

Syria's WMDs – Are they under control?

Volume 43, 2012

CBRNE **Newsletter** **Terrorism**

Terror News



www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com

Google reveals 'terrorism video' removals

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18479137>

Google said it restricted 104 of 149 videos that the Thai authorities had said insulted their monarchy

Google has revealed it removed about 640 videos from YouTube that allegedly promoted terrorism over the second half of 2011 after complaints from the UK's Association of Chief Police Officers.

The news was contained in its latest Transparency Report which discloses requests by international authorities to remove or hand over material.

The firm said it terminated five accounts linked to the suspect videos.

However, the firm said it had rejected many other state's requests for action.

Canada's Passport Office was among the organisations rebuffed. It had asked for a video of a Canadian citizen urinating on his passport and then flushing it down the toilet be removed.

Google also refused to delete six YouTube videos that satirised Pakistan's army and senior politicians. The order had come from the government of Pakistan's Ministry of Information Technology.

Free speech

But Google did act in hundreds of cases, including:

- requests to block more than 100 YouTube videos in Thailand that allegedly insulted its monarchy - a crime in the country
- the removal of a YouTube video that contained hate speech that had been posted in Turkey
- the termination of four YouTube accounts responsible for videos that allegedly contained threatening and harassing content after complaints by different US law enforcement agencies.

Overall, the firm said it had received 461 court orders covering a total of 6,989 items between July and December 2011. It said it had complied with 68% of the orders.

It added that it had received a further 546 informal requests covering 4,925 items, of which it had agreed to 43% of the cases.

Google's senior policy analyst, Dorothy Chou, said the company was concerned by the amount of requests that had been linked to



Google Search

political speech.

"It's alarming not only because free expression is at risk, but because some of these requests come from countries you might not suspect - Western democracies not typically associated with censorship," she said.

"For example, in the second half of last year, Spanish regulators asked us to remove 270 search results that linked to blogs and articles in newspapers referencing individuals and public figures, including mayors and public prosecutors.

"In Poland, we received a request from the Agency for Enterprise Development to remove links to a site that criticised it.

"We didn't comply with either of these requests."

Top 5 Threats to U.S. National Security in 2012

Source: http://www.idga.org/homeland-security/articles/top-5-threats-to-u-s-national-security-in-2012/?mac=IDGA_OI_Featured_2011?mac=1-4665299977&elq=061b57957257498aaa47a4857d751fd6&elqCampaignId=16

The U.S. military, intelligence services, FBI, and numerous other organizations exist to

protect national security in America. Countless budget dollars every year



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

are poured into this endeavor and it is the one thing that is truly a non-partisan issue in Washington. Politicians may at times disagree about the approach, but all Americans agree on the need for a sound, competent, and effective national security policy. In order to determine which policies should be implement and how dollars and resources are best used to achieve this task, it is fundamentally important to understand what threats exist. This is IDGA's list of the top 5 threats that currently exist to national security.

5. Border Security

The United States has been blessed with an excellent geographic position on the globe that has allowed it to prosper through trade using



both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It also has abundant natural resources that span a large landmass to include agriculture, oil, fresh water, and all types of raw materials. But one of the downsides of

its unique position on the North American continent is the huge amount of territory that could potentially be vulnerable to threats. The United States has two long coastlines that are difficult to completely protect and monitor due to sheer size. Smuggling of any type of contraband including weapons or persons with hostile intent is always a danger. Also, the United States grapples with securing two giant land borders that are among the longest of any in the world. Border violence and the narcotics trade are constant antagonists on the southern border and the northern border. Both these land borders are potential points where dangerous weapons and persons could slip into the United States undetected with malicious intent.

4. Cyber Attacks

Computer viruses like Stuxnet have shown that cyber threats are real and are growing in sophistication and frequency. The world is becoming more dependent on computers, the internet, and technology for managing everything from communications to banking to the power grid. Although Stuxnet was malware

that targeted industrial infrastructure and primarily affected Iran, an enemy of the United States, this incident shows that the possibility of this type of cyber-attack is no longer speculation. America's enemies are consistently gaining more advanced computer technology and it is only a matter of time before one of them develops code with the intent and ability to destabilize infrastructure in the United States. Attacks on the power grid, water supplies, or the banking system would cause panic and possibly lead to social disorder if left unchecked or unresolved for too long. The U.S. is a top cyber power and it needs to remain so in order to deflect or defeat the increasingly likelihood of cyber-attacks against American targets.

3. CBRNE Attack

The so called weapons of mass destruction are a constant worry for DHS, the FBI, and other agencies entrusted to safeguard domestic interests, cities, and citizens. Although a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon are the most feared they are also the most difficult to manufacture and smuggle into the United States due to complex mechanisms or radioactive components. This however, is still a concern as nations hostile to the United States like Iran and North Korea continue to enrich uranium, a key component in creating this type of weapon. But chemical and biological weapons are something different that can more easily be procured, manufactured, or smuggled by a creative terrorist. While these types of weapons don't have the outright destructive power of a nuclear blast, they have an excellent ability to instill fear and create panic in major cities. Targeting water supplies or transportation systems with this type of weapon is a huge concern for security forces and law enforcement as an attack could send metropolitan areas into hysteria.



2. Nuclear Iran

China and North Korea give the United States cause for worry on certain issues, but nothing compares to the concern over a nuclear



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

equipped Iran. Neither China nor North Korea have shown an inclination or tendency for a pre-emptive strike on the U.S or an ally. Iran is much more uncertain. It is unknown what a nuclear armed Iran will do or how it will react. Its leadership often makes incendiary comments towards Israel, a strong American ally, and has given reason to believe it may be bold enough to launch a first strike on Israel out of pure hatred. This scenario is a disaster for the United States who would likely be brought into an all-out war with the Persians and potentially a large part of the Muslim world that could rally against Israel and America. Even if Iran doesn't use the bomb, just having it could create a new arms race in the Middle East as the balance of power shifts and countries like Saudi Arabia become much more vulnerable to a far mightier Iran. None of these scenarios bode well for the U.S. and its national security objectives.

1. Global Financial Crisis

The great recession in the United States and Europe's current convulsions could be minor tremors leading up to a much larger quake. Sovereign nations under mountains of debt, speculative gambling and massive leveraging

by major financial institutions, and an expanding world population place increasingly uncomfortable pressure on the world's natural resources. If these trends continue forth unchanged on a global scale for too long a meltdown is inevitable. So far the crises have been isolated and contained to certain nations and regions. Certain parts of the world have been spared or have even experienced growth that has averted a worldwide crash. But as the world system continues to become more integrated, a global collapse becomes an increasing threat as the exposure to toxic assets permeates the entire system. This problem is easily avoidable by world leaders cooperating and using coordinated efforts to implement sound fiscal policy and not living beyond their means. At present, however, there seems very little appetite for this type of medicine and many economies are plugging along as usual hoping someone else will be left holding the bag if things fall apart. A financial collapse on a global scale could create mass panic, chaos, and might destabilize many parts of the world. A world that includes multiple nations lacking stability and social order is the United State's largest threat to National Security.

Files Reveal Neo-Nazis Helped Palestinian Terrorists

Source: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/files-show-neo-nazis-helped-palestinian-terrorists-in-munich-1972-massacre-a-839467.html>



Forty years ago, the massacre of Israeli athletes and coaches overshadowed the Munich Summer Olympics. Though it was never proved, left-wing extremists were suspected of working with the Palestinian terrorists behind the operation. But previously unreleased files seen by SPIEGEL prove that neo-Nazis were involved instead -- and officials knew about it.

The men who were arrested in the Munich house of former Waffen-SS member Charles

Jochheim late on Oct. 27, 1972 were armed like soldiers on their way to the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

front. In one suitcase, police found three Kalashnikov automatic rifles, six magazines, 174 rounds of ammunition, two pistols, a revolver and six Belgian-made hand grenades. The two men who were arrested were also carrying other weapons. Wolfgang Abramowski had weapons hidden in his waistband, while his accomplice, Willi Pohl, was carrying two pistols and a hand grenade, according to a Munich police investigative report.

A fellow member of a right-wing extremist splinter group calling itself the "National Socialist Fighting Group for a Greater Germany" had tipped off the police about Pohl and Abramowski. The two men allegedly planned to use the weapons to free a fellow extremist who was in prison, but investigators soon questioned whether this story was true.

Among the documents Abramowski and Pohl were carrying was a threatening letter to a Munich judge tasked with clearing up one of the most shocking crimes in postwar German history: the massacre at the Munich Summer Olympics.

On Sept. 5, 1972, Palestinian militants with a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist group called "Black September" took nine Israeli athletes hostage and demanded the release of several hundred Palestinians from Israeli prisons. When the police attempted to free the Israelis at the Fürstenfeldbruck military airport, where they were being held in two helicopters, the terrorists murdered all of their hostages. A police officer also died in the firefight. Three of the Palestinians survived, and the judge to whom the letter found in Pohl's and Abramowski's luggage was addressed was in charge of the case against them.

In the letter, Black September threatened to retaliate against the judge "if he continues to allow Israel intelligence agents to participate in the interrogations of the Olympic terrorists." An examination of the weapons seized from Pohl and Abramowski proved that this was no joke by right-wing extremist copycats.

Seeing the Attack in a New Light

The "final report" by Munich police, dated July 23, 1973, states: "An additional indication of the relationship between the crimes committed by Pohl and his accomplices and the attack on the Olympic Village in Munich is that the ... confiscated machine carbines and hand

grenades have the same characteristics as the weapons used by the militants."

This evidence practically proved that the suspicion that German neo-Nazis Pohl and Abramowski were collaborating with the Palestinian terrorists was in fact true.

The police report is part of more than 2,000 pages of files that the Cologne-based domestic intelligence service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), recently released in response to a request by SPIEGEL. The documents include classified analyses and memos, the agency's correspondence with the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND), Germany's foreign intelligence service, and the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA), as well as police reports. Based on these previously classified documents, is it now necessary to consider the story of the Olympic attack in a new light?

Yes, at least in part.

Until now, many experts assumed that it was left-wing extremists who had had ties to Black September, helping the terrorists find places to stay in Munich, for example. There were also indications of cooperation between the two groups, such as a pamphlet by Red Army Faction (RAF) founder Ulrike Meinhof, who later praised the massacre for making "the essence of imperialist control transparent." There was also a statement by someone who had left the terrorist organization, who told SPIEGEL in 1978 that another RAF member had told him that "Revolutionary Cells," a splinter group, had had its "fingers in the pie" when finding places to stay for the Palestinian militants.

But according to the released documents, such statements must now be treated as myths.

Black September didn't need any German logistic assistance. Some of the men had arrived in Germany weeks before the hostage crisis, and they had plenty of cash. They found accommodations on their own, which was not easy in Munich, where everything was booked because of the Olympics. Instead of staying together, as planned, they had to take rooms in various hotels.

One of the leaders, nicknamed "Tony," even took out an ad in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* newspaper, in which he wrote that he was "looking for living with family." Herta N., the unsuspecting former wife of an attorney, rented a room to "Tony."



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Neo-Nazis Instead of Left-Wing Extremists

In a letter to their foreign intelligence colleagues at the BND in early 1973, BfV intelligence agents concluded that there was "no evidence" that German left-wing extremists had supported the Palestinian terrorists.

But that was not the case with Pohl and Abramowski, the German neo-Nazis. Less than two months before the massacre, police in the western city of Dortmund sent a telex to the BfV containing information of potential interest to the intelligence agency. The subject line read: "Presumed conspiratorial activity by Palestinian terrorists." The telex discussed Willi Pohl and his relationship with Mohammed Daoud, whose nom de guerre was Abu Daoud, the mastermind of the Munich attack.

Could the massacre have been prevented if the BfV, but also the state offices of criminal investigation in Düsseldorf and Munich and the BKA, had properly assessed the importance of the telex?

Today Willi Pohl is a successful author of crime fiction who writes under a different name. He convincingly renounced terrorism and violence decades ago and even wrote a novel about it. Pohl has also written the script for many a northern German episode of the popular crime show "Tatort." Now 68, he only agreed to speak with SPIEGEL on the condition that he would not be pictured in the article.

In the summer of 1972 Pohl, born in the region of the Soviet Union formerly known as East Prussia, was a wiry 28-year-old blond man from a poor background with several convictions for grand theft under his belt. He had also stolen money from his employer, who, as a result, felt motivated to tell the police that Pohl supported the radical wing of the PLO and had met with a man of "Arab appearance" who was staying at the Römischer Kaiser Hotel in Dortmund. The police quickly learned that a man named Saad Walli was staying at the hotel. Saad Walli was an alias for Abu Daoud.

In the now-released documents, there is no indication that the state offices of criminal investigation, the BKA or the BfV, which had all been notified by the Dortmund police, did anything to find the suspicious Walli. As a result, according to the documents, Abu Daoud, a.k.a. Saad Walli, was able to stay, unchallenged, at the Eden Hotel Wolff in Munich before and during the attack, meeting with the militants in his hotel room and calling his associates in Libya and Tunisia from there.

Unknowingly Involved?

The connection between Pohl and Abu Daoud was established through a German neo-Nazi who had fought with the Palestinians in Jordan. Abu Daoud, then a 35-year-old teacher from Jerusalem with a boyish face and a thin moustache, later stated that he was indifferent to the political views of the blue-eyed Pohl, and that he had considered people like Pohl to be "very useful for our future."

In Dortmund, Daoud needed Pohl's help to buy him several Mercedes sedans, which Pohl did. Daoud was also looking for a professional passport forger, and Pohl introduced him to a friend from prison, Abramowski. The 28-year-old, also a displaced ethnic German from East Prussia, was considered a pro.

Today Pohl is almost certain that he was unknowingly involved in the preparations for the Olympic attack. "I drove Abu Daoud halfway across Germany, and he met with Palestinians in various cities. In Cologne, the PLO official also met with Arabs wearing suits and ties. Pohl believes that they were diplomats affiliated with the Libyan Embassy in Bonn. According to Pohl, he and Abramowski left Germany at the end of July and traveled to Lebanon via Rome.

As Abramowski later told the state security division of the BKA, he and Pohl moved into a flat-roofed bungalow in a village near Beirut. Almost every evening, a PLO official picked up Abramowski and took him to a print shop in the capital, where, according to Abramowski, he forged Kuwaiti and Lebanese passports, changed names on American and French documents and exchanged passport photos. It is still unclear today whether the Munich attackers used passports from Abramowski's workshop to enter Germany.

According to Pohl, he still had no knowledge of the planned attack in Munich at the time. It was only on Aug. 24, some 12 days before the massacre, that the Palestinians became more specific and spoke of a "spectacular terrorist attack."

Although Pohl does not remember hearing the word "Munich," there was talk of a hostage-taking operation in Germany, in which the Palestinians planned to exchange 20 Israelis for some 200 fellow Palestinian militants in Israeli prisons. The Palestinians insisted that it would be a bloodless incident, and they asked the two Germans what they thought the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

German public would think about it.

A Crazy Plan

Pohl says that he proposed an international press conference in Vienna, which he would give together with a PLO official. According to Pohl, he flew to Vienna via Paris, which was corroborated by the statement his friend Abramowski made to the BKA foreign intelligence agency at the time, namely that Pohl was in Austria during the Olympics "to take care of something for the Palestinians there."

When he saw on television that the hostage-taking operation had failed, Pohl left the country. A few days later, he was back in the Middle East, where PLO intelligence chief Abu lyad was determined to get revenge. In Pohl's account of events, he says that lyad blamed the German authorities, more than anyone else, for the fact that the Munich operation had turned into such a disaster. Besides, says Pohl, lyad believed a rumor that Israeli officers had led the failed rescue effort by German police.

From the standpoint of the PLO intelligence chief, this meant that Germany had intervened in the war between Israel and the Palestinians, making Germany an enemy that had to be dealt with. According to Pohl, lyad asked to suggest possible German targets of future attacks. A few days later in Cairo, Pohl presented what he now calls a crazy plan.

He proposed occupying several city halls throughout Germany and taking local politicians hostage. Then, on Christmas Eve of 1972, a group of militants would storm the Cologne Cathedral. The goal was to force Germany and other countries to comply with a list of demands. The operation was given the code name "Mosque," says Pohl.

In mid-October, Pohl and Abramowski traveled to Madrid to receive weapons for these and other operations. They boarded a train to Munich, via Paris, taking the weapons with them. This is Pohl's version, which essentially corresponds to information in the released documents.

Astonishing Leniency

But before they could put their plan into action, Pohl and Abramowski were betrayed and

arrested. The hand grenades that were found with the two neo-Nazis prompted investigators to conclude that they had to be in close contact with the masterminds of the Olympic massacre. According to one police report, the grenade stemmed from an "extremely rare manufacturing operation." They were Belgian grenades containing Swedish explosives that had been produced solely for Saudi Arabia. The PLO terrorists had used exactly the same grenades to murder their hostages during the failed rescue effort at Fürstenfeldbruck.

Of course, this raises the question of whether the same radical right-wing network had already brought the weapons for the Munich attackers to Bavaria on the same route through Madrid and Paris. The question remains unanswered to this day. Pohl denies that this was the case. He says that the route through Madrid was his idea, and that it was only used after the Olympics. Instead, he assumes that Libyan diplomats in Germany helped bring the Kalashnikovs and hand grenades for the Munich terrorists into the country.

The German courts treated Pohl and Abramowski with astonishing leniency. The investigations into suspected violations of the War Weapons Control Act and "membership in a criminal organization" came to nothing, even though the exhibits included "operation plans for hostage-taking" that "implied the kidnappings of unidentified personalities in Essen, Bochum and Cologne."

In 1974, the two Germans were merely convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Abramowski was sentenced to eight months and Pohl to 26 months in prison. Only four days after sentencing, Pohl was released and fled to Beirut. There is nothing in the files to explain the reasons behind such leniency.

Perhaps the authorities feared that the Palestinians could also try to gain Pohl's freedom with the same approach they had used to secure the release of the three surviving members of the Olympic attack operation: by hijacking a German airliner. A few days after Pohl's arrest, terrorists from the PLO's Fatah faction hijacked a Lufthansa flight bound for Frankfurt. The German government gave in to their demands, and the three were flown to Libya.




CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File

Top Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden Declassified

Source: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB381/>

The National Security Archive today is posting over 100 recently released CIA documents relating to September 11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations. The newly-declassified records, which the Archive obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, are referred to in footnotes to the [9/11 Commission Report](#) and present an unprecedented public resource for information about



September 11.

The collection includes rarely released CIA emails, raw intelligence cables, analytical summaries, high-level briefing materials, and comprehensive counterterrorism reports that are usually withheld from the public because of their sensitivity. Today's posting covers a variety of topics of major public interest, including background to al-Qaeda's planning for the attacks; the origins of the Predator program now in heavy use over Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; al-Qaeda's relationship with Pakistan; CIA attempts to warn about the impending threat; and the impact of budget constraints on the U.S. government's hunt for bin Laden.

Today's posting is the result of a series of FOIA requests by National Security Archive staff based on a painstaking review of references in the *9/11 Commission Report*.

DOCUMENT HIGHLIGHTS

The documents released by CIA detail the meticulousness of al-Qaeda's plot against the United States and CIA attempts to counter the rising terrorist threat. A previously undisclosed raw intelligence report that became the basis for the December 4, 1998, President's Daily Brief notes that five years before the actual attack, al-Qaeda operatives had successfully evaded security at a New York airport in a test-run for bin Laden's plan to hijack a U.S. airplane. [1998-12-03]. CIA analytical reports also provide interesting insights into al-Qaeda's evolving political strategies. "In our view, the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value. For instance, the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family." [2003-06-01]

Reports on early attempts to apprehend bin Laden detail the beginning of the U.S. Predator drone program in Afghanistan and Pakistan. "First Predator mission over Afghanistan [excised] September 7, 2000." [1] "Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however we had no way at the time to react to this information." [2004-03-19] American UAVs did not have sufficient weapons capabilities at the time the CIA likely spotted bin Laden in 2000 to fire on the suspect using the UAV.

Al-Qaeda's ties to Pakistan before September 11 are also noted in several documents. "Usama ((Bin Ladin))'s Islamic Army considered the Pakistan/Afghanistan area one region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as a regional base and training center for Islamic Army activities supporting Islamic insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. [Excised] The Islamic Army had a camp in Pakistan [Excised] purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan." [1997-07-14] While, "UBL elements in Pakistan reportedly plan to attack POTUS [U.S. President Clinton's] plane with [excised] missiles if he visits Pakistan." [2000-02-18]

Similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, the document collection details repeated CIA warnings of the bin Laden terrorist threat prior to September 11. According to a January 2000 Top Secret briefing to the Director of Central Intelligence, disruption operations against the Millennium plot "bought time... weeks... months... but no more than one year" before al-Qaeda would strike. [2000-01-07] "A UBL attack against U.S. interests could occur at any time or any place. It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place." [1999-08-03] By September 2001, CIA counterterrorism officials knew a plot was developing but couldn't provide policymakers with details. "As of Late August 2001, there were indications that an individual associated with al-Qa'ida was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States, [Excised]. No further information is currently available in the timing of possible attacks or on the alleged targets in the United States." [2001-08-24]

Despite mounting warnings about al-Qaeda, the documents released today illustrate how prior to September 11, CIA counterterrorism units were lacking the funds to aggressively pursue bin Laden. "Budget concerns... CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level. Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections. Due to budgetary constraints... CTC/UBL [Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit] will move from offensive to defensive posture." [2000-04-05]

Although the collection is part of a laudable effort by the CIA to provide documents on events related to September 11, many of these materials are heavily redacted, and still only represent one-quarter of the CIA materials cited in the *9/11 Commission Report*. Hundreds of cited reports and cables remain classified, including all interrogation materials such as the 47 reports from CIA interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from March 24, 2003 – June 15, 2004, which are referenced in detail in the 9/11 Report.

Highlights of the CIA September 11 Document Collection Include:

- The 1998 Raw Intelligence Report on UBL's Plans to Hijack an Airplane that Became an Item in the December 4, 1998 President's Daily Brief [1998-12-03].
 - The report details how bin Laden was planning "new operations against the United States (U.S.) targets in the near future. Plans to hijack a U.S. aircraft were proceeding well. Two individuals from the relevant operational team in the U.S. had successfully evaded security checks during a trial run at "New York airport [excised]."
- Internal CIA E-mails on Osama bin Laden
 - [1998-05-05](#) – "[Title Excised]" "Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well," To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Capture Op," "[Gary] Schroen to Mike." [Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report]
 - [1998-12-20](#) – "Re: urgent re ubl," Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "[Gary] Schroen to Mike" [Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119 9/11 Commission Report]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [1998-12-21](#) - "your note," Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Mike to [Gary] Schroen," [Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report]
- [1999-05-17](#) – "your note," From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Mike to [Gary] Schroen" [Chapter 4, Endnote 174 9/11 Commission Report]
- [2001-05-15](#) – "[Excised] Query [Excised]." Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Dave to John." [Chapter 8, Endnote 72 9/11 Commission Report]
- [2001-05-24](#) – [Title Excised] "Agee (sic) we need to compare notes," Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Dave to John." [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report]
- [2001-07-13](#) – "[Excised] Khalad [Excised]," Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Richard to Alan" [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report]
- [2001-08-21](#) – "Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar," Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Mary to John." [Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report]
- Two Definitive CIA Reports on the September 11, 2001 Attacks
 - [2003-06-01](#) – "11 September: The Plot and the Plotters," CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. [Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105 9/11 Commission Report]
 This document is a comprehensive CIA history of the 9/11 attack. Analysis includes notes on al-Qaeda, the evolution of the plot, terrorist techniques, timelines and detailed hijacker profiles.
 - [2004-03-19](#) – "DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida and the Intelligence Community Response," Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. [Chapter 2, Endnote 67]
 This document is a detailed summary of CIA efforts to apprehend Osama bin Laden from 1989-2004. Highlights include:
 - Agency notes on bin Laden's evolution from "terrorist financier" in the early 1990s to a significant threat to U.S. interests by mid-1990.
 - Discussions and debates regarding the use of Predator drones as early as 2000. [2]
 - Critiques of FBI information systems as impediments to counterterrorism efforts - "A major, ongoing concern is FBI's own internal dissemination system. CIA officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to the intended recipient within the FBI. In addition, FBI has not perfected its FI reporting system and headquarters-field communications so dissemination of intelligence outside of FBI is still spotty." And the report confirms suggestions by the 9/11 Commission Report that "the different organizational culture and goals of the FBI and CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results." (p. 22)
 - A group of Afghan tribal leaders worked with the CIA on the UBL issue, but "[Excised] judged to be unlikely to successfully attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin." "Masood has to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent or surrogate of the US government... Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent." (p. 58)
 Note "DIF" written on multiple pages stands for "Denied in Full"



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- A Series of CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs (SEIBS) from June-September 2001 Warning of "Imminent" Al-Qaeda Attacks:
 - [2001-06-23](#) – "International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised]" Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p. 257 9/11 Commission Report]
 - [2001-06-25](#) – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 14]
 - [2001-06-30](#) – "Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 12]
 - [2001-07-02](#) – "Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 18]
 - [2001-07-13](#) – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28]
 - [2001-07-25](#) – "Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28]
 - [2001-08-07](#) – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]
- Detailed Reports on Al-Qaeda Organization
 - "The spike in the network's activity stems in part from changes in Bin Ladin's practices. To avoid implicating himself and his Taliban hosts, Bin Ladin over the past two years has allowed cells in his network, al-Qa'ida, to plan attacks more independently of the central leadership and has tried to gain support for his agenda outside the group. – The network also has benefited from a sharp increase in mujahidin recruitment since the resumption of the conflict in Chechnya in 1999, which exposed a new generation of militants to terrorist techniques and extremist ideology through training at al-Qa'ida-run camps in Afghanistan. – Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests." [2001-02-06 – "Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency.](#) [Chapter 8, Endnote 4 9/11 Commission Report]
- Bin Laden's Attempts to Acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction
 - "Bin Ladin and his associates have experimented by crude means to make and deploy biological agents... Bin Ladin has sought to acquire military-grade biological agents or weapons." [2001-02-14 – "Afghanistan: Bin Ladin's Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons," Central Intelligence Agency Analytical Report](#) [Chapter 11, Endnote 5. 9/11 Commission Report Page 342]
- A Positive CIA Assessment of CIA Counterterrorism Capabilities in August 2001
 - In contrast to the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report and a [2004 CIA Office of Inspector General's review](#) of its pre-9/11 counterterrorism practices, [a report completed in August 2001](#) by the CIA Inspector General gives very positive reviews to CIA counterterrorism practices, the management of information and interagency cooperation. "CTC fulfills inter-agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues. The Center has made progress on problems identified at the time of the last inspection in 1994 - specifically its professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CIA 9/11 DOCUMENT LIST

[1992-05-29 – DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 23]

[1992-07-17 – "Warning," Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board from the Director of Central Intelligence.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 23]

[1993-07-22 – "Funding of the Gama'at al-Islamiya by Wealthy Saudi Oppositionist Usama Bin Ladin; Composition of Sudanese Wing of the Egyptian Gama'at al-Islamiya," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 1]
[1994-10 – Office of Inspector General Inspection Report: The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 3, Endnote 82]
[1995-12 – "Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network," DI TR 95-12, CIA Analytic Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 67]
[1996-11-26 – "Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army, And Bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan."](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnotes 25, 31, 35, 36, Chapter 4, Endnote 3]
[1996-12-17 – "\[Excised\] Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan," Memorandum, For: Acting Director for Central Intelligence, From: \[Excised\], Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 7]
[1996-12-18 – \[Title Excised\] "The Following Was the Structure of Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 3]
[1996-12-19 – "Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council Members."](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 37]
[1996-12-19 – "Terrorism: Activities and Functions of the Islamic Army's Military Committee, and Political and Sharia Committee; Process of Approving Terrorist Operations," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 3]
[1997-01-06 – "Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability," Counterterrorist Center Commentary, CTC 97-30002, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 49]
[1997-01-08 – "Terrorism: Fatwa Issued in 1992 by Usama bin Ladin's Islamic Army to Attack U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia, Movement of Explosives \[Excised\] by the Islamic Army \[Excised\] to Saudi Arabia \[Excised\]," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 47]
[1997-01-09 – \[Title Excised\] "A Fatwa Issued by Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army Which Allowed for Attacks Against the U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 47]
[1997-01-27 – \[Title Excised\] "Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army Issued a Series of Fatwas, Most of the Against the United States," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 3]
[1997-01-31 – "Terrorism: Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin's Islamic Army, Iran and the NIF," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 85]
[1997-01-31 – "Terrorism: Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 52]
[1997-02-13 – "Terrorism: Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an 'Egyptian Operation' and Logistical and Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 56]
[1997-03-05 – "Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Links to a Southern Yemeni Group," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 44]
[1997-03-18 – "Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Attempts to Acquire Uranium," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 49, Chapter 4, Endnote 3]
[1997-04-18 – "Terrorism: Usama bin Ladin's Historical Links to 'Abdullah Azzam," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 22, 43]
[1997-04-30 – "Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 45, Chapter 4, Endnote 3,]
[1997-06-17 – "Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Financial Support to the Egyptian Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya, as well as Algerian and Libyan Extremists," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 1]
[1997-07-14 – "Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 67]
[1997-08-01 – \[Title Excised\], "Plan to establish an Iraqi Element in Bin Ladin's Islamic Army," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 54]
[1997-08-25 – "DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin," Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 8]
[1998-02-23 – "Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," *Al Quds al Arabi*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Open Source Center.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 1]
[1998-05-05 – "\[Title Excised\]" "Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well," To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: \[Excised\], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Capture Op," "\[Gary\] Schroen to Mike."](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report]
[1998-06 – "TERRORISM: Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief \[Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1998 p. 342\].](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5]
[1998-08-14 – "Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam-An Update," Central Intelligence Agency Briefing Materials.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 37]
[1998-09-02 – "Talking Points Regarding Usama Bin Ladin for the DCI's 2 September 1998 SSCI Briefing," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 102]
[1998-09-22 – \[Title Excised\]. "Terrorism: Incorporation of Ayman Zawahiri's al-Jihad Organization into Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida; Recent Activities of Egyptian Associates of al-Qa'ida," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 82]
[1998-11-18 – "Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin," Central Intelligence Agency Summary Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 121]
[1998-11-19 – DCI Directive, "Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1: The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community."](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 13, Endnote 8]
[1998-11-24 – "\[Excised\] Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem," Talking Points, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 121]
[1998-12-03 – \[Title Excised\] Planning by Usama Bin Ladin to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 112]
[1998-12-04 – "Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 112]
[1998-12-18 – \[Title Excised\] "Possible Arrest of Two Persons Involved in Plan to Hijack U.S. Airplane in the United States," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 113]
[1998-12-20 – "Re: urgent re ubl," Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: \[Excised\], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "\[Gary\] Schroen to Mike."](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119]
[1998-12-21 – "your note," Note For: \[Excised\], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Mike to \[Gary\] Schroen."](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report]
[1998-12-24 – "\[Excised\] Timeframe for Completion of Hijacking Operation \[Excised\]," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 113]
[1999-01 – "Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report \(Undated. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as January 1999 p. 342\) .](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5]
[1999-01-08 – "\[Title Excised\], Claim that Bin Ladin Postponed Hijacking," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 113]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

[1999-01-27 – "How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network," 99-40003, DCI Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 5, Endnote 118, Chapter 6, Endnote 86]

[1999-02-10 – "\[Excised\] Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 157]

[1999-03-16 – "\[Title Excised\], Iraqi Delegation \[Excised\] Meet with Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 75]

[1999-04-05 – "\[Excised\] Terrorism: Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 3, Endnote 85]

[1999-04-09 – "Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively," Counterterrorist Center, Intelligence Report, CTC 99-40007, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 86]

[1999-05-17 – "your note," From Michael F. Scheuer, To \[Excised\], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Mike to \[Cary\] Schroen."](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 174]

[1999-06 – "Caucasus: Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report \(Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1999 p. 342\).](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

[1999-06-09 – "NEAR EAST: UAE: Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances," National Intelligence Daily, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 77]

[1999-07-20 – "DCI UBL Update," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 188]

[1999-07-29 – "Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities," OTI IR 1999-170CX, Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 77]

[1999-08-03 – "UBL Update," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 188]

[1999-10-29 – "DDCI UBL Update," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 193]

[1999-11-12 – "DCI UBL Update," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 193]

[1999-12-11 – "Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

[1999-12-17 – "Millennium Threat," Briefing for DCI, December 16, 1999.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 3]

[2000-01-07 – "Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 55]

[2000-02-18 – "DCI Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorism Threat," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnotes 63, 101]

[2000-03-06 – "EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

[2000-03-27 – "Afghanistan: Bin Ladin Evading Sanctions," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

[2000-04-03 – "Islamic Extremist Update," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

[2000-04-05 – "EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

[2000-05-22 – "DDO Update, Islamic Extremist Update," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

[2000-06-30 – "Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks," Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory, The Director of Central Intelligence.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 23]

[2000-07-07 – "DDCI Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 103]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [2000-07-14 – "DCI Updates - Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 114]
- [2000-10-18 – "The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen," Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment," The Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 130]
- [2000-11-02 – "Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC 00-400117, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnotes 4, 6]
- [2000-11-10 – "Attack on the USS Cole: Preliminary Findings," DCI Counterterrorist Center," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 140]
- [2001-02-06 – "Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 4]
- [2001-02-14 – "Afghanistan: Bin Ladin's Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]
- [2001-03-23 – "Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin for Now," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]
- [2001-03-27 – "Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism," CTC 01-40004, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 78]
- [2001-04-12 – "Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target," CTC 01-40003HCS, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 5, Endnote 126]
- [2001-05-03 – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 9]
- [2001-05-15 – "\[Excised\] Query \[Excised\]." Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Dave to John."](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 72]
- [2001-05-23 – "Terrorism: Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot \[Excised\]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 10]
- [2001-05-24 – "\[Title Excised\] "Agee \(sic\) we need to compare notes," Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Dave to John."](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 64]
- [2001-05-24 – "\[Title Excised\] "A Group Presently in the United States Planning to Conduct a Terrorist Operation Involving the Use of High Explosives," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 9]
- [2001-06-12 – "Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin Ladin Associates in Afghanistan," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 111]
- [2001-06-23 – "International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent \[Excised\]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p.257]
- [2001-06-24 – "MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training," Foreign Broadcast Information Service.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 16]
- [2001-06-25 – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 12, 14]
- [2001-06-30 – "Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks \[Excised\]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 12]
- [2001-07-02 – "Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay \[Excised\]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 18]
- [2001-07-03 – "DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 23]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

[2001-07-06 – "Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 20]

[2001-07-13 – "\[Excised\] Khalad \[Excised\]," Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Richard to Alan."](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 64]

[2001-07-13 – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned \[Excised\]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 28]

[2001-07-25 – "Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing \[Excised\]," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 28]

[2001-08 – " Office of Inspector General, Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations, IG 2000-0009-IN, Central Intelligence Agency..](#)

[Not cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Provided to Jeffery Richelson via the Freedom of Information Act]

[2001-08-06 – "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," President's Daily Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Reprinted on Page 261 of the 9/11 Commission Report.]

[2001-08-07 – "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US," Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]

[2001-08-21 – "Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar," Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Mary to John."](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report]

[2001-08-23 – "DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 103]

[2001-08-24 – "Terrorism: Sanitized Version of Threat Report," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 39]

[2001-09 – Michael Warner, "Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution," Center for the Study of Intelligence.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 3, Endnote 70]

[2001-11-29 – "Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 80]

[2001-12-08 – "Terrorism: Discovery that 11 September 2001 Hijacker Mohammed Atta Did Not Travel to the Czech Republic on 31 May 2000," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 7, Endnote 69]

[2002-02-27 – "Identifying Al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 5, Endnotes 116, 117, Chapter 7, Endnote 70]

[2002-08-07 – "Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa'ida Functioning," PWR080702-05, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 5, Endnotes 111, 127]

[2002-10-17 – "Written Statement for the Record of the DCI," Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 103, Chapter 6, Endnote 54, Chapter 8, Endnote 60]

[2002-11-14 – "Saudi Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations," CTC 2002-40117CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 77]

[2002-12-06 – "Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa'ida Travel," Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 12, Endnote 32]

[2003-03-10 – "Al-Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths," CTC 200340028CHX, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 30]

[2003-03-18 – "CT: Presence of Al-Qa'ida Operative Tawfiq Muhammad Bin Salah Bin Rushayd Bin Attash in Los Angeles In Summer 2000; Association of Bin Attash With U.S.-Based Extremists," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)

[9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 7, Endnote 9]

[2003-06-01 – "11 September: The Plot and the Plotters," CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.](#)



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105]
[2003-06-20 – "Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?" CTC 2003-40071CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 7, Endnote 89, 93, 102]
[2003-07-02 – "\[Title Excised\] Shaykh Sa'id \[Excised\] devotes him time to managing al-Qa'ida's finances," CTC 2003-30072H, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as "Shaykh Sa'id: Al-Qa'ida's Loyal Senior Accountant."](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 59]
[2003-12-10 – "Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts \(1990-2003\),' " Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency Director of Congressional affairs Stanley M. Moskowitz to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 76]
[\[Undated – Likely 2004\] – "DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1, Production of the \[Excised\] Usama Bin Ladin Situation Reports \('UBL Sitreps'\)," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 6, Endnote 1]
[\[Undated – Likely 2004\] – "DCI Document Request No. 52, Item No. 2," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
 [Likely 9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 4, Endnote 2]
[2004-02-24 – "DCI Testimony: The Worldwide Threat 2004," Testimony of George Tenet, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 12, Endnote 28]
[2004-03-11 – "Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates as of 11 March 2004," Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 7, Endnote 49]
[2004-03-19 – "DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida and the Intelligence Community Response," Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 2, Endnote 67]
[2004-03-24 – "Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United State," Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 3, Endnotes 85, 108, Chapter 13, Endnote 15]
[2004-04-14 – "Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community," Panel One of the Tenth Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.](#)
 [9/11 Commission Report - Chapter 8, Endnote 38]

NOTES

- [1] See also 9/11 Commission Report p 190.
- [2] See also 9/11 Commission Report, p. 189.

CSIS creates lexicon to distinguish 'terrorists' from 'sympathizers'

Source:<http://blogs.canada.com/2012/06/22/csis-creates-lexicon-to-distinguish-terrorists-from-sympathizers/>



Is he a "terrorist" or an "extremist?" A "supporter" or "sympathizer?"

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has created a set of standard definitions for commonly used terms to guide staff through

the super-delicate task of labeling the individuals they're watching.

According to a confidential memo obtained under access-to-information laws, the spy agency says it was compelled to create a "Standard Lexicon of CSIS Terminology" after two inquiries into the detention and torture of Arab-Canadian men overseas concluded that Canadian officials had failed to accurately describe the men in intelligence reports.

Here are some of the terms that CSIS has chosen to define:



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Terrorist: An individual who has or will engage in, assist, commit or conduct a politically, religiously or ideologically motivated act of serious violence against persons or property.

Extremist: An individual who holds an extreme belief or interpretation of an idea, ideology, cause or issue, who may incite others to hold similar views and/or advocates extreme measures, including the use of violence, to draw attention to or advance a desired goal.

Supporter: An individual who supports a particular organization, cause, issue, idea or ideology and who purposefully diverts or re-directs attention and or resources (ie. time, funds, propaganda, etc) towards this organization or cause.

Sympathizer: An individual who may be inclined to favour a particular organization, cause, issue, idea or ideology but who will not purposefully divert or re-direct attention and or resources (ie. time, funds, propaganda, etc) towards supporting this organization or cause.

Information: Information is unevaluated and unprocessed data of any type that has been openly or clandestinely collected. Information when processed may produce intelligence.

Intelligence: Intelligence is analyzed and processed information – normally derived clandestinely from an actual or potential event, or on a particular subject. It has potential value in mitigating risks and national security threats as well as providing advice to Government.

Al-Qaida trains Norwegian to attack

By Karl Ritter

Source:<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hZCrdGvfxkc5BkN9MJRjLo3rrGog?docId=d6679bb2854141d6b030c48eb298eb7e>

A Norwegian man has received terrorist training from al-Qaida's offshoot in Yemen and is awaiting orders to carry out an attack on the West, officials from three European security agencies told The Associated Press on

"We believe he is operational and he is probably about to get his target," one security official said. "And that target is probably in the West."



Members of Al-Qaeda are seen training with AK-47 sub-machine-guns in a video tape, June 19, 2001

A security official in a second European country confirmed the information, adding: "From what I understand, a specific target has not been established."

European security services, including in

Monday.

Western intelligence officials have long feared such a scenario — a convert to Islam who is trained in terrorist methods and can blend in easily in Europe and the United States, traveling without visa restrictions.

Officials from three European security agencies confirmed Monday the man is "operational," meaning he has completed his training and is about to receive a target. All spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the case publicly. They declined to name the man, who has not been accused of a crime.

Norway, have warned in recent years of homegrown, radicalized Muslims traveling to terror training camps in conflict zones. Many of the known cases involve young men with family roots in Muslim countries.

But the latest case involves a man in his 30s with no immigrant background, the officials said. After converting to Islam in 2008, he quickly became radicalized and traveled to Yemen to receive terror training, one of the officials said. The man spent "some months" in Yemen and is still believed to be there, he said.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The official said the man has no criminal record, which would also make him an ideal recruit for al-Qaida.

"Not even a parking ticket," he said. "He's completely clean and he can travel anywhere."

The official would not specify what preventive measures were being taken but said "there is a well-established relationship between Western security services, and they share the information needed to prevent terrorism."

The officials declined to specify what makes them think the man is operational.

Signs that a would-be jihadist is ready for an attack could include the creation of so-called martyrdom videos for release online in conjunction with an attack, or an abrupt cutoff of communication and contacts with peers to avoid detection.

The man has not been accused of a crime in Norway, where traveling abroad to attend terror training camps is not a crime per se. In many European countries, suspects are not named unless they have been formally charged with a crime.

Yemeni military officials said they had information on Europeans training with al-Qaida in the southern part of the country but that they weren't aware of a Norwegian being among them. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.

CIA and FBI officials in the U.S. declined to comment on the AP report.

Trond Hugubakken, a spokesman for Norway's PST security service, also declined to comment on the case. He referred to a PST security assessment in February, which highlighted that

"several" Islamic extremists have traveled from Norway to conflict zones to attend training camps.

Hugubakken acknowledged that converts who turn to violent extremism pose a particular challenge.

"Converts will have a different level of cover, especially if they have no criminal record," he said, adding that most Muslim converts do not turn to extremism.

There are several examples in Europe and the U.S. of converts linked to terror plots, from failed shoe-bomber Richard Reid, a British convert, to a Pennsylvania woman dubbed "Jihad Jane," who pleaded guilty last year to charges that she plotted to kill a Swedish cartoonist who caricatured Islam's Prophet Muhammad.

Norway saw the first convictions under its anti-terror laws this year when two men were given prison terms in January for plotting to attack a Danish newspaper that also had caricatured the Prophet Muhammad.

In March, Mullah Krekar, a radical Iraqi-born cleric who came to Norway as a refugee, was sentenced to five years in prison for making death threats against Norwegian officials and three Kurdish men he claimed had insulted Islam.

But Norway's most serious attacks happened last year at the hands of a right-wing, anti-Muslim extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, who admitted to killing 77 people in a bombing-and-shooting massacre on July 22. The self-styled militant's trial ended last week with conflicting claims about whether he is criminally insane. A verdict has been set for Aug. 24.

Associated Press writer Paisley Dodds in London, Intelligence Writer Kimberly Dozier and AP writer Eileen Sullivan in Washington and Ahmed al-Haj in Sanaa, Yemen, contributed to this report.

Key 26/11 conspirator Abu Hamza arrested at IGI airport in Delhi

Source: <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/key-2611-conspirator-abu-hamza-arrested-in-delhi/267741-3.html>

The Delhi Police has arrested suspected key 26/11 Mumbai attacks plotter Abu Hamza at the Indra Gandhi International airport. Sources say Hamza was arrested at Delhi's IGI airport on being deported from Saudi Arabia on India's request. His arrest being called the most significant development in the case since Ajmal Kasab's arrest.

Sources say Hamza had arrived in Delhi from the Gulf when he was arrested. Hamza was produced before a court which remanded him to 15-day police custody. The Mumbai Crime Branch will send a team to Delhi in the next few days to seek more



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

information about Abu Hamza and to work on getting a transit remand for a detailed interrogation in Mumbai.

Home Minister P Chidambaram in a statement said, "Abu Jindal has been apprehended and

"attack was a trailer and the entire movie was yet to come".

In the intercepted tapes, Ansari was also heard using typical Hindi words like "prashasan" (government) and was directing the terrorists to

conceal their Pakistani identity and identify themselves as Deccan Mujahideen hailing from Toli Chowk in Hyderabad.

His presence was also stated by Ajmal Kasab, the lone terrorist arrested during the Mumbai attack, in his deposition before a special court. He told the court that one person by the name of Abu Jindal



has been remanded to custody of law enforcement agencies." External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said, "We are awaiting the investigation report from Delhi Police and will take an appropriate action following the report." According to reports, Hamza alias Sayeed Zabiuddin alias Zabi Ansari alias Riyasat Ali is a suspected Indian Mujahideen terrorist. He is an Indian national who went to Pakistan for allegedly training people for the 26/11 attacks. Sources in the Delhi Police's special cell say that Abu Hamza not only trained those who carried out the 26/11 attacks, but was also one of the key conspirators.

His arrest is being seen as a crucial breakthrough and is likely to strengthen the 26/11 case. The 30-year-old who hails from Georai area of Beed district in Maharashtra, was arrested on June 21 when he arrived in India from a Gulf country, official sources.

With his arrest, the mysterious voice recorded during the conversation between 10 Lashker terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan has been identified, the sources said. Sources say he was in the Karachi control room at the time of attacks in Mumbai. According to the officials associated with the probe, Ansari had told the Lashkar terrorists carrying out attack in Nariman House to convey to the media that the

had tutored 10 terrorists on how to speak Hindi. Hamza was named in the dossier to Pakistan as India's most wanted. There was also an Interpol notice against him in 2009. Hamza is also alleged to have a hand in the IISC Bangalore attack in 2005.

Lashkar-e-Taiba operative David Coleman Headley also named Hamza as the Lashkar's India expert.

Missing since 2005, Ansari, who had undergone training at Indian Technical Institute in Beed, had a sudden rise in the ranks of Lashker-e-Taiba after he was indoctrinated by banned SIMI post Gujarat riots in 2002.

The Central security agencies had quizzed many arrested terrorists to study the case of Ansari during which it came to light that he had been operating out of terror camps in Karachi and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was a key figure in the terror group's plan to carry out the strikes in the country's hinterland.

Some unanswered questions:

- How did Hamza come to India?
- Will Pakistan now give India the voice samples of the other 26/11 accused?
- Will US give India further access to David Headley and Rana?



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Drones vulnerable to terrorist hijacking

By John Roberts

Source: <http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2012/06/25/drones-vulnerable-to-terrorist-hijacking-researchers-say/>

A small surveillance drone flies over an Austin stadium, diligently following a series of GPS waypoints that have been programmed into its flight computer. By all appearances, the mission is routine.



Suddenly, the drone veers dramatically off course, careering eastward from its intended flight path. A few moments later, it is clear something is seriously wrong as the drone makes a hard right turn, streaking toward the south. Then, as if some phantom has given the drone a self-destruct order, it hurtles toward the ground. Just a few feet from certain catastrophe, a safety pilot with a radio control saves the drone from crashing into the field.

From the sidelines, there are smiles all around over this near-disaster. Professor Todd Humphreys and his team at the University of Texas at Austin's Radionavigation Laboratory have just completed a successful experiment: illuminating a gaping hole in the government's plan to open US airspace to thousands of drones.

They could be turned into weapons.

"Spoofing a GPS receiver on a UAV is just another way of hijacking a plane," Humphreys told Fox News.

In other words, with the right equipment, anyone can take control of a GPS-guided drone and make it do anything they want it to.

"Spoofing" is a relatively new concern in the world of GPS navigation. Until now, the main

problem has been GPS jammers, readily available over the Internet, which people use to, for example, hide illicit use of a GPS-tracked company van. It's also believed Iran brought down that U.S. spy drone last December by jamming its GPS, forcing it into an automatic landing mode after it lost its bearings.

'Spoofing a GPS receiver on a UAV is just another way of hijacking a plane.'

- University of Texas Radio Navigation Laboratory researcher Todd Humphreys

While jammers can cause problems by muddling GPS signals,

spoofers are a giant leap forward in technology; they can actually manipulate navigation computers with false information that looks real. With his device – what Humphreys calls the most advanced spoofer ever built (at a cost of just \$1,000) – he infiltrates the GPS system of the drone with a signal more powerful than the one coming down from the satellites orbiting high above the earth.

Initially, his signal matches that of the GPS system so the drone thinks nothing is amiss. That's when he attacks – sending his own commands to the onboard computer, putting the drone at his beck and call.

Humphreys says the implications are very serious. "In 5 or 10 years you have 30,000 drones in the airspace," he told Fox News. "Each one of these could be a potential missile used against us."

Drones have been in widespread use in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen, but so far, GPS-guided unmanned aerial vehicles have been limited to the battlefield or southern border patrols and not allowed to fly broadly in U.S. airspace.

In February, under pressure from the Pentagon and drone manufacturers,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Congress ordered the FAA to come up with rules to allow government and commercial use of UAVs over American soil by 2015. The plan could eventually see police drones keeping watch over U.S. cities, UAVs monitoring transmission lines for power companies, or cargo plane-size drones guided by GPS pilotlessly delivering packages across the country. FedEx founder Fred Smith has said he would like to add unmanned drones to his fleet as soon as possible.

The new rules have raised privacy concerns about a "surveillance society," with UAVs tirelessly watching our every move 24/7. But Humphreys' experiments have put an entirely new twist on the anxiety over drones.

"What if you could take down one of these drones delivering FedEx packages and use that as your missile? That's the same mentality the 9-11 attackers had," Humphreys told Fox News.

It's something the government is acutely aware of. Last Tuesday, in the barren desert of the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, officials from the FAA and Department of Homeland Security watched as Humphrey's team repeatedly took control of a drone from a remote hilltop. The results were every bit as dramatic as the test at the UT stadium a few days earlier.

DHS is attempting to identify and mitigate GPS interference through its new "Patriot Watch" and "Patriot Shield" programs, but the effort is poorly funded, still in its infancy, and is mostly geared toward finding people using jammers, not spoofers.

The potential consequences of GPS spoofing are nothing short of chilling. Humphreys warns that a terrorist group could match his technology, and in crowded U.S. airspace, cause havoc.

"I'm worried about them crashing into other planes," he told Fox News. "I'm worried about them crashing into buildings. We could get collisions in the air and there could be loss of life, so we want to prevent this and get out in front of the problem."

Unlike military UAVs, which use an encrypted GPS system, most drones that will fly over the U.S. will rely on civilian GPS, which is not encrypted and wide open to infiltration. Humphreys warns it is crucial that the government address this vulnerability before it allows unmanned aerial vehicles broad access to U.S. airspace.

"It just shows that the kind of mentality that we got after 9-11, where we reinforced the cockpit door to prevent people hijacking planes – well, we need to adopt that mentality as far as the navigation systems for these UAVs."

Terror drill in Philadelphia all-too-real

Source: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57460369/terror-drill-in-philadelphia-all-too-real/

Every major city has plans in the event of a terrorist attack. This past weekend, emergency responders in Philadelphia were put to a surprise test.

It could make other cities wonder whether they're prepared for a potential terror attack.

From the start, the idea was to keep the responders on edge. In fact, it was called "Operation Edge."

The responders got the information one piece at a time, just as if it were a real incident unfolding.

Even the commanders didn't know what the drill was for until they got there.

It began in the early hours of Sunday morning. A "bomb" went off on a subway train at 8:30 a.m., trapping it in a tunnel.

Frantic calls flooded 911.

In one, a distressed woman was heard saying, "Help, help. I'm in the subway!"

In another, a man says, "Listen - I'm in the subway. My God, I can't see anything!"

A bit later, the woman from the first 911 call says, in a calm voice, "This is a part of Operation Edge. Do you understand that this is an exercise?"

Then, the "wounded" man also asks, also in a calm voice, "Do you understand that this is an exercise?"

But in a real crisis, would the plans work?

The small group that designed the drill disclosed almost nothing to the first responders who participated. They didn't even know it was a bombing in the subway until they arrived at the scene.

"We kept the information hidden from the main players, including myself, as



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

to the specifics of the emergency that was going to be simulated," Philadelphia Police Chief Inspector Joe Sullivan says.

Fitzpatrick, added another wildcard, and another lesson learned. Near the command post, an out-of town



Almost immediately, problems surfaced. **At the command post, communications issues arose between departments. Underground, confusion over a life-and-death issue: Should the rescuers follow procedure and retreat until the bomb squad handled the other suspected IEDs (improvised explosive devices)? Or risk it and rescue the victims while the bomb squad worked?**

The bombs and the victims weren't real, but the pressure and the decisions were.

They call it "stressing the exercise" - building the pressure on the players as the scenario unfolds, having the unpredictable event introduced into the scenario. Building enough pressure so that things will go wrong . . . because, in real life, that's the way it goes.

"It's very easy to carefully script an exercise like this and provide that script to all the participants in advance," Sullivan noted. "And we can come out here and we can go through the script and at the end of the day pat each other on the back and say what a great job we did – and have learned nothing."

The designer of the exercise, bomb squad commander and Philadelphia Police Lt. Tom

ambulance went un-noticed. Inside: a 900-pound bomb meant to kill the first responders. It was an important element borrowed from a real-world terror plot.

In fact, it was in London in 2007 that a car bomb was found right where police had set up their command post after responding to a terrorist incident.

Two years earlier, the London subway bombings killed 52 people. The Madrid train bombings in 2005 killed nearly 200.

Everything in the Philadelphia drill had actually happened somewhere.

In the end, not everything went according to plan, but from the start, that was the plan.

"It gives our guys a chance to see what went wrong ... so there's a lot of lessons learned today ... and to use it as a training tool," observes Philadelphia Fire Department Battalion Chief Anthony Hudgins.

Police Chief Sullivan said, "We faltered along the way, but we regrouped, and we worked our way collectively through those problems we were confronted with. **And that's the way things happen in real life.**"

EDITOR'S COMMENT: THIS is the the right way to conduct preparedness excises! Because this is how it will happen in real life!



