very confusing to see what we are trying to achieve (there) rather than that initial goal of defeating al-Qaeda. And it's worrying that those objectives are not clear."

The 12 October 2002 Bali bombing plot

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19881138>

Two bombs ripped through the Kuta area of the Indonesian tourist island of Bali on 12 October 2002, leaving 202 people dead. Among those killed at Paddy's Irish Bar and the nearby Sari Club were people from 21 countries, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians and 28 Britons. BBC News looks at the background to the bombings 10 years on.

The seeds of the October 2002 Bali bombing plot were probably sown in a hotel room in southern Thailand 10 months earlier.

At a secret meeting of operatives from South East Asian militant network Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, was believed to have ordered a new strategy of hitting soft targets, such as nightclubs and bars rather than high-profile sites like foreign embassies.

But it was not until August 2002 that Bali was chosen as the place to strike.

According to Ali Imron, who was jailed in 2003 for life for his part in the attacks, it was at a meeting in a house in Solo, Central Java, that "field commander" Imam Samudra announced

the plan to bomb Bali, and the main agents in the plot first came together.

Bali was chosen "because it was frequented by Americans and their associates", Ali Imron said. He quoted Imam Samudra as saying it was part of a jihad, or holy war, to "defend the people of Afghanistan from America".

In fact, more Australians and Indonesians died than Americans, prompting speculation that the plotters were poorly informed or manipulated by other people.

Hambali, who is currently in US custody in Guantanamo Bay, is believed to have been the South East Asian contact for Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.

But he is not thought to have played an active part in the Bali plot.

Terror attack

Instead, 43-year-old Islamic teacher Mukhlas - also known as Ali Ghufron - was convicted as the overall co-ordinator of the attacks.

Prosecutors said he approved the targets and secured financing for the bombings.

Mukhlas himself claimed he just gave the bombers religious guidance.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

He also recruited two of his younger brothers, Amrozi and Ali Imron, to play key roles in the attack.

Mukhlas and Imam Samudra are said to have chaired preparatory meetings in western Java during August and September.

Ali Imron said that the Bali attacks were originally planned for 11 September, to mark the first anniversary of the terror attacks on the US.

But the bombs were apparently not ready in time, and the plans had to be postponed.

The details of the attack were finalised in Bali between 6 and 10 October.

Suicide mission?

The bombers apparently all had separate roles. A man called Idris, who was later jailed for another bomb attack, was accused of gathering funds and arranging transport and accommodation for the bombers.

"Their duty was to explode the bombs," Ali Imron had said. "They were ready to die."

Iqbal is known to have died in Paddy's Bar. But Ali Imron also told police that the two bombs exploded prematurely, which could have caught Iqbal out, so it is unclear if he was on a suicide mission.

Different reactions

All the individuals detained for playing a major role in the attacks have been sentenced - and Amrozi, Mukhlas and Imam Samudra were executed in November 2008.

Other key suspects are believed to have been killed by police before facing trial.

Azahari Husin, a Malaysian who was alleged to be JI's top bomb-making expert and to have helped assemble the Bali bombs, was killed in eastern Indonesia in November 2005.

Another alleged bomb-maker, Noordin Mohammad Top, was killed in a raid in November 2009.

Dulmatin was killed by Indonesian police on March 2010 during a raid at a Jakarta internet cafe.

Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, seen as the spiritual leader of militant Islam in Indonesia, was jailed for conspiracy over the bombings, but his conviction was later

quashed. He is currently behind bars on different charges.

While the Bali attacks were a team effort, its aftermath provoked different reactions from those involved.

Police said Imam Samudra stayed in Bali for several days after the bombing to survey the devastation he wrought and observe the reactions of people he affected.

Ali Imron shed tears in court, and repeatedly expressed remorse for his actions.

Amrozi laughed and joked about his case, giving a thumbs-up sign when he was convicted. He said he was happy to die a martyr.



The three Bali bombers were sentenced to death

Amrozi admitted to buying the chemicals and the minivan used in the Sari Club blast.

He also named Dulmatin as the man who helped assemble the bombs. He also said that a man called Abdul Ghoni mixed the explosives. Another man, Umar Patek, was also convicted in June 2012 of helping make explosives.

Ali Imron said he helped make the main bomb that was used at the Sari Club.

He said a van loaded with explosives had been driven to Sari by a man called Jimi, who died in the blast. A man called Iqbal wore a vest with a bomb in it, which he detonated at Paddy's Bar.



Radical Islamist threatens Balkans with terror attacks

Source:http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/10/08/feature-02

Religious leaders and analysts are discounting the recent statements of Omar Bakri Muhammad, a radical Islamist based in Lebanon, who claims that the Western Balkans are Islamic lands and a target for future terrorist attacks.



"I do not know who is Omar Bakri, but I see that he is restless man who lost his British visa and citizenship. His antics are just duds that are not worthy of comment," Serbian Mufti Muhammed Jusufspahic told *SETimes*.

Bakri who spent 20 years running the al-Muhajiroun radical Islamist group from north London before moving to Lebanon in 2005, made the statements to the Bulgarian newspaper *24 Chasa (24 Hours)*.

"When Islam enters a territory, it becomes Islamic, therefore Islam is under obligation to eventually liberate it," Bakri told the newspaper in an interview published October 4th. "Spain, for instance, is a Muslim territory. Eastern Europe, as well. Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia ... due to its decision to send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq and its military co-operation with Israel, Bulgaria is also a legitimate target."

Bakri, who is banned from the UK, is considered to have strong ties with Al-Qaeda.

Professor Dragan Simeunovic, a terrorist specialist at the Belgrade Faculty of Political Science, said that although some Islamic leaders and extremists are prone to threats, their appeals are usually unrealised.

Although Islamic leaders have been threatening Balkan countries for the past 20 years, Bakris' statement could be an indicator of a renewal of the Islamic extremist interest in

the Balkan countries that were part of Turkish imperia, Simeunovic told *SETimes*.

He said that the threat is not an announcement of immediate danger, but could be a strategic shift towards these and other European countries.

"It can also be a trigger for the immediate action of Islamic extremists, living in, or originating from some Balkan countries," he said.

For some citizens of BiH, such statements provide proof of radical Islam.

"Honestly, I'm scared. If you take a look, mosques have been growing through Bosnia while there are less churches, although there are Catholics, Orthodox and others," Milan Mjailovic, a driver from Bosanski Novi, told *SETimes*.

Aleksandra Stankovic, 32-year-old Nis high school professor, said the things that Bakris threatens could be dangerous, but she hopes that world safety is better since the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks.

"There are numerous organisations and strategies against crime, war, terrorism at least. I believe in them and hope they are going to protect us of this evil since this is 21st century and all human beings have the right to peace and religion," Aleksandra told *SETimes*.

The prospect of a terrorist attack has left many Romanians concerned.

"The news gave me the goose bumps. This had never even crossed my mind, not in my wildest imagination. What I find more disturbing is that Romanian officials rushed to warn they do not rule out a terrorist attempt on our soil," Daniel Pascu, a computer engineer in Bucharest, told *SETimes*.

Qazim Qazimi, dean of the Faculty of Islamic Studies and an Islamic scholar in Kosovo, said that Bakri's statements are a call for attention.

"The claim for attacks in the Balkans, is just bounce to attract attention, and why not bounce on newspaper circulation or to get readers. There was never a danger by Islam ... the principles of Islam do not allow violence," Qazimi told *SETimes*.

Citizens say that they do not expect a terrorist attack in Kosovo because the Islamic tradition has shown that inter-



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

religious co-existence is stronger than words of certain people or groups.

"We are Muslims, but also we have here Christians and other religions. I believe that our

tradition has of tolerance has survived for many centuries, and is strong enough to not accept radicalisation or terrorism," Kushtrim Hyseni, a law student in Pristina, told *SETimes*.

Heathrow arrests: are Islamists training in Syria for attacks in UK?

Source: <http://www.theweek.co.uk/uk-news/49488/heathrow-arrests-are-islamists-training-syria-attacks-uk>

The arrest at Heathrow airport last night (October 9) of a man and woman off a flight from Egypt has underscored fears that militant Islamists are going to fight in Syria, only to return to put their training there into practice in the UK.

The police say the pair, both aged 26, are now being questioned at a central London station – where most terrorist suspects are interrogated initially. The two were arrested on suspicion of "the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism". Two homes in east London are being searched.

Fears have been growing that new groups, or small cells, of 'salafist' or 'jihadi' extremists have been moving from the UK to Syria and joining in the fight there, along with affiliates from the Gulf region and local Syrian insurgents.

This week the New York Times reported the discovery of supplies of weaponry and other military equipment to the Syrian rebels emanating from the Gulf, principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Despite initial support for the insurgency in Syria, and calling for the Assad clan to step down from power, the British government is becoming increasingly leery of supporting the rebels as they spot growing signs of al-Qaeda footprints.

An al-Qaeda group has claimed responsibility for blowing up the intelligence headquarters of the Syrian Air Force, a principal interrogation centre, while many of the bombings have the same signature as al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq.

The Heathrow pair are likely to have been tracked as part of ongoing surveillance operations that reached a peak during the London Games – the fear being that salafist groups would infiltrate the huge movement of people into the Olympic sites.

The new mood of apprehension reflects increasing concern of some effects of the Arab Spring. It is now believed that the popular

uprisings have opened opportunities for extremist groups to use the eastern and southern countries of the Mediterranean – Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and even Algeria and Morocco – as operational mounting bases (as they are known in security jargon) for attacks and operations in Europe and the UK.

The fear is that Muslims from the UK, many not of Arab or Syrian origin, are now travelling to Syria to fight for the jihadi cause. A British photographer, John Cantlie, recounted how he was recently abducted by an extremist group inside Syria, and held for more than ten hours by a gang, several of whom spoke with British accents.

The Sunday Telegraph journalist Andrew Gilligan wrote at the weekend that at least two groups of British citizens, of Somali and Sudanese and non-Arab ethnic origin, had been identified as travelling to Syria to fight.

The insurgency in Syria throws an interesting light, yet again, on the Saudi Arabian support for jihadi extremists there. The majority of the 9/11 hijackers originated from Saudi Arabia, and most from the Arabian Peninsula.

The problem now is that in its new mutation into the latest crop of salafist and jihadist groups, the al-Qaeda spirit is largely virtual – transmitted in cyberspace – and not tied to one or even a cluster of physical bases.

Instead, they are loose bunches of like-minded groups and individuals, who combine for a particular cause and then very often quarrel and fall apart. And they thrive in the endemic anarchy of today's Iraq, Libya, eastern and mountain Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, Syria, parts of Egypt and the wilder shores of Somalia and North Africa.

But somewhere at the heart of it all is Saudi Arabia and the countries and peoples of the Arabian Peninsula – because that is where the money comes from.

The police have yet to say whether the Heathrow pair were travelling to



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Syria, via London, or on their way back. The irony is that much of this year's surveillance for the Olympics was to track support for the al-Shabab Islamists in Somalia, both in recruits and money, particularly from the Somali community of east London. But for

the al-Shabab and their cause the target is Somalia and not London, which they need to keep secure for their main money supply.

The difference with the new jihadis travelling to Syria, one suspects, is that London is their ultimate target capital, and not Damascus.

Evolution and Trends in Terrorism Tradecraft

By **Scott Stewart**

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/evolution-and-trends-terrorism-tradecraft?utm_source=free-list&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20121011&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=8c1df49e966043d792d61af375a5b9ac

The terrorist tradecraft discussed in last week's Security Weekly does not happen in isolation. The practitioners of terrorist tradecraft conduct their activities in the midst of other people – the authorities attempting to identify them and thwart their plans as well as civilians. Terrorist tradecraft also does not remain static. It is constantly evolving. These changes are prompted not only by countermeasures put in place to prevent terrorist attacks but also by advances in technology – a powerful force that can serve to either nullify old tradecraft practices or to provide new tools to the purveyors of terror.

Terrorism is an enduring reality. While geopolitical changes may cause a shift in the actors who employ terrorism as a tactic, terrorism will continue to be used no matter what the next geopolitical cycle brings. It is, and will continue to be, a tactic used by militant actors who want to confront a militarily superior enemy. Focusing on the tradecraft used in attacks and charting its changes and trends not only permits observers to understand what is happening and why but also provides an opportunity to forecast what is coming next.

Documents

In the early terrorist plots of the late 1800s, many of the foundational tradecraft requirements were aided by the general simplicity of the times. Among the foundational tradecraft requirements discussed last week was procuring identification documents. Public records were very sparse, did not usually contain people's photographs and tended to be decentralized and not easily searched. (This is still true in some parts of the world today, such as in Afghanistan and Somalia.) There were no universal identification cards such as driver licenses, because automobiles had not yet

become common. Passports and visas were not widely required for travel until after World War I, and even then the records of passport and visa issuance as well as traveler entries and exits were localized, hand-written entries into ledgers and were hard to search.

During this time, it was not difficult for Irish Fenian, nihilist or anarchist terrorist actors to travel, rent safe-houses or raise and transfer funds. Communication was certainly more difficult for everyone at that time – authorities as well as terrorists. The mail system was slow, and while telegrams could be sent quickly, they were seen by many people. Law enforcement agencies did not communicate or coordinate very well across jurisdictional lines within one country, much less on an international scale.