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Microsoft attack puts spotlight on Greek tensions

Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-greece-idUSBRE85Q0ZE20120627>

Gunmen driving a van packed with gas canisters firebombed the Athens headquarters of Microsoft on



Wednesday, underscoring the threat of instability as Greece asks for more time and less hardship in



cutting its crippling debt.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Fire gutted the ground floor of the blue four-storey HQ of the U.S. software giant, blackening its walls with flames, on the eve of yet another European summit seeking a solution to a regional debt crisis first unleashed by Greece.

At least two attackers were involved in the sophisticated assault at 4.45 a.m. (0145 GMT) in Maroussi, a northern suburb of the sprawling Greek capital, police said.

Brandishing pistols and an automatic rifle, they kept security guards at bay and set fire to the van carrying three gas canisters and five cans of gasoline. No one was hurt in the early morning assault.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility and police said it was too early to say who was to blame. Suspicion, however, fell on left-wing militants, who have a long and violent history in Greece. Anti-terrorist units were investigating the incident.

Since the end of a military dictatorship in 1974, Greece has been scarred by political violence and assassination, much of it carried out by the militant November 17 group, named after a student uprising which was bloodily suppressed by the army.

Authorities have dismantled the group, whose victims included the CIA station chief in Athens, but splinter organizations committed to the same radical left-wing or anarchist ideals remain active.

Social tensions are rising in Greece over the harsh terms of an international bailout saving the country from bankruptcy but only at the cost of deep economic suffering.

Branches of Macdonald's, Citi and Starbucks in Athens have been set on fire by protesters and militants in the past using petrol bombs or gas canisters.

The attacks usually take place at night and there have rarely been injuries, but three bank staff suffocated in May 2010 when protesters set their branch on fire during a protest march in central Athens.

The assault on Microsoft is a new headache for big multi-nationals in Athens already considering quitting the debt-ridden country because of unpaid bills, falling revenues and the prospect that Greece might be forced to leave the euro.

"They entered the office in a van ... in an effort to burn the whole place down," Ernst-Jan Stigter, general manager of Microsoft's Greek unit, told reporters on Wednesday. "We're grateful there were no injuries and all our crew is safe."

The fire department estimated the damage at about 60,000 euros (\$75,000). Staff were told not to come to work.

Contacted by Reuters, Citibank, Coca-Cola and pharmaceuticals giant GlaxoSmithKline said they had no immediate plans to step up security, which has already been tightened after violent protests seen previously in Athens.

EDITOR'S COMMENT-1: A quick "reading" of the first picture (top) reveals that no serious defense measures were taken in advance for a building in direct contact with the street. Most probably security experts were infected by the universal virus of "it will not happen to us!"...

EDITOR'S COMMENT-2: On June 30, 2012 a new (?) terrorist group called "*Deviant behaviors for the spread of revolutionary terrorism - International Revolutionary Front*" (Apoklinouses Symperifores gia tin Diadosi tou Epanastatikou Terorismou – Diethnes Epanastatiko Metopo [in Greek]) claimed responsibility for the Microsoft's attack in Athens. In their notice they write about "using 150L of gasoline in a track", "no usage of arms" and "it was an act of war against sneaky silences and generalized imprisonment produced by modern world". They claimed that they acted in support to Olga Oikonomidou (of "Fire Nuclei Conspiracy") who is for 54 days imprisoned in isolation for she refused to comply with the "humiliating body examination". There are also notes about Mario Lopez (Mexico) and FAI (Italy).



Another spike in domestic terrorism?

By Tassos Symeonides

Source:<http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/editorial/1798-another-spike-in-domestic-terrorism.html>

A newly appeared terror group calling itself "Aberrant behaviors for the proliferation of revolutionary terrorism - International Revolutionary Front" has claimed responsibility for attacking the Microsoft HQ in Athens, Greece.

The pre-dawn attack occurred on June 27 and resulted in serious damage to the company building but caused no casualties. The terrorists drove a stolen van, carrying a detonator and cans full of gasoline, which they triggered outside the ground floor entrance after removing two security guards at gunpoint. The MO is familiar to anti-terrorist branch officers, who also reportedly said that the blast appeared to be a "test run" that would perhaps lead to other, bigger attacks.

The Microsoft incident is only the latest in a long string of terrorist acts that has haunted Greece since 1974. Greek authorities have a spotty record when it comes to a consistent counter-terror strategy – and they have been often accused of not doing enough to pursue those who choose the road of political violence in this country.

There are many theories concerning the exact nature of Greek domestic terrorism. Some claim that the various groups which have appeared over the years have sprung from the same "bedrock" organization evolving over time. Others insist that domestic terrorism is foreign-instigated and yet others see Greek terrorists as provocateurs working for the police. The disruption in 2002-2003 of the active cell of the 17 November Revolutionary Organization (17N), the longest surviving and most lethal terror group in post-junta Greece, gave few answers to key questions about home grown terrorism; and there are still investigators, primarily abroad, who believe that 17N's "directing" echelon has never been discovered.

The most important question occupying the authorities right now is whether the Microsoft incident signifies the beginning of yet another spike in domestic terror activity, especially given the collapse of the Greek economy and the advancing unraveling of Greek society



under pressure from austerity policies. Among the worries of the authorities are the possibility of an expanded terror campaign against foreign targets in Greece, fomenting street unrest coupled with focused "dynamic actions," and targeting individuals for assassination.

The current Greek predicament, many fear, is the perfect environment for those who would choose "armed revolutionary justice" now that the majority of the Greek population is outraged against the traditional political establishment and perhaps more prone to tacitly approving a "revolutionary" solution.

Two back-to-back general elections have effectively dismantled the two-party system that has governed Greece since 1974 and have resulted in a reinforced left wing and the parliamentary emergence of an ultra-nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-communist political group. Pundits suggest that a "common" crime wave, the collapse of living standards across the board, and the rapid expansion of fear among the Greek people have created conditions reminiscent of the interwar years when European totalitarian regimes rose riding a wave of popular support.

In recent years, home-grown terrorists have demonstrated that they have been learning fast. In 2010, police arrested six members of the so-called "Revolutionary Struggle" (RA) terror cell which, according to police, put together ANFO car bombs, one of which severely damaged the Athens Stock Exchange in September 2009. RS has also claimed responsibility for the January 12, 2007 rocket attack against the US Embassy in Athens. The Sect of Revolutionaries, specializing in assassination, has murdered a police officer and a journalist and has extended threats against government officials and media personalities. The Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei has claimed responsibility for many arson attacks and, in November 2010, the responsibility of sending fourteen parcel bombs to foreign governments and embassies in Athens. This latter action reportedly led to a coordinated, cross border law enforcement effort,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

with the Italian police claiming they had discovered unprecedented links between Greek and Italian "revolutionaries."

Somewhat hyperbolically, Greek government officials have claimed in the past that "all" home grown terrorists are known to the authorities but their arrest is hampered by lack of evidence. Such claims do not answer the obvious question of why these "known" alleged terrorists aren't persistently shadowed by the authorities so that they can be caught red handed.

The activities by the aforementioned three terror groups have demonstrated that the post-17N generation of domestic terrorists is more unpredictable and callous, not to mention prepared to quickly escalate "revolutionary action" with the introduction of modern means and advanced tactics. In demonstrating their ability to reach targets at the very top, domestic Greek terrorists targeted in June 2010 the public order minister himself with a parcel bomb, which exploded in the hands of the

minister's senior police adjutant, killing him instantly.

If the past is any reliable indicator, rapid anti-terrorist results following the Microsoft incident should not be expected. Furthermore, the broader counter-terror posture of the Greek state still remains plagued by political divisions which undermine resolve and create significant operational and judicial loopholes throughout any anti-terrorist operation. With the trial of the Revolutionary Struggle suspects under way, for example, seven out of the eight defendants, including the three who have openly admitted in court that they claim "political responsibility" for the terror cell's actions, are out of jail under "limiting conditions." Among them is the leading member of the group, a person with a long history of "revolutionary" action that somehow was never effectively prosecuted despite the claimed close surveillance of him by the authorities. So much for a determined posture toward domestic terrorists.

Tassos Symeonides worked for the US State Department as a Greek political analyst (1994-2011). Currently lives in US Pacific Northwest.

Terrorism: An Update

Source: <http://www.fairobserver.com/360theme/terrorism-update>

Background

In 2011, 10,000 terrorist attacks killed over 12,500 persons across the globe. Over a decade since the attacks of 9/11, terrorism remains a salient global threat. Although the definition lacks consensus, terrorism is generally characterized as the utilization of violence to coercively achieve an ideologically, politically, or religiously motivated end that is broader than the immediate effects of the means themselves. In short, terrorists aim to achieve religious, political, or ideological goals by inciting fear, or through the publicity or political statements that are engendered by the violence. Terrorism is a tactic that is not limited to any one group or ideology. While The Global War on Terror (now named Overseas Contingency Operation) spearheaded by the US was initially oriented to fighting global Jihadism, there are also left-wing, right-wing, communist, and single-issue oriented terrorist groups among others.

Despite the ideological diversity, most terrorists utilize such tactics to compensate for deficient conventional strategic influence and/or wreak general havoc. Terrorists are generally part of non-state actors or networks, groups backed by governments from weaker countries, or are even lone extremists. A terrorist attack is only one link in a chain of factors to be considered: the group's ideology, goals, the personality of the group or individual itself, their tactics, and the fallout of an attack also deserve scrutiny. Counter-terrorism efforts generally focus on eliminating one or more links in this chain.

Major trends in terrorism and counter-terrorism include:

- Decentralization of al-Qaeda.
- Sublimation of local grievances into a pan-Islamic Jihadi enterprise.
- The decentralized diffusion of al-Qaeda and the extremist Jihadi enterprise.
- New surgical counter-terror tactics such as drone, commando and intelligence fusion, and decapitation strikes.
- Attempted balancing of security and freedom.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- Some terrorist groups continue to seek weapons of mass destruction.
- Improved counter-terrorism intelligence is pushing terrorist groups to use archaic means of organization and communication.
- Sunni extremists perpetrate the most attacks, followed by secular, political, and anarchist groups.
- Drop in number of attacks since 2007 peak.

Regional trends and overview:

Middle East

- With the Arab Spring, the entrance of Islamist groups into the political process may be undermining the al-Qaeda narrative and local extremism.
- Yemen is an al-Qaeda Stronghold. Al-Qaeda is embroiled in a struggle against the US-backed Yemen government.
- Iran is a major state sponsor of terror through ties to Hezbollah, Quds force, and others, and has a history of involvement in terror and subversive activities all over the world. This record of terror is substantiated according to intelligence sources, US state department reports and former IRGC accounts, among many other sources.
- Iraq is a battleground for Sunni al-Qaeda- and Salafi-backed groups, and Shiite Iranian-backed groups.
- In the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda is fighting against secular status-quo governments and Western targets.

Southeast Asia

- Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines are the strongest foci of Jihadi extremist insurgency in south-east Asia. Jemaah Islamiyah is a major group tied to al-Qaeda and based in Indonesia.
- Counter-terror efforts are being met with success.

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Al-Qaeda Central was decimated in the ongoing counter-insurgency and drone campaign in Waziristan.
- In Afghanistan, the Jihadi Extremist Haqqani network, and al-Qaeda, among others, are still highly active.
- Pakistan is internally unstable with many Jihadist attacks. The US needs its cooperation in the GWOT and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorist groups.

Africa

- Mali, Somalia, and others, present fears of failed states breeding terrorism, and have witnessed an increase in attacks.
- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is active in Mali, Niger, Libya, and Chad. Nigeria has Boko Haram, a militant Jihadist group that attacks Christians.
- Al-Shabaab is an al-Qaeda-linked group in Somalia.
- US counter-terror efforts are ongoing with partners throughout region.

China

- Ethnic Uighur terrorism, most notable in the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Eurasia

- Arab Mujahedeen in Chechnya operating throughout the Caucasus and Russia, with many successful attacks, though recent decline.

Europe

- In Britain, the 2005 London bombings by homegrown Jihadis underscored Europe's vulnerability to terrorism.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- The Irish Republican Army has seen a sharp decrease in activity since the Belfast agreement of April 1998.
- Right-wing, left-wing, Marxist, and Jihadi extremists form the general European threat landscape.

Americas

- Exhaustive cross-government homeland security reform and global counter-terrorist efforts ongoing.
- Right-wing extremism and single-issue groups have faded, but have been replaced by threats of homegrown Jihadi extremism.
- In Colombia and surrounding areas, Marxist insurgent terrorist group FARC carries out the majority of western hemisphere attacks.

Why Global Terrorism is Relevant

Although not as dangerous as conventional military attacks, terrorism can cause social and economic havoc and alter foreign policy disproportionately to the force involved. It thus empowers otherwise marginal groups. Non-combatants expect protection from their states, yet the threat is complex, amorphous, expensive to fight, and can never truly be practically eradicated, as terrorists are merely those diverse entities that utilize a crosscutting tactic and are not an easily identifiable group. Governments must spend much more time and capital on counter-terrorism efforts than terrorists do in waging conflicts. Thus, the struggle is complex, expensive, and asymmetric. As the saying goes, a terrorist has to only get lucky once, while a government must get lucky every time.

Yemen: Between Iran, al-Qaeda, and the West

By Guzansky, Yoel

Source: <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=6834>

Although for the most part the Arab Spring has not had a major impact on countries that over the past twenty years have experienced extended civil war or deep internal polarization, Yemen is a notable exception. The civil unrest that has gripped the nation since January 2011, inspired by the upheavals elsewhere in the Arab world, has intensified existing trends and accelerated processes liable to lead to state failure. The hope had been that Saleh's resignation as president would contain the Yemeni revolution and, more importantly, the serious situation of the country, but so far the hoped-for stability has not materialized. On the contrary, the Yemeni revolution has further weakened the central government and resulted in increased Iranian and al-Qaeda influence. The Yemeni revolution has encouraged Iran to boost its political and military support for opposition elements in Yemen, first and foremost the Shiite Houthi rebels. Iran's support, however, does not end with the Shiites: the weakness of the current Yemeni government has prompted Iran to support other elements in the Yemeni arena, including those with different agendas, such as the southern

separatist Hiraq movement and, at least according to Saudi sources, elements associated with al-Qaeda. The goal is to make it even more difficult for the central government to impose its authority on various parts of the nation.


Among the Yemeni groups receiving Iranian support, the scope of military aid for the Shiites is the most significant, and includes activity by the Quds Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and perhaps assistance from Hizbollah as well. Similar to its involvement in Iraq, Lebanon, and to a lesser extent the Gaza Strip, Iran is making use of its proxies here too. Arms shipments from Iran (automatic weapons, batteries, anti-tank weapons, and cash, usually shipped by sea) are not, in and of themselves, significant relative to the quantities of weapons already found in Yemen, but they allow Iran to buy influence. Moreover, the assistance is steady and ongoing, indicative of the importance Tehran attributes to the Shiite revolt: a way to increase influence in a divided nation and damage the stability of Saudi Arabia, its main adversary in the region.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The rebels have taken advantage of the chaos existing in Yemen since 2011 to expand the areas under their control, so that they now

whenever necessary. Iran would gain access to the Red Sea and thus ensure the ongoing supply of arms by sea to its proxies in the



control most of Saada Governorate as well as extensive areas along the Saudi border. From an ideological-religious movement struggling against the Yemeni government, ostensibly because of longstanding government discrimination, they have become a classical guerilla movement exploiting the mountainous terrain in northern Yemen to its own advantage. Iran benefits from its involvement in the conflict by bringing in a third party to display its growing regional power and extent of military influence. For its part, Saudi Arabia worries that the growing destabilization of Yemen will afford Iran, its primary adversary, the opportunity to continue to intervene in Yemen's affairs.

Iran seeks to demonstrate that it is impossible to resolve Yemen's political issues without Iranian intervention. Iran will benefit from establishing a land-based stronghold in northern Yemen through which it can leverage its influence to pressure Riyadh, while using its ability to be a military nuisance to Saudi Arabia

region. It would also enable a continuous Iranian presence near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and from there to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has also exploited the internal chaos generated by the Yemeni revolution and steadily expanded the areas under its control. In the course of a year, it has taken control of many towns and cities and most of the Abyan province. In practice, Ansar al-Sharia forces, identified with AQAP, serve as the local administration in a number of regions where the central government is absent. Tribes with treaties with the Ansar al-Sharia keep trying to expand their control to the Lawdar District, which controls access to areas such as Hadhramaut, al-Bida and even Aden, Yemen's most important port city. The nature of the organization's activity has shifted accordingly, and it has increasingly assumed the form of an insurgency.



Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi is fighting against al-Qaeda because he is convinced that unlike the past, the organization is now threatening the stability and the territorial integrity of Yemen. He also views this struggle as a way to earn legitimacy for his positions and gain financial support from the

President's regime or units that have clearly harmed innocent civilians. In the past, the equipment and training of Yemeni army units were shown to be ineffective and a means of promoting personal agendas. Western nations and the Gulf states must also make their foreign aid to Yemen conditional on accepted

standards of basic human rights, to make sure that Yemen is going forwards rather than back. Indeed, Washington is measuring the success of its policy in Yemen by the number of al-Qaeda operatives it can reach, rather than on the comprehensive situation of the nation. Because of the virtually non-existent authority of the Yemeni government in the geographical periphery of the country, and consequently also the



West and the Gulf states. Indeed, since assuming the presidency, he has accelerated the struggle against Islamic extremists and reaped some significant rewards. On May 12, 2012 an extensive land and air offensive was launched with American help, and tribes loyal to the military fought al-Qaeda in southern Yemen. During this fighting, most of the strongholds in Abyan and Shaboa, including Zinjibar and Jaar, held by al-Qaeda for more than a year, fell; the organization is now on the defensive. Since taking office, Hadi has expanded cooperation, particularly intelligence gathering, with the Americans, and accordingly the number of targeted killings (usually by drones) of "terrorist suspects" has jumped. Since the beginning of the year, attacks for the first time have outnumbered the attacks in Pakistan. Given the increase in the rate of targeted killings, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between terrorists and those fighting against the government for their rights. American financial aid to Yemen is also growing as an incentive to the Yemeni government to fight al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, perhaps the United States aid to the Yemeni army should be made conditional on its not being transferred to units working against the

rise of new forces due to the unrest, there are now many loci of power that the United States must confront. In other words, it will take more than targeted killings of terrorists to confront this strategic threat.

Hadi is a partner in the war against al-Qaeda and is seeking to limit Iran's involvement in his country. He will stay committed to these goals to ensure that foreign aid continues. At the same time, he must carefully balance the ongoing influence of Saleh's family, tribe, and allies so that they do not feel their interests are threatened. What is exacerbating the situation even more is the fact that many are unhappy with the agreement that allowed Saleh to step down, which ensures the former president immunity to prosecution and leaves the formulation of the new constitution in the hands of the old elites. The process of reform in Yemen has yet to lead to the full ouster of the reigning political party or even the ouster of the reigning family. Saleh continues to play an important role in Yemeni politics because his family and loyalists still hold key positions in the country's leadership and the military.

The next few months will be crucial to Yemen's future, as they will determine



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

whether Islamic elements, headed by al-Islah, will complete the symbolic conquest of the "Square of Change" in Sana'a, and how the national dialogue, supposed to create the new constitution, will be conducted. Either way, each of the groups comprising the Yemeni mosaic has a different vision for shaping the

nation. The result: local groups are teaming up with external forces in order to improve their domestic standing. That alone makes Yemen into another arena of struggle – a most important one given its geostrategic location – between Iran and al-Qaeda on the one hand and the West on another.

The human cost of Somali piracy -2012 OBP Report

Source: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011_version1_4_2.pdf

The original Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) Human Cost of Piracy report, released

of time that seafarers are detained is increasing. Possibly as a result of this change, the public's attention to the plight of seafarers has declined as well, though there remain far too many who continue to endure captivity or face the risk of attack in the High Risk Areas of the Indian Ocean. Additionally, complexities and sensitivities continue to surround reporting on piracy incidents, which limit public knowledge of the plight of seafarers. As a result, maritime piracy and its impact continue to be poorly understood by the general public.

As described in the 2010 report on the Human Cost of Somali Piracy, there was scant official information previously available to the public on pirates' treatment of hostages during captivity. As a result, the figures described in the Violence Faced by Hostages section of this report came from a mix of sources. This lack of publicly available data prompted the formulation of the Declaration Condemning Acts of Violence Against Seafarers (the Washington Declaration). The Washington Declaration commits flag state signatories to submit reports on seafarer welfare during captivity to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). As of June 2012, four of the largest flag states—Liberia, the Marshall Islands,

Panama, and the Bahamas—have signed on to the document. The intent of the declaration is to provide a reliable and anonymized resource of information for organizations seeking to help seafarers who have either been subject to pirate attack or who are at risk of attack.



in June 2011, reported statistics collected during 2010. Subsequently, there was a peak in pirate activity in early 2011 with over 700 hostages held aboard vessels off the coast of Somalia. Throughout 2011, however, pirates captured fewer seafarers, reflecting a significant drop in the success rate of pirate attacks. This is welcome news, but the period



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

This joint OBP/IMB report is broken into two

In the second section, the IMB begins with a

- 3,863 seafarers were assaulted by pirates during the initial stages of an attack by firing weapons including assault rifles & rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).
- 968 seafarers came in close contact with armed pirates aboard their vessels. 413 (44%) of those who came in close contact with pirates were rescued from citadels by naval forces after waiting for hours (and in some cases days) often as pirates fought to breach the safe room.
- 1,206 individuals were held captive in 2011 by pirate gangs. These included:
 - 555 seafarers who were attacked and taken hostage in 2011
 - 645 hostages captured in 2010 that remained in pirate hands in 2011 including
 - 26 hostages have been held for over 2 years
 - 123 hostages have been held for over 1 year
 - 6 tourists and aid workers
- 35 hostages died in 2011:
 - 8 were killed by pirates during the attack or after being taken captive
 - 8 died from disease or malnutrition caused by lack of access to adequate food, water, and medical aid
 - 19 died during rescue efforts by naval vessels or attempting to escape, the majority of which were being used as human shields by the pirates
- The hostages held in 2011 predominately came from non-OECD countries, especially from the Philippines (17%), China (9%), and India (8%). Only 7% came from OECD countries.
- It is estimated that 111 pirates were killed in 2011 based on data from open media sources:
 - 78 died in direct encounters with naval forces
 - 3 died in clashes with Puntland security forces
 - 30 died in fights with other pirates over ransoms and hostages

sections. In the first section, OBP presents the types of crimes committed by pirates, the rates of mistreatment, and the hostage and pirate casualties in 2011. The analysis is based on a review of publicly available documents. The figures describing the number of people attacked by pirates include seafarers aboard vessels as reported by official sources including the IMB, European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), and the US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), with a few exceptions for incidents reported by open sources. It is strongly suspected that there are many others, especially local fishing vessels and dhows, which are attacked but not typically reported. We used a combination of official sources and open media sources to determine these rates.

general overview of Somali piracy. It then describes the treatment of hostages in 2010 and 2011 based on reports from 23 of the 77 vessels held by pirates in that period of time. The information contained in this section is the result of the Washington Declaration and is drawn from reports submitted to the IMB by Flag States, ship owners and operators, seafarers of ships hijacked and released by Somali pirates, as well as the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP). Due regard is given to the sensitivities of the identities of the seafarers, vessels, owners, operators, and other parties involved in each hijacking case; as such, the information on the treatment of the hostages is presented in an aggregated and anonymous format.



Uighur 'hijackers' die from injuries in fight with crew

Source: <http://www.news.com.au/world/hijackers-die-from-injuries/story-fndir2ev-1226415154129>

TWO men who allegedly tried to hijack a plane in China have died from injuries

hospitalised after mutilating themselves, but gave no details.

The report said authorities were investigating how the men, aged 20 to 36 and all from the city of Kashgar in the



sustained during a fight with crew.

Earlier reports said six Uighur men were arrested on Friday following the foiled hijack attempt in Xinjiang region. Four crew members were injured in the tussle. Xinjiang is home to a large population of minority Uighurs (pronounced WEE-gurs), but is ruled by China's ethnic majority Hans. There have been clashes between authorities and Uighurs resentful of government controls over their religion and culture.

An overseas rights group says the incident wasn't a hijacking attempt but an in-flight brawl over a seat dispute.

The state-run Global Times newspaper reported that two of the suspects had died in hospital from injuries sustained in the fight with

west of Xinjiang, managed to get the explosives past security checks.

Xinjiang regional government spokeswoman Hou Hanmin said she was unable to confirm whether any of the suspects had died.

Hou said the men took apart a pair of aluminum crutches and used the pieces to attack people while trying to break into the cockpit. She said they also had material believed to be explosives but that was still being tested by police.

The plane carrying 92 passengers and nine crew members safely returned to Hotan city in southern Xinjiang 22 minutes after takeoff, according to operator Tianjin Airlines.

Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the German-based World Uyghur Congress which campaigns for Uighurs' rights, said on Friday that it wasn't a hijacking attempt but an in-flight brawl over a seat dispute.

Friday's incident occurred just a few days before the anniversary of the July 2009 riots in Urumqi when nearly 200 people were killed in fighting between Han Chinese and Uighurs.

Tensions are already high in Hotan, where authorities raided a religious school recently and are conducting home searches, according to the Washington-based Uighur American Association.



passengers and crew, but didn't say when. The report cited local officials who weren't identified by name. Global Times said two others were



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Viewing terrorist attacks on TV increases pain intensity

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120703-viewing-terrorist-attacks-on-tv-increases-pain-intensity>

“Exposure to media coverage of terrorist missile attacks increases pain levels in people already suffering from chronic pain,” according



patients as a vulnerable population requiring special attention during terrorism-related stress.

Professor Golan Shahar and Dr. Sheera F. Lerman of BGU's Department of Psychology, along with Dr. Zvia Rudich of Soroka University Medical Center, assessed patients regarding their pain, depression, and anxiety, as well as their level of exposure following the missile attacks during Operation Cast Lead in Israel's Negev Region. Prof. Shahar is also affiliated with Yale University's Department of Psychiatry in New Haven, Connecticut.

Stress and media exposure were also strongly related, suggesting

to a new study by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) researchers.

“Does War Hurt? Effects of Media Exposure After Missile Attacks on Chronic Pain,” published in the online version of the *Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings*, showed that exposure to the attacks through the media predicted an increase in pain intensity and in the sensory component of pain during the pre-post war period, but did not predict depression or anxiety.

An American Associates, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev release reports that these findings contribute to the understanding of the effects of terrorism on physical and emotional distress, and identify chronic pain

that the amount of television viewing related to the terrorist attacks may have influenced how much stress the individual experienced.

“Patients’ previous levels of emotional distress may affect their ability to cope with stressful situations, making stressors more prominent and influencing them to seek out more information about the situation,” Shahar explains.

The study assessed fifty-five chronic pain patients treated at a specialty pain clinic. The patients completed self-report questionnaires regarding their pain, depression and anxiety before and after the three-week missile attack. The research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation.

Study: Islamist extremists emphasize self-defense, not world domination

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120710-study-islamist-extremists-emphasize-selfdefense-not-world-domination>

A common belief in the West is that al Qaeda wishes to impose Islam everywhere. This might be a pipe dream for the group, but a new study of their use of religious texts suggests that Islamists’ goals are much more modest.

Researchers with Arizona State University's Center for Strategic Communication (CSC) analyzed more than 2,000 items of propaganda from al Qaeda and related Islamist groups from

1998 to 2011. They catalogued more than 1,500 quotes from the Qur’an that extremists used to support their arguments, and identified the chapter (surah) and verse represented in the quote.

An Arizona State University release reports that results showed that most of quotes are about enduring hardships and maintaining faith and




CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

hope in the face of attacks by enemies of Islam. The so-called “Verse of the Sword” (9:5) that says “fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them” was used only three times.

“We were surprised at the very limited use of the sword verse,” said Bennett Furlow, a research assistant and one of the co-authors of the study, *How Islamist Extremists Quote the Qur’an*. “Conventional wisdom says Islamists are bent on world domination and this verse is the justification. We found it to be

reference to the theory that future wars will be fought over religious identity rather than national boundaries. “What extremists are really saying to Muslims is, ‘our communities are under siege and God will defend us if we have faith and courage.’”

It is important to be realistic about Islamists’ arguments when trying to counter their influence attempts, noted ASU’s Herberger Professor and study co-author Steve Corman. “If we try to portray them as evil conquerors when their audience sees them as protectors and champions, it damages our credibility and



insignificant,” he said. The verses most frequently cited came from three surah, Surah Nine, Surat at-Tawbah (“The Repentance”), Surah Three, Surat al-Imran (“Family of Imran”), and Surah Four, Surat an-Nisa (“The Women”). They address enduring hardships and the importance of fighting against the unjust outsiders who oppress men, women and children.

“These findings challenge the idea of a clash of civilizations,” said the study’s lead author Jeff Halverson, a professor of communication in ASU’s College of Liberal Arts and Sciences in

makes our communication less effective,” he said.

The study concludes with four recommendations for the West: 1) abandon claims that Islamist extremists seek world domination; 2) focus on addressing claims of victimization; 3) emphasize alternative means of deliverance; and 4) reveal that the image of “champion” sought by extremists is a false one. Other studies have shown in fact that al Qaeda-linked militants are thirty-eight times more likely to kill a Muslim than a member of another



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

group — hardly the activity of a “competent champion,” the ASU study states.

The release notes that the study of Qur’an quotes is part of the larger project at the center titled Identifying Terrorist Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Embedding Story Analysis

in Expeditionary Units, which examines Islamists use of narrative and persuasion to influence contested populations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. The 6-year effort is being funded by the Office of Naval Research.

— *Read more in Jeffrey R. Halverson, R. Bennett Furlow, and Steven R. Corman, [How Islamist Extremists Quote the Qur’an](#) (Arizona State University, Center for Strategic Communication, Report n. 1202, 9 July 2012)*

Crisis in Greece: Anarchists in the Birthplace of Democracy

By George Papadopoulos

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

Despite having consigned most members of Greece’s most violent anarchist groups to prison since 2010, there are new concerns amongst Greek authorities that the June 27 car-bombing of the Athens headquarters of Microsoft could mark a resurgence in anarchist political violence, a resurgence fuelled by the ongoing Greek economic crisis ([Capital.gr](#), June 28, 2012). In a statement carried on anarchist websites, a new group called “Deviant Behaviors for the Expansion of Revolutionary Terrorism International Revolutionary Front” claimed it had carried out the Microsoft attack in support of imprisoned anarchists in Greece ([Ekathimerini.com](#), June 30). Failure to bring many of the anarchist detainees to trial within the specified 18 month pre-trial detention period means that some detainees are now emerging from prison on conditional release. The disappearance of two leading members of the anarchist Revolutionary Struggle organization earlier this month after the Justice Department failed to bring them to trial in the 18-month period was an ominous development with many other prisoners coming up for release.

Modern Greek anarchism and terrorism can be directly correlated to major political events and socio-economic conditions that have fomented extremism. Social tensions that gave rise to the anarchist ideology in the 1970’s have emerged once again. The European sovereign debt crisis has created another perceived threat for anarchist groups, the neo-liberal order.

Greek terrorist groups first appeared after the fall of the military junta dictatorship in 1974. Resentment against the junta and the United States for its perceived backing of the regime led to the emergence of the fanatically

nationalistic, Marxist-Leninist, and anti-Western 17 November Revolutionary Organization (*Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri*), responsible for the assassination of CIA Chief of Station Richard Welch on December 23, 1975 as well as various foreign diplomats and Greek officials. The organization was named for the date that the junta crushed a student rebellion at the Athens Polytechnic in 1973, resulting in the death of 23 people. To this day, the event is still commemorated by an annual march on the U.S. embassy by many of Greece’s anarchist groups that claim their legitimacy from that uprising.

Since the group was dismantled by Greek security services in 2002, three prevalent anarchist terrorist groups have emerged: Revolutionary Struggle, Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, and Sect of Revolutionaries. All three groups have been sanctioned by the U.S. State Department and seem to have utilized the European sovereign debt crisis, the dismantling of 17 November, and the death of a 16-year-old protestor to fuel their political violence.

The economic storm in Europe has resulted in Greece’s GDP contracting by 15% since 2008, and a 52.8 percent unemployment rate for young adults between the ages 15-24 ([Ekathimerini.com](#), June 7). Neo-liberal policies and corrupt domestic political parties are regarded by many within Greece as the cause of the current predicament. Anarchist groups have capitalized on the climate of social unrest to renew attacks on financial institutions, businesses, the state and foreign targets ([Reuters](#), May 19, 2010).

It may be no surprise that Greek youths make up the majority of the anarchist terrorist groups in Greece.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

According to Mary Bossis, a former government advisor on counterterrorism, unpopular austerity measures have resulted in unprecedented anti-state sentiment and social unrest. “There are plenty of very young people who feel they have no prospect for the future and who see in front of them unemployment and a lot of social, political and economic problems. Recruitment over the past few years is being done within universities targeting young people.” (Athens News, November 7, 2010).

Revolutionary Struggle

Revolutionary Struggle (*Epanastatikos Agonas*) is seen as a direct offshoot of 17 November. The U.S. State Department designated Revolutionary Struggle as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2009 for various terrorist acts, including a 2007 RPG attack on the U.S.



Embassy in Athens. [1] Its members, similar to 17 November, seem to come from the lower socio-economic status of Greek society; their alleged leader, Nikos Maziotis (one of the two suspects who disappeared after his 18 month pre-trial detention period expired), is an unemployed construction worker. [2] Among many other violent crimes against the state, Maziotis tried to bomb the Ministry of Industry in 1998. When caught, he said, “The only thing I regret is that there was a technical error, the bomb did not explode, they found my fingerprints, and I was arrested” (Ekathimerini.com, July 8). Revolutionary Struggle has shot and wounded a riot police officer guarding the Culture Ministry and has used bombs to target foreign companies such as Royal Dutch Shell in 2008 and Citibank branches and the Athens Stock Exchange in 2009 (Reuters, November 3, 2010). What is of grave concern is the timing of the disappearance of Maziotis and fellow Revolutionary Struggle leader Panagiota

Roupa and the fact that they likely still have an extensive and very well organized underground network of supporters. There is a real possibility that the relative calm of the organization in the last two years will cease to exist now that their leaders are again amongst them.

Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei

The Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei (CFN - *Synomosía Pyrínon tis Fotiás*) transformed in 2006-2007 from *gazakides*, youth that placed gas bombs under cars, to a “new generation of terrorists” that do not care about the public’s opinion of them. [3] From 2008 they became much more sophisticated, and adopted a nihilistic attitude following the shooting death of a 16-year-old boy by a Greek police officer during demonstrations. [4] The event hardened the young group’s preexisting rejection of the state’s authorities, institutions and symbols.



The U.S. Department of State implemented a terrorist designation and sanctions on the CFN on October 13, 2011. [5] Targets of the group have included banks, government institutions, and foreign leaders. After a 2010 attack on Athens’ main prison, the group noted that the strike was meant to weaken the Greek government as it attempted to implement new austerity measures (Reuters, May 19, 2010). In 2010 two of the group’s members, Alexandros Mitrousiyas, and Gerasimos Tsakalos, mailed a series of parcel bombs to foreign leaders and embassies within Greece. [6] After their arrest the suspects proclaimed “We are rebels with a cause, we will continue our struggle, and the abuse that the system has given us has motivated us. Do not see us as small children, but as patriotic rebels, we have a war going on, and we will make sure that we will continue to fight” [7]

In February, 2011, the group sent a letter bomb to the office of Justice Minister Haris Kastanidis to show “solidarity” with its imprisoned members (Athens News, February 3, 2011). A new group, the “Zero Tolerance Organization,” emerged in December, 2011 in solidarity with the CFN by carrying out firebomb attacks on the offices of three prominent Greek



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

politicians. The new group argued that Greeks should “do away with the system” because “the economic and political crisis and the occupation of the country by the troika – the ECB, the EU and the IMF – were proof of its failure” (Ekathimerini.com, December 22, 2011). As of late 2011, the group had conducted about 200 attacks using artisan bombs that were always accompanied by nihilistic and anarchist proclamations. [8]
 The trial of Greek anarchist Theofilos Mavropoulos and several members of the Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei on charges of “inciting criminal acts” began on June 27. The accused are charged with issuing an October, 2011 statement that included the slogan “Not 1 Millimetre Back; 9mms in Cops’ Heads.” [9] Mavropoulos is facing other charges after being wounded and arrested in a gunfight with Greek police in 2011, an incident which he clothed in revolutionary rhetoric: He and a comrade did not stop at a police control point “because we had made the conscious choice of revolutionary illegality... wanting to get us out of this situation I made the choice, the political choice of armed conflict... The condition of illegality involves a life on the edge of the razor, where the choices get tougher since the risk goes sky high.” [10]

Sect of Revolutionaries

The Sect of Revolutionaries emerged in February 2009 a few weeks after the police shooting of a 16-year-old boy. The group attacked an Athens police station with grenades. While there were no casualties in that incident, in June 2009 the group killed Nektarios Sawvas, a counter-terrorism officer. [11] More recently, in July 2010, they assassinated Socrates Giolios, a prominent Greek journalist who had covered the group (Tovima.gr, July 19, 2010). In a statement claiming responsibility for the murder, the group promised to turn Greece into a “war zone,” declaring:

We in the Sect of Revolutionaries believe that only through the complete destruction of the state and the current structures will a new perspective of life be able to dawn. A life of new human relationships, without authority, without borders, without religion, without divisions. A life that money does not govern; neither will property rule. A life away from false idols, compulsions and conventions. [12]
 On February 24, 2011, the U.S. Secretary of State designated the Sect of Revolutionaries as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization, citing the group’s “indiscriminate terrorist activities” that “threaten the national security of the United States.” [13]

Conclusion

While these anarchist groups have little popular support, the evidence seems to suggest that there has been a gradual modification of the values of these terrorist organizations from the nationalism and anti-Americanism of 17 November to the anti-establishment and anti-capitalist ideology of Revolutionary Struggle and the Sect of Revolutionaries and the total nihilism of the Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei. With a shrinking economy, rising unemployment and social tensions, the rise of anarchy in Greece may continue for the long-term. The key question is whether the Microsoft attack signifies the beginning of yet another spike in domestic terrorist activity in Greece. It may be no coincidence that the Microsoft attack in Athens occurred after the recent disappearance of the leaders of Revolutionary Struggle



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Notes

1. See <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123590.htm>.
2. "Terrorists, 'Old' and 'New,'" Research Institute for European and American Studies, April 18, 2010, <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/editorial/1196-terrorists-oldq-and-qnewq.html>.
3. See <http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=123&locale=en>
4. Mary Bossis, "The Dimensions of the 'New' Greek Terrorism: The Spill-over Effect," *Journal of Counter Terrorism & Homeland Security International*. 17(3), Fall 2011.
5. See <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175362.htm>.
6. Tassos Symeonides, "Another Spike in Domestic Terrorism?" Research Institute for European and American Studies, July 1, 2012, <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/editorial/1798-another-spike-in-domestic-terrorism.html>
7. Alpha News Channel, 2010, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8iP9c5XqIQ&feature=related>.
8. Bossis, *op cit*.
9. "Letter from CCF and T. Mavropoulos in Solidarity to Anarchit Steki Nadir in Thessaloniki-Greece," October 11, 2011, <http://actforfreedomnow.wordpress.com/2011/10/11/letter-from-c-c-f-and-t-mavropoulos-in-solidarity-to-anarchit-steki-nadir-in-thessaloniki-greece/>.
10. Letter of anarchist political prisoner Theofilos Mavropoulos who is imprisoned in Koridall, July 18 2011, <http://actforfreedomnow.wordpress.com/2011/07/27/letter-of-anarchist-political-prisoner-theofilos-mavropoulos-who-is-imprisoned-in-koridallos-prisons/>
11. NET News Channel, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2sMJU_iqk0.
12. Sect of Revolutionaries, Announcement no.4, July 28, 2010, <http://actforfreedomnow.blogspot.com/2010/08/sect-of-revolutionaries-claims.html>.
13. See <http://athens.usembassy.gov/pr-2011-7.html>.

George D. Papadopoulos is currently a research intern at the Hudson Institute Center for Political-Military Analysis. Prior to that, Mr. Papadopoulos worked as an analyst at the American Hellenic Institute and was invited to participate in policy and economic conferences in Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Lebanon, and Switzerland. He holds a MSc in Security Studies from University College London.

Mossad helps Cyprus thwart attacks against Israelis

Source: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/721255.shtml>

Israel's Mossad intelligence agency aided Cypriot authorities in the recent arrest of a Hezbollah activist suspected of planning a string of terror attacks against Israeli tourists, local media reported Sunday, citing Cypriot news reports.

Cyprus Police spokesman Andreas Angelides confirmed that security forces detained a 24-year-old Lebanese national during a raid on his hotel in Limassol "on possible charges pertaining to terrorism laws." Police officials would not disclose the suspect's name or details concerning his alleged involvement in a plot to target Israelis on the island. Police were investigating whether he had accomplices.

The suspect reportedly told interrogators that he first contemplated attacking the Israeli embassy in Nicosia but concluded that the building was too heavily guarded. He then set in motion plans to blow up an Israeli

commercial plane with a shoulder-fired missile or to attack tour buses ferrying Israeli tourists, Cypriot newspaper Sigma Live reported over the weekend.

According to the report, security forces found in the man's possession flight schedules of Israeli airlines, photos of popular venues frequented by Israelis on the island and information on companies leasing tour buses, as well as maps and other documents.

Cypriot online news site Phileleftheros reported that the suspect, who holds a Swedish passport, initially denied any connection to terrorist activity, but later admitted to heading a terror cell affiliated with Lebanon's Hezbollah.

A court on Friday extended his remand by one week.

Both media outlets reported that a "foreign intelligence agency" tipped local police about the man immediately after he entered Cyprus.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

According to one unconfirmed report, Mossad agents were dispatched to the island to assist the investigation.

Mossad is said to have played a key role in thwarting numerous attempts by Hezbollah to strike Israeli and Jewish targets around the world in recent years, primarily locales favored by Israeli tourists, Israeli embassies and Israeli businessmen and officials operating abroad.

The Iranian-backed group is seeking to avenge the death of Imad Mughniyeh, one of its top commanders, killed in a car bombing in Damascus in February 2008.

Israel has also pointed at Iranian involvement in many of the planned attacks, claiming that Tehran seeks to avenge the assassination of several of its nuclear scientists over the past few years.

The Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem on Saturday night responded to the news from Cyprus, saying in a statement that " Iranian terrorism has no boundaries."

"After Iran sent its people to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on US soil and carry out attacks in Azerbaijan, Bangkok, Tbilisi, New Delhi and Africa, its intention to carry out a terror attack in Cyprus has now been revealed," the statement said.

It added that the international community "must fight the world's largest exporter of terrorism." Considered safe for tourists and internationally renowned for its pristine beaches, Cyprus has become an increasingly popular Mediterranean getaway for Israeli vacationers over the past two years. Some 15,000 on average arrive at the island every month on three daily charter flights from Ben-Gurion International Airport.

Terror attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria

Source: <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4257492,00.html>

At least seven people were killed and over 20

Following the attack, the Shin Ben has suspended all flights bound for Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Greece, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Security sources said that there was no intelligence indicating that Israelis traveling in the area may fall prey to terror attacks.



others were injured Wednesday in a terror attack on a bus carrying Israelis in Burgas, some 400 kilometers east of the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. Bulgarian media reported that the explosion took place while the bus was still in the terminal of Sarafovo Airport.

According to media reports, an 11-year-old child and two pregnant women were among the injured. Fortunately, the pregnant women are slightly injured. The evacuation of the injured has been completed.

Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has called for a situation assessment following the attack. He was also briefed on the available details by Bulgarian FM Nikolay Mladenov.

"An explosion occurred in a passenger bus with Israeli citizens at the Burgas Airport," Burgas Mayor Dimitar Nikoliv confirmed. Bulgarian security forces and emergency medical teams have blocked off the area. The airport has been closed as well.

According to media reports, a suicide bomber boarded one of three buses shuttling Israeli tourists across the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

terminal at around 5:30 pm and then detonated an explosive vest. Bulgarian media said 44 people were on the vehicle at the time of the explosion.

The Foreign Ministry has formed a team of experts that will fly to Burgas and assist local authorities in the investigation.

The Israeli Embassy in Sofia has been mobilized and is ready to assist the team,

"The murderous Iranian terror continues to target innocent people. Iranian terror is spreading worldwide... Israel will react to it with force," he said.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak added that the Israeli defense establishment will not rest until the perpetrators are apprehended.

An eyewitness told Channel 2 News that Bulgarian authorities were slow to respond to the event, adding that search and rescue teams and paramedics "didn't seem to care too much. They took a while getting



which includes ZAKA disaster recovery officials, in identifying the victims and ensuring that the injured and other Israelis that were unharmed return to Israel as soon as possible.

As a precautionary measure the Aviation Authority has ordered to delay 11 Europe-bound flights after a terror threat was made against flights heading to the continent. In Bulgaria, flights headed to Israel have been delayed as well.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that, "All the signs are pointing to Iran. Only in the past few months we've seen Iran try to target Israelis in Thailand, Indian, Georgia, Cyprus and more.

these two small fire-extinguishers to fight a burning bus, and the airport's fire truck took over 15 minutes to get there."

Shosh Eyler, who was on one of the buses that escaped the blast, told Ynet that the blast took place seconds after the groups boarded the buses. "The bus next to ours just exploded. There was smoke everywhere and people were running hysterically. We got off the bus and local security officers got everyone into the terminal immediately."

Burgas is the second-largest city on the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast and a favorite summer destination for Israeli tourists.

Mehdi Ghezali, Israeli Tourist Suicide Bomber?

Source:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/19/mehdi-ghezali-israel-tourist-suicide-bomber_n_1686448.html

United States intelligence officials said on Thursday that there is no evidence to support a report that Mehdi Ghezali, a Swedish citizen and former detainee at Guantanamo Bay from 2002 to 2004, is responsible for Wednesday's suicide attack in Burgas, Bulgaria. *The Times of*



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Israel reported that Bulgarian media named Ghezali as the suspect, but the report could not be independently verified.

Swedish officials denied the report early Thursday afternoon, and Bulgarian officials told ABC News that the suspect's name was reported incorrectly.



On Wednesday, eight people were killed when a suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying Israeli tourists in Bulgaria.

Mehdi Ghezali, the Swede detained by the United States for more than two years at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, holds a press conference in his hometown of Orebro, 150 kilometers west of Stockholm, July 16, 2004. (BERTIL ERICSON/AFP/Getty Images)

Surveillance footage showed "a normal person with Bermuda shorts and a backpack" at the airport of Burgas. Reuters described the man as in his mid-30s with long dark curly hair and wearing a dark blue cap.

Bulgarian authorities reportedly were using DNA from the man's finger to establish his identity. According to *The Long War Journal*, Mehdi Ghezali was arrested in Pakistan in December 2001. His lawyers claim he was caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, *The Weekly Standard* reports. Sweden's *The Local* reports that documents released by WikiLeaks show Ghezali was held at Guantanamo to "give general and specific information of the cultural, religious and ethnic recruitment of foreign nationals participating in the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia."



This image taken from CCTV provided by the Bulgarian Interior Ministry on Thursday, July 19, 2012, purportedly shows the unidentified bomber, center, with long hair and wearing a baseball cap, at Burgas Airport in Burgas, Bulgaria, on Wednesday, July 18, 2012. (AP Photo/Bulgarian Interior Ministry)



Bulgaria bus bombing underscores vulnerability of public transport

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120719-bulgaria-bus-bombing-underscores-vulnerability-of-public-transport-mti-experts>

Research reports published by the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) have underscored the fact that public transportation is still a seriously vulnerable target for terrorism. MTI says that this was validated by yesterday's bombing of a Bulgarian bus filled with Israeli tourists who had just arrived at the airport.

"Tourists move through airports safely because of all the strict measures in place," said Brian Michael Jenkins, international terrorism expert and director of MTI's National Transportation Security Center of Excellence. "But this attack took place on a bus chartered for a hotel.

Although most attacks are directed against regularly scheduled bus lines, attacks on these chartered tour buses enable terrorists to target specific foreign nationalities – in this case, Israelis."

Earlier this month, in testimony before the U.S. Senate, Jenkins noted that, while terrorists apparently consider

airliners to be their gold medal target, public service transportation offers easier access and a concentration of people in confined environments.

In the same testimony, he pointed to the resurgence of Iranian-sponsored attacks. This particular attack has not yet been officially tied to any nation, but some speculation points to Iran as the origin. "We have seen similar plots uncovered in Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Kenya, Cyprus, and Thailand," Jenkins said.

MTI notes that one of its research reports, published earlier this year, presents sixteen case studies of attacks against Israeli bus targets between 2000 and 2005, along with detailed statistical data. *Security Awareness for Public Bus Security: Case Studies of Suicide Attacks Against the Israeli Public Bus System* could help increase understanding of what can happen and of what can deter, prevent, or

mitigate terrorist attacks against bus transit. Jenkins. The 104-page report is available for free download from MTI Web site.

The second report, *Terrorist Attacks on Public Bus Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis*, covers attacks on buses, bus stations, and bus stops. It includes data about how often buses are attacked relative to other surface transportation targets, first with all weapons and then with only explosive and incendiary devices; the relative lethality of bus attacks; and the distribution of those attacks.

MTI's proprietary Database on Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation records 3,159 attacks against public surface transportation between January 1970 and January 2012, in which 7,997 people were killed and 30,046 were injured. Of these attacks, 47.4 percent were against buses, bus stations, and bus stops; they accounted for 55 percent of the fatalities and 41 percent of the injuries resulting from terrorist attacks during this period. Between January and July 2012, approximately 85 additional attacks have occurred against surface transportation systems, which have created approximately 1,319

casualties, 419 fatalities, and 900 injuries. In this period, there has been a high volume of bus attacks, accounting for upwards of 53 percent of the attacks. MTI continuously documents and updates emergent activity for assessment.

This database is developed from existing lists and media accounts, augmented by local sources, providing detailed information on targets, attack methods, and the ways in which bombs and incendiaries are placed to kill passengers on public trains and buses and to destroy transportation infrastructure. It aims to help government policy makers and transportation managers develop more secure systems by understanding not only what and how terrorists most often attack, but more important, which of their attacks are most deadly, and where their "return on investment" is greatest.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

“The United States, like many other developed countries, has not experienced successful terrorist attacks against public bus transportation,” said Jenkins. “It may be that terrorists in the U.S. are not as capable or determined as those in other countries, their plots may have been interrupted by police and intelligence officials, they may not have chosen bus targets for lethal attacks, or they may not

have focused extensively on public surface transportation.”

He said that Israel faces, and has faced, a host of determined, constantly improving terrorist foes who have benefited from a relatively fast tempo of operations and a restive populace apparently willing to provide bombers and material support.

House designates Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120718-house-designates-haqqani-network-as-a-terrorist-organization>

The U.S. House of Representative yesterday voted to designate the Haqqani Network as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The designation allows the United States to freeze the assets of the group and prosecute individuals aiding or assisting the group for providing material support to terrorism.

“The Haqqani Network is engaged in a reign of terror in Afghanistan and is the single largest threat for IED’s our soldiers face in that country,” Representative Mike Rogers (R-Michigan), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said in a statement. “They actively plot and kill U.S. and allied soldiers and routinely harm innocent Afghan civilian men, women and children in their path. To better protect the lives of U.S. soldiers, now is the time for action, not simply paperwork and talk. There is no good reason that this group has not yet been designated.”

Richard Burr (R-North Carolina). It now goes back to the Senate for consideration.

“We are bringing a great deal of pressure to bear on the Haqqanis,” Pentagon spokesman George Little said last week. “And we believe that on the Pakistani side of the border, that additional action needs to be taken by the Pakistanis to root out this network of militants that is a menace to Afghanistan and to Pakistan.”

The Haqqani Network was created by the Mezi clan of the Zadran Pashtun tribe in Afghanistan in the 1970s, then supported by the CIA and the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, during the 1980s in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After the Taliban took over Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, the Haqqani Network occupied itself with crime and smuggling.

Members of the network fled to Pakistan in 2003, after the Taliban regime was toppled by the United States. Since then, the relationship between the ISI and the Haqqanis have deepened. The Pakistani intelligence service helped the Haqqanis build three training camps in Pakistan, and the network, using money and arms provided by



Weapons seized from a Haqqani network camp in Afghanistan

Pakistan, has augmented its ranks by recruiting foreign fighters. It is not known how many fighters the network has, with estimates ranging from 5,000 to 15,000.

CNN reports that the bill originated in the Senate, where it was sponsored by Senator



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

With Pakistani military and intelligence help, the Haqqanis initiated the use of IEDs in Afghanistan against U.S. and coalition soldiers. More generally, Pakistan has used the network to support the Taliban, destabilize the Karzai government, and sabotage the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

The interesting question is this: If the Senate approves the House bill and Congress

designate the Haqqani network as an FTO, this would mean designating the Pakistani government, or at least some of its major agencies, as supporters of terrors, making it legally difficult for the United States to continue and send billions of dollars in military and civilian aid to Pakistan.

Threat of mass terror increasing: ASIS

Source:<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/threat-of-mass-terror-increasing-asis/story-fr3dxiwe-1226430264236>

The opportunities for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will increase over the coming decade, the head of Australia's overseas spy network has warned.

Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Director General Nick Warner

has used an unprecedented public address to warn that Islamist extremist organisations remain a potent threat.

"We know that the intention to conduct mass casualty attacks against Western countries, including Australia, remains very real," he said.

"We also know that many of these planned attacks are being conceived in places remote from Australia."

The threat of Islamist terrorism has been a key driver of ASIS' operational expansion from Asia into more far-flung locations such as Africa and the Middle East.

The agency's work involves not only collecting intelligence on terrorist plots but also disrupting their operations and helping law enforcement agencies make arrests.

ASIS had been closely involved with the arrest and detention of "dozens" of terrorists in South-East Asia over the past decade - including in recent months, Mr Warner said.

Counter-proliferation was also an important part of ASIS' work, he said.

Terrorist groups would have increasing opportunities to get their hands on material related to WMD over the coming ten to fifteen years, he warned.



"The threat posed by terrorist groups who might seek to acquire WMD is the ultimate nightmare for security planners and, of course, a prime concern for us

and all of the Australian intelligence community," Mr Warner said.

"Where terrorism intersects with counter-proliferation there is a clear but very challenging role for ASIS."