During World War I, concerns over spies and saboteurs caused important changes to international travel, including stricter passport and visa requirements. This also had an impact on terrorist actors, such as Irish Republican Army members traveling to and from the United States or England, but early passports, visas and other identification documents were often hand-written and easily forged or altered. During this era, it was also still quite easy to assume the identity of an infant or young child who had died, because birth and death records were not often cross-referenced – especially if they happened in different locations. This practice is referred to as an infant death identity in document-fraud investigations. Nazi and Soviet espionage agents used infant death identity quite frequently, which resulted in changes to the way records were kept, but domestic and international terrorist operatives continued to use infant death identities into the 1960s and 1970s.

Advances in technology in the 20th century allowed countries to make



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

their identification documents more resistant, but not immune, to counterfeiting and alteration. The real difficulty in using counterfeit or altered documents started when the documents were linked to a central computerized database. This meant that counterfeit passports and visas did not show up in the databases and allowed a quick photo comparison to ensure that passports with altered photos could not be as easily used. In 1988, Japanese Red Army bombmaker Yu Kikumura was able to enter the United States using an altered Japanese passport.

In 1992, al Qaeda bombmaker Ahmed Ajaj was arrested trying to come through immigration at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport using a Swedish passport in another name altered to bear his photo. His partner, Abdul Basit, ditched the altered passport he used to board the flight in Karachi, Pakistan, and used an authentic Iraqi passport in the name Ramzi Yousef to claim political asylum. In the 9/11 plot, and in all the follow-on al Qaeda plots directed against the United States, al Qaeda operatives have used authentic travel documents to enter, or attempt to enter, the United States. Some of the 9/11 operatives did commit document fraud in relation to driver licenses and state identification cards, but as outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report, that fraud almost resulted in the unraveling of the plot.

Changes in technology and enforcement in the United States and Europe have caused changes in identity and travel tradecraft for transnational jihadists, who are now searching for "clean skin" operatives who are unknown to law enforcement and who have the ability to travel internationally using legitimate travel documents.

Explosives

Bombing has been a staple of terrorism since Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators' failed attempt to destroy the British Parliament in 1605 in the so-called Gunpowder Plot. The invention of dynamite in 1867 was a very big boon for early terrorists, who no longer had to use black powder, a low explosive, as the main charge in their devices. Dynamite was not only more stable and less sensitive to moisture than black powder but was also more powerful. Dynamite was widely used by Irish Fenians in their attacks, but perhaps the image of the

anarchist bombthrower is the most iconic of that period.

In the age of modern terrorism, bombmakers have had the luxury of access to high-powered military explosives such as TNT, C-4 and Semtex. Technologies such as shaped charges, platter charges and explosively formed penetrators have also increased the impact of these powerful explosive compounds. Another development that has greatly altered the art of bombmaking has been the advent of microelectronics. Bombmakers can use sophisticated timers to activate a device days or even weeks after it is placed. They can also use sensors that detect motion, light, the presence of metal objects or changes in altitude in order to detonate the explosive device. Command-detonated devices using radio signals or cell phones have also been widely employed.

Perhaps one of the most influential bombmakers in the modern terrorist era is Abu Ibrahim, a former member of Black September, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the 15 May Organization. Ibrahim is often referred to as the "grandfather of all bombmakers" for his innovative improvised explosive device design and his willingness to train other bombmakers in his dark arts. Ibrahim was an early adopter of electronics in his designs.

During the 1970s and 1980s, state sponsorship did a lot to help advance bombmaking tradecraft, as sabotage experts from the Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi passed on training and technology. (The Eastern bloc was also a very important source of funding and identification documents during this period.) In addition, state sponsorship meant that sponsors, such as Libya, could use the diplomatic pouch to transport weapons and explosive components to terrorist operatives in places like London and Paris.

Controls on the purchase of explosives, and even on items like ammonium nitrate fertilizer, which can be readily used to make homemade explosive mixtures, have made it more difficult in recent years to make improvised explosive mixtures. This has caused bombmakers to change to mixtures made from more readily available precursors, such as acetone and peroxide. But these mixtures tend to be not only more dangerous to brew -
- the Palestinians refer to triacetone triperoxide, or TATP, as "the mother



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

of Satan" -- they also have a limited shelf life, are less stable and more difficult to transport and correctly synthesize. In 2009, would-be New York City subway bomber Najibullah Zazi was frustrated in his attempts to manufacture viable TATP.

In the realm of targets and tactics, we've talked elsewhere of the arms race in aviation security and how it has caused the threat to aircraft to evolve, with the next likely step being non-metallic explosive devices hidden inside the bodies of suicide attackers. There has also been an evolution in the targeting of Western interests abroad. Embassies have become harder targets and Western hotels have been increasingly more desirable targets, although the Sept. 11, 2012, attack in Benghazi may shift terrorists' focus back to vulnerable diplomatic missions in volatile locations.

Databases

Perhaps one of the most powerful inhibitors of terrorist tradecraft has been the use of computerized databases, allowing authorities to crunch a lot of data. One of the first well-documented uses of computers to locate terrorist suspects was the massive effort undertaken by the German Federal Criminal Police in the 1970s to combat the Red Army Faction. The German police created a database and then cross-referenced its information on a wide variety of indices. They then created a profile of the Red Army Faction safe-house with features such as young people living together, paying their rent and utility bills in cash and not registering with the local government or registering their motor vehicles. When a computer search identified addresses that matched the profile, they then dispatched detectives to investigate these possible safe-houses in person. This campaign was very successful in helping round up the first generation of Red Army Faction operatives.

Lists of terrorist suspects and their aliases have also proved quite useful in inhibiting terrorist travel, but it has not been without its failures or criticism. The U.S. State Department first adopted a database called TIPOFF in the 1980s designed to prevent terrorists from getting visas. The system was later turned into the Visas Viper system after the 9/11 attacks. The United States has created the Terrorist Screening Center, which is charged with consolidating all the various U.S.

government watch lists as well as administering the controversial terrorist watch list and the no-fly list.

Computers are also being used to monitor terrorist communication, whether by telephone, satellite phone or the Internet. But like the watch lists, these efforts have proved to be quite controversial.

Seizing or freezing bank accounts associated with known terrorists and efforts to crack down on charities that were funding terrorist groups have been somewhat successful in limiting the money moving to terrorist entities. But the presence of significant informal money transfer networks has made it impossible to totally stop the flow. The ability of terrorist groups to use narcotics sales and other criminal activity to fund themselves has also been hard to stop.

Trends

Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its allies have spent billions of dollars on security improvements and have made great efforts to increase security and to counter the tradecraft used by terrorist groups. It is now more difficult for terrorist operatives to travel to the United States and Europe -- as evidenced by the lack of serious attacks and by the calls of groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the al Qaeda core group for grassroots terrorist operatives to conduct simple attacks where they are rather than travel overseas for training or to wage jihad. It has also led them to recruit individuals who have travel documents like Richard Reid, Najibullah Zazi and Faisal Shahzad for attacks rather than send well-trained operatives to conduct them.

This inability to conduct attacks in the West and the frustration it causes, along with the downfall of the transnational al Qaeda core organization, may be causing the remaining jihadist groups to focus more on operations in their local areas -- places where they have the skilled operatives and materiel to conduct successful attacks.

This means that Western diplomatic missions, hotels and businesses located in these areas will remain vulnerable to attack. With these militant groups in possession of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles like the SA-7, there is also a lingering concern over the possibility of an attack against a Western aircraft in such areas.



Somali pirates release Greek-owned ship for ransom

Source: http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2019413379_apafsomaliapiracy.html

A Liberian-flagged Greek-owned ship and its crew of 21 Filipinos who were held hostage by

pirates for eight months have been released following the payment of a \$2.3 million ransom, a Somali pirate said Friday.



The M/V Free Goddess. Photo: Neptune Maritime Security

decrease that could signify that the scourge is ending, though experts say it is too early to declare victory.

Pirates still hold six ships and 156 crew members. At the height of Somali piracy, pirates held more than 30 ships and 600 hostages at a time.

The overwhelming majority of hostages have been sailors on merchant ships, though European families have also been seized while traveling in the dangerous coastal waters. Four Americans were killed in February 2011 when the pirates who boarded their ship apparently became trigger-happy because of nearby U.S. warships.


Bile Hussein, a pirate based in Garacad in the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia, said the brigands initially wanted to be paid \$9 million after they captured the bulk carrier MV Free Goddess. Months of negotiations led to the lowering of the ransom and they released the ship on Thursday, Bile said.

The ship's owners, Free Bulkers SA, did not comment about the ransom payment claims but they confirmed that ship had been released and that all the 21 Filipino crew are well.

They said the ship was seized on Feb. 7, 2012 in the Arabian Sea carrying a consignment of steel coils from the Black Sea but they did not specify the destination or source of the cargo.

The Company didn't want to specify exactly what day the Liberian-flagged ship was released, "as she's still in dangerous waters."

Hijackings by Somali pirates have significantly reduced in the last couple of years because many ships now carry armed guards and there is an international naval armada that carries out onshore raids. In 2010, pirates seized 47 vessels, so far this year they've taken five, a



For the pirates, the risks of being arrested, killed or lost at sea are overshadowed by the potential for huge payouts. Ransoms for large ships in recent years have averaged close to \$5 million. **The largest reported ransom was \$11 million for the Greek oil tanker MV Irene SL last year.**

The ransoms are often air-dropped down to hijacked ships.

Somalia has been mired in conflict since longtime dictator Siad Barre



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

was overthrown by warlords in 1991 who then turned on each other.

Somalia's inland conflict has helped piracy flourish on the waters off the horn of Africa.

NOTE: According to other sources the ransom paid by ship owners was \$5.7 mil (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/12/somali-pirates-release-ship-hostages>)

LaFree: Terrorism is 'bursty'

Source:<http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/lafree-terrorism-bursty/2011-11-13#ixzz29B3C0Kdj>

Governments should be careful that rare, atypical terrorist attacks such as those of Sept. 11, 2001 don't have an outsize effect on policy—although, at the same time, governments can't ignore the tendency of terrorism to occur in bursts, said Gary LaFree, a University of Maryland professor.

LaFree, head of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses, said during an Oct. 13 lecture at the University of Nebraska, that Sept. 11 should be understood as both a highly unusual event that one that people reasonably at the time feared was a precursor to additional attacks.

To put the rareness of 9/11 in perspective, 3,369 Americans within the United States have died of terrorist attacks since 1970, with the collapse of the World Trade Center accounting for the vast majority of them. "If you take out the fatalities of 9/11, our fatalities are on a level similar to Canada," he said.

Further, even foreign terrorist groups identified by the State Department as inimical to the United States attack non-U.S. affiliated targets in their home

region far more often than they do either the United States itself, or representations of the United States, such as embassies or U.S. corporate buildings located abroad, LaFree said.

The vast majority of terrorist groups also last for less than one year, LaFree added. "It's actually more difficult to keep a terrorist organization moving than you might think."

Terrorist attacks against transnational or domestic targets by 53 foreign terrorist groups identified by the State Department as threats to the United States, 1970-2010



Gary LaFree speaks Oct. 13 at the University of Nebraska.



A transnational attack includes an attack against a U.S. embassy, company or other organization located in a foreign country. Terrorists with a stated intent of harming the United States and its citizens more often attack non-U.S. targets in their home country.

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

However, terrorism as a phenomenon tends to be "bursty," LaFree said. "When it starts to happen, you tend to get a lot of it," he explained.

The frequency of worldwide terrorist attacks, for example, has increased in past years near to the point of the total global peak of 1991, after which terrorism declined, likely due to the collapse of the Soviet Union which was a state-sponsor of terrorism, LaFree said.


"This is the dilemma—we shouldn't be overly impressed by a very rare, 'black swan' event like 9/11, but yet we also have to be concerned about the burst nature of terrorism," he said.

LaFree said he's against the use of a war metaphor to describe the fight against terrorism, since terrorism, like crime, can't be defeated and because "there's clear indicators that Americans are getting weary of war, because it's seen as specialized incident."

"We don't think about crime going away, we have to manage it," LaFree said.

New Journal – Terrorism

Source: <http://www.terrorisselectronicjournal.org/>



Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base was initially founded by Prof. Yonah Alexander in 1998 as a follow-up to *Terrorism: An International Journal* published in 1977 also founded by Prof. Alexander, Director of the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism.

As of August 1st, 2012, *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base* will provide continuity to earlier studies on the "Age of Terrorism" as well as closing research gaps in the growing literature on the manifold aspects of the subject. This new electronic resource will focus on identifying warning signals on the manifold forms of terrorism in the post-9/11 era and recommend national, regional, and global strategies to confront the potential challenges to all societies.

Members of the International Advisory Board and the Editorial Staff consist of academics, former government officials, journalists, and scholars. It is expected that in the coming months and years additional individuals will join this effort.

Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base will publish two issues annually with periodic updates as deemed necessary.