ASIS "actively" worked against overseas companies that attempted to trade in illicit and embargoed goods, he said.

ASIS was created in May 1952, modelled on the UK's MI6, but its existence was not acknowledged until 1977.

Mr Warner - a lifelong public servant and diplomat - was appointed ASIS head in August 2009 and is the only member of the service who can be publicly identified.

TSA Let 25 Illegal Aliens Attend Flight School Owned by Illegal Alien

Source: <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/tsa-let-25-illegal-aliens-attend-flight-school-owned-illegal-alien>

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) approved flight training for 25 illegal aliens at a Boston-area flight school that was

owned by yet another illegal alien, according to the Government Accountability Office.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The illegal-alien flight-school attendees included eight who had entered the country illegally and 17 who had overstayed their allowed period of admission into the United States, according to an audit by the GAO.

Six of the illegal aliens were actually able to get pilot's licenses.

Discovery of the trouble at the flight school began when local police—not federal authorities—pulled over the owner of the school on a traffic violation and were able to determine that he was an illegal alien.

Rep. Mike Rogers (R.-Ala.), chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security, said he found the GAO's findings "amazing."

"We have cancer patients, Iraq War veterans and Nobel Prize winners all forced to undergo rigorous security checks before getting on an airplane," said Rogers, "and at the same time, ten years after 9/11, there are foreign nationals in the United States trained to fly just like Mohammed Atta and the other 9/11 hijackers did, and not all of them are necessarily getting a security background check."

Stephen Lord, who is the GAO's director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, testified about the matter Wednesday in Rogers' subcommittee. Rogers asked him: "Isn't it true that, based on your report, the Transportation Security Administration cannot assure the American people that foreign terrorists are not in this country learning how to fly airplanes, yes or no?"

Lord responded: "At this time, no."

Although the illegal alien who owned the Massachusetts flight school had not undergone a required TSA security threat assessment and had not been approved for flight training by the agency, he nonetheless held two Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot licenses, also known as FAA certificates.

The GAO report, released today, is entitled *General Aviation Security: TSA's Process for Ensuring Foreign Flight Students Do Not Pose a Security Risk Has Weaknesses*.

In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. homeland perpetrated by terrorists who learned how to pilot aircraft at flight schools in Florida, Arizona, and Minnesota, the TSA, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), developed the "Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) to help determine whether foreign students enrolling at flight schools pose a security threat," said the GAO's Stephen Lord in written testimony prepared for Wednesday's hearing in the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security.

According to the 911 Commission Report, four of the Sept. 11 hijackers who entered the United States with legal visas had overstayed their authorized period of admission.

Under the Alien Flight Student Program, foreign nationals are supposed to be subjected to a TSA security threat assessment prior to receiving flight

training to determine whether they pose a security threat to the United States.

"According to TSA regulations, an individual poses a security threat when the individual is suspected of posing, or is known to pose, a threat to transportation or national security, a threat of air piracy or terrorism, a threat to airline or passenger security, or a threat to civil aviation security," Lord said in his written testimony.

"According to TSA officials, when a foreign national applies to AFSP to obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by the foreign national—such as name, date of birth, and passport information—to conduct a criminal history records check, a review of the Terrorist Screening Database, and a review of the Department of Homeland Security's TECS [anti-terrorism] system," Lord testified.

However, a "weakness" in TSA's Alien Flight Student Program, noted by GAO, is that it does not check for immigration status.

"AFSP is not designed to determine whether a foreign flight student entered the country legally; thus, a foreign national can be approved for training through AFSP after entering the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

country illegally," stated the GAO in its report. "In March 2010, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigated a Boston-area flight school after local police stopped the flight school owner for a traffic violation and discovered that he was in the country illegally. In response to this incident, ICE launched a broader investigation of the students enrolled at the flight school."

"ICE found that 25 of the foreign nationals at this flight school had applied to AFSP and had been approved by TSA to begin flight training after their security threat assessment had been completed; however," reads the GAO report, "the ICE investigation and our subsequent inquiries revealed the following issues, among other things:

—"Eight of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by TSA to begin flight training were in 'entry without inspection' status, meaning they had entered the country illegally. Three of these had obtained FAA airman certificates [pilot's license]: 2 held FAA private pilot certificates and 1 held an FAA commercial pilot certificate.

—"Seventeen of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by the TSA to begin flight training were in 'overstay' status, meaning they had overstayed their authorized period of admission into the United States.

—"In addition, the flight school owner held two FAA airman certificates. Specifically, he was a certified Airline Transport Pilot (cargo pilot) and a Certified Flight Instructor. However, he had never received a TSA security threat assessment or been approved by TSA to obtain flight training. He had registered with TSA as a flight training provider under AFSP."

A GAO official told CNSNews.com that, based on their names, none of the 25 illegal aliens who attended the flight school appeared to be from Muslim countries. Instead, they had Latin American names.

The GAO found that, "From January 2006 through September 2011, 25,599 foreign nationals had applied for FAA airman certificates, indicating they had completed flight training." That information is placed on the FAA airmen registry.

The GAO provided information from the FAA's airmen registry to TSA "so that the agency could conduct a matching process to determine whether the foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were in TSA's AFSP database and the extent to which they had been successfully vetted through the AFSP database."

The GAO found that not everyone in the FAA registry had been vetted properly.

"TSA's analysis indicated that some of the 25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were not in the TSA AFSP database, indicating that these individuals had not applied to the AFSP or been vetted by TSA before taking flight training and receiving an FAA airman certificate," stated the GAO.

The GAO continued, "TSA's analysis indicated that an additional number of the 25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were also in the TSA AFSP database but had not been



successfully vetted, meaning that they had received an FAA airman certificate but had not been successfully vetted or received permission from TSA to begin flight training."



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The GAO did not provide the full number of individuals who were not properly vetted.

The GAO's Stephen Lord, in his prepared remarks, told lawmakers that the TSA does not screen new and existing FAA pilot license holders against the Terrorist Screening Database until after the foreign national has completed flight training.

"Thus, foreign nationals obtaining flight training with the intent to do harm, such as three of the pilots and leaders of the September 11 terrorist attacks, could have already obtained the training needed to operate an aircraft before they received any type of vetting," warned the GAO.

The TSA and ICE are working on a pilot program for vetting the names of foreign nationals against immigration databases.

However, the GAO noted that the two agencies "have not specified desired outcomes and time

frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the program."

The GAO further stated, "We recommended that TSA and ICE develop a plan, with time frames, and assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for assessing the results of their pilot program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants' admissibility status to help detect and identify violations, such as overstays and entries without inspection, by foreign flight students, and institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective."

"DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA will prepare a plan by December 2012 to assess the results of the pilot program with ICE to determine the lawful status of the active AFSP population," said the GAO.

Report Says Terrorists Regrouping in Indonesia

Source:http://www.voanews.com/content/terrorism-still-a-threat-in-indonesia/1416832.html?utm_source=Copy+of+July+14+BTW&utm_campaign=BTW+July+21&utm_medium=email



The blood of a terror suspect is seen at the site of a shooting in a rented villa in Sanur on the Indonesian island of Bali, March 19, 2012.

There has not been a major terrorist attack in Indonesia since the Bali bombings in 2002, but that does not mean the threat does not linger. An International Crisis Group report suggests terrorists are regrouping in increasingly sophisticated ways.

The report describes terrorist networks in Indonesia as weak, divided and even

somewhat inept in recent years. But it also points to rising activity on radical websites and chat forums, and increasingly sophisticated methods of fundraising.

In June, for example, police arrested a suspected terrorist with more than \$800,000 they believed was obtained through online hacking.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

ICG terrorism analyst Sidney Jones says these signs show jihadist inclinations flourish in some parts of Indonesian society.

"One of the things that this report points out is how easy it is for people who are being hunted by police to find new allies, to get arms and ammunition, to travel around the country and to actually plan an operation, even if so far they have not been very good or very professional at carrying them out," Jones said. "The point is the danger is not gone, however good and calm the situation may be at the moment, in fact there is still a possibility that terrorist attacks can occur in Indonesia."

The discovery of a militant training camp in Aceh, North Sumatra, in 2010 was a huge blow to terrorist networks operating in the country. But Jones says more than 200 arrests has inspired a desire for revenge in other hardliners.

The report suggests extremists are becoming increasingly savvy about vetting members and more secretive about the way they operate.

And International rights groups have emphasized a growing trend of religious intolerance in Indonesia over recent months.

In June, a concert by flamboyant U.S. pop star Lady Gaga was cancelled after pressure from

hardline groups - as was a book launch by Canadian feminist author Irshad Manji. In the same month, a Sumatran man was jailed for allegedly promoting atheism and denigrating Mohammed.

Jones says vigilante groups like those behind some incidents could serve as a stepping-stone to more violent extremism.

"I think that one of the areas for the government to make any moves on is actually community awareness programs, because actually everyone is so aware of stigmatizing Islam or there is a genuine concern that the lines will be drawn in such a way that some of the civil liberties restored after [former president] Suharto fell will be restricted again in the name of combating extremism. And that is a concern and that is something the government has to deal with, but we are seeing a complete passivity on this issue of addressing radicalization at the roots," Jones said.

In the lead up to the holy fasting month of Ramadan that begins this Friday in Indonesia, human-rights activists have also challenged the willingness of police to prevent hardline groups from their routine of raiding nightclubs and restaurants.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the country's violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many cases, the same individuals keep using old networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundraising. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could lead to more effective counter-radicalisation programs.

The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to establish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead of cowering the jihadis into submission, however, police operations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training centres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground activity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi views play a similar role.

Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fugitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows how much basic preventive work still needs to be done.



reappearing,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) as the country's largest and most active jihadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, accused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influence through its schools, however, and many disaffected former members remain active through other organisations. Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often composed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 and produced the Bali bombers.

Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more educated extremists have learned important lessons from the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by the "enemy" – the Indonesian state. They conclude that they must be much more careful about vetting members, protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could become much harder.

There has been less introspection within the government about why recruitment continues to take place or why there are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been poorly conceived. Indonesia's counter-terrorism successes have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have become skilled at identifying and arresting those responsible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective programs are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Indonesia:

1. Design a study to examine the networks extremists use to find sanctuary when they believe they are being pursued by police or that the place they are living has become insecure. Such a study could help define the support base for violent extremists in a way that could inform counter-extremism programs. Prisoners arrested in connection with the Aceh camp would be one possible respondent pool.
2. Design a program aimed at reducing the influence of extremist clerics that would include:
 - a) developing a consensus on what constitutes incitement and hate speech, then getting broad agreement from Muslim community leaders that such rhetoric is unacceptable;
 - b) ensuring that no government building and no institution receiving government funding can host anyone promoting such teachings;
 - c) identifying four or five target areas or specific institutions where extremist influence is high;
 - d) undertaking research in those areas to develop a profile of the followers of these clerics, with attention to socio-economic, educational and employment backgrounds of members and questions about what attracts them to the teaching; and
 - e) developing pilot programs, in consultation with community leaders and scholars, that might effectively challenge the teachings of extremist clerics; these should be regularly monitored, evaluated and adjusted as necessary.
3. Strengthen capacity within the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) to analyse ideological debates on radical networks for clues as to changes of targets and tactics.
4. Develop procedures for better information sharing among the BNPT; the Corrections Directorate within the law and human rights ministry; police; and prosecutors about extremist networks and individuals within them, with a view to their obtaining better understanding of not only the backgrounds of individual inmates but also the context in which they operate.
5. Speed up efforts to put in place a system under the Corrections Directorate for identifying and monitoring high-risk detainees, both while in detention as well as after their release, to include:
 - a) adoption of a professional risk assessment protocol, with evaluations of inmates conducted by trained officials and based on careful research; and
 - b) a pilot project to work out possible weaknesses and make adjustments accordingly.
6. Upgrade analytical capacity of corrections staff so that data systems now in operation can be used to improve supervision, as well as budgeting and planning.
7. Design and implement a policy of zero tolerance toward any religiously-inspired violence, including maximum sentences for vandalism, assault and threats of violence, with clear instructions



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

to all government employees, including police, to shun interaction with groups or members of groups that have a known history of such activity.

8. Implement more serious post-operation assessments within the police to study what might have been done differently, especially when use of lethal force has resulted in serious injury or death, and increase training in the study of non-lethal options when confronting active shooters.

9. Close loopholes in airport security that allow passengers to present false identification without fear of detection.

10. Make more systematic use of the expertise of young Indonesian scholars when developing policy on countering extremism.

Iran-Sponsored Terror: New Warnings from Bulgaria – Analysis

By B. Raman

Source: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/21072012-iran-sponsored-terror-new-warnings-from-bulgaria-analysis/>

Iran's covert war using terror against Israeli and Jewish targets continues. This covert war was started by it some months ago against Israeli and Jewish targets in retaliation for what it looks upon as the covert attempts of the Israeli intelligence to disrupt its nuclear programme through suspected assassinations of important Iranian nuclear scientists and disruption of the computer networks of Iranian nuclear establishments through carefully planted viruses.

While Israeli covert actions are confined to Iranian territory, Iran, whose intelligence does not have the capability for operating covertly in Israeli territory, has been striking at Israeli and Jewish targets in other countries where Israel has an active presence and which are the favourite destinations of Israeli tourists.

The indications are that Iran has been operating through its own intelligence, mainly of the Revolutionary Guards, as well as through elements of the Hezbollah operating from the Lebanon. It has been using the services of pro-Iranian elements in the countries where it wants to operate for the collection of operational information and for providing back-up support to the terrorists chosen and trained by it for carrying out the terrorist strikes against Israeli targets.

Since the Iranian intelligence launched its covert war against Israeli and Jewish targets, successful or unsuccessful attempts have been made in Georgia, India, Thailand, Kenya and Cyprus. There was a non-fatal attack against a

woman employee of the Israeli embassy in New Delhi married to an Israeli diplomat in February last by using a magnetised improvised explosive device.

During the investigation, an Indian Muslim (probably a Shia) reportedly working for sections of the Iranian media was arrested on suspicion of his having played a role in providing back-up support consciously or unconsciously. The investigation does not appear to have made much progress partly for want of clues and

partly due to pressure from pro-Iranian elements in the non-governmental community of New Delhi on the police. As a result, our investigation agencies have not been as proactive as one would have expected them to be in identifying and neutralising pro-Iranian terrorism-prone elements in Indian territory.

The past strikes directed against Israeli and Jewish targets in different countries, including India, did not cause many fatalities and involve suicide terrorism, a speciality of the Hezbollah. A devastating terrorist attack was carried out by a suicide bomber against a group of Israeli tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria on July 18, 2012, causing six fatalities. An injured person was reported to have died subsequently. This has been described as the deadliest terrorist attack against Israeli targets in foreign



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

territory since 2004. It has been reported that the suicide bomber had false US identity papers.

Israel has already accused Iran of involvement. The Israeli charges have been vehemently denied by Iran. There has been no claim of responsibility by any organisation. Apart from the Iranian intelligence and the Hezbollah, the only other terrorist organisation having the motive to kill Israelis and with the capability for doing so is Al Qaeda which had in 2002 targeted Israelis in Mombasa. One has to await further evidence before one can be definitive whether Iran and its surrogates or Al Qaeda were involved in the Burgas strike.

It is very unlikely that Al Qaeda would have carried out a terrorist strike in support of Iran because there is not much love lost between Al Qaeda and Iran and Al Qaeda is greatly concerned over the likelihood of a Shia A-bomb.

The present indications direct the needle of suspicion more at Iran and Hezbollah than at Al Qaeda. After the terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy employee in New Delhi in February last, one thought it might remain a sporadic

attack since it would not be in the interest of Iran, which has cordial relations with India, to start a campaign of terrorism against Israeli targets in Indian territory.

If the Iranian hand is established in the Burgas attack, it would underline the Iranian determination to continue attacking Israeli and Jewish targets wherever it can, whatever be the political consequences.

Even after the February attack in Delhi, I had stressed the importance of our intelligence agencies closely monitoring the activities of the Iranian intelligence and Hezbollah in Indian territory and vigorously investigating the February strike in order to identify and neutralise any terror network Iran might have set up in India. Complacency in this regard due to our close relations with Iran and due to pressures from pro-Iranian non-governmental elements would be dangerous.

In the light of the Burgas attack, security for Israeli nationals and establishments should be reviewed and further strengthened. Tourist spots favoured by Israelis would need special attention.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies.

Hezbollah terrorists a capable and growing presence

Source: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/07/20/analysis-hezbollah-terrorists-a-capable-and-growing-presence/>



Havakuk Levison/Reuters files – Fawzi Ayub joined Hezbollah in 1983 and became a Canadian citizen in 1992. In 2000, he was recruited into the elite Hezbollah terrorist unit known as Islamic Jihad.

Fawzi Ayub is a 45-year-old member of Hezbollah who uses the alias Frank Boschi and “should be considered armed and dangerous,” according to his entry on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list.

He is also a Canadian.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

After Hezbollah sent him to Romania to hijack a passenger plane, Ayub made his way to Canada. He married and worked at a

seen as soft targets and have the means to carry out an attack.”



supermarket until Hezbollah sent him on a mission to conduct a bombing in Israel.

This week's deadly suicide attack in Bulgaria that targeted a bus full of Israeli tourists has brought renewed attention on Iran's shadowy terrorist operatives, Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards.

While the bombing investigation is still in the early stages, Pentagon spokesman George Little said Friday it "does bear the hallmarks of Hezbollah." *The New York Times* reported that U.S. officials suspected Hezbollah was behind the blast.

According to an analysis prepared for the New York Police Department, and cited by *Reuters*, the Bulgaria attack was the ninth plot this year in which Iranian-sponsored terrorists had targeted Israeli or Jewish targets worldwide. Israel said there had been 20 such incidents in the past year.

"Clearly this is not an isolated incident, there have been quite a few attempts, and unfortunately this one succeeded," said Doron Horowitz, director of national security infrastructure at the Toronto-based Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs. "It shows a willingness and capacity, meaning that they are actively involved in identifying what could be

AFP/Getty Images – Smoke rises over Bourgas airport in Bulgaria on July 18, 2012 after an attack on a bus packed with Israelis.

Like other Jewish organizations, CIJA has been in touch with Canadian security officials since the attack in Bulgaria. The group was told to be vigilant but that there was no evidence of imminent terrorist attacks in Canada.

"This is not Europe. I would say that there are different challenges but I would say at the same time that Jewish communities in North America are responsible for a level of preparedness that will help mitigate and prevent such incidents," Mr. Horowitz said.

The attack on the Black Sea coast followed similar attempts in Thailand, India, Kenya, Georgia, Cyprus and Azerbaijan, and comes as Iran is facing opposition to its rogue nuclear program in the form of crippling sanctions, cyber attacks and the assassination of nuclear scientists.

But while Iran may be using its proxy Hezbollah to do its dirty work internationally, the latest attack will likely trigger renewed pressure on its operatives, including in Canada, where Hezbollah has long been active.



Hezbollah's "Most Sophisticated and Lethal" Attacks

April 1983: Car bombing of U.S. embassy in Beirut kills 63.

October 1983: Truck bomb attack at U.S. Marine barracks kills 241 American military personnel. A second attack kills 58 at a French military compound.

June 1985: Hijacks a TWA flight and kills an American passenger.

February 1988: Kidnaps and kills a U.S. official serving with a UN truce monitoring mission.

March 1992: Bombs Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29.

July 1994: Bombs Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, killing 86.

February 2005: Assassinate former PM Rafiq Hariri with a massive bomb that also kills 23 bystanders.

July 2006: Crosses Lebanon's southern border, kills three Israeli troops and kidnaps two others, triggering a month-long war with Israel that leaves about 1,200 dead, mostly Lebanese.

Source: "Hezbollah Intentions and Capabilities: Implications for Canada in 2010," Intelligence Assessment, Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, June 10, 2010. *SECRET*. *National Post*

Last week, a Quebec Muslim activist, Mouna Diab, was charged with smuggling firearms parts to Hezbollah. Acting under the direction of a Hezbollah associate in Lebanon, Ms. Diab had purchased AR-15-type rifle parts around Montreal and shipped them to Lebanon in packages carried by community members unaware of the scheme, according to the RCMP.

In Canada, Hezbollah is "primarily involved in logistics and operational support activities and fundraising destined for terrorist purposes overseas," the RCMP said in the statement announcing the charging of Ms. Diab.

But the group has scouted targets in Canada, and after terrorist chief Imad Mugnyah was assassinated in Damascus in 2008, Canadian security officials warned the Jewish community that Hezbollah might be planning a revenge attack.

"Anyone who has any connection to Israel, civilians or not, are potential targets," said Anita Bromberg, the national director of legal affairs at B'nai Brith Canada. The group said it had also spoken with security officials about the Bulgaria attack, but Ms. Bromberg said police told her they had not noticed an increase in "chatter" related to Canada.

Even before this week's bus bombing, Hezbollah was already a priority for the RCMP national security section. Hezbollah is a banned terrorist organization in Canada, which calls it one of the most technically capable terrorist groups in the world.

"Hezbollah has a proven capability to conduct a mass casualty attack, target unguarded foreign nationals, strike at heavily guarded targets, and

carry out multiple and coordinated attacks," reads a June 2010 Canadian intelligence study obtained by the *National Post*.

The report notes that Hezbollah "has not conducted a terrorist attack on Canadian soil," but it acknowledges a "presence" in the country. Several Hezbollah members have been caught in Canada, Hezbollah flags have appeared at demonstrations in Montreal and Toronto, and a billboard paying tribute to Hezbollah was once erected in Windsor.

The bomber who struck in Bulgaria has not yet been publicly

named, but Ayub was well trained, well traveled and had multiple identities. Ayub began his career as a terrorist in the Amal militia in Beirut. He joined Hezbollah in 1983.

His first assignment was to hijack an airliner in Romania in order to secure the release of prisoners held in Iraq. He was arrested shortly before the hijacking but his co-conspirators went ahead with the plot and the plane crashed, killing 62.

Freed from a Romanian jail (his release was allegedly facilitated by bribes paid by Hezbollah), Ayub came to Canada. He became a citizen in 1992 and married twice but returned to Lebanon, and in 2000 he was recruited into the elite Hezbollah terrorist unit known as Islamic Jihad.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Using a fake U.S. passport, he travelled to Israel in 2002. According to U.S. and Israeli

them. In exchange, Hezbollah handed over a kidnapped Israeli businessman and the bodies



authorities, Hezbollah sent him to conduct a bombing. He inquired about buying the components for a bomb but was arrested. He told Israeli authorities he was on a mission from God.

“Everything just for God,” he said.

Two years later, Ayub got a lucky break. Israel agreed to free 436 prisoners and he was one of

of three Israeli soldiers.

Ayub was taken from his cell and flown to Germany, where he boarded a plane back to Lebanon. Live television coverage showed him disembarking from a plane at Beirut airport and walking into the arms of Hassan Nasrallah, the boss of Hezbollah.

NEED POWER?
It's in the bag.

powerbag™
designed by ful



'Events dear boy, events': terrorism and security from the perspective of politics

By Andrew W. Neal

Source: <http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/r8enchSF6iBUzalyAk9a/full>

This article asks what it would mean to consider terrorism and security from the perspective of politics. It argues that security politics – defined as the activity of politicians when connected in some way to security – has been largely excluded from existing scholarly approaches to terrorism and security. In contrast to the assumptions about existential threat and sovereign/executive power characteristic of existing approaches, the article argues that if we consider security in terms of what is at stake for politicians, then it can no longer be considered as separate from 'normal' politics. From the perspective of politics, security events are just like other politically salient events.

Introduction

In the 10 years of scholarship on terrorism and security since 9/11, there has been a heavy focus from some quarters on the nature of threats and a heavy focus from others on the critique of sovereign power and security governance. Following the nomenclature of this journal, we might call these two strands 'traditional' security scholarship and 'critical' security scholarship, although such categories are always fuzzy and contestable. This article argues that there is something missing from the attentions of both, and that is security politics. By politics, I mean the activity of professional politicians (Weber 1994, Palonen 2006), rather than simply governments or political leaders, and by security politics, I mean when this activity relates to security in some way, whether objectively, discursively or by some other connection. My argument is that despite their differences, traditional security scholarship and critical security scholarship perform the same classic security trope: that security is an existential realm of sovereign or executive prerogative. The assumption is that if we want to understand security, we need to analyse how political leaders and the executive branch of government conceive, identify and tackle security threats. This trope leads to the analytical exclusion of security politics.

This matters because there is a great deal of activity by politicians relating to terrorism and security that does not fall under the umbrella of sovereign or executive power. For example, security policies have been contested in national parliaments; members of legislatures have set up inquiries and committees (for example, on extraordinary rendition (Intelligence and Security Committee 2007) or fast-track legislation (House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 2009)); and politicians have published reports (such as the 9/11 commission report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States *et al.* 2004)), scrutinised military and intelligence service budgets and fought elections at least in part on national security tickets. This activity, understood as *security politics*, involves backbench politicians, opposition parties and political leaders and ministers in their capacity as politicians rather than as executive office holders.

In the aftermath of 9/11 and other spectacular acts of political violence since, terrorism and security scholarship has been understandably drawn to focus on executive and governmental responses, some of which have been equally spectacular. Such responses to perceived security emergencies do appear to adhere to the classic sovereign security trope in the short term, with executive prerogative asserted, critical deliberation sidelined and concerns about liberties and rights pushed aside (Medical Foundation for the Care of the Victims of Torture *et al.* 2001, Chang 2002, Goldberg *et al.* 2002, Bamford 2004, Liberty 2004, Scheuerman 2006, Hewitt 2008). But the passing of 10 years since 9/11 has seen this short-term logic fade and more diverse forms of politics return. Ten years has allowed a broader range of political activities relating to security to play out, and the classic sovereign security trope does not do them analytical justice.

The classic trope assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that security transcends 'normal' politics because of its existential importance. The trope



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

ultimately derives from Hobbes and finds repeated expression to the present day. In Hobbes there can be no industry, arts or anything of civilised value without security, and therefore the security provided by the sovereign must be the first freedom in any modern state (Hobbes 1996, p. 89). Versions of this trope are reproduced in Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill and Schmitt (for overviews, see Hussein 2003, pp. 16–22, Neodeous 2008, pp. 11–38). It is Carl Schmitt who constructs the starkest argument for a necessary link between sovereign security prerogative and existential threat on the basis of the inevitability of ‘the exception’: ‘a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like ... It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty’ (Schmitt 1985, p. 6). The idea of ‘the exception’ has been subject to intense legal and political debate and is beyond the scope of this article (Fitzpatrick 2003, Huysmans 2004, 2008, Agamben 2005, Johns 2005, Prozorov 2005, Tierney 2005, Gross and Ní Aoláin 2006, Neal 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, Doty 2007), but what concerns us here is the sovereign security prerogative as expressed repeatedly in modern Western political thought and practice. The classic trope assumes that the existential realm of security is of such importance that normal politics and law should give way to sovereign or executive power in order to deal with security threats.

The analytical and political effect of this trope is the reification of sovereign or executive power as the fundamental security actor, excluding a wider analysis of *security politics*. It also has the effect of separating the realm of security from ‘normal’ politics. The trope can be performed in a variety of ways, but the effect is the same. It can be performed philosophically, as in the work of Agamben (1998, 2005). It can be performed discursively or sociologically in the vein of securitisation studies (Wæver 1995, Buzan *et al.* 1998, Balzacq 2011). Or it can be reproduced through its critique in the name of human security or emancipation (Booth 1991, Fierke 2007, pp. 186–205). The performance of the trope creates an analytical blind spot regarding security politics and an incomplete picture of the workings of security. It diverts attention from the multiple ways in which professional politicians mobilise and organise around security issues, the ways they contest

rather than make policy, the diversity of political discourse beyond executive pronouncements and the sheer breath of professional political activity that does not simply defer to executive security prerogative.

Most significantly, the existential logic of the classic sovereign security trope conceals the quite different political logics that may be at work in the activity of professional politicians. The point is not to question whether security threats are really existential or not, although this can certainly be a feature of political security debates. This would be to play into an old debate on objective/subjective security introduced by Wolfers (1952): a condition of objective security or insecurity being impossible to measure except perhaps in hindsight and subjective security being a psychological condition measured only by its deviation from ‘reality’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009, pp. 32–33; see, for example, Mueller 2005). The point is that existential survival of the state, nation or any other publicly articulated referent object is not necessarily the primary stake for professional politicians involved in the activity of security politics.

This article therefore asks what it would mean to rethink security from the perspective of *politics*, rather than through the critique of sovereign, executive or governmental power. What happens to our understanding of security if we refuse its separation from ‘normal’ politics? What happens if instead of beginning with the problem of existential threat (its identification, declaration, contestation and apprehension), we consider security politics in terms of the stakes involved for politicians? This move potentially undermines the reification of sovereign power performed by terrorism and security studies, critical or otherwise. The article will argue that understanding security from the perspective of politics means that what is at stake is not existential survival but *political* survival. This has very different implications for security analysis.

The first part of the article makes some further qualifications about the meaning of *security politics* and considers its exclusion from scholarship in more depth. The second part critiques securitisation theory as a sophisticated example of this exclusion. And the final part proposes



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

an alternative theoretical framing for understanding security from the perspective of politics.

Security politics and its exclusion

A few qualifications are necessary first. By 'security politics' I do not mean the wider critique of what is *political* about security. Security practices, security policies and security discourses are all political in the sense that they implicate power relations and can be critiqued and politicised as such. The potential scope of what is political about the problem of security is ever expanding thanks to a broad range of critical scholarship, from feminist approaches that unpack the gendered power relations of security practices (Hansen 2000, Richter-Montpetit 2007) to analyses of proliferating techniques of security governance such as risk management, insurance, bordering and surveillance (Vaughan-Williams 2007, Amoores and de Goede 2008, Salter 2008a, Basaran 2010, Lobo-Guerrero 2011). Jef Huysmans argues that such contest over the political meaning of security calls into question not only the identification of security threats but also the nature and limits of political community itself. For example, contest over the relationship between executive security prerogative and judicial application of human rights laws brings into question the proper relationship between the different branches of government (Huysmans 2006, pp. 11–12). The question of 'the political' is therefore an expansive one, expressed succinctly by the political scientist Colin Hay as follows: 'the political should be defined in such a way as to encompass the entire sphere of the social ... All events, process and practices which occur within the social sphere have the potential to be political' (2002, p. 3).

In contrast to this expansive notion of 'the political', in this article I mean security politics in a narrow sense: the activity of politics as practised by politicians. I mean the kind of political activity examined by Max Weber in 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', which considered the modern conditions under which the political activity of professional politicians takes place (Weber 1994). It is not my intention to privilege this notion of politics over any other, but rather to draw attention to its neglect in terrorism and security scholarship. The classic security trope does not capture the diverse ways in which politicians are called to

engage with terrorism and security. Existing assumptions do not capture the full extent of the activity of security politics.

My grounds for problematising security politics stem from my ongoing empirical research on counterterrorist lawmaking in the British parliament (see Neal 2012a). This focuses on the arguments, practices and tactics of the full range of parliamentarians at different times, not only in the wake of perceived security emergencies but also when there is no perceived emergency and when such perceptions are fading into the political background. My core claim, based on an analysis of these unexpectedly diverse parliamentary discourses and activities, is that a whole sweep of political actors, namely politicians, have been excluded from the analysis of security because of an overwhelming focus on the executive branch of government, broadly understood. This analytical neglect of politicians not only is true of traditional strategic studies and international relations (IR) approaches in their state centrism and focus on executive decision makers (e.g. Waltz 1979, Vasquez 1993, p. 105) but is also true of much of critical terrorism and security studies in its critique of sovereign power, its deconstruction of government security policies and its empirical mapping of techniques of government. All these areas of analysis can be filed under the broad category of executive power, even when that power is devolved to bureaucracies, technical operatives or arms-length agencies (see Bigo 2002, Butler 2004, Amoores 2009). Politicians have been marginally included as 'domestic factors' in some approaches, for example, in foreign policy analysis (Hudson 2007, pp. 125–142). Politicians could also be considered through securitisation theory as a kind of 'audience' for executive security discourses (to which we will return), but almost no terrorism or security analysis has placed politicians and the activity and practice of *security politics* at its centre. To foreground security politics would mean considering not simply the leaders, ministers and governments whose statements and policies are often the focus of security analysis, but rather the whole range of politicians who are members of political institutions, such as legislatures in sovereign states and others such as those of the EU. There are strong empirical grounds to argue that security does not simply involve



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the decisions of sovereigns or expansive techniques of government, but mobilises and engages politicians in diverse ways.

The analytical neglect of security politics is largely due to the structure and evolution of academic disciplines. Terrorism and security studies developed as an extension of the discipline of IR and as such excludes the political activities of politicians, other than statesmen, leaders and key ministers, leaving this to the discipline of political science. But at the same time, political science has been happy to leave the analysis of security to security studies and IR, and when it has considered questions of security it has simply performed the classic sovereign security trope. The outcome is that a proper consideration of *security politics* has been excluded from both disciplines. But furthermore, beyond academic scholarship, politicians themselves defer heavily to the executive in the aftermath of spectacular acts of political violence, marginalising their own political activity and any reflexive consideration of the relationship between politics and security. *Security politics* is therefore subject to a triple exclusion: first, by terrorism and security studies as a sub-discipline of IR; second, by the discipline of political science; and third, by politicians themselves in their at times uncritical reinforcement of sovereign or executive security prerogative. Let us unpack the three aspects of this exclusion a little more.

The identity of any academic discipline is constituted by what it includes and excludes. Buzan and Hansen argue that the boundaries of what they tellingly call '*international security studies*' (ISS) [emphasis added] have changed over time and have never been clearly defined. Sometimes its exclusions have been successfully challenged. As they argue: ISS ... does not have clearly defined borders. Instead it has 'frontier zones' where its debates blend into adjacent subjects, ranging from IR theory to IPE, to foreign policy analysis and Political Theory. (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 18)

In writing a history of ISS, Buzan and Hansen admit that they necessarily reproduce the history of its exclusions (2010, p. 661). However, it is notable that 'politics' is not included in the boundary subjects they list, suggesting that it has not even been registered by the discipline as excluded. This is not to suggest that security studies and its frontier

zones are not political or consider no political questions, but rather that the activity of security politics as practised by politicians is missing. Political science as a scholarly discipline, or more narrowly the academic study of the activity of politics, remains rather insulated from security studies, and vice versa. There has been little communication between them. Few security scholars will have engaged with the works of Philip Norton or Bernard Crick, who represent disciplinary staples in the study of politics, particularly of British parliamentary politics. When the discipline of 'politics' does engage with questions of security, it largely reproduces the classic sovereign security trope. For example, Bernard Crick, in the British classic 'In Defence of Politics', argues that in a 'state of emergency' open, free and consultative politics must be brushed aside in favour of 'the [sovereign] capacity to act without compromise or normal consultation' (Crick 1982, p. 27).

Beyond scholarly disciplines, my empirical research on counterterrorist lawmaking shows that politicians themselves perform and reproduce the classic security trope when they adhere to the constitutional convention of legislative consensus and deference to the executive at times of perceived emergency (Neal 2012a, 2012b). Politicians defer to, and therefore recognise and legitimise, the security prerogative of the sovereign. This means that at times of perceived emergency, there is a lack of open reflection by politicians on their own engagement in the activity and practice of security politics. From a different scholarly perspective, there is quantitative evidence that a post-attack 'rally round the flag effect' is a common phenomenon in Western democracies (Chowanietz 2011). However, this emergency political reaction does not encompass the whole of security politics, as the playing out of time beyond the aftermath of the 'emergency' reveals. When there is no perceived emergency, or when it is fading into the background, security politics becomes more critical, deliberative and reflexive.

The fundamental question implied by this exclusion is whether security politics is different or separate from 'normal' politics. Both the disciplines of politics and security studies/IR have perpetuated the separation of security from politics by reproducing the classic sovereign security trope. Security becomes a matter for the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

executive, not for politicians in general. For security studies/IR, the politics of politicians is of marginal concern compared with executive practices and the decisions of statesmen. For the discipline of politics, security begins where politics stops. This separation of security from the activity of politics is true of even the most sophisticated critical approaches to security, one of which we will look at now.

The separation of security from politics and the example of securitisation theory

Securitisation theory has been a growth area in security studies for the past two decades and has probably come closest to considering the role of politicians in the problem and practice of security. Yet at its core it is built on a separation of security from politics: the act of securitisation is conceived as the discursive movement of issues from the 'normal' sphere of politics to the 'exceptional' sphere of security by security elites (Buzan *et al.* 1998, p. 23). Securitisation is defined by urgency, crisis and exceptionality and thus set apart from mere politics (Buzan *et al.* 1998, p. 23).

The theory has formed the basis of a successful research programme for studying how issues and events get constructed and framed as security threats. Securitisation-based approaches analyse the statements of elites in terms of three things: first, security discourse/language (the grammar of security); second, institutional, historical and empirical context; and third, the 'audience' of securitising moves. This frame of analysis can be mapped quite neatly onto the field of politics as practised by politicians, but it is insufficient for understanding the empirical variety of political activity connected to security issues. The notion of discursive action that the theory is built upon is merely a sophisticated version of the classic sovereign security trope. The following criticisms all relate to the construction of the theory around sovereign security prerogative and its role in moving issues from the sphere of 'normal politics' to a rarefied realm of existential security, thus reproducing their separation.

First, as I and others have argued elsewhere, securitisation theory is elite led, and this in itself reproduces the classic sovereign security trope (Williams 2003, Neal 2010). The elite-led assumption is based, perhaps quite reasonably, on the empirical claim that it is usually the state or state elites who securitise

(Wæver 1995, p. 51). However, this move is not simply an innocent reflection of the way security works, but a reproduction of a particular understanding of security that separates it from politics. It is true that securitisation theory does not consider speech acts to occur in a vacuum of pure decisionist freedom, but in a historical, discursive, institutional and material context. The theory conceptualises this as the 'felicity conditions' which affect the chances of success of a securitising speech act (Wæver 2000, pp. 252–253). These conditions can include the social capital of speakers, the institutionalisation of security responses, commensurability with existing discourses (such as racial fears and prejudices) and the presence of objective material conditions such as troops massing on the border or images of physical destruction. Nevertheless, the elite-led understanding of securitisation, even if contextualised, does not fully encompass the activity of politics and the diverse ways that it can be connected to security.

Second, securitisation and security politics are not synonymous. Securitisation is the discursive construction of security threats. This does happen of course, but it is one political phenomenon among many possible in security politics. Even if we accept the premise that all security problems are ultimately constructed, the problem is that this is too narrow an analytical lens for the study of political activity relating to security. Studying the activity of security politics does not require a formal definition of security, but rather a willingness to be analytically led by empirical political connections to security issues of all kinds, whether objective, subjective or discursive.

It is easy to think of examples of political activity that reference security but do not neatly fit the securitisation model. For example, parliamentary discussion of new evidence about the complicity in torture by the British security services is not a case of securitisation because it does not primarily involve the construction of a security threat. Individual speakers in such a debate may indeed attempt to construct 'the security threat' in a certain way, but framing analysis around this and its contestation will not analytically capture the full scope and diversity of such political activity.¹ A parliamentary report hearing over a failed IT contract to build an 'E-borders'



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

system is not a case of securitisation because the participants will be focused on ministerial decisions and allocation of budgets and contractual terms, even if, again, such a debate may feature specific attempts to characterise security threats (Home Affairs Committee 2011). Making the scrapping of ID cards a manifesto commitment is not a case of securitisation, or even for that matter desecuritisation, because although the debate about ID cards did involve discussion of their use to counter security threats (as well as a whole menu of other uses), this alone did not encompass the entirety of ID cards as a political issue (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008, The Conservative Party 2010).

Third, politicians cannot be reduced to the 'audience' of elite securitising moves. To reduce politicians to 'audience' would be to assume that politicians are mostly reactive in their political activity, responding to the securitising moves of leaders or ministers. Although this purely reactive modality does appear to exist during periods of political consensus following spectacular acts of political violence, it is certainly not always the case, as I have suggested above. More sociological developments of securitisation theory have tackled the 'audience' problem by stressing the iterative possibilities of security discourse, whereby security claims can be modified in the discursive interplay between groups (Stritzel 2007, p. 371, Salter 2008b, p. 321).

These sociological variants of securitisation theory have done much to reduce its elite-led basis and thus offer a potential way out of its reproduction of the classic sovereign security trope. For example, Thierry Balzacq offers a sophisticated rethinking of the theory, arguing that analysis of securitisation should focus on the degree of congruence between statements, discursive/institutional contexts and material events themselves (2011, pp. 6–14). Balzacq loosens many of the quite restrictive formal conditions of the original Copenhagen School conception of the theory. For example, in their 1998 *Security: a new framework for analysis*, Buzan *et al.* (1998) are quite explicit that securitisation means an 'issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (p. 23). Balzacq offers a lengthy redefinition of securitisation that I will not reproduce in full

here. In place of speech acts it stresses a wide array of 'contextually mobilized ... heuristic artefacts' such as metaphors, images, emotions and intuitions; in place of 'existential threat' it stresses 'critical vulnerability'; and in place of 'emergency measures' it stresses a 'customized policy ... undertaken immediately' (Balzacq 2011, p. 3). Balzacq's reformulation is promising and takes securitisation theory quite far from its original conception, making it easier to fit the label 'securitization' to a wider variety of security-implicated situations. Even in this guise, however, the approach does not foreground the question of security politics, but rather includes it, along with potentially everything else, in the ever-expanding variables of 'context'. Moreover, it maintains the separation between the realm of security, even as expanded through broadened criteria, and the realm of 'normal' politics.

Even with a reduced emphasis on elite prerogative and existential threat, all forms of securitisation theory assume that security has a specific logic that makes it, at the very least, a special and distinct form of political activity. It takes security discourses, broadly conceived, at face value and treats them as signs of the logic of securitisation. This 'specialness' of security suggests that securitisation theory remains an extension of the disciplinary logic that constitutes security studies and IR as separate from political science. In this sense, securitisation remains an expression of the classic sovereign security trope. The defining, constitutive, organising stake in this logic is the construction of an existential threat (or critical vulnerability) to a referent object such as the state, society or environment and its connection to certain privileged actors and means of redress. And although the innovation of securitisation theory is that 'existential threat' may be a discursive construction rather than an objective condition, it still assumes that the construction of existential threat is the central stake and that the prime mover is some form of nominalist security prerogative under certain conditions. However, if we were to understand terrorism and security from the perspective of the activity of politics, rather than on the basis of this classic sovereign security trope, the logic and stakes would look rather different.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Security from the perspective of politics

Although politicians may indeed perceive or construct security threats as an existential threat to some referent object or other, this is not necessarily their primary motivation and not necessarily what is at stake for them politically. We should not take their claims at face value for there may be a different political logic at work. From the perspective of professional politics, we might consider that the biggest 'existential threat' for politicians is not to a publicly cited referent object, but to the electoral life of a government or their own political careers. This is quite different.

Securitisation analysis, which focuses on the public articulation of security discourses and their reception and acceptance by particular audiences, cannot easily incorporate this logic. Politicians could not in all seriousness publicly invoke the political life of a government or their own political career as the referent object of securitisation. Although sociologically we can say that politicians often invoke and modulate discourses of existential threat, foregrounding this distracts from what is at stake in *security politics*, and indeed in politics generally. This hidden stake in security politics, existing behind publicly articulated discourses of security threat, makes security politics a 'double game', as conceptualised by Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu argues that apparent concern for the interests of the politically represented public often 'conceals the relation of competition between the representatives' (Bourdieu 1992, p. 183). For politicians, terrorism and security may well be urgent problems to be solved, constructed or not, but the conventions of cross-party consensus and deference to the executive involved may conceal partisan political strategies and forms of opportunism. Political parties are, after all, struggling to win elections and secure control of government, but perhaps dare not speak this openly on the sensitive issue of terrorism.

My argument is that the fear and threat that drive politicians and governments may not be existential but political. The survival at stake for politicians is not existential survival but political survival. This is because security events and the way they are handled or mishandled, regardless of whether constructed or not, can make or break a government. In fact this is true of all events. Rethinking security as a problem of politically important events, rather than in terms of sovereign or elite prerogative over

existential threats, puts quite a different complexion on how we understand *security politics*.

In order to consider terrorism and security from the perspective of politics and to reflect what is at stake for politicians, we need a shift of ontology. What we need is a Machiavellian ontology, not a Hobbesian/Schmittian one as assumed by the classic sovereign security trope. This is a theoretical distinction I have previously made elsewhere (Neal 2010, p. 73), but one I would like to extend here. The key distinction is that in the statist ontology of Hobbes and Schmitt, the survival of the state, and thus the survival of the people within the state, is what is at stake. In Machiavelli the reign of the Prince is at stake, which is not the same thing. The reign of the Prince is akin to the reign of a government, not the survival of a state, people or indeed other referent object.

Under a Hobbesian/Schmittian ontology the state is sovereign. The state is not just politically sovereign, but ontologically sovereign. There are no higher forces at work than the state, other than the necessities for state survival that the ontology implies. Although states can, with some difficulty, be destroyed, the ideal form of the state for Hobbes and Schmitt is a state in sovereign command of its fate. In this sense, the sovereign state is a mortal God. It decides what is a threat, decides what needs to be done about it and does it. In contrast, Machiavelli's Prince is not a mortal God. He remains subordinate to the superior forces of *fortuna* or fate (Machiavelli 1999, p. 84). The Prince may build defences against the vicissitudes of *fortuna* and learn historical lessons of how to perpetuate his reign, but *fortuna* will always win in the end. The Prince cannot master contingency forever and he cannot always be in command of the meaning of events. A Machiavellian ontology is the one we should apply to security politics.

The point is that the eventual failure of the Prince's reign is part of the rules of the game. This is very different to the existential security trope in which 'failure is not an option'. It is not that the Prince can fail and the state (or securitising elites) cannot, but that the stakes and rules of the game are different.

Governments will fall as a matter of course. But in stable liberal democracies at least, this is not an existential catastrophe. Governments



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

accept this as part of the rules of the game, as must the Prince. Politicians, including those out of power, know the rules, must play by them if they want to be successful and consider the game worth playing (Bourdieu 1992, p. 180). In the meantime governments must build their political defences and try to hold on to power. Governments always try to plan and control their programme in government, to stick to their policies, to not tilt. But they cannot anticipate what *fortuna* may throw at them, and this is not a problem of existential threat, but of unforeseen, politically significant events. As Harold Macmillan is reported to have said (possibly apocryphally), the things prime ministers fear the most, the things most likely to blow a government off course, are *events dear boy, events*. This captures the political stakes of security politics, and indeed all politics, rather well.

In a book on the discipline of politics, the political scientist Jean Blondel opens with a remarkably Machiavellian account of the role of events in politics. His argument is that in politics, enormous changes can occur because of knife-edge results, unforeseen events and accidents and scandals that take on a life of their own. For example, governments can fall on votes of no confidence by a margin of one because an MP happens to be ill and absent. This is what happened to Prime Minister James Callaghan in March 1979 (Blondel 1981, p. 1). Similarly, winner-takes-all elections that are too close to call can unprecedentedly swing on the decisions of Supreme Court judges, as with Bush and Gore in 2000. Governments can misinterpret and misjudge their ability to handle unforeseen events, as with the fall of the Spanish Aznar government in the wake of the Madrid bombings. Luck and an unknown number of unforeseen circumstances outside of individual or party control can make or break political careers, and Blondel suggests this is more so in politics than in any other walk of life. The unexpected death or resignation of a colleague can open up a space for a new leader or minister; a scandal blowing up out of nowhere can discredit an opponent; and bad weather affecting voter turnout can affect the result of an election (Blondel 1981, p. 6).

Politics is peculiar ... in that straightforward 'accidents' uncannily erupt on the political scene. Accidents are those non-political or tenuously political events which come to have a sharp political impact. A natural calamity,

such as an earthquake or landslide, the illness or the death of a leader may produce major ripples. Human error, a rail or ship disaster, for instance, may surge on the political scene. Thus the 'normal' course of affairs may be upset because an event, which leaders could not predict or avoid – or could avoid only at considerable financial cost – largely because it had no political significance, creates a new situation which upsets calculations and modifies the equilibrium of forces. (Blondel 1981, p. 7)

Now, this is not to say that the meaning of political events is objectively contained in the events themselves – precisely the contrary. There is no inherent political meaning in a sudden death or a rail disaster. The problem is not simply that events are unforeseen, but their political significance is unpredictable. The question is whether or not governments and politicians can steer a safe path through events; whether they can remain in command of the situation and make the most of a good crisis; or whether, like Callaghan, they come to appear 'no longer able to dominate events' (Blondel 1981, p. 4).

Neither is this to say that events are random. Events have causes, but those causes may remain unknown, unseen and multiple. And as Blondel argues, with the passing of time, events can be seen in perspective and perhaps as part of an inevitable trend (Blondel 1981, pp. 7–8). Callaghan would have fallen sooner or later. And the impact of events may not be as great as initially thought: 'It is rare for the whole political system, or even governmental policies to be markedly altered in view of an "accident"' (Blondel 1981, p. 7). But trends lead to outcomes, and while trends can be examined, mapped and modelled, 'the process in which a *trend is converted into an outcome*' is more mysterious: 'it is *one outcome or another* which occurs in politics, not a trend ... by its very nature, the analysis of trends cannot lead to a precise prediction' (Blondel 1981, p. 13) [his italics].

This understanding of events does not fit the trope offered to us by terrorism and security studies. Unlike traditional strategic studies with its emphasis on states and the use of military force, there is no cold hard meaning contained in any particular event (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 83). But unlike in securitisation theory, actors do not construct the meaning of



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

events either, try as they might. The events that take on the most dramatic political significance seem to come from nowhere to exceed the predictive, preparatory and prophylactic capabilities of politicians. And even when events seem part of an analysable trend, the outcomes of those trends are fundamentally uncertain and can flip on the tiniest of margins. Certainly, governments' successful or unsuccessful attempts to 'spin' the meaning of events may have a large bearing on whether they are able to appear to remain in command, but under this alternative ontology the meaning and construction of events is not dominated by political elites. It is not their prerogative. Rather, events appear to take on a life of their own.

Adopting a Machiavellian political ontology based on the priority of events and the inevitable but non-catastrophic fall of governments gives an interesting complexion to the question of security politics. From this perspective, there is no difference between security events and other events. The question is not which unforeseen, contingent events will prove to be exceptional, existential security threats (the Schmittian formulation), but rather which events will be politically significant. This is equally unknown and contingent, but it is defined not by existential threat, but by its impact on the life of a government or the career of a politician. From the perspective of political survival, there is no difference between a terrorist attack, an economic crisis or a political scandal. Of course, there may be different ways of dealing with them politically and governmentally, but the *political* stakes are the same.

If there is no political distinction between security events and other events, then this dissolves the problematic separation of politics and security discussed earlier. Security is not defined by its separation from normal politics, as in the Copenhagen School mould. If we rethink the stakes as political and not existential, then this challenges the primacy of the classic sovereign security trope. From the perspective of politics and what is at stake for politicians, security politics is no different to politics in general. A Machiavellian ontology reflects this different tradition regarding the role of events in politics.

Conclusions

On the basis of the argument presented here, one should be prompted to stop and think hard

before adopting the naturalised disciplinary assumptions that seem to accompany existing analyses of terrorism and security. This article is thus intended as a way of rethinking the exclusions of scholarly approaches to terrorism and security. While this scholarship is broad and diverse, it seems to suffer from certain preoccupations to the exclusion of others; at stake is either the nature of threats or the nature of the sovereign, executive or governmental power that defines and handles threats. This trope suffers from four problems: first, it risks taking security discourses at face value when there might be other logics at work; second, it does not encompass the empirical breadth of politics as it relates to security; third, it risks reifying a certain understanding of political power at the expense of a more plural understanding of politics; and fourth, it risks allowing a particular object – which I have called the classic sovereign security trope – to define the discipline itself. These points raise a further question: to what extent do terrorism and security studies require security to be 'special' in order to justify their own importance?

We can consider this problem by turning to Michel Foucault. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault rejects the idea that discourses are constituted by a common object (Foucault 2002, pp. 35–36). This means, for example, that just because there is a large discourse about madness, this does not mean that madness is a single unified thing. Rather, madness is understood so differently from the perspective of different times and positions in the discourse on madness that it makes no sense to consider it as an objective thing (Foucault 2006). This is why he later said that his method consisted in saying

Let's suppose that madness does not exist. If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history make of these different events and practices which are apparently organised around something that is supposed to be madness? (Foucault 2008, pp. 20–21)

To translate this to the problem of security, we can ask whether terrorism and security studies are constituted by the assumption of a common object: the classic sovereign security trope. However, this article has shown that from a different perspective – that of politics as an activity – this object looks different to the extent that it is not the same thing. If we rethink security in



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

terms of *politically salient events* as suggested here, security loses its specialness as an object. This is a way of asking ‘what if security

does not exist?’ Thus, in answer to my initial question, this is what it would mean to rethink security from the perspective of politics.