New data reveals al-Qaida-linked groups among most active terrorist groups in the world

START Consortium releases 2011 data for Global Terrorism Database

Source: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

Only one of the **5,000** terrorist attacks in 2011 is attributed to al-Qaida Central, but more than half of the top 20 most active perpetrator groups in 2011 are linked to al-Qaida,

according to new data released today in the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) **Global Terrorism**



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Database (GTD), based at the University of Maryland.

The most comprehensive, unclassified database of terrorist incidents, the GTD now contains information on more than 104,000 domestic and international terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2011 that resulted in more than 225,000 deaths and more than 299,000 injuries. These attacks are defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. The top five most active perpetrator groups of terrorist attacks in 2011 were: Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M); Taliban; al-Shabaab; Boko Haram; and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). While only one of the attacks in 2011 was attributed to al-Qaida Central – the August kidnapping of Maryland native Warren Weinstein in Pakistan – 11 of the **top 20 most active groups** are linked to al-Qaida. Those groups alone carried out more than 780 attacks that resulted in more than 3,000 deaths and wounded more than 4,600.

Al-Qaida-linked groups were responsible for four of the top **five most lethal attacks** in 2011.

- **al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)** – Yemen: March 28 – 110 killed, 45 injured
- **Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)** – Pakistan: May 13 – 80 killed, 140 injured
- **al-Shabaab** – Somalia: Oct. 4 – 70 killed, 42 injured
- **al-Qaida in Iraq** – Iraq: March 29 – 65 killed, 95 injured

“Total attacks in the GTD in 2011 continued an upward trajectory that began a decade ago, paced by the ongoing historic shift in attacks away from al-Qaida Central and toward its growing number of affiliates,” said Gary LaFree, START director and professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of Maryland.

The other most lethal terrorist attack in 2011 was committed July 22 by Anders Breivik in Norway. He killed 69 people and injured at least 60 others when he opened fire on a youth camp hosted by Norway's ruling Labor Party. Additionally, earlier that day, he detonated explosives in an attack that killed eight people and injured at least 15 others. Breivik

confessed to the attacks and in August 2012, was sentenced to 21 years in prison.

Terrorist attacks in just five countries accounted for 70 percent of the terrorist attacks worldwide in 2011:

- Iraq (25.78 percent)
- Pakistan (19.96 percent)
- India (12.67 percent)
- Afghanistan (8.35 percent)
- Russia (3.71 percent)

The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2011 (10) accounted for less than 0.2 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2011. U.S. cases of note:

- U.S. Transportation Secretary Beverly Swaim-Staley and Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley received packages Jan. 6, each with a note stating “Report suspicious activity! Total Bull---! You have created a self fulfilling prophecy.” The packages contained a small battery and an electric match that ignited when opened. No explosive material was found. Investigators indicated the notes were in opposition to highway signs urging motorists to report suspicious activity. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.
- On Jan. 7 an envelope addressed to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano ignited at a postal sorting facility. The envelope was not opened and therefore did not cause any casualties or property damage. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- During a Martin Luther King Jr. parade on Jan. 17 in Spokane, Wash., authorities found and safely disposed of a backpack containing a bomb. There were no casualties or property damage. In March 2011, Kevin Harpham, who has ties to white supremacist groups, was arrested in connection with the attack. He confessed to planting the bomb and was sentenced to 32 years in prison in December 2011.
- On Sept. 26, animal rights activists drilled a hole into the storage space of Rocky Mountain Fur and Fireworks in Caldwell, Idaho. They pumped several gallons of fuel into and set fire to the retail building. There were no injuries, but the fire caused \$100,000 in damage. A group calling themselves the “Arson Unit” sent a message to the North American Animal Liberation Press Office in Los Angeles, Calif., and the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

BiteBack Magazine website claiming responsibility for the arson. The “Arson Unit” is believed to be a branch of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).

With the release of the 2011 data, for the first time, the START Consortium also released four decades of geocoded GTD data for eight regions of the world. The geocoding allows researchers to chart the city-level progression of attacks across global regions and specific terrorist groups and movements, including: the spread of leftist violence in Europe in the 1970s; the diffusion of terrorism in Central American conflicts during the 1980s; the prevalence of ecoterrorism in the United States during the 1990s; and the contagion of terrorism in the Caucasus region during the 2000s. Geocoding for the remaining regions of the world is ongoing.

“The advent of satellite technology and geographic information systems is revolutionizing the study of crime, political violence and terrorism,” LaFree said. “By releasing geocoded GTD data for the first time, we are making a down payment on what we hope will eventually be a fully geocoded Global Terrorism Database.”

The GTD team has also improved the quality of data from previous years, adding more than 1,500 new cases, removing cases that didn't qualify for inclusion and clarifying and supplementing data with new information in hundreds of other cases. For example, the Haqqani Network is now recognized as an entity separate from the Taliban; they have been linked to 39 attacks since 2006. Many of the new clarifications and improvements are based on tips from GTD users. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) makes the GTD available through an online interface in an effort to increase understanding of terrorist violence so that it can be more readily studied and defeated. START encourages users to submit appropriate updates, corrections or additions to the cases. Government officials and interested researchers may download the full dataset directly through the **GTD Contact Form**.

Top 20 most active groups in 2011

- Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)
- Taliban*
- al-Shabaab*

- Boko Haram*
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)*
- al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)*
- New People's Army (NPA)
- Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
- Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
- al-Qaida in Iraq*
- Garo National Liberation Army
- al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)*
- Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)
- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)*
- Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)*
- People's Liberation Front of India
- Haqqani Network*
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*

* = an al-Qaida-linked group

Top five most lethal terrorist attacks in 2011:

- **al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – Yemen: March 28 – 110 killed, 45 injured**

Perpetrators detonated explosives at an ammunition factory a day after al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants looted weapons from it. The attack killed 110 and injured 45. Though no group claimed responsibility, AQAP is suspected.

- **Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – Pakistan: May 13 – 80 killed, 140 injured**

Two suicide bombers killed 80 people and injured 140 people at a training center for the Frontier Constabulary when they detonated explosives hidden in their vests. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that "This was the first revenge for Osama's martyrdom. Wait for bigger attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan."

- **al-Shabaab – Somalia: Oct. 4 – 70 killed, 42 injured**

A Somali national, Bashar Abdulahi Nur, detonated a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device targeting the compound that houses several Somali government ministries. 70 people were killed and 42 were injured. The militant group al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

- **Anders Breivik – Norway: July 22 – 69 killed, 60 injured**

The fourth most lethal terrorist attack in 2011 was committed July 22 by Anders Breivik in Norway. He killed 69 people and injured at least 60 others when he opened fire on a youth camp hosted by Norway's ruling Labor Party. Additionally, earlier that day, he had detonated 2,100 pounds of explosives in a rental van he had parked in Oslo between the Norwegian prime minister's office building and Norway's Oil and Energy Department building. That attack killed eight people and injured at least 15 others. Breivik confessed to the

attacks and in August 2012 he was sentenced to 21 years in prison.

- **al-Qaida in Iraq – Iraq: March 29 – 65 killed, 95 injured**

Ten suspected al-Qaida in Iraq suicide bombers stormed the Salah ad Din council building wearing police uniforms. After firing upon government personnel in the council building and executing three government staff members, they detonated explosive belts. At least 65 people were killed in the suicide bombing, 95 others wounded. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but al-Qaida in Iraq is suspected.

Subway/Rail Commuters At Greatest Risk For Terrorism

Source: <http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/251448.php>

Despite homeland security improvements since September 11, 2001, subway and rail commuters face higher risks of falling victim to terrorists and mass violence than frequent flyers or those engaged in virtually any other activity. And while successful criminal and terrorist acts against aviation have fallen sharply, those against subways and commuter trains have surged. These are among the findings of a new study by Arnold Barnett, George Eastman Professor of Management Science at MIT's Sloan School of Management, who will deliver a presentation titled "Has Terror Gone to Ground?" at the INFORMS Annual Meeting in Phoenix on October 15.

Barnett found that during the period 1982-91 deliberate acts of malice caused 1,327 deaths worldwide among air travelers, but none on subways/commuter trains. But between 2002-11, the pattern reversed: there were 203 aviation deaths and 804 among subway/rail commuters.

Further statistics depict the implications of this reversal. A recent subway/rail commuter in the Developed World has faced twice the annual death risk of a frequent flyer, while the risk per mile traveled by subway/commuter rail was ten times as high as by air. Criminal and terrorist acts account for about 8% of the overall death risk of air travel, but they account for 88% of the mortality risk on subways and commuter railroads.

Barnett contends that this reversal does not imply that aviation security measures are less necessary; instead, it might suggest that the

success of such measures has displaced criminal/terrorist activity to other venues like commuter rail systems.

Barnett paid special attention to the events on 9/11. He noted that the number of air passengers killed on that day - at 232 - was similar to the death tolls in later bombings on the commuter rail systems of Madrid and Mumbai, and in an arson attack on a South Korean subway. What made 9/11 singularly horrible was the enormous death toll on the ground (2,700 killed).

Subsequent measures to secure airline cockpits may be the reason that there have been no further attacks that used commercial airlines as weapons. Indeed, Barnett notes, the most publicized of the recent air-terror plots - the shoe bomber, the underwear bomber, the liquid-explosives plot, the ink-cartridge bombs - have reverted to trying to blow up airplanes, the primary tactic that was used before 9/11 with greater success.

Barnett notes that even among subway/rail commuters, the risk of falling victim to terrorism or mass violence was very low in the last decade, at approximately 1 in 2 million per year. But because successful terrorism has such far-reaching consequences, Barnett argues, the prevention of rail terrorism warrants high priority. Stopping attackers once they reach stations and trains has proved difficult, so the most realistic way to prevent attacks might be to uncover and thwart terror plots at earlier stages. It was good intelligence work that



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

averted a planned 2009 attack on the New York subway, not security measures at Times

Square or Grand Central Terminal.

After Beslan: Changes in Russia’s Counterterrorism Policy

By Mariya Y. Omelicheva

Source: <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/15/after-beslan-changes-in-russias-counterterrorism-policy/>

In the early 2000s, Russia witnessed a series of catastrophic terrorist incidents connected to the protracted insurgency campaign in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus region. Beginning with the siege of the crowded Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on 23 October

more than 300 deaths, including 186 children who perished in the rescue operation provoked by powerful explosions at the school and the following gunfire.[1]

The Beslan siege and rescue operation exposed significant deficiencies in terrorism



2002 by armed Chechen insurgents that resulted in 129 casualties during the rescue attempt by the Russian security forces, a series of suicide bombings in the Moscow subway killed almost 80 civilians in February and August of 2004. The same year, a group of mostly Chechen and Ingush militants carried out a successful raid on the Russian interior forces in Nazran, Ingushetia, killing 80 troops, and two Russian passenger planes were blown up almost simultaneously on 24 August 2004. The most shocking in a series of deadly attacks by secessionist and Islamist militants seeking to liberate the North Caucasus from the Russian presence was the capture of over 1,100 hostages in a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, on 1-3 September, 2004 by the Chechen and Ingush militants. Branded as Russia’s 9/11, the terrorist attack resulted in

prevention in Russia. It showed the ineffectiveness of incident command that resulted in heavy losses of Russia’s special forces. It also shed light on the failures in intelligence management and errors in the dissemination of public information. The crisis had an immediate impact on Moscow’s counterterrorism policy but also had considerable broader political implications. It became a trigger for ambitious administrative and federal reforms and shaped essential features of Russia’s foreign and domestic policies for years to come. In the aftermath of the attack, the government of President Putin embarrassed by its inability to prevent and respond to terrorist threat pledged to strengthen the state authority, overhaul the system of the Russian security and law-enforcement



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

services, and develop procedures for coordinating the activities of the counterterrorism agencies. The rest of this article focuses on the changes to counterterrorism legislation, institutional framework, and strategies set off by Beslan.[2] Most of these changes were codified into a new Federal Law No. 35-EZ of 6 March 2006 "On Counteraction to Terrorism", which replaced the outdated 1998 version.

The 2006 law distinguishes terrorism, i.e., the practice of influencing decision-making by state and local agencies or international organizations by means of frightening the population or other forms of unlawful violent action, from terrorist activity (i.e., various forms of assistance, preparation, and instigation of terrorism), and terrorist acts (explosion, arson, hostage taking, and other actions). For the first time in the Russian counterterrorism practice, the law defines terrorism not as separate acts and methods of committing violence for political and material interests but rather a multi-layered social phenomenon, where intimidation is not a goal but a method for accomplishing terrorist political objectives.

At the time of the crisis in Beslan, responsibility for combating terrorism was vested in two different governmental agencies. Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) was responsible for preventing, uncovering, and defeating political terrorism, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) was tasked with fighting terrorist crimes with mercenary objectives. Since 2003, the MVD was placed in charge of the counterterrorist operation in the North Caucasus. A special inter-departmental center was established in the North Caucasus to address the problem of coordination and intelligence sharing between the FSB and MVD. However, the center lacked the authority and means for performing its information sharing and coordination functions and, therefore, was unable to resolve the issue of inter-agency cooperation.[3] This lack of coordination between the FSB and MVD was evident in Beslan where the MVD was ordered to transfer command to the FSB, but the latter failed to seek a briefing from the MVD commander and ignored the expertise of local police, thus missing an opportunity to acquire the valuable intelligence information.