Notes

1. Hansard HC vol 505, cols 914–926 (10 February 2010), David Miliband.

References

- 1. [Agamben, G.](#) 1998. *Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life*, Edited by: [Heller-Roazen, D.](#) Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- 2. [Agamben, G.](#) 2005. *State of exception*, Edited by: [Attell, K.](#) Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- 3. [Amoore, L.](#) 2009. “On forgetting the war on terror”. In *Terrorism and the politics of response*, Edited by: [Stephens, A.C.](#) and [Vaughan-Williams, N.](#) 130–143. Abingdon: Routledge.
- 4. [Amoore, L.](#) and [de Goede, M.](#) 2008. *Risk and the war on terror*, London: Routledge.
- 5. [Balzacq, T.](#) 2011. *Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*, *PRIO new security studies*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- 6. [Bamford, B.](#) 2004. The United Kingdom’s ‘war against terrorism’. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4): 737–756.
- 7. [Basaran, T.](#) 2010. *Security, law and borders*, London: Routledge.
- 8. [Bigo, D.](#) 2002. Security and immigration, toward a critique of the governmentality of unease. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(1): 63–92.
- 9. [Blondel, J.](#) 1981. *The discipline of politics*, London: Butterworths.
- 10. [Booth, K.](#) 1991. Security and emancipation. *Review of International Studies*, 17(4): 313–326. [[CrossRef](#)], [[CSA](#)]
- 11. [Bourdieu, P.](#) 1992. “Political representation: elements for a theory of the political field”. In *Language and symbolic power*, Edited by: [Thompson, J.B.](#) 171–202. Cambridge: Polity.
- 12. [Butler, J.](#) 2004. *Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence*, London: Verso.
- 13. [Buzan, B.](#) and [Hansen, L.](#) 2009. *The evolution of international security studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 14. [Buzan, B.](#) and [Hansen, L.](#) 2010. Beyond the evolution of international security studies?. *Security Dialogue*, 41(6): 659–667.
- 15. [Buzan, B.](#), [Wæver, O.](#) and [Wilde, J.D.](#) 1998. *Security: a new framework for analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- 16. [Chang, N.](#) 2002. *The silencing of political dissent*, London: Turnaround.
- 17. [Chowanietz, C.](#) 2011. Rallying around the flag or railing against the government? Political parties’ reactions to terrorist acts. *Party Politics*, 17(5): 673–698. 18. [The Conservative Party.](#) 2010. *Invitation to join the Government of Britain: the conservative manifesto 2010*, London: Conservative Research Department.
- 19. [Crick, B.](#) 1982. *In defence of politics. 2nd Pelican*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- 20. [Doty, R.L.](#) 2007. States of exception on the Mexico-US border: security, ‘decisions,’ and civilian border patrols. *International Political Sociology*, 1(2): 113–137.
- 21. [Fierke, K.M.](#) 2007. *Critical approaches to international security*, London: Polity.
- 22. [Fitzpatrick, J.](#) 2003. Speaking law to power: the war against terrorism and human rights. *European Journal of International Law*, 14(2): 241–264.
- 23. [Foucault, M.](#) 2002. *The archaeology of knowledge*, Edited by: [Smith, A.M.S.](#) London: Routledge.
- 24. [Foucault, M.](#) 2006. *History of madness*, Edited by: [Murphy, J.](#) and [Khlafa, J.](#) Abingdon: Routledge.
- 25. [Foucault, M.](#) 2008. *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the college de France, 1978–1979*, Edited by: [Davidson, A.](#) and [Burchell, G.](#) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 26. [Goldberg, D.](#), [Goldberg, V.](#) and [Greenwald, R.](#) 2002. *It’s a free country: personal freedom in America after September 11*, New York: RDV Books.
- 27. [Gross, O.](#) and [Ní Aolá, F.](#) 2006. *Law in times of crisis: emergency powers in theory and practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 28. [Hansen, L.](#) 2000. The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 29(2): 285–306.
- 29. [Hay, C.](#) 2002. *Political analysis: a critical introduction*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- 30. [Hewitt, S.](#) 2008. *The British war on terror: terrorism and counter-terrorism on the home front since 9/11*, London: Continuum.
- 31. [Hobbes, T.](#) 1996. *Leviathan*, Edited by: [Tuck, R.](#) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- 32. Home Affairs Committee, 2011. *Oral evidence taken before the Home Affairs Committee: UK border agency enforcement*, 5 April [online]. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/uc929-i/uc92901.htm> (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/uc929-i/uc92901.htm>) (Accessed: 16 December 2011).
- 33. [House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution](#). 2009. *Fast-track legislation: constitutional implications and safeguards*, London: The Stationery Office Limited.
- 34. [Hudson, V.M.](#) 2007. *Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 35. [Hussein, N.](#) 2003. *The jurisprudence of emergency. East Lansing*, The University of Michigan Press.
- 36. [Huysmans, J.](#) 2004. Minding exceptions. Politics of insecurity and liberal democracy. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 3(3): 321–341.
- 37. [Huysmans, J.](#) 2006. *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU*, London: Routledge.
- 38. [Huysmans, J.](#) 2008. The jargon of exception – on Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political society. *International Political Sociology*, 2: 165–183. 39. [Huysmans, J.](#) and [Buonfino, A.](#) 2008. Politics of exception and unease: immigration, asylum and terrorism in parliamentary debates in the UK. *Political Studies*, 56(4): 766–788.
- 40. [Intelligence and Security Committee](#). 2007. *Rendition*, London: The Stationery Office.
- 41. [Johns, F.](#) 2005. Guantanamo Bay and the annihilation of the exception. *European Journal of International Law*, 16(4): 613–635.
- 42. [Liberty](#). 2004. *The impact of anti terrorism powers on the British Muslim population*, London: Liberty.
- 43. [Lobo-Guerrero, L.](#) 2011. *Insuring security: biopolitics, security and risk*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- 44. [Machiavelli, N.](#) 1999. *The prince*, Edited by: [Bull, G.A.](#) London: Penguin.
- 45. [Medical Foundation for the Care of the Victims of Torture, The Law Society, Immigration Law Practitioners Association, Refugee Legal Centre, and Liberty](#). 2001. *Joint Statement – Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill*
- 46. [Mueller, J.](#) 2005. Simplicity and spook: terrorism and the dynamics of threat exaggeration. *International Studies Perspectives*, 6(2): 208–234.
- 47. [National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Kean, T.H.](#) and [Hamilton, L.](#) 2004. *The 9/11 commission report: final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- 48. [Neal, A.W.](#) 2006. Foucault in Guantanamo: towards an archaeology of the exception. *Security Dialogue*, 37(1): 31–46. 49. [Neal, A.W.](#) 2008a. Exceptionalism: theoretical and empirical complexities. *International Political Sociology*, 2(1): 87–89.
- 50. [Neal, A.W.](#) 2008b. “Foucault and Butler on discourses of war, law and exceptionalism”. In *Foucault on politics, security and war*, Edited by: [Dillon, M.](#) and [Neal, A.W.](#) 43–64. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 51. [Neal, A.W.](#) 2010. *Exceptionalism and the politics of counter-terrorism: liberty, security and the war on terror*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- 52. [Neal, A.W.](#) 2012a. Normalization and legislative exceptionalism: counterterrorist lawmaking and the changing times of security emergencies. *International Political Sociology*, 6(3)
- 53. [Neal, A.W.](#) 2012b. Terrorism, lawmaking and democratic politics: legislators as security actors. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(3)
- 54. [Neodeous, M.](#) 2008. *Critique of security*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- 55. [Palonen, K.](#) 2006. Two concepts of politics: conceptual history and present controversies. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, 7(1): 11–25. 56. [Prozorov, S.](#) 2005. X/Xs: toward a general theory of the exception. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 30: 81–112. 57. [Richter-Montpetit, M.](#) 2007. Empire, desire and violence: a queer transnational feminist reading of the prisoner ‘abuse’ in Abu Ghraib and the question of ‘gender equality’. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 9: 38–59.
- 58. [Salter, M.B.](#) 2008a. Imagining numbers: risk, quantification, and aviation security. *Security Dialogue*, 39(2–3): 243–266.
- 59. [Salter, M.B.](#) 2008b. Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian air transport security authority. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11(4): 321–349.
- 60. [Scheuerman, W.E.](#) 2006. Survey article: emergency powers and the rule of law after 9/11. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14(1): 61–84. 61. [Schmitt, C.](#) 1985. *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*, Edited by: [Schwab, G.](#) London: MIT Press.
- 62. [Stritzel, H.](#) 2007. Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3): 357–383. 63. [Tierney, S.](#) 2005. Determining the state of exception: what role for parliament and the courts?. *The Modern Law Review*, 68(4): 668–673.
- 64. [Vasquez, J.A.](#) 1993. *The war puzzle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- 65. [Vaughan-Williams, N.](#) 2007. The shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes: new border politics?. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 32(2): 177–195.
- 66. [Wæver, O.](#) 1995. "Securitization and desecuritization". In *On security*, Edited by: [Lipschutz, R.D.](#) 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 67. [Wæver, O.](#) 2000. "The EU as a security actor: reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders". In *International relations theory and the politics of European integration: power, security, and community*, Edited by: [Williams, M.C.](#) and [Kelstrup, M.](#) 250–294. London: Routledge.
- 68. [Waltz, K.N.](#) 1979. *Theory of international politics*, London: McGraw-Hill.
- 69. [Weber, M.](#) 1994. "The profession and vocation of politics". In *Weber: political writings*, Edited by: [Lassman, P.](#) and [Speirs, R.](#) 309–369. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 70. [Williams, M.C.](#) 2003. Words, images, enemies: securitization and international politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47: 511–531.
- 71. [Wolfers, A.](#) 1952. "National security" as an ambiguous symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4): 481–502.

Andrew W. Neal is a lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on Terror (Routledge 2010) and co-editor (with Michael Dillon) of Foucault on Politics, Security and War (Palgrave 2008).

Fire Jihad - Fact or Fiction?

By **James B. Crippin**

Source: <http://news.cbrne-resourcenetwork.com/newsDetail.cfm?id=80>

The term "Fire/Forest Jihad" has been bandied around for several years. It has its supporters and it has its naysayers. For those unfamiliar with the term, it refers to the use of fire by terrorists against civilian targets. The theory (and one that should be considered) is that by setting fires in wildland areas, tremendous resources (both financial and physical) would be depleted from the target country.

The term was originally coined by Al-Ikhlās Islamic Network in November 2007 and Al-JazeeraTalk.net in December 2007. Both

websites have been linked to Al Qaeda. Both have published information to their readers that say that the burning of trees, as a warfare method, is permitted in Islam with quotes from the Qur'an to back it up. The sites say that the "benefits" of the fires are that they will cause casualties, hit tourist income, create timber shortages for domestic, industrial use and pharmaceuticals, and stretch emergency services. They preach that this type of warfare is permitted by Islam and supported by the Quran.

Between 1988 to 1990, there were over 300 forest fires attributed to arson in Israel. The evidence overwhelming pointed that these

were deliberate acts of political sabotage. Numerous Palestinian and Israeli Arabs arsonists were apprehended in the act of setting fires, while others confessed to arson after their arrest. So now we have proof that Fire Jihad does exist, at least in the Middle East. It is not a stretch to imagine it happening elsewhere in the world.

As far as impact, "Fire Jihad" - if it does exist - costs the U.S. alone hundreds of millions of dollars each year. In 2008 the cost totaled over \$952 million, in 2009 over \$107 million, in 2010 less than \$40

million, and in 2011 over \$409 million. These costs were only for fires that covered areas in excess of 40,000 acres, so the actual cost is truly much higher. In January of this year a group calling itself "Masadat Al-Mujahidin" claimed responsibility for fires.

In addition to the U.S., Australia has had numerous fires that could be considered as Jihad in nature. In 2009 Australia suffered one of its worst brush fires in decades. Australia had been singled out as a target for "forest jihad" by a group of Islamic extremists who were urging Muslims to deliberately light bushfires as a weapon of terror. During this fire, 134

Between 1988 to 1990, there were over 300 forest fires attributed to arson in Israel. The evidence overwhelming pointed that these were deliberate acts of political sabotage. Fire Jihad does exist, at least in the Middle East. It is not a stretch to imagine it happening elsewhere in the world.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

people lost their lives and thousands their homes. U.S. intelligence channels early 2009 identified a website calling on Muslims in Australia, the U.S., Europe, and Russia to "start forest fires", claiming "scholars have justified chopping down and burning the infidels' forests when they do the same to our lands". A website carried the information that was posted by a group called the Al-Ikhlis Islamic Network.

Creating a fire in the name of Jihad can be as simple as dropping a match in dry grass to the use of elaborate Improvised Incendiary Devices (IID). The Internet is heavy with information of this kind. At the recent fire that devastated Colorado Springs, Colorado, several possible IIDs were found in burned areas. It has yet to be determined if they had anything to do with the fire, or if in fact they were actual IIDs at all.

Just because fire jihad is being denied does not mean that it has not or could not happen. It is a very cost-effective, viable tool in the terrorist's arsenal. These wildland or brushfires eat up enormous resources in both money and man power. They can and do cause deaths.

They are extremely terrifying to be part of - conflicting orders, rumors, massive TV coverage, authorities knocking on your door in the middle of the night telling you to pack and leave, coming home to a pile of smoldering debris. Trained personnel get stressed. Imagine what kind of effect it has on civilians.

The question remains, "Does Fire Jihad Exist?". As responders and investigators we have to examine all possibilities and ignore nothing. We have too many fires that are unattributed to known causes. There are way too many "caused by lightening" fires. Until full investigations are done and fire jihad ruled out for sure, we do have to consider it - even if there is not a claim for responsibility. I have been involved in past terrorist investigations where the terrorist group shied away from publicity and never claimed public or private credit for their deeds. If we had a group like this actively involved in fire jihad, we might never know.

This article is not to push the concept of "Fire Jihad" but merely to remind others that it has happened in the past and could happen in the future. Stay safe and always check your six.

James B. Crippen has an extensive background in emergency response and crime scene response, and is an internationally-recognized expert in fire debris/explosive response and analysis. He is the Director of the Western Forensic Law Enforcement Training Center (WFLETC), an official training partner of the CBRN Resource Network.

NOTE: A collection of papers on "Pyroterrorism" can be found at Newsletter's website – "CBRNE-CT Papers" section.

Prison Radicalization and Terrorism

By Patrick Dunleavy

Source: <http://news.cbrnresourcenetwork.com/newsDetail.cfm?id=77>

No one sits alone in the vacuum of a prison cell and suddenly becomes radicalized. Can incarcerated jihadists continue to operate from a prison? The answer is a resounding yes.

"If the devil leaders of New York think placing me in [prison] will end the war, they are wrong; this is only the beginning."

These words were spoken by El Sayyid Nosair following the first attack on the World Trade Center. Nosair would later be convicted of the crime in United States Federal Court and sentenced to life in prison, along with his co-defendants and their spiritual leader, Omar Abdel-Rahman.

Were his words prophetic? Did he truly believe that even in the confines of a prison cell a jihadist could still operate? Where does such belief come from? And the more important question, is it an issue that needs to be addressed by Counter Terrorism experts around the globe?

El Sayyid Nosair was an Egyptian immigrant who came to the United States in 1981. Little was known about him until 1990 when he shot and killed a Jewish - Rabbi Meir Kahane, in New York City. He was arrested while trying to flee the scene of the crime. However after a lengthy trial he was found not guilty of the murder. He



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

was found guilty of illegally possessing a gun and for shooting the police officer who attempted to arrest him. For this he was sentenced to seven years in a New York State prison. He was sent to Attica.

At the time, Attica was one of the most secure prisons in the United States. It is an ominous fortress like structure with gun towers and a foreboding look of authoritarian control. Ordinary criminals feared being sent there. Inmates were afforded very few privileges and their movement was strictly monitored by the ever present guards. In the prison there was a Chapel and a Chaplain for each of the major religions. Nosair declared himself a Muslim and was given an assignment to work in the Prison Imam's office. He faithfully attended Jummah service in the prison mosque every Friday with the other Muslim inmates, the majority of which were African-American. Several of those inmates helped him to learn how to use the prison phone system to call friends and family. He taught them the way of jihad.

The Chaplain for whom Nosair worked in the prison either knowingly or unwittingly also allowed Nosair to use the phone in his office, which is contrary to the rules and regulations of the Department and a breach of security because that phone was not monitored nor were there any restrictions on who could be called from it. As a result El Sayyid Nosair was able to maintain contact with his associates in the greater New York / New Jersey area. He also received visits from them. Thus he was able to conspire with them to send a truck loaded with explosives into the basement of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993.

The bombing killed six civilians and injured over one thousand. The jihad had come to America and one of its soldiers was an inmate in prison. Before his co-conspirators were arrested they had also planned to bomb several landmark sites in New York City including the United Nations Headquarters. They acted with a global mindset.

The ensuing investigation revealed that Nosair was a member of an Islamic terrorist organisation called al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Omar Abdel-Rahman, also known as the Blind Sheikh, was the spiritual leader of the group which had ties to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the co-founder and present leader of Al Qaeda.

Prison administrators finally realised Nosair was no ordinary inmate sitting in a prison cell. Shortly thereafter authorities transferred all the

involved jihadists to a more secure prison and sought to isolate them from other inmates in hopes that it would neutralize their ability to act or to influence.

Yet it did not end there. Another of their followers, a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship, was in prison for Robbery and Kidnapping. He had sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden and quietly began to create an Islamic education programme in the prison he was confined. What appeared as a benign programme to teach inmates Arabic and to help them study the Koran was later discovered to be a recruiting programme that helped newly released converts travel overseas to training camps to become mujahideen. This inmate recruiter also utilised the prison Chaplain's office, the phone system and visitors to facilitate the process of radicalisation in prison. He sought out the most vulnerable, those alienated individuals who were seeking acceptance and looking for meaning in their life. He often manipulated their feelings of animosity toward authority and steered them to hate a common enemy, the infidels, the non-Islamists and the Jews.

This inmate recruiter was identified by counter-terrorism investigators as a member of HAMAS. His sole purpose in prison as he saw it was to gain soldiers for Allah in the jihad. He did not discriminate. He chose African-Americans, whites, and Latinos for the cause. His methodology was simple; isolate, commiserate, and then indoctrinate. And it worked.

He also made alliances with other non-Islamic terrorists in prison, members of domestic terrorists organisations with ties to leftist and communist organisations who had been incarcerated in the 1970s for a series of murders and bombings of government buildings. Both now sought to inject their influences and opinions into the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Several of them became active in the Viva Palestina movement, posting statements on the internet in support of Palestinian terrorist organisations, even from their prison cells. Though these groups differed in ideology they found unity. In the ancient proverb, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Prison can produce strange bedfellows. When you take domestic terrorists whether them be Maoists,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Naxals, or Anarchists and put them in prison with Islamic terrorists and then add them to a prison population full of alienated, disenfranchised common criminals with a propensity for violence, you get the “Perfect Storm.” Often what comes out of prison is much worse than what went in.

This problem is not an isolated one, nor is it confined only to one country’s borders. It has happened in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. In the US, individuals like Jose Padilla(1), Michael Finton(2) and James Cromitie(3), are prime examples of prison converts who went on to become committed jihadists willing to kill the innocent for the cause of Allah following their release from prison.

In the United Kingdom, Richard Reid(4), a common criminal of no significance, converted to a radical form of Islam in prison. After his release he attended a mosque led by radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri. Then he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training. Following that he boarded a Paris to Miami flight with a quantity of PETN and TATP explosive in his shoe. He attempted to detonate the “shoe bomb” while in mid air and failing that he was subdued by fellow passengers and taken into custody upon landing.

Another example of this prison phenomena in the UK was Muktar Said Ibrahim(5), an Eritrean immigrant who became radicalised while spending five years in a British prison for robbery. After his release from prison in 2001, he conspired with several others to attack London’s public transport system. He attempted to detonate a bomb on a bus and having failed that, was arrested by authorities on July 21, 2005.

The most recent example of the transformation from common criminal to committed jihadist took place in France in March 2012. Mohamed Merah(6) was the son of Algerian immigrants living in Toulouse, France. He was an unremarkable individual described by some previously as a “petty criminal.” He had been arrested at least fifteen times before being sentenced to a French prison for two years. There, according to his own words, he began to study the Koran. Following his release from prison, he travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training. After that he described himself as a member of Al Qaeda as he went on a rampage killing seven people. Three of the victims were French military personnel, one

was a Rabbi and three were children from a Jewish School. After these horrific acts, Merah was killed in a shootout with French police.

The first description of Merah in the media was that he was “self-radicalised.” This was not only factually erroneous, but also misleading. The relationship between his time in prison and his radicalisation was known by authorities. More than five years earlier, the director of France’s intelligence agency said this about Islamic radicalisation in the prison system; “It is there, in prison that a minority of radical Islamist terrorists hook up with petty criminals who find their way back to religion under its most radical form.”(7)

The cause for this was the result of the successful prosecution of members of the terrorist organisation GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in the 1990s by French authorities for a series of bombings in Paris. Numerous individuals associated with the group were sentenced to long prison terms. The GIA originated in Algeria having been formed by mujahideen returning from Afghanistan after fighting the Soviets in the 1980s.

By placing them in prison they were able to permeate the correctional environment with their global jihadist ideology. The misleading aspect of the “self radicalisation” term ignores the fact that a terrorist is not hatched overnight. A person, radical or not, is a sum of many parts, made up of their cultural background, influences and experiences.

No one sits alone in the vacuum of a prison cell and suddenly becomes radicalized. It is a multi-layered process influenced by both internal and external stimuli.

Can incarcerated jihadists continue to operate from a prison? The answer is a resounding yes.

In 2004 Mohammed A. Salameh, a co-conspirator of Nosair, serving a life sentence in a United States prison for the first World Trade Center bombing, was able to smuggle letters(8) out of the “SuperMax” prison in Florence, Colorado to Mohamed Achraf, an Algerian who had spent a time in jail for minor crimes. Achraf was the architect of the railway system bombing in Madrid, Spain that resulted in one hundred and ninety-one deaths and almost two thousand injured.

Then in 2011 at Pul-e-Charkhi prison, the National Detention Center in Kabul, authorities had in custody Talib Jan. Jan was member of the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Taliban and part of the Haqqani network of insurgents committing terrorist acts against NATO forces in Afghanistan. The group, based in Waziristan, has been suspected of receiving covert support from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

While in the prison, run by Afghan police under the guidance of American trainers, Talib Jan was able to direct terrorist operations. His involvement included the selection of both personnel and targets for attacks. In addition, according to authorities he had the ability to communicate specific instructions to the would-be suicide bombers from his cell.

There are more cases, but as we have seen from these numerous examples world wide the committed jihadists does not stop their efforts when incarcerated. They find new and clever ways to achieve their goal. They are, if anything, patient and adaptable to even the most adverse environment.

What can be done to neutralise this threat? First we must recognise that it is an international problem and a global strategy is necessary to be successful. Second we must develop a multi-pronged approach to dealing with it. We most focus on those terrorists already in prison, creating conditions of confinement that, while humane, render them inoperable. One of the ways we accomplish this is by closing off communication avenues often used by prisoners for elicit gain.

We must also address the sizable prison population who are most susceptible to radicalisation. Those common criminals who if left to themselves will only progress from bad to worse.

Whether this is done by de-radicalisation programmes or counter radicalisation programmes is open for debate. We must however do something. Ignoring the problem will not make it go away.

References

- (1)<http://intelwire.egoplex.com/padilla011104.html>
- (2)<http://www.justice.gov/usao/ilc/press/2009/09September/24Finton.html>
- (3)<http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo052009.htm>
- (4)<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1783237.stm>
- (5)http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/email_news/6634901.stm
- (6)<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17456541>
- (7)http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5bt_tnews%5d=853&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=1818&no_cache=1
- (8)<http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a02wtcbombersencourageqihad#a02wtcbombersencourageqihad>

Patrick Dunleavy is the former Deputy Inspector General for the New York Correctional System and author of The Fertile Soil of Jihad. He has also written for the Washington Times and the New York Post and teaches a class at the United States Military Special Operations School. Following September 11, 2001, at the request of various international agencies he has been a speaker on the topic of terrorist recruitment to organisations such as the FBI, CIA, Scotland Yard and Canadian Intelligence Services.

Piracy on the Rise in the Gulf of Guinea as Niger Delta Militants Move Offshore

By Mark McNamee

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

While the threat of piracy has gained international recognition off the coast of Somalia and farther out into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, pirate activities in the Gulf of Guinea have only recently caught the world's attention. According to the UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO), 64 incidents of piracy were reported in nine countries of the Gulf of Guinea region in 2011, up from 45

incidents in seven countries in 2010 (*Ghanian Chronicle*, May 15). However, one of the defining features of West African piracy is its considerable underreporting, leading most analysts to believe that the level of attacks is in fact significantly higher than is officially reported (AP, March 29). It is widely believed that pirate activity, when unreported events are included,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

has reached levels similar to those experienced off Somalia's coast, which in turn has seen a recent decline in pirate activity. Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have been on the rise for several years, especially following the 2009 of members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The independent criminal gangs responsible for the piracy are composed mainly of former Nigerian rebels that joined the criminal ranks following the amnesty (African Confidential, October 21, 2011). In the opinion of many, the amnesty served largely to benefit the MEND leadership, leaving those in the lower ranks desperate for economic opportunities and open to recruitment for pirate operations.

The surge in attacks has been concentrated in the Gulf of Guinea off the coast of Nigeria and Benin and has naturally led to mounting concern in the shipping industry. In August 2011, maritime insurers in London added the waters of Nigeria and Benin to a list of areas perceived as high risk as a result of increased pirate attacks in the Gulf. According to the International Maritime Bureau, there were 32 piracy incidents recorded off the coasts of Benin, Nigeria, and Togo in the first half of 2012, up from the 25 attacks reported in 2011.

[1] After reporting that West Africa had become a piracy "hotspot," an IMB official further noted that this uptick likely does not reflect an actual increase in attacks but merely better reporting (AllAfrica.com, September 15, 2011; News24 [Lagos], July 18, 2012). In a worrying sign, pirate activity has occurred over the past year in Beninese and Togolese waters where no incidents were reported in 2010 or in early 2011. While attacks have traditionally centered off the coast of Nigeria's Niger Delta, the waters of Benin and Togo have become increasingly risky because of these nations' weak enforcement capabilities, leading former MEND rebels-turned-pirates to shift their operations away from Nigeria's comparably better patrolled waters. Moreover, the pirates have taken their activities to deeper waters, mirroring attacks by their Somali counterparts.

Attacks in West Africa generally target tankers along with oilfield service and support vessels.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has escalated over the years from low-level armed robberies to hijackings, cargo thefts, and large-scale robberies. Unlike Somali piracy, the attackers have not been driven by ransom payments. Pirates often take hijacked tankers to another

empty tanker to collect its siphoned fuel to be sold on the black market. The original vessel is then brought back and released. In a prominent incident highlighting this method, armed pirates boarded a tanker on September 14, 2011, kidnapping 23 sailors off the coast of Benin about 62 nautical miles from the Beninese port of Cotonou, one of the farthest offshore seizures ever recorded in West Africa. The pirates sailed to an unknown location and released the crew unharmed ten days later after having unloaded its cargo of oil (AP, October 11, 2011; September 14, 2011). Benin's underequipped patrol force was hours away and powerless to intervene.

The territorial waters of Nigeria and Cameroon have traditionally served as the focus of piracy in West Africa, driven in part by Nigeria's oil assets. The International Maritime Bureau warned ships to "steer clear of waters off Nigeria" after a trio of piracy attacks that occurred in early February, including a deadly assault on the master and chief engineer of a cargo vessel who were shot and killed by pirates about 90 nautical miles south of Lagos (AFP, February 27). The other attacks included a tanker that was briefly hijacked and a thwarted attack on an international shipping vessel (Vanguard [Lagos], February 13). Meanwhile, thanks to the increased focus of the Cameroonian Navy since 2010, there has been a decline in incidents in Cameroonian waters, which is believed to have pushed pirates westward, resulting in a marked increase in piracy precisely since that time in Benin and Togo. [2]

Ostensibly, attacks declined in Nigeria's waters in 2009 and 2010 thanks to a security crackdown in its waters and a general amnesty granted to southern rebels in 2009. However, it is believed that the lower levels of pirate attacks are more attributable to significant underreporting since the amnesty. [3] An IMB official has cited government pressure as a possible reason for this under-reporting (News24 [Lagos], July 18). In addition, the victims of the attacks themselves have an incentive to not report an incident in order to avoid the resultant higher insurance premiums.

Whatever the precise number of pirate incidents, piracy is inflicting a significant economic toll on the region. The nations of the Gulf of Guinea are reportedly losing \$2 billion annually to maritime crime, according to the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Nigerian Navy (This Day [Lagos], February 23). Moreover, Benin saw a 70% decrease in the past year in the number of ships entering its main port of Cotonou, which carries 90% of Benin's trade, representing 80% of the government's budget. Cotonou is a critical port for landlocked nations to the north, according to the Minister of State in Charge of National Defense in Benin. [4]

As in Somalia, the future of West African piracy in the long term depends on the security and economic situation on the mainland. It will be impossible to achieve substantive improvements in the fight against piracy through purely defensive tactics on the open sea. For real improvement, the benefits of legitimate economic pursuits on the mainland would have to outweigh the benefits of piracy for would-be buccaneers.

Notes:

1. According to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau's (IMB) Global Piracy Report, released on July 16, 2012, <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/747-six-month-drop-in-world-piracy-imb-report-shows>.
2. Comments by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice at a Security Council Debate on Piracy and Maritime Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, as reported in AllAfrica.com, February 27, 2012.
3. IMB Global Piracy Report, op cit.
3. United Nations Security Council Meeting, February 27, 2012, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10558.doc.htm>.

Jamestown analyst Mark McNamee is an Intelligence Analyst for Sub-Saharan Africa at an international risk consulting firm in the Washington, D.C. region as well as a contract employee for the U.S. Army Combating Terrorism Center.

Why won't EU call Hezbollah terrorists?

By Benjamin Weinthal

Source: <http://www.jpost.com/Features/InTheSpotlight/Article.aspx?id=279251>

Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman's diplomatic push last week in Brussels to convince the EU to designate the Lebanese-based Hezbollah group as a terror entity was met with robust resistance.

Liberman sought to inject new life into the drive

Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, whose country heads the 26-member EU presidency, said there is "no consensus among the EU member states for putting Hezbollah on the terrorist list of the organization," and claimed there is "no tangible evidence of Hezbollah engaging in acts of terrorism."

Counter-terrorism blogs and experts on both sides of the Atlantic were immediately awash with reactions that quickly mounted overwhelming evidence to refute Kozakou-Marcoullis's contentions.

Jacob Campbell, a research fellow at the Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy in the United Kingdom, and author of a report in late June on the EU

"Helping Hezbollah," told The Jerusalem Post on Friday, "Within just days of the Burgas bombing – almost undoubtedly perpetrated by Hezbollah – the Presidency of the EU Council explicitly ruled out the possibility of



to outlaw Hezbollah because of the murders of five Israelis and a Bulgarian bus driver on July 18. Israeli and US intelligence agencies believe Hezbollah carried out the suicide bombing at Bulgaria's Burgas airport.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

listing Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, insisting that there is no ‘tangible evidence’ to link Hezbollah to terrorism. This ludicrous statement was made despite an earlier resolution adopted by the European Parliament, which cites ‘clear evidence’ of terrorist acts committed by Hezbollah. On this issue, as in so many others, Brussels appears to have its head buried firmly in the sand.”

The United States classifies Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

Writing on his World Affairs blog, the US Mideast expert Michael J. Totten wrote that Hezbollah’s “first act of terrorism was the destruction of the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983. I could sit here all day and list all the incidents between then and now, but I won’t. European officials know perfectly well what Hezbollah has done. Their refusal to blacklist it has nothing to do with their ignorance or with Hezbollah’s innocence.”

In an exhaustive account on the popular Long War Journal news website, Bill Roggio, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, documented that “Hezbollah has provided support and training to other terror groups to carry out suicide operations, including Hamas and al-Qaida.”

Though the UK has outlawed the military wing of Hezbollah, the Iran-sponsored group continues to have wide political and organizational latitude across Europe to advance its ideology and increase its operational potency. According to Germany’s domestic intelligence agency (Verfassungsschutz), Hezbollah has roughly 900 active members in the Federal Republic. Germany, like France, has showed no appetite for a ban of Hezbollah. France has shied away from imposing a ban on the group so as to preserve its diplomatic influence in Lebanon.

Major security blind spots toward EU and Israeli security filled the German media after the Bulgaria attack. The head of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Ruprecht Polenz told a German radio program that there is no proof that Iran or its proxy Hezbollah was behind the attack in Bulgaria. Polenz, a controversial deputy from Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party, is engulfed in an anti-Israel scandal because of his support for a German “peace activist” who has denigrated Israel.

There has, however, been one national-based legislative resolution to urge the EU to pull the

plug on oxygen for Hezbollah’s main supporter, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Dutch parliament in late 2009, in an initiative first reported in the Post, urged, in a broad-based crossparty resolution, that the EU ban the Revolutionary Guard Corps because, “this organization has played a leading role during the bloody suppression of the recent popular protests [against the fixed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] and that it is increasingly active in facilitating international terrorism, among which support to Hamas, Hezbollah and anti-Western militias in Iraq.”

The EU simply ignored the Dutch appeal. Last summer, lawmakers in Italy’s Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a resolution calling for the international community to ratchet up its pressure on Syrian President Bashar Assad, to “end his government’s repression of democracy activists, as well as Iran’s and Hezbollah’s influence in Syria.”

The EU, once again, took no action against Hezbollah.

Prof. Gerald Steinberg, the head of the Jerusalem-based watchdog group NGO Monitor, told the Post that “in Lebanon, millions of euros from the EU budget are provided under the banner of ‘education reform,’ while the education minister has mandated the teaching of ‘Resistance,’ meaning Hezbollah terrorism, backed by Iran, as demonstrated tragically in Bulgaria.

Without full transparency in decision-making and independent evaluation, the history of EC failure in dealing with Middle Eastern realities is perpetuated.”

The Post first reported on Germany’s Interior Ministry issuing an administrative order in 2008 that merely restricted the Hezbollah television station Al-Manar from buying advertisements, fund-raising for its Beirut studio and the reception of its programs in German hotels. According to the Brussels-based European Foundation for Democracy, “Al-Manar TV was removed from all European satellites in 2004 and 2005 when it was found to violate European and national audiovisual directives.”

The foundation has long argued that Al-Manar ought to be banned because its programs are “aimed at spreading violent ideologies, jihadism, indoctrinating young children with hate, inciting terrorism and glorifying suicide bombers, spreading viciously anti-Semitic



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

propaganda, and calling for attacks against Western targets. Al-Manar TV reaches between 10-15 million viewers daily and is used by Hezbollah to recruit terrorists and reportedly is used communicate with sleeper cells around the globe.”

Israel has, without a doubt, a dog in the fight to ban Hezbollah in Europe, because the group

seeks to obliterate the Jewish state and to murder its civilians and Jews abroad. Hezbollah killings of French soldiers in Beirut and the Bulgarian bus driver would suggest that the EU also has a major dog in the fight, but it is still unwilling to confront Hezbollah.

Benjamin Weinthal is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a reporter for The Jerusalem Post.

The Complexities of Maritime Security

By Philip Dwyer

Source:http://blackwaterusa.com/2012/07/the-complexities-of-maritime-security/?utm_source=July+28+BTW&utm_campaign=BTW+July+28&utm_medium=email



Pirates in the Gulf of Aden – A Scenario

The thick salty air hangs low as evening nautical twilight gives way to the night’s pitch black. With cloud cover hanging low, the running lights on the fully laden freighter are the only lights that Mark sees as he stands watch on the port-side, upper deck. Mark is fully aware these are dangerous, pirate-infested waters and a risky passage for any cargo vessel. This ship is taking steps to mitigate its risk, however, by having Mark and his team onboard.



As a former Special Forces team member, Mark is highly trained in visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) tactics, and given that this is his tenth Gulf of Aden passage as a member of a small maritime security team he’s got more than enough experience.

The faint, green glow on Mark’s watch tells him it is just past 1am AST. Out of the corner of his eye, just where the ship’s lights drown in the endless dark, Mark detects a faint contrast.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Before he knows what he's seen, a skiff darts into view, aimed for the ship's hull. The vessel rocks to starboard as the shipmaster orders evasive maneuvers. Then, there's the unmistakable clank of a missed grappling hook bouncing off the side of the ship and men shouting from below at the water's surface.

Mark's earpiece buzzes with chatter, his weapon is already trained at the pirate vessel. His finger has reflexively eased nearly half of the trigger's pressure. The hammer is ready to fall.

Mark's next action should be the result of intricate planning, decision making, and training processes.

Maritime security as it relates to armed, shipboard security teams is one of the most complex security domains today. That's due mainly to the large number of decision makers, complicated legalities associated with the movement of international merchant vessels between many countries, and the lack of standardization in the planning and execution of the security.

The Many Facets of Maritime Security

Are you thinking about a career in Maritime Security? If this is the path you're going to follow but you've not done your homework, you're already behind the power curve. Any professional in this space needs to be familiar with the issues and topics. Maritime security is a large topic that includes both shipboard and port facility security. Shipboard security, highlighted by today's piracy threat, is one of the most complex fields of armed security. Why?

Christian Cartner, maritime security subject matter expert and author of *Defending Against Pirates: The International Law of Small Arms, Armed Guards and Privateers*, says, "Maritime security is a complex topic because not only is the operational environment by necessity more dynamic and mobile but the legal and operational planning aspects are exceptional." Christian says further, "In maritime security not only is the location constantly changing, so is the threat dynamic regionally and locally. Legally, the course of a voyage with an embarked security team may cover any number of nation states, and the



patchwork of laws, regulations and rules all come into play with what are necessarily armed teams aboard a ship."

Myriad stakeholders are involved in the shipboard maritime security decision-making process. A few of these stakeholders include the local country authority, the flag state authority, the ship's owner, the ship's operator, the insurer, the ship's Master, and the operators providing the security.

Each of these stakeholders influences the security posture of the vessel and how security will be deployed operationally (i.e. rules of engagement) during transit. Each stakeholder often has varying levels of influence during the entire lifecycle of one transit. The result is that both



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the planning and execution of effective maritime security require significant, thoughtful effort and coordination. The very presence of Mark and his team onboard the vessel is a decision that has almost certainly been the topic of many discussions among the various stakeholders involved in this transit. In creating any plan it is essential to know the rules and regulations—the boundaries for what can and can't be done.

Regulations and Standards

Title 46 of the U.S. Code is maritime law for merchant mariners. Like a lot of legal documents, it's not an easy read. But also like a lot of legal documents, a thorough knowledge of it is vital for the professionals it concerns.

One significant aspect of shipboard security is the weapons used in the application of that security.

Who is authorized to carry weapons onboard a merchant vessel? In short, no one. The Code makes no stipulation for carrying of weapons onboard by crew members. The ship's crew is subject to standing regulations as defined by the Master of the ship. So, what does the Master of the ship say about this? It depends.

In keeping with long standing naval tradition, the buck stops with the Master or Captain of any vessel.

And because different people see things differently, the situation is further complicated. Yes, the ship's Master is limited in what he can do and enforce, but he has a significant amount of control and influence over what happens onboard. This is absolutely the way things should be, but differences in the regulation of shipboard security teams only create issues—not solve them.

Thus far we've only talked about U.S. Code. When ships move into the territorial jurisdiction of other nations they are also subject to those local laws. This has, and will continue to generate issues. For example, some governments disapprove of merchant ships with armed security guards calling their ports. This has resulted in extremely inefficient practices like dumping weapons overboard or making extra stops just to disembark armed teams. A set of enforceable, international regulations would solve this problem by forcing standardization in the planning and application of security.

The actions Mark and his team take next should rest on the foundation of these international regulations.

In Comes the International Maritime Organization

From an international perspective, continued standardization of both the approach and application of maritime shipboard security will reduce complexity and risk. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, has done very good work thus far in standardizing an approach. The IMO's International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) is a comprehensive risk-management approach meant to provide a standardized framework for governments to reduce security vulnerabilities of both ships and port facilities.

Specifically in response to piracy, the IMO has issued guidance to flag states, security companies providing private maritime services, and shipowners and ship masters. IMO Piracy Guidance represents a very specific international step forward in a standardized approach to anti-piracy, but it has its shortfalls. Guidance is, after all, just guidance.

Laws, codes, regulations and standards all have purpose, but somehow they need to boil down to a very specific set of rules that can be applied in a tactical counter-piracy environment. We need rules of engagement.

Rules of Engagement – Does Mark Pull the Trigger?

Rules of engagement (ROE) are nothing new. They are just as important in the shipboard counter-piracy environment as they are on the ground in Afghanistan. They have to be clearly defined and consistently applied. This requires a well-defined chain of command and appropriate training.

February 15, 2012, is a date that underscores the absolute criticality of these rules. That was the day two Italian Marines onboard the *Enrica Lexie* mistakenly opened fire on a fishing boat, killing two Indian fishermen. The case has strained relations between Italy and India, and it serves as an example of how things can go completely wrong.

The security detachment onboard the *Enrica Lexie* were Italian military. Having military security onboard civilian vessels is not new. However, it presents a scenario where the chain of command gets confusing, and the result can turn deadly. A military detachment will,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

ultimately, not report to the civilian shipmaster; they already have a defined chain of command. In contrast, a privately contracted security team will, more likely than not, report directly to the shipmaster, thus this chain of command will be much less ambiguous when the ROE must be applied operationally. Any ROE should represent a stair-step approach to an escalating situation. Training for scenarios when specific steps have to be taken, sometimes very rapidly, requires effort, which ultimately means there is a cost. This training must start in the classroom, move to “sand-table” exercises, and progress to scenario-based, live-fire exercises. Deadly force is the absolute last step in any escalation. There are many non-lethal devices that can be deployed by ship crews and security teams, and those devices



require yet more training. The cost associated with this training, however, is a very small price to pay to avoid incidents like that of the *Enrica Lexie*.

Is Mark 100 percent certain he's aiming at the bad guy? Are there other ways to de-escalate the situation that don't involve gunfire?

Maritime Security Careers Now and Into the Future

Maritime Security is an excellent career choice for any security professional. There are several factors that will contribute to the growth of this field including:

Limited Resources – The military and other government security resources are already stretched very thin, and that trend will likely continue into the future. The Coast Guard, our primary domestic maritime security risk deterrent, serves as a primary example. “The Coast Guard’s primary challenge is utilizing its limited resources to meet its security workload. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Coast Guard field units have seen a substantial increase in their security workload,” according to a 2007 GAO report to Congressional Requesters.

Private security professionals will be called in to fill the gaps in maritime security both domestically and internationally, as they are in other security domains now. In an increasingly global economic marketplace the amount of transoceanic cargo is only set to increase.

More Standardization and Better Processes – Maritime security is not new per se but it has been thrust to the forefront as technology and politics change the face of terrorism. As standardization of the application of maritime security continues, new career paths will be defined. Now, much of the focus centers on operators. There are job opportunities open for security specialists in the maritime environment. But new career paths and skill sets need to be defined in this space and will be.

Consider the role of security planning and coordination. Consider the specialized legal and support roles. Consider certified risk management consultants who can analyze both port and



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

shipboard security according to standard. Consider process improvement experts who can analyze shipboard and port security processes and refine them to be more efficient and less costly. There are many considerations in this developing field.

National Security – Never forget that our most important energy commodities such as oil, gasoline, and natural gas are completely dependent on open and unimpeded sea-lanes. This fact alone will continue to drive opportunities for security professionals in this space. According to 2011 testimony before a House of Representatives subcommittee by Stephen Caldwell, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, “Energy tankers face risks from various types of attack. We identified three primary types of attack methods against energy tankers in our 2007 report, including suicide attacks, armed assaults by terrorists or armed bands, and launching a ‘standoff’ missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon fired from a distance.” Government security and law enforcement forces are reducing the risk, but not enough.

Closing

Maritime Security is a large, complex security domain. Specifically, there are many decision makers who are involved in planning and executing this type of security. There are also multiple legal jurisdictions that have to be accounted for when considering maritime security in the context of deployed, counter-piracy security teams.

Continued work in developing enforceable, international regulations and standardization in the planning and execution of maritime security, and the training of those involved, is an absolute must. This will help ensure that security teams, like Mark’s, are as prepared as they can be to safely and legally mitigate the



growing risk of piracy.

Any professional considering a career in this niche should be well-versed in the current news, trends and issues associated with it. There is excellent career potential here and not just as a trigger puller.

This career niche will expand to include other professions as it matures. Remember, to date, no vessel with armed security aboard has been taken by pirates.

Phil Dwyer works for SCN Resources Group.



In combat and in life!

Source: <http://www.kleinenwiese.com/Blog/2012/great-book-great-dogs-gsds-play-a-major-role>

Photographed by Jared Dort



German shepherds play a key role in defending our nation as military working dogs, many of which are featured in the New York Times bestselling book **Soldier Dogs: The Untold Story of America's Canine Heroes** by Maria Goodavage, including Tina M111, pictured. "If this doesn't prepare you for Afghanistan, nothing will," Air Force Technical Sergeant Adam Miller says. He's talking about the IASK course, a soldier dog and handler training exercise, in Yuma, Arizona. It's

114 degrees outside, and Miller has to carry his dog, Tina M111, to safety, demonstrating what a handler must do if their dog is injured in battle.

Military Working Dog Medevaced with Shot Paw

Source: <http://usnavyjeep.blogspot.gr/2011/08/k-9-soldier-cujo-gets-care-he-needs-as.html>



As some of you Kit Up! readers may have seen — last week Military.com sent two of the editorial staff to Bagram, Afghanistan to look at the USAF's Aeromedical Evacuation teams and the various phases of care delivered to our combat wounded.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Thanks to the USAF's Air Mobility Command we caught a ride from Ramstein to JB McGuire / Dix / Lakehurst and I got the chance to chat with some of the flight crew about the things they've seen and experienced in their job.

It turns out that just two days earlier they had a very special guest on their C-17 – this military working dog is named Cujo and while the crew didn't know a lot of details about what happened to him they told me he had been shot in the leg a few days earlier and was given the same professional and competent level of care as his human colleagues during his med-evac. He is expected to make a full recovery.

Heroes that few respect!

Source: <http://9gag.com/gag/1865831>



The two police dogs who died in service were cremated on the afternoon of Friday (Jan 20), with military honors of state, in the crematorium for animals Pet Memorial Pampulha, Pampulha in the region of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais.

The German shepherd Dox and Lyon were part of the 1st Company of Special Assignment, in count, and were shot dead during a police action on Tuesday (17), in pursuit of robbers who had robbed a house on Seven Ponds.

About 30 soldiers were moved and cried in the dismissal of the dogs. The ashes of the animals were taken to the 1st Company, Inconfidentes in the neighborhood, where they will inaugurate the Gallery of Heroes of the Military Police.

According to Captain Paul Roberto Alves, Dox was six and a half years old and was taken to the corporation about six months of life. There was only one year for the dog to receive his "retirement." Lyon already had three years and was also taken as a puppy to the PM.

- These animals participated in hundreds of operations and were specialized in capture. In the last five months have been highlighted in at least ten times. All the company is shaken.

The caregiver of Lyon, the soldier Wellys Lucindo Rodrigues, was moved and was comforted by other soldiers. He was off duty at the time the dog was shot.

- Once you know how I got my uniform and gun and went to the occurrence. I created, trained and cared Dox. It was like my family.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

According to the soldier Luis Antonio Castro Maciel, caretaker of Dox, missing less than a year for the animal to go definitely to your home. He said he only expects justice to the villain who killed the dogs.
 - It's like losing a child. I'm still trying to recover. Did I put them in the bush on this instance? We take care for the animal, as socialized every day.

As the lieutenant Edmar Geraldo dos Santos, in 25 years, this is the third episode of military dogs killed in action, with a total of four slaughtered animals. He said the coldness of the bandits; if the animals had not entered into action probably people were being veiled.

- Dogs are used to preserve the life of the military.

HARBINGER e-Zine (July 2012)

Source:http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/3a11b169?goback=.gde_3711808_member_140343075#3a11b169/1



The economic downturn: a boon for home-grown terrorists?

By Brooke Rogers

Source:<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Threads-Within/homegrown-terrorism-socio-economics/EN/index.htm>

The majority of studies conclude that socio-economic factors are poor indicators of terrorism. Yet factors such as poverty and education continue to be portrayed as fundamental drivers of terrorist violence in political rhetoric and practice targeted at preventing terrorism.

As we sit in the middle of an ongoing economic crisis, socio-economic issues have been forced into the limelight.

At first glance, the global financial crisis has certainly brought about distinctive conditions. These include:

- A widespread lack of economic growth,
- youth unemployment rates of over 50% in countries like Spain and Greece
- increasing levels of anti-austerity unrest across Europe, and
- rumours of contingency plans to restrict immigration in countries in the event of a financial collapse.

Does the current socio-economic landscape create the perfect storm for domestic, home-grown terrorist group recruitment? The resounding response to this question is ‘perhaps’.



Unemployment, especially among the young, is rising across many countries. How will this affect homegrown terrorism patterns?

Current thought is evolving in respect to this question. There is now a more nuanced discussion of the similarities and differences between domestic terror and international terror. There’s a move away from simply asking ‘if’ to asking ‘how’ socio-economic factors might influence participation in or

support for terrorists groups.

evidence that directly contradicts the assumed link between poverty and terrorism can be found across multiple case studies of terrorists

Let us take poverty as an example. It has been flagged repeatedly as a potential primary driver of membership of terrorist organisations. Put simply, poverty - and unemployment - are often blamed for creating feelings of hopelessness and desperation. Poor economic conditions foster a lack of economic opportunities, resulting in a limited number of options for gainful employment. This generates a positive relationship between unemployment and individual levels of willingness to engage in terrorist violence, but this relationship is complicated.



Police respond to a botched homegrown terrorist attack on Glasgow airport in 2007. The two assailants were a medical doctor and a PhD student.

For example, while individuals from higher GDP countries are more likely to have a range of economic activities available to them and less likely to engage in terrorist activities, high levels of unemployment can increase the potential for terror organisations to recruit well-

educated individuals capable of carrying out more effective, brutal attacks.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Conversely, economic growth has also been associated with increases in terrorism and support for terrorism. In this instance, economic growth has been shown to fuel political and social unrest as a result of the shockwaves of change that reverberate through a society. These changes cause higher degrees of social inequity. This fuels discontent and frustration, leaving the door open to terrorist groups who are keen to channel and offer solutions to the frustrations.

Furthermore, evidence that directly contradicts the assumed link between poverty and terrorism can be found across multiple case studies of terrorists.

- Bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers came from comfortable backgrounds.
- Two-thirds of British terror suspects are reported to come from middle-class backgrounds.
- Hezbollah terrorists are allegedly educated to a higher degree than the pool from which they are drawn.

In summary, these mixed and, at times, contradictory findings, make it impossible to identify a straightforward association between poverty and terrorist group membership or support at this point in time.

'Level of education' has also been in the frame in popular discussions about the ability of terrorist groups to brainwash vulnerable, uneducated individuals. Nevertheless, a growing body of evidence suggests that individuals become politicised through education and that higher levels of education and socio-economic status can be associated with higher levels of support for (and participation in) terrorism. For example, individuals living far below the poverty line may be too distracted by issues of mere survival to consider engaging in terrorism, while educated individuals (especially unemployed, educated individuals) are more likely to have the time and necessary skills to engage with new ideas/solutions and to adapt and fit into a variety of environments needed for a successful attack. These skills make highly educated individuals attractive recruits to terrorist organisations.

Some researchers have argued that the repeated focus on international terrorism is irrational, as incidents of domestic terrorism are far more numerous than international terrorist incidents (less than 20% of reported attacks).

This is not an entirely new trend as evidence for this argument can be found in the case of the journalist, Ulrike Meinhof - of the Baader-Meinhoff gang. More recently, the perpetrator of the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 was a psychiatrist in the US Army, and Glasgow Airport was attacked by a medical doctor and a man with an engineering PhD 2007.

Clearly, higher levels of education, combined with poor economic opportunities have the potential to increase the appeal of terrorist organisations to disgruntled individuals. These findings go some way towards explain the lack of political will to fully reject support for the link between socio-economic factors and terrorism. As a result, the continued political focus on social issues in order to prevent terrorism appears to have some basis.

Observations drawn from this empirical evidence base deserve a cautionary note in relation to home-grown terrorism, as they are built primarily upon an understanding of international terrorism. Some researchers have argued that the repeated focus on international terrorism is irrational, as incidents of domestic terrorism are far more numerous than international terrorist incidents (less than 20% of reported attacks). In fact, some suggest that domestic terrorism incidents outnumber international terrorist incidents by eight to one. Others believe that countries with higher levels of economic development experience more terrorist attacks than those with lower economic development.

Debates and discussions in this area must refocus the analytical lens onto domestic terrorism and, thus, home-grown terrorism to truly understand the similarities and differences between these two types of terrorism. This refocus is likely to have lasting implications for national and international policy and practice, and may open the door to a new understanding of the relationship between socio-economic factors and home-grown terrorism.

How will the relationships between socio-economic issues such as poverty, level of education and terrorism manifest themselves in today's recession-riddled world? While the evidence suggests that terrorists are not any more likely to come from an economically deprived or uneducated background, the potential of economic changes to fuel political and social unrest requires additional exploration. Will the shockwaves of austerity measures create new or additional social inequalities and fuel frustrations over poor expectations about future economic options? Will these dynamics improve the terrorist organisations' ability to recruit highly educated individuals?



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

We are still unable to provide a definitive response to these questions but the evidence suggests that, whilst not creating a perfect storm, the current economic crisis has created a 'weather front' worthy of observation.

Dr. Brooke Rogers is a Senior Lecturer in Risk and Terror in the Department of War Studies, and a co-Director of the MA in Terrorism, Security and Society at King's College London. Her current terrorism research focuses on responding to terrorism and violent radicalization.

"Free Syrian Army" is Al Qaeda: WikiLeaks Propaganda About Chemical Weapons in Syria

By Susanne Posel

Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=32127>

Members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are not just tied to al-Qaeda, the CIA-funded fake Islamic terrorist group, they ARE al-Qaeda. In a video of members of the FSA, these men are brandishing AK-47s provided to them by the CIA and have al-Qaeda flags flying in the background.

Al-Qaeda has been used by the US government in insurgent recruitment and in destabilizing Middle Eastern governments. The new recruits, being trained by the CIA in Turkey, then being allocated to the FSA and being used to destroy the Syrian government are directly tied to al-Qaeda. In the mainstream media, al-Qaeda is still touted as a separate terrorist organization with no ties to the US government.

Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister, is now decrying that his involvement in assisting the CIA has created a backlash of violence in his own country and compromised their national security.

Erdogan is reluctant to continue to cooperate with CIA training facilities that create more "troops" for the FSA who are released into Syria through the Turkish border. The further involvement of Turkey in attempting to "handover Assad" to the US government through the use of fake terrorist organizations is causing a Kurdish outcry while military training camps are turning out "a good number of Kurds" who have been taught how to covertly support the US and Israel movement toward forced regime change in Syria.

Abu Thuha (a pseudonym) is an al-Qaeda operative who claims that "we have experience now fighting the Americans, and more experience now with the Syrian revolution. Our big hope is to form a Syrian-Iraqi Islamic state for all Muslims, and then announce our war against Iran and Israel, and free Palestine."

The terrorist activity in Syria has been directly committed by oppositional groups that are being controlled and directed by the US government in order to facilitate internal conflict, says a study by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Joseph Holiday, analyst for the ISW, who studies the influence al-Qaeda has had on the Arab Spring, asserts: "The emergence of Al

Qaeda-linked terrorist cells working against the regime poses risks to the United States and a challenge to those calling for material support of the armed opposition. It's something to keep an eye out for, the convergence of Iraq and Syria. As the Syrian government loses the ability to project force on the periphery of its territory, what you're going to see is an emboldened Sunni opposition emerging in Nineveh and Iraq."

Daniel Byman, a professor and counterterrorism expert at Georgetown University as well as a fellow of the Brookings Institute, says that it is obvious that al-Qaeda is becoming more active in Syria. This terrorist organization was used by the US government in Somalia and Mali, and before that in Chechnya and Yemen, and the group is currently trying to turn a local conflict to its advantage. "There's no question Al Qaeda wants to do that, and they are actually pretty good at this sort of thing," said Byman. "They've done well at taking a local conflict" and taking it global. "They learned a lot from Iraq," he remarks. "They even write about this — they say, 'We got on the wrong side of the locals.'

Along with use of fake terrorist groups, Syria is being accosted with false claims of chemical weapons which are being tied to Iran by the US government and Israel. Documents provided by the European Union are being used to support the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

WMDs false flag. The EU says they provided the technical assistance and equipment as well as \$14.2 million to the Syrian Ministry of Industry in 2010. The EU says that now these procurements are being used to create a chemical weapon's program.

An EU spokesperson says that the money they gave Syria was supposed to be allocated to safety standards for products and laboratories, but now they believe it has been used to create chemical weapons.

James Quinlivan, senior operations research analyst at the RAND Corporation, a globalist front for Elite agendas, claims that "calibration is a big deal for these things. While mustard [gas] lasts amazingly well, nerve agents do not. For nerve gases, particularly sarin, retention relies on purity, and this must be tested."

WikiLeaks have been working with the US State Department in framing Iran and Syria, as the website has built a following and reputation as being an exposé of wrong-doings by governments. Yet, the WikiLeaks phenomena is also created and controlled by the US government and only "leaks" information that is useful to the US government's agendas and strategies overseas.



The so-called "Syrian Files" were nothing more than propaganda planted by the US government in conjunction with Julian Assange to divert attention, create false claims against Syria and promote the coming military strike against Syria.

Surfacing just in time to prove that Syria has WMDs is a 2006 communication that was

supposedly confidential which claims Syria and Iran are working together to develop 5 new chemical weapons plants; in particular that Syria has new sites that are fronts for manufacturing facilities.

This time the global Elite are not just claiming that the "enemy" has WMDs, they are planting the evidence so that the debacle that faced former President George W Bush with Iraq's non-existent WMDs will not be an issue.

According to the falsified documents provided by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat states: "Iran would provide the construction design and equipment to annually produce tens to hundreds of tons of precursors for VX, sarin, and mustard [gas]. Engineers from Iran's DIO [Defense Industries Organization] were to visit Syria and survey locations for the plants, and construction was scheduled from the end of 2005-2006."

A 2008 correspondence by the US State Department says that Syria has become "sophisticated in its efforts to move equipment and resources from civilian programs to weapons development."

According to the document "the Australians believe Syria is committed to improving and expanding its program, including through testing. Syria maintains a basic indigenous capability, in contrast to other countries of concern, but maintains some dependence on precursor imports. . . . Syria appears focused on importing precursors and precursors of precursors."

The false flag assertion of Syrian chemical weapons is giving the international community the necessary fuel to support the US/Israeli military attack of Syria. It is being kept secret from the general public with the assistance of the MSM that the murder of Syrian civilians is being committed by the FSA under the direction of the CIA, the script being played out to keep Assad's armies under foot with "little chance of turning defeat into victory."

Susanne Posel is a frequent contributor to Global Research.



Al-Qaida turns tide for rebels in battle for eastern Syria

Source: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/30/al-qaida-rebels-battle-syria>

In his latest exclusive dispatch from Deir el-Zour province, **Ghaith Abdul-Ahad** meets fighters who have left the Free Syrian Army for the discipline and ideology of global jihad



A member of a jihadist group sprays the slogan 'No Islam without Jihad' in Arabic on the wall at a border crossing with Turkey. Photograph: Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images

As they stood outside the commandeered government building in the town of Mohassen, it was hard to distinguish Abu Khuder's men from any other brigade in the Syrian civil war, in their combat fatigues, T-shirts and beards.

But these were not average members of the Free Syrian Army. Abu Khuder and his men fight for al-Qaida. They call themselves the *ghuraba'a*, or "strangers", after a famous jihadi poem celebrating Osama bin Laden's time with his followers in the Afghan mountains, and they are one of a number of jihadi organisations establishing a foothold in the east of the country now that the conflict in Syria has stretched well into its second bloody year.

They try to hide their presence. "Some people are worried about carrying the [black] flags," said Abu Khuder. "They fear America will come and fight us. So we fight in secret. Why give Bashar and the west a pretext?" But their existence is common knowledge in Mohassen. Even passers-by joke with the men about car bombs and IEDs.

According to Abu Khuder, his men are working closely with the military council that commands the Free Syrian Army brigades in the region. "We meet almost every day," he said. "We

have clear instructions from our [al-Qaida] leadership that if the FSA need our help we should give it. We help them with IEDs and car bombs. Our main talent is in the bombing operations." Abu Khuder's men had a lot of experience in bomb-making from Iraq and elsewhere, he added.

Abu Khuder spoke later at length. He reclined on a pile of cushions in a house in Mohassen, resting his left arm which had been hit by a sniper's bullet and was wrapped in plaster and bandages. Four teenage boys kneeled in a tight crescent in front of him, craning their necks and listening with awe. Other villagers in the room looked uneasy.

Abu Khuder had been an officer in a mechanised Syrian border force called the Camel Corps when he took up arms against the regime. He fought the security forces with a pistol and a light hunting rifle, gaining a reputation as one of the bravest and most ruthless men in Deir el-Zour province and helped to form one of the first FSA battalions.

He soon became disillusioned with what he saw as the rebel army's disorganisation and inability to strike



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

at the regime, however. He illustrated this by describing an attempt to attack the government garrison in Mohassen. Fortified in a former textile factory behind concrete walls, sand bags, machine-gun turrets and armoured vehicles, the garrison was immune to the rebels' puny attempt at assault.

"When we attacked the base with the FSA we tried everything and failed," said Abu Khuder. "Even with around 200 men attacking from multiple fronts they couldn't injure a single government soldier and instead wasted 1.5m Syrian pounds [£14,500] on firing ammunition at the walls."

Then a group of devout and disciplined Islamist fighters in the nearby village offered to help. They summoned an expert from Damascus and after two days of work handed Abu Khuder their token of friendship: a truck rigged with two tonnes of explosives.

Two men drove the truck close to the gate of the base and detonated it remotely. The explosion was so large, Abu Khuder said, that windows and metal shutters were blown hundreds of metres, trees were ripped up by their roots and a huge crater was left in the middle of the road.

The next day the army left and the town of Mohassen was free.

"The car bomb cost us 100,000 Syrian pounds and fewer than 10 people were involved [in the operation]," he said. "Within two days of the bomb expert arriving we had it ready. We didn't waste a single bullet."

"Al-Qaida has experience in these military activities and it knows how to deal with it."

After the bombing, Abu Khuder split with the FSA and pledged allegiance to al-Qaida's organisation in Syria, the Jabhat al Nusra or Solidarity Front. He let his beard grow and adopted the religious rhetoric of a jihadi, becoming a commander of one their battalions.

"The Free Syrian Army has no rules and no military or religious order. Everything happens chaotically," he said. "Al-Qaida has a law that no one, not even the emir, can break."

"The FSA lacks the ability to plan and lacks military experience. That is what [al-Qaida] can bring. They have an organisation that all countries have acknowledged."

"In the beginning there were very few. Now, mashallah, there are immigrants joining us and bringing their experience," he told the gathered people. "Men from Yemen, Saudi, Iraq and Jordan. Yemenis are the best in their religion

and discipline and the Iraqis are the worst in everything – even in religion."

At this, one man in the room – an activist in his mid-30s who did not want to be named – said: "So what are you trying to do, Abu Khuder? Are you going to start cutting off hands and make us like Saudi? Is this why we are fighting a revolution?"

"[Al-Qaida's] goal is establishing an Islamic state and not a Syrian state," he replied.

"Those who fear the organisation fear the implementation of Allah's jurisdiction. If you don't commit sins there is nothing to fear."

Religious rhetoric

Religious and sectarian rhetoric has taken a leading role in the Syrian revolution from the early days. This is partly because of the need for outside funding and weapons, which are coming through well-established Muslim networks, and partly because religion provides a useful rallying cry for fighters, with promises of martyrdom and redemption.

Almost every rebel brigade has adopted a Sunni religious name with rhetoric exalting jihad and martyrdom, even when the brigades are run by secular commanders and manned by fighters who barely pray.

"Religion is a major rallying force in this revolution – look at Ara'our [a rabid sectarian preacher], he is hysterical and we don't like him but he offers unquestionable support to the fighters and they need it," the activist said later. Another FSA commander in Deir el-Zour city explained the role of religion in the uprising: "Religion is the best way to impose discipline. Even if the fighter is not religious he can't disobey a religious order in battle."

Al-Qaida has existed in this parched region of eastern Syria, where the desert and the tribes straddle the border with Iraq, for almost a decade.

During the years of American occupation of Iraq, Deir el-Zour became the gateway through which thousands of foreign jihadis flooded to fight the holy war. Many senior insurgents took refuge from American and Iraqi government raids in the villages and deserts of Deir el-Zour. Osama, a young jihadi from Abu Khuder's unit with a kind smile, was 17 in 2003 when the Americans invaded Iraq, he said. He ran away from home and joined the thousands of other Syrians who crossed the porous border and went to fight. Like most of those volunteers,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

at first he was inspired by a mixture of nationalistic and tribal allegiances, but later religion became his sole motivation.

After returning to Syria he drifted closer to the jihadi ideology. It was dangerous then, and some of his friends were imprisoned by the regime, which for years played a double game, allowing jihadis to filter across the borders to fight the Americans while at the same time keeping them tightly under control at home.

In the first months of the Syrian uprising, he joined the protesters in the street, and when some of his relatives were killed he defected and joined the Free Syrian Army.

"I decided to join the others," he said. "But then I became very disappointed with the FSA. When they fought they were great, but then most of the time they sat in their rooms doing nothing but smoke and gossip and chat on Skype."

Fed up with his commanders' bickering and fighting over money, he turned to another fighting group based in the village of Shahail, 50 miles west of Mohassen, which has become the de facto capital of al-Qaida in Deir el-Zour. More than 20 of its young men were killed in Iraq. In Shahail the al-Qaida fighters drive around in white SUVs with al-Qaida flags fluttering.

The group there was led by a pious man. He knew a couple of them from his time in Iraq. One day, the group's leader – a Saudi who covered his hair with a red scarf and carried a small Kalashnikov, in the style of Bin Laden – visited Mohassen. He gave a long sermon during the funeral of a local commander, telling the audience how jihad was the only way to lead a revolution against the infidel regime of Bashar al-Assad, and how they, the Syrians, were not only victims of the regime but also of the hypocrisy of the west, which refused to help them.

"They were committed," said Osama. "They obeyed their leader and never argued. In the FSA, if you have 10 people they usually split and form three groups." The jihadis, by

contrast, used their time "in useful things, even the chores are divided equally".

Osama joined the group. "He [the Saudi] is a very good man, he spends his days teaching us. You ask him anything and he will answer you with verses from the Qur'an, you want to read the Qur'an you can read. You want to study bomb-making he will teach you."

In the pre-revolutionary days when the regime was strong it would take a year to recruit someone to the secret cause of jihad. "Now, thanks to God, we are working in the open and many people are joining in," said Osama.

In Shahail we interviewed Saleem Abu Yassir, a village elder and the commander of the local FSA brigade. He sat in a room filled with tribal fighters and machine-guns. The relationship with al-Qaida had been very difficult, he said, with the jihadis being secretive and despising the FSA and even calling them infidel secularists. But now they had opened up, co-operating with other rebel groups.

"Are they good fighters?" he threw the question rhetorically into the room. "Yes, they are, but they have a problem with executions. They capture a soldier and they put a pistol to his head and shoot him. We have religious courts and we have to try people before executing them. This abundance of killing is what we fear. We fear they are trying to bring us back to the days of Iraq and we have seen what that achieved."

Osama had told me that his group was very cautious about not repeating the Iraq experience – "they admit they made a lot of mistakes in Iraq and they are keen to avoid it", he said – but others, including a young doctor working for the revolution, were not convinced. The opposition needed to admit Al-Qaida were among them, and be on their guard.

"Who kidnapped the foreign engineers who worked in the nearby oilfield?" he asked. "They have better financing than the FSA and we have to admit they are here."

"They are stealing the revolution from us and they are working for the day that comes after."



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Al-Qaida altered underwear bomb formula

Source: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501706_162-57482387/tsa-chief-al-qaida-altered-underwear-bomb-formula/



FILE - This December 2009 photo released by the U.S. Marshal's Service shows Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in Milan, Mich. Transportation Security Administration chief John Pistole says the al-Qaida explosive device recently intercepted by a U.S. intelligence operation in Yemen was a different formula than that used by the Yemeni offshoot to try to bring down a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas day in 2009. (AP Photo/U.S. Marshals Service) (Anonymous)

U.S. security officials are on the lookout for a new type of explosive, after analysis of an

upgraded underwear bomb intercepted by a CIA operation in Yemen.

Transportation Security Administrator John Pistole told an audience at the Aspen Security Forum that the device smuggled out by a double-agent in an operation earlier this year was an upgrade from the underwear bomb carried by Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to try to bring down a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas 2009.

"We found in the Underwear Plot, Part 2...that a different type of explosive had been used than the previous one," Pistole said, "so we have gone back and recalibrated all the equipment and we have been working with our canine to detect this different type of explosive."

The CIA intercepted the device earlier this year, thwarting an ambitious plot by al-Qaida's affiliate in Yemen to destroy a U.S.-bound airliner around the one-year anniversary of the killing of Osama bin Laden.

The new model also had a more sophisticated trigger mechanism, an apparent attempt to fix the defective trigger that burned the bomber but failed to ignite the bomb in the Christmas attack.

How Artificial Intelligence May Change How Agencies Recognize a Terrorist Threat

Source: <http://www.topsecretwriters.com/2012/07/how-artificial-intelligence-may-change-how-agencies-recognize-a-terrorist-threat/>

The idea of artificial intelligence has been a science fiction concept in books and movies for many generations. Humans have always had the dream of developing computers and robots that could think, behave and respond to the world in the same way that humans do.

As computer technology continues to advance and eventually shrink into the nano-scale while at the same time increasing in computational power, the idea of reproducing the complexities and abstract thought processes of a human mind slowly become more practical.

My most accounts, the field of Artificial Intelligence research started at Dartmouth College in 1956, when computer experts of the time – men like John McCarthy and Herbert Simon and their students – produced computer programs that could perform mathematical and logical tasks that most people thought only humans were capable of. (1)

By the 1960s, computers and the idea of artificial intelligence soon entered into the realm of national security, since – as with most fields of technological research – both the United States and the Soviet union became concerned that the other side would establish an advantage over the other.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Artificial Intelligence as a National Security Concern

AI is no less a national security concern today than it was back then.

However, today, the “enemy” is the cyber-terrorist, or the foreign state with an intent to cause damage to Western computer networks, or otherwise influence the integrity of the growing, interconnected system of data communications and data storage.

This concern is documented in a 1962 SECRET CIA document describing several secret Soviet documents leaked by a Soviet source. The documents were all marked with code name IRONBARK and came under Richard Helm’s tenure as CIA Director.

The documents detailed a number of Soviet SECRET articles from the June 1961 issue of Collection of Articles of the Journal Foreign Military Affairs published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

Soviet Use of Artificial Intelligence

The one that included mention of artificial intelligence was Colonel P. Savinskiy’s article titled “Methods of Achieving Tactical Surprise in Ground Troop Operations”.

In that article, Savinskiy wrote:

“For this all possible means of deceiving the enemy will be used: setting up of mockups; simulated activities of communications means and radiotechnical stations, which service subunits using nuclear means; creation of artificial intelligence indicators of the location of nuclear means, such as, for example, evacuation of the civilian population and reinforced security in specific areas...” (2)

Within this context, the term refers to a careful analysis for areas potentially requiring civilian evacuation and enhanced security. However, what the use of the term in this document shows is that the concept of “artificial intelligence” was in use within intelligence circles and academia long before it became a commonly used term throughout society and in the media.

Intelligence Community Interest in AI

Artificial intelligence was always a concept under study and development by U.S. academia and the intelligence community.



In an April 3, 2001 speech prepared by John C. Gannon for the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee, Gannon stated:

“These changes [pace of change in information technology] could improve processing power, information storage, and bandwidth enough to make possible application of advanced software technologies-such as artificial intelligence-to cyber warfare.

-> Such technologies could provide the defender with improved capabilities for detecting and attributing subtle malicious activity, or could enable computer networks to respond to attacks automatically.

-> They could provide the attacker with planning aids to develop an optimal strategy against a potential target and to more accurately predict effects.” (3)

These comments revealed an intense interest in using cutting edge Information Technologies to detect and analyze “subtle malicious activities” within the volumes of data collected by the various intelligence agencies.



Terrorism Sparks Increased Interest in AI

Because of the existing interest in AI, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York city only served to fuel that interest and intensify efforts to make better use of IT technologies and to focus on further developing the cutting edge of artificial intelligence – particularly as applied to intelligence collection and analysis.

By 2003, the National Science Foundation had established the Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science (AICS)



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

program—focused on “advancing the state of the art in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science.” (4) This increased focus on IT and artificial intelligence was not limited to the intelligence community. By March of 2003, law enforcement agencies around the country began linking up to a nationwide system developed in part by the National Science Foundation’s “Digital Government” program.

The program, called COPLINK, used:

“...techniques from artificial intelligence and other fields to help sniff out the faint trails woven through vast databases, potentially across police divisions or among agencies, and provide investigators with leads for their cases.” (5)

The AI aspect of the system was rather remarkable. While previously a human analyst would need to sift through volumes of data from the various agency databases and other systems, the new computerized system could perform its own analysis – detecting specific patterns within the volumes of data.

Since 2003, developers have continued developing and improving the “detection algorithms”.

While this is good news for law enforcement and bad news for criminals, some civil liberties advocates question just which “agency databases” the system can access, and whether some of the data analysis might trample upon the privacy and civil liberties of regular Americans who pose no threat to national security.

Development of AI for National Intelligence Continues

As the field of computer technologies continues to advance into the nanoscale and computing power grows at an exponential pace, the interest of the federal government in making use of artificial intelligence hasn’t waned.



Evidence of this comes from a March 29, 2012 Fact Sheet from the Executive Office of the President which details the importance of “Big Data Across the Federal Government”.

One of the top programs promoted by that fact sheet specifically mentions artificial intelligence.

“The Machine Reading program seeks to realize artificial intelligence applications by developing learning systems that process natural text and insert the resulting semantic representation into a knowledge base rather than rely on expensive and time-consuming current processes for knowledge representation require expert and associated knowledge engineers

to hand craft information.”

Clearly, this indicates that the Cold-War era of human intelligence analysts sifting through documents for select pieces of critical intelligence information is fast becoming an artifact of the past.

In the future, supercomputers buried deep within the Pentagon will become even better at processing mind-numbing volumes of text, video and audio data in a never-ending effort to spot specific trends and potential threats to national security.

The White House Fact Sheet indicates that the U.S. Government has not yet brought that scenario to full reality, but it is only a moment of time before the science-fiction of true artificial intelligence is fully realized.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Hamas and the other terrorist organizations summer camps in the Gaza Strip

Source: <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20373>



Campers in the Khan Yunis refugee camp show off their military skills to visiting Hamas activists (Picture from the Hamas forum, June 18, 2012)

1. As in years past, this year as well summer camps were held for the children of the Gaza Strip. **Most of them were organized by the de-facto Hamas administration**, with a few organized by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other organizations. This year an estimated **100,000 children** attended summer camps.

2. Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip **consider the summer camps an important means of fostering its next generation of operatives and supporters, and as a way to brainwash the younger generation with their ideologies**, oriented towards radical political Islam. The main themes are the so-called "liberation" of Palestine and the annihilation of the State of Israel, the path of jihad (the so-called "culture of resistance"), the cult of the shaheeds and other themes taken from Hamas' strategies in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The camps are often visited by senior figures from Hamas and the other terrorist organizations

which support the inculcation of Gazan youth with political Islam.

3. As far as we know, as opposed to previous years, **this year there were no camps run by UNRWA**. More than 200,000 children participated in UNRWA summer camps in previous years (more than in the camps run by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations put together). UNRWA sources said the camps were cancelled because of the agency's budget deficit. However, in our assessment, there may have been other reasons, such as the constant competition between Hamas and UNRWA for camp enrollment, Hamas' criticism in the past that the UNRWA camps' curriculum "corrupted" Gazan youth, and the physical attacks waged on the UNRWA camps by Islamist elements.^[1] By not holding summer camps this year, UNRWA left the field open to the terrorist and other radical Islamic organizations, especially Hamas.





Summer camp logos. Left: The Palestinian Islamic Jihad's camp logo, with the slogan "A message of victory." Right: The Hamas camp logo, with the slogan "We will live with our heads held high."

Hamis Summer Camps

4. On June 9, 2012, Hamas summer camps opened with an estimated 70,000 registered campers. The slogan for most of them was "We will live with our heads held high," which accompanied the hunger strikes of the Palestinian terrorist operatives in Israeli jails. According to Hamas spokesman **Fawzi Barhoum**, the slogan marks one of milestones in the struggle for the restoration of the so-called "Palestinians' rights," the most recent of which was the Palestinian prisoners' hunger strike (Safa News Agency, June 21, 2012). **Azzam Wissam**, director of Hamas summer camps in the northern Gaza Strip, said that the slogan was meant to **emphasize the importance of the issue of prisoners held in Israeli jails.**

5. The campers engaged in the following types of activities:

- 1) **Identification with the prisoners:** The children created a "human chain," gave presentations illustrating the so-called "tortures" undergone by the prisoners and put on other shows.
- 2) **Paramilitary activities:** Some of the camps had paramilitary training, in which the children crawled as if under barbed wire, stood in military formation and had rifle practice. In some instances the campers wore uniforms.
- 3) **Ideological brainwashing:** The campers were indoctrinated with the ideology of armed "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] against Israel. They chanted slogans such as "One hand holds a pen and the other a rifle..." "...one hand studies and the other fights Israel..." (Filastin al-'Aan, July 12, 2012).
- 4) **Inculcating Islam through camps held for Qur'an memorization:** Several thousand children participated in Qur'an camps held under the aegis of the ministry for religious endowment of the de-facto Hamas administration, and the Dar al-Qur'an wal-Sunna Association. At a ceremony held to announce the opening of Hamas' summer camps, Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, gave \$50,000 to fund them, saying that he would give more to "prepare the army that would liberate Al-Aqsa in the coming years."

6. **Muhammad Abu Askar**, senior Hamas figure and one of the organizers of the summer camps in Jabaliya, said that the objective of the camps was to bring up a generation of gun-carrying young men and to inculcate them with love of the homeland and Islam as a way of life so that they would eventually participate in "the Palestinian liberation army." **Mustafa al-Soaf**, a political commentator affiliated with Hamas, said that the summer camps were "preparation for the day of victory" (Fajar website, June 10 2012). Senior Hamas figures visited the camps and met with campers. **Ismail Haniya** met with children attending the camp in the Shati refugee camp, and said that "the hour victory is getting closer and closer," adding that the current generation of children will "[live to] see victory and liberation" (Safa News Agency, June 12, 2012).



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The 'lone wolf' terrorist

Source: <http://newmedia-eng.haifa.ac.il/?p=5941>

A mounting global threat is of terrorists who act as "lone wolves". Locating and preventing such



terrorist activity is more complicated than organizational terror threats. A new study conducted by Prof. Gabriel Weimann of the University of Haifa, reveals that these "lone wolves" are not in fact so isolated and belong to virtual terrorist communities on the Internet. "We may be able to better prevent 'lone wolf' terrorist attacks by following the radicalization of opinions being expressed online and by tracking the enlistment and training processes that are happening in that sphere," noted Prof. Weimann. In recent years the number of "lone wolf" terrorists has been on the rise. They act alone, influenced by radical ideologies, and are not members of any organization or subjects of any organizational hierarchy, making it particularly difficult and almost impossible to locate them before they carry out attacks. Making it even more difficult to locate such individuals is the fact that they do not belong to any specific sector of the population and could in fact be "the guy next door". According to Prof. Weimann, intelligence organizations are aware that much of the terrorist activity is shifting from the known terrorist organizations to "lone wolf" activity, and even President of the United States Barack Obama commented in 2011 that this type of attack has become the most likely to cause harm in the Western world.

In his new study, Prof. Weimann shows that these wolves are probably not so 'lonely'. As part of a long-term study that he launched over ten years ago, Prof. Weimann has been

surveying encoded and public international terror organization websites, as well as sites supporting these organizations, forums, video clips, and whatever information there is on the net relating to global terrorism. According to Prof. Weimann, most of the "lonely wolves" make contact, share information, and acquire training through the Internet, whether from sites that are linked with terror organizations, from forums supporting such organizations, or from other platforms. In addition to this sort of "regular" activity on the web, social networks provide these individuals with their virtual wolfpack: a virtual community of people who think like

them, who share their ideals, and with whom they can consult and share advice. "The virtual community gives the 'lone wolf' social environment, support, and moral encouragement," Prof. Weimann notes.

The researcher presents a number of examples of such terrorists who supposedly acted alone. It was revealed that American officer Nidal Hasan, who shot and killed thirteen American soldiers, had communicated with a known terrorist through the Internet. Arif Uka, a young Bosnian who shot and killed American soldiers in Frankfurt, was a Facebook friend of various known Islamist radicals.

Another known example is the Internet activity that followed Mohamed Merah's attack killing four Jews in Toulouse a number of months ago. Monitoring the web, Prof. Weimann has observed that immediately after Merah was killed in a police siege, members of Jihadist online forums began praising Merah's act and encouraged additional acts like it. A Facebook page praising the killings was promptly created and by the time it was closed down with the involvement of the French government, 500 Facebook users had joined it. According to Prof. Weimann, it is these types of forums and activity that must be monitored to locate and identify the next "lone wolf".

"Enlistment, confidence building, explanations as well as social support for the 'lone wolves' are all becoming available on the Internet. These sites



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

can be monitored. Depending on how deeply the law will get involved in this sort of Internet activity is what will determine the time it takes to sound the alarm on an individualist's

intended act of terror. Clearly, undercover agents will be able to penetrate the terrorists' social networks by becoming more familiar with this sort of activity," concludes Prof. Weimann.

Israel estimates an Iranian retaliation would kill 200-300 Israeli civilians

Source: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120802-israel-estimates-an-iranian-retaliation-would-kill-200300-israeli-civilians>

The operation research experts at the Israeli Ministry of Defense estimate that an Iranian retaliation for an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities – a retaliation in which Hezbollah, a Lebanese group which follows Iran's orders, would participate – would cause about 200 dead among Israeli civilians. If Syria were to join the attack on Israel, the number of dead would rise to about 300.

Haaretz reports that the Ministry of Defense operation research department was tasked by the Israeli political and military leadership to study the issue of the cost to Israel of an Iranian retaliation. These studies are necessary



as the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, an attack which Israel would undertake unilaterally or in collaboration with the United States, is increasing by the day. Several rounds of talks with Iran have proved fruitless, and the very harsh economic sanctions imposed on Iran have, so far, failed to persuade the Iranian leadership to abandon the country's nuclear weapons program.

Ehud Barak, the Israeli defense minister, got into hot water a few months ago when he said in an interview that those who claim that an Iranian retaliation to an Israel attack would inflict thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of casualties on Israel were wide off the mark: a war with Iran "would not be a picnic," he said, but there would be "far fewer

than 500 dead' among Israeli civilians. He did not say at the time that he was basing his estimates on studies by his department's experts, and critics charged that he gave the impression of being uncaring about civilian casualties.

According to the information publically available, Iran has in its possession a few hundred Shihab missiles that can reach Israel. *Haaretz* says that the Israeli Ministry of Defense believes that Iran would retaliate against the destruction of its nuclear facilities by Israel, but that it would not use all its missiles in one or two salvos. The assumption is that some of the missiles Iran would launch would encounter mechanical problems before launch; others would be destroyed on the ground before launch by the Israel Air Force (IAF); a large number of the missile launched would be intercepted and destroyed in mid-air by Israel's Arrow ballistic defense system; and some of the missile which got through would miss their target and land in uninhabited areas. These calculations lead the Ministry of Defense to estimate that a few dozen missiles would hit Israeli cities, probably Tel Aviv and the surrounding cities.

In 1991, during the first Gulf War, Israeli defense planners estimated that there would be about three Israeli civilian deaths for every missile Iraq would launch at Israel. These estimates proved too generous: Iraq launched forty-one SCUD missiles at Israel and there was only one Israeli civilian casualty as a result of a direct hit by a missile.

Haaretz notes that the Iranian missiles today are better and more accurate than the Iraqi missiles of twenty years ago, but the Israeli population is better prepared, and better drilled, in missile attacks, and most Israeli buildings have fortified shelters.

During the summer 2006 war with Hezbollah, and since the 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Israeli citizens have been subjected to attacks by thousands of missiles and rockets, yet the number of dead and injured has been remarkably low because of the availability of shelters and the timely response of civilians to alerts about incoming rockets.

Moreover, alerts about rockets fired by Hamas and Hezbollah give citizens only a few seconds to find shelter, while Israel would enjoy 15-minute alerts in the case of an Iranian missile heading toward Israel.

The case of Hezbollah is a bit different. Hezbollah fired about 4,200 rockets at Israel during the July-August 2006 war, killing forty-two civilians and twelve soldiers. Hezbollah could not fire any of its mid-range and long-range missiles because, in a brilliant operation (code-named Operation Specific Weight), the IAF destroyed all of them in the first thirty-six minutes of the war.

Haaretz notes that Iran and Syria have restocked Hezbollah's arsenal, and the

organization now has about 60,000 rockets and a few hundred M-600 mid-range rockets capable of hitting Israel's population centers around Tel Aviv. Hezbollah uses the Shi'a population in South Lebanon as a human shield, hiding the organization's rockets in private homes, hospitals, and schools.

In 2006 the IAF destroyed dozens of homes in Lebanon in the process of destroying Hezbollah's missiles. In an intelligence briefing a year ago, Israel Defense Force (IDF) officers presented maps and aerial photographs showing how Hezbollah conceals its weapons in the midst of civilian population, and said that in the next war with Hezbollah Israel would have to destroy some 120 Shi'a villages and towns at the outset of the conflict in order to destroy Hezbollah's arsenal.

The Ministry of Defense operation research experts estimate that there would be one Israeli civilian death for every eighty rockets Hezbollah launches at Israel.



Country Reports on Terrorism

United States Department of State Publication
Bureau of Counterterrorism
Released April 2012

READ THE FULL REPORT AT:

<http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00040858:e65f6e761dfc40f0f62e9d083ab55fe9.pdf>

A New Terrorist Battleground

By **Sergey Markedonov**

Source: <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/new-terrorist-battleground-7277>



A nineteenth-century map of Kazan.

For the past two decades, Russian and Western experts, human-rights activists and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. No matter how sad it is to receive news of new terrorist bombings or sabotage acts from Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, these acts are perceived as somehow inherent to the region. But a recent tragedy in the Volga



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

region suggests that this sort of violence—and the Islamist terrorists that practice it—may not. For the first time, official Islamic religious leaders from outside the North Caucasus became victims of its breed of terrorism. Thus, the problem of inter-Islamic tensions in the Volga region suddenly became real, with some experts drawing attention to a historical parallel: religious and political violence in Dagestan, the largest North Caucasus republic, began with the symbolic murder of the Mufti Sayyid Muhammad Hadji Abubakarov in 1998. The Kazan tragedy raises a question: How likely is a repetition of the North Caucasus scenario in the Volga region, where the Karzan attacks took place? The territory of the Volga Federal District (PFD) is about 6 percent of all Russian territory, but its population is more than 30 million, or 21.3 percent of Russia's total (much higher than in the republics of the Russian Caucasus). Just this region provides about 24 percent of industrial production in the Russian economy; in terms of investment, the Volga region provides 15.3 percent of the nationwide figure. It also is home to about 40 percent of all Russian Muslims.

We cannot assume the automatic transfer of the challenges of one Russian region to another. The respective histories of the Volga region and the North Caucasus under Russian auspices are very different. Both regions have diverse ethnic compositions and Islamic traditions as well as a relationship with other religions, primarily with Orthodox Christianity. However, both the Volga region and the North Caucasus, since perestroika and especially after the Soviet dissolution, have seen processes of Islamic Revival.

After the Kazan tragedy, numerous media outlets found terrorist attacks in Tatarstan a shocking surprise. For many years, experts and journalists discussing the Islamic Revival compared the Volga and North Caucasus. Invariably, the "peaceful" nature of the first opposed the "militancy" of the second. In the Volga region, there was not any experience comparable to the creation of a de facto independent Chechen state. Moreover, the Volga region produced such potentially attractive conceptions as "Euro-Islam," which aimed to develop the religion in accordance with contemporary realities and interreligious dialogue. But the first alarm bells rang here long before 2012.

As recently as 1999, there were terrorist attacks on the border of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Kirov area. Some attempts of Salafis to create a "Special Islamic Territory," following the example of 1998 in Dagestan, were undertaken in Tatarstan as well as Mordovia. Among so-called "Russian Talibs" detained in 2002 in the U.S. camp at Guantanamo Bay, it was reported that some were from Tatarstan and Bashkiria. The trial of the Islamist group the Islamic Jamaat occurred in the Tatarstan territory as well, and in 2001–2004 neighboring regions experienced a similar resonance of religious fundamentalism.

For the last two years, the Volga region increasingly has been the site of law-enforcement and intelligence operations designed to curb the threat of Islamic terrorism. Probably the most impressive incidents took place in 2010, in the Arkhangelsk district of Bashkortostan and the Nurlat district of Tatarstan (by the way, one of the largest oil reserves in the country) where special-operations forces fought terrorists. This March, an underground Salafi network was revealed in a jail of the Ulyanovsk region. And there is particular interest among the North Caucasian Islamists in expanding their anti-Russian struggle in other parts of the country. Thus, in the spring of 2010, leader of the "Caucasus Emirate" Doku Umarov announced his readiness to "liberate" the Astrakhan and the Volga lands from the "occupation of the Russian kaafirs."

The conditions that led to the rise of this tangle of religious and political problems are complex and not reducible to external factors. To some extent, the Volga region is repeating the experience of the North Caucasus and Central Asia. Previously attractive nationalist doctrines (both progovernment and opposition) are losing their popularity, and the conversion of many of yesterday's nationalists to the ranks of Islamic radicals provides clear evidence. Radical Islamism, which uses the rhetoric of social justice, is beginning to gain popularity due to the nationalists' poor management, corruption and many other social vices. Representatives of the Spiritual Boards of Muslims, considered loyal to the government, do not appear to be on top of the situation; this is in part a result of internal schisms and intrigues but also is due to an inability to engage in polemics with well-trained foreign missionaries or those who have



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

received religious education abroad.

In contrast to the Northern Caucasus, the nonofficial and radical Islam in the Volga region exhibits a different character. In addition to the Salafi movement, the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami party—almost unknown in the Caucasus—also is active there. There are various additional movements of local origin, not related to the popular international Islamic organizations. And there are many more ethnic Russians among the activists of the Volga Federal District.

Containing the Caucasus Violence

What are the ways of minimizing the risks to the Volga region? How is it possible to prevent “Dagestanization” of this crucially important area?

First, this problem cannot be controlled by means of military or police operations. Of course, radicals who overstep the law must be held accountable. Still, the work to minimize the Islamist threat will not be effective if it cannot incorporate an understanding of social and ideological issues. The hard use of police power could help to bring down the temperature—but it is insufficient to treat the disease itself. In the Caucasus, there are many examples in which special services and authorities managed to minimize the

underground groups’ activity. But while the social preconditions for radicalism still exist, it appears again and again.

Secondly, we must consider strengthening traditional Russian Islam, which is linked to the history and culture of the country as a whole and the Volga region in particular. However, this policy should not be conflated with the straightforward support of loyal Muslim structures like spiritual boards of the republican and territorial levels or the narrowly focused sectarian lobbyists. Following such an approach is potentially dangerous because the religious policy of the state could be replaced by certain sectarian interests.

Thus, the focus should be on large-scale public, cultural projects in which the state does not subcontract its responsibilities to anyone and would remain the initiator of all key decisions affecting not only the religious but also the secular sphere; this should include education, especially the teaching of history and other humanities. It also must include active and consistent promotion of a pan-Russian, supra-ethnic political identity, as has been repeatedly proclaimed by all of Russia’s presidents. Otherwise, any attempt to compete with promoters of sectarian loyalties will look like a ticket on a flight without wings.

Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program, in Washington, DC.

Nasser Al-Bahri, Former Bodyguard of Osama Bin Laden: There Will Be Large-Scale Attacks against the West in the Near Future

Alaan TV (UAE) - July 18, 2012

► Watch the video at: <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3506.htm>



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Thoughts of a former extremist

Source: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Threads-Within/Thoughts-former-extremist/EN/index.htm>

Having been an active member of an Islamist organization for 13 years – a subject I tackle at length in my newly released memoir “Radical” – I would identify four main factors that attract people towards extremist ideologies.



Maajid Mawaz

In my experience, these factors apply across the board, and are not restricted merely to Islamist extremism, and they can occur in any order, and with varying levels of intensity depending on the person and circumstances.

- Grievances and lack of an outlet to express them– whether real or perceived – are essential in pushing the potential extremists to seek out alternative sub-cultures and narratives. For the purposes of understanding what motivates an individual, the mere perception of a grievance suffices here.
- Secondly, an identity crisis is also an important factor in creating the desire to seek out a sub-culture. This pushes the individual to reject the identity, country and people of their land of birth, instead adopting a form of recalibrated transnational camaraderie with other disenchanting like-minds.
- Into the confusion steps a charismatic recruiter, usually someone who can provide a sense of safety and security for the person experiencing a level of disillusionment from the mainstream.
- Finally, this recruiter is usually adept at spinning an ideological narrative, helping to

them make sense of the world and its ills with a catch all explanation.

These four factors, in any order, interplay with one another to send someone down the path of extremism. Human beings are not like water, they do not all boil at 100 degrees Celsius, therefore trying to find one reason that would push someone to extremism is as unhelpful as profiling a terrorist based on their ethnicity, gender or looks. It simply does not work. Anyone from any background can become an extremist, often there are high numbers of converts and people with higher than average levels of education who are attracted to such outsider narratives.

What measures can be used to tackle the problem?

We must first recognize that terrorism is a result of a long-term process that necessarily entails extremism. Measures to tackle the problem can only help if they come as part of a package that includes

- adopting a national strategy that covers the areas of foreign counter-insurgency measures,
- domestic counter-terrorism measures (these two areas generally cover the military and law enforcement sides to this effort),
- disengagement from violence (usually a policy that is attempted in prisons),
- counter-extremism initiatives in civil society,
- integration efforts (which is necessarily a two-way street), and
- democratic political participation.

Where there are real grievances, they should be addressed by policy changes. Where the grievances are perceived, the perception needs to be addressed by better communication and civic-engagement.

The chances of home-grown terrorism flaring up again in the UK, such as the kind that culminated in the 7/7 bombings, are very real. It follows therefore, that terrorism is not solely a military or legal phenomenon, but a wholly social one that is not restricted by borders. The solution can only be one that addresses the problem holistically.

While up-to-date laws, policing to enforce these laws, and counter-terrorism measures are essential,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

they must be coupled with policy, media and activism to address the social aspect of the problem.

Currently, very little of this is being formulated as a strategy across the globe. In countries where such a strategy exists, such as the UK, far more needs to be done in terms of rolling it out on the ground.

The chances of home-grown terrorism flaring up again in the UK, such as the kind that culminated in the 7/7 bombings, are very real.

One only has to look at the examples of the two British Muslims who were recently killed in Yemen fighting alongside Islamist militants - they had gone there reportedly to receive religious education - to see that the challenge of terrorism in the country is far from tackled.

This news coincided with the head of the security and intelligence services, Jonathan Evans, warning that the UK "continues to face a real threat from Al Qaeda-related terrorism" and that their activities have increased in places like Yemen, Somalia, Syria and Libya though they may have declined in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Arab uprisings are to be welcomed and it is hoped that they will usher in a new era of democracy in the Middle-East region. However, the potential for dangerous fallout must also be considered. Increased instability and a new security vacuum may allow jihadism in these countries to merge with legitimate resistance against dictators.

The perception that al-Qaeda is no longer a threat was compounded by Osama Bin Laden's killing in May last year. However, despite US electoral pressures pushing for another 'mission accomplished' moment, it is prudent to remember that since Bin Laden's death al-Qaeda has actually achieved what it could not during his lifetime. Al-Qaida affiliates now control cities in Bin Laden's ancestral land of Yemen and the entire region of North Mali. They have allied with Somalia's Islamist Shabab movement and they dominate the Sahel in sub-Saharan Africa. This renders travel to new safe havens for training purposes relatively easy.

The Arab uprisings are to be welcomed and it is hoped that they will usher in a new era of

democracy in the Middle-East region. However, the potential for dangerous fallout must also be considered. Increased instability and a new security vacuum may allow jihadism in these countries to merge with legitimate resistance against dictators. Libya and Syria being cases in point, according to Evans.

As with the global blowback from the Afghan 'jihad', Western Arab youth going to Syria under the cover of fighting dictators are at risk of exposure to jihadist narratives, increasing the chances of some returning to their countries' of origin with the express purpose of exporting the 'jihad'. Ironically, the more the international community is perceived to have failed in Yemen, Syria and (let's not forget) Iraq next door, the more likely such 'alternative' narratives inside these two countries are to spread.

It is no wonder then, that Evans made the remarks he did in his first speech in two years. Saying that the threats we face are "diverse in both geography and levels of skill involved", Evans added that "we should not underestimate the challenge of mounting the Games securely in an environment with a high terrorist threat."

To this end it is worth remembering that the 7/7 bombings hit London the week that the Olympic bid was approved for the city. The symbolism of another attack during the Games will not be lost on extremists and should not be lost on us either. The UK will be extremely vulnerable because while focus will be on London and the Games venues, this leaves much of the country open. During such a heightened time, an attack anywhere in the UK would be just as equally headline grabbing. Anything from swords, to nail guns to homemade bombs or traditional weapons could be used, lethal and easy to conceal.

Non-Olympic related terrorism arrests were already made in London in July 2012. The question is not one of 'if', but when and where an attempt will be made. And our security forces and police deserve our cooperation for ensuring that the Games pass securely. This should be cause for concern for everyone, not least because of the backlash against ordinary Muslims any successful attack could create.



Spain charges terror suspects who went paragliding

Source: http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/world/ci_21240736

Two Russians suspected of plotting a terror attack in Europe were charged in Spain on Sunday with belonging to an unnamed terror organization and possession of explosives, and placed under indefinite detention.

The judge who approved the charges also said a Turkish engineer who worked in Gibraltar for years and was arrested in the same case had paid for Spanish paragliding lessons for the men.

Justice Department that included information from a witness currently under government protection, French judicial authorities and the police services of Gibraltar and Russia.

The Turk, named in the statement as Cengiz Yalcin, was charged Friday with the possession of explosives and a device that could be used in a terror attack. He was also placed under preventive detention under Spain's anti-terror laws.



The court named the Russians of Chechen descent as Eldar Magomedov and Mohamed Ankari Adamov and said in a statement there was evidence linking them with "belonging to or forming part of a terrorist organization." The terror group was not specified, but Spanish authorities previously said it was al-Qaida, and the Islamic

The two men were driven to the court in dark unmarked government cars under tight security Sunday morning, escorted by police officers wearing masks to hide their identities.

Judge Pablo Ruz ordered both jailed incommunicado and indefinitely until a date is set for court proceedings, the court statement said.

Ruz said he decided to approve the charges after reviewing evidence provided by the U.S.

Yalcin worked for years in the construction industry in Gibraltar and the explosive material was seized at his property in the southwestern Spanish city of La Linea, just across the border from the British colony and naval base.

The judge's statement said the two Russians had also been living in La Linea, and that other evidence seized from Yalcin included passport photographs of the Russians and videos that could suggest preparation for a terror attack.

Evidence provided by Russia linked Magomedov with international terrorist organizations and said that he had been in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2010, the statement said.

Ruz's statement said evidence from the U.S. revealed that Magomedov may have acted under the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

pseudonym of Muslin Dost, and had been involved in terrorist activity in 2010 in Afghanistan and Waziristan, a lawless mountainous region in the northwest of Pakistan known as a terror training ground.

Both men traveled to France before entering Spain in April or May this year, where they stayed in La Linea. While there both men allegedly took paragliding lessons paid for by Yalcin, the judge said.

The Russians were allegedly heading back to France when police moved in to arrest them in the central city of Ciudad Real. Neither had any identification documents but each is known by several aliases, the statement said.

While Ruz's statement did not reveal the name of the terror organization the Russians are suspected of belonging to, it said both "partially acknowledged" links to it.

Interior Minister Jorge Fernandez Diaz on Thursday described the Russians as suspected al-Qaida members and said the Turk was suspected of being a facilitator for them.

Yalcin was arrested Thursday in La Linea while the Russians were nabbed Wednesday as they traveled by bus from the southern city of Cadiz toward the French border crossing at Irun.

Cadiz is very close to the large U.S. military base in Rota alongside the Mediterranean.

No mention was made in the judge's report on whether the suspects may have been planning a terror attack using paragliders, but experts have been concerned that Islamic jihadists bent on attacking Western targets might try to use small planes to target events with many people out in the open.

Fernando Reinares, a former senior anti-terrorism adviser to the Spanish government, said evidence uncovered so far shows "this is not a case of an independent homegrown radicalized cell. This is a local facilitator and two operatives coming from abroad on a mission with a connection to al-Qaida."

Governments and experts in recent years have highlighted jihadists who radicalize on their own without direct connections to terror groups as a growing threat, but Reinares said the Spain case underscores how organized cells with links to known groups are still dangerous.

"The whole story is very serious," said Reinares, now a terror expert with the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid. "It shows they were trying most likely to target something from the air."

'Al-Qaida Cell' May Have Targeted Gibraltar

By Paul Cruickshank (CNN Terrorism Analyst)

Source: <http://www.turmt023.com/news/31332951/detail.html>

Three suspected terrorists arrested last week in what Spanish officials call one of their largest operations against al-Qaida appear to have been interested in targeting a Gibraltar shopping mall.

Spanish security services suspect their plan may have been to attack the British territory on the southernmost tip of Spain from the air. While their planned date of attack is still not clear, any attack on British soil during the Olympic Games would have generated intense global publicity.

A paragliding instructor told police Saturday that Cengiz Yalcin, the alleged cell's Turkish facilitator, requested to be able to take pictures of a Gibraltar shopping mall "at all cost," said Fernando Reinares, a senior international

terrorism analyst who was briefed by Spanish security services on the investigation.

Yalcin, who worked as an engineer at a construction company on Gibraltar, was arrested in La Línea de la Concepción, a town bordering Gibraltar. He had lived in Spain with his Moroccan wife for several years. Explosives were found in his residence, as well as videos and photos suggesting the possibility of attack preparations, Reinares said.

Two Chechen-Russians -- Ahmad Avar and Muhammad Adamov -- whom Spanish security services



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

suspect had been tasked with carrying out an attack, were arrested on a bus travelling towards France. Investigating Judge Judge Pablo Ruz ruled Sunday there was sufficient evidence to unconditionally detain both men.

The arrests were announced Thursday. Experts say the men appear to have constituted one of the most skilled and experienced terror cells seen in recent times, and appear to have been dispatched by al-Qaida to carry out an ambitious attack in Europe.

Avar, the suspected leader, was a former member of Spetsnaz, the Russian special forces, according to Spain's Interior Ministry. He had training as a sniper and was an expert in poisons, the ministry said.

Reinares, of Madrid's Elcano Royal Institute, said that according to information passed to Spain by several Western intelligence agencies, Avar joined training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including camps run by Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, after leaving the Russian special forces outfits. According to this intelligence, between 2008 and 2011 Avar operated in the southwestern Russian republic of Dagestan and the Pakistani tribal districts of North and South Waziristan, transiting between them, Reinares told CNN.

Adamov, the other Chechen, had received explosives training in Afghanistan, where he became an expert in managing explosives and may have participated in a recent bomb attack in Moscow, according to Spanish authorities.

According to Reinares, the French described the Chechens to their Spanish counterparts as "really dangerous." He said British intelligence services were also involved in tracking the suspected terrorist cell.

Also found in Yalcin's home was equipment for three motorized paragliding machines. Yalcin told a Spanish investigating judge Friday that he was an enthusiast of motorized paragliding and wished to teach his two Chechen associates how to fly them.

Reinares said Spanish security services have established that both Chechens received motor-paragliding lessons near La Linea and may have had some instruction before arriving in Spain. A paragliding hand book in Russian was found in their possession, Reinares said.

Yalcin, the Turkish suspect, was ordered detained immediately after his arrest. Because information obtained by intelligence agencies is

generally not admissible in Spanish courts, Spanish police and security services had scramble in the past few days to provide sufficient evidence to bring a case, according to Reinares.

French security services tipped off their Spanish counterparts about the probable arrival of the two Chechen suspected terrorists in May, according to Reinares. The French had been tracking the duo and monitoring their phone calls. At one point, they intercepted a phone call in which the Chechens described Spain as a "more easy country to get explosives," Reinares said.

Investigators moved to arrest all three men after the two Chechens appeared to be heading back to France by bus, concerned that France may be their target. One of them violently resisted arrest, the Spanish Interior Ministry reported.

But police were frustrated by a judge's refusal to grant an immediate search warrant for Yalcin's apartment after his arrest, according to Reinares. Investigators feared that may have given the cell time to dispose of additional explosives, he said.

It took eight to nine hours for the search warrant to be granted. Police then drove with Yalcin and an official of the Spanish judiciary to his residence. According to the subsequent judicial report, his wife greeted him by saying "do not worry, honey, I cleaned it all." The agents wrote they noticed a "very strong smell of bleach when moving into the place," the report said.

Reinares said French security services had asked their Spanish counterparts not to share intelligence on the suspected cell with the Spanish judiciary, fearing that open exposure of such information in court – as required by Spanish law – could blow the whole operation. Dog teams used in the search suggested that more explosives had been present than police found, according to Reinares.

Spanish security services believe another target of the alleged terrorist cell may have been a joint U.S.-Spanish naval base in Rota, Spain, near where they were based, and have not ruled out other possible targets in Europe.

"The case definitely stresses, once again, how critical cooperation between Western nations is to successfully prevent and combat international terrorism," Reinares told CNN.



On going info: Police found a video in the home of one of the suspects, Turkish national Cengiz Yalcin, in the Spanish city of La Linea de Concepcion across the border with Gibraltar, which shows him piloting a **large remote-controlled plane**, the online edition of El Pais reported, citing anti-terrorism sources. "At a certain moment the plane descended and it **dropped a package from the air**. On the ground, Yalcin celebrated his achievement," it said. Police believe the suspects were preparing to use a remote-controlled plane to drop explosives on a mall in Gibraltar during the 2012 Olympics which wrap up in London on August 12, Spanish public television TVE and other media said.

Terrorism: The Tale of Three Cities

By Chris Blackburn

Source: <http://www.ebangladesh.com/2012/08/07/terrorism-the-tale-of-three-cities/>

The recent US Congressional investigations, led and chaired by Senator Carl Levin, into banking mismanagement and financial crimes have shown a number of important issues dealing with national and international security have failed to have been addressed since the global effort to stop terrorism since September 11th 2001.

London, Islamabad and Riyadh the main capital cities which are still allowing the global menace of Islamist terrorism to continue unabated. The US and the rest of the world should work together bring the problem to rest. Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other similar groups which have had state support need to be sanctioned. The countries which allow their operations, and promote them as proxy actors in strategic plans should also be sanctioned.

Major British banks, with international reputations, HSBC and Standard Chartered have come under scrutiny by US investigators for allowing major transactions between suspected terrorist financiers and rogue states. Standard Chartered is believed to have created a rogue banking unit to deal with Iran and helping it skirt around US and UN sanctions. HSBC is believed to have allowed transactions between the Social Islami Bank and the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) and the al-Rahji Banking Corporation, an entity which was flagged as being a Taliban and al-Qaeda supporter in 2001.

The US investigations showed how al-Rahji's activities had been flagged many times by the HSBC's own Financial Intelligence Unit, but the bank had persisted in keeping the accounts open. Financial Intelligence Unit's are a major part of international banking. They are designed for banks with high risk customers to check their activities. They are often assisted with the help of treasury and security officials from intelligence agencies. That is how they

are designed to function. HSBC allowed the bank to have accounts even when there were reports that terrorists in Bangladesh were using the IBBL to finance their activities and IBBL staff were helping to facilitate suspicious transactions. London has been called Londonistan by counter-terrorism officials throughout the world for the last 20 years. The French originally coined the phrase because UK security officials used to brush off investigations into suspected terrorists plotting attacks on French interests from safe havens within the UK. They didn't care.

After 9/11 the British policy of 'looking the other way' was meant to change, but it still took till 2005 for British authorities to begin to look at the problem. The UK government under Tony Blair was forced into taking a more sensible stance towards its engagement with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) because of an effort by British journalists to show the MCB's ties to Jamaat-i-Islami. I was also involved in this effort. Jamaat-i-Islami is a radical political movement based in South Asia which has fascist tendencies, but has strong support in the UK through a various guise of NGO's and charities. They have also been accused of helping al-Qaeda and other groups. The British state has even been accused of financing Jamaat politicians in Pakistan.

The banking scandal involving Islamist politics and the UK is not surprising. The fact that the US has launched an investigation and launched a public inquiry is surprising. The activities of Suleiman Abdul Aziz Al-Rahji, is a Saudi national and major political player in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia are well known within the international security arena, but probably not within the banking sector. The US investigations are merging two arenas which should have been working together on these important

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

international issues from the beginning. There has been poor oversight in the global effort against terrorism, but since 2010 the US is beginning to get a real grip when the Bush administration had failed to tackle al-Qaeda's sponsors, but had instead decided to invade countries which nothing to do with Islamist terrorism.