An important lesson that the Russian government learned from the deficiencies in the incident command was that all units and

resources engaged in a counterterrorism operation should be placed under a single command.[4] The new counterterrorism law places complete responsibility for the terrorist incidence management on the counterterrorism operation headquarters. The police, army units, firefighters, and other human and technical resources are transferred from the jurisdiction of their respective ministries under the full authority of the operation headquarters. In addition, in February 2005, President Putin decreed the creation of the National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK), tasked with the coordination of counterterrorism policies and operations among 17 federal agencies. The regional counterterrorism committees led by the regional administration chiefs perform the NAK's functions in the regions. The operational headquarters charged with the direction of counterterrorist operations were placed within the federal and regional counterterrorism committees. This multi-level structure of the federal and regional counterterrorism committees with the operation headquarters within each of them replaced the Federal Antiterrorist Commission created in 1998, which lacked a permanent secretariat, viable mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing its decisions, and effective tools for coordinating the day-to-day counterterrorism activities of the federal bodies.

Following Beslan and the terrorist incidents that preceded it, all of which highlighted the need for regulating the methods of counteraction and selection of weaponry by the responding forces, the Russian government expanded and specified the parameters of a counterterrorism operation. It legalized the utilization of military and operational-combat measures in counterterrorism operations and authorized the chief of a counterterrorist operation to order the creation of a combined group of forces that can include military forces for participation in counterterrorism. Besides direct participation in counterterrorist operations, the Russian military can be used for preventing terrorist attacks involving hijacking and suppressing acts of terrorism in the Russian inner waters and territorial sea. Military force can also be used for targeting terrorists and their bases abroad, and for suppressing international terrorist activity outside of the Russian territory.

One of the weakest points of the counterterrorist operation in Beslan



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

was the inability of the Russian law-enforcement agencies and troops to establish and enforce an effective security perimeter around the school. This allowed thousands of local civilians, some of which were armed with light weapons, to break through the police cordon. The new counterterrorism legislation, which legalizes constraints and limitations on the exercise of certain individual rights and liberties in the context of the counterterrorism operation, contains a long but exhaustive list of all permissible temporary restrictions on individuals' freedom to facilitate the effective management and response to the terrorist incident.

Another novelty of the counterterrorism legislation is the principle of making no political concessions to terrorists. The 1998 "On Combating Terrorism" allowed minimal concessions, whereas the current law contains a more categorical formulation.[5] The act, nevertheless, allows for the possibility of negotiations for the sole purpose of saving the lives of people. Those talks can only be conducted by the appointed negotiators and authorized by the chief of the counterterrorist operation. In other words, the law allows for some tactical concessions, but places a ban on giving in to terrorists' political demands. At Beslan, the Russian government that was informed by the failure of negotiations with terrorists, who sized the Budennovsk city hospital in June 1995 and who were allowed to return to Chechnya leaving behind 147 dead hostages, dismissed the idea of a negotiated settlement with terrorists in Beslan and focused, instead, on a military solution.

Although, Beslan highlighted the weaknesses in Russia's terrorism prevention, deterrence, and intelligence gathering, the reforms were tenuous in this area of counterterrorism. The new 2006 law, for example, was envisioned as a comprehensive piece of legislation encompassing a wide range of preventive measures and policies aimed at protecting people and infrastructure against terrorist attacks. Regrettably, the legislation is silent about preventive or prophylactic measures of counteraction to terrorism. Russia's counterterrorism policy retained its reactive and "catch-up" characteristics with most of the measures adopted in response to terrorist incidents. Operationally, Russian security forces failed to deter terrorist attacks and incursions in the broader North Caucasus

region or to make potential targets outside of this tumultuous area unattractive to terrorists by increasing their protection.

Neither have the changes to counterterrorism policy resolved the quagmire between the FSB and MVD. With the end of the counterterrorism operation in August 2006, the Russian President decreed the establishment of operational headquarters in each of the regional republics headed by the MVD officials for fighting the remnants of rebel units. In September 2008, the Russian president further strengthened the counterterrorism role of the MVD by replacing the Ministry's department for combating organized crime and terrorism with the new units tasked with the fight against extremism. Traditionally, however, it has been the FSB that has performed the counter-extremist and counter-terrorist functions.

The broad definition of terrorist activity provided by the 2006 law, which includes, among other things "informational or other types of assistance" to terrorism, as well as the "propaganda of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information, which urge terrorist activity, substantiate and justify the need for such activity" has had a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and open debate concerning terrorism. The broadcasting organizations are deterred from the circulation of unofficial information about terrorist attacks by the criminal liability for the "justification of terrorism," which was established by an amendment to Russia's Criminal Code in July 2007. Furthermore, the regime of counterterrorism operation, which does not require the declaration of a state of emergency and is not subject to either international accountability or parliamentary oversight grants enormous surveillance powers to the security forces and ultimate discretion to the chief of the counterterrorist operation in determining the area and duration of the operation. [6] In this way, the new law opens up possibilities for infringing on the basic rights of people.

The lack of a comprehensive program of prevention and the use of excessive force as a primary means of combating terrorism have undermined Russia's efforts to limit the growth of terrorism in Russia's regions. The government needs a long-term counterterrorism strategy that will include socio-economic approaches and an effective system of prevention and protection from terrorist attacks



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

along with the punitive and consequence management dimensions. The Russian legislators should address the corrosive effects of the counterterrorism legislation on the rule of law, civil society, and the media, and strengthen the safeguards against human rights violations in the counterterrorism

legislation. The latter should also define the mechanisms of public accountability and legal responsibility for the abuse of authority, as well as ascribe liability for negligence and inaction in implementing the counterterrorism legislation.

Notes

[1] Forster, Peter. 2006. "Beslan: Counter-Terrorism Incident Command: Lessons Learned," *Homeland Security Affairs* 2(3). <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.3>

[2] For a discussion of the impact of Beslan on Russia's domestic politics and international relations see Baev, Pavel K. 2004. "Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27(4): 337-352; Lynch, Dov. 2005. "The Enemy is at the Gate': Russia after Beslan." *International Affairs* 81(1): 141-161.

[3] Gorbunov, Y.S. 2008. [Terrorism and Normative Framework for Its Counteraction]. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, pp. 236-237.

[4] Forster, 2006; Plater-Zyberk, H. 2004. "Beslan – Lessons Learned?" Conflict Studies Research Center, Russian Series 04/34.

[5] Maruhina, Y.O., and A.A. Rozhdestvina. 2007. 26 2006
35- « » [Commentary to Federal Law No. 35-FZ of 26 February 2006 "On Counteraction to Terrorism"]. GARANT.

[6] Levinson, L. 2007. Governance as a Counter-Terrorist Operation Notes on the Russian Legislation against Terrorism. Submission to the Eminent Jurists Panel in connection with public hearings on terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights in Russia. Moscow. Available at: <http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Levinson.pdf>

Mariya Y. Omelicheva is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas. Her research interests include Russian foreign policy, counter-terrorism and human rights, Eurasian security, and democracy promotion in Central Asia.

Defining al Qaeda

By Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/defining-al-qaeda?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20121018&utm_term=sweeekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=b753063010f24f8c84c91f28f00030de

The Obama administration's efforts to counter the threat posed by al Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement have been a contentious topic in the U.S. presidential race.

Political rhetoric abounds on both sides; administration officials claim that al Qaeda has been seriously crippled, while some critics of the administration allege that the group is stronger than ever. As with most political rhetoric, both claims bear elements of truth, but the truth depends largely on how al Qaeda and jihadism are defined. Unfortunately, politicians and the media tend to define al Qaeda loosely and incorrectly.

The jihadist threat will persist regardless of who is elected president, so understanding the actors involved is critical. But a true understanding of those actors requires taxonomical acuity. It seems worthwhile, then,

to revisit Stratfor's definitions of al Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement.

A Network of Networks


Al Qaeda, the group established by Osama bin Laden and his colleagues, was never very large -- there were never more than a few hundred actual members. We often refer to this group, now led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the al Qaeda core or al Qaeda prime. While the group's founders trained tens of thousands of men at their camps in Afghanistan and Sudan, they initially viewed themselves as a vanguard organization working with kindred groups to facilitate the jihad they believed was necessary to establish a global Islamic caliphate. Most of the men trained at al Qaeda camps were members of other organizations or were grassroots jihadists. The majority of them received basic



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

paramilitary training, and only a select few were invited to receive additional training in terrorist tradecraft skills such as surveillance, document forgery and bombmaking. Of this select group, only a few men were invited to join the al Qaeda core organization.

diplomacy and financial sanctions. As a result, many al Qaeda members, eventually including bin Laden, were captured or killed and their assets were frozen. Such measures have ensured that the group remains small for operational security concerns. The remaining



Bin Laden envisioned another purpose for al Qaeda: leading the charge against corrupt rulers in the Muslim world and against the United States, which he believed supported corrupt Muslim rulers. Al Qaeda sought to excise the United States from the Muslim world in much the same way that Hezbollah drove U.S. forces out of Lebanon and Somalia forced the U.S. withdrawal from Mogadishu.

Al Qaeda became a network of networks -- a trait demonstrated not only by its training methods but also in bin Laden's rhetoric. For example, bin Laden's 1998 "World Islamic Front" statement, which declared jihad against Jews and Crusaders, was signed by al-Zawahiri (who at the time was leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and leaders of other groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiat-ul-Uema-e-Pakistan and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States applied against the al Qaeda core the full pressure of its five counterterrorism levers: intelligence, military, law enforcement,

members of the group mostly are lying low in Pakistan near the Afghan border, and their isolation there has severely degraded their ability to conduct attacks. The al Qaeda core is now relegated to producing propaganda for guidance and inspiration for other jihadist elements. Despite the disproportionate amount of media attention given to statements from al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, the al Qaeda core constitutes only a very small part of the larger jihadist movement. In fact, it has not conducted a successful terrorist attack in years.

However, the core group has not been destroyed. It could regenerate if the United States eased its pressure, but we believe that will be difficult given the loss of the charismatic bin Laden and his replacement by the irascible al-Zawahiri.

In any case, the jihadist movement transcends the al Qaeda core. In fact, Stratfor for years published an annual forecast of al Qaeda, but beginning in 2009, we intentionally changed the title of the forecast to reflect the isolation and



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

marginalization of the al Qaeda core and the ascendance of other jihadist actors. We believed our analysis needed to focus less on the al Qaeda core and more on the truly active and significant elements of the jihadist movement, including regional groups that have adopted the al Qaeda name and the array of grassroots jihadists.

Franchises and Grassroots

An element of the jihadist movement that is often loosely referred to as al Qaeda is the worldwide network of local or regional militant groups that have assumed al Qaeda's name or ideology. In many cases, the relationships between the leadership of these groups and the al Qaeda core began in the 1980s and 1990s.

Some groups have publicly claimed allegiance to the al Qaeda core, becoming what we refer to as franchise groups. These groups include al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Even though these franchises bear the al Qaeda name, they are locally owned and operated. This means that the local commanders have significant latitude in how closely they follow the guidance and philosophy of the al Qaeda core.

Some franchise group leaders, such as AQAP's Nasir al-Wahayshi, maintain strong relationships with the al Qaeda core and are very closely aligned with the core's philosophy. Other leaders, such as Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud of AQIM, are more distanced. In fact, AQIM has seen severe internal fighting over these doctrinal issues, and several former leaders of Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat left the group because of this conflict. Further, it is widely believed that the death of Somali al Qaeda leader Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was arranged by leaders of Somali jihadist group al Shabaab, which he had criticized sharply.

The last and broadest element of the global jihadist movement often referred to as al Qaeda is what Stratfor refers to as grassroots jihadists. These are individuals or small cells of individuals that are inspired by the al Qaeda core -- or increasingly, by its franchise groups - - but that may have little or no actual connection to these groups. Some grassroots jihadists travel to places such as Pakistan or Yemen to receive training from the franchise

groups. Other grassroots militants have no direct contact with other jihadist elements.

The core, the franchises and the grassroots jihadists are often interchangeably referred to as al Qaeda, but there are important differences among these actors that need to be recognized.

Important Distinctions

There are some other important distinctions that inform our terminology and our analysis. Not all jihadists are linked to al Qaeda, and not all militant Islamists are jihadists. Islamists are those who believe society is best governed by Islamic law, or Sharia. Militant Islamists are those who advocate the use of force to establish Sharia. Militant Islamists are found in both Islamic sects. Al Qaeda is a Sunni militant Islamist group, but Hezbollah is a Shiite militant Islamist group. Moreover, not all militant Muslims are Islamists. Some take up arms for tribal, territorial, ethnic or nationalistic reasons, or for a combination of reasons.

In places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and northern Mali, several militant groups are fighting foreign forces, their government or each other -- and sometimes all of the above. Some of these groups are jihadists, some are tribal militias, some are brigands and smugglers, and others are nationalists. Identifying, sorting and classifying these groups can be very difficult, and sometimes alliances shift or overlap. For example, Yemen's southern separatists will sometimes work with tribal militias or AQAP to fight against the government; other times, they fight against these would-be allies. We have seen similar dynamics in northern Mali among groups such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, various Tuareg groups and other tribal militias in the region.