Al-Rahji is believed to be one of the world's top supporters of Islamic politics and also has a major sideline in providing a cash flow to jihadi movements. Al-Rahji was named as one of the main financiers of Osama bin Laden's fledgling Al-Qaeda movement in a document seized by counter-terrorism agents. Al-Rahji was also named as defendant in the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism lawsuit, a major lawsuit designed to cripple terrorist finances.

Bangladesh's counter terrorism strategies have provided a breath of fresh air and are being widely applauded in the United States, and even begrudgingly in parts of London. They, unlike Pakistan, have decided that keeping Islamist actors as regional proxy fighters is not conducive to regional or national stability.

Bangladesh's authorities are aware of the networks and relationships which have sustained unrest between Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and the rest of South Asia. Al-Rahji being just one of many players involved in the process.

Bangladeshi authorities have done well in combating the threat without causing too much upheaval. Islamist politics and Islamist banking in Bangladesh has been a mainly foreign import. IBBL's major shareholders are foreign Islamic banks. Jamaat-i-Islami influence in IBBL isn't surprising. The international backers of IBBL and Jamaat are the same. The IBBL was designed not just to be a bank, but as a major catalyst in importing Islamist politics into Bangladesh and supporting Islamist politics within the diasporic community.

If the three capital cities: London, Islamabad and Riyadh, are allowed to keep supporting or turning a blind eye to international terrorists the rest of the world will suffer. The US and Bangladesh have begun to address the problem head on. Their effort should be applauded.

Chris Blackburn is a political analyst and writer based in the UK. He worked as a junior team member for the US National Intelligence Conference and Exposition (Intelcon 2005), which was organised by Slade Gorton and Jamie Gorelick who were both members of the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) He then went on to become a track leader for the Intelligence Summit 2006, which focused on the deteriorating security situation in Bangladesh and South Asia. Chris has briefed journalists on extremist movements. He has also worked with productions teams from BBC's Panorama and Channel 4's Dispatches. He has written for David Horowitz's Frontpagemag.com, Weekly Durdesh and others.

Terrorism and Surface Transport

Source: <http://buckssecurity.wordpress.com/2012/08/08/terrorism-and-surface-transport/>

This is from Security Management August 2012: "Trends in Terrorism Targets" (by Matthew Harwood)

While aviation security continues to attract the most attention worldwide, terrorist attacks against surface transportation targets have increased sharply since 9-11, representing a shift in terrorist target selection, according to a prominent terrorism expert.

Since 9-11, terrorists have targeted airliners and airports 75 times resulting in 157 deaths, according to Brian Michael Jenkins, director of the National Transportation Security Center at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-supported Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI). During that same time period, terrorists

have targeted surface transportation targets, such as buses and trains, more than 1,800 times, killing more than 3,900 people.

In the vast majority of those attacks, the number of fatalities has been small. But 11 of these attacks, such as the 2005 London bombings, have killed approximately 50 people each. Three caused incredible carnage, averaging 200 dead per attack, notes Jenkins. These attacks roughly equal seven commercial airplanes being destroyed by terrorists. "Since 9-11, if we had seen [the equivalent of] seven



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

commercial airliners go down as a result of terrorist bombs, we'd be going crazy," he says. "This tells you that terrorists see surface transportation as a killing field."

Jenkins notes that surface transportation cannot be protected in the same manner as the commercial aviation system, where security is front-loaded at checkpoints. "In surface transportation...it's more difficult to do all the security at the front end because of the volume of passengers [and] limitations on security resources," he says. "We're not going to put airport-style security into subway stations. We'd kill the system."

Which leaves security professionals asking: "What can be done about it?" One tool is intelligence. Inside the United States, people are not as conscious of the terrorist threat to surface transportation because there hasn't been a successful attack.

There have been at least six failed plots, however. The unsung hero, says Jenkins, is America's intelligence capability, which he says has improved incredibly since 9-11. Of almost 40 homegrown terrorism plots since 9-11, only three have gone operational, leaving 14 dead.

"The unprecedented unanimity of focus and cooperation among the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations worldwide...has made the terrorist operating environment way more hostile," he says.

Still, the numbers around the world show that intelligence has its limits. To see what else can be done, Jenkins and his coauthors looked for lessons from the data gathered about incidents that have occurred and those that have failed. In April, Jenkins and coauthors published a report called *Carnage Interrupted*, which analyzed 16 failed plots to attack surface transportation targets around the world. The report empirically shows that terrorists concentrate on attacking surface transportation targets during rush hours.

Other lessons Jenkins and his coauthors drew from their analysis is how terrorists choose their targets and what measures can be put in place to harden a surface transportation target. According to the cases, CCTV has some deterrent value, although not for suicide bombers.

"It is, of course, more difficult to deter suicide bombers, but they are harder to recruit than individuals who plan to escape alive," the report explains. "CCTV thus contributes to security indirectly, by raising the threshold for

recruiting attackers." CCTV also helps authorities nab the attackers when they're not suicide bombers, which occurred in a 2006 attack against two trains in Germany, when the terrorists' suitcase bombs failed to explode.

Jenkins and his coauthors concluded that none of the security measures in use beyond CCTV lead terrorists to terminate their plans. "Where awareness of security does appear in the plots, it is a cause for caution, perhaps a reason to modify a date or location, not a reason to call off the attack," they write.

DHS transit security grants have plummeted from \$253 million in fiscal year 2010 to \$87.5 million in fiscal year 2012, a 65 percent decrease in funding for owners and operators of transit systems. "The reason for the decrease is simply the budget cuts across the federal government," said a federal security official who was not authorized to speak to the media. The official noted that "basically, the amount that Congress has appropriated each year for the program has decreased."

Thus, the goal now is to find security strategies that are both effective and affordable. Israel, according to Jenkins, has a cost-effective security model worth emulating. In another report, Jenkins and two coauthors studied 16 cases of terrorist attacks, both lethal and nonlethal, against Israeli buses and bus stations during the Second Intifada. What Jenkins discovered is that many of the attacks were defeated or mitigated by alert bus drivers and an aware citizenry—a cost-effective counterterrorism tool that can be adopted by public transportation security stakeholders in other countries.

Ganor Boaz, director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel, says the challenge of the Israeli approach is that it starts early by educating children in security awareness. "When I was a kid, even in the kindergarten, they taught us to be aware of abandoned and suspicious objects," he says, which triggers an "embryonic instinct" to look around for suspicious objects when he hears overhead security announcements. That awareness was also stoked by the very real danger of bombings that became the fabric of everyday life in Israel and has produced a young, resilient population. That kind of awareness hasn't permeated the American consciousness.

Israeli bus drivers also receive specific security training, such as



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

suspicious-behavior recognition-training. And this approach has paid off, says Boaz. In one memorable incident, a bus driver in Tel Aviv realized that a suspicious passenger was boarding the bus. “He pushed him out” and the suspicious passenger fell out of the bus on his back. During the fall, his hands came out of his pockets. Two youths from the front row of the bus jumped out and held his hands to prevent him from triggering a bomb that he was carrying with him. The bus took off and the youngsters eventually fled in different directions. Immediately, the passenger got up, found a woman in the station and detonated himself, killing them both.

“Although there was a woman who died in this attack, it’s still regarded as a magnificent success of those security procedures,” he says.

That same sort of engaged staff and citizens also helped Great Britain thwart Irish Republican Army bombings against surface transportation targets from the 1970s into the 1990s.

Some of those strategies might be transferable to the United States. By knowing the most “lucrative” times and targets terrorists want to hit, notes Jenkins, security and an aware citizenry can help deter attacks at certain locations and times to reduce the casualty count. “Would we rather push them away from the centers of the city where they are going to

cause the most disruption out to areas where fewer people are going to be imperiled?” he asks. “The answer is yes, we would.”

In an effort to bring cost-effective security awareness to bus operators, MPI has developed a training video to educate them about the terrorist threat. Jenkins also applauded DHS’s “See Something, Say Something” campaign to elicit terrorism tips from the public.

Going forward, Jenkins would like to see surface transportation stations and carriages designed with counterterrorism in mind. “There are ways to design stations that facilitate security measures—open spaces, not a lot of hidden nooks and crannies—which also reduce crime,” and facilitate surveillance, he explains. And there are ways to design buses and subway and train cars to mitigate injuries, he notes.’

We say: Illuminating - while some sectors have been worrying about more aircraft related incidents the numbers and statistics point to surface transport as being vulnerable and an effective terrorist route to bring effect . It seems that this type of attack has happened in most parts of the world except the US. I suspect there are quite a few lessons that could be usefully learned here and there are some useful research activities to be conducted.

Phil Wood is Head of Security Studies at Buckinghamshire New University.

First pirate-free month in five years in Somalia

Source: <http://www.calgaryherald.com/First+pirate+free+month+five+years+Somalia/7059448/story.html>



Pirate attacks off Somalia dropped to zero for the first full month since the practice emerged more than five years ago, new figures show.

There has been no successful hijack since June 19, when a fishing dhow was seized, and no ship has been fired on or a boarding attempted since June 26, when a Maltese-flagged cargo ship was attacked, according to data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

It marks the longest unbroken stretch of peaceful transit through the waters off Somalia, and was attributed to the increased use of armed guards on ships and international naval patrols.

Bad weather is also thought to have played a part.

“This is traditionally a quiet time for pirate attacks but there has always been at least a handful of incidences even during the monsoon months of July and August,” said Cyrus Mody at the IMB’s London office.

“However, since June 26 this year, we have seen no activity whatsoever in the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Arabia or the Somali Basin. It’s the first time we’ve had a full month where nothing’s happened since before Somali piracy really grew into a major problem in 2007.”

The pirates’ lull comes on the heels of a 60 per cent reduction in their activity



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

in the first six months of the year, compared with the same stretch last year — from 163 incidents to 69.

Despite this, as many as 191 crew from up to 14 merchant vessels and fishing boats are still being held.

About three dozen warships from the Royal Navy, the US Navy, EU countries, Nato, Russia, China and India currently patrol the sea off the Horn of Africa, covering more than one million square miles.



“We’ve learnt a lot about piracy and we’re being a great deal more proactive in disrupting their activities,” said Rear Admiral Duncan Potts, operational commander of the EU’s antipiracy mission, Operation Atalanta.

The new tactics involve helicopter gunship attacks on pirate logistics bases onshore for the first time, and targeting teams in “pirate action groups”.

Ships’ captains have been taught how to accelerate and evade attack. Hulls are now festooned with barbed wire and powerful water hoses to deter pirates who try to climb aboard.

“All this has come at the same time as the quantum increase in the use of private armed security contractors, who have to date had a 100 per cent success rate preventing hijacks,” said Rear-Admiral Potts.

Most vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden and northwest Indian Ocean are now thought to be carrying armed guards, mandated to protect ships, first with warning shots and then with direct fire.

“The naval forces would perhaps dispute this, but I would say that private security is by far the major factor, not the warships,” said Stig Jarle Hansen, a Norwegian expert on Somali piracy.

“Pirate commanders I have spoken to onshore tell me that it’s those armed guards they’re most afraid of.”

In 2009, the most successful year for Somali pirates, one in three vessels that was targeted ended up hijacked and its crew held hostage. By late last year, that figure was as low as one in 20 for the most valuable prizes, most of which now carry private security staff.

That has forced the remaining pirate cells

to target fishing boats of limited value rather than large oil carriers, cargo ships or private yachts. In some cases, pirates have turned to other business, such as kidnapping, Prof Hansen said.

But there were warnings that international cartels that fronted the investment to put pirates to sea would “bide their time, then come back” once the warships left or private security was cancelled.

“All of this tactical and operational progress is, however, easily lost if we do not irreversibly change the strategic context on the ground that allows piracy to exist in the first place,” Rear-Admiral Potts said. “If all of our vessels moved on, and the shipping industry slowed down its vigilance, word would soon get around.”



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Terrorist Threat Targets Madonna Concert

Source: <http://www.t TMZ.com/2012/08/08/madonna-concert-threat-russia-u-s-embassy-terrorist/>



Someone has made a serious threat to harm spectators and performers at an upcoming **Madonna** concert in Russia, and the U.S. Embassy is warning Americans who might attend.

The Embassy issued an alert that the U.S. Consulate General in St. Petersburg received info regarding a threat of physical violence against the audience and people on stage at the St. Petersburg concert scheduled for tomorrow.

The Embassy is specifically warning American citizens planning to attend the concert "to remain vigilant regarding their personal security."

A source directly connected with Madonna tells TMZ they will not be deterred by the threat and the show will go on.

Officials are not giving details on the nature of the threat, but the threats were revealed days after Madonna spoke out in support of a jailed

Russian punk band called Pussy Riot. Madonna believes the group has been unfairly censored.

Al Qaeda leader designated as global terrorist

Source: <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/08/al-qaeda-leader-designated-as-global-terrorist/>

A senior al Qaeda leader who trained militants in Afghanistan and who has close ties to other top members of the group has been designated by the State Department as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist."

The designation also comes with sanctions against Azaam Abdullah Zureik Al-Maulid, better known as Mansur al-Harbi.

Though the United States is just now turning its attention to al-Harbi, he has long been a wanted man in his home country of Saudi Arabia.

In early 2009, al-Harbi was among the 83 Saudis and two Yemenis named on Saudi Arabia's list of most wanted terrorists for engaging in extremist activities abroad.

A veteran of Afghanistan's terror training camps, al-Harbi also was wanted for his connections with other senior al Qaeda leaders. According to the U.S. State Department, al-Harbi "traveled to Afghanistan more than a decade ago to join al Qaeda. He is responsible for training militants and for the coordination of foreign fighters who travel to Afghanistan to fight against coalition forces. As

a result of his key training position, al-Harbi is closely associated to many senior al Qaeda leaders."

Al-Harbi's most wanted associates include Saif al-Adel, the interim al Qaeda leader following the death of Osama bin Laden. Al-Adel is also wanted for his role in the 1998 African embassy bombings. Another wanted associate, Abdel Aziz Migrin, was al Qaeda's leader in Saudi Arabia but was killed in a shootout with Saudi authorities in 2004.

When the list of Saudi's most wanted terrorists was released, Interpol subsequently issued "Orange" notices seeking information on all of the wanted men and "Red" notices thereafter for 81 of the suspects. Authorities believed all of the suspects were planning attacks against Saudi Arabia from abroad.

Of the 83 Saudi terrorists wanted, 11 were once detainees at the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay. Upon their release they were repatriated and placed in rehabilitation programs aimed at abating their extremist views, but it wasn't long before all 11 fled.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Authorities believe they rejoined their jihadist associates in neighboring Yemen, which is home to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), one of the terror group's deadliest franchises.

Three of them have since surrendered to Saudi authorities. The most recent was Adnan

Muhammad Ali al-Saigh, who turned himself in just days ago. Al-Saigh fought with bin Laden's 55th Arab Brigade in Afghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and went on to join AQAP after being transferred back to his home country from Guantanamo Bay.

Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood: Alternative Visions of an Islamist Egypt

By Andrew McGregor

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org>

In late July, Sheikh al-Mujahid Hussam Abd al-Raouf a prominent al-Qaeda ideologue, member of its strategy committee and editor of *Vanguards of Khurasan*, the magazine of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, presented a lengthy examination of the steps Egyptian president Muhammad al-Mursi should take in transforming Egypt into an Islamic state. In an article carried on jihadi websites entitled "If I was in Mursi's place and sat on the Throne," Abd al-Raouf suggests the new Egypt should be a self-sufficient state based on social justice and preparation for jihad, both defensive and offensive (Ansar1.info, July 25). According to the sheikh's austere vision of a "New Egypt":

- The Islamic Shari'a must form the constitution of the country. It is a powerful force that can overcome any obstacle or challenge to comprehensive reform. Its implementation and progress should be explained in a monthly public broadcast. Senior figures of the old regime should be prosecuted "in all fairness and efficiency" and the funds that were looted in the past three decades should be recovered and deposited in the state treasury, "a battle that will not be easy or short."
- There must be a comprehensive change in the lifestyle and behavior of the Egyptian President. This should begin with a move from the opulence of the presidential palace in Heliopolis to much more modest quarters in the suburbs as a first sign that the president intends to follow "a policy of austerity, justice and humility." The presidential palaces, grounds and furnishings should be put up for rent or sale, as should most of the fleets of cars and aircraft, leaving only what is essential for the operations of the president. Further austerity measures should include the

abolition of Egyptian embassies in countries that do not have direct political, economic or military ties to Egypt as well as the cancellation of official celebrations and festivals.

- All international conventions must be reviewed, according to the rule of law, with an eye to eliminating those conventions and treaties that have created in Egypt a cycle of poverty, underdevelopment and defeatism. Payments on enormous international debts created through usury should be canceled "on the spot." Alternatives to such borrowing should be examined, including interest-free short-term loans, relying on Arab and Islamic solidarity for their provision.
- Investment from domestic capital and Arab and Islamic countries should be encouraged to exploit the business advantages offered by Egypt, including security, cheap labor, technical competence and low wages for professionals in comparison to those of Western or Asian countries.
- All Islamist political prisoners should be released immediately and the Ministry of the Interior cleansed of all those officials still loyal to the former regime. These steps should be accompanied by a review of the judicial system as a whole, including the qualifications of judges and amendments to the curricula of law schools and colleges.
- Rather than be appointed by the president of the republic, the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar should be elected directly by religious scholars. The *awqaf* system (religious endowments) and its control by a government ministry should be reviewed and reformed, while salary increases and



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

bonuses to improve the social status of scholars and preachers will encourage academically outstanding students to study Islamic law and the Arabic language.

- The Culture and Information sectors should be cleansed of corrupt officials and those promoting apostasy, immorality and vice.
- Immorality fostered by tourism is linked to corruption and decadence in Egypt. Given the impossibility of cancelling this sector due to the employment and hard currency it provides, tourism should be “Islamized” by encouraging domestic tourism and visits from other Arabs and Muslims. “Foreigners” would be welcome if they agreed to abide by community ethics and behavior consistent with Islamic law.
- Citizens should be held accountable in their observance of the pillars of Islam, such as the performance of prayers, fasting and pilgrimage for those who can afford it. Of special concern should be employees of the state who do not perform prayers or who break the fast during Ramadan.
- The problem of male youth unemployment and resultant issues of crime could be eliminated by removing women from the work force. Working women may spend more than their salary on transportation to and from work, nursery fees, meals, clothing and accessories while their children develop mental and physical health issues in their absence. Why not then return women to their homes where they are protected and can avoid mixing with men? In a reversal of the modern assembly-line technique of mass production, the sheikh suggests that women who seek to supplement their husband’s income can be trained by television in home production techniques and have raw materials delivered to their homes and finished products picked up later. Uneducated women can pursue sewing, embroidery, knitting and carpet production while educated women can assemble products such as watches and electronic devices.
- The performance of government departments and state facilities must be improved, especially government hospitals.
- Sectarian conflict must be extinguished in Egypt. According to Abdul-Raouf, the current leaders of the Coptic Church in Egypt continue to follow policies of the late

Pope Shenouda III that fuelled sectarian disputes by attempting to create a Christian “state within a state.” Christians must not form part of the nation’s senior leadership as there are a sufficient number of Muslims with “experience and competence.”

- All citizens must be provided with food security and adequate housing. Agricultural scientists and scholars of animal production must be employed in efforts to bring self-sufficiency in food to Egypt, which currently relies heavily on foreign imports. With many Egyptians living in slums, shanty houses and tents, the state must dedicate itself to creating new urban communities where borrowing from “Arab and friendly countries” can be used to provide housing to Egyptians with interest-free and affordable payments.
- Working from the axiom that people who do not have guns do not have freedom, Egypt should abandon military assistance from the United States “which it does not need” and instead focus on becoming self-sufficient in arms production, even if this means an immediate decline in the quality of available arms. Abd al-Raouf points to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as proof that “miracles” can be achieved with even backwards arms and limited ammunition against the most powerful military forces if Egyptians “put their trust in God.” The state must become militarized in preparation for the “epic battles” to come between Muslims and infidels, with military service binding on “every sane adult.” As Islam does not acknowledge only defensive jihad, but must sometimes attack in a pre-emptive war “to nip aggression in the bud,” the responsible government department must change its name from “the Ministry of Defense.”

While new Egyptian President Muhammad al-Mursi is likely to take his advice from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau rather than al-Qaeda, the document is nevertheless interesting as a detailed proposal of how an Islamist state should be formed and organized according to al-Qaeda, which has been especially weak in dealing with such issues in the past, preferring to devote most of its ideological production to the conduct, aims and methods of global jihad.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Reformation

Sheikh Ibrahim Munir, the Secretary General of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood (and a close friend of al-Mursi) has identified Egypt's entrenched bureaucracy and the still extant "deep state" power structure as major obstacles to the new president's reform mission:

President Mursi has to overcome obstacles, obstructions, and corrupt concepts that have accumulated during decades of individual pharaoh rule during which loyalty for the person of the ruler was put before loyalty to the country and the people. Thus, what are now called "deep state" practices, which do not distinguish between what is allowed and what is prohibited in dealing with the money, honor, or blood of the subjects, have been formed together with a terrifying backward bureaucracy that destroys any progress and efficiency, and that does not know the meaning of transparency, and regression has taken place in all the state institutions and their cultural, financial, medical, educational, services, and foreign policy actions that are related to the independence and interests of the country (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, July 11).

To overcome these obstacles, Sheikh Ibrahim suggests al-Mursi must do three things – surround himself with "a good entourage," overcome the bureaucracy by correcting the culture of those working in it and subject every member of the government at every level to the statutes of the law and constitution.

Internal Dissent

As Egypt's new leaders struggle to form a government, a vast post-revolutionary social upheaval continues. Labor strife persists; the 870 protests and strikes on the nation's railway system alone have cost the state an estimated \$120 million (*al-Masry al-Youm*, August 2).

Al-Mursi will also have to deal with different visions of the New Egypt even within the Muslim Brotherhood movement, whether from "liberal" Islamists like Dr. Abd al-Moneim Aboul Fotouh (a former member of the movement's Guidance Bureau who resigned to contest the presidential election) or voices like former Brotherhood spokesman Kamal al-Halbawi, who denounced al-Mursi's July 12 visit to Saudi Arabia (his first official visit abroad as president), which he described as "an enemy of

the Egyptian Revolution" (El-Balad TV, July 31; Fars News Agency [Tehran], July 31).

Al-Mursi, who taught at California State University in the 1980s, is often regarded as a protégé of Khairat al-Shater, the wealthy chief strategist of the Muslim Brotherhood, who sponsored his rise through the ranks of the Brotherhood. His detractors regard al-Mursi as a stand-in for al-Shater, who promoted al-Mursi as a presidential candidate only after his own candidacy was disqualified by the military in April on the grounds that he had recently been in prison, a violation of the election rule that a candidate must not have been imprisoned in the previous six years (*Egypt Independent*, June 22).

Tourism

With the vital tourism industry off by a third since the revolution, Egypt is scrambling for ways to restore the nearly 15 million visitors it hosted in 2010. Important tombs of the ancient period that have not been open to visitors for decades are being made available to tourists and a new Egyptian Museum is scheduled to open in 2014. Though the Muslim Brotherhood appears to understand the importance of Egypt's ancient monuments to the national economy as a source of foreign currency, Egypt's Salafists regard all such sites as products of the pre-Islamic *jahiliya* (time of ignorance) and would just as soon eliminate "idolatrous" visits to Egypt's ancient monuments (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, December 22, 2011). Fortunately for the industry, Salafist efforts to obtain the post of Minister of Tourism were unsuccessful, with the post going to an experienced technocrat, Hisham Za'azou. Nevertheless, efforts are underway by Islamist businessmen to promote Egypt as a center of "Halal Tourism" for families "committed to Shari'a." Approved hotels and tourist facilities would not serve alcohol, would provide *halal* meat and offer segregated facilities for men and women. [1]

Islamization

Egypt's Dar al-Ifta, an institution responsible for issuing *fatwa*s [religious rulings] under the supervision of Egypt's Grand Mufti, Ali Goma'a, issued a *fatwa* earlier this month declaring it was unacceptable for Muslims to eat or drink in public during Ramadan, calling such activity "a violation of public decency" (Daily News Egypt,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

August 2; *Bikya Masr*, August 2). Should the government decide to enforce the *fatwa* it will mark a major change in Egyptian society, where restaurants and cafés typically remain open during Ramadan.

On July 30, al-Mursi released and pardoned over a dozen Islamists imprisoned for trying to kill leading Egyptian officials (Ahrām Online, August 1). Al-Mursi has pledged to obtain the release of Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman from an American prison, where he is serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Egypt has also asked for the release of Egyptian jihadi Tariq al-Sawah, who has been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay since he was captured in the battle for Tora Bora (AFP, August 2).

Egypt's New Cabinet

The composition of the new cabinet reveals that several of the most important ministries remain in the hands of the pre-revolution power structure. In the Interior Ministry, responsible for internal security, Major General Ahmad Gamal al-Din has been appointed as minister despite being a former aide to the previous and much criticized interior minister, Muhammad Ibrahim (Ahrām Online, August 1). The general will have to deal not only with an internal security service that has largely collapsed since the revolution, but one that has been trained for decades to regard Islamism as a major internal security threat to Egypt.

The Nour Party, the most successful of the Salafist groups to take part in the parliamentary elections, has refused to join the new cabinet, rejecting new Prime Minister Hisham Qandil's offer of the Environment Ministry as being "unworthy" of the party (Ahrām Online, August 2; *al-Masry al-Youm*, August 1). Until parliament is reconvened or new elections are held, this effectively leaves the Salafists on the outside of the new government, a situation they are unlikely to tolerate for long. Al-Nour had sought the Ministry of Public Enterprise, which would have given it effective control of nearly 150 state-owned corporations.

Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein al-Tantawi will retain the post of defense minister, which he has held since 1991, thus ensuring there will be little civilian oversight of the armed forces. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has suggested creating a National Defense Council that would include both military and civilian leaders to work out

legislation regarding the military and its budget before its presentation to parliament. The president would only have the power to declare war after obtaining the approval of the National Defense Council and parliament, effectively limiting the president's ability to control foreign policy and command the national armed forces (Egypt Independent, August 2).

Reports that Muhammad Yousri Ibrahim, a leading Salafist and failed parliamentary candidate for the Salafist al-Asala Party, was al-Mursi's choice to take over the role of Ministry of Religious Endowments created immediate controversy at all levels in Egypt. Though educated at al-Azhar University, Muhammad Yousri is a noted critic of the institution and his candidacy was quickly opposed by the Grand Sheikh of the Islamic university, Ahmad al-Tayeb, on the grounds that the Minister of Endowments is traditionally chosen by the Grand Sheikh (Daily News Egypt, August 2). Muhammad Yousri is a close associate of Khairat al-Shater and it seems likely that the deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood was behind the appointment. The ministry is central to the religious direction of the nation as it is responsible for mosques, licensing imams and regulating the substantial endowments of property that fund the religious establishment. The announcement was widely condemned as a sign that Saudi-style Salafism had arrived with the approval of the Muslim Brotherhood and was loudly opposed by the nation's still influential Sufi leadership, which has endured attacks on its shrines from Salafists since the Revolution (*Egypt Independent*, May 17; *al-Masry al-Youm* [Cairo], March 30, 2011). Muhammad Yousri is also well-known for leading demonstrations against the Coptic Church. Amidst a deluge of criticism, al-Mursi's decision was quickly reversed and the ministry given into the hands of Osama al-Abd, the vice-chancellor of al-Azhar.

The Coptic Question

Despite early protestations of Coptic-Muslim cooperation in the early days of the Revolution, tensions between the Coptic and Muslim communities are now at an all-time high, requiring only a tiny spark to set off street violence that security forces show little interest in controlling. Most recently, major clashes erupted in the Dashour district of the Giza



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Governorate after a Coptic launderer accidentally burned a Muslim customer's shirt with his iron. The incident soon developed into street riots, looting of Coptic-owned shops and even the attempted arson of the Mary Guirguis Church, which was only narrowly prevented by security forces using tear gas (Ahram Online, August 2; *al-Masry al-Youm*, August 2; *Bikya Masr*, August 2). As many as 150 Coptic families may have fled the district. Following the clashes, Christian demonstrators who claim sectarian violence has intensified since al-Mursi became president appeared outside the Presidential Palace in Heliopolis bearing signs that said "Down with the rule of the Supreme Guide [i.e. of the Muslim Brotherhood]" (Ahram Online, August 2).

The interim leader of the Coptic Church, Bishop Pachomius, was critical of the cabinet appointments, which included only one Copt in the Ministry of Scientific Research, which Pachomius referred to as "a semi-ministry." The Bishop, who is filling in as leader until a new Pope can be elected after the death of Shenouda III, also denounced the security services for standing by "with arms crossed" during the sectarian riots in Dahshour (AFP, August 4).

Conclusion

The election of al-Mursi is just the beginning phase of the Brotherhood's 25-year Renaissance Project, a comprehensive effort to bring Egypt's administration, business sector and society in line with Islamic values. The chairman of the project's steering committee is Khairat al-Shater, who appears to be emerging as the real power behind the Egyptian throne.

The Brotherhood's Renaissance Project will inevitably collide with the interests of SCAF and the rest of Egypt's "Deep State" apparatus, which will be exceedingly difficult to dislodge. SCAF still holds supreme power in Egypt and

controls all decisions regarding the military. The determination of the Renaissance Project to make the military's large share of the Egyptian economy abide by free-market rules rather than continuing to use free labor (military conscripts) and free natural resources in its industries is certain to create friction (Egypt Independent, July 31). An antagonistic relationship was worsened in mid-June with the implementation of the Supplement to the Constitutional Declaration, which limited the president's powers and increased those of SCAF, including the right to intervene in the drafting of the new constitution (Egypt Independent, August 1). The ongoing political struggle has convinced many experienced technocrats and secular politicians to turn down government appointments, leaving al-Mursi with an inexperienced Prime Minister, no parliament, no vice-president, no power over the military and a corps of advisors with ties to Khairat al-Shater. Control of the most important ministries (Defense, Justice, Finance) remain outside the hands of the Brotherhood and promises of greater representation in the cabinet for women and Christians have been thoroughly dashed. The secular and progressive forces that filled Tahrir Square 18 months ago see too many familiar faces from the old regime in the "new" government and are unlikely to be inspired by the relative unknowns who are new appointments. Though al-Shater denies exerting influence over al-Mursi, Egypt's new president has so far made some questionable decisions in forming his new government and has generally been unable to attract Egypt's most talented and experienced leaders to the new regime. Further decisions of this type risk alienating large numbers of Egyptians, which could make a repeat of the Brotherhood's parliamentary victory earlier this year difficult when Egyptians return to the polls, possibly in December.

Note

1. See, for example: <http://www.shouqtravel.com/index.php/en/>

Andrew McGregor is the Managing Editor of the Jamestown Foundation's Global Terrorism Analysis publications and the Director of Toronto-based Aberfoyle International Security.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Suicide Bombings Return to Grozny

By Mairbek Vatchagaev

Source: <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ncw/>

Before the commotion over the possible death of the well-known Chechen rebel emir Zaurbek Avdorkhanov in the Ingush village of Galashki on July 29 had subsided (www.chechenews.com/world-



news/breaking/8565-1.html), suicide bombers attacked in Grozny. As of August 8, it was still unclear whether Avdorkhanov was really killed, since only the bodies of two other alleged rebels, Ibragim Avdorkhanov and Ayub Khaladov, were displayed on Chechen TV.

In the August 6 attack, two suicide bombers struck the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny on Baisangur Benovsky Street, which is on the border of the town of Michurin and Minutka Square. The attack took place on the anniversary of the storming of Grozny by Chechen militants in August 1996 (www.ntv.ru/novosti/318782/). The location of the attack – near a military-owned store where some military personnel are always present buying food and clothing – was selected for a specific reason. The store is located right in front of the entrance of the Russian military base in Khankala and at the juncture of a city highway. A suicide bomber reportedly ran up to a group of servicemen and blew himself up next to their armored minivan just as they were leaving the store. When other military personnel started to run toward the victims, a second suicide bomber apparently struck. Three Russian Interior Ministry troops died on the spot and a fourth died in the hospital

(www.gazeta.ru/social/2012/08/06/4713257.shtm).

Three people were also injured in the blasts, including two civilians. The remains of a body found at the incident probably belonged to the suicide bombers. However, on a video recorded by a surveillance camera posted by the Russian news website Lifenews, it can be seen that the blast seems to have taken place prior to the time the two suspected suicide bombers could have reached its location. The crater from the blast is next to the wall of the building, while the car next to which the suspected attackers supposedly blew themselves up did not even move at the time of the explosion, although the car dropped its front bumper, which was facing the store (<http://lifenews.ru/news/99040>). Therefore, an initial report by the Chechen Interior Ministry may have been truthful: it said that the servicemen were blown up during a demining operation. Another peculiarity of the attack was the fact that parts of the suicide bomber's belt survived, which is quite unusual. Normally, only the head of a suicide bomber survives the blast.

The police initially said that the servicemen died as they were demining the area. On the evening of the same day, however, the Chechen Interior Ministry stated that the blast was a terrorist attack and a criminal investigation was launched. Preliminary information reported on August 7 suggested there were two suicide bombers – 29-year-old Ali Demilkhanov, a resident of Geldygen village in Kurchaloi district, and 25-year-old Salman Gekhaev, a resident of the city of Gudermes. Gekhaev had previously been convicted of participating in an illegal armed group (www.rg.ru/2012/08/08/reg-skfo/opozn-anons.html).

It remains a mystery as to what compelled a young 25-year old man to become a suicide bomber. But Russian prisons are a breeding ground of hatred for everything Russian, given that incarcerated Muslims often are treated in degrading ways and their religious views are habitually flouted. Therefore, it is not surprising that the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

number of former convicts who join the insurgency is quite high.

Speaking to the media on the evening of August 6, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov admitted that the recent blasts were a suicide attack. Kadyrov said that well-known insurgent leaders, the brothers Hussein and Muslim Gakaev, may have been behind the attack. Hussein Gakaev is Caucasus Emirate leader Doku Umarov's deputy and Muslim Gakaev oversees insurgent activities in the Shali and Vedeno districts of Chechnya. "This is typical of the Gakaevs' tactics – find ill, feeble-minded people, drug them and send them to their death," Kadyrov said on August 7 (www.rferl.org/content/kadyrov-implicates-gakayev-brothers-in-grozny-bombing/24669216.html).

The Gakaev brothers are among the most wanted militants in Chechnya. Their subordinates have carried out suicide attacks on a number of occasions. The hottest year for suicide bombers in the republic was 2009, when 10 suicide attacks took place in the period between May and October (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/161321/). The wave of suicide bombing in the republic eventually subsided. In 2011, only one suicide attack took place in Chechnya: nine people died in Grozny in a triple suicide bomb attack on August 30. The last time a suicide attack took place in 2012 was on February 9 in Grozny, when a suicide bomber exploded several IEDs, injuring several riot policemen (aka OMON) (www.kommersant.ru/doc/1996679). Suicide bombers (called Shahids by the militants) do not enjoy much support and

understanding among a majority of the population in Chechnya. This tactic, which was introduced to Chechnya by volunteers from the Middle East, is completely incompatible with Chechen social and cultural norms and is not something that comes easily to the Chechen mentality.

Meanwhile, in Chechnya's mountainous Vedeno district, an armed clash occurred between government forces and militants. Two servicemen were injured and the search for members of the armed group involved in the clash continued (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/210885/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter). It is probably not an accident that a police and military operation was launched in this area, since it is where the Gakaev brothers operate.

Conclusion

Thus, if we accept the authorities' version of events and agree that a suicide attack did indeed take place, **it probably means that suicide bombings, which keep recurring in Chechnya and Dagestan**, are not merely a temporary tactic of the militants, and that similar attacks are likely to follow. These attacks have a negative impact on the Kremlin's image and policies in the region. **As the 2014 Sochi Olympics approach, Moscow will have to expend much effort and resources to prove to the international community that the North Caucasus is not a flashpoint for the government as it combats an armed and highly motivated insurgent movement that extends from one end of the North Caucasus to the other.**

BOOK – Jeffrey William Lewis. *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing*

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012. 346 pp.; ISBN: 97816110514. US \$ 39.95

Review by Assaf Moghadam

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/moghadam-the-business-of-martyrdom/html>


The Business of Martyrdom is a thoughtful and enlightening take at the problem of suicide bombings; it offers more than its title suggests. Lewis, an instructor at Ohio State University, provides an overview of the modern history of suicide bombing starting with its use in Imperial Russia, using a framework of analysis that interprets suicide missions as a technology.

Lewis defines technologies not merely in their narrow, physical, sense but more broadly as "processes that integrate behavior, thinking, and physical materials and transform them into goods or services of greater utility" (p. 7). His understanding of technology is informed by Arnold Pacey's framework, who sees technology as



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

an interactive process, combining technical aspects, culture/society, and organisation (pp.12-17). Lewis substitutes the technical



aspects of Pacey's definition with the human suicide attacker, although he considers organisations to be the most critical of these three nodes because suicide bombings allow for organisational control of "what would otherwise be an individual act" (p. 4). Cultures and societies play a role not only in constructing martyrs, but also in the diffusion of this tactic. The spread of suicide bombings, as is true of any tactic, is heterogeneous, embraced or rejected depending on the technology's ability to "solve problems consistent with their values and norms" (p. 7).

The book is structured in accordance with the life cycle of technological systems. Part I of the book examines the innovation phase, during which new technologies are developed, and includes insightful chapters on suicide bombings in Imperial Russia, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka. Lewis argues that suicide bombings used by Russian anarchists foreshadowed the contemporary forms of suicide attacks. Unlike today's 'human bombs,' however, the bombs were not yet fully integrated with the bombers, allowing for the possibility of the attackers' survival. The chance of surviving the suicide

mission afforded to Russian Anarchists was eliminated with the Japanese Kamikaze/Tokkotai, whose martyrdom operations more closely resemble contemporary tactics for that reason (61). The appropriation of the suicide bomber by organisations was completed by Hizballah and other groups in Lebanon during the 1980s.

Lewis' chapter on Sri Lanka might not offer much information that is new to the specialist, but his discussion does offer a fresh take on this particular case. Using his framework, Lewis convincingly explains why the first suicide bombing in Sri Lanka was followed by a three year hiatus—namely due to a lack of "dedicated organisational component for preparing and exploiting suicide attacks on a regular basis" (p. 107). He also distinguishes the use of suicide bombings by the LTTE from those employed by other groups by arguing that suicide bombings reinforced the political power of a single person, namely LTTE Leader Vellupilai Prabhakaran—a fact that, Lewis argues, also helps explain why LTTE suicide attacks essentially declined along with the LTTE leader's death (p. 111).

In Part II of the book, Lewis tackles the diffusion of the technology of suicide bombing. Lewis argues that the spread of suicide bombings depends on several factors, most importantly on the innovation's compatibility with the culture of the new society and the degree to which the innovation is perceived to be "better for solving a given problem relative to other solutions"(pp. 139-140). To be sustainable, suicide attacks require "careful cultural construction and management" (p. 111). Lewis shows that such construction was lacking in the case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army's campaign of 'proxy bombings'. The degree of the IRA's reverence for its martyrs simply did not meet the minimum required threshold, rendering suicide bombings "inconsistent with IRA cultural norms" (pp. 116-117).

Part III of the book, "Commodification," examines the global spread of suicide bombing, the signature technology of the global jihad movement. Lewis points at a tension in the most recent wave of suicide attacks. The more systematically organisations control



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the use of suicide bombings, the less 'authentic' martyrdom seems to broader audiences. This tension essentially plays the tactical aspect of suicide bombings off against the strategic dimension. Global jihadists have turned out to be poor managers of this contradiction, which helps explain the recent decline in the number of suicide bombings, at least when compared to the previous decade. The book's dual purpose is to offer both an intellectual synthesis of the existing debate, as well as to formulate a new interpretation of suicide missions. Although it achieves both goals, the book could have benefited from a more thorough analysis of the existing literature and *The Business of Martyrdom's* place in it. The author does discuss some of the more important debates in the field early on in the book (pp. 13-17), but the academic readership would have been well served had Lewis revisited that discussion in the conclusion, in light of the book's main arguments. Such discussion would have been particularly helpful

because Lewis' explanation does not amount to a radical new theory of suicide attacks, but rather to a reinterpretation that, thought-provoking as it is, closely relates to existing multi-causal approaches to understanding this phenomenon.

Some non-specialist readers may be deterred by the rather intricate nature of the book's main argument. Perhaps precisely because of its merit and strong explanatory power—after all, complex problems require complex explanations—Lewis' interpretation of suicide bombings is multifaceted, lacking the elegant simplicity of other explanations of suicide missions.

These minor points aside, Lewis has provided a highly valuable service to the field of terrorism studies. *The Business of Martyrdom* is a thoroughly researched, well written, and well-argued book – one that ranks among the most important and comprehensive works published on this topic to date.

Assaf Moghadam is Senior Lecturer, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy and Senior Researcher, International Institute for Counterterrorism (DC), Herzliya.

BOOK – Ramon Spaaij. Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention

London/New York: Springer, 2012. ISBN 978-94-007-2980-3. 119 pp. US \$49.95/ £ 44.99.

Reviewed by Mark S. Hamm

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/hamm-understanding-lone-wolf-terrorism/html>

To say that lone wolf terrorism is a neglected field of research is an understatement. Lone wolf terrorism has so far engendered few empirical studies or government reports and little textbook information. Nor is there a professional consensus on the definition of the crime. Such a void is troublesome, given that lone wolves have proven to be especially challenging for police and intelligence communities because they are extremely difficult to detect and to defend against.

Ramon Spaaij's *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* is therefore an important contribution to the literature. Spaaij begins this thoughtful and meticulous analysis by offering a concise four-part definition of lone wolf terrorism that clearly distinguishes the phenomenon from terrorist activities carried out by underground organisations or states. Based on this definition, Spaaij examines the leading

international databases and identifies 88 cases of lone wolf terrorism in North America, Europe and Australia between 1940 and 2010. The cases resulted in 198 attacks claiming 123 lives and injuring hundreds more. Spaaij then employs a case study analysis and concludes that while there is no standard profile of the lone wolf, radicalisation tends to result from a combination of individual processes, interpersonal relations and socio-political and cultural circumstances—a view that is consistent with a wider body of terrorism research showing that there is no specific "conveyor belt" to radicalisation. In this respect, Spaaij makes five ground-breaking observations.

First, Spaaij found that lone wolves tend to create their own ideologies that combine personal frustrations with broader political, social or




CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

religious grievances. Though important, this finding also highlights the difficulties of assigning clear-cut motives for the terrorist attacks. *Second*, and contrary to research indicating that terrorists do not suffer from any identifiable psychopathology, Spaaij shows that lone wolves are likely to suffer from some form of psychological disturbance. *Third*, lone wolves are inclined to suffer from social ineptitude: to varying degrees, they are loners with few friends and prefer to act alone. *Fourth*, even though lone wolves are by definition unaffiliated with a terrorist organisation, they may identify or sympathize with extremist groups and may have been members of such groups in the past. These organisations provide “ideologies of validation” for lone wolves and function as communities of belief by transferring personal frustrations onto the transgressive “other.”

Fifth, and most important in terms of prevention, lone wolf terrorism does not take place in a social vacuum. Instead, radicalisation can manifest itself in an activist stance involving the expression of one’s political beliefs and a hyperactive search for both physical and verbal confrontation with adversaries. In other words, lone wolves tend to *broadcast their intent* to commit violence. A classic example is the “Unabomber Manifesto”—written by Theodore Kaczynski at his log cabin in the Montana wilderness and sent to the *New York Times* with a warning that his terror would continue until the Manifesto was published, leading to Kaczynski’s arrest and the end of his 20-years long bombing campaign

The tendency to distribute ideas and manifestos to the outside world extends to each case of lone wolf terrorism examined by Spaaij. And it applies to cases occurring since his research. For example, before he shot US Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and 19 of her supporters in 2011, Jared Laughner displayed his contempt for government in numerous Facebook postings. Laughner also

posted two YouTube videos; in one he is seen burning an America flag, and in the other he



parrots popular themes of the radical right and provides his own definition of terrorism (his videos now have over 2 million hits). Laughner derided Giffords as a “fake” to classmates and even exchanged letters with the Congresswoman.

It is commonly assumed that lone wolves have a critical advantage in avoiding detection before and after their attacks because most of them do not communicate with others regarding their intentions. As US Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano once noted, lone wolf terrorist attacks are “the most challenging” from a law enforcement perspective, “because by definition they’re not conspiring. They’re not using the phones, the computer networks..they’re not talking with others” (p. 3). It appears that they are doing precisely that.

Mark S. Hamm is a member of UNICRI, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, a Senior Research Fellow, Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, the City University of New York and a Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University.



Hizballah in Africa

By Carl Wege

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/wege-hizballah-in-africa/html>

There is a gap in the existing literature on Hizballah which has rarely been examined: Hizballah and Iran's recent roles in Africa. The African continent, particularly countries below the Sahara, is characterized by a large number of failed states and/or effectively ungoverned regions. Hizballah exploited the opportunity presented there to create strategic depth for the organisation in Africa. Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - Sepahe Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami, Pasdaran), allied with Hizballah, utilizes the strategic space Africa affords to advance Iranian national objectives. Given the expanding US presence on the continent in pursuit of international Salafi jihadists affiliated to Al-Qaeda, it is worthwhile also to take note of the history of Hizballah's role and recent activities and those of Iran in Africa.

Introduction

Africa's state system, exploited by Hizballah and Iran for a generation,[1] more recently became an arena in which transnational criminal organisations and international Salafi jihadists turned into globally relevant players. Africa has now also become an important area of operations for the United States which created an African Command (*Africom*) in 2007 as part of the war against Al-Qaeda and in order to assist African security forces in their counterterrorism efforts.[2] This has changed the operational opportunities for transnationally operating terrorist organisations in Africa in general and those of Salafist orientation in the Sahel in particular.

The Sahel region transects Africa across the southern reaches of the Sahara and contains vast natural resources that, once developed, would offer revenue streams that could, if unchecked, be siphoned off by terrorist organisations.[3] Islamist activists in multiple varieties - from the benign to globally dangerous jihadists - are the primary drivers of social mobilization across the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active in the Sahel in Mali where an AQIM affiliate recently seized power in the northern half of the country. It has also reached out to the Horn of Africa where Al-Shabab has emerged as an important Al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia. Armed non-state actors and organisations that previously would have been isolated from one another - such as Hizballah and AQIM - are now more likely to interact with one another. However, the presence of the US African Command (*Africom*) creates a series of "tripwires" or nodes across the continent, reaching from the Sahel's *Africom*

base in Burkina Faso and to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.[4] A secondary and originally unintended effect of this system of "tripwires" has been an increased awareness of, and potential engagement with, Hizballah and its state sponsor Iran.

The analytical approach taken here conceptualizes Hizballah and Iranian networks as a series of geospatial layers that overlap one another, creating a matrix in the African space. The layer that defines Hizballah's network and creates revenue is primarily located in two spaces; one is an arc stretching from West Africa along the coast reaching down toward the Congo while the other is a circle encompassing the Horn of Africa which falls more under the operational control of Iran. Conceptually, the Iranian geospatial layer can be visualized as a circle encompassing the Horn of Africa seeking to influence the Middle Eastern theater. Iranian arms smuggling infiltrations from that circle reach into Nigeria, Kenya, and the central African spaces. Add to that the counterterrorism mission of the US *Africom* layer with a focal point in Djibouti with lesser nodes circling into the central African spaces and spread across the Sahel. If we think of these layers covering one another creating a three dimensional matrix, this can help inform our thinking with respect to counterterrorism efforts in Africa.

Hizballah, though born in Lebanon and an increasingly dominant power at home, is not synonymous with the Lebanese state, being denied the overt governmental instruments of power.[5] In part as a consequence of this, Hizballah designed covert infrastructures, often anchored in Shi'a diaspora communities around



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the world, both to support Hizballah's organisation in Lebanon and at times also to act abroad in partnership with Iran. Hizballah has built its covert infrastructure across Africa to provide the organisation with financial and

Lebanese Resistance Detachments (*Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah* or AMAL); it initially controlled the illegal diamond trade Hizballah would ultimately dominate. The Sierra Leone born Shi'a Lebanese Nabih Berri



operational support but also to further its alliance with Iran. Hizballah's African infrastructure consists of a relatively small number of genuine Hizballah operatives and large numbers of Hizballah associates and sympathizers engaging in activities that help sustain the organisation in Lebanon from Africa.

Hizballah's Support Infrastructure in Africa

Lebanese diaspora communities emerged in West Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were initially made up primarily of Lebanese Christian immigrants who were historically encouraged by British colonial policy to settle in places like Sierra Leone.[6] Ultimately both Lebanese Sunni and Shi'a emigrants entered Africa's diaspora communities in large numbers. The outbreak of Lebanon's civil war in 1975 coincided with Shi'a immigrants of Lebanese extraction beginning to dominate the illegal diamond trade between Sierra Leone and Liberia. In West Africa, as in Lebanon, family and clan structures became the prevailing modality of social and business interactions.[7] In West Africa, the Lebanese Shi'a rival to the Hizballah ("Party of God") was called the

assumed leadership of Lebanon's AMAL party in 1980. He eventually became Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. Berri and Shahid Mohammed Jamil, an ally of Sierra Leone's President Siaka Stevens (1971 - 1985), maintained a mutually beneficial political relationship.[8] This liaison gave Lebanon's AMAL militia an entrée into the Sierra Leonean Shi'a community which was to prove useful both for fundraising and for the smuggling of diamonds. AMAL associate Sayed Ali Ahmad, of the Lebanese Ahmad clan's Sierra Leone branch, invested money for Berri at the Antwerp end of the diamond trade. This was done through a maze of front companies the Ahmad's controlled, including Sierra Gem Diamonds, ASA International, and ASA Diam. The decade-long civil war that devastated Sierra Leone from 1991 until 2002 facilitated large-scale diamond smuggling with assistance from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), backed by Liberia.[9] However, that civil war weakened AMAL's local advantage in West Africa, thereby increasing concurrently the opportunity for AMAL's rival Hizballah to improve its position in the Shi'a community and eventually gain control of much of the illegal diamond



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

trade.[10] Hizballah and RUF cooperation in the illegal diamond trade has been documented by the US Congressional Research Service [11]. In other parts of West Africa such as the Congo, other Shi'a traders in illegal diamonds became subjugated to Hizballah men through middlemen, broadening further the revenue stream to finance the organisation.[12] Hizballah's successful blended the illegal diamond trade with legitimate business enterprises; this also helped to disguise finances that supported Hizballah activities in Lebanon.[13]

The flow of money to Hizballah from the Congo region made use of multiple corporate networks.[14] The Shi'a Lebanese Tajideen network, for example, reportedly used corporations such as Tajco Ltd. and Omas Trading operated through Ali Husayn and Kassim Tajiadeen along with diamond and food trading enterprises in Gambia, the Congo and Angola to launder money for Hizballah.[15] These Tajiadeen-linked corporations engaged in legitimate business but were also facilitating the movement of monies and goods to Hizballah and Hizballah-linked entities in Lebanon. Likewise they could provide cover in the form of employment abroad, establishing also safe havens for Hizballah operatives on the run from security services in the Middle East.

Activities of Hizballah that are less often mentioned include Hizballah's direct participation in organised crime to generate financial support for the organisation. The two major elements of this type of criminality are Hizballah shakedowns of Lebanese merchants in the African diaspora and its cooperation with narco-trafficking organisations. A less significant factor is Hizballah's involvement in various fraud schemes.

Hizballah has institutionalized a framework for shaking down "donations" from Lebanese businessmen in the African diaspora. As described by Douglas Farah, Lebanese-owned businesses across West Africa were assessed by Hizballah for a "contribution" on a yearly or semi-annual basis whereby the amount to be contributed was a defined fraction of revenue for any given Lebanese-owned business. Those contributions were collected, generally in cash, by Hizballah bag men who often moved the monies to the Middle East by courier.[16] Some contributions were likely to have been genuine voluntary donations meant

for political and social service organisations run by Hizballah, but many such contributions were little more than extortions.[17]

Some types of Hizballah-associated criminality required specific religious dispensation. A special fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in the mid-1980s, for example, gave Hizballah a spiritual go-ahead to engage in narco-trafficking.[18] The organisation became involved in illicit narcotics enterprises in several areas of the world, including both North and South America.[19] In the Americas, the increasing strength of Mexican drug cartels over the last decades precipitated a shift by South American drug traffickers toward Africa – very much to the advantage of Hizballah. West Africa became a storage and transshipment region used by transnational organised crime groups for major illicit narcotics shipments from Latin America to Europe, as documented by the US Drug Enforcement Administration.[20] A complex set of relationships emerged between Hizballah and other terrorist organisations and various transnational drug-trafficking organisations as well as with local criminal organisations. Those relationships were based on critical services each could provide to its partners - with all parties making a profit.[21] The local West African model of organised crime (sometimes called the 'Nigerian model') is not hierarchical; rather it consists of "project-based" networks that would coalesce and dissolve as opportunities warranted.[22]

Guinea-Bissau for instance, can be described as a narco-state it is one of the more significant drug trafficking hubs in West Africa. Guinea-Bissau-based Lebanese working on behalf of Hizballah have directly engaged the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* or FARC) due, in part, to the geography of the ninety island archipelago.[23] Narcotics are moved from Guinea-Bissau to Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, and then transhipped to Northern Africa's Mediterranean coast and from there on to final destinations in Europe.[24] The Liberian state under Charles Taylor (President 1997-2003) was a kleptocratic enterprise. Taylor's Liberia used state institutions to protect and further the activities of favored criminal enterprises, cooperating with organised crime groups from multiple countries – Israeli criminals as well as



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Al-Qaeda and Hizballah were operating in the same geographic space without much friction.[25] The aftermath of Taylor's resignation ending a civil war in 2003 saw multiple claims to the Presidency although Ellen Sirleaf was ultimately elected President in two 2006. Nonetheless the status of Liberia as a major drug trafficking hub has persisted with Al-Qaeda and Hizballah essentially using the same Liberian smuggling networks in subsequent years.[26]

Hizballah and Iran

Some elements of Hizballah's African archipelago support radical Islamist groups at the behest of Iran. These groups are sometimes Sunni but nonetheless share common interests with Iran and Hizballah in their opposition to Western interests. Iran's interests in Africa have likewise changed over time with early revolutionary fervour devolving to the pursuit of more mundane national and commercial interests. Irrespective of the quite real Sunni-Shi'a jurisprudential differences, both Hizballah and Iran have proven quite adept at working with Sunni radicals when they share common interests.