Taxonomy becomes even more difficult when a group uses multiple names, or when multiple groups share a name. Groups adopt different names for discretion, confusion or public relations purposes. AQAP called itself Ansar al-Shariah during its fight to take over cities in southern Yemen and to govern the territory. But radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was arrested in the United Kingdom in 2004 and extradited to the United States in 2012, has long led a movement likewise called Ansar al-Shariah. Even the Libyan jihadist militia that attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi uses the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

same name. But just because these groups share a name, and just because members or leaders of the groups know each other, does not necessarily mean that they are chapters of the same group or network of groups, or that they even subscribe to the same ideology. As we mentioned long before Moammar Gadhafi was ousted in Libya, jihadists and other militants thrive in power vacuums. This assertion has proved true in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, and more recently in Libya, northern Mali and now Syria. Weapons flooding into such regions only compound the problem.

Militant Islamists have seized the opportunity to grow in influence in such places, as have the subset of militant Islamists we call jihadists. So in this context, while the al Qaeda core has been crippled, other portions of the jihadist movement are thriving. This is especially so among those that aspires to mount local insurgencies rather than those more concerned with planning transnational attacks. The nuances are important because as the composition and objectives of jihadist groups change, so do their methods of attack.

"Defining al Qaeda is republished with permission of Stratfor."

Source of map: <http://www.standupamericans.org/terror-jihad/al-qaeda-study-released-by-selected-wisdom/>



Fifty-Third Terror Plot Foiled Since 9/11: Bombing Targets U.S. Financial Hub

By Jessica Zuckerman

Source:<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/terror-plot-foiled-in-new-york-bombing-targets-us-financial-hub>

On Wednesday, federal authorities arrested a man outside the Federal Reserve Bank in Lower Manhattan in an attempt to detonate a van he believed to be laced with explosives.

The man had been under close surveillance by the FBI for some time, and the explosives were rendered inoperable.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

While it appears that the public was never in danger, this latest attempted attack marks the 53rd thwarted terrorist plot against the United States since 9/11 and serves as a stark reminder that terrorists continue to plot against America.

Federal Reserve Bank Plot

According to reports by the FBI, 21-year-old Bangladeshi citizen Quazi Mohammad Rezwanaul Ahsan Nafis came to the U.S. in January 2012 on a student visa with the explicit

Immediately before attempting to detonate the vehicle bomb, Nafis also recorded a video statement to the American public, in which he stated: “We will not stop until we attain victory or martyrdom.”[2] While it appears that Nafis sought to carry out his attack in the name of al-Qaeda, it is not yet clear whether he had direct support from any foreign terrorist organizations.

Combating the Continued Threat of Terrorism



goal of carrying out a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Upon arriving in the U.S., Nafis actively sought out al-Qaeda contacts within the U.S. to assist him in carrying out an attack. Unbeknownst to Nafis, one of the individuals he sought to recruit for his terrorist cell turned out to be an FBI informant.

Nafis allegedly considered and surveilled multiple targets in Manhattan’s financial district, including the New York Stock Exchange, before settling on the Federal Reserve Bank. Undercover agents supplied Nafis with 20 50-pound bags of explosives. Nafis then purchased components for the weapons detonator and assembled what he believed to be a 1,000-pound bomb inside a van in a nearby warehouse.

In discussing the attack, Nafis indicated that he had a “Plan B” that entailed a suicide bombing in the event that the attack was about to be thwarted by police. Nafis further stated: “I came up to this conclusion that targeting America’s economy is most efficient way to draw the path of obliteration of America.”[1]

At least 53 publicly known Islamist-inspired terrorist plots against the U.S. have been thwarted since 9/11. Of these, 13 have involved New York City as a target, second only to domestic military targets, showing that terrorists continue to seek to strike at the heart of the U.S.

In order to combat the continued threat of terrorism on U.S. soil, Congress and the Administration should:

- **Maintain essential counterterrorism tools.** Support for important investigative tools, such as the PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. FISA authorizes electronic surveillance within certain legal limits, while key provisions of the PATRIOT Act—such as the roving surveillance authority and business records provision—have proven essential to thwarting terrorist plots. Yet these resources require reauthorization every year. In order to ensure that law



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

enforcement and intelligence authorities have the critical counterterrorism tools they need, Congress should seek permanent authorization of the three sunset provisions within the PATRIOT Act. At the same time, Congress should ensure that it does not deny the intelligence community the vital tools contained within FISA and the subsequent FISA Amendments Act, which is set to expire at the end of this year.

- **Increase visa coordination.** Careful screening of those who wish to come to the U.S. provides the opportunity to apprehend terrorists and other criminals before they enter the country. The Obama Administration has yet to place visa coordination at the top of its agenda. In fact, the Visa Security Program—which would provide background screening on visa applicants—has not been deployed at most high-risk airports. At the same time, Congress has let the Visa Waiver Program—which requires pre-screening of visa waiver participants and robust information sharing with member countries—to come to a virtual standstill. Both efforts should be allowed to expand.

- **Examine information-sharing gaps.** Efforts to increase information sharing between the U.S. and its allies while improving interagency communications between the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security and intelligence agencies are vital to protecting the U.S. from the continued threat of terrorism. Increased efforts at information sharing would amplify efficiency and timeliness in the counterterrorism field. Yet all too often, information sharing does not make for truly cross-cutting communication and simply entails state and local law enforcement sending information to the federal government. This gap in information sharing should not be allowed to continue.

Remain Vigilant

Though it is encouraging that, since 9/11, 53 terror plots against the U.S. have failed, the U.S. cannot afford to become complacent. Exploiting America's visa system, Quazi Nafis sought to attack the center of the U.S. financial system. Continued vigilance is needed, as are critical reforms of visa coordination and information sharing.

Notes:

[1]United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, complaint *United States of America vs. Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis*, October 17, 2012,

<http://cbsnewyork.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/nafis-complaint.pdf> (accessed October 17, 2012).

[2]Ibid

Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

Remains of 9/11 victim, Anna Laverty, identified

Source: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/united-states/121018/remains-911-victim-identified-11-years-after-ter>



Eleven years after the terror attack, the New York City medical examiner's office has formally identified the remains of a woman.

The New York City medical examiner's office has identified the remains of another 9/11 victim.

Fox News reported Anna A. Laverty, 52, of Middletown, New Jersey, was identified thanks to advances in DNA testing.

Bone fragments found in the original recovery



at Ground Zero were retested, according to a spokeswoman for the medical examiner.

The New York Times reported Lavery lived with her husband and daughter in Middletown.

She worked as a legal secretary at the Fiduciary Trust Company in 2 World Trade Center.

Fox News said in 2006, it was announced that more than 6,000 bone samples would be retested, due to advances in DNA techniques.

The identification of Lavery takes the total number of World Trade Center victims identified to 1,634. The remains of more than a thousand victims have either not been identified or were not found.



France, Africa and terrorism - An African journey

The French government has new African worries in the Sahel

Source: <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21564872-french-government-has-new-african-worries-sahel>

It is a rite of passage for every new French president to head to French-speaking Africa and reaffirm faith in *la Francophonie*. So it was with François Hollande, who has just visited Senegal and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Like his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, he said “*françafrique*”—the cosy post-colonial ties of party financing, arms, contracts and influence—was over and that human rights were paramount. He praised the shared use of French, “language of liberty”. But behind the

in Mali, whose families the president has just met in Paris, as well as four in Niger.

Despite France’s reluctance to play post-colonial gendarme, Mr Hollande is starting to sound tougher on Mali. During his African trip, he tried to rally regional leaders to the cause. Manuel Valls, the interior minister, visited Algeria to narrow differences. France drafted a UN Security Council resolution, unanimously adopted on October 12th, that authorises the dispatch of an African force to retake rebel-held territory in Mali. Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French defence minister, says such a force could be ready “within weeks”.



Yet his enthusiasm may be overdone. The plan is that a force would be made up of troops from Mali and other countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). But, even if willing ones can be lined up, regional forces do not have the capacity to mount an offensive

warm words lie grimmer concerns, the biggest being the entrenchment of terror networks in the al-Qaeda-held Sahel.

Islamist fighters tied to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have ruled a big swathe of northern Mali since March, dividing the country in two. In the far north extreme *sharia* law is being applied. Mr Hollande spoke in Senegal of “a reign of terror” in Mali, with “hands cut off, women raped and an area awash with weapons”. There are also two French hostages

operation without logistical and intelligence support. The French are ready to contribute, but have ruled out sending in ground troops. Although the European Union says it will send trainers under an EU flag, the Americans are reluctant to get involved.

France’s anxiety is that, if nothing is done, the Sahel might become a crucible for Islamist terrorism. “What makes people very nervous is the idea that it will become Africa’s



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Afghanistan,” says François Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think-tank. France, with its colonial history and commercial ties, is an obvious target. One Malian Islamist group has explicitly threatened Mr Hollande since his push for military action, and said that French hostages are in greater danger.

As it is, France is already fretting about terrorist threats. Although there is no direct link to AQIM, French police dismantled an Islamist cell in France earlier this month, arresting 12 suspects and shooting one dead. Two were wanted in connection with an attack on a kosher grocer in a Paris suburb last month, which rattled France's big Jewish population. Seven have been charged with terrorist offences.

François Molins, the Paris public prosecutor, called the cell “extremely dangerous”. Some suspects were French converts to Islam. The threat is “increasingly coming from within”, Mr Valls told the Senate, adding that radicalisation can take a matter of months. The country was shocked earlier this year when seven people, including three Jewish children and a rabbi, were shot dead in Toulouse by a French Islamist who claimed to have been trained by al-Qaeda. The surveillance of radicals has been stepped up. Mr Valls is putting a law before parliament to give the police new powers to pursue French nationals abroad suspected of links to terrorism or of attending foreign training camps. With or without a French-backed operation in Mali, France is on high alert.

Piracy in West Africa reaching dangerous proportions, says watchdog

Source: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/19/piracy-west-africa?newsfeed=true>



The Bourbon Liberty 249 boat from which pirates kidnapped seven crew off the coast of Nigeria. Photograph: TOMASZ MOROZ / BOURBON HANDOUT/EPA

Piracy in west Africa is reaching dangerous proportions, the global piracy watchdog has said, with the increase in attacks fuelled by Nigerian criminals.

As efforts continue to rescue seven foreign workers kidnapped from a vessel off the coast of Nigeria earlier this week, the director of the international maritime bureau (IMB) warned

that the region was now a major focal point for armed robberies at sea, and criticised the lack of efforts by governments in the region to tackle the problem.

While Somalia has recorded a decline in hijackings in recent months, incidents are on the rise in west Africa, with 32 reported by July this



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

year. There were 25 in 2011. In Nigeria alone there were 17 reports, compared with six in 2011, with particularly high levels of violence against crew members by pirates armed with guns.

"Piracy in west Africa is a serious problem," said Pottengal Mukundan, IMB director.

"Pirates are getting quite audacious, with increasing levels of violence being used.

"These attacks started off the coast of Nigeria,

held captive, and that efforts were underway to obtain their release.

"The emergency unit set up immediately by Bourbon has been set up to aim at their rapid liberation under the safest security conditions," the statement said. "Bourbon is in contact with the crew members' families, supporting them, and keeping them regularly informed."

A spokesman for Nigeria's Joint Military Task Force told the Guardian that joint military-naval



although they have also now spilled over into neighbouring countries. The problem has been there for a long time and authorities have had ample notice to deal with the problem. There is really no excuse for the fact that they have not been able to deal with it."

The warning comes as seven foreigners working for French oil transport company Bourbon were kidnapped while boarding a vessel belonging to the company on Nigeria's Pennington river earlier this week.

A statement on the company's website said that six Russians and one Estonian employed as crew members by the company were being

operations were underway to catch the attackers, and confirmed that incidents of kidnapping and piracy were on the increase.

"The Bourbon vessel that was conveying the expatriates during the incidents has been recovered. We have forward operational bases in the Niger Delta and our maritime friends are at the moment conducting a search to track down the kidnappers. We are conducting a lot of intelligence gathering" said Lt Col Oyeama Nwachukwu.

Although the legal definition of piracy encompasses acts of violence on the high seas, rather than in territorial waters, the incident is one of a



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

growing number linking thieves in Nigeria's Niger Delta, where hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil are stolen from pipelines each day, to increasingly bold attacks on ships.

There are concerns that piracy in and around Nigeria could engulf the entire west African coastal region – known as the Gulf of Guinea – an increasingly busy maritime region and a major thoroughfare for valuable commodities such as oil, gold, bauxite and iron ore, and agricultural products.

Although Nigeria's navy is regarded as relatively successful at tackling piracy off its own shores, experts say the problem has been pushed outwards to neighbouring countries who have little capacity for maritime law enforcement.

Benin and Cameroon have both reported rises in piracy attacks, which experts attribute to Nigerian pirates.

Benin – which depends on its port for around 40% of income – has asked the UN to send an international force to help police the coast in the region. Since being labelled a high-risk country by London-based marine insurers' group the Joint War Committee, the country has suffered a 70% fall in shipping resulting in

an estimated £50m (\$81m) loss in customs revenue, according to a recent UN report.

The problem has led to calls for a regional taskforce and outside intervention to rival the Nato and EU-led efforts off the coast of Somalia.

The US military said it was stepping up attempts to create a regional taskforce to deal with the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

"In the past, most of our efforts have been bilateral," US Africa Command head of air and maritime programmes told Reuters. "Now we are focusing on a regional basis because the solution is regional. Events are picking up in Benin and Togo because Nigeria is stepping up its enforcement efforts."

France has also bolstered surveillance in the region, with reports that the French military will conduct anti-piracy training in Benin and Togo later this year.

"This is a crime which easily spills over across borders, therefore there is a great need for co-operation and information sharing between the countries, but so far in west Africa that cooperation appears to be patchy" said Mukundan.

8,000 Miles, 96 Hours, 3 Dead Pirates: Inside a Navy SEAL Rescue

By David Axe

Source: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/navy-seals-pirates/all/>

The guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge tows the lifeboat from the *Maersk Alabama* to the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer on April 13, 2009. *Photo: U.S. Navy*



On April 8, 2009, four pirates armed with AK-47s clambered up the side of the U.S.-flagged container ship *Maersk Alabama*, sailing off the coast of Somalia. But after a brief scuffle with some of the 20 crewmembers, the pirates opted to abandon the 508-foot long ship,

sailing off in one of its motorized lifeboats. They may not have captured the *Maersk Alabama*, nor looted its millions of dollars' worth of food and humanitarian aid bound for

Kenya, but they didn't leave empty handed. The pirates had a captive: *Maersk Alabama's* captain, Richard Phillips.

Four days later, three of the four pirates were dead — each from a single .30-caliber rifle bullet to his brain, courtesy of the U.S. Navy's SEAL Team Six. The fourth pirate, just 16 years old, was in Navy custody. And Phillips was on his way home, unharmed but for the psychological strain from four days in captivity in a sweltering lifeboat, unsure

whether he would live or die.

The precision killing of the three pirates by six members of SEAL Team Six, the same unit that would later kill Osama bin Laden in his Pakistan hideout, has rarely been described in detail.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Retired Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, who commanded U.S. naval forces off Somalia during the *Maersk Alabama* standoff, devotes 45 pages of his new book *Pirate Alley* to the people, methods, equipment and even politics behind Phillips' daring rescue.

McKnight's book, published by the Naval Institute Press, shines new light on the SEALs' role — and, by extension, the rarely mentioned skills the secretive and lethal warriors bring to bear on battlefields across the globe. To be fair, some of these details are mentioned in passing in *No Easy Day*, the controversial memoir by former SEAL Matt Bissonnette that was published last month. But McKnight's book also reveals new information about the vital role that intelligence specialists — and particularly a Somali interpreter — played in the raid.

large commercial ships, an increase from 12 the previous year. The average ransom rose from a few hundred thousand dollars to millions.

Piracy was an old problem by the time McKnight took command of his task force. But the attempted hijacking of the *Maersk Alabama* and the kidnapping of Phillips were new. The *Maersk Alabama* was the first U.S.-flagged ship — that is, an American-owned vessel registered in the U.S. and subject to U.S. laws and protection — had been boarded by pirates for two centuries.

McKnight had stepped down as CTF-151 commander just three days before the *Maersk Alabama* incident, so he did not directly participate in the U.S. response. But with his high-level relationships, intimacy with counter-piracy methods and many inside sources, his



The *Maersk Alabama*, as seen from a Navy patrol plane the day she was attacked. Photo: Navy

From January to early April 2009, McKnight commander Combined Task Force 151, a rotating mix of a dozen or so warships from the U.S. Navy and its European and Asian allies that patrols more than a million square miles of the Indian Ocean, stretching from Kenya to the Persian Gulf and east to west from Somalia to India. Since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, sea banditry has steadily risen, with impoverished former fishermen and hardened criminals alike arming themselves with guns and rockets and taking to the sea in captured trawlers and fiberglass boats called "skiffs." In 2008, Somali pirates hijacked 44

account of the pirate-takedown is the most detailed yet.

CTF-151's destroyer USS *Bainbridge* was the first to respond to the maydays from *Maersk Alabama*, which bobbed near the pirates — and Phillips — in the stolen lifeboat, preventing it from escaping to land. The 9,200-ton *Bainbridge* had swapped its helicopters and pilots for a catapult-launched Boeing ScanEagle drone plus the robot's operators. It also had a beefed-up intelligence team that included one of the Navy's few, and prized, Somali interpreters. While technically part of CTF-151, the *Bainbridge* had her own unique missions. "I'll go out on a limb here and guess that the mission had something to do with supporting U.S.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Special Ops forces in Somalia,” McKnight writes. Under the command of Cmdr. Frank Castellano, *Bainbridge* raced toward the

Three more U.S. warships were on their way, but Castellano realized he needed more specialized help. “I don’t have sniper rifles on the ship,” he recalled in an interview with



Maersk Alabama at top speed. In the day it took the destroyer to reach the scene of the attempted hijacking, the crew began synthesizing intelligence from multiple sources, including the ScanEagle, an orbiting Navy patrol plane and reports from *Maersk Alabama’s* crew. According to McKnight, the interpreter added a dash of local knowledge, including the fact that pirates often chew narcotic *khat* leaves to ward off seasickness. In this case, “it turned out the pirates had run out of *khat*,” McKnight writes.

The pirates were already on edge when *Bainbridge* reached the lifeboat on the night of April 9, freeing the *Maersk Alabama* to continue to Kenya. The destroyer “lit up the place” with spotlights, sirens and loudspeakers. “They were pissed,” Castellano said of the pirates, according to McKnight. The bandits threatened to kill Phillips. In fact, they really just wanted to reach shore and ransom the merchant captain, McKnight writes. But if they could escape the American navy, the pirates seemed willing to die, according to the retired admiral.

McKnight. According to McKnight, the *Bainbridge* skipper specifically requested Navy SEALs. Perhaps Castellano was familiar with the naval commandos’ skillset, having spent part of his deployment supporting them with his drone. More or less simultaneously, the White House determined that SEAL Team Six was the best force to handle Phillips’ rescue. But those SEALs were based 8,000 miles away in Virginia. So in the meantime, *another* group of SEALs “working in the Horn of Africa” deployed to the warships. “This group would keep the situation at bay until the Team Six operators dispatched from the United States came in,” McKnight writes.

A Navy SEAL with his .30-caliber sniper rifle. *Photo: Navy*

According to McKnight, on April 10 six Team Six SEALs flew from Oceana, Virginia, direct to the Somalia coast. Their Air Force C-17 cargo plane refueled in the air no fewer than three times during the 16-hour flight. “SEALs are understandably concerned about



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

stealth,” McKnight writes. “That tells me that the operation was planned so that they would parachute into the ocean under cover of darkness, probably a high-altitude low-opening jump so that the pirates weren’t alerted.”

McKnight cites the log book from the frigate USS *Halyburton*, recently arrived alongside

were apparently already lying prone on *Bainbridge’s* flight deck, scanning the lifeboat with the crosshairs of their sniper rifles.

Phillips’ lifeboat, as seen by *Bainbridge’s* ScanEagle drone. *Photo: Navy*

In McKnight’s telling, the tension ratcheted up



Bainbridge. The log mentions six SEALs embarking the ship at 2:30 in the morning on April 11, then transferring via small boat to *Bainbridge*. McKnight says the SEALs brought their own sniper rifles, described elsewhere as .30-caliber SR-25s.

At 4:45 that afternoon, President Barack Obama, who had just been in office for three months, authorized the use of lethal force in Phillips’ rescue. Minutes later, the pirates radioed Castellano’s interpreter, announcing they were going to start the lifeboat’s engine and “make it to shore, no matter what,” according to McKnight. On his interpreter’s advice, Castellano informed the pirates that they had drifted 80 miles from their own clan’s territory. The pirates would need to negotiate with the elders of a rival clan in order to even consider going ashore. Castellano proposed that meeting take place at sea. The pirates agreed.

Later, they also agreed to let *Bainbridge* take the lifeboat under tow, ostensibly to keep the boat stable as the weather worsened. Sailors hooked a cable to the lifeboat and the destroyer slowly, imperceptibly, began winching the boat closer and closer to itself, until it was just 25 meters away. The SEALs

the next morning, April 12. One of the pirates, only 16 years old, had been injured battling the *Maersk Alabama’s* crew. He asked to go aboard *Bainbridge* for medical help, effectively giving himself up to the Americans. At the same time, another pirate radioed that Phillips needed to see a doctor. A Navy corpsman motored over to the lifeboat with a change of clothes for the kidnapped captain: blue pants and a bright yellow shirt. “Captain Phillips didn’t figure it out right then, but there were people aboard *Bainbridge* who wanted to make sure the he more or less glowed in the dark,” McKnight writes.

Stressed near the breaking point, on the night of April 12 Phillips wrestled with his captors in a failed escape attempt. In the scuffle, a pirate fired his rifle into the sea. That was enough for the SEALs. The next time all three remaining pirates showed their heads, three SEAL snipers fired one shot each. “Each of the three pirates was struck in the head, a deliberate shot that is used to kill a target while making sure that he doesn’t have an involuntary muscle response and pull the trigger on the automatic weapon in his hand,” McKnight writes.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

“BAINBRIDGE RETURNED FIRE,” is all the destroyer’s log book said, according to the admiral.

Phillips’ captors were dead; the captain was free. A pirate standoff that could have ended in disaster instead resolved itself without any

American blood shed — thanks in large part to a small team of far-flying, night-parachuting, sharpshooting Navy commandos, with an assist from a Somali linguist. And their exploits off the Somali coast would remain relatively obscure, if not for McKnight’s revealing book

Caucasus Emirate’s Ethnic Russian Suicide Bombers

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

The killing of the well-known Sufi sheikh Said Chirkeiski by a Russian female suicide bomber has again raised the issue of those in Russia who convert from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. The assassination of the sheikh was carried out by Aminat Kurbanova (maiden last name Saprykina), who had converted to Islam and was the wife of an armed resistance member. In the past 13 years since the start of the second Chechen military campaign, 46 female suicide bombers have carried out 26 terror attacks in Russia.

The adoption of Islam by ethnic Russians and their involvement in the North Caucasian Islamist armed underground is being discussed in the Russian press with increasing alarm. The question is whether Orthodox Russia has real reasons for concern. According to Russia’s leaders, it is a country where hundreds of ethnic groups that follow different religious paths coexist. Officials say that “Islam is rightfully an inalienable part of the contemporary religious, social and cultural life of Russia” (<http://ria.ru/religion/20120830/733504906.html>). In fact, Russia has the biggest Muslim community among European countries. According to various estimates there are an estimated 10 to 25 million Muslims in Russia (www.newsru.com/religy/29jul2008/moslems.html).

However, Muslims in Russia are a headache for the country’s leadership. Normally, the conversion of ethnic Russians to Islam is received very negatively in society. In a recent survey, 41 percent of the respondents called Russian Muslims “traitors to the Russian people”; 32 percent held a negative attitude toward the converts, but thought it was their personal decision; 14 percent had a neutral attitude; and 1.8 percent viewed their decision to convert positively (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=48317). Russian society does not differentiate between a

Russian man who converted to Islam out of conviction or a woman who converted after marrying a Muslim.

The chairman of the Muslim religious organization Pryamoi Put (Straight Path), Vasily Derevyankin, believes that most Russians who convert to Islam are not former believing Christians. “Those people who were Church-going Orthodox believers and then changed their views and converted to Islam can be counted with the fingers of one hand,” Derevyankin

said (www.newsru.com/religy/02feb2011/neue_moslems.html). Derevyankin probably is not an Internet user; otherwise, he would have known that even the fingers of two hands would not be enough to count just the Russian Orthodox priests who converted to Islam, not to mention ordinary Russian Orthodox believers (<http://clipiki.ru/video/189732/Islam-Istina-byivshiy-svyaschennik>).

So what is the problem? The Orthodox believer in Russia who adopts Islam regards it as an alternative to something he already knows (www.psdp.ru/rights/77339498-2). The merging of the authorities with the Orthodox clergy in Russia has reached absurdly high levels (<http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2001/1/malkina.html>), which repels young people. At the same time, these people come to regard Islam as an egalitarian community that is more independent of the government and has a mystical fraternal connection with the rest of the Muslim world. The converts tend to like the fact that the Islamic community adheres to strict moral principles, regulates the smallest details of life, provides a venue for common prayer in the mosques, etc. The impact of videos shot in Chechnya during the 1994–1996 war also should not be underestimated. Back then, Chechen fighters positioned themselves as Robin Hoods with green Islamic headbands. During the second war in Chechnya no one



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

counted the number of ethnic Russians who fought on the Chechen side, but there were quite a few such instances. In March 2004, two ethnic Russians, Vitaly Zagorulko and David Fotov, were killed in Stavropol region. In 2005, Viktor Semchenko and Yuri Menovshikov were killed in Krasnodar region. Semchenko and Menovshikov staged bomb attacks on four bus stops and were preparing another terrorist attack in the city of Krasnodar. Nikolai Kipkeyev was killed in the terrorist attack on the Rizhskaya metro station in Moscow on August 31, 2004 (www.kp.ru/daily/23756/56219).