The Nigerian case demonstrates how local grievances can potentially be exploited by Iran, Hizballah or Al-Qaeda. While the geography of the state of Nigeria has been defined only since independence in 1960, Islam penetrated portions of that space very early. The borders of the modern Nigerian state are transected with Islamic influence defining the culture of Northern Nigeria and separating it from the non-Islamic South. The non-Islamic Southern regions of the countries are the basis for Nigeria's oil-based wealth while the Islamic North is economically much less developed. That North-South divide is a rather fundamental one, strongly shaping Nigeria's polity.

The geographic space that now includes the Northern portion of Nigeria boasts a history of Sunni Muslim activism dating back to the ninth century. One consequence of that history of activism is that various Muslims sects from the Northern part of the country ultimately came to dominate the Nigerian army. Shedrack Best [27] has identified two significant Sunni Islamist movements in Northern Nigeria: (i) the *Izala* was a defined as a *da'wah* type movement striving for spiritual purification and orthodoxy but with no explicit intent to establish an

Islamist state and (ii) the *Maitatsine* movement which, by contrast, has engaged in ongoing, Islamist-inspired violence against the police and other symbols of the Nigerian state. *Maitatsine* terrorist operations however were less intended to build Islamist institutions as to target Nigerian state institutions.[28] Nonetheless, as the 21st century began, Sunni activists persuaded the Nigerian government in Abuja to allow twelve of its Northern States to make Shariah law the official standard for criminal justice procedures. Northern Nigerian states then saw the emergence of a *Hisbah* militia enforcing Shariah law.[29] More recently, Boko Haram, founded by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, has become more vociferous. Ravidly Islamist and engaging in widespread violence in the North of Nigeria Boko Haram is ideologically compatible with many of the regional Salafist groups and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Boko Haram's operational capacity is currently limited but has the potential to become much more challenging, particularly if armed and funded by Iran.

In addition to potentially exploiting local Islamist radicals, Iranian assets have also tried to build an arms smuggling network in Nigeria and throughout Africa. In doing so it was not always successfully. Iran's efforts to use Nigeria for covert arms distribution backfired in October 2010 when the Nigerian State Security Services, probably tipped by Western agencies, intercepted a ship in Lagos port of Apapa. The ship came from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and was operated through the French container company CMA CGM Group, carrying contraband freight consisting of thirteen containers of heavy arms with a listed destination of Banjul Gambia.[30] It became clear that an Iranian businessman Azim Aghajani who was managing the shipment in Nigeria was in fact a Iranian IRGC agent intending to forward the arms to support dissident factions in several countries, including Nigeria itself. It appears that part of the shipment was to be diverted to the *Hisbah* militia in Nigeria's own North. A fraction of the shipment was going to support the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) rebel movement in Southern Senegal and another part was to go to rivals of Gambian President Jammeh.[31] Gambia's President Yahya Jammeh had been a faithful ally of Iran for



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

some years, himself making a reasonable income buying arms from Tehran and reselling them [32] Senegal and Gambia, both of whom previously reported good relations with Tehran, took offence at the Nigerian discovery and broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 2011.[33] Kenya, while having more sophisticated security services, also offers rich opportunities for Iran.[34] Iran's intent to use the opportunities Kenya presented was demonstrated in 2012 when Kenyan police arrested Sayed Mansour Mousavi and Ahmand Abolfathi Mohammed, both Iranian nationals, for smuggling more than one hundred kilograms of cyclonite (RDX) to a warehouse in Mombasa, Kenya.[35]. The Iranians may have been attempting to strike back at Kenya due to the military incursion by its armed forces to stabilize parts of the Jubaland area of Somalia ruled by Al-Shabab.[36] Iran seems to prefer instability in the Horn of Africa, even under the auspices of Sunni Islamists like Al-Shabab, to gain and maintain Iranian influence in the region. The US government, through its embassy in Nairobi, tries to act as a counterpoint to Iran, deploying substantial resources to promote stability in Somalia. In addition, Manda Bay in Kenya serves as part of the *Africom* tripwire system for the United States. US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces use the Kenyan military base to conduct stability operations across the Horn of Africa.[37] While these operations are aimed primarily at Al-Qaeda affiliates functioning in the region, they inevitably impact on Iran's interests. *Africom* also utilizes facilities in Nzara (South Sudan). This too might generate apprehension in Iran's IRGC Force's North African Department.

While arms' trafficking is a significant component of Iran's West African operations, the main focus of Tehran's efforts has been the Horn of Africa, given the proximity of the Horn to the Middle Eastern theater. This is also a focal point of *Africom's* counterterrorism efforts through the vehicle of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) which is based on the old French military compound camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. While Western attention for the Horn has focused primarily on pirates and on Al-Qaeda's links with Al-Shabab, Iran has quietly continued its long-term efforts to exploit conditions there to further its own interests. The center of Iran's efforts in this regard has been Sudan and, to a lesser

extent, Somalia. Iran's efforts began a generation ago, following the 1989 Islamist coup by Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front in Sudan. Iran traded money for influence in Khartoum and Sudan became a focal point for Iranian intelligence officers liaising with networks of Sunni Islamists. By 1999 the US State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* referred to Sudan as a central hub for terrorist groups - from Lebanon's Hizballah to Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda.[38]

Concurrent with Iran's mentoring efforts with the Khartoum government, Tehran had established a Somali Revolutionary Guard in Sudan, trained under the tutelage of both Iranian and Hizballah personnel and intended to act as an Iranian proxy in Somalia.[39] However, Iran's efforts to leverage its presence in Sudan to project influence into Somalia became problematic. Somalia had not retained a functional government since 1991, making the Somali geographic space a constellation of competing tribes, warlords, militia factions and their affiliated criminal entities. When the Iranian-trained and Sudan-based Somali Revolutionary Guard was inserted into Somalia's ungoverned spaces, its revolutionary pretensions dissolved into nothing. The Somali Revolutionary Guard became yet another faction fighting on Somalia's battle ground. Iran and its al-Quds elements ultimately supported multiple factions in Somalia, including the Somali Islamic Union Party, a Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) then led by General Muhammed Abshir and Abdel al-Rahman who controlled parts of the Somaliland area. While these factions never constituted any coherent fighting force or established any consistent form of Islamic governance, they did two things: they allowed Iran's entrée into Somalia and they managed to stop the United Nations aid organisations from stabilizing the country - thereby preventing establishment of any Somali government conflicting with Iranian interests.[40]

The Islamic Court Union (ICU, also called Council of Islamic Courts), initially a device for local leaders to control small geographic areas under generic Shariah law, grew strong enough to assert control over Mogadishu and the trade routes inland.[41] A brief 2006 Ethiopian intervention into Somalia degraded whatever hope the Islamic Courts Union had for a government, although a splinter faction of the ICU called Al-



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Shabab under Mukhtar Robow Ali (Abu Mansur) continues the fight and lately has affiliated itself with Al-Qaeda. Consequently, Al-Shabab is attracting significantly more US attention, reportedly in the form of drone strikes if not ground level support for Somali factions. The 2006 Ethiopian incursion had resulted in the creation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) favored by the United States. The TFG created a Somali National Security Agency headquartered at the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu.[42] An *Alpha Group* within the Somali National Security Agency supported US activities in Somalia with “snatch” operations, direct combat operations against Al-Shabab, and interrogations of prisoners, some rendered from adjacent countries.[43] In the Puntland region of Northeast Somalia, US JSOC personnel, sometimes flying directly from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, have assisted Puntland forces in combating Al-Shabab.[44] In addition to Somali’s internal players, affiliates of Iran and allies of the United States as well as some Al-Qaeda elements are active in the Somali space.

Sudan, ruled by Omar Hassan al-Bashir, has become a safe haven for some wanted Middle Eastern terrorists, allowing some of them to rejoin the struggle by going from Khartoum first to Iran and then infiltrating back into operational areas of the Middle East.[45] In 2008 Sudan’s role in Iran’s arms smuggling networks[46] was enhanced by a defense agreement signed by the Defense Ministries of both countries.[47] This expanded Sudan’s role as a regional center for larger Iranian arms trafficking operations. In these efforts Hizballah members, acting on Iran’s behalf and often with the cooperation of Sudan’s *Abaaba* tribe, transported weapons north through Egypt and into the Sinai where Bedouin smugglers would move them on into Gaza. With both Sudan and Iran under international arms embargos, Jonathan Schanzer has argued in *Foreign Policy* that Iran might wish to shorten its supply chain supporting radical Islamists by manufacturing arms in the Sudan.[48] Efforts to establish local arms production facilities by Iran in the Khartoum area of Sudan are a possible result of a secret codicil in the 2008 agreement.

Sudan already had weapons production facilities operating under its Military Industrial Corporation that could be revamped under the tutelage of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps for Tehran’s designs in the region.[49] Israel was concerned enough about the volume and quality of weapons moving north to risk an international incident by attacking a convoy ferrying Iranian weapons in 2009 that was en-route to the Gaza Strip via Egypt.[50] At the end of the day, however, what remains is a substantive Iran-facilitated arms smuggling network, aided by Hizballah operatives, which is moving large quantities of arms through Africa into the Middle East. Some of these arms are smuggled to Hizballah in Lebanon, some to Hamas in the Gaza, and some further Iranian local interests in Africa.

This arms supply chain inevitably led to a confrontation with Egypt as Hizballah’s relations with Egypt, never good, began to degrade following the 2006 Israel-Hizballah Summer War in Lebanon. In November and December 2008 Egypt arrested 24 men accused of links to Hizballah and later expanded the search to 49 individuals.[51] The political nature of Egypt’s charges against the men became evident early on when charges shifted from financing Hamas to Red Sea shipping reconnaissance to operational preparations for an attack on Israeli tourists. The real confrontation between Hizballah and Egypt, however, involved Iranian facilitated arms smuggling networks that crossed Egypt on the way to Gaza.[52]

Conclusion

With the revolution in Egypt and the ensuing internal power struggle, it is an open question how much and how fast things will change in which direction. The Egypt military establishments still depends on the United States while President Mursi is seeking to revive relations with Iran, planning a state visit to Tehran in August 2012. The outcome of the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian military as well as the outcome of the civil war in Syria will co-determine what opportunities are left or will open up for Hezbollah and Iran to meddle in African affairs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Rudolph Atallah. “Hizballah: A Discussion of Its Early Formation.” *Infantry*, 94 (May / June 2005): 21-26.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- Bachmann, Jan. "Kick Down the Door, Clean up the Mess and Rebuild the House; The Arica Command and Transformation of the US Military" *Geopolitics* 15(2010), 564-585.
- Bienen, Henry and Jonathan Moore "The Sudan: Military Economic Corporations" *Armed Forces & Society* 13 (Summer, 1987): 489-515.
- Cambanis, Thanassis. *A Privilege To Die: Inside Hezbollah's Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel*. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2010.
- Donovan, Chau C. "US Counterterrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, And Conflicts." *The Letort Papers* US Army War College 2008
- Early, Bryan "Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State' Locating Hezbollah's Place within Lebanon's State and Society" *World Affairs* 168 (Winter 2006): 115-128.
- Farah, Douglas. *Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror*. New York: Broadway Books, 2004.
- Farah, Douglas. "Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States" *Prism* 2(3): 15-32.
- Garrett III, Major General William B., Colonel Stephen J. Mariano, and Major Adam Sanderson, US Army. "Forward In Africa: USAFRICOM and the US Army in Africa." *Military Review*, 119 (January-February 2010): 16-25.
- Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. *In the Path of Hizbullah*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
- Hirst, David, *Beware Of Small States*, New York: Nation Books, 2010.
- Johnson, Douglas H. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Oxford, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Kampala, Indiana University Press, 2003.
- Laremont, Richard and Hrach Gregorian. "Political Islam in West Africa and the Sahel" *Military Review*, 86 (January-February, 2006): 27-36.
- Mentan, Tafah. *Dilemmas of Weak States* Burlington Vermont and Aldershot England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004.
- Mazzitelli, Antonio L. "Transnational organised crime in West Africa: the additional challenge" *International Affairs*, 83 (2007), 1071-1090.
- Ranstorp, Magnus. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Autumn 1994), 303-339.
- Ranstorp, Magnus. *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
- Rudner, Martin. "Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money Laundering" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33 (2010): 700-715.
- Samii, Abbas William. "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship" *Middle East Journal* 62 (Winter 2008), 32-53.
- Shay, Shaul. *Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration*, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
- Shay, Saul *Red Sea Terror Triangle*, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2005.
- Shultz Jr., Richard H. and Andrea J. Dew. *Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Shahahan, Roger. *The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics*. London And New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005.

Notes

- [1] Hizbullah ("the Party of God") created a support infrastructure as far back as its first generation in West Africa. In the 1980s, Hizbullah cells provided logistical support for the organisation by accessing French embassies in Guinea, Gabon, and Senegal through Lebanese Shi'a contract workers who stole French passports and identity cards that were sent to Lebanon. See "Hezbollah Seen Setting Up Terror Network in Africa" *Los Angeles Times*, 27 November 1989.
- [2] *Africom's* Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa symbolized the US commitment to this program by moving nearly 2,000 men into the former French military base at Camp Lemonnier to deal with the especially difficult circumstances on the Horn of Africa. France also maintains the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion in Djibouti.
- [3] Earlier efforts by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (formerly the Pan Sahel Initiative) were ultimately of limited utility and demonstrated the need for the broader mission of *Africom*.
- [4] "US expands secret intelligence operations in Africa" *Washington Post* 13 June, 2012, and "Contractors run US spying missions in Africa" *Washington Post*, 14 June, 2012.
- [5] Hizbullah was created at the behest of Iran through the Sepahe al-Quds element of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) in the midst of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Allied with Iran and facilitated by Syria, Hizbullah eventually became the most significant actor in the Lebanese political system. Hizbullah, as a non-state actor, became an amalgam of proxy and ally for Iran's international ambitions.
- [6] The West African Lebanese diaspora near the turn of the 21st century included roughly 100,000 Lebanese in Cote d'Ivoire, 20,000 in Senegal and a few thousand left in Sierra Leone (from approximately 30,000 residents before Sierra Leone's civil war).



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

[7] Sierra Leone's Koidu region has the richest diamond deposits. Many of the Lebanese families in the diamond trade originate from the area of Nabatiyah in South Lebanon.

[8] AMAL (*Afwāj al-Muqāwama al-Lubnāniyya*) and Hizballah were rival Lebanese Shi'a organisations who were shooting at one another in Lebanon in 1988-1989. Of the two, AMAL was the more secular in its orientation and more influenced by Syria while Hizballah was more Islamist and oriented towards Iran. In the 21st century there is much more cooperation between the former rivals although Hizballah is clearly the dominating party. Berri was elected head of AMAL in 1980 and became Speaker of Lebanon's Parliament in 1992 while Hizballah currently holds several Ministerial posts.

[9] The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was neither revolutionary, nor united, nor a front. It is best defined in terms of amorphous and shifting groups of criminals, sometimes with political pretensions, engaging in combinations of war crimes and common crimes spanning a couple of decades in the geographic region of Sierra Leone. RUF was best known for kidnapping children and amputating the limbs of its opponents and others who crossed its path. Foday Sankoh, an illiterate photographer, and a couple of the original "members" spent time at Gaddafi's "Revolutionary University" in Libya, providing the closest thing to a political pretension the group ever expressed. RUF's primary impact was that of a destabilizing element in the larger civil conflicts that engulfed Sierra Leone. It should be noted that since much of West Africa is characterized by weak states and ungoverned spaces, constellations of rival and affiliated militias interact without regard to unguarded national borders.

[10] "Hezbollah and the West African Diamond Trade" *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* June/July 2004 (6) 6/7, p.7.

[11] *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. Washington, DC: CRS, 17 January 2002 (Report for Congress RL31247).

[12] Ibid., "Digging Up Congo's Dirty Gems" *Washington Post*, 30 December 2001. Farah has elsewhere noted that the "blood diamond" trade at its peak in West and Central Africa ran at roughly \$200 million per year. However, only a fraction of that amount would be supporting Hizballah. Hizballah's involvement in drug trafficking is ultimately more lucrative for the organisation. Conflict or "blood" diamonds are thought to account for only a few percent of a worldwide \$10 billion diamond trade.

[13] Lansana Gberie. "War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection". *The Diamonds and Human Security Project Occasional Paper #6 Partnership in Africa* Canada, 2002. - Antwerp's Hoveniersstraat district is the world's diamond center where nearly 90% of stones transit in one form or another. Less regulated markets have emerged in Bombay, Mumbai, and Dubai. See also: Douglas Farah. *Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror*. New York: Broadway Books, 2004.

[14] A Tripartite Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell that could have been helpful in this regard was located in Kisangani in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While underutilized by local services which it was originally intended to assist, it might have been better utilized for creating analytical products that monitored Hizballah-linked revenue streams.

[15] Press Release, *US Department of The Treasury*, 9 December 2009. Hasan Tajideen, a significant stakeholder in the Tajideen network, died in the crash of an Ethiopian airliner off the coast of Lebanon in January 2010.

[16] Douglas Farah, "Hezbollah's External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America." *International Assessment and Strategy Center*, 4 August 2006. The crash of a charter flight from Cotonou, Benin to Beirut on 25 December 2003 illustrated the courier process. Among the bodies was that of a Hizballah foreign relations officer carrying \$2 million in cash collected from Lebanese businessmen in West Africa. See "Confronting Drug Trafficking In West Africa" *A Hearing Before The Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate*. 111th Congress, 1st Session, 23 June, 2009, p. 33.

[17] It should also be noted that during Lebanon's civil war (1975-1989) many of Lebanon's Maronite, Druze, and Sunni militias likewise ran shakedowns within their own ethnic communities in the diaspora. However, none of these were as well organised as those of Hizballah.

[18] Fadlallah who died in 2010 is generally described as the spiritual guide of Hizballah although he was more closely associated with the *Da'wah* (Islamic Call group). Fadlallah never exercised direct control over Hizballah.

[19] For example in operation Titan the DEA in 2008 shut down a drug smuggling and money laundering operation between Columbian cartels and Hizballah which run through the Lebanese middleman Shukri Mahmud Harb. Likewise DEA's 2009 operation Mountain Express documented Hizballah affiliated trafficking of methamphetamine from Canada into the United States.

[20] DEA News: Civil Suit Exposes Lebanese Money Laundering Scheme for Hizballah *Press Release US Drug Enforcement Administration* Washington D.C. 15 December 2011.

[21] Douglas Farah, "Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States." *Prism*(2), No. 3, p. 18.

[22] Antonio L. Mazzitelli "Transnational organised crime in West Africa: the additional challenge" *International Affairs*, 83 6(2007), p. 1084.

[23] Marco Vemaschi "Guinea-Bissau Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and the Lebanese Connection". *Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting*, 19 June 2009. At one point in time, the headquarters for this network was alleged to operate out of the Palace Hotel in Bissau then owned by the Lebanese financier Tarek Arezki. The Lebanese managed administration and finance for the drug movement while Nigerian and local criminals operating under the supervision of alleged kingpin Bliri Augustus were responsible for labour.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [24] "Drug seizure in West Africa prompts fears of terrorist links", *Observer*, 29 November 2009. The movement of illicit drugs out of Guinea-Bissau into north Africa and Europe is thought to be facilitated in part by Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
- [25] "Al-Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary", *Washington Post*, 14 July 2004. Leonid Minin, a Jewish arms dealer originally from the Ukraine, and Aziz Nassour of Hizballah, for example, crossed paths in Liberia and elsewhere without difficulty.
- [26] Douglas Farah, "Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States." *Prism* (2) 2011, p. 22. These "shared services" are obviously not secure from infiltration as they are anchored in profit rather than ideology. However, they are nevertheless not much more accessible to intelligence agencies than they are to law enforcement. To a terrorist organisation such shared services are useful as long as their security limitations are kept in mind.
- [27] Prof. Best is a political scientist who served as the Director of the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies at the University of Jos, Nigeria. www.unijos.edu.ng/cecomps/?q=node/4
- [28] Richard Laremont and Hrach Gregorian, "Political Islam in West Africa and the Sahel". *Military Review* 86 (January-February 2006), p. 30.
- [29] Zachary Devlin-Folz "Africa's Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism" *Africa Security Brief*, No. 6, August 2010.
- [30] "Iranian guns and a king in Banjul," *Africa Confidential*, 3 December 2010.
- [31] Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance is a faction seeking independence from Senegal. They were found to be using some weapons of Iranian origin in 2011 when Senegalese soldiers were killed.
- [32] "Did Jammeh Sell Iranian Arms To Hezbollah?" *Freedom Online*, 26 February 2011. The story alleged that Jammeh worked through a Lebanese businessman and General Counsel to Lebanon, Mohammad Bazzi, who was said to coordinate the exchange. The arms were apparently stored at Kanilai Farms in President Hamme's home village. Bazzi allegedly used a bank he created in Gambia, the Prime Bank, for the financing. Prime Bank was a subsidiary of the Lebanese Canadian Bank which the US Treasury listed in February of 2010 as a money laundering concern with links to Hizballah.
- [33] Perhaps something in the winds of the Arab Spring was blowing against the fortunes of Hizballah in 2011. The Lebanese Ambassador to Cote d'Ivoire, Ali Ajami, who for all intents and purposes was the Ambassador for Hizballah as well as Lebanon, foolishly attended the swearing in of deposed and generally despised former President Laurent Gbagbo. This led to widespread threats against Lebanese in the country and resulted in emergency evacuations of hundreds of expatriate Lebanese back to Lebanon. - See "1,000 Lebanese Evacuated from Ivory Coast" *YaLibnan* 11 April 2011.
- [34] Kenya is particularly poignant for Americans, with the Embassy in Nairobi one of the first successful attacks by Al-Qaeda against the United States in 1998.
- [35] "Kenya police: Iranian terror suspects shipped 100 kg of explosive to hit Western targets" *Washington Post*, 10 July 2012. - See also 'Iranians were targeting British High Commission in Kenya', *The Telegraph*, 3 July 2012.
- [36] "Iranians on trial in Kenya deny bomb plot charges", *Reuters Africa*, 23 July 2012.
- [37] "US expands secret intelligence operations in Africa", *Washington Post*, 13 June 2012.
- [38] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, 2000*, p. 55.
- [39] *Ibid.*, see also Shaul Shay, *Red Sea Terror Triangle*.
- [40] Shaul Shay, *Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration*, pp. 61-64.
- [41] M.A. Mohamed Salih, "Transnational Islamist (Jihadist) Movements and Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa". *The Nordic Africa Institute*, Policy Notes 2011/2. - The United States supported a counter organisation called Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism. That organisation was unsuccessful.
- [42] "The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia," *The Nation*, 12 July 2011.
- [43] *Ibid.* It should also be noted that this conflict as others nowadays is supported by a significant number of private military companies. In this instance, Bancroft Global Development has also played an important role. See "US Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict", *New York Times*, 10 August 2011.
- [44] "Obama's Not-So-Secret Terror Wars", *The Daily Beast*, 24 July 2012. Ironically, Puntland also became an area of influence for the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led now by Abdullahi Yusuf of the Darod clan which was at one time supported by Iran.
- [45] "Israeli, US intelligence report says Sudan becoming haven for Hamas, Hezbollah", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* 14 March 2001.
- [46] Annette Huebschle. "Unholy alliance? Assessing the links between organised criminals and terrorists in Southern Africa." *Institute for Security Studies* (ISS Paper 93), October 2004, p. 9. Smuggling is sustained in part by tribal relationships and religious affiliations that are centuries old and stretch across a geographic arc from East Africa all the way to Pakistan.
- [47] "The Drones Club", *Africa Confidential*, 5 September 2008. In 2008, Sudan would see Iranian produced Ababil III UAV's operating in the Dufar region, probably using Iranian technicians, while Sudanese personnel were attending Iran's Military University.
- [48] Jonathan Schanzer, "The Islamic Republic of Sudan?", *Foreign Policy* 10 June 2010.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

[49] The facilities include the Alshagara and Yarmouk Complexes, the Zargaa Engineering Complex, the Elshaheed Ibrahim Shamseldeem Complex for Heavy Industries, and the Safat Aviation Complex.

[50] "Israeli drones destroy rocket-smuggling convoys in Sudan", *Sunday Times*, 29 March 2009 and Chau Donovan, "US Counterterrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts." *The Letort Papers*, p. 18. - Israeli Air Force assets including Hermes drones out of Palmachim air base near Tel Aviv accompanied by Eitan UAV carried out at least two separate operations in January and February of 2009. They attacked two separate convoys carrying Fajr 3 rockets intended to be smuggled from Egypt for use by Hamas in Gaza. It appears that dozens of smugglers and Iranian escorts were killed in the operation. US DOD Special Operations Task Forces (88/145) also covertly engaged Al-Qaeda across the Horn of Africa following the 1998 Embassy bombings.

[51] The numbers themselves are a bit incredulous. Typical terrorist cells consist of 5-7 persons. Discovering a terrorist cell made up of 49 persons rings false.

[52] "Egypt Accuses Hezbollah of Plotting Attacks and Arms Smuggling to Gaza", *New York Times*, 14 April 2009. Many of those arrested, including acknowledged Hizballah operative Mohammed Yusuf Mansour, would escape in a mass prison break in the midst of Egypt's 2011 Revolution. The role of arms smuggling as the root of the episode was also confirmed by Salah Ghosh, the head of the Sudanese Intelligence and Security Service.

Carl Anthony Wege is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia in Brunswick, Georgia. He has taught political science for twenty year and has published a number of articles on Lebanon's Hizballah and related topics.

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Twelve Rules for Preventing and Countering Terrorism

By Alex P. Schmid

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-12-rules-for-preventing-terrorism/html>

1. Try to address the underlying conflict issues exploited by the terrorists and work towards a peaceful solution while not making substantive concessions to the terrorists themselves;
2. Prevent radical individuals and groups from becoming terrorist extremists by confronting them with a mix of 'carrot and stick' –tactics and search for effective counter-motivation measures;
3. Stimulate and encourage defection and conversion of free and imprisoned terrorists and find ways to reduce the support of aggrieved constituencies for terrorist organizations;
4. Deny terrorists access to arms, explosives, false identification documents, safe communication, safe travel and sanctuaries; disrupt and incapacitate their preparations and operations through infiltration, communication intercept, espionage and by limiting their criminal- and other fund-raising capabilities;
5. Reduce low-risk/high-gain opportunities for terrorists to strike by enhancing communications-, energy- and transportation-security, by hardening critical infrastructures and potential sites where mass casualties could occur and apply principles of situational crime prevention to the prevention of terrorism;
6. Keep in mind that terrorists seek publicity and exploit the media and the Internet to propagate their cause, glorify their attacks, win recruits, solicit donations, gather intelligence, disseminate terrorist know-how and communicate with their target audiences. Try to devise communication strategies to counter them in each of these areas.
7. Prepare for crisis- and consequence-management for both 'regular' and 'catastrophic' acts of terrorism in coordinated simulation exercises and educate first responders and the public on how to cope with terrorism.
8. Establish an Early Detection and Early Warning intelligence system against terrorism and other



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- violent crimes on the interface between organized crime and political conflict;
9. Strengthen coordination of efforts against terrorism both within and between states; enhance international police and intelligence cooperation, and offer technical assistance to those countries lacking the know-how and means to upgrade their counter-terrorism instruments.
 10. Show solidarity with, and offer support to, victims of terrorism at home and abroad.
 11. Maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice and by matching your deeds with your words;
 12. Last but not least: counter the ideologies, indoctrination and propaganda of secular and non-secular terrorists and try to get the upper hand in the war of ideas – the battle for the hearts and minds of those terrorists claim to speak and fight for.

Alex P. Schmid is the Director of Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) & former Officer-in-Charge of UN Terrorism Prevention Branch)

Literature on the Future of Terrorism

By Eric Price

Source: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/price-literature-on-the-future-of-terrorism/html>

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterisk [] only have a clickable Table of Contents or limited further information.*

Monographs and Edited Volumes

- Abrams, I. and G. Wang (2003) *The Iraq War and its consequences: thoughts of Nobel Peace laureates and eminent scholars* New Jersey, London: World Scientific
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0708/2004337077.html>]
- Adams, J. (1998) *Next World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the Front Line is Everywhere* New York: Simon & Schuster
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/simon041/98021135.html>]
- Abuza, Z. (2006) *Political Islam and violence in Indonesia* New York, NY.: Routledge
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0610/2006007639.html>]
- Akbar Khan, M. (1967) *Guerrilla warfare, its past, present and future* Karachim Rangrut
- Albats, E. (1994) *The state within a state: the KGB and its hold on Russia; past, present, and future* New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux
- Alexander, B. (1995) *The future of warfare* New York: W.W. Norton
- Alexander, D. C. (2004) *Business confronts terrorism: risks and responses* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press/Terrace Books
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0418/2004012635.html>]
- Alexander, Y. (ed.) (1994) *Middle East terrorism: current threats and future prospects* New York: G.K. Hall; Maxwell Macmillan: Toronto, Canada
- Amass, S. F. (ed.) (2006) *The science of homeland security* West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip066/2005038030.html>]
- Amass, S. F. & Chaturvedi, A.R. (et al.) (2006). *Guiding future homeland security policy: directions for scientific inquiry* West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip066/2005038031.html>]
- Ask, S. & Mark-Jungkvist, A. (eds.) (2005). *The adventure of peace: Dag Hammarskjöld and the future of the UN* New York: Palgrave Macmillan
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0643/2006296127-t.html>]
- Barnaby, F. (2004) *How to build a nuclear bomb: and other weapons of mass destruction* New York: Nation Books [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0830/2004103464-d.html>]
- Basur, R. M. (2005) *Minimum deterrence and India's nuclear security* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0516/2005021505.html>]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- Berkowitz, P. (ed.) (2005) *The future of American intelligence* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0514/2005016688.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0514/2005016688.html)
- Bilek, A., & Graf, W. (et al.) (2002) *Kritik der Gewalt: Friedenspolitik im Zeichen von Krieg und Terror* Wien: Promedia
- Bisharah, M. (2002) *Palestine/Israel: peace or apartheid: occupation, terrorism, and the future* London; New York: Zed Books [<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol041/2002031138.html>]
- Boff, L. (2006) *Fundamentalism, terrorism and the future of humanity* London: SPCK
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0802/2006494702.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0802/2006494702.html)
- Booth, K. & Dunne, T. (2002) *Worlds in collision: terror and the future of global order* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol041/2002019596.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol041/2002019596.html)
- Bothe, M., M. & O'Connell, E. (et al.) (eds.) (2005). *Redefining sovereignty: the use of force after the Cold War* Ardsley, NY.: Transnational Publishers
- Brockopp, J. E. (ed.) (2003). *Islamic ethics of life: abortion, war, and euthanasia* Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press
- Brown, A. B. & Poremski, K.(eds.) (2005) *Roads to reconciliation: conflict and dialogue in the twenty-first century* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe
- Buckley, A. D. & Olson, D.D. (et al.) (eds.) (1980) *International terrorism: current research and future directions* Wayne, N.J.: Avery Pub. Group
- Buckley, M. & Fawn, R. (2003) *Global responses to terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and beyond* London; New York: Routledge
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0651/2003003799-d.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0651/2003003799-d.html)
- Bunker, R. J. (2003) *Non-state threats and future wars* London; Portland, Or.: F. Cass
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy036/2002015229.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy036/2002015229.html)
- Caracilo, D. J. (2006) *Military intelligence technology of the future* New York: Rosen Pub. Group
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0515/2005019303.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0515/2005019303.html)
- Chakraborti, N. (ed.) (2010) *Hate crime: concepts, policy, future directions* Cullompton, Devon; Portland, Or.: Willan
- Chamy, I. W. (2006) *Fighting suicide bombing: proposal for a "worldwide campaign for life"* Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0619/2006025924.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0619/2006025924.html)
- Le Chêne, E. (1989) *Chemical and biological warfare: threat of the future* Toronto: Canada & Washington, D.C., U.S.A., Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution National Intelligence Book Center [distributor].
- Clutterbuck, R. (ed.) (1986) *The future of political violence: destabilization, disorder and terrorism* London; Basingstoke: Macmillan [<http://lcn.loc.gov/89205887>]
- Cobban, H. (2000) *The moral architecture of world peace: Nobel laureates discuss our global future* Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia
- Collins, A. (ed.) (2006) *Contemporary security studies* New York: Oxford University Press
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip073/2006034950.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip073/2006034950.html)
- Combs, C.C. (1996) *Terrorism in the twenty-first century* Boston: Pearson
- Condon, B. J. (2002) *NAFTA, WTO, and global business strategy: how AIDs, trade, and terrorism affect our economic future* Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy034/2002023040.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy034/2002023040.html)
- Cooper-Hill, J. (2006) *The law of sovereign immunity and terrorism* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications [<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0606/2005924806.html>]
- Cordesman, A. H. (2004) *The war after the war: strategic lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan* Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0707/2004011306.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0707/2004011306.html)
- Cymbala, J. & Sorenson, S. (2001) *God's grace from ground zero: seeking God's heart for the future of our world* Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan
- DeFronzo, J. (2007) *Revolutions and revolutionary movements* New York, NY.: Westview Press [<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip072/2006032493.html>]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- DeLillo, D. (2002) *In den Ruinen der Zukunft: Gedanken über Terror, Verlust und Zeit im Schatten des 11. September* Berlin: F. Berlin Verlag
- Dolnik, A. (2007) *Understanding terrorist innovations: technology, tactics and global trends* New York, NY.: Routledge
[\[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip072/2006034183.html\]](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip072/2006034183.html)
- Falk, O & Morgenstern, H. (eds.) (2009) *Suicide terror: understanding and confronting the threat* Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley
[\[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0828/2008038591.html\]](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0828/2008038591.html)
- Farnam, J. (2005) *U.S. immigration laws under the threat of terrorism* New York: Algora Pub.
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip056/2005000276.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip056/2005000276.html)
- Foran, J. & Lane, D.S. (et al.) (2007) *Revolution in the making of the modern world: social identities, globalization, and modernity* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0718/2007018405.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0718/2007018405.html)
- Ford, C. & Cohen, A. (eds.) (2011) *Rethinking the law of armed conflict in an age of terrorism* Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books
- Ganguly, S. & Shoup, B. (et al.) (2006) *US-Indian strategic cooperation into the 21st century: more than words* New York: Routledge
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0610/2006009572.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0610/2006009572.html)
- Ganor, B. (ed.) (2005) *Post modern terrorism: trends, scenarios, and future threats* Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Goldman, L. (2005) *Raising our children to be resilient: a guide to helping children cope with trauma in today's world* New York: Brunner-Routledge
[\[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0647/2004011603-d.html\]](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0647/2004011603-d.html)
- Haywood, R. & Spivak, R. (2012) *Maritime piracy* New York, NY.: Routledge
- Harari, H. (2005) *A view from the eye of the storm: terror and reason in the Middle East* New York, NY.: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0911/2005299696-d.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0911/2005299696-d.html)
- Harris, S. (2004) *The end of faith: religion, terror, and the future of reason* New York: W.W. Norton & Co. [\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0417/2004007874.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0417/2004007874.html)
- Hitchcock, M. (2006) *Iran: the coming crisis* Sisters, Or.: Multnomah Publishers
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0613/2006013982.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0613/2006013982.html)
- Holmes, L. (2007) *Terrorism, organised crime and corruption: networks and linkages* Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA.: Edward Elgar
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0620/2006028689.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0620/2006028689.html)
- Hotaling, E. (2003) *Islam without illusions: its past, its present, and its challenge for the future* Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip043/2003009143.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip043/2003009143.html)
- Howard, R. D. (et al.) (2008) *Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism* Dubuque, IA: McGraw Hill
[\[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0902/2008298857-t.html\]](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0902/2008298857-t.html)
- Hubbard, D. W. (2011) *Pulse: the new science of harnessing Internet buzz to track threats and opportunities* Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley
[\[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1106/2010050399-t.html\]](http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1106/2010050399-t.html)
- Hussey, A. (2001) *The game of war: the life and death of Guy Debord* London: J. Cape
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy02/2001536018.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy02/2001536018.html)
- Johnstone, R. W. (2006) *9/11 and the future of transportation security* Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International [\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip068/2006004354.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip068/2006004354.html)
- June, D.L. (ed.) (2011) *Terrorism and homeland security: perspectives, thoughts, and opinions* Boca Raton, Fla.: Taylor & Francis
- Kaplan, J. (ed.) (2002) *Millennial violence: past, present, and future* London; Portland, OR.: F. Cass
[\[*http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy033/2002006339.html\]](http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy033/2002006339.html)
- Knop, K. v., & Neisser, H. (et al.) (2005) *Countering modern terrorism: history, current issues, and future threats* [proceedings of the second International Security Conference, Berlin, 15-17 December 2004] Bielefeld, Germany: W. Bertelsmann Verlag
- Kohler, C. (2006) *Turkey in the news: past, present, and future* Berkeley Heights, NJ.: MyReportLinks.com Books



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0515/2005018762.html>]
 Krishna-Hensel, S. F. (ed.) (2006) *Global cooperation: challenges and opportunities in the twenty-first century* Aldershot, Hampshire, UK; Burlington, VT.: Ashgate
- [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip061/2005028890.html>]
 Kushner, H. W. (ed.) (1998) *The future of terrorism: violence in the new millennium* Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0655/97021184-d.html>]
- Laqueur, W. (2003) *No end to war: terrorism in the twenty-first century* New York: Continuum
- Leffler, M. P. (2003) *9/11 and the past and future of American foreign policy* [Harmsworth inaugural lecture, May 20, 2003] Oxford: University of Oxford
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip071/2006031165.html>]
- Levi, M. A. & O'Hanlon, M.E. (2005) *The future of arms control* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press [*<http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/2005/futureofarmscontrol.aspx>]
- Lia, B. (2005) *Globalisation and the future of terrorism: patterns and predictions* London; New York: Routledge [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip058/2005005339.html>]
- Liddick, D. (2006) *Eco-terrorism: radical environmental and animal liberation movements* Westport, Conn.: Praeger
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0619/2006024499.html>]
- Lindner, E. (2006) *Making enemies: humiliation and international conflict* Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0702/2006015399.html>]
- Liu, G. (ed.) (2004) *Chinese foreign policy in transition* New York: Aldine de Gruyter
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0411/2003024829.html>]
- Lodgaard, S. & Maerli, B (eds.) (2007) *Nuclear Proliferation and National Security* Routledge
- Lord, C. (2006) *Losing hearts and minds: strategic influence and public diplomacy in the age of terror* Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0704/2006015431.html>]
- Macken, C. (2011) *Counter-terrorism and the detention of suspected terrorists: preventive detention and international human rights law* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY.: Routledge
- Maggio, E. J. (2009) *Private security in the 21st century: concepts and applications* Sudbury, Mass.: Jones and Bartlett Publishers
 [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0825/2008035266.html>]
- Mandelbaum, M. (2005) *The case for Goliath: how America acts as the world's government in the twenty-first century* New York: Public Affairs
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0828/2005048897-d.html>]
- Martin, A. & Petro, P. (eds.) (2006) *Rethinking global security: media, popular culture, and the "War on Terror"* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0518/2005024638.html>]
- Martin, G. (2011) *Essentials of terrorism: concepts and controversies* Los Angeles: SAGE
 [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0720/2007023519.html>]
- Millar, A. & Rosand, E. (2006) *The future of multilateral counter-terrorism: the case for an international counter-terrorism body* New York: Century Foundation
- Moorcraft, P. L. (ed.) (2005) *The new wars of the West: Anglo-American voices on the War on Terror* Havertown, PA: Casemate
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0608/2006276750.html>]
- Mullard, M. & Cole, B. (2007) *Globalisation, citizenship, and the war on terror* Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA.: Edward Elgar
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0716/2007016158.html>]
- Munkler, H. (2004) *The New Wars* Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA.; Polity Press
- Murray, W. & Sinnreich, R.H. (eds.) (2006) *The past as prologue: the importance of history to the military profession* Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip061/2005028130.html>]
- Nardo, D. (2006) *Biological warfare* San Diego, Calif.: Lucent Books
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0611/2006010020.html>]
- Nolan, J. E. & Finel, B.I. (2003). *Ultimate security: combating weapons of mass destruction* New York: Century Foundation Press



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

- Olasky, M. N. (2006) *The politics of disaster: Katrina, big government, and a new strategy for future crises* Nashville, Tenn.: WPub. Group
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0612/2006012963.html>]
- Pearlstein, R. M. (2004) *Fatal future? transnational terrorism and the new global disorder* Austin: University of Texas Press
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/texas041/2003020477.html>]
- Phares, W. (2005) *Future Jihad: terrorist strategies against America* New York: Palgrave Macmillan
 [<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0711/2005049892.html>]
- Pilat, J. F. (ed.) (2006) *Atoms for peace: a future after fifty years?* Washington, D.C. Baltimore, MD.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0668/2006029064-d.html>]
- Ranstorp, M. (ed.) (2006) *Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps and future direction* New York: NY, Routledge [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0611/2006011250.html>]
- Rees, M. J. (2003) *Our final century: a scientist's warning: how terror, error, and environmental disaster threaten humankind's future in this century - on earth and beyond* London: Heinemann
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy044/2003000301.html>]
- Ross, J. I. (2006) *Will terrorism end?* New York: Chelsea House
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip069/2006006021.html>]
- Rupert, M. & Solomon, M.S. (2006) *Globalization and international political economy: the politics of alternative futures* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0510/2005009542.html>]
- Schaffer, D. (2006) *Saudi Arabia in the news: past, present, and future* Berkeley Heights, NJ.: MyReportLinks.com Books [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0516/2005022205.html>]
- Schneckener, U. & Wolff, S. (eds.) (2004) *Managing and settling ethnic conflicts. Perspectives on successes and failures in Europe, Africa and Asia* London: Palgrave Macmillan
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0702/2003068934-t.html>]
- Schram, M. & Ted Turner Documentaries (Firm) (2003) *Avoiding Armageddon: our future, our choice: companion to the PBS series from Ted Turner Documentaries* New York: Basic Books
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0831/2003002721-d.html>]
- Sharma, R. (2006) *Global jihad: current patterns and future trends* New Delhi: Kaveri Book
- Shogan, R. (2002) *War without end: cultural conflict and the struggle for America's political future* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0832/2002002564-d.html>]
- Silke, A. (ed.) (2004) *Research on terrorism: trends, achievements & failures* London; Portland, OR.: Frank Cass
 [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0805/2003062610.html>]
- Sofaer, A. D., & Goodman, S.E. (et al.) (2001) *The transnational dimension of cyber crime and terrorism* Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press Stanford University
 [<http://www.hoover.org/publications/books/8296>]
- Spindlove, J.R. & Simonsen, C. E. (2010) *Terrorism today: the past, the players, the future* Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip061/2005029483.html>]
- Taylor, M. & Horgan, J. (eds.) (2000) *The future of terrorism* London: Frank Cass
 [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0711/00027775.html>]
- Tertrais, B. & Philip, F. (2005) *War without end: the view from abroad* New York: New Press
- Tollitz, N. P. (ed.) (2005) *Saudi Arabia: terrorism, U.S. relations and oil* New York: Nova Science Publishers
- Ullman, H. (2005) *Owls and eagles: ending the foreign policy flights of fancy of hawks, doves, and neo-cons* Lanham, Md.; Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield
- U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Confronting Terrorism in Russia (2002) *Workshop on Terrorism in a High-Tech Society and Modern Methods for Prevention and Response* [2001: Moscow, Russia] Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press
 [*<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0711/2002102001.html>]
- Verton, D. (2003) *Black ice: the invisible threat of cyber-terrorism* New York: McGraw-Hill/Osborne [*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/mh041/2004272545.html>]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Webb, M. (2006) *Illusions of security: global surveillance and democracy in the post-9/11 world* San Francisco, USA: City Lights Books

[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0614/2006018066.html>]

Younger, S. M. (2007) *Endangered species: mass violence and the future of humanity* New York: Ecco

[*<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0713/2006048163.html>]

Non-conventional Literature

[Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D.F. (et al.) (2001) *Networks and networks: the future of terror, crime, and militancy* Santa Monica, CA.: RAND [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html#toc]

Bergin, A., W. & Bateman, S.G. (et al.) (2005). *Future unknown: the terrorist threat to Australian maritime security* Barton, A.C.T.: Australian Strategic Policy Institute [http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=69]

Berry, L. (et al.) (1998) *Bibliography on future trends in terrorism* Washington, DC: Library of Congress [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Future_trends.pdf]

Beutel, A. J. (2012) *Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States* Muslim Public Affairs Council [<http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-Post-911-Terrorism-Data.pdf>]

Bosch, O. & Ham, P. (2007) *Global non-proliferation and counter-terrorism: the impact of UNSCR 1540* The Hague; London; Washington, D.C.: Clingendael Institute, Chatham House, Brookings Institution Press [<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/MEEK-GOULD.PDF>]

Buddemeier, B.R. (et al.) (2011) *National Capital Region: Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism* Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/ncr.pdf>]

Calfano, B. R. (2002) *Terror in the air: Biological weapons, terrorism, and asymmetric threats to United States national security in the twenty-first century* [thesis] Regent University

Chalk, P. (et al.) (2005) *Trends in terrorism: threats to the United States and the future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act* Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf]

Chalk, P. & Ungerer, C. (2008) *Neighbourhood watch: the evolving terrorist threat Southeast Asia* Barton, A.C.T.: Australian Strategic Policy Institute [http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=172]

Dvis, L.M. (et al.) (2010) *Long-term effects of law enforcement's post-September 11 focus on counterterrorism and homeland security* Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf]

Delpach, T. (2002) *International terrorism and Europe* Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies [<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai56e.pdf>]

Durch, W. J. & Holt, V.K. (2004) *The Brahimi report and the future of peace operations* Washington DC.: The Henry L. Stimson Center [<http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf>]

Ellingsen, S. A. (2009) *Nuclear terrorism and rational choice* [thesis] King's College London

Fowler, A. (2005) *Aid architecture: reflections on NGDO futures and the emergence of counter-terrorism* Oxford: INTRAC [<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/21688/1/Aid%20Architecture%20Reflections%20on%20NGDO%20Futures%20and%20the%20Emergence%20of%20Counter%20Terrorism.pdf>]

Gerstein, D. (2008) *Examining the potential for a bioterror attack* [thesis] George Mason University

Hafidz, T. S. (2003) *The war on terror and the future of Indonesian democracy* ETH, IDSS: Zürich [http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/27022/publicationdocument_singledocument/13e9ee96-676b-4f29-badb-a67bcd2816ba4/en/WP46.pdf]

Hoffman, B. (2003) *Al Qaeda, trends in terrorism, and future potentialities: an assessment* Santa Monica, CA.: RAND [<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P8078.pdf>]

Hoffman, B. (1990) *Recent trends and future prospects of Iranian sponsored international terrorism; prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy* Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation [<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R3783.pdf>]

Hoffman, B. (1988) *Recent trends and future prospects of terrorism in the United States* Santa Monica, CA.: RAND [<http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R3618.pdf>]



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

International Atomic Energy Agency & European Union. (et al.) (2005) *Nuclear security: global directions for the future* [proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency]

[\[http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1232_web.pdf\]](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1232_web.pdf)

International Crisis Group (2011) *Turkey: Ending the PKK Insurgency* Europe Report N°213

[\[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/213%20Turkey%20-%20Ending%20the%20PKK%20Insurgency.pdf\]](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/213%20Turkey%20-%20Ending%20the%20PKK%20Insurgency.pdf)

Jenkin, C. M. (2006) *Responses to terrorism scenarios: Event features, individual characteristics, and subjective evaluations* [thesis] University of New Hampshire

Jenkins, B.M. (2012) *Al Qaeda in It's Third Decade; Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP362.pdf

Lindberg, M. (2010) *Understanding terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES: Madrid

[\[http://www.gees.org/files/article/20022010093237_Analisis-07561.pdf\]](http://www.gees.org/files/article/20022010093237_Analisis-07561.pdf)

Manwaring, M. G. (2004) *Shadows of things past and images of the future: lessons for the insurgencies in our midst* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

[\[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub587.pdf\]](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub587.pdf)

Murray, W. (2002). *Transformation concepts for national security in the 21st century* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

[\[www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/asap_sep02.pdf\]](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/asap_sep02.pdf)

Pernin, C. G. (et al.) (2008) *Unfolding the future of the long war: motivations, prospects, and implication for the U.S. Army* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.

[\[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG738.pdf\]](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG738.pdf)

Rowan, S. (2004) *Defending against bioterrorism: Lessons from the 2001 anthrax attacks* [thesis] University of Southern California

Stanley Foundation (2004) *Capturing the 21st century security agenda: prospects for collective responses* Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation

[\[http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/C21CSA04.pdf\]](http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/C21CSA04.pdf)

Stohl, M.: *Cyber terrorism: clear and present danger, the sum of all fears, breaking point or patriotic games?* [in: Kushner, H. W. (ed.) (1998) *The future of terrorism: violence in the new millennium*

[\[http://ceps.anu.edu.au/publications/pdfs/stohl_pubs/stohl_cyber_terrorism_a_clear_and_present_danger.pdf\]](http://ceps.anu.edu.au/publications/pdfs/stohl_pubs/stohl_cyber_terrorism_a_clear_and_present_danger.pdf)

Ungerer, C. (2011) *Beyond bin Laden: future trends in terrorism* Barton, A.C.T.: Australian Strategic Policy Institute

[\[http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=324\]](http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=324)

Zuhur, S. (2005) *A hundred Osamas: Islamist threats and the future of counterinsurgency* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute [\[http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/100osamas.pdf\]](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/100osamas.pdf)

Prime Journal Articles and Chapters in Edited Volumes

Anon.: *Future Directions for Early Warning and Early Response* Source *OECD Development* 19 February 2009 pp.85-95

[\[http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oced/development/preventing-violence-war-and-state-collapse/future-directions-for-early-warning-and-early-response_9789264059818-7-en\]](http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oced/development/preventing-violence-war-and-state-collapse/future-directions-for-early-warning-and-early-response_9789264059818-7-en)

Ayub, F. & Kouvo, S.: *Righting the course? Humanitarian intervention, the war on terror and the future of Afghanistan* *International Affairs* 84 (4) 2008 pp.641-657

Bakker, Edwin. *Forecasting the Unpredictable: A Review of Forecasts on Terrorism 2000 - 2012.* The Hague: ICCT, 19 July 2012 (Research paper), 41 pp.; at www.icct.nl/publications/icct-papers

Bergen, P. (et al.) *Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests* *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (2) 2011 pp.65-101

[\[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538830\]](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538830)

Coates, J.F.: *A Thriving Future for Terrorism* *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 51 (3) 1996 pp.295-299

Cruikshank, P.: *The Growing Danger from Radical Islamist Groups in the United States* *CTC Sentinel* 3 (8, August) 2010 pp. 4-9



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

[\[http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8-12.pdf\]](http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8-12.pdf)

Dale Walton, C.: Not Only Islamism: Great Power Politics and the Future of Terrorism *Comparative Strategy* 26 (1) 2007 pp.21-37

Dessaur, C. I. & Moor, L.G.: Survey of Future Developments in Criminality for the Netherlands. International Summaries: A Collection of Selected Translations *Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice* Vol. 3 (1979) 12p.

Dolnik, A. & Bhattacharjee, A.: Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD? *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14(3) 2002 pp.109-128

Dom, N. & Levi, M.: Regulation of Insurance and Corporate Security: Integrating Crime and Terrorism Seriousness into the Analysis *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 12 (3) 2006 pp.257-277

Fleischman, A.R. & Wood, E.B.: Ethical Issues in Research Involving Victims of Terror *Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine* 79 (2) 2002 pp.315-321

Garrison, C. Sirens of Death: Role of Women in Terrorism Past, Present, and Future *Journal of Criminal Justice and Security* 8(3) 2006 pp.332-339

Gori, S. (et al.) Is game theory a useful tool for terrorism insurance *International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management* 7 (8) 2007 pp.1176-1190

Gunaratna, R. & Oreg, A.: Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (12) 2010 pp.1043-1078

[\[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860\]](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860)

Haider-Markel, D. P. & Joslyn, M.R. (et al.) Can We Frame the Terrorist Threat? Issue Frames, the Perception of Threat, and Opinions on Counterterrorism Policies *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(4) 2006 pp.545-559

Hansen, J.: US intelligence confronts the future *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17(4) 2005 pp.673-709

Hanson, R.: Designing real terrorism futures *Public Choice* 128 (1) 2006 pp.257-274

Hoffman, B.: Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26 (6) 2003 pp.429-442

Hoffman, B.: Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 25 (5) 2002 pp.303-316

[\[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/105761002901223\]](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/105761002901223)

Jackson, R.: The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments *Political Studies Review* 7 (2) 2009 pp.171-184

Kaur, M.: Terrorism, Religion and our Future *Journal of Sikh Studies* 14(1) 1997 pp.95-106

Kondrasuk, J. (et al.) Leadership in the 21st Century: Understanding Global Terrorism *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal* 17 (4) 2005 pp.263-279

McCue, C. & Haahr, K.: The Impact of Global Youth Bulges on Islamist Radicalization and Violence *CTC Sentinel* 1 (11, October) 2008

[\[http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss11-Art5.pdf\]](http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss11-Art5.pdf)

Mitliaga, V.: Networks and Netwars – The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy *International Journal of Law and Information Technology* 10 (2) 2002 pp.238-239

Moghadam, A.: Shifting Trends in Suicide Attacks *CTC Sentinel* 2 (1, January) 2009

[\[http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss1-Art4.pdf\]](http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss1-Art4.pdf)

Nacos, B. L.: The Terrorist Calculus behind 9-11: A Model for Future Terrorism? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26 (1) 2003 pp.1-16

O'Brien, K.: Information age, terrorism and warfare *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 14 (1) 2003 pp.183-206

Ranstopf, M.: Hezbollah's Future *Jane's Intelligence Review* 7(January) 1995 pp.34-36

Reed, D. J.: Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31(8) 2008 pp.684-722

Reshetnikov, M.: Visions of the future: social processes and terrorism in Europe *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 53 (5) 2008 pp.653-665

Scanlan, G.: The enterprise of crime and terror ? the implication for good business: Looking to the future ? Old and new threats *Journal of Financial Crime* 13 (2) 2006 pp.164-176

Scanlan, G.: The war on terror - future trends *Journal of Financial Crime* 12 (2) 2005 pp.104-111



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Schmid, Alex P. Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where the Risk? In: Max Taylor & John Horgan (Eds.). *The Future of Terrorism*. London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp.106-132.