The story of Said Buryatsky (aka Alexander Tikhomirov) is also instructive. Originally from Buryatiya, Buryatsky converted to Islam and became very popular among Russian youth on account of his lectures about the history of Islam. Having no higher Islamic education, Buryatsky eventually stood on par with the leaders of the Caucasus Emirate. At times it seemed that he was better known and more liked by the rebels than Doku Umarov himself. Said Buryatsky exemplified the trend of converts becoming leaders of those who were born into Islam (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/158565).

After Said Buryatsky died in March 2010, other Russian Muslims fighting under the banner of the Caucasus Emirate appeared. On February 14, 2011, two residents of the city of Pyatigorsk, Vitaly Razdobudko and his wife Maria Khorosheva, blew themselves up next to the police station in the village of Gubden, killing four people and injuring 20 (www.utro.ru/articles/2011/12/26/1019461.shtml). In July 2011, Viktor Dvorakovsky and Vladimir Skirko were arrested in the village of Inozemtsevo in Stavropol region. Dvorakovsky resisted his arrest by police and was wounded when he tried to detonate an IED. The two

were declared to be Russian Wahhabis, and a court sentenced Dvorakovsky to 23 years and Skirko to six years in prison (www.yuga.ru/news/262798/). Finally, there was the Russian suicide bomber Aminat Kurbanova (aka Alla Saprykina), who blew up Sheikh Said Chirkeisky on August 28, 2012 (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/211915/).

It appears that Russian converts choose not simply Islam, but radical Islam (www.newsru.com/religy/02feb2011/neue_most_ems.html). According to unconfirmed information, the Riyad-us Saliheen suicide bomber battalion in Dagestan is also reportedly headed by an ethnic Russian Muslim, 24-year-old Alexei Pashintsev (aka Emir Abdul-Malik) from the city of Belgorod. If this information is correct, it would explain why ethnic Russian suicide bombers have been so active in Dagestan in the past two years (http://newsru.com/russia/25sep2012/pashintze_v.html). Moreover, the new Russian converts to Islam look for adventures not only in the Caucasus, but across the world (www.kp.ru/daily/24327.3/519171/). They can be found today not only in Afghanistan, but also in Syria.

So is the conversion of ethnic Russians to Islam a mounting new trend in Russian society? No. The few examples cited in this article do not allow us to say that there is a serious Russian segment in the Islamist resistance movement in the North Caucasus. However, the Russian government's policies toward the Muslims of Russia pave the way for such a possibility in the future. Today, for a certain part of the ethnic Russian Islamic community, Islam's image is equated with a person who fights the authorities with arms. This means that we will still have to deal with Russian jihadists in the North Caucasus and in Russia proper in the near future.

The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (I), Ethnicity and Conflict

Europe Report N° 220 (19 Oct 2012)

Source: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/220-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-i-ethnicity-and-conflict.aspx>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Europe's deadliest conflicts are in Russia's North Caucasus region, and the killing is unlikely to end soon. The state has fought back against attacks, first claimed by Chechen

separatists, now the work of jihad-inspired insurgents, that have hit Moscow, other major cities and many Caucasus communities. But its security-focused counter-insurgency



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

strategy is insufficient to address the multiple causes of a conflict fed by ethnic, religious, political and economic grievances that need comprehensive, flexible policy responses. Moscow is increasingly aware of the challenge and is testing new approaches to better integrate a region finally brought into the Russian Empire only in the nineteenth century and that has historically been a problem for the Russian state. Diversity in religion, ethnicity, historical experience and political allegiances and aspirations complicate efforts to alleviate local tensions and integrate it more with the rest of the country. Understanding this pluralism is essential for designing and implementing policies and laws that advance conflict resolution rather than make differences more irreconcilable.

The challenge of ethnic nationalism has been most evident in Chechnya where two bloody wars caused tens of thousands of deaths. During the early 1990s, separatists sought full independence for their republic, but the failure of their state-building project and the ruthless manner in which Moscow fought transformed the nationalist cause into an Islamist one, with a jihadi component. Chechen fighters began to use terrorism widely, and the state responded with massive, indiscriminate force. After 2003, it adopted a policy of Chechenisation, transferring significant political, administrative and security functions to ethnic Chechens. Today the republic has gone through a major reconstruction, and its head, Ramzan Kadyrov, wields virtually unlimited power. Governance and rule of law remain major concerns, but human loss is significantly reduced. The effects of the ongoing insurgency continue to be felt across the North Caucasus, where it has spurred mobilisation around fundamentalist Islam.

Several inter-ethnic conflicts that developed at the end of the Soviet Union remain unresolved, continuing to fuel tensions. The Ingush-Ossetian conflict led to full-fledged war in 1992, as both groups asserted claims over the Prigorodny district. Though Russia invested large sums to return displaced persons and rehabilitate their communities, the Ingush in Prigorodny remain unintegrated in the rest of North Ossetia. Exclusionary historical narratives and competition over land and decision-making, fuel conflicts in other multi-ethnic republics, especially Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Stavropol Krai. Some

of the groups maintain maximalist aspirations, including the change of internal borders and establishment of new ethnically-identified entities.

Inter-ethnic tensions do not presently threaten major violence, but they may grow with the recent revival of national movements that were particularly strong in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though political parties based on national or religious identity are prohibited, a new law simplifying registration is likely to make it easier for politicians with nationalist agendas to infiltrate small parties. Large investments and a return to regional elections are likely to facilitate ethnic competition and mobilisation if local communities feel their rights and interests are not adequately protected by the state. Already groups such as the Nogays, Kumyks, and Lezgins in Dagestan and the Circassians and Cossacks are sharpening their organisational capacity and political demands that tend to focus on rehabilitation and justice, state support for native language and culture, development, greater autonomy and access to land. Tensions are beginning to appear where the legal framework is not sufficient to address these, existing laws are not implemented, and police and local administrative capacity are perceived as ethnically biased and corrupt.

Many of these disputes and tensions feed into the Islamist insurgency that causes most of today's violence. Parts of the younger generation that twenty years ago would have joined nationalist movements to address their grievances have become disenchanted with those movements and choose to join the Islamist insurgency instead. It increasingly operates across the entire region, attracting youth of all ethnicities, and attacking not only federal forces and local police, but also civil servants and elites who disagree with its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

A day rarely goes by without an attack on a Russian security official or the killing of an alleged insurgent in a counter-terrorist operation. Some 750 people were killed in 2011, and with over 500 hundred deaths in the first eight months of 2012, there appears to be little chance of a let-up in violence that has spread to parts of the North Caucasus that were peaceful only a few years ago.

The threat of jihadi groups is not unique to Russia or the North Caucasus, of course, and many



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

governments are looking for effective means to cope with it. Russia's counter-terrorism policies have primarily focused on eradicating insurgents through heavy-handed law enforcement measures, but the need for a more comprehensive approach is becoming evident in Moscow and among local leaders.

The North Caucasus is also wracked by corrupt institutions, ineffective governance, poor rule of law and uneven economic development in a combination that leaves a vacuum some dissatisfied youth seek to fill by joining groups that appear to have resolute aims. The weakness of the institutional and economic system further undermines Moscow's efforts to implement policies to better integrate the region and combat extremism. These systemic problems will also need to be addressed for any conflict resolution effort to succeed.

This first report of Crisis Group's North Caucasus project outlines the region's ethnic and national groups, their grievances and conflicts. The simultaneously published second report analyses the Islamic factor in detail: the growth of fundamentalist Islam (mainly Salafism); radicalisation of parts of the community; the insurgency; and the state's counter-insurgency effort, which mainly aims to eradicate extremism via hard-security methods but is beginning to also use softer means, including dialogue with and rehabilitation of ex-fighters. A subsequent report will elaborate on the quality of regional governance, the rule of law, the economy and Moscow's regional policies and offer policy recommendations for all three parts of the series.

The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency

Europe Report N° 221 (19 Oct 2012)

Source: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/221-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-ii-islam-the-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.aspx>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Armed conflict in the North Caucasus is the most violent in Europe today. Insurgents seeking a regional political unit founded on Sharia (Islamic law) attack Russian officials and security forces, whose main response till recently has been a tough focus on eradicating the insurgency with a massive security presence, leaving little room for dialogue. While this policy has had successes, some 574 insurgents, security forces and civilians have died through September 2012, and there are almost daily attacks in the region and, occasionally, as far afield as Moscow. A dialogue with moderate Salafis and efforts to reintegrate insurgents who surrender has started, especially in Dagestan, but is challenged by opponents of soft power measures among security services and the insurgency. The root causes of violence are as much about ethnicity, state capacity and the region's poor integration into Russia as about religion. To succeed in conflict resolution, Russia needs to design and implement a long-term comprehensive approach joining ethnic policies, intra-confessional dialogue, institution building and reintegration of ex-fighters.

Fundamentalist Islam, in particular Salafism, has been growing in the region since the end of the Soviet Union. The manner in which it has evolved in the several republics has depended largely on how the government and its security forces have treated conservative Muslim communities, the historical role of religion and ethnicity, ties to the Chechnya conflict and local religious leaders' teachings. Islamisation tends to be more prominent in the east, but Salafi communities are also growing in the west. In the east, an acute conflict with followers of a more traditional form of Islam, mainly Sufis, with whom the state tends to side, contributes to Salafi radicalisation. Most Salafis remain peaceful but have difficulties integrating into the local social space and economy. An effort to reduce the sectarian schism by civilian dialogue and increased cooperation between religious groups has been underway in Dagestan since spring 2011, but this was seriously undermined in August 2012, when the most influential Sufi sheikh in the North Caucasus was killed by a suicide bomber.

The insurgency behind most of the armed clashes and the terrorism that haunts local communities declared itself a unified force, with its own



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

cause, modes of operation and communication, funding sources, leadership and cadre, in 2007 when it created a regional Caucasus Emirate to bring disparate groups under a central command. Much of the original leadership has been killed by security forces and replaced with a much younger, less experienced and unified cadre. The insurgency is less able to carry out large, spectacular acts of terror or engage in lengthy battles with Russian military forces, but it has not given up the tactic of terror attacks in other parts of Russia, especially on transport lines and hubs, such as Domodedovo Airport (2011) and the Moscow Metro (2010). The vast majority of its attacks in the North Caucasus are now against security services, local officials and traditional clergy and involve improvised explosive devices (IEDs), shootings and, at times, suicide bombers.

The government's counter-terrorism policy has mainly been led by the interior ministry and the Federal Security Service (FSB) and focused on law enforcement. Commanders have significant room for manoeuvre, including establishment of zones for operations that can last several months and cover extensive territory in which many constitutional rights and liberties are suspended. Until recently suspected insurgents were most often killed in special operations or detained. Torture is applied widely for investigative or intelligence purposes; enforced disappearances target not only alleged insurgents, but also those believed to be aiding them or prominent Islamists; retributive punishment is applied to family members in some republics. These harsh measures do little to convince radicalised parts of the population to give their allegiance to the

Russian state. They seem instead to stimulate a new generation of disillusioned youth to "join the forest" (go over to the insurgency) in search of revenge or a different political order.

Many in the Russian government have come increasingly to understand the limitations of a counter-insurgency that employs only hard security measures and does very little to win the hearts and minds of local communities. Local authorities in Dagestan have been testing a novel approach that includes dialogue with and more tolerance of moderate Salafis and negotiations to encourage insurgents to lay down their weapons and reintegrate into peaceful life. A similar approach in Ingushetia has significantly improved the situation since 2009. Chechen officials also go beyond hard security measures but apply a very different approach, seeking to promote a Sufi Islam while eradicating Salafi ideology and applying very tough measures to suspected fighters and often their supporters.

This second report of Crisis Group's new North Caucasus Project analyses the Islamic factor in detail: the growth of fundamentalist Islam; radicalisation of parts of the community; the insurgency; and the state's approaches to counter-insurgency. It should be read in conjunction with the first report, published simultaneously, that outlines the region's ethnic and national groups, their grievances and disputes, including a more extensive discussion of the Chechen conflict. A subsequent report will further elaborate the government's regional policies, governance and the local economy and offer specific policy recommendations relevant to all aspects of the three-part series.

Algerian leaders of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb reassert control with appointment of new Saharan Amir

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

AQIM's Algerian leadership has appointed al-Vourghan Brigade leader Jemal Oukacha (a.k.a. Yahya Abu al-Hammam) as its new Saharan *amir* (Agence Nouakchott d'Information, October 4). Al-Hammam's appointment was intended to fill a vacancy created when Nabil Makhloufi (a.k.a. Abu al-Kama) was killed a month ago, allegedly in a "car accident" in the desert between Gao and Timbuktu (*Le Temps d'Algerie* [Algiers], October 5).