Schönteich, M.: Back to the Future? *New South African Anti-Terror Law Terrorism and Political Violence* 14(2) 2002 pp.1-22

Tranter, K.: Terror in the Texts: Technology – Law – Future *Law and Critique* 13 (1) 2002 pp.75-99

Weimann, G.: Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28(2) 2005 pp.129-149

Yishal, Y.: The Jewish Terror Organization: Past of Future Danger? *Conflict* 6(4) 1986 pp.307-332

About the Compiler: *Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who worked for many years for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Currently he is an Editorial Assistant to 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.*

TRAC Analyzes Growing Terrorist Danger in Central Africa

Source: <http://www.virtual-strategy.com/2012/08/14/trac-analyzes-growing-terrorist-danger-central-africa>

According to the latest U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, the Obama administration is more troubled about the threats of violence and terrorism in parts of central Africa – especially Nigeria – than in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) is providing researchers with insight into this growing danger with its newly published definitive analysis of the terrorist group Boko Haram, which threatens the stability of the Nigerian government and its lucrative oil exports to the West.

"Both the CIA and French foreign intelligence services are paying close attention to escalating relationships between radical Islamic groups in the Sahel and

especially Nigeria," said Vervan Khan, editorial director of TRAC. "Boko Haram has dominated the news in Nigeria and is particularly important for studying violence in West Africa. Despite this intense interest, reliable information about this group has remained scant. We feel this new analysis will clarify and simplify research about Boko Haram."

The extensive analysis, entitled "Dangers at Home: Boko Haram's Threat to Nigeria and The Limits of Its Strategic Expansion," is written by TRAC contributors Jacob Zenn and Virginia Comolli and chronicles Boko Haram's history and activities, as well as its danger within Nigeria. "Boko Haram has released statements directly threatening the United States, but the real danger is to local companies and American interests operating in West Africa," says Zenn. "Boko Haram is of

particular interest to terrorism experts because of AQLIM's failure to establish roots in Nigeria." Zenn's and Comolli's analysis in TRAC explores the level of engagement between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) – which has been an area of debate among many experts. "Even though the extent of the relationship between Boko Haram and AQLIM is hard to ascertain, a number of indicators confirm that a degree of interaction exists. Boko Haram has pledged it is a full partner with AQLIM, but the relationship is really more like a junior partner or little brother -- limited to weapons training and possible sharing of kidnapping ransoms," says Comolli.

Zenn and Comolli explain why such disconnects between AQLIM and Boko Haram are present – uncovering tensions and racial divides between the groups that can splinter and weaken their impact – and take the reader further into what the authors feel is the group's real threat: its effective recruiting and extensive regional activity that can destabilize the region. "Dangers at Home: Boko Haram's Threat to Nigeria and The Limits of Its Strategic Expansion" appears in the Publishing Center of the TRAC database. TRAC's Publishing Center is a forum for scholars from around the world to submit articles that can be shared with members of the TRAC research consortium and users of the database – which is most often purchased and made available through academic libraries



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

and other institutions supporting research of terrorism.

TRAC is a digital information resource that addresses the burgeoning need among faculty, scholars, students, government and defense professionals for cutting-edge research on terrorism and terrorists of all kinds. The Beacham Group, LLC, unveiled TRAC in February 2012 after eight years in development. Immediately commended for its breadth of content – described by Library Journal as “astonishing” – TRAC provides historical context and maintains a current intelligence repository with a consortium of 2,200 specialists and a real-time news feed that reports on events as they occur. It includes profiles of 3,850 terrorist groups and links to over 1,600 think tanks, universities, government agencies and other resources studying terrorism.

Jet Skier Breaks Through JFK Airport’s \$100 Million Security System

Source: <http://abcnews.go.com/US/jet-skier-breaks-jfk-airports-100-million-security/story?id=16992190#.UCqIG6AaLJZ>

A man whose jet ski failed him in New York's Jamaica Bay swam to John F. Kennedy airport, where he was easily able to penetrate the airport \$100 million, state-of-the art security

Casillo's night began innocently enough, as he and some friends were racing on jet skis in Jamaica Bay near JFK airport when his watercraft stalled. After calling for and receiving



system. Daniel Casillo, 31, was able to swim up to and enter the airport grounds on Friday night, past an intricate system of motion sensors and closed-circuit cameras designed to to safeguard against terrorists, authorities said. "I think he should be given dinner and a bottle of champagne for showing us our faults," said Nicholas Casale, an NYPD veteran and former MTA deputy security director for counterterrorism. Instead, Casillo was arrested after the incredible adventure that has stunned security officials.

no help, he managed to swim towards the only thing he could see, the runway lights at JFK. Once he made it to land, Casillo climbed an eight-foot barbed-wire perimeter fence and walked undetected through the airport's Perimeter Intrusion Detection System and across two runways into Delta's terminal 3. Unnoticed until then, Casillo walked into the airport dripping wet and wearing his bright yellow life jacket. When he was eventually spotted by a Delta employee, police charged Casillo with criminal trespassing.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

"It's outrageous," Casale said. "Why in 2012 do we not have a security system throughout our airports?"



This is not the first time an airport's security systems failed.

In March, a black jeep sped down a runway at Philadelphia's international airport. That incident came on the heels of another in California, when a BMW slammed through the airport fence when the driver reportedly lost control.

Last year at JFK there was a huge uproar over that same perimeter fence, when it was knocked out by weather and remained down for days.

New York Port Authority officials tell ABC News this time around they "took immediate action to increase its police presence with round the



clock patrols of the facility's perimeter and increased patrols by boat of the surrounding waterway."

"We have called for an expedited review of the incident and a complete investigation to determine how Raytheon's perimeter intrusion detection system-which exceeds federal requirements-could be improved. Our goal is to keep the region's airports safe and secure at all times," the Port Authority said in a statement.

**They have to be lucky all the time!
We have to be lucky only once!**

Statement of the IRA spokesperson following the unsuccessful attempt to murder former UK Prime Minister Margaet Thatcher!

Al-Qaeda's 'suicide bombers wanted' ad

Is this for real?

Source:

<http://www.timesofisrael.com/al-qaeda-posts-suicide-bombers-wanted-ad/>



Apparently low on bombers, al-Qaeda is running a (short-term) employment advertisement on its *Shumukh al-Islam* Internet forum. Under the heading "Area

of activity: The planet Earth," the ad seeks jihadists to carry out suicide attacks.

Applicants must be Muslim, mentally mature, dedicated, able to listen, and utterly committed

to completing their mission, the Hebrew daily Yedioth Ahronoth reported on Tuesday.

Several email addresses are provided for applicants. While their real names are not required, candidates are asked to send details of their nickname or handle, their age, marital status, languages spoken and a list of passports in their possession.

The ad on the forum, which is accessible only to al-Qaeda members, specifies the targets of the terror attacks that applicants will be expected to carry out, including "People who fight Islam and Muslims" and enemy "financial, military and media targets."



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

The ad indicates that the anticipated attacks will be solo operations: “Only one person will be in charge. He will gather all of the intelligence, he will prepare the operation — and he will complete the attack.” However, it continues, “a military panel” will oversee the bomber’s training and select the target. The job description promises only a “very slight chance of being caught.”

The ad has elicited several positive responses, the Yedioth article claimed. One forum participant requested that Germany, Denmark and Sweden be specified as potential targets. The same participant warned the forum to be very careful about what it publishes, for fear that the enemy may see what the group is planning.



Al-Qaeda Planning Massive Terror Attack on Israeli Plane

Source: <http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/report-al-qaeda-planning-massive-terror-attack-on-israeli-plane/2012/08/17/>

Illustration - Photo Credit: Pierre Terdjman / Flash90



Recently there has been an increase in the warnings within the security system about possible attacks against civilian and foreign flights by terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other groups, who are working on such an attack.

At the same time, there has been an increase in reports by ground crews and flight attendant noting that when Israeli planes are landing in foreign countries, they

Israel's Security apparatus is concerned that Al-Qaeda is planning a large scale terror attack on Israel's civil aviation, Walla reported.

are approached by Middle-Eastern civilians who photograph them ostentatiously.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Senior defense officials suspect that this could be part of intelligence-gathering efforts of terrorist groups that include the “Al-Quds Corp,” the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Hezbollah, in preparation for terrorist attacks around the world.

These efforts correspond to a promise made last year by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, on his plan to avenge Israel’s assassination of the head of his organization’s military wing, Imad Mughniyah, and Israel’s elimination of nuclear scientists in Iran.

Israel’s defense apparatus and the IDF have enhanced recently the guidelines for senior officers, diplomats and former military officials staying abroad on how to deal with potential threats and how to increase the level of personal safety. In a few exceptional cases, flights to targeted destinations have been canceled.

In addition, Walla reports, several key new steps have been taken to secure the air and ground crews on Israeli airlines, which were already considered the safest in the world.

160 gangs looking for trouble

Source:http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1061153793&svc=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+bostonherald%2Fnews%2Fregional+%28Local+%2F+Regional++News+%26+Opinion++BostonHerald.com%29

Seeds of violence are planted across the Hub by what authorities say are 160 gangs — some just small crews of kids from the same block,

at you for too long or somebody asked a girl you were interested in out on a date.

“When these worlds collide, it could be at a barbecue or a house party, and when you couple that with easy access to firearms and young people who aren’t developmentally adjusted enough to not act in a split second of ferocious violence, it’s a recipe for trouble,” the DA said.



But the gangs themselves also differ from those in other major cities, experts said. Hub crews identify themselves by streets, neighborhoods and housing projects, and largely lack ties to well-known national gangs

armed to the teeth and itching to fight — that can grow into sophisticated drug operations with international ties.

such as the Latin Kings, Crips and Bloods, save for pockets in East Boston, Chelsea and Revere, Conley said.

The staggering number of gangs poses a unique problem for Boston lawmen as they scramble to find the ruthless killer of three young women Sunday night on Harlem Street. Suffolk District Attorney Daniel F. Conley, whose office revealed the shocking tally yesterday, said gang-linked murders make up the “bulk” of the city’s homicides.

It leaves them to create their own identifiers — sometimes among as few as a dozen members — that can include team logos and hats.

“It could be just organized around mischief and mayhem,” Conley told the Herald. “Sometimes it’s things most adults in the city would view as completely inconsequential: Somebody looked

Raffi Yessayan, a Quincy lawyer who spent seven-plus years in the Suffolk DA’s gang unit, including the last four as its chief, said a gang indicator of a Pittsburgh Pirates logo once sparked a shooting.

“It’s not anything overly sophisticated,” he said.

Boston police Commissioner Edward F. Davis said yesterday the horrific



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Harlem Street massacre was “gang-related.” But as the families of the promising young women prepared to bury their dead, Conley stopped short of saying the slayings were linked to gang activity.

Yet authorities were working on the theory that Sharrice Perkins, Kristen Lartey and Genevieve Marie Phillip, all 22, and a fourth woman who survived the shocking shootings were “selected.”

Davis said the women were “definitively targeted,” and he later told the Herald one of the victims “has a criminal history,” but he declined to say which.

“All I know is three beautiful lives were taken,” said the Rev. Gary Adams, Perkins’ cousin, as Boston’s Ten Point Coalition offered a \$2,000 reward for information leading to the killer’s

arrest. “There’s no explanation that could make sense.”

According to the most recent FBI data, gangs are responsible for 48 percent of violent crime nationally, but in some states, including Massachusetts, it can be as high as 90 percent. The FBI gang list dumps the Colombo Crime Family with the notorious Boylston Street gang, H Block and Franklin Hill and Franklin Field groups of Boston.

“The majority of gang violence in this country happens by a chance encounter,” said Al Valdez, a gang expert and head of the criminal justice program at Westwood College in Anaheim, Calif. “Culturally speaking, violence is the language of street gangs. Everything is settled with that. The simplest solution for them is murder.”

Preparing The Public For The Attack On Hezbollah

By Dan Lieberman

Source: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/18082012-preparing-the-public-for-the-attack-on-hezbollah-oped/>

When the rhetoric starts to ratchet, the bombs are ready to explode. Before the assault the attacking nation unleashes a propaganda offensive that shapes the public mind to regard the soon to be attacked nation as wanton killers, who must be eliminated before they

saviors of peace in the Middle East are prepared to take another aggressive step in the arena they safeguard and complete their task – total elimination of Israel’s manufactured adversaries. Jordan, Egypt and Libya are defenseless; Iraq has tumbled; Syria will soon be gone; Iran awaits its fate – Hezbollah is the last man standing and will be the last man walking.

A bus with Israeli tourists is attacked in Bulgaria and immediately, without a single bit of evidence, U.S. and Israeli intelligence accuse Hezbollah – reason being the terrorist attack had the marks of a Hezbollah operation – a triple piece of propaganda.

(1) With no more proof than could be attributed to Paraguay,

Hezbollah is accused of the attack

(2) Although none of the few foreign attacks attributed to Hezbollah have been definitely proven (only two, back in the 1990s, have some credible evidence), and no attacks had been noted in twenty years, we are led to believe that Hezbollah is an active foreign terrorist organization.

(3) Although Hezbollah has never been linked to an attack on a busload



eradicate every woman, child and baby seal in the universe.

Commentators smirk at U.S. administration accusations against Hezbollah, but neglect to realize these accusations predict the preparation of a combined U.S./Israeli attack against the Party of God. Why? Because these nations expect Hezbollah to react militarily to the attack on Iran. It’s doubtful that Hezbollah will respond – why fight a losing war – but the



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

of tourists, we are told this is a familiar Hezbollah operation.

As if reality and truth have no place in conversation, U.S. government sources inform us that Hezbollah is responsible for terrorism in South America and Europe, where it is expanding its activities. Too bad, the Latinos and Euros don't know about this, or do they know the opposite – Hezbollah has never disturbed their sleep for one moment.

All this not so subtle preparation leads to the August 10 coup de grace from the U.S. Treasury and State Departments – unverified and undocumented accusations that “the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah is deeply involved in the Syrian government’s violent campaign to crush the uprising there. Hezbollah has trained and advised government forces inside Syria and has helped to expel opposition fighters from areas within the country. Hezbollah secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has overseen those activities, which is part of the Syria government’s increasingly ruthless efforts to fight against the opposition.”

When pressed to supply proof, the government spokespersons retreated to conclusions from press reports and classified intelligence – in other words, no proof.

The opposite has been noted. Despite Hezbollah’s close attachment to the Assad regime and dependence on its moral and military support, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has been unusually quiet in expressing support for Assad. His comments have been scarce and only reflect those of anyone who relies on another for assistance. One comment:

Nasrallah Renews Support for Assad, July 19, Hussein Dakroub, Daily Star

BEIRUT: Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah renewed his support Wednesday for the regime of embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad and praised the three generals killed in a bombing in Damascus, describing them as comrades-in-arms to the resistance party. He also reiterated his call for dialogue between the Syrian regime and opposition to end the 16-month unrest.

Hezbollah’s website is milder in its contempt for the Syrian rebels and more informative on the situation than the New York Times. Trust, but verify.

The decades of Hezbollah’s questionable terrorist activities have been summarized by Israel “can do no wrong” Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, affectionately known as CAMERA.

Starting with its year of formation in 1985 (everything before that date has nothing to do with the Hezbollah organization nor has been verified), CAMERA lists violence, other than in the tit-for-tat war with Israel, it attributes to Hezbollah.

Feb. 16, 1985: Hezbollah publicizes its manifesto. It notes that the group’s struggle will continue until Israel is destroyed and rejects any cease-fire or peace treaty with Israel. The document also attacks the U.S. and France.

June 14, 1985: Hezbollah terrorists hijack TWA flight 847. The hijackers severely beat Passenger Robert Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, before killing him and dumping his body onto the tarmac at the Beirut airport. Other passengers are held as hostages before being released on June 30.

Hezbollah terrorists? According to a Time Magazine June 24, 2001 summary of the story, “the hijackers were identified by an accomplice as members of Islamic Jihad (or Holy War), the shadowy Shi’ite Muslim organization that is regarded as a sort of umbrella for various fundamentalist terror groups operating in Lebanon and other Middle East countries.”

Dec. 31, 1986: Under the alias Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Hezbollah announces it had kidnapped and murdered three Lebanese Jews. The organization previously had taken responsibility for killing four other Jews since 1984.

The alias is only speculation. There is no evidence that the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth is other than a group of extremists who call themselves Organization of the Oppressed on Earth – no relation to Hezbollah.

Feb. 17, 1988: The group kidnaps Col. William Higgins, a U.S. Marine serving with a United Nations truce monitoring group in Lebanon, and later murders him.

Same doubt as above.

March 17, 1992: With the help of Iranian intelligence, Hezbollah bombs the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and injuring over 200.

July 18, 1994: Hezbollah bombs the Jewish community center in Buenos



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Aires-again with Iranian help-killing 86 and injuring over 200.

These charges have legs, but not sufficient proof. The responsibility for these atrocities have had contradictory conclusions. According to the Los Angeles Times, Islamic Jihad Says It Bombed Embassy; Toll 21

*March 19, 1992/WILLIAM R. LONG
/ TIMES STAFF WRITER*

BUENOS AIRES – Workers uncovered more bodies Wednesday in the bomb-wrecked rubble of the Israeli Embassy, while a terrorist group in the Middle East claimed responsibility for the devastating attack.

In Beirut, a statement bearing the name of the pro-Iranian group Islamic Jihad (Islamic holy war) claimed responsibility for the bombing, which it said was a suicide attack carried out by an Argentine who had converted to Islam.

The Islamic Jihad statement said a Muslim convert called “Abu Yasser” carried out the bombing to avenge the deaths of Sheik Abbas Moussawi and his family in an Israeli air raid Feb. 16 in southern Lebanon. Moussawi, a Shiite Muslim leader, was believed to head Hezbollah, or Party of God, a pro-Iranian terrorist organization linked by experts to Islamic Jihad.

According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “The Argentinean Intelligence Service (AIS) completed a comprehensive report on the international aspects of the terrorism. The main conclusions of the report are as follows:

- The Iranian Government instigated the attack. Its implementation was the responsibility of then-Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian.*
- Iranian Intelligence charged Hezbollah with mounting the attack.*
- Hezbollah’s operational unit abroad led by Imad Mughniya perpetrated the attack. Syria was also in the know.*

No indictments came from the AIS report, which were plagued by charges of bribery and false evidence. Note that the bombings in

Argentina, although unjustified, were retaliation to planned and wanton killings of Lebanese citizens by Israeli military and its intelligence agency. The latter obvious terrorist attacks have not been condemned by the western nations.

Despite no entries by CAMERA after 1994 that accused (without documented proof) Hezbollah of foreign terrorism, Hezbollah is labelled an international terrorist organization.

Arriving at year 2011, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, an Israeli based and pro-Israel group, brings us up to date.

1) Turkey: On May 26, 2011, there was an attempted attack on the life of David Kimchi, the Israeli consul in the heart of Istanbul. The attack failed but wounded eight Turkish civilians, and might have been a so-called “work accident.” According to the Italian Corriere della Sera, July 2011, the Turkish authorities concluded that the attempted assassination had been carried out by three Hezbollah operatives who had arrived from Beirut. They followed the consul’s daily routine, in our assessment intending to attack him on his way to the consulate.

Intelligence sources in Ankara denied the report in the Italian daily, calling it Israeli propaganda. “Israel releases false information once in a while for disinformation purposes,” the source said.

<http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/italian-newspaper-istanbul-blast-was-hezbollah-attempt-on-israeli-consul-s-life-1.373935>

2) Thailand: In the middle of January, 2012, an attack against an Israeli target in Bangkok was prevented, apparently a venue customarily frequented by Israelis. On January 12, Thai police at the Bangkok airport arrested Hussein Atris, a Shi’ite Hezbollah operative from south Lebanon, as he was trying to flee the country. In his possession were a Lebanese and an expired Swedish passport. During the investigation the Thai police uncovered a supply of chemicals for manufacturing explosives for the attack/attacks.

According to National Police Chief Piewpan Damapong, Atris insisted that the materials seized were not intended for attacks in Thailand but were going to be transported to a yet-to-be-named third country (a Stratfor source has cited the Philippines as a logical



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

destination). He also allegedly told authorities that, although he was a member of Hezbollah, he was not a member of the group's militant arm – a big difference – several terrorists in the United States have been members of a U.S. political Party. Did they operate from Party orders?

<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/hezbollah-threat-thailand>

3) India: At 15:00 hours on February 13, 2012, a day after the anniversary of the death of Hezbollah's senior terrorist operative Imad Mughniyeh, a motorcyclist attached an explosive device to the car of an Israeli Ministry of Defense representative in New Delhi. In the car were the local driver and the wife of the Israeli Ministry of Defense representative, who was seriously wounded. Of the series of six attempted attacks initiated by Iran and Hezbollah, it was the only one which was carried out and harmed an Israeli. The Indian media reported that the police had detained five men for interrogation who had been detected by security cameras as they examined the Israeli car. The Indian media also reported that the motorcycle had been found abandoned near the site of the attack.

Where are the Hezbollah links to any of the six attempted attacks?

4) Georgia: On February 13, 2012, the same day as the attack in New Delhi, an explosive device was attached to an Israeli embassy car in the capital city of Tbilisi. A Georgian employee of the Israeli embassy driving an embassy car felt the car was dragging something behind it. He alerted the police, whose demolition experts neutralized the bomb. The Israeli prime minister accused Iran and Hezbollah of responsibility for the attacks in Tbilisi and New Delhi, following those in Azerbaijan and Thailand. The Iranians, however, denied any and all involvement in the attacks in India and Georgia, and accused Israel of planning the attacks itself to incite world public opinion against Iran.

Except for the political Israeli PM statement, where is the link to Hezbollah?

Similar to the reason for the bombings in Argentina, these atrocities were provoked by

the killings of Iranian citizens, assumed to have been done by Israel's Mossad.

The Europeans are not fooled.

NYT, Aug 15 Despite Alarm by U.S., Europe Lets Hezbollah Operate Openly

Hezbollah has maintained a low profile in Europe since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, quietly holding meetings and raising money that goes to Lebanon, where officials use it for an array of activities – building schools and clinics, delivering social services and, Western intelligence agencies say, carrying out terrorist attacks.

Although no Hezbollah attacks have been reported since 1994, and the Lebanese political Party has no relation to the 9/11 attack, the NYT prints: "Hezbollah has maintained a low profile in Europe since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2000," and "Western intelligence agencies say, (Hezbollah is) carrying out terrorist attacks (in Europe)."

Nor is it probable that Hezbollah is quietly holding meetings and raising money that goes to Lebanon. Lebanese Shiites have scattered throughout the world for generations, working and sending money back to Party of God agencies and to support their families in Lebanon.

The militarist/nationalist regimes of the post World War II era dispatched the rulers appointed by the Post World War I British-French alliance, which arranged the Middle East to satisfy its interests. Unable to rearrange the nations' borders in accord with ethnic persuasions, the new regimes suppressed ethnic rivalries. Soon, the Middle East will contain only nationalist regimes without the militarist bite and with renewed ethnic conflicts. With Hezbollah pulverized, the Palestinians will lose their last defense and face a catastrophic fate. Because challenging the Israel-United States alliance by conventional means will not be possible, we can expect decades of severe terrorism. Getting rid of the non-terrorist terrorists will open an expanded era of terrorist terrorists – the real stuff.

When will the United States ever learn?

The views expressed are the author's own

Dan Lieberman is the editor of Alternative Insight, a monthly web based newsletter. His website articles have been read in more than 150 nations, while articles written for other websites have either appeared or been linked in online journals throughout



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the world. Many have served as teaching resources in several universities and several have become Internet classics, each attracting thousands of readers annually.

Terrorism trumps military taboos in Germany

Source: <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16177278,00.html>

Germany's highest court issued a ruling allowing the military to be used - in some instances - within the country. The decision is the latest chapter in a debate that stretches back decades into German history.

It was a late afternoon in January 2003 when a dormant debate was revived in Germany: What action is the Bundeswehr, the German military, allowed to take against threats inside Germany? A motor glider was circling just 50 meters (160 feet) above Frankfurt's skyscrapers with the pilot threatening to crash into one. Parts of the city were evacuated and the German Air Force scrambled two Phantom jets to hold the pilot in check. After two dramatic hours, the pilot was convinced to land. No one was hurt.

But the situation raised the question of exactly what action the jet pilots - or any German military units - were authorized to take while confronting a terrorist threat at home. What if, instead of a single motor glider pilot, al Qaeda hijacked a jet from Frankfurt's huge airport and threatened an attack on the city or a nuclear power plant?



A power glider got Germans talking about confronting terrorist attacks

The government enacted an air safety law that explicitly permitted the military to shoot down passenger jets in cases of hijacking and terrorism. The Federal Constitutional Court, however, struck the law down in 2006, deeming it illegal to weigh the lives of the innocent passengers on the plane against the

potential victims on the ground in the event of a terrorist attack. The court further ruled that the Bundeswehr could support police action inside Germany but would be limited to using police techniques and equipment. The use of tanks or fighter jets remained prohibited under the judges' ruling.

This, however, was a point where the two chambers of Germany's highest court disagreed. As a result, a plenary session of the Constitutional Court, which has only convened five times in the country's history, was called. After several years of consideration, it issued its ruling on Friday (17.08.2012) that the military could use its weaponry and equipment within Germany during "states of emergency of catastrophic proportions."

This category is thought to include defense against terrorist attacks from air and sea - situations when the police, who are responsible for security inside the country, do not have the fighter jets, warships or other capabilities necessary to prevent a catastrophe.

Learning from history

While the debate about preventing terrorist attacks is relatively new, the German military's role in operations within the country has been the subject of an on-again, off-again debate for decades. German law strictly separated the roles of the police and the military, making the police responsible for domestic security and the military responsible for defending the country from foreign attack. In the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) the Reichswehr fought against communists, and during the Nazi era, Hitler used the SS paramilitary units against the population to secure power.

In the years after World War Two, Germany's history of misuse of the military meant anyone who considered deploying the Bundeswehr within the country was accused of wanting to open the door to state-sponsored terror. This applied even in the case of having soldiers assist authorities during natural disasters, which the constitution explicitly allows.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Troops can lend a hand

The Bundeswehr received thanks from the German populace when troops left their barracks to help civilians during a major flood of Hamburg in 1962, a winter snow disaster in Schleswig-Holstein in the winter of 1978/1979, and when the Elbe and Danube rivers flooded in 2002. There were, however, serious hostilities among the military and demonstrators when Germany hosted the G8 summit in 2007 and military reconnaissance aircraft and vehicles kept watch over protesters.

Many were happy to have soldiers' help during flooding

Many other countries do not maintain the same separation of police and military. In Italy it is the military's duty to contribute to the protection of a free and democratic society. In France there are some

In Germany, domestic Bundeswehr missions - even after the court's decision this week - will be extremely limited. Shooting down passenger planes is still prohibited, as is using military methods to prevent a demonstration. The court



2,000 soldiers domestically deployed in the country's train stations and tourist attractions to protect the country from terrorist threats. In Great Britain the military played a role in providing security for the London 2012 Olympic Games - including stationing ground-to-air missiles and fighter jets in the city.

also made clear that a single government minister cannot order an army deployment by insisting that the entire government be involved in deciding on such a mission.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

CHILE – What makes a terrorist?

Source: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/08/security-chile>

It is often said that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The question of who is a terrorist has been asked with renewed vigour in Chile over the past week, as a country with little history of terrorist attacks has been



divided by the case of a young anarchist, Luciano Pitronello.

In the early hours of June 1st last year, Mr Pitronello tried to plant a bomb in the lobby of a bank in the capital, Santiago. It exploded in his hands. He staggered clear of the building, his arms in flames. The bank's security cameras recorded the entire episode.

A year on, blind in one eye and with his right hand amputated from the blast, he began trial on terrorism charges. But the judges ruled that he was guilty only of relatively minor offences, not terrorism. On August 15th he was sentenced to three years for carrying explosives, 541 days for falsifying the registration plate on the motorbike he used on the night of the attack, and 41 days for the damage caused by the bomb. After further

consideration, the court decided he should not go to jail at all. Instead, it ordered Mr Pitronello to sign in at a local police station once a month for the next six years.

The verdict has baffled many Chileans. Mr Pitronello's defence lawyers say he never intended to provoke terror with the bomb. If he had, they argue, he would not have planted it in the dead of night. They say the state prosecutor handled the case badly, and failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that their client harboured terrorist intent.

The government sees things differently. "When someone decides to manufacture, plant and detonate a bomb, he's thinking about far more than the physical damage he can cause to the bricks, to the place itself," said the interior minister, Rodrigo Hinzpeter. "He's thinking about spreading alarm, of causing fear."

State prosecutors have until August 25th to appeal the verdict. The government is mulling a change in the law to ensure that anyone who plants bombs in Chile is automatically considered a terrorist. And Mr Hinzpeter has found an unlikely ally in Mr Pitronello's sister, Romina. On her Twitter page, she said she was dismayed that her brother had been cleared of terrorist charges. "He's a danger to society," she tweeted.

'Rehabilitating' Jihadis with Cage-Fighting?

By Raymond Ibrahim

Source: <http://www.meforum.org/3303/jihadis-cage-fighting>

UK officials have taken wishful thinking to a new level: not only are some of the most violent Islamic terrorists being released onto the streets; but in order to "rehabilitate" them, they are being trained by a former radical Muslim in one of the most violent forms of sports—cage-fighting, which even the Olympics refuses to acknowledge.

CNN's "Cagefighter 'cures' terrorists," by Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, has the details. While the entire 2,300-word report is worth reading for its eye-opening (or eye-popping) qualities, the following excerpt summarizes:

In the shadow of London's Olympic stadium, home of the Summer Games, is a hotbed of



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

radical fundamentalism dubbed Londonistan, from where al Qaeda has already recruited for some of its most ambitious plots. In past months, dozens of

the most dangerous offenders being released from the highest security wings of the British prison system; men convicted of carrying out terrorism on behalf of al



convicted terrorists have been released in the UK, including onto the same London streets.... At the same time a no-holds barred fight for security is under way. It is unorthodox, but British officials say it is working, producing results which have never been seen before—and at its epicenter is a veteran Muslim cagefighter. ... "Unfortunately, we know that some of those prisoners are still committed extremists who are likely to return to their terrorist activities," Jonathan Evans, the director of British domestic intelligence service MI5, warned two years ago. The task of managing the re-integration into society of these young men has proved beyond the capabilities of most Muslim community groups. But one east Londoner, proud to be both British and Muslim, has felt religiously compelled to take on the fight. Usman Raja, the 34-year-old grandson of a Pakistani immigrant is not tall but he is built like an ox, with a close shaven head, short beard, and otherwise pure muscle....Raja is one of the UK's most renowned cage-fighting coaches... He is also a man of deep ideas, including harnessing Islamic teaching to defeat the ideology of the terrorists. Three years ago, Raja began taking under his wing some of

Qaeda in murder, assassinations, bombing, and arson plots. His aim was to rehabilitate them into mainstream society.... Raja tried a novel approach with some of the most challenging freed convicted terrorists; he coached them cage-fighting skills. Raja says it proved a remarkably effective way of breaking them out of their pro al Qaeda mentality and opening up their minds to his counter-extremist message.

Some questions:

First, where is the proof that training violent jihadis in cage-fighting is a great success, "producing results which have never been seen before"? Indeed, the report later quotes a UK official gushing about how Raja—who "once subscribed to fundamentalist views himself, and says he came close to fighting Jihad in Bosnia in the 1990s"—is "the most successful guy out there doing this sort of work."

Yet the closer one reads, the more it appears that the only proof for Raja's success is that the released jihadis he is training have not (yet) been rearrested on terror charges.

Is that really proof that this approach is working? Are all jihadis like trapped animals that, once released, must instantaneously start terrorizing all



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

and sundry? Is it inconceivable that they could still harbor the same jihadi inclinations, yet have learned to be patient, in accordance with jihad's prescribed tactics (see taqiyya and tawriya), even as they continue sating their bloodlust through cage-fighting?

And exactly how does the specific act of cage-fighting help rehabilitate jihadis? Again, the closer one reads, the less answers one receives. Instead, it's more of the usual: during their training, Raja "impresses on them [the released jihadis] that true Islam is spiritual, tolerant and humanistic, and not the narrow-minded, divisive message of hate peddled by self-serving radical preachers," who exploit the fact that, in Raja's words, "some of them [UK's Muslims] are very angry."

In short, this jihadi cage-fighting business is being hailed by CNN simply because it has all the ingredients to validate leftist ideas: 1) "true Islam is spiritual, tolerant, and humanistic"; 2) jihadis are simply "very angry," presumably at Western foreign policy; 3) this pent up frustration and hostility is nothing that some

good old fashioned cage-fighting won't alleviate (apparently "art therapy" and Play Station were deemed insufficient).

On the other hand, this story can also be interpreted according to Islam's perspective: 1) jihad is not about instantaneous terrorism but long-term preparations. Even the Muslim Brotherhood—which recently boasted "we will be masters of the world, *one of these days*"—showcases the word "prepare" in their logo, which comes directly from Koran 8:60, which commands Muslims to "prepare" for jihad "so that you may strike terror into the hearts of Allah's enemies and your enemies"; 2) according to most Arabic legal manuals on jihad, combat sports—cage-fighting being ideal—are essential for jihadis in training.

Despite all this, now that the Olympics have ended without incident, no doubt those myopic UK officials who think only in the short-term and according to their leftist paradigms are now convinced that training jihadis in cage-fighting—that is, preparing them for acts of violence—is the way to go.

Taqiyya: <http://www.meforum.org/2538/taqiyya-islam-rules-of-war>

Tawriya: <http://www.raymondibrahim.com/11267/tawriya-lying>

Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

North Caucasus Suicide Bombing Highlights Russia's Islamist Terrorism Problem

Source: <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/08/21/north-caucasus-suicide-bombing-highlights-russias-islamist-terrorism-problem/>

The attack in Ingushetia, Russia, is believed to have been organized by Doku Umarov, a Chechen Islamist leader. (AFP photo/Hunafa.com)

The suicide bombing on August 19 in the North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia in Russia is a tragic reminder of increasing extremist violence in this troubled region.

The suicide bomber targeted participants in the funeral of the police officer killed in a shooting incident the day before. The explosion killed seven police officers and wounded 15 others who came to pay last respects to their fallen comrade. Also, on Saturday evening in the town of Khasavyurt in nearby Dagestan, a



masked gunman opened fire in a mosque, killing one as worshipers celebrated the end of Ramadan. This is typical for extremist Salafi attacks on more moderate mosques around the world,



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

including in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that Russia officially ended its counterterrorism operation in Chechnya, the North Caucasus has been marred by rising violence and risks, turning it into one of the most violent and lawless regions in the world and a hub of international terrorism. As Russia continues to lose effective control of the North Caucasus, extremist groups may start waging an even greater terror campaign inside Russia and beyond, joining forces with Islamist fighters in central Asia and Afghanistan as the latter prepares for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Islamist terrorists from the self-proclaimed Caucasus Emirate have already attacked energy infrastructure, trains, planes, theaters, and hospitals. In December 2011, a suicide bomber exploded in Moscow's Domodedovo international airport, resulting in scores of killed and wounded. The establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the North Caucasus, which is the aim of self-proclaimed emir Doku Umarov, would be a disaster for Russia and the entire region.

However, the Kremlin's approach to fighting extremism in North Caucasus isn't working. The multifaceted strategy implementation has been plagued with torture, extra-judicial killings, administrative detentions, and rampant corruption.

During and following the second Chechen War, Russia gave priority to using brutal force to regain control over territory. The Kremlin has also poured billions of dollars to improve the regional economy, but much of the money has been stolen. The Russians have failed so far to develop a population-centric strategy focused on gaining the trust of local populations, including moderate Muslims, and working with them to find a sustainable solution to exclude Salafists.

Destabilization in the North Caucasus also threatens U.S. and allied interests. As we wrote

in March, the dangers of further destabilization of the North Caucasus are threefold.

First, the presence of such an ungovernable enclave in southeastern Europe compromises the border stability of U.S. friends and allies such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Unrest in the North Caucasus increases the security threats to the two countries, where border security is already problematic due to the Georgia–Russia and Azerbaijan–Armenia conflicts.

Second, the North Caucasus poses a global threat as a potential terrorist base in close proximity to U.S. European allies. Some terrorists are already operating in the European Union, as illustrated by the capture of the Jemaat Shariat cell, which was staffed with North Caucasus terrorists in the Czech Republic.

Third, and finally, an emirate in North Caucasus would jeopardize the flow of oil and gas from the region to world markets.

The rise of extremism-fueled violence in the North Caucasus and in central Asia is Russia's most serious security threat. The recent attacks on the two senior muftis in Tatarstan demonstrate that the violence is spreading and, in the worst case, may endanger Russia's statehood. The Russian ambitious ongoing military reform and multibillion-dollar rearmament is partly aimed at combating future local conflicts incited by extremists.

There are several things that the U.S. can do to help. The U.S. should encourage cooperation of Georgia and Azerbaijan and help train their enforcement agents and border guards. Washington can encourage Middle Eastern government to stop their nationals from financing international terrorism, and, finally, the U.S. should engage European states in bilateral and multilateral anti-terrorist cooperation and improve NATO-based anti-terrorism cooperation.

The Balkans: Militant Islamism's New Front

By Gordon Bardos

Source: http://www.realcworld.com/articles/2012/08/21/the_balkans_militant_islamisms_new_front_100199.html

The July 18 terrorist attack on a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria is only the latest in a series of deadly incidents in the Balkans involving Islamist extremists.

In April, five people on the outskirts of the Macedonian capital of Skopje were murdered by suspected Muslim radicals.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Last October, a Wahhabi convert attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo.

In 2010, Serbian police broke up a terrorist cell in the mountainous Sandzak region straddling

the border between Serbian and Montenegro planning to attack western embassies in Belgrade.

Long ignored or downplayed by western countries, al-Qaida and Hezbollah surrogates in the Balkans are increasingly important, thanks primarily to Saudi and Iranian financial support and the influence and power it buys. From Skopje to Sarajevo to Novi Pazar, Islamists and Wahhabis are attempting

to take over mosques and building their own network of almost extra-territorial, sharia-run villages in remote Balkan areas. According to Malcolm Hoenlein, for radical Islamists Sarajevo, home to the largest Iranian embassy in Europe, is becoming "a jumping-off place, a radicalization place, a crossroads, something like Berlin during the Cold War."

The origins of the Islamist/Wahhabi threat to southeastern Europe go back to the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, when the late Islamist president of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, invited militants from the Middle East and Central Asia to join his war effort. In August 1993, Izetbegovic ordered the formation of the Kateebat el-Mujahidin, his own personal al-Qaida "Battalion of Holy Warriors."

The roster of veterans of Izetbegovic's Bosnian jihad reads like a who's who of terrorist all-stars. On September 11, 2001, three of Izetbegovic's holy warriors - Khalid Sheik Muhammed, Nawaf al-Hazni and Khalid al-Mindhar - planned and participated in the greatest mass murder in American history. Another Izetbegovic jihadi, Juma al-Dosari, was involved in the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Riyadh which killed sixteen US citizens.

In August 1998, Izetbegovic jihadi Abdul Rashim al-Nashiri participated in the bombing of the US embassies in Dar es Saalam and Nairobi in which over 400 people were killed; the mastermind of the plot, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, visited Bosnia shortly before the

embassy bombings for a three-day "business trip" on a visa issued by the Bosnian consulate in Turkey.

In December 1999, Bosnian jihadi Ahmed Ressaym was apprehended attempting to bomb LAX airport as part of the failed Millennium Bomb Plot; the document forger for the plot, Karim Said Atrmani, was a resident of the Bosnian mujahedeen village of Bocinja Donja.

In October 2000, Izetbegovic army veterans Juma al-Dosari, Ahmed Zuhair, Jamal al-Badawi, Abu Asim al-Makki, and Abd al-Rahim Hussein Mohammed al-Nashiri attacked the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, killing 17 US servicemen.



In February 2002, Izetbegovic jihadi Omar Saeed Sheik was involved in the murder/ritual beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Amer Azizi, the key go-between for al-Qaida's top leadership and the March 2004 Madrid Train bombers, trained in terrorist camps near the central Bosnian town of Zenica. The list goes on, but the severity of the problem is clear.

Moreover, while it is true that Bosnia is not unique in having al-Qaida cells, what does make Bosnia unique is that it is the only country in Europe in which sympathizers, surrogates and collaborators of radical Islamism are in the highest levels of government.

In February 1996, plans to attack NATO installations in Bosnia were discovered at a terrorist training camp near Sarajevo staffed by Iranian instructors. The commandant of the camp was Alija Izetbegovic's personal intelligence chief. In October 2001, a plot to use aerial suicide bombers to attack US Camp Eagle Base in Bosnia was disrupted.

The airport planned for the operation was controlled by Izetbegovic's closest political confidant.

During the 1990s, the leading Islamic cleric in Bosnia, Mustafa Ceric, controlled a bank account with, among others, Fatih el Hassanein, a Sudanese national with close ties to Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

Even today, the head of the security affairs committee in Izetbegovic's Islamist party is considered one of the main Iranian agents in Bosnia, despite the fact that he is on the US black list of individuals with ties to terrorist groups.

Along with the threat Islamist and Wahhabi radicals in the Balkans pose internationally, they are also having a severely negative effect on efforts to stabilize inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the region. Catholic nuns in Sarajevo report that they now only go out in pairs for fear of being attacked by Wahhabis, and that Wahhabi-run bakeries refuse to sell them bread - even when it is in plain sight.

Misogyny and anti-Semitism are of course the Islamists' and Wahhabis' other favorite pastimes. A few years ago, after Grand Mufti Ceric announced on television that Israeli actions in Gaza were "genocide," graffiti appeared around Bosnia equating the Star of David with a swastika.

As a correspondent from Der Spiegel reported when visiting the Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo run by one of Izetbegovic's

wartime commanders, the obliteration of Israel is heralded in a torrent of words.

"Zionist terrorists," the imam thunders from the glass-enclosed pulpit at the end of the mosque. "Animals in human form" have transformed the Gaza Strip into a "concentration camp," and this marks "the beginning of the end" for the Jewish pseudo-state... .

Currently, the Bosnian security minister estimates there are 3,000 potential terrorists in Bosnia alone. Hundreds of others can be found in Kosovo, Macedonia and the Sandzak. The dangerous impact these individuals and groups are having should not be underestimated. In societies still struggling with the legacies of hatred left over from the wars of the 1990s and devastating economic problems, well-funded extremists are finding willing converts.

Western policymakers have ignored this problem for far too long, to the detriment of the Balkans, and Europe and the US as well. As was tragically seen last month, the Balkans have become another front in Israel's war against terrorists as well.

Gordon Bardos is a Balkan politics and security specialist based in New York.

Domestic Terrorism: A Persistent Threat in the United States

By Scott Stewart

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/domestic-terrorism-persistent-threat-united-states?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120823&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=5816c35aa14f457cbb8596c22b2668d9

A string of incidents over the past month has served as a reminder that despite the intense, decadelong focus on the jihadist threat, domestic terrorism is still an issue in the United States. On Aug. 5, Wade Page opened fire on the congregation of a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wis., killing six and wounding three others. Though Page killed himself and did not leave any evidence explicitly listing his motives for the attack, his long association with the white supremacist movement was clearly a factor in his target choice.

On Aug. 15, Floyd Corkins shot and wounded a security guard in the lobby of the Family Research Council's office in Washington after the guard blocked him from entering the office. Corkins reportedly was carrying a bag containing a box of ammunition and a number of Chick-fil-A sandwiches. He apparently targeted the Family Research Council because

of its public support for Chick-fil-A in the wake of the controversy over statements made by the fast food chain's founder regarding gay marriage. According to media reports, Corkins said, "I don't like your politics," before opening fire.

And on Aug. 16, an off-duty sheriff's deputy was shot and wounded while working as a security guard at an oil refinery in St. John the Baptist Parish, La. When two other deputies responded to a nearby trailer park where a vehicle reportedly associated with the shooting was spotted, the trailers' occupants ambushed and killed the deputies. An additional officer was wounded, along with two of the suspects involved in the shooting, Brian Smith and Kyle Joekel. Seven people have been arrested in connection with the incident, including Smith's father and brother. News reports indicate that



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the group was associated with the sovereign citizen movement, and members of it were under investigation for weapons offenses and previous threats to law enforcement officers in other states.

All three of these incidents stem from distinct ideological streams: the white supremacist skinhead movement, the radical left and the Posse Comitatus/sovereign citizen movement. While unrelated as far as timing and motive, when taken together they show that extremist ideologies subscribed to by certain individuals on the fringes of U.S. society continue to radicalize some to the point that they are willing to take violent action in accordance with those ideologies. Domestic terrorism is thus alive and well.

Old Streams

First, we need to remember that terrorism is a tactic practiced by actors from a wide array of ethnic and religious backgrounds who follow various ideologies stretching from anarchism to neo-Nazism. Terrorism does not equal jihadism. Long before jihadism reared its head in the United States, anarchist Leon Czolgosz assassinated President William McKinley, white supremacist James Earl Ray assassinated Martin Luther King Jr., and Posse Comitatus member Gordon Kahl killed three law enforcement officers in a multistate spree of violence.

Indeed, as we look at all of the recent attention being paid to lone assailants and small cells, it must be remembered that anti-government and white supremacist leaders in the United States embraced the leaderless resistance model of operations long before jihadist groups began to promote it.

In 1989, **William Pierce** wrote his novel ***Hunter***, which detailed the exploits of a


fictional lone wolf, named Oscar Yeager and was loosely based upon real-life lone wolf

Joseph Paul Franklin. In 1990, Richard Kelly Hoskins published a book titled *Vigilantes of Christendom*, in which he introduced the concept of a "Phineas Priest," or a lone wolf militant chosen and set apart by God to be his agent of vengeance upon the earth. In 1992, former Ku Klux Klan leader Louis Beam published an essay in his magazine, *The Seditonist*, that provided a detailed outline for moving the white supremacist movement toward a leaderless resistance model. Jihadists such as Abu Musab al-Suri first began to promote leaderless resistance only after the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks began to severely affect al Qaeda. But even so, groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula did not really embrace al-Suri's concept of leaderless resistance until late 2009, and the al Qaeda core did not follow suit until 2010.

The recent spate of incidents is also not all that unusual. Other examples stand out in recent years of different streams of domestic radicalism leading to a confluence of attacks by different types of actors. For example, on April 19, 1995, a large truck bomb built by anti-government extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols detonated outside the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. Five days later, on April 25, timber lobbyist Gilbert Murray became the third fatality and final victim of Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski's long Neo-Luddite bombing campaign.

Another such convergence occurred in the summer of 1999. After conducting arsons at three Sacramento-area synagogues, brothers Matthew and Tyler Williams killed a gay couple in their home in Happy Valley, Calif., on July 1. On July 2, World Church of the Creator adherent Benjamin Smith began a multistate shooting spree that killed two and wounded nine and that only ended when he killed himself July 4. On Aug. 10, former Aryan Nations member Buford Furrow mounted an armed assault against a Jewish day care center in Los Angeles, during which he wounded five people before killing a Filipino-American mailman on the street.

Domestic terrorism in the United States is a cyclical phenomenon. There are discernable peaks in that cycle, like those we've discussed – and like the one the country is currently experiencing. The intense political polarization that has occurred in recent years in the United



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

States, the widespread distrust of the government on both the extreme right and the extreme left, and the current election-year rhetoric will further inflame political passions. This means that the current cycle of domestic terrorism plots and violence is likely to continue for at least the next several months.

Implications

While domestic terrorism is currently at the peak of the cycle in the United States, it is important to remember that most domestic terrorism cases tend to be simple attacks conducted by a lone actor or small cell. There are far more instances of simple bombings, such as those conducted by Olympic Park bomber Eric Rudolph or animal rights bomber Daniel Andreas San Diego, than the sort of large truck bomb attack committed by McVeigh and Nichols, which was an anomaly. Even more common than bombing attacks are the armed assaults that we've seen recently, and they are generally implemented against soft targets – something we've talked about in relation to other terrorist threats.

And that means that the implications for domestic terrorist threats are essentially the

same as they are for the jihadist or Iranian threat. First, it is critical for people to remember that terrorist attacks do not appear out of a vacuum. Individuals planning an attack – no matter what their motivation or ideology – follow a discernable cycle, and that cycle involves behavior that can be identified and detected before the attack is conducted. Indeed, it appears that the Smith family and their associates involved in the Louisiana shooting were known by authorities in several jurisdictions and were considered armed and dangerous.

It is also important for individuals to understand that it is physically impossible for governments to protect all potential targets from every sort of attack. This means that many places are vulnerable to an attack, should an assailant choose to strike and should the assailant's preoperational activities go undetected. Therefore, citizens need to assume responsibility for their own security. This involves citizens not only reporting suspicious activity to the authorities, but also practicing good situational awareness and having updated and appropriate contingency plans in place for their families and businesses.

The Toulouse Terrorist: Was He or Was He Not a Lone Wolf?

Source: <http://world.time.com/2012/08/24/the-toulouse-terrorist-was-he-or-was-he-not-a-lone-wolf/>

Was self-proclaimed al Qaeda member and Toulouse killer Mohammed Merah the lone wolf that French officials initially suggested? Or did he actually rely on active support of fellow radicals in both France and abroad in mounting his spree of slaying last March?

Those questions were raised anew Aug. 23 by a story in French daily *le Monde* indicating Merah had far more numerous contacts with suspected extremists than previously known—and took pains to keep nearly 2,000 telephone calls to those people secret.

Yet French authorities warn TIME that despite the sinister-sounding details of the *Monde* story, information in it doesn't contradict what they've known for months. Nor, they add, do they reveal Merah had any significant assistance in conceiving and executing his

three shooting attacks beyond training he received from al-Qaeda figures during a previously known visit to Pakistan.

The story in Thursday evening's edition of *le*

Monde details recently declassified intelligence documents the paper viewed. *Le Monde* says the intelligence reports show that Merah—whose killing spree of seven people ended with his own death during a dramatic police siege March 22—

made 1,863 calls or sent text messages to numerous people in 20 nations. Those spanned the U.K., Egypt, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco and Bhutan—where Merah called nine different numbers—between September 2010 and late February 2011. *Le Monde's* report also quotes intelligence analyses detailing Merah's international travels during



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

the same period, notably to Middle Eastern nations and Afghanistan. All that, the article proposes, seriously undermines the view counter-terrorism authorities have given that Merah was a self-radicalized “lone wolf”.

The article says French intelligence services first kept an eye on Merah's older brother Abdelkader—an outspoken Salafist figure in Toulouse—in 2008, as well as their sister Souad in 2010. At times, Mohammed Merah also appeared on their radar screen, leading French security services to start watching the young delinquent's movements and contacts carefully.

Indeed, following Merah's 2011 trip to Afghanistan—and arrest and expulsion by U.S. forces as a security threat—the budding jihadist was himself placed under close surveillance. It was during that time intelligence officials noted Merah's use of his mother's mobile phone and frequent replacement of pre-paid SIM cards—precautions his watchers interpreted as Merah's attempts avert detection and eavesdropping of his multiple calls abroad. Meantime, authorities duly noted Merah's increased encounters with members of Toulouse's Salafist milieu.

Yet it was only after a trip Pakistan in September 2011 that Merah was summoned by intelligence services for confrontational interrogation. During that encounter, a seemingly cooperative Merah showed the questioning agent photos he'd taken in Pakistan on what he called a tourism visit. The relaxed and unflappable Merah at one point even laid down during that encounter, complaining of a liver ailment that had cut his Pakistan sojourn short, and laid him low since returning to Toulouse.

In reality, it was later learned, Merah had traveled to the Taliban stronghold of Waziristan to meet with who he later said were al-Qaeda leaders. During that time, Merah also received arms and combat training, and took advice on the terror spree he decided to commit once back in Toulouse. During the siege in which he later lost his life, Merah told that same interrogating intelligence agent who'd believed the tourism version of the Pakistan visit that though his al-Qaeda hosts counseled him to undertake an attack using explosives, Merah insisted on staging strikes that would allow him to kill his victims himself.

The contents and thesis of the *Monde* report and articles about it echo earlier suspicions

that the failure to identify Merah as a security threat and stop him before he could put his deadly plot into action was the result of a French intelligence failure. The *Monde* story also suggests previous depictions of Merah as a self-radicalized lone wolf who duped unsuspecting spooks with a convincing act are now proven incorrect—or even intentionally misleading—by the details and chronology of the intelligence reports.

Yet French senior security officials tell *TIME* that the *Monde* article doesn't contain anything they weren't previously aware of. They similarly contend it doesn't undermine prevailing evidence Merah's evolution into extremism and terror action was still mostly a grim personal quest.

The details of the intelligence reports themselves show how carefully French agencies had watched Merah at home and abroad, officials say. That Merah was placed under surveillance a full year before his killing spree is also evidence authorities took him seriously as a potential threat—even if they were later duped by Merah re-assuming the profile and activities of a club-hopping, late night-partying youth and petty criminal. The major error in his case, they concede, was not viewing his Sept. 2011 trip to Pakistan as a likely clue Merah had a more sinister focus and commitment to extremist violence.

What of the nearly 2,000 calls abroad? While they acknowledge those appear significant in hindsight, officials say a large chunk of those were made to Egypt while Abdelkader was in that country receiving Koranic instruction, or else to Algeria, where Merah's father and many relatives live. That still doesn't close the possibility that Merah wasn't also calling radicals overseas to receive encouragement in his own extremist progression—or perhaps even to discuss and finalize his own jihadist shooting campaign as it materialized.

But those same French officials stress that those kinds of contacts are quite different from the active assistance and material support that operatives in a terror plot would actually need. And despite France's ban on hand guns and assault weapons, officials say the arms Merah used are relatively easy to acquire on the French black market if one has the money.

For a delinquent experienced in robbery like Merah, raising the cash necessary for that would have been easy without outside help in funding.



CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – August 2012

With the major difference of his jihadist intent—and the clues authorities should have used to foresee and prevent his violent intent—officials say the nature and tools of Merah's killing

spree is sadly similar to the kind of rising gun violence committed in other French cities for non-terror motives, and without co-conspirator help.



72 VIRGINS DATING SERVICE

The relationship is up to you.....We just arrange the meeting!