Al-Hammam is a native of Reghaia, a town in Algiers Province in northern Algeria, and has been involved in the Islamist militancy since 2000, when he finished an 18-month term in prison and joined the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), which later became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The young jihadi began to come into prominence through his participation in several raids against Mauritanian and Algerian military



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

posts under Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid. In 2006, al-Hammam was sentenced to death *in absentia* in Biskra on terrorism-related charges. By 2010 he was heavily involved in the kidnapping of



European nationals in the Sahel region with the Vourghan Brigade (*Liberté* [Algiers], October 6).

Al-Hammam is believed to be very close to AQIM leader Abd al-Malik Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu Mus'ab Abd al-Wadad) and his appointment can be seen as an attempt by the Boumerdes-based leadership to reassert their authority in the wild Sahara/Sahel sector, where movement commanders have grown used to a large degree of autonomy in their operations and decision-making.

Al-Hammam's promotion appears to have come at the expense of Mulatham Brigade leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was reported to have been seriously wounded in a clash with Tuareg rebels earlier this year (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, July 12). If this is the case, the appointment may well create new tensions within the movement, but the decision marks Droukdel's intention to establish firmer control of the movement's southern brigades in anticipation of a major confrontation with ECOWAS, African Union or Western forces in

northern Mali in the coming months. News of the appointment was apparently accompanied by orders from the AQIM leadership to Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid and others to respect the decision (*El-Khabar* [Algiers], October 6). It has been reported that the division of spoils from AQIM's lucrative Saharan kidnapping business has been a recent source of friction between the movement's southern *amirs*.

AQIM's dominance in the Sahara/Sahel region is now being challenged by the rival Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), which is attracting large numbers of sub-Saharan recruits (*Jeune Afrique*, October 14). A spokesman for the Mulatham Brigade denied Algerian reports

that Mokhtar Belmokhtar was injured in a dash between the AQIM Brigade and MUJWA fighters on September 27 (*Le Temps d'Algerie*, October 1). Nonetheless, al-Hammam's appointment is in part an effort to reinvigorate AQIM's profile in the region.

With an external military intervention in Mali very unlikely before the end of the year, both AQIM and MUJWA have an opportunity to rally supporters and prepare an armed response. MUJWA leader Omar Ould Hamaha has warned France against adopting an aggressive stance against the Islamists of northern Mali as well as claiming Mauritania's armed forces would be no match for MUJWA fighters, who he says are more experienced and better armed than Mauritanian troops (*al-Akhabar* [Nouakchott], October 6). Algeria appears to be favoring an approach that would simultaneously encourage dialogue with northern Mali's Tuareg rebels (without exclusion) while isolating AQIM and MUJWA from the local community (*Tout sur l'Algerie* [Algiers], October 12).

TSA Removing Backscatter X-ray Scanners From Largest U.S. Airports

Source: <http://mashable.com/2012/10/19/tsa-backscatter-x-ray/>

You know those x-ray body scanners that not only expose you to radiation but reveal your nakedness to security agents? That unsettling experience will be a thing of the past at many major airports, because the Transportation

Security Administration (TSA) has been quietly removing them, according to *ProPublica*.

Over the past few weeks, backscatter x-ray scanners from airports in



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Boston, Los Angeles, Chicago, Orlando and New York's JFK, have been replaced with safer

Many of the removed backscatter machines will be sent to smaller airports. Meanwhile, the TSA



says the new millimeter wave scanning machines will move people through airport checkpoints faster, because the old backscatter X-ray machines require a TSA agent to view each image. The TSA spokesman told *ProPublica* that the backscatter X-ray machines weren't removed because of radiation dangers, which experts have characterized as "trivial." The resulting exposure is compared to the

millimeter wave scanners. Those new devices use less-harmful radio waves similar to cellphone signals rather than the ionizing radiation emitted by x-rays, and they show a cartoon-like figure to the security

amount of radiation a person would encounter during two minutes of flying on an airliner. The new millimeter wave scanners aren't perfect, either, deemed in a European study to deliver from 23% to 54% false positives.

Millimeter Wave Safety

Backscatter Safety



Millimeter wave technology emits thousands of times less energy than a cell phone transmission.

One backscatter technology scan produces the same exposure as two minutes of flying on an airplane.

agent instead of a realistic negative image of a traveler's body.

The new scanners are smarter, too — able to automatically detect which items are threats and then showing them on the screen alongside that cartoon figure. Using this technology, agents will only need to view those images when the computer has detected a threat.

They're also easily fooled by sweat or folds in someone's clothes. But in this case, it seems better to have more false positives than negatives.

The new scanners are part of \$490 million worth of government contracts with L-3 Communications Corp. and American Science and Engineering, Inc.



U.S. redesigns terrorist target list

Source:http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2012/10/24/US-redesigns-terrorist-target-list/UPI-37411351060200/?spt=hs&or=tn

The Obama administration is planning a next-generation terrorist targeting list that transforms the CIA into a paramilitary force, The Washington Post reported.

The secret list, called the "disposition matrix," contains terrorism suspect names laid out against resources available to track them down, the Post said in a report published Tuesday.

The report, the first of three on changing U.S. counterterrorism policies, is based on interviews with current and former White House, Pentagon, intelligence and counterterrorism officials, the Post said.

The White House, National Counterterrorism Center, CIA and other agencies declined to comment on the matrix or other counterterrorism programs.

The National Counterterrorism Center is part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which integrates intelligence information, and draws on CIA, FBI, Pentagon and other experts who seek to ensure all potential terrorist-attack clues are detected and acted on when necessary.

The matrix -- designed to go beyond existing kill lists -- is a continually evolving database cataloging terror suspects' biographies, locations, acquaintances and alliances, the Post said. Strategies for taking targets down are also spelled out, including extradition requests, capture operations and drone patrols, the newspaper said.

The database, which officials said was not in operation, is designed to map out contingencies, creating a ready menu for multiple agencies' roles in case a suspect surfaces in an unexpected spot, the Post said.

"If he's in Saudi Arabia, pick up with the Saudis," a former official said. "If traveling overseas to al-Shabaab [a fundamentalist militia in Somalia], we can pick him up by ship. If in Yemen, kill or have the Yemenis pick him up."

Officials declined to disclose the identities of suspects on the matrix.



The database also reflects a change in Washington's worldview about terrorism, officials said, reflecting its evolution from finite emergency measures after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States to institutionalized fixtures of the national security apparatus.

Senior Obama administration officials agree such counterterrorism operations are likely to extend at least another decade, with some saying they saw no end in sight as al-Qaida continues to metastasize, the Post said.

"We can't possibly kill everyone who wants to harm us," a senior administration official told the newspaper. "It's a necessary part of what we do. ... We're not going to wind up in 10 years in a world of everybody holding hands and saying, 'We love America.'"

Although the matrix is still in development, some officials -- including those from the White House, Congress and intelligence agencies -- described it as a blueprint that could help Washington adapt to al-Qaida's morphing structure and its increasing efforts to exploit turmoil across North Africa and the Middle East.

The report follows news Friday the CIA has urged the White House to increase the agency's armed drone fleet to fight new North Africa al-Qaida threats. The request by CIA Director David Petraeus for up to 10 remotely piloted aircraft would strengthen Washington's ability to stop the growth of an increasingly aggressive al-Qaida affiliate known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, White House officials cited by the Post Friday said.

The request to expand the CIA's arsenal and growing involvement in lethal paramilitary operations reflects the agency's transition into a paramilitary force, the Post said. It also makes clear the CIA does not intend to return to its pre-Sept. 11, 2001, focus on gathering intelligence.

The CIA started out as a civilian intelligence agency in September 1947.



Terror suspects 'plotted bombings worse than 7/7' and 'raised funds posing as charity collectors'

Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2221370/Terror-suspect-trio-plotted-massacre-crowds-using-car-fitted-knives-detonating-suicide-bombs-attack-bigger-July-7.html>

Three British Muslims were accused yesterday of plotting a suicide bomb attack designed to wreak more devastation than the July 7 attacks.

The Al Qaeda-inspired trio masterminded a conspiracy to detonate eight home-made rucksack devices, a court was told.

They bragged how the attacks would have caused 'mass deaths' in crowded areas. One of the men was secretly recorded saying the 2005 London attacks had 'gone a bit wrong' because the killers forgot to put nails in their bombs.

which were to be released to the media after their deaths.

On their return to Birmingham, they set up a bomb factory in a council flat and began recruiting a team of accomplices.

The jihadist plot was smashed by counter-terrorism police and MI5, who had the cell under intensive surveillance, bugging the men's cars and the bomb factory.

Eleven men and one woman were arrested when officers swooped on addresses across Birmingham in September last year.

Opening the case amid high security at



From left to right, Irfan Naseer, 31, Irfan Khalid and Ashik Ali, both 27, who are accused of being 'central figures' in the extremist plot to cause mass deaths and casualties

They also discussed mass poisoning and fixing blades to the wheels of a vehicle before driving it into a crowd of people, and boasted their plot would be 'another 9/11'.

The trio raised thousands of pounds to fund the plot by posing as street collectors for the humanitarian charity Muslim Aid, the jury was told. Two of the men are alleged to have travelled to Pakistan to attend a terrorist camp and received training with explosives, weapons and poisons. They are said to have recorded 'martyrdom videos' explaining their actions

Woolwich Crown Court, prosecutor Brian Altman QC said those on trial were 'senior members of a home-grown terror cell'.

He said: 'The police successfully disrupted a plan to commit an act or acts of terrorism on a scale potentially greater than the London bombings in July 2005. The defendants were proposing to detonate up to eight rucksack bombs in a suicide attack and/or to detonate bombs on timers in crowded areas in order to cause mass deaths and casualties.'

'One of them was even to describe their plan as "another 9/11".'

Two of the men – unemployed graduate Irfan Naseer, 31, and former security guard Irfan Khalid, 27 – are accused of twice travelling to terrorist



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

camps in Pakistan. They spent 15 months learning how to make bombs, use weapons and create poisons 'for the sole purpose' of bringing their knowledge to Britain and using it, the court heard.

When they returned in July 2011, they teamed up with Ashik Ali, 27, whose ground-floor flat was transformed into a safe house to experiment with explosive chemicals. The court heard Naseer was recorded agreeing with another man that July 7 had 'gone a bit wrong' because the bombers did not use nails.

Naseer, a heavily-built man known as 'Chubbs', used knowledge from his pharmacy degree to mix the chemicals. He bought an instant cold pack, in the mistaken belief it contained ammonium nitrate.

The men were recorded talking about training with AK-47 assault rifles and grenades as well as firing a rocket launcher and the vehicle blade plot, which was in the Al Qaeda magazine, Inspire.

Partially-sighted Ali, a former charity manager, obtained the flat with the help of a blind charity. But he was recorded telling his estranged wife he was going abroad to fight jihad, and comparing himself and others to Four Lions, a film about bungling British extremists. After he was arrested, Ali confessed that his role was to wear a suicide vest and carry a gun, but he denied he would have carried out the attack, it was alleged. The terrorist cell was allegedly inspired by internet videos and the writings of Osama Bin Laden and US-born Yemeni extremist Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed in a drone strike 12 days after the suspects, were arrested.

The men raised £14,500 by impersonating street collectors for a charity and an Islamic

learning centre, the jury heard. But Rahin Ahmed, 26, a conspirator who has admitted terrorist offences, lost £9,000 gambling on the currency markets. The court heard the law graduate was the gang's 'chief financier' but was ostracised after his trading spree.

The men wanted to spend the money on setting up a high-street Islamic centre which would serve as a front for terrorist recruitment. All three are also accused of radicalising and recruiting other young Muslim men to their extremist cause. All of those allegedly involved in the plot are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin and from the Sparkhill, Sparkbrook, Balsall Heath and Alum Rock areas of Birmingham.

The jury was told about others linked to the plot, including several men who have admitted involvement and are awaiting sentence.

They included Ahmed and Mujahid Hussain, 21, who pleaded guilty to helping collect money for terrorism. Four men – Ishaq Hussain, 20, Naweed Ali, 24, Khobailb Hussain, 20, and Shahid Khan, 20 – have admitted flying to Pakistan for terrorist training in August 2011. But they returned before joining the camp after one of their families learned of their plans.

Two others – Ashik Ali's brother Bahader, 29, and Mohammed Rizwan, 33 – will go on trial next year accused of terrorist offences. Ali's estranged wife, Salma Kabal, 23, will also go on trial next year, accused of failing to inform the authorities of her knowledge of the plot.

Naseer, Khalid and Ali deny preparing terrorist acts, including plotting a bomb attack, recruiting others and sending people aboard for training. The trial, which is expected to last three months, continues.

Terrorism and transnational crime

Source: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf>

This report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In addition, the report discusses the U.S. government's perception of and response to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options.

In recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests.

Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections, observers often focus on several common patterns.

- **Partnership Motivations and Disincentives:** Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – October 2012

Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations.

- **Appropriation of Tactics:** Although ideologies and motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials.

- **Organizational Evolution and Variation:** A criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda's affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah.

To combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a role

in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for example, the Obama Administration issued the *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, which emphasized, among other issues,

the confluence of crime and terrorism as a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests. While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs,

and resources sufficiently respond to the combined crimeterrorism threat. Common foreign policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation. ■

